In Memoriam

Vladimir Padunov (1947-2022), Slavic Languages and Literatures; Film & Media Studies (University of Pittsburgh). Volodia Padunov was a dedicated teacher, mentor, and regular discussant for the European and Eurasian Undergraduate Research Symposium. He will be missed.
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SECTION 1
Minorities and Populism
"The Emptying of the Plains: The Comanche and Kalmyk Nomads in the Shadow of an Empire"

Nicholas Pierce, University of Texas at Austin

Introduction

From their cores in the Thirteen Colonies and the Grand Duchy of Moscow, two nascent modern states, the United States of America and Russia, threw off the burden of foreign control and began to expand into the hearts of their respective continents. However, the ever-expanding American and Russian states faced a common obstacle: the Great Plains and the Eurasian Steppe. Both of these grasslands were inhabited by relative newcomers, the Comanches and Kalmyks, who used their unmatched mastery of the horse to project power over their lands without the need for fortifications and static settlements. Unbeknownst to them, the land that sustained the horse herds, the economical source of their power and center of their cultures, held their downfall. By virtue of their soils, these grasslands were also the location of some of the richest farming soils in the world. The expanding American and Russian states, motivated by complex domestic desires, were always hungry for more agricultural products to feed growing development in their heartland regions, and sought to make what they saw as “empty” lands productive. This brought waves of settlers into conflict with the land’s nomadic inhabitants, who saw encroachment as an attack on their way of life and usurpation of their land. The expansion of the frontier also drew the attention of the central governments, always eager to “civilize” the wild frontiers, and by extension, the nomads who called them home.

But these nomadic groups did not meekly submit to subjugation. Both groups negotiated, raided, and fought according to their unique understanding of law and diplomacy, much to the frustration of the expanding settler states. I argue that these conflicts, far from being peripheral, were central to, and revealing of, the process of imperial expansion and the closing of the frontier on the North American and Eurasian continents. These nomads also occupied a unique historical space; the decline of their power took place as the market for travel memoirs and frontier narratives developed, allowing for a greater, though still limited, understanding of the process of subjugation. Using printed materials from the twilight of frontier nomad independence on two continents, there is an opportunity for greater understanding of the conflicts that defined transcontinental settler-nomad interactions, which were an integral step in the development of the centralized nation-states that now dominate global politics. The similarities between the Kalmyks and Comanches also shed light on a historical transcontinental culture complex — the nomadic horse cultures — which came into contact with, fought against, and eventually were overcome by the European empires.

Brief Summary of Primary Sources

The primary sources I have chosen to use are narratives, both captive and travel narratives written by Europeans who lived and traveled through the areas populated by
the Comanches and Kalmyks. These narratives give color to the history of the two nomadic groups, and offer insight into the conditions present during the twilight of nomadic power in the Southern Great Plains and the Caspian Steppe. The European perspective of these narratives is useful in uncovering the contemporary attitudes and cultural differences, important to the study of porous frontier regions. The captive narratives in particular give a view, of nomadic groups in crisis, with Mikhailov’s account describing the desperate 1771 flight of the Kalmyks to China, and Lehmann’s 1870s account of the final years of Comanche power before their surrender. These encounters are supplemented by more extensive narratives from more educated observers, such as a travel memoir written by French engineer Xavier Hommaire de Hell and his wife, and the memoir of the US Boundary Commissioner, who traveled through Comanche country in the 1850s. These sources help to outline the conditions of the frontiers, and more importantly, the thought processes and lives of people on the frontier amidst the decline of nomadic power.

Methodological Issues (de Hell Memoir)

Characteristics - Printed travel memoir written by French engineer Xavier Hommaire de Hell and his wife Adele, who travelled across a large portion of Southern Russia in the late 1830s.

Cultural Production - The volume was assembled from notes by Xavier and his wife, written in French, and around 1847 was translated from French into English and printed.

Challenges - As European travelers, the de Hells had to make extensive use of translators and spent most of their time interacting with their servants and other Europeans. The narrative is also interspersed with notes and asides about the status of the Kalmyks, but from a Western European perspective, which placed them at the status of “half-savage tribes,” almost mythical creatures. There is also a problem of language, especially with the translation of Russian or Kalmyk words and names multiple times, best illustrated by the use of the name Kalmuck instead of the proper Kalmyk.

Choices - I have chosen to closely read the sections of the memoir describing specifically the travels of the de Hells through the Kalmyk lands. Within these chapters I chose to closely read

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3 Xavier Hommaire de Hell and Adele Hommaire de Hell, Travels in the Steppes of the Caspian Sea, the Crimea, the Caucasus, &c. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1847).
5 de Hell, Travels.
6 de Hell, Travels, 168.
the text to draw out details on the frontier and its governance, as well as the status of the Kalmyk people in a period of economic decline and political subjugation.

**Methodological Issues (Lehmann Memoir)**

**Characteristics** - Memoir of the life of Herman Lehmann, child of German settlers in Texas, who was captured at age 11 by the Apaches, and later joined the Comanches in the final years of their independence. This is a digitized version of the 1927 printing of Lehmann’s memoir, that he dictated to editor J. Marvin Hunter when the former was an old man.

**Cultural Production** - Lehmann’s memoirs are an interesting case, as he by all accounts, became a Comanche and adopted the ways of their people, even being granted tribal rights within the Comanche Nation by the Office of Indian Affairs. The dictation that is presented in this version was done when Lehmann was 68 years old, and around 57 years after his initial capture by the Apaches.

**Challenges** - Though there is a large time frame covered, the vignettes that Lehmann remembers are relatively short and occasionally lack necessary context. Lehmann was part of a small and obstinate band of Comanches, and therefore was not present at many of the treaties and various important events, and most of the major events that took place are referred to second-hand.

**Choices** - I chose to use the parts of Lehmann’s narrative relating directly to his experience living with the Comanche as a snapshot of the Texas frontier in the last decade of Comanche independence. A close reading shows that the trends described in secondary sources, the depopulation of the buffalo, the disintegration of Comanche bands, and the encroachment of European settlement, were true in the 1870s, and were directly experienced by Lehmann.

**Historiography**

The Kalmyks have struggled for a long time to emerge as a separate scholarly focus from the shadow of their more famous predecessors, the Mongols under Genghis Khan, and only recently have they received specific attention. The English-language scholarship on the Kalmyks consisted of translations from the Oirat language, especially focusing on the Mongolian ancestry of the Kalmyks and the religious institutions of Tibetan Buddhism in Kalmyk society. This tendency is apparent in Stephen A. Halkovic Jr. 's work, consisting of a short introduction to Kalmyk history and a translation and comparison of Kalmyk historical chronicles. This relatively basic historiography was expanded by Michael Khodarkovsky, who has written several books integrating the Kalmyks into a larger frontier history and clarified their complex relationship.

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7 Lehmann, *Nine Years Among the Indians*.
8 Lehmann, *Nine Years Among the Indians*, 1-3.
9 Lehmann, *Nine Years Among the Indians*, 234.
with the expanding Russian Empire.\(^{12}\) His approach emphasizes the relationship between the Russians and the Kalmyks, developing sources from both and positioning them in the developing field of borderland and frontier studies.

Like most Native American groups, scholarship on the Comanches in the early 20th century emphasized their backwardness and alienness in the context of American history, which has been challenged by historians in the past few decades questioning both the veracity of sources and the biases of previous scholarship. This traditional scholarship on the Comanches developed a theory of the Comanches as, “a formidable equestrian power that erected a daunting barrier of violence to colonial expansion.”\(^{13}\) These histories emphasized this idea of a Comanche barrier and drew upon frontier tales of soldiers and settlers, of Texas in the time of the Comanches as, “the main battleground of the Indian wars.”\(^{14}\) This one-dimensional view was expanded in the mid 20th century with the publication of a landmark ethnohistory of the Comanches by Texas historian Ernest Wallace and anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel.\(^{15}\) This book was a part of a larger initiative by the University of Oklahoma Press to create a fuller picture of the Native Americans through their “Civilization of the American Indian” series, drawing together historians to expand the existing scholarship on Native Americans.\(^{16}\) In the 21st century, the ethnohistorical approach has been challenged by a new generation, revisionists who seek to place the societies of Native Americans in new contexts, such as Pekka Hämäläinen, who set out in his book to redefine the Comanches as an indigenous empire, one which “[questions] some of the most basic assumptions about indigenous peoples, colonialism, and historical change.”\(^{17}\) This is part of a larger reckoning within history as a whole, as indigenous and marginal voices have been brought to the front, with more emphasis placed on their societies as historical actors with agency, rather than “cameos,” within European-centered narratives.\(^{18}\)

**Outline**

I. Both the Comanches and Kalmyks were named and defined by others, and cultural differences between them brought them into conflict with empires that spelled their downfall.

   A. Names - Comanche came from the Ute word meaning “enemy,”\(^{19}\) and Kalmyk derived from the Turkic verb “to stay, to remain”\(^{20}\)

   B. Cultural differences - Sources mention the problems that cultural differences created in interactions between settlers and nomads.

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19 Wallace and Hoebel, *The Comanches*, 4-5.
1. Comanches saw no problem with trading in New Mexican fairs while simultaneously raiding Spanish towns. This was repeated with the Texans when Comanche bands agreed to treaties, but were unable to halt all raids, frustrating the Texans. Lehmann also described his primary Comanche occupation as raiding.

2. Kalmyks saw no problem in signing treaties of alliance with the Russians while also pillaging Russian frontier provinces like Kazan and Orenburg. German missionaries described the raids of the Kalmyks on the Russians and Tatars of the frontier. The naturalist Peter Simon Pallas remarked that the Kalmyks were “accustomed to uncontrolled and vagrant habits…”

C. Both groups, treated by the settlers as if they were a single well-defined group, were actually made up of several distinct and sometimes conflicting divisions.

1. Comanche divisions - “Kwahada, Yamparika, Penateka, and Noyuhka.” and many smaller bands recorded by various sources.

2. Kalmyk divisions - “Torghuud, Khoshuud, and Dörböd,” or “the Torgut, Derbet, Khoshut, and Jungar.”

II. Both nomadic groups were defined by their carefully balanced environment and integration into frontier economies, and when European encroachment threatened these, they faced material deprivation and political disintegration.

A. Description by German missionaries about importance of wells to the Kalmyks, and access to rivers used for watering horses and fishing threatened by Russian settlers. The Comanches similarly fought the Apaches and settlers to control strategic water sources, like river valleys, and the headwaters of rivers.

B. Political weakening was brought on by the collapse of complex frontier economies, which the nomads relied on for manufactured goods they could not produce.

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29 Halkovic, *Mongols of the West*, 41.
31 Zwick and Schill, *Calmuc Tartary*, 49.
1. Comanches weakened as buffalo herds destroyed by hunters; described by Lehmann: “It made us desperate to see this wanton slaughter of our food supply.”

2. Kalmyks pastoral economy weakened by the encroachment of settlers from West and North and the Russian demand for increased fish and salt production. So desperate, they were forced to sell their own children.

C. Dissolution of frontier trade - The Comanches were cut out of cross-border trade, and deprived of trade opportunities with the closing of frontier markets. Kalmyks were similarly impoverished by the diminishment of Central Asian and Caspian trade through Astrakhan.

III. The Comanches and Kalmyks understood their position and options vis-a-vis the empires they faced, and both faced internal conflict over whether to resist or accept subjugation.

A. Speeches by leaders outlined the dire situations created by economic degradation, political disintegration, and settler encroachment.

1. Comanche leader Ten Bear’s speech at 1867 Council: “The Texans have taken away the places where the grass grew the thickest and the timber was best… The whites have the country which we loved, and we only wish to wander on the prairie until we die.”

2. Kalmyk nobleman Tsebek-Dorji’s speech at 1770 Council: “The banks of the Yaik and Volga are now covered with cossack settlements, and the northern borders of your steppes are inhabited by Germans. In a little while, the Don, Terek, and Kuma will also be colonized…"

B. Disagreements within nomadic groups; there was no unified response to European encroachment and cooptation.

1. Lehmann describes Quanah Parker continuing the fight after the 1867 Council, refusing to agree to the US Government’s demands.

2. Kalmyk nobleman Zamyan informed the Russian authorities about Khan Ubashi’s plans to flee to China. The same Zamyan was settled by the Russian authorities, causing widespread unrest among other Kalmyks.

C. Choosing a “final stand” against imperial expansion: some of the Comanches chose to fight to the end, while the majority of Kalmyks chose to try and escape to their ancient homeland in Central Asia.

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35 Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, 299.
36 Lehmann, Nine Years Among the Indians, 171.
37 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 223-224.
39 Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, 299-301.
40 de Hell, Travels, 192.
41 Wallace and Hoebel, The Comanches, 284.
43 Lehmann, Nine Years Among the Indians, 159-160.
1. The Comanches, devastated by the destruction of the buffalo, defied the reservation treaty of 1868, with Quanah Parker’s band choosing to follow messianic religious figure Isatai to attack buffalo hunters at Adobe Walls. The defeat there lead to Quanah’s surrender in 1875.

2. The majority of the Kalmyks chose to follow their leader Ubashi from the Russian frontier to China in 1771, a journey described first-hand by captive Mikhailov, also referenced retrospectively by the de Hells.

IV. The American and Russian empires pursued varied strategies to turn the “empty” nomadic spaces into productive land. They utilized a blend of settlement, military force, and diplomatic strategies to bring these nomadic peoples and their lands into their expanding empires.

A. Settlement of both heartland populations (Anglo-Americans and Russians) and distinct ethnic minorities (Texas-Germans and Volga-Germans) on the frontier to transform “empty” nomadic lands into productive agricultural land.

1. Lehmann from Texas-German family which settled in Fredericksburg on the frontier, “By 1860, a large segment of southern Comancheria had become Texas-German farming and grazing range.”

2. The de Hell’s account describes the Volga-German colony of Sarepta, the home of Zwick and Schill who described its founding by the Moravian Brethren thanks to Catherine II’s invitation to German settlers.

B. Establishment of fortification lines on the frontier to control the movement of nomads and project power over nomadic spaces.

1. The Texas Congress set aside funds for a fortification line in 1838, the US Government created a new line of fortification in 1849, and another in 1851 to match the rapid advance of settlement. Bartlett described the immense cost of these fortifications, and the ferocious resistance given by the Comanches. Capt. Robert G. Carter served at several frontier forts, including several that had seen important Civil War-era officers serve there, showing the importance of this frontier fortification line.

2. Russians began to extend existing fortifications against nomads as early as the 1640s, Tsaritsyn line completed in 1718 to specifically contain the

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52 Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*, 306.
53 de Hell, *Travels*, 156-162.
54 Zwick and Schill, *Calmuc Tartary*, 14-16.
56 Wallace and Hoebel, *The Comanches*, 300-301.
Kalmyks and later lines built to cut them off from prime grazing lands and raiding targets.\textsuperscript{60}

C. The empires used lavish gifts and coopted nomadic leaders to create political dependence through material dependence, and to influence often mercurial nomadic leadership.

1. Large amounts of gifts were given out to bring the Comanches to treaty with the US Government,\textsuperscript{61} massive sum given to bring them to council in 1867 and promises to pay them for their land.\textsuperscript{62}

2. The de Hells described the house of the Kalmyk “prince” Tumene, enriched and employed by the Russians as a cavalry colonel. Khodarkovsky writes,\textsuperscript{63} “able to dispense gifts and compensation… the Russian government [engaged] in a policy of promoting the economic dependency of the nomads.”\textsuperscript{64}

D. The European empires used the grudges of other native groups when necessary, relying on them to provide support and to apply additional pressure on the troublesome Comanches and Kalmyks.

1. Tonkawas - As Lehmann wrote, “[Tonkawas] blamed the Comanche for all of their misfortunes and eventually made a treaty with the white people… acting as scouts and trailblazers and warriors…”\textsuperscript{65} Their use by the Army was described by Capt. Robert G. Carter, “An officer of the Army had charge of them [Tonkawas]… The Comanches were their implacable enemies…”\textsuperscript{66} Quanah Parker himself demanded, “attack[s]… to punish the Tonkawas for serving the U.S. Army as scouts.”\textsuperscript{67}

2. Several Russian governors asked the Kazakhs to “wage war” on the fleeing Kalmyks.\textsuperscript{68} Mikhailov described the “incessant attacks of the Kirghiz,” on the Kalmyks on their way to China.\textsuperscript{69} Kazakh raids on the Kalmyks produced a surge in livestock trade on the Russian frontier; the vulnerable migration presented a chance for the Kazakhs to settle old scores.\textsuperscript{70}

Conclusion

In the modern era, two nascent continental empires lay at the edge of what to them were boundless, empty land for settlement and integration into their expanding empires. But these “empty” lands were all but that, home to complex nomadic societies that viewed the settlers as trespassers on their rightful lands. Conflict ensued, as the settler-states sought to construct solid

\textsuperscript{60} Khodarkovsky, \textit{Where Two Worlds Met}, 230.
\textsuperscript{61} Wallace and Hoebel, \textit{The Comanches}, 280.
\textsuperscript{62} Hämäläinen, \textit{The Comanche Empire}, 323.
\textsuperscript{63} de Hell, \textit{Travels}, 169.
\textsuperscript{64} Khodarkovsky, \textit{Where Two Worlds Met}, 220.
\textsuperscript{65} Lehmann, \textit{Nine Years Among the Indians}, 154.
\textsuperscript{66} Carter, \textit{On the Border}, 68.
\textsuperscript{67} Hämäläinen, \textit{The Comanche Empire}, 338.
\textsuperscript{68} Halkovic, \textit{Mongols of the West}, 72.
\textsuperscript{69} Mikhailov, \textit{Adventures}, 14.
\textsuperscript{70} Khodarkovsky, \textit{Where Two Worlds Met}, 233-234.
borders to defend and tax, while the nomads sought to continue their nomadic lifestyle unhindered by arbitrary lines of exclusion. But the era of nomadic independence faced subjugation as the increasingly centralized, powerful empires pushed the frontier forward. As sources show, the Comanches and Kalmyks were integral actors on the plains frontiers of North America and Eurasia, where nomadic horsemen and expansionist empires interacted and conflicted.

The decline and fall of nomadic power was engineered as part of the process of colonialism and imperial consolidation. To become a valuable part of the empire, the plains had to be emptied of their nomadic inhabitants, and to make it safe for European settlers, nomadic groups were marginalized and politically disempowered. The experience of the Comanches and Kalmyks was emblematic of this transcontinental conflict in the consolidation of the American and Russian states, showing that these were not isolated experiences, but part of a global collision between nomadic peoples and settled empires in the modern era.
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"Russian Minority in Estonia. Russian Identity Versus European Values. Is Integration Possible?"

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Abstract

The Russian minority in Estonia started growing during the USSR. Russians came there to work mainly blue-collar jobs and lived comfortably since the majority of the country spoke Russian, and the Russian ethnicity got more privileges in society. That continued until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and Russia abruptly losing its influence in the Baltics. Estonia had to embark on a process of creating its own identity, beyond its Soviet past, which resulted in it becoming a nation-state, establishing Estonian as the official language, and divesting more and more from affairs with Russia. As a result, the Russian community in Estonia started experiencing struggles, such as having to learn and speak the Estonian language, losing citizenship, and having fewer job opportunities. Additionally, for the first few years after the fall of the USSR, Estonians expressed dislike for Russians, as a result of being under the Soviet occupation for decades.

In consequence, the Russian minority never fully integrated into Estonia. It is currently disproportionately concentrated in counties near the Russia-Estonia border, where many Russians seem not to be willing to participate in Estonian society and learn the language. Additionally, Russians have trouble obtaining citizenship and have less income compared to Estonians. Many Russians, especially of the older generation, still prioritize Russian media over Estonian and support the actions of the Russian government in regards to international conflicts such as in Georgia and Ukraine.

Therefore, these are the most important questions driving this research paper: can the Russian minority ever be fully integrated, but also - does it want to be? What is preventing it from doing so? This paper claims that since the Russian minority is highly divided by age and citizenship status, while younger generations show willingness to integrate and speak the Estonian language, separated Russian communities such as those in Ida-Viru, where a significant amount of the population belongs to the older generation, are likely not to ever desire to be integrated, especially with the political climate becoming more and more divisive in the recent years.

The structure of the paper is as follows: firstly, the Estonian integration policy is discussed, along with a background of Estonia’s and Russia’s power dynamic, and how it affects the Russian minority today. Then, the paper explains how the attitudes existing in Estonia inform the view of the Russian minority, including the Soviet past, as well as recent conflicts of the Bronze Soldier, Russo-Georgian war, and Ukraine revolution followed by Crimea annexation. After contextualizing the positioning of the Russian minority in Estonian society, the paper describes attempts made by Estonia in terms of European integration and Estonia’s concerns about the European Union’s requirements. Followed by the integration attempts made by Estonia for the Russian minority, regulations, and how they affected the community.

Introduction
Estonia’s integration policy has been to recognize the diverse backgrounds of ethnic minorities living in the country, and letting them express their culture and learn their language, while still centering the Estonian language and the importance of Estonian citizenship.\(^7\)

The shift of the power struggle for the Russian minority in Estonia is important. During the Soviet Union Estonians did not have societal power, and Russians living there were more privileged than those native to the region. After Estonia’s assertion of power in 1991 (after the dissolution of the USSR), Russians started experiencing many disadvantages. The conflict between two nationalities has existed through that whole timeline, but the dynamic changed. When a country asserts its independence, it increases the risk of violence coming from the oppressive country, because it was violence that created the power struggle in the first place. The relationship between the oppressors and the oppressed is inherently violent, so what happens when they switch roles during that integration process?

It is also crucial to note that integration in the context of the research paper will be mainly assessed through 1) Citizenship status 2) Knowledge of the Estonian language 3) Participation in Estonian politics, and voting rights. This paper argues that since 1991, Estonia has implemented significant policies to help the Russian minority integrate, which in part happened. A significant number of younger Russians have been able to integrate into Estonia and share similar views and values. However, older Russian communities, primarily those who immigrated before the fall of the Soviet Union, did not integrate as successfully and many are still hanging onto their Soviet past.

Gromilova drives a comparison between the Baltic countries in terms of minority protection, and specifically the Russian-speaking minority. She states how the Baltic states are willing to showcase how European they are, but with that, they also have to abide by EU’s policies, including laws for minorities. Estonia has struggled with creating good conditions for Russians, however, there were some policies put in place after the dissolution of the Soviet Union that were aimed at helping. These policies were much needed as nearly thirty percent of the country consisted of Russian immigrants, who did not have Estonian documents. As a response to that, Estonia introduced the Citizenship Law, which only gave citizenship to those who have been Estonia citizens before 1940 or their descendants. That resulted in over forty-five thousand Russians being left behind, who were considered “residents with undetermined citizenship.” In 1995, through the Citizenship Act, it became possible to gain citizenship by fulfilling the following requirements: Estonian language, knowledge of Estonian constitution and Citizenship Act, age requirement (over 15), proof of residence in Estonia (over 5 years), and taking the Estonian Oath. Those without citizenship were not granted voting rights, and no Russians were represented in the parliament. Since then, the number of citizenships granted has experienced a steady decline. The Russian community has expressed significant feelings of disconnect and exclusion, also having a much lower income compared to the Estonians.

Skerrett describes how during the Soviet Union, the Russians living in Estonia were in a rather privileged position. Russian was the most common language spoken everywhere, however, after the collapse in 1991, Estonia began a process of “Estoniazation,” which was centered

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around reinstating the Estonian language as the most commonly used in the country. It was important for Estonian independence, as it cut ties with its Soviet Union past, but the Russian community started facing more struggle. Estonian became the official language in 1989, and since then policies have started to be implemented to integrate it in schools and workplaces.\textsuperscript{72} That in turn was challenging for Russians who never learned the language.

Besides the conflict of citizenship, there is also a political divide between Russians and Estonians. Many in the Russian community get their news from Russian media sources, (which often have different opinions than Estonian), and with the political climate heating up in the last decade (Bronze soldier, Russian war in Georgia, and Russian aggression towards Ukraine including the annexation of Crimea), it has been especially difficult for the Russian community to be integrated, as European Union’s perspective on Russia’s actions differentiates so drastically.\textsuperscript{73} The political divide stems from how the Russian government is viewed in regard to those conflicts.

**Attitudes towards Russians**

The political divide amongst Russians and Estonians has become even more evident in the light of recent events. To start off, Estonia has memories of being under Soviet rule, which was traumatic for the country. Estonia never wanted to be a part of the Soviet Union, evident from the Estonian War of Independence in 1919, and it remained that way until 1991. The Soviet Union prioritized Russian rights and was oppressing Estonia, along with the other Baltic countries, imposing the Russian language and strict regulations. In the 1930s, the Soviet Union employed major policies to make the country as unified as possible, including Russification, which meant adopting Russian as the widely-spoken language, and therefore restricting the use of other languages for many ethnic groups (especially Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland.) As a result, the Russian language in Estonia has been prevalent for decades and spoken as if it was the official language of the country.\textsuperscript{74} Soviet occupation has therefore undermined any kind of trust that could have existed between Russia and Estonia, and resulted in Estonia divesting from Russia, and establishing a new identity within the European Union.

Russia has a history of imposing violence on countries that have asserted their willingness to cooperate with the European Union, and it also doesn’t shy away from using hard and soft power to put pressure on international actors. Estonia’s disregard for the Russian minority (which is what Russia claims is happening) is fundamentally different from Russia’s invasion of its neighboring country. One is a state just coming out of occupation struggling to establish its own identity, and another is a major political actor that has shown time and time again it is ready to create conflict to remain in control.

Since the USSR, the ethnic conflict has remained. Estonians and Russians, coming from the imbalanced power structure, still have presumptions against each other. That notion proved itself relevant in 2007, in regards to the Bronze Soldier conflict. When the USSR authorities


\textsuperscript{74} Kuutma, Selhamaa, and Västrik, “Minority Identities and the Construction of Rights in Post-Soviet Settings,” 56.
erected that monument in 1944, it was supposed to commemorate the Russian soldiers “liberating” Tallinn. Over the years, the meaning translated into celebrating the Russian heritage in Estonia and became a central point of pride for Russians as a symbol of their rights and liberties whilst living in Estonia. Hence, when the monument was relocated in 2007 to the Defence Forces Cemetery of Tallinn, that caused rage from the Russian community and Russia itself. Two nights of riots in Tallinn, followed by cyberattacks of Estonian organizations as well as protests outside the Estonian embassy in Russia broke out, as Russians were stating that they believe the monument is an important part of their identity, and its relocation puts the Russian minority in danger, and could potentially be an attack on their culture and rights.

The Bronze Soldier conflict is a striking example of the power dynamic that exists currently in Estonia. Russia feels entitled to Estonia’s historical monuments, and its place in Estonia’s history. However, due to oppression and aggression coming from its neighbor, Estonia does not want to create that space for Russia, and it does not want to celebrate Russian soldiers who claimed to have “liberated” Tallinn, meanwhile imposing violence on the region. However, the Russian minority in Estonia is different from Russia as a whole, as their position in society is at a real disadvantage. Russians in Estonia have long struggled to preserve their heritage but also to integrate into the Estonian society, so the relocation of the Bronze Soldier for them signified the potential of Estonia to become more hostile, and refuse rights to the Russian minority, enforce the restrictions on getting citizenship or learning the Estonian language. It also seems like the conflict arose not only out of concern for the Russian minority’s well-being but also as a question of power. Do Russians still influence Estonia? That was the point of conflict in 2007, as Estonia was more and more divesting from cooperation with Russia.

For the Bronze Soldier conflict, Russia was largely held responsible by Estonians for organizing riots (including those in Russia, outside of the Estonian embassy), and cyberattacks. Russia’s involvement in minority protection in Estonia, according to Schulze, only proved itself harmful and backward, as it resurfaced the conflict that could have been avoided if the Russian state wasn’t involved. However, it is not only the Russian government that has a conflict with Estonia - the Russian minority, undoubtedly, fueled by Russian media, also is concerned for its rights and power in the country, yet they are the ones who face the consequences of those political movements, meanwhile, Russian state can divest from the situation at its convenience.

The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 followed by Crimea Annexation in 2014 only further solidified Estonia’s caution of Russia and Russian military powers. The first European War of the 21st century as a result of Georgia gaining independence from the Soviet Union, and starting to develop its relationship with the West. In 2008, the Russian military entered Georgia, and launched airstrikes on the region, subsequently terrorizing the population and occupying South Ossetia. The war displaced nearly 200,000 people, and not only reinforced instability in the region and declared independence of Abkhazia and North Ossetia, but also reminded the European countries that Russia is still an active threat, and is ready to use military power to reclaim its influence.

Another point of conflict is Ukraine. Startled by Yanukovich refusing to sign the Ukraine-Europe Association Agreement in 2013 protests which were referred to as Euromaidan

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75 Jennie Schulze, Strategic Frames: Europe, Russia, and Minority Inclusion in Estonia and Latvia, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018), 387.
sparked all around the country, leading up to the Ukrainian revolution. The reason why people
were protesting was that by refusing to sign, Ukraine chose to pursue closer ties to Russia than to
Europe, and the people did not agree with that. Russia, just like in Georgia, could not allow its
former ally to choose the European Union, so after the revolution, it attacked Ukraine and held
an illegal referendum to annex Crimea. The 2014 annexation of Crimea has been especially
alarming for Estonia, since Russia annexed Crimea on the premise that many ethnic Russians
were living there, which is also true for many parts of Estonia. Therefore, following the pattern,
Estonia has reasons to worry about potential aggression coming from Russia. Gromilova states
that the Estonian government is wary of becoming the next Crimea. Since 2004, the European
Union’s major enlargement, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all been in support of European
growth, so when in 2014 Russia attacked Ukraine, all the Baltic states expressed strong disap-
proval for its actions.

All in all, Estonia has come out of 1991 already not being in favor of Russians and therefore
the Russian community living in the country, and its presumptions of Russia have been only
confirmed in the upcoming decades. Estonian Russians, however, are politically much more in
agreement with Russia, and therefore political views create a constant point of tension between
the two groups.

Integration Attempts

Despite Russia’s claims, Estonia has employed a partially successful integration policy. The
Estonian Integration Program was first implemented from 2000 to 2007 and included three
steps: first, spreading the use of the Estonian language as the primary language used in the coun-
try, second, encouraging people to get Estonian citizenship, and third, a plan for economic de-
velopment. Following up with the next Integration campaign in 2008 up until 2013, Estonia aimed
to continue the work that has already been done and center the integration process around Euro-
pean values, such as democracy, cultural diversity, and freedom. Finally, the last Integration
Strategy which went on from 2014 to 2020 aimed at promoting multiculturalism and recognizing
the diversity of all minorities living in Estonia, and providing them with resources as well as
translation services of Estonian media. The latter aspect is likely influenced by, as Nielsen and
Paabo mentioned, the fact that Estonia realized that the Russian minority was only consuming
biased media produced by Russian channels, creating a threat to the political stability in the
country.

In a study done by Cianetti and Nakai, it was revealed that minority activists in Estonia
(many of whom are Russian speaking) have lost their trust in the European Union over the years,
in terms of its ability to implement a successful integration strategy. However, it is not due to its
values considering minority protections, but rather, the lack of weight to the real implication of
policies instituted by the European Union. While the framework that the European Union uses to

76 Agata Włodarska-Frykowska, “Ethnic Russian Minority in Estonia,” International Studies: Interdisciplinary Po-
79 Kristian Nielsen and Heiko Paabo, “How Russian Soft Power Fails In Estonia: Or, Why The Russophone Minor-
address the issue of minorities is useful, activists believe it is not possible to do it through the EU, rather, it has to happen regionally: “the solution is domestic, the tool (or, rather, one of the tools) is European.”

What’s important to notice is that minority activists have gained a lot from Europeanization, such as the European “values” which are used as a tool to shame their governments into following protocols, as well as establish how they want to be treated. In that sense, minority protection activism still largely operates under the definitions of the European Union, even if its own policies have not been as successful for the Russian minority in Estonia. This means activists are able to balance not blindly trusting European institutions, while also taking reference from how they operate, in order to fight for their rights.

Estonia’s regulations

In 1995, Estonia implemented the Citizenship Act, which allowed for some Russians (who lived in Estonia since 1940) to gain citizenship. However, it has slowly been implementing policies since then to ease the requirements for obtaining citizenship. For example, the Estonian language test has been modified, and programs were introduced for people who wanted to take it, as well as increased support for educators. The government offered language classes so that people could pass the exam. Russian secondary school students can attend Estonian language classes so that they are equipped to study in Estonian Universities.

Lindemann and Saar argue that there exists an inequality between Russians and Estonians in terms of opportunities for education and future growth for adolescents. The reasons for that are insufficient knowledge of the Estonian language or lack of secondary and higher education offered in the Russian language, as well as the absence of high-qualification jobs for the older generation, which results in many being over-skilled for their professions and having weaker social networks than Estonians. Also important to take into consideration is the notion that after Estonia’s abrupt language policy, many Russian schools were forced to switch the language that they were teaching in, which resulted in poor quality education, undermining the second-generation Russians living in Estonia, limiting their opportunities and preventing them from living to their fullest potential in the country.

Why don’t Russians leave?

According to Vetik and Helemäe, Estonian and Russian society have been inherently divided for decades, through two different school systems, disproportionate regional distribution of two groups, as well as neighborhoods built by either Soviet construction unions or Estonians, which also resulted in differentiation of social relationships.

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Old and young generations

Even though younger generations of Russians seem to be fairly integrated into Estonian society (speaking the language, similar political views, studying in Estonian universities), the older generation of Russians has been noted to not as easily accept the fall of Soviet power. Many older Russians are not eager to learn the Estonian language and mostly consume biased media from Russian sources.\textsuperscript{85} This creates a gap not only in communication but also in political ideology, as Estonia generally does not support Russia’s political actions. The Estonian older generation, on the other hand, does not want to speak Russian (even though many know the language), because it is a reminder of the Soviet Union’s now decaying power.\textsuperscript{86} These dynamics are not unsurprising, but what really becomes evident from these observations is how language is used as a tool for gaining power. Russians were in a privileged position due to the USSR policies, and Estonians were treated unfairly, however, after the power shift the dynamic changed, yet historical memory remained.

It is clear that this political divide affects Estonia now, and although younger Russians are able to integrate much more and speak the language better, older Russians still remember how different life was before 1991. That raises the question of whether or not the Russian minority is willing to integrate in Estonia in the first place. Speaking Estonian seems less like an issue of access (as Estonia has implemented policies to make it easier for people to access language school), but rather an issue of power and identity. The older generation did not want to give up the privileges it had during the USSR, and speaking Russian is an important connection not only to their country of origin but also to that position in society.\textsuperscript{87}

Does the Russian government really like Russians?

Russia has claimed to protect the Russian minority living in Estonia and employed a number of strategies to pressure Estonia into giving living Russians there more influence, including military actions, sanctions, disinformation, and complaints to international actors.\textsuperscript{88} However, Schulze argues that Russia’s actions have done more bad than good. For example, Russia offers citizenship to anyone who has an undetermined status, which results in people holding Russian passports being the least integrated into Estonian society.

Another divide lies in political memory, which Pfoser (2014) demonstrates in the case of Narva, a city near the Estonia-Russia border, with 95% of the population being Russian-speaking. The difference is between remembering Narva as a Soviet or Estonian place. Some Russians, as Pfoser found, saw Estonia as a little “brother,” whom they were helping economically and culturally, and did not understand or expressed disapproval of the fact that Estonians see Russians as oppressors and colonizers. All in all, the border conflict showcases how memory can not only shape the identity of the nation, but also influence the conflicts happening in a country.


\textsuperscript{86} Skerrett, “How Normal Is Normalization? The Discourses Shaping Finnish And Russian Speakers’ Attitudes Toward Estonian Language Policy,” 375.

\textsuperscript{87} Skerrett, “How Normal Is Normalization? The Discourses Shaping Finnish And Russian Speakers’ Attitudes Toward Estonian Language Policy,” 375-376.

and although both Russians and Estonians have their personal accounts of what happened, different parts that are meaningful to them inform how they view Estonia and each other.

It seems, although the Russian minority in Estonia does face real disadvantages, it is unwilling to accept the fact that the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia have not had a positive impact on Estonia. Estonians were oppressed under the USSR, and Estonia was eager to join the EU and NATO as a way to seek protection from Russia, and rightly so, as it has been carrying out conflicts in Ukraine and Georgia. The consumption of Russian media and regional alienation only further contribute to this divide. While younger Russians go to university in Estonia, learn the language, and become more or less integrated, the older generation, holding onto the Soviet Union past as one of the few remnants of their previously high position in society, seems to be much less interested in integration. It seems like the process of integration in Estonia for the Russian minority would mean giving up their power as members of the more “powerful” nation, and also having to face how the past and present USSR and Russian government might not be as well-intentioned as the Russian state wants people to believe. This statement, therefore, points to how integration is not only the process of assimilation but also an inevitable power dynamic, in one way or another. Integration is political, complicated, and not as straightforward as it might seem, especially concerning the European Union.

Conclusion

This paper started off by asking the question: is it possible for the Russian minority to be fully integrated? Judging by the arguments presented from the research, and the state of current events, the paper leans towards saying that full integration is highly unlikely, especially for the older generation. At the same time, young people, who were born in Estonia, have the knowledge of the language, go to Estonian schools/universities, or have jobs in Estonia, seem to be sufficiently integrated. Still, some young people choose not to be as they consume Russian media, and develop oppositional views to European values.

However, there is a large portion of older Russians, especially those geographically alienated, who exist in a liminal space of speaking the Russian language, believing the Russian news, and not subscribing to European values. Additionally, many Russian people are either unemployed or have low-paid jobs, as well as lack strong social networks. These factors prevent certain groups of Russians, in particular the older generation who lived during the Soviet Union as well, from fully integrating in Estonia. The majority, who immigrated during the USSR and states after its collapse, has since been in a state of limbo, many not being able to obtain Estonian citizenship, having to process the political shift, and remember the power the Soviet Union once held, which brought them a higher position in society. In that sense, this paper wonders if this demographic of Russians want to be integrated in the first place, or if it is comfortable enough in its own community. Still, there are disadvantages that Russians have to face in Estonia, but possibly holding onto the past, or preserving the culture that still exists, is more important than gaining that advantage.

Estonia pursues a policy that centers the Estonian identity but still lets minorities express themselves freely, as long as that’s what they are - minorities. Russian activists have been able to gain recognition of their struggles over the years, and not get persecuted for it like many of their peers in Russia. Being on the periphery, wondering who cares about the Russians in Estonia, results in the development of a unique identity, which is not easy to put into boxes. One thing that has become clear: many Russians are not ready to give up their identity to integrate into Estonia.
and the European Union, they still choose to support the country they came from, cherish the language they speak, and remember where they came from, even at the cost of having undetermined citizenship status.


"A Feminist Reading of I. A. Bunin’s 'Mitya’s Love'"
Ali Karakaya, Yeditepe University

In this work, Ivan Alekseevich Bunin’s "Mitya's Love" is considered as a key to understanding the acceptance of feminist ideas in Russia in the 20th century. The analysis is based on the idea of the evolution and the development of the female character, Katya, who in this context appears as a representative of the first Soviet feminist Alexandra Kollontai’s concept of "The New Woman". In her view, the woman walks away from the ingrained tradition: she does not fulfill the traditional role of a woman, which leads a man to see her as the representative of "The Second Sex", later proposed by Simone de Beauvoir. In this study, the emphasis is put on the peculiarities of Katya's character and the differences between the roles traditionally assigned to Russian women and the roles women start to take in Russian society in the 20th century. It is stressed that Katya is not just an ordinary girl whom Mitya loves, but a collective female image that reflects the cardinal changes that have taken place in the Russian woman’s view of womanhood in the 20th century.

Keywords: Ivan Alekseevich Bunin, feminist criticism, image of women, The New Woman

Феминистское прочтение рассказа И.А.Бунина "Митина любовь"

В работе рассматривается произведение Ивана Алексеевича Бунина «Митина любовь» как ключ к пониманию принятия феминистских идей в России XX века. В основе анализа лежит представление об эволюции развития женского персонажа, Кати, которая в этом контексте выступает в образе представительницы концепции «Новой Женщины» первой советской феминистки Александры Коллонтай. На её взгляд, женщина отступает от укоренённой традиции: она не выполняет традиционную роль женщины, способствующей мужчине увидеть её как «второй пол», позже предлагаемый Симоной де Бовуар. В данном исследовании основное внимание уделено особенностям характера Кати и различиям между ролями, отведенными женщинам, и теми ролями, которые начинают занимать женщины в российском обществе 20 века. Подчеркивается тот факт, что она не просто заурядная девушка, в которую влюблен Митя, а собирательный женский образ, вобранный в себя кардинальные изменения, произошедшие в мировоззрении русской женщины ХХ века.

Ключевые слова: Иван Алексеевич Бунин, феминистская критика, образ женщины, Новая Женщина.

“All poetry, all fiction, all comedy, all belles lettres are but the expression of experiences and emotions and these expressions are the avenues through which we reach the sacred adytyum of

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Introduction

Literature can be used as a medium for understanding people and their positions in life. Ivan Alekseevich Bunin is particularly suitable for this kind of approach because of the multi-layered nature of his work and his artistic versatility. Feminist readings of Bunin's prose can be utilized to make the writer more relevant for a contemporary reader. Traditional Russian values and the role assigned to women are reexamined here, and it clearly makes way for the modernist view of women both in life and in literature. Therefore this paper argues that there is a feminist tone in the work “Mitya's Love,” which enables the readers to go beyond the old norms and values of Russian society to see the newly developing mentality of “The New Woman.”

The ideas of feminism began to spread in Russia in the 1880s. The main reasons for this phenomenon were both the emergence of ideas about gender equality in Western Europe and talks about the emancipation of women which were also imported from the West. Subsequently, these ideas turned into the Women's Movement. The main goals of this movement, both around the world and in Russia, was to provide women with access to paid work, public education, and suffrage. These goals were achieved thanks to the October Revolution, after which women received many rights even before the countries of Western Europe. But as early as 1913, the Russian revolutionary and Marxist theorist of Bolshevism on women's issues Alexandra Kollontai wrote an article where she mentioned her new concept of "The New Woman."

Although even at this time Marxist feminist organizations were criticized for not answering the question of "the oppression of women by men," she managed to publish this article in the collection New Morality and the Working Class after the revolution in 1919. Kollontai's views were considered an integral part of feminist thought in Russia. When expressing her views, Kollontai criticized the pragmatic attitude that men held towards women, arguing that the men used women to achieve their personal goals while completely ignoring the goals and ideals of women. According to Kollontai's concept, the “New Woman” must refuse to be the shadow of a man. Rather, she herself must become a complete and full-fledged personality. The "New Woman" does not play a secondary role and does not seek to limit herself to live only within the framework of marriage and family. For her, the only right decision is the path to her intended ideal. After these events, the spread of feminist ideas continued and they were reflected in Russian literature of the twentieth century. One of the most striking examples of this perpetuation is in the Russian author Ivan Bunin's story "Mitya's Love".

Ideas of the emancipation of women were not welcomed with cheers in Russia, just like anywhere else in the world. For example, in his youth, the great Russian literary critic Vissarion Belinsky spoke negatively about female writers, saying that "a female writer is mediocre, ridiculous and disgusting." However, in the 1840s, he proclaimed George Sand a genius writer. In addition to him, the issue of social inequality, as well as the position of a woman in the family, was also raised by the writer A.I. Herzen. Later, not only individual articles and statements by famous writers began to appear, but also works of art, in which more and more often the authors

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92 Ibid.
turned to the images of advanced women. In this regard, we can name the novel by Nikolay Chernyshevsky *What is to be done?*, as well as refer to the works of Ivan Turgenev and Ivan Goncharov. It seems to me that in this context, the article by D. Pisarev “Female types in the novels and stories of Pisemsky, Turgenev and Goncharov” acquires special significance. In the article, the author, in particular, admits that men oppress women in vain. “A man who constantly corrupts a woman with the yoke of his strong fist, at the same time constantly accuses her of her mental underdevelopment, of the absence of certain high virtues, of a tendency to (...) criminal weaknesses...”

Literary critic Nikolai Strakhov another can be shown as another example of the extremist approach, an ardent opponent of emancipation propaganda. He detailed his thoughts in the article "Women's Issue", in which he accused women of being fake and pretentious. In 1870, Strakhov spelled out the "danger" of the ideas of emancipation point by point in the aforementioned article, advocating that the "true destiny of a woman", was not the rejection being an ideal of a wife and mother. In this regard, one cannot unsee that the religion, Orthodoxy, plays an important role with its attitude towards the patriarchal family. Femininity is determined as motherhood the Russian family model. The source of the idea of emancipation was the criticism of traditionalism based on Orthodoxy. Literary critics listed above and many more clearly saw that the destruction of the patriarchal family, which seemed to him the essence of Russia itself, was taking place. They experienced fear, foreseeing the inevitability of this process, and at the same time described it with documentary accuracy and great expressiveness.

A different attitude to the "women's issue" was set by the great Russian writer Ivan Turgenev. In the novel "Fathers and Sons" we face the image of a provincial emancipated woman - Evdokia Kukshina. Her appearance and ridiculous mental reasoning do not reveal the true image of an intellectual. In contrast to him, N.G. Chernyshevsky leaves the following entry in his diary: “... I am outraged (...) by inequality. A woman should be equal to a man (...), a decent man is obliged to put his wife above himself - this temporary advantage is necessary for future equality. Elizaveta Vodovozova, author of the book “At the Dawn of Life,” recalls that during the late 19th and early 20th centuries a lot had changed. There was a desire for higher education and equal rights for women. Here is one of the curious new phenomena of those times: if before a working woman, like a governess for example, was looked down upon, contemptuously, then in the 60s of the 19th century, according to the author of the book, such women were sought after, and idlers were despised. Vera Pavlovna, the heroine of the novel “What Is To Be Done?” is not only free when choosing a man for herself, but she is also free in her behavior at home. Isn't that why she does not deny herself playing music and "enlightening" the maid of the house in order to be known as a "new woman"? By its influence, the novel became a "banner for Russian youth." "We read the novel almost knee-deep obliquely," the critic Alexander Ska-bichevsky admitted, “with such piety that does not allow the slightest smile on the lips with which liturgical books are read.”

When Ivan Bunin emigrated to France in 1920, his attitude towards literature did not change. In his best works, Bunin convinces readers that life is both a priceless gift and a tragedy, with its brightness and rewards, and that tragedy is not outside of life but is closely intertwined with it. All this can be seen in his later works, among which his story "Mitya's Love", created...

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by the writer in 1924, stands out in particular. The story was first published in 1925 in Sovremennye Zapiski, a politicized literary journal. In the work, the main character is Mitya. He is in love with a student at a theater school. His lover's name is Katya. They met in December, but from the very beginning Mitya is worried about Katya's behavior. It seems to him as if there are two different Katyas. Mitya in the story is experiencing the torment of love for Katya. He worries constantly, and is always jealous of her. During Lent, Katya begins to work directly with the director of the school. Mitya knows that the director is known for his inappropriate behavior: every summer the director seduced and took some student with him to his travels, so it seemed to Mitya that this summer his beloved would become the “victim.” This explained Mitya's jealousy. And he was not only jealous of him, but everyone! He constantly thought about Katya with the other men around her. And when imagined her with others, he felt an urge to strangle her. By the end of Lent, Katya had passed the director's exam. She had a huge success. After the exam, things were no longer the same as before.

**Domostroy**

At the beginning of the story, Katya accuses Mitya of judging women based on *Domostroy* in the presence of her mother. What does this mean? First, you want to find out what *Domostroy* is. The literal translation of it would be home order, *dom* meaning home and *stroy* meaning order or system, connected with the interfix -o-. It is "a monument of Russian literature of the 16th century, a set of everyday rules and instructions, a kind of encyclopedia of Russian patriarchal domestic life." According to the rules of Domostroy, the wife had to be “clean and obedient.” Katya correlates Mitya's jealous behavior to the norms of 16th century Russia, meaning that she is fully aware that this time has already passed and his behavior should already change. On the other hand, her mother confronts her saying that she cannot imagine love without jealousy, and adds that one who is not jealous cannot love. Here, a strong conflict of ideas and mentalities can be seen. “The New Woman" is separated from the old. She doesn't want to live her life under the control of a medieval book, and she does not even show doubt when expressing her opinion.

**“Loving the Soul”**

One day, during their argument, Katya asks Mitya why he loves her. Mitya cannot give a proper answer, and then Katya says: “You love only my body, not my soul!” At these words, Mitya thinks: "Yet again she talks with someone else's, theatrical words ..." It is quite obvious that Katya's statement, which Mitya did not quite understand, is completely alien to him. As can be seen here, the main problem of the story is that Mitya believes that Katya, a woman, cannot genuinely produce such phrases, despite her theatrical nature and the fact that she is well-educated. It seems to Mitya that these are not really her words. The educated “New Woman” has a certain place in life and expresses her thoughts frankly. This is a direct contradiction to Mitya's beliefs about women, which are more on the traditional side.

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97 Ibid.
The fourth part of the story begins with the words: "She changed more and more." Katya seemed to have turned into some kind of new person, but she still treated Mitya exactly as before. Mitya realized drastic changes in Katya, as she was becoming a part of society on her own, with her talent and determination. But Katya, was the same old Katya in the terms of how she felt towards Mitya and how she acted. In other words, Katya's process of emancipation was fully on track, but she still had her questions. Nothing has changed for the young couple. Yet.

**The Departure**

Starting from the fifth part, everything becomes more complicated. Mitya leaves for the village. After another fight with him, Katya states that they need to temporarily separate in order to sort things out. Given the fact that Katya corresponds to the image of the “New Woman,” she can deal with her problems herself, and she will not wait in despair for some man to decide her fate. She controls her life and makes her own rules.

Katya and her mother leave for Crimea for the summer. After their separation, the young people agreed to meet in Crimea. Starting from this part in the story, Katya is only mentioned in the anxious thoughts of Mitya, who of course misses her and does not even sleep at night. He never stops thinking about her. He writes letters to her in the hope of receiving an answer. And when the answer comes from her, Mitya cherishes it because in the letter Katya calls him "beloved" and "the only one." Mitya writes many more letters to her, but Katya doesn't even send a second letter to Mitya. He begins to worry again. Every day he goes to the post office to find out if he has received a letter from his beloved, but every day he returns home empty-handed. Once while returning home he says to himself that if he does not receive a letter in a week, he will shoot himself. From that moment on, Mitya tries every possible way and everything in his power to make Katya answer him. He writes about the strongest love in the world, writes that he is sick in bed, writes that he will commit suicide, begs Katya to love him, or to at least stay friends with him. But Katya has other plans.

After several days, a lot has changed in Mitya's fate. He receives a letter from Katya, which he reads over and over again:

“Dear Mitya, do not hold a grudge against me, forget, forget everything that happened! I'm bad, I'm vile, spoiled, I'm not worthy of you, but I'm madly in love with art! I made up my mind, the die is cast, I'm leaving - you know with whom ... You are sensitive, you are smart, You will understand me, I beg you, do not torture yourself and me! Don't write me anything, it's useless!”

There are many ways to think about this letter. It can be assumed that Katya is a heartless and evil woman (she is described as a “wicked woman” in Madelaine Boyd's translation from French) who only thinks of herself. But as this paper is written from a feminist perspective, we need to think differently. Katya is a free and self-sufficient girl who has chosen a different path in her life for herself. Her passion is art, and in the name of it she is ready to overcome any obstacle, and do anything necessary.

As a result of reading and analyzing the story "Mitya's Love"through a feminist lens, it

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can be demonstrated that Katya is not just Mitya's beloved and not just the “wicked heroine.” Rather, she is a character that shows the important changes that women underwent during the period when Ivan Bunin wrote this story. She, as a representative of the conception of “The New Woman,” does not exist in the presence of a man, but, on the contrary, coexists with him on equal terms. She determines her own tastes and solves her problems on her own. Of course, she does that not only by relying on her mind, but more importantly the decisions and the consequences of those decisions belong to her.

Conclusion

“The period from 1895 to 1925 was the most difficult in the history of Russian literature. It can be characterized as the era of modernism and its various manifestations: decadence, symbolism, avantgardism, futurism, acmeism, formalism and a number of other doctrines, which were formulated by writers who were acutely aware of culture as an entity created by the human mind.”

This quote shows how rich and different this period was in Russian literature. The short novel of the Nobel laureate Russian writer I.A. Bunin, "Mitya's Love", naturally contains the changes and variations in the culture that Russian society went through in this transitional period.

Bibliography


“The Freedom of Madness: Madness as an Act of Feminine Defiance in Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita and Zinaida Gippius’s 'Madwoman’

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Madness tends to be portrayed in Russian literature in the same way it is viewed in the real world, as devastating, ravaging, unforgiving, and relentless. However, madness occasionally presents within literary figures as a source of freedom and liberty; mad geniuses and mad artists epitomize this blend of empowerment and altered mental state. More specifically, psychological ailments bring release to characters trapped in mundane worlds, and women historically fall into this category time after time. In Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita and Zinaida Gippius’s “The Mad Woman”, the archetype of the wild Russian madwoman is found in the form of Margarita and Vera, two women who embrace their respective interactions with madness in order to free themselves from a patriarchal society that smothers them. In the contemporary world, both the patriarchy and the trope of the madwoman persists, specifically in the form of the Russian female pop duo t.A.T.u.. The group’s 2002 hit “Ya Soshla S Uma”, which translates to “I Went Mad”. Margarita, Vera, and t.A.T.u all utilize their labels of “hysteria” to enact protests against the patriarchy, even if the protests are silent or invisible.

In the early 1900s, Russian women were defined by their household responsibilities to husband and child. With the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922, women were supposedly level to men in rank, but this was not entirely true; according to “‘A Woman Is Not a Man’: The Culture of Gender and Generation in Soviet Russia”, young women growing up in this era “did one-half again as much housework as the boys”, and “often served as surrogate mothers to other children in the family”, depriving them of elementary and advanced education. They also grow up as a target for more ridicule and punishment from parental figures than their male counterparts, whom the parents allow more freedom and less expectations. By forcing women to stay in the home, Russian society prevents them from having both physical and economic freedom, thus making dependence on male figures necessary for survival. Historically, Russian psychiatrists believed women were “weak and far more prone to insanity than men” and that women’s “susceptibility to madness was heightened by any deviation from their “natural” sphere of activity, that is, home and family”, according to “Female Sexuality and Madness in Russian Culture: Traditional Values and Psychiatric Theory”. Dissention to and resistance of conventional gender roles by women tend to lead to a label of “madness”, making female madness a socially categorized phenomenon. The lack of female independence within Russian society forces women into subservience, making moments of rebellion unexpected and assumed to be a result of mental instability, as seen in both Margarita from The Master and Margarita and Vera from “The Mad Woman”.

Feminine madness and the embracing of madness allow women to break free from the confinements of their gender roles as mothers, wives, and homemakers. This type of conventional freedom is seen in the literary figure Margarita. Bulgakov introduces Margarita halfway through his novel The Master and Margarita, and she is a beautiful married woman in love with

another man simply called “The Master” but is trapped in her upper-class lifestyle, that is, until the devil offers her a deal. She agrees to accompany him for an evening in the underworld, and in return, she will be reunited with her lover. By participating in this mad reality, she is granted the powers of flight, invisibility, and youth, but beyond these physical forms of freedom, she is “free, free of everything” and is empowered enough to leave her husband “and her former life forever”.\(^{103}\) Margarita’s reaction to the fantastical world of demons and witches is in stark contrast to the reactions of the men within the story, underscoring the idea that this madness is significantly gendered. Ivan Bezdomy, Nikanor Ivanovich, Bulgaksy, and others who interact with Woland and his crew find themselves confined, imprisoned, and psychologically traumatized rather than rapturously freed. This line of thinking is underscored further by the subsequent freeing of Margarita’s maid Natasha, who also chooses to join Margarita in her whimsical experience with magic. Natasha also forces Margarita’s male neighbor Nikolai to partake in the madness by smothering magic cream on him, but rather than becoming youthful and beautiful, he “squeezed into a pig’s snout, and his arms and legs had acquired hooves”.\(^{104}\) Not only does Nikolai’s reluctant reaction to the magic lead to a diminishing of appearance: it also places him in a subservient position as he is literally carrying Natasha on his back as they fly. The reversal of power seen in Natasha’s dominance over the male character further emphasizes the ability of madness and mysticism to elevate women from their traditional position in the social hierarchy.

Margarita’s acceptance of the fantastical and mad magic of the devil allows her deviate from the demure, passive behavior normally attributed to women. During her rejoicing flight, Margarita exacts revenge on a publisher named Latunksy and the publishing office that wronged the Master in the past by destroying their property. Through her agreement with the devil, she is granted anonymity in the form of invisibility; Margarita takes advantage of this anonymity in order to unleash violence and rage seen in when she “slashed the sheets with a kitchen knife” on the bed of Latunsky, which “gave Margarita intense pleasure”.\(^{105}\) In “Haunting the Center”, Charlotte Bronte’s character Bertha Mason in *Jane Eyre*, a woman plagued by madness, acts as models for “female rage and rebellion against patriarchal oppression”, which is seen in Margarita’s powerful acts of destruction.\(^{106}\) The images of Margarita smashing windows with hammers and shattering fragile keepsakes evoke equal parts triumph and unbridled insanity, and her violence openly defies expectations of the female upper class. Margarita makes the most of Woland’s otherworldly powers and breaks free from the social decorum attributed to elegant, soft-spoken women.

Even in moments when women are mentally stable in reality, the label of “madness” that is placed upon them can be a tool for them to take agency in their own lives. This phenomenon is epitomized by Vera Ivanova, whose husband relays her story leading up her voluntary incarceration in a mental institution. With the narration being through the lens of the husband, who is unaware of his wife’s faking of her illness, only hints of Vera’s sanity are present. However, the narration also establishes the social idea of husbands being mouthpieces for their wives, and the principles of covering and male superiority within the story provide a confining environment for Vera, our “mad woman”. The husband, Ivan Vasilyevich, is a self-proclaimed humanist, yet he views his wife as less so; when Vera states that her domestic existence is making her “bored”,


Ivan muses on how one day she will be “a real woman – and not only a woman, but a human being as well”, as if her criticism of the homemaking role is not only linked to immaturity but inhumanity as well.\textsuperscript{107} Ivan also wishes her to take up employment fitting of her sex if homemaking would not do, and this employment would be for her “to teach and to nurse”, which Ivan deems as “truly sacred jobs for women”.\textsuperscript{108} Ivan’s male lens on how Vera should conduct herself reveals his need for control over her, which leads her to become increasingly dissatisfied with her marriage to him. Vera has several confrontations with Ivan, including one in which she exclaims that she is “suffocating”, especially since she interacts with sects of society her husband deems unreasonable such as religion and spirituality.\textsuperscript{109} With each argument, Ivan and his patriarchal-conforming sister Klavdia express concern for Vera, with the latter claiming Vera to be “hysterical, unbalanced, and immature”; Ivan and Klavdia view Vera’s dissenting statements on the nature of the soul as alarming rather than passionate, and because she is defying the feminine ideals of meekness, passivity, and obedience, they deem her psychologically unhinged.\textsuperscript{110} Vera attempts to take control over her life through the raising of a child, which the narrator believes will help; “If Verochka...had had a child, none of this would have happened”, he laments, and soon, they adopt a young boy named Andryusha.\textsuperscript{111} Vera is responsible for raising Andryusha, which provides her with purpose and agency since she can make decisions regarding his upbringing. However, when Vera tells her husband that she plans to take Andryusha to mass, he vehemently protests to her decision and prevents her from taking the child with her.\textsuperscript{112} Now faced with the loss of something she had power and influence over, something that was uniquely hers, Vera becomes a recluse.

Despite being victimized by those around her, Vera perceives the attack on her mental state as an opportunity to escape the binding environment in which she exists with her callous, aloof, and controlling husband. Vera’s claustrophobic existence takes a physical toll on her, with her body “becoming pale and withered” as the “life in [the] house was unbearable”.\textsuperscript{113} Vera’s wasting illness reflects the exhausting and draining existence of living with a domineering husband and a society that forces her into the domestic sphere. She is unable to challenge the structure of Russian society without being deemed a deviant, so she takes advantage of the title in order to finally make a deliberate decision in her life. One day, Vera tells Ivan that she “would like to undergo some treatment” because she “cannot control [her]self”, thus submitting to the idea that she is mentally ill.\textsuperscript{114} Ivan reluctantly takes her, and she refuses to return home despite his pleadings. Vera’s final acts of defiance against her abusive home situation feel empty however, as she seems to trade one confinement for another, but this is not an unusual occurrence in Russian literature. In Pushkin’s “The Queen of Spades”, the protagonist Hermann also finds himself incarcerated by the story’s end, but literary critic Gary Rosenshield, in his piece titled “Choosing the Right Card”, claims it too is a victory similar to Vera’s. On Hermann’s playing of the “wrong” card which leads to his incarceration in an insane asylum, Rosenshield claims it is actually the “highest act of sanity”, because Hermann makes “a choice for the first time for chance.

\textsuperscript{108} Pachmuss and Gippius, “The Mad Woman,” 43.  
\textsuperscript{109} Pachmuss and Gippius, “The Mad Woman,” 46.  
\textsuperscript{110} Pachmuss and Gippius, “The Mad Woman,” 53.  
\textsuperscript{111} Pachmuss and Gippius, “The Mad Woman,” 51.  
\textsuperscript{112} Pachmuss and Gippius, “The Mad Woman,” 59.  
\textsuperscript{113} Pachmuss and Gippius, “The Mad Woman,” 57.  
\textsuperscript{114} Pachmuss and Gippius, “The Mad Woman,” 62.
play, and life” and decided to live for himself rather than anyone else. Rosenshield argues that madness can catalyze instances of action and agency from characters defined by their societal roles, and Vera epitomizes the employment of mental breaks in order to achieve a form of freedom, even if the freedom seems contradictory in nature. Scholar de Sherbinin adds to this argument, claiming that Vera’s “silence is empowering in the sense that it is self-determined”. Like Margarita, Vera’s protest is one not overtly understood; where Margarita had anonymous protest, Vera had quiet protest, and neither women could claim the satisfaction of their oppressors realizing they have been bested by a woman. The conclusion to Vera’s story may not seem incredibly triumphant or satisfying upon first thought, yet her resolve in her decision and final protest feel more victorious than if she remained trapped within her suffocating home. Vera utilized her perceived madness as a tool to elevate her state of living as well as exact agency in her otherwise oppressed homelife, and she took advantage of a category she was forced into in order to free herself from social confinement.

In the song and accompanying video for “All the Things She Said” or “Ya Soshla S Uma”, by Russian pop group t.A.T.u., the female duo provides a modern version of feminine madness, in which a homosexual relationship between the two women is scrutinized by the public but proves to be a form of freedom from the male-dominated society. The song, which more accurately translates to “I Went Mad”, describes a relationship that is a “delirium” and a “poison” that drives the narrator insane with need for her lover (t.A.T.u. Ya Soshla S Uma). This compulsive desire leads to a deindividuation of the singer, who claims, “there’s no me at all” and “there’s no me without you”, and this loss of identity contributes to the insanity and desperation felt in the text. The repetition of the song’s title as well as phrases such as “I need her” reflect a cyclic form of obsession that suggests a fixation on a relationship deemed taboo by greater conservative society. The relationship is less about love and affection and more about the ways in which relationships that defy the traditional expectation can frustrate those who wish to be free to choose who they love. Despite the song possessing internalized sentiments of madness and insanity, the music video reveals the external response to women who are mad, specifically as it pertains to homosexuality and feminism.

The music video for “Ya Soshla S Uma” acts as a visual vehicle for the manifestation of madness not as an illness but rather a result of external judgement and labelling. Set in blueish-grey scale and during a rainstorm, t.A.T.u. sings while trapped behind a chain-link fence and soaked with rainwater. On the opposite side of the fence stands men and women, shielded from the rain with umbrellas and silently staring at the two women, who embrace and kiss throughout the video (0:27 t.A.T.u). The metal fence that divides these two groups of people seems to encapsulate the mad women, but they are simultaneously on display for the onlookers. The decision to represent these women as spectacle contributes to the idea of madness being a construct of society; the label of madness is placed on these women by spectators who deem their actions as deviant. However, by the video’s end, the perspective shifts, and the women are not the ones confined behind a chain-link fence but rather the condemners who observe them. The women run hand-in-hand towards the horizon, away from the people who believe they are the ones that are free (3:20 t.A.T.u.). The confinement which was once the women’s is now society’s, whose close-mindedness and social norms leave them trapped and standing in the rain. The inversion of

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116 De Sherbinin, “‘Haunting the Center’: Russia’s Madwomen and Zinaida Gippius’s ‘Madwoman,’” 738.
entrapment underscores the fact that Russian women are able to escape societal expectations when they embrace the label of madness, just like Vera and Margarita. While these women are able to free themselves from the confines of traditional Russian femininity, they gain agency in their lives. While Margarita is able to enact female rage in her freedom, Vera and the members of t.A.T.u. display a different form of power, one that releases them from the confines of general society. Vera trades one confinement for another, but t.A.T.u. seems to reach a new level of clarity; they are literally able to depart from the stormy, clouded landscape of judgement towards the drier, more hopeful horizon. Their madness and their participation in society-defying behavior elevates their existence to one of enlightenment and greater understanding, which is in stark contrast to the stagnant thinking of the onlookers. By pretending to be in a homosexual relationship, the members of t.A.T.u. disrupt conservative, traditional societal values, and by presenting themselves as being free from these values, they push for progressive and liberal thinking and acceptance. Several people around the world protested and attempted to ban this song due to the presence of homosexuality in the music video, which further underscores the attempts by conservative forces to silence voices that deviate from the norm.

In Mikhail Bulgakov’s *The Master and Margarita*, Zenaida Gippius’s “The Mad Woman”, and t.A.T.u.’s song “Ya Soshla S Uma”, the societal label of madness is placed on women and manifests in the form of protests in defiance of patriarchal society rather than real, diagnosable mental illness. Bulgakov and Gippius both characterize female existence in early 20th century Russia by entrapment in loveless marriages and confinement in the domestic sphere, and they work to highlight the severity of these traditional gender values through Margarita and Vera, who must embrace their deviance from the norm in order to escape their claustrophobic lives. Through these characters, Bulgakov and Gippius suggest that madness can be a sickness of society, one that results from the environment in which people live rather than mental or physical defect of the brain. The pop duo t.A.T.u. presents straying from the social norm in the form of female homosexuality, which acts as the ultimate affront to the patriarchy; this type of rebellion leads to not only complete cultural upending but also total freedom from the bonds of society. Perhaps mental illness is simply a deviation of what society deems normal, and as values shift within a culture overtime, insanity too shifts in definition and nature. As Alexander Pushkin elucidates in his poem “God grant that I not lose my mind…”, madness would be freeing and rejoicing if it were not for the judgement and fear that society employs in response to mental states it deems abnormal:

“In flaming frenzy would I sing,  
Forget myself within a haze  
Of shapeless, wondrous dreams.

…men will dread you like the plague,  
And straightaway lock you up,  
Will put the madman on a chain  
And, through the screen like some small beast,  
Will come to harass you.”
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Among the myriad of social and political issues being explored through the medium of literature by writers in the post-Soviet epoch, there exists many female post-Soviet writers examining the gendered dimension of corporeality in their work, especially the experience and effects of gender-based violence and misogyny. These writers give us a wealth of material with which to analyze the constrictive or even traumatic nature of gender roles – especially the standards of femininity – as well as heteronormativity, and of course, violence against women. Furthermore, their works depict the ways in which corporeality and corporeal identity is mediated and altered by these experiences and social structures, and in particular, as a direct reaction to gender-based trauma. However, their literature not only recounts narratives of trauma, but mounts rebellions against the social structures that catalyzed and abetted their traumatic experiences. In fact, I argue that these writers sometimes employ their altered corporeal realities as a direct resistance to the forms of trauma that engendered it, not only accepting but embracing a new corporeal identity as a means of rebellion. Further, through close reading of three texts by Vasyakina, Rymbu, and Boteva, I argue that their embrace of the abject is a powerful subversion of the status quo and repressive social structures, and thus one of the most effective tools in their arsenal of resistance, as well as further evidence of a corporeality mediated through gender and trauma. Through these narratives, we see corporeality and corporeal identity altered and mediated through trauma and gender-based violence, oppressive social structures, and transformations of corporeality as attempts to resist and subvert these phenomena.

In Maria Boteva’s short story, “Where the Truth Is,” the narrator grapples with the fate of her attacker, along with the complex nature of the truth – and its complication and obfuscation through both lies and silence. We see the narrator wrestling with her altered sense of self, and we even see her forgive her attacker, and lie to protect her attacker – potentially as a result of her sense of guilt. Arguably, however, the attack itself plays a secondary role in the story. The nature of the attack is somewhat ambiguously detailed in the middle of the narrative, but more often than not, the attack plays an implied and underlying role in Boteva’s story.

Boteva’s story follows a somewhat disjointed narrative through space and time, one that helps to embed deeper implications into the story, and one that helps to piece together the narrator’s understanding of this traumatic narrative without explicitly stating the experience. Judith Greenberg asserts that literary trauma narratives often mirror the internal nature of a survivor’s memory – specifically, the fragmented and disjointed narrative, one that resists linear narration altogether, akin to the non-linearity and fragmentation of traumatic memory itself.117 Boteva’s narrative follows this pattern, or, more precisely, that the narrator struggles to stay on a linear path, finding themselves repeatedly side-tracked in re-telling this account.118 Vasyakina similarly recalls a trauma narrative – in fact multiple narratives – presenting us fragmented snapshots...

through her poetry.\textsuperscript{119} According to Patricia Moran, the act of this re-telling can serve as a therapeutic vessel to reconnect these fragmented narratives, and act as a form of resistance.\textsuperscript{120} To complicate this, Boteva’s re-telling is often not explicitly described, but rather implied silently through her guilt or her actions, and especially through her altered sense of self, one that rejects femininity – or, specifically, outward expressions of it in public. However, that doesn’t mean that Boteva’s re-telling is any less an act of resistance. In Boteva’s story, sometimes the body says what words cannot, thus revealing the hidden dimension of trauma in an affective and corporeal manner. Interestingly, the implied and oft-unspoken nature of the narrator’s traumatic reactions mirrors her depiction of her silence through the assault as well, therefore allowing the rest of the narrative to expose, through her corporeal identity and sense of self, the underlying unspoken nature of her trauma. Thus, there is more to these trauma narratives than a simple retelling; they are also exploring the psychobiological reactions to trauma, and even using them subversively. Importantly, the psychological realm is inherently connected with physiological responses as well as the alteration of corporeality as a trauma response; the psychological manifests itself corporeally, making it relevant to an investigation into corporeality.

After narrating the memory of her assault, Boteva’s protagonist then recounts the aftermath:

“I kept wailing on the way home, but when I got home I suddenly wanted to cut off all my hair – it smelled really badly like the oil from the railroad ties – and I cut it off with Mom’s little sewing scissors, really short, but it smelled anyway. I stuffed my coat into the stove piece by piece.”\textsuperscript{121}

On one hand, there is a common psychological response to trauma – gender-based violence in particular – being depicted here. The desire to alter one’s appearance radically following events like the one Boteva depicts is a well-documented phenomenon, as an effect of body image dysregulation that is shown to occur often following traumatic events.\textsuperscript{122} Boteva continues, “But I’m still afraid to dress up in something really feminine or to pierce my ears, let alone wear a skirt in the evening. Legs knocked that desire out of my head back then […].”\textsuperscript{123} There is, of course, an undeniable traumatic reaction, a shift in corporeal identity as a result of violence, that is central to this passage. Yet, there is also a subversive potential, a rejection of the societal standards for femininity. Her corporeality is at once altered both by her attacker and the psychological ramifications of trauma, but also by her repudiation of these standards of femininity that contains an inherent potential for subversion and rebellion. The ridding of pieces of her former corporeal identity also mirrors the traumatic fragmentation of memory and narrative, utilizing a more affective dimension to illustrate this fragmentation to the reader.

\textsuperscript{119} Oksana Vasyakina, \textit{Wind of Fury – Songs of Fury}.
\textsuperscript{120} Patricia Moran, \textit{Virginia Woolf, Jean Rhys, and the Aesthetics of Trauma}, translated by Jonathan Brooks Platt.
\textsuperscript{121} Maria Boteva, “Where the Truth Is,” 294.
\textsuperscript{123} Boteva, “Where the Truth Is,” 293.
Rymbu likewise rejects – or rather, is actively struggling against – these standards of femininity, as well as heteronormativity. Rymbu’s poem focuses – as the title suggests – on a rejection of heteronormativity and socially embedded misogyny, as well as traditional standards of femininity and challenges to women’s rights, all through the prism of the poem’s central symbol, the vagina. Rymbu’s poem covers a breadth of interconnected issues, from the personal – her struggles against heteronormative relationships and reflections on her previous queer relationships, and her struggles with maternity – to the political, specifically the challenges to women’s rights brought forth by the Orthodox church and the Kremlin in kind. The rejection of maternity here is of particular interest: Jane Ussher suggests that it is the reproductive potential of the female body that gives rise to the myth of the “monstrous feminine,” and thus plays a significant role in the policing of the female body. If the reproductive nature of the female body is the catalyst for its policing, then it is even more impactful that childbirth seems to be the catalyst for Rymbu’s narrator’s rebellion against this regulation. Immediately after childbirth, the narrator says:

“Then they stitched up my vagina;
It changed shape. Became narrow and constricted
A vagina-prison, vagina-wound. [...]”

Maternality has transformed the narrator’s corporeality into something constrictive, awakening a discontent with the misogynistic and heteronormative constraints of traditionally imagined femininity.

Vasyakina takes this rejection of femininity even farther. Vasyakina’s poem imagines a monstrous recreation of a collective being, rebirthed out of the trauma of gender-based violence and the constrictive nature of traditional norms of femininity. Vasyakina imagines the stripping of anything markedly feminine, a rejection of that which made them targets for gender-based violence, for example:

“My mother has become an Amazon
she sat upon a boulder
and in one stroke cut off her left breast
To make it easier to hold the bow
To leave nothing for the feeding of babies
her right breast became heavy wood long ago”

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125 Galina Rymbu, My Vagina, Translated by Kevin M. F. Platt, 1.
126 Vasyakina, Wind of Fury – Songs of Fury, 36.
In this passage, the mother, in response to the trauma of gender-based violence, not only rejects the standard conception of a feminine body, but also maternality. Her breast is the burdensome symbolic of inhabiting a traditionally feminine-presenting body, a body that made her the target of gender-based violence and masculine social dominance, through the figurative amputation of her breast. Vasyakina’s imaging of this amputation, this unequivocal rejection of traditional femininity, is an even more blatant re-rendering of corporeality as both a trauma response and as subversion. Here, rebellion is reliant on the transfiguration of the corporeal body.

But Vasyakina’s subversion does not stop there, she continues to mount her rebellion through embracing that which is traditionally considered the abject – another innate dimension of corporeality, but one under taboo. Ussher cites Kristeva’s work, that “bodily fluids and emissions—sweat, pus, excreta, breast milk, semen, blood—stand as signifiers of the abject, of the body without boundaries which threatens the illusion of the contained, controlled, rational subject, and as such, threatens stability and social unity.”

If bodily fluids are the traditional symbol of the abject, then Vasyakina leans fearlessly into the abject as a means of subversion:

“We are covered in a crust
of blood and sperm
she stretched out her skin
she lowered us into the earth”

The abjected fluids, the remnants of the violence perpetrated against them, are depicted like a pseudo-fertilization for their collective re-birth; their trauma transfiguring their corporeality and preparing the new collective for their resistance. In fact, the physical remnants of their trauma are directly depicted as that which strengthens and protects them, enabling their collective being to morph into an impenetrable and inviolable being, transforming them into a force of resistance:

“awash in blood up to the vagina
it will harden into a black scab
an invincible armor
it will grow into our meat”

The abject plays a dual role, in representing the lasting imprint of their trauma, but also the central aspect of their corporeal reconfiguration. Simultaneously, it is becoming their protection, their “armor,” depicting their trauma as their defense, the site of their resilience. That which is perpetrated against them actually becomes the corporeal representation of both their trauma and their newfound resistance.

127 Ussher, Managing the monstrous feminine: regulating the reproductive body.
128 Vasyakina, Wind of Fury – Songs of Fury, 44.
129 Ibid., 44.
Rymbu, in her poem, similarly embraces the abjected bodily fluids as a means of subversion and resistance, specifically against the constraints of gender roles and heteronormativity:

“I love it when your penis is covered with my blood,  
and love to imagine that you have a period, too,  
that salty, warm blood is dripping from the little hole  
in your glans.”130

Here, Rymbu embraces the abject, embraces the taboo, before continuing to subvert social norms and depicting her discontent with heteronormativity. Rymbu’s embrace of the abject continues on, and palpably demonstrates the narrator’s discontent with this heteronormative relationship, and adds a distinct corporeal dimension to the narrator’s longing for previous queer relationships (which the narrator describes in one line as “[…] so good that you don’t do it in Russia”), writing here with a demonstrable discontent:

“I’ll let you drink it, love, it will pour over your face,  
your tender little nipples (almost like a girl’s),  
   wet the fuzz on your chest,  
neck, your tummy, where,  
in my dreams, you might someday carry our daughter.”131

In Rymbu’s subversion, she transfigures the corporeality of another’s body in her own mind; the manifestation of the narrator’s overt discontent with the heteronormative standards she finds herself constrained by. Similarly, it illustrates the narrator’s own repression of her feelings, which have manifested in re-imagining her partner’s corporeal body. Simultaneously, in embracing the abject, in daring to speak of the taboo, the narrator seems to be arriving at not only a point of recognition of what is repressed but seeding her own resistance to the social structures constraining her existence.

Similarly, it is the representation of the abject, of the mingling of bodily fluids, that Rymbu uses to illustrate the tender memories of the narrator’s relations with another woman:

“where Katia and I would lay forever on the carpet after school over  
at her apartment touching one another, turning into a single salty  
sea, and then would be afraid to talk about it.”132

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130 Rymbu, My Vagina, 2.  
131 Ibid., 2.  
132 Ibid., 3.
Interestingly, the embrace of the abject here is not embracing the remnants of violence—like we see in Vasyakina’s poem—or of anything negative, but is still functioning as a tool of subversion; as a resistance to the heteronormative standards that stifle and constrict the narrator. Additionally, just like the mother in Vasyakina’s poem, Rymbu is forming resistance through the rejection of social expectations of maternality, by reveling in inherently non-reproductive sex, a kind of subversion of social standards of femininity, and a further repudiation of maternality.

Furthermore, Rymbu triumphantly voices her resilience, leaning into the abject and the taboo, transgressing boundaries:

“My vagina is love, history and politics.
My politics is the body, the everyday, affect.
My world is the vagina. And I bear peace.”

Rymbu even more directly voices her resistance, vocalizing her desire “To make revolution with the vagina,” and “I think, well, maybe the vagina will bring down this state for real”. In engaging with the taboo of speaking directly about the vagina, in creating boundary transgressions between the vagina and the outside world, Rymbu molds a powerful model of subversion against masculine dominance, and against constrictive social structures.

When it comes to the oppressive structures of masculine social dominance, and in particular, the normalization of violence against women, Vasyakina’s narrator depicts even heteronormative relationships as inherently (at least, to an extent) untenable in the aftermath of this violence. The narrator depicts her mother as recognizing that queer relationships are the only way to completely partake in this subversion, in this rebellion against the violence that has been perpetrated against them:

“She understood that rejecting her breast was not enough
She had to become a lesbian
And she will if she has time
If she has the strength to rise from the cold stone
And walk across the desert
To meet her sisters”

While this transfiguration is less focused on corporeality, it is reminiscent of Boteva’s narrator’s transformation of her identity and sense of self in the aftermath of violence. It thus seems to suggest that a principle, underlying change in identity inherently occurs as a result of this trauma, and by extension, a change in how one relates to others and is seen in society—

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133 Ibid., 4.
134 Ibid.
135 Vasyakina, Wind of Fury – Songs of Fury, 37.
particularly in Boteva’s story, where the narrator no longer wanted to be overtly perceived as feminine.

However, unlike the transformation seen in Vasyakina’s poem, where there is an overt rebirth and a sense of finality – that this transfiguration is permanent, or at least it is untenable to return to one’s past self – Boteva’s narrator seems to be returning, at least in some sense, to her previous self. Boteva’s narrator describes the regrowth of her hair, a symbolic rejuvenation of that which she reactively ridded herself of in the immediate aftermath of her attack:

“But otherwise it’s not so bad, it’s all behind me, and my hair has grown out, too, but that evening Marty shaved my head with his razor. Really, he’d bought it for himself, his first one, but I really couldn’t stand to look at my noggin, so I asked him to shave me.”

And, furthermore, Boteva’s narrator describes her regrowing hair later in terms of a dandelion, saying, “[…] and by March my head already looked like a light-brown dandelion, because I have light-brown hair.” This gives the sense of a sort of paradoxical nature to the narrator’s rejuvenation, having both the characteristics of a blooming flower as a sign of rebirth in the face of previous destruction, as well as the symbolism of the dandelion as a weed, suggesting a sort of unwelcome but persistent growth — as if her hair was the unwanted returning sign of femininity.

All three of these authors depict moments where their narrators model resistance against the traditional confinements of femininity, whether out of traumatic reaction, calculated resistance, or both. However, Vasyakina and Rymbu go even farther, in order to subvert masculine dominance, constrictive femininity, and heteronormativity by embracing the abject. In the case of Vasyakina, this means even taking in the abject, incorporating it into a transfigured corporeality. However, they all depict transformations in corporeality, whether it is their own body that undergoes these changes — as is the case in Vasyakina and Boteva’s works — or the imagined transformation of another’s body as exemplified in Rymbu’s work.

If, like Kristeva’s work suggests, the deterioration of the boundaries between the body and the abject “threaten[s] stability and social unity,” then perhaps this embrace of the abject is serving as an appropriate resistance to the status quo of “social unity” in its current form. Interestingly, this embrace of the abject sometimes takes the form of incorporating the traumatic physical remnants of violence into one’s transfigured and revolutionary self – as in the case of Vasyakina’s poem – and sometimes takes the form of symbolizing the loving union of two queer individuals – as is the case in Rymbu’s poem. And, in yet another depiction, Rymbu also utilized the embrace of the abject in her heterosexual relationship, using it as vehicle for a sort of internal, mental resistance, of re-imagining these moments with a queer potentiality, as well as palpably demonstrating the narrator’s discontent with this heterosexual relationship. In addition, if these depictions of embracing the abject intrigue rather than repulse the reader, then it stands to reason that these depictions actually serve as a form of literary resistance capable of spilling over into the social sphere, transfiguring the way we experience our own corporeality. Thus, in

137 Ibid., 294-195.
138 Ussher, Managing the monstrous feminine: regulating the reproductive body.
engaging with these models of resistance through the embrace of the abject, we can explore these modes of resistance through the literary form, providing us with a sort of testing ground for new understandings of resistance and new methodologies to accomplish it.
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SECTION 3

Policing and Enforcement
"Violent Terraces, Violent Government: Football Ultras, Organized Crime, and Political Clientelism in Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Dual State"

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Veljko Belivuk: Criminal, Football Fan, and (Former) Friend of the Government

On March sixth, 2021, Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić called a press conference wherein he detailed the grisly crimes committed by Veljko Belivuk, the leader of a particularly violent section of the organized fans, or ‘ultras,’ of Partizan Belgrade, one of Serbia’s most prominent football clubs. Serbian police had arrested Belivuk a month earlier on charges including, amongst others, drug trafficking and murder. Belivuk, along with the now deceased Aleksandar Stanković, who was better known by his nickname “Sale the Mute,” has spent the past decade consolidating control over both his section of ultras as well as the lucrative drug trade from Serbia’s southern neighbor, Montenegro, to Western Europe. The Serbian president went as far as to claim that Belivuk and his ultras group were, in fact, plotting to kill him, and garages underneath the Partizan stadium were cordoned off as crime scenes after it was discovered Belivuk’s group was using them to store weapons. The arrest of Belivuk looks, on the surface, like a prime example of Vučić making good on the promises to fight corruption and organized crime that were part of what brought his party, the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka, or SNS) to power in 2012. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that Vučić’s government and Belivuk’s ultras were more closely connected than it appears. For starters, Vučić’s son has been regularly photographed with members of the group in previous years. Additionally, a 2017 story by the Serbian association of investigative journalists KRIK outlined the close connections, complete with photographic evidence, between Sale the Mute and Borko Aranitović, who regularly worked security for SNS events and strong-armed anti-Vučić protesters at the president’s 2017 inauguration, as well as Nenad Vučković, a member of the Serbian special police unit known as the Gendarmerie. Former Partizan vice president Vladimir Vuletić openly accused Vučić of using Belivuk’s gang as a cudgel against political opponents inside and out of the Partizan stadium, and in the following months was subject to a significant amount of negative press from tabloids closely aligned with Vučić’s government. Though this evidence does not necessarily constitute a smoking gun that...
directly ties Vučić to Belivuk, it proves at the very least that there are plenty of places where organized crime, football hooliganism, and the Serbian state overlap.

Even if we take Vučić’s account of the arrest at face value, another element of the Belivuk story shows a clear link between organized crime and national football governance in Serbia. In the months following Belivuk’s arrest, head of the Football Association of Serbia Slaviša Kokeza resigned after being brought in for questioning regarding his association with Belivuk’s gang. Kokeza, like Vučić himself, had once been a part of the Serbian Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka, or SRS) before Vučić’s faction split from the party to form the SNS. The SRS is a far right political party in Serbia that was headed for many years by Vojislav Šešelj until he was put on trial for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2003. Kokeza has expressed sympathies with extreme Serbian nationalist positions in the past, most notably when he protested the arrest of Radovan Karadžić, who served as president of Republika Srpska during the Bosnian War and is currently serving a lifetime sentence in The Hague for his role in the conflict. Kokeza is heavily involved with the consulting firm Prointer, which has consistently won public contracts in both Serbia and Republika Srpska, including taking on 17 public contracts in Serbia alone during 2020. In trying to determine why Vučić turned on Belivuk and Kokeza after evidence pointed to a close relationship between them, some credible voices in Serbia have suggested it may be due to an internal rift between different factions of the SNS and/or the informal political networks they associate with, which are described below.

The Serbian Dual State and Vučić’s Fractured Discursivity

The case of Kokeza and Prointer, as well as Kokeza and Vučić’s connections to Belivuk and other elements of organized crime, are exemplary of the “dual state” that emerged in Serbia following the privatization and governmental decay that accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia, wherein official mechanisms of government exist alongside, and are often reliant upon, powerful and sometimes extralegal networks of non-state actors. Official actors within the state can make use of these informal networks to consolidate private sector support, enrich themselves, and intimidate or shut out opposition while still maintaining enough distance to have a degree of plausible deniability. In return, informal actors in the private or criminal sectors can take advantage of favorable government contracts and regulations and can be assured, to an extent, that they will not face criminal prosecution for their actions.

This dual state is fittingly accompanied by a dual, or as Serbian historian Srdjan Jovanović refers to it, “fractured” discursivity on the part of Vučić and other high ranking members

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150 Malone, “Serbian Football Federation President Resigns Position over Police Investigation.”
151 “Кo Je Buntovnik Slaviša Kokeza?”
153 Higgins, "Arrests Shake Up a Soccer Scene in Serbia Ruled by Gangsters and ‘Gravediggers’.
of the Serbian governing elite. Jovanović describes how Vučić adopts a reformist, anti-corruption and anti-nationalist stance in many of his most visible public statements, particularly those which are being observed by the European Union and other multinational European bodies. At the same time, however, Vučić has allowed far right parties to thrive and has regularly used the media outlets he has strong influence over to point fingers elsewhere in regards to corruption scandals that embroil his government and to push a hardline nationalist stance on issues such as Kosovo and the legacy of the ICTY.  

Though this tactic may not have the same success with the European Union, FIFA and UEFA–riddled with clientelistic, corrupt patronage networks themselves–are often willing to buy into the outward-facing reformist language of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes hook, line, and sinker.  

A Brief History of the Politicization of Ultras in the Former Yugoslavia

The intermingling of organized crime, deep connections to the state, rightwing nationalism, and football has roots in the western Balkans that date back to at least the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Throughout the period of Tito’s leadership the Yugoslav intelligence service known as the State Security Administration (Uprava državne bezbednosti, or UDBA) would regularly target perceived threats to the Yugoslav state living abroad for surveillance and sometimes assassination, particularly those associated with the most extreme edges of Serbian and Croatian nationalism. In order to carry out these missions, the UDBA would often utilize connections with organized crime networks that had developed amongst Yugoslav emigre communities. Due to its proximity to Yugoslavia, as well as increasing migration flows between the two countries beginning in the mid-1960s, some of the most substantial emigre crime networks, as well as some of the most destructive perpetrators of emigre Croat political violence, were located in West Germany.  

One of the most prominent criminals with connections to the UDBA was bank robber and mobster Željko Ražnatović, more commonly known to history by his nickname, Arkan. Arkan returned to Serbia in the 1980’s, and by 1990 was head of Delije, the official supporters’ group of Red Star Belgrade. As Yugoslavia began to disintegrate during that year, Arkan used young members of Delije to form the core of the Tigers, his Serb nationalist paramilitary group. The Tigers would go on to commit some of the worst atrocities of the Yugoslav wars, and in 1999

Arkan was indicted by the International War Crimes Tribunal.\textsuperscript{162} After the war, Arkan continued to be involved with football. Through looting, sanctions-busting, and opportunistic monopolization of industries as the socialist economy crumbled and was privatized, the conflict had left Arkan very wealthy. He used this wealth to buy football clubs, first in Kosovo and later in Belgrade. During his time in charge of the latter club, FK Obilić, Arkan used his paramilitary connections to threaten opposing teams and referees until his assassination in 1999.\textsuperscript{163} There are still competing theories over who was behind Arkan’s death. One of the most common is that it was orchestrated by business partners involved with FK Obilić who were spiteful of all the extra profits Arkan was siphoning from transfer fees, a scenario with clear similarities to that of the Mamić brothers in Croatia.\textsuperscript{164}

The case of Arkan and Delije has parallels in other western Balkan states, most notably Croatia. Though there was not a singular figure that possessed Arkan’s level of notoriety, the Dinamo Zagreb fan club Bad Blue Boys was also one of the largest recruitment bases of Croat paramilitaries, and the months following Croatian president Franjo Tudjman’s election saw the formation of many nationalist sports clubs that could be mobilized into paramilitary units.\textsuperscript{165} Tudjman, who in the 1980’s had actually served as the president of Partizan Belgrade, was aware of the vital tool football could be in establishing political legitimacy and national identity, and he particularly focused on Dinamo.\textsuperscript{166} Interestingly, however, a miscalculation on Tudjman’s part regarding Dinamo led to BBB turning on the Croatian president and represented one of the first fractures in the nationalist consensus that fueled support of Tudjman and his party, HDZ. In a move intended to reinforce the transformation away from socialism and towards Croatian nationalism, Tudjman changed the name of the club from Dinamo to “Croatia Zagreb” in 1993. This move angered Dinamo fans, and BBB in particular, and led many to turn on Tudjman’s government, particularly after the end of conflict in Croatia.\textsuperscript{167} The backlash proved that, despite close connections between the clubs and political elites, the political utilization of football clubs did have its limits. So too did the Red Star Belgrade fans’ decision to turn against Slobodan Mišošević’s regime in October of 2000.\textsuperscript{168}

**Xenophobic Nationalism as Serbian Ultras’ Guiding Ideology**

Despite their role in toppling the previous generation of nationalist leaders, hardline nationalism and religious conservatism are still commonplace amongst football ultras in the western Balkans as a whole and in Serbia in particular. While the clientelism of the Serbian dual state serves to provide material and prestige benefits to the upper echelons of criminal ultras such as Belivuk, it is this nationalism and conservatism that serves as the ideological justification for the everyman ultra to oppose and even threaten liberal and leftwing opponents of Vučić’s regime.

\textsuperscript{162} Sack and Suster, "Soccer and Croatian Nationalism: A Prelude to War," 313.


\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{165} Sack and Suster, "Soccer and Croatian Nationalism: A Prelude to War," 313.


Survey research done on violent Serbian football fans found that they very often held conservative beliefs, as well as the belief that the world is largely corrupted by exploitative groups. The primary target for the latter belief is not usually Vučić’s government, however, but rather the European Union, the International Criminal Court and other international institutions. Amongst some fans, these beliefs cross into into explicit racism, islamophobia, and antisemitism.

In years past ultras, along with other groups associated with the Serbian right, have come out in force to protest events they associate with social progressivism, such as pride parades. Whereas other attempts to organize pride parades throughout the 2000’s were called off due to concerns for participant safety, the two most successful attempts at organizing pride parades were particularly notable for the violence of the right’s response. In 2001 political elites, afraid they would be unable to control the presence of football ultras, quickly called off the parade after violent confrontations occurred at its beginning, an example that shows the influence from the bottom up these fan groups can have. In 2010 the government allowed the parade to take place and riots led to 140 being injured. Though it has not ceased entirely, the violence from rightwing agitators at pride parades has decreased significantly since Vučić’s rise to power, something that many Serbs see as being no coincidence now that Vučić is pursuing European Union integration. In the government’s response to pride parades we also see the Vučić government’s fractured discursivity at work, as SNS officials will often appear in the media before pride marches to signal their support and then return to condemn the marchers after the event has taken place. The example of Belgrade pride parades demonstrates both how far right ultras can put pressure on government officials and how Vučić has seemingly played a role in toning down these groups, instead redirecting them to events such as his previously mentioned inauguration.

The nationalist and conservative ideology that is expressed by ultras in Serbia has counterparts elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Sections of the BBB still hold these beliefs, with the most extreme flirting with Ustashi fascism. In multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, violent confrontations between ultras groups holding different nationalist views often take place, such as those between clubs based in the primarily Bonsian Muslim Sarajevo and those based in the primarily Serbian Banja Luka. In Montenegro, the national Football Association has had a history of paying fans off in order to prevent them from using particularly xenophobic language and

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175 Thue, "We - the People. A Study of Contemporary Serbian Nationalism," 66.
176 Thue, "We - the People. A Study of Contemporary Serbian Nationalism," 68.
participating in violent altercations.\textsuperscript{179} This situation echoes that of the Belgrade pride parades, as another case where political elites have had significant issues combatting the power of organized fan groups, and have had to rely on under-the-table methods in order to do so.

It is important to state that organized fan groups in the western Balkans are not a monolith. In Croatia, some subsections of the BBB, such as the White Angels Zagreb, are actively left-wing, and many are simply apolitical, or more affiliated with specific Zagreb neighborhoods than hardline conservative nationalism.\textsuperscript{180} In Bosnia and Herzegovina, ultras in the multiethnic city of Tužla have taken a significant stand against ethnic enmity, writing “death to nationalism” with the same spray paint used to graffiti “death to Serbs” or “death to Muslims” in other parts of the western Balkans.\textsuperscript{181} Even in Serbia, where the influence of rightwing fans seems the most hegemonic, parts of the Partizan and Red Star fan bases have found space for leftwing organization by calling on the clubs’ socialist Yugoslav past rather than their Serbian nationalist present.\textsuperscript{182} Ultras across the political spectrum often find common ground in fighting against the increasing influence of private capital that has eroded fan input into club structures as football becomes increasingly financialized and globalized.\textsuperscript{183} As these examples show, even where elites can use clientelistic networks and pander to nationalist sentiments to instrumentalize football fans, it is a balancing act, and ultras are never anything as simple as a leader or political party’s private army.

\textbf{Points of Comparison: Italy, Home of the Ultra}

When one investigates world football, it is tough to find exact comparables to the relationship between the state, organized crime, and ultras groups found in Serbia. In Italy, however, there are some recent scandals that have come close. Italy is the birthplace of the term “ultras,” and remains a hotbed of politically-motivated organized football fandom to this day. There is also a long history of corruption and links to organized crime in both the Italian government and Italian football. In 2007 the ultras of Rome-based team Lazio repeatedly threatened the owner of the club at the time, Claudio Lotito, trying to get him to sell the club back to a former owner, Giorgio Chinaglia. A few months later Chinaglia was arrested, along with several prominent leaders of the ultras, on charges that they were trying to buy the team using money that was being laundered by \textit{camorra}, part of the Neapolitan mob.\textsuperscript{184} Though this story does show that connections between football and organized crime exist in Italy, and how ultras groups can be utilized to put pressure on elite decision-making, it lacks the direct connection to the state that we see in the Serbian case. It also lacks the ideological component that is apparent in similar western Balkan cases, even if Lazio has historically been associated with the legacy of Benito Mussolini’s fascist government.\textsuperscript{185}

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    \item \textsuperscript{179} Ivana Gardasević, "The Problem of Aggression and Fan Violence in Montenegro," \textit{Connections. the Quarterly Journal (English Ed.)} 17, no. 1 (Jan 01, 2018): 68.
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    \item \textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 43-44.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
A significant difference between ultras in Italy and those in the western Balkans in general is that, while still held perhaps just as strongly, in Italy there are a wide variety of ideological positions amongst fan groups, including regionalist as well as far left and far right positions, depending on which club’s fan group is being examined. In the western Balkans, though not entirely uniform, there is much more of a clear association between the majority of ultras and some level of nationalism and conservatism. This is likely due in part to the fact that whereas in Italy there are a number of prolific clubs located throughout the country (Juventus in Turin, AC Milan and FC Internazionale in Milan, Roma and Lazio in Rome, and Napoli in Naples), in the western Balkans domestic football leagues are almost always dominated by a few clubs from one or two major urban centers (i.e. Dinamo Zagreb and Hajduk Split in Croatia, Red Star and Partizan in Serbia, or Budućnost in Montenegro) which are supported by large segments of the countries’ population as a whole. As such, there is less room for ideological distinctions amongst the clubs with large enough ultras groups to be influential.

There are also significant examples of the close connections between national politics and football in Italy. One of the most obvious of these is the case of Silvio Berlusconi, which perhaps comes the closest to mirroring that which we see in Vučić’s Serbia. Berlusconi helped make his name outside of the business world by purchasing storied Italian club AC Milan in 1986. Under his ownership the club became immensely successful, in both a footballing and financial sense. He used the public spotlight owning AC Milan gave him as part of the platform to launch his political career, in which his party, Forza Italia (FI), promised to bring the same technocratic business sense that had propelled AC Milan to the Italian economy. Berlusconi also heavily drew upon Italian football fans for his support, calling on them to sign up voters for FI and paying off certain violent ultras groups, a tactic that calls to mind the example of the Football Association of Montenegro paying off fans mentioned previously. FI also has faced accusations of links to organized crime over the course of its existence, including an alleged promise to drop cases against the Italian mafia in exchange for electoral support for the party. Though the case of Berlusconi and FI does contain many of the same elements that are to be found in Serbia, there are a few crucial distinctions. Firstly, though Berlusconi relied on support from both organized crime and football ultras, they were nominally independent bases of support, unlike in Serbia, where ultras and organized crime have close links, and the state arguably even uses the former as a go-between with the latter. Secondly, Berlusconi’s case lacks the far right nationalist ideological element that has been so important to relations between ultras and the state in the western Balkans, both historically and in the present day. Finally, as Italy is an established democracy, the kinds of incentives FI received from ultras were more oriented towards electoral support than physical intimidation, as is the case in Vučić’s semi-authoritarian Serbia.

Points of Comparison: Post-Socialist Central and Eastern Europe

Moving eastward from Italy, some helpful comparisons with the Serbian case can be drawn with other CEE countries. One of the countries where the parallels are most striking is Serbia’s northeastern neighbor, Romania. Much like in the former Yugoslavia, the 1990s were a

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187 Ibid., 355-357.
time of turmoil for Romania as the country made the painful transition from a communist economy to a market one. As is the case in the western Balkans and elsewhere in CEE, the disintegration of welfare systems and mass privatization created a very concentrated new economic elite and left much of the rest of the country’s citizens in a state of severe financial precarity. In order to combat this, many Romanians turned towards clientelistic reciprocal exchange networks with members of this nouveau riche in order to maintain a level of material stability during this chaotic time in Romanian history.\textsuperscript{189} This was certainly true for ultras groups, particularly as members of the new economic elite often owned football clubs, and top Romanian gangsters also often found nouveau riche patrons.\textsuperscript{190} Romanian ultras, like their counterparts in the western half of the peninsula, have a tendency to gravitate towards cultural conservatism, but have more open enmity towards the state than in Serbia, at least since Vučić came to power.\textsuperscript{191} Though there are some concerns about political capture of ultras’ patronage networks in Romania, most of these Romanian ultra patronage networks still run primarily through economic elites, not party politicians.\textsuperscript{192}

Another interesting example from CEE is that of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. Hungary, too, experienced the transition from communism to a neoliberal market economy, and Orbán operates in a similarly populist conservative and nationalist space to Vučić.\textsuperscript{193} Like Vučić himself, who has boasted about participating in stadium brawls as a Red Star fan in the past (Higgins, 2021),\textsuperscript{194} Orbán has a football-heavy background, as both a passionate fan and a former semi-professional player, something he has used to increase his credibility with Hungarian ultras and Hungarian football fans more generally.\textsuperscript{195} Orbán has also sought to promote and invest in football as a way to develop a post-communist, rightwing Hungarian national identity.\textsuperscript{196} This has led to a well-funded system of domestic football in Hungary in recent years, but also one that is highly subject to state influence, with Orbán’s government directing funds to the sporting causes he deems most favorable to his vision of Hungarian national identity.\textsuperscript{197} Despite their similar ideological outlook and reliance upon football to achieve political goals, Orbán and Vučić differ in their strategies. Whereas Vučić’s government makes active use of Serbia’s strong ultras culture and their connections to informal and extralegal political and economic networks, Orbán relies on direct state investment in football in order to use the sport for his political goals.

Points of Comparison: Beyond Europe

Turning away from Europe, there are some similarities to be found in Argentina. Argentina, like many Latin American countries, has a similar recent history of autocratic governance

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{194} Higgins, "Arrests Shake Up a Soccer Scene in Serbia Ruled by Gangsters and ‘Gravediggers’."
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 9.
and painful neoliberal economic reform to the countries of the western Balkans, as well as a similarly deep passion for football, which makes comparisons between the two all the more enlightening. In Argentina organized fan groups, known not as ultras but as “barras bravas,” are heavily involved in clientelistic patronage networks. These patronage networks are often sponsored by local political and business interests and also include participants in illegal activity such as drug trafficking. In exchange for political support to politicians involved in these patronage networks, barras bravas receive significant financial benefits and are able to avoid punishment for intimidating referees and players on opposing teams.

A vital distinction between Serbian ultras and Argentinian barras bravas is that while the former have been a consistent thorn in the side of previous left-leaning governments and display strong opposition to leftwing and anti-nationalist policies in general, the barras bravas patronage networks have functioned without complaint through leftwing and rightwing Argentinian governments. This was likely due for a long time to their close relationship with Julio Grondona, who was head of the Argentinian Football Association, which he ran as a virtually impenetrable political machine, from the period of military dictatorship in the country until his death in 2014. It seems likely that if the barras bravas groups have been instruments of any political elite it was Grondona, not a specific president or state regime, and as such lack the ideological character of western Balkan ultras, even if some of the clientelistic patronage networks display similar features.

In the Middle East and North Africa, autocratic governments are keenly aware of the political potential of soccer and are heavily involved in domestic club football, often to the point of actively appointing many players and managers themselves. Despite this involvement, however, many governments in the region have antagonistic relationships with football ultras groups in their nations. There are often violent clashes in the region between ultras and state security forces, who are not afraid to use excessive violence against the fans they come into conflict with. In many parts of the region, particularly in countries such as Egypt where regime change has not brought a decrease in the harsh treatment of ultras groups, these violent interactions have caused many football ultras to withdraw from politics, or at the very least electoral politics, altogether.

In Turkey there has been perhaps an even greater depoliticization of football, one that has been an active project of Turkish politicians. In the past, tactics of violent repression similar to those used elsewhere in the Middle East were used against ultras, but since 1980 several other methods have resulted in the decrease of political stances by ultras. As opposed to Serbia, where state influence and clientelistic networks have been used to redirect ultras violence towards targets deemed acceptable to the regime, in Turkey these tactics have been used to limit organised fan demonstrations in general. After 1980, many state security officials, as well as politicians, became involved with Turkish club soccer ownership, particularly of Istanbul’s three

200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid., 7.
largest clubs. Under this structure political figures who held executive positions for clubs were able to gain prestige by associating themselves with club successes, much like Berlusconi in Italy, and start to implement the concept of “industrial soccer,” wherein football clubs’ role in society shifted from that of a community center to that of a business. In this model, fan outbursts are harshly punished in order to avoid damaging the club’s brand. Many of the top European clubs, which are in many ways multinational entities in terms of their scope, have adopted a similar model. As these examples show, state involvement with domestic soccer does not always lead to the instrumentalization of ultras by political elites.

Conclusion

As this section has hopefully demonstrated, there is nowhere where the relationship between ultras, the state, and organized crime operates in quite the same way as Serbia. There are strong parallels elsewhere in the western Balkans, particularly if one steps back to examine the history of the post-Yugoslav states, but none are exactly the same. Similarly, Italy, Argentina, Turkey, Romania, and Hungary all share some of the same elements as the Serbian case, but they aren’t developed and interconnected in the same way as they are in Vučić’s Serbia. This is due to the fact none of these countries display the same combination of post-socialist neoliberal economic decay, a history of hardline nationalism and ethnic conflict, kleptocratic semi-authoritarian governance, and well-developed ultras culture that is to be found in Serbia. In many of the cases previously mentioned, the separating factor was nationalism and its legacy, something that is a running theme in football and politics across the western Balkans.

205 Ibid., 4-5.
206 Ibid., 5-6.
207 Ibid., 7.
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“Political and Ideological Biases in the Rankings and Country Descriptions of the Trafficking in Persons Report”

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Abstract

Human trafficking is a multi-billion dollar industry that treats people as objects for profit and impacts millions of victims in almost every country across the globe. Every year, the US State Department publishes the Trafficking in Persons Report (TIPR) to assess global human trafficking and rank countries on a three-tiered system. The TIPR is the most widely used of its kind, but it is not without flaws. The TIPR has been criticized for political bias in the rankings, and this study provides examples of this bias from the TIPR published in 2021, specifically focused on Lithuania, Ukraine, and Russia. These states were chosen because they were ranked in tiers 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and they vary in their relations with the US. Lithuania is a NATO member and a strong trading partner with the US. Ukraine has democratic ambitions and has expressed interest in becoming a NATO member, making it reasonably ideologically aligned with the US. Russia is the US’ former Cold War enemy and current ideological challenger, making it an adversary of the US today. This study looks at the relations between the US and these countries, what the TIPR mentioned about these states, and what the TIPR missed. By looking at what the TIPR included and excluded in the descriptions for these states, it becomes clear that the rankings and descriptions are biased. Essentially, the US portrays its friends as making progress and its enemies as falling behind in their efforts to combat human trafficking. This paper concludes by discussing the consequences of political and ideological biases in the TIPR, the need for alternative publications, and ways to improve the US’ TIPR.

Introduction

The human trafficking industry is enormous, worth roughly 150 billion dollars annually. This astronomical amount of money can only be produced because people are reusable resources in the eyes of traffickers - objects to be sold repeatedly. Given how the trafficking business works, convictions only create space for other traffickers to take their place. Therefore, sustainable solutions must consider prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, and prevention of future trafficking - as the Trafficking in Persons Report (TIPR) does.

The TIPR provides several valuable contributions, but one area where it has received a fair amount of criticism is political and ideological bias. Collecting data and analyzing the actions taken by states does not have to be political, but the TIPR is often interwoven with political influence throughout. The TIPR, one of the most widely used reports on human trafficking, tends to rank its partners in higher tiers and its adversaries in lower tiers; each would have to do something drastic to move levels.

209 Feingold, 2005, 30.
This paper will look at the TIPR’s design, purpose, and the criticism it has received. Then, it will explore three states in the 2021 report - Lithuania, Ukraine, and Russia - their relationship with the US, how they are portrayed in the TIPR, and what it missed. These states represent the different tiers and strengths of relations with the US. Finally, the paper will conclude by restating the importance of a credible and politically neutral report and the importance of having alternatives to the US’ TIPR.

**What Is the Trafficking in Persons Report?**

The US State Department first produced the TIPR in 2001 to fill a gap in human trafficking knowledge.\(^\text{210}\) It created a definition for human trafficking to be used for all states, collected and analyzed data on many countries, and suggested ways to improve their anti-trafficking efforts.\(^\text{211}\) However, the section of the TIPR that gets the most attention is by far the ranking system, in which it ranks each country it collects data for on a scale from 1 to 3. Tier 1 countries comply with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking outlined in the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA); Tier 2 countries do not meet these minimum standards but are making significant efforts to fulfill these requirements; Tier 2 Watch List states are similar to Tier 2 except they have a significant or increasing number of victims in the state, and are not making any significant efforts to combat trafficking than the previous year, or have only committed to making a significant effort that will hopefully be carried out in the coming years; Tier 3 states do not meet the minimum standards for eliminating trafficking and are not making significant efforts to come into compliance with these standards.\(^\text{212}\)

The ranking is based on the steps governments take to improve the trafficking situation in the state, with less emphasis on the size of the problem.\(^\text{213}\) So a Tier 1 country is not necessarily free from trafficking, but it has implemented policies that fulfill the US requirements to be a Tier 1 country. These rankings draw a great deal of attention as it impacts a state’s status internationally, and there are several sanction options related to Tier 3 rankings.\(^\text{214}\) These sanctions can only be released if the US President decides that funds will help fight human trafficking, benefit the US, or avert adverse effects on vulnerable people in the offending state.\(^\text{215}\)

The minimum standards from the TVPA are that a state should first prohibit and punish human trafficking. Second, governments punish the “commission of any act involving sex trafficking induced by force, fraud, or coercion” or sex trafficking of children with sentences similar

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to other grave crimes.\textsuperscript{216} Governments are also expected to create penalties severe enough to deter future acts and "reflect the heinous nature of the offense."\textsuperscript{217} Finally, they are to make "serious and sustained efforts" to eliminate human trafficking.\textsuperscript{218} The TVPA then outlines 12 criteria for "serious and sustained efforts," including prosecutions, victim protections, prevention of future trafficking, international cooperation, and progress in eliminating severe forms of trafficking.\textsuperscript{219} This also considers whether that state is an origin, transit, or destination country, the extent to which government actors have been complicit in trafficking activities, and how reasonable it is for the country to become compliant given its current circumstances.\textsuperscript{220}

\textbf{Previous Political Bias in the US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report}

Over the last 20 years, the TIPR has been seen as a high-quality publication on human trafficking, but that does not mean that it is flawless. One of the prominent criticisms is political biases in the ranking process and descriptions, which impact the credibility of the document and make it seem as though the US cares more about politics than combatting human trafficking.\textsuperscript{221} Those who author the TIPR may not have political motives, but those in more powerful positions surely do, and the TIP Office’s recommendations are known to be overruled by higher authorities in the US government.\textsuperscript{222} Criticism has come from NGOs, poorly ranked states, journalists, academics, and the US Senate.\textsuperscript{223} The TIPR has little transparency with accusations, no way to appeal a ranking, the standards are selectively applied, and information on trafficking is not always reliable.\textsuperscript{224} All of the criticism stresses the idea that the credibility of the TIPR is in jeopardy if it is politicized, which risks making a potentially valuable tool for global anti-human trafficking policy and implementation useless.\textsuperscript{225}

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\bibitem{219} Ibid., 12-13.
\bibitem{220} Weiss, ” Ten Years of Fighting Trafficking: Critiquing the Trafficking in Persons Report through the Case of South Korea,” 312.
\bibitem{223} Committee on Foreign Relations (2019): 31.
\bibitem{225} Committee on Foreign Relations, (2019): 2 & 23.
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Country Assessment: Lithuania - Tier 1

US Relations with Lithuania

The US has had diplomatic relations with Lithuania since 1922, and it has been a NATO ally since 2004. The US invested 88 million dollars in security funds in Lithuania in 2019, and the US was Lithuania’s fifth-largest export partner. Lithuania is a member of many of the same international organizations as the US, including NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Lithuania has also represented localized forms of the US’ democratic principles, institutional ideas, and market economy foundations among “young European nations” since the US helped it rebuild after leaving the Soviet Union. Overall, the US and Lithuania are allies and strong trading partners.

TIPR Details and Concerns

The 2021 TIPR places Lithuania in Tier 1. It states that the Lithuanian government has met the minimum standards for eliminating trafficking. The prosecution portion emphasizes how Lithuania “criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking” with penalties from two to 12 years in prison. There were eight trafficking investigations in 2020, compared to 13 in 2019, and the government prosecuted 40 suspects in trafficking cases, but only 16 were convicted, with 12 receiving prison sentences.

The victim protection section says that Lithuanian authorities found 24 victims, which is a seven-year low, and they were underprepared in some areas to identify and interview victims. Additionally, not all victims were referred to NGOs for assistance, despite there being a mechanism for such referrals for the police to utilize. Child protective services struggle to identify, protect, and assist child victims, and when it does identify them, they are placed in state care facilities and community houses. The state also does not have a clear way to protect victims that assist in investigations by testifying. Victims do not receive mental health services to prepare for these events either. On a better note, the state passed a law giving assistance to victims of all crimes. It also gave $310,000 to NGOs specifically to support victims of trafficking. In addition, Lithuania updated its laws, so the state could not punish labor trafficking victims for committing crimes related to their trafficking situation. The TIPR argues that Lithuania “maintained protection efforts.”

Furthermore, the TIPR states that Lithuania improved its prevention strategies. The state created a new national action plan for 2020-2022, reserving $460,000 for the implementation process. This action plan addresses more efforts to prevent trafficking, cooperate within the

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government, and provide victims with assistance. Additionally, the government has multiple awareness campaigns. The state created a national hotline in cooperation with NGOs, and the police made an email account for people to report trafficking or ask for advice. The state trained 52 new investigators to identify trafficking victims and created a unit for forced labor investigations. They conducted inspections for construction sites, hotels, and restaurants and identified 29 potential victims in these searches. Lithuanian authorities worked to decrease the demand for commercial sex by giving five people fines for buying sexual services, compared to 16 in 2019. The TIPR covered many aspects of Lithuania’s human trafficking problem and how the government has dealt with it, but it missed essential details.

Aspects Not Addressed

One aspect not addressed in the TIPR for Lithuania is that foster care families, group homes, and general state housing for children can be dangerous places where children can be recruited and trafficked. These children can be trafficked by other youth in the state care system, foster parents, social workers, those that work in the facilities, or outside actors. This is especially true in larger group homes or state facilities because there is less supervision. The TIPR mentions that Lithuania is no longer sending children to orphanages, which is a positive step, but it does not discuss the dangers of the alternative options that Lithuania has implemented. It did, however, address the threat of trafficking in foster care in Ukraine’s section, stating that “children institutionalized in state-run orphanages are at especially high risk of trafficking. Officials of several state-run residential institutions and orphanages have allegedly been complicit or willfully negligent in the sex and labor trafficking of girls and boys under their care.” The statistics in this are specific to Ukraine, but children in state care across the globe are vulnerable to human trafficking. Lithuania and Ukraine have a similar problem, but the TIPR only called attention to Ukraine, the Tier 2 country with weaker relations with the US.

Lithuania is primarily a source country. Source countries may have excellent records of prosecuting offenders and protecting victims. Still, they should have robust prevention mechanisms so that traffickers have fewer opportunities to exploit those from or in Lithuania. The TIPR emphasized Lithuania’s new national action plan and inspections, but it did not discuss the root causes that leave people vulnerable to trafficking, such as poverty, unemployment, lack of access to education, and violence. These aspects could have been left out of the TIPR for a number of reasons, one being the US may not have wanted to point out the flaws in its ally’s anti-human trafficking efforts.

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Country Assessment: Ukraine - Tier 2

US Relations with Ukraine

The US has had diplomatic relations with Ukraine since 1991, when it gained its independence from the USSR, and the US supports Ukraine through the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. Ukraine is also a member of multiple international organizations with the US, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The US is invested in Ukraine’s ambitions of becoming and staying an independent, democratic state with a market economy. Unfortunately, Russia has been aggressive toward Ukraine. Responding to this, the US has created multiple laws to support Ukraine with the invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the continuing conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine. The US has provided assistance to support Ukrainian security, democracy, and freedom, as well as having “permanent trade relations status.” Overall, the US and Ukraine are not official allies, but they are strengthening their partnership, and the US encourages its development into a Western democracy.

TIPR Details and Concerns

The 2021 TIPR places Ukraine in Tier 2, stating that it did not meet the minimum standards, but it is making significant efforts. The prosecution section states that Ukraine decreased its efforts overall. It has criminalized sex and labor trafficking. However, the authorities investigated 203 trafficking cases in 2020 and referred 92 suspects to prosecutors, significant decreases from 2019. Due to pandemic restrictions, the court system was limited, only convicting 29 people in trafficking cases in 2020, compared to 35 in 2019. The larger issue is that only 17% received prison sentences, while the rest received probation or fines. Ukraine has also investigated officials for being complicit in trafficking situations, but it has not convicted any in 4 years. Over the last six years, Ukraine has made many changes to its institutions. High turnover rates have impacted the work of the Social Policy Ministry, the National Police, and the courts. As a result, fewer people in these positions have trafficking expertise, but training has been provided to make up for that. The TIPR reflects optimism about these reforms, as they cause some short-term delays but will improve effectiveness in the long run.

The TIPR argues Ukraine has made some efforts to protect trafficking victims. The government gives victims stipends, increasing the amount in 2020. The state also identified fewer victims from 2019 to 2020, going from 262 to 146, and granted fewer applications for victim status due to the pandemic. Approximately half of the identified victims came from conflict-

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fected areas around Donbas. Ukraine relies on the resources of IOs and NGOs to identify, protect, and assist victims, but it does not have high-functioning referral mechanisms to get victims from the police to the NGOs and IOs. Due to decentralization efforts and institutional reform, NGOs received more stable financing and support from the government. The state provides victim services, including housing, legal assistance, medical and mental health services, and vocational training. Still, IOs and NGOs often support these victim services as the state cannot provide it all. The government provides extra services for child victims as well.\textsuperscript{245}

Regarding prevention, the TIPR states that Ukraine has improved its efforts. The Ministry of Social Policy had limited effectiveness due to restructuring, but the government created a new national action plan and published a report on the current anti-trafficking policies and their use.\textsuperscript{246} The government created a hotline for trafficking, gender-based violence, and violence against children. The government worked with NGOs, IOs, and others to create awareness campaigns. Government ministries conducted labor inspections and increased the number of inspectors from 1,138 in 2019 to 1,815 in 2020. The state also made it a crime to knowingly purchase services from a sex trafficking victim to decrease demand for commercial sex.\textsuperscript{247}

\textbf{Aspects Not Addressed}

One major problem that the TIPR glossed over was the conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine that has been going on since 2014. There have been reports about Ukrainian militias using child soldiers, a type of human trafficking, or “patriotic youth organizations” training children to be child soldiers.\textsuperscript{248} Updated statistics are difficult to acquire in conflicts, so in 2016 there were five cases of recruitment of children for armed conflict and two of forced recruitment of minors.\textsuperscript{249} The same report found 37 cases of child involvement in the conflict, with 21 children directly involved in fighting and one case with both direct and indirect duties.\textsuperscript{250} In 2019, “patriotic youth organizations” in Donbas taught children combat, weapons handling, and summer camps focused on military training with “anti-Russia and survivalist rhetoric.”\textsuperscript{251} Child soldiers may still be being used on the Ukrainian side of the conflict, but the TIPR only discussed those on the Russian side.\textsuperscript{252} Including reports of child soldiers on the Russian side without showing problems associated with the Ukrainian side could reveal the US’ political bias.

Another aspect overlooked by the TIPR was the trafficking of children for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and pornography production. The amount of pornographic content featuring minors originating in Ukraine is significant, and “children from socially disad-

\textsuperscript{245} Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, (2021): 572-574.  
\textsuperscript{246} Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, (2021): 574-575.  
\textsuperscript{247} Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, (2021): 574-575.  
\textsuperscript{249} S. Burov, O. Lazarenko, G. Ianova, A. Nekrasova, and V. Shcherbachenko, Involvement of children in armed conflict formations during the military conflict in Donbas, (2016).  
\textsuperscript{250} Burov et al., (2016).  
\textsuperscript{252} Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, (2021): 575.
vantaged families and those in state custody” are at high risk for being trafficked for these purposes. These may have been excluded for many reasons. One explanation is the US favoring Ukraine over Russia in the TIPR because Ukraine aligns more closely with the US ideologically.

**Country Assessment: Russia - Tier 3**

**US Relations with Russia**

The US has had diplomatic relations with Russia since 1809, excluding the interruption between 1917 and 1933. The US has expressed interest in cooperating and stabilizing ties with Russia, but that has not worked out. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, which the US declines to recognize, and in response to Russia’s aggression, the US suspended the Bilateral Presidential Commission. Russia has positioned itself as a competitor with the US by undermining Western liberal norms and institutions. Therefore, in the US’ eyes, Russia has created a role for itself as an ideological and political adversary to the US. Economically, the US has suspended most involvement, and since 2014, the US has imposed sanctions on Russia for its actions regarding Ukraine, cyberattacks, election interference, trade with North Korea, and more. Russia has membership in common with the US in a couple of international organizations, including the UN Security Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

**TIPR Details and Concerns**

The 2021 TIPR places Russia in Tier 3, meaning it does not meet the minimum standards and is not making substantial efforts to eliminate trafficking. This tier comes with limits on aid and potential sanctions. The TIPR states that Russia “decreased already minimal law enforcement efforts in the prosecution section.” Russia has criminalized both sex and labor trafficking, but its definition does not align with international law. Trafficking cases are often prosecuted under different charges with lighter penalties, making the problem seem statistically smaller. The government began four trafficking investigations and continued three others this year, compared to starting three in 2019 and 14 in 2018. One trafficker was convicted in 2020, compared to eight in 2019 and 21 in 2018. Despite being trained to recognize trafficking situations, government officials and police are often bribed with money or sexual services to avoid investigating trafficking. The government has investigated these cases as bribery or other non-trafficking offenses. The TIPR also details North Koreans in Russia being subjected to forced labor, and the Russian government continues to allow North Korean people into the country using different visas such as student or tourist visas without conducting trafficking screenings.

Regarding the protection of victims, the TIPR concludes that Russia has put little to no

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effort into protecting victims of trafficking.\textsuperscript{260} It did not create a national action plan or define trafficking to make it distinct from other crimes. Russian authorities identified 52 victims in 2020, a decrease from 61 in 2019 but an improvement from 19 in 2018. Unfortunately, police also charged trafficking victims for crimes committed while trafficked. Police did not refer victims to NGOs for assistance and often did not register the reports as cases if the police thought convictions would be unlikely, another way of manipulating statistics. The state does not provide services to trafficking victims, nor does it support NGOs that do this work, leaving many NGOs overworked and under-resourced during the pandemic and facing further restrictions placed on NGOs by the Russian government. On a positive note, the repatriation of Russian children whose parents were ISIS fighters has been a significant project, with Russia bringing in “144 children from Iraq and Syria in 2020.”\textsuperscript{261}

The prevention section of the TIPR describes how Russia has done very little to prevent trafficking.\textsuperscript{262} The government operates regional migration centers where people may receive work permits quickly, but it does not conduct screenings for trafficking there. Nor did the state make efforts to decrease the demand for sex tourism or purchasing sexual services. However, during the pandemic, Russian authorities conducted inspections of companies with foreign workers to look for labor and immigration violations, allow for extended work and residence permits, and create 10-year identification cards for stateless persons.\textsuperscript{263} The TIPR covered many aspects of Russia’s handling of its human trafficking situation, but it missed a few things.

\textit{Aspects Not Addressed}

The TIPR references unconfirmed accounts of Russian-led forces using child soldiers in the conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine, but it does not mention the possible use of child soldiers on the Ukrainian side.\textsuperscript{264} There have been multiple accounts of children used by Ukrainian militias for various purposes in the conflict, but the TIPR only discusses possible Russian recruitment of children into the conflict. This could be because the US favors Ukraine based on its democratic ambitions as opposed to Russia’s challenging of democratic values, creating a possible political or ideological bias in the TIPR.

The TIPR mentioned many negative aspects of Russia’s anti-trafficking work or lack thereof. However, it neglected to acknowledge the progress Russia has made. Russia has taken significant steps to protect children from sexual exploitation for the purposes of prostitution or the production of child pornography.\textsuperscript{265} First, Russia criminalized such acts. The state also “shut down 38,000 links related to child pornography” from 2012 to 2017, which may serve to make child trafficking for pornography less lucrative.\textsuperscript{266} By not acknowledging Russia’s positive steps, the US may show that it is motivated by politics and ideological differences rather than improving anti-trafficking efforts.

\textsuperscript{261} Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, (2021): 473.
\textsuperscript{262} Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, (2021): 473.
\textsuperscript{263} Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, (2021): 473.
\textsuperscript{264} Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, (2021): 575.
Conclusion

The idea behind the TIPR was to add to the knowledge base of human trafficking as there are few sources that provide detailed assessments on a variety of states. The one place where the US State Department’s TIPR has fallen short is in objectively ranking and describing states. This is partially a result of incomplete information and political or ideological bias woven into the rankings and descriptions. A degree of incomplete information will always be a problem due to the nature of the crimes, but there are essential aspects of trafficking in particular states that are left out of the TIPR, as demonstrated with Lithuania, Ukraine, and Russia. This shows that the US is portraying its friends as though they are making great progress while showing that their adversaries are not making much of an effort to stop human trafficking, even if that is not necessarily the case. If the TIPR is found to rank and potentially sanction states based on politics or ideology rather than their anti-human trafficking efforts, it can damage the TIPR’s credibility. It may be seen as a political weapon rather than a global anti-trafficking initiative.

Generally, there is a lack of alternatives to the TIPR. IOs and universities should work to develop reports on global human trafficking to describe the situations in countries and provide tailored solution proposals. Politics also play a role in IOs and universities because of funding and other pressures, but they could be a more trusted source of information with more accountability measures than the US State Department. The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has its Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, which provides information on themes in human trafficking, trafficking flows, regional overviews, and country descriptions. Unfortunately, the country descriptions are not nearly as detailed as the TIPR. The UNODC report is promising, but it is still in its early years, with its sixth report being published in 2021. If the UNODC report could add more detail and gain a reputation of reliability over time, it could become a genuine alternative to the US’ report.

Currently lacking a genuine alternative to the TIPR, the State Department should prioritize keeping subjective, political, or ideological aspects out of the TIPR. Instead, they should focus on providing transparent, detailed, complete, and accurate descriptions of trafficking realities and government efforts to combat trafficking. Without these biases, the TIPR could do vital work with only minor criticism and possibly gain support from more NGOs, making the process more inclusive and accurate. Accountability and improvement are the goals that should motivate this TIPR, and if the US would like to be a true leader, it should not let politics get in the way of anti-trafficking reporting.

Bibliography


Abstract
When violence broke out between Catholics and Protestants (Nationalists and Unionists) in Northern Ireland, it was the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) who moved in to restore order. For a modern police force, it should not have been any harder than the previous riots they had dealt with. However, the RUC was so badly beaten that they not only failed to defeat the rioting residents of the Bogside neighborhood in Derry in the Battle of the Bogside, but it failed so spectacularly that the British Army was called in to replace them. Not only that, but Catholic Northern Irelanders cheered for the British Army. How could this happen? How could a policing organization fail so spectacularly in its goals? This paper will examine the tactical factors of the Battle of the Bogside that led to the RUC’s defeat. Many great works have been written and discuss the societal, religious, political, and economic factors that led to the RUC’s defeat, but few focus on the tactical fighting. In terms of those factors, it was the relentlessness and bravery of the Bogsiders, the poor equipment, and the poor tactics of the RUC that led to the RUC’s humiliation in the Bogside.

Unthinkable.
As British soldiers laid down barbed wire and set up their fighting positions in Derry, they all noticed lines of dusty and haggard police officers, decked out in riot gear and exhausted. They knew they were looking at a beaten force. After all, if the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) hadn’t been beaten, then why was the British Army in Northern Ireland? Despite their guns, their Shorland armored cars, and the B-Special Auxiliaries, they had been beaten by the rioters in the Bogside and elsewhere across Northern Ireland. David Moffat, one of the first British soldiers to roll into Derry in 1969 said in the BBC documentary, Spotlight on the Troubles: A Secret History, “Then on the other side of the road you seen all these guys march down in the RUC uniforms, covered in muck. Obviously shattered tired and it was a defeated look.”271 As the British Army arrived and took the place of the battered RUC, the violence that had rocked the Bogside came to a halt. The Catholic population, to the great surprise of many British soldiers, welcomed them as protectors and were happy to see the RUC off the streets. It was a humiliating defeat for the RUC, not only had they failed in their operational and organizational goals, but they had failed so spectacularly they had to be replaced by the British Army. How could this have happened?

How it Came to This.
In 1922, Northern Ireland was a chaotic realm. The Irish War of Independence had only ended a year prior and the Irish Civil War was still raging.272 In response to the instability in Ireland, the Unionist (and almost exclusively Protestant) government of Northern Ireland formed a

police force to maintain law and order in the burgeoning territory.\textsuperscript{273} Much like the Unionist government, the Royal Ulster Constabulary was predominantly Protestant, with only a small Catholic minority. This meant that the makeup of the RUC was often not proportional to the communities they policed. However, the RUC was not simply a policing organization. In addition to their normal police work, they faced a unique challenge unlike what any other British police force had to face.

The RUC, from the moment of its inception, had to perform military-style operations against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who operated at the time in the Free State of Ireland and would eventually operate in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{274} Years and decades would pass from the two wars that birthed modern Ireland, but the constant battle between the RUC and IRA remained. It would eb and flow, but it was always there. In late 1939 and into 1940, the RUC helped end the IRA’s Sabotage Campaign (S-Campaign) and assisted in the recovery of over 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition and various firearms stolen from the Dublin Magazine Fort in the Republic of Ireland.\textsuperscript{275} Later on, the RUC helped combat the IRA Northern Campaign of 1942-1944 and the Border Campaign of 1956-1962.\textsuperscript{276} In addition to their normal police work, this was a heavy burden placed upon the RUC, but they had still another objective that would break them in a way few could have foreseen.

The RUC also had the goal of preserving the government of Northern Ireland and its controlling political party, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP).\textsuperscript{277} This was not just preservation against violent overthrow, but also against non-violent civil resistance. This does not mean that the RUC existed to suppress dissent, but when many of the descenters were calling for the abolition of Northern Ireland and the union of the two Irelands, preserving the government looks a lot like suppressing dissent. This obviously put the RUC at odds with the Nationalists who wanted this reunification, but it also put them at odds with the reformists who wanted to improve the lives of Catholics within Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{278} As can be seen with the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, reformists were often lumped together with Nationalists and the IRA despite their different agendas and methods, contributing to this hostility between peaceful resistance and the RUC.\textsuperscript{279} This was only made worse by the lack of religious diversity in the RUC. At the inception of the organization, the RUC was supposed to be a third Catholic, but by the later 1960s, that number had dropped as low as 12 percent.\textsuperscript{280} In addition to this, members of the RUC’s predecessor organization, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), had participated in mass killings of Catholic civilians, such as the McMahon Murders and the Arnon Street Massacre.\textsuperscript{281} Along with the violence from the Independence War only fifty years in the past and the traditional sectarian divides present in Northern Ireland between Catholics and Protestants, the odds were heavily stacked against the RUC as The Troubles began to shake to life in 1969. This was only made

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{274} Coogan, \textit{The IRA}, 19.
\item \textsuperscript{276} Bell, \textit{The Secret Army}: 194-216.
\item \textsuperscript{278} Doherty, \textit{Thin Green Line}, 154-156
\item \textsuperscript{279} Ibid, 155-157.
\item \textsuperscript{280} John Morrison, \textit{The Ulster Cover-Up} (Lurgan Ulster Society, 1993), 39–40.
\item \textsuperscript{281} Robert John Lynch, \textit{The Northern IRA and the Early Years of Partition, 1920-1922} (Dublin: Dublin Irish Academic Press, 2006), 98.
\end{itemize}
worse by the actions of RUC officers, such as those on 5 January, 1969, when a group of RUC officers went into the Bogside, destroying property and assaulting people, resulting in the Bogsiders building barricades and famously painting the phrase “You are now entering Free Derry.” 282 There was also the death of Sammy Devenny, a local man who was beaten so badly by the RUC that he died a month later. 283 His entire family was also beaten by the RUC, even though they had taken part in no rioting. 284

That explains how the RUC got to losing the goodwill of Catholic population and how those two factions would come to blows, but how did they end up coming to blows in the Bogside? All because of a parade. Every year, the Unionists held a parade called the Apprentice Boys March, marking the anniversary of the Protestant victory in the Siege of Derry in 1689. 285 This was seen by many Catholics as a calculated insult. 286 While the parade did not go into the Bogside, a poor and majority Catholic neighborhood, it did pass directly next to it, especially at the intersection of Waterloo Place and William Street. 287 In stark contrast to many NICRA protests or marches where the RUC had either bludgeoned the protestors or failed to protect them from gangs of Unionists, the RUC was out in major force to protect the Apprentice Boys, not only did they suspect violence between the Apprentice Boys and the Bogside residents was inevitable, there was also clear religious/political favoritism. 288

Another group also perceived a violent clash. The Derry Citizens Defence Association (DCDA) had been formed after Bogside had faced rioting during previous Unionist parades. 289 Formed by Irish Republicans, it was a coalition of Republicans, left-wing activists, and many local people who wanted to both keep the peace and defend the Bogside from incursions by both the Apprentice Boys and the RUC. 290 They prepared caches of materials to build barricades and gathered missile weapons to lob at the RUC. 291 Whatever would happen at the parade, both sides were prepared for violence. When the day came, the Apprentice Boys marched next to the Bogside and exchanged heated words with the crowds of Bogsiders and Nationalists who were waiting for them. 292 It began with the Apprentice Boys throwing pennies at the Bogsiders and the Bogsiders slingshotting marbles back. 293 Soon, it escalated to throwing stones and melee combat. The RUC made their first move here and encountered a far graver threat than they had anticipated.

Now the question posed above is brought back to the forefront, how did it come to this? The RUC had no legitimacy or goodwill with the Catholic community of Northern Ireland, enforced unjust policies against Catholics, and found themselves placed firmly on the Protestant
side of the religious divide both by their makeup and their being part of the Unionist government. This position, regardless of what happened in the Bogside in August, 1969, was untenable in the long term. Much has been written about these political, religious, and societal factors and those excellent works have formed a portion of this paper’s bibliography. However, despite the Battle of the Bogside being only one of many factors leading to the eventual defeat of the RUC, it was by far the most powerful accelerant imaginable. Even if their defeat was inevitable, someone had to make it happen on the ground. The question of how and why that happened is not only important to understanding The Troubles and understanding modern riot warfare, but it is also a question sidelined in favor of societal answers. Almost every work about the Troubles or the Battle of the Bogside pays some credence to how the RUC was beaten on the ground, but none seem to examine it in depth. That is the hopeful goal of this work, not to thoroughly examine it here but to begin that exploration and understanding. But to the question of how the RUC was defeated, the answer seems to be a combination of tactical factors. They were defeated in the Bogside because of the relentlessness and resilience of the Bogsiders, their poor equipment, and their poor tactics.

The Bogsiders: An Entire Neighborhood Mobilized.

When the RUC entered the Bogside after the fighting at the Apprentice March, they were walking into a very different battle than what they had faced before. Previously, they had faced NICRA marches and sporadic street riots, but these were generally not in the protestors neighborhood and were also against protestors who, while they expected violence, had not been preparing materially for it. The Bogsiders had constructed barricades, they had collected throwing weapons, and they had a crude leadership system in place under the DCDA. As soon as the battle started, the challenge only increased. The DCDA organized aid stations with volunteer doctors to assist the wounded, they established petrol bomb workshops to create and supply petrol bombs to the front line, and they helped catalyze many of the less politically active Bogsiders to join the fight. In addition, they also set up Radio Free Derry, named after the now famous “You Are Now Entering Free Derry” phrase painted at the entrance to the Bogside. This radio station not only helped the Bogsiders coordinate their resistance, but it also allowed them outside contact with other Nationalist or Catholic groups who rioted in support of the Bogsiders.

On the ground, Bogsider tactics ran the gamut of the usual to the surreal. Barricades were built everywhere and out of everything, including lumber, oil drums, sheet metal, burnt out vehicles, scaffolding, traffic signs, and dozens of other materials. The Bogsiders not only hid behind their barricades, but also used them to disrupt two of the RUC’s movements. Stones were thrown often, but so were bricks, metal poles, bottles, and petrol bombs. Petrol bombs, made from petrol, flour, sugar, cloth, and bottles, were especially loved for their effectiveness, ease of creation, and ease of concealment. These missile weapons were especially dangerous if thrown from two directions or from overhead. The Bogsiders also had preparations for if the fighting got

295 Paddy Doherty and Peter Hegarty, Paddy Bogside (Cork: Mercier, 2001), 109.
298 Target, Unholy Smoke, 101.
299 Target, Unholy Smoke, 103.
300 Cunningham, Battle of the Bogside, DVD (BBC, 2004).
closer, including clubs and iron bars. On the stranger side of things, there were reports of Bog-
siders using fireworks against the RUC. Their effectiveness is unclear, but one can imagine
that to a Bogsider or RUC officer in the thick of the fighting, they would have sounded like gun-
shots. The Bogsiders also utilized their home field advantage by gaining a height advantage,
raining down projectiles on RUC officers from above while their comrades hit them from the
front. The most famous and most effective example of this is when young Bogsiders took the
roof of the Rossville High Flats apartment building and used their vantage point to rain missiles
down on the officers.

In addition to their clever tactics and large quantity of supplies, the Bogsiders had the
motivation to be on the field, fighting to protect their home. According to Bernadette Devlin, for-
mer Member of Parliament (MP) and participant in the Battle of the Bogside, the people of the
Bogside “were afraid of the police and I think they were much more afraid of a police invasion
under the cover of August then they were of a loyalist invasion.” This fear was one of the
main driving factors in the incredible resistance the Bogsiders put up and it only became more
evident when the B-Specials were called up.

Unlike the regular RUC, which had at least some Catholic representation in it, the B-Spe-
cials were the boogeymen of the Catholic Northern Irelanders. The Ulster Special Constabulary,
better known as the B-Specials, were a reserve branch of the RUC that terrified the Catholics to
their bones. The B-Specials were all Protestant, they had no training in crowd control, they were
armed with service revolvers, and many of their number had participated in violence against the
Catholics at places such as Burntollet Bridge in the months prior to the Bogside. The Bogsiders
feared that if the B-Specials made their way into the neighborhood, it would be a massacre,
so they redoubled their efforts and fought on. However, the Bogsiders never came to blows
with the B-Specials, as the British Army arrived to take control of the situation before it esca-
lated further.

While the Bogsiders certainly fought hard and skillfully, their tactics are not so different
from both riots of the era, as well as contemporary riots. Indeed, many of the basic tactics used
by the protestors have their roots in the urban warfare of the Second World War or even the
fighting of the ancient world. Many other security forces across the world had fought similar or
worse riots than the Bogside and had won, so while the tactics and skill of the Bogsiders are cer-
tainly factors into the RUC’s defeat, it is not the main reason. Indeed, the RUC had made them-
selves so weak that all the Bogsiders needed to do was stand firm and watch the RUC break.

**Equipment: Under-Equipped and Without Authorization.**

The RUC had two equipment issues that, while different, compounded in a similar way to
defeat the RUC. The RUC was not only poorly equipped for their job, but they were also not au-
thorized to use a large portion of their gear. Starting with the equipment the RUC could use, it

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301 Target, *Unholy Smoke*, 104.
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
305 Cunningham, *Battle of the Bogside*.
306 Ibid.
was pretty poor all around. The standard issue uniform was not fire retardant. This did not 
compound well with the use of petrol bombs by the Bogsiders and there are several films of 
RUC officers catching fire from Petrol Bombs. However, the clothing wasn’t the only issue with 
the standard kit. According to an anonymous RUC Sergeant called “Sergeant Robinson” who 
was interviewed for the 2004 BBC Documentary “Battle of the Bogside” “The shields that we 
had were hopeless, they were quite small. There was no such thing as body armor.” The riot 
shields provided to the RUC were indeed hopeless. They were too small to hide behind even if 
the officer was crouching, many had a grate part at the top where petrol bomb fire could pass 
through, and they were too small and poorly shaped to form a shield wall. Without being able to 
form proper shield walls, the only way to block projectiles was to see them coming and block 
them or to hide behind a building or barricade. In addition, the lack of body armor meant officers 
were far more likely to be injured since their shields were already useless. The helmets the RUC 
officers did have protected their heads and the visors protected the eyes, but little else. To try and 
reduce the effect of stones bouncing off the road and hitting their shins, the officers tied cardboard to their legs like football shin guards. This was a terrible start for the RUC officers, 
lacking proper protection and shields, but it would only get worse as they engaged the Bogsiders.

When it came to weapons, the primary weapon of the RUC officer was the baton, also 
called a club, truncheon, or billy-club. Batons were wooden and were both personal weapons 
and unit weapons. It could be used alongside a riot shield to strike opponents in melee combat or 
used as a part of a unit maneuver called the baton charge. First, in single combat, RUC officers 
were only permitted to strike at the legs of assailants per the regulations in the RUC Code of In-
struction. However, video evidence and the Cameron Report, a British inquiry into riots earlier 
in the year, found that many RUC officers had not only struck people in the face, neck, and gen-
titals, but also had bludgeoned them while on the ground. The Cameron Report also found that 
RUC officers had engaged in sectarian violence and the use of sectarian language, however the 
Cameron Report did not condemn the entire RUC. While video evidence of melee fighting is not 
often forthcoming from the Bogside, one can imagine it did occur. The far more common 
method of baton fighting was the baton charge, a massed charge of officers bent on breaking a 
riot with sheer shock, like ancient heavy cavalry. However, the effectiveness of that tactic will be 
discussed further below. The batons in general were fine weapons to use in melee combat, but 
melee combat took a backseat in the Bogside because of the terrain. What good is a baton charge 
if the Bogsiders can rain down projectiles from nearby buildings? Clearly ranged options were 
needed.

Of what the RUC was authorized to use, their ranged arsenal was severely lacking. Ac-
cording to Sergeant Robinson, “they issued a few riot guns that fired rubber bullets... but the

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309 Cunningham, Battle of the Bogside.
310 Ibid.
311 Target, Unholy Smoke, 56.
312 The National Archives, “The Royal Ulster Constabulary, Rule Making Authority Regulations (Northern Ireland) 
tents/made.
313 Raidió Teilifís Éireann, “Northern Ireland,” RTÉ Archives (Raidió Teilifís Éireann, 2022), https://www.rte.ie/ar-
chives/exhibitions/1031-civil-rights-movement-1968-9/1039-peoples-democracy-march-belfast-to-derr/319704-re-
flecting-on-the-belfast-to-derry-march/; CAIN, “CAIN: HMSO: Cameron Report - Disturbances in Northern Ire-
gunners only had ten rounds each or something and when they were finished, that was it.” Other sources corroborate the experience of Sergeant Robinson, with the supply of RUC rubber bullets being depleted so quickly and the supply chain being so poor that the RUC was ordered to pick up stones and throw them back at the Bogsiders. With no authorization to use water cannons or firearms, the RUC employed a new tool for British police, CS gas. CS gas, very similar to tear gas, burns in the same place as wasabi, but 100,000 times worse. The RUC used it to break up crowds in the street, but while many children and elderly people were evacuated from the Bogside because of the breathing problems caused by the gas, the Bogsiders seemed to simply push through it, with the volunteer aid stations handling the worst cases. By the end of the three day battle, the RUC had fired around 1,100 canisters of CS gas, fumigating almost all of the Bogside, but not breaking the Bogsiders. However, Deputy Inspector-General of the RUC Graham Shillington stated later that the CS gas was the only reason the RUC had not been pushed back further. CS gas caused a great amount of controversy, not just because of its chemical nature, but because of reports that RUC officers were firing CS gas into homes and at crowds of women and children, though the veracity of those claims are still debated.

The RUC certainly had other ranged equipment within their arsenal, but they did not have the authorization to use them. Water cannons and firearms had been powerful tools used in the past, but the RUC could not break them out. However, even if they could, what difference would they make? Water cannons work great for large mobs out in the street, but what happens when they're in buildings or on top of buildings, sometimes ten or more stories up. The water cannons would be incapable of elevating that far up. Additionally, since RUC water cannons were mounted on Shorland armored cars, it’s likely these would have met the same fate as the Shorlands used in the Bogside; a pincushion for petrol bombs. On the topic of firearms, while some shots were fired on the third day of fighting, resulting in two Bogsiders wounded, they were not deployed in the numbers needed for tactical change and the firearms used were only light service revolvers. There is plenty of evidence that not using firearms was the correct choice, but the greatest of all was the shooting of Patrick Rooney. Patrick, a nine year old boy, was killed by a stray RUC bullet fired from a Browning machine gun mounted on a Shorland armored car. While the RUC officers had been under fire from Republican fighters, the death of Rooney, as well as a retired British soldier was terrible for public relations in an organization that could no longer afford it. If machine guns and rifles had been fully deployed in the Bogside, the resulting massacre would have given the IRA the propaganda coup of Bloody Sunday, but three years earlier and magnified far more. In addition, effective policing should not result in the shooting of dozens of people, so firearms would have only inflamed the situation. It was one of the few RUC choices during the Battle of the Bogside that made any sense.

314 Cunningham, *Battle of the Bogside*.
315 Ibid.
322 McClean, *Bloody Sunday*, 94.
RUC equipment was poor for their job and helped prevent them from effectively combating the Bogside. However, history is full of forces prevailing over their opponent despite lesser equipment because of superior tactics. Unfortunately for the RUC, they would also be cursed with ineffective tactics from the beginning of the battle to the end.

**Tactics: Ineffective and Unable to Cope.**

When the RUC made their initial move into the Bogside, they used a classic tactic of theirs, the baton charge. The baton charge relied on shock, massing together a large group of officers who would surge forward with their shields and batons, beating down on assailants as they went. If arrests could be made, all the better, but the goal was to break the opponent. If it failed to work the first time, they would simply retreat and repeat the charge. While such a strategy could break street riots, it was ineffective against barricades and against the Bogside who had taken up positions on buildings such as the Rossville High Flats. The RUC, throughout the battle, continued to attempt these charges, but to no avail. RUC Sergeant Ivan Duncan described the flow of the battle as, “So, you baton charged, you retreated, you baton charged, you retreated. You had to stand there and wait for the next charge to come from them. It was a very sad situation there.” This flow would continue until the British Army arrived.

With their charges failing, the RUC would often take up defensive positions to rest after a fight. To do this, they deployed crush barriers, the type seen at sporting events or concerts. While not as effective as the Bogside barricades, they did help the RUC get some rest. However, this was the greatest tactical and strategic failure of the RUC throughout the battle. The RUC had no plan or ability to refresh or replace its officers, even to the most basic degree. According to Lord James Callaghan, Home Secretary of the United Kingdom during the Battle of the Bogside and close observer of the events in the Bogside for the British government, the RUC had no plans in place to provide the officers with refreshments, shelter, or rest. The officers were just strung out over three days of hard fighting. This is corroborated by many officers on the ground, many saying they were too far from the main RUC base in Victoria for anything to be done about the sad state. Many RUC men grabbed meals when they could and got sleep in the doorways of homes and businesses.

These men were enduring the fight of their lives and yet their superiors had seemingly no ability to provide them with the basic necessities that anyone needs, let alone fighting officers. One can only imagine how a lack of sleep, a lack of solid food, and just general exhaustion would compound with the stresses of Bogside combat. With such a terrible toll being exerted on the men, they must have asked the question, “what can be done?”

Truly, the RUC only had one good choice, articulated by MP Bernadette Devlin. “The whole thing was as easily stopped as withdrawing the police. You couldn’t withdraw the Bogside. It was a fixed entity, the people lived there.” Withdrawing is rarely a good feeling for any force, especially in a conflict as hot blooded as the sectarian violence of the Bogside, but what

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325 Cunningham, *Battle of the Bogside*.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid; Target, *Unholy Smoke*, 110.
329 Cunningham, *Battle of the Bogside*. 
could the RUC hope to accomplish by continuing their assault? They could not break the barricades with baton charges, they could not break them with CS gas, and they were exhausted. Apart from mowing down the Bogsiders with machine guns, an act that would have sparked mass violence as well as immediate British and possibly international intervention, the only option was to withdraw. However, the RUC was never going to do that of its own accord. Their organizational honor was on the line, as well as any proof of their own effectiveness, for if the RUC cannot stop the Bogsiders from rioting, then what can they really do? In the end, the deployment of British troops was the only true option. On the 14th of August, a company of 1st Battalion, Prince of Wales’s Own Regiment of Yorkshire arrived in Derry after Deputy Inspector Graham Shillington requested their support. They set up barricades and barbed wire, separating the RUC and the recently arrived B-Specials, who had not gotten a chance to do any fighting, from the Bogsiders. Critically, the British Army did not move into the Bogside. In typical British understatement, one of the arriving British Army officers said they wanted to give everyone “some time to calm down.” Some RUC officers, like Sergeant Robinson, were relieved to have the British Army there to end things, but others were not happy that the British did not come down hard on the Bogsiders.

The Legacy of the Bogside.

The Battle of the Bogside and the RUC actions during it matter more than just to those interested in Irish history, but should matter to all those who wish to see better policing and less civil conflict. It is a tale of an organization broken by both societal forces and their own tactical blunders, but also because of their squandering of the goodwill of the citizens they were supposed to protect. It is also a tale of how, even in the most heated of situations, it can be best to step back and give everyone time to cool off, instead of pressing the attack. Riots and policing are not warfare, though it no doubt felt like it to them men of the RUC. It is instead a failure of understanding and policy when the people begin rioting and it is up to the police to restore peace in as gentle a fashion as possible. Gentle may seem strange in the context of a riot, but the RUC provides a great example of how the possession and usage of superior force will not lead to superior results.

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331 Ibid, 134.
332 MacIntyre, “Spotlight on the Troubles.”
Bibliography


"Judiciary in Jeopardy: The Undermining of Judicial Independence in Hungary and Poland"

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In Hungary and Poland, the judiciary is in jeopardy. As an essential condition for the rule of law, maintaining the independence of the judiciary is a vital task.\textsuperscript{333} Despite the crucial role an independent judiciary plays in a democracy— or, perhaps, because of it— the ruling nationalist parties in both Hungary and Poland have sought to undermine, even dismantle, this institution in recent years to consolidate power further and promote political influences. For a judiciary to be independent, it must maintain “independence from the executive” such that the leadership of a particular country is subject to legitimate checks and balances and, as a result, the constitutionality of a country’s laws can be upheld.\textsuperscript{334} Nevertheless, through both overt and clandestine constitutional reforms, the Hungarian and Polish governments each have assumed absolute control over their respective judiciaries, thus indicating an inflection point in both countries’ democratization processes. This inflection point has also spelled an increasingly tense relationship between both countries and the European Union, as the latter leads legal investigations into the former’s convoluted constitutional reforms. In this essay, I will argue that, as of my writing, the European Union’s investigations and criticisms, though important, have had little tangible impact on curtailting the jeopardizing of the judiciary in Hungary and Poland. It is my view that, due to this lack of tangible impact, the European Union and even other organizations, such as businesses within Hungary and Poland, ought to address these changes in new, more consequential ways.

This essay will be arranged as follows: first, the legal though highly contentious methods used by the ruling party in Hungary to undermine the independence of the judiciary will be addressed; second, the same considerations will be addressed for the case of Poland; third, what these illiberal developments mean for the European Union and, subsequently, what solutions may be available to either the European Union or other organizations to curtail these changes will be discussed. This paper will not address the critical issue of whether or how these illiberal developments impact human rights nor what pre-existing circumstances might have led to these recessions in democratization. Instead, this essay aims, in a sense, to offer a diagnosis and propose some remedies— not necessarily explain how the disease appeared in the first place.

In 2010, the Fidesz-Christian Democratic coalition led by Viktor Orbán, “the main voice of far-right politics in Europe,” achieved an overwhelming victory in the Hungarian general parliamentary election.\textsuperscript{335} This victory was such a landslide, in fact, that it granted Fidesz a total of 263 seats in the Parliament— nine seats above a two-thirds majority. Achieving 68% of the seats in the Parliament is remarkable not just because it was a sweeping victory for Orbán’s coalition but because this numeric suggested something far more profound for the Fidesz party. With a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, Fidesz could now change, reform, and even dismantle the


\textsuperscript{334} Ibid., 674.

Hungarian Constitution at will. The opportunity was a troubling proposition for a country that was the subject of communist rule only twenty years prior. Yet, it proved to be an opportunity that Orbán and his two-thirds majority could not refuse.

Within a year, Fidesz “amended the constitution it inherited 12 times” (Kovács and Schepppele 2018, 6) and, proving unsatisfied with the constitution codified in 1989, rid themselves of it entirely and “adopted a wholly new constitution without the support of any other party.” The extent to which Orbán’s party reformed Hungary’s constitution and, as a result, the country’s political institutions, was exhaustive. Even more, the speed with which these reforms were crafted was remarkable: the “Fundamental Law,” as Hungary’s new constitution as designed by the Fidesz party was known, “was elaborated by more than 800 new laws” within a few years. The new document and its consequences radically disrupted the status quo and process of democratization that Hungary had experienced in its first two decades of post-communism. The reforms also ushered in a new era of nationalistic autocracy unchecked—quite notably—from an institution Fidesz had taken great pains to dismantle: the independent judiciary.

An independent judiciary presents the fiercest challenge to an autocrat’s power-grabbing machinations because one of its roles is to issue checks and balances on illegal and unconstitutional actions in the executive. In the case of Hungary, the independent judiciary with the most significant say as to the Fidesz party’s gross dismantling of established government institutions would be the Constitutional Court. Therefore, it was this same institution that Orbán wished to neutralize as soon as practicable and with as little fuss as possible. Accordingly, two substantial amendments were written, proposed, and adopted solely by the Fidesz two-thirds majority, which aimed at the erosion of Hungary’s Constitutional Court.

First, in July of 2010, just months after Fidesz’s landslide victory, an “early constitutional amendment… changed the selection procedure for the justices of the Constitutional Court.” This reform made the selection procedure more convoluted than ever before, essentially meaning that only judges who received two-thirds approval from the Parliament were permitted to join the court. In other words, if Fidesz did not take kindly to the selected judge, they, with their vested power of the two-thirds majority, could guarantee the judge would not assume power.

Second, in April of 2011, citing the increased workload which the many new amendments brought about by the “Fundamental Law” were causing for the Constitutional Court, an additional constitutional amendment was passed that “changed the numbers of judges on the Constitutional Court from 11 to 15.” As could be expected, the Fidesz and no other political party had the power to fill these newly opened seats.

By the spring of 2013, enough turnover and bogus but bona fide constitutional amendments were adopted such that Orbán’s coalition had approved the majority of judges on the Constitutional Court. This signaled the end of Fidesz’s battle to pack and undermine the judiciary of the Constitutional Court but, by and large, just the beginning of their assault on the ordinary judiciaries of Hungary.

337 Ibid.
338 Ibid., 7.
339 Ibid.
Throughout the scholarly literature, the most often cited instance of the Fidesz party’s undermining of the independence of the ordinary judiciary was their sudden and unprecedented lowering of “the age-limit for compulsory retirement” which the country’s judges were obligated to abide by.\textsuperscript{340} This change resulted in “between 10-15% of all judges in the country... [being] forced to leave the bench almost immediately.”\textsuperscript{341} Previous reforms crafted by Fidesz had generated concern from the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s independent body of constitutional experts. However, it was not until this retirement reform, the “Status and Remuneration of Judges,” that Orbán’s coalition was condemned by the Venice Commission and the European Court of Justice. The latter organization found that Fidesz’s sudden enforcement of “premature judicial retirements” was, indeed, illegal, but based on “a violation of EU law on age discrimination”—not because of concerns over the undermining of the judiciary.\textsuperscript{342} Found guilty, the Hungarian government was mandated to compensate but—importantly—not necessarily reinstate the unlawfully removed judges. This “slap on the wrist” measure was arguably far too little, far too late on behalf of the European Union. There was no genuine penalty for Fidesz’s most egregious effort yet to obliterate the independence of the judiciary in Hungary. Whether or not the European Union could have done more is not entirely certain. There was no defined procedure on how to punish Hungary because the main European Union treaties presumed “that all states will have independent judiciaries,” but did not mandate them.\textsuperscript{343} This delayed action and misguided foresight, it seems, was one that the European Union wished to learn from when, to incredible surprise, Poland began their own efforts to undermine the independence of its judiciaries.

In 2015, Poland, another of the “success case” countries from Central Eastern Europe who—much like Hungary—was once recognized for its “high levels of judicial independence... judicial accountability, and judicial impartiality,” began its own strides towards undermining and dismantling the independence of the judiciary, when the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party came to power.\textsuperscript{344} Much like the Fidesz coalition in Hungary, the Law and Justice (PiS) party also wished to “seize control over the rule of law” by undermining judicial independence.\textsuperscript{345} Unlike Orbán’s ascent to unbridled power, however, the Law and Justice party’s achieving an absolute majority in the Sejm and the Senate was not an overwhelming victory.\textsuperscript{346} In fact, only about half of eligible voters participated in the 2015 Polish parliamentary elections, and PiS won “only 37.5% of the vote of the participating half.”\textsuperscript{347} Nevertheless, with the left’s votes split between the long-standing Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and the newly formed Modern Poland (Nowoczesna), “half-hearted support from half the population” was enough to bind the body politic to the autocratic Law and Justice.\textsuperscript{348}

\textsuperscript{340} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{341} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{342} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{343} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{346} The Sejm is the lower house and the Senate is the upper house of the Polish bicameral Parliament.
\textsuperscript{348} Ibid., 18.
Upon coming to power, PiS immediately began to undermine the institutions to which it belonged. The outgoing leadership, Civic Platform, now put into a position of minority opposition, had unconstitutionally modified a provision such that they could elect judges to the Constitutional Tribunal—the Polish equivalent of Hungary’s Constitutional Court—months in advance, as opposed to the date of the term’s end as is standard (and when they would no longer be the majority power). As a result, out of a possible five, two seats were filled on the Constitutional Tribunal through Civic Platform’s subversion. As a result, one could have hoped that PiS merely canceled the two illegally selected appointments for the Constitutional Tribunal. But instead, “the PiS Parliament… canceled the election of all five Civic Platform judges” and “elected five of its own judges to fill all of the open seats,” (emphasis mine). A dispute then erupted between Andrzej Rzepliński, the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, who refused to “seat the three illegally elected PiS judges” and Andrzej Duda, PiS President of the Republic, who had “sworn in all five of the PiS judges;” it was at this early stage in the conflict where the European Union got involved.

Despite the European Union’s getting involved practically at the outset, a “legal blitz” raged on, and the PiS majority crafted and implemented increasingly convoluted legislation to delay at all costs their being subjected to a majority on the Constitutional Tribunal that was not their own. It is important to highlight that the Law and Justice party retains only a simple majority— not a two-thirds majority like the Fidesz in Hungary— yet modification of the Polish constitution is the same as Hungary’s in that it requires two-thirds approval. Thus, passing convoluted and clandestine legislation is the approach PiS has taken to design and implement controversial reforms rather than outright modify or dismantle the constitution. Though less severe than the Hungarian government’s incontestable dismantling of institutions, this approach is still one which lends itself to a partisan ignorance of checks and balances and is also, perhaps, more surprising given the long history of pluralism in Poland.

The European Union’s oversight was rendered throughout this so-called legal blitz, but it was rendered with minimal impact on PiS’s ultimate intentions. The stand-off between the Constitutional Tribunal and the Polish government dragged on. By June of 2016, the European Commission issued a Rule of Law Opinion and, by July of 2016, a Rule of Law Recommendation. Within, the European Commission “demanded that Poland change its ways,” firmly declaring that Poland was suffering “from a systemic threat to the rule of law.” However, these mandates fell on deaf ears as, by December of the same year, Andrzej Rzepliński’s term as President of the Constitutional Tribunal ended. Subsequently, the PiS party took advantage of this turnover and, in so doing, captured the court.

Because the Polish government was subject to more persistent criticism than the Fidesz in Hungary, the illiberal measures which they took to dismantle the independent judiciary also required a more robust defense. This defense has taken form through a “narrative of ‘sovereign democracy.’” The PiS party invokes this narrative to argue that “a party that has won the majority of seats in Parliament represents the sovereign will of Poland.”

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349 Ibid., 18.
350 Ibid., 19.
351 Ibid., 20.
352 Ibid., 21.
354 Ibid.
narrative does generate a critical fallacy, though, namely in its claim that all questioning of a government’s actions are illegitimate if that government itself is certifiably democratically legitimate (e.g., the winning party of a free and fair election) and, therefore, representative of the sovereign will. Questioning government action, irrelevant of the party in power and whether they control a majority, is a central tenet of democracy. Indeed, a majority, regardless of how major, can be wrong. Nevertheless, the narrative “has not been successfully countered in parliamentary or public debate.” The strength of “sovereign democracy” appeals have been further empowered by the PiS party’s explicit rejection of European Commission decisions and the lack of consequences of their doing so.

With the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal fully besieged and conquered by the Law and Justice party, “the ordinary judiciary came next;” much like how the Fidesz party in Hungary had attacked first their Constitutional Court and then moved on to infiltrating less centralized institutions. In the summer of 2017, PiS “brought forward three new laws, all of which were designed to make the courts politically dependent and all of which were passed by the PiS-dominated Parliament.” One of these laws was evidently out of Orbán’s playbook, as it “lowered the judicial retirement age” such to force openings that the PiS party could take advantage of.

The European Union’s failure to curtail the illiberal developments in Hungary and Poland in meaningful ways, despite the consistent criticisms they have rendered and actions they have taken, demonstrate that their efforts have been ineffective. Why should the ruling parties in Hungary or Poland bother complying with the threats, mandates, and criticisms of the European Union when they can simply ignore them without consequence and get what they want? Though the European Union’s track record has, thus far, been one that in no way has successfully maintained the independence of the judiciary in either Hungary or Poland, it is my view that this may not always be the case. Just as the Hungarian and Polish governments “have learned that if they strike fast and eliminate resistance quickly, they will win facts on the ground,” perhaps the European Union is also settling into its role in this fight and still evaluating what the most effective routes to addressing these worrying changes might be.

One such route could be the European Union’s arguing on the grounds of a recent European Court of Justice decision in 2018. Though not related directly to either Hungary or Poland, the case concerned judiciaries and essentially found that “national judiciaries are… also EU judiciaries.” This verdict could prove helpful because it demonstrates that “national judiciaries have a role in both EU law and national law — and EU law requires them to be independent.” If this verdict was applied to the European Union’s case against Poland, it could have “real consequences, unlike the warnings of Article 7(1) TEU” as it could subject Poland to substantial fines each day that they remained without a genuinely independent judiciary.
Another route to addressing the jeopardizing of the independence of the judiciary that is related to “substantial fines” or, more generally, finances, would be the role that private sector actors can play in this fight. As legal scholar Rachel Stopchinski writes, “recent scholarship has noted the importance of judicial independence in a country’s economic health… private actors thus have an incentive to encourage states to move towards compliance with international standards of judicial independence.” Actions which private sector actors could take during times when judicial independence is being undermined could include simply relocating their business away from countries “that do not maintain judicial independence” and directing investment towards non-governmental initiatives that “promote judicial independence in areas without a strong tradition of independent judiciaries.”

Here, it is essential to note that the two routes mentioned above of addressing regressing judicial independence translate most effectively towards addressing the situation in Poland, not necessarily Hungary. Though the first route could address the situation in Hungary, if it ever even reaches Hungary is contingent on its use, and the verdicts therein, in the current European Commission case taking “infringement action against Poland, alleging that Poland had violated its Article 19(1) TEU law obligations to maintain an independent judiciary.” As to the second proposed solution, that of the private actor’s leverage, the long-standing “unpredictable tax policy, legal uncertainty, and anticapitalist rhetoric” deployed by Orbán’s party means that “the interaction between state and market” has already been “seriously distorted by political interests” in Hungary. Therefore, the absence of private sector actors’ investments would likely encourage maintaining judicial independence more in Poland than it would in Hungary.

However, this does not mean that the goal of recovering judicial independence in Hungary is hopeless. The same optimism can apply to Poland as well, where despite compelling hypothetical solutions existing, none have curtailed the illiberal developments. “The maturation of democracy is a long historical process,” writes economist János Kornai, “and Hungary has only just begun it.” Kornai’s “maturation of democracy” theorem applies to Poland, too. Yes, the situation for judicial independence is unfavorable in Poland and perhaps highly unfavorable in Hungary. Yet just because the conditions for a resurgence of an independent judiciary are unlikely and difficult does not preclude the possibility for such a resurgence. How a restoration of this kind is initiated and maintained remains unclear. However, if external actors such as the Venice Commission and the European Union and internal actors like private businesses and, perhaps, more moderate political parties can continue the fight by adapting to the subversive strategies of the ruling nationalist parties, the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland may be recovered.

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365 Ibid., 689-690.
368 Ibid. 46.
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SECTION 4
Kleptocracy in Eastern Europe
Explaining Moldovan Elites Divided Opinion on Moldovan EU Membership

Dylan Gooding

Abstract
Moldova has been in a state of limbo since the fall of the Soviet Union. On one hand, the country appears to be a prime candidate for European Union integration. On the other hand, while some progress towards EU integration has been made, progress has stalled in recent years. Blame can be mostly pointed at the government and Moldovan elites. This has led to the question: what is preventing Moldova’s elites as a unified group from committing to EU ascension? What prevents Moldova from joining the EU are the same reasons it has also not fully integrated with Russia. The country is divided to the point that no faction can decisively guide the country’s foreign policy one way or the other. The main arguments are three-fold. First, failed privatization efforts led to state capture of government institutions by elites. Second, historical factors led to pluralism by default and rapacious individualism, making the government ineffective as a whole. Third, efforts by Russia and the EU to gain influence in Moldova by supporting different elites and influencing the country's politics have entangled their geopolitical interests in the country’s independent interests. These three arguments create a deadlocked state apparatus that has not been able to move towards a long-term pro-EU or pro-Russia affiliation since the country’s break from the Soviet Union. Future researchers should consider these particular factors when analyzing Moldovan foreign policy.

Introduction
The common narrative is that Moldova should be a prime candidate for joining the European Union (EU). Previously part of the Soviet Union, it belongs to a group of former communist nations whose future is with Europe and whose elites should be unified in this common goal. Many researchers would agree with this narrative. They have argued that Moldovan political elites should be more inclined to join the EU due to the Moldovan Government’s rocky relations with Russia. Analysis by Michael O. Slobodchikoff showed Moldovan elites generally value integration with the EU over Russia. By analyzing treaty networks between Moldova and Russia, he argued that elites should be more receptive towards the EU. Sergiu Buscaneanu also noted that Moldovan elites were proven to be “risk-acceptant” towards any Russian objections, shown by the signing of an Association Agreement with the EU in 2013. This can be explained by the conflicts Moldova faced with Russia since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

However, Moldova has not joined the EU. Nor do they seem likely to join anytime soon. What these authors failed to recognize are the internal factors, primarily involving Moldovan elites that obstruct the country’s ability to join the EU. The country has been left in a state of

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limbo in its foreign policy, as there is a tug-of-war between elites who wish to join the EU and elites who wish to further integrate with Russia. This has led to the question: what is preventing Moldova’s elites as a unified group from committing towards EU ascension? The reasoning can be found through political analysis of the country’s economic elites, the current state of Moldovan politics, and how both the EU and Russia interact with the country. As economic elites have gone through the process of state capture to promote their economic interests, intense political polarization from linguistic and historical trends has led to a state of dysfunction in Moldovan politics. Along with the entanglement of the EU and Russia's interests in the country’s politics, this has led to the inability of Moldovan elites to take necessary steps for EU ascension.

The first section of this paper will analyze Moldova’s economic elites. The failures of privatization led to the formation of a group of economic elites, who in return gained incredible influence in Moldovan state institutions through state capture. These economic elites can manipulate their ideology for political and economic gain, which makes it difficult to identify what the Moldovan elites’ true intentions are regarding EU integration. The second section begins with a historical analysis of how divisions over identity stemming from the language debate have led to Moldovan politics splitting on a “geopolitical orientation.” This and the legacy of foreign rule has led to a “pluralism by default,” where neither faction can monopolize power to decisively change policy. This has led to weak political parties and “rapacious individualism.” Finally, this paper will review the entanglement of Russia and the EU in Moldovan politics. As both blocs have pushed for more influence in the country, it has only exacerbated the existing geopolitical divide.

**Self-Interests of the Economic Elite**

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Moldova went through a period of failed privatization that eventually led to the formation of an economic elite. This elite then began the process of state capture, which is a process where both public and private sector individuals, groups, or firms provide benefits to public officials in return for influence in the formulation of policy in government to their advantage.\(^\text{371}\) The consequences of this capture have had major implications for the country's ability to reform and join the EU.

This section will review the privatization of the Moldovan economy and how it led to the formation of an economic elite. Then, the section will explain the capture of Moldovan state institutions, highlighting examples of how much power the economic elites have in the country. Finally, this section will analyze how state capture and corruption have made it impossible to understand the true intentions of the economic elite regarding EU ascension.

**The Formation of an Economic Elite and its Capture of the Moldovan State**

The privatization of Moldova’s economy began on January 1, 1994. Citizens were given vouchers in which they could buy either state assets or equity shares of state-owned enterprises. This process of privatization was used to give every citizen equitable control over the economy. However, this did not play out equitably. The privatization of state-owned enterprises was made in secrecy, with the Ministry of Privatization committing serious violations. Most profitable
companies were bought below market value by interest groups close to the government. Similarly in the privatization of agriculture, the major economic recession that followed independence along with the sharp decrease in agricultural productivity led to an elite consolidation of property. The domination of vested interests in the privatization of public goods led to clientelism between business and government.\textsuperscript{372}

After the formation of this economic elite, these special interests began to use their wealth to gain political power of their own. After the 2001 elections, the Moldovan Communist Party (PCRM) won 70\% of the seats. Using this supermajority, the PCRM began to increase its control over state media and the courts, making Moldova more authoritarian.\textsuperscript{373} The country trended towards greater centralization and paternalism which in return led to the process of state capture by a communist elite.\textsuperscript{374} Examples include the son of the president Vladimir Voronin, Oleg Voronin, who amassed a net worth of US$2 billion. But an even more egregious example would be that of Vladimir Plahotniuc. Worth around US$2 billion, the PCRM donor was seen as a prime minister contender in 2008. But around 2010, he joined the opposing Democrats who then won power over the PCRM. He became vice president of the party, and reportedly had control over the country’s judiciary. Another Democrats’ leader, Prime Minister Vlad Filat, worth US$1.2 billion often came into conflict with Plahotniuc.\textsuperscript{375}

Another good example of state capture is Christian Cantir’s piece on Moldovan oligarchs. In it, he shows that some Moldovan oligarchs have become mayors of cities to shield themselves domestically and expand their image internationally. Cantir talks about how Moldovan oligarch-mayors have used their mayorships to gain popularity as well as shield themselves legally from prosecution over corruption charges. He also talks about how these oligarch-mayors can influence diaspora networks to claim an international position that can rival the Moldovan government.\textsuperscript{376}

**Corruption in the Moldovan State**

State capture of institutions has led to unbelievable amounts of corruption. According to Freedom House, “corruption is entrenched in all levels of government” and alongside deficiencies in the justice system has “hampered democratic governance.” This is the main reason why Freedom House ranks Moldova as “partially free.” There are few safeguards against corruption because any anti-corruption laws are not enforced. Government operations are not transparent. While it has gotten better since 2019, procedural breakdowns have led to failed efforts to openly appoint public officials.\textsuperscript{377}

These examples show an uncomfortable truth concerning the economic elite of Moldova and state capture and corruption. The general trend seems to be that any party that comes

\textsuperscript{373} Lucan A. Way, “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine,” *World Politics* 57 no. 2 (2005): 244.
\textsuperscript{375} Tudoroiu, “Democracy and state capture in Moldova,” 659 & 662.
into power will allow for state capture. This was shown in 2010. While the Democrats ended the communist businessmen’s control over state institutions, it was merely replaced by PlahotniucESPOLITICAL migrants or new businessmen who acted the same as the communists before. It does not matter if a party runs on an “anti-corruption” platform, as economic elites find ways to enter the party that discourages reform.378

Regarding joining the EU, as shown by Plahotniuc, the economic elite of the county aren’t bound by any loyalties or ideologies. They only care about continued control over state institutions and their businesses. If those who hold control over state institutions are kicked out, new business leaders can simply replace them. This is due to the clientelism that has been ingrained into the political process. If Moldovan economic elites hold control of state institutions, and many of them have no ideology in terms of politics except that they can continue making money, this makes it almost impossible to gauge if economic elites support joining the EU. The rampant corruption that goes on in Moldova makes it less likely that economic elites would want to join the EU. The EU would force anti-corruption reforms as a prerequisite before ascension, which would harm the embedded clientelism between businesses and the state.

**Political Polarization in Moldova**

Because of its history of being a subject of empires, Moldova today is a divided nation. While few would think of Moldova as pluralistic, its history has made it such. Instead of pluralism like in western nations, where it is formed through civil society and is allowed to be a check on the state, Moldova has “pluralism by default,” where the government and society are so polarized it makes it impossible to monopolize control of the state.379

This section will first historically analyze the trends that make the concept of “pluralism by default” possible in Moldova. They are due to historical factors and linguistic divides that have led to a “geopolitical orientation” in Moldovan politics. Then, this section will show how pluralism by default has led to a fragmentation of elites and “rapacious individualism.”

**Linguistic Reasons for a Geopolitical Divide in Moldovan Society**

Language serves as the great chasm in Moldova. This is primarily based upon a Moldovan/Romanian and Russian language line. Moldova ethnically is mainly Moldovan with significant Russian, Ukrainian, and Gagauz minorities. Most ethnic minorities only speak Russian and thus are separated from the rest of the Moldovan-speaking society. During the time of the Soviet Union and its annexation of Bessarabia, it switched the script of Moldovan from Latin to Cyrillic. However, during the collapse of the Soviet Union when Moldovan leadership began to deSovietize the country, the country’s leaders switched the official script from Cyrillic, back to Latin. Moldovan is nearly identical to Romanian when it is in the Latin script. This is important because it was a formal rejection of what made Moldova different from Romania, paving the way for reunification. Russian speakers in Transnistria, fearing unification, then came into conflict with the new Moldovan government, leading to a civil war from 1991 to 1992. Language became a polarizing issue. Because of the harsh divide linguistically that generally follows ethnic lines,

379 Ibid., 656.
two separate linguistic spheres and identities have emerged since independence.

As a result of these separate linguistic spheres, Moldova became divided on a “geopolitical orientation.” Two factions have existed since independence: a pro-Romania faction and a pro-Russia faction. The pro-Russia faction wants to see Russian become a second language in Moldova while maintaining closer relations to the East. The pro-Romania faction wants to keep Moldovan the official language while also keeping the Latin alphabet. They also advocate greater integration with Romania. When Romania joined the EU in 2007, the pro-Romania side became pro-EU, advocating for closer relations with and to eventually join the EU. For either side, they see no compromise as acceptable, as this is not a conflict over policy but that of identity.

Pluralism by Default and Rapacious Individualism

Those factors have led to a term that is called “pluralism by default.” The Moldovan electoral system has generally been characterized as competitive because of geopolitical polarization over national identity and the weakness of the state. This has prevented any consolidation that would decisively trend the country more democratic or authoritarian. The elite are so fragmented and polarized that no one can monopolize political control. This has made the Moldovan government incapable of pursuing the agendas that got them elected.

Defection by high-ranking officials inside the government is common in Moldova. This stems from the weakness of the state and the inability of executives to build up government networks. Thus, the main source of opposition for incumbent presidents usually comes from the people they are supposed to be working with the closest: the prime minister of parliament and the president’s cabinet members. This means that the president has an incentive to undermine the successes of their own “allies,” because a successful prime minister or cabinet official might lead to a challenge in the next election. In Moldova, the president not only must watch for the opposition as a threat but also their own “allies.” This internal competition from the government makes it hard to control elections. Generally, “administrative capacity and elite coordination” are needed to manipulate elections. But if the political elite is divided, it becomes a scenario like in 1996, when competition between the president, prime minister, and parliamentary head canceled out efforts by the other to bias media coverage or enlist local governments to manipulate the vote.

The best way to describe the political arena in Moldova is through the idea of “rapacious individualism.” Defined as “a situation in which politics is dominated by a nonideological, unstructured, and highly individualized competition for power,” resulting in a lack of trust through either party or informal networks that can make for stable coalitions. Because of distrust of members of their political party, the political elite is in a constant state of self-sabotage, which makes effective policy-making almost impossible.

382 Ibid. 463.
383 Ibid., 464-465.
384 Ibid., 475.
A Geopolitical Rivalry: the EU and Russia in Moldova

To finally understand the situation Moldova is in, this paper needs to look at the geopolitical contest that not only affects Moldova, but also Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states: the war for influence between the EU and Russia. This section will go over how both the EU’s and Russia’s jockeying for influence in Moldova has entangled themselves politically in the already divided nation. First, the section will review Russia’s attempts to influence the government, from its involvement in Transnistria, supporting certain Moldovan regimes using carrot and stick methods, and use of Russian media in the country. Next, the section will analyze the EU’s attempts to push reform in the country by supporting certain political parties and how this affected their standing in the eyes of elites and the public. Finally, this paper will summarize how the actions of these outside groups have affected the Moldovan elites’ capability to enact a platform for eventual ascension into the EU.

Russian Interference in Moldova

Russia has a long history of interference in Moldovan affairs. It has done so to retain influence and to prevent the pro-Romania faction from gaining too much power to decisively swing the country towards the West. Moscow has used various tactics in Moldova to achieve their goals, including support for separatist groups, aiding the government with authoritarian consolidation, and misinformation in Moldovan media.

Russia has continuously supported the breakaway regions in Moldova, most noticeably Transnistria. It has done so to protect its military bases from the Soviet era and to use the separatists as a “trump card” in negotiations. During the conflict between Transnistria and Moldova, Moscow took several actions to support the Transnistrians. Before the collapse of the USSR, the Soviet Agro-Industrial Bank helped Transnistria establish a national bank, ensuring its economic independence from Chișinău. In 1992 as the conflict escalated, the (now) Russian government renewed aid to the country as top-ranking officials visited the breakaway nation, promising even more support. Militarily, 14th Army troops helped arm the Transnistrians and increasingly fought on their side. These actions helped Transnistria gain de-facto independence from Moldova, and Russian troops have continued to occupy military bases there to guarantee its continued non-allegiance.385

The Russian leadership has also given support to certain Moldovan elites in return for loyalty to Moscow’s foreign policy objectives in the region. They have used carrot and stick methods of diplomacy towards Moldovan political elites. As Putin gained power in Russia, Moldova got a new government with the election of the PCRM in 2001. Relations between the two countries began to improve with the rise of new regimes in both countries. President Voronin agreed to inter-government and inter-economic linking between Moldova and Russia in return for Moscow’s support for Voronin’s centralization of power in the country. However, friendly relations between the two countries ended in 2003 when Moldova canceled the Kozak Memorandum, an agreement that would have ended the conflict with Transnistria but would have made Russian a second language in the country. Moscow

retaliated harshly, hurting the economy by cutting economic deals and entrenching its support for Transnistria afterward.\textsuperscript{386}

Russian media presence in Moldova is still quite prominent. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow-based stations such as RTR, RenTV, NTV, TV6, and TNT have either fuller partial programming in the nation. Since Russian was the lingua-franca during the Soviet years, one-third of the population still speaks Russian daily. 43\% of Moldovans presently get their news from Russian TV and radio. Russian newspapers also expanded into the Moldovan media market after 1991.

Moscow uses its well-established media presence in the country to its advantage to promote the views it wants Moldovans to hear. Moscow seeks to further increase the chasm between Moldova’s two geopolitical orientation groups to create discord and erode public trust in state institutions even further. It does so by using Russian state-owned media to target “weak spots” that undercut public confidence. In Moldova, Russian media attacks using issues that are especially potent to Moldovans, such as Transnistria and Gagauzia, weak government institutions, corruption, a limited banking sector, and the divided geopolitical orientations of its citizens. This, as well as support from pro-Russian parties, NGOs, and the Orthodox Church, has led to “parallel realities” in the minds of Russian-speaking Moldovans. These parallel realities further polarize the country.

\textit{EU Involvement in Moldova}

The EU overall has a poor strategy when it comes to interacting with Moldova. The bloc’s involvement has hurt its image in the country. While it might not do it with malicious intent, it does have the end goal of Moldova’s eventual ascension into the EU and the bloc. The EU has supported these goals by supporting certain regimes, mainly ones that were either pro-EU integration or at the very least anti-Russian. This led the EU to become reluctant to change in the country, even tolerating egregious corruption or authoritarianism in fear that the opposition would be pro-Russia. Because the EU did not promote its core values first, the image of the bloc became tainted throughout the 2000s to the 2010s.

Following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2005, the EU began to increase its efforts to influence events in Moldova. However, 2005 was not the first time the EU held influence in the Moldovan government. When President Voronin canceled the Russian-backed Kozak Memorandum, a major reason the memorandum was canceled last second was because of phone calls by Western leaders advising against the signing of the treaty.\textsuperscript{387} Due to the cancellation, as Russian sanctions almost collapsed the economy, the EU began to increasingly support the communist Moldovan government. While European leaders continued to criticize the PCRM’s consolidation of power and authoritarianism in the country, they also allied themselves politically with them. In return for more economic and political support, the PCRM began to lessen authoritarian crackdowns. By the time of the Twitter Revolution in 2009, EU support of the regime was so absolute that the EU only began to support the pro-democratic forces after Voronin initiated the brutal crackdown on protests.\textsuperscript{388}

The EU’s support of certain political parties also hurt its image with both Moldovan


\textsuperscript{387} Tolstrup, \textit{Russia Vs. The EU: The Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States}, 185.

\textsuperscript{388} Ibid., 227.
elites and the general population. The PCRM had the veneer of European integration, dating back to 2003, but they never pursued such an agenda in their foreign policy. However, after the EU backed their more explicit pro-European political rivals in the early 2010s, this veneer of mild pro-European rhetoric was cast aside for a clear-cut pro-Russian attitude. When that same party became associated with continued state capture and banking fraud in 2014, it lost power in parliament later that year. Effectively, the EU’s support for Moldovan authoritarians permanently soured their image to half of the political elite while making themselves look bad because they supported a corrupt party.

Conclusion

This paper was written to show that when observing any nation’s foreign policy, it is of utmost importance to dig deeper than surface-level trends and to look at the internal push and pull factors that drive the previous, current, and potentially future administrations’ policies. It is especially true for a nation that is as divided as Moldova. This paper shows that the way Moldova displays itself to the world is contradictory because, in a nation divided on geopolitical orientation, a change in administration often means a complete shift in foreign policy.

Focusing on elites, this paper has demonstrated how elites interact in Moldovan politics. In this regard, the rise of economic elites resulting from privatization in the 90s has led to the capture of state institutions. With little loyalties to any faction, these elites can manipulate parties with their immense wealth to keep themselves in power. The country is also fragmented based on an ethnicity/language divide. This has led to pluralism by default and rapacious individualism becoming characteristic of Moldovan politics, making it harder to pass reforms in the government. Finally, Russian and EU interference in the country has tainted the images of both organizations in the minds of both elites and citizens. Russian interference seeks to divide the country further to weaken any government that comes to power. The EU’s poor strategy in terms of support for Moldovan governments has tainted its image in elite circles and across the country.

While a new pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity has formed a new government in the wake of parliamentary elections in 2021, it remains to be seen whether this new government can make the changes necessary to join the EU (Tanas, 2021). History would say this government will fail much like the Democrats in the early 2010s, as the internal forces that press Moldovan elites might prevent any real progress on a pro-EU agenda. For example, the recent energy crisis with Russia demonstrates that Russia still has a lot of power in the country (AFP, 2021). But what will become of it is anyone’s guess. It could move past its internal divisions and eventually join the EU, and this paper could be proven wrong. Until the fundamental political forces of Moldova are reigned in, Moldova will sit outside the borders of the EU. If history is any tool to predict the future, it will be sitting there for some time.

389 Ibid., 227.
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How does the 2012 Foreign Agent Law affect democracy promotion in Russia?

Catherine Zou

Introduction

Russia’s 2012 Foreign Agent Law is generally seen as part of an authoritarian turn in politics under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. Western commentators argue that the law, which labels NGOs and organization that receive foreign funding as ‘foreign agents,’ attempts to discredit the most democratically-inclined NGOs in Russian civil society. By stigmatizing foreign funding, the law effectively stymies Western-led democracy promotion, as NGOs dissociate from potentially problematic associations with foreign funders. In doing so, it drives out international NGOs, while either pushing domestic NGOs towards the state or depriving holdout groups of both resource and recourse. The law, in short, stifles democracy promotion in Russia by creating a nonprofit sector that is, in the first case, politically toothless, and in the second, financially subjugated.

Such an interpretation of the Foreign Agent Law is understandable, given the unique financial, reputational, and operational challenges that it poses to affected groups. Without denying these realities, I aim to bring a more critical perspective on this argument by examining the longer history of democracy promotion in Russia. In particular, I object to the argument that the Foreign Agent Law, or indeed any of the legislative maneuvers that have been introduced to tighten state oversight over Russia’s civil society in the last two decades, is the only obstacle to Russia’s democratization. Instead, scholarship on Western democracy promotion in post-Soviet Russia reveals the underlying incentive structures that constrain civil society actors, prompting them to trade genuine democratic progress for organizational stability. With this, I show that the Foreign Agent Law intensifies existing difficulties faced by NGOs in Russia.

Understanding said difficulties allows us to develop a more informed view of the challenges of democratization in Russia by nuancing our perspective of NGOs actors and their relationship to democracy promotion. Instead of seeing nonprofits as straightforward ‘democracy promoters’ or handmaidens of the state,’ I contend that NGOs seek first and foremost to guarantee their own survival. To do so, they balance their own interests with those of their constituency, their home state, and their foreign partners—even in earlier, more optimistic periods of nonprofit ‘flourishing.’ Crucially, this phenomenon is true of Russian and Western NGOs, both of whom must satisfy certain standards of success to sustain their operations. The NGO sector was thus a fraught landscape in which individual organizations sidelined more high-minded principles in favor of immediate financial and technical concerns even before the Foreign Agent Law. In this light, the law should not be understood as the singular or the decisive impediment to civil society development. Rather than advance the divisive view that the Foreign Agent Law cleaves civil society into a dichotomy of ‘persecuted pro-democracy’ groups and ‘beholden pro-state’ organizations, we should recognize the challenges common to most nonprofit actors. A greater appreciation for the practical constraints of nonprofit work will not only temper and sharpen our projections for democracy promotion programs, but also to locate the agency of nonprofit leaders as active negotiators, and not pliable recipients, of the repressive laws or external expertise that shape their repertoire of action. A brief history of democracy promotion in Russia is necessary.

Context: Civil Society Development and Regulation in Russia

The third wave of democracy arrived in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Democracy promotion, carried out under a U.S.-dominated world order, aimed to facilitate
Russia’s transformation to a liberal democracy, a newly heralded “world value.”\textsuperscript{392} To do so, Western governments offered both organizational, financial, and technical support to the non-profits and grassroots organizations that were emerging in the post-Soviet space. These fledgling groups were seen as the foundation of a stable and sustainable democratic transition. A strong civil society was simultaneously an effective check against democratic backsliding and authoritarian expansion and a way of habituating citizens to mass political participation.\textsuperscript{393} Because NGOs are independent from the state, they would be able to monitor and criticize political excesses or oversights. This would in turn promote governmental openness and accountability, which are especially important in newly-democratized states. NGOs were also thought to be bastions of democracy in the long term, as they could inculcate values of democratic participation and pluralism by mobilizing citizens around critical socio-political issues.\textsuperscript{394}

The initial expansion of democracy promotion in Russia took place under the “benign neglect” of the Yeltsin administration, which offered scant support but few restrictions on the newly-formed grassroots groups in Russia.\textsuperscript{395} In the absence of significant state oversight of the nonprofit space, the civil society that emerged was largely funded by Western governments and frequently supported by advisors and consultants from Western aid agencies.\textsuperscript{396} Yet even with the support of liberal democratic governments, Russian civil society was generally considered to be weak and constrained. Non-profit groups were hindered not only by the lack of state support, but also by popular suspicion of mass organizations and volunteerism, a holdover from the Soviet era.\textsuperscript{397} Indeed, Russia had one of the lowest rates of organization among post-Communist states, which collectively ranked among the worst-performing transitional democracies in this area.\textsuperscript{398}

If Yeltsin’s approach to democracy promotion was largely laissez-faire, state policy towards Russian NGOs became much more centralized and state-controlled under Putin’s leadership. In contrast to the limited government involvement in the development of the nonprofit space during the 1990s, the Russian government enacted a suite of regulations and institutions to regulate civil society starting in the early 2000s. The 2012 Foreign Agent Law works alongside two other laws that circumscribe the activities of foreign or foreign-funded NGOs. Following on the heels of a series of democratizing revolutions in Russia’s immediate neighborhood, the 2006 NGO Law increased state scrutiny of the nonprofit sector by tightening its registration and documentation requirements.\textsuperscript{399} Foreign NGOs, in particular, were required to provide information on the uses and sources of their funds.\textsuperscript{400} Failure to comply would result in additional official checks

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\textsuperscript{396} Henderson, “Civil Society in Russia”, 17
\textsuperscript{397} Henderson, “Civil Society in Russia”, 12
\textsuperscript{399} Beissinger, Mark R. 2007. “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5(2), 260
In a further escalation of the attack on international NGOs, the “Undesirable Organizations’ Law” was signed in 2015, empowering the state to identify and expel “undesirable” foreign NGOs that purportedly threaten national security interests.

Of the three main legislative amendments to NGO activities in Russia, the 2012 Foreign Agent Law has generated the greatest amount of scholarly and media attention in recent years. The law allows Russia’s Ministry of Justice to label NGOs that (i) participate in “political activity” and (ii) receive any amount of funding from foreign sources as “foreign agents.” Although the law appears to only affect a subset of internationally-oriented nonprofits, it is widely understood as a broader attack on Russia’s civil society as a whole. This is because the official definition of “political activity” is so broad as to encompass virtually all NGOs that engage in some form of public advocacy or policy-related commentary. This means that most, if not all, foreign-funded NGOs may fall under the remit of the law, with its highly stigmatizing designation of ‘foreign agent,’ which recalls Cold War era discourses of espionage and foreign interference in domestic politics. Nonprofits that fall afoul of the Foreign Agent Law are required to voluntarily register with the Justice Ministry and to self-identify as a ‘foreign agent’ in all their communications. They must also publish biannual fiscal reports, undergo additional auditing by the state, and notify authorities of their intentions to participate in any ‘political activities,’ sometimes a year in advance. In effect, any NGO that is affiliated with a non-Russian funding source could be cast as a malevolent actor that was meddling with Russian affairs. The law disproportionately affects NGOs that are supported by international, democracy-promoting organizations: such groups were cast as vectors of foreign influence, whose activities also advanced insidious, external interests. This ‘othering’ view is perhaps best encapsulated by Putin’s 2004 speech to the Federal Assembly, which insinuated that internationally-funded NGOs were vocal on foreign interests but silent on the actual issues afflicting Russian society:

Not all of the [public associations and unions] are oriented towards standing up for people’s real interests. For some of them, the priority is to receive financing from influential foreign foundations. Others serve dubious group and commercial interests while the most acute problems of the countries and its citizens remain unnoticed.

Civil Society post-Foreign Agent Law: Narratives of Co-optation and Confrontation

401 Ibid.
403 Tysiachniouk, Maria, Svetlana Tulaeva, and Laura A. Henry. “Civil society under the law ‘on foreign agents’: NGO strategies and network transformation.” Europe-Asia Studies 70, no. 4 (2018), 623
404 Oleinikova, Olga. "Foreign funded NGOs in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine: Recent restrictions and implications." Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: an Interdisciplinary Journal 9, no. 3 (2017), 87
405 Ibid.
407 Ibid.
Responding to the shrinking space for foreign and foreign-funded NGOs in Russia, scholars and commentators have tended to focus on the ways in which the Foreign Agent Law has disrupted and even reversed prior democracy promotion efforts in Russia. The setback to democracy promotion, according to this argument, is twofold: on one level, the law reduces internationally-backed democracy promotion initiatives by stigmatizing foreign involvement and funding. On the second level, the law creates a climate of fear and uncertainty for nonprofits, because it is not consistently enforced or because its vague wording creates ambiguity about the necessary course of action. This forces NGOs not only to cut off much-needed foreign funding sources, but also to withdraw from any potentially prosecutable ‘political activity,’ which creates a sector that is subservient to or eclipsed by the state’s interests.

First and most immediately, it is argued that the Foreign Agent Law destroys US- and EU-led democracy promotion efforts by delegitimizing foreign NGO presence in Russia and shutting down democracy-related programs. For example, USAID, which has spent over 2.6 billion USD on democracy promotion efforts since 1992, was forcefully expelled from the country in 2012, depriving Russian NGOs of more than 50 million USD in funding for democracy promotion projects. Furthermore, as some NGOs distance themselves from international organizations to escape the ‘foreign agent’ label, there may be less domestic impetus to implement initiatives focused explicitly around democracy promotion in the first place.

On a second, broader level, scholars have contended that the Foreign Agent Law also undermines long-term democratic progress as it exerts a chilling effect on civil society as a whole. While only a small number of Russian NGOs are directly affected, the law heightens the sense of danger and precarity experienced by Russian NGOs. The definition of ‘political activity,’ for example, is at once ambiguous and all-encompassing as it includes events that are not typically considered to be political, such as observing elections or conducting polls. Furthermore, enforcement of standards that are neither explicitly set out in the law nor consistently applied across cases create even greater confusion about the acceptable parameters of action for NGOs. As NGOs become increasingly cautious and risk-averse, they may be less inclined to take part in political or policy-related discussions, eliminating the type of civic activity and political engagement that is essential for democracy.

More importantly, it may also be argued that the Foreign Agent Law weeds out the internationally-connected, politically-engaged NGOs that contribute most to democratic development, while nurturing organizations that are either active supporters of the Russian state, or are

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412 Under 300 organizations have been put on the foreign agents list, while there are over 100,000 registered non-profit organizations in Russia.
414 See Beilinson et al, “Created and (or) Distributed.,” 10-18
415 Stuvøy, “The Foreign Within”, 1120
willing to remain apolitical to secure state funding for their projects. Crotty et al., for example, suggest that the reduction in international or Western funding sources increases Russian NGOs’ dependence on state funding to carry out their programs. As a result, NGOs will become enmeshed in the timelines, conditions, and parameters imposed by the state. More than this, state grant-awarding processes are selective, meaning that many groups may be left without viable funding sources as foreign backers pull out of Russia. The human rights groups and election monitoring agencies that are the hardest-hit by the Foreign Agent Law are also the least likely to receive grants and funding from the government, which prioritizes funding only for ‘socially-oriented’ NGOs that focus on service delivery rather than activism and advocacy. Indeed, many grant competitions disqualify organizations that have been labelled ‘foreign agents’ from participating in the application process. Thus, the law appears to hobble the most politically outspoken NGOs—notable examples are the recently liquidated human right organization Memorial and the deregistered election watchdog Golos—while allocating available resources to groups that support the interests and policies of the Russian state. In the vacuum left by pro-democracy organizations, some analysts have theorized that the NGO sector will become dominated by so-called ‘marionette’ organizations that are run by relatives or allies of government officials, or even covertly set up by the state. Moreover, even non-‘marionette’ NGOs that are not otherwise affiliated with or favored by the state may move closer to state objectives and abstain from any form of political or policy-driven activity, because this places them in a better position to win the grants and resources that sustain their operation. Over half of surveyed nonprofits in a 2014 study reported experiencing some form of fiscal stress in sustaining day-to-day activities, making budgetary concerns the central consideration of many nonprofits. These indicators suggest that state patronage could become the shaping force in civil society. Instead of acting as an effective counterweight to the state, civil society becomes state-dominated, losing its

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416 Ibid.
418 NGOs have to undergo a competitive process for grants through the Public Chamber, or seek out business sponsorship. See Crotty et al, “Post-soviet civil society”, 19
419 The 18 policy areas for ‘socially oriented’ nonprofits include organizations, which include health, social services, disaster prevention, education, and culture and the arts. Although human rights issues are included in the list, the overall bent of the policy aims at supporting nonprofits who can provide additional social services, acting as a “third-party” welfare system. See Skokova et al., “The non-profit sector in today’s Russia”, 543
424 Crotty et al, “Post-soviet civil society”, 1262
425 Flikke, "Resurgent authoritarianism", 116
426 Saloman et al., “Penetrating the dual realities”, 2187
autonomy and connections with transnational movements. The Foreign Agent Law, it seems, reverses previous strides towards democracy and an open civil society, ushering in a new era of co-optation and “civilized oppression.”

Ambiguities and tensions in NGO-led democracy promotion in the 1990s and 2000s

As seen above, analysts have concentrated mainly on how the Foreign Agent Law affects the NGOs that are most closely tied to the international human rights and democracy establishment, while documenting spillover effects on the rest of the nonprofit sector in Russia. In this view, the law has served as a source of rupture and discontinuity for both democracy promotion and civil society development. There is, it is implied, a shift in the outcomes of democracy promotion before and after the enactment of the new restrictive laws: democratic progress before the law; cessation and regression after. The character of Russian civil society is also bifurcated: NGOs are seen as either international and democratic or docile and state-dependent.

Without downplaying the effect of the Foreign Agent Law on civil society, I assert that such arguments both overstate the reach of the law and overgeneralize the nature of Russian NGOs, by defining it only by its relation to the state. I present two complicating narratives to challenge the binary view of NGOs as supporting either democracy or autocracy. First, I show that NGOs are not work actors, but work dynamically with and against state interests. Second, I describe pre-existing limitations to democracy promotion in the period before the Foreign Agent Law, when domestic NGOs enjoyed generous Western funding. Both insights uncover longstanding barriers to democracy promotion in post-Soviet Russia that have little to do with the problems of administrative coercion. What these examples reveal is that the aim of democracy promotion is distinct from the prevailing goals of organizational stability. While their outcomes may be interlinked, democracy promotion is not synonymous with organizational stability; when these goals conflict, NGOs may be forced to pick one over the other. The Foreign Agent Law does not create a trade-off between NGO stability and democratization so much as it exacerbates the latent tensions between the two objectives.

First, current perspectives on the NGO landscape in Russia tend to interpret NGO responses to the Foreign Agent Law as characteristic of either ‘dissenters’ or ‘compliers,’ occluding the overwhelming majority of NGOs who operate between the two extremes. The inadequacy of this framework in reflecting Russian civil society is strikingly illustrated in Stuvøy’s account of the disagreements between Russian and EU NGOs in the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum. According to Stuvøy, EU officials separated Russian NGOs into the categories of Government-Organized NGOs (GONGOs) and the “vulnerable rest,” encouraging the latter group to make principled criticisms of the Russian state. By contrast, Russian NGO leaders adopted a more pragmatist principle, eschewing potentially confrontational tactics that may endanger their organization’s relationship with local authorities. While international commentators hoped to exert pressure on the Russian state by making a collective statement against its restrictive laws, Russian NGOs took a more muted approach. These NGOs capture a middle-point between the

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429 Stuvøy, “The Foreign Within”, 1119
430 Stuvøy, “The Foreign Within”, 1106
431 Stuvøy, “The Foreign Within”, 1114
extremes of state cooperation and conflict: far from being subservient to the Russian govern-
ment, the NGOs attending the Forum were networked and internationally connected. At the same
time, these organizations did not see themselves as opposed to the state: they remained open to
cooperating with the public sector to address specific social issues, and wary of needlessly al-
ienating public officials. Their position, then, was one of compromise: while maintaining their
international ties, these NGOs refrained from directly challenging the Foreign Agent Law, which
allowed them to avoid crackdown while preserving their transnational ties.

A similar dynamic can be observed with the human rights groups that are often framed as
state dissenters. Liudmila Alekseeva of the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG), for instance, care-
fully positioned her advocacy for improving human rights protection in Russia as being non-op-
positional in nature. Alekseeva argued that, as a nonprofit organization and not a political
party, MHG’s policy advocacy does not constitute political opposition to the state, as this would
imply involvement in electoral competition. Indeed, as early as 2001, Alekseeva described her
approach of taking a both principled and conciliatory stance in MHG’s interactions with state au-
thorities. MHG, she stated, was willing to engage in dialogue with state authorities to better com-
 municate MHG’s policy positions to policymakers. They remained, however, prepared to criti-
cize the state on instances of human rights violations. NGO responses to state repression, then,
balance both support and dissent rather than adhering entirely to one extreme. This approach
 stresses the importance of maintaining some level of productive cooperation with the govern-
ment, while finding ways to advocate for policy preferences. MHG’s mixed approach to state
oppression is a particularly illuminating example that highlights how NGOs have always taken a
pragmatist approach to ensure their own survival.

In this light, focusing only on the most obviously “pro-democracy” minority of NGOs in
Russia needlessly dichotomizes the types of NGO-state relations that are possible. Internation-
ally-linked groups are not necessarily reflective of Russian civil society groups as whole. Assum-
ing that their experiences are interchangeable would be to overstate the influence of democracy-
 promoting organizations and, more importantly, to generalize all other NGOs as irrelevant to the
cause of democracy. In reality, the number of NGOs listed in the Justice Ministry’s registry of
‘foreign agents’ has never exceeded 200, accounting for just under 0.1% of an estimated 200,000
active nonprofit organizations across Russia. Even as the Foreign Agent Law curtails the space
for civic activity and participation, it is reductive to paint all NGOs outside of the directly-af-
 fected groups as GONGOs. Accounts of the flexibility and inventiveness of NGO actors high-
light how civil society does not start and end with the most prominent ‘democracy promoting’
activist groups, but rather with organizations that adapt ceaselessly to a changing operating envi-
ronment.

432 Bindman, Eleanor. "The state, civil society and social rights in contemporary Russia." East European Politics 31,
no. 3 (2015), 342
433 Daucé, Françoise. "Civilized oppression?", 249
434 Daucé, “Civilized oppression?”, 249
435 Daucé, “Civilized oppression?”, 244. Alekseeva’s response, in full:
It is natural that the human rights movement should cooperate with the authorities,
as long as they favour the defence of human rights or, at least, do not infringe
them. And it is natural that the movement should criticize the authorities when
they do infringe human rights. It was from that position...that we decided not to
refuse negotiations. We considered that we should take part in the dicussions and
make our point of view known to the authorities.
436 Stuvøy, “The Foreign Within”, 1119
437 Tysiachniouk et al., “Civil society under the law ‘on foreign agents’”, 615
On a second, more fundamental level, criticisms of the real and deleterious impacts of the Foreign Agent Law tend to occlude the failures of democracy promotion programs that predate the creation of new repressive laws. This prevents program designers from discerning the unresolved incompatibilities between democracy promotion and NGO survival in the early period of ‘progress’ and ‘democratization’ in the early 2000s. Henderson, for instance, highlights that prior NGO programs had not been truly effective at enshrining new habits of civic participation and openness across civil society.\textsuperscript{438} For her, the Western-funded Russian NGOs in the 1990s are best understood not as democracy promoters but survivalists whose programs were geared towards securing continued funding and support, not long-term democratic transformation.\textsuperscript{439} Because international NGOs were a major source of funding in the absence of dedicated state support for the nonprofit sector, Russian civic groups tended to organize around the advocacy themes and interests of international democracy promoters, which sidelined more relevant local concerns.\textsuperscript{440} The problem of the missing domestic constituency, in which “U.S. funding priorities […] may have little or nothing to do with the natural breakdown of civic groups in Russia”, meant that U.S. funding efforts \textit{distanced} local NGOs from the communities that they had hoped to serve, lending credence to citizens’ dismissal or distrust of NGOs as being irrelevant to their lives.\textsuperscript{441} In this light, democracy itself appeared to be an exogenously imposed goal that ignored actual Russian interests.

Importantly, the tension between NGO survival and democracy promotion is not unique to Russian NGOs, but applies equally to international NGOs and their home governments as well. The imperatives of justifying state spending and democracy promotion abroad created constraints on funding organizations and favored the replication of less effective but quantifiable projects. As literature on the international democracy establishment shows, international democracy-promoting NGOs serve not only Russian but also domestic interests.\textsuperscript{442} In order to justify their use of taxpayer money, agencies like USAID tended to favor projects with immediate and clearly measurable outcomes\textsuperscript{443} that would bolster their own claims for continued state funding.\textsuperscript{444} Democracy promotion initiatives, then, privileged output over outcome,\textsuperscript{445} and tended to reproduce a narrow range of cut-and-dry tactics such as newsletters, training sessions, and conferences. At the same time, the increasing professionalization of democracy establishment meant that aid workers were often careerists who move between organizations and projects, favoring short- and medium-term projects over more transformative long-term endeavors.\textsuperscript{446} It is therefore overly simplistic to frame the Foreign Agent Law as the only or even the main challenge facing democracy promotion, which was halting and variable even under a freer, more relaxed administration.

\textsuperscript{438} Henderson, Sarah L. "Selling civil society: Western aid and the nongovernmental organization sector in Russia." \textit{Comparative political studies} 35, no. 2 (2002), 142-143
\textsuperscript{439} Henderson, “Selling Civil Society”, 154
\textsuperscript{440} Henderson, “Selling Civil Society”, 155
\textsuperscript{441} Henderson, “Selling Civil Society”, 160
\textsuperscript{442} Bush, Sarah Sunn. 2015. \textit{The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1, 3-21
\textsuperscript{443} Marsden, Lee. \textit{Lessons from Russia: Clinton and US democracy promotion}. Routledge, 2018, 191
\textsuperscript{444} Marsden, \textit{Lessons from Russia}, 192
\textsuperscript{445} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{446} Henderson, “Selling Civil Society”, 153
The picture that emerges is one of \textit{continuity}, at least in the ways that Russian NGOs have adapted to the interests of external bodies such as US-funded aid organizations and the autocratic Russian state. Contradicting binary before/after and for/against views of civil society, NGOs do not simply channel the interests of the state or of transnational activist movements. Throughout the last three decades of post-Soviet civil society development, they have deliberately chosen mixed strategies to avoid crackdowns, secure resources, and implement projects. Often blending goals of self-preservation, advocacy, and compliance, NGO strategies are neither linear nor easily classifiable as pro- or anti-democracy. Indeed, such unequivocal categories are ill-suited to capture the complexity of how nonprofits work, and their need to strike a delicate balance between autonomy and dependency. Commentators should recognize the necessity of developing such hybrid strategies in an increasingly authoritarian context. Rather than reproducing the Russian state’s attempt to distinguish between foreign and domestic or political and non-political organizations, it is critical to focus on ways for NGOs to balance both transnational \textit{and} national, social \textit{and} political issues in order to serve their constituencies.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Current analyses of the 2012 Foreign Agent Law have understandably focused on the ways that it has disrupted and distorted civil society development, particularly in the arena of democracy promotion. This paper identifies and fills in the gaps in this approach by emphasizing the continuities in NGOs’ behavior throughout this process. First, I argue that commentators tend to flatten the variability in the character and behavior of Russian NGOs. By generalizing the experiences of human rights and democracy-oriented organizations, they overlook the ways in which ‘co-opted’ NGOs have employed various strategies to advance their own causes while avoiding legal penalties. Second, I argue that current analyses fail to acknowledge the autonomy of NGOs from the governments or aid organizations that seek to influence or control their activities. These views conflate the goals of local NGOs with those of their sponsors, and disregard the flaws that had impeded democracy-promoting programs long before the Foreign Agent Law was passed.

These insights are important not just as a matter of clarification, but as a way of understanding enduring principles behind NGO work, which relies on hybridity for survival. The Foreign Agent Law is without a doubt a destructive force that is dramatically reshaping Russia’s NGO sector. However, the problems the law ‘creates’ are in fact abiding difficulties with reconciling the tasks of democracy promotion and NGO survival. Contradicting the conventional wisdom that civic groups are natural complements to democracy, the flaws of democracy promotion in the 1990s demonstrate the importance of more imaginative program design and longer time horizons for NGO programs. By gaining a deeper understanding of how Russian NGOs operate, policymakers can tailor better strategies to support civil society in hybrid or autocratic regimes, for example by de-emphasizing strategies of political confrontation, and focusing instead on building solidarity between groups. This understanding can also help aid agencies to look beyond the most obviously ‘pro-Western’ groups in order to support not just more NGOs, but ultimately the diverse and underserved segments of the population that they represent.
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Government sources and news articles


Secondary literature


SECTION 5
Religion
The stories of the Jewish people across world history are ones of faith, culture, and strength but also tragic narratives of loss, anti-Semitism, and displacement. The experiences of Jews in the Balkans are no exception. Specifically in the early to mid-20th century, the Jewish population in the Balkans experienced a myriad of changes as borders shifted, new regimes gained power, and the World Wars impacted the political landscape of the European continent. Ultimately, the treatment of Jews in the Balkan states, while varying, would impact the Zionist movement and other calls for Jewish nationalism and immigration. Despite, or perhaps in spite of, harsh treatment of Jewish communities throughout the region, Jews in the Balkans continued to evolve as a cultural community and uphold their values. Although the end of the Second World War and the creation of the state of Israel led to the Balkan Jewish population significantly decreasing in the second half of the century, it is still integral to acknowledge how Jews in the Balkans impacted Jewish history and the modern-day dispersal of the international Jewish community.

When discussing the treatment of Jews living in the Balkan states during the early 20th century, one must acknowledge the prior history of Jews in the region, which would continue to impact their circumstances throughout the century. While generalizations can be made regarding the treatment of Jews, it must be noted that policies did vary by country; nevertheless, in a climate with changing borders and continued regional migration, beliefs of one state or political group did have the ability to impact another. Historically, Jews were accepted in the Ottoman Empire, and “as Peoples of the Book…they could practice their own religion, maintain their own houses of worship, and manage certain affairs independently, as long as they accepted the primacy of Islam.”447 With Jews having faced discrimination quite frequently, the acceptance of the Ottoman Empire appealed to Jews seeing as they could worship openly there. However, it is important to acknowledge that while practicing Judaism was allowed in the Ottoman Empire, it still was not fully embraced due to the overarching influence of Islam. Living in the Ottoman Empire may have been one of the best circumstances for Jews during its peak, but that does not mean it was the absolute ideal situation. Nevertheless, the freedoms that policies of the Ottoman Empire granted to Jews, such as the millet system, which allowed Judaism to be practiced, were appealing to Spanish Sephardic Jews after 1492, who immigrated and joined the Ashkenazi Jews, some of whom immigrated to the region in the Middle Ages.448 Historically, the Ottoman Empire was regarded as a space safe for Jewish intellectuals. In the 15th century, it is noted that Jews “were free to practice and patronize their religion in a way that would have been impossible anywhere else in Europe at the time.”449 Ultimately, these primarily positive sentiments led many Jews to settle in the Balkans as they faced discrimination in other regions.

As the Ottoman Empire declined and more of its previous territories became independent, the treatment of Jews in the Balkans began to vary more widely. One place that continued to be

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448 Ibid., 91.
known for its large Jewish population was Salonica in Greece. Salonica is an important case study when looking at how external factors impacted Jewish immigration, and it is particularly fascinating due to its extreme population shifts between the beginning and middle of the 20th century. One reason for the initial popularity of Salonica amongst Jews was that social mobility was possible, allowing some Jews to become members of the upper or middle classes. A society that demonstrates social mobility, even if it is not promised to everyone in the population, is more likely to draw a crowd because it gives people hope for equality and a better future. Additionally, by providing this hope, Salonica paved the way for the introduction of new ideas and discussions. It has been noted that, “At the beginning of the twentieth century, Salonica as a Jewish city had already captured the imagination of Zionist political figures such as David Ben-Gurion and Ze’ev Jabotinsky.” The attention of Zionist thinkers, who called for a national Jewish state in the Holy Land, contributed largely to the eventual immigration of Jews out of Salonica. As thinkers discussed these ideas in a large Jewish society comprised of individuals who had experienced the benefits of social mobility, support for the cause grew, particularly amongst those who felt a strong religious pull towards Israel. Despite this line of thinking’s eventual contribution to the decline of Jews in Salonica, it is necessary to recognize its role as a Jewish community in the Balkans due to its uniqueness and impact on Jewish identity during the latter half of the century.

In conjunction with the spread of Zionist ideas in Salonica, other more physical factors contributed to Jewish immigration out of the city. For instance, after the turn of the century and prior to the end of the Second World War, “the city [had] weathered many a storm, during the Balkan Wars and in the first World War.” During the wars and the inter-war period, Europe was experiencing great upheaval. Residents of Salonica also faced the effects of the Great Fire of 1917, large-scale population movements, and the Greek government’s Hellenizing policies. As a whole, the Jewish community in Salonica faced numerous physical challenges, both man-made by international and domestic political officials and external factors from their environment. With all of these elements building upon each other and elevating the already high-tensioned atmosphere in Europe, it is no surprise that people wished to leave the region. Considering all of these factors, it would have been logical for Jews in Salonica who had been exposed to Zionist ideas to express more interest in implementing and following the goals of the movement. In the end, however, it was not Zionism that led to the official end of Salonica as the Balkans’ Jewish city. Instead, “Salonica was soon to be a ground zero in the Nazi war on Europe’s Jews. The Holocaust brutally destroyed the lives of tens of thousands of Salonican Jews. It also marked the final destruction of Salonica as a Jewish city…” As hate and anti-Semitism spread throughout Europe during World War II, even Salonica, which was once a city of culture and opportunity for Balkan Jews, could not escape the terrible policies of Nazi Germany.

While Salonica did exist, it was not the norm to have strong and widely accepted Jewish communities in the Balkan states during the first half of the 20th century. In fact, even the degree of acceptance of Jews varied strongly based on the policies of their home countries. Romania had

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451 Ibid., 444, online.
454 Ibid., 454, online.
extremely strong anti-Semitic rhetoric in its policies, in spite of having the highest Jewish popu-
lation in the Balkans prior to the First World War. Its 1866 constitution, while revised directly
before the turn of the century to allow citizenship for Jews, only granted citizenship to immi-
grants who practiced Christianity.455 This type of policy is important to note because while it did
eventually change to allow Jews to gain citizenship, its implementation in the first place greatly
impacted their mindsets regarding the Romanian government and whether or not they would
even want to identify as the Romanian nationality. The policy of isolating Jews from claiming
nationality in the country that they called home alienated them and further emphasized their
identification with their Jewish identity rather than their national identity. By being othered from
the Christian population and ostracized by the Romanian government, Jews in Romania sought
stronger relations within their own community. In comparison, Hungary, while on the fringe of
the Balkan states, saw its Jewish community attempt to assimilate into greater society; however,
this did not halt the stereotypes regarding the professions of Jews as doctors and businessmen.456
This shows that, while the nature of the ostracization varied, the intent of alienating Jews was
prevalent throughout the region. It also was not the first time that Jews attempted to assimilate in
an effort to improve their livelihoods. In fact, “[i]n the 19th and early 20th centuries, it was not
uncommon in Europe for assimilated Jews desirous of social advancement to embrace Christian-
ity.”457 The situation in Hungary showed how deep the discrimination was that even Jews who
tried to change themselves to further blend into society still were not fully welcomed, despite
sacrificing parts of their identities. Additionally, the stereotypes placed on Jews further contrib-
uted to othering and laid the groundwork for further anti-Semitic sentiments in the region.

Despite the harmful policies in some states, others proved more accepting of Judaism. Al-
bania is one example of tolerance. The acceptance of private schools in Albania led various eth-
nic and religious groups to open schools, including Jews, leading to the belief that “[o]ther na-
tionalities likewise saw education as the engine of freedom and progress.”458 Similar to the con-
cept of social mobility, education has the power to inspire groups that have previously felt unac-
cepted by society. The presence of Jewish schools, in particular, allowed Jews in Albania to fur-
ther their sense of community and continue to foster their religion in younger generations. This
was especially important in the Balkans at this time because discrimination in other countries led
Jews to fear teaching their religion to younger generations. Additionally, the acceptance shown
towards Jewish education had the ability to draw other Jewish scholars to Albania, as educators
and to bring ideas.

One idea was brought by Leo Elton in 1935; Elton was a British Zionist, who believed
that a Jewish state in the Balkans could potentially be established in Albania.459 While some may
hear this and immediately question why a Zionist would choose Albania as a potential homeland
for the Jewish people, it may be more beneficial to look at the Jewish population rather than the
regional history. During the early 20th century, there were “more Balkan Jews (some two mil-
lion) than either Slovenes and Albanians,” who had states while the Jews did not. This fact can

455 Steven W. Sowards, “Twenty-Five Lectures on Modern Balkan History: Lecture 17: Nation without a state: The
Balkan Jews,” (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1997), online.
456 Ibid. online.
459 Nir Hassan, “What if Albania Had Become a Jewish State?” (Tel Aviv: Haaretz, 2009), online.
be contributed to the Jews being late, historically speaking, in their arrival to the region.\footnote{Steven W. Sowards, “Twenty-Five Lectures on Modern Balkan History: Lecture 17: Nation without a state: The Balkan Jews” (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1997), online.} When looking at population statistics in addition to the comfort that Jews experienced in Albania compared to other states in the region, it makes sense why someone pushing for a Jewish state may have seen Albania as a viable option even though it was not a historic Holy Land for the Jewish religion. Evidently, Albania did not become a Jewish state; however, it is important to note that this idea was presented because it indicates that nationalism was growing amongst Balkan Jews even prior to the events of the Second World War and that there were supporters of the Zionist movement throughout Europe.

Prior to World War II, there were other calls for a Jewish state from numerous groups. The Zionist Organization was founded in 1897 in Switzerland, and in the years following, multiple other organizations and funds centering around Zionist ideals were created, such as the Jewish National Fund, the Palestine Office, and the Women’s International Zionist Organization as well as a newspaper titled Die Welt.\footnote{Bojan Mitrović, “Believe me, we know only one reality…” European Review of History: Revenue européenne d’histoire, vol. 26 (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), online.} Despite not being founded in the Balkans, the ideas behind the Zionist Organization were not confined to Switzerland. Instead, the formation of numerous other Zionist groups in the years directly following its creation illustrates that the ideals had already dispersed, and the formation of the initial groups encouraged other Jews to follow suit. One of the notable Zionist groups in the Balkans was the Federation of Jewish Youth Associations of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was founded in 1919 and focused on promoting Jewish ideas and educating Jewish youth throughout Yugoslavia and beyond.\footnote{Ibid., online.} This group is notable in the sense that it was comprised of Jewish youth who educated other Jewish youth on Zionist principles, thus ensuring that younger generations would continue to learn their culture and strive to accomplish the principles of the Zionist movement. These sentiments could combat fears that young Jews would decrease their practice in favor of assimilating for greater acceptance.

Conversely, as support for Jewish nationalism continued to grow in the interwar period, anti-Semitic rhetoric spread as other nationalist political groups and advocates began to gain traction. Evidence can be seen in both Romania and Croatia in the 1930s. The Iron Guard was a fascist movement in Romania that took inspiration from Italy’s Mussolini and Germany’s Hitler with its founding by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, who had previously participated in the anti-Semitic student movement during the 1920s.\footnote{Marie-Janine Calic, The Great Cauldron: A History of Southeastern Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019): 411.} In his speech titled “A Few Remarks on Democracy,” Codreanu stated that one of the reasons that democracy would be detrimental to society was the fact that it would give citizenship to millions of Jews, which led him to say, “[w]e Romanians are fully responsible for Greater Rumania. They have nothing to do with it… What are the reasons for the Jews’ demanding of equal treatment, equal political rights with the Romanians?”\footnote{Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, “A Few Remarks on Democracy” (Bucharest: 1937): 1, online.} While pushing the fascist ideology, Codreanu purposefully alienated Jews and wove anti-Semitism into the fascist movement, intertwining the two so that this hate speech became a core component of Romanian nationalism. Another important aspect to note about his speech is the simplistic language he utilized. By making his language accessible to those with little formal
education, the Iron Guard’s movement had increased potential to gain momentum and spread its anti-Semitic rhetoric. This also gave lower class groups who felt alienated by other politicians the ability to feel accepted into a movement and alienate another group in their place.

A similar rhetoric was found in the Croatian fascist movement, both in legitimate and unofficial ways. In terms of political parties, there was the “Croatian Party of Rights, which called for an independent, ethnically homogeneous Croatian nation-state…”465 By adopting the ethnically homogenous mindset, this party inherently discriminated against minority groups in Croatia, including Jews, and justified it with calls for Croatian pride. Hateful ideologies are in and of themselves concerning and potentially deadly, and the idea that politicians could actually implement laws that acted on them likely incited fear in the targeted groups. Croatia was also home to Ustasha, an underground student organization founded by Ante Pavelić, “which was militantly anti-Yugoslav, anti-Serb, antiliberal, and anticommunist” and utilized terrorism to further its ideals.466 Pavelić also publicly made anti-Semitic comments. When listing the groups that he saw to be enemies of the Croat Liberation Movement that he was advocating for, he said, “Today, practically all finance and nearly all commerce in Croatia is in Jewish hands…The entire press is also in Jewish-Masonic hands…The press serves primarily to combat the Croat independence movement directly or indirectly, and also to misrepresent abroad the popular feelings in Croatia…”467 Parallels can be drawn between Pavelić’s beliefs and Codreanu’s speech in the sense that they imply that to support their movement, people must see Jews as the enemy. Pavelić continues his anti-Semitic tactics by adding stereotypes about Jews and their professions that are purposefully meant to anger Croatians in support of the independence movement.

The culmination of anti-Semitic sentiments would eventually be seen, both in the Balkans and across Europe, during World War II and the Holocaust spearheaded by Nazi Germany. The systemic genocide resulted in the deaths of an estimated 6 million Jews and occurred during the height of anti-Semitism in Europe.468 The actions carried out by Nazi Germany and other states that implemented Hitler’s policies against Jews displayed the deadly nature of anti-Semitic rhetoric and how hateful policies unnaturally changed the entire cultural and ethnic makeup of the Balkans and the European continent as a whole. Originally, the scope of the Holocaust was not known, even while ongoing. One journalist wrote in 1941, “[i]t is good to know that Salonika was evacuated in time before the Nazi hordes invaded the city.”469 As previously mentioned, this fact would not hold true. Other Jewish populations throughout the Balkans also faced oppression as a result of the anti-Semitic policies and actions of Nazi Germany. The Nazi regime deported Jews and placed them into camps, stating that they were addressing “the Jewish question,” in various countries, including Croatia, Serbia, Greece, and Romania, by implementing these methods and utilizing other murder tactics.470 The erasure of the Jewish population became a goal of Nazi Germany. Anti-Semitism fueled the build-up of this goal by dehumanizing Jews in these countries. As shown by statements leading up to the height of the Nazi regime, such as Pavelić’s, Jews were already being dehumanized and seen as enemies, particularly of professionals and

466 Ibid., 412.
468 “The Holocaust” (New Orleans: The National World War II Museum), online.
469 C.Z. Kloetzel, “Salonika and Palestine” (Jerusalem: The Palestine Post), online.
working-class people, through the usage of stereotypes. It is even noted that Hitler’s support strongly aided the Iron Guard and Ustasha in gaining the momentum that they did. With the backing of Nazi Germany, these groups and other anti-Semitic people and parties in power were able to significantly harm the Jewish communities in the Balkans.

Similar to how treatment of Jews varied by states in the years prior to World War II, the impact of Nazi policies on Jewish communities also depended on location. With this being said, it is necessary to acknowledge there was no ideal situation for Jews in the Balkans at this time. Even if they were not in a community that was directly causing harm, the political and cultural landscape in Europe during the Second World War was largely unwelcoming towards Jews, and the fear of anti-Semitism was widespread. Salonica proved that communities that were initially believed to be safe from the Nazis truly could not predict their own futures. Jews in Croatia and Albania are recorded to have faced less persecution compared to the other Balkan states. However, this does not mean that the Jews residing in these states were not still victims of rampant anti-Semitism. Despite the fact that many Jews in Bulgaria eventually left the country by 1948, a large number survived the war due to some resistance by the government towards Nazi Germany; however, deportation still occurred in some areas under the Bulgarian government’s control. While these three countries ultimately had higher Jewish survival rates during World War II than other states in the Balkans, they display that even the so-called better circumstances were still laced with Nazi influence and fear as the result of long fostered anti-Semitism was felt in Jewish communities throughout the region.

During and following the Second World War, the Balkan Jews became widely dispersed and immigrated to various regions in an effort to escape persecution. Jews who survived the Holocaust could have experienced “psychological after-effects of the Holocaust which were of demographic significance, e.g., instances decreased will for Jewish continuity. (Instances of the opposite phenomenon are also to be noted.)” It is no surprise that European Jews were struggling with their identity in this period. They experienced fear and faced discrimination for their faith firsthand. Psychologically, it makes sense that there would be two perspectives on the opposite end of the spectrum, fear of openly practicing their faith or further embracing it since it could not be taken from them. Both are valid reactions to their experiences. For many Jews, the effects of the Holocaust led them to question how they should continue practicing and where they should go, seeing as many were already forcibly displaced from their homes and had lost positive perceptions of the countries that were willing to turn against them. Following World War II, many Jews moved to regions, such as the Americas, Australia, and Israel, that only roughly three percent of Jews had inhabited 100 years prior; on the other hand, regions such as the Balkans and Eastern Europe saw their Jewish populations significantly decrease. Israel was historically significant to the Jews, and immigrating to the Holy Land was the result of years of efforts by Zionists in the Balkans and other movements throughout Europe. Other locations that saw great waves of Jewish immigrants offered opportunities where there was not the deep-rooted history of anti-Semitism that many experienced in the Balkans.

471 Ibid., 412.
472 Ibid., 460.
475 Ibid., 61-62.
In discussing Jewish immigration following World War II, one must acknowledge the increased presence of Jews in Israel due to its significance in Judaism as well as its modern-day importance in international politics. In the years between the 1948 establishment of Israeli statehood and 1981, the population of Jews in Israel increased from about 650,000 to over 3 million. These numbers display the positive reception of a Jewish state by the international Jewish community and underscores the success of the Zionist movement, which members had been working towards throughout the first half of the century. However, while some Jews did immigrate to Israel as staunch supporters of the Zionist movement, it must be considered that others moved there out of necessity for acceptance. Some Jews chose to stay in the Balkans following World War II and continued to face discrimination. For example, Jews in Romania experienced continued anti-Semitic propaganda under the communist regime and eventually began immigrating to Israel after 1968. This is not to say that the Jews who waited to immigrate to Israel did not initially support Israeli statehood; rather, they still maintained a desire to stay in the place they called home, in this instance Romania, until they truly felt like they could not.

In summary, the relationship between the Jewish community and the Balkan states is complex, and it is difficult to generalize, seeing as all of the states varied slightly in their treatment of Jews. While Jews historically lived in the region, they never held a state, which contributed to the differences in treatment over time and continued question of Jewishness as a national identity, religious identity, or both. Throughout the first half of the 20th century, many Balkan Jews faced large levels of anti-Semitism and extreme persecution that continues to live in the memories of many Jews today. Nevertheless, the Jewish communities worked to find new ways to survive. This can be seen in immigration patterns, social movements, and efforts to educate younger generations on Jewish culture. Movements and thinkers from the Balkans ultimately contributed largely to the Zionist movement, which led to the establishment of the state of Israel. In the end, stories from the Balkans are significant moments in Jewish history. While the Balkans may not be home to a large percentage of Jews today, there is no denying the importance it holds.

476 Ibid., 103.
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Chechnya, at least as the United States knows it, was the home of the Boston Bombers. That is the line at which our social understanding of what Chechnya is begins to fade. In reality, Chechnya is a small piece of the larger Russian puzzle. It is a rural, mountainous Sufi republic with a long and complex history of conflict with the Russian state (and previously the USSR). The conflict between the two is rooted in cultural history and religious extremism, and the conflict during the Second Chechen War (SCW) constitutes a neglected and often unrecognized crisis of human rights. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, an extremist and purist variety of Islam called Wahhabism rushed into Chechnya. This branch of Islam goes so far as to promise rewards in the afterlife for proper pursuit of jihad—and the activities of this small group of religious extremists are the cause of much of the turmoil in Chechnya today. In this essay, I seek to answer the following questions: How do Chechen separatists use Wahhabism to pursue their goals? How is Russia combating Chechen Wahhabis, and are they doing it well? In this essay, I argue three related but admittedly separate points. Firstly, Chechen Wahhabism primarily serves the purpose of legitimizing Chechen violence, rather than promoting religious understanding. Secondly, Russian repressive tactics are important not because of their effectiveness, but their illegitimacy and blatant illegality. Lastly, Russian counterterrorism tactics during the SCW were both ineffective, unacceptable, and constitute a violation of human rights.

A Brief and Confusing History of Chechnya and Wahhabism

Connections to modern wars in Chechnya are drawn as far back as Imam Shamil. His rallying of the Chechen people to fight off Russian Imperialism as far back as 1853 is often cited as the beginning of the history of the Chechen jihad—and his very existence has served as a rallying cry for Chechen separatists. However, the emulation and idolization of Imam Shamil by modern Chechen Wahhabis is simply a consequence of literary romanticization. Importantly, Imam Shamil was not entirely the grand Chechen warrior he has been exemplified as—he was a compromiser, and regardless of the success of his jihad or lack thereof—the strict modern Wahhabi interpretation of the Quran as it exists among fighters in Chechnya certainly does not permit compromising with non-adherents. Imam Shamil accepted favorable terms from the Russian government instead of continuing his jihad—which historically would have denoted him as an apostate. The continued idolization and emulation of Imam Shamil by modern Chechen fighters is both a shirking of the Islamic doctrine of tawhid (God’s oneness) and an explicit disregard for the doctrines of takfir (excommunication or even murder of non-purists). In reality, I argue that Chechen Wahhabism (as opposed to the more peaceful and traditionalist Saudi Salafism) uses the Wahhabi purist ideology when it is convenient rather than when it is doctrinally appropriate.

479 Ibid.
480 Ibid., 14.
There is much overlap between Chechen tradition and Islamic tradition—and this is another potential reason for the proliferation of both Wahhabism and Sufism. Some scholars even believe this “style…was probably the only tool legitimizing the building of Chechen statehood at the time [of the Caucasian wars].”

Admittedly, though, newly converted Chechen Wahhabis were not practically prepared to accept all of the tenets of this complex form of Islam. Even in the early days of the Chechen conflict with Russia, one of Chechnya’s leaders expressed: “Russia…has forced us to choose the path of Islam, even though we were not duly prepared to adopt Islamic values.”

The history of Chechen Islam is both convoluted and unique, but this complication is a result of Chechnya’s more modern history. Frankly, there is a long history of modern Russian repression in Chechnya. It is an admittedly intricate topic, but it is worth skimming a rough timeline of the repression of Chechens. First, “the Chechen peasants resisted the state expropriation of their livelihood during the collectivization of 1929-1932… which resulted in a bloody cycle of rebellion and state repression.”

Additionally, as with many other peoples in the USSR, many Chechens were sent to work camps by Stalin. In short, Chechens do have a demonstrated history of state sponsored repression—and it is not hard to see why a small number of Chechens turned to Wahhabi-jihadi ideals in spite of Chechnya’s originally Sufi background.

Prior to even the First Chechen War—Sufism in Chechnya was not mosque centered. After Chechens were returned from deportation from about 1954 onward, Chechens were still disallowed from constructing mosques. The importance of this is that Islam developed elsewhere in the world as a community centered religion, whereas Islam in Chechnya was practiced in secret. It can be said that “…a completely unique Islam emerged in Chechnya by the end of the Soviet Era”, in which “all individuals were their own bosses, even in matters of faith.” This set the stage for the development of Wahhabism—although this transformation was, as I contend, not entirely a religious referendum for the purposes of Islamic ideological development.

Instead, I argue that the Chechen transition into Wahhabism by a relatively small number of individuals was a method of seeking religious exemption for acts of violent retribution. Chechen combatants seek to legitimize their actions “in a divine, and therefore absolute code.” The Islamization of this conflict served the purpose of escalation rather than defining a Chechen narrative. The public narrative of Chechen guerrillas during the SCW was fragmented at best, and the constant confusion between seeking swift & peaceful resolution and eternally engaging in jihad against the evil Russian state certainly did not work to further the Chechen cause. In private, however, Chechen leaders appealed to Wahhabis through religious rhetoric not unlike that

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482 Ibid.
483 Politkovskaya & Derlugian, A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya, 15.
485 Politkovskaya & Derlugian, A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya, 139.
during the Soviet-Afghan War. Private rhetoric was aggressive and demanded blood for transgressions, with a heavy emphasis on the necessity of engaging in jihad against the kafiris (unbelievers of the true, Wahhabi, interpretation of Islam). In public, Chechen guerilla leaders expressed a desire to be taken seriously as a power by the outside world, but their private extremist narrative serves the function of radicalizing members and further confuses their goals. Although I do not necessarily agree with the use of the term “banditry”, Igor Ivanov sums up my point rather well in saying that Chechen guerillas are “trying to use Islam to camouflage open banditry.”

“Banditry”

So, what exactly does “banditry” (or more aptly, terrorism) perpetrated by Chechens look like? The SCW began after Chechen separatists (aided by the mujahideen and several other radicalized groups) invaded Dagestan and killed nearly 300 civilians. Over the years, Chechen separatists have killed many, many more civilians in a number of terrorist attacks in pursuit of Chechen independence (or more recently, for the purpose of declaring an Islamic emirate). From the beginning of the SCW to 2010, Chechen militants were allegedly responsible for the deaths of upwards of 900 people (excluding the initial Dagestan bombing), many of whom were children; and sadly this is only taken from a brief catalogue of what the Council on Foreign Relations deemed to be “major attacks.”

Terrorism is an infuriating problem, and the actions of Chechen guerillas since the beginning of the SCW have been unspeakable. The Russian government has said as much since Putin took power in 2000. In fact, Putin and his government routinely draw connections between Chechen Islam and al-Qaeda. The issue with these comparisons, however, is that they are taken to the extreme. The Kremlin does not distinguish Chechen Sufis from Wahhabis, nor combatants from civilians.

So, what exactly does the Russian offensive look like—and why does it matter? Well, recently, Russia has been trending toward discriminate violence rather than indiscriminate violence—as well as toward less violence overall—which is certainly a step in the right direction. One author even goes so far as to say “…security agencies incorporated more selective uses of violence into their tactics, thereby reducing the number of indiscriminate violent actions to an insignificant level.” This, however, only accounts for the period after 2007 and the declaration of the Caucasian Emirate, when data on Chechnya became more commonplace. Additionally, this data does not catalogue illegal action by the Russian government (local or federal). There-

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488 Ibid., 11-12.
489 Ibid., 15.
495 Ibid., 1.
fore, hearsay in the form of personal narrative is an integral part of the story prior to this time period, just as it was during the Soviet-Afghan War. As in this conflict, some scholars argue that there was a genocide perpetrated by the Soviets in Afghanistan, and others still are unsure because of a categorical lack of direct evidence. As a result of this lack of evidence, nobody knows exactly what happened on the ground in Chechnya other than the soldiers and the people who lived there, which is where my most important source for this essay comes in.

Anna Politkovskaya’s book *A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya* demonstrates both illegal and legal Russian repression all too well, at least in the early days of the SCW (1999-2003). It was a gruesome and deeply upsetting read—and although I think her reasons for presenting the tragedies she discusses are a bit short-sighted and sometimes blatantly wrong—her writings are a valuable piece of this history that she likely died for, and it is not difficult to understand why. She paints a picture of what could be described as a genocide in Chechnya—through both direct action and criminal neglect. Her book is filled with the on-the-ground realities behind the food shortages, kidnappings and ransoming, rape, and sometimes unknowable disappearance of non-combatants. She even discusses her own torture and detention—and none of these things were catalogued by the state. Almost none of the stories Politkovskaya discusses resulted in arrests or reparations of any sort. Much of this book was simply cataloguing blatant evil.

Soldiers were intended to be placed on the ground strategically throughout Chechnya to combat the Wahhabis—but oftentimes children were tortured instead. Lawlessness is an essential and undeniable characteristic of the early period of the SCW, and the frequency and diversity of illegal and repressive action Politkovskaya demonstrated in her book was astounding. The Kremlin has no desire to catalogue or prosecute their own war crimes, either. The reality of the situation is that war crimes are expensive, and: “All too often, the feds exterminate those who open their mouths.”

The lower ranks of the Russian army are lawless, and the SCW presented capitalistic opportunities to higher ranks—and they took them. Often, money and other resources simply go missing, and informed assumptions need to be made about where these resources are going and who they are benefitting. Politkovskaya asserted that Chechen oil was a massive industry in the early 2000’s—and although reserves are dwindling today—this is not an insignificant reason for the proliferation of conflict early in the SCW.

**Was It Worth It?**

This is the official narrative as it stands. Chechnya posed a terrorism problem for the Russian state, and Russia did something about it. A lot of people have died because of the violent methods of repression Russia used—and soldiers used this war to their advantage—but was it

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498 Ibid., 96.
499 Ibid., 105.
500 Ibid., 172.
worth it for Russia? In the larger context of counterterrorism—is this scorched Earth strategy worth pursuing?

In short, no. Politically, repression in Chechnya serves Putin well—but this same success could have been accomplished using far less violent methods. Logically, engaging in ground-based combat with a group that does not have defined geographic borders, i.e. any terrorist organization without its own state, is inefficient when compared to soft-power methods of counter-terrorism.\(^{502}\) In addition to being inefficient, ground offensives are incredibly costly in terms of manpower and money—but it is my opinion that the purpose of this ground offensive was spectacle rather than efficiency.\(^{503}\) The war crimes Politkovskaya catalogues are a result of soldiers with a lack of clear direction, far too much power, and oftentimes even malice toward ethnic Chechens.

Most importantly, repression in Chechnya (and its mirrored conflict in Afghanistan) continues to cost non-combatants their lives and their livelihoods. The SCW and the Soviet-Afghan War compromised any potential for normalcy in both places. This is why we should care. Many Chechens were denied the rights: to bury their family members (a very important ritual in Sufi culture), to return to their homes, and to simply exist free of the fear of destruction of their home. Any hope for the future of Chechen youth was destroyed along with the rest of the republic—and the potential of Chechen prosperity no longer exists because of the lack of interest in the international sphere and the degree of emigration. Even Chechnya’s leader admitted in early 2022: “...we won’t be able to last three months—not even a month’ without Russia’s financial backing.”\(^{504}\)

Lastly, connections are often drawn between Chechen guerillas and al-Qaeda, and the most important thing about these connections is that their existence (or lack thereof) is neither surprising nor important. This connection seems to be the primary narrative on Chechnya, especially post-Boston bombing.\(^{505}\) Chechen Wahhabism is imported from the globalization of jihad that occurred during the Soviet-Afghan War as far back as the 70s and 80s—and al-Qaeda are an evolution of the mujahideen, which further cemented the ideological development of Wahhabism during the previous war. It is disappointing that these connections are the sole focus of one of the only U.S. congressional hearings on Chechnya.\(^{506}\) The United States only seems to care when it is under direct threat—and the same goes for Russia. I can only hope for the rejuvenation of Chechen culture—and for significant infrastructure re-investments that may never come.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, Chechens experienced a plight that the Russian state allowed to happen twice. The consequences of the Soviet-Afghan War are not altogether different from that of the SCW. Wahhabist ideology originally propagated in Afghanistan under the mujahideen—and the


\(^{505}\) R. Locker, K. McCoy, & G. Zoroya, “Russia’s Chechnya has long terrorist connections.” usatoday, April 20, 2013.

conflicts stemming from both the Afghan and Chechen Wahhabi jihads produced the same disastrous consequences. Additionally, Chechen Wahhabi ideology gave mistreated Sufi Chechens an opportunity to legitimize desires for revenge, and a discrepancy between espoused ideology over the course of time demonstrates separatists opportunistic use of Wahhabism as a religion when coupled with the misrepresented legacy and relative idolization of Imam Shamil.

Also, Russian counterterrorism efforts, while properly intentioned and based on legitimate grievances, are not a legitimate reason for the pursuit of several of the deplorable activities demonstrated in Anna Politkovskaya’s book. Counterterrorism, as with many things in a colloquial political sense—is a slippery slope. Seeking to defeat terrorists is certainly a legitimate goal, but the actions of Russian military personnel give credence to many of the points often made by separatists about Russian illegitimate uses of violence. This illegitimate use of violence constituted itself in the continuation of war for many years—because terrorist actions are often proliferated by actions that combatants deem disproportionate or illegitimate.

Moreover, Russian counterterrorism tactics do not make sense in the larger context of counterterrorism studies. Fighting a ground war against a decentralized enemy with no defined borders is expensive in terms of manpower and monetarily inefficient—and it costs the lives and mental wellbeing of hundreds of thousands of people. Russia does know how to use soft power methods.⁵⁰⁷ The country learned to use them later on in the war when it discovered the efficiency of these tactics—but the indiscriminate killing of non-combatants and destruction of infrastructure continues to cost Russia money to this day. Industry and the value of infrastructure is undeniable—and the destruction of these facets of Chechen life represents a major policy failure of the Russian government. Russia allowed its soldiers to undertake a military operation without consistently stated goals, and as a result the every-day Chechen people have and will continue to pay the price.

As for broader implications, Russia has a demonstrated history of engaging in political rather than logical wars—which is truly exemplified in the case of Chechnya. Even when submitting this paper, when Russia was building its military presence along the border with Ukraine, I wrote that Russia’s amplification of the potential for war with Ukraine was yet another attempt by a leader with waning popularity to demonstrate derzhavnost to his people. In essence, derzhavnost is “being a great power and being recognized as such by others.”⁵⁰⁸ I, as with others, underestimated Putin’s willingness to disrupt the international order to “restore a mystical vision of greater Russia.”⁵⁰⁹ In other words, I underestimated the lengths to which Russia was willing to go in pursuit of derzhavnost. Our logical knowledge of cost-benefit analysis and game theory failed us—because from those lenses—it’s hard to give a rational explanation for the war. If Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine have taught us anything—it’s that we simply cannot expect Russian foreign policy to be strictly logical. Russia will go to immense lengths in pursuit of derzhavnost, even in the face of insurmountable expenses paid for by the country’s people—and this is a frame from which we must not underestimate Russia’s resolve, as I did.

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⁵⁰⁷ Zhirukhina, “Protecting the state: Russian repressive tactics in the North Caucasus.”
Bibliography


SECTION 6
Literature
Edgar Allan Poe’s “William Wilson” and Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Double both demonstrate the mid-nineteenth century infatuation with literary doppelgängers that existed during the transition from romanticism to realism. Poe’s work is subject to constant psychological criticism while Dostoevsky’s has been subject to continuous criticism on form and quality of work, neglecting the work’s psychological implications that are only possible given its unique form. The distortion of space in Poe’s short story is mirrored by the distortion of time in Dostoevsky’s novella, both of which reveal a dream narrative that does not replace, but rather enhances the Freudian, Lacanian, and Jungian analysis that dominates the psychological criticism. Ultimately, the two stories are mirrors of each other, where the primary perspective is opposite in each. The flipped perspectives help to reveal the same overarching implications within the dream narrative.

Introduction

Poe’s “William Wilson,” is the story of an English boy of noble upbringing who encounters his double while in boarding school and subsequently competes with him to be perceived as superior. His double starts to thwart his various vices and malfeasances leading to his escape across Europe. With his efforts to sin being continually thwarted by his double, Wilson confronts and kills him.

Dostoevsky’s The Double describes the titular councilor Golyadkin in St. Peterburg whose double takes over his life and job, causing great sorrow for the original Golyadkin. After struggling with their coexistence, Golyadkin has a psychotic break at the end of the narrative and is taken away to a mental hospital by his doctor.

Freudian Interpretation

The boldest Freudian interpretation sees the story as being narrated by Wilson’s superego and telling the story of Wilson’s id. This interpretation seems counter intuitive given that the narrator describes his own debaucherries, suggesting the narrator is committing said “sins.” However, the narrator does not laud his own actions, but rather recognizes them as immoral. He describes his “crimes at Eton,” which developed his “rooted habit of vice” at Oxford. The descriptions of his actions create an implicit condemnation of them. Clearly, he recognizes the wrongness and immorality of his decrepit actions, giving loan to the idea that his superego is in narration. In this interpretation it would be uncharacteristic of the id to condemn its own actions, as the id does not weigh morality in action, rather acting solely on primitive motives.

A more classical Freudian analysis does not seek to reconcile this contradiction with the id’s motive and directly posits that the narrator is Wilson’s id and that his double is the restraining superego. The narrating Wilson personifies his vices, as he “seek[s] acquaintance with the

511 Edgar Allen Poe, “William Wilson,” American Studies at the University of Virgnia, online.
vilest arts of the gambler by profession, and, having become an adept in his despicable science”,
takes advantage of novice gamblers.512 His physically meeting his vices and seeking acquaint-
ance with them has direct juxtaposition with his running from his double, the personification of
his superego. If the narrator is presumed to be the superego, then the narrator recognizes that he
is running from himself. This contradiction is almost irreconcilable. If the id is narrating, then he
is running from the superego toward vice. And while the narrator does characterize his actions as
being immoral, he is indifferent to this fact and is almost proud. He is boastful in his indulgence,
stating, “that among spendthrifts I out-Heroded Herod… I added no brief appendix to the long
catalogue of vices than usual in the most dissolute university of Europe.”513 The superego cannot
be proud of vice, but should rather feel guilt. If the superego were the narrator, then he would be
projecting guilt onto the ego by stating that he leaves Oxford, “in a perfect agony and of
shame.”514 However, with the id as the narrator, this phrase becomes not an expression of guilt
but rather of masochism. “Perfect” seems to suggest this interpretation, as if his shameful action
were pleasurable because of its very nature. The id would gladly indulge in this masochistic ten-
dency. Freud reduced consciousness to being a function of libido, so masochism is perfectly via-
ble an id narrator.515 Inversely, some perceive the double as a sadistic superego, which is a seem-
ingly contradictory phrase.516 The absence of guilt in this shame, in combination with the self-
aggrandizing bragging about his vices and sins, points to the id as a narrator, just in a more com-
plex fashion.

Similar to the Freudian analysis of “William Wilson,” it is essential to understand the role
of the narrator in shaping the psychological interpretation of The Double. The narrator and the
two Golyadkins all “vie for superiority” in the novel, suggesting they each represent components
of the psyche.517 The narrator is thusly the ego, Golyadkin Sr. is the superego, and Golyadkin Jr.
is the id. It is important to understand the narrator is not explicitly third person. Rather, the lan-
guage of the narrator reflects that of Golyadkin Sr. If the events of the novel are seen as halluci-
nations, or in this case manifestations of the ego’s conflicts, then the absurd events are not only
experienced by Golyadkin Sr., but also seen by the narrator. For the narrator to be truly third per-
son it is not possible to also be indulged in the hallucination; he must be seeing the world from
the perspective of Golyadkin, and thus reflect a part of Golyadkin’s conscious. The narrator also
narrates the thoughts only of Golyadkin Sr., indicating that the ego is dominated by the superego
in this novel.518 Similarly, Mikhail Bakhtin suggests “We feel that we are moving essentially
within the circle of a single consciousness” in the novel.519 When the different parts of the psy-
che interact with each other they are bound to clash. With the narrator as the ego, it could be said
that the ego is in a constant clash with the superego and id, resulting in a cognitive dissonance so
strong it produces a full psychotic break at the end of the novella. The narrator speaks with the

512 Ibid.
513 Ibid.
515 D. J. Moores, “Oh Gigantic Paradox’: Poe’s ‘William Wilson’ and the Jungian Self,” The EdgarAllan Poe Re-
516 Yonjae Jung, “The Imaginary Double in Poe’s ‘William Wilson,’” Lit: Literature Interpretation Theory, vol 11,
517 Michelle Zvedeniuk, “(Sur)Realism in a Higher Sense’: Convulsive Beauty in Dostoevsky’s the Double,” The
518 Craig S. Cravens, “Čapek’s Hordubal and Dostoevsky’s The Double: Madness and Free-Indirect Discourse,”
519 Ibid., 64.
same accents and words as Golyadkin, as if he were another double. For instance, the narrator describes “some small or fairly significant act of nastiness that he witnessed, heard of, or recently carried out himself—carried out frequently even, not on any sordid basis, not even from some vile motive, but sometimes by chance, for example, out of delicacy, at other times because of his utter defenselessness and finally…in brief, Mr. Golyadkin knew very well why!” This passage displays many of the characteristics of Golyadkin’s speech: ellipses, parentheses, several repetitive clauses (reminiscent of Golyadkin’s lack of confidence), and transitions such as “for example” and “in brief.” Even without this similar language, the most clear, but easiest to overlook aspect of the narration that suggests the narrator is the ego sympathetic with the superego is the continuous use of the first person “I” and “our” in reference to Golyadkin. Saying, “our hero,” implies possession of Goldyakin Sr., not Golyadkin Jr.

Unlike Wilson, the narrator in The Double is sympathetic with the superego. In “William Wilson” the double is cast as an oppressive villain for restraining the malice of Wilson, whereas Golyadkin’s double is portrayed as maleficent for undermining the benevolence and calm of Golyadkin Sr.’s world. Despite this malice, Golyadkin still attempts to befriend his double, whereas Wilson hates his double simply for their similarities, despite the “many points of strong congeniality in our tempers.”

Further, Wilson also mentions shame in passing, whereas “shame” and “guilt” are feelings the narrator of The Double constantly recognizes in the original Golyadkin. If the narrator is the superego dominated ego of Golyadkin, then Golyadkin’s superego constantly casts shame onto the ego. This shame arises from the id, furthering the idea that Golyadkin Jr. reflects a part of the unconscious that he is ashamed of, and which slowly takes over his life, causing misfortune. In contrast the superego gradually takes over Wilson’s life, preventing vice.

**Lacanian Interpretation**

Under the Lacanian perspective the primary conflict in the story is between the self and the specular self, or the self that develops from perceiving your own image in a mirror. Under Lacan interpretation, Wilson’s double represents the “imaginary double of the self or specular image reflected in the mirror.”

Lacan’s theory revolves around three registers: the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. To summarize the main ideas of each, one must know humans are born egocentric, such that they recognize themselves as an internal idea. Once being able to recognize oneself in the mirror, they are also able to gain understanding of the other and the ego in an external context and this understanding leads to the development of the imaginary. During the mirror stage, there is a certain incompleteness that is formed as the human is incapable of fully understanding his full autonomy without having to contextualize it with the other; hence, the self is never fully autonomous and its struggle for autonomy will never cease in one’s life, creating a lasting dissonance in the

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520 Ibid., 63.
Before developing the imaginary, the self is naturally narcissistic, only being able to perceive itself and its own needs. The symbolic register essentially includes the ideas that are developed in society such as “customs, institutions, laws, mores, norms, practices, rituals, rules, traditions, and so on of cultures and societies.” Finally, the real is a deeper understanding that is impossible to ever grasp fully, as one tries to understand meaning in perceptions of the imaginary and symbolic.

Wilson’s personality is characteristic of the developing mirror stage as his narcissism is dominant and the other is incomprehensible. Narcissistic tendencies are seen throughout the story as Wilson cons and cheats others for his own benefit, without remorse. This narcissism is threatened by the seemingly dominant mirror image, in this case the double, as Wilson is threatened by his double who refuses “implicit belief in my assertions, and submission to my will.” This struggle comes to a head in the final struggle, in which the mirror is literally revealed. Wilson stabs his double and then sees his own bloodied self in the mirror and recognizes the double speaking in the same voice as his own and having a similar face, but he still fails to recognize that they are one in the same. He states, “I could have fancied that I myself was speaking,” indicating he sees his identity in the mirror as a possibility but doesn’t fully recognize it. Having a ruptured psyche and conflict between the self and specular self, Wilson is not able to fully develop the imaginary, and fails to see any deeper meaning in his surroundings, so is early in the struggle with understanding the real.

Lacanian analysis of The Double also reveals the idea of a split self that seen in “William Wilson.” Golyadkin Jr. is the constant reminder of Golyadkin Sr.’s struggle for autonomy. In the imaginary register, Golyadkin mistakes his double for himself, and has constant misidentification, indicating struggle in the mirror stage. The struggle for autonomy which can be seen when Wilson seeks to indulge in his own narcissism and casting out the other (indicating a psyche incapable of perceiving the real and truly moving closer to autonomy) is mirrored by Golyadkin’s struggle in the symbolic register to do the same. In The Double, the symbolic register is most significant as Golyadkin attempts to assert his position in the rank system, but is overwhelmed by his double. He fails to achieve autonomy in the symbolic register as he cannot fully accept the other, as seen with his failure to assimilate with his double. Golyadkin repeatedly expresses his disdain for the outside world as it has treated him cruelly, attempting to gain mastery over it, but fails to do so and is enslaved by it. On the contrary, Wilson accepts the outside world without understanding his place in the symbolic register, his ego is autonomous in regard to others as he does not recognize their selves.

**Jungian Interpretation**

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526 Ibid., 389.
527 Ibid., 388.
529 Jung (quoting Poe), “The Imaginary Double in Poe’s ‘William Wilson.’”
530 Poe, “William Wilson,” American Studies at the University of Virginia, online.
532 Ibid.
533 Ibid.
Critics have made comparison between the theory of Jung and the writings of Poe and their being “vitally concerned with obsessional drives emanating from the unconscious, [and both] tended to concretize shadowy subterranean processes in archetypally significant individual figures and modes of behavior.”534 D. J. Moores suggests there are two Jungian readings of “William Wilson,” the first in which the double is the whisper of Wilson, and the second involving a dream narrative which will be explored later.

The straightforward interpretation sees Wilson’s double as the whisperer and shadow of his consciousness. The shadow contains the unwanted, and discarded parts of the conscious that are repressed. However, the ego does not have full control of the Jungian self, rather it shares some power, in varying degrees, with the shadow.535 Being unwanted, and discarded, there is an internal schism within Wilson upon meeting his double.536 He recognizes the shadow as his equal, despite projecting himself as and being perceived by classmates as superior. A healthy conscious allows for its shadow to form a part of its self (in the same way a healthy ego recognizes the influence of the superego), but when one is neurotic like Wilson the conscious will attempt to assert superiority over the shadow and deny its influence.537 The Jungian reading suggests the superego is not repressed as Wilson is aware of the immorality of his actions. He recognizes that he has the persona as “the gay, the frank, the generous William Wilson --the noblest and most commoner at Oxford --him whose follies (said his parasites) were but the follies of youth and unbridled fancy --whose errors but inimitable whim --whose darkest vice but a careless and dashing extravagance?”538 Yet he knows his “vice” is truly malice, and recognizes them as examples of “avarice,” and “revenge,” and thus being conscious of his wrongs, his superego cannot be repressed.539 Moores suggests that the double is a daimon, “any element in the unconscious that can possess consciousness, taking control of and thwarting one's conscious will,” hence why Wilson often notes the similarities between the overall appearances of the two, but cannot see “the features of his face.”540 The muted voice of the double is a further feature of the perception of the original Wilson and not of reality. In trying to repress the shadow (as the shadow tries to dominate the conscious), he perceives his counterpart as having a softened voice, as this perception better fits Wilson’s internal narrative, that he, not his shadow, is in control and has power over his conscious. However, at the end of the story, after stabbing his double, and seeing his own bloodied self (as the double) in the mirror, “he spoke no longer in a whisper, and I could have fancied that I myself was speaking.”541 In trying to destroy his shadow, he destroys part of his self, as he failed to recognize the shadow’s influence over himself. Poe has been recognized for asserting that when a half of a split self is killed, the other half does as well (being part of the same individual), as in “The Fall of the House of Usher.”542 This explains the double’s dying words, “In me didst thou exist --and, in my death, see by this image, which is thine

536 Ibid.
537 Ibid.
538 Poe, “William Wilson,” American Studies at the University of Virginia, online.
540 Poe, “William Wilson,” American Studies at the University of Virginia, online.
541 Ibid.
own, how utterly thou hast murdered thyself.” 543 The narrator Wilson foreshadows this very interpretation at the beginning of the novel: “Death approaches; and the shadow which foreruns him has thrown a softening influence over my spirit.” 544

Jungian analysis of The Double emphasizes the relationship between the persona and Golyadkin. Stefan Bolea posits that Golyadkin Sr.’s shortcoming is his lack of persona. For Jung, the persona is the projection of self that man displays to society. Having a persona is important to interacting with society in a healthy way (and from the Lacanian perspective, interact appropriately in the symbolic register). Golyadkin states, “I put on a mask only for masked balls, and do not go around in it before people every day.” 545 However, Golyadkin does state that he “acts” (Dostoevsky 130). Initially this statement suggests that he does put on a mask, but he clarifies stating that he loves “peace and quiet and not the hurly-burly of society,” that expect “you to make clever puns… and pay such compliments. But I’ve never learned to do that kind of thing… I’ve never learned all those cunning tricks.” 546 So, his acting is simply carrying out “action” such as enjoying quiet, but he does not act for society, denying any persona and thus casting himself from social norms. Without this persona, Golyadkin cannot distinguish between ego and persona, as he recognizes that his persona is a lack of persona. 547 Nietzsche notes that without persona the shadow gains more control. 548 Since Golyadkin rejects all aspects of the persona, all the qualities that may be found in the persona are then pushed onto the shadow. The shadow, being personified by Golyadkin Jr., has redeeming qualities one would want to have in their persona, as well as malicious qualities one would expect to be found in the shadow. He is able to interact well with his superiors and fellow clerks, leading to promotion and high social standing. However, he also publicly embarrasses Golyadkin Sr., and has a manipulative tendency. Because the persona is pushed onto the shadow, the shadow is strengthened, allowing for the ego to be bullied by the shadow and become squandered in the larger field of consciousness. This squandering is seen as Golyadkin is further embarrassed and ridiculed by colleagues, bosses, and even his own servant who freely insults his master. The desirable traits being combined with malicious traits in the shadow highlights the ruptured psyche of Golyadkin.

Under Jungian analysis, Golyadkin’s interaction within the self is distinctly different from that of Wilson’s. Wilson is the master of this persona, displaying himself as previously mentioned as “the gay, the frank, the generous William Wilson --the noblest and most commoner at Oxford.” 549 Wilson is so adept at this mastery, he is sociopathic like Golyadkin Jr. Given this perspective, the role of the double is opposite in each narrative, with the primary character being sociopathic in “William Wilson,” and the secondary being sociopathic in The Double. However, if one supplements Jungian analysis by viewing each narrative as being dream narratives of the main characters, these differences are reconciled.

Establishing the Dream Narrative

543 Poe, “William Wilson,” American Studies at the University of Virginia, online.
544 Ibid.
545 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground and The Double, 132.
546 Ibid., 130-131.
549 Poe, “William Wilson,” American Studies at the University of Virginia, online.
Nancy Berkowitz Bate developed the idea that “William Wilson” is a dream narrative. This assertion is revealed through many literary clues related to imagery and space. It is important to note that nightmares are a common theme in Poe. Firstly, the environment of the school Wilson originally attends is described as “dream-like,” “in a misty-looking village” (Poe) and within the school it is impossible “to ascertain with precision, in what remote locality lay the little sleeping apartment assigned to myself and some eighteen or twenty other scholars” (Poe), reflecting the lack of distinct location in dreams, as well as the maze of the unconscious. Leonard Engel notes the prevalence of the idea of enclosure throughout the story. Scenes occur in rooms and halls of buildings, and to escape his double the reader only sees Wilson in various other rooms across continental Europe. The narrative ends only when Wilson recognizes his enclosure and closes the door to trap his double, forcing their confrontation. The closed setting suggests a limited viewing of events, as if experiencing a dream. Wilson himself, narrating, opens up this interpretation at the beginning of the story by asking, “Have I not indeed been living in a dream? And am I not now dying a victim to the horror and the mystery of the wildest of all sublunar visions?” The reader can then interpret the rest of the story as being a dream, asking the same question Wilson does.

There are also a multitude of literary clues in The Double that reflect the idea of a dream narrative. Renee Perlmutter notes how Golyadkin’s motion in space is dream like. Specifically, much of Golyadkin’s motion is purposeless, beyond his control, and almost animated as if in a dream in which one simply experiences events, rather than dictating them. For example, while being kicked out of the party for Klara Olsufyevna, “He stumbled and felt he was falling into an abyss; he wanted to cry out- and then suddenly he found himself in the courtyard… Mr. Golyadkin suddenly remembered everything.” In this passage, Golyadkin is not cognizant of moving himself; instead, he perceives being moved as one does while dreaming. This passive perception is coupled with the action occurring in scenes, “suddenly” finding “himself in the courtyard.”

This scenic perception is dream-like.

The distortion of time also helps to reveal this dreaming state. D. J. Moores points out that Golyadkin begins the novel waking “a little before eight o’clock in the morning,” and mentions, “however, for about two minutes he lay motionless on his bed like a man not yet entirely certain if he has woken up or was simply a continuation of his chaotic daydreaming.” That day is described as “murky,” similar to the description of mistiness in “William Wilson.” Next, Golyadkin briefly “closed his eyes as if feeling regret for his recent slumbers and wishing to recall them if only for one brief moment. But a minute later, he leapt out of bed in one bound, having in all probability finally hit upon the idea around which his scattered and thoroughly disorganized thoughts had so far been revolving.” Throughout the story, Golyadkin repeatedly instructs his servant to make sure he wakes up at eight. This suggests the two minute interlude described at the beginning, and the momentary closing of the eyes could imply, and allows for the possibility that the entire story is dreamt up, especially considering the “daydreaming” is “chaotic” like the events of the novel and waking he confronts “disorganized thoughts” which would

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552 Poe, “William Wilson,” American Studies at the University of Virginia, online.
553 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground and The Double, 159.
554 Ibid., 121.
555 Ibid.
occur after dreaming of such chaos. Further evidence occurs when Golyadkin wakes up “at exactly eight o’clock” at the beginning of chapter six, suggesting all events between chapter one and six were dreamed. In this same chapter Golyadkin even asks “What is this – is it a dream or not?... Is it simply a continuation of yesterday’s events...Am I sleeping, am I daydreaming?” and tries “pinching himself—he even conceived the idea of pinching someone else...No, it was no dream and that was that.” Golyadkin, begs the same question as the reader, and in doing so contributes to the idea that this story is a dream. The confused timeline is reminiscent of dreams and “daydreaming” harkens back to this same word in chapter one, suggesting perhaps that when he believes he awakes and is daydreaming he is truly asleep and dreaming. His trying to pinch someone else suggests that the Golyadkin depicted is asleep and the narrating Golyadkin is the one who needs to be pinched and awakened. The greatest evidence for this is the narrator himself, not Golyadkin Sr., states, “No, it was no dream and that was that.” Hence, the narrator is convincing himself he is not dreaming; thus, he is the sleeping subject in need of awaking.

Golyadkin also experiences the same sense of enclosure that is seen in “William Wilson.” For instance, before entering Klara Olsufyevna’s party, he stands “huddled up in the corner” of a hall for “nearly three hours.” This enclosure results from Golyadkin’s own indecisiveness. He even becomes enclosed by his own conscious at the end of the novel as he sees numerous doubles multiply to the point of surrounding him. The irrationality of this can be explained by dreaming, and the enclosure once again reflects the limited viewing of events.

**Jungian Implications of the Dream Narrative**

If Wilson is truly sleeping, the narrator is actually the shadow. The double is representative of the ego which seeks to restrain the vile interests of the shadow. The narrator is then the “object of the double.” It then makes sense for the narrator to describe the double’s thwarting of his vices as “evil.” From the shadow’s backward perspective, these actions are evil. Jung even said that “one’s better impulses are rarely repressed.” The shadow tries to dominate the self, trying to convince itself that it is the whole of the self, but inevitably the ego asserts its dominance, so the shadow’s only way to repress the ego, is to destroy the self entirely (a symptom of Wilson’s troubled psyche that reveals itself in the dream). In killing the double, the shadow achieves this destruction, displaying the self’s reliance on both the unconscious shadow and conscious ego and inability to survive with only one.

In *The Double* this same overarching conclusion can be drawn. The sleeping Golyadkin may associate his confidence and success with treachery; thus, in his dream these ideas are transferred onto the shadow, displaying his ego as being vulnerable and in turn being sympathetic (leading to the “hero” carrying this same attribute). Golyadkin and his double are two extremes

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558 Dostoevsky, *Notes from Underground and The Double*, 172.
559 Ibid.
560 Ibid., 150 & 151.
561 Moores, “‘Oh Gigantic Paradox’: Poe’s ‘William Wilson’ and the Jungian Self” 35.
562 Ibid., 40.
563 Poe, “‘William Wilson,’” *American Studies at the University of Virginia*, online.
564 Moores, “‘Oh Gigantic Paradox’: Poe’s ‘William Wilson’ and the Jungian Self” 40.
of his personality. Golyadkin Sr. attempts to befriend his double, but his double takes advantage and embarrasses him, ruining this potential friendship. Likewise, the original Wilson is the Wilson who, though recognizing the potential for friendship, rejects it. The dream interpretation asserts how these opposites are possible, as both rejectors of friendship are able to be the shadow.

Further on, the night Wilson goes into his double’s room and sees that his face is exactly like his own he runs in a fit of denial. Moores suggests this flight is a symptom of the shadow realizing it is the “unwanted projection of Wilson’s ‘better’ half.” If he admitted this unwanted-ness, then his role in the self would be diminished. Conversely, Goldyakin accepts that his double looks just like him and has the same biographical details as him, but he only cannot accept the shadow taking over his life, and thus his ego. Eventually, this leads to the complete shattering of self at the end of the story as he once again reflects on his lack of persona (“I don’t wear a mask when I’m with decent people.”). Charles Sherry points out that Golyadkin’s own rejection of being an imposter himself reflects and strengthens the disdain and conflict he has with his double. He then recognizes his inability to assimilate with his shadow (in a healthy self the ego and shadow coexist, but in Golyadkin’s troubled psyche this leads to schism within the dream): At the end of the story, Goldyakin Sr. believes he is invited to another party to meet Klara; however, upon entering,

Our hero looked around in bewilderment, but he was immediately stopped and his attention directed to Mr. Golyadkin Junior, who offered his hand. ‘They want us to make peace,’ our hero thought and, deeply moved stretched out his hand to Mr. Golyadkin Jr; and then he leant his head towards him. The other Mr. Golyadkin followed suit. At this point Mr. Golyadkin Senior had the impression that his treacherous friend was smiling, that he had given a fleeting, roguish wink at the entire surrounding crowd, that there was something sinister in the improper Mr. Golyadkin Junior’s expression, that he had even grimaced at the moment of his Judas-kiss . . . There were ringing noises in Mr. Golyadkin’s head, there was darkness before his eyes; it seemed that a great multitude, a whole file of absolutely identical Golyadkins was noisily forcing open every door in the room.

The optimistic Golyadkin Senior tries to make peace, but he is not able to reconcile with Golyadkin Junior, his shadow, and he perceives betrayal in the facial expressions of Golyadkin Junior. It is important to note that the narrator himself describes Golyadkin Junior as “treacherous” and “sinister,” suggesting the narrator is the sleeping self who can identify and sympathize with the conscious ego, but not his own shadow. This denial and lack of reconciliation leads to a literally break in self as Golyadkins multiply, as if the self is shattered. The exact moment the self has this break occurs at the ellipses and the narrator no longer then distinguishes between Junior and Senior and just states, “There were ringing noises in Mr. Goldyakin’s head.” This is when the destruction of the psyche occurs and it is revealed, just as in “William Wilson,” that the self is reliant on both the ego and the shadow; their inability to reconcile conflict leads to a destruction of the self.

565 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground and The Double, 172.
566 Ibid., 297.
Bibliography


The novel A Clockwork Orange has not ceased to shock its readers since it was first published in 1962. At the forefront of author Anthony Burgess’ commendation, and severe criticism, has been the curious argot in which he wrote. This jargon, referred to as “Nadsat” from the Russian suffix for -teen, defined the teenage gang subculture of the novel and has perplexed even the most intellectual of readers. Yet its heavy reliance on Russian loan-words has created a dilemma for Russian translators of the novel, who must decide how to distinguish the Nadsat slang within a text that is entirely Russian. Translating Nadsat from Russian words in Latin script to English words in Cyrillic script has proved the most effective way to give the target audience a similar reading experience to that of the source text readers. Despite this, no translation of A Clockwork Orange in Russian has managed to capture perfect equivalence, as each work struggles to make sense of a novel that was never intended to make sense.

In the words of Kingsley Amis’ 1962 review, “A Clockwork Orange is told in the first person. That is the extent of its resemblance to anything much else.” This first person narration delves into the tormented mind of Alex, a teenage gang member who finds immense pleasure in beating, stealing, murdering, and raping. Alex’s world is one of anarchy; children hold no respect for their elders, and little can be done to stop the rampant violence inflicted by Alex’s clique and the other young tormentors of their town. Though doctors try to condition Alex to associate violence with illness, Alex ultimately breaks away from this conditioning, which raises difficult questions about the possibility of moral improvement. Burgess asks, “Is a man who chooses to be bad perhaps in some way better than a man who has the good imposed upon him?”

As the reader ponders Alex’s controversial perspective and moral dilemma, they also struggle with the complex language in which he speaks. Nadsat was intended by Burgess to be everything that Alex’s generation is: mechanical, strange, and dystopian. To achieve this effect Burgess married Russian loan-words with Cockney rhyming slang, compound words, and archaisms. Nadsat is described by Dr. Branom in the novel as containing “odd bits of rhyming slang with a bit of gipsy talk, too. But most of the roots are Slav. Propaganda. Subliminal penetration.” According to scholar Robert Evans, approximately three percent of the text is foreign or borrowed, making for a “rather large amount of invasion, considering the nature of the non-English words.”

Indeed, these borrowed words, which appear over a dozen to each page, infiltrate the text with their blatant foreignness. Alex refers to his friends as his droogs, an anglicized spelling of the Russian language’s дру́г (friend). In a similar way, their pockets are “full of deng (money), so there was no real need from the point of crasting (stealing) any more pretty polly (lolly, or British slang for money) to tolchock (beat) some old veck (chelloveck; man) in an alley and viddy

569 Burgess, A Clockwork Orange, 120.
(see) him swim in his blood.” Other popular words within Nadsat include the word horror-show, which comes from хорошо and means “good,” as well as gulliver which is derived from голово, the Russian word for “head.” Burgess plays with the concept of mixing these anglicized Russian loan-words with English style grammar to create distinctly Nadsat phrases. For example the word peet, which comes from the Russian infinitive verb пить meaning “to drink,” is given the English ending “-ing” to create the present participle peeting.

Despite the extensive vocabulary of Nadsat jargon, the dust jacket of the Heinemann edition of Anthony Burgess's A Clockwork Orange claims that the reader needs no more than fifteen pages to master its linguistic intricacies. This assumption proves false for many readers who struggle to piece together the context clues necessary to decipher the Nadsat-dominated text. They are in turn locked out of the novel and its true meaning, but are perhaps sheltered by doing so. The text is so foreign and unfamiliar to the reader that they do not have to feel the words’ true weight, or fully grasp the horror of the murders and rapes that Alex is describing. Burgess states that Nadsat was “meant to muffle the raw response we expect from pornography. It turns the book into a linguistic adventure. People preferred the film because they are scared, rightly, of language.”

It is rather ironic that the very feature which protects and shields the audience from the atrocities of the novel is what they fear the most. Nadsat allows the reader to read the events as an outsider. Even within the novel, the characters are separated between those who speak Nadsat, primarily teenage gang members, and those who do not. Though the book never explains how Alex or his peers learn Nadsat, it is evident that his parents, the doctors, and the police do not comprehend it. The adults of the novel struggle to understand this slang, which comes to be associated with violence and delinquency. The jargon represents members of the dreaded new generation, who have no respect for their elders or sense of morality. The reader is given a glimpse into this controversial persona. At first it is strange, frustrating, and even repulsive to read such vulgar and unnatural language. Yet, it could be argued that as the reader becomes more accustomed to the Nadsat jargon over the course of the novel they also become initiated into the exclusive gang that understands its significance.

The use of Russian language for the basis of Nadsat also serves the purpose of promoting a specific group mindset and set of ideals. Evans states that through this argot “the medium becomes the message. For the Anglo-American reader the Slavic words connote communist dictatorship, the society of Darkness at Noon, without moral value and without hope.” Evans, who wrote his analysis in 1971, shared the perspective of many, including Burgess, during this time period. A Clockwork Orange was written in the midst of the Cold War, in an era when the Soviet Union and its Russian roots had been depicted as communist brainwashing to the Western masses. It is only fitting that Anthony Burgess’ dystopian society would be inspired by the most prevalent and threatening bodies to the 1960s capitalist state.

The notion of whether or not the Soviet Union and consequently the Russian language deserves to be vilified as a dystopian figurehead is heavily influenced by whether one shares the Western mindset. However, it should be acknowledged that the literary censorship of the Soviet Union played a significant role in Russian translations of A Clockwork Orange.

571 Burgess, A Clockwork Orange, 4.
572 Ibid., xiv.
Revolution of 1917, led by the Bolsheviks, set the ideological justifications needed to suppress the flow of foreign ideas into the Soviet Union. The Central Board for Literature and Press Affairs, or Glavlit, sought to suppress political dissidence and expressions considered destructive to the new order. Goskomizdat, the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade, was in turn responsible for the publishing decisions that censored all printed matter. With these changes came a wave of Anti-Westernization that led to the mass destruction of pre-revolutionary and foreign books and journals from libraries. Writer Roddy Newlands notes that few translations were produced during the era of Glavlit, which was formed in 1922 and lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Those that did emerge in Russia appeared in truncated forms, with all mentions of religion and opposing ideologies entirely eliminated.

Though restrictions on publications began to lift with the “Khrushchev Thaw” in 1953 after Stalin’s death, only one Soviet-era translation of *A Clockwork Orange* into Russian has been discovered. According to scholar Kevin Windle, the autobiography of Burgess references a Russian Translation of the novel that emerged from Israel in 1975. This text is presumed to have been *Mekhanicheskii Apel’sin*, translated by A. Gazov-Ginzberg, though Burgess does not name the translator directly. In this translation, no effort is made by the translator to keep Nadsat intact. Instead, the Russian loan words in the argot are changed back into Cyrillic script and absorbed into the rest of the Russian text. *Droogs* becomes *друзья* and horrorshow translates into *хорошо*. Burgess snidely remarks that the translator must have “been delighted to find a good part of the lexis already Russian and his work partly done for him.”

Burgess was highly critical of this translation, but his criticisms fail to acknowledge the ideological limitations of the time period. The translator’s residence in Israel is most likely the only factor that kept such a violent and anti-communist text out of the grasp of Glavlit. Like Lin Shu’s “Paratext to a Record of the Black Slave’s Plea to Heaven” which acknowledges its deliberate removal of all religious references from *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, it could be similarly argued that Gazov-Ginberg’s elimination of Nadsat from *A Clockwork Orange* takes liberties in translation that skew the source text author’s intentions and sacrifice fidelity to the original text. Yet, a compelling argument can also be made for their publications regardless of their target text-oriented adaptations. These texts offer their target audiences the opportunity to read and interpret foreign texts that, though ridden with biases, would not be able to be consumed otherwise. Though Gazov-Ginberg’s translation fails to find any equivalence for the Nadsat argot in Russian and follows a word-for-word approach to translation, it is worth acknowledging that it made such a controversial novel publishable during the Cold War.

Gazov-Ginberg’s translation also introduces the ideas of Schleiermacher into the discussion of *A Clockwork Orange*. In his work “On the Different Methods of Translating,” Schleiermacher argues that the translator has two options if they truly wish to bring the writer and reader of a source text together. He explains that “either the translator leaves the writer in peace as much as possible and moves the reader toward him; or he leaves the reader in peace as much as

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576 Windle, “Two Russian Translations of A Clockwork Orange, or the Homecoming of Nadsat,” 166.
577 Ibid.
possible and moves the writer toward him.” Schleiermacher also emphasizes that these two methods, which will also be referred to as foreignization and domestication respectively, cannot be used in unison lest the writer and reader fail to cross paths entirely.

By Schleiermacher’s distinctions, Gazov-Ginberg’s translation would be considered an act of domestication since the elimination of Nadsat could be seen as prohibiting what “would not also be allowed in any original work of the same genre written in his native tongue.” This translation sought to produce a work that would be deemed more acceptable to Russian readers of the time period, yet in doing so produced a work both “null and void,” since much of Burgess’ exceptional word play and frame of mind was inevitably lost by translating the slang in uniformity with the rest of the text. Schleiermacher puts a great deal of emphasis on the novelty of an author’s utterances, so it is difficult to imagine that he would support the elimination of something as significant to the text as an entire argot. He would most likely view Gazov-Ginberg’s translation like a paraphrase; it can “perhaps reproduce the contents of a work with some accuracy, but the impression made by the work must be dispensed with altogether.” This translation seeks to overcome the irrationality of Burgess’ convoluted text and at best merely paves the way for future translations.

Despite the bizarre nature of Burgess’ Nadsat slang, Schleiermacher would have been arguably quite impressed by its linguistic creativity. Schleiermacher emphasizes in his text that the only utterances that will survive are that which “constitute a new moment in the life of language itself,” proving to be both a product of the language from whose elements it was derived and the intentions of the speaker who brought this language to life. Burgess creates Nadsat from the distinct genius of both the Russian and English languages, and in doing so births this very own concept of their merged styles and ideologies. The mechanical, vulgar tone of Nadsat and portrayal of Burgess’ vision could not be replicated with any other languages or grammatical structures.

The reading of Russian in Latin script produces a unique experience for the English reader of the text, especially in the context of the Cold War. As discussed in Roman Jakobson’s article, On Linguistic Aspects of Translation, the reader would feel alienated by these words. Though the Latin script makes them readable, the vocabulary based on Russian loan words cannot be completely identified by the English reader. Alien code-units and messages force the reader to use the context of the novel to develop an equivalence. As the reader struggles to understand these foreign words and concepts, they develop more familiarity with the language that at first puzzled them, and “an inkling, if only a distant one, of the original language and what the

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579 Ibid.
580 Ibid., 56.
581 Ibid., 47.
582 Ibid., 48.
583 Ibid.
584 Ibid., 47.
586 Ibid.
work owes to it.”587 It can be argued that the alienation the reader experiences due to the deliberate foreignization of the text in fact brings them closer to the Russian language, which was vil- lainized by American ally propaganda during the Cold War, by helping them to recognize some of its foreign words and sounds.

This indicates that maintaining Burgess’ characteristic manner of thinking and sensibility is essential to a Russian translation of A Clockwork Orange, but this nonetheless proves to be a particularly challenging endeavour. The translator is posed the task of foreignizing a text that is inherently meant to be foreign. The source text reader is not meant to understand Nadsat from the beginning of the novel; their immediate feelings of discomfort and confusion are essential to the author’s intentions. It is the translator’s responsibility to notice and best replicate these unique features of the text, to “note which words and associations of ideas appear to him there in the first splendor of novelty; he will see how they have insinuated themselves into the language by way of the specific needs of this spirit and its expressive powers.”588

In the case of A Clockwork Orange, the translator must determine how to indicate to the translated text reader that the source text contains a foreignizing element. In 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union, V. Boshniak produced a translation of A Clockwork Orange with a preface written by Burgess. Boshniak’s translation combined the use of modern Russian youth slang with common Russian words in Latin script. For example, malltshick was written instead of Мальчик, and nozh appeared in place of ночь. Admittedly, the use of modern youth slang could be considered an adequate equivalence for the nature of Nadsat, which is used only by teenagers. Furthermore, by keeping the Russian loan-words in Latin script, the Nadsat slang is maintained from the original. The Russian reader will acknowledge these words as strange and deliberately separate from the rest of the text. This method of translation, however, is also not ideal. Though it does create an element of foreignization in the text, it does not produce the same effect as the original. Windle makes the argument that Boshniak’s method of translating makes the assumption that the target text reader has no difficulties deciphering the Latin script or system of transliteration.589 While the Russian reader may pause to read the Latin script, they will have no difficulty understanding what the Russian word references. Consequently, Boshniak’s translation eliminates the confusion that the English reader faces when confronted with an easily readable, but incomprehensible, Russian word.

An abridged translation of A Clockwork Orange by Evgenii Sinel’shchikov was published in a 1991 edition of the monthly journal Iunost and tackled the Nadsat slang in an entirely different manner. Sinel’shchikov relied on extensive anglicisms to replace the Russian loan-words in the source text. His work is accompanied by a glossary of 140 English words in Cyrillic script. It includes words such as Френды (friends), бутсы (boots), файтинг (fighting), and Таэд э бит (tired a bit; a bit tired). Another significant aspect of this method noted by Windle is that Sinel’shchikov pairs his anglicized words with Russian grammar in the same way that Burgess added English grammatical endings to his Russified speech.590 This allows the target text reader to experience the foreignizing elements in the way most comparable to the source text, since both the translation and the original text force the reader to decipher foreign words in their

588 Ibid., 51.
589 Windle, “Two Russian Translations of A Clockwork Orange, or the Homecoming of Nadsat,” 166.
590 Ibid., 168.
native script. This is also the method for translation that Anthony Burgess best supported. Writing in 1970, Burgess said, "the Russians, of course, would have no difficulty at all; they would merely have to replace my Slavonic loan-words with English."591

This is not to say, however, that Sinel’shchikov’s translation is without flaws. Windle points out that Russian readers are more likely to have a comprehensive knowledge of English words than English speakers are to have knowledge of Russian words, especially because English words were already being used in Russian vernacular speech by 1991.592 It is also worth noting that all methods of translating Nadsat have a great likelihood of following Antoine Berman’s deforming tendencies. For example, rhetorization is likely to occur as the translator searches for unique ways to translate Nadsat, subsequently turning the original text into their own stylistic exercise.

Translators also run the risk of clarifying and rationalizing Burgess’ text. According to Berman, it is a translator’s inherent desire to make a target text clearer than the original.593 This can prove problematic, however, in a text such as A Clockwork Orange that is supposed to puzzle the reader. Similarly, translators who are critical of Burgess’ writing, such as Polish translator Robert Stiller, tend to try and rationalize what Burgess deliberately intended to be irrational. Stiller in particular believed that Burgess’ Russian was inadequate and that the English structures Burgess uses with loan-words show an ignorance of the language.594 Russian was not a native language for Burgess, but rather a skill developed through his own personal study. The inspiration for Nadsat, in fact, came from his re-learning of the language for a trip to Leningrad in 1961.595 Stiller disapproved of the translation of “bastards” in the original Nadsat, and suggested that the use of bratchnies was the result of a misused dictionary.596 He suggested improvements for the text as well, such as the use of sookinsyn or moodack in place of bratchnies. It is doubtful that a translator such as Stiller, who was critical of the original text, could translate the work without demonstrating bias or making edits.

Even the novel’s title is likely to lose its meaning in translation, leading to the destruction of an important expression within the text. A Clockwork Orange is often translated as «Заводной Апельсин» in Russian. Though this captures the literal meaning of a wind-up orange, it fails to acknowledge the significance of this phrase. The British idiom “as queer as a clockwork orange” means as queer as something can possibly be. According to Windle, Burgess liked that the word “orang” mean “man” in Malay.597 He pondered the concept of a clockwork man, who “can only perform good or only perform evil… who has the appearance of an organism lovely with colour and juice but is in fact only a clockwork toy to be wound up by God or the devil or (since this is increasingly replacing both) the Almighty State.”598

591 Ibid., 165.
592 Ibid., 170.
594 Windle, “Two Russian Translations of A Clockwork Orange, or the Homecoming of Nadsat,” 165.
596 Windle, “Two Russian Translations of A Clockwork Orange, or the Homecoming of Nadsat,” 165.
597 Ibid., 163.
598 Burgess, A Clockwork Orange, xiii.
Burgess intended for his work to carry the weight of this statement, of what it means to be a clockwork orange. He implied that every man, or orang, is merely the shell of a human, fitted with the inner workings to further someone else’s morals and beliefs. This question of morality is especially lost in the Sinel’shchikov translation. Sinel’shchikov’s text is based on the American publication of *A Clockwork Orange* and cuts out the last chapter of the book, where Alex realizes that he wants to contribute to the creation, rather than the destruction, of society. Considering this significant omission, Sinel’shchikov’s translation might best capture an equivalence for the Nadsat slang through its use of English words in Cyrillic script, however, it fails to acknowledge the author’s fundamental intention to prove that moral transformation is possible.

Anthony Burgess’ novel *A Clockwork Orange* has succeeded in puzzling both readers and translators alike for over half a century. The Nadsat jargon that makes it so linguistically compelling has also made it nearly impossible to translate into Russian, the language of its origin. Yet the attempts that Russian translators have made to translate this iconic novel continue to raise provoking questions about equivalence, foreignization, and the discordant minds of the writer and the reader. *A Clockwork Orange* suggests that perhaps not everything is meant to be understood, even in translation. Some readers will strive and struggle to reach a common understanding with these teenage delinquents, whose violent and hateful tendencies lay so far outside of Western ideals. “But,” as Kingsley Amis admitted, “the less adventurous reader, especially if he may happen to be giving up smoking, will be tempted to let the book drop” (*The Observer*). Perhaps, this is exactly the sort of frustrating equivalence that Burgess would want a translation to achieve.
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"Grimm’s Fairy Tale Witch and the Fear of Cannibalism in Post-Malleus Europe"

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The idea of the witch is one that has enchanted and terrified popular culture for thousands of years. From Ovid’s terrifying tale of Circe to Elphaba in Gregory McGuire’s Wicked, the witch has been at the center of millions of stories. However, one of the most recognizable and most terrifying is the witch from the classic fairy tale Hansel and Gretel. Focusing on the image of the witch popularized by Heinrich Kramer and Jacob Sprenger in their 1486 treatise on witchcraft the Malleus Maleficarum, the idea of the witch changed in the minds of medieval Europeans, and with it, their fears. The witch from Hansel and Gretel reflects the cultural fears of starvation, cannibalism, and the destruction of community to produce one of the most terrifying and notorious villains in the literary canon. Through the Malleus Maleficarum and Hansel and Gretel, the fears of societal deviation from gender roles, and community-wide catastrophe, the idea of the cannibalistic witch in the woods solidified into a monolithic reflection of the cultural anxieties and panic found at the heart of European witch trials.

The Great Famine of 1315 laid a landscape of fear over Europe. From 800-1300, Europe had seen a relatively prosperous period where production had gradually increased and the standard of living had improved overall. However, as the fourteenth century rolled in, the population had overgrown what resources the land could provide under ideal conditions. Without a margin of error for natural disaster, bad harvests, or catastrophic crop failure, the population stood at a dangerous precipice. Simultaneously, the climate of Central Europe was undergoing a subtle but significant climate shift. A Little Ice Age eclipsed a centuries-long period of global warming, and with it came colder temperatures and torrential rains. Lasting from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the Little Ice Age had smaller periods of intense cold followed by short warming periods, and each time the cold increased, climate changes caused catastrophic agricultural damage. Crops rotted before harvests, seeds never sprouted, livestock starved or drowned, and “freshly plowed fields [turned] into shallow lakes.” It’s generally thought that “the strongest phase of Northern Hemisphere cooling [was] c.1550 to c.1650, [and] coincided with a number of cultural movements and social activities”—most notably with an explosion of witch panic and trials. The result was that “famine and pestilence in France, Germany, and England were more serious than any living person in these lands had yet seen”, and with it widespread hunger and desperation. And who did the people of Central Europe blame for their misfortunes? Witches.

Although the idea of magic practitioners has existed for millennia, the figure of the witch as someone to be feared emerged much later. Magic influenced medicine, protection symbols,
philosophy, and culture of the ancient world, even pervading religious rituals.604 It wasn’t until Christianity became the dominant religion of Europe that magic and witchcraft came to be associated with demonic influences and malintent. With this, the church seemed to have realized that witchcraft and magic practices and associations. The onset of this belief took place in the 15th century, corresponding with the writing of the *Malleus Maleficarum*. The next great uptick in witch trials came with the Reformation in the mid-17th century.605 Each time church power came to the forefront of society’s mind, so did the fear of the witch.

The notion of weather magic, just like general magic, was not a new one. It existed in pagan beliefs before the church rose to prominence, and survived through word of mouth.606 Though the church had no strict position on witches' ability to perform weather magic, “the *Malleus Maleficarum* unquestionably impugned to witches the ability to affect weather magic” into common belief.607 For a span of nearly 200 years, the *Malleus Maleficarum* was a bestseller in Europe, second only to the Bible in terms of sales.608 Aided by Gutenberg’s printing press and the lack of other witchcraft manuals, the *Malleus* spread through Europe rapidly. The influence of Kramer and Sprenger was immense and enduring. Due to Central Europe’s location and dependence on an agrarian economy, any sort of climate change or disaster put the people in peril.609 Pope Innocent VIII’s Papal Bull of 1484 stated that it was within a witches’ power to “[suffocate] and wipe out” grain, vineyards, fruits, and other crops, but did not attribute this to weather magic.610 The *Malleus*, however, explicitly states that “…demons and their disciples can cause such acts of sorcery in stirring up lightning, hailstorms and rainstorms”, and that witches were able to harness *maleficales*, or magic-based malicious harm to hurt their communities.611 Events like bad weather affected entire populations of people and were a tangible form of harm wrought upon people. With the spread of the *Malleus*’ influence this idea reinfiltred culture and led to increased fears of malevolent magic and witch practices.

Though accusations of witchcraft tended to be between individuals and focused on small interpersonal conflicts, “charges of weather magic were frequently raised by entire communities” due to the danger bad weather posed to society.612 This was exacerbated by the effects of the Little Ice Age. The Little Ice Age, though a constant period of cooler temperatures, had particularly cold intervals, one of which fell in line with the second half of the sixteenth century. This period was “marked by falling annual temperatures, a curtailed growing season, pervasive meridional cold streams from the poles, extreme winters, a lowering of the snowline on moun-

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605 Barry, “What Sparked Our Fear of Witches.”


tains, and the advance of alpine glaciers,” all of which were seen by the people of Central Europe as “unnatural weather.” Unnatural weather, at least in the common perception, included phenomena such as evening frosts late into spring, winters that lasted longer than usual, overly wet summers, hailstorms, floods, and persistent snowfalls—anything that was an out of the ordinary weather pattern and could cause damage to the fragile agricultural economy. Famine spread again in the Low Countries, Nordic Countries, and Ireland from 1521-1523, and with it came an uptick in witch accusations.

With famine came fear and desperation. In order to combat starvation, which was especially rampant through the impoverished populations, people fed themselves in any way they could, eating “dogs, cats, the dung of doves, and even their own children.” Reports of young children and infants being abandoned were common, and “the elderly voluntarily starved themselves to death so that the younger members of the family might live to work the fields again.” The reasoning behind this was sound, if not morbid. Those who could work to provide for the family and had a better chance of survival were given priority access to food. Vulnerable and underproductive members of society, such as young children and the elderly, were sacrificed to ensure the greatest number of people survived. However sound the logic, though, this sowed the seeds of a deep-seated European fear of starvation and all that came with it, especially cannibalism.

The notion of the child-eating witch can be traced back to the *Malleus Maleficarum*. Kramer and Sprenger include quotes of convicted supposed witches confessing to their crimes. A convicted witch named Walpurgis allegedly instructed women on how to get first-born male children to be silent as they were “cooked up in an oven.” Another “witch” confessed that she and other women would kill children, steal their bodies from their graves, and cook their flesh down until it was drinkable to be used in rituals. With the remainder of the body, she said, they made fatty salves. It’s no surprise that the witches of the Brothers Grimm’s stories took on the face of cannibals hungry for human flesh. The original editions of Grimm’s Fairy Tales weren’t intended for children at all; they were renditions of oral stories that were recorded by adult men for adult audiences. It wasn’t until after several editions were published that the Grimms decided to rework their folktales into something more digestible for middle-class families and children. Eventually, after the tales had gone through several editions, Grimms’ Fairy Tales was adopted into the Prussian curriculum for elementary children and spread rapidly in both popularity and influence.

The Grimm’s recording and proliferation of *Hansel and Gretel*, along with the rest of their tales, was not only to preserve oral stories and tales, but was also an act of combating the dangerous “other” in the world. The story was originally told to the Grimms by Dorchen Wild,

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617 Nelson, “The Great Famine (1315-1317) and the Black Death (1346-1351).”
618 Kramer and Sprenger, “Malleus Maleficarum,” 289.
the woman who would one day become Wilhelm Grimm’s wife, and consisted of elements belonging to many other tales present at the time. The Grimms collected their stories in an attempt to forge a “German identity” for people to latch onto. During the Grimm’s lifetimes, Germany was less of a country or a nation-state, and more a conglomerate of separate Germanic kingdoms. The Grimm’s aim was to provide a cohesive national character. In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars and Napoleon’s domination of Germany in the early 19th century, Germans were struggling to maintain a culture independent of the French. Despite Napoleon’s reorganization of German kingdoms into larger, more unified states, there was a lack of cultural unity and recognition amongst Germans. People who told oral tales were becoming scarce, and the Grimms feared losing any German culture that was left to the “other” of the French.

In the 1812 first edition of the tales, there are several instances of cannibalism. The evil queen in Snow Drop– later to be renamed Snow White– wanted to eat the heart and lungs of her daughter out of jealousy. In the lesser-known story of The Juniper Tree, a stepmother kills her stepson and cooks him into blood pudding to feed to his father. In The Children of Famine, a tale that has a very similar beginning to Hansel and Gretel, a mother tells her children she will have to eat them in order to survive. While these are certainly evil women, they aren’t described as possessing magical abilities. In Hansel and Gretel, however, the cannibal comes in the blatant form of a witch.

Because of the origins of Hansel and Gretel, especially the oral nature of the story as it was passed on through time, the basis of the tale existed long before the Grimms wrote it down in 1810. The story also reflects deeply ingrained cultural fears that were present from its inception to the moment it was passed to the Grimms. Over time, the tale of Hansel and Gretel has been somewhat distorted. In the Grimm’s original edition, their parents, not a wicked stepmother, decided to abandon their children in the woods in order to prevent everyone in the household from dying of starvation. The children didn’t stumble on a house made of candy and gingerbread, but rather a house made of bread and cake, filling foods for malnourished children. The witch lures them into her home with a nutritious meal and warm beds. Instead of modern versions of the tale where the witch acts as a warning against the gluttony of two greedy children, the original Grimm witch preys upon their hunger and vulnerability– a much more culturally terrifying prospect.

The witch is framed as an outsider in numerous ways in Hansel and Gretel, and one of the most prominent is her cannibalistic nature. Aside from being one of the most heinous crimes of witchcraft that Kramer and Sprenger include in the Malleus, the cannibal as an outsider has a
much longer history. Cannibals have “played their role in the description of non-European cultures ever since the Greeks ventured out into the Western Mediterranean.” From the anthropophagi of Herodotus’ Histories and Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia to the myth of Tantalus who killed and cooked his son to feed to the Gods, cannibalism was a behavior reserved for outsider populations or for those, like Tantalus, who would be forever punished for their crimes. Cannibalism was for those less-than-human, and “through its relation to hunger, to bestial appetite, the taboo on cannibalism became absolute.” The anthropophagi, or man-eater, became a figure present on maps of imaginary geographies that stretched to the end of the world, a terrifying outsider lurking just outside the confines of society.

The “outsider” and the “man-eater” resurged in public consciousness with Christopher Columbus’s journey to the New World. Upon Columbus’ arrival in the Caribbean, he inquired about the existence of mythic man-eaters. What he found were the Carib people who lived in the Lesser Antilles, and who supposedly ate human flesh. The word ‘cannibal’ is derived from ‘Carib’, and though it was originally only a term to refer to Native Americans, the phrase “changed from an ethnographic-geographical term into a general technical term for man-eater” and replaced the ancient “anthropophagi” in popular vocabulary. When word of Columbus’s discovery reached Spain, Queen Isabella issued a 1503 decree allowing her captains to enslave any cannibals they came across in the Americas. Not only was the idea of cannibalism now fresh in the minds of the European consciousness, the idea of the cannibal as an outsider was cemented. The cannibal wasn’t only a man-eater, they also represented a nebulous idea that “sucked in a variety of other transgressions or taboos and formed the boundary marker of a realm into which good Christians dare not enter.” The cannibal no longer only existed on the fringes of maps and the dark corners of myths. They were real, and living in a strange new world to the West.

However, cannibalism in Central Europe wasn’t as black and white as these new emerging fears may have made it seem. Europeans themselves took part in a kind of cannibalism all their own—medicinal cannibalism. Though they didn’t consume human flesh like the meat of an animal, for hundreds of years Europeans embraced healing practices that required the ingesting of human substances. Human blood, flesh, and fats were all thought to have healing properties, and were applied in a variety of ways. Though the practice started with gladiator blood in ancient Rome, “by the 1650s there was a general belief that drinking fresh, hot blood from the recently deceased would cure epilepsy” as well as tuberculosis, and that dried and powdered blood could stop nosebleeds or be applied to wounds to stem bleeding. Human blood was even rendered into a marmalade-like substance to preserve its healing ability, and was thought to be good for up to a year. Human fat could be made into a paste and applied externally to ease gout.

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632 Behrend, “Resurrecting Cannibals,” 42.
633 Behrend, “Resurrecting Cannibals,” 42.
636 Lovejoy, “A Brief History.”
pain. It could also be taken in a tincture, and was thought to internally aid bruising and bleeding. These cures were so popular that in Munich, Germany, that when a criminal was executed for their crimes “the executioner delivered fat to the city’s apothecaries by the pound until the mid-eighteenth century.”

One of the most popular cures, though, was a substance called Mumia. Mumia was a powder derived from the remains of mummies, initially coming from Egypt. By the 15th century, it was regarded as a cure-all, and remained a recommended cure until late into the 18th century. The craze for Mumia was so great that the supply of mummies couldn’t keep up, and people began to make their own mummies to sell to practitioners of corpse medicine. These mummies were made up of bodies taken from the graves of the poor or criminals who had been executed. The reason that corpse medicine could be justified was very clear. The source of the medicine came from those who were “alienated, in various ways, from ordinary humanity… people were ancient Egyptians or criminals or the poor…The medicinal ingredients made from corpses came not from friends or loved ones but from the most abject members of society—executed criminals, the poor, the unknown.” Even as witches were accused of some of the same crimes as those who practiced medical cannibalism—recall the witch quoted in the Malleus who claimed she would render flesh into salves— they targeted those in society who mattered. Children were the future of a family and a community. They represented the continuation of a bloodline and the potential of another worker to aid in the survival of the family. They could carry on cultural traditions and faith. By allegedly targeting children instead of outsiders, the witch made herself a target for communal retaliation.

The witch’s forsaking of her own community was at the crux of many societal fears. Witches were seen as heretical and especially dangerous because of this. They weren’t heretics “by their intellectual errors but by their membership in a secret society, by their demonolatry, and by their explicit pact with the devil.” It was a choice to move away from their Christian communities, not a lack of understanding. Witches, therefore, presented no opportunity to be converted. They were in line with the devil despite their knowledge and acknowledgment of God. A witch’s ability to commit acts of cannibalism and child murder became “a symbol of the witch’s identity with the devil, her spiritual depravity, and her responsibility for a particularly awful form of concrete social harm” within their neighborhoods. Cannibalism was also a very complex offense. It was seen as a sin against nature, but also as an act of defilement of the self and an “unnatural crime.” Women were already perceived to be more polluted than their male counterparts by birth, and their bodies were vessels for contamination, and thus women were more likely to fall victim to further defilement. Self-defilement and self-pollution encapsulated crimes beyond cannibalism, such as sodomy and onanism, and were thought

637 Lovejoy, “A Brief History.”
639 Lovejoy, “A Brief History.”
641 Broedel, 129.
to be a product of sexual deviancy and sub-humanity.\textsuperscript{644} Because of the severity of the crime, it was believed that an entire community would be viewed as failures by God for going against His teachings and His wishes, and He would punish the whole community accordingly.\textsuperscript{645} Not only was the witch turning her back on God, she was turning her back on her entire community and allowing them to suffer for her transgressions.

It didn’t help that the people of Central Europe viewed bad things happening as both a societal and a moral failure. Witchcraft, according to Kramer and Sprenger, happened because God allowed it to happen.\textsuperscript{646} To Kramer and Sprenger, as well as the European people, there was a clear “link between moral behavior and ambiguous harm, between the perception of human malice and malicious misfortune” that controlled aspects of their lives, and some of the individuals who had access to that sort of power were witches.\textsuperscript{647} Witches were said to have this ability because their moral failings and sins allowed the devil to give them power.\textsuperscript{648}

During witch trials, the accused were most often women. The \textit{Malleus Maleficarum} argues that this was because women, by nature, were less trustworthy, less intelligent, and more susceptible to demonic influence. Kramer and Sprenger believed that “in the original shaping of woman, since she was formed from a curved rib, that is, from the rib of the chest that is twisted and contrary, so to speak, to man,” and that Eve herself was worse than the devil.\textsuperscript{649} In drawing this conclusion, Kramer and Sprenger were subscribing to very common tropes of what a woman could be, most notably the character tropes of the mother and the trickster.\textsuperscript{650} The Virgin Mary was the ideal version of the mother, a woman who devoted her life to her children— in her case both Christ and all of humanity. Her foil was Eve, the trickster. Where Mary’s life was dedicated to the redemption of man, Eve was the cause of man’s initial downfall.\textsuperscript{651} Eve’s pride and disobedience led her to cause the fall of humanity, and was a trickster who couldn’t be trusted because she persuaded Adam to take part in her sinning. The witch fell into the category of the trickster, not only for their supposed role in leading their communities away from God, but because they went against the traditional framework of the family to serve their own needs. In doing this, they were metaphorically biting their own forbidden fruit and forsaking the people around them to sate their own desire.

Kramer and Sprenger not only believed that female witches were lesser than men, they believed witches were less than human. Kramer and Sprenger wrote that “death is natural and kills only the body […] sin introduced by woman kills the soul as well as the body by depriving it of grace as a penalty for sin” and described women as “imperfect animals” who were always deceptive and deceiving men.\textsuperscript{652} Through this view of witches and women as animalistic, their distance from ‘humanity’ is made starkly clear. While Pope Innocent VIII’s \textit{Summis Deside-

Kramer and Sprenger, “Malleus Maleficarum,” 165.

Behrend, “Resurrecting Cannibals,” 43.

Behrend, “Resurrecting Cannibals,” 46.


function of nourishment and they impeded fertility in both the natural and human worlds, rendering men impotent, injuring animals and blasting crops.” Witches were seen to have a grip on the line between life and death, but instead of killing their targets or victims, a witch was thought to be able to control things that would force a person to watch their own family and lineage die out.

The fear witches engendered in society and culture wasn’t limited to just their perceived devil-given abilities. Through the framework of the Malleus Maleficarum, the fears of Central Europe seeped into popular culture. The fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm offer a look into some of the most popular and widespread oral tales of their time, and the witch was molded into a form that suited the fears and needs of Central Europeans. Witches provided a scapegoat, an evil on Earth to blame for the horrors of everyday life. The Malleus Maleficarum taught the world what Kramer and Sprenger thought it should fear, and the figure of the witch metamorphosed to deliver. Fears like societal deviation, the unknown, perversion of gender norms, and famine all coalesced in the terror of cannibalism that haunts the pages of the Grimms’ Hansel and Gretel.

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"The Legacy of Orientalism: Rebecca West's Single Story"

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To imagine the former Yugoslavia as comprehensible, whether culturally, ethnically, or politically, goes directly against the negative stereotypes of the East analyzed by Edward Said in *Orientalism*. These stereotypes, which extended to the Balkans, paint the people of this region as backwards, barbaric, and strange. Rebecca West, author of *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, however, lauded Yugoslavia as a place where “everything was comprehensible.” But because she wrote of the country with the same stereotypes that Said analyzed, her vision of Yugoslavia as a place of comprehension is all the more ironic. Nevertheless, Balkan scholarship of the late 20th and early 21st centuries repeatedly reference West’s pinnacle work, published in 1941, despite reinforced as a biased and essentialized narrative of her misperceptions and mythologization of the region and its peoples. At the end of the 20th century, after numerous local conflicts, two World Wars, and a genocide in the 1990s, the Balkans, and Bosnia in particular, were in fact a complex geopolitical region, making hesitation of the continuation of concerning stereotypes and efforts to untangle these complexities all the more important.

“*Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* drew me to Yugoslavia,” writes Robert Kaplan in his 1993 work *Balkan Ghosts*. West’s book is still influential in significant ways and lives on through the works of authors such as Kaplan. Kaplan adopted West’s Orientalist notions in *Balkan Ghosts*, in that the ethnic groups of the Balkans have always fought one another, which helps convince westerners that the South Slavs of Yugoslavia were and always will be a violent people. This argument played a role in the Clinton administration’s reluctance to get involved in the war in Bosnia in the 1990s. The influence of West’s *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* peaked in 1993 when “Hillary Clinton gave her husband a copy of Robert Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghosts*…that portrays people in the Balkans as if they were destined to hate and kill.” Hence President Clinton feared “a quagmire in an unmendable region.”

To explore Rebecca West’s *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* helps shed light on how standard impressions of the Balkans came to be, and how a book written by an English woman came to be the precedent for knowledge and characterization of the Balkans’ varied cultural identities, ways of living, and narratives of history. Decades after West’s narrative of Yugoslavia came to fruition in *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, interpretations and analysis have stemmed from ideas seeded in the text. These ideas affect perspectives of Balkan socioeconomic status, ethnic divides, perceived hierarchy, culturally significant or insignificant facets of the region’s peoples, and historical nuances. Modern impressions of the countries that formerly made-up Yugoslavia are influenced and sometimes dictated by single sources, such as West’s book.

Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, a Nigerian author, coined the phrase “The Danger of the Single Story.” In a TED Global speech that went viral on the internet, Adichie shares a breathtaking narrative about imparting impressions and stereotypes on peoples who are different from

those one might have met before. West’s depiction of the Balkans influenced future narratives of the region and perpetuated a decades-old legacy of stereotypical impressions and assumptions. Her writing in *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* articulates her Orientalist approach, in that she emphasizes the Slav as “the other.” West’s *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, and later Robert Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghosts* played a role in the United States’ hesitancy to intervene during the war in Bosnia during the 1990s. Authors referenced West’s writing heavily in the 1990s and into the 2000s, compared to the decades prior. Although the Balkans give the impression of a region where violence and war always looms, it was the Bosnian War in the 1990s that brought renewed interest in the historical divide between ethnic groups in Bosnia. Looking at the uptick in references of *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* towards the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century shows the legacy of West’s work and that of an Orientalist approach.

By examining *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* through the lens of Said’s *Orientalism*, one can gain a more thorough understanding of a legacy of imperialistic notions that perpetuate a discriminatory and subjugated portrayal of ethnic minorities. Various secondary sources examine the role that language and the portrayal of ethnic minorities play in current foreign policy, and the ways that people respond to the targeting of these minorities. Specific wording in the work of West and Said allow for further analysis of the impact of such language. The word “comprehensible,” which both West and Kaplan use, serves to form a binary between logic and understanding, and the chaos and violence so often spoken about in the Balkans. A single interpretation of the region derived from works like West’s perpetuates stereotypical impressions of the region. The act of assigning a single definition to an ethnic group, as Adichie discusses when sharing how she was taught to view poor people in Africa, misrepresents and ‘others’ minority ethnicities, as does when people assign characteristics to ethnic groups in the Balkans. Throughout various mediums over the decades, a broader understanding of the Balkans and its complexities begins to take shape. In no way is it comprehensible, but critical analysis brings a more thorough picture of the Balkans and its ethnicities to life.

### *Orientalism*, and the Formation of the Single Story

Edward Said’s book *Orientalism* was published in 1978 and helps to reconcile the deep divide imposed by white westerners between “the Orient” and “the Occident.” Themes in *Orientalism* help to connect West’s arguments in *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* to previously held views of the ethnicities of this region. Said’s work also helps to broaden one’s understanding of the theme of timelessness in respect to these ethnicities, and the prejudice that stems from this association.

The first theme in *Orientalism* that helps connect *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* to the divisions between ethnicities is how, as Said writes, “one voice becomes a whole history.” This is also a concept described by Adichie as “the danger of a single story.”667 To start, Said writes about broad “generalities” such as that of “Asia, the Orient, or the Arabs.”668 Consequently, the inverse of this categorization is to narrow the manner of identification to a single representation. He describes this as, “one voice [which] becomes a whole history, and for the white westerner,

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as reader or writer—the only kind of Orient it is possible to know.” Both forms of identifying others come from the western perspective. There is no agency for the individuals within these assigned categories. They are part of a broad and large group of individuals, grouped together not necessarily for objective and concrete reasons as part of what Said calls the “generalities” of “Asia, the Orient, or the Arabs.” Or it may be that the identifying characteristics of those within assigned categories that decide who or what they are. This is the example of when only “one voice” forms “the only kind of Orient it is possible to know,” and the “one voice” is that of a westerner.

Growing up in Nigeria, Adichie’s father was a professor and her mother was an administrator. Her family had live-in domestic help, as was the norm for their middle-class family. She learned to read and write early and wrote stories with illustrations that depicted her learned idea of identity and place. The depictions she shares in her TED Talk reflect how all the early books she read had characters with white skin and blue eyes. She also shares how her first impression of their domestic help, a young boy named Fide, was her mother’s repetitive insistent-sounding mantra of how poor his family was. These examples instilled and perpetuated Adichie’s notion of a single-story. The single-story she knew from books when she was young, was that characters had white skin and blue eyes. The single-story she learned about Fide was not that he or his family could make beautiful things, as she was astonished to find out when her family visited his village and his brother had hand woven a basket, but that they were poor.

To associate a person, place, thing, or event with a single story, leaves out any possibility for inclusion and awareness of similarities between people, and focuses only on the differences. Adichie expands on her concept of the single story by discussing how stereotypes are created by the single story. She continues this discussion with her observation that, “the problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one story become the only story.” To return to Said’s discussion in Orientalism of how “one voice becomes a whole history,” the stereotypes which the white westerner brings to a foreign land become the “single story” that Adichie speaks about.

A second theme in Orientalism found in West’s writing is the idea of timelessness. Timelessness is a major component in the development of ideas and themes seen in writing about the Balkans, and that of West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. West paints a picture of divisions between the ethnicities of the republics of Yugoslavia as an occurrence which transcends time. The false belief that relationships between distinct groups of people never changes in the Balkans perpetuates a trope like timelessness. The abstract idea of timelessness can evoke good-natured and nostalgic notions in the historical narrative of the Balkans. However, timelessness comes to mind with associations and evocations in the context of the former Yugoslavia in respect to

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669 Said, Orientalism, 243.
670 Adichie, “The Danger of,” 02-47.
671 Adichie, “The Danger of,” 02-47.
672 Adichie, “The Danger of,” 00-27.
673 Adichie, “The Danger of,” 00-27.
674 Adichie, “The Danger of,” 02-47.
memories of violence and subjugation towards ethnic minorities. Said quotes an excerpt by Gertrude Bell, who he identifies as an Orientalist. In this excerpt, Bell essentially criticizes the Arabs, in that they have not gained any wisdom from the thousand year period where they lived “in a state of war.” Bell’s words help to delineate the belief by Orientalists that timelessness characterizes a people [the Arabs] and the faults that they still hold. The fault, precipitated by Orientalists, is that violence and subjugation towards ethnic minorities is not an ancient historical event or merely a memory.

Said discusses how authors who write on the East craft their own work from previous knowledge. These authors, Said writes, “assume some Oriental precedent, some previous knowledge of the Orient, to which he refers and on which he relies.” West does assume “some Oriental precedent,” although it seems more like a myth that she promotes throughout the text. To form a work of writing on the East, while successfully using a “precedent…[and] previous knowledge,” the author would need to remain objective. This is like writing a definitive statement established from fact, and not including the necessary citation. Rebecca West comes to mind for this, in that she does not cite along the way. She instead includes a three-page bibliography at the end of Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, and a lengthy explanation about what she included and excluded in the bibliography. This is a yes or no decision and deciding what sources to include in her bibliography is a way to favor one Balkan ethnicity over another that can suggest that certain works function as examples of propaganda.

In Orientalism, Said delineates a derogatory impression of the East, which is an impression from a Western point of view. A premise of Orientalism is that the ‘barbarian’ or ‘other’ being that Said’s text links to the East and the Orient, cannot be established without fitting an identity opposite to it. Orientalism and its ensuing definition must come from a Western figure, as Said uses Orientalism, “to describe the Western approach to the Orient.” To establish that binary between the East and the West, as Said argues, allows the ‘other’ identity to be formed. As well as a divide between the East and the West, Orientalism sits “as a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern over the Orient.”

Beneath the Surface: Subjugation, Language, and Imagery

Like Said’s term Orientalism and the framing of “the other,” there are themes of class and ethnic hierarchy. The subjugation of the Slav people ties directly to a construct by the West, with the Slav as representative of the “other.” To “other” an ethnic minority is an abstraction explored by Said, and is a concept defined by the West. Focusing more specifically, however, the West looks at the Croats, the history of their position in respect to the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the recurrent idea of an outside group coming in to civilize them. When Rebecca West visited the sanatorium in Croatia, Western medicine, as a commonly accepted means of treatment, understanding of illness, and the role of a medical professional, is not what she observed. West’s descriptions of the patients in the sanatorium appear to be contradictory. The patients and the doctor’s “forebears had all been peasants together,” and this shared

678 Said, Orientalism, 196-197.
679 Said, Orientalism, 229.
681 Said, Orientalism, 73.
682 Said, Orientalism, 95.
heritage bridged the divide between the patient and the doctor. What West heard the doctors say forms the contradiction, in that they “talked of the peasants as of beautiful and vigorous animals that have to be coaxed and trapped and bludgeoned into submission.” The Croatian doctors acknowledged their close ties to and shared heritage with the patients. But West’s account of what the doctors said about the patients reflects a binary of the two uncategorical images. Along with the descriptions “beautiful and vigorous,” the doctors contradict a seemingly mutual relationship because of their shared history as peasants, with the description of the patients having been “coaxed, trapped, and bludgeoned.” By comparing beauty and life to subjugation and death, West evokes themes Said presents in *Orientalism*, and the construct of “the other.”

The prologue of West’s book begins during her trip to Yugoslavia with her husband. She quickly backtracks to the first time she had said the name Yugoslavia, recounts an operation she had, and details her convalescence before and after the surgery. Prior to her surgery, she envisioned Yugoslavia as from the “Stone Age.” Whether intentional or not, this language suggests that Balkan history parallels that of the Stone Age. The key here is that this is a current impression and image. For the image of the Balkans that comes to mind to be that from a different time and era, proves to be problematic in the late twentieth century. For a narrative of timelessness, described through the lens of the Stone Age, to be assigned to the memory of the former Yugoslavia is a disservice to modern concerns and issues in the region.

Violence, such as that during the war in Bosnia during the 1990s, is also an association that West ties to the Balkans. She writes about the Slavs in a pejorative manner, and portrays them as savage, barbarous, and characteristically as the ‘other’ figure. West admits that “violence was, indeed, all I knew of the Balkans: all I knew of the South Slavs.” [The name Yugoslavia means “the kingdom of the South Slavs.”] A contradictory point in West’s writing, is that she views Yugoslavia to be where everything made sense, and where everything was comprehensible. She wants to know where it all began. The lens through which she looks at the region is one of global scale and importance, or at least became so after *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* chiseled its way into time immemorial as an authority on the Balkans. West does not take into consideration the individual people of Yugoslavia, and when she does consider the individuals within its ethnically diverse populace, she brings a bias and judgment towards the Slav identity, which ends with the impression of a ‘savage, barbarous, uncivilized’ individual. This fits with Said’s argument on Orientalism, because Rebecca West is Western and therefore can formulate the impression about the “Orientals.”

Robert Kaplan, author of *Balkan Ghosts*, credits *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* as what drew him to Yugoslavia. World War II was the “horrific cataclysm…that [West] couldn’t yet describe.” However, a substantial part of West’s narrative and thought process, which she appears to use her writing to outline, reflects her individual desires, interests, and understanding of the world. The country that West lauds for its honesty and comprehension, today the world sees fragmented by war, scarred by genocide, and further marred by an outside notion of their hatred for one another.

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683 West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, 79.
684 West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, 79.
Robert Kaplan uses the word “comprehensible” in *Balkan Ghosts*, as does Rebecca West in *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*. The context of “comprehensible” in *Balkan Ghosts*, is when Kaplan describes the city [of Belgrade, Serbia] that he sees as he looks out from both the Srbski Kralj and the Moskva, both of which are hotels. When Kaplan was in Belgrade, he “gazed at Byzantine ramparts, the few remaining Turkish buildings, the Orthodox Cathedral, and the reconstructed, neo baroque monuments.” 688 This description is the view of the city from Kalimegdan Park, where the Srbski Kralj once was. 689 Kaplan describes the city from this vantage as “not only handsome but comprehensible.” 690 His gaze out onto the city from the Moskva, on the other hand, was not comprehensible. 691 Why is “comprehensible” a fitting word to describe the view from one hotel and not the other?

In the book *Metropolitan Belgrade: Culture and Class in Interwar Yugoslavia* by Jovana Babovic, Babovic examines the historical context of the two hotels, the Srbski Kralj and the Moskva. She discusses how the sculpture *Pobjednik*, by the artist Ivan Mestrovic, was intended to be placed in front of the Moskva as a “commemoration to Serbia’s victory in the Balkan Wars.” 692 Critics spoke out about the planned placement of the sculpture, and it was installed instead in Kalimegdan Park. The Srbski Kralj was destroyed by Nazi bombers during World War Two, yet the sculpture remained standing. 693 A literary analysis of Kaplan’s choice of language, “comprehensible,” might suggest that for the view from near where the Srbski Kralj once stood to be “comprehensible” means that because the sculpture was not considered to be placed by this hotel, the political and ethnic weight associated with the Srbski Kralj is not one that showed support for Serbia’s victory during the first Balkan War. It is important to keep in mind the decade from which Kaplan bases the assertion that Belgrade was comprehensible from the vantage of the Srbski Kralj, but not that of the Moskva. The context he uses the word comprehensible in is that of the Balkan Wars in the 1910s, while Rebecca West writes about Yugoslavia as comprehensible in the sphere of the late 1930s.

Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghosts* was first published in 1993, during the war in Bosnia, which “broke out in 1992.” 694 The view from where the Srbski Kralj once was, encompassed the architectural significance of the Ottoman Empire. As an inverse to the celebrated architecture of the Ottoman Empire, the Moskva originally celebrated Serbia’s victory during the first Balkan War, in which they drove the Turks out. For Kaplan to find the view “comprehensible” from near where the Srbski Kralji once was suggests that he supports the Ottoman Empire’s reign, rather than the victory by Serbia during the first Balkan War.

Yugoslavia, as a region within lines drawn as boundaries, is not in itself a myth. Although borders of nations are a human construct, the myth associated with Yugoslavia, and more generally with the Balkans, is that the ethnic groups of this region “have always wanted to kill

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689 Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, 73.
690 Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, 73.
691 Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, 73.
693 Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, 73.
each other, have always been at war... and are of the savage, barbarous, other nature’ that Edward Said writes about in Orientalism. Rebecca West herself admitted that “Violence was...all [she] knew of the Balkans.”

Modern Impressions of the Balkans

In more modern times, such as the years of the post-Cold War world, numerous authors of books related to the Balkans, or the former Yugoslavia, cite West’s work in their prologue, preface, or introduction. Black Lamb and Grey Falcon morphed into a quasi-authoritative source on the Balkans, and many books that come after West’s text use her writing and analysis on the Balkans as precedent for writing on the region.

To use Black Lamb and Grey Falcon as an authoritative source on the Balkans perpetuates West’s orientalist viewpoints. Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts uses West’s work as an authoritative source and furthers West’s orientalist beliefs by doing so. Cynthia Simmons makes a powerful argument when she writes about the potential response to “victims of catastrophes” in a foreign country compared to that of a war in a foreign country. In her article, “Baedeker Barbarism: Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon and Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts,” Simmons intriguingly discusses how books, such as that of West and Kaplan, can discourage intervention or assistance for the peoples of foreign wars. Both authors wrote texts that emphasize the otherness of the peoples of the Balkans. Simmons articulates how the representation of otherness, emphasized in the media, can lead to consequences “tied to issues of political policy and...human rights.”

Prejudice stems from the way people in foreign countries are spoken and written about, which can lead to “potentially harmful stereotyping,” with language such as “barbaric,” “foreign,” and “uncivilized.” The term “barbaric apathy,” Simmons uses to describe how “nations will or will not attend to the needs of others in times of danger.” And how “[i]n relatively peaceful times, their generalizations and misrepresentations failed to promote true understanding. In times of war, they affected policies that resulted in human rights disasters.” Balkan Ghosts drew presumptions and biases from West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, and thus these misrepresentations supported President Clinton’s decision to not intervene during the Srebrenica massacre.

The images of Srebrenica and those which document the ensuing massacre, as the Bosnian Serbs advanced into the UN safe zone, shown in the media, are graphic and evoked a strong rhetorical response in the summer and fall of 1995. Searing, dramatic images and language from survivors made for a dramatic headline on the nightly news, but inevitably brought a lack of action and intervention. There was, and is still, criticism towards President Clinton about his lack of intervention during the war in Bosnia. A complicated point in the matter, however, is that photos which supplied compelling evidence of loss of life in Srebrenica did not reach President Clinton’s top advisors until August 4.

In the end of October of 1995, over three months after the massacre in Srebrenica, a New York Times article reported about American satellite photos

\[695\] West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, 21.
\[697\] Simmons, “Baedeker Barbarism,” 110.
of “Muslim men held in fields [around Srebrenica] at gunpoint on July 13.” Two weeks after the first satellite photos were taken, a U-2 spy plane took shots that showed “freshly turned earth [was noticed] in the same fields.” These images shared with the media, and also with President Clinton’s top advisors, served as proof of crimes against the Muslim population in Bosnia.

The Bosnian Muslims’ plight continued despite documentation of the killing and despair. The inaction lay in the fact that the Bosnian War was a foreign war, and the word foreign connotates “the association of negative characteristics.” However, there is a broader-minded and more historically oriented perspective concerning the reasons why the U.S. did not intervene in the Bosnian War sooner. The legacy of Orientalism and the “othering” of those of the East determined the fate of the Bosnian Muslims before the war even began.

The continued narrative of Rebecca West’s misperceptions and structuring of ethnic hierarchy of the Balkans and its people is that which Said articulates in Orientalism. A point to make beyond describing the misperceptions and structuring of ethnic hierarchy that West delineates in Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, is that to describe the people of the Balkans, or of the East in the sphere of Orientalism, one needs to highlight their differences.

In an excerpt of a paper by Arna Elezovic, titled “Finding the True Slav in Rebecca West’s Black Lamb, Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia,” the identity of the subject position in Elezovic’s writing is that of the Slav. She describes how West, “deconstructs the stereotypes about and highlights the positives of Slavs and the Balkans and their character, she builds or reinforces a stereotype of her own: that of the Slav as the Other.” Many, if not most, of the books about the Balkans, including West’s Yugoslavia in Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, are written by a Western author. Arna Elezović, a scholar at the University of Washington, is not a Western-born scholar, but did write about the Balkans and West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. Elezovic writes how West uses language in her text which identifies the peoples of Yugoslavia as “the Slav, the Turk, and the Hun.” This “othering” by West, establishes an us-versus-them mentality, even if she intended to just articulate the points of the differences between westerners and Orientals.

Vesna Goldsworthy notes that the West holds certainties about the Balkans, due to its own complacency. This complacency rests in the myth of the “timeless notion of perpetual fault lines… [and the] equally timeless ‘ancient hatreds.’” The trope of timelessness appears once again in this language. Rebecca West does not perpetuate this timeworn language, and instead writes about the violence of the South Slavs, and their barbarous and savage nature.

Some individuals may make the argument that Black Lamb and Grey Falcon is an essentializing book and perpetuates stereotypes and discriminatory attitudes towards ethnic minorities. This argument is valid, as well as the fact that a westerner’s account of traveling in Yugoslavia has become such a standard in Balkan writing. An important point to focus on, and remember, is

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699 Engelberg, “Massacre in Bosnia.”
700 Engelberg, “Massacre in Bosnia.”
703 Korchnak, Remembering Yugoslavia, 27-45.
705 Goldsworthy, “Invention and In(ter)vention”, 26.
that interchange between ethnicities and countries of origin will foster a more fluid dialogue in which honest conversation and the spread of ideas can take place. The Balkans, given the long history of violence between the countries of former Yugoslavia, is not a comprehensible place. No country or region whose identity centers around violence and division is easily understandable. But no matter the history of the countries in the Balkans, their history and narratives matter and are more important than ever to share.
Bibliography


SECTION 7
Music and its Socio-Political Impact
Throughout history, Jews have been targeted or even blamed for the problems a country had and thus have become a marginalized group in society. Although the history of marginalized communities is very extensive, in this paper I will talk about how these ideas are reflected in and propagated through the different operas that Wagner managed to create, and how they influenced musicians and Hitler alike. Out of the many operas that Richard Wagner created, I will explain the blatant anti-Semitic views that Rienzi, Parsifal, and ‘Ring’ have. It is important to understand how Hitler was inspired, through operas, to create certain atrocities and to analyze how big of an impact a composer can be on someone like Hitler. Through propaganda and various classical works, Wagner’s music managed to normalize the deep sentiment of anti-Semitic views and inspire Hitler throughout his life.

For anti-Semitism to thrive there were many ways to spread anti-Semitic sentiment. One of the ways was through propaganda. Although propaganda can be seen as something very blatant like a poster or a sign, there are other ways to showcase these ideas for the public. One of the ways to showcase the ideas was to use books or letters. For example, Judaism in music is a letter written by Wagner. Historian Brearley explains that “Judaism in music, unleashed a wave of vicious antisemitism in Germany in the 1870s and 1880s.” Not only do certain books indicate to people what is popular or what should be believed but they can reaffirm those strong sentiments, and, in this case, it is anti-Semitism.

A way to reaffirm those ideas would be letters, especially those of Wagner. In particular, this influenced certain composers, as other musicians during that time period were influenced by Wagner, to have anti-Semitic views. Elly Ney was influenced by Wagner to believe in certain anti-Semitic views. Wagner managed to reaffirm these anti-Semitic views through his letters to Elly Ney. Elly Ney was a German romantic pianist who was prominent under the reign of Hitler who also specialized in Beethoven. In the book, The Twisted Muse: Musicians and Their Music in the Third Reich, Michael H. Kater explains that Nye previously had a stereotypical belief about Jewish people and later became more of an anti-Semite. Kater explains that

“…Ney’s abiding anti-Semitism is probably unique among the outstanding German musicians of the time. She was obsessed with Jews as firmly as she believed in the curative powers of medicinal herbs. Early on in the regime, she claimed to have realized how insidiously the Jews had oppressed the Gentiles, without using any force at all, and later, once she had read Richard Wagner’s treatises on the so-called Jewish Question, she became even more convinced. Over time she came to accept all the vicious prejudices proliferating in Nazi Germany…”

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706 Margaret Brearley, ““Hitler and Wagner: The Leader, the Master and the Jews.”” Patterns of Prejudice 22, no. 2 (June 1988): 4.
With previous established anti-Semitic thought, she had become more convinced of the deeply embedded anti-Semitic rhetoric going on in Germany during that time.

The letter by Wagner that influenced her was the same letter, “Judaism in Music,” that had increased the anti-Semitism in Germany from the 1870s- to the 1880s. In this letter, “Judaism in Music,” created by Richard Wagner, he explains the rhetoric that he and Ney believed. Wagner explains that “…The Jew — who, as everyone knows, has a God all to himself — in ordinary life strikes us primarily by his outward appearance, which, no matter to what European nationality we belong, has something disagreeably foreign to that nationality: instinctively we wish to have nothing in common with a man who looks like that.”

By stating that Jews have God for themselves, Wagner implied that they have oppressed the gentiles, the Germans, from attaining a version of God. Ney already had that presumption, but Wagner reaffirmed it in his letter. This also appealed to Hitler, who used religion to appease a certain base of voters. Brearley explains “in particular, he typified his vehement antisemitism as having not only the posthumous approval of Martin Luther but also the blessing of Almighty God.”

Letters can influence certain people or re-affirm certain views, but there are also other ways to influence or reaffirm existing anti-Semitic views. The other way to spread the anti-Semitic rhetoric is through certain musical pieces and in this case, it would be Wagner’s operas or musical pieces. Hitler was strongly influenced by Wagner’s operas and musical pieces. In the book Hitler: 1889-1933 by Donna Faulkner, Faulkner explains how at a young age Hitler was already fascinated by Wagner’s musical works. Faulkner says, "At twelve, gripped by the music of German composer Richard Wagner and moved by his tales of ancient kings and knights battling hated enemies, he began to associate Wagner’s operatic heroes with dignitaries he had read about in his German history books.”

Later in Hitler’s life, he found one of Wagner’s operas to be truly inspirational. Hitler also stated in the book, Mein Kampf, “My youthful enthusiasm for the Bayreuth Master knew no limits. Again and again, I was drawn to hear his operas; and today I consider it a great piece of luck that these modest productions in the little provincial city prepared the way and made it possible for me to appreciate the better productions later on.”

As Hitler saw Wagner become inspirational or someone to be admired, he needed to see more of Wagner and what he had to offer. Historian Carolyn S. Ticker explains that “the young Adolf loved Wagner’s music and also knew it very well. Hitler was introduced to his music at a relatively young age when he saw a 1906 production of Rienzi in Linz. From that point on, Hitler made every effort to attend many of Wagner’s operas…” Ticker argues that it was not Wagner himself that made Hitler admire him, but it was his works. Ticker explains that “Richard Wagner’s works are regarded highly and are often considered among musicians to be the epitome of

710 Margaret Brearley, “Hitler and Wagner: The Leader, the Master and the Jews,” Patterns of Prejudice 22, no. 2 (June 1988): 5.
714 Ibid., 60.
German Romantic music.”\textsuperscript{715} Since Wagner’s works were considered high German art, then he would attract those with already growing nationalism, and they would seriously respect anything he said since he was the epitome of German romantic music.

According to Naxos Music Rienzi can be summarized as

“The Pope has fled from Rome and open conflict has broken out between the two noble families, the Colonna and the Orsini. One of the latter seeks to abduct Rienzi’s sister Irene, who is rescued by Adriano Colonna. Order is restored in the city by Rienzi, supported by fellow citizens. Cardinal Raimondo pledges Rienzi the support of the Church in curbing the powers of the feuding nobles and Adriano eventually agrees to act with him. In spite of the public support seemingly offered to Rienzi, the noble’s scheme against him, as Adriano warns him. An attempt at assassination is foiled but the guilty members of the nobility are spared at the urging of Irene and Adriano. A Further attempt at insurrection is made, and Orsini and Colonna are killed, but the loss of life has led the citizens now to plot against their tribune, while the Church, with the Holy Roman Emperor, joins in his condemnation. Adriano tries to persuade Irene to desert her brother, but she is resolute and she and Rienzi retreat to the Capitol, where they die as the building burns.”\textsuperscript{716}

It is important to consider what the opera, Rienzi, is about. Ticker explains that "Rudolf Vaget points out a remark in which Hitler said, referring to a performance of … Rienzi which he saw in Weimar, ‘in that hour, it all began.’ … In all likelihood, his quotation refers to the moment when he first felt the desire to restore German greatness, just as Rienzi tried to do for the Roman state.”\textsuperscript{717} Not only does Hitler interpret this opera for himself as going back to “German greatness” but from another perspective, it can also be seen as the roots of modern-day fascism taking place in Hitler. Historian Berthold Hoeckner explains that “if Rienzi contained, as Adorno put it, all the ‘essential elements of fascism,’ it is not surprising that Rienzi became a role model for Hitler.”\textsuperscript{718} Since Hitler admired Rienzi because it had all the essential elements of fascism, it would not be surprising for Hitler to propagandize Wagner’s musical works under the Nazi regime. Hitler also took life lessons from Rienzi, which is explained by Historian Vaget as thus: “Wagner's opera awakened Hitler's political sensibilities to the advantages of charismatic, as opposed to traditional, forms of leadership ---a lesson he evidently internalized and heeded for the rest of his life.”\textsuperscript{719} Not only did the opera show Hitler what “German greatness” is or how to start creating the elements of German fascism, but it also showed Hitler how to accomplish the goals he wanted.

Hitler saw Wagner as an artist and a thinker.\textsuperscript{720} Another opera that managed to inspire Hitler was Parsifal. An overview of Parsifal is given by Historian Ticker, he explains that,

\textsuperscript{715} Ibid., 60.  
\textsuperscript{717} Ticker, “The Effect of Richard Wagner's Music and Beliefs on Hitler's Ideology,” 60.  
\textsuperscript{720} Margaret Brearley, “Hitler and Wagner: The Leader, the Master and the Jews.” Patterns of Prejudice 22, no. 2 (June 1988): 17.
“The character Klingsor provides the perfect example of a person excluded. Klingsor, who wishes to become a Knight of the Holy Grail, is excluded because his community perceives him and his strong desires as not being “chaste.” Rejected, he decided to castrate himself so that he would be accepted. This, however, served only to further alienate him from his community, since they looked upon his actions as unnatural and disgusting. Because of this rejection, Klingsor ends up becoming the evil magician, the main antagonist of the opera.”721

However, Wagner also used religion to attract people by including religion in the operas. Brearley explains that “he claimed that he was writing Parsifal in order to 'create a re-awakening of a German instinct. Parsifal, this 'last and holiest' of Wagner's works, actually uses Christian symbols and language to portray a pagan world denuded of Judeo-Christian ethos, in which the representatives of the Jewish people, seen as seducers and poisoners of mankind, are destroyed. In composing what he called 'this most Christian of all artworks.'”722 By using his own version of Christianity Wagner managed to reinforce a connection that was already there, just as Hitler managed to attract people with similar religious views. Since it is tied to religion this example can be described as a stand-in for the Jews, a people who “misunderstand” Christianity by not recognizing Jesus.

Another justification for the inspiration that Hitler took from Wagner is how inspirationally he viewed the opera, Parsifal. Porat explains that “when he proclaimed that he based his religion on Parsifal, as he understood it - Hitler was indicating, in all these references, the direction Wagner's inspiration was leading both him and Germany.”723 Not only does Hitler now see Wagner as an inspiration for himself but an inspiration for Germany. Later, Brearley explains that ‘Klingsors’ in the play are Jews, which indicated that Hitler was inspired through operas to commit genocide. Brearley explains that “…Hitler asked for the prelude of Parsifal to be played and later declared: 'I have built up my religion out of Parsifal. Divine worship in solemn form, without pretenses of humility . . . one can serve God only in the garb of the hero'. In 1939 Hitler commanded that Parsifal should not be performed until after the war. By then Hitler, a new Siegfried, and a new Parsifal in messianic disguise would have had time to cleanse Europe of its racial degeneracy, to reintroduce paganism in a religious guise, and to extinguish all of Europe's Kundrys and Klingsors.”724

In another opera called the Ring, which also has blatant anti-Semitic views, Hoeckner explains that the opera had “… a perfect picture of an economy controlled by big capital, for which he, fully in line with nineteenth-century anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, blamed the Jews.”725 Brearley also explains the opera The Ring had underlying meaning to them which is later explained by Hoeckner. However, another underlying meaning is that Jews were attacking a certain thing in the opera. Brearley explains “that this is indeed true is suggested by the many references in Mein Kampf to Jews in the context of the Ring. Jews are described as attacking 'the horny Siegfried', wearing the 'tarn cap' of lies, and being insolent mimics. The influence of Parsifal is

724 Brearley, “Hitler and Wagner: The Leader, the Master and the Jews,” 18.
especially discernible in the marked emphasis on the Jewish 'original sin of racial poisoning.' In *The Parsifal*, Hitler meant that Jews attacked Siegfried, and thus the German people.

There were many underlying meanings to the operas, especially *The Ring*, which is a cycle of four operas. A summary of *The Ring*, as explained by Brearley would be

“The Ring is intended as one step in that emancipation. It is clearly an allegory. The pagan gods Wotan, Donner (Thor), and Froh (Gay) have lost their power through contracts (symbolic of the oppressive state) with Fasolt and Fafner (the etymology of whose names suggests that they may well be representatives of the Church). Through breaking morality and encouraging incest, Wotan achieves the unthinkable, the miracle of the utterly free, all-human German man, Siegfried, a Christ-like pagan redeemer who achieves what Wotan calls 'the redemptive World-Deed'. Siegfried represents 'the fair young form of Man' whom Wagner had found in 'the deeper regions of antiquity.'”

Hoeckner describes two of the most significant underlying meanings. He writes, “Alberich’s theft of the Rheingold is certainly the first evil deed we encounter in the Ring. Yet over the course of the tetralogy, we become gradually aware of another evil deed, which is fully disclosed only in the narration by the Norns at the beginning of Gotterdammerung: here we learn that Wotan drank from the Well of Wisdom, which dried up, and that he broke a branch from the World Ash Tree, which withered away.” Here we can see the stereotype of Jews that is expressed through the operas.

However, there are two different types of meaning in the opera which describe Jewish people, Hoeckner also describes that: "The two different origins of evil associated with Alberich and with Wotan receive quite different treatments in the Ring, and this difference has important consequences for their place in Wagner’s economy of evil. What Alberich does, we see and see right at the beginning of the Ring. What Wotan did, we never saw, and are told about only near the end of the cycle.”

Wontan and Alberich both represent Wagner’s beliefs about the Jewish people. Furthermore, Brearley explains the roots of Wagner’s ethnic hatred toward the Jews. Brearley says "The roots of Wagner's antisemitism must ultimately be sought, however, at a deeper and more dangerous level. By the time of writing the Ring, he had evolved an original, passionate, and comprehensive philosophy of life in which the Jewish people had a unique and totally negative role. Crucial to this philosophy was a strong historical perspective, in which Wagner expressed uncritical regard, even adulation, for the world of pagan classical Greece, and intense contempt for the Judeo-Christian world which had followed it."  

However, at first, it did not start off as simple hatred toward Jewish people or the music. Historians have found that the hatred grew from jealousy of successful Jewish composers. Brearley explains that “Wagner's antisemitism undoubtedly derived in part from envy, particularly of Jewish composers such as Offenbach, Meyerbeer, and Mendelssohn who, like Jews in many fields since the opening of the ghettos, had achieved considerable success. It is also derived from ignorance. His inability to speak English and French resulted in hostility to many aspects of British and French culture. His ignorance about Judaism—clearly revealed in Judaism in

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726 Brearley, “Hitler and Wagner: The Leader, the Master and the Jews,” 17.
727 Brearley, “Hitler and Wagner: The Leader, the Master and the Jews,” 11.
729 Ibid., 168.
730 Brearley, “Hitler and Wagner: The Leader, the Master and the Jews,” 8.
Music—was even more profound.” Since Wagner was jealous of certain composers who were Jewish and did not like other cultures because he did not understand them would not be surprising for Wagner to make anti-Semitic letters and operas in order to degrade those who he was jealous of.

In order for Hitler to be inspired to commit his atrocious acts, Hitler needed certain people to propagate the culture that inspires his ethnic hatred. Hitler needed a certain composer to show him how and why he should do it. Wagner not only influenced Hitler but also those around him. Through the three operas, Richard Wagner managed to cultivate anti-Semitic rhetoric and inspire Hitler’s anti-Semitic ideology. The blatant anti-Semitic views that *Rienzi*, *Parsifal*, and ‘Ring’ were not only on purpose, but a strategic way to normalize the hateful sentiment that already existed. The normalization of this sentiment is reflected in Hitler’s rise to power. The impact that Wagner had on Hitler should not be cast aside but should also be shown as a catalyst that brought upon despair and destruction to Europe during the World Wars.

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“Soviet Homemade Jams”
Nikolas Khimerik, Brooklyn College

Abstract

20th century America saw the birth of a wave of musical genres. Beginning with Ragtime and evolving into the various styles of Jazz, Rock, Country, Punk, and later Funk music, all of which would serve to build a distinct cultural identity for the United States. But what of the other side of the Iron curtain? “Soviet Home-Made Jams” discusses and analyzes the Soviet parallel to America's genre-diverse cultural scene. While equally diverse, Soviet music production operated under completely different pretenses compared to its American counterpart. The idea that culture was something that needed to be built and advanced meant that it needed to be strictly curated in order to avoid cultural degeneration. Through an exploration of Soviet subculture, “Soviet Home-Made Jams” reveals an overall reflection of the Soviet government on its cultural dilemma: How can art be centralized, and yet free?

From the vast Siberian wilderness to the crammed Khrushovkas of Soviet cities, men and women with acoustic guitars pioneered new genres of music behind the backs of Soviet authorities. While some would eventually obtain official national recognition, still many more would maintain their ordinary jobs and pursue art as a hobby. “Soviet Home-Made Jams” explores the various iterations and transformations of music, both official and unofficial, within the Soviet Union from the 1950s until its eventual collapse in the 1990s. We will discover how the artists behind it, though unknown to the greater world, maintained and experienced stardom under Socialism.

Rather than claiming that the government and underground artists were inherently averse towards one another, this paper takes a different approach. Instead, I believe that Soviet authorities had an agenda which the amateur artists simply did not care for. While the Soviet government attempted to build culture as if it were an institution – a social structure, artists composed pieces of self-expression and reflection on life and their experiences. It was the relatability and weight of what they expressed to their comrades which made them and their art into cultural icons. Indeed, it was these amateurs whose music drove the cultural shift from beneath the surface, shielded by the walls of their own Soviet homes.

Paper

I believe it is important to acknowledge the overarching Orientalism which pervades our Western understanding of Eastern European music throughout the late 19th and 20th century. Tony Judt explained best how in the early post-war years, “the line dividing East from West, Left from Right, was carved deep into European cultural and intellectual life.”732 Needless to say, this line of division applies equally to the United States as it does for Europe. This presentation attempts to cross that line, if only to make a narrow bulge in the border guarding the foreign “other” that is the former Soviet bloc.

Today, it is easy for one to acquaint themselves with stereotypical Russian music through something as simple as a Google search. You are bound to come across some variation

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of a video which attempts to inform you of the names of some familiar Russian melodies. The curation of melodies throughout these videos tends to be very consistent; a balanced mix of traditional folk melodies, classical compositions, and perhaps a few Soviet anthems or war songs sprinkled in for good measure. If you put these melodies onto a timeline such as this one, a clear paradigm emerges: Nothing written after 1938 appears in the catalog. You can observe a single exception, and that would be what is colloquially referred to as the, “Troll Song”, of which a recording by Eduard Khil from 1976 was rediscovered and promptly turned into an internet meme between 2009 and 2010. Even still, this rediscovery was only made possible nearly two decades after the end of the Cold War, a fact which could easily lead you to think that the Iron Curtain did an efficient job of isolating the Eastern Bloc from Western Europe and the United States. Whereas Soviet music did not flow freely to the West, Western music did often transcend and transgress the so-called Iron Curtain. Western music had a significant impact on the development of Soviet genres — those both state-sponsored and those not.

It should come as no surprise to anyone here today, that the infrastructure surrounding the development of art in the Soviet Union differed drastically from its Western counterparts. Any official artist within the Soviet Union inherently worked for the government, and was thus chosen by the government to do so. In order to “get in” typically a Soviet citizen would start young, attending an art school or conservatory, creating a social network and earning government contracts. Public recognition was not the key to making it as an artist. Government recognition was, and maybe if you really were worth it, public recognition would come subsequently. So how about those artists who were able to garner recognition from the public, but not from the government?

Amateur musicians were a vivacious counterbalance to the orthodox reality of Soviet dictatorship. These underground artists gained recognition through cabaret-style concerts and unofficial means of recording. Melodiya was the only Soviet record label available in the Soviet Union, and the only way for a Soviet citizen to make it onto the stage in any major theater was through Souzconcert, now known as Rosconcert. The centralized nature of Soviet record and concert management meant that it was difficult for alternative style artists to exploit their niche. Melodiya’s music records consisted primarily of classical music and neglected most other popular genres of the time, especially those influenced by the West. As a result, many musicians

were forced underground, regardless of their occupation. Both amateurs and professionals were frequently left to their own resources in view of abundant state censorship.

This inadvertently helped to spawn one of several genres which adapted to this state-restricted environment. A seed nurtured by the egg of the home. The late 1950s and 60s saw a rapid expansion of housing in the USSR. “According to one calculation, between 1956 and 1970, over 126,000,000 Soviet citizens— more than half the country— moved into new housing”, made possible in large part by manufactured apartment buildings – the infamous “Khrushobas.” The combination of private spaces, guitars and poetry in the hands of amateur musicians created a force difficult to stop. It was now possible to create music which was hidden from the scrutiny of the state. “Guitar Poetry” and “Authors’ Songs” are just two of the popular names for a genre I will refer to throughout this presentation as “Bard music”.

Bard music could be considered as the first widely recognizable underground musical genre of the Soviet Union. Its accessibility and versatility in conveying stories and emotions, which would otherwise not pass Soviet censorship, cannot go understated. It was a tradition which allowed for the circulation of literature which you wouldn’t find in official Soviet media. Tenants of recently constructed Khrushovkas would invite their peers to apartment concerts or “kvartirniki”. The nature of this space is important, because the crammed confines of these Soviet apartments helped to establish intimacy between audience and performer. These concerts were typically lyrical and quiet - introverted as opposed to the larger and louder performances of the later underground rock scene. Inevitably, Bard music rapidly rose into the mainstream of Soviet culture. Larger concerts and conventions would be arranged out in the wilderness, in many ways akin to Woodstock, still away from the prying eyes of the State. The fantastical post-war, space-age ideals of the 1950s and 60s sync well with the “Romantic Era” of Bard music. A reflection of the utopian dreams which at the time, at least to some, seemed to be right around the corner.

The pioneering figure of this epoch in Bard music was the writer and musician, Bulat Okudzhava. Born in 1924 to a Georgian father and Armenian mother, Okudzhava managed to experience Soviet life in all of its extremes, both horrific and hopeful. He witnessed first-hand the destruction of his family at the hand of Stalin’s purge; his father being killed and his mother, imprisoned on multiple occasions. Before finishing high school, he was already in the Red Army, soon to experience the war, about which he would later write many songs. Despite the trauma of his youth, or perhaps because of it, Okudzhava’s work maintains an idealism which won the hearts of many, who also dreamed of harmony and friendship. Additionally, Okudzhava’s poetry spoke many truths which were otherwise suppressed within the Soviet milieu. While he was not a very good singer, the art of Okudzhava’s music lay in the prolific poetry of his lyrics, as well as the character through which he delivered them. His music is merely a means of telling a story. The metaphors and imagery in his songs are no less impressive than his many parables and novels. Even today, Okudzhava represents something of a grandfather figure within the Eastern Bloc. It is only appropriate that a man, whose poetry filled countless tents and communal apartments on dark starry nights, also gift his namesake to a celestial body, asteroid Okudzhava 3149.

It was clear by the start of the 1970s, however, that any revolutionary fervor present in the Soviet ideology had been extinguished by an aging leadership. The apparent economic stagnation, and blatant indulgence of party leaders in luxuries not accessible to the general public was reflected in the next epoch of Bard music, the “Ironic Era”. No longer did Communism appear to be just around the corner, and the decline of this revolutionary sentiment was in blatant contradiction to the Soviet Union’s progressive origins. It became more and more apparent that the State’s agenda was not necessarily in line with the interests of the people. What Melodiya considered to be hip and new, did not necessarily correspond to what music was actually popular at the time.

Probably the most famous Bard of all, Vladimir Vysotsky released some of his best-known songs during this era. His, “Ballad of Childhood” paints a deep and accurate picture of the childhood which, no doubt, was experienced by many of Vysotsky’s peers, whose infancy was traumatically marked by the outbreak of the second world war. But unlike Okudzhava’s generation, which attempted through their verse to turn tragedy into hope in which to find beauty, Vysotsky’s poetry effectively satirized the contemporary Soviet milieu. Though I am not a major Vysotsky fan, one song by him which I have enjoyed since my own (far less traumatic) childhood is called, “Dialogue by the Television” and as you can infer by the title, the piece is just that: A simple old couple bickering by the TV, as they take part in the nightly ritual of entertainment consumption. The archetypes of the two characters, Zina and Vanya, both expertly voiced by Vysotsky, ring relatable and true to this day. As far as Soviet comedy goes, this exemplar in particular has aged surprisingly well.

In 1976, an equally timeless masterpiece was released, this time in the world of Soviet Cinema. “Irony of Fate” or “Enjoy Your Bath!” gives further justification to the nomenclature of the 1970s as the “Ironic Era”. A New Year’s film, it has aired on Russian television every December 31st since its release. And while the film itself deserves (and has, on occasion, received) discrete scholarly attention, I intend to focus on the music laden within it. “Irony of Fate” features 9 distinct poems performed as Bard Songs by primary characters all throughout the film. Many, if not the majority, of these poems were banned in the USSR, having been written by alleged class enemies and other victims of the 1930s’ purges.736 Their addition to the film was vital in providing an authentic portrayal of the Soviet home. Beyond that, the melancholy lyrics of many of these Bard Songs creates a stark contrast to the otherwise ironically comedic plot. Performed by the legendary Bard, Sergei Nikitin, and a then still unknown artist, Alla Pugacheva, the Bard songs were instant hits in the Soviet Union, and still retain their popularity to this day.

Although by this point Bard music was well into the mainstream, many of its forerunners still went unrecognized by the Soviet music industry. Indeed, the Ministry of Culture had its gaze set away from these amateur musicians with acoustic guitars, and this was not unhindered by their increasingly dissenting lyrics. It was clear to the state that this was not their coveted “cultural progress”. If only they had realized that their progressive flame had already long been outshined.

By this point, cultural progress had moved elsewhere. With the peak of the flower power movement in the United States, Rock n’ roll had become the new cultural ambassador of peace, friendship, and corn. Meanwhile in the USSR, the state was yet to recognize anything

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north of jazz as something other than perverted Western ideology. What we have here is what Alexei Yurchak would call Lefort’s Paradox, wherein the Soviet leadership is in constant anxiety about publicly justifying its firm grasp on cultural production, while simultaneously attempting to promote experimentation and independence for the sake of cultural progress. 737

Alongside Bard Music, the late x-50s and x-60s saw the arrival of Rock’n Roll in the Soviet Union. American and British bands were all the rage. With no official means by which they could acquire the music they so coveted, the youth of this generation was forced to take innovative measures. Used plastic x-ray plates were crafted by hand into homemade records, christened “Rock on Bones.” 738 Sold shamelessly in front of Melodiya record stores, they would nurture an affinity for Western culture, and what ordinary Soviet citizens imagined it to be. 739 In no time, amateur Soviet bands began popping up all over the Soviet Union. Underground venues became relatively common, primarily in metropolitan areas such as Leningrad. The literary culture of Bard music would carry over into the styles of many of these novel bands, just as others would try to emulate their Western muses.

Eventually, State sponsored Vocal Instrumental Ensembles (VIAs) would join in on the trend, and begin producing music aesthetically similar to Western Rock, but with the added twist of being censored and, for the lack of a better term, cheesy. Sanctioned bands such as Kvar tet Sekret were advertised in footage of Soviet ambassadorship as adored by audiences — almost to the point of Beatle-mania. 740 However, popular collective memory shows that censorship-passing family friendly content is not the main ingredient in the baking of hits. It was instead amateur musicians whose homemade jams dominated the taste buds of the Soviet populace.

While Western cultural contraband poured in like buckets of rain through the black market, the state would continue to ignore the storm. The metaphorical corner, around which Communism was projected to be, had been turned, and in its place was revealed instead a broken promise. The progressive ideals of communism laid contradicted by the conservative habits of the aging Soviet leadership. Echoes of the Prague Spring would reemerge, this time closer to home. It all came to a head in 1978, when student protests in Georgia regarding the Russification of Georgia’s official language policy, would result in a step back and moment of reflection on behalf of the Soviet government. The relationship between the Soviet elite and the youth of the next generation had clashed in the microcosm of Georgia, and reforms needed to be made if “cultural progress” were to be achieved. The centralized authority of the Soviet regime could no longer afford to maintain its orthodoxy and continuously ignore the needs of the youth.

The Soviet government would give its response two years later, in the form of the Tbilisi Rock Festival, also known as Spring Rhythms 1980. This would be the first sanctioned rock festival in the USSR, and would be a beautiful event for a multitude of reasons. Here we have a clear devolution of power from the Soviet gerontocracy to the experimental and progressive youth, in large part thanks to the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, Eduard Shevardnadze, who was a major reformist. Additionally, many of the bands which participated in this festival started out in the underground scene. Bands like Mashina Vremini, whose music

737 Alexei Yurchak, Everything was forever, until it was no more : the last Soviet generation, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006): 12.
738 Ibid., 182.
739 Ibid.
would for the first time emerge from the lecture halls and auditoriums of schools, and find official recognition, even laurel wreathes, by the conclusion of the festival.

Spring Rhythms would gather a diverse catalog of ensembles: Magenetic Band from Estonia, Gunesh from Turkmenistan, and an even greater number of bands from Russia and Georgia – and their repertoire also ranged in genre, many putting a modern twist on national folk songs, experimental Jazz-Fusion, and Progressive rock. This was more than just a rock festival – it was a unique musical encounter between peoples who were otherwise isolated and growing apart. People who in ten years ’time, would find themselves separated by international borders.

One musical genre you did not hear me mention was that of Punk, and this is for good reasons. There was indeed a representative of the Punk Rock genre on stage at the Tbilisi Rock festival, but their performance was not very well received. This amateur ensemble, known as Aquarium, would actually be disqualified from the competition, for what the philharmonic director called “homosexual demonstration.”\footnote{Troitsky, Artemy, \textit{Back in the USSR: the true story of rock in Russia}, (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1988): 89.} The band had summoned quite the scandal, and it would take a lot of clarification from both Troitsky and Boris Grebenshikov, the band’s co-founder, in order to keep Aquarium from getting expelled from the festival altogether.\footnote{Ibid., 90.}

Despite their removal from the competition, Aquarium’s showmanship would leave a mark in the memories of all those present that day, and an even greater mark in the history of Soviet Rock. We’ve all heard the saying, “Any publicity is good publicity” and despite the contentiousness of this statement, it surely was the case for Aquarium. This event would cement Aquarium as an icon in the Soviet public, and their irreverent authenticity would forever change the meaning of Rock in the USSR.

I could not conclude this presentation without mentioning one final Bard, whose untimely death, sentenced his art to relative obscurity. Alexander Mikhailovich Litvinov, better known as Venya D’rkin, is someone I regard as the last Soviet poet. Through his music, Litvinov depicts in sardonic fashion the lived experience of his generation in the final years of the Socialist Bloc. The raw vulgarity of his nonetheless sophisticated lyrics, gave the Soviet subculture a final gasp of fresh air.

Litvinov was born in 1970 and grew up in typical Soviet fashion in Eastern Ukraine – what is now the disputed territory of Lughansk. Finishing school with honors, he went on to spend a year in University, followed by work in the army as a driver. Afterwards he went through multiple occupations as a teacher, an artist, even a construction worker.\footnote{V. A. Gavrikov, (n.d.), \textit{Zhizn’ i tvorchestvo Venyi D’rkina}, 174.} The pseudonym, Venya D’rkin, he jokingly made up while signing up for a local music festival. Being declared its winner, the moniker was duly kept.

There is no clear consensus on the classification of Venya’s music. While its minimalist acoustic instrumentation – guitar and voice – make it a candidate for Bard music, its aggressive intensity gives it traits more congruent to Rock. Thus, “Bard Rock” is the commonly given nomenclature to Venya’s novel musical genre. However, popular scholarly opinion prefers “Post-Rock” as the proper identification for Venya D’rkins legacy.\footnote{Ibid.} This is because Venya’s music marks the beginning of a new era, both cultural and political, distinct from the mark left by his

\textit{\textsuperscript{741} Troitsky, Artemy, \textit{Back in the USSR: the true story of rock in Russia}, (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1988): 89.}\n\textit{\textsuperscript{742} Ibid., 90.}\n\textit{\textsuperscript{743} V. A. Gavrikov, (n.d.), \textit{Zhizn’ i tvorchestvo Venyi D’rkina}, 174.}\n\textit{\textsuperscript{744} Ibid.}
Rocking predecessors. Venya effectively brings together the eclectic traits of all previously discussed Soviet subcultures. His lexicon includes slang developed from English words, and the themes of his poetry, accompanied by equally complex music, unafraid to venture into dissonant extremes, combines to create art with a novel, Post-Modern flavor.\(^\text{745}\)

It was in the early x-90s that Venya D’rkin began gaining prominence, but fame was something that would only arrive posthumously. Cancer would prevent our hero from surviving the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century. But before his untimely demise, Venya managed to write over three hundred songs which he performed in, then Soviet, now Post-Soviet homes. Today, several of his recorded kvartirniki are available to view for free on YouTube. In them, you can see the warm, cozy tones of crammed domestic spaces, an artist seated on the floor with nothing but his voice and a guitar – all of this a testimony to the irrelevance of material luxury in the development of good art. Like your grandma, making you her signature jam, the close proximity between art, artist and idea create a magnetic intimacy. A connection which we all insatiably crave.

\(^{745}\) Ibid., 175.
Yurchak, Alexei. Everything was forever, until it was no more: the last Soviet generation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006.
“Now I’m Cheburashka: Vladimir Shainsky and the Jewish Presence in Soviet Animation"

Isabelle Krieger, Vanderbilt University

Introduction

One of the preeminent symbols of Russian identity is a fantastical brown creature with large ears and a shy smile. His ubiquitous presence in Soviet pop culture is reflected by each Team Russia athlete holding a plush version with patriotic white fur during a 2010 Olympic group photo. The 1969 debut of Cheburashka in a series of four stop-motion films is tenderly embraced throughout three generations of Russians. The cartoon’s central themes of goodness and compassion seemed to have the ability to assuage the bitterest of moods, yet its music was what delighted audiences of all ages. With melodies that were easy to sing, combined with an upbeat tempo, the Cheburashka cartoon may as well have been the magnum opus of Soviet animation and pop culture.

Most of the Russian population can recognize the iconic note grouping at the start of Crocodile Gena’s “Birthday Song,” but the lack of formal scholarship concerning the music of Soviet animation is striking. What is more is that many of the composers responsible for these timeless songs were Jews who flocked to animation studios as a safe haven amidst the purging of Jews from the Soviet Union. Changes in leadership and social climate led to increasing antisemitism during the mid-twentieth century. The stark contrast between the songs’ benevolence and the harsh circumstances under which composers found themselves at the gate of the State’s premier animation studio, Soyuzmultfilm, is a result of the impossible situation that Soviet Jews faced in the mid-to-late twentieth century.

The uncertainty surrounding the place of Soviet Jews in society resulted in the influx of Jews in animation studios. The fear that Jewish presence would undermine the Soviet ideal of cultural unity ironically resulted in a secret pipeline into the very heart of popular identity: animation studios. Former actors, musicians, artists, and performers could still be hired as independent contractors with Soyuzmultfilm, for the filmmaking industry was associated with crafting a national image, whereas animation lacked this association, granting more room for flexibility. Even though animation was official Soviet culture, the responsibilities reserved for this sector entailed the “moral education and emotional consciousness of the nation’s ethnic minorities and children,” which ultimately resulted in more leniency from state censors. This culminated in composer Vladimir Shainsky’s employment at Soyuzmultfilm. Previously, he had been working as a music instructor and composer. Once he began composing for the studio, however, his songs for children became instant hits due to their catchy yet unpretentious melodies. Two in particular—Gena’s “Birthday Song” and “Blue Wagon”—became the hallmark for Soviet nostalgia for years to come.

The works of Jewish musicians are ingrained into the cultural fabric of Russian identity and are indispensable to contemporary Russian social memory. Jewish presence in Soviet pop culture warrants more scrutiny, and I explore how animation and music created an outlet for self-reflexive ethnographic expression. Jewish engagement in Soviet culture naturally results in the

entwinement of the two; the national identity of Russians in contemporary society is heavily influenced by Jewish artists. By illuminating how Russian Jews in the USSR were active musically throughout the twentieth century and how their engagement at the Soyuzmultfilm animation studio culminated in the popular *Cheburashka* cartoon, I assert that Russian and Jewish cultural influences are difficult to distinguish due to their eventual coalescence in the formation of a multi-layered identity through musical expression. These analyses are meant to elucidate how Vladimir Shainsky may have expressed his own multifaceted identity while conforming to ideological standards. I challenge the notion that these aims are contradictory by privileging the often-neglected voices of Russian-Jewish artists at the forefront of the Soviet Golden Age of animation.

**Jewish Musicians in Soviet Society**

The large proportion of Russian Jews among St. Petersburg Conservatory students during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries gave rise to a popular joke: the school must have a quota limiting the number of non-Jews allowed to enroll. While this quip is historically inaccurate, its implications of the prominence of Jewish musicians in Russian society underscores the tumultuous relationship between Jews and the state. Prior to WWII, the Soviet Union officially promoted Jewish music, yet after the war the State officially declared that Jewish music was illusory. This antithetical modification of State policy resulted in an ethnically exclusive idea of what it meant to be Russian, and in the latter case, being Jewish and Russian were incompatible.

Despite systematic erasure of any identity that deviated from the Soviet notion of its ideal citizen, Jews had historically established themselves within the USSR from as early on as the nineteenth century. The emergence of Jewish musicians within the Soviet Union dates back to traditional Klezmer musicians who steadily gained European interest and fostered a two-way exchange of musical styles with European peoples. Naturally, Jewish musicians began to study and perform European concert music, with some gaining international recognition such as Russian-Jewish composer and virtuoso concert pianist Anton Rubinstein. The vast majority of East European concert musicians remained socially involved with local Jewish communities, yet their visible success precipitated in the rise of antisemitism and resentment to Jewish success, placing Jewish origin in advance of musical talent.

In contrast to the rampant antisemitism in the Soviet Union following WWII, the early twentieth century painted a completely different portrait of the status of Jews: the state actively encouraged Jewish national culture. In response to the cultural freedom Soviet Jews enjoyed, Jews quickly espoused music as a means of expressing identity with the creation of organizations such as the Society for Jewish Folk Music coming to fruition in 1908. In Soviet conservatories and orchestras, the burgeoning population of Jews playing and producing works steadily at-
tracted interest among the Jewish community. It saw music as the means to nationalist self-expression after decades of implicit identity suppression in societies often overlooking Jewish communities within its boundaries. But despite the international visibility of twentieth-century Jewish concert soloists and establishment of the Jewish musical organizations, Russian and Soviet Jewishness in itself was a balancing act both in terms of personal identity and cultural space.

The high level of Jewish visibility in music created a social quandary: State goals of political progressivism warranted tolerance of Jews to uphold its cultural prestige, but contrarily communist universalism and Russian nationalism called for the reduction of Jewish presence in society. This phenomenon produced conflicting attitudes and policies towards Jewish involvement in Soviet musical circles. Still, accompanying Joseph Stalin’s rise to the status of premier in 1924 were his korenizatsiya policies, which encouraged the Jewish artistic intelligentsia to mobilize and combat Nazi antisemitism. Thus, the stage was set for modern Jewish culture to prosper through musical ensembles, the publishing of Yiddish songs, and other related projects. Culture flourished up until its systematic erasure in 1948, when Stalin’s new policies of “anticosmopolitanism” targeted Jewish figures and disbanded Jewish organizations.

Over the next decade, the repression of Jews was successful only to an extent—when turning towards the musical sphere, the lines between Jews and Russians in Soviet music were so muddled that disentangling the two was unrealistic. Music disguised Jewish origins behind a sheen of interpretive ambiguity: both Russians and Jews could express spirituality and a recognizable Jewish aesthetic, as long as it was interlaced with a modern European sound. Jewish historian James Loeffler points out the most renowned embodiment of this intimacy in his work The Most Musical Nation: Jews and Culture in the Late Russian Empire—amid the political thaw after Stalin’s death in 1953, Dmitri Shostakovich (1906-1975) and Mieczslaw Weinberg (1919-1996) “introduced two new symphonies…Remarkably similar in form and theme.” Shostakovich was ethnically Russian, while Weinberg encompassed many identities simultaneously, including being a Soviet Jew. Despite their varied backgrounds, their music attests to the interwoven history of Russians and Jews and more accurately how ingrained Jewish musicality was in Soviet culture.

Soviet Jews at Soyuzmultfilm

Following this inquiry into Jewish involvement in Soviet musical culture is the question of how Jews remained active musically while facing State-mandated repression. One possible answer can be attributed to the Jews who were able to find work in animation and assumed roles such as artists, animators, and composers. Unlike artistic occupations previously heavy in Jewish demographics such as the film industry, State supervision of animation was more relaxed most likely due to an assumption that cartoons could not be taken seriously nor express complex modes of identification. Lax policies surrounding animation called forth auspicious circumstances for Jews that led to their influx at Soyuzmultfilm, the State’s premier animation studio.

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753 Loeffler, 201.
756 Loeffler, 215.
The magnum opus of the studio was a series spanning only four episodes about a creature of unknown origins known as Cheburashka (1969-1983). While Cheburashka struggles to find his place in Soviet society, he encompasses a resilience that both Russians and Jews could relate to amid the turbulent political climate of the mid-twentieth century. While most Russian instantly recognize the songs accompanying the comic mishaps in each episode, not many are aware that Cheburashka’s creative team was almost entirely made up of Jews.

Animation was of great significance to the Soviet Union precisely because it educated the youth on Soviet ideals cleverly disguised in a manner that was easily digestible to most audiences. Screen artists rejected language they considered too noisy in favor of silent images with inherent philosophical value. In general, Soviet-style cartoons dismissed bonds of language and dogma impeding the aim of non-judgmental sentiment. Unlike animation studios in the West, the task animators were confronted with was the moral education of the people while reflecting heritage and Soviet realism. As a result, most cartoons featured animals. Not only did this choice reflect heavy Soviet emphasis on folklore, but animals could not be accused of duplicity; they were seen as kind-hearted and honest with no capacity for ulterior motives. The apolitical nature of cartoons may come as a surprise, but in fact, according to Slavic scholar David MacFadyen “Cartoons are the sentimental, if not mawkish, force of inclusion of which any political system dreams.” This observation is crucial precisely because the implication is that the realm of animation is one in which the State fosters the creative space necessary for inclusion of multiple ethnicities spanning the country’s demographic. If this were the intention, then logically the Jews involved in the studios had the ideological space to express their identities while remaining compliant with State values. The very nature of animation presented “a future aimed permanently at potential and possible change” where Jews would become indispensable in its workings.

The collective artistic efforts of both ethnic Russians and ethnic Jews led to the creation of the Cheburashka series at Soyuzmultfilm, the State’s premier animation studio. Founded in 1936, Soyuzmultfilm became the top producer of animated works in Europe and even gained international acclaim to such a high degree that the film was resurrected in 1999 under decree of President Boris Yeltsin. Beginning as early as the 1920s, law known as the korenizatsiya policies lifted non-Russian Soviet citizens into equal considerations for employment. Jewish-born artists now had an impetus in migrating to the Soviet capital of Moscow to begin work at film

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759 David MacFadyen, *Yellow Crocodiles and Blue Oranges: Russian Animated Film Since World War Two* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), 90.
760 MacFadyen, 88.
761 Slavic scholar David MacFadyen defines Soviet realism as “supposedly the logical culmination of Russia’s socially responsible and admirably ‘critical’ Golden Age, while simultaneously addressing the demands of the present and the desires of the future,” MacFadyen, 32.
763 MacFadyen, xvi.
764 MacFadyen, 43.
765 MacFadyen, xii.
766 Katz “Drawing,” 2.
studios. Once Stalin rose to power, film and classical music were sanctioned under the “anticosmopolitanism” campaign, which marked animation as the only feasible vocation left for the initial influx of Jewish artists.

Jews who had already established themselves at Soyuzmultfilm prior to WWII recruited Jewish connections to combat the growing atmosphere of institutional antisemitism in the fine arts. Soyuzmultfilm sponsored postwar training programs that allowed members of the cohort to bypass the formal artistic training at educational institutions in favor of freelance employment at the studio. A disproportionate number of Jewish applicants were successful, thus continuing to thwart the State’s restraint on employment. Composers also sought out contracts with the studio precisely because it granted them artistic freedom in featuring Jewish musical themes as an acceptable part of a musical composition. Cheburashka’s creative team was composed “almost entirely of Jews,” including writer Eduard Uspensky, director Roman Kachanov, art director Leonid Shvartsman, and composers Vladimir Shainsky and Mikhail Ziv, among others. Both visual and story elements are evocative of Jewishness, yet Shainsky’s music written for the series remains the most captivating element in Russia today.

Vladimir Shainsky’s Music in Cheburashka

While an endearing cartoon due to its genuine characters and artful stop motion animation style, it is the music of Cheburashka that functions to preserve its legacy into the present, and by extension, the legacy of the Jewish artists bringing the creatures to life. Singing songs featured in the series is a staple of childhood in Russia and other post-Soviet countries: the opening lines of Crocodile Gena’s “Birthday Song” and “Blue Wagon” are ubiquitous among schools, where they are essentially treated as nursery rhymes that one automatically recognizes. The composer behind the songs, Vladimir Shainsky, is popular in Russian society, yet fails to occupy a significant space in music scholarship. Perhaps due to his recent passing in 2017 and dearth in scholarship about him, Russian cartoons being taken for granted by scholars, or a combination of the two, little information is available concerning how his Jewish background fed into his prolific musical scores.

Regardless of the recognition he received for his contribution to Soviet animation music, Shainsky was not immune to the cultural politics surrounding his identity as a Soviet Jew. Whereas now his Jewish identity is of little consequence for the masses who sing and admire his work, this very identity might have been the reason for why he initially began work at Soyuzmultfilm. The way in which his Jewishness was received by the USSR in the mid-twentieth century most likely encouraged his work in the animation industry in lieu of classical music. However, I do not believe this limited his impact on Soviet society. Given that his music remains widely known throughout the former USSR, his Jewishness seems to be secondary to cultural product. Whereas in the mid-twentieth century Shainsky would have been persecuted by the State for his ethnicity, in the present the Jewish identities of former Soviet musicians and artists do not factor into the appeal of their works both by ethnic and Jewish Russians. This signals an acceptance of Jewish artists as ingrained contributors to Russian culture.

767 Katz “Drawing,” 42.
768 Katz “Drawing,” 42.
769 Katz “Drawing,” 44.
Shainsky’s upbringing resembled that of many Jews drawn to musical study. Born in Kiev in 1925 to a Jewish family, Shainsky studied the violin at the Kiev Conservatory before being evacuated to Tashkent, where he continued pursuing the violin. After WWII, he graduated from the orchestral department of the Moscow Conservatory with hopes of becoming a composer. This coincided with Stalin’s policy of erasing Jewish influence in the USSR, and as such, Shainsky was barred from entry due to being Jewish and unable to seek out composing as a vocation. Only in 1962 did he manage to enter the composition department at a local conservatory in Baku and begin writing a string concerto and symphony. His employment at Soyuzmultfilm seemed quite natural, as Shainsky quickly composed numerous memorable children’s songs such as “Antoshka” and “Chunga Changa.” Employment placed him in an atmosphere where he could compose using both his European musical training and knowledge of Klezmer Jewish music traditions. Shainsky stated that Jewish music had always affected him deeply and that many of his songs were influenced by Klezmer. This nod to Jewish music can be heard by scholars attuned to Klezmer in songs he composed for Cheburashka, such as Gena’s “Birthday Song.” It seems that Shainsky shared the position of many Russian Jews at Soyuzmultfilm who felt they were at the crossroads of identity, never quite fitting into a clean, distinguishable category. Just as Jewish artistic feats have been historically muddled by lack of recognition and state censorship, Shainsky’s music is no exception: Russians know his music by heart, but many remain unaware of his Jewish roots. What can be drawn from his music in Cheburashka, however, is that the furry creature belongs in society with music reinforcing his position in it.

The second episode of the series, the self-titled “Cheburashka,” premiered in 1971 and features Gena and Cheburashka encountering the Pioneers, a group of young boys intent upon providing service to their society in the form of outdoor labor. Their inclusion in this caper pokes fun at the orthodoxy of the Soviet children’s program: Love for one’s school, country, the Communist Party, and other ideologies were part of the aims of the Young Pioneers. With the paramount goal of “[bringing] adults joy through success in study and conduct” and of fostering respect for “the work of adults for the common good and the welfare of the family,” children who were enlisted in this program were seen as the quintessential Soviet citizen. Their fantastical representation elicits a stark juxtaposition between Cheburashka and Gena and the Pioneers. Katz and other scholars state that Cheburashka can be read as symbolic of Jews in the Soviet Union. Cheburashka’s reticent nature and naïve inability to conform to societal standards is what evokes pity and affection from an audience. His origins are unknown even to himself, he cannot read, and he has a propensity for overlooking negative qualities in others in favor of a steadfast sense of optimism. Overall, he is a misfit, albeit a gregarious one. Despite his being labeled as an “other,” Cheburashka integrates into the Pioneers purely through determination and altruism. After proving their work ethic through manual labor and community beautification, Cheburashka
and Gena are invited by the Pioneers by the end of the cartoon to join their ranks regardless of being visually aberrant (see Figure 1).\textsuperscript{777}

![Figure 1. Cheburashka and Gena begin marching alongside the Pioneers.](image)

This visual component portrays homogeneity clearly as Cheburashka and Gena line up with the Pioneers and begin marching out of the town square.

While the visual information conveys the Jewish Cheburashka’s ability to conform to the Soviet State Pioneers, I propound that Shainsky further renders this assimilation musically in the scene. Both the “Birthday Song” and the Pioneer march song comprise the medley present at the conclusion of the episode. Earlier as the duo struggled to fit into the Pioneer ideals, a strict bifurcation of musical themes can be heard: the march song plays as the Pioneers are featured performing civic engagement, while the “Birthday Song” sounds after Cheburashka and Gena’s failed attempts at building or moments when only they are in the frame. Throughout the episode, the pair attempt to contribute to society in the same manner as the Pioneers, yet they lack the training and resources the Pioneers have access to. This results in their efforts being in vain in contrast to the Pioneers, who always come back to show off their successful attempts at beautification. Only once Gena and Cheburashka deviate from the accepted standard and use their distinct identities to contribute to society are they finally successful. Gena has an idea to gather debris from the bottom of a nearby lake and promptly descends into the water, for his identity as a crocodile allows him to do so while the human Pioneers remain on land.\textsuperscript{778} He returns to the Pioneers with twice his height of rubbish, who stand back in awe and applaud the pair, culminating in their newfound status as honorary Pioneers.

I draw attention to the initial discordance between the Pioneers and the pair first exemplify how they function as symbolic Russian Jews, and second to give context to the analysis. Cheburashka and Gena’s rejection from Soviet society is implied in their initially hostile relations with the Pioneers. They are perceived by the human Pioneers as incongruous creatures, unable to join their ranks purely on the basis of identity alone. As the pair continue to find ways to aid their human Soviet society, their eventual success is a testament to Russian Jews’ assimilation into Soviet society while retaining their identities as Jews. What the ending of the cartoon


\textsuperscript{778} Kachanov Ep. 2, 15:30.
seems to imply, furthermore, is that identity is multifaceted, and neither the Russian nor the Jewish portions are invalid when considered together.

The music buttresses the sense of cohesion shared by both groups as they jubilantly march forward into a seemingly better tomorrow. As earlier stated, the march song represents the Pioneers and by extension the Soviet regime, with the “Birthday Song” accompanying the antics of Cheburashka and Gena. As both groups line up in preparation of marching, horn calls reminiscent of military parades sound in the distance.\(^{779}\) The single-file line makes their way across the frame as an upbeat, stately march song plays. The main melodic line is composed of upper brass and follows a simple melody, yet the remarkable aspect of this line is the texture in the background: the garmon, a Russian folk instrument akin to the accordion, backs the melody with chordal accompaniment. Gena plays on a garmon in the cartoon, but it is more realistic to assume that an accordion is playing the soundtrack for the series due to the more common availability of accordion players. The “Birthday Song” is redolent of the Klezmer style due to the instrumentation, which features the accordion and clarinet, as well as its upbeat melody and ornamentations interspersed throughout the melody as it is present in this scene. The accordion is a traditional Klezmer instrument and is associated with Jewish music.\(^{780}\) Its distinct reedy sound is constantly present in a semi-triplet figure through the authoritative brass tones.

Once the line of characters turns around and every member is out of the frame except for Cheburashka, the music seamlessly switches into the “Birthday Song” and draws attention to the presence of Cheburashka in the Pioneers.\(^{781}\) Just as the musical style transitions, the brass is relegated to the background as the accordion takes center stage in a dynamic exchange of the musical line. Curiously, Shainsky modifies the “Birthday Song” to include ornamentations that are absent from the initial theme played by Gena at the start of the episode. Grace notes now weave within the melody, as it is present the first time during the medley. The brass simultaneously adopts the role of the accordion and supports the main line with harmonic interjections. Shainsky does not stop there, for the “Birthday Song” reemerges a second time with unfettered ornamentations: turns, mordents, and grace notes. As the characters march into the background to the beat of the “Birthday Song,” Cheburashka’s shadow is not forgotten as he is the last figure to exit the frame—perhaps hinting that Russian Jews’ musical influence cannot be so easily forgotten.

Cheburashka’s happiness at being accepted by the world around him while acknowledging the difficulty of his former position colors his hopeful demeanor with an unexpected complexity. Cheburashka’s identity and sense of self are contingent upon his lived experiences with much that can be read as an analogy to Jews in the USSR. If lyrically Cheburashka’s status of being excluded and included suggests his Jewishness and Russianness, then both components of identity ultimately form his person. Whether or not Shainsky intended to narrate his own experiences remains unclear, yet his compositional works for both Yiddish and Soviet audiences hint towards the salience of both—just as Cheburashka realizes the same for himself.

**Conclusion**

Examining Soviet animation through a musical lens presents an opportunity to better understand the influence of Russian Jews on contemporary popular culture. While there is much

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\(^{779}\) Kachanov Ep. 2, 17:56-18:06.


that remains unknown about the identity politics concerning the Jews of Soyuzmultfilm, their presence at the forefront of animation opens an avenue for further exploration into their experiences. Jewish voices emerged from within the shared creative space into Soviet entertainment to be seen and heard publicly, and to attest to the validity of Russian-Jewish identity. By expressing personal experiences through *Cheburashka*, the work of Russian Jews suggests that Soviet culture has room to include people of multiple identities. The musical elements of the series supplements and strengthens the visual information implying harmony between ethnic Russians and ethnic Jews. Vladimir Shainsky’s music reflects his own identity having a place in Soviet culture through his contributions in children’s music. The music and animations made it possible for Jewish and Russian identity to be closely intertwined and almost indistinguishable when considering the impact of cartoons in contemporary society.
Bibliography


SECTION 8
Communication and PR
"Ongoing Russian Influence Operations in Turkey: A Case Study in Political Cartoons"
Eric Workman, University of Pittsburgh

Abstract
The aims of this paper are first to provide a criterion for identifying propaganda, and second to then apply that criterion to a specific case study. In pursuit of that aim, I draw attention to ongoing influence operations being conducted by Sputnik News, a Russian state-owned media company. I begin by identifying all of the different languages which Sputnik News conducts its influence operations in. Then, I select one of these influence operations for further examination—Turkish. Next, I outline the various dissemination techniques which Sputnik News uses in its Turkish influence operation, and select one of these techniques for further examination—the dissemination of political cartoons. From that examination, I discover a trend—Sputnik News’s Turkish political cartoons consistently portray the U.S. and Turkey as adversaries engaged in a zero-sum game. I then describe how the dissemination of such false narratives supports the goal of Sputnik News’s Turkish influence operation—to create rifts between two NATO allies. Finally, I discuss how, as consumers of information, we can improve our ability to spot potentially bad-faith actors and manipulation campaigns (state-sponsored or otherwise) by studying case studies like this one.

Introduction
Throughout this paper, I repeatedly use the terms “propaganda” and “influence operation”. While closely related, these two terms are not synonymous. Jason Stanley, a professor of philosophy at Yale University, defines propaganda as being “…in the service of either supporting or eroding ideals” (52). Note, however, that Stanley’s definition of propaganda is a functional one—it describes what propaganda does i.e., how propaganda works—not what propaganda actually is. This paper does not attempt to provide an exact definition of what propaganda is. Instead, it simply attempts to establish a criterion which can help us better identify propaganda when we encounter it. To establish this criterion, I transform Stanley’s definition into a teleological one and then answer a few related questions.

Teleology is concerned with purpose. So, we might revise Stanley’s definition as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teleological version of Stanley’s definition</th>
<th>If the purpose of disseminating X is to either support or erode certain ideals, then X is propaganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

But, when would someone want to support or erode ideals? Well, perhaps whenever that actor wants to persuade others. By supporting or eroding an ideal, a certain preference about those ideals is conveyed to the audience. That preference is: the ideal being supported/eroded is superior/inferior to some alternative ideal. By conveying that preference, the disseminator of X can persuade the target audience into adopting that same preference. So, the underlying purpose of supporting/eroding ideals is to have the target audience adopt particular preferences.

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We now have a sufficient criterion for identifying propaganda:

| Criterion for identifying propaganda | If the purpose of disseminating $X$ is to persuade others to adopt certain preferences, then $X$ is propaganda. |

The dissemination of propaganda is thus an act of persuasion. And when an actor disseminates multiples different kinds of propaganda, we call it an “influence operation”. Sputnik News conducts influence operations in many different languages. This paper draws attention to one of these influence operations—its Turkish influence operation. As a case study for this Turkish influence operation, I examine Sputnik News’s dissemination of one specific kind of propaganda—political cartoons.

Sputnik News
Sputnik News operates sites in several languages. Figure 1 lists all of these sites:

![Figure 1](image)

Many of these sites also contain a caricature page. For example, since it’s creation in 2015, Sputnik News’s Turkish site has published over 1200 political cartoons. But interestingly, some of these cartoons also appear on other Sputnik News sites. Figure 2 provides an example of a cartoon which was published on 9 of Sputnik News’s caricature pages:

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783 Total: 30
784 Arabic, Czech, Dari, Persian (Farsi), Polish, Portuguese (Brazil), Spanish, Turkish, and Vietnamese
Even more interestingly, the cartoons published on almost all of Sputnik News’s caricature pages are illustrated by the same artist—Vitaliy Podvitskiy. What makes this so interesting is that many of Podvitskiy’s cartoons contain text—and that text changes to match the specific caricature page which it’s published on. Figure 3 provides an example of this:
On the surface perhaps this isn’t too surprising. We should expect that the caricature page on the Turkish site has cartoons with Turkish text, the caricature page on the Arabic site has cartoons with Arabic text, etc. But, once we take a step back, we realize that Sputnik News’s dissemination of political cartoons is more intricate than simply illustrate and publish.

For example, it seems highly unlikely that Podvitskiy speaks all of the languages his cartoons are published in. But if translators are involved, why isn’t every one of Podvitskiy’s cartoons published on all of Sputnik News’s sites with caricature pages? The cartoon depicted in Figure 3 appears on only seven of Sputnik News’s caricature pages. But from Figure 1, we saw that Sputnik News operates 30 sites. These observations and questions led me to suspect that Sputnik News’s dissemination of political cartoons is more elaborate, systematic, and intentionally curated than it initially appears. Figure 4 makes these suspicions explicit by laying out a template for how I think Sputnik News disseminates its political cartoons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The (Suspected) Sputnik News Template</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Podvitskiy draws a “base” cartoon (i.e., one without any text)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Arabic, Italian, Polish, Portuguese (Brazil), Spanish, Turkish, and Vietnamese
2. If necessary, Podvitkiy annotates what text should be included, and where on the cartoon that text should go
3. An editor for each of Sputnik News’s sites determines if the cartoon is suitable for its caricature page (if “yes”, then move to next step)
4. If necessary, a translator uses Podvitkiy’s annotates to add language-specific text
5. The “updated” cartoon is added to the relevant language-specific caricature page
6. The cartoon is tagged with keywords

By disseminating its political cartoons in a way that resembles what I’ve outlined here, Sputnik News is able to selectively curate the kinds of narratives that it portrays to different target audiences. Sputnik News’s dissemination of Turkish political cartoons is a prime example.

The Turkish Case
As mentioned previously, since its creation in 2015, over 1200 political cartoons have been published on Sputnik News’s Turkish caricature page. After proposing my Suspected Template for how Sputnik disseminates its political cartoons, I wanted to quantitatively analyze these Turkish political cartoons. So, I examined the keyword-tags that Sputnik News has applied to each cartoon. I first translated these Turkish tags into English, and then constructed a database. This database is structured using Sputnik News’s own tagging system and hierarchy. Each keyword-tag that Sputnik News applies to a cartoon is also associated with one of eight different classes. So, my database simply aggregates English versions of Sputnik News’s tags based on these classes. Figure 5 provides an example of how this works:

![Sputnik’s Tagging System](image)

After aggregating these tags, I obtained several interesting results. First, “USA” (646) appears in roughly half of the cartoons. Second, “USA” (646) occurs over six times more frequently than
“Turkey” (105). Since the target audience for these cartoons is those who speak Turkish, this was especially surprising. Third, “Donald Trump” (146) is the most tagged Person; but is also tagged over five times more frequently than the second most tagged Person “Vladimir Putin” (29) and over nine times more frequently than the President of Turkey “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan” (16). Again, since the target audience for these cartoons is those who speak Turkish, this was quite surprising. However, perhaps the most noteworthy discovery is that these cartoons consistently depict a false narrative—one where Turkey and the U.S. are not NATO allies, but instead are adversaries in a zero-sum game. This focus on a zero-sum game is critical because it conveys the message that there are no opportunities for the two countries to cooperate, collaborate, or mutually benefit.

Because of rising anti-American sentiment in Turkey, many Turks have found this kind of false narrative appealing. In Turkey there is widespread perception that the West, and in particular the U.S., helped orchestrate the failed coup in 2016. To be more precise, many Turks view the events which occurred in July of 2016 not as a true domestic coup d’etat attempt, but rather as a failed attack on Turkey’s sovereignty carried out by the U.S. and Fethullah Gülen. During the failed coup, attacks on Turkish federal buildings were aided by Turkish military personnel operating out of İncirlik Air Base. İncirlik hosts a significant number of American troops, and as a result, many Turks suspected the U.S. had been involved. These suspicions intensified after Turkish President Erdoğan proclaimed that the mastermind of the failed coup was Fethullah Gülen, an Islamic cleric who has been residing in Pennsylvania under political asylum since 1999. After this proclamation, Erdoğan called on the U.S. to immediately extradite Gülen. When Washington refused to do so, the Turkish public viewed it as Washington protecting its co-conspirator. To voice their resentment, large groups of Turkish citizens gathered just outside the gates of İncirlik and protested the presence of U.S. forces in Turkey. Following these protests, significant public discussions about the role and value of U.S. forces in Turkey began. Nevertheless, American access to İncirlik hasn’t been revoked yet, nor have any U.S. forces been withdrawn. But perhaps most importantly, the public’s animosity towards the U.S. hasn’t left either. In fact, it might well have increased.

This increase in animosity is, in part, due to persistent disagreements between the two countries over the S-400 missile system. In August of 2017, President Trump signed into law the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Under Section 231 of CAATSA, the Executive Branch is required to impose sanctions on any entity that engages in a significant transaction with the Russian government, or its defense and intelligence sectors. So, in September of 2017, when Ankara agreed to pay Moscow $2.5bn for S-400 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, it should have triggered CAATSA sanctions. But at the time, the White

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789 “ADD: 15 Temmuz ‘hükümet darbesi’ değil, Cumhuriyet’e saldırdır!” Kayseri Olay Haber, 14 July 2020.
791 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Public Law 115-44 (H.R. 3364).
House chose to suspend the imposition of these sanctions. Perhaps the Trump administration didn’t want to be in the awkward position of having to sanction its NATO ally. Or, perhaps the Trump administration had hoped Ankara could be persuaded to abandon its S-400 deal before the missiles actually arrived. Regardless, after the first shipment of S-400 missiles arrived at the Murted airfield in Ankara in July of 2019\textsuperscript{793}, it became clear that any such hopes were in vain. The presence of S-400s in Turkey forced the U.S. to remove its NATO ally from the F-35 program\textsuperscript{794}. But once again, the White House refrained from imposing any immediate CAATSA sanctions on Turkey. Instead, Washington announced that if Ankara’s S-400s remained non-operational, then CAATSA sanctions would not be imposed\textsuperscript{795}. But when Turkey conducted a test of the S-400 system in October of 2020\textsuperscript{796}, Ankara signaled that it had no intention of doing this. In response, Washington finally implemented the long-overdue CAATSA sanctions in December of 2020\textsuperscript{797}. Targeting Turkey’s military procurement agency, the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), these CAATSA sanctions included a ban on all U.S. export licenses to SSB as well as several asset-freezes and visa restrictions for its senior executives\textsuperscript{798}.

Now consider Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8:

Figure 6

Figure 6 and Figure 7 both reference Turkey’s desire to acquire an F-35 fighter jet, and the U.S. blocking that acquisition by removing Turkey from the F-35 program. Interestingly, Figure 6 fails to note that Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program was a direct consequence of Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system. On the other hand, while Figure 7 does reference the S-400 system, it depicts an incorrect timeline. Rather than accurately portraying Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program as a consequence of Ankara purchasing the S-400 system, Figure 7 portrays it as the cause. In this way, both Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict the U.S. as

\textsuperscript{794} Statement by the Press Secretary, The White House 17 July 2019.
\textsuperscript{795} Aaron Mehta “Turkey has the S-400, The Trump administration is silent.” Defense News, 12 July 2019.
\textsuperscript{796} “Turkey reportedly test-fires S-400 air defense system” Defense News, 16 October 2020.
\textsuperscript{797} Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, 14 December 2020.
\textsuperscript{798} Press Statement by the Secretary of State, Department of State, 14 December 2020.
unfoundedly undermining Turkey. To support this depiction, both Figure 6 and Figure 7 utilize zero-sum game imagery.

In Figure 6, Turkey and the U.S. are portrayed as explicit adversaries—with President Erdoğan and President Trump even colliding directly. The setting of the cartoon, an American football field, is also particularly revealing. In Turkey, the fervor surrounding Turkey and the F-35, like the game of football, is viewed as an American creation. So, even though Washington had told Ankara that if it purchased the S-400 this would be the only outcome, many in Turkey became frustrated when this outcome occurred. From Turkey’s perspective, the fervor surrounding Turkey’s purchase stemmed from norms and rules which Washington had created—not Ankara.

In Figure 7, Turkey and the U.S. are also portrayed as explicit adversaries. The setting of this cartoon, a chess game, indicates that the two nations are in constant competition. In chess, a player makes a move, and then responds to the opponent’s counter-move with a counter-move of their own. This is cycle of moves and counter-moves continues until there is a clear winner and a clear loser. But this is not an accurate representation of international relations. Nations are always presented with opportunities to work together—and often take advantage of such opportunities to achieve their individual goals.

By utilizing zero-sum game imagery in these ways, Sputnik News is able to capitalize on rising Turkey-U.S. tensions and portray a false reality. And by repeatedly portraying this false reality, Sputnik News hopes to persuade its Turkish audience into believing that Turkey and the U.S. actually are adversaries without any opportunities for the two to collaborate, cooperate, or mutually benefit. And that kind of persuasion fits the criterion for propaganda which I identified in the Introduction.
On December 12, 2019 the U.S. Senate passed a resolution which officially recognized the Ottoman Empire’s killing of over 1,500,000 Armenians from 1915 to 1923 as a genocide. This sparked an uproar in Turkish politics. Figure 8 references that uproar.

Here, Turkey and the U.S. are once again portrayed as adversaries using zero-sum game imagery. Like Figure 7’s chess game, the setting of this cartoon, a card game, indicates that the two nations are engaged in a turn-taking competition. Under this metaphor, since Washington just played its “move”—recognition of the genocide, Turkey must respond with its own a retaliatory counter-move. The cartoon even offers two suggestions of which moves Turkey could make—either undermine U.S. forces at Incirlik Air Base, or recognize the U.S.’s killing of Native Americans as a genocide. The absence of any other cards in Turkey’s “hand” further implies that that these are the only two moves available to Ankara. Similarly, the absence of any cards in the American “hand” implies that no matter which of these two options Ankara chooses to “play”, the U.S. will not be able to respond. But there are several reasons why this representation of international relations is inaccurate. First, Turkey is under no obligation to respond to a U.S. declaration about a past historical event. Second, even if Turkey were to respond, there are certainly more options available to Ankara than the ones Sputnik News has illustrated here. Third, even if Turkey pursues one of the actions outlined in Figure 8, its incorrect to assume that Washington would not be able to produce a response of its own. Finally, like Figure 6 and Figure 7, Figure 8 offers no avenues for the two nations to work together.

By utilizing zero-sum game imagery in this way, Sputnik News is able to capitalize on rising Turkey-U.S. tensions and portray a false reality. And by repeatedly portraying this false reality, Sputnik News hopes to persuade its Turkish audience into believing that Turkey and the U.S. actually are adversaries without any opportunities for the two to collaborate, cooperate, or mutually benefit. And once again, that kind of persuasion fits the criterion for propaganda which I identified in the Introduction.

Conclusion and Future Development
This paper began by proposing a criterion for identifying propaganda. I then examined Sputnik News’s dissemination of political cartoons, generally. Next, I examined Sputnik News’s dissemination of Turkish political cartoons specifically. Finally, in the last section of the paper, I situated several of Sputnik News’s Turkish political cartoons within their relevant context. In doing so, I discovered that these cartoons fit my proposed criterion for propaganda. Because of this, I now able to conclude that Sputnik News disseminates Turkish propaganda in the form of political cartoons.

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799 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that it is the policy of the United States to commemorate the Armenian Genocide through official recognition and remembrance, Senate Resolution 150
Based on this conclusion, I infer that the other kinds of Turkish media which Sputnik News disseminates, might be propaganda too. But this inference needs to be verified. If verified, it would mean that Sputnik News is conducting an ongoing Turkish influence operation. And based on the evidence available, I also infer that Sputnik News conducts influence operations on each of its different language sites. It’s also important to note that Sputnik News is not the only Russian state-owned media company publishing content in multiple languages. Similarly, it’s also important to note that Russia is not the only government which owns and control media companies. The inferences and observations I have made here are good starting points for future research into this topic. As consumers of information, we must improve our ability to spot potentially bad-faith actors and manipulation campaigns (state-sponsored or otherwise). Even though, spotting these bad-faith actors and manipulation campaigns can often be quite difficult, it is certainly necessary.
Bibliography


“Power Balancing in Cyber Space Between the United States and Russia"
Kiera Fyffe, George Washington University

Abstract

Cyberspace is a relatively new domain of warfare that presents its host of potential challenges when it comes to the stability of the international system. In analyzing the effectiveness of balance of power theory in cyberspace and how such a scenario would potentially play out between the United States and Russia, this paper will utilize several case studies. To exemplify the academic consensus of how BOP theory applies in cyberspace, this paper will use existing literature that analyzes and describes how BOP theory works. This paper will then use real examples of cyber-attacks between the US and Russia, whether they originated from the state or a third party, and analyze how or whether they impacted the relationship and shifted the BOP in the world. This paper will analyze and determine if US or Russian responses to cyber-attacks from one another have historically resulted in the stabilization of the international stage. This paper will examine the role of offensive realism versus defensive realism and its role in this debate. This paper will argue that power balancing is possible in cyberspace and give potential scenarios of what that would look like between the United States and Russia that focus on alliances. While neorealism may need to be modified and adapted to the digital age, answering this question does not need to include another supplementary school of thought altogether.

Keywords: neorealism, structural realism, power balancing, balance of power, cyberspace

Introduction

In the span of the last two decades, humanity has seen the rapid growth and development of the internet and impressive technological advances. The growing complexity of the tool that is cyberspace has resulted in a new domain of warfare, where the same age-old archaic realist scenarios are allowed to play out between states. However, rather than by land, sea, or air, the struggle to maximize power is happening in a digital abyss. This paper will seek to advance realist theory by examining how traditional IR neorealist political theory’s predictions are affected by this new domain of warfare and whether power balancing between the United States and Russia is possible and what it would look like under this new domain. Does power balancing have the same stabilizing effect on the relationship between the US and Russia in cyberspace?

Literature Review

This literature review will argue that current political science research does not adequately analyze and address the question of how realist theory operates in cyberspace, nor analyze whether power balancing has the same stabilizing effect it does in cyberspace as it does in the real world and examine the implications of this on US-Russia diplomatic relations.

While it appears that there is a widely accepted consensus that power balancing will inevitably look different in cyberspace, there is a lack of unity and ongoing debates surrounding exactly what power balancing would look like in such a space or whether balancing is even a viable option or rendered obsolete digitally. Current academic literature seems to modify neorealist theories on power dynamics to include other international relations theories or only simply point out that an entirely new school of thought is necessary to understand the problem of cyberwarfare.
In one article James Adams approaches the issue of cyber warfare from a neorealist perspective. He accepts the assumption that enemy states will, in a true neorealist fashion, put their resources into developing cyber technology that will give them an asymmetrical advantage in defeating US technological capabilities. He argues the solution is to forge a partnership between policymakers and the private sector tech community as the private sector often has more information and intelligence about cyber vulnerabilities than the government. Adams fails to explain whether his solutions would contribute to the balance of power, what kind of balancing would play out in the digital space, and whether this would lead to the level of stabilization that traditional power balancing promotes.

Unlike other methods of warfare, there does appear to be a consensus that cyberwarfare, requires some shred of cooperation between governments and private sector technology companies. Unlike Adams who advocates for Congress to pass a bill to expand DOD cyber-spying capabilities at the cost of civil liberties to increase US defensive capabilities, others argue that defense strategies don't work in cyber warfare. As one article argues, to launch a defensive system, attacks would need to be avoided on all national networks in the private and public sector. If the private sector plays such an important role but is independent of the government, the overall defense against cyber-attacks is weakened as the government and private sector aren't a united front.

Some have argued that neorealist power balancing theory is not complex enough for such a topic and other international relations theories must be incorporated to understand the problem. As Constantine J. Petallides argues, the Internet needs to be seen as a place that has its own customs and states need to come together to promote its devolvement and ensure their security. This resolution utilizes elements of constructivist theory. While this is a potential solution, this doesn't examine how power-balancing looks in cyberspace through a neorealist lens, a clear gap in social science research. Constructivism argues that states must have common identities and become a sort of cyber friends with other states through the acceptance of norms, but this also centers states as main actors when rogue hackers and private companies exist. Is everyone getting on board for these norms even possible? Including the constructivist perspective can help one understand the Internet as a unique medium, with constantly changing norms, but it does not offer a reliable solution for long-term stability. Petallides is not alone in supplementing realist theory with another theory to examine how power balancing looks in cyberspace.

Yavuz Akdag argues that Power Transition Theory is necessary to supplement the neorealist perspective on power balancing in the digital realm. The author argues that while the neorealist perspective has been applied to cyberspace, these studies only analyze the applicability of neorealism to the digital realm and are devoid of a systematic analysis of direct reference to the likelihood of cyberwar between states. This opinion is valid, hence why I will be exploring how power-balancing looks in cyberspace and what effects this has on the likelihood of war, and if it is stabilizing enough. While correct about the theoretical gaps in political science regarding this

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body of research, Akdag doesn't close these gaps using neorealist theory and instead argues PTT must be taken into consideration.

Based on current examinations of academic literature, most research only examines how power balancing looks through the lens of a case study between the United States and China, but not between the US and Russia which my paper will be exploring. While existing academic literature explores how BOP theory operates in cyberspace, from the perspective of neorealism, it often does so by using other theories. Academic literature that doesn't supplement neorealism doesn't offer solutions for the problems power-balancing faces due to the idiosyncrasies of digital warfare compared to traditional means. Existing research also focuses on cyber warfare or the potential for it between the United States and China and rarely explores this scenario between the United States and Russia. I found no research exploring the implications of cyber warfare on power balancing between the United States and the Russian Federation. My paper will aim to close these gaps in academic research.

**Neorealism**

The balance of power is an idea rooted in neorealist theory. Neorealism, also known as structural realism, is a school of international political thought founded by Kenneth Waltz. It differs from classical realism in that it doesn't believe the behavior of states is derived from human nature which is inherently self-interested. Neorealist theory rests on various assumptions that help explain the behavior of states.

First, neorealism assumes that the structure of the international system is inherently anarchic. This means that the international system simply lacks any supreme authority or governing body, i.e. supranational organizations, keeping states in check. Neorealism also assumes that states are unitary and rational actors and that they think strategically and make rational calculations on how to best survive in the anarchy of the international system. This also means that states are the most important factors when analyzing the international system. Non-state actors are acknowledged in this theory but regarded as significantly less important. Also, important to understanding neorealism is the idea that the basic motive of states is survival and that all states, no matter how limited, have some military capability.

**Balance of Power Theory**

With these assumptions in mind, the concept of power balancing attempts to explain the emergence of alliances or a state's attempt to increase its power in an anarchic international system. To prevent the emergence of a single all-powerful hegemony, states make alliances (external balancing) or increase their economic and military power to balance against any potentially merging hegemony (internal). The balance of power must be kept lest states, especially smaller and weaker ones, feel insecure about their security leading to an increasingly chaotic and conflict-inducing international system. There is technically no one definition for the BOP or how it should be referred to but for the purpose of my analysis, BOP's goal is to prevent war as states

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804 Ibid
will be deterred from attacking other states if they believe they will be countered and unsuccessful in their endeavor. Like there is no agreed-upon definition, there is no one method of balancing power. It can almost include any strategy states use to keep from being vulnerable or maintain some form of equilibrium amongst powers. Offensive realists and defensive realists interpret the BOP in differing ways.

Defensive realism, founded by Kenneth Waltz, argues that the state's need for security (above all else) leads them to favor the status quo of the international system and adopt a defensive position towards any opposition.\textsuperscript{805} The goal is to keep the peace; states will avoid aggressive tactics out of fear of retaliation using greater force. Defensive realists argue states are okay with an acceptable amount of power so as not to upset the balance of power and set off the security dilemma, where a state's attempt to increase security automatically makes other states feel theirs decreased. Defensive realists emphasize the offense-defense balance, which indicates how easy or hard it is to defeat an enemy. If the balance favors the defense, conquest is hard, and war is unlikely.\textsuperscript{806} In the case of the defense having an advantage, great powers are not incentivized to use force to gain power.

Offensive realism, founded by John Mearsheimer, argues that the need for security and survival leaders states to make aggressive power maximizing moves.\textsuperscript{807} States will only cooperate when forming fleeting alliances but are always trying to diminish other state’s powers and increase their own.\textsuperscript{808} More power means more security. The nature of the international system motivates states to try and achieve hegemony and expand territory. However, according to Mearsheimer, complete hegemony is not possible given other factors that make it hard to achieve such as geographical constraints. Instead, only regional hegemony like that of the US can be achieved.

Whether or not the offense or defense is favored depends on the system. It begets the question of whether these same power balancing mechanisms can play out and have the same stabilizing effect in cyberspace, specifically between the US and Russia?

**Difficulties of Power Balancing in Cyber Space**

Traditional methods of balancing power will no doubt play out differently in cyberspace than they normally would. Just like the international system, the internet is anarchic. It lacks a sole governing body, such as a supranational organization, keeping state actors in check. In cyberspace, states are not the most important actors when it comes to analyzing the international system. Neorealism emphasizes the states and great powers as the primary actors in the international system, with domestic affairs or other actors having very little effect on the system. However, as the case study that I will present will show, oftentimes third-party actors act offensively against other states, and it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether the third party was state-sanctioned.

Notable, is that offensive strategies become more prevalent in an online arena as it is much easier to act offensively online than defensively. For example, while to act offensively you

\textsuperscript{808} Steven E. Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism.”
only need software, the state cannot possibly avoid all cyber-attacks to act defensively, especially considering many cyber-attacks occur on private institutions, such as banks, that are still relevant to security. Cyber-attacks are also the cheapest domain of warfare. As one article in my research noted, “budget plans in 2014 show the US Air Force spending 2.4 times as much on cyber offense research as on cyber defense.”

When the offense is favored in the offense-defense balance, states will more likely take preemptive measures to increase their power and security. War is more likely. Therefore, unlike in other domains where the offense-defense balance can vary, the inherent nature of the internet makes the offense favorable.

There are no borders or territorial sovereignty in cyberspace and anonymity is made easy. This means that it can be difficult for states to determine whether they were attacked as an act of war (ex. Hackers hacking private American companies but vastly affecting the American people), who particularly attacked them, and whom they can trust. This could prove to make power balancing strategies such as alliance forming difficult as secondary power states, according to neorealist theory, form alliances and combine capabilities with weak states in order to combat a revisionist hegemony seeking state acting offensively. Even classifying traditionally weak states as weak in cyberspace may be a mistake as economic power can usually define military capabilities, but this isn't necessarily the case in cyberspace. While the US has the most powerful military in the world, the US has seen various cyber-attacks from enemies and third-party actors. Last, for obvious reasons, another issue is that a state’s cyber capabilities can be difficult for other states to discern.

I will now examine various real-world examples of cyber-attacks to determine the attack and how the response to the attack impacted the balance of power between the US and Russia. Did these offensive attacks trigger the aforementioned balancing methods or push the two states closer to conflict and possible war, whether it be kinetic or in cyberspace?

**Case Study 1: SolarWinds Hack**

My first case study will examine the recent SolarWinds hack. SolarWinds is a major US IT firm. In this case, Russian intelligence agents were suspected to have hacked the company and were able to add malware to spy on private companies like the cybersecurity firm FireEye and the US Government, including the Department of Homeland Security and Treasury Department. The hack went undetected for 9 months. The US intelligence community and federal investigators blamed SVR, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service for the attack. The CEO of FireEye agreed with this assessment, stating that based on his company’s analysis the forensic analysis points to espionage seen from Russia. The cybersecurity breach is one of the largest in recent years. US Cyber Command, a government organization designed to protect American networks never saw the attack coming. In fact, FireEye was first to notice the security breach.

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811 Ibid.
812 Ibid.
As one article explained, “The attack may also lead to a strengthened relationship between the US government and the cybersecurity industry, with the private sector helping federal officials fight off nation-state attacks and foreign bad actors in the future.”813 One could argue that a form of balancing is occurring where the US is building alliances with the private sector in order to respond to Russia’s offensive security moves in order to keep the status quo (the US's long-standing superpower status). Since the private sector is heavily involved in cyberspace, the state forming alliances can aid in being on the defensive against possible attacks.

This is another real-world neorealist scenario that appears to be unfolding, however, more time is needed to determine if this leads to long-term stability.

**Case Study 3: Colonial Pipeline Hack**

For my final case study, we will examine the colonial pipeline hack. This was a Ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline in May of 2021 carried out by the DarkSide hacking group.814 Panic buying of gas ensued after the pipeline was down for days and gas stations were forced to close all across the southeastern United States. Colonial paid a 4.4-million-dollar ransom in bitcoin to hackers in order to receive back control of their pipeline.815 While the group claims to be apolitical, intelligence shows that the group's software is coded to avoid working on computers where Russian or other Eastern European languages are set as the default.816

In response to this attack, the Biden administration issued Executive Order 14028.817 Its goals were to increase software security standards for sales to the government and tighten detection and security on existing systems.818 It also focused on improving information sharing and training between government and private sector cyber security heads. In addition, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency announced the opening of a new cyber planning office where government agencies such as the FBI or NSA will work with private sector giants such as Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, or AT&T to focus on combatting ransomware.819 This is another example of how power balancing between the US and Russia appears to be playing out. The US and private sector are forming deeper alliances, even though, as neorealism suggests, the States are still the primary actors. If the idea is to prevent an escalation between the US and Russia towards war, this move works as the US tightening its security will ideally deter Russia if they feel they would be unsuccessful in an attack.

**A Closer Look at Alliances**

As these real-world examples have exhibited, the main way the BOP appears to play out in cyberspace is through alliances. Concerning the Russian side, Russia and China, appear to be balancing against US hegemony. As both states resent growing pressure from the West, they

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813 Ibid.
815 Ibid.
816 Ibid.
818 Ibid.
819 Ibid.
have deepened their military, economic, and political relations. The states held joint military exercises and issued joint statements to the West. Vasily Kashin, a senior fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, claims the relationship is the strongest it has been since the 1950s. Arguably, this is no coincidence as technology improves and cyberwar becomes more commonplace, as does states' effort to balance against hegemony through alliances.

Andrew Yang, secretary-general of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies think tank in Taiwan, argued "this is the traditional, old-fashioned balance of power. They consider if China and Russia can join together, they can also regulate the regional security issues." However, as BOP theory and offensive realists predict, some experts think Cold War-era distrust between China and Russia is likely to limit cooperation to broad or informal actions rather than a signed pact. Analysts predict it is likely the two sides could set up a military technology-sharing deal – one that includes cyberwar technology. This alliance could potentially create a favorable BOP as two weaker states balance against hegemony, stabilizing the system. As BOP theory maintains, the system is more stable without a single hegemon. We may continue to see these forms of soft balancing continue. Soft balancing can be defined as "actions that do not directly challenge US military preponderance but that use non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive and unilateral US military politics." As one article noted about the US’s foreign policy, "soft balancing is likely to become more intense if the United States continues to pursue an aggressively unilateralist national security policy. Although soft balancing may be unable to prevent the United States from achieving specific military aims in the near term, it will increase the costs of using U.S. power, reduce the number of countries likely to cooperate with future U.S. military adventures, and possibly shift the balance of power against the United States”xxvi. However, the tactic is regarded as quite ineffective, as notably, the informal Chinese- Russian alliance, which has been mostly about appearances and international posturing, has been.

As the Russians deepen alliances with US adversaries, the US will continue to deepen its alliances, mostly with private tech companies to maintain the status quo and the US’s status. In fact, a White House statement summarizing the conversion between President Putin and President Biden reaffirmed the US’s goal to maintain a relationship with Russia that is “predictable and consistent with US interests.” The US wants Russia to act in ways that are predictable and not completely out of character with maintaining an international status quo.

However, as one article noted about US alliance efforts, “Government officials have disagreed about how effective the stepped-up actions against ransomware groups have been. National Security Council officials have said activities by Russian groups have declined. The F.B.I. has been skeptical.”

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821 Ibid.
822 Ibid.
824 Ibid.
CLOSING

Cyberspace is a powerful tool that can connect billions of people from various states and bring nations together. However, the tool also can wreak havoc as a form of warfare. While I do not think the key should be thrown away, only time will tell whether the traditional methods of balance of power are sustainable enough in cyberspace to prevent war. The growing trend of alliances as a result of cyber-attacks shows that neorealist predictions, without the modification of adding other theories, stand the test of time, even in this new domain.
Bibliography


SECTION 9

Energy
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Azerbaijani Economy

Azerbaijan is one of many oil exporting countries that is exposed to fossil fuel rents. Oil and gas account for more than 90% of Azerbaijan’s exports and contributes to around 30% of GDP.\(^{826}\) Since its independence in 1991, oil and gas production has increased considerably. One of the main directions of Azerbaijan’s oil strategy since 1994 is the transportation of Azerbaijani oil to world markets.\(^{827}\) Negotiations and measures have been taken in this area to ensure the long-term protection of Azerbaijan’s interests, the development of large-scale international economic cooperation, and the transportation of oil to world markets in connection with the increase in oil production in the region. For example, the agreement signed on September 20, 1994, entitled “Contract of the Century”, opened up the oil strategy of Azerbaijan. By signing agreements with major oil companies and several countries, it laid the foundation for international cooperation. In addition, the joint work under these and other signed international oil agreements has opened up vast opportunities for the introduction of advanced technologies and the reconstruction of the infrastructure of the oil industry in Azerbaijan.\(^{828}\)

Following the discovery of the Shah Deniz gas field, the production of oil has continued to increase in the past 2 decades. Despite the improvement of Azerbaijan’s oil and natural gas sector, the country has committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 35% by 2030 under the Paris Agreement. In recent years in Azerbaijan, multifaceted economic reforms have been implemented to ensure sustainable and competitive development of the economy, including comprehensive measures to ensure socio-economic development of the regions, diversify the economy, increase non-oil exports, and stimulate the non-oil sector.\(^{829}\) Nevertheless, practical deployment of projects to reach the goals of economic diversification has been limited compared to the scale of the country’s strengths and ambitions. The long-term resilience of the economy must be strengthened to adjust to the changes in the global energy market. These revelations show the importance of investigating and collecting evidence on the asymmetric short-run impact of oil prices and rents on the macroeconomy in oil-exporting economies. Then, the effects of these measures on the GDP and level of economic diversification can be calculated.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to comprehend the asymmetric short-term impact of oil prices and oil and natural gas revenues on the real GDP and economic diversification of Azerbaijan, literature

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\(^{827}\) "Əsrin müqaviləsi, 10 il, Soh, (2004): 2-21.

\(^{828}\) Ibid.

on energy economics and politics should be reviewed first. In recent years, literature has advanced on energy economics and politics to explain how oil price shocks affect the macroeconomy of a country. Several studies on oil-rich post-Soviet countries have emerged to explain the underlying causes of economic vulnerability to oil price shocks. In particular, Bayramov and Orujova (2017) link low levels of economic and export diversification to high vulnerability in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. The sharp reduction of oil prices has made these countries incapable of supporting high levels of public spending, growth, and consumption. The subsequent devaluation of national currencies in response to declining oil prices has caused large fluctuations in exchange rates. As a result, there has been a clear negative impact on the macroeconomic stability, price levels, and the populations’ purchasing power.

Several other predominant studies have emerged for the case of oil importing countries and oil-exporting countries (Emami and Adibpour, 2012; Aleksandrova, 2016; Alekchina and Yoshino, 2018; and Charfeddine and Barka, 2020). By reviewing economic theories and empirical studies, several main explanations can be used to explain how oil price changes affect Azerbaijan’s economic situation.

The first explanation is typically referred to as the fiscal channel, in which oil-exporting will have increased budget surpluses following a rise in oil prices. As additional money is accumulated, it will be used through government spending to stimulate investment, economic growth, and development. On the contrary, a decrease in oil prices will negatively affect government revenues. It can lead to an increase in the budget deficit because the income is not enough to cover spending. The fall in oil prices will also reduce the imports of intermediary products and limit the access to credit in the private sector. Each of these downsides will have a negative impact on the real GDP of the country.


833 Charfeddine & Barkat, *Short- and long-run asymmetric effect of oil prices and oil and gas revenues on the real GDP and economic diversification in oil-dependent economy.*

834 Emami & Adibpour, *Oil income shocks and economic growth in Iran*; Alekchina & Yoshino, *Impact of world oil prices on an energy exporting economy including monetary policy.*

835 Charfeddine & Barkat, *Short- and long-run asymmetric effect of oil prices and oil and gas revenues on the real GDP and economic diversification in oil-dependent economy.*
The second explanation is the exchange rate channel, which refers to the appreciation of the domestic currency following a rise in oil prices. As oil prices increase, a natural transfer of wealth through trade balance is created. In fact, wealth is transferred from importing countries to oil-exporting countries and the balance is shifted. These capital inflows of foreign currency will induce an appreciation of the domestic currency and a decrease in the competitiveness of local producers. As a consequence of this decrease in the exchange rate, the import price of foreign goods will fall. As the import price of foreign goods fall, the share of foreign goods for consumer’s is higher and the inflation is expected to fall.836

Several other theoretical explanations of the asymmetric impact based on the economic structure and activities of oil-exporting countries have been established.837 The first of these theoretical explanations is based on the Dutch disease theory and maintains that oil-exporting countries will favor investment in the oil sector over other trading sectors.838 As the oil price increases and benefits the country over a short period of time, they will be less resilient and more vulnerable to price changes. When the oil price decreases, it will have a higher impact on economic activity compared to an oil price increase.839

Another important theoretical explanation of the asymmetric impact on the macroeconomy in oil-exporting countries is based on the role of the public sector. The government plays an important role in oil-exporting countries by supporting investment and employment decisions. In other words, it is the main driver of economic activities.840 For example, a period of oil price growth will cause these countries to start several investment or development projects. Unfortunately, a drop-in oil prices may leave these projects unfinished or abandoned.841 Despite this, sovereign wealth funds that have been established by the majority of oil-exporting countries can reduce the negative impact of lower oil prices and oil and natural gas revenues.842

Although literature on oil-exporting countries is limited, these fundamental theories are important to analyze how oil prices impact the macroeconomy. Ultimately, the empirical and

836 Alekhina & Yoshino, Impact of world oil prices on an energy exporting economy including monetary policy.
841 M.R. Farzanegan, Oil revenue shocks and government spending behavior in Iran. Energy Econ. 33 no. 6, (2011): 1055–1069; Charfeddine & Barkat, Short- and long-run asymmetric effect of oil prices and oil and gas revenues on the real GDP and economic diversification in oil-dependent economy.
theoretical evidence provided will also help analyze whether the accumulated oil and gas revenues have significantly contributed to diversify oil-exporting countries apart from the oil and gas sector.

3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data Description

The first step in examining the effects of real oil price shocks is to collect macroeconomic data. In particular, quarterly data spanning from 2015Q1 to 2021Q3 was collected for six macroeconomic variables: the total real GDP, the non-oil real GDP, the real exchange rate, inflation, real oil prices, and real oil and gas revenues. This time period accounts for a total of 27 observations. The majority of the data was collected through reports by the Central Bank of Azerbaijan and the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The total real GDP is used as an indicator of real economic activity and the non-oil real GDP is used as a proxy of economic diversification. In addition, inflation rate is defined as quarterly changes in consumer prices of Azerbaijan and the real exchange rate is defined such that an increase means a real depreciation of the Manat.

Besides these four main macroeconomic variables, real oil prices and real oil and natural gas revenues need to be defined. First of all, the symmetric measures are the changes in real oil prices and real oil and natural gas revenues. The symmetric equations that will be used in the analysis can be observed below:

\[
\cdot DLROPt = \log (ROPt) - \log (ROP\text{-}1), \text{ for the real oil prices measures.}
\]

\[
\cdot DLROGRt = \log (ROGRt) - \log (ROGR\text{-}1), \text{ for the real oil and gas revenues.}
\]

Second of all, the asymmetric measures are calculated by Mork's (1989) definition of increases and decreases. These equations have been used in previous studies on this topic and provide additional robustness to inaccuracies. They are proved below:

Real oil price increases and decreases by Mork (1989):

\[
MORK\_\text{POST} = \max (DLROPt, 0), \text{ for the real oil prices increases.}
\]

\[
MORK\_\text{NEGt} = \min (DLROPt, 0), \text{ for the real oil prices decreases.}
\]

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843 Charfeddine & Barkat, Short- and long-run asymmetric effect of oil prices and oil and gas revenues on the real GDP and economic diversification in oil-dependent economy.
Each of these symmetric and asymmetric measures will be examined through the AB–SVARX model in R. Vector autoregressive (VAR) models, in particular, are used to capture the relationship between multiple observations as they change over time. The so-called structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model variant, where the relationship between contemporaneous variables is modelled more directly, will be ideal. By imposing special restrictions on two separate matrices, the AB–SVARX model is better suited for the analysis because of its focus on short-term modeling. Other models, such as the Nonlinear AutoRegressive Distributed Lag (NARDL) model developed by Shin et al. (2014), are better for the long-run relationship. In this paper, the AB–SVARX model will help us assess the short-run asymmetric responses of Azerbaijan’s real GDP and non-real GDP to changes in oil prices and oil and natural gas revenues. In turn, conclusive observations can be made on the macroeconomy and economic diversification of the oil-exporting country.

3.2. Short-term analysis

The AB–SVARX model needs to be estimated in several distinct steps. First of all, a general model specification is estimated based on Amisano and Giannini’s (1997) design:

\[ A Y_t = A_1 Y_{t-1} + A_2 Y_{t-2} + \ldots + A_p Y_{t-p} + C X_t + B u_t \]

In this model, \( Y_t \) represents the \((n \times 1)\) vector of the six macroeconomic variables used in the analysis. As a result, \( n = 4 \) describes the symmetric oil price measure and \( n = 5 \) describes the asymmetric oil price measures. The vector \( Y_t = [DLROP_t, DLRER_t, INF_t, DLRGDP_t] \) is used in the case of the symmetric measures and \( Y_t = [MORK_{POS_t}, MORK_{NEG_t}, DLRERF_t, INF_t, DLRGDP_t] \) for the case of asymmetric measures. \( X_t \) is a vector of indicator variables that may alter the impact of oil prices and revenues on the macroeconomy of Azerbaijan. These variables include political, economic, financial, and global events such as wars or pandemics.

\( A_t \) and \( C \) are \((n \times n)\) matrices with \( n = 4 \) and \( n = 5 \) in the case of symmetric and asymmetric measures, respectively. In addition, \( u_t \) is the \( n \)-vector of structural shocks, denoted \( u_t = [u_t^{ROP}, u_t^{RER}, u_t^{INF}, u_t^{RGDP}] \).

The second step in building the AB–SVARX model is to define the \( A \) and \( B \) matrices. Both of these matrices are \( 4 \times 4 \) if symmetric measures are used and \( 5 \times 5 \) if asymmetric measures are used.

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
X & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
X & X & 1 & 0 \\
X & X & X & 1 \\
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
\varepsilon_t^{ROP} \\
\varepsilon_t^{RER} \\
\varepsilon_t^{INF} \\
\varepsilon_t^{RGDP} \\
\end{bmatrix}
= 
\begin{bmatrix}
X & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & X & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & X & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & X \\
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
u_t^{ROP} \\
u_t^{RER} \\
u_t^{INF} \\
u_t^{RGDP} \\
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Moreover, once the AB – SVARX model is estimated, all non-significant coefficients in the matrices will have zero values, while the ‘X’ symbol is used to define the coefficients to be estimated. The first row in the above matrix indicates that the real oil prices affect real exchange rate, inflation, and real economic growth of Azerbaijan. The second row in this matrix shows that oil prices will significantly affect the real exchange rate. This can be logically explained because an increase in real oil prices leads to an appreciation in the currency of the oil-exporting country. The third row argues that the level of inflation in Azerbaijan is affected by the real oil prices and the real exchange rate. Finally, the fourth row indicates that the real GDP will be affected contemporaneously by real oil prices, the real exchange rate, and inflation.

4. ANALYTICAL RESULTS

4.1. Impulse Response Functions

Impulse response functions (IRFs) are a beneficial way to analyze the asymmetric impact of oil price increases and decreases. The asymmetric responses of the main macroeconomic variables were measured and graphed following a structural standard deviation of real oil prices. The results are reported in Figure 2 for the total real GDP and Figure 3 for the non-oil real GDP.

As an indication of the level of significance, 95% confidence intervals have been used for the IRFs. The middle lines in the figures represent the impulse response function while the bars represent confidence intervals. In this regard, when the horizontal line falls into the confidence interval, the null hypothesis that there is no effect of oil price shocks on other macroeconomic variables cannot be rejected.

4.1.1. Impact on the Real Exchange Rate

The results in Fig. 2 and 3 show clear evidence for the asymmetric responses of real exchange rate within one structural standard deviation change to the asymmetric oil price measures of Mork. Following asymmetric positive shocks on oil prices, the response of real effective exchange rate is increasing and statistically significant every quarter after the initial shock. This response supports the presence of an appreciation of the manat and a Dutch disease syndrome. After a decrease in real oil prices, the initial response of the real effective exchange rate is negative. It reaches its minimum in the 2nd quarter after the shock. This negative response remains significantly different from zero until the 8th quarter. The significant reduction of the real effective exchange rate can be interpreted as real depreciation of the manat and a warning sign of currency crisis. The main economic explanation of this result is that following a decrease in oil

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845 Charfeddine & Barkat, Short- and long-run asymmetric effect of oil prices and oil and gas revenues on the real GDP and economic diversification in oil-dependent economy.
prices, the foreign currency reserves of the country will decrease. This decrease will encourage the central bank to increase its demand for foreign currency. These empirical findings about the impact of oil prices on the real exchange rate are similar to those of Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) for the case of Iran and Charfeddine and Barkat (2020) for the case of Qatar.

Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions - GDP

4.1.2. Impact on Inflation

The results in Fig. 2 and 3 show that the impact of oil prices on inflation has an instantaneous impact. In other words, the Azerbaijani economy faces pressures from inflation with both positive and negative oil price shocks. An increase in real oil prices decreases the inflation response for at least 3 quarters. However, this effect is not significant. The absence of a significant effect of real oil price increases on inflation for the Azerbaijani economy can be explained

Charfeddine & Barkat, Short- and long-run asymmetric effect of oil prices and oil and gas revenues on the real GDP and economic diversification in oil-dependent economy.
by the presence of subsidies. Domestic fuel prices, for example, are not regularly adjusted to international price movements.

The initial response of inflation to a negative shock in real oil prices, on the other hand, is positive. This positive response reaches its maximum in the second quarter and gradually decreases over the remaining period. This positive response is statistically significant for the first two quarters after the shock. A possible explanation for the negative response of inflation that follows these two quarters is a fall in government expenditure and investments. The government conducts public budget consolidation and budget cutting in order to decrease the level of consumer prices and lower global demand.

4.1.3. Impact on the total real GDP and non-oil real GDP

The results in Fig. 2 and 3 shows evidence of an asymmetric impact of both the real GDP and non-oil real GDP. Their responses are clearly positive and significant. This result confirms the stimulus effect of positive oil price shocks on GDP. The response of real GDP to a negative shock of real oil price is statistically significant for at least 1 quarter, but the non-oil real GDP decreases after the initial shock for 3 quarters. These results confirm the results of Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) and Charfeddine and Barkat (2020).

Since the oil sector is still dominant in Azerbaijan’s public revenues and GDP, the world oil price is very crucial for the economy. Moreover, a decline in oil prices will have a profound impact on real GDP growth each time. The rents of this sector play a crucial role in the formation of Azerbaijan’s income and budget. Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) and State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) try to limit the effects of an oil price decline by reducing the volume of production as well as the volume of exports.

The decline in oil prices and export volume also has a negative impact on the income and investment from the non-oil sector. In fact, the state budget revenues from the non-oil sector are indirectly affected by oil money. Although it is possible to balance the budget by cutting budget costs or increasing the contribution of the State Oil Fund, other costs are reduced in difficult circumstances. These cost cuts affect non-oil sectors, such as infrastructure, that are needed to diversify the economy. Since the falling oil prices on the world market have a negative impact on overall income, Azerbaijan understandably has the desire to keep prices stable.

5. POLICIES

The empirical findings in this academic paper are a good starting point to evaluate the macroeconomy of Azerbaijan and help diversify it away from oil and gas. It will also help Azerbaijani policy makers design better economic policies that achieve a complete and sustainable economic system. Combined with other studies on this topic, the following assessments and policy suggestions are critical.

5.1. Economic Diversification

The low, but significant impact of decreases in real oil prices on total GDP and non-oil GDP confirm the partial resilience of the Azerbaijani economy. Despite this, Azerbaijani policymakers must continue to diversify government revenues during these periods of decline. These investments will ensure continual development of the non-oil sectors, but they must be sustainable and optimal for future production, investment, and development. These aforementioned non-oil sectors are characterized by their higher comparative advantages and can give the country greater future prospects. Among these sectors, the financial, tourism, technology, sports, and culture sectors may be very important for Azerbaijan to become a financial hub and a top tourist destination in the region. This status will be accomplished thanks to an investment of oil and gas revenues into the country and through hosting several international events such as the Azerbaijan Grand Prix.

Diversification of exported goods would also reduce the risks related to external oil price shocks. Moreover, it is recommended that Azerbaijan move away from the commodities sector to create a buffer against changing commodity prices. This action would limit the volatility of certain exports in the Azerbaijani economy. Diversification will also facilitate a wider market

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850 Charfeddine & Barkat, Short- and long-run asymmetric effect of oil prices and oil and gas revenues on the real GDP and economic diversification in oil-dependent economy.
of both foreign and local origin and increase domestic demand. Increasing domestic demand will have a long-term contribution to growth and development.

5.2. Comparative Advantages

Several studies in the past on resource-rich countries have focused on comparative advantages and the development of vertical diversification strategies. Comparative advantage has high potential in several of Azerbaijan’s economic sectors. For example, the development of the agricultural sector will reduce the import dependence on other countries and help meet local demand. In addition, the development of chemical and food industries may also contribute to local demand and employment. The growth of these sectors will be critical in future transition away from the oil-sector.

In order to fully transition away from the oil sector in the long-term, the Azerbaijani economy should also create vertical diversification strategies for the short-term. In other words, Azerbaijan needs to expand its business to new manufacturing sectors related to oil such as chemicals or plastic manufacturing. Although these steps will be long and complex, they need to be taken in order to avoid the inevitable downturns of the oil sector.

5.3. Investment

The government also has a big role to play in Azerbaijan’s future development. First of all, it needs to make structural reforms and setup new policies to promote and support private-public partnerships. These new changes will stimulate workers and firms, thus increasing employment in the private sector. New employment will then help reduce current government expenditure and increase the development of small and medium enterprises.

After the increase of private sector participation, the government will need to assess the energy sector and related economic challenges facing Azerbaijan’s future. Moreover, policymakers need to propose several ways to increase the efficiency and diversity of domestic energy supply and use. The most common and beneficial strategy among scholars is a gradual transition to competitive markets with energy prices that reflect the cost of production. The withdrawal of subsides would ensure new investments into the market, which would help Azerbaijan develop its renewable energy potential. A significant increase in solar, wind, and hydro power would follow.

5.4. Social Protection


Bayramov & Orujova, Volatility, Diversification and Oil Shock in Resource-Rich Turkic Countries: Avenues for Recovery.

CESD Research Group, Social consequences of the oil price shock in the resource rich post-soviet countries.

Charfeddine & Barkat, Short- and long-run asymmetric effect of oil prices and oil and gas revenues on the real GDP and economic diversification in oil-dependent economy.

Global Energy Review 2021, IEA.

Ibid.
In addition to ensuring competitive markets, Azerbaijan needs to increase the social protection of the vulnerable population by re-balancing budget expenditures. When a decrease in oil and natural gas revenues impacts non-oil sectors, investment and budget should be maintained in these sectors because they help diversify the economy and reduce the share of oil products in the economy. The re-allocation of state funding that Azerbaijan has conducted in the past, for instance, minimized negative social consequences of oil prices and devaluation.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper examined the short-term asymmetric impact of real oil prices and real oil and gas revenues on the total real GDP and economic diversification of Azerbaijan. By using the AB – SVARX model, empirical evidence was gathered to support the main arguments of the analysis and showed that the impact was asymmetric. In particular, the results from the model show that the impact of a negative shock is higher and more significant than that of a positive shock.

The other macroeconomic variables showed interesting results. The Azerbaijani economy appears to face pressures from inflation with both positive and negative oil price changes. These pressures are characterized by responses in government policy to rising or falling consumer prices. It was also found that the real exchange rate has a long-term and significant response to both positive and negative oil price shocks. These results indicate a symptom of the Dutch disease because positive oil price shocks increase the real effective exchange rate and appreciate domestic currency.

The empirical findings highlighted that Azerbaijan’s economy is significantly affected by changes in oil prices and oil and natural gas revenues. These energy resources influence the economy through the oil and gas revenues that determine the level of government expenditure. When Azerbaijan is faced with negative changes in the global market, they often have to bear the consequences. Therefore, Azerbaijan should consider economic diversification and investment into non-oil sectors. These non-oil sectors should become the foundation for Azerbaijan’s future economic growth and prevent drastic negative impacts on Azerbaijan’s budget expenditures.

Oil and natural gas may have a more drastic and significant impact on the Azerbaijan economy and economic diversification in the long-term. To test this theory, future research should be done on Azerbaijan’s economy since the development of its oil-sector until the present day.

859 CESD Research Group, Social consequences of the oil price shock in the resource rich post-soviet countries.
860 Bayramov & Orujova, Volatility, Diversification and Oil Shock in Resource-Rich Turkic Countries: Avenues for Recovery.
Bibliography


SECTION 10
International Conflict
"Deepening Fractures and Prolonging Conflicts: Russian Support of Separatist Movements in Post-Soviet Space"

Cody Bloomfield, Smith College

Introduction

Russia supports separatist movements across post-Soviet space. Enshrined in Russian law is a mandate to protect “compatriots abroad,” as defined as ethnic Russians and people “spiritually, culturally, and legally linked to the Russian Federation.” Russia exacerbates longstanding tensions using artificially constructed identity markers, contributing to the development of separatist identity. Russian support allows separatist groups to display the trappings of statehood, often culminating in the creation of a de facto state. Examining separatist conflicts in Donbass and Crimea in Ukraine, Transnistria in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, I argue that Russia engages in strategic destabilization that impedes the integration of de jure nations with the West.

Historical Identity in Contemporary Separatist Regions

Donetsk and Luhansk, Ukraine

Russian sources describe Donetsk and Luhansk (known collectively as the Donbas region) as a historically Russian enclave. However, the region’s history is more complex. The Donbas hosted the proto-Ukrainian state of the Zaporizhian Sich prior to its annexation by the Russian Empire. In the 17th century, waves of colonization increased ethnic diversity. Even following Holodomor, Donbas was far from a mono-ethnic Russian population center. Today, ethnic Russians comprise less than a third of the population. Donbas is home to a substantial Russian minority, but the numbers do not support the existence of a Russian enclave.

A unique feature of historical interplay into contemporary politics is the rhetorical emphasis on the continuation of World War II fights against fascism. President Vladimir Putin

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claims “Nazis” took power after ex-President Yanukovych fled following Euromaidan protests.\textsuperscript{866} Russian state media frequently portrays Ukrainians from across the political spectrum as “bourgeois nationalists” and “fascists.”\textsuperscript{867} While fringe ethnonationalist groups exist in Ukrainian politics, these groups never held significant power.\textsuperscript{868} Soviet and Russian nationalisms enjoy broader support, yet Russian media has successfully convinced many Donbas inhabitants that their culture is under siege from Ukrainian fascism. Donbas territories have gone so far as to eschew Ukrainian names, instead restoring Stalin-era monikers.\textsuperscript{869} The renewed fight against perceived fascist oppressors has animated separatist conflict.

\textit{Crimea, Ukraine}

Due to its strategic position on the Black Sea and favorable climate for agriculture, Crimea has been the envy of empires across millennia.\textsuperscript{870} The annexation of Crimea under Catherine the Great in 1783 is mythologized in historical memory as marking the symbolic adoption of Orthodoxy by the Russian Empire.\textsuperscript{871} Crimea has also interested elites as a territorial heir to ancient Greek civilization - a way of laying Russian claim to the Western canon.\textsuperscript{872} Adding to the salience of Crimea in Russian cultural consciousness is the “double-myth” of the defense of Sevastopol, once in Tsarist times and once in the Soviet era.\textsuperscript{873} Despite its multiethnic, diverse past, Crimea occupies an outsized place in Russian historical mythology. This milieu of cultural associations has left many Russians with a sense of entitlement to the territory.

During Soviet times, Crimea underwent demographic change from majority Crimean Tatar to majority ethnic Russian. Under the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars were discriminated against, oppressed, and harassed.\textsuperscript{874} When German forces invaded Crimea,

\textsuperscript{866} Taras Kuzio, “A New Framework for Understanding Nationalisms in Ukraine: Democratic Revolutions, Separatism and Russian Hybrid War,” \textit{Geopolitics, History, and International Relations} 7, no. 1 (June 2015), https://go-gale-com.libproxy.smith.edu/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T002&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId=GALE%7CA421626553&docType=Report&sort=RELEVANCE&contentSegment=ZBCI&prodId=ITBC&contentSet=GALE%7CA421626553&searchId=R1&userGroupName=mlin_w_smithcol&inPS=true.

\textsuperscript{867} Kuzio.

\textsuperscript{868} Kuzio.


\textsuperscript{871} Hilpold, “Ukraine, Crimea and New International Law: Balancing International Law with Arguments Drawn from History.”


\textsuperscript{873} Hilpold, “Ukraine, Crimea and New International Law: Balancing International Law with Arguments Drawn from History.”

\textsuperscript{874} Charron.
some Crimean Tatars welcomed them as liberators. In response, the Soviet Union forcibly re-located them to Central Asia. During perestroika, Crimean Tatars began to return to Crimea, but never again held a majority there. Since the 2014 Russian annexation, Crimea’s demographics have shifted further in the direction of a Russian majority. By official counts, 247,000 Russians have moved to Crimea since annexation, encouraged by incentives for pensioners to relocate from remote locales where providing services is expensive. Many Crimean Tatars feel yet again displaced. This sense of dislocation, combined with institutionalized discrimination, caused many to emigrate to mainland Ukraine. This demographic shift has in turn bolstered Russian claims of protecting ethnic Russians.

**South Ossetia, Georgia**

Georgians and Ossetians dispute how long the Ossetian people have resided within South Ossetia. As with many contested identities, history provides a fraught proving ground for claims of shared history and land ownership. As Georgian borders shifted under the weight of empire, identity markers evolved through time. Ossetians often claim that their predecessors fought on the Georgian side of wars against invading powers. That Stalin was half Ossetian is positively assessed. Claims of intertwined history support Ossetian claims to Georgian land.

For their part, Georgians generally claim that Ossetians migrated to the territory two or three centuries ago, a blink of an eye in a history dating back to the ancient Greeks. This desire to displace Ossetians from historical title ideologically supports the creation of a unitary state without the requirement for South Ossetian special status. In the dominant consciousness, Georgia sees itself as a perpetual victim of conflicts of empire. This mentality incurs suspicion of minorities as potential fifth columns, which did occur occasionally in Georgian history, including during annexation into the Soviet Union. In historical retrospective, many Georgians today perceive the creation of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast as the destabilizing event that allowed the Soviet Union to annex Georgia. Some go so far as to deny the historical roots of South Ossetian identity altogether, claiming that South Ossetia was an artificial construction of the Soviet Union created to destroy Georgia’s autonomy.

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878 Khotin, Khalilov, and Coalson.
879 Khotin, Khalilov, and Coalson.
883 Valentyn Hrebennyk, “Transnistria and South Ossetia” (Kyiv, Ukraine, 2020).
884 Sammut and Cvetkovski, “Confidence-Building Matters: The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict.”
885 Valentyn Hrebennyk, “Donbas” (Kyiv, Ukraine, 2020).
886 Sammut and Cvetkovski, “Confidence-Building Matters: The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict.”
887 Sammut and Cvetkovski.
At the end of Soviet era, both Georgia and South Ossetia moved towards ethnonationalism. In the late 1980s, Ossetian popular movements began to call for the unification of North and South Ossetia. Responding to rising nationalist sentiment, Georgia began steadily eroding minority rights. In 1989, Georgia’s Supreme Council expanded the use of Georgian in the public sphere, effectively marginalizing minority languages. Comprising only 3% of the population of Georgia, but 65% of the population of South Ossetia, Ossetians realized they had much to lose from integration with Georgia. In a 1992 referendum, 99.9% of South Ossetians voted in favor of independence, with a close second favoring outright unification with Russia. In response, the Georgian Supreme Council cancelled the results of the election and revoked the region’s special status. The Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet began characterizing Georgia’s South Ossetian policy as genocide, opening the door to consideration of South Ossetia’s bid to join the Russian Federation, further alarming Georgia. Drawn to Russia due to shared ethnic ancestry with North Ossetians and cornered by Georgian policy, South Ossetia became dependent upon Russian support.

Abkhazia, Georgia

Abkhazia is a de facto state located in northwestern Georgia. Abkhazians are an ethnic minority, both within Abkhazia and in Georgia more generally. Ethnic Abkhazians speak their own language (related to Circassian), practice multiple religions (including Christianity, Islam, and animist traditions), and generally organize their society around kin and village relations. As is the case in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia dispute how recently Abkhazians began to occupy their present territory. Claims related to recent Abkhaz emigration secure less purchase than similar claims made about Ossetians, but nonetheless, the allegations undermine the historic claims of Abkhazians to the territory.

During the days of the Russian Empire, Abkhazians were displaced and replaced with, in the view of the Russian Empire, more “reliably Christian” people. This created a large

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889 Sotiriou.
890 Sotiriou.
891 Sotiriou.
892 Sammut and Cvetkovski, “Confidence-Building Matters: The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict.”
898 Sammut and Cvetkovski, “Confidence-Building Matters: The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict.”
899 Derluguian, “The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria Before and Since the Soviet Collapse.”
diaspora while making Abkhaz people minorities within their own homeland. When the Soviet Union accorded Abkhazians titular status, a side effect of plurality rule was a perpetual sense of precarity. Close ties between elites and Moscow ensured Abkhazia’s support for the Soviet Union despite policies Georgianizing Abkhazia. Even though Abkhazians experienced marginalization of their language and culture under the policies of Beria and Stalin, many perceived the USSR as a guarantor of their rights against the local imperial power of Georgia, an impression that has carried through to contemporary Russia. 

Paradoxically, holding political power depended on Abkhaz ethnic membership even as Abkhaz mobilized to defend their culture from both Georgian and Soviet assimilatory policies. The contradictory Soviet Union policies of affording political power while stymieing cultural development resulted in the increased salience of Abkhaz ethnic identity, often as oppositional to Georgian identity. This sense of discrimination and oppression increasingly led to the description of the conflict through the lens of ethnicity. By the collapse of the USSR, Abkhaz ethnic identity had ossified into a political identity marked by opposition to the “local imperialism” of Georgia.

Transnistria, Moldova

The Moldovan territory of Transnistria is a de facto state, ideologically supported by a mythology of difference. Indeed, the region has long followed a separate historical trajectory from Bessarabia, the precursor to the rest of Moldova. However, the emergence of nationalist/pro-Russian sentiment is a relatively recent phenomenon, differing from the more mature ethnonationalist movements of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The status of Transnistria shifted multiple times within the Soviet Union, creating varying levels of regional autonomy. For various reasons, after World War II, political favoritism and propagandic rhetoric strengthened perceptions of fundamental difference between Transnistrians and Moldovans. The media dichotomy between Romanians as occupiers and Soviets as liberators amplified distrust of Romanians, including Moldovans. Transnistrians became more likely to speak Russian and espouse topline Russian values. In the late 1980s, Transnistrian identity underwent a transformation due to the perceived threat of a perestroika-era Moldovan orientation towards ethnonationalism, which included forging closer ties with

901 Clogg.
902 Clogg; Derluguiian, “The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria Before and Since the Soviet Collapse.”
903 Jones, “Clash in the Caucasus: Georgia, Russia, and the Fate of South Ossetia”; Clogg, “The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia: Managing Diversity and Unresolved Conflict.”
904 Derluguiian, “The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria Before and Since the Soviet Collapse.”
906 Bobick, “Separatism Redux.”
908 Cojocaru.
910 Wagemakers.
Romania, shifting the Moldovan alphabet away from Cyrillic, and expanding the use of Moldovan in the public sphere. Initial constructions of Transnistrian identity revolved around reactionary fears of linguistic oppression and resistance to pro-Romanian policies. Following Transnistria’s war for independence against Moldova, grassroots identification with the Russian World (Russkiy Mir) narrative and the purported East-versus-West struggle replaced anti-Romanian sentiment as a primary identity marker.

Although Transnistria is not majority ethnic Russian, common history with Russia is emphasized in official narratives and school curricula. Parallels are drawn between the anti-fascist conflict against Romania in World War II and the contemporary struggle for independence. Young Transnistrians increasingly see the region as an Orthodox and/or Slavic civilization aligned against European/Western Moldovan society. This narrative of civilizational clash provides elites with the mandate necessary to maintain a separate state.

Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan

Nagorno-Karabakh is a majority Armenian territory located within Azerbaijan. Armenia supports the independence initiatives of the Nagorno-Karabakh leadership (although foregoing formal recognition), while Azerbaijan maintains that granting Nagorno-Karabakh independence would undermine its own territorial integrity. Nationalist propaganda in both nations frames the conflict in ethnic terms. Unlike in other post-Soviet conflicts, Russia positions itself as a mediator between the two primary parties to the conflict, rather than providing direct informational infrastructure. Here too, though, similar historiographical processes benefit Russian interests. As in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the ethnic minority in Nagorno-Karabakh depended on the Soviet government for protection against “local imperialism.” In recent years, Russia has opportunistically positioned itself as a mediator in the conflict, often in ways benefitting Russian interests.

Identity Construction in Separatist Conflicts

Donetsk and Luhansk, Ukraine

Prior to the current invasion of Ukraine, Russia engaged in hybrid warfare in the Donbas
region, here defined as a “tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism, and criminal means or activities” comprising hot conflict, surreptitious aid to separatists, and information warfare. Hybrid warfare provides separatists with political cover through providing plausible deniability regarding Russian engagement. Embedding unmarked Russian forces within Ukrainian society gives the war the veneer of insurgency instead of the appearance of occupation. Despite abundant evidence that Russian citizens were fighting alongside separatists, Russia claimed its soldiers were spontaneous patriots who decided of their own volition to volunteer to fight fascism in Ukraine. In 2014, so-called “political tourists” traveled from Transnistria and Russia to Donetsk, Luhansk, Odesa, and Kharkov. The echoes of this rhetoric can be found in contemporary narratives portraying the invasion of Ukraine as a defense of Russian minorities against an onslaught of Ukrainian neo-Nazism. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, maintenance of the hybrid war was underwritten by an insidious Russian media campaign. Through activating fears of linguistic and ethnic oppression, Russia positioned itself as a viable guarantor of civil liberties. The territories adopted “patriotic education” laws, which among other things, encouraged citizens to take up arms against Ukraine as part of an existential struggle for freedom and against fascism. Representative of this rhetoric, Putin claimed “millions of Russians went to bed in one country and woke up in another.” Currents of nostalgia, reinforced by media narratives, propagate the victim mentality of an oppressed Russian people struggling against a pseudo-legitimate, neo-fascist Ukrainian regime.

In addition to manufacturing a sense of victimhood among ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, Russian media in Donbas crafts an image of the Ukrainian government as morally bankrupt. In Russian media, NATO and the EU are synonyms for the rejection of traditional values. In propagandist constructions, NATO and EU support for feminism and LGBTQ+ rights are cast as evidence that a shift towards the West would mean not only cultural oppression, but rejection of traditional values. Russian media augments fears and nostalgia into a full-blown sense of existential and cultural crisis. In a precursor to today’s information warfare, following the start of the Donbas conflict, Russian platforms blocked pro-Euromaidan pages, collected personal data from people seeking out such websites, and recruited Ukrainians to the “Donbas

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922 Lanoszka.
923 Lanoszka.
928 Vladimir Putin, quoted in Bodie, “Modern Imperialism in Crimea and the Donbas.”
People’s Militia.” In response, Ukraine attempted to reclaim media space by banning Russian search engines and social media sites. Ukraine rebuilt television and radio towers in Donbas, a signifier of the high importance the nation ascribes to countering Russian narratives. Despite limited evidence that hostility towards Kyiv has translated into increased support for separatists, media plays a role in polarizing opinions of the Ukrainian government. Despite dubious empirical efficacy, both sides prioritize “winning hearts and minds” in the media. This identity-formation project presented a formidable barrier to reintegration even prior to the 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine. Thanks to Russian intervention, minority discontent with Kyiv erupted into protracted conflict that impeded Ukrainian integration with the West, raising the specter of ethnonationalism and fascism.

Crimea, Ukraine

Prior to the current large-scale invasion, Crimea provided the clearest example of Russian intervention targeted at destabilizing a de jure nation. Russian unmarked troops (“little green men”) took over institutions and military bases in Crimea. These soldiers were subsequently described by the Russian government as “self-defense forces,” thereby implying indigenous support for annexation. In order to comply with constitutional prerequisites for accession to the Russian Federation, Russia conducted a misleading referendum that warped an election with 30% turnout and a 50-50 bifurcated vote into a landslide favoring annexation.

In justifying the move to the Russian public, Putin emphasized the common destiny of Crimea and Russia, all the while warning of the threat imposed by Ukraine potentially joining NATO. Putin claimed that this move would “exclude Russia from this region [Crimea], for which so many Russian bones have been buried over the centuries.” In rhetoric directed towards Russians, Putin discussed how Ukraine’s move towards the West would mean losing a fraternal nation to the corrupting influence of the United States. Putin emphasizes the 1956 transfer of the region from Russia to the Ukrainian SSR as a particularly salient historical event, punctuating rhetoric that the relationship operates on Russia’s terms. The defiant slogan “Crimea is Ours” epitomizes this appeal to history; Ukraine has responded with the counter-

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933 Bobick, “Separatism Redux.”
934 Bobick.
935 Bodie, “Modern Imperialism in Crimea and the Donbas.”
937 Hopf.
938 Hopf.
On the world stage, Putin legitimized the annexation of Crimea with historical mythology, even while acknowledging the destabilizing impact upon Ukraine.

Russia has fundamentally reshaped the Crimean media ecosystem. While self-censorship and selective reporting are problems in Ukrainian media, Russian occupation of Crimea has further narrowed the availability of independent media. ‘Restructuring’ of the press has occurred in Crimea, often entailing the replacement of neutral or pro-Ukrainian journalists with reporters more friendly to the Kremlin. Russian authorities in Crimea have cracked down on dissent through persecuting activists, particularly Crimean Tatar organizers. The primary Crimean Tatar representative organization, Mejlis, has been disbanded and its activists barred from entering Crimea. Through integrating Crimea into both the Russian Federation political system and historical narrative, Putin sought civic identification and a sense of shared destiny. The claim is, in essence, that Crimea has come home, following brief rule by an illegitimate fascist government. This narratives ring familiar to observers of the 2022 invasion. The shape is new, but narratives remain consistent.

South Ossetia, Georgia

South Ossetia enjoys military backing from Russia. Three Russian military bases and several thousand troops are located on the territory. Defense of South Ossetia is a formal charge of the Russian FSB and military. Complicating conflict resolution efforts, the frozen conflict line is a matter of dispute between Russian peacekeepers and the Georgian government. Russia uses a map from the 1980s with different topography from the updated map, a likely pretext for seizing more territory. The Russian security guarantee and de facto annexation prop up the South Ossetian de facto state.

Following the brief 2008 war with Georgia, Russia extended recognition to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states. Justifying Russian intervention in the conflict, then-President Medvedev invoked UN Article 51, “responsibility to protect,” claiming that it was preventing a genocide. While atrocities did occur, Russian media played a role in exaggerating the severity of the war in South Ossetia. Russia has invoked human rights in justifying its aggression in the 2008 war and its ongoing military support of South Ossetia.

Since 2008, Russia has attempted to manipulate the political process in the region.

943 Maksym Butkevych, “Media, War, and Hate Speech” (Kyiv, Ukraine, 2020).
945 Muratova, “The Transformation of the Crimean Tatars’ Institutions and Discourses After 2014.”
946 Bobick, “Separatism Redux.”
947 Higgins, “In Russia’s ‘Frozen Zone,’ a Creeping Border With Georgia.”
948 Higgins.
949 Higgins.
951 Littlefield, “Citizenship, Identity, and Foreign Policy: The Contradictions and Consequences of Russia’s Passport Distribution in the Separatist Regions of Georgia.”
952 Littlefield.
953 Littlefield.
Despite hotly contested presidential elections, all the candidates tend to be pro-Russian. Disputes in the political system mainly revolve around how Russian aid should be spent, acknowledging that South Ossetia relies on Russian support for its continued existence. South Ossetian President Bibilov advocated strengthening ties with Russia with diplomatic initiatives up to and including “reunifying” with the Russian Federation. The step would mark a political shift, but not necessarily a change in dependence. Currently, an estimated 99% of the region’s budget comes from Russia. Politically, militarily, and economically, South Ossetia depends on its sole patron.

Russia has made good on its investment in the South Ossetian state. Conflicts on Georgian soil make investors leery of channeling money into oil and gas networks. Russia benefits from the lack of competition this anxiety generates. As long as South Ossetia depends on the security guarantees and financial assistance provided by Russia, Georgia is prevented from growing its economy or moving further towards the West. South Ossetians have found a willing patron in Russia, albeit one that severely constrains the region’s autonomy.

**Abkhazia, Georgia**

Unlike South Ossetia, Abkhazia seems to have adopted Russia as its patron due to a dearth of alternatives rather than a desire for further integration. Backed into a corner by Western and Georgian policies of isolation, Abkhazia struggles to maintain its sovereignty from both Georgia and Russia. In 2008, Russia expanded aid to Abkhazia and recognized the territory’s independence from Georgia. Russia began to station troops on Abkhazian territory and grew to supply about 60% of Abkhazia’s federal budget in aid. As in other separatist regions, Russia offered citizenship and pensions that did double duty in propping up the fledgling Abkhazian government. What business exists outside of trade with Russia tends to depend on Russian tourists. Abkhazia imports ideological infrastructure and media from Russia, though to a lesser extent than occurs in other separatist regions. An independent press exists in Abkhazia, but Russian television, radio, and newspapers are commonplace. Many Abkhazians

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956 Jones, “Clash in the Caucasus: Georgia, Russia, and the Fate of South Ossetia”; “South Ossetia: Rise of a New Politics and Foreign Policy.”

957 Jones.

958 Jones.

959 Russia Recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia.”


consume media created by affiliates of the Russkiy Mir Foundation.\footnote{Thomas de Waal, “Abkhazia and the Danger of ‘Ossetianization’,” The Moscow Times, July 16, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/07/16/abkhazia-and-the-danger-of-ossetianization-a66437; Kirova, “Public Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Russia, Georgia and the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”} In a nation where only a quarter of people use the Internet, Russian media is influential, though partially counterbalanced by a somewhat free press.\footnote{Kirova, “Public Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Russia, Georgia and the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”} Non-Russian outside aid, such as it exists, is dwarfed by Russian financial support. Despite Abkhazian fears of \emph{de facto} integration into Russia, the region is forced into Russia’s arms due to a lack of alternative options. Russia is willing to provide security guarantees and economic aid; Abkhazia is forced to accept.

\textbf{Transnistria, Moldova}

Transnistria has reached a relatively stable status quo, albeit through dependency upon Russian security guarantees. Transnistria displays many of the institutions of statehood, including a security force, school and university system, healthcare system, and government agencies issuing documents.\footnote{Matthew Crandall, “Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: The Transnistrian Effect,” \textit{Studies of Transition States and Societies} 4, no. 1 (April 28, 2013), http://publications.tlu.ee/index.php/stss/article/view/87.} The half million inhabitants of Transnistria live with an essentially functional government and economic system, backed by Russian security guarantees and aid. Russia positions itself as Transnistria’s political, economic, and cultural “big brother,” doling out advice and humanitarian aid.\footnote{Crandall.} In exchange, Transnistria emphatically endorses the Russkiy Mir narrative.\footnote{Carnegie Europe, “Transdniestra: ‘My Head Is in Russia, My Legs Walk to Europe.’”}

Both school curricula and media consumption tend to reinforce Russkiy Mir. Transnistrian and Moldovan state television stations are underfunded, and Russian media is all too happy to fill in the gaps.\footnote{Reggie Kramer, “Transnistria Primer,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 3, 2016, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/10/transnistria-primer/; Lungu, “Transnistria: From Entropy to Exodus.”} In 2015, 40% of Moldovans (both Transnistrian and right bank) received most of their information from Russian sources, many of which stoke separatist fears of Moldovan unification with Romania.\footnote{Kramer.} Opposition media is predominantly Romanian, feeding into Transnistrian fears and Russian narratives.\footnote{Kramer.} Russia provides the education and media infrastructure necessary to secure continued affinity with Transnistria.

Surprisingly, Russia’s largest contribution to the Transnistrian economy lies in its security guarantee. The 1,500 Russian troops stationed in Transnistria prevent the Moldovan government from entering the territory.\footnote{Kramer.} This allows for a thriving smuggling economy nicknamed by critics the “black hole.”\footnote{Kramer.} Frequently, imports destined for Moldova or Ukraine disappear into Transnistria from Odessa ports, skirting taxes.\footnote{Kramer.} While Transnistria engages with diverse partners, it indirectly depends on Russia to sustain the conditions necessary for its
black-market economy.

The benefit to Transnistria is clear; the benefit to Russia is hazier. Unwilling to admit Transnistria into the Russian Federation, Russia instead wields the conflict as a pressure point against Moldova. Despite multiple referenda and repeated requests to Moscow, Russia has opted for maintenance of an unstable status quo. In 1994 and 1999, Russia signed agreements removing troops from the region, but failed to follow through as soon as Moldova motioned towards closer integration with NATO, the EU, and OSCE. As in other post-Soviet countries, the ongoing presence of Russian troops in Moldovan territory presents an obstacle towards Western integration. Instead, Transnistria exists in a twilight realm, recognized only by Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Orphaned from the Russian Federation and partially isolated from the world, Transnistria relies on Russia as it ekes out an existence in permanent limbo.

**Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan**

While Russia is a combatant in other post-Soviet conflicts, Russia plays the role of mediator and arms dealer in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia sees leadership in the Caucasus as an integral component of maintaining a sphere of influence. The shared Armenian and Azerbaijani sense of precarity - that favorable terms of conflict resolution are contingent upon the quality of relations with Russia - leads both nations into Russia’s orbit. To improve their relationship with Russia, they engage in diplomatic initiatives, arms deals, and Russian-led international organizations. Although not a conflict of Russia’s making, Russia has exploited Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to draw both Armenia and Azerbaijan closer.

In collaboration with other international actors, Russia has served as the primary mediator in the region. As the co-chair of the Minsk Group, Russia has been responsible for advancing a variety of (largely unsuccessful) conflict resolution proposals. A surfeit of mediators, which at times have included the OSCE, Iran, and Turkey, has not helped the situation. Parties dissatisfied with the result could always find an alternative mediator. Yet, here too, Russia benefits from an unstable status quo. Russia has supplied both sides of the conflict with arms and diplomatic support. These policies have made Russia the lowest common denominator mediator, holding limited power but enjoying mutual acceptability. Wielding the specter of unfavorable settlement, Russia ensures that neither nation moves further towards the West.

**Conclusion**

While most international actors refuse to engage with separatist leadership and instead

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974 Kramer, “Transnistria Primer.”
975 Crandall, “Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: The Transnistrian Effect.”
976 Bobick, “Separatism Redux.”
977 Lungu, “Transnistria: From Entropy to Exodus.”
979 Betts.
982 Betts
pursue conflict resolution through relationships with de jure states, Russia has exhibited a readiness to develop diplomatic and political relationships with separatist entities, thus supporting claims to legitimacy. Russian support allows separatist entities to weather the pragmatic problems of partial recognition or lack of recognition. This facilitates their continued survival, expands their capacity to decline unfavorable conflict resolution settlements, and impedes the Westward integration of post-Soviet de jure states.
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SECTION 11
Life and Culture in Russia
"Transformation in Russian Civil Society: an Examination of the Impact of Imperial Soviet Practices on Post-Soviet Civil Society in Russia"

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Abstract
This paper studies transformations in Russian civil society from the eighteenth through the twenty-first century. It argues that powerful political structures, formed during the Imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet period, have influenced civil society arrangements in the modern-day Russian Federation. Similar to Russian forms of democracy and the market economy, which diverge substantially from Western European models, civil society as it exists in the Russian Federation has not followed the West’s trajectory of development. This Russian iteration of civil society, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is the result of successive transformations across social sectors over several centuries and is justified through various factors unique to the Russian socio-political context.

Keywords: Civil Society, USSR, Soviet Union, Third Sector Organisations, Public Sphere, Russia,

Introduction
The volatile political landscape in the Russian Federation is a phenomenon inherited from its post-Soviet experience, which continues to dictate the current actions of the state. Consequentially, this particular political background also contributed to the rejuvenation of civic and organizational life in the Russian Federation. Though civil society stagnated during the Soviet period, from the early 1990s, a variety of civil society institutions were established: these organisations were fueled by transnational financing and concentrated on social issues ranging from humanitarian assistance to wildlife relief. External funding not only prescribed which organisation’s projects were significant but was also indicative of what types of Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) work were deemed significant. These developments, particularly connections to foreign financing, were scrutinized by the Russian government which has increasingly monitored NGO activities over the last decade. With the advent of “foreign agent” legislation, passed in 2012, NGOs were frequently and systematically labelled ‘foreign agents’ if they received external funding, particularly if they were involved in politics or activism. The political segregation of ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’

civil society was enforced by the Russian State. This political manoeuvre formalised the legislative oversight of Russian civil society and is linked to the authoritarian propensities of the Russian State. The recent extensive scrutiny of civil society institutions is often credited to Russia’s political elite and the apprehension caused by the ‘colour revolutions’ in Eastern Europe and potential reactions over the Russian concept of “sovereign democracy”. In order to fully understand the contemporary problems facing Russian civil society, one must evaluate the historical development of civil society and the enormous impact of Russia’s post–Soviet experience on the re-emergence of civil society institutions in the modern-day Russian Federation.

This paper examines the gradual transformation of civil society in Russia. It investigates the specific impact of fundamental socio-political norms that were established during the Soviet and post-Soviet period and continue to influence civil society organizations in modern-day Russia. Moreover, this paper shows that the political environment in the Russian Federation has dynamically transformed, and continues to transform, its influence on contemporary civil society institutions. The paper argues that much like the relative conceptualization of democracy in Russia and the condition of market-based institutions there was a gradual resurgence or recreation of a specifically Russian iteration of civil society. In order to understand these precise circumstances, I review the development of civil society in Imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, particularly its historical development, its networks, and its partially symbiotic, yet always dependent, relationship with the state.

The Concept of Civil Society
Civil society is often referred to as the “third sector” of any given society. Modern societies generally comprise the state or government (the first sector), the market and corporations (the second sector), and civil society. Each sector plays an important role and completes an essential function. For instance, the state’s function is to maintain order and fulfill administrative tasks, which in turn guarantees the sustenance of its authority. The market’s function is to maintain economic prosperity and fulfill consumer needs, which in turn guarantees profits and return on investment back to the businesses involved. Civil society’s function, however, is slightly different: it is to monitor both of these sectors and their actions, while also rallying support to improve the lives of individuals living within a given society.

Though there are multiple definitions and understandings of civil society, most scholars agree that, as fundamental concept, ‘a civil society is the sum of institutions, organizations, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market, in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests.’ Henceforth, I refer to civil society as an agency of solidarity and

987 Hanson, Philip, and Elizabeth Teague, "Big business and the state in Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 5 (2005): 657-680.
strength that upholds the essence of democracy, while acting as a ‘counterweight to the state.’ This specific meaning demonstrates the intermediary nature of civil society and includes ‘voluntary – autonomous – informal/formal associations’ as ‘third sector organizations’ (TSOs).

Civil Society in Russia
In 18th century Imperial Russia, a crude form of civil society began to take form. The early instances of civil society action can be traced to Catherine the Great’s sosloviya (the Russian estates) reforms. These reforms led to the establishment of public institutions established for the exploration and funding of charitable initiatives, science, leisure activities, the fine arts, and literature. As a result, several popular and notable associations were formed such as the Moscow Agricultural Society, the Russia Technical Society, and the Free Economics Society. This trend, however, did not last and was engulfed by an intrusive government and largely incompetent bureaucracy.

During the early 20th century, Imperial Russia was not perceived as an inclusive society of “joiners” by other nations in Europe. There were, however, around 10,000 voluntary associations in 1914. Furthermore, several State ordained private associations also entered into the public sphere with diverse ambitions and unique projects. These private and voluntary societies flourished in large urban cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in small towns and provincial districts. They included, but were not limited to, recreational clubs, sports societies, intellectual societies, charitable and agricultural societies. Until 1914, Russia fostered the largest community of cooperatives and associations in the world.

The latter half of the 19th century saw a meteoric rise in associations that reflected Russia’s rapid economic, cultural and social transformation. Though the Imperial government was unable to keep up with the expansion of associations, their growth was the result of state encouragement. Associations and societies allowed Russian citizens to organise informally, collaborate on projects, and take initiative in solving social problems. While this particular form of a primordial civil society empowered Russians, it was antithetical to a political culture that was founded on personalized autocracy.

It is the clear intention of civil society to be distinct from the state and the market in which it exists. This in turn makes civil society unique in its existence and is one of the defining characteristics of its functions. Even though both civil society and the government work together, and their purposes even overlap in some instances, the sole ambition of civil society is to function outside of governmental influence. This independence allows civil society to serve the common interests of individuals and ensure human rights regulations are observed.

Civil society also acts as an intermediary between organizations and the state to ensure efficient communication on issues that might otherwise be ignored. Considering the current authoritarian
leanings of the Russian government, the relationship between the state and civil society organizations in the Russian Federation is volatile. Putin’s centralization and extension of executive power, as well as the administration’s general suspicion of outside intervention (or interference), means that NGOs that work on or defend human rights are perceived as a threat. Authorities generally respond to social movements, protests and human rights demonstrations very harshly, usually through force and repressive legislation. There is a general trend of governmental hegemony over the philanthropic sector, which calls the possibility of Russia’s compatibility with a liberal and open civil society into question.

Civil Society during Soviet Russia

In order to properly understand the intricate socio-political influence of post-Soviet Russia on civil society arrangements, it is critical to recognize the context of the Soviet period. One of the major characteristics of the Soviet government was that the state closely regulated and controlled all political, social, and economic activity. Thus, the ruling Communist Party was able to subdue any formal associations that may form autonomously or mass-movements that questioned the authority of the Party-State. Strict control demanded and created “good Communist citizens,” and a compliant population of individuals outside of the official Party establishment. Though informal associations did exist, particularly related to cultural activities in the form of amateur clubs, their very and continued existence was completely dependent on the State in contrast to their Western counterparts.

In the Soviet Union, TSO’s existed as official organizations that were defined by the state as ‘an intricately organized series of state-controlled organizations.’ These government organized TSOs were spaces for public participation and activism with the objective of providing services to citizens. Services offered were often based not on citizens’ needs, but according to their relative contributions to the Communist government. Moreover, the leadership in these TSO eventually formed the political elite of the Soviet Union, or nomenklatura. The Soviet government integrated several vertical power structures one of which hegemonized public dialogue of TSOs and straitened collective action.

Rather than a watchdog for the people, nomenklatura organizations and ‘contact groups’ were used by the Soviet government to informally monitor society, instituting social control mechanisms designed to sustain the state’s stability and establish a ‘pseudo civil society’ that had no intrinsic meaning or function. Several small-scale networks were, however, able to achieve some level

of autonomy which allowed them to protect members from the Soviet regime through personal connections.  

The government’s grip on civil society arrangements and institutionalized regulation of associations did not stop small, ostensibly illegal networks on an incredibly scale. These independent associations, movements, and organizations were established around intelligentsia groups, individuals who shared a ‘rebellious, opposition-minded approach shared exclusive closed mutual circles.’  

Individuals depended on informal networks of family members and friends for the acquisition of specialty goods or to avoid potential issues from the Communist government. Informal ‘contact groups’ facilitated individuals’ ability to mitigate the regime’s incompetence in providing basic consumer goods. Not only did this culture motivate ‘circles of intimacy and trust among family members and close friends, but allowed Soviet citizens to adapt to the shortcomings of the regime. They also allowed an intrinsic civil society to co-exist within the official, institutionalized version prompted by the regime, and provided the foundation for civil society after the collapse of the USSR.

**Perestroika and Civil Society**

Perestroika, initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, began in 1985 and aimed at democratizing and liberalizing the Communist establishment through the implementation of various reforms and policy changes. Gorbachev’s reorientation of society resulted in several institutions and independent organizations and the emergence of alternative political parties within the one-party state. Though several associations and organizations were permitted to exist at the time, they lacked legal and political legitimacy or authority.

Social movements and the re-emergence of voluntary associations were hallmarks of Perestroika, but an independent and autonomous civil society did not materialize. Western scholars expected an accelerated institutionalization of civil society after the fall of the USSR, which would hasten the foundations of democratization and freedom. Nevertheless, the political space required for an autonomous civil society to function within the public sphere was not present prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The conventional monolithic ways of governance in the Soviet period were, to some extent, eradicated under Gorbachev. Despite this transformation and the political upset caused by the collapse, post-Soviet Russia did not undergo genuine democratization. While the relationship between the state and society fundamentally changed, these developments did not herald an abundance of civil

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society institutions. The Russian Federation’s pseudo-democratic politics means that informal means of social action continue. While this socio-political setting did not encourage the establishment of a conventional civil society recognized by the West, it did contribute to the formation of an emerging alternative civil society.

Factors Influencing Post-Soviet Civil Society

Several social movements sprang up during Perestroika but soon after the collapse of the USSR democratization divided these initiatives into various single-issue movements. While many of these groups lacked coordination or focus, people did not associate themselves with these submovements. For instance, the environmental movement was a pivotal player in the fall of the Soviet Union. Soon after the collapse, however, the environmental movement fragmented and lost its collective identity and agenda.\textsuperscript{1006} Social movements deteriorated into regional and local organisation. This separation disturbed the essence which was present previously as a single social movement: the separate and divided associations lacked public appeal and determination. As a result, TSOs were not interested in the betterment of the wider population and were more focused on furthering their own economic and political agendas. Ideally, the function of TSOs after the fall of the Soviet Union would have concentrated on bridging the gap between the state and society. Similar to civil society in the Soviet period, however, the TSOs did not intend a holistic approach to social action.\textsuperscript{1007}

There was a clear disconnect between the TSOs and the general population. Prior to the collapse, the Soviet regime coerced participation in social associations and institutions eliminated the notion of ‘volunteerism’. Russian citizens were simply not accustomed to taking initiative in the public sphere. As a result, there was limited public support for TSOs in general.\textsuperscript{1008} For instance, in the USSR, trade unions were functional under the state’s control. While these unions were vital in mobilizing the general masses, they still identified as state organizations.\textsuperscript{1009} For that reason, post-Soviet trade unions were unable to garner mass interest. TSOs were unable to act as intermediaries between Russian citizens and the state due to deficient public support which is fundamental for TSOs present in democratic settings. Therefore, the notion of civil society acting as the ‘middle ground’ was constrained and limited democratization in post-Soviet Russia.

Finally, TSOs were exclusive and hostile to members interested in joining. According to Mendelson & Gerber (2007), human rights institutions have observed this pattern in Russian TSOs, which constrict outsider involvement and are unwilling to engage the public in their projects. The primary reason for this attitude can be traced to TSOs in the Soviet period, when they existed to protect

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1006} Jo Crotty, "Making a difference? NGOs and civil society development in Russia," \textit{Europe-Asia Studies} 61, no. 1 (2009): 85-108.
\item \textsuperscript{1008} Aleksander Smolar, "Civil society after communism: From opposition to atomization,” \textit{Journal of Democracy} 7, no. 1 (1996): 24-38.
\item \textsuperscript{1009} Jan Kubik, "How to study civil society: the state of the art and what to do next,” \textit{East European Politics and Societies} 19, no. 1 (2005): 105-120.
\end{itemize}
their members from the state rather than serve society more broadly. Over the years, TSO’s solidified this exclusive identity, which, in essence, hampers the development of a democratic civil society.

The development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia is obstructed by these three factors. The constant weakness of Russia's civil society structure is inherited from Soviet-era policy, the fragmentation of social movements and the nature of Russian TSOs themselves. The inability to understand the general requirements of the population, and unite citizens behind non-political social issues, has systematically damaged the function of contemporary civil society. While the introduction of foreign TSOs and resources allow local and regional organizations to act as intermediaries between the state and Russian citizens, strict government policies and regulations have also limited foreign influence.

Future Prospects of Civil Society in Russia

Russia’s struggle to establish a strong civil society from within has been a challenge since the first vestiges appeared in Imperial Russia. Some corporations and wealthy individuals have funded NGOs encouraging Russians to actively indulge in philanthropic initiatives to further strengthen civil society institutions. There are, however, several restrictions in place to obstruct foreign funding to NGOs. The infamous ‘foreign agents’ law, adopted in 2012, requires any NGO that receives foreign funding to register with the Ministry of Justice, and thus are subject to increased surveillance, administrative burdens and fines, which often lead to dissolution. The ‘foreign agents’ law is regularly used by the authorities as a method of criminalizing of the work of human rights defenders, which is evident not only in the restriction of NGOs but also increasingly indicative of restrictive legislation targeting freedom of speech and assembly. The simple act of participating in an unauthorized rally or picket could lead to criminal prosecution.

Looking to the future, barring some unforeseen change and given the events of the last twenty years, it seems the response of authorities will become harsher as time progresses. But this may be a positive development for the mobilization of civil society in Russia, because it indicates that participatory interest is much stronger than it was previously. Overall, more people are becoming ‘joiners’, and more young people are engaged. While this generates a harsher response from authorities and more draconian legislation to restrict their activities, social movements under the banner of civil society will likely gain momentum. The question that remains, however, is whether non-political issues addressed by civil society organizations will be able to galvanize this type of support: According to an article published in The Moscow Times, 28% of Russians voiced their willingness to be a part of a protest over poor government policies and declining quality of life. Given the Russian government’s failure to accommodate the needs of its citizens, civil society

organizations have opportunities to act and promote change through demonstrations and civil dialogue.

Yet, the information available is contradictory. Levada’s pollster recently confirmed that half of Russian citizens polled either do not trust anyone or are unsure who to trust. While this particular poll also marked the lowest approval and trust rating for current Russian president Vladimir Putin (reversing trends in political ambivalence), lack of faith or uncertainty over which organizations to trust could hinder the further development of civil society.  

Conclusion

The Imperial and Soviet legacies have shaped the post-Soviet Russian Federation in numerous ways. This paper demonstrates that the Russian iteration of civil society has been influenced by practices prevalent during the Soviet era which encouraged TSOs to depend on the state for resources. Moreover, I have shown that historically, Russian civil society has not conformed to conventional models of civil society arrangements, which leads to an uncertain future. Given the rise of stricter governmental policies, however, distrust amongst citizens could potentially equip civil society arrangements with the ability to act and make their voices heard. Alternatively, lack of trust could be interpreted as an indicator that civil society institutions in the Russian Federation will continue to operate as they have since the collapse of the USSR.

Even though civil society in Russia is closely regulated and controlled, there is still room for development in the form of adaptation to Russian particularities. At the moment, Russian civil society is not dead, but instead seeks to broaden its horizons and contextually arrange itself in alignment with Russia’s current political vertical power structure.
Bibliography


Russian Hospitality

Julia Brock

Russian hospitality is legendary and is well-represented in both fictional and non-fictional works. Although there are limits to Russians’ graciousness, the depth and breadth of their willingness to host and entertain visitors seems to greatly exceed that of today’s Westerners. Written works by Massie, Tolstoy, Turgenev, a quote by Rimsky and a painting by Borovikovsky provide examples of generosity in Russian homes.

Massie expounds upon Russians’ willingness to receive guests, and provides multiple reasons:

Enormous distances and bad roads separated people in the provinces, and because of this, hospitality was open and generous. Victor Tissot, traveling in the isolated Russian countryside in 1893, commented, ‘Never is the unexpected arrival of a visitor or a stranger a surprise, and it was always a pleasure. You are received if anyone at all has sent you, or even simply by presenting yourself. Guests are welcome to stay as long as they please, one night or six, or several weeks.’ Rather than allow their guests to return home at night, every apartment in the house was turned into a sleeping room. Beds were made up on sofas and chairs, accommodation found for a dozen acquaintances.¹⁰¹³

Such lack of prior notice would be perceived as rude and irresponsible in our culture, and such crowded conditions would not be accommodated unless dire circumstances such as poverty or natural disaster necessitated it. This may be an expression of the early Russian social value of the collective over the will of the individual; doing what is in the interest of the larger group of guests supersedes the convenience of the fewer individuals who are hosting. Russia’s difficult conditions (such as the cold climate, famines, traversing unpopulated and long geographical distances) would motivate others to assist travelers.

As fictional characters, Vasili and Nikita in Tolstoy’s Master and Man enter a wealthy acquaintance’s estate during a blizzard as evening falls after a holiday. Despite the suddenness of the arrival at a less than convenient time, they are urged to stay longer:

‘Yes, friend, we’ve gone astray,’ said Vasili Andreevich. ‘We wanted to get to Goryackin but found ourselves here. We went a second time but lost our way again….But we’re not staying the night.’

‘Where will you go in the night? You’d better stay!’

‘I’d be glad to, but I must go on. It’s business, and it can’t be helped.’ ‘Well, warm yourself at least. The samovar is just ready.’¹⁰¹⁴

On a grander scale, Massie describes meals at St. Petersburg’s Winter Palace during

lavish “balls and receptions for 2,000, 5,000 and on occasion 10,000 people, and a summons
to one of these evenings was equivalent to an invitation to fairyland.”\textsuperscript{1015} Even in more mod-
est abodes, great measures were taken for guests. Massie references a classic Russian cookbook from 1861 that included instructions that would be laughable in today’s American homes. “If twenty-six people arrive unexpectedly for dinner, do not worry. Go to the cellar and take down one or two hams hanging there. Take one pound of butter and two dozen eggs…”\textsuperscript{1016}

Even famous Russians took part in entertaining the masses, and not only their peers.

The quantity and intensity of guests in Tolstoy’s home is difficult to fathom.

[He] became almost an oracle, and Yasnaya Polyana a place of pilgrimage. The house
swam with visitors – friends and admirers both famous and humble, religious teachers
and philosophers…As the nearest railroad station was three miles away and there were
no hotels, Sofia, in the open and generous way of the Russian countryside, offered hos-
pitality to everyone. The house was full of people who came to stay, sometimes for a
week or even a month.\textsuperscript{1017}

Beyond literature, Russian art illustrates this value of welcoming and hosting. In Bo-
rovikovsky’s \textit{Portrait of Catherine the Great} the tsarina was represented as open and gener-
ous.\textsuperscript{1018} She smiles gently, her finger pointing the way (perhaps to her palace), her dog appears
friendly, and the features of her face are soft. The trees and garden in the background are ver-
dant. There is light in the sky, and all seems to be well as she strolls and beacons the viewer.
The artist deliberately arranged the details in this image. In fact, this work was commissioned
almost as a propaganda piece. Copies of this portrait were intended to widely introduce a
stately but approachable leader of an exotic country.

The author Turgenev chronicles several households and their approaches to hospitality.
His treatment of hosting presents a more ambivalent, conditional view. At Arkady’s home, his
father and uncle receive his friend from the university. Bazarov is slow to accept a handshake
but is fed and sheltered.\textsuperscript{1019} The escalation of his insults is tolerated up to a point (probably far
beyond the breaking point at which a Western host would suggest other lodging). As the young
men were leaving for their next journey, “The young people in Marino regretted their depar-
ture…but the old folks breathed a sigh of relief.”\textsuperscript{1020}

At the widow Odintsova’s home, the hostess is generous and entertaining and her male
guests are quite enamored with her. Her household is very structured, and this extends to her
guests. Perhaps it is in this way that hosting seems effortless; she is in complete control of the
timing of the days’ events.

Time (as is well known) sometimes flies by like a bird, while at other times it crawls

\textsuperscript{1015} Massie, \textit{Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia}, 275.
\textsuperscript{1016} Ibid., 297.
\textsuperscript{1017} Ibid., 321.
\textsuperscript{1018} Ibid., 138.
\textsuperscript{1020} Turgenev, \textit{Fathers and Sons}, 48.
like a worm; but a person is particularly fortunate when he doesn’t even notice whether it’s passing swiftly or slowly. In precisely this way Arkady and Bazarov spent about two weeks at Odintsova’s. This was facilitated in part by the order she’d established in her house and in her life. She adhered to it very strictly and forced others to submit as well. ‘…[In] the country it’s impossible to live with disorder; the boredom would be overwhelming.’

Amusingly, a third visiting friend arrives, uninvited, on the eve of the two men’s departure. The next morning “Sitnikov was completely disconcerted…now, all of a sudden, his comrades were deserting him!...[He] suddenly, almost in fear, almost in a wail, announced that he too intended to leave. Odintsova made no attempt to detain him.” By this point, Odintsova likely had tired of entertaining the young men, particularly after her emotional exchange with Bazarov the day before.

At his parents’ home, Bazarov experiences entirely too much hospitality. His father follows him around, talking and asking questions. His mother sighs and stares at him without cease. Arkady finds them agreeable and admirable for the most part. The hosts apologize for not having beef the first night of the visit and correct this situation by the following night. Arkady appreciates the “sumptuous” home-cooked meal and is willing to overlook the poor quality of wine and the presence of flies, as a good guest. Bazarov decides to end the smothering visit after three days, despite his father’s protest that it had been three years since they had seen each other. Thus, the host-guest dynamic is fraught with misaligned expectations.

Surely, at times hospitality was taken advantage of and exceeded all rationality. The author Massie recounts musician Rimsky’s description of a fellow musician’s apartment in this way:

‘often used as a shelter or a night’s lodging by various poor (or “visiting”) relations, who picked that place to fall ill or even lose their minds. Borodin had his hands full of them, doctored them, took them to hospitals…In the four rooms of his apartments there often slept several strange persons of this sort – sofas and floors were turned into beds…At dinner and tea too, great disorder prevailed. Several tomcats that found a home…paraded across the dinner table sticking their noses into plates, unceremoniously leaping onto the diners’ backs.’

As described, Russian hospitality is seen in Massie’s sweeping description of Winter Palace entertainment, in Tolstoy’s character’s noble estate, in Tolstoy’s own home, and in more modest homes such as Bazarov’s in Turgenev’s novel. Borovikovsky’s commissioned painting of Catherine the Great and Rimsky’s review of his musician colleague’s home evoke the art of hosting in other art forms. Out of necessity and given freely, Russians offer what they have available. Boundaries must be established, though, when extreme circumstances cause distress to the host or other guests.
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Daniil Tourashev, U.S. Air Force Academy

An old mulberry tree near Mariupol
Has never seen so many boys in her life
Boys picking her fruit, boys dancing in the branches,
And the smallest boy climbing
To the very top.

RPGs, a machine gun, sniper rifles, helmets, bullet-proof vests
All laid carefully down.

—Borys Humenyuk

In his verse about the ongoing war in Donbas, the poet-soldier Borys Humenyuk juxtaposes the natural rhythms of childhood with the instruments of the war. By doing so, he demonstrates the extent to which the threat of armed conflict has become woven into the fabric of everyday life in the city of Mariupol. Indeed, Mariupol, Ukraine — a mid-sized industrial city on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov — has been perpetually under the threat of attack since the start of hostilities between the central Ukrainian government and armed insurgents in eastern Ukraine.1025 Because of the city’s ability to consistently resist separatist activity, Mariupol in recent years underwent a profound change in the Ukrainian popular imagination. No longer viewed as a polluted, economically declining, regional hub, the city now often evokes feelings of bravery and patriotism among Ukrainians around the country. A local TV station produced a documentary miniseries about Mariupol’s victory over separatism called The City of Heroes (Misto heroïv, 2015-2016), which helped establish the city’s postwar identity on a regional level.1026 At the same time, Humenyuk himself, originally from the Ternopil region in western Ukraine, singles out the city for its ability to raise the next generation of warriors.

The story behind its struggle and success dates to the spring of 2014. Maidan was over in February of that year and Kiev was undergoing the reforms the Revolution of Dignity strived to achieve. In March, Russia annexed Crimea and by April, the referendum was over, and the peninsula became a part of the Russian Federation. Kremlin’s next move was mobilizing Russians in eastern Ukraine by beginning to promote pro-Russian protests. In many cities, they escalated into armed insurgencies, leading to many of them falling under separatist control.

While much of Donbas fell into separatists’ control, Mariupol became one of the only major cities whose people revolted against the separatists and successfully overthrew its pro-

Russian groups to remain part of Ukraine. When armed conflict broke out, the protests gained momentum primarily in small, economically declining industrial cities such as Donetsk and Luhansk. Some people, including the Russian government, thought that Mariupol would overthrow their government and flip like the rest of Donbas because the city was part of the Novorossiya project when the proposed map became public. The reason came down to Mariupol’s Russian community, which amounted to nearly half of the population. If appealed to properly, it could be compelled to rise against the city’s government. At the time, Rinat Akhmetov, the most influential individual in eastern Ukraine, backed the insurgents in Donetsk, signifying that he would likely do the same in Mariupol. Additionally, the city’s economic decline, complemented by nostalgia for the Soviet rule, could have inspired many residents to seek a better life by casting their lots with modern Russia. However, not only did Mariupol reject the Novorossiya project, but it became a symbol of Ukraine’s broader fight against Russia’s destabilizing role after the Revolution of Dignity. In this essay, I argue that the city’s unique combination of factors allowed it to become the place that helped turn the tide of the war, including history and geography, the power of the oligarchs, the effectiveness of militias, the will of civil society, and the support of national and foreign aid.

The Battle for Mariupol

From May to June 2014, Mariupol witnessed a series of clashes between pro-Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists, which became known as the Battle for Mariupol. The earliest protests broke out in the months leading up to the presidential elections, which were called after President Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia and were scheduled to take place in May.

On March 18, pro-Russian separatists held a rally in front of the City Council building, which quickly escalated. The protesters removed the front door of the building from its hinges and sent five representatives to a round table meeting. At the meeting, political figures, representatives of public organizations, and separatists discussed the possibility for a referendum. Following the meeting, Mariupol’s mayor Yury Hotlubey declared his intention not to run for re-election. Meanwhile, the protesters moved to the Post Bridge, where they blocked all public transport for about half an hour and prevented a vehicle with border guards from leaving the city. However, these pro-Russian forces seem to have been an outspoken minority in the city. “Our local government building is locked and is occupied by protestors demanding a referendum


\[1028\] Novorossiya, or New Russia, was a proposed union composed of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic. Both were under the control of pro-Russian separatists at the time the project was proposed.

\[1029\] Although the commonly used name for the Battle for Mariupol is ‘The Battle of Mariupol,’ I prefer the former because the latter implies that the battle was a single event rather than a prolonged series of clashes.


and for us to join Russia,” one resident told the BBC: “Most of the people here don't support unifying with Russia, they just support enlarging our local powers.”

By April, the pro-Russian forces then began to overtly attack members of the Ukrainian army. In his book *Greetings from Novorossia* (2017), the photojournalist Paweł Pieniążek describes the events of 16 April 2014, when a group of pro-Russian separatists launched an attack on a National Guard outpost. The first “skirmishes broke out […] when militants attacked a Ukrainian military unit,” he writes. One of the individuals who participated in the attack Sergei Shevchenko, a 40-year-old businessman from Donetsk, described how the insurgents “threw Molotov cocktails to light the way,” before exchanging fire with the Ukrainian soldiers. In the end, “three attackers were killed, 13 wounded and 63 detained,” according to the minister of defense Arsen Avakov. However, while “the Ukrainian forces managed to hold on,” Pieniążek soberly observed that at that point “the city was under the separatists’ control.”

By May, the Ukrainian forces regrouped and went on an offensive to reassert control over the city. The government was able to successfully retake the city council on May 7. Multiple law enforcement vehicles along with several dozen fighters from The Right Sector (Praviy Sector) surrounded the building and proceeded to use tear gas to force those inside to come out. All separatists inside the building were successfully detained upon abandoning the building. The city experienced its greatest turbulence during the Victory Day protests on May 9. A series of clashes took place between the Ukrainian military and the separatists in the city center. According to *The Guardian*, at least seven people were killed when the Ukrainian army entered the city to regain control of the police headquarters, where separatists were concentrated. The confrontation ended with the station burning down and the separatists fleeing. After the fighting, the military withdrew from the city, leaving the control to the local law enforcement.

Almost immediately after the military withdrawal, the oligarch Rinat Akhmetov stepped forward to provide security for Mariupol. On 10 May, Akhmetov’s company, Metinvest, announced that it would form and fund a militia of steelworker employees to prevent looting and instability caused by the separatists and criminals in the city. Indeed, Mariupol’s battalions,
according to the Atlantic Council’s Askold Krushelnycky, came to play a crucial role in the defense of the country and filled “a gap created by the uneven performance of Ukraine’s national military.” According to the city’s most prominent militia, the Azov Battalion, initially had around 200 members, but its numbers doubled when it took regular soldiers, national guard troops, and other volunteers. On 13 June, the Azov Battalion, with the support of the Ukrainian security forces, launched a raid on the separatists’ headquarters that killed five insurgents, led to the arrest of dozens of others, and ultimately drove the separatists out of the city for good.

**History and Geography**

The first factor that allowed Mariupol to remain in Ukrainian control was its location on the north coast of the Sea of Azov. Unlike the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, which experienced the insurgency and remain in separatists’ control today, Mariupol is located farther from the Russian border where Russia had its troops. Moreover, the two cities lie on the M-4 freeway that stretches as far north as Moscow yet goes through both. Meanwhile, Mariupol requires an additional detour, which the Russian military never took.

In his research article “How the War Began: Conceptualizing Conflict Escalation in Ukraine’s Donbas,” Jakob Hauter argues that Mariupol experienced a lesser level of violence than other areas. Hauter points out that after Sloviansk, “Mariupol was the first place in the Donbas where tensions crossed the armed conflict threshold.” He further describes that the conflict unfolded similarly in both cities: “the appearance of armed groups, the deployment of the security forces, and the first armed clashes happened in close succession.” However, the “level of violence” and “separatist control” failed to reach the same level observed in other areas. I argue that Mariupol’s geographic position played a role in the continued fighting in the city.

Mariupol’s position on the coast of the Sea of Azov not only had strategic consequences, but it also gave the city a distinct cultural history. Local historians have found evidence that the city started as a Cossack settlement, which gives the city a rebellious ethos and Ukrainian origins. As Hiroaki Kuromiya has shown in his history *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s-1990s*, the Cossack legacy of the Donbas would come to

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embody “the characteristics of the wild field — freedom, militancy, violence, terror, independence.” Later, the city became part of the Russian Empire during Catherine the Great’s campaign against the Turks and further grew into a port city. Hence, the population is traditionally Russian-speaking with an even split among the ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Mariupol is also the 10th largest city in Ukraine and the 2nd largest in the Donetsk Oblast. In this respect, Mariupol is like many other cities in Donbas. However, in 1780, Russian imperial authorities forced the Greek population living in Crimea to move to Mariupol. Today, Mariupol remains a coastal city bringing in tourists from within the country and around the world, and its international connections continue to make it stand out from its counterparts in Donbas.

Specifically, the direct link between the city and Western civilization makes Mariupol a unique city in Ukraine. The Greek population first came to Mariupol from Crimea. However, those Greeks were descendants from the Greeks living in the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Empire was the eastern half of the Holy Roman Empire which considered itself as the inheritor of the Greek civilization and cultivated the ideas of modern democracy. Today, the Greeks continue to represent a minority population in the city.

During Soviet rule, Mariupol was, in part, responsible for the industrialization of Ukraine. The Illich Steel and Iron Works, founded in 1897 but expanded in 1933, set the foundation for Mariupol’s role as an industrial hub in Ukrainian SSR. Today, it is the second largest metallurgical enterprise in Ukraine. It further employs 60,000 people making it one of the largest employers in the city. The individual most responsible for representing a Ukrainian Mariupol as a free city is the oligarch Rinat Akhmetov.

Oligarchs

The influence of oligarchs was another factor that played a significant role in allowing Mariupol to fight against its pro-Russian insurgency. Specifically, Rinat Akhmetov, the richest person in Ukraine, supported the fight against Russian insurgents. His businesses are primarily based in eastern Ukraine where the pro-Russian movements first gained momentum. Quentin Buckholz, a political consultant, claims that Akhmetov first chose to support the insurgency in the city of Donetsk because his businesses were better integrated with the Russian economy, specifically the refined coal industry. However, by May 2014, “he appears to have made a different calculation there” and had “workers employed by [him] act[ing] forcefully to counter separatist influence in Mariupol”.

Another possibility regarding his decision making is that as a businessman with more than enough money, it is possible that he chose to fund both sides of the conflict. Regardless of the victor, that side would owe him for his support. Although his intentions are unknown, a similar pattern occurred when observing his behavior in Mariupol and Donetsk. It is drastically different, Buckholz claims.

The influence of oligarchs in fighting the insurgency is not limited to Mariupol. The Oligarchs in Kharkiv and Dnipro, Genady Kernes and Igor Kolomonsky respectively, chose to support the Ukrainian side.\footnote{Quentin Buckholz, “The Dogs That Didn’t Bark,” \textit{Problems of Post-Communism}, p. 158-161 (2017).} With Akhmetov’s support in Mariupol and their support in those key cities, the front did not advance thus saving cities like Odesa from falling to pro-Russian groups. Researchers can argue that the oligarch’s “motivation by instrumentalist factors” gave Mariupol and those cities enough support to stand up and fight the insurgency.\footnote{Quentin Buckholz, “The Dogs That Didn’t Bark,” \textit{Problems of Post-Communism}, p. 158-161 (2017).} If not for them, those cities could have fallen and the momentum the insurgents had already gained could have continued. In the worst-case scenario, Ukraine might have been even more torn apart and engaged in an armed conflict on a significantly larger scale.

Militias

With Akhmetov committing to aid Mariupol in its struggle, enough funds became available for city militias to form and train to fight the separatists. On June 13, 2014, they played a key role in liberating the city. The groups ranged from the National Guard to Azov Battalion, Dnipro-I, and Shakhtarask; that day 150 Azov Battalion fighters, two squadrons of Dnipro-I, two squadrons of the National Guard, and spetznaz of the MVD forces participated. The battle lasted for six hours and resulted in the deaths of five militants and two soldiers.\footnote{Elena Kolgusheva, “Mariupol. Poslednij forpost,” \textit{Ukraineform} (2020): https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-ato/3044138-mariupol-poslednjy-forpost.html.}

One account of the battle stands out the most: when Ukrainian armored tanks were riding through the city, one of them broke down. Separatists immediately surrounded it. On one hand, the lives of the soldiers inside were in danger. On the other, the separatists came out onto an open street and found themselves confronted by the militia members who were dressed in civilian clothing. Not only did they disorient them and force the separatists to retreat, they also sabotaged the vehicle so the separatists could not use it.\footnote{Elena Kolgusheva, “Mariupol. Poslednij forpost,” \textit{Ukraineform} (2020): https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-ato/3044138-mariupol-poslednjy-forpost.html.} Without the militia’s support, the Ukrainian military wouldn’t have enough resources and reach to make the separatists withdraw from the city.

The support of the militias gave people confidence to protests even at the most dangerous of times. Days before the city’s residents came out to protest, 30 separatist tanks appeared in Novoazorsk, a city located 40 km from Mariupol. A Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) spokesman also sent a rogue Tweet affirming that DNR would retake the city. Despite the residents’ fear of falling under separatist control again, 5,000 people came out to participate in anti-war demonstrations on August 28.\footnote{Paweł Pieniążek, \textit{Greetings from Novorossia: Eyewitness to the War in Ukraine} (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017), 160.} Protesters chanted “Mariupol is Ukraine” knowing that the Russian
tanks were likely on their way. The slogan carried a political meaning intended to assert that Mariupol was not willing to fall to pro-Russian separatists and would fight if they had to. The role of the militias further helped Mariupol earn the title of “the last outpost” in its struggle against the insurgence. President Poroshenko immediately moved the regional capital to Mariupol. Hence, through the help of the city’s militias, the Ukrainian military was able to successfully liberate the city from the separatists.

**Civil society**

A strong number of militias allowed Mariupol’s civil society to express itself in relative safety. Whether a refugee from the Donbas region or a permanent resident of Mariupol, the city’s men and women let their voices be heard. For instance, Paweł Pieniążek wrote his account of visiting the city and hearing from a Donetsk refugee exclaiming “I just want peace.” While his priority was escaping the conflict by fleeing from it, the citizens of Mariupol refused to give up their ground. Pieniazek further recalls talking to a Mariupol resident during a shelling of the city and hearing “I’m standing here…I live here” in response to why the resident was not hiding or seeking shelter. The perspective the man had was not an outlier among Mariupol’s people; after taking the city back, they refused to give it up again.

**Slogans**

To complement that chant, people also chanted “Glory to Ukraine, glory to the heroes,” a slogan used during the Maidan protests. The slogan appeals to the nationalist nature of the protests. Ilya Gerasimov, executive editor of *Ab Imperio*, argues that Maidan was the first “postcolonial revolution” because it can be characterized by “the people acquiring their own voice” to “force a new Ukrainian nation as a community of negotiated solidarity action by self-conscious individuals.” The slogan meant to explicitly separate the people of Mariupol from the separatists because the slogan was not only used to unify Ukrainian people during the Maidan protests, but it also carried an anti-Russian historical connotation. Additionally, Volodymyr Ischenko, a sociologist and part of Ukraine’s leftist movement, recognized that the ‘right side’ played a significant role in the Maidan protests and “also succeeded in mainstreaming their slogans” while referring to the same one used in Mariupol.

The final slogan chanted during the protest was “PTN PNCH,” a slogan directed against President Putin. Often described as a low-blow phrase, it literally translates to “Putin…go f-yourself.” Personally, I believe the phrase encompasses the frustration the people of Mariupol had over the months the insurgence occurred by directing it against the person responsible for it.

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Public Spaces

The tanks never came, but the people let their voices be heard. Today, “Mariupol is Ukraine” is on the city administration building aimed to demonstrate the act of defiance the residents of Mariupol showed that day. Moreover, on the burnt down wall of the city council building, a mural depicts a girl defeating a one-headed serpent, painted in the colors of the Donetsk People’s Republic. The girl symbolizes Ukraine that uses the spear to send away predatory entities from its land. The sign underneath says, “Defend your future, vote for Ukraine.” The mural is based on the iconography of St. George. “Since St. George is one of the patron saints of Russia and Moscow (and is often used in grotesque ways as a symbol of Orthodoxy’s victory over Islam), the reversal is powerful” because “the city hall mural represents Russia as the vanquished force.” Moreover, the girl is holding what may potentially be a Ukrainian passport in her hand with her background, “however distant [it] may be,” is in the colors of the E.U. flag.

The mural on the city administration’s building isn’t the only one that emerged in the city since 2014. Today, there are dozens of murals depicting societal problems that reflect social reality in the city. The very first mural was painted by Azov Brigade fighters in 2015 and is called “The Spirit of Time.” It depicts the ‘defenders’ of Mariupol across time. For instance, it shows a Cossack fighter, a Ukrainian Insurgent Army fighter, and an anti-terrorist fighter. Each represents the imperial time, World War II, and the Donbas insurgency time periods, respectively. The citizens of Mariupol were not particularly content with the mural, however, because of the controversial values the Azov Brigade stands for alongside their intentions of defending the city.

Other murals throughout the city encompass various elements of Ukrainian history and culture. For example, volunteers of an organization “Waking Up Ukraine at Once” painted a Cossack on a wall of a business center as a symbol of “patriotism” and “fearlessness.” Furthermore, the members of public service are also celebrated in the murals; a Mariupol artist depicted a special police unit equipped with gear and firearms during an operation on a wall of the police headquarters. Another painter from Dnipro depicted a “re-settler” by drawing a boy riding his bicycle while carrying a multiple-story house on his back. I believe the creator wanted to emphasize the hardships of war that many refugees had to endure.

Perhaps the most recognized mural in the city is “Rukavichka.” It depicts the children who were harmed during the war. The location of the mural is not accidental; it is showcased on the wall of School No. 68, which is one of the buildings partially destroyed during the bombing of the city. The symbolism behind the mural lies behind a Japanese folktale and stands for the solidarity and unity of the citizens of Mariupol and the refugees that came over.

Outside aid

Mariupol’s success may not have continued to 2021 if not for outside aid the city receives. For instance, in 2019, President Zelensky announced multiple projects aimed at developing Mariupol. First is a plan for a two-lane, 225-kilometer highway that will connect Mariupol with Zaporizhzhya. Second, is a plan to extend 4G coverage to 90% of the country within 2 years. Third, is an initiative to construct 11 digital TV transmitters thus expanding TV access throughout the country, including Mariupol. Fourth, a private transportation company called Ukrzaliznytsya has promised to construct a $6 million Kiev-Mariupol night train. Fifth, COFCO, a Chinese shipping company invested $50 million in developing port infrastructure, which will boost cargo traffic by 2.3 million tons. Sixth, the French government committed to spending $111 million on a water supply and treatment project. Finally, Metinvest, Rinat Akhmetov’s company, allocated $400 million to reduce pollution in Mariupol.

All of these projects show that the decline the city was enduring in 2014 that led it to temporarily fall to separatist control is no longer occurring. People’s lives are getting better as the result and it is less likely for another insurgence to occur in Mariupol. The country’s GDP has also been on a rise since 2014 and continues on the same trend.

A particular instance of outside aid that goes beyond a construction project and extends into the cultural element of the city is the Mariupol book fair in 2018. USAID sponsored it by bringing authors from all parts of the country to Mariupol. In essence, the fair brought in the cultural aspect that the industrial nature of the city lacks. It is significant, first, because USAID’s sponsorship demonstrates the foreign involvement in organizing cultural events in the city, a phenomenon that was nonexistent prior to 2014. Second, it allows for cultural diversity among the city’s working class, which makes up the majority of the population. Essentially, the fact that Mariupol was selected as the location of a national book fair with foreign sponsorship demonstrates the strategic importance of the city and Ukraine’s emphasis on appealing to the city’s population, in order to prevent another insurgence.

Conclusion

The story of Mariupol is an inspirational one. Mariupol’s defeat of the pro-Russian movement within its borders required many factors going right. All groups played a role from the oligarchs, militias, and the military helping to liberate the city to the people letting their voices be heard during and after the Battle of Mariupol. In the end, the U.S. could learn the influence that having the support of the government, the support of the wealthy, and popular support, respectively, can have on the outcome of events in a politically tense scenario. In 2021, Russia continues to exert its influence and tactics to stir controversy and turbulence in eastern Ukraine by

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bringing its troops and equipment to the border between the two.\textsuperscript{1069} The U.S. must use the lessons of Mariupol to continue utilizing the support of those groups and stop Russia’s interference with Ukraine’s stability once and for all.

Bibliography


“Hidden Folklore: A Case Study of a Carpatho-Rusyn American Family”

Isabel Fernando, Slippery Rock University

1. Origins and Introduction

Rituals are often carried out with an intent. A reason why one is practicing them and mostly full consciousness of what the ritual means. These overt practices might include the practice of wearing folk costumes or celebrating holidays. However, folk custom and culture can also dictate one's internal behavior, the way they think things should be done, what they think is moral or immoral, and how they react to situations can all be culturally determined. These are ancient ways of thinking about the world that can be passed down through generation to generation. These beliefs might have once had an overt intent to them, be it spiritual, magical, or practical. However, as time goes by and groups shift and immigrate, these behavioral rituals can lose their magical intent, morphing into reflexes rather than rituals. They evolve into behaviors that one performs or beliefs one subscribes to without knowing the origin or intent of the behavior or belief. Simply one must do it or believe in it given their situation.

The Carpatho-Rusyns traditionally inhabit the intersections of Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Romania. They are a stateless people who are possibly descended from both the Kyivan Rus’ and the Slavic tribes that settled with the Huns and the Avars in 400-500 AD as well as the White Croats in the 500s-600s. Later influences tie them to Vlach shepherds from present day Romania in the high and late Middle Ages. Carpatho-Rusyn ties with the Kyivan Rus’ mostly come in the form of the settlement of nobles from Galicia, the western part of the Rus’ in present day Ukraine. These nobles were invited by the kingdom of Hungary in the 1100s-1500s AD. It is important to note that this origin is currently being debated, however, it appears to be the most concise argument for the origin of the Carpatho-Rusyns.

Many Carpatho-Rusyns immigrated to North America due to poverty and famine in the last quarter of the 19th and first quarter of the 20th century Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants who have retained some of their traditions reveal their European culture from the past. Their immigration in itself set the culture, both internal (Beliefs, Attitudes) and external (Dress, Holiday traditions, Language) on a different evolutionary route than their counterparts in Europe. These cultural divergences emerge from both the separate historical events experienced, as well as pressures to assimilate into American culture.

This paper consists of looking at old customs and beliefs among the Carpatho Rusyn people and analyzing how these customs translate into beliefs and actions of a Carpatho Rusyn immigrant family residing in the United States. This case study will be looking specifically at a family who immigrated in 1922 from the village of Folvark, Czechoslovakia (now Stranany, Slovakia) to Johnstown, Pennsylvania. They were a part of a later wave of immigrants who came over after World War 1, a wave that mostly consisted of women and children rejoining their husbands, as well as some families. I will take an intergenerational approach to analyze changes in behavior the longer the family has resided in the United States. The 1st generation, for this paper’s purposes, is defined as those who were born in the Hungarian Kingdom or postwar Czechoslovakia. The 2nd generation refers to their children born in America, the 3rd generation refers to

1070 P. R. Magosci, Our People, (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1984).
1071 Ibid.
1072 Ibid.
the 2nd generation’s children, and The 4th refers to the 3rd Generations children. Observations of the authors family throughout her lifespan, when compared to various Carpatho-Rusyn ethnographic studies in the Carpathian Rus’, show that Psychosocial cultural beliefs about family, gender, and death can survive significant language loss due to immigration. These psychosocial beliefs are maintained, lost, and revived from generation to generation.

Although this family immigrated from a historically Greek-Catholic village in the Carpatho-Rusyn homeland, their involvement with the Johnstown Pennsylvania “Carpatho-Russian Orthodox” diocese led to the adoption of an Eastern Orthodox view of religion. When my 1st generation great-grandmother married my Roman Catholic Slovak great-grandfather, the family became less outwardly affiliated with the Carpatho-Rusyn church, but still practiced many of its traditions in the home. The family’s involvement with a diocese that refers to itself as “Carpatho-Russian” lent itself to a somewhat confusing method of self-identification. Many individuals in my family know that they are not “Russian” but call themselves Russian. This probably arose for the ease of outsiders and to avoid questioning, as well as for the fact that many outsiders who do not know what a Carpatho-Rusyn is will simply assume they are Russian. However, when individuals in my family are asked if their ancestors from Russia they will say no immediately and will instead say that they are “Carpatho Russian” or “Rusyn” if pressed further. This can lead to political confusion with outsiders, and even with younger family members, who wonder, even if their ancestors are not from Russia, if they have any ties to the Russian state. Even I had confusion with this when I was a young child. It is yet to be seen how this confusion in self-identity, in conjunction with current Russian aggression in Ukraine, will impact both the family’s self-identification, as well as outsider reactions to the family. It is also important to note that the family does not and has never identified as Ukrainian either. This is due to the fact Ukrainization of Rusyns began when the Czechoslovakia came under the Soviet sphere of influence and Soviet ethnographers started classifying Carpatho-Rusyns as Ukrainian. This took place after the family’s ancestors left the homeland, and the Ukrainization ideology did not reach Johnstown.

2. Loss, Merging, and Maintenance of external culture

The integration into American culture in the family mostly came in the form of External cultural traditions, defined in this paper as dress, holiday traditions, and language. Carpatho-Rusyn folk dress was not worn daily from the first moment the family arrived in America. The 1st and 2nd generations maintained a knowledge of folk dress custom; however, this was completely lost in the 3rd generation. Some members of the 4th generation are working to reclaim folk dress through academic means and examining family photos. Holiday traditions have followed a similar pattern of dissipation and incomplete reemergence; however, these traditions have become intermingled with American traditions. When the 2nd generation was growing up, the family celebrated sviaty vecer (Christmas dinner) the Carpatho-Rusyn way on December 24th. The family also had a separate dinner on January 7th and attended Orthodox church services. These traditions radically changed during the 3rd generation’s upbringing. They celebrated Christmas on the 25th secularly but still with some Rusyn cuisine. They also still celebrated Orthodox Christmas on January 7th but only with a minor dinner. The changes in these more religious tra-

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1073 John and Helen Timo foundation (2020) The Resurrection of a Nation [Film; Digital], Retrieved From (44) https://youtu.be/I0g6cYw35lk.
ditions might have been affected by economic reasons, such as schedules not allowing for members of the family to call off work for Christmas Eve or skip school January 7th, as well as a distancing from organized religion in general that started in the second generation and progressed in succeeding generations. However, when the 3rd generation grew up, they began to have Christmas dinner again. Albeit without most of the sviaty vecer traditions and food. And their children, the 4th generation, experienced a secular Orthodox Christmas that borrowed East Slavic figures such as Ded Moroz or as they called him, “Russian Santa”. The 4th generation also experienced the melding of the American Easter egg hunt with the traditional dish of Carpatho-Rusyn Cirecz. This created a tradition in which finding the “cirecz egg” meant good luck and the child who found it would be rewarded if they ate it.

The changes and adaptations of these overt and open traditions represent the collective hiding, rather than erasure of Carpatho-Rusyn culture after immigration. “Collective hiding” is defined for this paper’s purposes as the delegation of Carpatho-Rusyn culture to the psychological home and family environment. This occurs when one is pressured to appear fully assimilated to the dominant American culture in their public and working life. This creates a sort of “Carpatho-Rusyn inside/American Outside” manner of behaving. In which those affected will “act out” being American when interacting with the broader American culture. To illustrate this, the author notes changing in both her and her family’s inflection, tone and volume of voice when they interact with non-Carpatho-Rusyn Americans. While doing this, their speaking tone often reflects the person they are speaking to, or voices heard on television and other media.

This imitation of Americanness in social interactions is similar to the way holidays are enacted. For example, various generational observations of the way 4th of July is supposed to be celebrated by “Americans” leads to a holiday in which the inherent meaning to this Carpatho-Rusyn family is Beer, Grilling, and fireworks, rather than the formation of a country. Thanksgiving is a similar situation with pumpkin pie and turkeys, rather than the historical meaning it has to Anglo-Americans. These holidays, and social interactions with non-Carpatho-Rusyn Americans are external performances of assimilation and acceptability. However, there are cracks in the façade. Carpatho Rusyn sausage is always cooked on 4th of July, Traditional Carpatho-Rusyn walnut rolls are served on thanksgiving, Haluski (Carpatho-Rusyn dumplings) are put in Irish corned beef and cabbage; and during emotional moments I might break out of my measured academic English that I learned how to speak on the TV, into my “real” voice that matches the one my family spoke around me. A voice that has been described as Jagged and loud, similar to the inflections heard in Carpatho-Rusyn folk singing.

One of the few fully Carpatho-Rusyn traditions of the more deliberate variety (not relating to food) which survived assimilation is that on New Year’s Eve, all the male children visit the matriarch of the family, who in this case is their grandmother and say a phrase to initiate good luck in the new year. The first boy to visit receives a prize. This echoes Mykola Musinka’s observations about the Prešov region, where he observed the New Year’s tradition of well-wishing. In the original version of this tradition, groups of boys from the whole village visited both neighbors and relatives. This had to be scaled down in a post-immigration context in which Carpatho-Rusyns lived farther apart, being narrowed down to boys only practicing this well-wishing within a family context. This also relates to the delegation of culture to the home environment mentioned in the last paragraph. While this tradition is quite deliberate in nature, many

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in this family were unaware of its village origins, simply learning to do it by watching generations that came before them.

The Rusyn language did not survive to a usable extent in the family. A few words remained such as the word for “colander”, *drishlyak*. As well as the term the 2nd generation matriarch, the author’s grandmother (baba), called her. The term was *kotchamaty*, which means “Cat mother” because I would take care of stray kittens and cats like they were my children. *Bozhe Bozhe Bozhe* (Lord, Lord, Lord) was said by the 2nd generation matriarch as well, whenever myself or my siblings and cousins did something scandalous. Discourse tends to look at “first languages” in the context of using a language with complete fluency. Using it this way is limiting when looking at how diasporic groups relate to their ancestral languages. While i do not know how to speak the Rusyn language, these Rusyn words were my “first words” for these objects and concepts. So much so, that calling a *drishlyak* a colander still feels uncomfortable. The majority of the Carpatho-Rusyn language was forgotten for multiple reasons according to the 2nd generation matriarch of the family. The first being the fact children in her kindergarten class harassed anyone (including her) that did not speak perfect English, or individuals who spoke with an accent. The second reason seems to serve as a humorous contrast to the first, that reason being that the matriarch’s parents, aunts, and uncles didn’t want her to know what they were talking about.

3. The maintenance of “internal” culture and comparison to beliefs in the Carpathian Rus’

Even without fluent language, hidden aspects of Rusyn and East-Slavic culture survive in this family, these aspects include beliefs about family dynamics, gender, spirituality, and death. These psychosocial cultural beliefs constitute “Internal culture” for this paper’s purposes. These are not as easily lost as the “external” cultural beliefs mentioned earlier because while one may be able to fake an accent or an external tradition through imitation. It is nearly impossible and very uncomfortable to imitate the internal psychological and moral processes of someone of the dominant American culture in the same way. In the home and family environment, these processes and ideals survive, both in conflict and in cooperation with the adopted cultural environment.

3.1. Marriage

The grandparents of the 2nd -generation family matriarch were both wed due to arranged marriages, as was common in Carpatho-Rusyn culture.\textsuperscript{1075} This practice was abandoned upon immigration, however, as one party recounted to the matriarch “don’t let your mother pick your husband”. The 2nd-generation mother and father were a love match who met in America, but they were approved of by the bride's parents to get married. While the official practice of arranged marriage might have ended, the belief that parents ultimately held the decision of who their daughter was allowed to marry remained. When the second-generation matriarch met a person that her parents didn’t approve of. The girl’s parents supervised her movements outside of the home, threw away letters that the boy had sent, and forbade her from speaking to him. In the end she ran away with the boy and then bargained with her parents over the phone to either let her get married or she would not return home, this finally persuaded her parents to allow her to

\textsuperscript{1075} M. Musinka, *Folk Customs of Carpatho-Rusyns: Christmas and New Year*, (1983).
marry the boy. This act of eloping, even though the couple were completely unaware of it, is almost identical to the folk custom of bride kidnapping, which, according to Musinka’s ethnographic work, was practiced in Rusyn villages when the bride's family was not approving of a marriage.1076

Many girls in this family also unwittingly practiced the behavior of moving into the bride's parents' house even after they were married. A tradition sometimes practiced in the Carpathian Rus’, where it was called prystassvo.1077 In this tradition, the couple moved in with the bride’s parents until they could build a house of their own. The couple would of course help the bride’s parents with whatever they asked, this was mostly practiced when the bride had no male siblings. The reasoning of why the Carpatho-Rusyn American family practiced this was a little different. In the cases of the 2nd generation and some of the 3rd generation it was partly due to the husband’s family being unwilling to support the new couple as they got settled into married life. Another possible reason this marriage pattern was practiced in the 2nd and 3rd generations was the possible distance the married couple might move away if not supported by the bride's family. In the post-immigration context, the girls’ marriages might move them to faraway and unfamiliar places, and when doing this many of the girls felt disconnected from their support system that was so integral to them for much of their lives. Rather than moving back into their parents’ actual house, they symbolically did this by moving into houses on the same street as the one they grew up on, purchased by their mother and father. This system earned the nickname of “the compound” by the former husband of a 3rd -generation daughter. In turn for the parents' support of their children, they were expected to be cared for later in life by their children and their spouses. The 2nd -generation matriarch also mentioned this tradition in earlier times, with her paying for her parents’ retirement, as they helped her pay for trade school. As is written in Carpatho-Rusyn folkloric songs such as “Teche voda, teche” (Flow water, flow) in which a daughter sings about how her mother took care of her and now she must take care of her mother.1078 This tradition remained at least until the 3rd generation, in which all but one female child participated in this practice. The sons of the family also remained close by, albeit not on the same street, in order to help take care of their parents.

When a marriage ceremony is preformed, the family practices the Carpatho-Rusyn custom of “dancing in a row” in which the bride dances with and collects tips from guests.1079 In Carpathian Rus’, this dance was solely performed with the husband's male relatives, but in the diasporic context, both spouses' families as well as friends join in. What has not changed is the fact that the money the bride receives from the dance is hers to do what she wishes. The group of dancers in this family’s version of the dance is also supposed to block the husband from the bride, appearing to communicate “if you want her, you'll have to work for it”. The author’s mother commented on the significance of the dance: “if I got married to someone your baba (the matriarch) didn’t approve of, she would never let them through.” This refers back to another Carpatho-Rusyn custom relating to prystassvo, the person who the daughter married would be expected to be a worker for his parents-in-law. In the diasporic context, his refusal to do this would not lead to him being made to divorce his daughter and move out of their house, but it would.

1076 Ibid.
1077 Ibid.
1079 Musinka, Folk Customs of Carpatho-Rusyns: Christmas and New Year.
make him the topic of gossip in the family. As a result, the author remembers all of her uncles helping the matriarch and the author's grandfather with their household errands quite often throughout her childhood.

3.2. Family and Gender roles

It is important to note the naming traditions in this family. They do not exactly mirror those practices noted by Kolojeski, in which the sons' name was based on a line of male relatives, starting with the father, and the girls had to be named “Mary, Anna, and Helen” before any familial names. This tradition was broken not in America, but in the homeland, in which the oldest daughter was named Katerina, which was followed by a Mary, and then a Julia. Rather, familial names seem to be the most popular for both genders in this family. Kateryna’s daughter (the matriarch) was named the Americanized “Kathryn”, which further divulged into “Kirston”. The girls’ names from this point on were usually a mix of familial names and outside chosen names. Familial names were often used to honor dead ancestors, for example my full name “Isabel Katheryn” was chosen because an aunt named Isabel on my mother’s paternal Lebanese side passed away shortly before she was born. “Katheryn” was chosen because it honored the familial naming traditions and combined the family name of “Kateryna” with the name of the author’s paternal grandmother's middle name “Catherine”. However, the naming tradition of the boys follows Carpatho-Rusyn custom almost perfectly. In the 3rd generation, the first boy was named after the father, the second was named after the mother’s father because the paternal grandfather was named the same thing as the father. My brother is also named after my father. Since my parents only wanted two children, my brother’s middle name was a combination of both of my grandfathers. The naming traditions in this family show utmost respect to ancestors and family above all else.

Younger mothers in this family are sandwiched between taking care of the matriarch in the family: taking her on errands, as she does not drive, or bringing her groceries. Many of these women also have full-time jobs, and children, whom the matriarch will take care of after school, while the mothers work at said jobs. Still, women are expected to “take care of their own” and it is frowned upon to look towards resources outside of the family such as daycare or institutions, leading to some of these women getting less than 5 hours of sleep. This echoes Cristina Cantin’s observations about Carpatho-Rusyns in Ukraine and Slovakia. The women in the villages she studied were often exhausted, due to their expected role of “family cultivator” this exhaustion often led to stress related health conditions and breakdowns which could require hospitalization or spa treatments. These hospitalizations too are not without a parallel in the Rusyn-American family. One of the young 3rd- generation mothers was hospitalized with pneumonia, likely aggravated by stress, leaving the matriarch to care for her children while she was away.

The Carpatho-Rusyn ideals of cultivating the family and living close together clashes with the prescriptive American individualism the family encountered in the new world. This individualism works upon a definition of “close family” as being one’s spouse and children. This is not compatible with the ideal Carpatho-Rusyn family dynamic. When a family member is disabled or gets very sick, as has happened with my brother on more than one occasion. the family

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1080 G. Kolojeski, Carpatho-Rusyn Given Names- Traditional Patterns of Naming Carpatho-Rusyn Children, (2003), Retrieved from Given Names (rusyn.com).
has a strong reaction when they see their sister and daughter, my mother, overwhelmed. They offer their help, although this wish to help often conflicts with work schedules that operate on an individualistic schedule. Therefore, most family members are busy with work during the day, when help is most needed, or are away at college like I currently am. The family members that offer to help often can only do so at night, or on very certain occasions, which leads to guilt at the thought of not participating in the ideal family system, and sometimes anger at the author’s mother for “denying” their help when in fact the ways they can help are not sustainable in accordance with American culture.

The US principle of institutionalizing family members also goes against the Carpatho-Rusyn “take care of your own” ideal, leaving much of the family, especially the author’s mother in a tough spot when the author’s brother’s illness (autism) becomes unmanageable. Many doctors expect the author’s mother to give up and institutionalize the author’s brother, so they do not provide him with enough outpatient care. On the other hand, the thought of the author’s brother becoming unmanageable with inadequate outpatient care and possibly needing to become institutionalized makes the author’s mother feel like she has failed in a Carpatho-Rusyn cultural context.

Despite the expectations excised over daughters in this family, some of the gender roles in this family are more progressive than the surrounding American culture. As Hillary M. Lips in her women’s psychology book *A New Psychology of Women: Gender, Culture, and Ethnicity* (2017) states: women cook the food, men produce it. Yet, among this Carpatho-Rusyn family, women learned how to do both. The 1st and 2nd generations consisted of only girls, yet the family experienced no shortage of work during these periods. The 1st -generation daughters worked on a full-scale farm rented and worked by theirs and another family. The 2nd-generation daughters were encouraged to learn how to raise livestock, get a job to earn money for their families among any other practical skill. This encouragement of practical knowledge continued through the 3rd and 4th generation where the girls learned along with the boys how to raise livestock, do garden work, as well as trap and fish if they wished to. The phenomena of boys learning traditionally female roles, such as cooking, is prevalent among the 4th generation, but apparently not among the older generations as the unmarried 3rd generation male children still stop at their mothers’ house for a meal quite often.

The belief in this family about these gender non-divisions is that the ability to do these things makes the girl a more useful young person to the family and in general, this belief that women can do practical work classified by urban western societies as masculine, speaks to the Carpatho-Rusyns long history as sustenance farmers in the homeland. The 2nd generation matriarch of the family often says she feels sick if she is away from her plants, garden and chickens for too long. When her husband was stationed in Vietnam, the first thing she did when she moved back home from base in California was walk barefoot in the dirt of her home state. She said this healed her, further illustrating a deep connection with the land that some Carpatho-Rusyns still embody to this day.

In her dissertation, Cristina Cantin interviewed a Carpatho-Rusyn woman named Halina, who described Carpatho-Rusyn concepts of masculinity as such: “they work very hard, and smoke, and drink. They need wives so they don’t die early because they don't know anything”

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1083 Magosci, *Our People*. 
The last part of this description almost precisely matched the description of men offered by the Rusyn-American matriarch, who would often say, “Having a husband is like having an extra child, that is why you need to cook.” One 4th-generation member of the family remarked that growing up she didn’t really understand the term “man of the house.” She understood that there were men in the house but did not see how they could be in charge any more than the women, as all they really did was sit, eat, and do the work the woman said needed done outside. This also echoes Cantin’s description of the woman’s role as the “cultivator of the family.”

3.3. Spiritual Belief

Women in this family also learned of the prevalence of curses. When one of the 1st-generation family members was pregnant and left by her fiancé, her mother cursed the man’s entire family to never give birth to a girl again. While there are no remarks of curses after that instance, the matriarch retelling this story seemed to see no quarrels between her mother’s spell work and Christian faith.

Other beliefs combine the culture of the land with Slavic belief. There is the superstitious belief in this family that if a bird flies into and hits the window or door of a house, or it actually flies into said house, someone in that house will die or become ill. This belief is also shared by the author’s paternal grandmother who was raised in the local old stock Scots-Irish American culture. The fact that this might be a local Southwestern Pennsylvania superstition does not make the fact that the Carpatho-Rusyn family believes in it completely devoid of Slavic influence. Tied to this belief, many members of this Carpatho-Rusyn family also believed that the souls of their loved ones could be reincarnated into birds. As the matriarch of the family would always state that the birds she saw in the garden were deceased members of her family returning for a visit. These beliefs might have to do with the old Slavic belief in “Vyraj”, a land in where the birds go in the winter and souls go when they die. The Eastern Slavic belief in the ability of the soul to reincarnate into a bird is also noted in east Slavic mythology. Further beliefs about death included the remaining of family members' spirits after death to watch over the younger generation. This is also reflected in Cantin’s observation that the Carpatho-Rusyns had a similar belief. These beliefs predate Christianity, and these spirits were worshipped as minor gods. These minor gods did the same thing as the family spirits that were believed in by the Rusyn-American family, acting as protectors to their descendants’ well-being. Tied to this is the unintentional continuation of the holosynja (funeral wailing), as noted by Musinka. Loud, expressive crying is allowed and appreciated after a person in the family passes away. I have always conceptualized the meaning of this as a way to show the ancestor, who is now watching a person from the other side, how appreciative one is of them as well as how much one misses them.

4. Conclusion

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1084 Cantin, “Peak Experiences and Hegemony Resistance: Cultural Models of A Good Life and Group Identity in Carpathian Rus’.”
1086 Elena Levkiskaya, Myths and legends of the Eastern Slavs, Moscow, Russia: Litres, (2010).
1087 Cantin, “Peak Experiences and Hegemony Resistance: Cultural Models of A Good Life and Group Identity in Carpathian Rus’.”
These traditions have unintentionally been passed down generation after generation. Some of which, such as the last ones mentioned, for thousands of years. These traditions have survived not by research but by simply observing what previous generations did and forming judgements around those observations. These judgements may inflict cultural pain and hardship onto future generations, as a belief in “doing what has always been done” can restrict a person’s individual freedoms, but they can also pass on hidden beauty and a different way of understanding the world. It can be of ease to imagine humanity as sprouting up as it is, with no background, no story. However, everyone is the continuation of something, every generation grows out of the embers of the previous one. Despite the loss of the Carpatho-Rusyn language, pressures to appear “American”, and distance from the Carpathian Rus’. The Members of this immigrant family maintained a connection to Carpatho-Rusyn cultural belief systems until at least the 4th generation.
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John and Helen Timo foundation (2020) The Resurrection of a Nation [Film; Digital]. Retrieved From (44) https://youtu.be/I0g6cYw35Ik


In 1993, 75 years after its official founding and just four years after the Berlin Wall fell, the country of Czechoslovakia, in what is now called the Velvet Divorce, separated into two separate states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Czechoslovak economic structure was unique because even though both regions made up one country, they were economically disbalanced. Yet the economies operated as one integrated whole. By 1993, many Czechs and Slovaks still desired a united Czechoslovakia. However, inherent differences between the two groups, made more apparent by the communist regime, outweighed desires for continued union. The communist state was more successful for the Czechs than it was for the Slovaks, especially since the Czechs carried more influence in running the state. Since the split in 1993, both countries have joined the EU and pursued their own routes of economic development and integration. This paper will take a comparative approach and focus specifically on the topic of euro adoption. Visiting both countries since the 2008 recession and the euro debt crisis revealed much controversy surrounding Slovakia’s euro adoption because of adverse effects on current economic conditions. Slovakia’s adoption of the euro occurred in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, which rocked economies on a global scale. Since then, many have tried to analyze whether adopting the euro was a good or bad idea. This analysis is also influenced by the drastic Eurozone crisis, which wreaked havoc on EMU member states due to extreme debt. Additionally, many who analyze Slovakia’s euro adoption also focus on Czech Republic’s economic standing since it did not adopt the euro. A comparative approach to this topic will shed light on whether adopting the euro has done more harm than good; this analysis will present the history behind Slovakia’s economy and why it even considered adopting the euro in the first place in comparison to the Czech Republic. This paper will also look at exports, responses to the Great Recession of 2008, the Eurozone crisis, and overall psychological responses to currency transition in order to evaluate whether or not the euro was truly beneficial for Slovakia. Finally, it will conclude that economic crises such as the recession must be taken into account because Slovakia adopted the euro at the time of this crisis. Overall, the paper will emphasize the fact that the euro has done more harm than good for Slovakia, which can shed light on the question of whether a centralized currency is absolutely necessary for successful economic integration, especially in a post-communist context.

In 2008, the European Commission reported that only Slovakia fulfilled all the necessary criteria for accession to the eurozone. The country’s adoption of a single currency was in accordance with the Big Bang strategy, which involved circulating euro banknotes and the single national currency (Slovakia used the koruna) at the same time. The national currency is quickly withdrawn, but for a short period, both currencies operate at the same time. Before Slovakia officially adopted the euro, specific measures were taken to protect the most vulnerable groups; such groups included the elderly, disabled, and also those living in rural regions or working in small enterprises. In addition, the government also tried to ensure protection for consumers by displaying prices in two currencies before the euro was officially adopted as the sole currency.

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Slovak authorities placed great pressure on the monitoring and control of prices, as well as the elimination of unfair price increases that could result from this currency change.\textsuperscript{1090}

After World War II, the Slovak region’s economy was less developed than the Czech economy but strove to converge with the Czech region’s economic level. This was facilitated by a significant reallocation of resources from the Czech to the Slovak region. However, the Czech GDP level still outdid Slovakia, which only reached three quarters of the Czech GDP level in 1992. It is important to note that even though Slovakia and the Czech Republic still constituted the same state at that time (until the divorce in 1993), they were already separate enough that they can be discussed as separate entities, even in common Czechoslovak context. As stated earlier, ever since Czechoslovakia’s establishment in 1918, the Czech and Slovak economies made up one integrated whole. However, almost from the outset, Slovakia was the poorer region, meaning it was more severely affected by economic crises. As a result of severe economic difficulties in the 1930s, the Czech and Slovak economies were temporarily separated, meaning the Slovak region could not rely on the Czech region’s economic strength. In the 1950’s, Czechoslovakia was renewed within its pre-war borders through the interference of the Soviet Union. However, its inclusion in the Eastern Bloc led to economic backwardness on an incredibly significant scale. Modernization slowed down significantly as the general economic level experienced considerable descent. However, this was also the first instance in which there was some progress in creating balancing levels between these two very different parts of the country. The communist structure demanded central planning, as well as all-society ownership, which enabled and facilitated the transfer of resources from the Czech to Slovak lands. This financed major investments in Slovak industries and infrastructure. Yet these achievements were also offset by issues in the production structure, which reflected issues in the communist system. Because of this, Slovakia and the Czech Republic faced greater structural problems than other post-communist, Central European countries did.\textsuperscript{1091}

Overall, the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993 initiated additional economic shocks because it demanded that the Slovak living standards be lowered in relation to Czech Republic. It also demanded more flexibility towards new economic conditions, because Slovakia could no longer rely on the Czech Republic as much as it used to. Each country took different economic approaches in accordance with their actual needs. Investigating economic development of each state, prior to the actual dissolution of Czechoslovakia, reveals that there were factors unique to each individual part that greatly influenced respective economic development. Slovakia’s economic gap began to narrow after World War 2 because of resource reallocation. In addition, Slovakia’s economic advancement happened in part because of a dynamic population development that saw an increase of two million people. In the Czech lands, population growth occurred, but at a much slower pace. Between 1948 and 1989, Slovakia’s national income per capita increased from 60% in the year 1948 to 88% in the year 1989.\textsuperscript{1092} However, harder effects of the transformation crisis that were felt when transferring to the market economy led to a wider gap in Slovakia’s economic level. Before Czechoslovakia’s official division, the Slovak region’s economic level dropped to about three quarters of the Czech region’s. This motivated a greater transfer of

\textsuperscript{1092} Ibid.
resources from the Czech lands, which allowed for improvements in transportation, infrastructure, education, and research. In the 1980s, the extent of resource outflow from the Czech economy exceeded GDP increases, causing stagnating consumption and investments in the Czech region. Czechs were extremely frustrated by this, which influenced Czech political elites in their decision to dissolve the common, Czechoslovakian state.\textsuperscript{1093}

Czechoslovakia finally split into Slovakia and the Czech Republic after the transformation crisis, which occurred as a result of transfer to the market economy, with overrated heavy industries tied to markets in Eastern Bloc countries. In order to achieve competitive ability with Western markets, it was important to reduce prices and wages in relation to foreign countries. For this reason, the Czechoslovak koruna depreciated in 1990 in an extensive process. In the Slovak region, gigantic heavy industry plants and strong armament production had been established; the region was also suffering the adverse effects of the collapse of Eastern markets. The reallocation of resources could only do so much, as “Slovak bands had to borrow relatively more from the central funds, because the savings were much lower in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands.”\textsuperscript{1094} Tensions increased and political disputes were revived. In the common state, labor and capital factors moved freely, but there were still some central arguments: Czechs complained about the transfer of public resources to Slovakia, while Slovaks complained about how they worked more for the creation of Czech GDP than for their own. Thus, the division of the common state into the Czech Republic and Slovakia increased the need for development that occurred independently of each other. From this perspective, it can be argued that the divorce was beneficial. Differing economic conditions required an adjustment of economic policies. The weaker Slovak economy required more restrictions in wages, as well as greater currency depreciation than in the Czech economy. At first, Slovakia’s GDP generation was lower in relation to other countries. In 1990, the Slovak GDP per capita reached 84% of the Czech Republic’s level, but the use of resources was higher due to resource reallocation. In addition, depreciation of the Slovak koruna against the Czech koruna increased cost competitiveness; also, due to different policies, wage levels in each state grew further and further apart. Overall, the Czech economy had faster real wage growth. Following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the adjustment of wages to the lower economic performance level of the Slovak economy, along with the division of economic policies, led to a noteworthy increase in competitive ability.\textsuperscript{1095}

Once both countries joined the EU in 2004, economic growth accelerated. Accession to the EU was accompanied by the cultivation of an institutional environment, in which Czech and Slovak economies were more attractive for foreign capital and accelerated economic growth. Comparative analysis within the Visegrad states reveals that Slovakia’s GDP growth has been the fastest. It is now referred to as Europe’s “economic tiger.” However, even with these high GDP growth rates, high unemployment persists in Slovakia. In 2009, in the wake of the global financial crisis, Slovakia officially joined the eurozone and adopted the common currency. There were many potential benefits for Slovakia if it chose to adopt the euro. It could benefit from the removal of exchange rate risks and reduced transaction costs. Additionally, adopting the euro could transfer Slovakia to an environment with lower interest levels, allowing for cheaper loans, supported investment, and supported growth. This specific advantage did and still does not apply to the Czech Republic – on the contrary, interest rates in the Czech Republic are lower than in

\textsuperscript{1093} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1094} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1095} Ibid.
the euro area. If the Czech Republic chose to adopt the euro, loans would become more expensive, as opposed to Slovakia’s case, in which loans would become cheaper. There were other benefits for Slovakia to consider when adopting the euro. In general, the euro umbrella had greater importance for Slovakia because it could ensure currency stability. Adopting the euro would help Slovakia acquire “stabilized economy” status. Even after the Velvet Divorce, the Slovak and Czech economies were still close – this was mainly due to historical links, as well as the many opportunities for cooperation offered by mutual EU membership. Slovakia lost a lot of resources when it split with the Czech Republic from the economically more advanced part of the common state, but it could adjust to new market conditions by lowering price levels and depreciating the exchange rate of the Slovak koruna – or, even better, by adopting the euro. This would allow Slovakia to obtain higher cost competitiveness within the EU. Thanks to this change, Slovakia reduced the economic gap to the average EU economic level, while also catching up with the Czech Republic’s economic level.

It is important to note that these were all predictions for how Slovakia could positively benefit from euro adoption. In reality, an economic analysis of Slovakia from 2008 to 2013 reveals that introducing the euro has not been the most beneficial. The 2008 financial crisis, which wreaked havoc on a global scale, happened to coincide with Slovakia’s adoption of the common currency. Perhaps Slovakia would have fared better if the crisis had not occurred, but that is only a speculation. The 2008 financial crisis caused extreme bankruptcy, turmoil in global financial markets, sharp falls in world stock markets, and an unexpected increase in interest rates. As the crisis spread across the globe, the economies of EU countries suffered as well. Slovak authorities were determined to press forward with their euro adoption plan, convinced that adopting the euro would allow for its small, export-centered economy to survive this period of economic downturn better than other Central European neighbors. However, contrary to these predictions, Slovakia saw a big drop in GDP, an increase in the unemployment rate, and a deterioration of public finances. However, inflation rates slowed down, and during the economic recovery period of 2010, Slovakia began to feel the benefits of euro adoption (because foreign investors were not exposed to foreign exchange risk). Apart from 2009, the Slovak economy has been experiencing steady economic growth, but this has mainly been in an effort to recover.

Another way of gauging whether the euro has been successful in Slovakia is by comparing the state’s export performance to that of the Czech Republic, a state that did not adopt the euro. Analysis of their export performance sheds light on whether or not Slovakia’s adoption of the euro has done more harm or good. Some theoretical background is important – the initial introduction of the euro to postwar states had almost no effect on trade, which is evidence for the gradual increase in trade intensity between countries that later joined the European Monetary Union. When Slovakia and the Czech Republic first split in 1993, there definitely were some notable, negative side effects. In the first two years after the split, the Czech Republic saw a 22% and 19% decline, respectively, while Slovakia saw a 18% and 8% decline, respectively. Since the 2004 enlargement of the EU and the euro’s introduction in Slovakia, it is difficult to make an accurate analysis about the impact on the Slovak economy, given that too little time has passed since the currency’s adoption. Additionally, the euro is expected to be more beneficial over a

longer period of time, so this must be taken into account when evaluating the costs and benefits of euro adoption and integration. This must all be taken into account. This is also especially important to consider, given the fact that the economic recession coincided with Slovakia’s euro adoption.  

Close observation of the exchange rates of Slovak and Czech Korunas from 2004 to mid-2008 (time at which Slovakia adopted the euro) reveals that these two currencies evolved in parallel. Both currencies had notable nominal effective appreciation, and the exchange rate between the two was relatively stable. When Slovakia first adopted the euro, the Slovak koruna was still in effect so as to ease the transition to a more common currency. Fixation of the Slovak koruna against the euro led to stable exchange rates between the two. Meanwhile, the Czech koruna, while enjoying full exchange rate flexibility, sharply depreciated against the euro from mid-2008 to early 2009. In 2008 both economies experienced a decrease in price competitiveness as a result of the strong, effective exchange rate appreciation in 2008. Yet in 2009, the difference in exchange rate regimes resulted in a dissimilarity, whereby the Slovak REER increased but the CZK, with its exchange rate elasticity, depreciated. During the recession, the Czech export volume dropped by 17% while the Slovak export volume dropped by 23%. It appears that euro adoption did not help the Slovak economy in terms of exports. The Czech Republic could have had an advantage in keeping its own currency—nominal exchange rate depreciation against the euro could have enabled Czech exporters to lower prices, therefore allowing the Czech Republic to mitigate negative impacts of external demand shocks. 

In 2010, as a member of the EMU, Slovakia was more economically open than the Czech Republic. This high level of openness played a crucial role in the substantial decrease of exports. Because it was using the euro at this point, it had higher trade dependence and was therefore more sensitive to developments in Germany and in the Eurozone. The Czech Republic maintained a positive trade balance, but Slovakia’s trade balance continued to oscillate around 0. A negative trade balance offsets positive intra-EU statistics, shedding light on noticeable distinctions between two countries. It is possible that such distinctions are caused by differences in their economic structures, with more value added in the Czech Republic, but Slovakia’s trade balance is worthy of note here as a potential negative side effect of adopting the euro. Such adoption makes it more vulnerable to the economic hardships of fellow EU member states, especially in times of severe economic crisis (2008 recession, and, as will be discussed later, the eurozone crisis). Therefore, the Czech Republic was actually protected because it maintained its own currency.

At the beginning of the 2008 crisis, Czech exports generally fared better than in Slovakia; the nominal exchange rate of the koruna depreciated against the euro at the beginning of the slowdown period, which allowed Czech exporters to lower prices and therefore mitigate the negative impact of external demand shocks on sales abroad. Looking at Slovakia, a regression analysis estimating the impact of euro adoption on the country’s export development did not lead to results that were statistically significant. Thus, it is incredibly difficult to distinguish whether any negative effects as a result of euro introduction are because of euro introduction or because of the financial crisis. Empirical evidence may show that positive trade effects brought about by introducing a common European currency are rather moderate. Overall, a comparative analysis of

1101 Ibid.
Czech and Slovak exports, since their divergence in currency, may be ambiguous and inconclusive because Slovakia’s adoption of the euro coincided with the financial crisis, as stated before. Before 2008, most postcommunist states were doing pretty well in terms of economic integration and economic forecasts were optimistic, as witnessed in the growth of current account deficits, which measure a country’s trade when import values exceed export values. In an effort to recover from the damaging effects of the recession, large sums of money were pumped into consumption and real estate across Europe, but Slovakia and the Czech Republic were more wary. In 2012, the Czech Republic fell into another recession. Out of all the postcommunist states, Slovakia is one of the only states to successfully attempt defying downward trends and propel growth rates in order to return to the pre-2008 economic level. In the Czech Republic, foreign direct investment inflow was favorably structured, but due to high national debt, the Czech Republic was more dependent on an influx of foreign capital, which stopped suddenly in 2008 once the recession hit. Investment strategy caused the state to accumulate many bad loans, eventually leading to a banking crisis. In Slovakia, the influx of foreign direct investments was structured much more favorably. The government here tried to limit private consumer borrowing even before the crisis by slumping export markets. Thus, when Eastern European currencies suddenly dried up in 2008, Slovakia was better prepared than the Czech Republic. Before the recession, the Czech Republic was far from being the most prosperous EU country, but it had a respectable GDP per capita for just having been a part of the EU for three short years. The Czech Republic had lower unemployment rates than that of the entire EU. However, the recession placed it behind many of its European counterparts. This is mainly because the Czech Republic pegged its national currency to the euro – after liberation from the Soviet Union, it installed a currency board. This is usually a stable move by a smaller economy like that of the Czech Republic’s, but this also means that it could become a liability in cases of international economic crisis. The Czech Republic’s currency, the koruna, had a fixed exchange rate that was reliant on the euro; when inflation and recession hit the Eurozone, the Czech Republic was also greatly impacted. In addition, because it had the currency peg, there were fewer options for controlling inflation because it became more difficult to regulate exchange rates that satisfied the country’s needs. Consequently, the Czech Republic did not have many options left for combatting the financial crisis or responding to impending economic problems, causing an inevitable fall into extreme recession. As noted earlier, the Czech Republic did not have the euro.

Slovakia seems to have fared much better after the recession – at least in comparison to the Czech Republic. This has been linked to its adoption of the euro. The Czech Republic’s currency was weakening in comparison to the euro, but the Slovak koruna (in 2008, Slovakia operated with two currencies before finally streamlining to just one – the euro) was more stable. Though impacted by the recession in negative, significant ways, Slovakia’s financial sector generally fared better than other surrounding countries. This was because Slovakia completely restructured its economy at the beginning of the decade. It prepared itself to adopt a new currency, even in the midst of a global economic crisis as damaging as the 2008 recession. However, in the years since the recession, perceptions of euro usefulness and desirability in Slovakia have changed. Eurozone membership typically comes with reduced inflation, or just no apparent improvement at all. Just before the financial crisis broke out, Slovakia met all the Maastricht convergence criteria, which define the conditions for successful euro adoption. The economic crisis

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had similar effects on both the Slovak and Czech economies, showing that perhaps euro adoption does not provide a specific advantage or safety net against economic downturn.\footnote{Vintrová, “Lessons from the Czech and Slovak Economies Split,” 3–25.}

One of the biggest changes affecting the Slovak Republic, in recent times, has become more noticeable since it joined the Eurozone. There have been obvious changes in consumer behavior since the adoption of the new currency.\footnote{Eva Litavcová, Robert Bucki, Róbert Štefko, Petr Suchánek, and Sylvia Jenčová, “Consumer’s Behaviour in East Slovakia After Euro Introduction during the Crisis,” \textit{Prague Economic Papers} 24, no. 3 (2015): 332–53.} One particular study tried to parse the relationship between perception of euro introduction and influence on consumer behavior. The purpose of this study was to analyze if such a relationship indeed exists, and if this potential relationship could shed some light on the euro’s success in Slovakia’s postcommunist economy. Two hypotheses were presented. The first predicted that there is a valid relation between the perception of euro introduction in Slovakia due to the external influence of the economic crisis of 2008. The second hypothesis predicted that there is a relationship between euro introduction in the country during the global economic crisis and levels of subjective anxiety about what the future holds, economically. The study relied on a factor analysis of the euro and crisis perception, as well as a cluster analysis on the basis of the crisis and euro perception. Specifically, the cluster analysis could shed light on if it was even possible to identify a population segment with a generally positive attitude towards purchasing anything with the euro. The study generated the clusters by minimizing the differences between respondents within each cluster, and then maximizing inter-cluster differences. This was so the segments of customers could be identified based on how they perceived the economic crisis in relation with the euro adoption. The study also involved factor analysis for feelings of fear and uncertainty towards the future, along with cluster analysis for these same sentiments. The study concluded that “Slovakia’s joining the Eurozone in January 2009 at the time of the global crisis created a very specific situation.”\footnote{Ibid.} Potential retail customers who were confident and did not suffer from fear of economic failure took a more positive, proactive approach to euro adoption and the crisis. Potential retail customers who felt sufficient financial security also had a positive, proactive approach to euro adoption and the overall crisis. Potential retail customers with positive perceptions of the euro and crisis were significantly more responsive. However, this also meant that retail customers with negative perceptions of the euro and financial crisis were not as confident in consumer decisions. There is a general sentiment of anxiety towards the euro’s adoption in Slovakia. However, this could also just be because its adoption was conflated with the economic recession.\footnote{Mary Stegmaier, “Economic Evaluations and Electoral Participation in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic,” \textit{Virginia Social Science Journal} 39 (2004): 73–90.} Another study that focused on the psychological consequences of Slovakia’s currency transition, which took a comparative approach with the Czech Republic. The results of the study were quite telling. Slovaks generally enjoyed higher average satisfaction levels in relation to Czechs, but this effect reversed in 2010 – this is incredibly significant, because it is the year after Slovakia adopted the euro. It is also when the 2008 financial crisis was wreaking havoc upon global economies. Overall, the study concluded that the response to Euro adoption was negative.\footnote{Vladimir Otrachshenko, Olga Popova, and José Tavares. “Psychological Costs of Currency Transition: Evidence from the Euro Adoption.” \textit{European Journal of Political Economy} 45 (December 2016): 89–100.}

These feelings were only exacerbated by the Eurozone debt crisis, which could be traced back to the 2008 financial crisis. In general, adopting the euro as a common currency created two
major issues. First, the low interest rates enjoyed by those in the Eurozone made cheap credit more available, which caused higher amounts of sovereign debt. This also meant that the disparate economic competition levels of European nations would not be automatically adjusted by exchange rate devaluations, due to a common currency. Generally, there was a noteworthy lack of oversight in creating a fiscal Eurozone.\textsuperscript{1108} The Maastricht Criteria originally set the guidelines for entry; one of the demands was maintenance of a low inflation rate at 1.5% per year and a budget deficit maintenance of less than 3% of the GDP. However, these standards have been rendered null because most Eurozone countries run significant deficits and deal with unprecedented debts. Overwhelming debts led to general financial instability – and in the wake of a damaging recession, this instability led to a debt crisis. The Eurozone crisis certainly had lasting impacts on Slovakia. When the crisis broke out in 2011, Slovakia’s government was struggling with unprecedented changes in its party system. These created issues on a whole other level, which could also all be traced back to the global financial crisis of 2008.\textsuperscript{1109} Additionally, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, designed to provide financial assistance to EMU countries in times of economic crisis, created controversy in Slovakia’s political arena. This, combined with the economic effects of the euro debt crisis, created distrust of Slovakia’s democratic system. Citizens are much more wary and feel they cannot have the same confidence in their original reasoning for joining the EMU – to strengthen their post-communist democracy through engagement with Europe. In general, within the EMU the debt crisis increased “disparities between its member states,” eroding sentiments of transnational solidarity, an important foundation for recovery from such a crisis.\textsuperscript{1110} As discussed previously, Slovakia’s main goal for EMU membership was further post-communist integration and stability in a liberal model. However, this crisis exacerbated the effects of the recession and euro adoption. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe that converged their relative price levels with eurozone averages experienced higher inflation rates. Slovakia experienced this, and since joining the eurozone and having more direct exposure to the effects of the recession and the euro crisis, has not necessarily grown economically.\textsuperscript{1111} Before the succession, Slovakia’s growth rate was approximately 7%, but decreased significantly to 2% after such economic tumult.\textsuperscript{1112} It is also important to understand how the Czech Republic could be impacted by this, even though it is not a part of the EMU. The Czech Republic has exercised caution in its levels of economic integration – this is evident in its decision not to join the EMU. It should continue to exercise this level of economic caution. Because of macroeconomic imbalances caused by the recession and the debt crisis, transfer economies will have to form, but high fiscal transfers will not be readily available because of the debt crisis.

When evaluating whether or not Slovakia benefited from the euro, there is a lot that must be taken into consideration. First, Slovakia’s history as a former member of Czechoslovakia had direct impacts on its current economic state. Adopting the euro was a more suitable decision for Slovakia than it was for the Czech Republic, due to interest rates. However, its adoption of the


\textsuperscript{1109} Matus Halas, “A Model Disagreement: The Fall of the Slovak Government during the Eurozone Crisis in 2011.” \textit{Europe-Asia Studies} 70, no. 9 (2014): 1472–95.


\textsuperscript{1111} Juraj Spiko, “The Global Recession and its Implications for the Slovak Economy.”

euro coincided with the Great Recession of 2008, which had incredibly damaging effects. Therefore, scholarship on whether or not the euro was a success for Slovakia must take this financial crisis into account. Additionally, studying export statistics, psychological effects on citizens, and consumer behaviors can give further insight on whether adopting the euro was a good idea.

When the Eurozone debt crisis hit Europe, Slovakia was more adversely affected than the Czech Republic because it has more direct ties to the euro. Both economies have seen their struggles and have had their own motivations for their varying levels of economic integration. However, it can be argued that adopting the euro has not been the most beneficial for Slovakia. Yet it is crucial to take into consideration the fact that much of Slovakia’s integration efforts have occurred in the context of global financial crises and that an analysis of euro adoption will be more accurate after more time has passed.
Bibliography


“Exploitation of Migrant Laborers in Contemporary Russia"

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From 2001 to 2019 Russia experienced an astounding 1271% increase in their incoming labor migrant population.\(^{1113}\) Russia is the fourth most popular destination country in the world for international migrants according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2020 report. In fact, migrants make up about 8% of Russia’s total population.\(^{1114}\) The top three sending countries are Ukraine, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan.\(^{1115}\) While the Russian government has been considerably expanding policies that allow for more temporary labor migrants to enter, these policies offer little to no legal protections, leaving many vulnerable. How have the inclusionary policies that allow more migrants to access work and to potentially improve their lives in Russia paradoxically also created more situations of labor trafficking and forms of modern-day servitude?

This paper focuses on the exploitation of and available protections for migrant laborers in contemporary Russia. Ultimately, through an analysis of: 1) the visibility of data available, influenced by the Russian government and international organizations including the United Nations (UN) and IOM, 2) the impact of the economic and political systems of capitalism and the legacy of the USSRs communist regime, and 3) a comparative case study between the top three sending countries of migrants to Russia, I explore the array of domestic and international causes that impact the levels of migrant labor exploitation in Russia today and enhance global conversations on how to improve protections for migrant workers.

Scope of Exploitation and Visibility of Data

Current data on exploitation of migrants in Russia varies widely by source and lacks clear visibility. Understanding the data available is essential as it creates awareness and ultimately more visibility around the issues of exploitation that migrants face. Visibility is an important factor in creating solutions for accountability and protection. However, accurately measuring or quantifying “exploitation” is nearly impossible. To define “exploitation,” I will be specifically looking at victims of forced labor which is defined in the UN’s 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. In this convention the UN found four distinct practices pertaining to “service status”: “debt-bondage, serfdom, servile marriage and the transfer of persons under eighteen for the purpose of exploiting their labor”.\(^{1116}\) In the following section I explore how Russia’s migration policy creates situations of exploitation and contextualize the available data related to the exploitation of migrant laborers in Russia.

86 percent of foreign workers in Russia are men and 80 percent of all migrant men are between the ages of 18-36. A large majority of migrants work in unskilled professions and construction. In fact, as of 2015, 52% of unskilled workers in Russia were from Uzbekistan, 24% from Tajikistan and 10% from Kyrgyzstan. Russia has seen a large growth in labor migrants following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and especially after Vladimir Putin was elected president in 1999. From 2001 to 2019 Russia’s labor migrant population rose from 175,000 to 2.4 million. This rapid growth is due to both push and pull factors. The main motivating push factors for migrants to leave Ukraine, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, the top three sending countries, are lack of economic opportunities, conflict in the area, and social and political instability, among many more. Russia is a popular destination country for migrant laborers as there are deep rooted historical and geopolitical ties to the region. The pull factors thus include pre-established migrant groups already there and familiarity with culture and language. Furthermore, the Russian government has been expanding policies that allow more labor migrants in, largely because of Russia’s economic need for temporary labor migrants. Citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which is made up of 12 former Soviet Republics, are able to enter Russia through a simplified process, often without a visa, making Russia a very appealing and easy destination for migrants from the CIS searching for work.

Russia’s expansion of inclusive migration policy has opened its borders to more temporary labor migrants, however, has left many vulnerable and without protection. In 2010, Russian migration authorities “introduced two new ways to access the labor market: a ‘patent’ system for citizens of former Soviet countries with visa-free entry, and simplified rules for the recruitment of highly qualified specialists.” The patent, which in English more closely translates to permit, allows immigrants to perform domestic work in private households and is not limited by a quota. Patents also require small monthly payments, which benefit the Russian economy. In 2014, “2.4 million patents were issued, exceeding the number of work permits by almost 1 million. In 2015, the patent system was expanded to cover employment for entrepreneurs and companies. At the same time, regional authorities were allowed to establish their own patent fees.”

Since the implementation of this system, Russia has become one of the leading importers of labor in the world. While immigration to Russia slowly declined from 1995-2010, since 2010 it has been on the rise. From 2010-2015 there was a 4.01% increase in migrants to Russia. As of 2017, the foreign-born population in Russia is the third largest in the world after the United States and Germany. As of 2020, the top 9 out of 10 leading countries of origins of immigrants to Russia are former Soviet Republics. The top 3 countries are Ukraine with 143,330, Tajikistan with 93,330 and Kazakhstan with 64,500 new migrants in 2021.

1118 Ibid.
1119 Denisenko and Chudinovskikh, “Russia: A Migration System with Soviet Roots.”
1120 Ibid.
1121 Ibid.
1122 Ibid.
1124 Denisenko and Chudinovskikh, “Russia: A Migration System with Soviet Roots.”
1125 Statista, “Immigration by Country of Origin in Russia 2021.”
Reports find that many migrants, especially nationals from the CIS, are vulnerable to be “drawn into a situation of human trafficking for labor exploitation.”\textsuperscript{1126} This is not only due to the lack of protections available through Russia’s migration policy and systems, but also due to a lack of visible data, reporting, or influence of humanitarian organizations to help protect migrants. International migrants are considered vulnerable to issues of exploitation, including labor trafficking and forced servitude. The UN 2020 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons explains that “trafficker’s target victims who are marginalized or in difficult circumstances. Undocumented migrants and people who are in desperate need of employment are vulnerable, particularly to trafficking for forced labour.”\textsuperscript{1127} They estimate that “migrants make up a significant share of the detected trafficking victims in most global regions.”\textsuperscript{1128}

In a study conducted by Ryazantsnez et al. in 2015, they found that “although figures from the statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation state that only 1% of all crimes are classified directly as ‘use of slave labour,’ the phenomenon is widespread and many offences are covert and inhumane in nature.”\textsuperscript{1129} Sychenko et al. found that over five years “13,977 cases of sexual exploitation, 101,487 cases of forced labour and 10,577 cases of exploitation in the criminal sphere were registered. In 2017 alone, the total number of crimes potentially related to trafficking in persons was up to 43,618.”\textsuperscript{1130} This marks a drastic difference to Russia’s official statistics which found six crimes under Article 127.2 of the Criminal Code, “use of slave labour,” in 2017.\textsuperscript{1131} Sychenko et al. argue that disparity in data is a consequence of “the poor definition of the crimes of human trafficking and slave labour in the [Criminal Code] of Russia (comparing with the internationally accepted definition).”\textsuperscript{1132} While limited definitions of “exploitation” in Russian policy contribute to the drastically different data available, the Russian government is also known to not report accurate numbers on human rights abuses and Putin actively pushes back on Western influence, thus limiting the influence of International Organizations and local human rights activists in the region working to protect migrants.

International organizations and global data bases report different numbers still on exploitation in Russia. The Global Slavery Index, based on data by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as the IOM and the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that 794,000 people live in conditions of modern slavery in Russia on any given day.\textsuperscript{1133} The US Department of State places Russia as a tier three country, the highest tier of concern, in their 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, stating that there are between six and 12 million foreign workers in Russia, of which approximately three million lack proper work authorization. Up to 40 percent of these migrants, around 1.2 million migrants, are vulnerable to both forced labor and sex trafficking.\textsuperscript{1134} Overall, the available data shows that exploitation of migrant laborers is an issue that lacks clear visibility and is difficult to measure, and in Russia this is particularly due to the lack of reporting


\textsuperscript{1128} Ibid., 10.


\textsuperscript{1131} Ibid., 264.

\textsuperscript{1132} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1133} Global Slavery Index,“ Russia | Global Slavery Index,” 2018, accessed December 7, 2021.

from the Russian government and the lack of presence and influence of international organizations in the region.

Another issue in data collection about migrant labor exploitation is that there are many migrants who are left outside of legal frameworks all over the world. This lack of legality creates a lack of visibility as it is impossible to measure true levels of exploitation or collect data on an exact number of migrants who work outside of legal frameworks. In a discussion with Bela Hovy, who previously worked as Chief of the Migration Section at the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), he noted that much data is manipulated and impossible to accurately represent. When asked about UN data on migrants who are trafficked, undocumented or exploited he explained that much of it comes from population censuses from all around the world combined with surveys conducted by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime in Vienna that then uses the statistical method "capture recapture" through their sampling frames. "Are these data reliable," he asked in our conversation, "probably not very much but these are the first global estimates they’re trying to develop for [undocumented, trafficked and vulnerable] migrants."1135

Overall, Russia faces several issues with migrant labor exploitation, and it is highly under-reported and lacks clear visibility especially due to the lack of reporting from the Russian government and the lack of influence of IOs in the region. Without awareness of data, migrants experience higher levels of vulnerability to exploitation as they are even less visible in society and to humanitarian organizations that offer them protections.

The Influence of Current Capitalist Systems and the Communist Legacy

The intersectional segmentation of the labor market today stems from historic legacies created by pre-industrialization, industrialization, colonization, slavery, and more recently, but equally importantly, neoliberalism, globalization, and the capitalist world economy. Many scholars have argued about the exploitative nature of capitalism as an institution referencing surplus value, endless accumulation of wealth, prioritization of profit above all else, inequal divisions by class, gender and race, and the expansion of multi-nation corporations (MNCs) which have continued colonial legacies of unequal power dynamics and exploitation between the Global North and Global South.1136 Scholars have also noted the impact of communist systems on oppression and exploitation arguing communist regimes have benefitted from exploiting workers through a command economy and alienating the people from the state.1137 While capitalism and communism are often separate frameworks of analysis, Russia’s migration policy and the systems

and practices that allow for high levels of labor exploitation to occur poses a unique situation where critiques of capitalism, critiques of communist legacies and the two systems different influences on labor exploitation must come together.

The connection between migration, the exploitation of migrants and capitalism has been defined by Chacón and Davis (2006) and Choudry and Hlatshwayo (2015) in their understanding of neoliberal immigration. "Free market capitalist policies force people from their farms, jobs, families and communities and into exploitation and precarity as migrant workers in other countries." While migration is often considered an individual choice, underlying neoliberal influences bring into question whether it is, in reality, forced. Wilkinson explores the experience of undocumented and less visible migrants, many of whom are trafficked through the promise of formal employment. His study also brings up questions about whether free market capitalist policies force migrants to move and accept undesirable and exploitative positions or if they have individual agency in their decision to migrate.

Russia’s current immigration policy was shaped after the collapse of the USSR during their transition to a free-market capitalist economy. Scholars have found that after the collapse of the USSR, "the opening of [Russia’s] borders and the integration of the Russian Federation into the global economy facilitated an increase in the number of journeys made by Russian nationals overseas and by foreigners to Russia, and also increased the problem of international trafficking and irregular migration." Between 1991-2015, 90 per cent of immigrants to Russia were nationals from previous Soviet Republics. Originally, citizens from Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States made up most of the 11.8 million migrants Russia received between 1991-2015. More recently, migrants from these groups have decreased and those from Central Asia and Transcaucasia have increased. In the 1990s migrants from Central Asia and Transcaucasia made up 15 percent of all migrants to Russia, from 2011-2015 this increased to about 40 percent. Chudinovskikh & Denisenko (2017) understand this shift as due to "a gradual transition of temporary labor migrants into permanent immigrants, as well as mortality among elderly immigrants from Ukraine and Belarus."

Much of Russia’s migrant policy has been motivated by their need for temporary labor migrants. In 1994, work permits were first given to foreign workers; 108,000 permits were issued that year. From 1995-2000 the number of work permits issued ranged between 106,000 – 186,000. During this time, one-third of these work permits were given to migrants from Ukraine, and more than half were issued to migrants from China, Turkey and former Yugoslav


1141 Denisenko and Chudinovskikh, “Russia: A Migration System with Soviet Roots.”

1142 Ibid.

1143 Ibid.
countries. In the early 2000s, new laws and institutions were created to better define and manage labor migration which resulted in an increase in work permits issued. In doing so, number of labor migrants rose from 175,000 in 2001 to 570,000 in 2006. After Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999, Russia’s economy improved and had a newfound demand for labor, especially in construction, transport and services. At the same time, several other former Soviet Republics were not performing as well economically so citizens from these countries were drawn to Russia for job opportunities. With this came the issue of illegal immigration and thus more vulnerability to exploitation.

The expansion of inclusionary migration policy to increase temporary labor migrants due to economic need that occurred when Russia transitioned to the capitalist economic system would seem to align with the capitalist critique; that capitalism prioritizes profit above all else and is thus exploitative in nature to workers as it encourages finding labor at the cheapest possible cost. However, this critique is complicated by Russia’s history as a communist country until 1991. Communist and capitalist critiques tend to stay separate in academic theory, however, both are needed to understand the exploitation that exists for migrants in Russia today.

Scholarly work that understands the impact the legacy communism has on current Russian policy fills in gaps that the capitalist critique alone does not to explain why Russia has high levels of exploitation of migrant laborers today. Woolfson argues that post-Soviet states economic structures, largely rooted in communist legacies and practices, are highly responsible for the deterioration in labor standards that has led to situations of exploitation today. Libman and Obydenkova conclude that anti-immigration sentiments in Russia today have deep ties to the legacies of the Communist regime. They found a significant link between regions in Russia with higher shares of Communist Party of the Soviet Union members in the past and lower tolerance to migration today. Clark and Wildavsky assert that “communism is vulgar capitalism” as they argue Marx’s main assumptions about the economy and state under capitalism including the exploitation of workers, alienation of citizens, and commodity fetishism is true under communism as well. This argument has been used by several other scholars who essentially argue that despite implementing communist ideals, the USSR closely aligned with a version of state capitalism where the state took on the role of the capitalist class and aimed to compete with capitalists in the world economy. If this is the case, the state, in functioning like capitalists, was guided by capitalism’s logic of profit above all else which leads to the exploitation of workers and nature.

Overall, transitioning to a capitalist economy in the 1990s opened the Russian Federation to more flows of external migrants. The implementation of capitalist practices and systems that prioritize profit above all else and thus promote attaining the cheapest labor possible has left migrants vulnerable to labor exploitation. However, the legacy of communism, which has been foundational in determining Russia’s current structures and systems, has continued legacies of labor exploitation and influenced labor practices and standards held today. Communist legacies

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1144 Ibid.
1145 Ibid.
also impact social acceptance and willingness to protect migrants today. Therefore, an understanding of both capitalist and communist influence and critique is needed to understand and evaluate Russia’s migration policy and the situations of exploitation labor migrants face.

**Ukrainian, Kazakh and Tajik Migration to Russia**

Migration and experiences of exploitation of migrant laborers in Russia varies by migrant group. Through comparing the top three sending countries, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, it is clear that there is ethnically rooted discrimination that causes migrants from Central Asia to be offered less protection that ethnically Slavic migrants.

Out migration from Ukraine and Ukrainian migration to Russia is due to several push and pull factors including: conflict in Eastern Ukraine beginning with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the economic recession related to this conflict; reforms of migration policy in Russia and the introduction of a visa free travel for Ukrainians to Europe; and the large diversity of Ukrainian migrant networks that have developed due to the long history of Ukrainian migrant activity abroad.\(^\text{1149}\)

Studies have found that labor migrants tend to leave Ukraine mainly in search of better economic opportunity.\(^\text{1150}\) Ukraine faces major economic issues with their high reliance on the shadow economy which includes illegal trade and black-market activity, increasingly levels of inequality and insecurity, gender pay gap, high inflation rates and high unemployment levels.\(^\text{1151}\) This all contributes to Ukraine’s increase in out-migration. As of 2018, 4.6 million Ukrainians were seeking work abroad.\(^\text{1152}\) Ukrainian labor migrants also leave due to conflict in the region, environmental problems, and gendered inequalities including gender discrimination in the workplace and issues of domestic violence.\(^\text{1153}\)

Similar to Ukraine, the first push factor for labor migration out of Kazakhstan is economic. Kazakhstan today is an upper-middle-income country with a rapid economic growth rate over the last 20 years.\(^\text{1154}\) However, income inequality is rampant in Kazakhstan. Half of the population lives in “rural and economically isolated areas with poor access to public services and vulnerability to poverty,” and the COVID-19 pandemic has had detrimental effects on Kazakhstan’s economic and social vulnerabilities.\(^\text{1155}\)

Second, gender inequality and violence are high in Kazakhstan. The UN report on violence against women in Kazakhstan found that labor force participation of women had dropped from 88% in 2001 to 73.3% in 2015.\(^\text{1156}\) The gender pay gap in Kazakhstan is currently at

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\(^{1151}\) Ibid.

\(^{1152}\) Olga Gulina, “West or East: The (Un)Predictable Choice of Ukrainian Migrants” Kennan Institute 31 (March 2018).


\(^{1155}\) Ibid.

32%. Furthermore, women are subjected to bride kidnappings. This cultural tradition was banned under the Soviet Union but started up again when Kazakhstan gained independence in 1991. While some bride kidnappings involve implicit or explicit consent today, some are still non-consensual.

The third push factor is the authoritarian government’s human rights abuses as well as the current unrest from anti-government protests. While Kazakhstan has been relatively stable since the collapse of the USSR, its political leadership has had a history of human rights issues. Recently, wide-spread protests began in January 2022 when the government removed a cap on energy prices which led gas prices to double. The protests have continued to get more violent, and Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev has called on Russia and neighboring countries through CSTO to send military backup naming the protests as a “terrorist threat.” This current conflict and unrest has caused more migration from Kazakhstan.

In contemporary Tajikistan, economic opportunities largely dictate their migrant flows. The countries GDP and production activities have been decreasing since 2000. With this has come wide-spread unemployment. In 1998, Tajikistan’s unemployment peaked at 16.5%. Since then, it has been decreasing but is still high at 7.6%. There are also massive amounts of inequality. Half of the population lives below the poverty line. Nearly 15% of Tajikistan’s working age population is made up of temporary labor migrants abroad, and the majority reside in Russia. Tajiki migrants abroad are responsible for contributing to 41% of the country’s GDP in 2015 through economic remittances, a large increase from just 6% in 2002.

Tajikistan also faces gendered violence and issues including discrimination in the workplace, bride kidnappings and lack of protection against domestic violence, which has spurred migration. The government is also an authoritarian state that has committed several human rights abuses which has been a push factor for labor migration.

Ukrainian, Tajiki and Kazakh migrants all face different levels of exploitation and have different vulnerability factors in Russia. Much of this is due to a difference in social treatment and acceptance as well as political protection. Social and political acceptance of Ukrainian migrants in Russia places them on top of the migrant hierarchy. Social assimilation is easier due to similar Slavic appearances with ethnic Russians. While Ukrainians do face forced labor and servitude in Russia, especially in situations of forced begging, protections offered from Ukraine as well as limited protections in Russia through NGO organizations and their social and cultural capital as ethnic Slavs places Ukrainians at a unique intersection of vulnerability to exploitation

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1157 Ibid.
1163 Ibid.
1164 Yormirzoev, “Determinants of Labor Migration Flows to Russia: Evidence from Tajikistan.”
1165 Ibid.
versus protection in Russia. In comparison, migrants from Central Asia are often treated as “second class citizens” and face severe forms of exploitation and servitude.\footnote{Valentia Chupik, “Interview with Valentina Chupik,” 2022.}

This is shown in a poll conducted by Levada in 2021, where Russian respondents were asked about their attitude towards different groups of migrants. 17% of respondents said they would not let Ukrainians into Russia. Comparatively, 26% said they would not let Central Asians in.\footnote{Levada,” Xenophobia and Migrants,” 2022, accessed March 25, 2022.} Levada concluded that Russian’s are most xenophobic towards Gypsies, people from Central Asia and Africans, all three of which are ranked very closely, and are least xenophobic towards Jews followed by Ukrainians.

I was able to speak to Valentina Chupik who is a human rights defender and migrant from Uzbekistan to Russia. In September 2021 she was barred from returning to Russia and stripped of her refugee status there due to her criticism of Russia’s migration policy.\footnote{Front Line Defenders,” Woman Human Rights Defender Valentina Chupik Barred from Entering Russia, Stripped of Her Refugee Status and Detained,” Front Line Defenders, 2021, accessed March 12, 2022.} In our conversation she reflected a similar understanding of xenophobia as the Levada polls explaining that Ukrainian migrants to Russia are an extremely special situation as they have a Slavic appearance and thus are not targeted by the Russian state, unlike most other migrants, and are more easily socially accepted. She said Ukrainian migrants mainly tend to face non-payment of salaries when it comes to issues of exploitation. In comparison, migrants she has worked with from Central Asia face severe exploitation as labor migrants, sometimes finding themselves in situation of modern-day servitude, as well as political prosecution including corruption-motivated detentions, direct extortion of bribes by Russian civil servants, and much more.

Russia offers very little protection for their migrants. While there is a need for labor migrants in Russia and an expansion of inclusionary policies to allow more temporary labor migrants in, including visa-free entry programs for specific states, patents and increased work permits, Russia also tends to see migrants as “disposable, [and] deprives [them] of health care, workplace safety, education for family members, or any form of legal protection.”\footnote{Olga Brednikova and Elena Nikiforova,” On Labor Migration to Russia: Central Asian Migrants and Migrant Families in the Matrix of Russia’s Bordering Policies,” Political Geography 66 (2018): 144.} Ukrainian migrants, due to their Slavic appearance and higher cultural and social connection to Russia, are not protected by the state but are afforded services more often than migrants with non-Slavic appearances. Ukrainians also tend to be granted asylum and refugee status at much higher rates than other ethnic groups. Thus, this political and social treatment leads Central Asian migrants to be more vulnerable and experience higher levels of exploitation than Ukrainian migrants.

Conclusion

Human trafficking, forced servitude, and contemporary slavery, are all severe forms of exploitation that labor migrants, due to existing vulnerability and willingness to accept undesirable positions due to financial need, are susceptible to. While current data is limited to accurately represent to extent of the issue, exploitation of migrant laborers is a critical problem in Russia. Ultimately, Russia’s recent expansion of inclusionary immigration policies that attract temporary
labor migrants to fill Russia’s demand for labor supply, has to an extent opened borders but, simultane-ously, created more situations of labor trafficking and modern-day servitude. This is because of the following three reasons.

First, the lack of visibility of data in Russia on the exploitation of migrant laborers, due to lack of accurate reporting or any reporting from the Russian government as well as the limited presence of International Organizations and humanitarian organizations in Russia, limits the accountably the government faces to address the issue and limits social awareness. This allows exploitation of migrants to continue at higher rates than if data was visible and more actors were working to address the problem and offer migrants protections. Second, Russia’s relationship to both capitalism and communism places it at a unique intersection where it faces structural issues that creates situations for labor exploitation to exist. This allows for high level of exploitation to occur as systemic issues, policy and social perspectives that affect migrant labor exploitation are deeply rooted in historical legacies of communism as well as current capitalist ideals and institutions. Lastly, migrants in Russia experience exploitation differently based on their ethnicity, Central Asians and non-Slavic appearing migrants face much more discrimination socially and politically in Russia. Because the majority of Russia’s labor migrants today, a number that has been increasing over the past two decades, are from Central Asia, it thus naturally follows that higher levels of exploitation and less protections for migrants have increased as well. Therefore, Russia’s inclusionary immigration policy, an on-the-surface beneficial policy reform, may hurt labor migrants, through increasing their vulnerability to severe forms of exploitation by rejecting effective forms of migrant protections, more than it benefits them.
Bibliography


When eastern bloc countries broke away from the Soviet system at the end of the 1980’s and early 1990’s, they sought to undergo a dual transition from single party states with planned economies to liberal democracies with a market economy. The economic transition was a particularly important step for countries throughout Eastern Europe and one that attracted many outside observers and advisors. The economic transition was typically understood in four parts: liberalization, macroeconomic stability, restructuring/privatization, and legal/institutional reforms. This paper examines how the move to a market-based economy materially affected how democracy developed in these countries through case studies of the Czech Republic, Russia, and Poland. There were many different programs for countries to complete the privatization step of the transition, and I hypothesize that choices made during this step of the process were integral to the success of democracy in the country. When outsiders were prioritized over insiders in the privatization process, it helped form an ownership class, similar to a middle class, that favored the continuation of democracy within the country.

Theory

In all of the post-Soviet countries, most of the wealth of the nation was tied up in state owned industries. When growth stalled across Eastern Europe due to a debt crisis, political instability, and poor macroeconomic conditions, many of the nations faced economic decline. As the political system began to crumble, so did the support system for many state firms. When communist governments were removed from power, emerging political leaders looked for ways to reignite growth by transitioning away from the command economy to a market economy. Western economists proposed a series of bold economic reforms that would be necessary to transition the economies to the capitalist system of the West. There were also national and international pressures to create sustainable liberal democracies that would replace single party systems and prevent the return of authoritarian governments.

Underlying western observers’ arguments was Lipset’s modernization theory from his famous 1959 paper, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” which argued that economic development creates legitimacy for a democracy and that the more modernized a country is, the more likely it is to be democratic. In his argument, modernization means higher rates of education which results in a longer time horizon for the policies that are chosen. The resulting middle class has positive effects on the prospects of democracy by acting as a moderating class which dulls extremism and social conflict. Without the moderating class, the countries would be caught in political turmoil as extremist parties wrestled for control or the citizenry could not exert a sufficient amount of power in the political system and a strong man could take control.

But the true success of these reforms may not have come directly through economic growth. Modernization has been widely debated and authors propose specific conditions that al-

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1172 Ibid., 83
1173 Ibid., 83
low for democracy to grow as a result of increased wealth. Moore argues that the key to modernization is the creation of a new economic class. In Eastern Europe, privatization programs had the goal of creating a new ownership class that had a financial stake in the success of the country. When executed properly, these programs would allow for more people to benefit from economic growth. This resulting class would then have a moderating effect when on politics and prefer democratic solutions that preserve their wealth.

Furthermore, Huber explains that democracy is an exercise in power sharing and that to create a democracy, there must be a shift in power towards collective organizations.\(^{1174}\) A large part of the power of communist states lies in their control of industries, so any change in the power structure would require changing who controls these industries. Capitalism would be capable of creating a shift in the balance of power away from the state.\(^{1175}\) Hence, successful privatization of state industries would play a large part in democratization if it were able to break the power of the state and create a new ownership class that could act as a semi-cohesive collective organization. However, ineffective privatization, where the industries only land in the hands of political insiders could lead to extremely high inequality, can have detrimental effects on both growth and the prospects of democracy within a country.

While there were large, short-term but sharp drops in GDP and higher unemployment rates, the region would eventually start to see benefits from liberalization. There were countless new opportunities for business and an influx of foreign investment. One of the countries that took liberalization the furthest—Poland—saw its GDP increase by 127 percent from 1989 to 2000, while a less reformed Belarus increased by only 62 percent.\(^{1176}\) In the mid 2000s, some less reformed countries began to catch up, but this growth can be largely attributed to a rise in commodity prices.\(^{1177}\) Another study found overall strong positive effects of liberalization in transition economies.\(^{1178}\) This paper will try to understand how privatization choices may have affected the success of some liberalization policies.

Through this theoretical lens I will look at the effects of two types of privatizations in select transition economies. The first type of privatization is insider privatization. Insider privatization is a method which sees the privatized business primarily owned by former managers, workers, and even the state. This ownership composition may happen informally, but the typical route is through leased buyouts or manager and employee buyouts (MEBOs).\(^{1179}\) Under my theoretical structure, a scheme that results in insider privatization could have a number of effects. Since the system is not confined to sales to the highest bidder, there is potential for inefficient allocation of the firms. Sachs contends that the allocation may be relatively efficient but result in inequitable economic outcomes.\(^{1180}\) Additionally, not selling to the highest bidder, the door is left open for

\(^{1174}\) Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, “The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 73

\(^{1175}\) Ibid., 74-75


\(^{1177}\) Ibid., 485


discretion by government officials during the sale process. This leads to bribery and other politically dysfunctional activities which may work to keep the state empowered and involved in the firm. The winners of this process will be the few who are already connected and able to be able to stall further liberalization efforts to enrich themselves.\textsuperscript{1181}

The second type of privatization is outsider privatization. Outsider privatization is a method of privatization which sees non-managers and foreigners take ownership of the firm. Typically, this method takes place by simply selling the firm to the highest bidder or through a voucher system which would allow everyday citizens to gain ownership of part of the firm. In theory, it was proposed that these programs would result in the efficient allocation of firms which would see them run effectively by new ownership with the appropriate expertise and motivations.\textsuperscript{1182} Ultimately this proved to be correct, firms with outside ownership saw much better performance than firms with insider ownership, which may mean better economic growth for the country if it chose a method which led to outsider privatization.\textsuperscript{1183} Outsider privatization that is not controlled by state or local authorities prevents the state from meddling in privatization outcomes, lowering the incentive for bribery and general political dysfunction.\textsuperscript{1184} Most important to the theoretical framework is that growth and more widespread participation in ownership may create a new ownership class that favors democracy for its moderating effects and the longer time horizon it presents. While some winners might favor a halt to liberalization to preserve their winnings, the outsiders, who usually make up a larger group with broader interests for growth, can dominate.

\textbf{Case Selection/ Methodology}

This paper will look at three countries that took different steps towards privatizing state industry: the Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia. I will describe the method of privatization each one underwent and the distributional effects of those choices. Then, I will look at how these effects may have influenced the progress of democracy in the country before the 2008/09 financial crisis. The paper will then finish with some analysis of all the cases to point out critical choices that affected moves towards or away from democratic institutions.

The dual transition across Eastern Europe provides an excellent space to examine this theoretical concept. First, I will look at the transition of the Czech Republic, which pursued voucher privatization resulting in widespread outsider ownership and link it to positive democratic outcomes. Then, I will look at the transition of Russia, which demonstrates the effects of widespread insider privatization in a dramatic fashion and link it to the lack of democratic outcomes in the country. Finally, I will examine the Polish case, which allows me to explore other trends that might overcome the effects of insider privatization and produce a democracy. The time frame for analyzing the democracies must be cut off before 2009. Developments after this time, including the fallout from the financial crisis and refugee crises, present too many confounding variables when analyzing democracy in these countries. The strengthening of democracy will primarily be understood through the Freedom House scores of each country. However,

\textsuperscript{1182} Sachs, Jeffrey D., Kenneth A. Froot, and Olivier Jean Blanchard, eds. \textit{The Transition in Eastern Europe}. 12
\textsuperscript{1183} Estrin, Bennett, Urga, and Maw, “Privatisation methods and economic growth in transition economies.” 23.
\textsuperscript{1184} Sachs, Jeffrey D., Kenneth A. Froot, and Olivier Jean Blanchard, eds. \textit{The Transition in Eastern Europe}. 13
other methods, including the European Values Survey, will be used to assess the state of democracy in a given country. Additionally, this paper will attempt to pick out democratic and antidemocratic movements during the given time frame.

**Czech Transition Section**

The Czech Republic provides an excellent example of outsider privatization. While the Czech Republic was a part of Czechoslovakia until 1993, it was still able to carry out its own privatization schemes after the ousting of the communist government. The Czech Republic opted for economic reforms that would quickly transition them to a market economy. On January 1, 1991, the government implemented sweeping economic reforms including anti-inflationary policies, cut taxes, liberalized prices, and restructured many government programs and by 1992, the Czech Republic saw a 22% decrease in industrial production, while wages and hours had dropped.\footnote{Dyba, Karel, and Jan Svejnar. "Stabilization and transition in Czechoslovakia." *The Transition in Eastern Europe* 1 (1994): 97-98} However, the unemployment rate in Czech lands was only 3.7%, compared to 12.3% in Slovak lands. Some attribute this to a faster rise of the private sector in the Czech Republic.

The privatization process in the Czech Republic was quick, robust, and was aimed at turning the firms over to outsiders. While at first, there was documentation of spontaneous privatization, this was carried out through informal, mostly criminal, activities that were limited in scope.\footnote{Mertlik, Pavel. "Czech privatization: from public ownership to public ownership in five years?." *Prague Economic Papers* 4, no. 4 (1995): 16} The next step was a small privatization program beginning in 1990. The Small Privatization Act oversaw the direct sale and auction of over twenty-four thousand properties, small businesses, and small factories by the end of 1993.\footnote{Ibid., 3} This first step created a small ownership class that would have wanted to see the process of democratization through to the end so that their property rights would be respected.

The primary component of this process was voucher privatization of large firms in two waves in 1992 and 1993, which was implemented alongside some smaller restitution programs, largely focused on turning over ownership of large state-owned enterprises to private entities through voucher privatization. Under this scheme every Czech citizen over the age of 18 could purchase a voucher booklet of 1000 voucher points that could be invested directly or put into an investment privatization fund (IPF).\footnote{Earle, John S., and Scott Gehlbach. "A spoonful of sugar: privatization and popular support for reform in the Czech Republic." *Economics & Politics* 15, no. 1 (2003): 8} At the cost of about a week and a half’s worth of wages, virtually all citizens could afford to participate, but the decision did require some consideration on the part of the buyer.\footnote{Ibid., 8} The program eventually saw 91.7% of the eligible population participate in at least one of the waves, where 52.7% of participants chose to invest their shares rather than sell them.\footnote{Ibid., 8} This meant that over 45% of the eligible population had invested in IPFs or directly in the firms, which shows immense outsider control of firms as well as a broad range of owners who held shares in the success of these companies. While the control of these groups may not have been direct, bringing in outsiders was a key component of the program.
The key to the success depended on private initiative from below, and it was the decentralized process in which the government primarily set rules by which different actors had to play. The design of this system gave non-management bidders a reasonable chance to compete and prevented the unpopular situation where management was able to control everything through their various political connections. In this way, the state was removed from the process to discourage rent seeking behavior or reward those that were politically connected.

The Czech Republic was considered a consolidated democracy, with a political rights score of 1 (best) and rated “Free” between 1994 and 2009. A 1996 survey shows that those who retained their shares were significantly more likely to be satisfied with economic reform, believed the economic situation was improving, and expected an improvement in living standards. This group was also more likely to say that they lived in their preferred economic system and that they did not want rule by “strong hand.” Perhaps this group saw a heavy hand as an anti-democratic threat to their future economic growth and were not willing to regress to a strong handed ruler in order to preserve their gains as insiders in Russia have been prone to do. Meanwhile, those who simply participated without retaining their shares showed no significant opinion on any of these issues.

In 1999, 37% Czech citizens were satisfied with the development of democracy, while 92.6% of citizens saw democracy as the most suitable regime type for the county. The most dissatisfied were the Communist Party and CSSD, despite the fact that they had won parliamentary elections the previous year. It is notable that, while citizens may not have been happy with their democracy, they still understood the value of the system of government. There was an interest in continuing the system while endeavoring to make the institutions work. This is the sort of response Moore might have expected when an ownership class had been created.

The Russian case

Russia, the largest post-Soviet economy, is an incredible case of insider privatization. In July of 1991, the Russian legislature passed a law to privatize most state firms, but the actual privatization process did not start until early 1992. Between the time of the passage of the bill and its implementation there were major shifts in the Russian political landscape—most notably the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the chaos, property rights were not clearly defined, and the ownership of industries was in constant flux. This is because when socialism collapsed, ministers retained some control of their industries and sat on the Council of Ministers, which was in charge of the privatization process. With this power, they were able to prevent privatization of their industries by claiming that an industry was too valuable to the state or guide privatization in such a way that they retained control.

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1191 Mertlik, Pavel “Czech Privitization,”
1194 Ibid., 22.
1197 Ibid., 142.
These movements were combined with even less formal ‘spontaneous’ privatization. Managers would set up a private company near the state-owned firm, buy the low-priced state output, and then sell the goods at market price for a profit.\textsuperscript{1198} Due to high rates of corruption, this process often involved private managers bribing government officials. Another method, the worker/management buyout, has similar anti-competitive issues that place the previously state-owned firms in only a few hands. In this method, a firm is purchased with borrowed money for a very low price and, as the name suggests, ownership is split between management and workers. Shleifer and Vishny claimed in 1992 that a few organizers would become very rich without monitoring by shareholders and banks would pressure owners to focus on making the firm efficient, eventually causing the firm to go bankrupt.\textsuperscript{1199} Meanwhile, employee control prevented layoffs and wage controls which would have otherwise helped the efficiency of the firm. While this would be beneficial for workers in the short term, high wages would be unsustainable due to the lack of state support combined with managers stripping the company of its assets would result in the total loss of the firm. Low levels of outsider monitoring of MBO firms are confirmed by a 1999 study that found managers and employees colluded to keep outsiders out.\textsuperscript{1200} Insider control was widespread, with an average of more than 60\% of voting power within a firm belonging to insiders in 1995/96.\textsuperscript{1201} After spontaneous privatization, local governments would demand a share of privatized firms.\textsuperscript{1202} This demonstrates how the balance of power had not been effectively shifted away from the state to create conditions favorable to democracy.

Russia’s loan for shares privatization led to oligarchs taking control. While 132 million Russians took advantage of the program, a great deal of the vouchers were sold on the open market but the end of the privatization period, insiders still held 70\% of the companies where voucher funds had been invested.\textsuperscript{1203} While the privatization program may have shaken up the business environment, the benefits of ownership never reached a large part of Russians as they chose to sell their vouchers for cash.

These reforms failed to create an effective ownership class and concentrated ownership of Russian firms into the hands of a few oligarchs. In June 2003, the top ten families in Russia owned 60\% of the Russian stock market.\textsuperscript{1204} For comparison, the share owned by the top 10 families in the U.S. and U.K., is in the single digits. Furthermore, the oligarchs routinely received subsidies, tax breaks, land grants, and subsidized credit through their political connections.\textsuperscript{1205} Through their cooperation and bargaining with the state, these selectively protected certain industries from privatization and renationalized others like Gazprom.

By all indicators, Russia’s democracy has been extremely flawed for some time. In 1991 the nation’s political rights stood at a 3 but by 2008 had dropped to a 6- only one away from the

\textsuperscript{1198} Ibid., 146
\textsuperscript{1199} Ibid., 147-8
\textsuperscript{1200} Filatotchev, Igor, Mike Wright, and Michael Bleaney. "Privatization, insider control and managerial entrenchment in Russia." \textit{Economics of Transition} 7, no. 2 (1999): 500
\textsuperscript{1201} Ibid., 492
\textsuperscript{1202} Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. "12. Privatization in Russia: First Steps." 144
\textsuperscript{1205} Ibid., 140
worst rating assigned by Freedom House. This section shows that the economic transition, particularly the privatization of industry, did not create a class which could sustain democracy. On the contrary, Russian oligarchs have often found themselves further intertwined with Yeltsin’s regime before the emergence of democracy and have pitted themselves against democracy ever since. Bankers who had benefited enormously from privatization bankrolled Yeltsin’s campaign and controlled the country’s television and newspaper. After Yeltsin’s victory, the businessmen received billion-dollar tax credits and a myriad of other benefits. As Hellman predicted, the early liberalization winners were able to steer government policy decisively away from additional liberalization of their country’s market. After Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin further consolidated his power and cracked down on dissent and reinterpreted the constitution to extend his time as the nation’s executive.

**Polish Transition Outlier**

It is important in the discussion of the theoretical framework to find cases where the theory may not hold up in order to discover other important variables in the transition to democracy. One case that breaks the trend, at least during the time analyzed, is that of Poland. The economic conditions surrounding the transition in Poland were not much different than any other post-Soviet country. Poland pursued a program of shock therapy to quickly transition to a market economy. Before reforms started in 1990, 92.8% of workers were employed in state owned enterprises but by 1993, employment in large enterprises only made up 72% of the entire workforce, while employment in the large firms had dropped from 6.6 million to 3.8 million.

In addition to unemployment, Poland experienced a number of other economic issues including high inflation, reduced output, and a drop in investment growth. As a result of, anti-reform political forces in the country exerted pressure and slow the pace of change.

While the collapse of the Communist Party meant that the state would no longer intervene in the economy to the extent they used to, workers who had gained new power, would still manage to reinsert the state to support worker-owned firms. This meant workers could potentially have a large say in the privatization of the economy and leverage their position to the advantage of labor. The high level of organization of workers that made their position so strong was made possible in part by the history of the Solidarity Movement. Economic advisors feared that workers would absorb income in wage compensation without any improvements in firm outputs or profits, leading them to ask for state assistance in keeping unproductive firms afloat.

There was a small wave of spontaneous privatization which happened outside of the view of that state. In these cases, managers of state-owned firms would enter deals with outside capital in exchange for favorable positions, or into deals with their own private company to essentially transfer the output of the state-owned firm. This is very similar to the system we saw emerge

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1210 Ibid., 311
1211 Ibid., 307
in Russia, but it was not nearly as widespread. Ultimately, these sorts of events prompted stronger state oversight, and the Act on Privatization was passed in 1990 by the Solidarity government in order to guide the process of privatization. Under the act, state enterprises would be made into Treasury-owned joint stock companies under the direction of the Ministry of Ownership Transformation and could only be approved by the workers council and only Prime Minister, who was accountable to the whole country, could overturn a decision by workers.1212

These actions derailed privatization which would have brought in a great deal of outsider control of industry. Such high levels of insider control of industry, according to the theory, should have been seriously harmful to democratic prospects in the country. Despite this, the country became a stable democracy and hosted free and fair elections throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. So, what drove this strong wave of democratization in the country? The first answer lies with the very insiders who worked to prevent privatizations.

The Solidarity movement had created a very well-organized civil society. Many believe that this sort of civil society is key in the formation and continued operation of a democracy.1213 Solidarity’s commitment to actual solidarity and to democracy can be seen in their bargaining with the Communist Party early on in the transition. It is also possible that preventing many of the largest enterprises from fully privatizing did not have that large of an effect. And, since the effective control of the firms largely remained with the workers, wealth inequality stayed low as workers retained their jobs, wages, and other benefits. In addition, these laws required that if a firm was privatized, 20% of shares had to be reserved for workers at 50% discount, essentially creating 4 million small investors.1214 This, in essence, created an almost collective ownership class whose interests were tied up in the democratic future in the country as they retained a large sway in democratic system. Additionally, a push from the bottom and people creating their own smaller businesses that drove the creation of an owner class. In 1989, a law was passed which allowed an individual to own their own business. Within a year, over 800 thousand people became owners, and after two years the number exceeded 1.4 million small business owners.1215

Up until 2008, we see that Freedom House rated Poland as a 2 in 1990, but by 1995 the rating had risen to a 1 where it stayed through 2008. The country saw respectable parliamentary voter turnout, staying between 40-55% from 1991 to 2007.1216 Polish approval of their democracy, 42%, was slightly higher than the citizens of the Czech Republic.1217 To reemphasize the impact of labor on government, the parliamentary coalition was led by the Democratic Left Alliance, a left leaning alliance who prioritized work in the public sector, from 1993-1997 and then again from 2001-2005.1218 This all points to a relatively healthy democracy that was able to survive the tumultuous transition period of the 1990s and early 2000s. Both the privatization schemes as well as the strong civil society seem to have aided in the country’s success.

1212 Ibid., 313
1215 Ibid., 156
Concluding Remarks

There is plenty of opportunity to extend this sort of analysis to more countries across Eastern Europe to get a bigger picture of the relationship of the dual transition. Cases from Central Asia and the Baltics may radically differ in their approaches and outcomes to the dual transition. Despite some of these shortcomings, the thesis that the method of privatization has an impact on democracy in Eastern European countries holds up to a certain degree. The case of the Czech Republic shows how their implementation of voucher privatization allowed a large number of outsiders to participate in the program. Meanwhile, Russia saw spontaneous privatization and extensive corruption that came from unclear property rights led to severe misallocation and mismanagement of firms as insiders took over. Finally, the case of Poland shows the emergence of a democracy despite the privatization process being taken over by what the theoretical section of the paper considered insiders. The insiders in Poland used their bargaining position to slow privatization and may have helped to create an ownership class.

The cases analyzed in this paper presented three paths to privatization and how those choices had an effect on the emerging democracies within the country. While the theoretical framework may not be able to fully explain each case across Eastern Europe, the effects of insider and outsider privatization seems to have clearly impacted democracy in at least two of the three case studies presented. It seems that if a population has ownership over parts of the economy after the collapse of a single party state, they favor democracy’s property rights and the opportunities it allows for future growth. Further research is needed to apply this theoretical concept to other former eastern bloc countries to get a better idea of its broader usefulness.
Bibliography


