In late October of 2008, feminist activists gathered each night until long after midnight in the hallways of the parliament building in Montevideo, Uruguay. The women had literally “camped out” so they might work around the clock with left-wing legislators to ensure the success of the bill for Sexual and Reproductive Health that was being debated in the Uruguayan Congress. Included in the bill was a clause that legalized abortion in the first trimester – a major achievement for the movement. Alejandra López Gómez, a longtime MYSU\(^1\) activist, later recalled those days as:

> working in Congress all day and all night … there were 8 or 9 of us … we basically set our secretariat in the offices of the block of the Frente Amplio [left-wing political party] and that became our operational base.\(^2\)

For women’s reproductive rights and freedom, the atmosphere had never been more co-operative and exciting, the possibility never more real.

Seven years later, in 2015 and on the other side of the Andes, in Santiago de Chile, reproductive rights activist Claudia Dides, executive director of MILEs,\(^3\) painted a very different picture of movement–government relations:

> It is a pity that this government has been working in an environment of secrecy around this bill, an initiative that actually began in civil society, within women’s and academic organizations and that the government later includes in its agenda.\(^4\)

Activists’ frustration with the secrecy that surrounded President Bachelet’s negotiations to advance abortion rights was clear.
The contrast in relations between legislators and activists in the two stories illustrates the differing access social movement activists have when interacting with government officials in their campaigns for policy reform, even when these governments belong to left-wing parties. This book tries to understand the reasons for and consequences of such a gulf in distance. From these considerations a number of questions emerge: How does policy reform happen and what are the roles of social movements and progressive governments in that process? What historical and contextual factors explain the ability or inability of social movements to access the policy-making elite? To what extent are these factors structural or contingent on social movement choices? Which critical contextual factors seem most likely to mediate the success or failure of social movements in their quest to achieve policy reform?

These questions have generated burgeoning literatures that explore matters of social movement outcomes, as well as women's public policy. Scholars of social movement outcomes generally argue that “elite allies in power” increase the chances of policy reform success. Since social movements cannot translate their protests directly into policy, they rely on government allies to support their demands and advance policy reform. Scholars of women's public policy agree but use the concept of “issue networks” instead to describe these coalitions of activists, legislators and state officials pushing for policy reform in a particular issue area. In these studies, “elite allies in power” or “issue networks” have been for the most part treated as the independent variable that explains the existence or lack of policy reform. Through a study of women’s movements in Uruguay, Chile and Argentina I demonstrate how those alliances do in fact improve the chances of policy reform. The close alliances between movements and policy-makers in Uruguay, as the opening anecdote illustrates, did result in more significant policy reform than did the more distant relationship in Chile, and in Argentina as well.

This book goes beyond taking alliances as a given or a binary that either exists or does not and examines their origins to present a more in-depth explanation of social movement outcomes, one that understands and explains the alliances themselves. In particular I explore the following questions: How are relationships between social movements and government allies built and developed? Under what circumstances are alliances most likely available to a movement? Even when available, are they always desired and pursued by the movement? Which kind of relationships lead to addressing social movements’ demands in a comprehensive way and which ones do not? Which contextual factors in the political system affect the characteristics these relationships will have or if they can be established at all?

With these research questions as a starting point, this book problematizes the notion of civil society and government collaboration and treats it as a dependent variable that needs to be explained. I do so through studying the campaigns for abortion reform in three Latin American countries, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina, and their interaction with left-wing governments from the turn of the century.
until 2017. The book traces three distinct paths of interaction that resulted in different policy reforms (or lack thereof) and provides an explanation for these outcomes. I demonstrate how both individual variables such as Executive branch preferences, and institutional factors such as the characteristics of the country’s party system, leftist parties and the separation of powers, shape the possibility and ability of social movements to establish relationships with allies in power – that could in turn increase their chances of policy reform and having their demands addressed.

Alliances with sympathetic actors in power may not always occur. The conditions for their establishment are not always present. Alternatively, alliances are not always desired or pursued by social movements. The fear of co-optation and the lack of trust in political parties has increasingly left movements to choose more autonomous and alternative paths to achieve policy reform. The case of Argentina in particular will illustrate new movements’ strategies to achieve de facto reform without de jure policy reform or through creative interpretations of existing laws.

For many years scholars studied the relationship between social movements and policy reform through the analysis of activist–government elites collaborations. This book aims to explain the conditions under which these collaborations are possible and ultimately advance our understanding of movement–government relationships in the process of policy reform.

**Methods and Data Collection**

This book provides an in–depth, qualitative comparative analysis of the interaction between women movements and government allies in their struggle for abortion reform in three different countries. The cases have been chosen based on a most similar design (John Stuart Mill). The three countries share similarities in terms of their economic, social, cultural and political history, but differ with regard to the status of their abortion policy and the presence or absence of abortion reform. The three – Uruguay, Chile and Argentina – form part of a sub-region within Latin America known as “the Southern Cone,” which has some special features of its own. For one, the countries comprising this sub-region have a similar culture that emerges from a common colonial history. The Southern Cone represented a peripheral area of the Spanish Empire.

Uruguay, Chile and Argentina achieved independence during the early 1800s and began organizing as nation–states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the turn of the twentieth century the region witnessed a large wave of immigrants from Southern Europe and the Ottoman Empire, and the newcomers merged with the predominantly mestizo population. The three countries have, moreover, shared key political processes, particularly in the last 50 years. They have experienced bureaucratic authoritarian dictatorships in the 1970s (O’Donnell 1983), democratic transitions during the 1980s, neoliberal policies in the 1990s
and left-wing governments at the turn of this century. Economically and socially speaking, they have the highest index of human development in the region, with strong middle classes, high levels of education and professionalization and strong traditions of mobilization and activism. As with the rest of Latin America, colonization brought with it the presence of the Catholic Church, which has remained a key political actor in the region ever since.

At the same time, however, these countries have very different abortion policies. Uruguay has comprehensively reformed its abortion policy. It is the only country in Latin America, aside from Cuba, that has, since 2012, passed legal abortion on demand during the first trimester. Chile’s experience between 1989 and 2017 could not have been more different: It was one of seven countries in the world (five in Latin America) that banned abortion under all circumstances. It has since experienced a moderate abortion reform allowing the practice when there is a threat to the life of the woman, fetal malformations incompatible with life outside the womb and when conception was the result of rape. Finally, Argentina has allowed legal abortion when there is risk to the mother’s health and life and when conception was the result of rape since 1921, and has seen no abortion reform since. The countries thus differ in both the presence or absence of abortion reform, and the content of such reform; together they offer a composite approach that when viewed comparatively may bring into focus the different paths taken by activists and government allies in their way to policy reform.

Following George and Bennett (2005), the book’s methodology is that of a structured and focused comparison. The comparison is systematic, asking the same questions about all the cases under study so as to standardize the data collection. The research is focused in that it will examine one particular aspect of the historical cases: The interaction between women’s movements and their government allies in their struggle for abortion reform (George and Bennett 2005: 67).

The main collection of data took place during two consecutive years (2007–2008), during which time I lived in Argentina and traveled to Uruguay and Chile for extended field research visits. I followed up with multiple trips to the region during 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 to further study the movements and the political developments of these cases. Over this 11-year period, I conducted numerous interviews with movement activists, government officials and academics. I observed movements’ activities and congressional sessions and analyzed movements’ documents and congressional minutes from plenary and committee sessions, and followed the cases in the local media.

I intend my book to offer a contribution at different levels. It first advances the theoretical understanding of the alliances between movements and governments. How are the alliances constructed and what are their dynamics? What makes them more feasible in certain institutional contexts than others? With such considerations, my research adds to the literature on social movement outcomes and on women’s public policy. Neither literature has sufficiently interrogated the formation of these alliances in depth and explored the conditions behind their existence.
Within the literature on social movements outcomes scholars have mostly focused on the study of one movement in one country (Tarrow 1998; Kane 2003; Soule and Olzak 2004; Olzak et al. 2016). Few scholars have conducted comparative studies of social movements’ outcomes (Kriesi et al. 1995; Giugni 2004; Kolb 2007; Bosi et al. 2016), and most of those have focused on Northern industrialized countries. My research tests the theories on allies in power in the developing world. The literature on women’s public policy has explored the role of women in and out of the state in advancing women’s rights, but has mostly studied these alliances as an independent variable of policy change (Costain 1992; Stetson and Mazur 1995; Ferree and Martin 1995; Weldon 2002; Waylen et al. 2013; Htun and Weldon 2012 and 2018). My study interrogates the origins of these alliances, turning them into the dependent variable.

In addition, this is a story about women’s public policy and, in particular, abortion reform in Latin America. The two main books that have given comprehensive explanations on this particular issue have focused on the developments of the 1990s (Htun 2003; Blofield 2006). But both the movements for abortion rights as well as the political context within these countries have changed substantively since then. There has been no major comparative work on this issue beyond the year 2000, notwithstanding the significant increase of women’s mobilization and the coming to power of left-wing governments in the region. This book aims to fill this gap.

The Argument

This book argues that abortion rights movements in the Southern Cone have established different interaction patterns with state actors, which have in turn led to three different policy outcomes around abortion reform in each case.

- **Collaboration** between the movement and sympathetic leftist legislators leading to comprehensive abortion reform: Uruguay.
- **Little to no collaboration** and co-optation of movement demands by the Executive branch leading to the passing of a moderate abortion reform: Chile.
- **No collaboration** and political indifference from the Executive and Legislative branches leading to no legal abortion reform: Argentina.\(^5\)

In light of these three cases I state the first hypothesis to explain the first dependent variable.

Co-operation between a social movement and sympathetic government officials increases the chances for comprehensive policy reform.

How do we now explain the presence or absence of co-operation between civil society and government actors? I argue that the likelihood of each of the
patterns presented above is mediated through the interaction of the following variables:

- strength of the social movement and its strategies
- institutional-level variables: the institutionalization of the party system, characteristics of leftist parties and coalitions, and division of powers between government branches
- individual-level variables: Executive preferences on the movement’s demands
- the power of counter-institutions: in this case, the Catholic Church, in each national context

Social movements have been found to be key actors in activating the political process that leads to policy reform in the arena of gender and moral issues (Weldon 2002; Haas 2010; Diez 2015; Htun and Weldon 2012). Throughout Latin America, non-bread-and-butter issues such as abortion have, for the most part, no weight in people’s decisions at the ballot box; perceptions regarding the economy and anti-crime policies mostly dictate their preferences. It follows that in the absence of a social movement that defines the issue (such as abortion), organizes around it and demands government attention to it, politicians see no electoral value in addressing it – and thus usually prefer to ignore it. For most of this period, abortion was perceived as politically costly, a risky issue, commonly referred to as ‘pianta votos.’ The result has been a general stasis and lack of policy change, which has only broken when a social movement emerges and succeeds in introducing the issue in the political and societal agenda.

But the emergence of such a social movement alone is insufficient to produce policy change. The literature on social movements outcomes confirms that a movement requires sympathetic allies in power to actually prompt policy reforms (Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998; Kane 2003; Soule and Olzak 2004; Giugni 2004; Meyer 2004; Kolb 2007; Amenta et al. 2010). Because social movements lack power vis-à-vis the state (Piven and Cloward 1979), they cannot translate their protests directly into policy without the help of political insiders or allies. In agreement with social movement scholars, the literature on women’s public policy has examined the relationship between social movements and state actors through the concept of issue networks (Htun 2003; Reutersward et al. 2011) defined as “elite coalitions of lawyers, feminist activists, doctors, legislators and state officials, that bring about policy change” (Htun 2003: 5). This leads us to the second hypothesis.

The stronger the social movement, the better the possibility of generating support from government officials and establishing a close co-operation with them that will lead to policy reform.

In their struggle for policy reform social movements can gather support from three government actors: the Legislative branch, the Executive branch and/or
technocrats within specific ministries and government agencies. Major policy change can happen mostly through the Executive and the Legislative branches but not the latter. As will be discussed in the case of Argentina, technocrats can design programs that might broaden the interpretation of the existing law in a way that addresses some of the movements demands, but they cannot legislate and produce policy reform. Thus, the key places for movements to look for alliances are the Legislative and Executive branches.

When seeking allies within the Legislative branch, institutional variables play a relevant role. In this case, the level of institutionalization of the party system, the presence of a leftist party (with roots in society) and a strong division of power provide the movement with a political environment conducive to establishing collaborations with legislators in power, which leads to the following hypotheses.

- The higher the level of institutionalization of the party system and internal party structures, the more likely the social movement will find a stable clear interlocutor within the Legislative branch to build relationships with in pursuing its demands. The lower the level of institutionalization of the party system and internal party structures, the more relationships with state actors will depend on individual personalities and preferences of party leaders and Executive positions in government.
- The existence of a strong leftist political party with roots in society increases the likelihood the social movement will find a clear interlocutor and institutional channels set up to build a relationship and interact with in the pursuance of their demands. On the contrary, the presence of an electoral-professional leftist party with no roots in society or institutionalized channels to receive input from civil society groups and organizations will diminish these chances.
- The stronger the division of power between government branches, the more likely the movement will be able to create relationships with legislators to advance their demands without interference from other branches, particularly the Executive. This hypothesis accounts for both formal and informal institutions that rule the separation of power between branches. The weaker the division of power, the more Executive preferences on the issue will influence discussions in Congress.

Congress can become a valuable ally for the movement and its collaboration can lead to comprehensive policy reform. However, in presidential systems like the ones in this study, Executive branch support of the movement’s demand for policy change might be a faster road to policy reform. Executive branches under presidential systems have strong agenda-setting powers. In the case of Executive support, the movement has the possibility of a straight channel of communication with the most powerful political position. Thus, a sympathetic Executive reduces the significance of other institutional and contextual variables that otherwise can play a significant role when establishing a relationship with the Legislative branch.
For example, if the Executive embraces the movement’s demands, a low level of institutionalization of the party system and less division of powers might play in favor of the policy reform. The lack of institutionalization would allow the Executive to push for its policy preferences within its party and in Congress and disregard party institutions and the division of powers among branches. The support of the Executive for policy reform might be so strong as to trump the opposition of a politically strong Catholic Church. Executive support for reform is particularly key in the final stages of the proposed reform when it is necessary to get enough votes for the bill to be passed in Congress. In these situations, the Executive’s informal powers to sway undecided legislators through electoral promises, selective incentives or issue linkage can make the difference between a reform being approved or not. A clear example of how Executive support helped the passing of policy reform has been Argentina’s same-sex marriage law. After the LGBT movement launched a strong campaign that introduced a bill in Congress, the final success of the bill was ensured by President Fernández de Kirchner, removing from the Senate floor some of her party’s legislators who would have otherwise voted against it. The lack of Executive support from the Macri administration in the 2018 abortion debate in Argentina prevented the bill from being approved despite the overwhelming presence of the movement and supporting allies in Congress. The following hypothesis states that:

the stronger the Executive support for the movement’s demands, the larger the possibility for comprehensive policy reform. In this situation, the lack of institutionalization of the party system and the lack of separation of powers between the governing branches will increase chances for policy reform.

However, a sympathetic Executive also carries a risk: co-optation. The Executive may want to ensure that policy reform is managed and advanced in a way that does not threaten its own political and electoral priorities, redefining the movement’s goals and demands. While co-optation might happen through collaboration with the Legislative branch as well, the concentration of power in the Executive makes it the more likely site. Fears of co-optation have driven some movements away from seeking alliances with those in government and many times have divided movements over these strategic decisions. Thus, Executive preferences need to be analyzed in detail to define the level of alignment with those of the movement, and the presence or lack of common motivations among these actors.

When the Executive supports the movement’s demands there is a higher likelihood of the movement’s cause being co-opted and redefined based on the Executive electoral and political needs, risking a deradicalization of the original reform proposal.
When support is denied from both the Executive and the Legislative branches, movements can still reach out and collaborate with technocratic agencies in their area of interest. In the case of leftist administrations, as is the case of the three country cases during most of the last 17 years, technocratic positions may be filled with individuals from social movement organizations and NGOs. These individuals might even be part of the campaign for policy reform, in which case the movement gains what the literature refers to as “institutional activists” (Tilly 1978; Pierson 1994; Pettinicchio 2012). This concept refers to outsiders (social movements’ activists) that have become insiders (government officials) and bring to their government position the movement’s demands and perspectives. This can also happen with political parties’ candidates, though less frequently. While technocrats cannot for the most part produce a change in policy, they can draft documents, and launch and implement government programs that address the movement’s demands within the current legal framework. Again, this path of collaboration tends not to produce policy change, but it can provide increased benefits to the movements’ constituents and an implementation of current laws and government programs in line with the movements’ goals and demands.

A final consideration exists independent of the political orientation of the individual actors in government – the reach and power of the Catholic Church. This reality creates different incentives for politicians to situate towards the movements’ demands.

- A politically weak Catholic Church increases the chances of the movement for abortion reform establishing a relationship with state actors, given that those in power can act without fears of Church-inspired political and personal reprisals.
- A politically strong Catholic Church will place obstacles in the creation of relationships between the social movement and state actors given that politicians will take into consideration the political costs associated with pushing for legislation that goes against the Church’s doctrine.

These four variables – movement strength, institutional variables, Executive preferences and the power of the Catholic Church – interact and affect each other, creating different scenarios. While ideally those advocating for policy reform obviously want a strong movement, strong institutionalization of the political system, a supportive Executive and a weak Catholic Church – a situation close to what happened in the case of Uruguay in 2012 – the situation rarely lines up that way in the region.

Among the four variables, some are more likely to experience change than others, making them more likely to open up possibilities for reform than the rest. Namely, the strength of the movement and Executive preferences are the variables more likely to change often. The institutionalization of the political system and the power of the Catholic Church tend to vary more gradually and in the
long term. This does not imply that countries with a low institutionalization and a strong Catholic Church are condemned to see no policy reform; rather, that it would be less likely, more difficult and the other two variables (strength of the social movement and Executive preferences) will have to do most of the heavy lifting. Some of these scenarios present throughout the region are discussed in Chapter 5.

Variables and Cases

The variables discussed above explain the presence or absence of alliances between social movements and allies in power, and the way these paths resulted in different kinds of abortion reform or in no policy change at all. In Uruguay, the close collaboration between women activists and leftist legislators allowed for a successful abortion reform that in 2012 legalized abortion on-demand during the first trimester. The campaign for abortion reform launched in 2001 explicitly designed a strategy of collaboration with sympathetic allies. Uruguay’s highly institutionalized party system, the deep social roots of the leftist party Frente Amplio and the strong division of powers, coupled with a neutral Executive and a weak Catholic Church, all combined to build a successful alliance between activists and legislators – and that resulted in a comprehensive abortion reform.

After a nearly 30-year total ban on abortion instituted by former dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1989, the Chilean Congress liberalized the abortion law in August 2017. The new legislation permitted abortion in cases that posed a risk to the woman’s life, in which conception was the result of rape, and/or where fetal malformations incompatible with life outside the womb were detected. During the 30-year ban, the movement was divided on how to advance reform. While women activists were responsible for introducing the issue to the societal agenda, there was little collaboration with the leftist parties in power to advance legislative reform. Instead, a leftist administration headed by Socialist Michelle Bachelet introduced its own abortion reform bill, limited interaction with civil society campaigns and through secret negotiations ensured the support from her governing coalition and secured a moderate reform. The professional character of the Socialist Party in Chile and its lack of roots in society, the complexities of coalition governments, together with a powerful Catholic Church, all worked together to explain the difficulties that an alliance between activists and leftist parties in power experienced in Chile. The co-option of the movement’s initial proposal left activists with no voice in significant phases of the political process and as a consequence moderate reform resulted – and not surprisingly has been deemed insufficient by many activist organizations.

Finally, Argentina has seen no modification to its 1921 Criminal Code, which allows legal abortion in cases of threat to the woman’s life or health, or when conception resulted from rape. Despite the presence of a strong campaign to legalize abortion, which has introduced a bill for abortion reform in Congress every year
since 2006, the movement has found no strong support within the Legislative or Executive branches during the administrations of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández. Under their governments, the movement-sponsored bill was never discussed, let alone voted on, beyond congressional commissions. The movement has been divided over the question of how to interact with allies in power. The low level of institutionalization of the party system, the lack of a strong, national-level leftist party, a weak division of powers, opposition to abortion from the Executive and the existence of a politically strong Catholic Church all worked to prevent the creation of an alliance that could push abortion reform forward through Congress. In light of the political indifference the movement has received during this period, activists have diversified their strategies and pursued alliances with technocratic agencies in health ministries both at the federal and provincial levels. These have resulted in no policy change, but these steps have led to the drafting of health protocols that have increased access to abortion within the same legal framework.

**Literature Review and Definition of Concepts**

Two main literatures speak directly to the main questions raised in this book: The literature on social movements outcomes, which has mostly focused on studying cases within advanced industrial democracies, and that of women’s public policy, particularly those studies that focus on Latin America. This section introduces both literatures, considers their relevance to the current research and offers a discussion of the concepts they have developed to explain policy change. In addition, this section discusses the main dependent and independent variables identified in this study, their definitions and ways of measuring them.

**Elite Allies and Issue Networks**

The literature on social movements has traditionally focused on explaining the emergence of protest, an effort that has led to the development of the main theories in the field: Resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977), political process (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998), and cultural and framing approaches (Snow et al. 1989). Once a neglected area of research, the impact of social movements on state policy has increasingly drawn the attention of scholars in the last three decades (Amenta et al. 1992 and 1994; Tarrow 1993; Giugni et al. 1999; Cress and Snow 2000; Soule and Olzak 2004; Giugni 2004; Bosi et al. 2016; Amenta and Caren 2019). When it comes to advancing a movement’s cause, scholars have debated the significance of the internal characteristics of a movement (membership, organization, strategies) (Gamson 1975; Schattschneider 1960; Cobb and Elder 1972; Andrews 2001) versus the impact of the external context (political opportunities, public opinion support) (Burstein et al. 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1998). Within the branch that focused on political external factors, one of
the variables that has received increasing attention is that of “elite allies,” meaning actors within the state that work in collaboration with the movement to achieve policy change (Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998; Rucht 1999; Kane 2003; Soule and Olzak 2004; Giugni 2004; Olzak et al. 2016). Because social movements lack power vis-à-vis the state (Piven and Cloward 1979), they cannot translate their protests directly into policy without the help of these political insiders (Rucht 1999). When a government sympathetic to the movement is in power, the chances of its demands being addressed are higher (Kriesi et al. 1995).

The literature on women’s public policy has centered upon questions of women’s participation in politics, and the analysis of policy areas related to the role of women in society. Scholars studying global gender policy have explained the advancement of women’s rights as a function of different factors: The strength of women’s movements, the presence of women’s state agencies, left-wing governments in power, women’s participation in politics and the evolution of international norms (Costain 1992; Ferree and Martin 1995; Stetson and Mazur 1995; Weldon 2002; Htun and Weldon 2012 and 2018). Particularly relevant to this study are the efforts of scholars considering the role of women’s movements as opposed to that of women within the state in advancing these policies (Haas 2010; Banaszak 2010; Lycklama et al. 1998; Waylen et al. 2013; Htun and Weldon 2012 and 2018). Some scholars emphasize the relevance of women’s movements, highlighting their key role in articulating and defining new issues, and raising awareness around them (Weldon 2002; Htun and Weldon 2012). Others have found that women’s state agencies are fundamental in addressing women’s issues, and that movements’ actions do not lead to reform in the absence of women’s policy machineries (Stetson and Mazur 1995). A third group of scholars, while acknowledging the relevance of activism, point to the value of the interaction between women in and outside the state – what has been referred to as the “jaw strategy” or the “triangle of empowerment” – or, put another way, the combined efforts of feminists within the legislatures, ministries and civil society (Lycklama et al. 1998; Haas 2010; Ewig and Ferree 2013).

Within the literature on gender politics, the studies on abortion policies in Latin America have explained policy reform by focusing on different variables: The role of the Catholic Church (Htun 2003; Blofield 2006), public opinion, economic inequality (Blofield 2006), institutional factors (Htun 2003; Haas 2010; Blofield and Ewig 2017), the strength of social movements (Htun and Weldon 2012 and 2018). Similar to the literature on social movements’ outcomes and that on gender politics more broadly, this branch has also focused on the alliance between non-state and state actors, referencing them with the concept of “issue networks” (Htun 2003; Reutersward et al. 2011). Originally crafted by Heclo (1978) within the literature on interest groups, issue networks first appeared in Htun’s book analyzing moral policy in the countries of the Southern Cone (2003). She defines issue networks as “elite coalitions of lawyers, feminist activists, doctors, legislators and state officials, that bring about policy change” (Htun 2003: 5). In his analysis
of same-sex marriage in Mexico, Argentina and Chile, Diez utilizes the notion of the network but departs from Htun’s definition (2015). According to Diez, Htun’s concept focuses on elite actors and does not fully recognize that “the formation of networks is the result of the efforts made by activists” (2015: 9).

Borrowing Diez’s modification of Htun’s concept, this book stays within the tradition of the literature of social movements’ outcomes and treats movement activists as actors with agency who can decide whether or not they want to establish alliances and work together with state actors. In my numerous interviews, activists and state allies alike highlighted the complex dynamics of policy reform. Women activists complained about how party loyalties and electoral concerns prevented feminist politicians from advancing abortion reform as required by the movement. Feminist politicians, for their part, complained that activists did not understand the political dynamics and times that need to be taken into consideration when working within the state. The use of concepts such as issue networks not only erases the agency of the social movement but also limits the understanding of the logics present in working from within or outside the state. The fact of being an elected government official or a bureaucrat creates new interests and motivations that are different from the incentives activists have within civil society, no matter how united by feminism those in or out of the state might be. The notion of “allies in power” or “sympathetic allies” allows for this differentiation.

**Measuring Elite Allies**

The opportunity to form political alliances has been identified as one dimension of the political opportunity structure (McAdam 1996) and thus many scholars have used it as a variable to explain the impact of social movements on state policy. Most studies have measured this variable in terms of the percentage of movement sympathizers (leftist or green parties, for the most part, given their historical commitment to egalitarianism and women’s political participation) in the government at a particular point in time (Rucht 1999; Giugni 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004; Kane 2003). Other scholars have defined movement sympathizers as those politicians who have supported the movement as evidenced by their attendance at the movement’s protests and initiatives they have undertaken from positions of power to address the movement’s demands (Cress and Snow 2000).

Left-wing governments and their possible alliances with the women’s movement have also been explored by studies on women’s public policy as a potential variable (Stetson and Mazur 1995; Htun and Weldon 2012 and 2018). Conventional wisdom considers left-wing parties more likely to nominate and elect women, given their focus on egalitarianism. Studies on the Latin American Left, however, disagree on the extent to which this tendency holds across the whole region (Alles 2014; Jones et al. 2012; Funk et al. 2017). According to Funk et al., Pink Tide governments have not strengthened quota laws, nor have they elected more women to office than have right-wing governments. In terms of left-wing
parties embracing women’s demands, studies have found contradictory evidence as well. While this alliance appeared to be the case in the Northern industrialized countries (Stetson and Mazur 1995), a larger global database suggested that more generally the presence of left-wing parties appeared to be more relevant to those gender issues that overlap with class, such as child care facilities or funding for reproductive rights services, especially when compared with non-class issues such as violence against women or family law (Htun and Weldon 2012 and 2018).

In line with Htun and Weldon’s analysis, in the study of these trends in Latin America, results are mixed and support of left-wing governments for gender policies differed depending on the issue. While Pink Tide governments advanced gender equality policies — increasing, for example, the income of women — they have many times rejected the expansion of reproductive rights (Friedman 2009 and 2019; Blofield et al. 2017). The type of left-wing party thus matters, and this is considered when analyzing the cases in the present study.

When studying gender policy reform, scholars have also measured the “structure of gendered opportunities” (Soule and Olzak 2004), a concept that refers to the number of women in the Executive and Legislative branches. There is agreement within the literature on gender policy that an effective way to increase the number of women in power is to implement gender quotas (Craske 1999; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Franceschet et al. 2012). Latin America has been a pioneer in the implementation of gender quotas, Argentina being the first country in the world to do so in 1991. Since then, the rest of the countries have followed, with the exception of Guatemala. In 2018, 28.9% of congressional seats were held by women, compared to a world average of 23.8%. Latin America is home to three of the four countries with the greatest proportion of women in congress in the world.

There is a debate within this field, however, about whether an increase in the number of women in power actually translates into a higher likelihood that progressive gender policies will result, a development referred to as substantive representation (Chant and Craske 2007; Htun and Jones 2002; Franceschet et al. 2012; Johnson and Taylor 2014). Htun and Weldon suggest that a larger number of women in power is unlikely to have a substantive effect without other factors being present such as feminist movements, political parties and international pressures (2018). Many have argued that the passage of quotas for women in legislatures in Latin America has not necessarily brought to power more sympathizers of gender policies (Htun and Jones 2002; Weldon 2002). As more conservative women have been elected to office, research has been forced to pay attention to the ideological diversity among women politicians and the more nuanced consequences of the increasing number of women in power (Kampwirth and Gonzalez 2001; Haas 2010). Thus, scholars have looked at left-wing party affiliation and feminist orientation of the women in power to identify those who are most likely to advance women’s rights (Htun and Power 2006). It is worth noting that women in conservative parties are still more progressive on gender issues than their male colleagues (Carroll 2001).
A second way of measuring the structure of gendered opportunities is to consider the presence or absence of women’s state agencies. In their study of women’s ministries across postindustrial countries, Stetson and Mazur (1995) conclude that these agencies are necessary for successful policy reform. They acknowledge that these agencies’ impact depends on their leadership, structure and the interaction or lack thereof with the women’s movement. In Latin America, however, these institutions have faced larger challenges in terms of their lack of autonomy, funding and appointment of conservative women as leaders – often making them irrelevant in the advancement of women’s rights, particularly when it comes to controversial issues such as abortion (Caldeira 1998; Baldez 2001; Franceschet 2003; Haas 2010).

All of these indicators identify availability of allies for the movement, and they represent a good start in the process of measuring the existence of state supporters. This book focuses on the presence of left-wing parties in power as potential allies, and also discusses the presence of women in power, particularly within these left-leaning parties, since scholars have already highlighted the significant role of feminist politicians working within their political parties in advancing legislation on women’s rights (Haas 2010). However, giving numbers and percentages of these two potential allies to the women’s movement is not enough to test the impact allies might have in advancing abortion reform. My field research was key to understanding whether this availability translated into an actual collaboration between movement activists and their potential allies. The numerous interviews conducted for this study offer evidence of the existence or lack of meetings and alliances between them and allow us to see in detail how and under which conditions these collaborations take place. My hope is that such an in-depth analysis of these processes – similar to those in Diez’s book (2015) – will constitute an original contribution to our understanding of social movements and policy reform.

Movement Strength

Within the literature on gender policy, the strength of women’s activism has been found to be a critical force for policy reform across regions of the world (Banaszak 1996; Costain 1992; Disney and Gelb 2000; Ferree and Martin 1995; Stetson and Mazur 1995; Weldon 2002; Htun and Weldon 2012 and 2018).

Measuring a movement’s strength, though, has been difficult. Most scholars have defined it in terms of the level of mobilization, operationalized as the number of protest events in a given period (Burstein and Freudenburg 1978; Giugni 2004), or in its level of organization, operationalized as the number of members, chapters in a given territory or the financial resources of the movement (Weldon 2004; Kane 2003; Giugni 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004; Paxton et al. 2006; Johnson and McCarthy 2005).

These measures have limitations. While social movements’ main repertoire of action is the street protest (with the goal of disrupting the social order), this is
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not their only strategy. In addition, it is important to know the number of people attending each protest event to have an idea of the level of support the movement has at any point in time. Research has found that protest size matters more than protest frequency (McAdam and Su 2002). In terms of accounting for the number of organizations, membership and budgets, these measures are limited to account for formal organizations that are closer to an NGO than the multitude of informal organizations that exist within a social movement.

In an attempt to address some of these limitations and attend to the complexity of the concept, scholars studying women’s movements’ strength have combined these original dimensions with new ones. In their study of policies addressing violence against women, Htun and Weldon (2012 and 2018) combined qualitative and quantitative data and measured movement strength based on narrative accounts of scholars, number and membership of women’s organizations, massive protests and media presence. Mazur et al. have measured movements’ mobilization by taking into consideration both formal and informal networks, combined with the level of institutionalization defined as the presence of the movement in government institutions (Mazur et al. 2016).

In light of these scholarly works and based on the availability of sources for the country cases analyzed in this book, I define movement strength using a combination of the following indicators: 1) Academic accounts on the strength and unity of the women’s movement and the abortion reform campaign in each case; 2) the number of organizations involved in the campaign; 3) the support the campaign has received from other social actors; 4) the media presence; 5) the public opinion support for the campaign’s demands; and 6) the number and size of protests. These multiple indicators compensate for the lack of data for some years and address the different expressions of each of the movements in terms of their level of formality or informality or the strategies chosen – without identifying one specific modality with that of strength or weakness. For example, the Uruguayan campaign did not have as large a street presence as did the movement in Argentina, but it still had a strong public opinion support and media presence, which, under this definition, makes it a strong movement.

Institutional Variables

During the last 25 years, institutional perspectives within political science have been examining how the configuration of governing institutions, such as electoral rules, federalism, presidentialism, party systems and the separation of powers, impact political practice and policy change (Skocpol 1992; Carey 1997; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). Institutions matter because they affect the distribution of power and influence how civil society interacts with the state. Scholars have applied the insights of this institutionalist perspective to the study of gender and moral policies (Htun 2003; Diez 2015; Blofield and Ewig 2017). Institutional arrangements influence the level of access, interaction patterns and
the possibilities of working together with the state women’s movements might have. Several institutional variables, in particular, need to be taken into consideration with respect to the question of collaboration of women’s movements with politicians, among them the institutionalization of the party system, the presence and characteristics of leftist parties and coalitions and the separation of powers between government branches.

**Institutionalization of the Party System**

The characteristics of the party system condition the kind of relationships women’s organizations can establish with Congress in their struggle for abortion reform (Waylen 2000; Htun 2003; Blofield 2006). In her analysis of gender politics in Argentina and Chile, Georgina Waylen notes that women activists can be more effective in exerting pressure in the presence of an institutionalized party system since “it is clearer where the pressure points are and any changes to the rules can be enforced more easily” (Waylen 2000: 790). The level of institutionalization of a party system is defined as the stability and meaningfulness of political parties, their roots in society, their ideological stability and the level of electoral volatility (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 2018). As stated by Mainwaring, an institutionalized party system “shapes the future expectation and behavior of political elites, masses and other actors” (Mainwaring 2018: 4). In this sense, an institutionalized political system in which parties matter, have continuity over time and can be easily positioned along the ideological spectrum allows civil society organizations to have clear and stable interlocutors.

**Left-Wing Parties**

The presence of a strong leftist party in power also increases the chances of abortion reform (Blofield 2006; Blofield and Ewig 2017). Scholars agree that the Left is usually more sympathetic towards feminist demands than other parties (Ellickson and Whistler 2000; Rozell 2000). However, scholars also agree that the type of left-wing party matters when analyzing their impact on reproductive rights (Friedman 2009; Blofield and Ewig 2017). Three aspects of left-wing parties need to be considered when analyzing the chances of alliances with women’s movements: Their roots in society, their religious or secular character and the presence of feminist politicians.

First, when parties have strong roots in society, there are institutional channels already set in place that link civil society and parties, allowing a more stable and fluid interaction between them. On the opposite end of the spectrum, leftist parties can lack these institutions, thus providing grassroots organizations and movements with no channels for interactions with points of power. These are what political scientists call “electoral professional parties” (Pribble 2013).
Second, the presence of a religious party within the Left can alter predictions and assumptions about leftist parties’ behavior. Latin American religious left-wing parties align with Catholic doctrine on family and reproductive issues. This factor goes a long way to explaining why a Center-Left coalition has been in power in Chile for all but two administrations since the 1989 democratic transition, but there was no progress in terms of abortion reform until 2017. The presence of the Christian Democrats in the governing coalition was one of the reasons preventing any change to the total ban on abortion.

Finally, scholars have shown that the presence of feminist activists within leftist parties increases the likelihood that the party will include gender issues in their platforms and agendas (Matland and Studlar 1996; Caul 2001; Haas 2010). These feminist party cadres can work as a liaison with the feminist movement in the absence of institutionalized channels that connect the party to grassroots organizations, thus increasing the chance of collaboration between activists and party members.

**Separation of Powers**

The division of power among government branches can also affect the alliances that are possible between the movement and state actors. Latin American countries have a history of strong conflict between Executive and Legislative branches, making this factor particularly relevant (Carey and Shugart 1998). Liesl Haas, one of the few scholars who has looked into how this relationship affects feminist policy-making, identifies how the powerful tools awarded to the Executive branch in Chile allow for control of Legislative agendas. As a result, only those bills backed by the Executive have a good chance of passing in Congress (2010). Given the conflicts characterizing the relationships between branches of government, Executive preferences play an important role in the dynamics of abortion reform.

**Executive Preferences**

Latin American countries have strong presidential systems in which the institution of the presidency is key in setting the government agenda and formulating policies (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). According to Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) presidential strength relies on both constitutional and partisan powers. Constitutional powers can be proactive (such as decree power) or reactive (as in total and partial veto power). Based on their constitutions, the three country cases have strong presidential systems, though they vary slightly in terms of the powers each of their Executives are assigned. Chile’s president has decree and strong veto powers together with the exclusive right to introduce certain types of legislation. Argentina’s president has decree and strong veto powers but does not have the exclusive right to introduce legislation. In Uruguay the president has strong veto powers, the exclusive right to introduce legislation, but no decree powers.
Partisan powers are the abilities to shape the legislative process through the disciplining of the party in congress (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). That is, the power of the Executive is also influenced by the level of party discipline, and the presence or absence of a congressional majority. Abortion, being an issue within “the politics of morality,” has been considered a matter of one’s own conscience, not a party issue. Regardless, there have been political parties in both Chile and Uruguay that have imposed party discipline when abortion reforms were voted on, making this an important consideration when analyzing the preferences and powers of the Executive branch.

Aside from formal powers, presidents have informal resources that increase their influence on congressional debates and the approval of bills. Among those are the Executive’s superior resources in terms of technical expertise and staff in comparison with Congress, its lobbying power and access to congressional committees during debates. These have resulted in a general larger rate of approval of bills introduced and supported by the Executive than those that lack this support (Siavelis 2000; Haas 2010).

Scholars have highlighted the significance of the presidents’ position in the abortion debate (Htun 2003; Blofield 2006). Presidential opposition has been a main obstacle for decriminalization campaigns throughout Latin America. With the exception of current Argentine President Alberto Fernandez, no president in the Southern Cone countries, or more broadly in the whole region, has stated his/her support for abortion liberalization based on the woman’s autonomous decision. The presidents’ timidity as both candidates and chief executives in supporting abortion decriminalization suggests that it is still perceived as politically risky for a president to come across as supporting such a policy. I measure such “Executive preferences” using presidents’ public statements on the issue of abortion. Presidents can be against abortion reform, in which case they constitute a veto player to the process; they can be in favor, in which case reform is sped up due to Executive’s strong powers under presidential systems; or they can be neutral, allowing the discussion to proceed in Congress without much interference.

The Power of the Catholic Church

As with most issues considered part of the politics of morality – a field that includes all policies that deal with life-and-death decisions, sexuality and self-determination (Mooney 1999; Meier 1999; Mourao Permoser 2019) – the strength of religious institutions, particularly the Catholic Church in Latin America, is a significant factor in understanding policy change on abortion (Blofield 2008; Haas 2010; Htun and Weldon 2018). A more secular society, in which the Catholic Church lacks political influence, might allow for politicians to freely address reproductive rights issues and establish relationships with abortion reform campaigns without fearing condemnation from the Church. In a society in which the Church still holds strong societal and political power, politicians are more careful when addressing
reproductive rights issues for fear of antagonizing this institution – and ultimately damaging their political careers.

The literature has looked into the role of the Catholic Church as one important variable in explaining abortion policy through the use of the following concepts: secularism, Church–state relations (Borland 2004), Church–government relations (Htun 2003; Borland 2004), religiosity (Hagopian 2009; Blofield 2006), and used different indicators to measure each of them. In an effort to address the numerous potential channels of influence the Catholic Church has on the abortion debate I use multiple measures and analyze which ones hold more explanatory power. The power of the Catholic Church will be initially assessed through the institution’s hegemony in society (Hagopian 2009) and the formal relationships between Church and state. These assessments will then be supplemented with the analysis of more informal measures of influence such as the links the Church has with economic and political elites (Blofield 2006; Haas 2010).

In addition, since this book focuses on the alliances between activists and state actors, I will also analyze the availability of allies for the counter-movement, in these cases mostly led by the Catholic Church. For example, one of the ways the Church has attempted to influence society and elites has been through religious education. The Church has recognized its interest in Catholic education as one of its key missions in numerous documents. The extensive networks of Catholic educational institutions at all levels is evidence of the Church’s determination to instill Catholic values in the people of Latin America.

Analyzing the different reach that Catholic educational institutions – in particular, universities – have in the education of political elites is yet another way of measuring the Church’s political influence. Catholic universities in particular have become a significant channel to educate future leaders in areas relevant to reproductive rights: Law and medicine. To measure the availability of allies for the counter-movement I code legislators in the three countries on whether they had a secular or religious university education. The higher the percentage of political elites educated by Catholic universities, the larger their exposure to Catholic teachings and the less their contact with feminist theories and notions of reproductive rights. This does not imply that a Catholic education automatically places politicians in the anti-choice camp but it does offer an index on the possible influence that the Church has on educating political elites and steeling them against any sympathy for reform in matters of reproductive rights.

Alternative Explanations

Some of the common factors identified in the public policy literature as key variables for policy change, such as the direct role of public opinion (Barreiro Pérez Pardo 2000; Burstein 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983) or international factors (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), challenge the relevance of social movements on policy change and thus the significance of their alliances with
those in power. However, both public opinion and international factors have been found in this study to be either not significant or to be mediated by the variables highlighted, e.g., social movement strength.

**Public Opinion**

There is an assumption that public opinion has a strong impact on public policy in democratic societies, and scholarly work has offered considerable evidence supporting this view (Erikson et al. 2002; Page and Shapiro 1983). At the same time, some scholars have challenged this assumption, showing that studies have overestimated the power of public opinion and that government responds more to special interests than the majority of the public (Burstein 2005; Page 2002; Gilens and Page 2014).

In fact, when it comes to abortion reform, many scholars have challenged the very relevance of public opinion as an explanatory variable. A 2006 review of 26 public opinion studies of abortion in Latin America concluded that the region’s restrictive laws did not reflect the general support for decriminalization (Yam et al. 2006). In her book on abortion reform in Catholic countries, Blofield (2006) found that Latin American countries still awaiting abortion reform have larger levels of public opinion support for decriminalization than Spain had in the 1980s right before decriminalization. Her research demonstrated how in Spain support for decriminalization followed rather than preceded policy reform, challenging the direction of the causal link between public opinion and policy change (Blofield 2006). In Latin American countries, politicians prefer to avoid any political costs associated with raising the issue of abortion, despite growing support for decriminalization among society. The reluctance to discuss the abortion bills during electoral campaigns makes this clear (Johnson 2011). Only after the national campaigns for abortion reform made abortion “an issue” can we find more data on public opinion support from society. Put another way, people might have an opinion on abortion, but in the absence of a movement for abortion reform, politicians have no way of knowing what public opinion is or where their constituents stand on it, and thus could remain unaffected by it.

A good example of this phenomenon can be seen in the case of Uruguay and Argentina, where public opinion became more favorable to decriminalization only after the campaigns for legalization were launched, suggesting a positive relation between the movements’ activities and increased support for reform. Other scholars have found similar results in the US context (Banaszak and Ondercin 2016). In the case of Chile, the abortion reform campaign launched by MILES appeared as a response to academic research done by feminist activists that showed an overwhelming support among the population for the legalization of abortion under certain circumstances. In this case, while women’s activism was not behind increasing the support for legalization among Chilean society, it had a significant
role in measuring public opinion and making it known to the wider public in support of their abortion reform campaign.

Finally, there is a large limitation in the study of public opinion on abortion across the three cases. There are no longitudinal studies conducted across the three countries with a similar methodology and similar questions. The closest available is the World Values Survey, which has asked systematically the same questions in each of its waves since the 1980s. However, the question chosen relates to the approval of the practice of abortion, not the approval of a particular policy on abortion (decriminalization or criminalization). This value-based question does not accurately indicate support for specific abortion policies and tends to over-represent those against the practice without giving precise information about policy options. Research has already shown how the formulation of the question in such sensitive topics can alter results (Yam et al. 2006).

International Factors

Scholars have highlighted the way international norms and standards of appropriate behavior embraced by a significant number of states can have an impact on domestic policy change (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In the case of gender policy, scholars consider the influence of international treaties on women’s rights as well as regional demonstration effects or pressures to conform to certain standards (Htun and Weldon 2018).

International events such as the regional September 28 Campaign to Decriminalize Abortion in Latin America launched in 1991, as well as the Cairo and Beijing United Nations conferences in the mid-1990s, have surely provided a supportive environment for abortion reform. However, the fact that Uruguay is the only country besides Cuba to have legalized abortion in the region points to the larger significance of domestic factors in the explanation of these processes. As Htun and Weldon state in their study on activism around violence against women, the impact of global norms is conditional on the presence of domestic women’s movements (2012 and 2018). Thus, international treaties and conferences advancing women’s rights need local advocates embracing them and bringing them to the national arena to effect actual policy change.

In addition, the global context has not been particularly kind to the side of women’s rights. The transnationalization of the abortion discussion has created opportunities not only for feminists but also for anti-choice activists to create networks and to share resources and strategies (Htun 2003). If anything, the international context suggests more recently a movement in the opposite direction, as evidenced by the wave of criminalizing policies that banned therapeutic abortion in Honduras (1997), El Salvador (1998), Nicaragua (2006) and the Dominican Republic (2009), as well as the restrictions implemented in some Mexican states that followed abortion reform in Mexico City (2007). The international climate of criminalization was reinforced during the first decade of the new millennium.
by US policies under the George W. Bush administration (2001–2009) and later by the Trump administration (2017–2020), which banned federal funding for international non-governmental organizations involved with providing and advising on abortions or even advocating for abortion decriminalization (1984 Mexico City policy), and also indirectly through its support of anti-abortion discourses and the increasing restrictions at the state level of access to abortion. The end of the twentieth century saw the emergence of conservative activism at the global level led by American Christian Right organizations advocating for the “natural family” to counter what they perceived as the United Nations’ feminist and gay agenda (Buss and Herman 2003) more recently labeled “gender ideology” (Miranda Novoa 2012; Corredor 2019).

Who is the Subject of Abortion Rights?
A Note on Language

Historically the term “women” has been used to refer to those that are directly affected by the issue of abortion and those that have been active in the movement for abortion reform. This is the term that has been used until the present in the legal field to draft regulations on abortion and in the field of reproductive health to track the impact of those regulations on women’s health. Activists have historically used the term “women” as well. They understood the criminalization of abortion as a way of controlling women’s bodies, felt themselves part of the women’s movement and pushed for this reform as a way of asserting and advancing women’s rights. The slogans and frames upheld by activists referred to women’s right to choose over their own bodies, and the need to stop the death of women through unsafe abortions.

In the last decade, the mobilization of trans people and the advancement of trans rights in the form of gender identity laws both worldwide and in the region brought with it a discussion about who is the subject of abortion rights. Those who support a more inclusive language emphasize the need to acknowledge that not all those that can get pregnant identify as women, and that not all women can get pregnant and thus need an abortion. A preference for more neutral language that refers to “people,” “patients” or “people that can get pregnant” emerged among health care providers and activist organizations alike. But these changes generated strong resistance among those who refuse to abandon the language of “women.” Those behind this position argue that the overwhelming majority of those affected by the way abortion is regulated identify as women and that women have historically been at the forefront of this struggle. They thus refuse to adopt a language that erases women as the main subjects of this fight (Pollitt 2015; Smith 2019).

This book uses the term “women” when referring to those that are affected by the issue of abortion and those active in the movements for abortion rights. This choice is grounded on the language that activists used in the three countries during
the time period studied here. The discussions on language were not present in Uruguay given that legal reform took place in 2012, a time when the reference to “women” was not contested. It was not present in Chile either, where the existing total ban on abortion called for moderate frames to advance reform. The discussion on language around abortion rights has emerged, though, within the campaign for abortion reform in Argentina but not during the period analyzed here. According to Sutton and Borland, internal discussions around language emerged as early as 2014. These concerns only made an appearance in public documents in 2016 (Sutton and Borland 2018). In this case, the decision to change language was gradual. In the 2016 bill, activists decided to continue using the language of “women” while including a statement acknowledging that the right to abortion should be granted to all people that can get pregnant. In 2018 a revised version of this bill used the term “women and people that can get pregnant” each and every time when referring to those who have the right to abortion and are affected by state regulations of the practice.

With the growth of non-binary identities, it is possible to envision a further shift in the future in which the word “women” might be abandoned completely among movements for abortion rights and replaced with more neutral language. However, given that this book provides an analysis limited to a particular historical moment (approximately the first 15 years of the twenty-first century depending on each of the countries), it is only fair to respect the language and frames that activists have chosen to use in their struggle to advance abortion rights throughout this period. This by no means implies a denial of abortion rights to individuals that can get pregnant but do not identify as women.

Organization of the Book

The book is a comparative analysis of three cases. Chapter 1 provides a description of the status of abortion in the region and explains the reasons why abortion reform has encountered so many obstacles. It also provides a history of the legal status of abortion in each of the country cases to provide a context to the analysis provided in the empirical chapters. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 present the qualitative analysis of abortion reform in each of the cases. Chapter 2 discusses the case of Uruguay and its successful abortion reform, highlighting the close collaboration between the women’s movement and legislators from the left-wing party Frente Amplio. Chapter 3 introduces the case of Chile and explains the lack of policy change during most of the years since the 1990 democratic transition and the recent moderate reform. The chapter analyzes the relationship between women’s movements and the Center-Left electoral coalition Concertación through two time periods: from 1990 until the year 2000, and from the beginning of the new century until the 2017 reform. Chapter 4 discusses the case of Argentina and explains the lack of abortion reform under the Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner administrations. It also explores the diversification of the women’s
movements’ strategies and the search for allies in the state bureaucracy, which resulted in no policy reform but an on-the-ground increase in access to abortion within the current legal framework. Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the theoretical framework for the literature on social movements’ outcomes and gender politics, and explores the future of abortion reform in the new political scenario in Latin America today with the coming to power of right-wing governments, particularly through the case of Argentina and the 2018 congressional debate under the Macri administration.

Notes
1. MYSU stands for Mujer y Salud Uruguay (Women and Health Uruguay).
3. MILEs stands for Miles por la Interrupción Legal del Embarazo (Thousands for the Legal Interruption of Pregnancy).
5. The book analyzes the case of Argentina during the administrations of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, and does not include the 2018 Congressional debate under the Macri administration. An analysis of these recent events based on the book’s theoretical model is provided in the Conclusion.
6. See Latino Barómetro.
7. Expression in the Southern Cone that refers to an issue that scares voters away.
8. There are also stories that say that Néstor Kirchner got together with his legislators and told them directly: If you want to be re-elected, vote in favor of the same-sex marriage bill. Interview with legislator, Buenos Aires, October 2012.
10. On Christian Education (1885), Declaration on Christian Education (1965), To Teach as Jesus Did (1972), among many others.

Bibliography


