‘Knowledge is of Universals’ – How to Understand Aristotle’s Claim without Problems

Pieter Sjoerd Hasper
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Indiana University at Bloomington

After canvassing the contexts in which Aristotle makes the claim that ‘Knowledge is of Universals’ (primarily in his account of experience (empeiria) and in his anti-Platonic discussions of the ontological status of universals, but also elsewhere) and the problematic aspects of this claim, I will propose an interpretation of it which does not get Aristotle into trouble. My interpretation comes in three stages. First I show briefly how knowledge of universals, by consisting in scientific explanatory demonstrations, does not comprise mere knowledge of universal facts and the possession of universal concepts. Then I show more extensively that Aristotle presupposes that scientific explanatory demonstrations have a certain logical form, namely the one common in Greek mathematics, where a theorem is proved in the case of an arbitrary individual. Aristotle uses arguments of this form in his logic, he accuses Platonists of having a false interpretation of them, and presupposes this logical form in his argument from Universal Mathematics against the existence of Platonic Forms (Metaphysics M.2). Finally, I show how with this interpretation in hand we can make sense of Aristotle’s claim to have solved, in Metaphysics M.10, ‘the greatest difficulty’ with the claim that knowledge is of universals without committing himself to the existence of Platonic Forms.

Friday, February 20, 2015
4:00 p.m.
244B Cathedral of Learning

Reception following lecture in in the Crogan-Schenley Room, 156 Cathedral of Learning