Pachakutik, the indigenous voters, and segmented mobilization strategies

Diana Dávila Gordillo

d.l.davila.gordillo@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

Institute of Political Science, Leiden University

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Abstract

The 2021 Ecuadorian national elections resulted in one major surprise; the small ethnic party Pachakutik almost made it to the second round. The party's candidate came in third with less than 1% difference from the runner up. In addition, the party's candidates to the legislature secured 27 seats (out of 137) at the National Assembly. These achievements were unexpected, particularly because Pachakutik has been defined as an ethnic party with a small indigenous captive electorate. In this paper I address the glaring question: where are all these excess votes coming from? To do so I answer two research questions: who votes for Pachakutik, and how does Pachakutik mobilize these voters? I leverage quantitative and qualitative data. I use elections data to explore Pachakutik's electoral performance through the years and combine it with self-identification data from the 2001 and 2010 Censuses to study the indigenous voters' voting patterns using the ecological inference technique. I find that, on average, less than 25% of all indigenous voters' votes were cast for Pachakutik's candidates between 2002 and 2019 at national and subnational elections. To explore Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies, I combine two novel data sources from the 2014 mayoral elections and data from the 2021 national elections and analyze it using qualitative content analysis. I find Pachakutik's candidates use multiple mobilization strategies to engage their voters. I argue, in sum, that Pachakutik is an ethnic party, with indigenous leaders, an inclusive programmatic and symbolic platform, and a multi-ethnic electorate.

Keywords: Pachakutik, ethnic-parties, mobilization strategies, Ecuador

Introduction

On the night of February 7, the *Consejo Nacional Electoral* President, Diana Atamaint, announced the official quick count showed that Andrés Arauz and Yaku Pérez would move into the second round. Fourteen days later, the CNE announced that the official outcome was not the one announced. Guillermo Lasso got 19.74% of the national vote, and Yaku Pérez got 19.39% of the vote, which meant the former would move into the second round. Yaku Pérez and his party, Pachakutik, requested a vote-by-vote recount. At the time of writing, this process is still ongoing, although, in all likelihood, Lasso will face Arauz in the second round. Despite the disappointment, Pachakutik's candidates' achievements in terms of the number of votes and the number of seats (approximately 27 seats) remain surprising and unexpected.

The quick explanations for Pachakutik's electoral prowess turned, as usual, to the indigenous voters' expected support for the party. Many pundits and analysts referred to the October 2019 *levantamiento* organized by the indigenous social movements against the current president's austerity measures. If the indigenous population could come together and paralyze a whole country then, it could also support Pachakutik's candidates. To be sure, media pundits also acknowledged Pachakutik's voters included mestizo voters but focused more on the "natural" connection between Pachakutik and the indigenous social movements, primarily to Conaie. A brief assessment of this "excess votes" (conceptualized as those added to core/indigenous voters' ballots) had been hailed as a new accomplishment of the indigenous party.

In this paper, I address the glaring question: where are all these excess votes coming from? To do so, I first challenge the idea of a captive indigenous electorate (the ethnic vote). I use election data to explore Pachakutik's electoral performance through the years. The electoral support Pachakutik received at the national level between 2006 and 2017 (less than 4% of the national vote) suggests the indigenous electorate may not be supporting the party as a block (see tables 1.1 and 1.2). At the subnational level, the party's candidates have been consistently elected, but in different districts at the subnational level. This strongly suggests Pachakutik does not have strongholds in the traditional sense and that the indigenous voters may not be the party's captive electoral supporters (see appendix figures 1.9 to 1.12). These multiple sources of support challenge the idea that Pachakutik may be an ethnic party in the traditional sense, i.e., recipient of the support from a single ethnic group (see, for example, Chandra, 2004; Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985).

To explore further the different sources of support, and particularly the indigenous voters' voting patterns, I use the ecological inference technique. I combine the electoral data

with self-identification data from the 2001 and 2010 Censuses. I find that, on average, less than 25% of all indigenous voters' votes were cast for Pachakutik's candidates between 2002 and 2019 at national and subnational elections. I moreover show that Pachakutik has consistently relied on non-indigenous (mestizo) voters, who have contributed to the party's long-lasting presence in subnational and national elected offices. These patterns of mestizo support are visible for all electoral processes since 2002, particularly at the subnational level. These findings contradict the expectation that Pachakutik turned in 2006 into an ethnocentric party that would have reduced its electoral bases to – only – the indigenous voters (see Madrid, 2012).

The second question I address, building on the party receiving electoral support from a diverse electorate, is: what does Pachakutik do to mobilize these voters? It has been traditionally argued that Pachakutik, as an ethnic party, mobilizes voters with a combination of ethnic content and programmatic appeals (Collins, 2004; Jones West, 2011; Madrid, 2012; Mustillo, 2016; Van Cott, 2005). I analyze Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies for the 2014 mayor elections and the 2021 national elections using qualitative content analysis. I use data from all working plans presented by the party's candidates in 2014 and data from 140 public events conducted by 17 candidates to the legislature and Yaku Pérez during the 2021 campaign.[1] I show the party's candidates only sporadically make use of symbolic indigenous content. The candidates focus more on programmatic appeals (not linked to the indigenous agenda) and on a candidate's charisma and aptitudes.

Pachakutik is, hence, an ethnic (indigenous) party based on its (indigenous) leadership (Chandra, 2011; Van Cott, 2005), but a multi-ethnic party in as much it employs an inclusive platform that relies on symbolic content not limited to ethnic (indigenous) appeals and includes inclusive programmatic content. Pachakutik is, moreover, a party with a multi-ethnic support base (not limited to indigenous voters). These distinctions are crucial to making sense of the conventional expectations regarding the party and the party's overall electoral base and how they are not met. Unlike Bolivia's MAS, Pachakutik does not fit comfortably under the category of ethnically based parties (Anria, 2019; Madrid, 2008), mainly due to its mostly indigenous leadership. Simultaneously, the party does not fit either with the conventional conceptualization of ethnic parties due to its inclusive platform and multi-ethnic support base.

[1] The 2014 data comes from my doctoral dissertation, and includes 65 working plans presented by Pachakutik's candidates in 2014; the 2021 data comes from a joint project with Angélica Abad, Raúl Aldaz, and Sebastián Vallejo with the support from Universidad de las Américas (UDLA) Ecuador. The data was collected using the same theoretical framework and coding scheme developed for my dissertation.

This definition and findings help contextualize the 2021 electoral results. Although party loyalty is determined by several other variables, what a party does to mobilize voters matters. Pachakutik's candidates actively engage with indigenous and non-indigenous voters during their campaigns. These strategies appear to have been successful at the local levels in previous elections and likely contributed to mobilizing a broad group of the electorate in these elections. It is important to note that it is not only the mestizo votes that should be defined as "excess votes" that require explanation; "excess votes" include votes from both (and likely other smaller) electorates. This paper contributes with an essential piece of the puzzle to make sense of the surprise performance: the party's candidates adapt their mobilization strategies and are not limited to ethnic-based content.

This paper further contributes to multiple research agendas. First, toward studying (ethnic) political parties' mobilization strategies. This research agenda is slowly moving towards an understanding of parties employing multiple strategies at a time to mobilize voters (Anria, 2013; Calvo & Murillo, 2019a; Halvorsen, 2019; Luna, 2014; Madrid, 2012; Thachil, 2014). In addition, this paper also speaks to the scholarship on ethnic politics in Latin America and beyond. It highlights the need not to take for granted an "ethnic pull" between a party and an ethnic group; instead, scholars should start by questioning whether this link is effectively present (see, for example, Hirseland & Strijbis, 2019). Lastly, this paper advances the overall research agenda on Ecuadorian politics and specifically research on Pachakutik. Research on this party stalled during the early 2000s (mostly after 2006) and has since then dwindled (Van Cott, 2005, 2008). I make two important contributions: 1) Pachakutik's electoral outcomes are not linked solely to the support the party receives from the indigenous voters, and 2) Pachakutik is an ethnic party that mixes and segments strategies across and within districts that likely contribute to the party's mestizo electoral support.

This paper continues as follows; the first section discusses and overviews the literature, what we know about ethnic parties, their voters, and their mobilizations strategies in Latin America and beyond. The second section introduces Pachakutik as an ethnic party and discusses Pachakutik's electoral performances between 1996 and 2019 at the national and subnational levels. This section highlights the puzzle of Pachakutik's electoral support: who votes for the party? The third section discusses the data and methods of analysis in more detail. The fourth section discusses the ecological inference estimations, shedding light on the indigenous voters' voting patterns. The fifth section discusses Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies. The last section discusses the implication of these findings.

Unity within diversity: beyond the indigenous (ethnic) linkage

The conventional view on ethnic parties is that the feature that defines these parties is the goal "to promote the interests of a particular ethnic group, or coalition of groups" (Chandra, 2011; Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985). The supply and the demand sides of the electoral processes are expected to work in consonance: ethnic parties will appeal to a specific group, and the group will support the ethnic party. The premise is that "ethnicity offers political leaders the promise of secure support" (Horowitz, 1985, p. 295). Crucially, this view relies on the expectation that this connection will be unbreakable.

Ethnicity is, however, not always the default shortcut voters employ. Individuals will resort to this shortcut only where ethnic identities are salient and politicized (Birnir, 2007; Carlin, Singer, & Zechmeister, 2015; Dunning & Harrison, 2010; Huber & Suryanarayan, 2016; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008; Moreno Morales, 2015). In addition, the size of ethnic groups affects the types of cues parties employ to engage voters, i.e., whether an ethnic group is engaged or not (Chandra, 2004). As ethnic groups are not large enough to bring a party past an electoral threshold, ethnic parties may fail and disband or re-organize into multi-ethnic parties to engage a larger pool of voters. Nevertheless, both types of parties (ethnic and multi-ethnic) are expected to employ targeted or clientelistic mobilization strategies (Chandra, 2004, 2007; Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985).

The mismatch between the number of core voters a party has and the necessary votes to get past an effective electoral threshold is a problem common to all types of parties (Gibson, 1992). A solution to this conundrum, other than *diluting* a party's brand (Lupu, 2016), is to segment the appeals a party employs to mobilize voters. This means that parties will aim to target a wider pool of voters; these will be: core and non-core voters (Calvo & Murillo, 2019b, 2013; Luna, 2014). This strategy goes against conventional expectations about the party's ideal linkages and voters (Kitschelt, 2000). Nonetheless, as researchers explore parties' usage of multiple strategies, this practice appears as more pervasive than initially envisioned (and less costly) (e.g., cases in Latin America see: Calvo & Murillo, 2019b, 2014; Gibson, 1997; Luna, 2014; Madrid, 2012; Taylor-Robinson, 2010) (e.g., cases in Africa see: Lindberg & Morrison, 2008; Resnick, 2014; Wyatt, 2013) (e.g. , cases in India see Elliott, 2011; Thachil, 2014).

Ethnic parties are amongst the parties that employ multiple strategies to engage their core and non-core voters. In stark opposition to the conventional idea that ethnic parties employ – most of the time – clientelistic strategies (Chandra, 2011; Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985), ethnic parties often use multiple mobilization strategies. Ethnic parties employ programmatic strategies and ethnic content to mobilize voters (Huber & Suryanarayan,

2016; Jones West, 2011; Van Cott, 2005). Ethnic parties have been found to combine different appeals to mobilize their voters, e.g., programmatic, clientelistic, and "ethnic linkages" (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008), programmatic, clientelistic, personalistic, and ascriptive characteristics appeals (Resnick, 2014), and "ethno-populist" strategies that include ethnic symbols, programmatic (ideological claims) and populist appeals (Anria, 2013; Madrid, 2012).

Because in Latin America only at times and in few cases a group's ethnic identity is a relevant predictor for these individuals" voting preferences (Hirseland & Strijbis, 2019, p. 2027; Moreno Morales, 2015, p. 122), ethnic parties have expanded and segmented their strategies to reach beyond their core voters. As Anria (2013) shows, Bolivia's *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) has consistently engaged its core-rural-voters in one way while it engaged its non-core-urban-voters differently. In the case of Pachakutik, the party's leaders back in the early 2000s often highlighted the mestizo vote's importance. As Raúl Ilaquiche quoted in Madrid (2012) asserted, "with indigenous votes, you can't win. You need white, mestizo, and urban votes" (p. 79).

Unlike the case of Bolivia's MAS, as years have gone by, Pachakutik has been expected to maintain a close link with the indigenous voters and a growing distance with the mestizo voters. Madrid (2012), for example, emphasized that the party's candidates since 2006 have moved towards a more indigenous-centered campaign that would translate into fewer mestizos' votes. This idea was grounded on the fact that multiple mestizo party leaders left Pachakutik denouncing its ethnic and exclusionary turn (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 103). Moreover, Pachakutik has been considered, from the outset, as one of the flagship examples of ethnic parties that successfully leveraged ethnic cues to mobilize voters (Madrid, 2005, 2012; Van Cott, 2005; Van Cott & Birnir, 2007). The connection between the party and the indigenous population has been presented as unbreakable.

From this perspective, Pachakutik has come across as the exception to this move towards the diversification of strategies and voters. To be sure, scholars have highlighted that the party's candidates at times use more than a single strategy. Van Cott (2005) and Mustillo (2016) describe the party's strategies as ethnic programmatic. Collins (2004), focusing on the party's strategies at subnational elections, describes the party's strategies as programmatic combined with ethnic appeals and candidate-centered appeals that focus on the candidate's ethnicity. In turn, Madrid (2012) asserts the party used ethno-populist strategies (a combination of ethnic appeals, programmatic appeals, and populist appeals) until 2006 and since then has moved to ethnic-centered programmatic strategies. And Jones-West (2011, 2020) describes the party's strategies as programmatic with the often added use of personalistic and ethnic appeals.

Yet, in general, scholars have highlighted the party's candidates' appeals as marked by high levels of ethnic (indigenous content), with only a few exceptions.

I, by contrast, suggest Pachakutik is not an exception to the rule, but the case that effectively confirms the new rule: parties segment their strategies to engage voters beyond their core-voters facing little trade-offs. Pachakutik is the least likely case of strategy segmentation. The party's long-term relationship with the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador* (Conaie) considered Latin America's "strongest, oldest, and most consequential indigenous movement" (Yashar, 2005, p. 85), [2] alongside the fact that indigenous leaders have held the party's leadership (with few exceptions), feeds into this expectation of an unbreakable connection between the party and the indigenous electorate. This connection is moreover expected in terms of both: support and the strategies the party employs. I show in the following sections that Pachakutik has achieved *unity within diversity* by mobilizing the Ecuadorian electorate employing segmented and mixed strategies and that the effects of using these strategies are reflected in the party's general electoral support (even when the party received very few votes).

Pachakutik: the party and its electoral performances:

The ethnic party Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik's (MUPP or Pachakutik) was created in 1996.[3] The party's founding members were representatives of a very diverse *social alliance* comprised of leftist groups, syndicalist groups, and numerous smaller organizations connected to peasants' organizations, neighborhood organizations, and Cristian-left (liberation theology) organizations. Conaie was at the center of the alliance. Due to this social movement's

[2] This organization was formed in 1986 and brought together all other regional indigenous organizations in Ecuador like the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE), the *Ecuador Runakunapak Rikcharimuy* organization also known as ECUARUNARI (also known as the Confederation of the Kichwa Peoples of Ecuador), and the Confederation of Nationalities and Pueblos from the Coastlands of Ecuador (CONAICE). It was under Conaie's umbrella that the 1990s *levantamientos* in Ecuador were organized, thus making the organization into a major Ecuadorian political actor (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 16). For a detailed overview of the early 1990s *levantamientos* see: Almeida et al. (1992); Becker & Tutillo, (2009); Pallares,(2002)

[3] The party's original name was *Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo País* (MUPP-NP). The party changed its name to *Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik* (MUPP) in 2012 when all political parties in the country had to re-register to be able to participate in electoral processes. The 1996 name reflects the fact that the party was registered under an electoral alliance between Pachakutik and the independent political movement *Nuevo País* also known as *Movimiento de Ciudadanos por un Nuevo País*. *Nuevo Pais* was a mestizo led political organization connected to Pachakutik's first presidential candidate Freddy Ehlers. In 1996, when Pachakutik was registered as a party, it was registered alongside the candidacy of Ehlers and thus the names of both organizations were merged. Both organizations, however, maintained a differentiation throughout the years. In fact, *Nuevo País* participated in the following electoral processes (from 1998 onwards) as an independent political movement. Because of this I prefer to use the shortened initials MUPP when referring to Pachakutik even when I refer to the party prior to 2012.

primacy within the organization, Pachakutik has been considered an ethnic party from the outset. Nonetheless, the party leaders always contended that Pachakutik "represented the interests of all Ecuador's popular classes, [and] that it was not a political movement dedicated solely to the struggle for the country's indigenous peoples" (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 40).

Several researchers have thoroughly analyzed Pachakutik's formation (e.g., Becker, 2010; Birnir, 2004; Mijeski & Beck, 2011; Van Cott, 2005). There was a combination of factors that contributed to the party's formation. First, the strength of the indigenous social movement;[4] second, the electoral system's openness (changes on the ballot entry requirements); and third, Ecuadorian voters were dissatisfied with political parties, including leftist parties (Conaghan, 2003). Pachakutik came into being as the anti-establishment alternative that would bring together left-leaning voters *and* the indigenous voters.

Pachakutik's party organization has evolved through the years. The party transformed from an almost horizontal organization in the late 1990s to a complex tiered organization with internal democracy and accountability procedures that expands throughout much of the Ecuadorian territory. In this process, Pachakutik has also established a consistent rotation of party leaders.[5] The party's members and leaders have invested time and energy into it. Nevertheless, the party's resources in terms of membership and infrastructure are limited, with few formal members and a lack of party locales. The party seems to be run by a few members at both the national and sub-national levels.[6]

Figure 1.1 shows Pachakutik's branches' national reach. The first map shows the parishes (filled with blue), cantons (outlined by a dark blue line), and provinces (outlined by a black line) where Pachakutik presented candidates at the subnational elections of the year 2000; the second map shows the same but for the 2019 elections. Taking candidates' presence as a sign of active party branches' presence, these maps show how the party's branches have extended across the territory, especially towards the southern border.

[4] Conaie eschewed electoral politics up until 1996. The organization had often asked the indigenous population to stay away from electoral politics insisting on the fact that the power of the indigenous organization resided on "actions not elections" (Freidenberg & Sánchez López, 1998, p. 70; Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 38).

[5] Party leaders were initially elected every two years and since 2016 party leaders are elected every 3 years. These leaders were: Miguel Lluco (1999-2003), Gilberto Talahua (2003-2007), Jorge Guamán (2007-2010), Rafael Antuni (2010-2013), Fanny Campos (2013-2016), Marlon Santi (2016- 2021).

[6] . Although other members (not part of the officially appointed committees) participate in meetings and primary processes, it is difficult to determine whether their commitment to the party goes beyond these actions. Party meetings are fairly well attended. I participated in one of these meetings back in August of 2018 organized by the Cotopaxi branch and the room was at capacity with many persons not able to secure a seat. This meeting had been called to discuss the future subnational elections (that took place in 2019). The meeting was organized over 6 months prior to the start date for the registration of candidatures which could arguably signal the constant work of the party branches.

Figure 1. 1 Pachakutik's branches national reach in 2000 and 2019



As the party developed through the years, it consistently participated in national and subnational elections. The party's electoral support has declined with the years at both national and subnational elections (with the notorious exception of the 2021 election). Pachakutik presented its first presidential candidate in 1996 and has presented candidates in elections since then, except for the 2009 elections. Table 1.1 and figure 1.2 summarize Pachakutik's presidential candidates' electoral support through the years. In 2002 Pachakutik's candidate was the most voted candidate during the first round. He was elected president after the second round in 2002 with 54.8% of the national vote. However, the electoral alliance only lasted six months after the new president took office, which meant Pachakutik was never effectively in power. In 2006 Pachakutik presented its first "party member candidate," Luis Macas. He was also Pachakutik's first indigenous presidential candidate and received only 2.2% of the national

vote. Since then, the party's candidates have received marginally more electoral support. In 2013 Pachakutik joined the electoral alliance *Unidad Plurinacional de las Izquierdas* to unseat Correa. Despite bringing together most left-leaning opposition parties, Pachakutik's candidate came in 6th, receiving only 3.3% of the national vote. In 2017 Pachakutik joined another electoral alliance with roughly the same characteristics as the 2013 alliance. The party's candidate came in as a distant 4th with 6.71% of the national vote. The 2021 elections show a drastic change. The party performed almost as well as it did in its best years (1996 and 2002).

Table 1. 1 Presidential electoral results: Percentage of the national vote share received by Pachakutik and the parties that moved to the second round.

Presidential Elections: percentage of the national vote								
	1996 (%)	1998 (%)	2002 (%)	2006 (%)	2009 (%)	2013 (%)	2017 (%)	2017 (%)
Run-off 1st	27.2	34.9		26.8	52	57.2	39.4	32.7
Run-off 2nd	26.3	26.6	17.3	22.8	28.2	22.7	28.1	19.7
MUPP	20.6	14.7	20.6*	2.2		3.3	6.7	19.4

Source: Compiled with data from Consejo Nacional Electoral and Tribunal Supremo Electoral
** Pachakutik's candidate, Lucio Gutierrez, was the candidate with the most votes in the first round of elections in 2002. He was elected president in the second round.*

Figure 1. 2 Presidential Elections results from 1996-2021 (percentage of votes received by parties going to the run-off and Pachakutik)



Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Pachakutik has also consistently presented candidates to the legislature. Pachakutik's candidates, as was the case for the party's candidates at the presidential elections, have lost electoral support throughout the years. Nevertheless, this has not directly translated into lost seats. The party's electoral performance is dismal, to be sure. However, in the end, these votes have been enough to secure the party seats at the legislature consistently. The reduced national vote share can be explained as the byproduct of Pachakutik's choices, presenting candidates under electoral alliances. Alliances have effectively reduced the number of votes allocated to the party.[7] Table 1.2 summarizes the number of Pachakutik's candidates elected under alliances and single-party tickets. The votes' data comes from Polga-Hecimovich and Mustillo (2018); official data for the 2021 election is not available.

Table 1.2 Pachakutik's legislative seats between 1996 and 2021 (including legislators elected as part of electoral alliances).

Pachakutik's legislative seats (1996-2017)					
Year	Legislature Seats (#)	Percentage (%)	Seats with Electoral Alliances (#)	Percentage (%)	National Vote (%)
1996	8	9.8	-	-	-
1998	6	4.9	9	7.4	3.6
2002	5	5	14	14	5.4
2006	6	6	7	7	4
2009	3	2.4	4	3.2	2.7
2013	1	0.7	7	5.1	1.0
2017	3	2.2	7	5.1	2.7
2021	27	19.7	-	-	-

Source: Based on data from the Consejo Nacional Electoral and Tribunal Supremo Electoral (full data for the 2021 election was not yet available).

Pachakutik's leaders, from the outset, recognized the importance of subnational elections. The party presented candidates for prefects, provincial council members, mayors, municipal council members, and parish council members ever since its formation. Table 1.3

[7] The eight seats registered as elected under a single ticket in 1996 effectively represented the party's alliance with independent movement *Nuevo Pais*.

shows an overview of the number of party candidates elected to the offices of Prefect, Mayors, and Parish council members. As it is clear, the party's candidates have been consistently elected throughout the years. Nonetheless, in terms of votes, the party's candidates have received fewer votes as the years advance.[8] Interestingly, despite the *stable* results, it is important to note that the party's candidates are not consistently elected in the same province, cantons, and parishes.

Table 1. 3 Subnational elections: Prefects, Mayors, and Parish council members elected between 2000 and 2019

Pachakutik								
	Prefects (#)			Mayors			Parish Council members	
Year	(#)	(%)	Votes (%)	(#)	(%)	Votes (%)	(#)	(%)
1996	-	-	-	10	5	-	-	-
2000	5	22.7	-	30	13.9	-	603	15.5
2004	5	22.7	7.5	25	11.4	7.2	570	14.3
2009	5	21.7	4.8	28	12.6	4.8	458	11.5
2014	5	21.7	4.8	29	13.1	4.2	530	13
2019	5	21.7	6.9	20	9.1	4.3	519	12.7

Pachakutik stability at the subnational elections is not linked to strongholds. Only two provinces have consistently elected Pachakutik's candidates as prefect since 2000: Cotopaxi and Morona Santiago. All other prefects have been elected in different provinces throughout the years. Many of these prefects also ran under electoral alliances.[9] Pachakutik's candidates for mayor, as was the case with the candidates for prefects, are also rarely re-elected. There is no single canton where the party has held control of the municipality during this period (1996-2019). The only canton where the party has had a mayor in five out of the six periods is the canton Taisha in Morona Santiago. In some other cantons, the party has held the mayoral seat in three out of the six periods. It is most common that the party does not hold the mayor's seat in a canton a second time.

[8] Exact data for the number of votes received by the Parish Council members candidates was not available.
[9] These provinces are: Bolivar, Orellana, Sucumbios, Imbabura, Tungurahua, Zamora Chinchipe, Pastaza, Napo, Azuay, and Chimborazo.

Nonetheless, Pachakutik has a more stable presence at the parish councils than at the canton (mayors) and provincial (prefects) levels. Although the party's candidates are often elected in different parishes, their re-election rates (the party's) are higher than at any other subnational level elections. On average, the party's candidates are elected in 271 parishes in every election. This is equivalent to close to 34% of all parishes in the country. From election to election, around 70% of the parishes that already had Pachakutik's council members re-elected at least one of Pachakutik's candidates.[10] Nonetheless, it is essential to highlight that these are multi-member districts that can help a party get its candidates elected.

Despite the absence of strongholds, Pachakutik holds around 20% of all prefect seats, 10% of all mayoral seats, and 13% of all parish council members' seats throughout the years. Yet, the percentage of the national vote that the party receives continues to be small. One of the reasons for this small national vote share is that the cantons where the party competes and wins are sparsely populated. Figure 1.3 shows two maps. The map on the left shows the cantons where a candidate from Pachakutik was elected mayor between 1996 and 2019. Each canton in the map on the left is filled with color to reflect the canton's share of the indigenous population. The map on the right shows the same cantons but is colored to reflect the registered voters' share in these cantons. Figure 1.3 also shows one crucial fact about where Pachakutik's candidates are elected: candidates are elected in cantons with indigenous majorities and in cantons with indigenous minorities. This, added to the fact that only rarely the party has a mayor elected two times in the same cantons, suggests that the indigenous vote is not necessarily consistent for the party's candidates.[11]

Pachakutik is a party that persists with low electoral support levels and with scarce resources through the years. At the national level, the party receives, on more than one occasion, fewer votes than necessary to maintain formal registration, i.e., 4% of the national votes. At the subnational level, the number of votes is "stable," albeit it rarely surpasses the 4% mark. At this level, the party's electoral trajectory could be described as "flat" (Mustillo, 2009, p. 329). A flat trajectory for a party like Pachakutik is not necessarily surprising; this party is considered an ethnic party likely to garner consistent support from indigenous voters and nothing else.

[10] I focus here on whether a candidate (any candidate) from Pachakutik is elected in a consecutive election in the same parish. Due to the number of candidates and the inconsistencies on the data from CNE it is difficult to determine the rate of individual candidate re-election.

[11] The same applies to the provinces and parishes where Pachakutik's candidates are elected. The corresponding maps can be found in the appendix.

The data suggest, however, that this might not be the case. The *tell-tale signs* of this type of electoral support are absent, e.g., apparent strongholds and consistent re-election in districts with indigenous majorities. Instead, Pachakutik's 'successes' (understood as candidates' elections and re-elections) appear almost haphazard. The party's candidates are elected in different districts year after year. Moreover, these districts rarely have similar characteristics, e.g., some have high percentages of indigenous population, while others do not. Furthermore, although the party presents candidates in almost the same districts year after year, the votes the candidates get in each district fluctuate. It is difficult to identify a core set of voters per district.

Figure 1. 3 Cantons where Pachakutik's candidates were elected as mayors (2000-2019)



Source: Indigenous population data from the 2010 National Socio-economic census and registered voters' data from Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Pachakutik's haphazard electoral support at the national and subnational levels, instead of providing clues regarding the party's supporters, opens up more questions about the party. Is there a relationship between the party and the indigenous voters? Does the party receive the indigenous vote? Given that the party's candidates are often elected in districts where the

indigenous population is not a majority, how does the party mobilize non-indigenous (mestizo) votes?

Data and Methods

To answer these questions, I leverage quantitative and qualitative data. I use elections data to explore Pachakutik's electoral performance through the years and combine it with self-identification data from the 2001 and 2010 Censuses to study the indigenous voters' voting patterns using the ecological inference technique. To explore Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies, I combine data from the 2014 mayoral elections and data from the 2021 national elections and analyze it using qualitative content analysis. In addition, I complement these analyses with data from 11 months of fieldwork in Ecuador. I conducted over 24 semi-structured interviews with party experts, party (former) leaders, party members, confidential informants, and collected data through archival work.

Ecological inference data and method

The ecological inference method helps researchers overcome the problem of reaching conclusions about individual behavior without data gathered at this same level. Although these estimations may not necessarily reflect with exact precision the percentage of indigenous voters supporting Pachakutik and other parties (for which survey data would be necessary), the estimations do offer enough information to think about a "region" where the exact number may fall (Cho & Manski, 2008). Hence, the ecological inference is a good method to explore voting patterns of different population groups absent other sources of data. King's EI approach has been applied in several studies relating to ethnic voting and ethnic parties where individual-level data is not available (e.g., Chandra, 2004; Hirseland & Strijbis, 2019; Madrid, 2005; Mijeski & Beck, 2008, 2011).

I explore the indigenous population's voting patterns using the ecological inference method RxC (Rosen, Jiang, King, & Tanner, 2001). This method solves the problem of cross-level inference by combining two processes: first, it computes the deterministic bounds or ranges of the parameters of interest, e.g., the ethnic support of a given party; and secondly, it computes "a probabilistic model showing where the [parameters of interest] are likely to lie by "borrowing strength" from all constituencies in order to produce estimates for each" (Chandra, 2004a, p. 305). This two-step process produces estimates of the proportion of, for instance, members of an ethnic group that supported a particular political party. To produce these estimates, King's EI relies on three strong assumptions: first, that the parameters follow a truncated bivariate normal distribution;

secondly, that there is no aggregation bias in the data; and lastly, that there is no spatial dependence between the territorial units (King et al., 2004, p. 6).

I use election results and census data at the lowest possible ecological level (parishes).[12] I matched data from the 2001 Census with the election results of 2002, 2004, and 2006, and the data from the 2010 Census with the election results of 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, and 2019. The data did not match perfectly. The main problem is that the electoral data reflects the country's administrative division in a more detailed way, while the censuses data do not.[13] Table 1.4 summarizes the number of matched and dropped parishes per election. I used the matched data to estimate the indigenous voters' voting patterns for all elections at the canton level.[14]

To report the estimations, given the overwhelming number of parties participating in a single election in Ecuador, I sorted parties into three categories: traditional, non-traditional, and independent movements party categories.[15] I keep Pachakutik outside the categories, although the party effectively falls within the non-traditional party category.[16] In this paper, I focus on the presidential elections of 2002, 2006, 2013, and 2017 and the elections of mayors of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2017.[17] I do not report the estimations for all cantons in all elections, however. In the case of the presidential elections' estimations, I report estimations for half of the country's cantons on every election. In many cantons, the estimations are impossible because the indigenous population represents a too-small percentage of the population. In these

[12] It is important to point out that the percentage of the population in Ecuador that can be categorized as indigenous has been debated for years. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the indigenous movement leaders insisted the indigenous population in the country represented around 40% of the population (Mijeski & Beck, 2011; Pallares, 2002; Van Cott, 2005). However, no official data has been produced that reflects these percentages. Even the Integrated System of Ecuadorian Social Indicators (SIISE) in the year 2000 estimated that the indigenous population in Ecuador represented 14.5% of the national population. However, this estimation was produced based on expert reports rather than on actual survey data (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 44). The first official census data available regarding the indigenous population in Ecuador was produced in 2001. The Census data have been consistently challenged. One of the main critiques is that the data comes from self-identification data. The United Nations Report *Los pueblos indígenas en América Latina* (2014) explains that self-identification data is unreliable because the structural marginalization of the indigenous peoples by the state, enhanced by mistrust to government officials, often foster under-reporting of self-identifications. Additionally, the report stresses that the percentage of indigenous population that self-identifies as indigenous in the census is negatively influenced by the fact that the census offered as an option to self-identify as *mestizo*. Nevertheless, the Census is currently the only official and state sanctioned data on the percentage of the Ecuadorian population that self-identifies as indigenous. The data from the SIISE is no longer available.

[13] For example, the censuses lump together all urban parishes from a canton into a single parish while the electoral data includes data for each independent urban parish.

[14] Ernesto Calvo helped me run the estimations in R and I am grateful for his help. He wrote the original code to run the estimations of the 2014 elections. I made the necessary adjustments for each election.

[15] These categories are explained in full detail in the appendix.

[16] The full estimations on a party per party basis are available upon request.

[17] I analyzed all national and subnational elections between 2002 and 2019 using the ecological inference technique. The analyses of all elections are available on the online appendix (available at www.dianadavilagordillo.com)

cases, the estimations show that the indigenous voters in a canton split their votes equally amongst all parties, which is unlikely.[18] I, therefore, only use estimations that offer some variation on the way votes were cast. In the mayors' elections, I report only the estimations for cantons where Pachakutik presented candidates (on average less than half of all cantons had a candidate from Pachakutik).

Table 1. 4 Number of parishes employed in the EI estimations

	Year of elections							
	2002	2004	2006	2009	2013	2014	2017	2019
CNE parishes	1166	1177	1177	1185	1248	1255	1227	1232
Parishes used for EI	968	960	950	970	981	979	978	982
Number of dropped parishes	198	217	227	215	267	276	249	250

Mobilization strategies: Qualitative Content Analysis

To research the types of mobilization strategies Pachakutik's candidates employ, I developed a coding frame that builds on Mustillo's (2016) party-voter linkages (programmatic, clientelistic, vote-buying and symbolic, which was divided into party-based, candidate-based, and ethnic-based), and extant research on Pachakutik's campaign content (Collins, 2004; Jones West, 2011, 2020; Madrid, 2012; Van Cott, 2005). The coding frame was developed to identify the different appeals that the party's candidates employed in their campaigns using Qualitative Content Analysis (Schreier, 2013).[19]

The coding frame employed diverges substantially from prior efforts to categorize Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies. Traditionally, Pachakutik's programmatic appeals have been categorized as "ethnic" or "ethnic programmatic" because they are considered "traditional indigenous demands" (Becker, 2011; Lalander & Gustafsson, 2008; Madrid, 2008, 2012). These categorization efforts combined programmatic content alongside symbolic content. The coding frame employed here, by contrast, required the evaluation of the appeals based on the content and the beneficiaries and strived to disentangle the different types

[18] For example, in a canton of the 2002 elections, the estimations showed that each of the 11 candidates received 7.6% of the indigenous voters' votes and also that 7.6% of the indigenous voters casted null votes, and the same percentage casted blank voters.

[19] A detailed overview of the coding scheme is available in the appendix.

of appeals. Therefore, an appeal about "the defense of land rights" in prior coding frames would be categorized as "ethnic programmatic" because it is a key issue discussed by the indigenous social movement. In this paper, by contrast, this appeal is categorized as programmatic. If the appeal was accompanied by a reference to ethnicity (indigeneity) or the population's diversity, the coding frame required the appeal to be coded as programmatic *and* symbolic ethnic. An example of this case would be an appeal that states, "the defense of land rights is important to protect the population's diversity." Instead, if the defense of land rights appeal included references to a specific pueblo or nationality as recipients of the benefit, e.g., "the defense of pueblo *Kañari's* land rights," the appeal would be categorized as clientelistic (due to the nature of the recipients) *and* symbolic ethnic.

Two data sets were analyzed using this coding frame: data from the 2014 mayor elections and the 2021 national elections data. The 2014 data comes from the working plans presented by Pachakutik's candidates at the moment of their registration. These documents detail the candidate's general and specific objectives regarding the municipal office, the candidate's pledges (with technical criteria on implementation), and a diagnosis of the canton's state of affairs. [20] These documents offer the possibility to have a systematic account of all candidates' main pledges and are available upon request to the *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (CNE) as they are public documents.[21]

The candidates' working plans provide a bird's eye view of the intended appeals the candidates will employ during their campaigns and can be analyzed to determine the strategies used. The working plans, however, have some drawbacks. Specifically, because they are prepared before the beginning of the actual campaigns, the strategies and the appeals parties effectively deployed while campaigning – or the intensity with which these strategies and appeals were used – may have changed. Moreover, since these documents are prepared without direct interaction between candidates, parties may choose to amend their strategies or the appeals after the campaigns start in response to other candidates' campaigns. Nonetheless, changes in parties' strategies are difficult to grasp without studying (and trailing) each candidate. Therefore, despite the drawbacks, the working plans represent a rich source of

[20] This is stablished in article 13 de the *Código de la Democracia*.

[21] Researching local elections in Ecuador is not easy. Data about the local elections are scarce. The national media rarely report the electoral campaigns in small cantons. Before 2009, it was almost impossible to gather systematic information about these elections without traveling to each of the 221 cantons to review local archives. In fact, given the unpredictable quality of these local archives, the only feasible solution for anyone wanting to research local elections and mobilization strategies would be to shadow candidates and campaign managers. There are nonetheless some few cases in which the documents are not available due to processing problems e.g., the documents were not scanned in full by the local offices of CNE.

information. I coded and analyzed 65 working plans. This data set is the first, to my knowledge, to provide systematic data on subnational-level electoral campaigns in Ecuador.

The data from the 2021 elections comes from a joint project of data collection.[22] The data was collected by 18 research assistants that were trained on the discussed coding frame. The research assistants followed the campaigns of 87 candidates to the legislature and 3threepresidential candidates. In total, 17 Pachakutik's candidates to the legislature's campaigns were followed alongside Yaku Pérez's campaign. The coders followed each candidate's campaign and coded the content of all events where the candidate participated that served as a "campaign rally" or as the *candidate meets the community* event broadcasted through social media.

Ethnic voting in Ecuador: who votes for Pachakutik?

In Ecuador, scholars have focused on ethnic voting linked to the *indígena* identity. Their findings do not conform to the standard expectations, i.e., that the indigenous voters support Pachakutik *en mass*. Instead, indigenous voters appear to support different parties at different times. In parishes where the indigenous population is a majority, these voters support diverse candidates (including, but not limited, to Pachakutik's candidates) (Báez Rivera & Bretón Solo de Zaldívar, 2006; Madrid, 2005, p. 701; Sánchez Parga, 2013). To be sure, Pachakutik's candidates do often get support from the indigenous voters. However, this support is limited. Mijeski and Beck (2004, 2008, 2011) found that, on average, in 1996, around 30% of the votes cast by the indigenous voters were for Pachakutik's presidential candidate; in 1998, the percentage of votes declined to 20 %; in 2002, the proportion of votes increased to 46%; and in 2006, the percentage of votes declined again to 23%. These findings suggest a possible disconnection between the indigenous voters and Pachakutik. These also signal that the indigenous voters' do not necessarily vote as a block in general.

Given the absence of individual-level data, the ecological inference method offers the best possible way to examine the indigenous voters' voting patterns. In the following section, I review the ecological inference estimations regarding the indigenous voters' voting patterns. The conventional expectation is that – in general – most of the indigenous voters' votes should have gone to Pachakutik (given the *ethnic-pull* between the party and the electorate). This builds on the idea that Pachakutik is a viable ethnic party that will capture most of these votes

[22] My co-investigators in the are Angélica Abad, Raúl Aldaz, and Sebastián Vallejo with the support from Universidad de las Américas (UDLA) Ecuador.

(Madrid, 2005). To ground the expectation of *most* votes (and make sense of the estimations), I use as a baseline for comparison Mijeski's and Beck's (2004) findings for the presidential elections in 1996 where 32% of the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidate. I take this as the minimum percentage of votes Pachakutik's candidates should receive to be characterized as recipients of ethnic voting, i.e., most indigenous voters' vote. Because there are no available estimations or data regarding indigenous vote at the subnational level, I use the same criteria (32% of the votes) for the mayor elections' analysis. In sum, to claim Pachakutik holds the indigenous electorate captive, the estimations should show that at least 32% of the indigenous voters support the party's candidates consistently at all levels. If, by contrast, the party's candidates receive less support, i.e., less than 32% of the indigenous votes go to the party's candidates, and this support is not stable across the years, then it is possible to claim Pachakutik does not hold the indigenous electorate captive.

Presidential elections

The Ecological inference estimations show Pachakutik's presidential candidates up to 2017 did not count with the indigenous voters' undivided support. Table 1.5 shows that in 2002, on average, only 31% of the indigenous voters supported the party's candidate. Since then, the average number of indigenous voters' votes for Pachakutik has declined. This reached a historical low in 2017 when only 12% of the indigenous voters supported the party's candidates. The estimations suggest a lack of connection between the indigenous voters and the party's candidates. Even in 2006, when the party presented its first indigenous candidate, the indigenous voters did not coalesce. Instead, while some indigenous voters cast votes for Pachakutik, the majority supported other parties' candidates.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that the indigenous voters' support for any other party did not surpass the baseline percentage of ethnic voting (i.e., 32%). In 2006 the bulk of the indigenous' vote went to PSP. On average, 25% of the indigenous voters supported this party. In 2013 MPAIS received approximately 25% of the indigenous voters' votes.[23] In 2017 the bulk of the indigenous ballots went to the electoral alliance CREO/SUMA with their candidate Guillermo Lasso. This candidate received approximately 27% of the indigenous votes.[24] The rest of the indigenous voters' ballots during these elections was spread out between

[23] The percentage of votes from the indigenous population for MPAIS was calculated with the EI estimates. The standard deviation of this mean is 0.19.

[24] The percentage of votes from the indigenous population for CREO/SUMA was calculated with the EI estimates. The standard deviation of this mean is 0.19.

numerous candidates. This shows that the indigenous voters have not found a replacement party to coalesce behind. As Madrid (2005) discusses, when political parties fail to represent indigenous voters, they tend to split their votes amongst multiple parties.

*Table 1. 5 EI estimations of the proportion of indigenous and mestizo voters casting ballots for Pachakutik, Traditional Parties, Non-Traditional Parties, and Independent Movements in the presidential elections of 2002, 2006, 2013, and 2017**

Year	Pachakutik	Traditional Parties (added)	Non-Traditional Parties (added)	Independent Movements (added)
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Indigenous voters				
2002 (n=105)	0.31 (0.24)	0.23 (0.14)	0.17 (0.09)	0.12 (0.07)
2006 (n=108)	0.13 (0.14)	0.21 (0.10)	0.40 (0.21)	0.13 (0.07)
2013 (n=109)	0.17 (0.18)	0.04 (0.03)	0.62 (0.18)	0.04 (0.03)
2017 (n=109)	0.12 (0.09)	0.07 (0.05)	0.54 (0.18)	0.13 (0.08)
Mestizo voters				
2002 (n=105)	0.30 (0.17)	0.28 (0.11)	0.17 (0.07)	0.09 (0.04)
2006 (n=108)	0.03 (0.03)	0.18 (0.07)	0.60 (0.13)	0.06 (0.02)
2013 (n=109)	0.06 (0.11)	0.01 (0.01)	0.82 (0.12)	0.01 (0.009)
2017 (n=109)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.04)	0.68 (0.10)	0.06 (0.03)

Source: Means and standard deviations calculated based on EI estimations with data from the National Census of 2001 and electoral results from CNE.

** The percentage of null votes and blank votes are not included in the table. With these columns, the rows add to 100% of the votes.*

Table 1.5 also includes data about the mestizo voters' voting patterns. In 2002 about 30% of the mestizo voters supported Pachakutik's candidate. In 2006, by contrast, only 3% of

the mestizo voters supported Luis Macas. The decline in the number of mestizo votes in 2006 for Pachakutik and the fact that the mestizo population supported Pachakutik's candidate in 2002 is not entirely unexpected. Much has been said about non-indigenous voters' support for Pachakutik before 2002 due to *ethno-populist* strategies (see: Madrid, 2012). The argument stresses that after the party abandoned these strategies, both mestizo and indigenous voters stopped supporting the party.

Nonetheless, in 2013 and 2017, more mestizo voters supported Pachakutik's candidates compared to 2006. This shift suggests these voters returned to support Pachakutik's candidates, albeit still in small numbers. However, it is essential to point out that these years candidates were electoral alliances' candidates. This could have impacted the mestizo support, i.e., mestizo supporters may be voting for the other members of the alliance and not for Pachakutik.

Figure 1.4 plots the data from table 1.5. The dark blue dot on each boxplot marks the mean value of the estimations. The figure shows the decline in Pachakutik's indigenous support from 2002 to 2006 and a slight increase in support for the party's candidates in 2013 and 2017. Moreover, the boxplots show that despite the average support for Pachakutik declined from 2006 onwards, in several cantons, the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik as a block (indicated by the outlier dots).

These outliers suggest that there are some cantons where the indigenous voters do vote together. This has already been discussed by scholars focusing only on indigenous majority parishes (see: Báez Rivera & Bretón Solo de Zaldívar, 2006; Sánchez Parga, 2013). Yet, as was already acknowledged by these authors, there is no consistency in Pachakutik's candidates' support in these cantons. I explored each of the outlier cantons. No canton where the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidates in one year similarly supported the party's candidate during the next election. The only pattern I found was that there is no pattern. The indigenous voters appear to vote together only at times, in different cantons, and for different candidates. Figure 1.4 also shows that the indigenous voters split their votes between parties across different party categories. Notably, the indigenous voters' voting patterns are very similar to the mestizo voters' voting patterns.

Figure 1.4 also shows the mestizo voters' voting patterns. Interestingly, the figure shows that again, in some cantons, the mestizo voters supported Pachakutik's candidates as a block. This suggests that Pachakutik's candidates can effectively mobilize mestizo voters. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that the higher percentages of mestizo support happen in years when the party's candidate was mestizo.

Figure 1. 4 Indigenous and mestizo voters' voting patterns in the presidential elections of 2002, 2006, 2013, and 2017.



Overall, the presidential elections' EI estimations show that the indigenous voters do not vote as a block for Pachakutik or any other party. The idea of ethnic voting in Ecuador, at this level, appears unfounded. The indigenous voters' voting patterns resemble the mestizo voters' voting patterns. They show no consistency (in terms of support for a single party). It follows that it would be a mistake to think about the indigenous voters' connection to Pachakutik as a given. If this was the case, the indigenous voters should support the party's candidates in similar numbers across elections. Moreover, suppose the ethnic pull was present; in that case, the indigenous voters should have supported the indigenous candidate (Luis Macas) at higher rates than they did any of the mestizo candidates. Yet this was not the case.

Municipal elections

In the subnational arena, as already discussed, Pachakutik has more consistent electoral support. Yet, this support does not come from strongholds. This suggests that the generally expected connection between the indigenous voters and Pachakutik may not be present at this level either. The EI estimations confirm this and show that the indigenous voters are not

supporting Pachakutik's candidates as a block. Only rarely more than 32% of the indigenous voters' ballots were for Pachakutik's candidates. Importantly, when this happens, it happens only once. In the following elections, the voters appear to shift their support towards different candidates. Interestingly, the EI estimations also show that much of Pachakutik's candidates' support comes from mestizo voters.

Table 1.6 summarizes the EI estimations for all cantons in Ecuador with a Pachakutik candidate for mayor in 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019. The table includes data for cantons where Pachakutik's candidates participated, and the estimations were possible. Because not all parties present candidates in all cantons, the number of cantons considered for the estimations of support for all other categories of parties changes.

The EI estimates show that Pachakutik's candidates in all elections received support both from the indigenous voters and the mestizo voters. Yet, the indigenous voters do not appear to have supported Pachakutik's candidates as a block. Except for 2014, on average, less than 30% of the indigenous votes were for Pachakutik's candidates. As was the case at the presidential elections, the indigenous voters split their votes across parties in all party categories. Notably, the average indigenous support for Pachakutik's candidates in these elections is higher than at the national level. Nonetheless, as discussed already, the stable average obscures the fact that the votes come from different districts. Table 1.6 also shows the average support for Pachakutik's candidates from mestizo voters. This support is relatively stable. The party's candidates get, on average, 20% of all mestizo voters' votes in multiple elections.

The support for Pachakutik's candidates is not unexpected. Experts and Pachakutik's (former) members I interviewed highlighted two things regarding the relationship between the indigenous voters and political parties, including Pachakutik, at the subnational level. First, local leaders are crucially important. They define who becomes a candidate, with which party, and whom the community will support. Second, local organizations do not always have the support of all indigenous voters in a district. Instead, it is often the case that there are multiple organizations in one district. Hence it is possible that even if Pachakutik's candidates are linked to an indigenous grassroots organization, this might be connected to all indigenous voters in a district. Third, it is also possible for Pachakutik's candidates to be linked to non-indigenous organizations. Pachakutik's local branches had enough freedom to develop their own strategies and make electoral alliances with (whichever) necessary organizations. However, this does not mean that they would do so with the largest or more important organization in a district. These

three factors can contribute to Pachakutik's fluctuating electoral outcomes and the fact that different electors support the party.

Table 1. 6 EI estimations of the proportion of indigenous and mestizo voters casting ballots for Pachakutik, Traditional Parties, Non-Traditional Parties, and Independent Movements in the mayor elections of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019.

Year	Pachakutik	Traditional Parties (added)	Non-Traditional Parties (added)	Independent Movements (added)
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Indigenous voters				
	n= 83	n= 78	n= 82	n= 12
2004	0.27 (0.19)	0.32 (0.18)	0.21 (0.16)	0.11 (0.10)
	n= 80	n= 54	n= 80	n= 66
2009	0.27 (0.17)	0.16 (0.16)	0.29 (0.16)	0.17 (0.12)
	n= 75	n= 35	n= 76	n= 32
2014	0.31 (0.21)	0.12 (0.12)	0.38 (0.19)	0.18 (0.17)
	n= 83	n= 70	n= 81	n= 68
2019	0.23 (0.19)	0.13 (0.10)	0.27 (0.20)	0.30 (0.22)
Mestizo voters				
	n= 83	n= 78	n= 82	n= 12
2004	0.20 (0.15)	0.43 (0.20)	0.23 (0.18)	0.07 (0.07)
	n= 80	n= 54	n= 80	n= 66
2009	0.21 (0.16)	0.16 (0.11)	0.34 (0.15)	0.25 (0.19)
	n= 75	n= 35	n= 76	n= 32
2014	0.20 (0.18)	0.13 (0.15)	0.51 (0.23)	0.21 (0.17)
	n= 83	n= 70	n= 81	n= 68
2019	0.18 (0.18)	0.21 (0.18)	0.32 (0.21)	0.26 (0.20)

Source: Means and standard deviations calculated based on EI estimations with data from the National Census and electoral results.

Figure 1.5 plots the data from table 1.6. The dark blue dots represent the mean percentage of votes cast by each group of voters. Figure 1.5 is useful to see the remarkable similarity between the indigenous voters' voting pattern and the mestizo voters' voting pattern. Both groups' support for independent movements increases across the years. In turn, both groups' support for Pachakutik's candidates is somewhat stable. Nonetheless, the indigenous

voters' support for Pachakutik's candidates only rarely reaches the minimum baseline level discussed (32% of the votes).

Figure 1. 5 Votes cast by mestizo and indigenous voters for candidates for mayor in the elections of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019



Figure 1.5 also shows that, at times and in some districts (cantons), the indigenous voters appear to vote for Pachakutik's candidates as a block. Interestingly, this is also the case for mestizo voters in some cantons. As I did for the presidential elections' estimates, I explored each of the cantons where more than 50% of the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidates. I found that the indigenous voters in these cantons do not consistently support the party's candidates across the years, nor do they always vote as a block. Similarly, the cantons where the mestizo voters support Pachakutik's candidates as a block change from election to election. This suggests that there may be different connections between indigenous and mestizo voters and the party's candidates they support, in addition to or despite Pachakutik's indigenous relationship.

In sum, the EI estimations confirm what the electoral results data suggested. Pachakutik's electoral support is not coming only from the indigenous voters. These voters

only rarely support the party's candidates as a block. This finding, if not surprising, is unexpected. It goes against the conventional idea of Pachakutik as an ethnic party with a solid ethnic electoral support base. The EI estimations, as discussed already, also highlight the need to explore how Pachakutik's candidate engage their voters – primarily the mestizo voters. This opens up multiple lines of inquiry, crucially: what is Pachakutik doing to get votes from these two groups.

Going back to the discussion of excess votes for the 2021 elections, defined as the percentage of the national vote the party has not received in previous elections, approximately, 15% of the national vote (considering the party's national average tends to be around 4%), should not be conceptualized as mestizo-only new votes. The EI estimations suggest that the party's 4% was already multi-ethnic and hence the excess votes will also be multi-ethnic.

Pachakutik's mobilization strategies

Researchers focusing on Pachakutik, and defining it as an intrinsically ethnic party, have found that the party's candidates employ multiple mobilization strategies (Collins, 2004; Madrid, 2012; Mustillo, 2016; Van Cott, 2005). Moreover, some scholars have highlighted that Pachakutik's candidates employ strategies (considered contradictory) simultaneously, e.g., programmatic and personalistic appeals, as well as programmatic and ethnic (particularistic) appeals. Extant research on Pachakutik's strategies highlights how the party and its candidates aim to mobilize voters. First, that Pachakutik employs more than a single strategy to mobilize voters, i.e., the party uses appeals from more than a single mobilization strategy; second, that it does not – or at least not in full – deploy the same strategy across all districts and electoral arenas (see: Collins, 2004; Jones West, 2011, 2020); and third that the appeals the party and candidates employ are also numerous and appear to change from district to district. There are some gaps in our knowledge, however.

First, it is unclear how these strategies are deployed, especially in the subnational arena. The current findings are contradictory; Jones West's (2011, 2020) work shows Pachakutik's candidates employ different strategies and appeals in different legislative districts. By contrast, Collins' (2004) work implies the party used the same combination of strategies in all subnational electoral districts. The second gap in our knowledge relates to the party's candidates' actual appeals and whether these appeals are the same across districts. This is particularly relevant for the use of symbolic (indigenous appeals).

Additionally, researchers have not explicitly focused on who the party is aiming to mobilize. There is a lack of discussion on whether the mixed and segmented strategies follow the logic of appealing to diverse core-voters or appealing to non-core-voters, or by contrast, it aims to mobilize both groups. To be sure, all of the authors studying Pachakutik's mobilization strategies highlight that the candidates can mobilize electoral support from both indigenous (expected core-voters) and mestizo voters (expected non-core-voters). Nonetheless, these authors also stress that mestizo votes have dwindled as the years passed. Hence, it is clear that it is necessary to evaluate the party's mobilization strategies from this perspective.

In the following sections, I discuss Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies at subnational and national elections. Building on extant research, the expectation would be that the party's candidates employ symbolic ethnic appeals across all districts. In addition, these symbolic appeals should be accompanied by programmatic appeals linked closely to the interests of the indigenous movement agenda.

Pachakutik's mobilization strategies in the 2014 elections

Pachakutik's candidates employed multiple appeals to engage their voters in the 2014 elections. Against conventional expectations, the party's candidates did not employ symbolic ethnic appeals consistently or across all districts. The only set of appeals used by the candidates in all districts were programmatic appeals. The candidates used a combination of 47 different programmatic offers in every district. The appeals relate, in general, to changing or improving services such as education, agricultural services, waste disposal, public health, security, roads and public transport services, and territorial control.[25] Importantly, most of these appeals were not linked to specific indigenous content or specified as serving only that particular constituency. Consequently, these should not be qualified as ethnic-programmatic.

The next set of appeals found in the working plans are the symbolic appeals, which were subdivided into ethnic-based, candidate-based, and party-based. These appeals are not included in all working plans. The symbolic ethnic-based appeals can be subdivided into generic and specific appeals. The generic ethnic appeals make references to generic aspects of the indigenous identity. The working plans contain references to 1) the importance of "diversity," 2) the need to ensure "inclusion for all [population groups]" as well as "the integration of all [population groups]," 3) the importance of maintaining the cultural identity of the population, and 4) the importance of protecting and preserving "ancestral values." The

[25] An overview of all appeals employed is listed in the appendix.

second subset of symbolic ethnic appeals is more specific. These appeals refer to differentiated identities. These appeals hence mention different *pueblos* and nationalities by name, e.g., the protection of the cultural identity of the pueblo Kañari. Furthermore, there are references to the concept of "good living" or buen *vivir* in an indigenous language, either in Shuar or Kichwa. The languages are used based on the languages spoken by the indigenous population in specific cantons.

The party-based appeals were scarcer than the indigenous-based appeals. These appeals focused on the known principles of Pachakutik: *ama llulla, ama killa, ama shuwa* (do not lie, do not be lazy, and do not steal).[26] Other working plans spoke of the party as "an organization that advances participatory intercultural governing practices or alternative government" and about the party as the promotor of "new forms of development." The party-based appeals in the working plans fit with the party's longtime definition as an anti-establishment party and present the party as an alternative for the electorate that is different from traditional parties (Mijeski & Beck, 2011). These appeals focused on the party's brand rather than its ability to deliver or the party as an incumbent.

The candidate-based appeals were even scarcer than the party-based appeals. These focused on the candidates' prior experiences with references to the candidate's academic achievements, prior work, and general life experience, i.e., the candidates' work with the local population. These appeals also often included – albeit not always alongside the candidates' prior experiences content – references to the candidates' incumbency. The working plans referred to the candidates' work as sitting mayors and how the experience was necessary for their re-election.

Lastly, within the working plans, I found clientelistic appeals. These appeals resembled programmatic appeals with the difference that clear clients (benefits' recipients) were listed. The clientelistic appeals were uncommon. Only a few working plans included them. When they did, the clientelistic appeals focused on 1) the establishment of bilingual education programs which can only be accessed by the indigenous population in the canton; 2) direct offers of land rights recognition or infrastructure for specific groups of voters; 3) the inclusion of *indígena* quotas in public administration and health programs; and 4) the use of indigenous languages within the municipal services.

[26] This content was not coded as symbolic ethnic even though the words are in Kichwa as they are linked to the party's principles and are often presented as a form of party slogan.

Based on the appeals found in each of the working plans, it is possible to produce an overview of the mobilization strategies the candidates employed in each canton. Table 1.7 summarizes this information. The party's candidates used in total nine types of mixed mobilization strategies and one pure strategy. The pure strategy was the programmatic mobilization strategy. The mixed mobilization strategies all included programmatic appeals alongside different combinations of symbolic and clientelistic appeals.

Table 1. 7 Pachakutik's mobilization strategies at the mayor's elections of 2014 (by canton)

Mobilization strategies	Number of Cantons	Percentage of cantons	Elected candidates
Pure strategies			
Programmatic	31	47.7	8
Mixed strategies			
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (candidate)	3	4.6	1
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and candidate)/ Clientelism	2	3.1	1
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and party brand)	2	3.1	2
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic, candidate, and party brand)	1	1.5	1
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic, party brand, and party incumbency)	2	3.1	2
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic)	13	20.0	6
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic)/ Clientelism	4	6.1	3
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (party brand)	5	7.7	1
Mixed Programmatic/Symbolic (ethnic and party incumbency)	2	3.1	1
Total	65	100.0	26

Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies at the 2021 national elections

The 2021 data shows patterns similar to those from the 2014 elections as the candidates mixed and segmented strategies. One important difference is that the most employed set of appeals

was not programmatic but symbolic party-based.[27] Figure 1.6 shows the appeals employed by the candidates in the 140 campaign events that were analyzed. In 87.9% of these events, the candidates used symbolic party-based appeals. The candidates referred to Pachakutik motto: *ama llulla, ama killa, ama shuwa* (do not lie, do not be lazy, and do not steal), described the party as an honest party, the rainbow party, the party that stands with the people, the party that would fight against corruption and a non-only indigenous party. Often linked to these appeals, the candidates use programmatic appeals. These programmatic appeals focused on multiple topics, such as providing free education and access to universities, legal reforms (penal code, and reforming the legislature), protecting the environment, and lowering unemployment. Crucially, these programmatic appeals are not ones linked solely to the indigenous movement's agenda. The third most used set of appeals was the symbolic candidate-based. The candidates referred to themselves (or to the presidential candidate) as honest, caring, generous, humble, and educated. The candidates also emphasized they were part of "the people" and had been poor growing up. These appeals focused on highlighting how the candidates were the ideal persons for the job.

Figure 1. 6 Pachakutik's candidates' appeals at the 2021 national elections



The fourth more used set of appeals, albeit vastly underused compared to the other appeals, were the symbolic ethnic-appeals. Contrary to the expectation, but in line with the 2014 elections data, Pachakutik's candidates only at times use ethnic symbolic appeals. These appeals ranged from generic, i.e., the use of folkloric music, to more specific with candidates

[27] An overview of these appeals can be found in the appendix.

speaking in Kichwa and claiming to be part of a specific indigenous *pueblo* or nationality. Lastly, Pachakutik's candidates also used clientelistic and vote-buying appeals. The former included targeted promises to specific communities (wherever the candidates were meeting voters). The latter included free covid tests, personal protective equipment, and party paraphernalia such as small bracelets.

Figure 1. 7 Pachakutik's candidates appeals by province



Pachakutik's candidates, mixed and segmented strategies. Not one single candidate used the same mix of mobilization strategies in all events. In 20 events, the candidates used a pure- strategy to engage their voters. In all other events, they mixed multiple strategies (see table 1.8). Figure 1.7 is useful to visualize the variation across candidates and provinces. The figure shows how certain appeals were used less frequently in some provinces, such as symbolic ethnic appeals in Guayas and Manabí.

Table 1. 8 Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies at the 2021 national elections

Mobilization strategies	Number of event s	Percentage
Pure strategies		
Programmatic	6	4.4%
Symbolic (candidate)	1	0.7%
Symbolic (ethnic)	1	0.7%
Symbolic (party)	12	8.8%
Mixed strategies		
Mixed Programmatic / Symbolic (candidate)	3	2.2%
Mixed Programmatic / Symbolic (candidate) / Clientelistic	1	0.7%
Mixed Programmatic / Symbolic (candidate and party)	16	11.7%
Mixed Programmatic / Symbolic (candidate and party) / Clientelism	7	5.1%
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic)	1	0.7%
Mixed Programmatic / Symbolic (ethnic, candidate, and party)	3	2.2%
Mixed Programmatic / Symbolic (ethnic, candidate and party) / Clientelism	2	1.5%
Mixed Programmatic / Symbolic (ethnic, candidate and party) / Vote-buying	2	1.5%
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and party)	19	13.9%
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and party)/Clientelism	2	1.5%
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and party)/ Clientelism/ Vote-buying	1	0.7%
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (party)	13	9.5%
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (party)/ Clientelism	2	1.5%
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (party)/ Vote-buying	2	1.5%
Mixed Symbolic (candidate) / Clientelism	1	0.7%
Mixed Symbolic (candidate and party)	12	8.8%
Mixed Symbolic (candidate and party) / Clientelism	4	2.9%
Mixed Symbolic (candidate and party) / Clientelism / Vote-buying	1	0.7%
Mixed Symbolic (candidate and party) / Vote-buying	6	4.4%
Mixed Symbolic (candidate) / Clientelism / vote-buying	1	0.7%
Mixed Symbolic (ethnic, candidate, and party)	3	2.2%
Mixed Symbolic (ethnic, candidate, and party) / Vote-buying	5	3.6%
Mixed Symbolic (ethnic and party)	5	3.6%
Mixed Symbolic (ethnic and party) / Clientelism	1	0.7%
Mixed Symbolic (party) / Clientelism	2	1.5%
Mixed Symbolic (party) / Vote-buying	2	1.5%
Total	137	100.0%

The 2014 and 2021 election data show that Pachakutik does not behave like a stereotypical ethnic party. The candidates only at times emphasize symbolic ethnic content and in some districts. Instead, they focus on programmatic content (not linked to the indigenous movement agenda), symbolic party-based content, and symbolic candidate-based content more consistently. The variation in the location and how candidates mix strategies suggest they aim to mobilize different electorates at different times. My interviewees discussed this during fieldwork: the party's branches' leaders advise candidates on running campaigns and who to engage. Although this advice and strategies may not be foolproof, the use of these strategies has likely contributed to non-indigenous voters' engagement.

Conclusion

The 2021 elections surprised most academics studying Ecuador and Pachakutik. Yaku Pérez (almost) achievement, alongside 27 seats at the legislature for Pachakutik's candidates, brought attention to this otherwise irrelevant party. As discussed in the introduction, the question in everyone's minds was: where did all these votes come from? This paper has shown that the most intuitive answer to the question is not necessarily correct. This explanation was that the indigenous voters' undivided support pushed Pachakutik's candidates across the electoral thresholds in many provinces (and, almost, nationally). To be sure, it is very likely that the indigenous voters indeed supported Pachakutik's candidates in large numbers. Yet, the historical data analyzed in this paper shows that this has not been a constant. Moreover, it is also likely non-indigenous voters supported the party as well. Importantly, the "excess votes" described in the introduction should not be conceptualized as new mestizo-only votes, rather these excess votes should be conceptualized as both indigenous and mestizo votes.

The next question was, how does Pachakutik mobilize voters indigenous *and* mestizo? Although party loyalty is determined by several other variables, what a party does to mobilize voters matters. I focused on the party's candidates' mobilization strategies. I showed that Pachakutik takes an active role in mobilizing different voters in different districts. Pachakutik segments and mixes strategies. These strategies help the party engage the core (indigenous) and the non-core (mestizo) voters. I showed that the party's candidates do not consistently emphasize ethnic appeals, and when they do, this content is not always specific. These findings go against the conventional evaluation of Pachakutik as an ethnic-programmatic party (Collins, 2004; Van Cott, 2005), and the argument that Pachakutik has turned into an ethno-nationalist party that emphasizes ethnic appeals (Madrid, 2012). Moreover, the use of mixed and

segmented strategies goes against common arguments about ethnic parties, emphasizing the use of clientelistic appeals (Chandra, 2011; Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985). Pachakutik's candidates' use of these mixed strategies does not appear to follow a particular logic, other than being set-up to appeal to as many voters as possible within each district.

Pachakutik is, hence, an ethnic (indigenous) party based on its (indigenous) leadership (Chandra, 2011; Van Cott, 2005), but a multi-ethnic party in as much it employs an inclusive platform that relies on symbolic content not limited to ethnic (indigenous) appeals and includes inclusive programmatic content. The fact that these mixed strategies have, for the first time, helped the party win more than 5 to 10 seats at the legislature have important implications for, the party system, the ethnic/non-ethnic divide, and how government will be organized – regardless of who is elected president.

Pachakutik's achievement has an important impact on the party system. After 2017, the one party that had contributed to the overall reduction of the party system fragmentation, Alianza Pais, fell apart with multiple members joining other organizations, opting to remain as *independent* and others coalescing under a new name. This was likely to trigger further fragmentation of the system, as was the case in 2002 and 2006 when traditional parties lost their power. However, Pachakutik winning 27 seats that could have gone to smaller/provincial organization indubitably will reduce the party system fragmentation. Moreover, the number of legislators turns Pachakutik into an important coalition maker.

Pachakutik's candidates' election also suggests the party has been able to overcome a divide that was considered long-lasting and unsurmountable: the indigenous/non-indigenous divide. To be sure, ethnic identities in Ecuador are fluid which makes this expected divide counter-intuitive, but nonetheless present particularly in the way pundit's see politics.

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Appendix

Electoral results data: where are Pachakutik's candidates elected?

Figure 1. 8 Provinces where Pachakutik presented candidates for prefects



Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Figure 1. 9 Provinces where Pachakutik's candidates were elected prefects (2000-2019)



Source: Indigenous population data from the 2010 National Socio-economic census and registered voters' data from Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Figure 1. 10 Cantons where Pachakutik presented candidates for Mayor



Source: Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Figure 1. 11 Parishes where Pachakutik presented candidates for parish councils



Source: Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Figure 1. 12 Parishes where Pachakutik's candidates were elected to the parish councils



Source: Indigenous population data from the 2010 National Socio-economic census and registered voters' data from Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Methodological considerations:

Party categories

One of the main difficulties of studying the Ecuadorian party system is the large number of parties participating in elections. In addition to the many new parties (national and mostly local) created for every election, the number of competitors is compounded by electoral alliances.[28]

A solution to deal with the ever-growing number of parties, particularly for longitudinal analyses, is to organize the parties and the alliances into categories. Using categories helps follow the trends of support for different party groups and simplifies narratives (moving away from long and often confusing lists of parties). Parties in Ecuador can be divided into three categories.[29] The first category is the *traditional parties'* category. The traditional parties are national parties that participated in the first or the subsequent national elections since Ecuador's return to democracy in 1979.[30] The second category is the *non-traditional parties'* category. The non-traditional parties are national parties that were not present at the first or the subsequent national elections since Ecuador's return to democracy. The last category is the *Movimientos Independientes* (independent movements) category. This category includes all political movements created after 1996 that have not received political parties' status (rights and duties). Pachakutik is a non-traditional party.

As many parties participate in electoral alliances, these also need to be allocated within the three categories.[31] To do this, I take into consideration the different partners within the alliance. Suppose the alliance is between parties that belong to the same party category. In that case, the alliance is allocated to the same party category. Suppose the alliance partners are from different party categories. In that case, I assign the alliance to the party category of the partner with the larger number of seats at the legislature in that electoral year.[32] Using this rule ensures

[28] This is mostly due to the fact that parties may join different alliances in different districts: in 2017 there were in total 28 electoral districts (for the legislative elections) a party could – in theory – present candidates in all 28 districts under different electoral alliances and use a different one for the presidential candidate. In total one single party may effectively turn itself into 29 different parties.

[29] I build on Flavia Freidenberg's (2015) categorization of Ecuadorian political parties. She divides the Ecuadorian political parties into two categories: *traditional parties* and *non-traditional parties*.

[30] The traditional parties are: *Izquierda Democrática* (ID), *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC), *Democracia Popular* (DP-UDC), *Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano* (PRE), *Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano* (PSE), *Movimiento Popular Democrático* (MPD) and *Concentración de Fuerzas Populares* (CFP).

[31] How to deal with alliances depends on the type of analysis. For analyses centred on the number of votes parties receive, votes may be divided following what is established in the Ecuadorian electoral laws i.e., splitting votes following past electoral performances of the partners. An alternative is also to split the votes equally between alliances' partners (e.g. Mustillo, 2009; Mustillo & Polga-Hecimovich, 2018).

[32] For example, in the case of the electoral alliance between PSC and an independent political movement MIFPPE from the election of 2002 I assign this alliance to the Traditional Party category. I do this because in 2002 PSC was the largest party in the legislature thus also the partner with the largest legislative block. If by contrast

that the allocation of alliances considers the changes in political parties' relevance throughout the years.[33] Additionally, as my focus is on Pachakutik's performance, I assign all of the party's electoral alliances as part of the category Pachakutik.

Coding Scheme

The programmatic appeals were defined as all offers of services and benefits that had universal beneficiaries and were contingent on the party's candidates' election. These included all content relating to protecting land rights, providing health services, and service provision (e.g., road improvement, drinking water services, and waste disposal services). In turn, clientelistic appeals were defined as those referring to public and private goods with specific (limited) beneficiaries. This included services provided solely to the indigenous population, e.g., offers of setting up bilingual education and the use of indigenous languages in public administration. Vote-buying was coded as the delivery of goods before elections. The symbolic strategy was divided into three subcategories: ethnic-based, candidate-based, and party-based.

The symbolic ethnic subcategory was defined as relating to all appeals that included any reference to the *indígena* identity, the indigenous social movement, and specific identities of the *pueblos* and nationalities. The coding frame allows for the further division of these appeals into low, medium, and high levels of ethnic content. References to plurinationalism, diversity, and alternative forms of government are coded as low-level ethnic appeals. Additionally, any reference to state-sanctioned data or laws that refer to the indigenous population was also coded as low-level ethnic appeals.[34] The political arena is filled with these appeals. These are found amongst Pachakutik's candidates and other parties' candidates' appeals and could be defined as constitutive of everyday political speech in Ecuador.[35] In turn, medium level ethnic appeals included references to the indigenous population in general, e.g., that the work is done for *pueblos* and nationalities, references to the indigenous identity of

MIFPPE had a larger number of seats at the legislature on that year, I would have allocated the alliance to the Independent Movements category.

[33] Many parties that were once relevant, such as traditional parties, have become less relevant within the system receiving declining shares of the national votes. For instance, for the elections of 1996, 1998, and 2002, most electoral alliances that included at least one traditional party were re-categorized to the traditional parties' category. By contrast, from 2006 onward, it is more often that I allocate these alliances (with a traditional party partner) to other party categories.

[34] Initially the second coder struggled to identify the difference between mentions of *pueblos* and nationalities as part of appeals, and refences to state policies that represent more a case of repetition of policies than actual ethnic appeals. Moreover, the listing of these laws was included as part of the mandatory diagnosis section of the working plans so they can't hardly be taken as a form of appeal.

[35] The fact that these topics are pervasive in the political discourse in the country reflects the effects of the indigenous social movement and Pachakutik in the political arena. Nevertheless, because they have become so common and are used across the board by all politicians they should not be taken as actual explicit ethnic appeals.

candidates, and references to the party as an indigenous representative (similar to what was reported by Jones West (2011) about candidates claiming to "stand with" the indigenous population). The high level of ethnic appeals, in turn, included the use of explicit ethnic symbolism such as the use of an indigenous language in the text (e.g., references to the good living concept in an indigenous language in Kichwa: *sumak kawsay* or in Shuar: *penker pujustin*). Additionally, references to specific *pueblos* and nationalities by name and location, e.g., *el pueblo Kañari*.

Symbolic candidate-based appeals are defined in the coding frame as referring to the candidate's competence, e.g., efficiency and transparency (Collins, 2004), a candidate's reputation, or a candidate's prior work, and the candidates' incumbency. Lastly, party-based appeals were defined as relating to mentions of the party's reputation, competence, characteristics, e.g., "a party that delivers" (Collins, 2004), and incumbency.

A final evaluation of the party's candidates' mobilization strategies is produced with the analyzed data. The final assessment reflects the *added* outcome of the coding. In short, the final evaluation reflects all aspects in which the appeals were coded as being present. The use of ethnic appeals was re-coded into a dichotomous variable, making "low" equivalent to appeals *not present*, and "high" and "medium" equivalent to appeals being *present*. This works in the following manner: Pachakutik's candidate's working plan in 2014 in the canton Girón in the province Azuay was coded as using low-level ethnic appeals, programmatic appeals, and party-based appeals. The final evaluation of that canton's working plan reflects this, and it was defined as using: a *mixed programmatic and symbolic (party brand) mobilization strategy*. In turn, the working plan from the candidate in the canton El Tambo in the province Cañar was coded as employing high-level ethnic appeals, plus programmatic and party-based appeals. Thus, the final evaluation reflects this and states the working plan used: m*ixed programmatic, symbolic (ethnic-based), and symbolic (party-based) mobilization strategies*.

Researchers focusing on Pachakutik, and defining it as an intrinsically ethnic party, have found that the party's candidates employ multiple mobilization strategies (Collins, 2004; Madrid, 2012; Mustillo, 2016; Van Cott, 2005). Moreover, some scholars have highlighted that Pachakutik's candidates employ strategies (considered contradictory) simultaneously, e.g., programmatic and personalistic appeals, as well as programmatic and ethnic (particularistic) appeals. Van Cott (2005) and Mustillo (2016) describe the party's strategies as ethnic programmatic. In turn, Madrid (2012) asserts the party used ethno-populist strategies (a combination of ethnic appeals, programmatic appeals, and populist appeals) until 2006 and since then has moved to ethnic-centered programmatic strategies. Jones-West (2011, 2020)

describes the party's strategies as programmatic with the often added use of personalistic and ethnic appeals. Lastly, Collins (2004), focusing on the party's strategies at subnational elections, describes the strategies as programmatic combined with ethnic appeals and candidate-centered appeals.

Table 1.9 summarizes the party's appeals as listed by these authors. The appeals are organized into three mobilization strategies' categories. Van Cott (2005) describes Pachakutik as a party combining programmatic and ethnic appeals. She asserts the programmatic appeals focused on land rights, bilingual education, indigenous rights, and indigenous' recognition. Van Cott (2005) further stressed that the symbolic appeals concentrated on the candidates' ethnic identities, including mestizo and indigenous' identities. Madrid (2012) also distinguishes two types of appeals. The first type of appeals is programmatic. These appeals focus on anti-establishment claims, neoliberal critiques, bilingual education, and land rights. The second type of appeals is candidate-centered (symbolic) and focuses on the candidate's ethnic identities (mestizo and indigenous).

Jones-West (2011, 2020) observes programmatic appeals (linked to the party's platform) and three types of symbolic appeals: party-centered, candidate-centered, and indigenous-centered. The party-centered appeals, she asserts, can focus on 1) Pachakutik's brand or 2) the distance between the candidate and the party's brand, and even 3) Pachakutik's partner's brand. The candidate-centered appeals, in turn, focused on the candidate's reputation and the candidate's competence. The indigenous-centered appeals concentrate on 1) establishing a connection between the party and the indigenous population, e.g., "standing with" *indios,* or on 2) the candidate's indigenous identity. Jones-West (2011) also identifies the use of vote-buying appeals (as the delivery of different goods during the campaign). The goods delivered were: soccer balls, meat, rice, beer, cane alcohol, wine, and cigarettes. Lastly, Jennifer Collins (2004) lists the programmatic appeals as focusing on development and education projects and international funding for these projects. Collins (2004) identifies two types of symbolic appeals. The first type focused on the candidates as having a transparent work ethic and being accountable, efficient, and "able to deliver" (p. 51). The second type of appeals focused on a positive image of the indigenous' identity and the use of indigenous symbols.

Table 1. 9 Appeals employed by Pachakutik's candidates

	Pachakutik's appeals		
Authors	Programmatic	Symbolic	Vote-Buying
National arena			
Van Cott (2005)	Land rights Bilingual education	Candidate's ethnic identities (mestizo and indigenous)	
Madrid (2012)	Anti-establishment claims Neoliberal critiques Bilingual education Land rights	Candidate's ethnic identities (mestizo and indigenous)	
Jones West (2011)	Party platform	Party: Pachakutik's brand Distance from the party's brand Electoral alliance partner brand Candidate: Candidate's reputation Candidate's competence Indigenous: Ethnic connection ("standing with" indios) Candidate's indigenous identity	Material goods (soccer balls, meat, rice, beer, cane alcohol, wine, and cigarettes)
Local arenas			
Collins (2004)	Development and education projects International funding	Candidate: Candidate's accountability Candidate's efficiency and transparency Candidate's ability to deliver Indigenous: Positive indigenous identity Indigenous symbols	

Source: Constructed with data from Van Cott (2005), *Collins* (2004), *Madrid* (2012), *and Jones West* (2011)

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Pachakutik's mobilization strategies

Table 1. 10 Pachakutik's candidates' appeals employed at the 2014 elections.

Pachakutik's candidates' appeals		
Programmatic	Symbolic	Clientelistic
Addressing erosion. Basic services. Education. Encouraging citizen participation. Food security. Furthering decentralization. Health. Improving the economy. Management of natural resources. Management of solid waste. Protecting the environment. Protection and improvement of agricultural activities. Protection of vulnerable groups. Rescue heritage. Road network improvement. Tourism. Urban equipment. Water services. Coordination with the central government.	*Ethnic appeals generic:* Diversity. Inclusion (for all). Integration (of all groups). "*Pueblos* and nationalities." Cultural identity. Ancestral values. *Ethnic appeals specific:* Specific *pueblos* and nationalities names e.g. *Cañari.* Words in Kichwa. Words in Shuar. *Party based:* Principles of the party *ama lllulla, ama killa, ama shuwa* (do not lie, do not be lazy, and do not steal). Pachakutik as an organization that advances participatory intercultural governing practices or 'alternative government.' Pachakutik as the promotor of "new forms of development." *Candidate based:* Prior experience. Incumbency. The need for continuity.	Bilingual Education programs. Land and infrastructure (with specific beneficiaries). *Indígena* Quotas. Health services for specific population groups.

Table 1. 11 Pachakutik's candidates' appeals employed at the 2021 elections.

Pachakutik's candidates' appeals			
Programmatic	Symbolic	Clientelistic	Vote-buying
	Ethnic-based		
Improving the economy	Folkloric music	Local projects	Personal protective equipment (PPE)
Climate change legislation	Words in Kichwa: Minka, Pachamama	Projects for the rural population	Free covid tests
Education	Naming the specific indigenous communities in the region	Free internet for the poor	Water bottles
Judicial reform	Candidate wearing indigenous clothing	Targeted legislative reforms	Party paraphernalia
Transport and mobility law reform	Candidate claims she is indigenous (part of a *pueblo)*		
End/fight corruption			
Lowering interest rates Stop any form of mining	*Candidate-based*		
	Honest		
Reforms to the legislature	A member of the people		
	Kind		
Laws against gender violence	Generous		
	Ideal candidate		
Better legislation (general)	Committed candidate		
	Professor		
Improve internet quality	A good human		
	"Knows how to do the work"		
Provision of computer hardware	Humble		
	"Hard working hands"		
Promote agriculture	Educated		
Lower unemployment	Happy and joyful		
	Tradition follower		
	A fighter against corruption		
	A good listener		
	A candidate that was once poor		
	A non-indigenous candidate (a candidate for all, not only the indigenous voters)		
	An experienced candidate		
	A candidate that fulfills promises		
	Party-based		
	Party colors and symbols		
	An honest party		
	An anti-corruption party		
	A party that will stand with the people		
	A party that will change Ecuador		
	The rainbow party		
	Not only and indigenous party		
	A party with good candidates		
	A party that fulfills promises		
	The traditional Kichwa party slogan		