Can politicians use political tools to prevent volatility in the financial markets? The political economy literature shows that international financial actors watch political developments closely and can respond negatively to certain political events, such as the election of left-wing governments. However, these events are the outcomes of a (sometimes unpredictable) democratic process and beyond the control of political elites. We take a novel approach to this question and explore how political actors can directly mitigate the negative financial market effects based on their selection of ministers and portfolio allocation. We argue that international investors closely monitor political appointments, and are fast to reward governments that appoint (non-partisan) technocrats, especially when these governments lack credibility in the international markets. We expect that technocratic appointments act as signals to investors that a competent and market-friendly environment exists. With an event study analysis that employs new data on the professional and political background of finance ministers in 21 Western and Eastern European parliamentary democracies, we test the effects of ministerial appointments on the market returns. Our findings shed light to a so-far unexplored effect of international financial markets on domestic and partisan politics.