TITLE: GROUND RULES FOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

GROUND RULES: CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES

The report seeks to devise, and in three subsequent sections apply, ground rules to govern Soviet and American involvement in areas of present and prospective regional tension. This section analyzes the concept and relevance of guidelines and outlines possible approaches.

In recent years, both Soviet and American officials have implied that there is or ought to be a "code of detente." But the most ambitious bilateral efforts to enact such a code, the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations and the 1973 Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War, were flawed at the outset by the vagueness of the mutual commitment to foresew "efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly." Later misunderstandings were inevitable.

Although the Soviet-American talks at the working level on conventional arms transfers (CAT's) and the Indian Ocean have been suspended for some time and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dims prospects for early bilateral agreements, ground-rules for U.S.-Soviet behavior have immediate relevance in the multilateral context of the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to be held in Madrid in November. Moreover, in the intermediate future circumstances may once again become more propitious for bilateral negotiations on measures of mutual restraint.

Two valid premises underlie the view that formally agreed ground rules might ease regional tensions by restraining superpower involvement: 1) existing modes of conflict regulation are inadequate and 2) explicit agreements as opposed to tacit "rules of the game" create some autonomous pressure on states toward compliance. But the expectation that such accords can radically transform the behavior of states is in all probability misplaced.

To avoid the pitfalls of highly generalized commitments to restraint, a series of specific approaches is needed in four broad categories:

1) limitations on conventional arms transfers

2) confidence-building measures including advance notification of and limits on military activities
3) naval limits
4) mechanisms of joint political consultation.

Controls on CAT's can contain the level of conflict between regional actors while reducing the likelihood that the U.S. and USSR will get drawn into a conflict between client states. Quantitative and qualitative limits, particularly on the transfer of advanced weapon systems, as well as prior U.S.-Soviet consultations on CAT's can be varied by region as appropriate.

Confidence-building measures that might be incorporated into a code of detente include: limitation of military maneuvers, more stringent requirements concerning advance notification of major military maneuvers, prior notice of small-scale military maneuvers, limits on the introduction of military personnel and advisers, prior notice of major military movements, and zones of disengagement and limited deployment coupled with assured early warning.

Naval controls could include limits on maneuvers and deployments, but limits on overall ship inventories are of doubtful negotiability under the best circumstances and would not deal with the question of restraints in particular regions. In some cases, agreed limits on access to naval support facilities might enhance mutual confidence.

Finally, some mechanism for the negotiation and monitoring of any agreements establishing ground rules would contribute to institutionalizing observance of mutual restraints. The Standing Consultative Commission for SALT might provide a rough model.

Although these four approaches might well advance the interests of arms control and the containment of regional conflict, there are important reasons why the Soviet Union might wish to avoid negotiation of ground rules with the United States. By their nature ground rules would seek to limit the freedom of action of parties to them. Although the principle of mutual advantage suggests that the results of such negotiations should confer roughly equal benefits on both parties, Soviet leaders, no less than their American counterparts, may be expected to harbor doubts on this score. The fluidity of regional political dynamics, existing commitments to regional actors, and the vicissitudes of Soviet-American relations will inevitably create a solid basis in Moscow for arguments favoring a cautious approach to negotiating ground rules. Soviet leaders will undoubtedly be mindful of the fact, moreover,
that the initially symmetrical impact of agreed "rules of the game" may, over time and under changing circumstances, give advantage to the other side. No less importantly, Soviet officials may be reluctant, even under conditions of uniformly symmetrical restraints, to surrender their freedom of action. This may be especially true with respect to the freedom to maintain Soviet influence with allied states in Eastern Europe and to provide support for friendly regimes and revolutionary movements in regions where Soviet and American interests are in conflict.

Many Soviet officials have in the past, for instance, clearly believed that conventional arms transfers enhance Soviet influence with recipients despite occasional examples to the contrary. Moscow might also prove reluctant to limit CAT's in any bilateral agreement with the United States that left France and Britain free to provide arms to pro-Western clients. With respect to confidence-building measures, the Soviets may resist constraints on Soviet military activities that serve a demonstrative or threatening function, especially in areas like Eastern Europe where Soviet determination to maintain the status quo influences public and elite perceptions of the limits of the possible.

Appearances are important in other respects. Merely by agreeing to conduct negotiations so directly affecting the interest of other international actors, the Soviet Union may convey the impression of Soviet-American collaboration at their expense. This danger itself constitutes a substantial disincentive to agreement. Sectors of the Soviet national security bureaucracy may be expected to raise objections to the negotiation of ground rules impinging on their missions and capabilities. By way of example, officials in the Party responsible for forging the maximum degree of unity within the international Communist movement, including non-ruling Communist parties in the Third World, would likely resist any regime of mutual restraint that promised to introduce strains in relations with those parties. Although opposition on ideological grounds to collaboration with the chief imperialist power has apparently been of declining importance under Brezhnev, such sentiments continue to enjoy considerable support among some officials, who might be more inclined to advance their objections under a successor regime. Because negotiation of ground rules would inevitably involve the disclosure of information and attitudes regarded as matters of national security in the Soviet Union, elements of the security apparatus would almost certainly support those objections. In light of the key role arms sales play in generating "hard" currency foreign exchange earnings, economic and foreign trade officials favoring policies of détente in other areas might well make common cause with "hardliners" in this area of ground rules.
The United States, by its actions and policies, may exert a degree of influence on the Soviet decision-making process concerning ground rules. The United States may do so by creating either positive incentives or negative disincentives designed to develop Soviet interest in forging rules of the game. As a "reward" for Soviet participation in this effort, the United States might hold out the prospect of a broader and deeper array of cooperative relationships than heretofore has been realized. This strategy might lead the United States to extend to Moscow positive benefits in areas of technology transfer, reduced tariffs, credits, and agricultural exports in the expectation that Moscow would respond by agreeing to regulate its involvement in areas of regional tension. It is unclear, however, whether this broad strategy, which foundered on human rights and emigration issues in the 1970s as it sought to moderate Soviet policies in the Third World, would be more successful in the 1980s. As long as Soviet forces remain in Afghanistan, it will be difficult for any U.S. Administration in the near future to offer Moscow the benefits of detente.

A variant of this strategy would entail a U.S. policy of linkage. Also attempted with only limited success in the 1970s, this policy would deny Moscow specific benefits from the bilateral relationship in the absence of agreement on regulating conduct in various regions. Difficult to implement without giving offense to Moscow or antagonizing politically important constituencies in the United States, this strategy requires the existence of benefits sufficiently valued by the USSR that the threat of their denial would cause Moscow to give higher priority than at present to moderating its involvement in regional conflicts. In a more extreme form of this approach, the Soviet Union might be given to understand that the alternative to enactment of ground rules would be a more assertive U.S. foreign policy, buttressed by a substantial long-term increase in U.S. military programs. But at present, just such a prospect appears insufficient incentive for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Moreover, such a policy is likely to be ill-suited to the task of negotiating a code of detente, which requires a high degree of mutual trust at the outset. The conclusion seems inescapable that bilateral agreement on ground rules, at least for areas outside Europe, will have to await a fundamental change in Soviet-American relations. At that time the aforementioned strategies may play a constructive role in bringing Moscow to the bargaining table.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE HORN OF AFRICA: GROUND RULES FOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

The Horn of Africa, considered here as including Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, is of strategic interest to the United States and Soviet Union primarily because of its location. Near key oil shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf and fronting on the Indian Ocean, the countries of the Horn have recently experienced volatile shifts in both domestic and foreign policies. Once enjoying close relations with the United States, Ethiopia since 1977 has aligned itself closely with the Soviet Union, using 16,000 Cuban troops to fight Somalia and Eritrean rebels. Somalia, host in the mid-1970s to military advisers from Cuba and the Soviet Union in return for Soviet access to naval and air facilities at Berbera, abruptly terminated the Soviet presence in November 1977. Soviet-Cuban involvement in behalf of the Ethiopian effort to expel Somalia from the disputed Ogaden raises the danger of Soviet-American confrontation, particularly in the event Somalia and the United States agree to military cooperation measures presently under negotiation. The growing U.S. and Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean in recent years signals an increase in the security interests at stake.

Efforts by the United States to enact ground rules of mutual restraint in the Horn face serious obstacles. The Soviet Union may well resist such attempts for several reasons related to the broad range of its objectives in the Horn and the adjacent waters of the Indian Ocean. Moscow's strategic objectives appear to include maintaining a potential for interdicting oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf to the United States, Western Europe and Japan. In addition, Moscow seeks to promote a panoply of regional objectives that include pacification of Afghanistan and maintenance of predominant influence in radical Arab states on the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. Regional objectives may also embrace destabilization in Iran and the maintenance of a permanent military presence in Ethiopia. Ground rules that threaten attainment of these objectives will have to surmount formidable hurdles within the Soviet defense and foreign policy bureaucracies.

Thus, limits on naval deployments and access rights are likely to be attractive to Moscow only to the extent they prevent a U.S. naval buildup in the region and permit Soviet submarine and other sea-denial deployments. Similarly, as long as the Soviet Union wishes to maintain Ethiopia as the militarily most powerful state in the Horn capable of threatening pro-Western states in the region such as Somalia and the Sudan, Moscow may turn aside proposals to limit conventional arms transfers. Soviet leaders, believing that an arms supply relationship confers influence with Ethiopia, may place a higher priority on CAT's than on efforts to
restrain them. This is particularly likely to be true if Moscow is convinced that its arms aid strengthens the Mengistu regime against its internal opponents. Similar calculations concerning the utility of the Cuban troop presence in Ethiopia militate against any agreement for their withdrawal, especially if such a withdrawal had to be forced upon a reluctant Fidel Castro, thereby introducing new strains in Soviet relations with Cuba. Finally, Moscow may prefer to avoid discussion of any ground rules regime if it perceives that U.S. zeal in this regard is a function of a poverty of alternatives. In the event the Soviets conclude that the United States is unprepared to mount an independent, unilateral effort in the Horn, they will have little incentive to compensate the United States for its own self-imposed restraint.

Although near-term prospects for Soviet-American agreement on ground rules in the Horn are poor, such guidelines might become relevant further in the future. Both the United States and USSR share an interest in blunting the possibility of direct confrontation between them and minimizing the cost of maintaining good relations with their "clients." Prospects for mutually agreed restraints on conventional arms transfers (CAT's) are enhanced by the relatively low existing level of transfers to the region. Limits on transfer of offensive and advanced weapon systems would make the greatest contribution to stability in the region. But Ethiopia's local military superiority, buttressed by recent Soviet arms shipments, may remove incentive for agreement in the absence of compensatory U.S. CAT's to Somalia. The result is a paradox. Low levels of existing transfers to the region make agreement possible, but larger U.S. transfers to Somalia may be an indispensable precondition for agreement on reductions. Moreover, such transfers may be required for the U.S. to gain access to Somali military facilities needed to implement the Carter Doctrine.

If transfers become part of a broader package of Somali-U.S. military cooperation, however, U.S. flexibility to negotiate CAT limits with the USSR will be substantially reduced. The possibility that U.S.-provided arms might be used by Somalia for aggression against neighboring Kenya and Djibouti, not to mention Ethiopia, makes necessary a commitment from Mogadishu not to use American arms for aggressive purposes.

An alternative approach would be for the United States to implement the Carter Doctrine by means other than military cooperation with Somalia. This approach would avoid the danger represented by Ethiopia's warning that the naval and air facilities in Berbera might come under attack if renewed fighting with Somalia breaks out and the United States has sent arms to Somalia. But even as this approach offered a conciliatory signal to Moscow it would fail to create the symmetrical arms supply relationship that would give Moscow a tangible incentive to agree to mutual limits.
Agreed restrictions on the presence of external military personnel on the ground would clearly serve U.S. interests and contribute to a reduction of tensions. But the Soviet Union will have little incentive to negotiate on such a ground rule unless the United States provides an incentive, which might take the form of holding out to Moscow the alternative of a greater U.S. military presence in the region. If Moscow came to believe that the United States was contemplating the introduction of its own, or proxy, forces into the area, prospects for mutual agreement on the non-introduction of external forces, including withdrawal of Cuban forces presently in Ethiopia, would be enhanced. The Soviet Union might well be unwilling, however, to trade the removal of 16,000 Cuban military personnel already on the ground in Ethiopia for a U.S. commitment not to do what it was only contemplating doing. On the other hand, if the U.S. secures access to the Berbera facilities, the U.S. interest in secure oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf would argue against sacrificing access to Berbera.

Less ambitiously, the United States might begin by seeking an accord with the Soviet Union on prior notification and consultation concerning either CAT's, the introduction of military personnel into the area, or major military movements. As the CSCE experience indicates, informational requirements are more readily negotiated than actual limits on military activities.

Moscow's incentive to accept any of the above restraints might be increased if they were linked to naval ground rules in the Indian Ocean where the balance of naval power favors the U.S. Naval restraint measures might limit deployments and/or access to land-based naval facilities. The failure within the past two years of Soviet-American talks on arms control in the Indian Ocean does not augur well for such measures in the near term. The Carter Doctrine's commitment to repel any external attack on Persian Gulf states also makes agreement appear unlikely and, perhaps, undesirable from the standpoint of U.S. security interests. An accord embodying these ground rules of mutual restraint may have to await a redefinition by the Soviet Union and United States of their interests in the region.

Other ground rules may find readier acceptance in Moscow. The periodic Soviet proposal to make the Indian Ocean a nuclear-free zone is calculated to enhance the Soviet objective of denying the Indian Ocean to the United States as a launching area for SLBMs. Because denuclearization of the Indian Ocean would be virtually impossible to verify and would impact asymmetrically on U.S. strategic nuclear deployments, it is a measure that probably should receive consideration only as part of a broader regime of restraint that would include measures asymmetrically favoring U.S. security interests in the region. Here is one area, however, where U.S. policy might offer a positive inducement for Soviet agreement to mutual restraint. Other U.S. policies might also serve to increase Moscow's interest in ground rules, but their advisability will depend on a host of tactical factors not easy to forecast in advance.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SOUTHERN AFRICA: GROUND RULES
FOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

The political impasse in southern Africa (Namibia and the Republic of South Africa) between the white government of the Republic and black political forces there and in Namibia ultimately threatens, if it is not broken, to involve the United States and USSR in a crisis at some point in the future. Despite marginal reforms, the white minority government shows no intention of initiating sufficiently rapid change to accommodate the black majority. This majority is not strong enough to overthrow the Nationalist government but may provide fertile ground for intervention by external powers in the future. In Namibia, prospects for a settlement appear somewhat better but nevertheless uncertain.

The stakes in southern Africa are high: access to strategic mineral resources, large-scale foreign investment, control of oil-shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the United States, and the defense capabilities of sub-Saharan Africa's strongest power. The Soviet Union has long supplied arms and money to black guerrilla movements in South Africa and Namibia. The forces of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) have been given access to Soviet and Cuban camps in neighboring Angola.

Ground rules aimed at implementing a peaceful resolution of the political impasse in southern Africa possess some modest potential. To the extent that the United States perceives its overall interests to be best protected by further distancing itself from the Nationalist Party government and can persuade the Soviet Union that its interests also lie in a strategy to increase the peaceful pressure on the white regime, potential exists for the construction of ground rules whose purpose would be to increase the willingness of the opposed parties within South Africa and Namibia to negotiate a political settlement of their dispute.

To accomplish this end requires the employment of a strategy such as that which was employed by the various outside powers involved in the recent settlement in Zimbabwe. In that situation, South Africa used its influence to persuade the Rhodesian regime that a settlement could not be avoided, while the Front Line States applied their leverage over the Patriotic Front to persuade it to come to the same conclusion. By threatening the viability of their respective clients rather than by supporting their irreconcilable ambitions, the outside powers increased the incentives of the indigenous actors to negotiate seriously on a political solution of their dispute.
Translating the Rhodesian strategy to the South African context involves ground rules that express a United States willingness to exercise leverage on the South African regime in exchange for Soviet willingness to pressure the guerrilla movements struggling against that regime. In practice, the ground rules might result in a reduction of United States economic links with Pretoria and a slowdown in Soviet arms and financial assistance to the insurgents. By diluting each side's ability to pursue its maximum goals, the applied ground rules could encourage the emergence of a political compromise between them.

Despite the difficulties inherent in attempting to impose equivalent restraints on very different types of transfers, there is little choice: the arms and financial aid the USSR supplies to the guerrillas and the economic flows sanctioned by the United States are perhaps the only potentially effective levers of influence either superpower possesses over the South African situation. The United States might also actively attempt to disrupt the network through which Pretoria still obtains Western arms. But, because that network appears to operate independently of Washington's control, it is not within the United States' capacity to deliver as part of a Soviet-American effort. Likewise, the insurgents would still be able to acquire their arms elsewhere.

Construction of guidelines to induce conciliatory moves by the Nationalist Party and the insurgent forces is an option whose theoretical attractiveness confronts problems of negotiability and implementation. Cutbacks in American economic links with the Republic and in Soviet aid to guerrilla forces in the Republic of Namibia could only be agreed upon if there were prior agreement between Washington and Moscow as to the responsiveness of the Nationalist Party regime, on the one hand, and the insurgents, on the other, to such restrictions. The measurement problems involved in estimating this political elasticity would be severe even in the absence of mistrust between the negotiating parties.

The successful resolution of the difficulties besetting the Rhodesian/Zimbabwe dispute might be taken as a harbinger of possible success in the South African context. But even if a Soviet-American bargain were to prove negotiable at some time in the future, intractable problems would remain at the stage of implementation. Unlike the outside powers engaged in efforts to settle the Rhodesian/Zimbabwe dispute, the Soviet Union and the United States possess only very limited levers of influence over indigenous political forces in South Africa and Namibia. The ability of the guerrillas to acquire arms elsewhere and of South Africa to adjust to United States economic pressure might well leave the status quo in the region essentially intact.
Given this situation, it may be worthwhile to explore the use of ground rules aimed less at encouraging a domestic political settlement than at controlling the risks of escalation through the introduction of external military forces. Here, too, problems of negotiability and implementation arise. The Soviet Union would have little incentive to agree, for instance, to a ban on the introduction of outside (Cuban) military forces if there were no credible prospect that American forces might possibly be introduced into the area. Such a ban, moreover, would have the political consequence of favoring the white minority government that, in the absence of external forces, is now dominant.

Efforts to enact ground rules regulating the introduction of outside forces would probably stand a better chance of success if they were linked to the larger context of Soviet-American relations. A U.S. linkage strategy would offer the U.S. the opportunity to extend the range of both carrots and sticks that it might utilize to encourage Soviet restraint in the region.

Resort to a linkage strategy will probably be made necessary by virtue of the Soviet Union's otherwise stronger interest in destabilizing southern Africa and assisting black revolutionary movements. With little at stake in the status quo in southern Africa, Moscow has every incentive to promote violent change. By doing so, the Soviets cement their relations with the black forces they see as the ultimate victors in the class struggle in southern Africa. Mutual restraints on arms transfers and on the introduction of external military personnel could substantially diminish the political dividends Moscow expects eventually to accrue. Soviet decisionmakers, noting the U.S. effort to distance itself from Pretoria and U.S. policy to date toward Angola, can hardly assess as high the probability that the United States would deploy its own forces in southern Africa.

Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence in the Third World also provides a motive for Soviet reluctance to agree with the United States on measures of restraint. Although that rivalry has recently diminished somewhat in Africa, Soviet policymakers will be reluctant to cut back on their support for revolutionary groups if this opens the way for increased Chinese influence among groups feeling abandoned by the Soviet Union.

The United States, nevertheless, is not entirely without leverage on the Soviet Union with respect to southern Africa. A U.S. Administration more favorably disposed toward Pretoria might
credibly threaten to resume arms shipments to that country, particularly if oil shipping routes from the Persian Gulf around the Cape seemed insecure and South Africa's assistance appeared crucial. Such a scenario, however, involving imperiled oil supplies, is likely to occur only in the context of Soviet-American tension so grave that negotiation of ground rules would have to take a back seat to immediate crisis management.

Short of such a crisis, the United States would probably have to link ground rules in southern Africa to prospective benefits to the Soviet Union in other areas. In fields such as agricultural exports, technology transfers, and tariff and credit concessions, the United States possesses potential, if limited, leverage over the Soviet Union. To date, with the exception of partial use with respect to Afghanistan, these levers have largely been applied for purposes other than restraining Soviet policy in the Third World. In these other respects they have not been entirely unsuccessful. Although propitious timing, tactical flexibility and avoidance of undue publicity are preconditions for their effectiveness, the threat to withhold trade-related benefits from the Soviet Union in 1973 was accompanied by an easing of emigration restrictions in the Soviet Union. If prospects for expanded economic cooperation with the United States were capable in that context of effecting a change in Soviet policy in an area as sensitive domestically as emigration, it would hardly seem inconceivable that similar levers might yield corresponding benefits in the effort to restrain conflict in southern Africa.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

YUGOSLAVIA: GROUND RULES FOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN RESTRAINT

Tito's death commences the long-awaited succession era in Yugoslavia at a time when the country also confronts problems of the economy, nationality relations, and external relations with the Soviet Union and the West. The collective leaderships in the Party and government that have succeeded Tito may prove politically unstable. His successors are generally not well-known outside their own republics, and the principle by which the top spots in Party and government rotate annually by republic may hamstring effective leadership. The exercise by each republic of a veto power in the federal parliament may also impede new initiatives to solve pressing problems.

The Yugoslav economy is beset with high inflation and declining, although still high, living standards. Chronic trade deficits and dependence on the Soviet Union for a large proportion of energy imports complicate the situation. Growing differentials in per capita income between the wealthier northern republics and the poorer south provide the basis for potentially divisive ethnic conflict. For many years the Soviet Union has sought to encourage ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia as a means of extending its own influence in the region, particularly in the south and along the Dalmatian coast where the Soviet Union has sought greater access to naval support facilities. Although Yugoslav-U.S. relations may now be as good as they have ever been, Belgrade continues to play a balancing role as leader of the non-aligned movement.

Among the broad array of U.S. policies that might enhance Yugoslav independence and reduce East-West rivalry over Yugoslavia, ground rules have a potential role to play. Limits on conventional arms transfers, however, might be destabilizing since Yugoslav will and ability to defend the country militarily constitute the greatest deterrent to foreign invasion. Although the Soviet Union has been Yugoslavia's chief arms supplier in recent years, Yugoslavia is now interested in purchasing sophisticated early warning, anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems from the United States.

In any event Moscow may well resist CAT limits with respect to Yugoslavia since its arms supply relationship gives it entree into the Yugoslav army command and provides tangible evidence of Soviet interest in Yugoslavia and internal developments there. In light of Yugoslav defense needs and its own interest in a similar entree, the United States would gain little or nothing from CAT limits applied to Yugoslavia, which could be expected to oppose vigorously any such measures.
Confidence-building measures modeled after those in the Helsinki Final Act offer greater promise and are favored by Yugoslavia itself. The multilateral forum of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid in November will permit active Yugoslav participation in formulating such ground rules and avoid the impression of a Soviet-American negotiation behind Belgrade's back. Requirements in the Final Act of prior notification of major military maneuvers might be strengthened by expanding forewarning times and requiring prior notice of smaller-scale maneuvers. Multiple simultaneous or consecutive maneuvers might also be made subject to prior notification, and fuller information might be required. Mandatory notification of major military movements would further enhance confidence.

Beyond notification regimes, actual constraints on military activities would limit the political utility of Soviet military forces. Maneuvers might be limited in size, duration, and proximity to national (Yugoslav) borders. Qualitative limits on offensive weapon systems used in maneuvers near borders, especially tanks, would strengthen Yugoslav security. Most effective would be limits on major military movements, particularly in border areas. Creation of zones where deployment of foreign offensive forces would be constrained would heighten the effect, but their negotiation, if on a Europe-wide basis, would have to proceed from an assessment of their impact on the security of NATO, especially West Germany. To forestall advantaging the offense, disengagement schemes would have to include measures of assured early warning.

Although the Soviet Union has been willing to limit its military prerogatives in Europe to the extent of agreeing to give 21-days advance notice of major military maneuvers, Moscow has been less than eager to extend this regime, a reluctance born out by its diffidence in implementing voluntary CBMs in the Final Act. Whether from habit, preoccupation with security, or paranoia, Soviet officials will probably continue to resist proposals for greater sharing of information. They are even more likely to be inclined to avoid agreement on ground rules that limit their freedom of action (and, therefore, leverage) in Eastern Europe and, specifically, with respect to Yugoslavia. In light of recurrent instability in Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders are undoubtedly aware that even the perception of their having lost some freedom of action could destabilize the region by undermining the public conviction there that a sense of realism requires deference to Soviet sensitivities.

While these considerations are not inconsequential, the willingness of the Soviet Union to bow to Western insistence on including CBMs in the Helsinki process suggests that somewhat more farreaching CBM's would be negotiable if proper incentives for Soviet acceptance could be devised. The multilateral forum of the CSCE itself is an incentive to agreement since the USSR will be eager to avoid the diplomatic isolation that might follow from unqualified rejection of proposals to extend the CBM regime. Pressure on the Soviet Union will be greatest if Western states coordinate their proposals in advance of CSCE review conferences, such
as the Madrid meeting, both among themselves and with the neutral and non-aligned. Since Soviet acceptance of the CBMs in the Final Act was substantially motivated by the expectation of increased economic cooperation, including technology transfer provided for in Basket Two, the United States and its allies should in principle be able to encourage accord on further CBM's by linking expanded economic cooperation to agreement on these security-related measures. In practice, U.S. economic sanctions against the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan, and Allied agreement in principle not to undercut them, make this linkage strategy dubious until the situation in Afghanistan permits lifting of the sanctions.

With respect to specific CBM's proposed here, the Soviet Union will probably have fewest reservations concerning "classic" CBM's that impose more stringent notification requirements rather than actual limits on operations. Since Moscow has embraced the principle of prior notice and has fulfilled its commitments in this regard, it appears the Soviet Union could be persuaded to accept a longer, perhaps 45-day, forewarning period in lieu of the present 21-day requirement. Similarly, incremental progress in lowering the troop level requiring prior notice from the present 25,000 figure to perhaps 12-18,000 would also seem feasible at some point in view of Soviet acceptance of the somewhat higher number at Helsinki. Tightening existing provisions to include greater detail on units engaged in maneuvers would also not require new decisions in principle on Moscow's part. Expansion of reporting requirements, however, to include mandatory advance notification of major military movements may run into greater resistance since it would diminish the Soviet Union's ability clandestinely to mount military operations aimed at suppressing instability in Eastern Europe.

Although strengthened reporting requirements enhancing Yugoslavia's sense of security would make minimal demands on Soviet decisionmaking processes, the same cannot be said of measures to limit military activities in proximity to Yugoslavia's borders. Even here, however, there have been modest signs in the past of a flexible Soviet attitude. Constraints on the size of military maneuvers near borders might seem likely to raise serious problems from the Soviet standpoint. But the USSR proposed a ceiling of 50-60,000 troops at the Belgrade Review Conference. While the Soviet offer was undoubtedly motivated by the fact that NATO and not the WTO has usually held larger exercises than this, the Soviet proposal opens the door to discussion of a lower limit that might impact more symmetrically on the force readiness of the two alliances. In fact, Moscow's willingness to discuss limiting the size of maneuvers opens the way to consideration of such other constraints as fixing a time-limit on maneuvers, barring flights by fighter-bomber aircraft along borders, and limiting the number of tanks and armored personnel carriers engaged in border exercises.
More ambitious measures than these are likely to encounter correspondingly greater resistance in Moscow. A ban on all military movements in border areas except for normal redeployment and replenishment, a thinning out of foreign offensive forces near borders, and the presence of ground listening posts and on-site observers to monitor observance of these constraints might impinge directly on Moscow's ability to threaten the use of force to maintain internal security in Eastern Europe. To make such constraints more readily negotiable, the United States and its NATO allies might consider ways of framing such measures to limit their impact on intrabloc relations. Along this line the provisions might be made applicable only to frontier areas bordering on states not holding membership in the given alliance. This approach would not directly benefit Rumania, for instance, but it would contribute to the security of Yugoslavia.

Naval activities in the Adriatic are another area where ground rules might be applied. Measures including prior notification of naval exercises, naval deployments and amphibious exercises would help to prevent surprise and restrict the use of naval forces for political purposes. Actual limits on Soviet and American naval activities might theoretically include agreement to ban all foreign ships from the Adriatic or restrict their number or type. A supplementary effort might be made to reduce or restrict to present levels foreign naval access to ports along the Yugoslav coast.

The Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, concluded in 1972, furnishes an optimistic precedent for bilateral agreement on limiting naval activities of a tactical nature. But measures in that accord to limit chances of collision, harrassment, and simulated attack have only marginal relevance to the task of preventing either a naval confrontation over Yugoslavia or a political-military confrontation over access to naval facilities on Yugoslavia's Adriatic Coast. Nevertheless, by requiring at least 3-days notice of naval activities that might create a hazard to navigation, the accord testifies to the potential negotiability of the more far-reaching naval restraints described above.

From a Western standpoint, however, it is less than clear whether such restraints, even if confined to the Adriatic, would reduce potential threats to Yugoslavia's independence. The geographic and force asymmetries that exist on the ground along Yugoslavia's borders militate in favor, from NATO's standpoint, of the restraint imposed by prior notification of ground troop exercises. But the naval superiority of the U.S. Sixth Fleet over the Soviet Mediterranean squadron suggests that a naval notification regime parallel that for ground force maneuvers would be to NATO's disadvantage. Delays in shows of naval force occasioned by a prior notification requirement would asymmetrically hamper the application of NATO leverage in response to any hypothetical Soviet threat on the ground. One might be justified in speculating that Soviet resistance to more restrictive CBM's applicable to ground forces stems
in part from the same calculations of relative advantage. Although this line of analysis leads to a somewhat pessimistic prognosis for the negotiability of further CBM's in Europe, quite aside from the impact of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan on all East-West negotiations, a wide range of factors apparently remains at work furthering Moscow's interest in maintaining and strengthening détente in Europe. The asymmetries in naval and ground forces in the region also suggest the possibility of a trade-off in which the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact might surrender some greater degree of freedom of action on the ground in return for greater NATO and American restraint, de facto, at sea. Since the chief threat to Yugoslavia's security is from Soviet ground forces, the trade-off would appreciably enhance stability in the region.
Chapter 1

Ground Rules: Concepts and Approaches

I. THE CONCEPT OF GROUND RULES AND THEIR RELEVANCE

While the outcome of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the stalled SALT II ratification process will establish the overall climate within which other aspects of Soviet-American relations will develop in the foreseeable future, this study seeks to move beyond the contentious issue of Afghanistan and the exhaustively studied questions of strategic arms limitation in order to deal with general problems of regional conflict. The timeliness of such an approach has only apparently been diminished by the recent exacerbation of Soviet-American relations. In fact, its relevance has been underscored by the evidence that many of the cooperative and mutually beneficial aspects of Soviet-American relations cannot easily withstand large-scale shifts in public sentiment brought about by Soviet-American misunderstanding in areas of regional conflict.

Although regional conflicts are most likely to give rise to nuclear confrontations between the two superpowers, they have received insufficient attention from the standpoint of regularizing Soviet-American competition.
This study, therefore, focuses on possible ground rules governing U.S.-Soviet involvement in areas of present and prospective regional tension. It remains an open question whether Soviet interest in such "rules of the game" extends beyond high-minded generalizations concerning superpower behavior to embrace the possibility of concrete and mutually agreed measures to enhance regional stability. Of paramount importance in this respect are the Soviet Union's estimates of the costs and benefits of such measures to both the United States and itself. Accordingly, the study not only will investigate possible ground rules but also will make a modest attempt to examine the means whereby they might be brought into effect.

At least since the full flowering of detente in 1972, both government officials and scholars in the United States have periodically stated or implied that there existed, or ought to exist, certain (generally unspecified) ground rules governing Soviet and American behavior. Such "rules" have even been conceptualized as a kind of "code" of conduct the violation of which constitutes a departure from a detente relationship. Calls for the elaboration of such a "code of detente" have tended to multiply at times of low-level frustration over Soviet actions abroad seen as upsetting the international status quo. They have diminished during periods of
greater frustration when detente itself has become the object of attack from the skeptical and of disillusion from the once sympathetic.

Statements by high officials of the U.S. Government concerning alleged Soviet violations of an (unwritten) "code of detente" in Southwest Asia and Africa reinforce the case for devising more explicit and systematic ground rules. Indeed, so long as the code of detente is vague, each party to it will have maximum leeway in construing those strictures applicable to itself as permissively as rhetorical self-justification permits. Perhaps in partial recognition of this, Soviet-American working groups, as a result of Secretary of State Vance's visit to Moscow in March 1977, considered areas of possible cooperation in such related areas as controlling conventional arms transfers and demilitarizing the Indian Ocean. The failure of these talks underscores both the difficulty of developing and agreeing to ground rules and the importance of the effort.

Although less publicly and less urgently, Soviet officials and scholars have hinted at a similar interest in developing greater mutual agreement on the ground rules of detente. Speaking to a joint session of the Central Committee and Supreme Soviet in November 1977, General Secretary Brezhnev pointed to the importance of "recognizing and enacting in international documents a kind of code of rules" for relations between the Soviet Union and Western
states. While the Soviet leader's purpose, in part, was to stress achievements already recorded in such agreements as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, he appeared to suggest the possibility of codifying principles aimed at reducing superpower tensions and preventing military confrontations with the United States in various areas of the world, including southern Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Mideast. Soviet scholars visiting the United States from the USA and Canada Institute and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) have periodically broached the same possibility.

Because formally and informally, both the United States and the Soviet Union have expressed some interest in developing guidelines for the conduct of their relations, this section of the study will briefly assess the assumptions that appear to underlie interest in such guidelines, tentative and episodic as it has been.

1. The General Premises of Support for Ground Rules of Detente

Soviet and American expressions of support for developing informal rules of detente apparently derive from three beliefs: that present methods of restraining superpower conflicts are inadequate to the task of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war; that international agreements can transform the general nature of international politics; and that the conclusion of agreements can
influence the specific behavior of nations acceding to those agreements. An analysis of each of these three premises in succession will confirm the validity of the first, reject the second as conceptually unsound, and offer qualified support to the third.

a. Modes of Conflict Regulation

To regulate their relationship in the post-World War II period, the Soviet Union and the United States have relied largely upon tacit rules of the game, the careful management of crises, and incentive or linkage strategies, each of which has weaknesses that might be remedied by the construction of guidelines.

Tacit rules of the game, the most important of the modes of superpower conflict control, are simply expectations about permissible actions and reactions that have developed as a result of discernible patterns in superpower behavior in the post-war period. The failure of the United States to respond actively to the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the similarly low-keyed Soviet response to United States interventions in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic established and then confirmed the existence of a tacit rule permitting each superpower license to behave at will in its own sphere of influence without fear of direct military counteraction from the other. The assertive United States response to the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 reinforced a tacit understanding observed by the
West during the communist takeover in Eastern Europe forbidding direct intrusions into the other's long acknowledged sphere of influence. The restriction on the introduction of ground combat troops into the Middle East is also the product of inferences from behavior observed over some period of time.

Tacit rules of the game have yielded several significant dividends. Most compelling is that in conjunction with other factors, they have contributed to preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, although the correspondence between the tacit guidelines and the absence of war may be coincidental rather than causal. They have, moreover, come into existence without the plague of prolonged and acerbic negotiations and the concomitant consumption of vast amounts of bureaucratic time and energy. Unlike explicit rules, in addition, tacit rules of the game leave players some room for flexibility in strategy and tactics and can be readily adjusted to changing circumstances.

On closer scrutiny each of these ostensible advantages, however, loses some of its lustre. The apparent contribution of tacit rules of the game to the prevention of nuclear war in the past, for instance, is no guarantee they will be equally effective in the future when each superpower may possess at least a theoretical first-strike capability against the fixed-coordinate, land-based nuclear deterrent of the other. Moreover, the flexibility of tacit guidelines may seem considerably less appealing from the United States perspective if the
next leadership transition in the Soviet Union produces a Politburo consensus in favor of probing more aggressively the gray areas or ambiguous boundaries of existing implicit behavioral standards, an adventurousness that could precipitate a superpower confrontation, especially if it were to coincide with a period of mixed signals from the United States.

Many of the same considerations argue for and against reliance on crisis management techniques to contain superpower involvement in regional disputes. A uniquely crippling disadvantage of crisis management techniques is that their failure poses an extraordinarily high risk of eventuating in nuclear war. Given the intensity of threat to vital interests and the abbreviated response time that a crisis by definition imposes, escalation is dismayingly probable should crisis management break down. The presumption of failure to control superpower involvement in regional disputes inherent in reliance on crisis management techniques argues strongly in favor of erecting barriers to the development of crises.

The inadequacy of linkage in its recent uses as a reliable mode of conflict control has become apparent to both the Soviet Union and the United States. From the U.S. perspective, the policy of linkage has thus far failed to work consistently both because of a poverty of means and because of foreign policy priorities and domestic pressures
vitiating the strategy itself. The Soviet inability to wield equivalent carrots guarantees, moreover, that, on the other hand, the USSR itself will not be willing to rely upon linkage either as a viable alternative to explicit rules of the game or as an important supplement to extant modes of regional competition.

From the United States perspective, the theoretical advantages of linkage are obvious: it permits the use of the country's most powerful levers of influence outside the specific sphere in which their relevance is immediately apparent. Access to United States export credits, for example, can be linked to Soviet political and/or military activities in a particularly tense region of the world. Leverage over certain areas could be enhanced if greater leverage from other areas could be brought to bear successfully on them.

The problems that complicated the United States' pursuit of linkage, however, sufficiently degrades these advantages in practice to justify detailed examination of ground rules as a separate but supplemental approach. The arguments that have been advanced against the utility of economic sanctions are equally persuasive when marshalled against a linkage strategy. Unless the entire international community is united in support of such a strategy, the opportunity to gain access to the embargoed resource elsewhere than from the sanctioning state always exists. Only very infrequently does one state,
even a superpower, exercise monopolistic control over the supply of a valued resource. As in the case of Rhodesia, for example, even effective denial of significant resources can serve to reinforce rather than weaken the will of the sanctioned state to pursue the prohibited course of conduct. Nor in democratic countries is the executive guaranteed that the domestic political process will approve its particular definition of linkage. That the Congress could impose on the Administration a linkage between Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and most favored nation status for that country suggest that the theoretical advantages of linkage may not prevail in practice.

To the extent that Soviet interest in ground rules rests upon shortfalls in existing modes of conflict control, therefore, it is well-founded. While regional conflict has been contained below the level of direct superpower confrontation in the postwar period to date, the palpable inadequacies of these techniques argue persuasively in favor of their reinforcement by any reasonable means available.

b. International Agreements and International Politics

Implicit in unofficial Soviet feelers concerning a code of detente is the assumption that somewhat more explicit agreement on the rules of the game might make a significant contribution to enhancing the dividends of detente. This assumption raises the issue of the nexus between explicit inter-state
agreements and patterns of international politics that has long
beguiled international relations specialists.

Most sophisticated observers maintain that international
agreements and international law generally are reflections and
instruments of the political order and that their independent
capacity to affect that order is minimal. As E. H. Carr noted
some 40 years ago, "the law is not an abstraction. It cannot
be understood independent of the political foundations on which
it rests and the political interests which it serves." Con-
curring, Louis Henkin reflected more recently that

much of law, and the most successful part, is
a codification of existing mores, of how people
behave and feel they ought to behave. To that
extent law reflects, rather than imposes, ex-
isting order. If there were no law against
homicide, most individuals in contemporary so-
ciety would still refrain from murder. Were
that not so, the law could hardly survive and
be effective. To say that nations act pursu-
ant to law only as they would act anyhow may
indicate not that the law is irrelevant, but
rather that it is sound and viable, reflecting
the true interests and attitudes of nations,
and that it is likely to be maintained.

Advancing the frontiers of political cooperation is not
within the power of international agreements themselves. As en-
thusiastic a proponent of world order reform as Richard A. Falk
maintains that ". . . it is not realistic to rely upon law as an
independent instrument of order and change. For law provides
only the method and ritual by which deeply held values and pol-
ices can be preserved and protected. Law is an integral aspect
of a functioning social system. It is not an autonomous force able to overlook the dominant expectations that guide action in the relevant community."³

The dependence of international agreements on the underlying pattern of international politics is even more marked with respect to the enforcement of those agreements, a point of obvious relevance to the consideration of the merits of the construction of explicit rules of detente. While in domestic society the ability of a victim to gain redress for the illegal acts against him is only occasionally a function of his personal command of certain resources, in international society a victim is characteristically in a position in which his legal rights can be enforced only to the extent his own power permits.

As a consequence of the absence of any collective enforcement mechanism that is not itself a hostage to the great power politics that frequently give rise to violations, self-help is viable only for certain actors under certain condition. Hedley Bull observes, "... there exists an intimate connection between the effectiveness of international law in international society and the functioning of the balance of power. It is only if power, and the will to use it, are distributed in international society in such a way that states can uphold at least certain rights when they are infringed, that respect for rules of international law can be maintained."⁴
Because international agreements largely reflect rather than shape international politics, any rules of the game that are concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States are likely to strengthen rather than precipitate changes in superpower behavior with respect to the deepening of detente and the containment of regional conflicts. A genuine commitment to restraint has to precede agreement on guidelines, therefore, if the guidelines are to be other than what Henkin calls "paper laws": 'gimmicks' that will not be adopted, . . . agreements which nations will not invoke, . . . tribunals they will not use."^5

c. The Influence of Agreements on State Behavior

That international agreements per se create some pressure for compliance with their provisions independently of the signatories' original interests in concluding the agreements is the third premise underpinning any interest in rules of detente. The Soviet predilection for the representation of its interests in the form of concrete international agreements is long-standing. A review of 40 years of Soviet theory and practice with respect to international treaties led American scholars Jan Triska and Robert Slusser to conclude that "all of the Soviet leaders from
Lenin to Khrushchev, have relied more on international treaties than on all other foundations of international order combined. By both words and deeds they have made clear their view that treaties constitute the ideal vehicle for relations between the Soviet state and the outside world. Between 1917 and 1957, the Soviet Union concluded more than 2100 agreements with other states, almost 25 per cent of which were of a political rather than of a solely economic or functional nature.

Their reliance on formal international agreements suggests that successive Soviet leaders have assumed that formal agreements compel a stricter adherence than does the tacit expressions of such principles in implicitly acknowledged rules of the game. The record also suggests that the process of foreign policy formation is not impervious to the influence of relevant international agreements.

Both careful reflection and empirical evidence suggest that international agreements do exert some autonomous pressure on states toward compliance. Probably the most compelling reason states observe international agreements is that they contribute to the maintenance of a stable and predictable network of relationships among the constituent units of the international
political system. International agreements provide one of the primary means by which an anarchic international system can regulate contacts between and among nations. By distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable behavior, they enable each state to identify the range of behavior within which it can operate safely as well as that within which it can expect others to operate. As Carr observes, "the peculiar quality of law which makes it a necessity in every political society resides not in its subject-matter, nor in its ethical content, but in its stability. Law gives to society that element of fixity and regularity and continuity without which no coherent life is possible." Thus, in principle, states have an interest in observing international agreements to the extent that they have an interest in preserving the state system.

A markedly less abstract impetus to compliance with international agreements than the state system's viability is the norm of reciprocity that prevails in the operation of the international legal order. The decentralized character of that order not only means that enforcement is the province of each constituent unit individually, it also means that law creation is a haphazard process that is heavily contingent on reciprocity. In the international legal system, Falk observes, "... a violation of rule
A by X tends to create a legal basis for states Y, Z . . . n to violate in similar proportionate fashion. . . . [T]he option of states to reciprocate noncompliance creates a marginal incentive to comply, especially as the noncomplying response is often not readily predictable. A violation of international law may itself become the efficient cause of an escalation of tension and conflict, bringing an underlying conflict close to the threshold of violence." 9

Moreover, a violation of an explicit international agreement can result in the imposition of sanctions upon the state committing the offense. While the international community as such generally has no military forces at its ready disposal to deploy against the violator, neither it nor the state against which the violation was directed is powerless to act to defend its interests. The sanction of community opprobrium, while admittedly weak and not infrequently ephemeral, does exist, its influence evidenced by the attempts of states to cast defenses of their actions in legalistic terms.

Undoubtedly, a more compelling deterrent to the abrogation of international agreements is a reasonable probability that the victim or target will be able to respond
effectively to it. In every case, of course, a violation enables a state to assume an equivalent right to transgress the boundaries of the agreement, but a reciprocal transgression may not be as daunting a prospect as a response that threatens the imposition of sanctions not directly related to the provisions of the agreement itself.

There is, moreover, substantial bureaucratic momentum behind the observance of international agreements. As Falk notes, "the effectiveness of international law arises [in part] . . . from the habits of compliance that government officials develop. The observance of international law is routinized in the standard bureaucratic operations of most states." The play of bureaucratic politics also ensures that the foreign policy process remains permeable to influence by existing international agreements, since the latter can be used to buttress the arguments of participants in that process. Because of the diverse interests of decision-makers, observes one analyst, it is "almost impossible that legal considerations should not enter the process of decision. They will always tend to favor one or more of the players in the game, who will see that they are brought to bear."
Even situations of intense threat that exclude most bureaucratic players and mobilize high-level decision-makers are not immune to the influence of existing pertinent international agreements. Although there is a relative paucity of evidence regarding crisis decision-making in the Soviet Union, evidence from the United States decision-making process during the course of the Cuban missile crisis, perhaps the most threatening situation confronting United States policymakers in the nuclear era, suggests that even crisis choices are influenced by formal international commitments. In the Cuban missile case, for example, Abram Chayes, in 1962 the Legal Advisor to the Department of State, believes that the perceived need to justify its action in the light of existing international agreements affected the government's decision-making during the missile crisis. He noted, "comparative justifiability -- which is another way of saying the comparative case of generating political support or acquiescence -- is necessarily an important factor differentiating among alternatives in the intra-governmental process of choice. The perhaps disproportionate significance of law for public justification feeds back on this internal process to enhance the weight of legal considerations there." Chayes attributes to international law a "significant" role in the
Kennedy administration's decision to reject a surgical air strike against the Cuban-based Soviet missiles.\textsuperscript{13}

An important caveat with respect to the proposition that international agreements tend to compel compliance on their own accord is the existence of state interests other than the preservation of the international political system and the avoidance of the opprobrium of the international community. Even in the nuclear era, when the preservation of a framework of implicit rules of behavior is of necessity a preeminent concern of both superpowers, violations of international agreements have been sufficiently frequent to make clear the existence of other, occasionally more compelling national interests. The Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979 are indisputable evidence of the priority ranking the Soviet leadership assigns to the maintenance of "compatible" Communist regimes over the observance of the United Nations Charter. Despite glaring exceptions, however, Soviet behavior has generally conformed to the premise that international agreements increase the probability that state interests in restraint will be expressed in concrete foreign policy decisions when those interests have themselves been codified in inter-state instruments.
Among those objecting to this conclusion are Triska and Slusser, who are critical of the Soviet record to 1957 of compliance with international agreements. Asking whether "... Soviet leaders [can] be trusted to honor the commitments they voluntarily assume in international treaties," they reply: "basing one's answer to this question on the past behavior of the Soviet leaders, one would have to say that the chances that they can be trusted are distinctly poor. Furthermore, the more important the subject of a given treaty and the more directly it is related to Soviet long-term objectives, the poorer are the chances of the Soviet Union's honoring the treaty."14 As a consequence, they conclude, political agreements are more likely to be violated than are economic or functional agreements.

The relevance to this study of Triska's and Slusser's pessimistic conclusions is marginal, however. Their work, published in 1962, is based on an analysis of Soviet treaty law and practice only until 1957. In addition, almost all of the cited violations of political agreements by the Soviet Union occurred in connection with the advent and course of the Second World War. For several reasons their conclusions do not provide today a basis for predicting future Soviet behavior.
Few states at that time regarded international agreements as sacrosanct. As Arie E. David observed after a review of practice in the interwar period, "while legal theory during the 1930s gave a simple 'no' answer to the question of unilateral termination of [treaties], the general practice was that of considering treaties as scraps of paper." The Soviets and others extensively violated political agreements during a period of intense security fears and gathering war clouds largely because the agreements were distantly removed from the facts of international politics and, so, were doomed to become irrelevant to state behavior.

Much the same is true of several more international accords. The United States and the Soviet Union in the agreement on "Basic Principles of Relations," signed during the Soviet-American summit meeting of 1972, asserted:

The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation, and mutual benefit. Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.
A year later in the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War, the two parties slightly refined their commitment to mutual restraint but still left much room for interpretation:

the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries.

The Parties agree . . . to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.

Such general language commits the signatories to almost no significant substantive action. The accords thereby could hardly be expected to restrain the parties in any particular manner although they simultaneously opened the way for the allegations, necessarily unsurceptible to substantiation, that their provisions were being violated. It is questionable whether either superpower's compliance with the agreements should have been reasonably expected.

More successful in terms of Soviet compliance have been agreements expressing concrete interests of the USSR. While criticisms have been leveled against alleged Soviet violations of the 1972 SALT treaty, the charges have not been substantial enough to persuade either Congress or three Administrations that intentional serious violations have been committed. The willingness
of the Soviet Union to rectify practices that United States representatives charged violated the terms of the arms accord suggests that formal agreements can moderate Soviet behavior.

d. Conclusion: Validity of Premises Underlying the Ground Rules Approach

The three premises that underlie interest in rules to restrain superpower involvement in regional disputes exhibit varying degrees of analytic rigor and empirical support. Least theoretically and empirically justifiable is the premise that the conclusion of international agreements to restrain superpower involvement in regional conflicts will, in and of itself, transform the nature of Soviet foreign policy. On the contrary, the available evidence suggests that international agreements only moderately advance the frontiers of international politics. To suggest that the guidelines themselves will create a mutual superpower interest in controlling outside involvement in third party disputes is to create an illusion of cooperation whose inevitable undoing would only wreak havoc on an already unravelling detente.

If, however, a genuine reciprocal interest exists in reducing tensions and the possibility of nuclear conflagration stemming from conflicts in the third world, the expression of this interest in specific international agreements may well increase the probability of restraint. By delineating clearly the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable involvement, international
agreements create some pressure upon states to observe those boundaries that would not exist were states relying only on vague, tacit rules of the game. That states have an interest in preserving a framework of international accords, that violations create a reciprocal right to violation, that the community of nations expects agreements to be respected, and that sanctions are more easily justified when a clear-cut violation occurs argue persuasively that behavior could be positively influenced if rules of detente were more explicit.

The strongest argument, however, that can be mustered in favor of the construction of rules to regulate superpower involvement in regional conflicts stems from the shortcomings of existing modes of conflict control.

2. Soviet Interests and Possible Guidelines: Caveats

Apart from that of forestalling the outbreak of nuclear war, a number of Soviet interests might be realized by the negotiation of rules to regulate superpower involvement in regional conflict.

As has been true of other Soviet foreign policy initiatives in the past, the Soviet leadership's suggestion that guidelines would be useful stems from its drive for international recognition of the USSR's achievement of equal global status with the United States. United States agreement even to negotiate on guidelines
would confer a legitimacy upon the USSR's participation in the politics of the given region. It would also imply recognition that the long inferiority in the Soviet ability to project conventional military power had been substantially overcome. Both developments might have the unintended consequence of deepening Soviet involvement in regional conflicts, possibly leading, in the event of failure to agree on rules of restraint, to more dangerous Soviet-American clashes.

Among indirect benefits the Soviet region might derive from this enhanced legitimacy would be a modest reinforcement of its domestic position as well as of its influence in Eastern Europe. To the extent, however, that ground rules might limit Soviet freedom of action in Eastern Europe or be perceived there as doing so, a regime of restraint might give encouragement to local forces favoring greater domestic experimentation and a larger degree of autonomy from Moscow. On the other hand, the more independent East European states like Yugoslavia, reluctant to become the object of Soviet-American agreement over their heads, will not easily accommodate themselves to any arrangement they perceive as placing limits on their freedom of action.

Should the Chinese leadership perceive the specter of a U.S.-USSR condominium in such talks, the Soviets might succeed in disturbing relations between the United States and China. Moreover, they might succeed in exacerbating relations within the Atlantic Alliance, should the United States disregard West European
interests in the Third World in the course of bilateral talks regarding guidelines. If discussions on guidelines did not culminate in agreement on actual guidelines, the Soviets might succeed in realizing some measure of these gains without incurring corresponding costs.

In the event certain guidelines were actually to be agreed upon, the Soviets might well succeed in constraining the United States from involvement in the Third World in ways that have benefited the United States in the past. A very likely component of explicit rules of the game with respect to the containment of regional conflicts would be specific limits on the deployment of military forces to any arena of tension. The United States, however, has frequently utilized non-violent deployments of military force in an attempt to influence the outcome of events in foreign countries. Although not always successful in the long run, such political uses of the armed forces by the United States have "at times . . . been a useful step in shoring up situations enough to avoid dramatic setbacks, to mitigate domestic and international pressures for more forceful and perhaps counterproductive actions, and to gain time for sounder policies to be formulated and implemented." United States' discretion in the use of its forces for political purposes would undoubtedly be curtailed, to Soviet advantage, were some conceivable guidelines actually ratified.

On a markedly more defensive and conservative note, the timing of the Soviet expression of interest in the construction
of guidelines of detente may hold a clue to a rather different source of Soviet interest in them. Generally, international agreement, and international law more broadly defined, serve the interests of the status quo, primarily because their revision to accommodate changes in the international environment remains a very unsettled area of international law. As a consequence, formal agreements tend to legitimize existing situations and incumbent governments to a greater extent than they recognize the flux prevalent in most political situations. The provision of stability is the special province of formal agreements.

An appreciation of the conservative nature of international agreements is evident in Soviet practice with respect to the observance of those agreements. When, immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet leadership repudiated all treaty obligations incurred by the pre-revolutionary leadership, it did so on the grounds that those obligations served the interests of a now impotent bourgeois class. The inevitable progress of history invalidated for early Soviet leaders the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* -- international agreements must be observed. Over time, however, as the Soviet Union became a power in the established order, it embraced this same principle and denied other states wide latitude to determine independently whether their situations had changed sufficiently to justify the abrogation of commitments assumed in international agreements. As the USSR acquired a stake
in the stable operation of the international political system and particularly as it relied on treaties as an instrument of its foreign policy, its leadership has come to value the role international agreements play in the defense of established interests.

Thus, one might speculate, on the basis of the organizational process model of foreign policymaking, that even while some Soviet officials might find ground rules attractive as a means of extending Soviet (and their) interests in an offensive mode, other organizational representatives might find value in a code of detente as a means of merely preserving existing Soviet positions. Accordingly, some Soviet leaders might embrace the idea of rules of detente if they were to conclude that in particular areas of the world certain guidelines might protect Soviet interests.

Brezhnev's favorable reference to a code of detente in 1977 was introduced during a period of quiescence in American foreign policy. Persuaded that the country's involvement in Vietnam had been a disastrous mistake, the population at large and the majority of Congress also perceived the danger of another Vietnam lurking behind every prospective active engagement of United States policy. It was in this spirit that the United States responded passively to intense Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war and in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in the strategic Horn of Africa.

If the Soviet Union could succeed in codifying this unilateral United States restraint in instances of regional conflict,
it might succeed in protecting and enhancing its interests in the Third World, a potentially attractive possibility during any period of instability within the USSR after Brezhnev’s disappearance from the scene. Given the unpredictable nature of American politics and the prospect that a period of resurgent American activism abroad might coincide with a leadership struggle or internal consolidation in the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership may yet be induced to negotiate a series of ground rules of restraint.

II. APPROACHES TO GROUND RULES

To avoid the limitations and dangers inherent in highly general commitments to restraint such as those in the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations, there is need for a series of rather more specific measures. For purposes of this study, the following broad categories of measures will be examined: 1) limits on conventional arms transfers, 2) confidence-building measures, including limits on, and advance notification of, military maneuvers and movements, 3) limits on naval deployments and facilities, and 4) mechanisms of joint political consultation.

While concrete measures such as these, if negotiated, would offer the realistic possibility of constraining Soviet and American involvement in regional conflicts and of verifying their observance, this more "realistic" approach necessarily suffers the common shortcomings of specificity. Specific restraints will vary in their applicability from one region to another. As superpower
relations fluctuate and regional dynamics change with the passage of time, some measures will lose relevance while others may acquire enhanced attractiveness. At the same time, the negotiability of specific commitments is more readily called into question than that of rhetorical pledges. Following the discussion of approaches to ground rules immediately below, an attempt will be made to take these problems into account in the sections on regional applications of the guidelines.

1. Controls on Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT)

The introduction of a wide category of conventional arms into local conflict situations has repeatedly aggravated regional tensions in recent years, often drawing the Soviet Union and the United States more deeply into conflicts. The massive shipments of Soviet arms to Egypt prior to the October 1973 Mideast War, Soviet-bloc arms transfers to the MPLA during the 1975 civil war in Angola, and the airlift of Soviet arms to Ethiopia during the conflict with Somalia illustrate the American interest in controlling arms transfers. At the same time, the prospect of U.S. arms transfers has sometimes aggravated regional tensions despite a declaratory policy of self-restraint. The U.S. announcement of its willingness to supply Somalia with arms in the summer of 1977 appears to have contributed to that country's decision to invade the Ogaden, precipitating deeper Soviet and Cuban support for Ethiopia. It is clear, moreover, that future developments in southern Africa
Will provide new opportunities for external arms suppliers to undermine efforts at peaceful progress toward stable independence for Namibia and greater racial equality in the Republic of South Africa.

Agreement by the USSR and the United States on measures to limit the volume of such shipments and to prohibit the introduction of advanced weapon systems and offensive arms could make a substantial contribution to stability and peaceful change in various parts of the world, particularly if limits were also applied to arms transfers by proxies.

To be sure, prospects for such limits seemed more promising in 1977 and 1978 than at the present time, the CAT talks with the USSR being moribund. But the constraints of the present and immediately foreseeable future need not establish the limits of the possible in the medium and longer-term. In fact, the recent experience of the Soviet-American working group on conventional arms transfers is suggestive of new approaches -- and variants of old ones -- that might serve to lessen Soviet-American rivalry in the Horn and in southern Africa.

This experience, supplemented by the circumstances surrounding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, underscores both the
difficulty of moderating superpower behavior and the importance of efforts designed to achieve that objective.

a. Limits on Volume of CAT's

In regions where existing inventories of weapons on each side to a dispute are relatively modest, comparatively small transfers of military equipment can exert a disproportionately large influence in upsetting the local balance of power. The transfer of approximately 200 Soviet tanks to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, supplemented by additional weapons and Cuban ground forces, played a decisive role in the outcome of the Angolan civil war. By contrast with the Middle East, where total arms inventories rival those on the Central Front in Europe, such regions may be destabilized by a relatively small-scale infusion of arms. Accordingly, volume limits on CAT's to areas like southern Africa must be set low to achieve a stabilizing effect. On the other hand, limits applicable to more heavily armed areas could probably be more permissive without sacrificing the stabilizing effect of the controls.

Differentiated limits, varying by region, as opposed to a global approach embodying universal principles and limits, might serve to overcome two of the principal sources of resistance to CAT limits: the differing nature of security dynamics from region to region and the value of arms shipments, especially to the Soviet Union, as earners of hard currency. In an era when Soviet oil
export earnings are likely to decline dramatically, if not dis-
appear altogether, as a major source of hard currency, volume
limitations on CAT's may be more negotiable if stringent limits
applicable to some regions can be counterbalanced by a more len-
ient regime or none at all in other areas.

b. Limits on Transfer of Advanced Weapon Systems

Introduction of sophisticated weapon systems into a region
where arms stocks are based on older technologies and equipment
may be especially destabilizing, particularly if those systems are
primarily offensive in nature. Although the distinction between
offensive and defensive weapons is frequently blurred -- "offens-
ive" weapons being needed for defensive counterattacks and mobile
anti-tank weapons being useful in an attack -- such weapon systems
as supersonic fighter-bomber aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles,
and modern tanks pose an exceptionally strong offensive threat.
Even high-technology "defensive" systems such as surface-to-air
missiles may be invaluable to an attacker in overwhelming less
modern forces. Moreover, the introduction of new technologies on
one side of a regional dispute creates pressures for reciprocal
action by the other side, thereby making involvement in the region-
al conflict of both superpowers more likely. When foreign mili-
tary personnel are introduced not only to maintain but also to
man these advanced weapon systems, as has been the case recently
in Egypt, Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen, the danger is substan-
tially increased.
Any effort to secure agreed limitations on the transfer of advanced weapon systems should probably take into account the fact that Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM's) aid the defender more than the attacker under most conditions. In some cases, also, the high accuracy of PGM's may reduce incentives for recipient states to acquire tactical nuclear weapons. These circumstances argue strongly against limits for their own sake and in favor of regionally-specific approaches to restrictions on high-technology weapons exports.

c. Prior Consultation Concerning CAT's

U.S. efforts to engage the Soviet Union in meaningful talks on limiting CAT's have been suspended since the last round of talks in Mexico City in December 1978, the Soviet and American working groups being unable to agree on specific regions where mutual interests would be served by common restraint. Although the invasion of Afghanistan has further undermined prospects for negotiating limits in the immediate future, it may be useful to consider, at some point in the future, a regime of consultation by the superpowers in advance of their decisions to transfer conventional arms to non-allied recipient countries. While not necessarily holding out the possibility of blocking transfers, a requirement of prior consultation would allow for prior notification of a potentially destabilizing transfer and might permit some modification of the transfer as originally conceived.
2. Confidence-Building Measures

The ground rules of detente might also include measures less directly related to traditional forms of "arms control" but nevertheless having the effect of limiting the deployment and use of weapon systems. Confidence-building measures, or CBMs, enjoy the advantage over traditional arms control initiatives of finessing nettlesome issues of divergent definition, numerical inequalities, non-comparability, geographic asymmetries and doctrinal incompatibilities that impede mutual agreement on measures to reduce arms transfers. At the same time, however, CBMs, by directly affecting political perceptions in a regionally specific manner, may run into political obstacles no less formidable than those that have thus far thwarted successful conclusion of the MBFR talks and the negotiations between Soviet and American working groups on conventional arms transfers.

a. Limitation of Military Maneuvers

Of all presently imaginable military CBMs, among the most ambitious would be strict limits on military maneuvers. From a theoretical standpoint four approaches to constraining maneuvers are possible: 1) limits on their size, 2) constraints on their qualitative aspects, 3) limits on their geographic reach, and 4) constraints on their duration.20
One positive sign of Soviet interest in such CBMs was Moscow's proposal, on the occasion of the Belgrade Review Conference in the fall of 1977, that military maneuvers in Europe be limited in size to 50,000-60,000 men. Although this proposal may well have been motivated by the fact that only NATO, and not the Warsaw Pact, is in the habit of holding maneuvers on this scale, the Soviet initiative suggests that CBMs devised to limit or ban certain military activities in Europe as in other areas of the world may have some appeal to Moscow, provided it believes that such measures will not undermine its security interests.

Qualitative constraint on maneuvers would entail limits on the types of weaponry that might be exercised. The use of offensive weapon systems (to the extent they may be distinguished from "defensive" systems) of certain types might be banned or limited in quantity. Constraints might apply to various models of tanks, armored personnel carriers or fighter-bomber aircraft.

Maneuvers could also be limited in their geographic reach by adoption of a ban on exercises in close proximity to borders. Zones along borders might, alternatively, be established in which the size and qualitative aspects of maneuvers might be subject to regulation. Additional zones might be agreed upon within which other more permissive limits might apply.

Finally, time limits imposed on the length of maneuvers might further limit their utility both as threats and as cover for surprise offensive operations.
The purpose of any combination of the above-mentioned constraints would be to generally reduce tension and increase warning time before an impending attack since violation of the regime would arouse alarm at an earlier than otherwise juncture. As the prolongation of Warsaw Pact military maneuvers prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 suggests, limits on exercises would also reduce the political leverage conferred by the threat to use force implied by maneuvers.

b. Advance Notification of Major Military Maneuvers

The single most impressive achievement of the CSCE to date with respect to CBMs has been the provision in the Final Act obliging signatory states to give advance notification of major military exercises (defined as involving 25,000 or more troops). All signatories, Eastern and Western, have complied with this provision. In addition to instances of Soviet compliance in prior years, the USSR in January 1979 gave three weeks' advance notice of a joint maneuver with Czechoslovakia involving 26,000 troops in Czechoslovakia. In mid-March 1979 Moscow again notified other signatories of a maneuver to be held the first week of April in Soviet territory of 25,000 ground and air forces. In both cases, as in prior years, the requirement of 21 days of advance warning was observed. Less optimistically, it bears noting that the amount
of information furnished by Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) countries has been sparse by comparison with Western practice. Whereas WTO states have provided only the required data on total troops engaged in maneuvers, NATO states have gone beyond this statutory minimum to include unit breakdowns, type of forces, and sometimes their designation. 23

Prior notification of military maneuvers will enhance international confidence and security to the degree such notice is made well in advance of the scheduled exercises. A requirement that maneuvers be notified at least 60 days in advance, * by way of example, would inhibit the conducting of exercises on brief notice as a cover for an invasion of another country. Preparations for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia took place under the cover of such maneuvers. Under a 60-day notification regime unnotified exercises would, upon discovery by other signatories, provide early warning of presumptively aggressive intentions, thereby facilitating diplomatic or military counteraction by those states.

c. Prior Notification of Small-Scale Military Maneuvers

Although the Final Act does not mandate advance notification of military maneuvers involving fewer than 25,000 troops, it does encourage signatories to give such notice. NATO member-states have provided such forewarning on several occasions, but

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*Western states at the CSCE had originally proposed a 60-day forewarning, Warsaw Pact countries a 5-day advance notification.
as of June 1979 Hungary was the only Warsaw Pact signatory to have reciprocated, in this case on three occasions. On at least one of those occasions, in May 1979, the maneuver involved Soviet troops as well as Hungarian and, for that matter, Czechoslovak, Rumanian and Bulgarian forces. It would hardly seem beyond the pale of possibility, therefore, that the Soviet Union might at some future date find compulsory notification of small maneuvers an acceptable means of strengthening the CBM regime in Europe or even elsewhere.

One contra-indication must be noted, however. The two Hungarian notices given in the two years immediately following the signing of the Final Act took place on the same day as the maneuver, were oral and not written, and provided few details. Whether greater significance should be attached to the willingness to give some notice or to the cursory nature of the notice is a matter of subjective judgment. In either case, a modest precedent has been set that might be extended and deepened.

d. Limits on Introduction of Military Personnel and Advisers

The introduction of military "advisers" and combat units, sometimes from proxy states, has seriously aggravated several regional conflicts in the last decade. While the example of Vietnam is most prominent, outside military forces have recently seemed to upset several regional balances of power in Africa. Cuban military personnel, presently stationed in a dozen African countries,
have become a mobile expeditionary force that is redeployed from one conflict area to another throughout the African continent.

Although the United States has made informal attempts to limit the role of foreign interventionary forces in Africa, those efforts have not been successful. The welter of confusion concerning the nature and purpose of these forces underscores the need for a more explicit bilateral understanding to govern such deployments.

Although it might appear that the Soviet Union would have little incentive to limit the deployment of "proxy" forces at a time when the United States has appeared disinclined to counter those forces with its own, past and present developments suggest modest grounds for a contrary view. It has become increasingly evident, for instance, that progress in other areas of Soviet-American relations where the Soviet Union has a stake, will be retarded in the absence of some diminution of regional tension. From the Soviet standpoint mutually agreed limits on military force deployments could provide one means of resolving this problem.

Moreover, it is evident to some Soviet policymakers that as the memory of the Vietnam War recedes in the United States, sentiment has grown in the Executive, in Congress and among the American public in favor of limited U.S. military involvement in
areas of regional conflict. If the Carter Doctrine in the Persian Gulf, the resumption of draft registration and, earlier, the willingness of the Administration to assist the "proxy" forces of Belgium, France, and Morocco in Zaire's Shaba province are seen in Moscow as forerunners of a more active U.S. policy, the Soviet Union may perceive benefits in joint limits on the introduction of military personnel into certain regions.

e. Prior Notification of Major Military Movements

The Helsinki Final Act encourages but does not require advance notice of major military movements, as distinct from maneuvers, within Europe. In light of the Eastern signatories' spotty record in responding to the Act's encouragement of military observer exchanges for maneuvers, it is perhaps not surprising that the USSR and its allies have declined to give prior notice of military movements. NATO states had shown a modestly greater degree of cooperation in this regard, having furnished movement information as part of several maneuver notifications. But as of June 1979 no signatory had yet notified other parties of such a military movement in a context divorced from a maneuver notice.

In certain regions and under certain conditions, in Africa for instance, advance notification of military movements involving either the forces or logistical capabilities of the USSR and the United States could play a role in restricting the
employment of forces external to Africa in both the Horn and southern Africa. Political difficulties may presently pose insuperable obstacles to agreement to circumscribe military movements themselves. But advance notification, if mutually agreeable, might serve as an early warning sign of impending intensification of conflict, which might itself serve to quicken negotiations directed at peaceful resolution of the conflict.

f. Zones of Disengagement and Limited Deployment Coupled With Assured Early Warning

Regimes of restricted deployment of forces through the creation of demilitarized zones (DMZ's) have had a checkered history in recent times. The demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam until Saigon's collapse in 1975 was honored chiefly in the breach. Its failure to stem military movements across it, however, may be attributed less to the impracticability of the concept than to the specific circumstances surrounding its attempted application. The DMZ was overloaded with the burden of limiting what was already a longstanding and ongoing military conflict. Moreover, the terrain facilitated infiltration.

In other instances, however, military disengagements have contributed to reducing the danger of war breaking out. The staged disengagement of Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai
not only lessened the threat of surprise attack but created a precondition for a subsequent broader settlement of differences. Three factors appear to have contributed to this result. The two opposing parties were not actively engaged in armed conflict at the time, the desert terrain eased the task of observation, and a third party acceptable to both belligerents was prepared to monitor observance of the agreement both at on-site locations and by national technical means of verification.

The latter factor of verification, implying the right to early warning in event of a violation of the disengagement regime, might be adapted to other situations in a manner not requiring participation by a neutral third party. Listening posts, together with reconnaissance satellites and aircraft operated by each direct party to the disengagement accord, might well be a substitute. In either event, mutual confidence would require some means of early warning since offensive forces that are prepared to violate the regime will be considerably advantaged by the demilitarization of previously existing defensive positions.

Variations on this approach are potentially numerous. Categories of weapon systems might be subject to differing deployment limitations. Tactical fighter-bombers might be restricted to bases sufficiently distant from the border (or demilitarized zone)
that they would be unable to support offensive ground action. Deployment of tanks might be banned from an area along the border extending beyond the range within which infantry troops, for instance, might be permitted. Depending upon the terrain, particular categories of engineering equipment necessary for offensive operations might be forbidden from established zones (e.g., bridging equipment where rivers create territorial boundaries or natural obstacles). Similarly, relocation of ammunition storage sites far to the rear would hamper prospects for a surprise attack since large-scale transportation of ammunition could be easily detected. As an alternative or supplementary measure, on-site observers might perform the same warning function (as would interference with performance of their task by the host country).

While many of the aforementioned confidence-building measures have clear applicability to Europe, several might also find application in other regions where opposing military forces threaten stability.

3. Limits on Naval Deployments and Facilities

In several areas of the world, Soviet and American naval deployments have interacted with regional disputes, sometimes aggravating them but other times contributing to international stability. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, for instance, the Nixon Administration, by deploying an aircraft carrier into the Indian Ocean in its "tilt" toward Pakistan, helped deter India's
complete dismemberment of the country. Apprehension over the security of oil tanker routes from the Persian Gulf played an important role in U.S. willingness to supply the Shah of Iran with large amounts of advanced weapon systems, and, following the Shah's downfall and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, has led to the stationing of U.S. aircraft carrier task forces in the Indian Ocean.

On the Soviet side, Somalia's temporary extension of naval, naval air, and missile storage rights to the Soviet Union provoked widespread concern in the mid-1970s over the naval balance in the Indian Ocean. Construction of a Soviet naval base in Aden, Southern Yemen, has revived that concern. Elsewhere, the presence of Soviet naval vessels off Angola has contributed to regional tensions, and Soviet requests at the highest level, raised from time to time in the past, for regular access to Yugoslav naval facilities have implications for both the naval balance in the Mediterranean and the political-military balance in Europe.

While it is apparent that Soviet-American agreements proposing the complete demilitarization of one or another major body of water are impractical, more modest objectives may be attainable over the medium or long term. Mutually agreed limits on the size and character of naval deployments and basing facilities in a region may be both negotiable and capable of stabilizing regional conflicts and local naval balances. Although the collapse of the
Soviet-American talks on Indian Ocean arms limitation, the last round of which took place in February 1978, dims near-term prospects of success, Soviet willingness to enter the talks suggests the potential viability of such an approach under more propitious circumstances.

Limits on global naval inventories are one of the less promising approaches from the standpoint of their negotiability since an inventory accord would require exceedingly complex calculations of geostrategic commitments and of force comparability. Moreover, such limits, even if agreed to, would permit rapid surges of naval force into one or another selected areas of the globe, thereby undercutting efforts to restrain involvement specific to the region.

Limits on the size and character of Soviet and American regional naval deployments are likely to be both more negotiable and more effective. So long as unverifiable or imbalanced controls are not attempted (limiting, for instance, submarine deployments or ships carrying nuclear weapons on board), limits on the size and character of superpower naval deployments may serve to lower tensions, reduce Soviet-American competition, and remove the incentive to conduct a naval first strike against the vulnerable surface ships of the adversary.

Denuclearization schemes are not considered in detail here for several reasons. Because the Soviet Navy deploys no aircraft carriers serving as platforms for nuclear-capable aircraft and generally makes only slight use of nuclear weapons as
ordnance, the creation of nuclear free zones would impact asymmetrically and disadvantageously on the United States. Moreover, either a full or partial curb on naval nuclear weapons would require intrusive on-ship inspection for high-confidence verification, thereby making agreement less likely.

a. Limits on Size, Character and Duration of Naval Warship Deployments

In the absence of complete naval disengagement, less ambitious but more negotiable measures may reduce great power competition by establishing limits on tonnage or numbers of ships permitted in a body of water.* If the duration of naval deployments is also strictly circumscribed, the political-military effect may approach that of full disengagement.

Asymmetries in Soviet and American naval force structures would complicate the negotiation of specific terms, however. Since the Soviet Navy tends to deploy large numbers of small ships and the U.S. Navy deploys a relatively smaller number of large ships, tonnage limits would allow the Soviet Union to flood an area with large numbers of ships while the U.S. Navy might, by way of example, find its carrier task force stripped of escorts. Restrictions on ship numbers, on the other hand, would so significantly advantage the United States with its larger, more capable ships

*The United States, Britain and Canada have long agreed to limit the number and tonnage of naval vessels in the Great Lakes in the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 and subsequent revisions.
that it is difficult to conceive of the Soviet Union's accepting such a numerical framework. To be negotiable, therefore, an accord would probably have to place limits on hull numbers in various categories of vessels.

Time limits on naval deployments within specific seas represent an approach, like tonnage and numbers limits, that have important historical precedents. Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, for example, non-littoral states may not deploy any warship in the Black Sea for longer than 21 days. The result has been to effectively exclude outside powers from any significant military activity in the Black Sea. Similar provisions, more or less restrictive, might find important application in other seas where neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is presently a littoral power.

b. Limits on Naval Facilities

As an alternative or supplement to limits on the size, character, and duration of naval deployments, onshore naval support facilities might be constrained. Drydocks, repair and overhaul facilities, fuel storage depots, shore leave rights, naval ordnance supply depots, and communications installations could all be made subject to formal limits or prohibition. In some bodies of water where the Soviet Navy enjoys full-scale basing rights such an arrangement might redound to the detriment of the United States. In other seas, however, the effect might be the
reverse, particularly if the ban were to apply to the extension of any new basing or access arrangements or if the coastline of a particular country were to be declared off-limits to such facilities.

4. Mechanisms of Joint Political Consultation

Because no agreements, however explicit, can be expected to cover the full range of contingencies that may develop in areas of regional tension, it is important to consider whether the United States and the Soviet Union should have additional institutionalized means of consultation. While personal communications between Soviet and American leaders at the highest level may suffice in times of crisis, several considerations argue for institutionalizing the consultation process at the working level.

First, it may be anticipated that, whatever the agreed ground rules, disagreements over their application will lead to charges of violations. One or more Soviet-American working groups would facilitate clarification and mediation of such disputes. Second, such an institutional mechanism would hold out modest promise of continuity of commitment and interpretation despite the vicissitudes of both the Soviet and American political processes. The likelihood of a period of instability in the Soviet Union associated with a relatively imminent succession process underscores the importance of institutionalizing
arrangements for mediating disputes at a time when new and younger Soviet leaders will be reviewing past commitments. The unpredictability of public opinion and election processes in the United States also argues for a greater measure of continuity than informal consultations provide. Moreover, such mechanisms, operating perhaps in the general manner of the standing Consultative Commission (SCC) established to review compliance with the SALT I accords, would provide for careful interdepartmental consideration of the impact of proposed policy initiatives on the ground rules of detente. The result would be to promote the commitment of broad segments of the national security bureaucracies in both countries to the management of detente.

At the same time, however, such a mechanism should seek to avoid suggesting to third parties that a Soviet-American duopoly has been established. The domestic and international obstacles to further progress toward a peace settlement in the Mideast posed by the *ad hoc* handling of the Soviet-American statement on the Mideast on October 1, 1977 illustrate that bilateral consultations may be self-defeating if they are perceived by others as leading to a superpower condominium. Moreover, individual states that are in some manner the object of measures of superpower restraint may take vigorous exception to such a consultative mechanism, whether its proposed membership includes them or not. On the other hand, a vague commitment to consult, such as that found in the 1973 Soviet-American Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear
War, makes at best only a marginal contribution to international security.

Such a commission might have either a functional area of responsibility, like the SCC for SALT, or a regional jurisdiction. In either event the mechanism could provide a locus both for resolution of disputes and for development of further measures of restraint, combining the functions of verification and negotiation.

III. REGIONAL APPLICATIONS

Using the measures of restraint and consultation outlined above, the next three chapters will explore their applicability to three regions where local tensions and Soviet-American rivalry might be moderated by bilateral agreement on ground rules of behavior. The Horn of Africa, treated in the next chapter, represents an area where conflict in the recent past has reached near-crisis proportions and continues at present. Southern Africa, by contrast, is a region where the elements of international crisis are only presently beginning to mature. The third case study, of Yugoslavia, deals with a situation of relative stability at the moment but one that in the future may develop into chaos, embroiling the Soviet Union and the United States.
FOOTNOTES


7. Ibid., p. 397.


12 Ibid., p. 104.

13 Ibid., p. 40.

14 Triska and Slusser, op. cit., p. 397.


Chapter 2

The Horn of Africa: Ground Rules for Soviet and American Involvement

Considered here as including the countries of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti, the Horn of Africa is of strategic significance to both the Soviet Union and the United States less because of its inherent wealth or military power than because of its location. It is situated directly along the straits of Bab al-Mandab that control one entrance to the Red Sea. Access by a hostile power to basing rights in any of the Horn countries, or for that matter in Yemen or South Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula across from the Horn, is thus a potential threat to the free transit of shipping between Europe and Asia via the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

Superpower influence over events in the Horn of Africa in recent years has not been easily exercised, however, because of the region's volatile internal and external politics. Since Somalia gained its independence from colonial rule in 1960, it has harbored aspirations for the formation of a Greater Somaliland that would embrace all ethnic Somalis within the region in a single state. It has, as a consequence, advanced territorial claims against Ethiopia, Djibouti (the former French territory of the Afars and the Issas, granted independence only in 1977), and Kenya. Soviet and Cuban involvement in Ethiopia and Somali support of anti-Ethiopian guerrillas in the Ethiopian province of
Ogaden and a commitment of Somali Army units to the province in 1977 in support of the Western Somali Liberation Front have created enormous tensions in the Horn that have been and promise to continue to be an avenue for the penetration of external influence in the region.

Between Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia would seem the more powerful state and the more valuable prize in any superpower competition for influence in the region. Ethiopia is almost twice as large as Somalia, occupying an area of 472,000 square miles. Its population and GNP also swamp those of Somalia: it has 30 million people and a GNP of $2 billion relative to Somalia's 3.2 million people and national output of $250 million. It is also the oldest independent state in black Africa.

But Ethiopia has been so rent by ethnic divisions, guerrilla warfare, and internal political strife in the recent past that its relative power position in the Horn is less advantageous than statistical comparisons alone might seem to suggest. Of all its internal problems, perhaps none has so plagued Ethiopia as the secessionist battle guerrillas have been waging more or less intensely for almost twenty years in the province of Eritrea. Rooted in the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia in 1962, insurgent warfare against Ethiopian rule has waxed and waned ever since, dictated by the state of relations within the guerrilla movement between Moslems and Christians and by the state of domestic politics within Ethiopia itself. In 1977, the combined forces of the predominantly Christian Eritrean Popular Liberation Front and the
predominantly Muslim Eritrean Liberation Front scored extensive gains against Addis Ababa's forces, gaining control of more than 90 per cent of the disputed territory.\(^2\) In 1978, however, the situation in the province was reversed, as newly reinforced Ethiopian troops routed the guerrillas in an expression of the regime's determination to maintain control of the territory that offers it its only outlet to the sea.

Addis Ababa's pursuit of the Eritrean conflict has been complicated by political turmoil in Ethiopia itself. The victim of its own rigidities, including its failure to provide for an orderly succession and its mismanagement of a 1973 famine that caused the starvation of more than 100,000 Ethiopians, the regime of Emperor Haile Salassie was toppled in a coup in 1974 that brought to power the Dergue, an amorphous grouping of young military officers whose assumption of control was marked by a fierce internal rivalry for leadership that eventually resolved itself when Col. Mengistu Haile physically eliminated the majority of his Dergue colleagues. Under Mengistu's rule, the Ethiopian government assumed an increasingly ideological, pro-Marxist stance, violently imposing its rule and seriously weakening the national economy. Civil strife became so extensive that by 1978 ten of fourteen provinces were in a state of rebellion with a third of Ethiopia's territory controlled by opponents of the government.\(^3\)

While possessing fewer of the tangible assets of wealth and population, Somalia has an advantage over Ethiopia because of
the stability of its domestic political situation. A 1969 military coup against the civilian government brought to power Mohammed Siad Barre, who pronounced himself and his government Marxist-Leninist. Its ethnic homogeneity has spared Somalia the internal tensions that have afflicted Ethiopia.

In its bid for economic assistance and military support, Somalia has traded chiefly on its geographical location at the southern tip of the Red Sea and its possession of port facilities at Berbera that became, with Soviet assistance, the most extensive anywhere in the lower Red Sea area. The facilities around Berbera include: 1) a deep water port, 2) fuel storage facilities with an estimated capacity of 175,000 barrels, 3) a runway of 13-15,000 feet, 4) a tactical missile and a storage handling capacity, and 5) a communications facility. 5

I. SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT IN THE HORN

The history of Soviet and American engagement in the Horn of Africa has mirrored the radical shifts in domestic politics within Ethiopia and Somalia, the tensions between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu that erupted into open warfare in mid-1977, political developments within the Soviet Union and the United States, and superpower relations themselves. Alignments that prevailed in the early 1950s between regional states and superpower actors had, as a result, largely reversed themselves by 1980.
Originally, ties between Haile Selassie's Ethiopia and the United States were strong, reflecting Addis Ababa's interest in economic and military assistance and American admiration for Haile Selassie, desire to aid Ethiopia's development and interest in using the Kagnuew military base in Eritrea as a major communications facility. Over a twenty-five year period that began in 1953, the United States supplied more than $300 million in military aid and $350 million in economic assistance to Ethiopia, making that country the largest recipient of American aid in black Africa. 6

The Ethiopian-American relationship succumbed during the mid-1970s to changes within Ethiopia and the United States and to changing military technology. The 1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie and the assumption of his role by an avowedly socialist regime weakened ties between Addis Ababa and the West and correspondingly strengthened those between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. Even earlier, however, the United States, under the Nixon Administration, had decided to end its use of the facilities at Kagnew, motivated in part by fears that the base would become a target of the Eritrean insurgents and in part by a disenchantment with overseas bases in general. The decision also reflected,
however, advances in technology that permitted satellite communications with submarines and the knowledge that the British possession of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean could serve as a functional alternative to the Kagnew facility. 7

Aid continued at reduced levels until 1977, however, when a shift in American domestic politics brought the Carter Administration into office and when the Ethiopian commitment to socialism and the relationship with the Soviet Union intensified. In February 1977, the Carter administration named Ethiopia as one of three countries guilty of human rights violations and ended grant military aid. In April, it halved the American military advisory and assistance group (MAAG) in Ethiopia and announced its desire for an early termination of the Kagnew base. The Mengistu regime responded by expelling the MAAG and ordering the United States out of Kagnew within four days. The cycle continued until all United States military programs and arms shipment to Ethiopia were halted shortly thereafter. 8

Soviet relations with Ethiopia over the 1950-1980 period were virtually a mirror image of those of the United States. It was only when United States relations with Ethiopia began to deteriorate in the mid-1970s that relations between the USSR and Ethiopia began to improve. As the post-Haile Selassie regime came under the increasing control of Col. Mengistu, it also moved closer to Moscow. In 1976, Mengistu concluded a $385 million arms
agreement with the Soviet Union, and, in 1977, the Soviet Union and Cuba together supplied the arms and manpower that were crucial to the success of Ethiopia's effort to expel the Somalis from the Ogaden. In November 1978, Mengistu signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow.

As might have been predicted from the acrimonious state of relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu that itself culminated in the Somali invasion of the Ogaden in 1977, the improvement in relations between Ethiopia and the USSR led to a deterioration in relations between the Soviets and the Somalis. In a twist unusual for the Horn and elsewhere, for that matter, however, Washington did not turn out to be the immediate beneficiary of that deterioration.

In 1962, the Somalis had requested Western aid and then rejected the aid proffered because they considered it both too small and too restrictive with respect to the conditions under which it was offered. The United States', Italian, and West German offer of $10 million was contingent upon Somalia's agreement that it would use the aid only to support a small internal security force and that it would not seek additional aid elsewhere. Mogadishu found a more compatible source in the Soviets, whose assistance was secured in return for what eventually would become access to facilities at Berbera, later expanded and upgraded. By the mid-1970s, the Somalis would be host to 6000 Soviet advisers, as well as several hundred Cuban military personnel.
The Barre coup and the subsequent turn to the left in Somali domestic politics after 1969 contributed to closer ties between Mogadishu and Moscow, expressed in the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two states in 1974.

That treaty, as well as the Soviet-Somali relationship, did not survive the Somali invasion of the Ogaden and the intensification of ties between the USSR and Ethiopia, however. The Soviet decision to end all military supplies to Somalia was succeeded by a massive airlift of equipment and an infusion of 16,000 Cuban troops into Ethiopia, a successful attempt to aid Ethiopia's expulsion of Somali troops from the Ogaden. The Somalis reacted by abrogating their treaty of friendship with Moscow, expelling Soviet advisers stationed in the country, and denying the USSR the use of its military facilities.

Several months before the November 1977 break with Moscow and shortly before their invasion of the Ogaden, the Somalis had sought United States military assistance as they perceived what apparently seemed to them to be the progressive rupture of relations between their country and the Soviet Union. In late July 1977, the Carter Administration announced that it was prepared to join with other governments in the provision of military assistance to Mogadishu, conditioning the offer of assistance on Somali assurances that the aid would be used only for defense and not in the service of guerrillas fighting against Ethiopia in the Ogaden.11
By late August, however, the Carter administration withdrew the offer, apparently persuaded that Somali forces were directly engaged in the Ogaden and concerned that the Somali effort might ultimately extend beyond the Ogaden, creating unease in Djibouti and Kenya.\(^{12}\) In early September, the United States conditioned its offer of assistance on a Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden. The United States offer was aborted as the Somalis continued to prosecute their war in the disputed province.

Despite its failure to obtain United States aid, Mogadishu, buttressed by commitments from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, abrogated all ties with Moscow in November in reaction to extensive Soviet and Cuban assistance to the Ethiopian defense of the Ogaden. On 13 November 1977, Somalia expelled all Soviet advisers, broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, terminated Soviet use of the Berbera facilities, and abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Whether the severity of the Somali reaction was based on the expectation that such an action would induce a significant United States response remains unclear. But Somalia may well have anticipated, incorrectly as it turned out, that the United States might at least encourage Iran to provide military assistance.\(^{13}\)

The Somalis were forced to withdraw from the Ogaden in March 1978, lacking support from any other country and confronted by a Soviet-equipped and Cuban-reinforced Ethiopian offensive.
Provided only with small arms support from other Arab states, Somalia was unable, without armored personnel carriers, helicopters or anti-helicopter missiles, to overcome the Ethiopian and Cuban forces. The pattern of United States non-involvement and Soviet support for Ethiopia that emerged in 1977 remained unchanged until early 1980, when the prolonged Iranian-American impasse over the holding of American hostages in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impelled the Carter Administration to seek expanded military facilities in the region. Because the facilities at Berbera were the most highly developed in the area, negotiations were opened between Mogadishu and Washington over the conditions of United States access to the naval base. As of mid-1980, no agreement had yet been announced. Negotiations, whose future was uncertain, were stalled over the extent and type of U.S. aid to be provided as a quid pro quo.

II. SUPERPOWER INTEREST IN THE HORN

United States interests in the Horn of Africa are easier to assess than are Soviet interests, primarily because they seem to be more clearly reflected in U.S. behavior in the area than are those of the Soviet Union.

The Horn of Africa has traditionally been assigned a very low priority in the hierarchy of United States national interests, reflecting the fact that Africa as a whole "has played a minor role in postwar American strategic thinking and in the development
of U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean over the past seven years. "14
As indicated by past American use of the base at Kagnew and cur-
rent interest in use of the facilities at Berbera, United States
concerns in the Horn have been heavily influenced by strategic
military interests related to communications with the submarine
fleet and the projection of power into the Persian Gulf area.
But both the Nixon administration and subsequently the Carter ad-
ministration chose to keep a low profile in the Horn despite the
tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia and the active involvement
of the Soviet Union.

The evidently very strong reluctance of the Carter admini-
stration to aid the Somalis despite their ousting of the Soviet
presence suggests a second U.S. interest unrelated to strategic
military concerns. Somalia's support of the Western Somali Lib-
eration Front (WSLF), its 1977 invasion of the Ogaden, and its
espousal of claims against Kenya and Djibouti ran directly coun-
ter to the long-standing policy of the organization of African
Unity against any alteration in colonial boundaries. Mogadishu's
actions made any U.S. aid to Somalia that could be employed in
support of the latter's irredentist claims prohibitively costly
in terms of the enmity that would thereby be engendered in other
politically, strategically, and economically more crucial African
states. Particularly after Somalia expelled the Soviet Union
from Berbera, the United States stood to gain few tangible bene-
fits in exchange for the costs to United States relations with
black Africa.
Soviet interests in the Horn are more difficult to analyze, partly because the USSR's behavior in the area has been less consistent over the years and also because that behavior seems to reflect a more fluid and multi-faceted balancing of ideological and strategic interests than is true of the United States' involvement in the region. Moscow's quest for influence has also been intimately tied to its interests in the Indian Ocean. Because Soviet naval doctrine and deployments have evolved considerably in the past fifteen years, Soviet policy has acquired steadily increasing -- and visible -- prominence in the region.

The sometimes uneasy co-existence of multiple goals of Soviet engagement in the Horn is demonstrated most strikingly in the radical reversal of alliances that occurred in 1977, when the USSR risked its position in Somalia by intensifying its relationship with Ethiopia. Prior to 1977, as Helen Defosses observed recently "... two deductions seemed almost unchallengeable: ... that the USSR would do nothing to endanger continued access to its Somali port facilities [and] ... that, in the Horn, at least, geostrategic considerations were a more important motivation for the USSR than the possibility of advancing socialism in Somalia or any neighboring states."\(^{15}\) The dramatic re-alignments that occurred in 1977 suggested either a much greater role for ideology as a determinant of Soviet foreign policy in the Horn since Barre was a more lukewarm Marxist than is usually assumed by Western
observers, a remarkable failure in Soviet intelligence capabilities in the area, or, conversely, a shrewdly calculated response to what was assessed as an unfavorable trend.

Attributing to the Soviet leadership the ability to forecast correctly that their increasing ties to Ethiopia would cause their expulsion from Somalia encourages the conclusion that Soviet policy in the Horn has been determined to a greater extent by the desire to advance the cause of socialism in the Third World than by the more tangible goals of controlling Red Sea traffic or strengthening Soviet naval and air capabilities in the Indian Ocean. This line of analysis suggests that the Soviet leadership was more attracted to the idea of supporting what appeared to be the profound and genuine Marxist-Leninist government of Colonel Mengistu than it was inhibited by the concomitant sacrifice of the Berbera facilities. This argument is strengthened if the costs to the Soviet Union of losing the Somali facilities are assessed as lower in the context of the re-opening of the Suez Canal and the availability of bunkering and repair facilities in such other countries as South Yemen.

A very different explanation of the Soviet shift and a correspondingly different calculus of Soviet interests result if, instead, some failure of intelligence is assumed to have occurred. There is some reason to believe that the Soviet leadership hoped
that its relationship with Ethiopia could be intensified without foregoing its gains in Somalia, particularly since the United States had largely withdrawn from the region. In early 1977, Castro visited the Horn of Africa, reportedly in an effort to promote a pro-Soviet federation that would include Ethiopia and Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and South Yemen. Moscow may have labored under the misunderstanding that the commitment of Ethiopia and Somalia to socialism would outweigh their national differences and permit the Soviet Union to play the role of mediator between them. According to this line of argument, the Soviets would not have extended aid to Ethiopia if they had had a more accurate image of the political dynamics of the Horn. Had they recognized the vast gulf separating Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, they would have been deterred from embracing Ethiopia because of the inevitable cost of access to Berbera.

Yet a third explanation of the Soviet shift emphasizes a somewhat diffuse Soviet interest in maintaining a presence in the Horn of Africa with little regard for the national locus of that presence; it depicts the Soviet leadership as essentially indifferent in any choice between Somalia and Ethiopia and largely insensitive to the vagaries of internal politics in either country. Only which way the wind was blowing mattered. The membership of Somalia in the Arab League and the pressure exerted on that country by Saudi Arabia and Iran to weaken ties to the USSR may have led the Soviet Union to conclude that it had little to lose by
making the first move away from Somalia. That conclusion may have been reinforced by the Soviet leadership's own reluctance to become too heavily entangled with a country bent on a war that no other African country was likely to support and that could catalyze the United States to renew its involvement in Ethiopia. The greater size and wealth of Ethiopia and the availability of facilities in Aden that could compensate to some degree for the loss of Berbera helped to justify the shift.

The intricate web of Soviet behavior in the Horn in the recent past ought not obscure its linkage to the very general Soviet strategic interest in the Indian Ocean. The re-opening of the Suez Canal and the evolution of Soviet naval doctrine and deployments during the past fifteen years have created a solid Soviet stake in access to refueling and basing facilities along the Red Sea coasts that would ease the logistical problems the Soviet Union encounters in trying to maintain the continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean that it initiated in 1968 in the hope of realizing several interests.

One of the earliest Soviet initiatives with respect to the Indian Ocean may offer a clue to what has become an enduring interest. In 1964, the USSR suggested that the Indian Ocean, along with the Mediterranean Sea, be made into a nuclear-free zone. An evident response to the development and deployment of the Polaris A-3 SLBM by the United States, the Soviet proposal for a nuclear-free zone, which has since been revived periodically, made
manifest the Soviet aim denying to the United States the ability
to use the Indian Ocean as a launch point for its submarine-
launched nuclear warheads. With a range of 4000 miles, the Tri-
dent I missile has exacerbated Soviet concern, as Moscow is now po-
tentially jeopardized by submarines stationed in a wide range of
the Indian Ocean instead of the much more restricted area of the
Arabian Sea from which earlier-generation warheads could be
fired. The Soviet stationing of ships in the Indian Ocean may,
therefore, have been intended in part to neutralize it as source
of nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. This explanation, how-
ever, overlooks the fact that initial Soviet naval deployments in
the Indian Ocean had no significant anti-submarine warfare capa-
bility against U.S. submarines.

The Soviet interests, then, served by the USSR's naval
presence in the Indian Ocean were not originally intended and are
not now limited to the sphere of strategic nuclear denial. They
have focused instead on the furtherance of Soviet regional and
strategic non-nuclear objectives. In accord with Khrushchev's de-
clared belief that any armed confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union would inevitably escalate to the level
of general nuclear war and that, as a consequence, conventional
arms were an expensive anachronism, the Soviet navy in the pre-
1964 period played a marginal role in Soviet military strategy
and was denied the opportunity to acquire a full complement of
non-nuclear forces.
The navy's role and capabilities expanded in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis and Khrushchev's ouster, however, as the military and political utility of naval deployments impressed itself on the post-Khrushchev leadership. The first forward deployment of Soviet vessels occurred in the Mediterranean in 1964, "a watershed (year) in naval thinking, in that it marked the initiation of a forward deployment based on afloat support." Soviet deployments in the Indian Ocean began in 1968, after the British announced their decision to withdraw its military forces from east of Suez and in accord with the gradual expansion of the Soviet navy itself. Since 1969, there has been a continuous Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, usually composed of a rotating group of ten combatant and ten auxiliary ships, with more than 60 percent of Soviet ship visits concentrated in the Horn of Africa/Aden area. An accounting of Soviet ship days in the Indian Ocean, although a less valid measure of Soviet naval strength because of its failure to differentiate among significantly different types of ships, also demonstrates the growth in Soviet interest in the area over that period and the flat level of U.S. deployments:
The Soviet and U.S. Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean
by Number of Ship-Operating Days, 1968-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figures rounded to nearest 100)
(The large Soviet increase in 1972-1974 is mainly the result of port-clearing operations in Bangladesh).

The interests the Soviets hope to realize by their Indian Ocean presence include those generally associated with flag-showing missions by its and other countries' navies in the past, as well as that of matching and, where possible, exceeding United States force capabilities across a wide spectrum in an effort to advance its regional objectives. The flag-showing mission of the Soviet navy undoubtedly represents an effort to impress upon the

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littoral states of the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea the growing capacity of Soviet forces (a demonstration having the ancillary benefit of dramatizing the inability of China to project military power in the region).

The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean also, however, embodies the much less amorphous and more concrete interests Moscow possesses in the protection of its own access to the maritime routes between its European and Asian regions (especially in the event of a Sino-Soviet war) and in the capability to threaten the security of transit of Western shipping through the area, especially oil tankers from the Persian Gulf.

United States interests in the Indian Ocean, until recently at least, have been somewhat less intimately tied to its Horn of Africa policies, primarily because Washington believed access to the British island possession of Diego Garcia would make good relations with the littoral states of the area less necessary to sustain its own Indian Ocean presence. When completed, United States facilities on Diego Garcia will greatly facilitate the maintenance of the major task forces that the United States has sent to the region since the 1973 Middle East war and the reopening of the Suez Canal, allowing the United States to keep a carrier task force stationed off the Persian Gulf during sustained periods of high tension. But its distance from the Gulf states -- approximately 2600 miles from Diego Garcia to Bahrain, for example -- make it less suitable as a staging area for the rapid deployment force planned by the United States.
A strong U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean is indispensable under the Carter Doctrine, which commits the United States to intervene in the Persian Gulf area in the event external forces threaten the region. In effect the United States has a vital interest in using its forces in the Indian Ocean both to maintain secure sea lanes for the transportation of oil and to prevent oil supplies from being cut off at their source on the ground. In addition, a renewal of warfare between Israel and its Arab adversaries would place a premium on maintaining free passage through the Straits of Bab al-Mandab in the face of efforts to blockade or otherwise disrupt the waterway. All these considerations constitute limiting factors with respect to the negotiability of naval restraints in the region.

III. THE ROLE OF GROUND RULES IN THE HORN

The panoply of Soviet and American interests in the Horn and Indian Ocean, the complex history of Moscow's and Washington's engagement in the region, and the volatility of internal and international politics within the Horn itself create the possibility that a local crisis might develop into a superpower confrontation. As is true of any region whose internal politics are such as to threaten the development of active warfare and in which the two superpowers are associated with rival clients, there exists some potential in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean area to
create ground rules that might reduce the probability that a regional clash will spiral into a superpower confrontation. Assuming that both the Soviet Union and the United States are interested in avoiding such a confrontation, with its evident attendant risks of nuclear war, both states have an interest in ground rules.

The precipitating crisis is less likely to occur as a result of the continuing insurgency in Eritrea than as an outgrowth of a renewed confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden. Although the Eritrean rebels at one time had the sympathy of outside powers for their struggles, that sympathy, particularly among the conservative Arab states, has dwindled as, among other things, fears increased that the rebels' success would result in the installation of a radical Marxist state along the Red Sea. Although the Sudan supports the Eritrean rebels, it is unlikely that the United States would intervene in support of the guerrillas against the will of most nearby states, and a superpower crisis stemming from developments in Eritrea is, as a consequence, relatively unlikely.

A relatively higher probability can be assigned to the possibility of a direct Soviet-American confrontation ensuing from a clash between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu over the Ogaden. The U.S. decision to remain aloof from the 1977-78 conflict despite extensive Soviet and Cuban involvement suggested, however,
that the United States would be leery of involving itself in a situation that might spiral into a superpower confrontation.

In a vivid reminder of the volatility of Soviet-American relations and regional politics, however, events in late 1979 and early 1980 made the prospect of such involvement more likely. After a period of dormancy, United States policy toward the Horn revived as Washington began to seek access to Berbera to counter perceived threats to its interests in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in the wake of events in Iran and Afghanistan. The danger of a Soviet-American confrontation in another Somali-Ethiopian war lies in the heavy Soviet commitment to Ethiopia and the potential entanglement of the United States in any renewal of large-scale fighting. Washington's offer to exchange military aid for the use of the Berbera facilities, if agreement were to be reached, would make this eventuality more likely, particularly in light of Ethiopian warnings that naval and air facilities at Berbera might come under attack in the event of renewed fighting and U.S. arms aid to Somalia. While client states do not always succeed in embroiling their patrons in struggles not of the latter's choosing, the prospect of the embroilment always exists as a consequence both of U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil supplies and of the dynamics of patron-client relations that measure the patron's prestige partly against the client's fate.
To the extent that there is the possibility of another large-scale clash between Somalia and Ethiopia and as long as both the Soviet Union and the United States are engaged in the region, therefore, the danger of a crisis in superpower relations, with all the accompanying risks of escalation to the level of nuclear war, also exists. It is this danger that enhances the attractiveness of, and creates at least the potential for, the creation of ground rules of detente specifically designed for the Horn of Africa.

The Soviet Union and the United States may both realize other interests by the imposition of reciprocal restraints on their behavior in the Horn. The interest of Moscow in maintaining its ties to Ethiopia at the lowest possible cost and Washington's desire to gain access to the Berbera facilities with a similarly minimum expenditure of resources create a potential common interest in imposing a ceiling on the amount of external military aid that may be shipped into the Horn. Because ground rules incorporating exactly this kind of ceiling would be firmly rooted in very concrete interests of both sides, they may turn out at some point in the future to be negotiable.

That restraints on arms transfers by the Soviet Union and the United States to Ethiopia and Somalia might promote their mutual interests is, of course, no guarantee that the parties will be able to negotiate such ground rules. That SALT process, for instance, has encountered difficulties despite the generally conceded admission that in principle strategic arms limitations
agreements serve the national self-interest of both parties. Many of the factors that have bedeviled attempts to conclude a SALT II treaty are not irrelevant to superpower relations in the Horn of Africa. The asymmetrical force structures, different missions, and conflicting conceptions of national security that characterize the strategic arms race are present also in the sphere of conventional arms transfers to Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.

Nevertheless, a codification of restraint with respect to arms transfers to the Horn might be less difficult than conventional arms transfers limitations generally because of the degree of self-restraint exhibited to date by Moscow and Washington in their supply of military aid to their regional clients. Although Somalia has been the largest single recipient of Soviet aid in tropical Africa -- granted almost $90 million in economic aid and approximately $132 million in military aid over the course of the Soviet-Somali relationship -- the Soviets have nonetheless been cautious with respect to the capabilities of the armaments transferred. During the ten-year period in which aid was extended, the Soviet Union consistently denied Somali requests for sophisticated equipment. Moscow appeared more interested in promoting an image of responsiveness than in developing a viable Somali offensive capability. Similarly, although Soviet aid to Ethiopia in the late 1970s prevented the downfall of the Mengistu regime and represented possibly the largest arms aid agreement in the history of black Africa, it did not go so far as
to permit the construction of an effective, modern army for the long run. Even more propitiously, U.S. arms shipments to the area have been virtually non-existent in the recent past; the potential for growth now exists, however, as a consequence of U.S. efforts to gain access to the Berbera facilities.

The self-interest of Moscow and Washington in limiting military assistance to their Horn of Africa clients, the absence of the domestic constraints on agreement that have plagued the strategic arms talks, and the restraints unilaterally imposed by both superpowers on their own arms transfers suggest that the Horn is susceptible to the application of regionally specific ground rules of detente. Among the full complement of measures to control conventional arms transfers, constraints on the volume of transfers of offensive weapons, especially tanks and helicopters, and limits on the delivery of advanced weapons systems would be most pertinent to the area.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have supplied tanks, armored personnel carriers, and combat aircraft to the region over the years. But recent Soviet shipments of these heavy armaments to Ethiopia, including sophisticated MI-24 attack helicopters, have greatly exceeded past shipments by the United States. U.S. shipments to Somalia may yet occur, however, as a consequence of recent U.S. interest in Berbera. The heightened concern over the vulnerability of Western access to Persian Gulf oil suggests
that it would not necessarily be to U.S. advantage to conclude an arms transfer control agreement applicable to Somalia and Ethiopia. The levers the United States can employ to gain access to Somali military facilities are limited in number, and arms transfers constitute one readily usable instrument that ought not be abandoned without careful consideration of the costs. Given the military imbalance in the Horn presently favoring Ethiopia, one might even speculate that only compensatory U.S. arms transfers to Somalia would provide the basis for an equitable accord limiting CAT's. But since a military resolution of Somalia's territorial claims against Kenya and Djibouti as well as Ethiopia -- all rejected by the OAU -- might thereby be facilitated, such a course would run serious risks in the absence of a Somali commitment not to use the arms for aggression.

Some restrictions or controls on the movement of military forces of external powers into the region might also be applicable. The Soviet Union has not exported combat troops into the Horn but has sent 3,000 military "advisers" to Ethiopia, including Vasily I. Petrov, First Deputy Commander in Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, while relying on up to 16,000 Cuban combat troops to supplement Ethiopian troops fighting in the Ogaden. The United States, which at one time had a Military Advisory and Assistance Group stationed in Ethiopia, currently has no military personnel in either Somalia or Ethiopia. Although the extent to which Cuban policy toward the Horn is formulated independently of Soviet
policy is debatable, there is no doubt that the actual introduction of Cuban troops into the area could not have been accomplished without Soviet backing and the use of Moscow's transport capabilities. It is also highly unlikely that Cuba, dependent on the Soviet Union both economically and for security, would long maintain its forces in Ethiopia in the face of Soviet opposition. Thus, the introduction of Cuban as well as Soviet military personnel into the region and their retention there are also susceptible to control by Soviet-American ground rules. Soviet willingness to accede to a commitment to ban or limit foreign troops in the region depends to a significant extent on the USSR's assessment of the potential for the dispatch of American combat forces. Insofar as the Soviet Union perceives the United States as gripped by a post-Vietnam syndrome, that potential is not likely to be evaluated as high by the USSR. The very fluidity of American domestic politics, however, makes it dangerous for Moscow to rely on an indefinite prolongation of the recent U.S. reluctance to become engaged in military undertakings abroad, and Moscow might well be tempted at some time in the future to freeze this reluctance by codifying it in a set of ground rules. Even a less ambitious accord requiring prior consultation with the other superpower in advance of major military movements by external powers would make a modest contribution to stability in the Horn.

Moreover, it is conceivable that a demilitarized zone or zone of limited deployments might be established in the Ogaden
where desert terrain would permit effective monitoring of force deployments. Several of the desiderata applicable to the negotiability of CAT limits would probably apply here also: Soviet perception of U.S. intent to otherwise involve itself more deeply, Ethiopian perception of growing Somali military capabilities and Somali curtailment of its territorial ambition.

Moscow's incentives to accept some restraints on the movement of Cuban troops and Soviet "advisers" and on the transfer of arms to the Horn might be increased were the United States to link both to the construction of ground rules applicable to the Indian Ocean, where the balance of power favors the United States. Because naval competition in the area is only beginning to intensify and the Indian Ocean is an area where deployed forces are still relatively small, the risk of unintended conflict between the superpowers stemming from naval confrontation is less than in the Mediterranean. One potential benefit of some limited disengagement in the Indian Ocean region would be to prevent the Indian Ocean from acquiring several of the more dangerous characteristics of the Mediterranean. 32

Despite the disparity in ship operating days through much of the 1970s, the regular United States deployments 33 in the Indian Ocean have lately been more capable than the Soviet force. Now that the regular U.S. deployment has been supplemented by two carrier task forces, the balance has shifted even more in favor of the United States. The stationing of U.S. task forces in the
Indian Ocean for extended periods of time will be facilitated, moreover, when construction is completed at Diego Garcia, the naval facility that will offer sizable support and logistics services.

A naval disengagement agreement suitable for the northern part of the Indian Ocean might provide for the removal of all or some of the forces and their re-introduction only for specified purposes -- such as transit to other regions or the conduct of training cruises -- only with notice to a Joint Control Commission and the corollary that every such introduction would grant a reciprocal right of introduction to the other party. An agreement might also require the removal of some or all land-based naval facilities, such as Soviet facilities in Massawa and, across the Straits of Bab al-Mandab, in Aden, and the abrogation of any agreements with littoral nations designed to support each superpower's naval presence.34

The prospects that such an agreement can be concluded in the foreseeable future cannot be evaluated as bright, however. Despite General Secretary Brezhnev's expression of interest in establishing a "zone of peace" and President Carter's erstwhile call for complete demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, talks between the USSR and the United States on arms control in the Indian Ocean have been suspended, stymied by the sizable differences between Soviet and American naval operations in the region35 and shifting superpower assessments of the stakes in the region.
Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had two effects detracting from the likelihood (and possibly desirability, from the U.S. standpoint) of bilateral agreement on ground rules for the Indian Ocean. By its occupation of Afghanistan, Moscow radically exacerbated the already growing climate of distrust, making agreements of almost any sort with the United States less likely in the near future. The Soviet invasion also served as a catalyst spurring renewed U.S. interest in force projection in the larger region of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The reinforcement of this interest by the prolonged holding hostage of American diplomatic personnel in Iran similarly militates against any agreements limiting U.S. military capabilities in the area. This is particularly true if the regimen of limitations on naval facilities were to extend beyond the Horn proper to include Kenya to the south and Oman to the east, two states interested in enhancing their security by providing the United States with access to naval and air facilities.

Even if the naval facilities regime were limited to the Horn proper, it would probably serve U.S. interests only to the extent Somalia was unwilling to provide access to Berbera. If Mogadishu were unwilling to provide such access, limits on naval facilities would likely be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Moscow would have little to gain unless the limits were tied in with constraints on naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, an area of relative U.S. advantage. But the U.S. commitment in the
form of the Carter Doctrine to repel any external attack on Persian Gulf states -- requiring large naval deployments, prepositioned stores of weapons, ammunition, and fuel, and access to naval facilities -- makes such a trade-off seem a distant possibility.

In addition to the options of reliance on crisis management techniques, tacit rules of the game, and linkage, that of permitting the Soviet Union to continue its activities in the Horn unchecked by the exercise of American influence also exists. As one observer has recently argued, "leaving the Soviet Union to cope with these problems is the wisest course the United States can follow; the difficulties that the USSR has encountered (and can be expected to encounter) as a result of its involvement in African affairs are substantial and can be expected to grow in the years to come." The reversals to its position the USSR has encountered in the last three years simply as a consequence of the volatility of politics within and between the countries of the Horn suggest that the ability of Moscow to control events in the region is limited.

The volatility of regional politics in the Horn and neighboring areas and Soviet involvement in southwest Asia, however, suggest the dangers of a policy of passivity. Ground rules are, after all, intended to reduce the threat to vital U.S. interests and the probability that a regional crisis will escalate into a
superpower confrontation, and it is precisely the inability of either the USSR or the United States to control the course of politics in the Indian Ocean region that makes a crisis in the area especially dangerous and provides justification for an attempt to negotiate ground rules there. But until there is a greater compatibility of interests between the U.S. and USSR in the region, together with an assessment by each that mutual restraint will serve those interests, prospects for agreement on guidelines will necessarily be hedged with doubt.
FOOTNOTES


4 See Ibid., p. 121.


6 David, "Realignment in the Horn," p. 71.


8 For a more detailed accounting, see David, "Realignment in the Horn," p. 75.
The Cuban nationals were described as either troops or technicians. (See William J. Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Spring/Summer 1978.) The figure of 6000 Soviet advisers is cited in David, "Realignment in the Horn," p.76.


21. Richard Burt, for example, discounts the hypothesis that Soviet deployments in the Indian Ocean are a response to United States advances in SLBMs, pointing out that "while the deployment of the Polaris A3 system ... roughly coincided with the establishment of a regular Soviet presence in the region, few, if any, analysts credit this force with any convincing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability against SLBM boats operating in the area." See his "Strategic Politics and the Indian Ocean: Review Article," Pacific Affairs (Winter 1974-75), pp. 509-514.


The Los Angeles Times, 3 October 1979.


See, for example, Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East."

Blechman, The Control of Naval Armaments, p. 65.


35 Larrabee, "After The Break: Soviet-Somali Relations."

Chapter 3

Southern Africa:

Ground Rules for Soviet and American Involvement

The political impasse in southern Africa (Namibia and the Republic of South Africa) is a product, on the one hand, of the commitment of the white government of the Republic to maintain apartheid within the Republic and to control the evolution toward independence of Namibia and of indigenous black forces. The other half of the equation is the commitment of outside powers to dilute that government's power over the political future of both the Republic and Namibia. The likelihood that this impasse will be broken short of a crisis threatening superpower involvement depends on the future of the government's racial policies, the response of the black South African majority to those policies, and the degree of pressure exerted by outside powers. The stakes in the contest for power are increased by virtue of the rich mineral wealth and strategic location of the territories in dispute.

The first section of this chapter will consider each of these factors in turn, concluding that a resolution of the tensions besetting the region is unlikely in the near future. The interests that compel both the Soviet Union and the United States to remain attentive to the region are outlined in a succeeding section, which is followed by an assessment of the role of ground
rules in controlling the expression of those interests in a situation of continuing and potentially explosive tension.

I. POLITICAL TRENDS

1. The Government of the Republic of South Africa

There are few signs that the white minority government intends to initiate a process of sufficiently rapid evolutionary change that could culminate in a political settlement acceptable to the black majority. Despite its increasing isolation in the international community -- an isolation underscored in 1977 by the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo on the Republic by a unanimous vote of the UN Security Council -- and unmistakable evidence of profoundly rooted black opposition to its rule, the South African government continued into mid-1980 to display almost complete intransigence with respect to the continuation of white rule within the Republic itself, while pursuing a strategy of delay and postponement in regard to the evolution toward independence for Namibia.

The changes that Prime Minister Botha implemented not long after he assumed office in 1978 were designed to operate at the margins of the structure of white power, although they
went far beyond what some of Botha's colleagues in the Nationalist Party were ready to sanction. Botha's changes largely affected the operation of petty apartheid, the myriad of regulations that are intended to ensure the separation of races in the public facilities within which they might otherwise come into contact. The changes also encompass constitutional change but at a pace far too slow to persuade a majority of non-whites to support the present government.

While momentous when compared with the rigidity that had previously characterized Nationalist Party rule, the practices sanctioned by the new prime minister did not affect the core of the governing party's long range plan for ensuring political dominance by the 16 per cent of the Republic's population that is white. Untouched by the new prime minister was the heart of the Nationalist Party plan to ensure the "separate development" of the races: the homelands, or Bantustans, program.

The objections of blacks within South Africa and within Namibia as well -- where Pretoria has also applied the program -- to separate development can only be understood if both its broad purpose and its constituent elements are also understood. The ultimate goal of the Bantustans program is to create
a Republic of South Africa whose citizenry is exclusively white by relegating all of the country's blacks to ten tribal homelands that are eventually to be declared independent states.

The anger aroused within the black population by this arbitrary denial of citizenship and classification as tribal members is intensified by the poor quality of the land areas designated to become Bantustans. The territories to which the black South African population has been consigned under the homelands program are among the country's least fertile and least industrialized lands. The 87 per cent of the Republic's land area that is reserved for the white population includes the country's gold and diamond mines, all of its industrialized and urbanized regions, and its harbors as well.\(^1\) That the ten Bantustans are composed of ninety-seven separate pieces of land that are segmented to preserve white-owned farms and populated towns further compromises their viability as independent economic entities, and the Bantustans will remain dependent on the Republic of South Africa long after the territories are granted formal political independence from Pretoria.

Similarly, the homelands concept as applied in Namibia confines the 90 per cent of the territory's population that is
black to 40 per cent of the land area, some areas of which are "overcrowded, overgrazed, underdeveloped, lacking in basic amenities, and, in some cases, waterless, or with soils lacking in the chemicals needed to raise healthy animals."2 In contrast, it allocates to the whites, who constitute 10 per cent of the population, a 60 per cent share of the land, including "the best farming land, all of the urban centers, most of the known significant mineral deposits, the entire seacoast (with all its alluvial diamonds), and most of the Territory's economic infrastructure, such as roads, railroads, airports, electric lines and boreholes."3

The inability of the designated areas to provide sustenance for the entire black population of the Republic at any time in the foreseeable future has apparently persuaded Pretoria to regard as inevitable the permanent residence of blacks in urban areas outside the Bantustans. But there is as yet no evidence that the government is prepared to extend to the black South African population any rights to participate in politically significant ways in governing the country. "For the foreseeable future," notes John Seiler, "the central fact of South African political life will be the effective domination
of all political institutions by Afrikaner nationalism, "4 and, therefore, the perpetuation of essential aspects of the political status quo in the Republic. The tactical differences between the "accommodationists" and "dogmatists" within the Afrikaans community, maintains Seiler, should not be allowed to obscure the very real unity and "profound commitment [of all Afrikaners] to the dual causes of Afrikaner communal identity and ethnically based political development."5

There has been at least the appearance of somewhat greater movement in Namibia, however, beginning with the convening in 1975 of the Turnhalle conference to draft a constitutional framework for an independent Namibia. Apparently persuaded that it could not expect to maintain the political status quo in Namibia indefinitely, South Africa sanctioned the initiation of talks in Windhoek, Namibia's capital city, that were to culminate within three years in self-rule for Namibia.

In terms of their prospects for acceptance by forces within Namibia itself and by the international community at large, the Turnhalle proceedings were doomed from their inception. Only representatives of the "peoples" of Namibia were authorized to participate in the conference. Representation,
in other words, was to be based on ethnic groups, a mode of selection that simultaneously reinforced the homelands plan and excluded the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). SWAPO, a major political party that had begun a guerrilla resistance movement within South West Africa in 1966, had been recognized by both the OAU and the UN as the only genuine representative of the Namibian people until and unless independence and elections indicated otherwise. As such, representative of SWAPO had been permitted to participate in UN debates on Namibia and had become involved in the work of the UN Council for Namibia.  

Had the exclusion of SWAPO from the Turnhalle talks not condemned them at the outset in the eyes of the international community, their evolution undoubtedly would have done so. The framework designed at Windhoek, while seen by some as preferable to control by Moscow-oriented terrorists, would "assure for some time to come a substantial (and perhaps decisive) measure of white influence and a fragile, decentralized system of government subject to centrifugal pressure and inherently dependent upon South African political and military support."  

The Turnhalle constitutional provisions and the entire self-rule process set into motion in 1975 was superseded by the initiatives of the "Contact Group" of five Western powers -- the United States, Canada, West Germany, Britain, and France -- who collectively made it clear to Pretoria that implementation of the Turnhalle provisions would lead ineluctably to the
imposition of United Nations sanctions. South Africa effectively abandoned the Turnhalle idea, and negotiations with the Contact Group, under the chairmanship of Donald McHenry, then a senior member of the American delegation at the UN, led in 1978 to Pretoria's acceptance of the principle of universal suffrage and of a UN role in the election process.

This relatively auspicious start to the negotiations, however, did not augur an equally successful conclusion. By early 1979, the efforts of the Contact Group to mediate between Pretoria and SWAPO had broken down completely, as the parties to the dispute reached an impasse over the monitoring of SWAPO guerrilla bases. The refusal of SWAPO to have its bases in Angola and Zambia monitored during the transition process proved as obdurate as Pretoria's insistence on the point. In the interim, South Africa has proceeded with an internal settlement plan for Namibia, evidently in the belief that "conservative governments in London and Washington might accept a political solution in Namibia that include [sic] most internal black movements but exclude SWAPO-Nujoma on terms the current administrations in London and Washington could not easily swallow."
2. Domestic Resistance

Whether the explosive potential inherent in the South African government's commitment to separate development ignites, creating fertile ground for superpower involvement in the Republic itself, is critically dependent on the evolution of black protest there. While Pretoria has been remarkably successful in containing black unrest over the years, the Soweto uprisings and associated violence that occurred in 1976 created a new danger for the minority government. That year, 1976, notes Colin Legum, "marked a watershed in the modern history of the Republic of South Africa. 1977 was the year in which the Republic's facade of internal stability was finally shattered; it marked the beginning of a new and sharper confrontation between entrenched white power and its black challengers; and it shook Western political and economic confidence in the Republic's ability to maintain its existing system."

The catalyst for the Soweto demonstrations was the decision of the South African government's Department of Education to enforce a twenty-year-old rule dictating that black students receive instruction in Afrikaans as well as in English. On June 16, 1976, 10,000 Soweto schoolchildren demonstrated against the decision, engaging in an exchange of stone throwing and tear gas with police that culminated in the latter's firing upon the crowd. The ten days of violence that succeeded the protest demonstration
resulted in the death of 175, the wounding of 1140, and the arrest of 1300. The riots in Soweto -- the southwest township bordering on white Johannesburg -- sparked a wave of unrest throughout South Africa and the organization of a highly successful "stay-away" by black workers. Moreover, the events in Soweto created a small-scale exodus of black youths faced with warrants for arrest from South Africa to guerrilla training camps of the African National Congress (ANC) in Mozambique.

The Nationalist Party is unlikely to be overthrown by black indigenous forces without the intervention of external powers. "Despite . . . the deep discontent of the majority," Robert Rotberg observes, "South Africa is far from revolution. It is doubtful that the country has entered the period of hopefulness that has elsewhere often been a prelude to reaction followed by revolution." Chester Crocker concurs, asserting that violent upheaval in the Republic does not appear to be imminent, in the absence of some external cataclysm capable of profoundly shaking the will and morale of white South Africa. The term 'upheaval' implies a completely different order of events from anything yet seen, an uncontrollable wave of violence . . . that cannot be contained short of a reordering of basic power relationships. The South African state, on the other hand, is structured politically and organized militarily to withstand significant levels of unrest by international (and especially Western) standards."
Prognostications that assign a relatively low probability to the likelihood of a successful black revolt against white rule are based in part on the history of black protest in the Republic. This history has demonstrated the ability of the South African government to counter effectively violent expressions of opposition to its apartheid practices while also revealing the extent to which blacks are divided among themselves as to the most appropriate tactics of dissent. As one observer comments, "... there has been no great unity of action throughout the history of black nationalism in South Africa. Organizational efforts have been relatively easy to nip in the bud not only due to South Africa's massive and effective security machinery, but also to the cross-currents that run through black aspirations and goals."14

The resources available to the South African government to contain black protest are impressive, particularly when compared to resources possessed by South African blacks. The almost entirely white armed forces of the Republic, presently used on the frontier rather than against blacks internally, are at an active strength of 65,500 with a mobilization strength of 404,50015 and a budget that absorbs 5.1 per cent of the country's GNP.16 They have been intensively trained in counter-insurgency techniques, and their firepower and organization are far superior to their black counterparts, who have at least in the past been equipped with few weapons more destructive than homemade bombs.17 Nor is
the 50 per cent of the Republic's police force that is black an impressive physical resource for the black community since the force has until now sided with the government and has had access to few weapons.

Black political movements in the Republic have in the past proved vulnerable to the superior police power of the state. A mass demonstration against South African pass laws, the Sharpeville protest of March 1960, was the last of its kind for more than a decade. The government's response to that protest was swift and far-reaching. The police fired upon the demonstrators, killing 67 and wounding 186,¹⁸ and the government declared a state of emergency, arresting some 1900 people and outlawing the African National Congress and its breakaway group, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which had organized the Sharpeville demonstrations. A subsequent effort by blacks in 1961 to organize widespread protests was derailed by the government, which in the two years thereafter succeeded in decimating the black leadership through imprisonment and exile. As a consequence, as Gwendolen Carter observed, "the politically organized internal African strength for rights was crushed."¹⁹ The efforts of exiled groups to infiltrate within the Republic were hampered by the lack of sympathetic border states until Portuguese colonialism collapsed in the mid-1970s.
A resurgence in black politicization began in 1969 with the beginning of the Black Consciousness movement, represented by the founding of the South African Students Organization (SASO) and the later establishment of a number of other groups committed to the establishment of a black-ruled state. In the wake of the Soweto riots, however, the Black Consciousness movement was subjected to the same types of governmental repression that had destroyed earlier efforts to organize opposition to the government. Steve Biko, the leader of SASO, died in police custody in September 1977, and a massive crackdown on the Black Consciousness movement took place one month later as eighteen organizations were declared illegal, forty of the organizations leaders were arrested, seven well-known whites, including London Observer correspondent Donald Woods, were banned, and two large circulation newspapers, The World and the Weekend World were closed. 20

Whether the dampening effects on black political activity will prove to be as profound and enduring in the 1980s as they were twenty years earlier is a crucial unknown that explains much of the inability to estimate the likelihood that massive internal dissent will topple the South African government at any point in the near future. The number of circumstances that differ between 1980 and the early 1960s -- the transition to black rule in Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique; the economic problems of the Republic itself; and the very different exposures to South African
society experienced by younger blacks\textsuperscript{21} -- suggest, however, that black political activity may now be less susceptible to governmentally-sponsored co-optation and eradication than it was earlier. It is unlikely, in any case, that South African blacks will be so subdued that conditions for intervention by outside powers will be entirely lacking.

3. **Outside Powers**

Namibia's domestic political picture is even less clear. SWAPO is rent by internal divisions, plagued by its identification with the Ovambos of northern Namibia and opposed by the massive military apparatus of the Republic. It is, in addition, opposed by other political forces indigenous to Namibia. The mass protests evidencing black dissatisfaction in the Republic of South Africa have been absent in Namibia, a rural society simply not conducive to the type of mass mobilization tactics employed in urban areas in South Africa. In this context, the support extended to SWAPO and the pressure exerted on Pretoria by outside powers assumes importance.

The capacity of outside powers to pressure the South African government into offering the kinds of political concessions that would be necessary to defuse the tensions that otherwise may precipitate superpower intervention over Namibia and South Africa is limited but not entirely lacking. The African states, particularly the five front-line states, and the Western industrialized
countries, are in a position to apply very different kinds of pressure. Although their efforts can and have been joined to similar ends, the African and Western states control sharply contrasting levers of influence on the South African government.

The means available to the Western states to influence the political evolution of South Africa and Namibia in the direction of majority rule now consist primarily of economic instruments. In the wake of the Soweto riots, Steve Biko's death, the wave of repression imposed by Pretoria in October 1977, the major Western powers, including the United States, joined in what turned out to be a unanimous vote of the Security Council to impose a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. Although the embargo has apparently not been watertight -- circuitous arms transfers apparently continue through the good offices of Israel and other states\(^{22}\) -- a major source of influence that remains to be activated by the Western states resides in trade and financial flows between their citizens and the Republic.

South Africa's engagement in the international economy, which limits internal repression, is a primary source of its economic growth which, in turn, provides Pretoria with some cushion against even more widespread political unrest. The imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa that would be faithfully subscribed to by the advanced industrialized states would cause substantial economic disruption by slowing economic growth and increasing unemployment,\(^{23}\) whose ramifications could be profound.
The industrialized states have not, however, endorsed an economic embargo as a means to pressure Pretoria into granting significant access to political power to its majority population or independence to Namibia. Governmental moves in this direction have not been lacking altogether, as Legum's list of initiatives taken in 1977-78 makes clear: "Canada became the first Western country officially to discourage trade with SA; Holland was the first whose parliament considered a Bill to authorize participation in any international sanctions campaign; West Germany restricted government security and insurance guarantees for German exporters to SA; a Swedish all-party parliamentary committee recommended the suspension of all further investment in SA; and the EEC adopted a collective policy designed to apply economic pressures." 24

It is not this litany of policy measures that has been responsible for the substantial decline in capital inflows to the Republic that has occurred in the very recent past, however. The decline is instead the consequence of market uncertainties with respect to the uneasy political situation in South Africa and of investor's reactions to the apparent reductions in returns to investments in the Republic. 25 The turnabout in capital
flows has nonetheless been impressive: net private capital inflows totalled $590 million in 1975 but by 1978 had turned sharply negative as an outflow of $916 million was recorded.\textsuperscript{26}

The likelihood that South Africa will be the target of an economic embargo by the West that will markedly decrease its ability to implement its separate development policy or to control events in Namibia cannot be evaluated as high. As a consequence of a variety of political, economic, and strategic factors, the Western nations are very reluctant to apply economic coercion to affect developments in the South African region.

More strenuous efforts may be made by the African states, although the effectiveness of those efforts is likely to be incommensurate with the level of energy devoted to them. While the record of the OAU with respect to implementing its measures against South Africa has been extremely poor, the emergence of Angola and Mozambique as independent, leftist, black-rulled states, and the joining of those two states with the three others of Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana to form a loose coalition of Frontline States suggest that the record may improve. The capacity of the Frontline States and the OAU has been further enhanced by the increased concentration on South Africa that the resolution of the Rhodesian question promises to permit in the 1980s.
The interdependencies between the Frontline states and South Africa, however, vastly complicate the exercise of the levers of influence theoretically at the disposal of these states to accelerate the process of political change within South Africa and Namibia. The attractiveness of the option of providing sanctuaries for guerrillas operating within South Africa is much reduced in practice. For example, Mozambique, the only state bordering on the Republic with a terrain suitable for such a purpose that does not make guerrillas into sitting ducks for South African border patrols, relies on South Africa as the major source of its foreign exchange earnings. The income generated by the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric power complex, by the port of Maputo, and by the remittances from its emigrant workers would all be placed in jeopardy were ties with Pretoria to deteriorate seriously.

The manifold links between African states and South Africa are not the only constraints on the adoption of effective policy. The African states are themselves divided as to the most appropriate
strategy to achieve change in the region, disagreeing on the wisdom of concluding alliances with powers outside the region for that purpose, the role of external versus internal forces in upsetting the status quo, and the utility of diplomatic and military power. They are also plagued by the conflicts incident upon disparities in national power and status, differences in the level of commitment to the liberation struggle in southern Africa, and preoccupations peculiar to the subregional contexts in which they operate.

4. Prospects for resolution

There are no very encouraging signs that accommodation is near between the opposing political forces concerned with South Africa and Namibia. Instead, tensions between them appear likely to continue in a tinderbox situation whose ignition could engulf detente as well, given the proximity of Cuban troops to South Africa and the possibility that a U.S. Administration might respond to protect its interests in the region. Nor is that ignition only a remote possibility: The negotiation of a political settlement acceptable to all parties in Zimbabwe leaves South Africa and Namibia as loci of likely conflict in the coming decade.
II. SUPERPOWER INTERESTS IN THE REGION

The risk that the Soviet Union and the United States would become involved in a war or crisis short of war in the region in a way that threatens to escalate beyond the region itself is a derivative of their conflicting interests in and the intrinsic value of the area. At stake in South Africa are a "near monopoly power over the production and distribution of strategic vital minerals, an opportunity to undermine the health of some of capitalism's largest multinational enterprises, added problems for the United States and Great Britain's ailing balance of payments, control of the West's main access route to oil-producing countries and the Far East, and use of the southern hemisphere's most sophisticated shipping and defense infrastructure."³⁰

While this estimate of the stakes in South Africa may be on the high side, there is no question that the United States has tangible economic interests in South Africa that take three forms: trade, investment, and access to resources. The direct investment of U.S. firms in South Africa totalled $1.67 billion in 1976,³¹ and among those enterprises represented were many of the largest corporations in the United States. The share
of South Africa in total U.S. direct investments abroad in that year was 1.18%. Trade figures were of a similar order of magnitude, amounting to an annual level of $2.27 billion and representing 1.05 per cent of total U.S. trade. The Western countries import 60 per cent of their vanadium, 30 per cent of their manganese, and a major proportion of their gold, diamonds, and uranium from South Africa; together with Zimbabwe, South Africa also is the source of 50 per cent of the chrome and 75 per cent of the platinum imported by the West. Moreover, South Africa has more than 80 per cent of the world's platinum and chrome reserves, the largest known deposits of gold, vanadium, manganese, and florspar; and substantial reserves of a number of other metals.

That South Africa abuts the strategically important shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope apparently has not been overlooked by the United States, which benefits from South Africa's protection of the Cape route, in effect provided gratis by the Republic. But American naval vessels have not used South African port facilities since 1967, and official Washington seemingly has accepted the view that Soviet interdiction of oil supply routes could be accomplished more easily from points less remote from Soviet territory than southern Africa.
The political stakes in Washington's relations with Pretoria are also significant. To the extent that other African and Third World states regard the distance Washington puts between itself and Pretoria as an important basis for determining their own relations with Washington, the political ramifications of continued ties with Pretoria are profound. If U.S. willingness or unwillingness to support various resolutions advanced in the United Nations to isolate the Republic further become the critical determinant of various Third World states positions on issues in dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union or more generally of the status of their own ties to Moscow, the political stakes would multiply accordingly.

The USSR has long supplied arms and financial assistance to black guerrilla movements in South Africa and Namibia, both directly and through the OAU. SWAPO has also been accorded access to Soviet and Cuban camps in Angola. To the extent that the United States and Western Europe profit by the existence of a South African regime that is a reliable supplier of important raw materials, an outlet for foreign direct investment, and a defender of Western interests in a secure Cape route, the Soviet Union has an interest in aiding opponents of that regime. It also has an interest in doing so in order to offset presently modest Chinese influence in the area.

The advent to power of a black government in the Republic, however remote the contingency seems at present, would very
probably deny to the West the strategic military resources of South Africa, while creating at least the potential for Soviet access to the country's well developed naval facilities. Soviet strategic operations in the South Atlantic would be aided by access to facilities on the South African littoral, the value of which would increase if at sometime in the future the Soviet Union wanted to use the South Atlantic to deploy submarine and other naval forces having the mission of denying sea control of the South Atlantic to the United States. Moreover, the installation of a black government in South Africa might increase the possibility that the country would ally with Brazil and Argentina to form a military alliance, what has been called "NATO for the South Atlantic (a SATO) . . . ." Such an organization would, however, attempt to neutralize the South Atlantic.

The potential for Soviet harassment and interdiction of Western shipping along the Cape route would also be enhanced by a radical change of governments. That the Soviets would actually interfere with or attempt to deter Western shipping in the area may presently be deemed unlikely. But their capacity to do so could prove politically important, nonetheless. William Griffith notes that Moscow might anticipate "that such a possibility [of interruption of shipping] could arise (in the event of a black-rulled South Africa) might prompt some West European governments -- although hardly the United States -- to be less openly anti-Soviet, that is, somewhat 'finlandized.'"
The overthrow of the white, Western-oriented regime in Pretoria would also offer the Soviet Union less tangible but equally significant gains in its struggle with the West. The perception that political trends in the world favor the Soviet Union rather than the United States would be given powerful reinforcement by revolution in South Africa and Namibia. It would also free other states in southern Africa to pursue more independent domestic and foreign policies to the extent that they have been constrained in the past by their economic ties to the Republic, thus further reinforcing the appearance of a trend favorable to Soviet interests. In Soviet analyses, South Africa is perceived as "the key to 'progressive' change in the rest of Africa, particularly in those neighboring states held in economic vassalage." 41

III. THE ROLE OF GUIDELINES IN THE REGION

Because the United States' political (as distinct from its short-run economic) interests in South Africa might be pursued by opposition to rather than support for the Nationalist Party government, there is some scope for ground rules in the region that are directed less at containing the risks of escalation that arise from superpower intervention than at preventing the risks entirely by cooperating to implement a mutually agreeable resolution of the tension-provoking situation. To the extent that the United
States perceives its overall interests to be best protected by distancing itself from the Nationalist Party government and can persuade the Soviet Union that its interests also lie in a strategy to increase the peaceful pressure on the white regime, a potential exists for the construction of ground rules whose purpose would be to increase the willingness of the opposed parties within South Africa and Namibia to negotiate a political settlement of their dispute.

To accomplish this end requires the employment of a strategy such as that which was employed by the various outside powers involved in the recent settlement in Zimbabwe. In that situation, South Africa used its influence to persuade the Rhodesian regime that a settlement could not be avoided, while the Front Line States applied their leverage over the Patriotic Front to persuade it to come to the same conclusion. By threatening the viability of their respective clients rather than by supporting their irreconciliable ambitions, the outside powers increased the incentives of the indigenous actors to negotiate seriously on a political solution of their dispute.

Translating the Rhodesian strategy to the South African context involves ground rules that express a United States willingness to exercise leverage on the South African regime in exchange for Soviet willingness to pressure the guerrilla movements struggling against that regime. In practice, the ground rules might result in a reduction of United States economic links with
Pretoria and a slowdown in Soviet arms and financial assistance to the insurgents. By diluting each side's ability to pursue its maximum goals, the applied ground rules could encourage the emergence of a political compromise between them.

Despite the difficulties inherent in attempting to impose equivalent restraints on very different types of transfers, there is little choice: the arms and financial aid the USSR supplies to the guerrillas and the economic flows sanctioned by the United States are perhaps the only potentially effective levers of influence either superpower possesses over the South African situation. The United States might also actively attempt to disrupt the network through which Pretoria still obtains Western arms. But, because that network presumably operates independently of Washington's control, it is not within the United States' capacity to deliver as part of a Soviet-American effort. Likewise, the insurgents would still be able to acquire their arms elsewhere.

Construction of guidelines to induce conciliatory moves by the Nationalist Party and the insurgent forces is an option whose theoretical attractiveness confronts problems of negotiability and implementation. Cutbacks in American economic links with the Republic and the Soviet aid to guerrilla forces in the Republic of Namibia could only be agreed upon if there were prior agreement between Washington and Moscow as to the responsiveness
of the Nationalist Party regime, on the one hand, and the insur-
gents, on the other, to such restrictions. The measurement prob-
lems involved in estimating this political elasticity would be se-
vere even in the absence of mistrust between the negotiating par-
ties. Such mistrust encourages the Soviet Union to overestimate
the effects of a cutback on the willingness of the guerrillas to
negotiate and to underestimate the effects of restrictions on
American economic exchanges on the white minority government,
while encouraging the United States to do the converse.

Although the successful resolution of the difficulties be-
setting the Rhodesian/Zimbabwe dispute might be taken as a har-
binger of success in the South African context, other obstacles
to the contemplated ground rules remain. If a Soviet-American
bargain were to prove negotiable at some time in the future, in-
tractable problems would remain at the stage of implementation.
Unlike the outside powers engaged in efforts to settle the Rho-
desian/Zimbabwe dispute, the Soviet Union and the United States
possess only very limited levers of influence over indigenous
political forces in South Africa and Namibia. The ability of the
guerrillas to gain resources elsewhere and of South Africa to ad-
just to United States economic pressure by relying on third party
intermediaries and its own resources might leave the status quo
in the region essentially intact.
Given the probability that guidelines aimed at a political settlement in the region are not immediately negotiable and might not be effective even were they negotiable, efforts to negotiate ground rules applicable to conflict control in the South African region might profitably be supplemented by efforts to control the risks of escalation. If black political movements gain the strength necessary to pose a real threat to the survival of the white regime, a situation ripe for the introduction of outside forces would be created.

Ground rules appropriate to a crisis stage of an intensifying conflict situation would vary significantly according to which of two assumptions about a U.S. use of military forces is accepted: 1) that the U.S. government would define its interests so that any contemplated intervention is designed to favor those political forces pressing for change, or 2) that the U.S. government would define its stakes as involving support for the Nationalist Party government against a Soviet- and Cuban-supported threat to its continued rule. Moreover, essential to any effort to secure Soviet acquiescence to ground rules restricting the introduction of military forces may be the acceptance in decision-making circles in Moscow of the premise that the deployment of American troops on any side in the South African conflict is a genuine possibility.
If the Soviet leadership were to be persuaded, for example, that the United States would not respond in any significant way to the deployment of Cuban troops into Namibia or the Republic itself, Moscow would have little incentive to negotiate with Washington on ground rules designed to control the introduction of outside troops. Rather, as was true in Ethiopia and Angola, the Soviets and Cubans might choose to make such a decision on their own, exercising an autonomy that would undoubtedly be more in their interests than would mutually agreed upon restraints.

As noted earlier, however, any estimate of a U.S. response to a future crisis in South Africa is subject to error, given the flux in American politics. Moreover, an analysis of the U.S. interests at stake in South Africa indicates that, while South Africa is not vital to U.S. economic or military security, there would nevertheless be considerable costs -- both to the United States and its allies -- involved in the assumption of Soviet or other hostile control over the country's resources. The existence of substantial U.S. interests in the area and the swings in American domestic politics may at some juncture create sufficient uncertainty in Moscow about American military intervention to interest the Soviets in the construction of guidelines.

That any U.S. intervention would be oriented toward change rather than support for the status quo would be the more reasonable assumption of the two, given a U.S. administration resembling the one presently in office. The Carter Administration has been
unambiguous with respect to its intentions in the event of a serious threat to the South African regime. Early in the Administration, Vice President Mondale told South African Prime Minister Vorster that "We hope that South Africa will not rely on any illusions that the United States will in the end intervene to save South Africa from the policies it is preserving, for we will not do so." 42

On the not immutable assumption, then, that both the Soviet Union and the United States would be disposed toward intervening on behalf of interests opposed to rather than supportive of the Nationalist Party government, the ground rules would have to ensure that the contemplated joint or parallel measures would be directed toward a common objective, perhaps that of persuading all indigenous forces to agree to UN supervised elections. Such an objective would face the threat that one or more parties to the accord might seek to use it to secure the ultimate success of a favored faction among those contending for power. Jointly controlled forces would be the optimal method of achieving this objective, but ground rules in the area would be desirable even if they only placed equivalent limits on separately controlled forces and the weapons with which they were to be equipped.

Negotiating ground rules would present more severe problems if the assumption is accepted that the Soviet Union and the United States would be intervening on behalf of antagonistic
forces in the region. The irreconcilability of their interests in this case would create a negotiating climate in which compromise would be inhibited by its zero-sum aspects, a situation which would be mitigated only by the presumed desires of both the United States and Soviet Union to avoid the direct clash of their forces that could, in turn, escalate to strategic nuclear war.

One alternative in this case would probably be to aim for the exclusion of all external forces from the region rather than to attempt to negotiate limits on the forces that could be introduced. Negotiations on permissible troop deployments might well bog down in interminable discussions of, for example, the disparities in military forces available to the indigenous parties. These disparities might require, from the Soviet perspective, higher limits for their forces (or proxy forces) than for American forces or necessitate, from the American perspective, adjustments to take into account the different strategies of warfare pursued by the South African government and the insurgents. The negotiability of a complete or partial ban on all outside forces would be in doubt, moreover, because the absence of external intervention would favor the white regime, which presently has greater power at its disposal.

More favorable prospects for the conclusion of ground rules embodying a control or ban on the introduction of forces into the region would be secured if the United States were to
link the ground rules effort itself to a larger political context. Incentives for the Soviets to agree to behavioral guidelines for the South African situation could be sought in other spheres of Soviet-American cooperation and conflict. Incorporating ground rules into a larger linkage strategy, beyond the scope of this study, would offer the United States the opportunity to extend the range of both carrots and sticks that could be utilized to persuade the Soviet Union to refrain from intervening in a deteriorating situation in southern Africa.
FOOTNOTES


3 Ibid., pp. 147-48.


5 Ibid., p. 5.


17 Rotberg, "How Deep the Change?" p. 128.


19 Ibid., p. 107.


21 For a fuller description of the factors relevant to an assessment of the future course of black political activity in South Africa, see McDonald, "The Black Community."


23 Ibid., p. 35.


25 For the actual figures on returns on U.S. direct foreign investment in South Africa from 1970-1975, see ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 193.

36 William Foltz suggests that if the Soviets were interested in interrupting the flow of oil to the West, they could accomplish that goal much more easily at a point closer to the Straits of Hormuz than the Cape. See his analysis in "United States Policy Toward Southern Africa: Economic and Strategic Constraints," Political Science Quarterly (Spring 1979), pp. 47-65.


39 Ibid., p. 168.


Chapter 4

Yugoslavia: Ground Rules for
Soviet and American Restraint

The death of Marshal Josip Broz Tito on May 4 commenced the long-awaited succession era in Yugoslavia. Whether it will culminate in the preservation of the country's stability, territorial integrity, and independence depends on a diversity of factors, many of them imponderable. No little speculation has been devoted to the forces that might undermine the country as it grapples with intractable problems that in the past were always overcome, if not ultimately resolved, by the last of the great wartime leaders and the symbol of Yugoslav national unity. A measure of Tito's centrality to Yugoslav politics is that his rule spanned the terms of no fewer than eight Presidents of the United States.

I. THREATS TO STABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE

Yugoslavia now must confront critical problems in four areas in the absence of the man who for three and one-half decades lent stability to a country still regarded in hostile quarters as artificially contrived. Those problems relate to:
1) the political succession, 2) the economy, 3) nationality relations, and 4) relations with the Soviet Union and the West.

The central problem of the Yugoslav succession is that there is no "young Tito" waiting in the wings to provide strong

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central leadership to a country historically riven with ethnic, religious, and ideological strife. Instead, a collective gerontocracy, rivaling the Soviet and Chinese top Party leadership in age, is to rule through a constitutional system so complex very few even well-informed Yugoslavs claim to understand it. Basically, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), or Party, is to be run by a collective leadership: the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee. It is composed of 23 members: 3 each from the republic parties in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia; 2 each from the autonomous province parties in Kosovo and Vojvodina; and one representative of the army. Tito has been succeeded as chairman of the party presidium by Stevan Doronjski, a Serb from Vojvodina, who will serve only until October 1980, when the annual rotation among the republic representatives will presumably yield a new chairman. For power to recentralize, the rotation system will have to be ignored or overcome. Some observers expect that the man who does this may be either the Slovene LCY Secretary Stanc Dolanc or the conservative leader of the Bosnian party, Branko Mikulic.

Tito's state functions have been assumed by a no less ungainly conglomerate. The State Presidency of 15 members is composed of seven ex officio members not eligible for the "Presidency of the Presidency" and eight others: one from each of the six republics and two autonomous provinces. The new head of state, until he is rotated out of the Presidency of the Presidency next May, is an ethnic Serb from Bosnia-Hercegovina, Cvijetin Mijatovic.
A further source of uncertainty in the succession process is the role of the Serb-dominated Army, which some believe is honey-combed with Soviet sympathizers and others regard as a bulwark of Yugoslav centralist nationalism.\(^5\) In the event of popular unrest or bitter elite infighting the Army might play the decisive role in resolving the Tito succession.

This confusing leadership situation, in which very few top leaders have a following beyond the borders of their republics, promises eventually, if it persists, to paralyze national decision-making in relations between ethnic groups and republics within the country. This situation and the consensus system in which each republic exercises a veto power in the federal parliament's Chamber of Republics and Provinces are likely to favor continuance of policies reflecting the status quo and encumber any near-term effort to take new initiatives.\(^6\) Agreement on incremental changes may be easier, including the area of arms control and confidence-building measures discussed below. Whether continuance of the status quo in economic policy and nationality relations can overcome prospective problems in these areas remains in doubt.

Yugoslavia's economic problems are serious. For the first quarter of 1980 the cost of living had increased 27% over the first-quarter 1979 figure with the result that net personal incomes stagnated after three years of strong advances. A record trade deficit of $6.4 billion occurred in 1979 as imports grew 8% in real terms while exports failed to grow at all. A current
account deficit of $3.4 billion was chalked up in 1979 as
tourism fell off in the wake of the devastating earthquake in
Montenegro in April and remittances from Yugoslav "guest workers"
in West Germany, Sweden and elsewhere failed to grow. Yugoslavia's
hard-currency debt now totals $13 billion, some of which had to be
renegotiated in 1979. Convertible currency debt service in 1979
was 23% of convertible currency earnings.

Financing from the International Monetary Fund in 1979 helped
to cover the growing deficit. To deal with these trends the
Yugoslav government has also initiated restrictive monetary and
credit policies, has sought to moderate debt-leveraged investment
growth particularly in non-productive construction of administrative
buildings, etc., and has enacted a program of wage restraints.\(^7\)
In June 1980 additional restraints were imposed. The dinar was
devalued 30%, prices were frozen, consumer credit curbed, and new
wage guidelines promulgated.

As a result of these measures real wages will continue to
fall in 1980 even as inflation abates somewhat. Already fuel
conservation measures imposing an odd-even system for gasoline
have occasioned grumbling. Spot shortages in diverse areas like
coffee, citrus fruit, and laundry detergent have occurred. At
the same time more than one million Yugoslav "guest workers"
have recently lost their jobs in Western Europe and been forced
to return home. Domestic productivity, meanwhile, lags as a
result of interminable worker self-management meetings that may
consume as much as 20% of the labor force's time.
In this situation a highly decentralized governmental system, no longer enjoying the prestige of an acknowledged national leader, confronts the need to prevent drastic reductions in living standards and lifestyles that approach those in Western Europe and the United States. Similar trends, starting from a lower baseline, in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, have led to popular protests and political instability.

In addition to the dangers of general popular discontent that may arise, the country faces two other political-economic problems: energy dependence on the Soviet Union and nationality resentments occasioned by the continuing growth of income differentials between northern and southern republics and by Federal efforts to overcome them.

Yugoslavia's chronic trade deficits have been fueled by oil imports, which now account for 75% of total domestic consumption. Soviet oil supplies to Yugoslavia, which now account for 40% of its crude oil imports, have been priced at close to world market levels. The $4 billion Yugoslav-Soviet trade protocol for 1980 calls for $1.1 billion in oil imports and another $330 million in natural gas and coal deliveries. The Soviet Union has agreed to supply an annual 2.5 billion cubic feet of natural gas to Yugoslavia through 1986 via a pipeline network opened last year. Yugoslavia's other major crude oil suppliers are Libya and Iraq, which have enjoyed better relations with Moscow than has Belgrade and might be persuaded, in a Yugoslav-Soviet crisis, to use oil for political purposes.
Although "GNP" growth rates in the southern republics of Yugoslavia exceed those in the north, per capita income differentials between Slovenia and Croatia, on the one hand, and Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo, on the other, continue to grow as a result of the higher base level of the former. It is estimated that in Slovenia, the wealthiest republic, average per capita incomes exceed those in Kosovo, the poorest region largely inhabited by ethnic Albanians, by a factor of six or seven. To be sure, official statistics exaggerate this differential by their inability to include data from the virtually unquantifiable barter economy outside the monetary economy in the south. But a vast disparity remains and apparently is growing. To overcome it, the federal government has sought to re-allocate investment funds from Slovenia and Croatia to the south, utilizing the hard currency earnings of the northern republics. During the outbreak of Croatian nationalism in 1971, greater retention of those earnings became a key Croatian demand. Subsequent reforms returned a larger share of foreign exchange to the republics in which it was earned, but in light of growing inter-republic income differentials the issue may well reappear, whether raised by the economically backward south or by Croatia, where nationalist leaders were purged by Tito in the aftermath of popular unrest and street demonstrations in 1971.

Most fears of possible Soviet-American confrontation over Yugoslavia stem from one or another hypothetical scenario involving internal disintegration as a result of nationality conflict. The plausibility of such worst case analysis revolves to a considerable extent around the general state of Yugoslavia'a
economy, especially economic relations between the republics. Few close observers anticipate the sudden revival of separatist sentiments in Croatia or elsewhere in the next two or three years. But many prominent Yugoslav scholars, even those sympathetic to the major lines of Tito's policies, are unwilling in the aftermath of Tito's death to make firm predictions concerning the intermediate future. Although this consensus may give pause to contrarians, general agreement exists that the key to Yugoslavia's domestic stability will be the performance of the economy in the next several years with respect to the relative position of the republics. The availability of Western economic assistance, whether bilateral or extended through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, can have an important impact on the Yugoslav economy. The same is true of trade relations and forms of economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the West, particularly if such measures are designed to reduce Yugoslavia's chronic trade deficit with the EEC, which in 1979 accounted for almost half the country's trade shortfall. Because these economic relations are not especially amenable to Soviet and American cooperative efforts, however, they do not fit easily into a framework of mutually agreed ground rules. For that reason they are not examined in detail here.

Although the Yugoslav economy may determine the extent to which nationality grievances coalesce in the future, ground rules regulating Soviet and American behavior in the region can contribute in other ways to the reduction of tensions within Yugoslavia and between Yugoslavia and other states. It is not uncommon for
members of each ethnic group in Yugoslav to dismiss the possibility that its leaders might ever contemplate soliciting Soviet support in an internal Yugoslav dispute while suggesting that leaders from other republics might very well entertain such a request for fraternal assistance. To the degree that the Soviet Union commits itself to non-interference in Yugoslav internal affairs, such suspicions will tend to lose their credibility. There may be too much a good thing, however, since popular and elite perceptions of a Soviet threat never too far off the horizon might well be expected to cause ethnic groups to submerge their differences in the interest of national unity. Nevertheless, the assumption here is that diminished perceptions of threat from the Soviet Union will give the Yugoslav government greater latitude in seeking solution of the country's pressing problems.

In light of Yugoslavia's strategic significance for European security, its symbolic role as an alternative model for East European states, and its leadership of the non-aligned movement, it seems inevitable that the country will remain for the foreseeable future a critical object of Soviet and American concern.

The Soviet Union may be tempted, in particular, to exploit the nationalities question as a means of pressuring the Yugoslav government to accommodate its interests. At the extreme, Moscow might even go so far as to promote the country's dismemberment. Such an outcome would eliminate Yugoslavia as an alternative model for both the restive populations of Eastern Europe and the countries of the Third World being courted by the Soviet Union. As a bonus, the main obstacle would be removed to Soviet efforts to wrest
control of the non-aligned movement through the good offices of Cuba.

The Soviet Union has long sought to strengthen ethnic nationalist sentiments among the Yugoslavs. Under Stalin in the 1920s and 1930s the Comintern supported the creation of separate Serb and Croatian Communist Parties rather than a single unified Party, an effort that Tito opposed in one of his earliest signs of independence of Moscow. Stalin also fostered the sense among the Montenegrins that they were a separate nationality from the Serbs, also in the interest of detaching the southern part of the country from the north, a tactic that then as today might have resulted in Soviet access to the Adriatic. After the war Tito sent loyalists to Montenegro to engineer the ouster of top Montenegrin Party leaders following Moscow's lead.

Under Brezhnev the Soviet Union has apparently encouraged Bulgaria in its claims that Macedonia is an artificial nation created only in 1945. While respecting their border with Yugoslavia in terms of the Helsinki Final Act, the Bulgarians continue to lay the basis for a future claim on Yugoslavia's "Bulgarian" republic. Yugoslavia is also potentially subject to pressure from Albania with respect to the ethnic Albanians inhabiting the autonomous province of Kosovo. The recent warming trend in Soviet-Albanian relations, apparently prompted by Enver Hoxha's dispute with the Chinese, may provide Moscow with another pressure point on Yugoslavia in the future.

Reports by the Yugoslav ambassadors to Sweden and West Germany that the Soviet Union had links with the extremist Croatian Ustashi
during the outbreak of Croatian nationalism in 1971 have strengthened the impression that Moscow is prepared, under the right circumstances, to manipulate the single most explosive ethnic antagonism within Yugoslavia. The underlying calculation behind such policies is probably that a truncated Yugoslavia, even if Croatia and Slovenia turned west, would pay strategic dividends by giving Moscow predominant influence in the south, including use of the Bay of Kotor on the Montenegrin coast.

Even short of Yugoslavia's dismemberment a persistent source of apprehension to the United States has been the question of Soviet access to Yugoslav naval support facilities and the possibility that at some time in the future a more complaisant Yugoslav government might yield to Soviet pressure for establishment of a full-scale naval base on its coastline. With major ports, shipbuilding and overhaul facilities running from Rijeka in the north of Croatia to the Bay of Kotor, Yugoslavia would be able to provide all necessary support services to sustain the Soviet Mediterranean squadron. Since 1974 Yugoslavia has permitted, under a revision of a more restrictive 1965 law, three warships and two naval auxiliaries of any foreign country to be within its territorial waters at any time. Since the earlier law had prohibited the presence under normal conditions of more than three combatants without making provision for auxiliaries, this change offered Moscow more liberal port visit rights by adapting to the Soviet Navy's practice of sending auxiliary ships to accompany combatants visiting non-aligned states. At the same time the 1974 law placed tonnage limits on foreign naval vessels that might be repaired at Yugoslav
naval shipyards (in practice, Tivat in the Bay of Kotor) and specified conditions under which such work was to take place. The purpose of these last conditions was to assure Yugoslav control over overhaul operations and thereby forestall any gradual evolution of access rights into foreign base rights. Accordingly, repair work on any naval vessel cannot last longer than six months, has to be performed by Yugoslav shipworkers, and has to be approved in advance by the government. No more than a third of the crew can stay over in port, ships have to enter port without ordnance, and foreign states are denied the right to maintain fuel and repair storage depots on Yugoslav soil.

From one standpoint these restrictions are a source of reassurance that Belgrade is determined to offer facilities to the USSR only on its own terms. And in fact, in August and November 1976 it is reported that Tito vigorously rebuffed personal demands from both Admiral Gorshkov and Brezhnev himself not only for something close to naval base rights in Yugoslavia but also unhampered over-flight rights and permanent Yugoslav representation in Warsaw Pact military discussions. No less important an indicator of its independence, Yugoslavia has sought since 1977 to improve markedly its relations with both the United States and the People's Republic of China. Subsequent disagreements with Moscow over Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, Cuba's efforts to re-orient the non-aligned movement in Moscow's direction, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have reinforced this trend.

Nevertheless, other signs point to the present limits of Yugoslav independence. One early sign was the decision a month
after Brezhnev's November 1976 visit to establish a prohibited security zone at Tivat, where Soviet warships are repaired, a zone not extended to include Sibenik, where Yugoslav naval vessels are overhauled. More significantly, Yugoslavia, while producing domestically two-thirds of its arms and equipment, remains dependent on the Soviet Union for most of its arms imports, especially heavy arms and SAMs, even as it seeks to diversify its sources of supply. Moreover, Yugoslav officials have recently begun to supplement their earlier denunciations of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ("we condemned the action even before the victim did") with vague allusions to involvement of other great powers in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion. Although Yugoslav-U.S. relations may be at their warmest level in many years, the result is a somewhat confused picture. Some Yugoslavs themselves profess concern that the balancing act required by non-alignment, by causing bewilderment domestically, might lead to Soviet miscalculation of the Yugoslav popular will to resist Soviet pressure and, even, armed intervention.

II. THE ROLE OF GROUND RULES

A broad array of American policies may be conceived that might be expected to have a favorable impact in reducing superpower rivalry over Yugoslavia and in enhancing that country's internal strength and unity. In addition to unilateral and bilateral U.S.-Yugoslav political, economic and military measures, multilateral efforts to restrain competition have a potential role to play. Confidence-building measures within the framework of the CSCE offer one approach in this context. The same may be true of agreements to limit naval
activities and access rights in the Adriatic. Measures to limit transfers of conventional arms, however, would appear to be less appropriate. In another sphere clandestine operations by Soviet intelligence agencies pose a potential threat to Yugoslav unity and independence. By their nature, however, they are not susceptible to regulation by agreed ground rules, which require reliable means of verification.

1. Limits on Conventional Arms Transfers

Insofar as the will and ability of the Yugoslav Army and republic-based Territorial Defense Forces to defend the country are an important deterrent to the use of external military force against the country, limits on the transfer of conventional arms to Yugoslavia could be inadvertently destabilizing. Since Yugoslavia remains dependent on the Soviet Union for advanced heavy weaponry and has annually purchased only $1 million worth of military equipment from the United States in recent years, such controls, highly hypothetical in any event, might chiefly operate in the present context to constrain Soviet deliveries. Moreover, CAT limits, especially in the area of advanced weapon systems, would damage the prospects of Yugoslavia's improving its defense capabilities in the area in which it is least self-sufficient and most vulnerable. Generally conceded to be a determined if-rough-hewn force, the Yugoslav Army needs, in the view of Western military experts, new technical equipment and training for it, particularly in command and control. Any prospective military threat from the Warsaw Pact would in future years involve surprise, with armor moving into the country (from Hungary and Bulgaria) together with
parachute assaults by some or all of the eight airborne divisions of the Soviet Army in advance of the tank thrusts along the main front. Yugoslavia has, therefore, clear need of an early warning system to detect concentrations of men and aircraft at airborne assault staging points both on Soviet territory and in Eastern Europe. Belgrade being a leisurely three-hour drive across the Pannonian plain from the border with Hungary, where four Soviet divisions are deployed, a similar capability to anticipate an armored attack ranks high on the Yugoslav list of defense needs. Beyond early warning requirements Yugoslavia also has need of sophisticated anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to deal with the twin threats of Soviet armor and air assault. The United States is a possible supplier of systems in all three areas, provided Yugoslavia can afford purchase of the expensive systems or overcome its reluctance to accept U.S. foreign military sales credits, regarded in Belgrade as possibly compromising its non-aligned status despite their utilization by other non-aligned states such as Peru. Any bilateral Soviet-American restraints in these areas would almost certainly run counter to U.S. and Yugoslav interests. Even superpower consultations would deepen Yugoslav suspicions of a deal behind their backs, apprehensions never very far below the surface since the Churchill-Stalin understanding in 1944-5 that there would be a fifty-fifty division of Western and Soviet influence in Yugoslavia.
2. Confidence-Building Measures

Confidence-building measures, on the other hand, have greater potential than CAT limits for preserving the security interests of Yugoslavia and, for that matter, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They also hold out the possibility that Soviet-American accord might not generate misunderstanding in Yugoslavia. The multilateral framework of the CSCE offers a forum for agreement that would include active Yugoslav participation. Moreover, multilateral measures of restraint would not ostensibly be designed specifically for the Yugoslav case or aimed at deterring any particular aggressor, thereby satisfying Yugoslav conceptions of the balance required by its policy of non-alignment. In practice, Yugoslavia, at both the Helsinki Conference and the Belgrade Review Conference, has been the most ardent advocate of confidence-building measures in Europe. At the Madrid follow-up meeting in November 1980, Yugoslavia will again likely take the lead in pressing for not merely "classic" forms of CBM's such as prior notifications, observer exchanges and the like but also actual limits on military activities.12

Implementation by signatories of the Final Act's requirement of advance notification of major military maneuvers (25,000 or more troops) is recognized by most Yugoslav scholars as having been technically in compliance with the Act's provisions. Nevertheless, in a larger sense Yugoslav officials remain dissatisfied with results to date for two reasons. The spirit, if not the letter, of this CBM has in their view been violated all
around by the practice of holding two or more consecutive maneuvers each of sufficiently small size not to require prior notification. As a result the functional equivalents of major military maneuvers have on several occasions taken place without notification. Second, the number of maneuvers in Europe has been increasing every year in the absence of actual limits on them.

In an era of strategic nuclear parity between the superpowers, military maneuvers by an external power or bloc in proximity to the border of a non-aligned state offer an opportunity to exert political-military pressure on that country as well as to conduct preparations for crossing the border if necessary. Yugoslav leaders, mindful of the precedent set by Warsaw Pact maneuvers in and around Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, clearly believe their country's security would be substantially enhanced by further strengthening the military maneuver regime. Notification procedures could be tightened with respect to the time limit for prior notification, now 21 days. Although the Soviet Union originally argued for a 5-day warning, it ultimately accepted the 21-day provision at Helsinki as a compromise with the West, which advocated a 60-day forewarning. This suggests the possibility that at the Madrid meeting an upward revision in the time limit might well be negotiable, perhaps to 45 days if not 60.

Additionally, the troop level requiring prior notice might be lowered below 25,000 to a figure closer to the original Western proposal of one division or 12,000 or more men. The Warsaw Pact countries, which initially had proposed a limit of one army corps or 45-50,000 men, might find a middle figure acceptable, perhaps the 18,000 level advanced by the neutral and non-aligned group at Helsinki. In light of Yugoslav complaints concerning
evasions of the spirit of the prior notification CBM, a stricter regime might also require advance notice of multiple simultaneous and multiple consecutive maneuvers.

The content of notification might also be made more explicit and detailed. Instead of permitting only disclosure of total troop numbers and the area and duration of maneuvers, provisions might be strengthened to require more detailed information such as unit breakdowns, the period of their maneuver activity, and the starting time of troop movements toward the maneuver area. In a related sphere the guidelines for exchange of military observers at maneuvers, presently a voluntary gesture extended at the discretion of the inviting state, would more effectively enhance mutual confidence if the provision for observer exchange were made mandatory and the "appropriate facilities and hospitality" mentioned in the Final Act were spelled out in a manner facilitating observation.

Ground rules promoting greater sharing of information about military activities in proximity to Yugoslav borders might usefully be supplemented by agreement at Madrid or elsewhere on mandatory notification of major military movements, action which the Final Act leaves to the discretion of participating states. Since unannounced military movements can create an element of surprise more ominous than maneuvers themselves, required pre-notification would enhance confidence. Detection of unnotified military movements in violation of such a provision would provide an early warning signal of presumptively hostile intentions and thereby facilitate effective counteraction. In either case the security of Yugoslavia, vulnerable to surprise attack across its borders with Hungary and Bulgaria, would be strengthened.
Valuable as reporting requirements may be, however, they cannot substitute for agreed limitations on military capabilities and activities themselves. Yugoslav officials and analysts clearly believe that among such limits arms reductions at the Vienna MBFR talks would yield the greatest dividends for Yugoslav security. As the seven-year duration of the talks suggests, however, their complexity and sensitivity for European and Atlantic security are sufficiently daunting to justify their exclusion from detailed consideration in the framework of ground rules examined here. It should be noted, though, that any agreement at Vienna on balanced reductions that succeeds in curbing Soviet offensive, particularly tank, capabilities is unlikely to benefit Yugoslavia unless redeployment is forbidden to countries outside the Central Front, like Hungary, that border on Yugoslavia. In this case Belgrade might find itself seriously disadvantaged by the outcome.

Constraints on military maneuvers, if agreed to by the United States and Soviet Union, would significantly promote Yugoslav and U.S. security interests by reducing tension, limiting the political pressure that maneuvers can create, and increasing warning time in the event of their violation. Placing a maximum on the size of permitted maneuvers might degrade NATO defense capabilities more than Warsaw Pact offensive capabilities since only NATO has in the recent past been in the practice of holding large exercises in the region. Nevertheless, the likelihood that a very large Soviet force would be required for a hypothetical invasion and occupation of Yugoslavia argues in favor of serious consideration of the possibility that maneuvers be limited in size, if not to 50-60,000 troops, as proposed by the USSR at the Belgrade Review
Conference, then to some figure impacting symmetrically on NATO and Pact force readiness. Negotiation of a fixed time-limit to maneuvers, perhaps two or three weeks, would also serve to reduce tensions by limiting the political utility of prolonged maneuvering close to borders in time of crisis, a form of pressure exerted by the Soviet Union against Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968.

Yugoslav security would significantly benefit from restraints on military activity in proximity to national borders. A bar on certain kinds of military flights along borders might provide the opportunity for longer warning times of air incursions. A system of flexible restraints might permit a limited number of military reconnaissance flights to guard against the destabilizing danger of surprise attack but prohibit altogether more threatening flights by fighter-bomber aircraft. Tensions along Yugoslav borders might also be reduced by restraints on electronic interference with radio communications.

Qualitative constraints on military maneuvers close to borders represent an approach to ground rules that have still greater stabilizing potential. Warsaw Pact tank forces in Hungary and Bulgaria pose the greatest military threat to Yugoslavia. Limits on the numbers of tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC's) engaged in border exercises, for instance, could radically slash the offensive potential of exercises. In this respect it bears noting that the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the Czechoslovak reformists in 1968 was achieved by tank forces rather than infantry. Although an outright ban on the use of tanks and APC's in maneuvers close to borders would have maximum impact,
less stringent limits with a sliding scale on permissible numbers of offensive weapons within one or more zones might yield similar dividends and be more readily negotiable.

Although an initial Warsaw Pact invasion of Yugoslavia, however hypothetical at present, would probably take place under cover of large-scale maneuvers, far larger numbers of troops would have to be moved closer to the Yugoslav border as part of a serious effort to occupy the country. For this reason mutual confidence in the likelihood of restraint by the Soviet Union and United States would be significantly reinforced by negotiation of limits on major military movements above and beyond any accord concerning prior notification of them. Most effective would be agreement to limit the area where military movements of a threatening character would be allowed. Along these lines there might be a ban on all military movements except for normal redeployment and replenishment in border areas, which might be defined as within 50-150 miles of frontiers. Limits on large-scale military movements in and out of potential staging points for airborne assault might be more difficult to conceptualize and negotiate but would merit consideration. Together with a regime of prior notification of permitted military movements, such a series of measures would allay some of the worst-case apprehensions of Yugoslav defense planners.

One of the persistent questions raised privately by Yugoslav foreign policy officials and international relations scholars is why the Soviet Union should have such large concentrations of forces near Yugoslav borders. The rhetorical nature of the
question suggests that Yugoslavs, at least, would find reassuring a commitment by the superpowers to measures of disengagement. One approach would be to thin out foreign offensive forces in specified border zones. By restricting only (or largely) foreign forces, this measure would leave intact whatever Yugoslav troops are necessary to defend against surprise attack. While Hungarian and Bulgarian forces would remain similarly unaffected, it seems less likely that their deployment would exert comparable political-military pressure on Belgrade. This would be particularly true if the thinning-out regime applied to specific categories of primarily offensive weapons, allowing the Yugoslavs to maintain defensive positions close to their borders. There are, of course, scenarios in which anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons can be used for offensive operations and, on the other hand, in which tanks and fighter-bombers perform defensive functions. But restricted deployment of Soviet tanks and fighter-bombers, if Yugoslavia's clearly defensive weapon systems were unaffected, would probably not be construed by Hungary and Bulgaria as diminishing their security vis-a-vis Yugoslavia and would substantially ease Yugoslav apprehensions. Decreased deployment of forces and weapons in other sensitive areas, perhaps near airfields and railroad junctures, might also merit exploration. Limitations utilizing other criteria might also apply to categories of weapons and logistical capabilities. Fighter-bombers possessing a known range might be restricted to bases far from borders so that they could not, without repositioning, be used in an offensive
operation. Fuel stocks and ammunition storage sites might also be moved to the rear, complicating and delaying mobilization for attack.

Consideration of any combination of disengagement measures on a Europe-wide basis, whether multilaterally or bilaterally between the United States and Soviet Union, will have to include an assessment of their impact on security of allies. If such measures were negotiated within the CSCE framework, provision would have to be made to insure that the security of West Germany would not be diminished, possibly by exempting East and West Germany from such measures. Since the forward deployment of NATO forces in the Federal Republic is critical to the credibility of alliance commitments to come to the FRG's assistance immediately upon attack, disengagement rules would have to be drafted with care.

Any measures, whether Europe-wide or more narrowly applied, would require a foolproof system of verification that would allow early warning in event of violation. Absent early warning, offensive forces violating the regime to mount an invasion of an adversary would be greatly advantaged by the faithful observance of any strictures applied to defensive forces in the disengagement zone on the other side of the frontier. The asymmetry favoring the offense in this case would inadvertently create an incentive for aggression. Assurance of early warning, then, is a necessary component of disengagement schemes. Reconnaissance flights along borders together with satellite observation might
provide such assurance although listening posts on the ground and on-site observers at key installations would strengthen monitoring capabilities. Interference either with national technical means of verification or with the performance by on-site observers of their tasks would constitute a violation of the regime (and would itself provide early warning of impending attack).

3. Limits on Naval Deployments and Facilities

Although proposals to limit the naval inventories of the United States and Soviet Union have been made by various groups in recent years—and have historical precedent in the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty and the 1930 London Naval Treaty—inventory limits would have at most an indirect effect on Soviet and American deployments in the Mediterranean Sea. Accordingly, the emphasis here is upon naval deployments and access to naval support facilities. Several of the elements of a proposed naval regime for the Mediterranean might impact negatively on the interests of the United States or its NATO allies but serve a useful purpose in reducing the potential for East-West rivalry over Yugoslavia. Since the Mediterranean is a large body of water where protection of U.S. interests entails a diversity of commitments with respect to littoral states and might some day involve a need to project power overland toward states bordering on the Persian Gulf, the following discussion of naval limits will seek to focus on measures relevant to the Adriatic. Yugoslav officials and analysts are themselves interested in applying confidence-building measures to naval activities in the area.
The Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, concluded in 1972, furnishes an optimistic precedent for bilateral agreement on limiting naval activities of a tactical nature. But measures in that accord to limit chances of collision, harassment, and simulated attack have only marginal relevance to the task of preventing either a naval confrontation over Yugoslavia or a political-military confrontation over access to naval facilities on Yugoslavia's Adriatic Coast. Nevertheless, by requiring at least 3-days notice of naval activities that might create a hazard to navigation, it testifies to the potential negotiability of more far-reaching measures to restrain naval competition.

In the field of prior notification of naval activities, agreement to give notice, say, 21 to 45 days in advance of ship deployments and exercises, in the Mediterranean generally or Adriatic specifically, might forestall the possibility of naval threats to Yugoslavia's independence in time of crisis. In principle prior notification of naval exercises should enhance Yugoslavia's confidence in its own security, much as in the case of notifying maneuvers of ground troops. Yugoslav international relations experts have themselves explored the desirability of such a naval CBM. Yugoslav representatives engaged in preparations for the Madrid review conference have also played a leading role in winning endorsement at a June 1980 meeting at the expert level of neutral and non-aligned CSCE participants of proposals for prior notification not only of naval exercises but maneuvers of amphibious forces as well.
Like prior notice requirements for maneuvers of ground forces, the same principle applied to naval-related activities would help to prevent surprise and restrict opportunities to use unannounced exercises to pressure other parties. Advance warning of new ship deployments into the Adriatic together with information concerning length of stay would reinforce the effect.

From a Western standpoint, however, it is less than clear whether such requirements, even if confined to the Adriatic, would reduce potential threats to Yugoslavia's independence. The geographic and force asymmetries that exist on the ground along Yugoslavia's borders militate in favor, from NATO's standpoint, of the restraint imposed by prior notification of ground troop exercises. But the naval superiority of the U.S. Sixth Fleet over the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, particularly as one leaves the Eastern Mediterranean—indeed, the possible superiority of the Italian Navy over Soviet naval forces likely to appear in the Adriatic—means that naval asymmetries favor the West. This suggests that a naval notification regime parallel that for ground force maneuvers would be to NATO's disadvantage. Delays in shows of naval force occasioned by a prior notification requirement would asymmetrically hamper the application of NATO leverage in response to any hypothetical Soviet threat on the ground. One might be justified in speculating that Soviet resistance to more restrictive CBM's applicable to ground forces stems in part from the same calculations of relative advantage. Although this line of analysis leads to a somewhat pessimistic prognosis for the negotiability of further CBM's in Europe, quite aside from
the impact of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan on all East-West negotiations, a wide range of factors apparently remains at work furthering Moscow's interest in maintaining and strengthening detente in Europe. The asymmetries in naval and ground forces in the region also suggest the possibility, perhaps remote, of a trade-off in which the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact might surrender some greater degree of freedom of action on the ground in return for greater NATO and American restraint, de facto, at sea.

The same logic as above would appear to apply even more strongly to measures that would place actual limits on naval activity in the Adriatic. The most extreme form of naval limits would apply to the Adriatic the Yugoslav proposal to turn the Mediterranean into a "Sea of Peace" by banning all foreign ships from its waters. Given what appears to be the predominant analysis of the Yugoslavs themselves with respect to the nature of the threat to their independence from the Soviet Union--that Moscow will play a patient, waiting game, allowing developments within Yugoslavia to take their own course while discreetly applying political-military pressure to influence their evolution in the desired direction--one might question the logic of seeking the simultaneous removal of the Sixth Fleet and Soviet Fifth Squadron from the Mediterranean.

Limits on Soviet and American naval activity in the Adriatic would probably impinge disproportionately on the carrier task forces of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. But to the extent limits on exercises and deployments enhanced the relative importance of the Italian Navy, which deploys approximately 40 ships of the corvette
size or larger from 10 coastal bases, the net result might very well favor NATO. Because the Soviet Union is not unaware of these considerations, one might expect Moscow to argue that the forces of Adriatic littoral states be included at some stage in the restraint regime. Two distinct regimes with different requirements would probably have to be established for littoral and non-littoral states, particularly with respect to limits on ship deployments. The Yugoslav Navy -- whose larger vessels include 5 submarines, 1 destroyer, and 3 corvettes -- and the Albanian Navy, with 3 old, formerly Soviet submarines, would remain unaffected by any restraints on littoral states short of virtual demilitarization of the Adriatic.

One approach to naval limits would be to restrict the length of time that a set number of foreign ships of various categories might be permitted to sail or maneuver in the Adriatic. Calculations of relative equity would present serious complications, but less formidable than those being addressed at the MBFR talks. The number of exercises could be regulated along with their location so that littoral states could be assured that they would occur no closer to their shorelines than a set number of nautical miles.

In view of the highly sensitive nature of foreign naval access to Yugoslav port facilities, an alternative or supplementary effort might be made to buttress Yugoslavia's existing limitations on access to its harbors. This might be done with or without parallel limits on access to Italy's ports on its Adriatic Coast. The
presence of two NATO naval commands headquartered in Naples would alone require that restraints apply to Adriatic coastlines of littoral states rather than to littoral states as such. Agreement not to seek or offer any expansion of existing access rights would diminish the prospect of future Soviet demands on the Yugoslav collective leadership, which is bound to be weaker and less unified than under Tito. More ambitiously, a subsequent effort might be launched to restrict access to Yugoslav repair facilities to non-combatants or merchant ships. However, insofar as only one U.S. Navy vessel has been repaired at a Yugoslav port since 1974 while the Soviet Navy has annually averaged a dozen operational visits in the past three years,18 Moscow may not find such a proposal very enticing.

If some combination of naval and ground force guidelines, perhaps offsetting each other's asymmetries, were to be negotiable, the most favorable negotiating forum would probably be the CSCE where a subgroup of participants concerned with Mediterranean or Adriatic security might provide the locus for discussions. Such a forum has the not inconsiderable advantage of being in existence and being acceptable to all potentially interested parties (except Albania). Yugoslavia's strong commitment to the multilateral processes of the CSCE would promote its willingness to discuss sensitive matters bearing directly on its security and independence.
In short, the CSCE offers the most promising means of constructing a system of early warning devices and restraints that, when triggered, will permit timely countermeasures to manage the developing crisis. The demands of crisis management, however, argue strongly against any prior imposition of restraints on conventional arms transfers to Yugoslavia and make self-defeating any limits on naval activities not matched by constraints on ground forces.
FOOTNOTES


5. During the mourning period following Tito's death, the Army command in Croatia expressed its Yugoslavism by flying only the Party flag and the Yugoslav national flag while other Zagreb institutions flew, in addition, the Croatian national flag.


15. Radovan Vukadinovic, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb University, interview, June 18, 1980.

16. Acimovic, interview, as cited above. Acimovic, deputy chief of the Yugoslav delegation at the Belgrade Review Conference and de facto deputy head of his country's delegation at Helsinki, chaired the meeting in question.

17. Albania, which was the one European state to reject a role in the CSCE, denouncing it as a Soviet American conspiracy, would undoubtedly refuse to join in such an agreement in any event.

Chapter 5
Conclusions: Ground Rules Re-assessed

The analysis in the case studies of the Horn of Africa, southern Africa and Yugoslavia leads to several tentative conclusions concerning the applicability of ground rules of detente to restrain Soviet-American rivalry in regions of past, present and prospective tension. The Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean represent a region where Soviet-American rivalry has been superimposed on a local conflict that broke out in the recent past and continues, only somewhat abated, at the present time. Although such categories are necessarily fuzzy, the Horn might be called an area of past-and-present crisis. Southern Africa, on the other hand, has yet to mature into a full-scale crisis involving the Soviet Union and United States in direct rivalry although the contours of a potential confrontation have lately been emerging. Defined as including the Republic of South Africa and Namibia, southern Africa represents a present-and-future area of crisis. Yugoslavia, by contrast, is presently not even a smoldering crisis region but threatens to become one at some time in the future. It fits the category of a region of potential future crisis.

Selection of the three regional case studies on the basis of their stage of maturation into crisis was prompted by the expectation that analysis might lead to a calibration of ground rules relevant to different stages of crisis development. The tentative conclusion of the study is that Yugoslavia offers the most fertile ground for elaboration of restraints on external involvement and that southern Africa probably presents the least
promising outlook for agreement on ground rules. The Horn of Africa represents an intermediate case. It would, therefore, be difficult to argue necessarily that "the further along a crisis is, the more difficult it is to contain." But the Yugoslav case suggests that the best opportunity for forestalling crisis exists well in advance of even its incipient stage. Although Yugoslavia may be only a potential future locus of crisis, the array of Soviet and American forces and commitments in the surrounding area is, nevertheless, far greater than in the Horn or southern Africa and has been in existence far longer. The conclusion is tempting that as a statistical probability "the more there is that can be limited, the more likely are some kinds of limits." Agreement at Helsinki in 1975 on confidence-building measures in Europe and their reasonably successful implementation provide modest support for the proposition. Active preparations to extend the CBM regime at the Madrid follow-up meeting in November, in the face of the chilly atmosphere created by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, underscores the point.

The relative success of CBMs in Europe and the clear possibility they may in the future be broadened and deepened to the benefit of stability in Yugoslavia suggests a number of other hypotheses. The generally good Soviet record of observance of the confidence-building measures (if not human rights provisions) of the Final Act lends weight to the view that, whether from a desire for reciprocity or out of bureaucratic habits of compliance, international agreements exert at least some autonomous pressure on states in the direction of compliance. The Yugoslav case also
suggests that, when a crisis is still only in the offing, the prior existence of multilateral mechanisms and established precedents makes for substantial opportunities to reach accord on ground rules. Functioning multilateral mechanisms of which the superpowers are members, like the CSCE, help to channel broad pressures in the direction of agreement on mutual restraints. Although not fully institutionalized, the conduct of regular review conferences creates pressures for compliance and for extension of restrictions to new functional areas, as from prior notification and exchange of military observers to actual limits on military activities. By comparison, the Organization of African Unity, functioning more as an advocate than a forum for agreement between adversaries, and, in any event, not including the USSR and U.S. in its membership, has not functioned as successfully in this regard.

Another factor contributing to the negotiability and potential effectiveness of ground rules has to do with their objective. Where it is to preserve the international status quo, as in Yugoslavia and Europe, agreement seems to be favored. As argued earlier, international agreements tend to serve the interests of the status quo, if only because their revision to accommodate changes in the environment is often awkward and usually delayed. Governments in power naturally, if not invariably, seek to legitimize a system that accords them legitimacy. Much more difficult is the task of winning broad international agreement to change, especially domestic social change, if only because change can take so many forms. In this light it is not surprising that a situation so much in flux as southern Africa and in which demands for domestic change are so
prevalent is far less amenable to the erection of a formal system of restraint. In an intermediate position appears to be the Horn of Africa where challenges to the internal distribution of power by proponents of change have not been the primary propellents of the international crisis. In Ethiopia, to be sure, the Eritrean rebellion has been one factor leading to the presence of external forces in the country. But bilateral agreement by Mogadishu and Addis Ababa on a common boundary, entailing a change in position by either government -- a minor event by comparison with demands for change in southern Africa -- would remove the most serious cause of the crisis most likely to embroil the superpowers.

The case study of Yugoslavia lends credence, too, to the belief that incrementalism is the most promising approach to enacting a code of detente. Because of the regularity of CSCE review conferences, there is the evident opportunity to revise and perfect applications of previously agreed upon principles. If all parties agree that prior notification is a useful principle for the holding of large-scale ground maneuvers, it is logical to seek their extension to smaller-size ground maneuvers, to amphibious troop exercises and perhaps even to naval exercises. The injunction in the Final Act that parties voluntarily notify other states of smaller-scale ground maneuvers and major military movements leads in a similar direction. If all parties find that in implementing these initial CBMs, their confidence is enhanced, it is only logical to extend the principle of more openly informing others of military activities to such areas as military budgets, an extension which the neutral and non-aligned may seek at Madrid. In the Horn of Africa incrementalism has less
to build on, but there limits on specific kinds of advanced weapon systems and heavy armaments are more likely to be negotiable than blanket proscription of all conventional arms transfers. Limits on transfers of tanks, helicopters and combat aircraft would substantially diminish the ability of Ethiopia and Somalia to wage a war that does involve the Soviet Union and could entangle the United States. In some cases, however, such as southern Africa, an incremental approach (or any other) to ground rules seems less promising. Unlike the Yugoslav case, there are no precedents to build on, and, unlike the Horn, tension cannot be eased by highly selective restrictions on particular categories of advanced weapons systems. Moreover, the most stabilizing ground rule would probably be a ban on the introduction of all external forces into Namibia and South Africa -- a measure having the advantage of merely freezing the status quo but one that over time would impact asymmetrically in favor of an unacceptable social status quo in the Republic. 

One might also conjecture that agreement on the exclusion of external military personnel, particularly combat troops, from a region is not likely to be negotiable if either superpower is plainly not going to introduce its own forces or those of a proxy into the area. The clear unlikelihood that U.S. forces would be sent to Namibia or the Republic of South Africa diminishes the marginal incentive for the Soviet Union to agree to a system of restraints on Cuban forces, which for other reasons have apparently not been introduced yet into Namibia. Once either superpower has introduced forces under its control into the region in the absence
of a countervailing response by the other, as is true in the Horn, prospects for an accord would seem to dim.

The existence of a rough parity between the Soviet Union and United States in the form of military presence is, therefore, an important precondition for a regime of mutual restraint. Aside from perceptions by the stronger superpower that it has nothing to gain from the bargain, the weaker superpower will in any event have less leverage on its client, making it more difficult to restrain the client in its relations with its own counterpart in the region.\(^1\) The result fuels the insecurity of the stronger superpower's client, increasing its incentive to maintain the foreign military presence on its soil.

Nor would the application of functionally different restraints by each superpower, military in one case and economic in another, always seem to be promising. At least in the South Africa case, where the United States has little military involvement that it can offer to limit, American economic pressure, would be difficult to calibrate with Soviet-Cuban measures to cut off arms supplies to black guerrilla movements or deny SWAPO access to Soviet and Cuban camps in Angola. The fact that such economic pressure would have to be exercised largely through private corporate channels further complicates this approach.

This dynamic of regional politics makes it evident that under some circumstances a code of detente applicable to a region will be more negotiable if a broader linkage is employed at the global level in Soviet-American relations. The threat, or promise, to link apparently unrelated issues provides the opportunity to right a regional imbalance of influence by invoking costs or benefits in
another geographic or functional sector where an opposite imbalance exists. While examination of broad linkage strategies is beyond the scope of this report, the relative paucity of U.S. influence in Africa suggests that agreed restraints on future Soviet-Cuban military support for guerrilla movements will most likely come about by the practice of linkage to areas where the United States can offer or deny Moscow (and Havana) something of value. Even in Europe, where the United States enjoys a large military presence, techniques of linkage have proved useful in the past. By offering Moscow recognition of post-war boundaries in Eastern Europe and the prospect of large-scale trade and technology transfers, the Western states won Soviet acquiescence to human rights provisions and confidence-building measures in the implicit bargain resulting in the Helsinki Final Act. In a period of relatively great growth in the Soviet Union's military capabilities and deployments abroad, linkage techniques offer the opportunity to invoke political and economic leverage, where the United States is often at advantage, to redress local military imbalances on the ground. In a local context, also, linkage may make sense in the military sphere alone. U.S. and NATO naval superiority in the Adriatic, for instance, might be used to offset the greater military power that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact can bring to bear on the ground along Yugoslavia's borders. Limits on naval activities might be traded for compensatory limits on naval access to Yugoslav ports and repair
facilities and on other confidence-building measures limiting ground maneuvers and troop movements.

The broader the trade-off, however, the more likely that the negotiability and effectiveness of measures will require multilateral agreement including regional actors, and, in some cases, other external powers than the Soviet Union and United States. In the areas examined in this study, the People's Republic of China is not yet a significant factor comparable to the USSR or U.S. In areas of the world closer to its borders, however, China might have to be a party to agreed restraints. Given the state of Sino-Soviet relations, this need sharply reduces the transferability of lessons from the Horn, southern Africa, and Yugoslavia to such areas. In other areas, the demonstrated willingness of still other external actors, such as France in Zaire or East Germany in Southern Yemen, to insert themselves might also require multilateral agreement on restraints before one or the other superpower would agree to limit its own freedom of action. Because such a multilateral approach in these areas will itself often raise problems of negotiability, however, bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and United States should probably not be rejected in principle.

In summary, the applicability of ground rules of detente would appear to be partly a function of the stage of maturation of a crisis. But the specific characteristics of the region and the nature of the involvement of external powers are at least as important. Moreover, the functional nature of the guidelines is a critical variable. Limits on conventional arms transfers may be
stabilizing in one context but destabilizing in another. In some regions mutual restraints will be successful if they can achieve the modest objective of enhancing confidence. In others they face the formidable task of overcoming fundamental conflict over the internal distribution of power. In most cases, moreover, constraints on military activities will be more difficult to negotiate than agreements to share information on those activities, although the latter will be less effective.

Ground rules, designed to pose an obstacle to crisis, function as a sort of prior supplement to crisis management. They would seem to depend for their effectiveness on the following: broadly compatible interests, a stable regional balance of power, and comparable local leverage by the external parties. The trouble here, of course, is that such a situation is not likely to be an imminent crisis -- the rules are therefore valuable chiefly as an additional confirmation of the status quo. Hence, Yugoslavia -- not an imminent crisis -- seems the best case for their application, and, not surprisingly, the rules serve in large measure as an early warning system for crisis management techniques.