TITLE: The Debate on De-Stalinization in the USSR, 1961-1972: Novyi Mir vs. Oktiabr'

AUTHOR: Alexander Yanov

CONTRACTOR: The Regents of the University of California (Berkeley)

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Carl G. Rosberg

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SUMMARY

The bitter struggle in the USSR between reform, and the semi-Stalinist reaction to it, surfaced throughout most of the 1960s and early 1970s in the form of a vicious debate between the two main literary journals Novyi Mir (The New World) and Oktiabr’ (October). This study, by one of the contenders now in emigration, extrapolates from the debate to identify the major elements of the society in conflict and their convictions, passionately held and diametrically opposed, on such crucial questions as relations with the West, military superiority, management of the economy, corruption of the Party and society, and the purpose of socialism.

This overt debate was finally suppressed (involving the dismissal of the editorial board of one journal and the suicide of the chief editor of the other) with the spokesmen for the reaction in ascendance. The importance of the study lies in the author’s belief that the convictions and the struggle are only submerged, ready to burst forth in mortal combat again at any time, perhaps especially in the 1980s with the impending successions of leadership and under the pressures of still unresolved critical domestic and foreign problems.

In the USSR literature is a major political and ideological instrument, made totally subservient under Stalin to the propaganda purposes of the Party by merciless suppression, sometimes physical, of insubordinate voices, and exorbitant rewards of prestige, publication, wealth and power for diligent servants. The literary world was, and with few exceptions still is, part of a massive industry of "pseudo-culture" through which the Party exercises a virtual monopoly on literature, art, music, education and the humanities. The emergence of a decade-long debate between the two prominent journals bespeaks a broad cultural confrontation within Soviet society and particularly within the Party and power structure over the issues in question. At stake were not only the reputations, financial security, and power of the literati immediately involved, but those of whole echelons of interest groups behind them for whom they spoke.

The central issue was no less than the course of Soviet society epitomized by first Khrushchev’s and then Brezhnev’s policies of de-Stalinization within Soviet society, and of detente and expanding civil interchange rather than confrontation with the West. In fact, neither side supported the policies of Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

The reformists, grouped around the journal Novyi Mir, started by restoring aesthetic criteria based on classical Russian literature not only to their own journal but to Soviet literature as a whole, launching a savage attack on the literary standards of the pseudo-cultural apparatus.
and its journal Oktiabr', dictated as they were by propaganda and political expediency. Thus the orthodox literature of Oktiabr', based upon orthodox (Stalinist) ideology and proclaiming previously unassailable orthodox values, was subjected to merciless criticism and found no protection from the state that controlled both journals. As the debate progressed the Novyi Mir group voiced their convictions that the reforms of de-Stalinization did not go far enough and were inadequate. They proposed an alternative program of reforms. To the Oktiabrist orthodox stereotype of hostile capitalist encirclement, they contrasted the "human face" of the West. To the Stalinist hypertrophied centralized "vertical" management of economy, they posed horizontal managerial autonomy and regulation by the "socialist market." To the chronic stagnation of collectivized agriculture, they proposed a fundamental reorganization on the basis of a "link system" and the elimination of overbearing direction by rural "little Stalins." To the mystique of professionalism centered on ideological and moral vigilance, they projected the secularization of Party work and its subordination to rational economic criteria.

The Oktiabrists strongly opposed the reforms of de-Stalinization. They rejected the goal of economic rather than ideological and military supremacy over the West; the elevation of the consumer as the primary beneficiary of the state; the relaxation of cultural controls within the society and the opening to cultural interchange with the West. They sought as minimum to freeze the movement to reform and to reverse it if possible. They adhered to the image of the infallibility and omnipotence of the Party and its representatives and they postulated hostile Western encirclement with aggressive intent, a "fifth column" of enfeebling reformists, and a never-ending condition of economic and political "temporary difficulties" at home in justification of that Party role. They saw in the Khrushchev program the danger of corruption leading to the irreversible degeneration of socialism; for the workers excessive material welfare leading to consumerism and an unhealthy private-property instinct; for the intelligentsia access to Western bourgeois culture leading to individualism and a pro-Western lobby ("fifth column"), for the Party professional dissolution into economic work and the abandonment of the sacred moral and ideological mystique. All of that in head-on collision with reformers for whom it was precisely Stalinist orthodoxy that was the source of corruption and degeneration of society. In their search for support the Oktiabrists finally turned to the military as the island of purity and dedication to true orthodoxy in a society awash with reformist sin. That led to a reiteration of the dogma of asceticism, sacrifice, and the subordination of all else in support of the military in their eternal vigilance and goal of military superiority over the West.
It is more difficult to identify the interest groups or elements of society for whom the two journals spoke. The reform-minded seemed everywhere from Khrushchev and Brezhnev down, characterized by Oktiabr' as "economic and artistic muddleheads," who usually have advanced degrees... they speak foreign languages, are urbanized, civilized, and as a rule are concerned exclusively with the interests of their careers and the privileges connected with these. Sometimes they fly very high. Well known examples are the Academician and Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada Institute, Georgii Arbatov, the Academician and Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Politics, Nikolai Inozemstsev, and the former assistant Secretary of the Central Committee and editor-in-chief of the journal, Voprosy Filosofii, Ivan Frolov. These people are 'high-brow experts.' They head institutes and edit journals.... They are in the waiting rooms of the Ministers and Secretaries of the Central Committee and on the staffs of some members of the Politburo.

A study in 1968 revealed that the readers of Novyi Mir came predominantly from large cities and were by profession writers, journalists, and scientists.

The same study indicated that the readership of Oktiabr' consisted largely of party professionals in the provincial cities. This was consistent with the fact that the positive heroes of literature of the Stalinist era were precisely the "little Stalins," the obkom and raikom Party secretaries, the regional dictators whose careers would be destroyed by any reform of the Party political structure through de-Stalinization. From the priests of the pseudo-culture connected with Oktiabr', they received the legitimation of their role and their status as positive heroes in the Stalinist period; they supported the priests in the post-Stalinist period in the hopes of retaining that status.

The winning combination proved to be that between the Oktiabrists and the military, who proceeded to work together toward their mutual goal of freezing reforms and internal dissent. The implication of this study, however, is that the internal political struggle in the Soviet establishment, which was focused in the 1960s with such remarkable openness in the debate on de-Stalinization, continues to have potential significance in the period of transition ahead.
Introduction: The Alternative

Is there an alternative to the deepening economic, intellectual and political stagnation which has gripped the USSR (and systems of the Soviet type) in the 1970s? Are these systems doomed to economic bankruptcy, as has already happened in 1980 in Poland? Or to gradual degradation? Or to political collapse? Or will they live through a militarist action on a global scale, fraught with the restoration of a one man dictatorship?

The materials analyzed in the present work give us a serious basis for assuming that in the 1960s the Moscow liberal intelligentsia, grouped around the journal *Novyi Mir*, tried to work out an alternative to the approaching stagnation. The *Novyi Mir* alternative was remarkably analogous to the one which was being worked out at the same time by the liberal intelligentsia in Prague and in Budapest. It might have seemed (and to many within these systems, it did seem) that precisely then, in the 1960s, the time had come for a significant deepening of the process of reform—for, we may say, a Second Historical Experiment—after these systems had found in the course of the First Experiment during the 1950s, the strength within to free themselves from the regime of one man dictatorship and total terror. If the successful completion of the First Experiment required, chiefly, the destruction of the dominance of the political police, placed over the Party by the dictator, then the successful completion of the Second Experiment required, apparently, something more than this:
namely, the destruction of the dominance of those groups within the Party establishment which were obliged for their origin to the dictatorship and therefore saw in the deepening of the reformist process a mortal threat.

Fate, as we know, decided otherwise. In August of 1968, Soviet tanks suppressed the Czechoslovakian experiment, not giving us a chance to judge the degree of viability of the alternative which it offered. Soon after this, the reformist process in the USSR was frozen, thus putting an end to one more experimental attempt. And there began an unstoppable decline in the pace of economic growth, militarization of the country, stagnation of its agriculture, chronic food crisis, a "cold war" of the regime with the liberal intelligentsia, mass emigration, and dissident Resistance.

Now, in the 1970s, this behavior on the part of the Soviet leadership seems natural. The adherents of pedestrian cliches see in this only a new confirmation of their old truth: the "totalitarian system" is not compatible with a deepening of the reformist process, with managerial autonomy and a "socialist market," with the cultural independence of its citizens.

If for some reason the attempt at the First Historical Experiment had failed (that is, the de-Stalinization in 1953 had not taken place, and the regime of one man dictatorship had continued after Stalin), I am afraid that we would also have found this natural. And probably we would have explained this in precisely the same way: a "totalitarian system" cannot survive without total terror and one man dictatorship. In that case, the opponents of this point of view would have found themselves in a still worse position than they do now, when they have in their hands an experimental proof that systems of the Soviet type may still be capable of a Second Historical Experiment. I have in mind the experience
of Hungary in the 1970s, where the reformist process, fortunately, was neither suppressed by tanks, as in Czechoslovakia, nor artificially frozen, as in the USSR. This experience shows that at least one of these systems is compatible with the same reform program and with the same alternatives to the present stagnation, which the Moscow liberal intelligentsia of the 1960s offered to the regime as a condition for its collaboration with it. Judging by this single experience, in which the possibility of such a collaboration was experimentally verified, the "cold war" between the regime (insofar as it remains a regime of de-Stalinization) and the liberal intelligentsia is by no means either natural or inevitable. And neither are the stagnation of agriculture, the militarization of the country (and the consequent expansionist foreign policy), the food crisis, or the dissident Resistance. In Hungary there is no "cold war" or dissident Resistance. And the regime has not collapsed. On the contrary, it has proved to be more stable than in other places—or at least more stable than in Poland, where the deepening stagnation has already led, as we know, to economic collapse.

But if we take the Hungarian experience as an experimental confirmation of the thesis that the deepening of the reformist process by no means threatens the existing regime with disintegration, an interesting question arises. Namely, what is the origin of the stereotype, so deeply engrained in the minds of Soviet leaders, to the effect that the threat of disintegration always proceeds "from the left"—that is, from groups which have an interest in the deepening of the reformist process? The hypothesis on which the present work is based holds that, parallel to the program of the Second Historical Experiment proposed by the Moscow liberal intelligentsia, there was worked out among the Stalinist pseudo-intelligentsia
grouped around the journal *Oktiabr'*, an alternative program, one of the most important functions of which was to introduce into the consciousness of the leadership this stereotype of the "threat from the left."

This program, insofar as our materials permit us to judge, went considerably further than the prevention of the Second Historical Experiment and the freezing of the reformist process. However, for the groups that were interested in it, this freeze was a *sine qua non*. I am proceeding here from the assumption that sources exist capable of confirming this hypothesis with the greatest degree of reliability possible in a "closed" society. I have in mind belles lettres--novels, essays on public affairs, critical articles, and even poems--which appeared during the course of one unique decade of Soviet history, in which the Atlantis of political passions slumbering in the souls of Soviet people suddenly appeared on the surface. This historical instant, registered in literature, allows us to look into the intimate political laboratory of Soviet society. This Atlantis burst out as a furious debate on the fate of de-Stalinization in the USSR which thundered over the country in the 1960s, suddenly and sharply polarizing its literary establishment into two "parties," which were grouped around the two so-called "fat" journals (the traditional refuge of Russian critical thought)--*Novyi Mir* and *Oktiabr'*.² It was precisely in these journals and precisely in the course of the debate on de-Stalinization that there appeared, or so I think, materials which, given careful and systematic reading (and when translated from the foggy Aesopian language of hints into ordinary political parlance), can transmit to us important information both as to the internal structure of Soviet society and as to the strivings of individual groups within it.
The entire experience of my work in Soviet literature (and I might say the entire experience of my life) has convinced me of the simple fact that Russian writers, even very good ones—first-class writers—extremely rarely take up their pen with the intention of expressing themselves or of making a contribution to the treasury of world culture. As a rule, they do so in order to communicate to the reader their political credo (in the English-language literature this is expressed by the term "message," which unfortunately has no equivalent in Russian). What are we to say, then, of third-rate writers, not to speak of the pseudo-writers engendered by the Stalin era, who simply have nothing on their minds except this political message? How could these people be expected to behave in an era when the very existence of Stalinist pseudo-culture in the USSR was, apparently, openly called into question?

I am proceeding here from the assumption that the debate on de-Stalinization generated powerful currents of such political messages. There is certainly no doubt that, as we've already mentioned, they were firmly encoded, sometimes to a degree which made them quite incomprehensible to an outsider. Is it reasonable however, to ignore them as a historical source, merely because of the extreme difficulty of deciphering and interpreting them? Would it not be preferable to try to find in them, so to speak, a code key which would give us the opportunity to minimize the unavoidable subjective "noises" and maximize the objective information? As a participant in the debate, who used this "key" over the course of a decade, I tried to do everything in this direction that I could. I am not sure that I have succeeded entirely in this in the present work. Perhaps people who will undertake this job subsequently (if there are any) will be more successful than I. I wish them luck.
The "code key," however, was not my only problem. It is difficult if not impossible to evaluate the true role of the debate without at least trying to consider it in the broader context of Russian history and of the political dynamic of the post-Stalin USSR. I will also attempt to do this, in the concluding part of this work.

I.

ENCOUNTER WITH THE MIDDLE AGES

I permit myself to begin with a personal impression, which, however, to a certain degree predetermined many of the concepts on which this work is based. I first met Vsevolod Kochetov, editor-in-chief of Oktiabr', at a readers' conference devoted to his just-published novel Sekretar' Obkoma [The Secretary of a Provincial Committee]. The impression which this book made was horrible. Essentially, it constituted a model of that kind of pseudo-literature which was the predominant reading of Soviet people in the Stalinist period, and which, under the blows of the Novyi Mir party, was expiring before our eyes. And at the same time it was an insanely bold book. It was devoted to a Party scandal which had just burst forth and shaken the country. The First Secretary of the Riazan' Provincial Committee, Larionov (Artamonov in the novel), who intended to overtake the United States within one year in the production of meat and milk, obligated himself to increase the annual deliveries of these products to the state by a factor of three. Riazan' did overtake the United States. Its boss received the highest award available in the USSR—the Golden Star of the Hero of Socialist Labor. It soon turned out, however, that the "overtaking" was the result of a gigantic hoax (the meat had been bought in neighboring provinces) and of the complete ruination of the economy in Riazan'. Larionov was dismissed and shot himself, and his story became the symbol of Party corruption. This is what Kochetov had written his book about.
The most striking thing in it was that the author placed in the mouth of his negative hero, of the swindler Artamonov, declarations which were known to everyone: "Party work is not an end in itself. Party work is a means. You know what our Party work--yours and mine--will be judged by? It produced meat, it produced grain, it produced milk--there's your Party work for you." And still worse: "A Communist is anyone who fulfills the plan and not only the person who has a Party card in his pocket. . . Party work is primarily economic work." This was precisely the quintessence of the philosophy and Party policy of the then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev himself. Within two years this philosophy was destined to be embodied in the general division of the Party into two parts, subordinated respectively to the urban and rural economic tasks. And within two more years, the Khrushchev philosophy was destined to be rejected, ruined, and to perish. The paradox of the novel consisted, thus, in the fact that what the author declared to be a rotten philosophy and a ruinous policy was a philosophy and a policy of the heads of the Communist Party and the Soviet State. In a certain sense, this was a call for a coup d'etat, or at least a prediction of such a coup.

In Artamonov's character, Kochetov boldly parodied not only Khrushchev's efforts to dissolve Party work into an economic one, but also the style of his leadership—his megalomania, his tendency toward adventurism, his patronage of liberal writers, even his hunting habits and his vanity.

Even a reader who did not know that Kochetov's long-time patron was the then Number Two man in the state, Frol Kozlov, must have wondered who was depicted in his novel as the positive hero—that is, the First Secretary of the neighboring provincial Committee, Denisov, who opposed Artamonov. This Denisov (Kozlov) was, of course, the complete opposite
of Artamonov (Khrushchev). He pronounced the word "Party" with a prayerful
tremor. Khrushchev's revelations sounded to him like sacrilege: what
did meat and milk mean in a world bristling with hostile ideas, to which
Khrushchev had opened the doors wide, in starting his flirtation with the
West? By comparison with this "Party" work--that is, the struggle against
liberal ideas, which were spreading over the country like a plague--
economic work was only a secondary detail. Correspondingly, the West
for Denisov is by no means a partner in peaceful coexistence, as it is
for Khrushchev, but an extremely dangerous source of infection which
corrupts Soviet society. Denisov is a crusader, and for him "the perfection
of the weapons has always decided and still decides the issue."6

It is virtually impossible to escape the impression that behind
this struggle of two Party professionals at the provincial level, there is
subsumed the struggle of two Party professionals on the national scale.
And when did Kochetov predict the scandalous collapse of Artamonov (Khrushchev) in this struggle? In 1961, on the eve of the 22nd Party Congress,
when Khrushchev's star had reached its zenith and his power appeared un-
questionable. In this sense, Kochetov's novel seems a no
less powerful political message by the Oktiabrist camp than
Solzhenitsyn's story, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, which
appeared in 1962 in Novyi Mir. I am not, of course, talking about the
professional level of these two works, which are not comparable at all,
but about their significance as political messages. At the moment when
it must have seemed to an outside observer that the reformist process
had sunk in to the point of no return, it was boldly challenged, prac-
tically in the open (to anyone who knew how to listen). It is not without
significance to consider that, unlike Solzhenitsyn's, which was immediately
felt around the world, Kochetov's message went unnoticed by political observers.

I have to admit to my shame that in 1961 I didn't pay much attention to these matters either. I was young, inexperienced in literary politics, and for this reason concerned primarily with the backstairs-literary aspects of the case. I heard with my own ears how, at the discussion of Kochetov's previous novel, The Yershov Brothers, Aleksei Surkov, one of the bosses of the Union of Soviet Writers at that time, contemptuously remarked (quoting the Russian proverb relating to a bad cook): "You can't write these days according to principle: it may be tasteless, but at least it's hot." Now, in his new novel, Kochetov puts these very words into the mouth of a certain "literary snob," who is criticizing the writer Baksanov—the author's alter-ego. Here is what Baksanov (Kochetov) answers to this: "Excuse me, but I have fought and still am fighting. I am no gourmet, but a soldier, and I know from my own experience that in battle a mug of hot boiling water is dearer than the most exquisite delicacies. Excuse me, but you are taking your ease at the literary hearth, crossing your feet and putting the soles of your slippers to the fire. And I am on campaign."

It must be said that Kochetov had an interesting face, quite urbanized, subtle, even inspired. Had it not been for the extremely thin, almost invisible lips and the icy eyes, he might even have seemed attractive. But when I asked him during intermission: "Forgive my asking, Vsevolod Anisimovich, but whom are we fighting? What campaign are you on? And is it moral to abuse a colleague in public?," Kochetov's face turned to stone. Before me was the mask of a medieval crusader. "Excuse me," he replied, precisely like his character, "As long as those in the West
still exist, the war is not finished. And it will not be finished until our total victory. There can be no neutrals in it. Neutrals serve the enemy. They are traitors. What morality has to do with traitors?"

He departed, leaving me embarrassed. Such an inhuman force of conviction was in his face and in his voice, such a power of fanaticism. And this seemingly long-forgotten feeling of embarrassment returned to me many years later, when, here in America, I read and saw on television the speeches of another man, just as fearless a foe of Communism as Kochetov had been its soldier (speeches in which this man, among other things, violently attacked me). The name of this man is Alexander Solzhenitsyn. But the same inhuman force of conviction was in his face, the same dead mask of a medieval crusader again spoke to me with the voice of Kochetov: "Neutrals serve the enemy. What does morality have to do with traitors?"
And, just as with Kochetov, all who dare to question his message are traitors for him.

Of course, the credos of both men are different—at first glance, even contradictory. Nevertheless, they are strangely similar. While Kochetov was absorbed in the war with the world conspiracy of bourgeois liberals, Solzhenitsyn is burning with the idea of struggle with the worldwide Communist conspiracy. But just as Solzhenitsyn considers the liberals traitors and accomplices of the Communists, Kochetov saw in his critics (even the moderate ones, not to speak of the hated Novyi Mir party) traitors and accomplices of the liberals. In some fatal way, the liberals still proved to be the common denominator in both credos which are so different.

Both Kochetov and Solzhenitsyn fought, and both were on campaign, even in peacetime. Solzhenitsyn spoke of the third world war which had
begun in 1945. For Kochetov World War II had never ended. It is impossible to avoid the thought that Kochetov was the Oktiabrist Solzhenitsyn. But placing them side by side, I understood, perhaps for the first time, not only that my country is still capable of giving birth to people who seem to have emerged from the medieval womb of the "church militant," but also what a fearsome opponent Novyi Mir had in the debate on de-Stalinization.

II.
THE RENAISSANCE THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN

"What happens to a country's genetic/cultural pool when more than fifty million of its citizens--over a fifth of its population--die unnatural deaths or emigrate over sixty years?" asks Walter Clemens in an essay, "Russia's Critical Intelligentsia," in speaking of "the resurgence of a tradition unmatched even in the lands of free speech and xeroxing."

"What happens when many of these people are among the country's most talented individuals--entrepreneurs, army officers, party leaders, successful farmers, leading writers, and the intelligentsia? And what happens to a country's capacity for critical analysis when, in addition to physical disasters on the scale indicated, it has been sealed off from the rest of the world and severe limits have been placed on discussion within the country?"8

Even if we had no need to consider the debate between Novyi Mir and Oktiabr' in a broader, cultural-historical context, we would still probably not have a right to ignore these dramatic questions, which, it must be admitted, do not often enter the heads of foreign observers. We do not have the right to ignore them, if only because they lead us immediately into the heart of the problem which concerns us here. I would like only
to add to them one more question. For the country of which Clemens speaks was not defeated in war, was not occupied, and is not exploited by enemies. What happened to it was something worse: one part of it rose up against the other, Russia rose up against Russia, and it is exterminating itself. There is no enemy whose intrigues, machinations, and violence, could explain its misfortune. There is no one to accuse, no one to curse, no one to whom to complain. And for this reason my question is the following: how could it happen that a country which had been turned into an intellectual desert, not only did not lose the capacity for the rebirth of critical thought, but did not die spiritually and intellectually? How could there arise in it what is now the object of our analysis—a fierce debate on de-Stalinization?

In the thirty-five years which have followed the death of the dictator we have become used to a new Russia, where people know how to think independently, speak more or less freely, and argue fiercely. Involuntarily it begins to seem that it was always so. But this is an optical illusion. It is enough to look at the same Novyi Mir and Oktiabr', in the Stalin period, to become convinced of this. They are empty of all life. Not only depth of thought, but thought itself, its critical edge, is absent. Dark dogma rules tyrannically, obscure Party scholasticism replaced analysis, rhetoric replaced thought. Everything looks as though mankind had never experienced either the Renaissance or the epoch of the Enlightenment, as though there had never been on earth any Descartes or Hegel or even Marx, let alone Einstein. The Short Course of the History of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) replaced not only the history of thought but history in general.

Compare this with what appeared in the same journals in the 1960s, not to speak of the so-called samizdat of the 1970s, and it will seem
to you that you have come to some different country, and are breathing quite different air. This air is filled with challenge to dead stereotypes; it is rich in the oxygen of thought; it provokes critical analysis and calls for intellectual independence.

One can take various attitudes towards this miracle of the liberation of thought. One may speak of it with respect, as Walter Clemens does, or with contempt, as Jerry Hough does, who denies Russian intellectuals the right to interpret the problems of their country. However this may be, the meaning and attractiveness of this cultural renaissance consisted by no means in the level of the thought, which at times is truly naive and infantile, but in its independence. People seemed to be looking for the first time at ordinary things, at trite themes, at everything which had its fixed place established by others in the universe around them, and to be discovering suddenly that these things and these themes and their place in the universe, and that very universe had been named, constructed and defined incorrectly, and that they were in need of reinterpretation, renaming and redefinition. In this remarkable attempt to discover the world anew, in the new ideas which were born each day and which spread like a forest fire, in the long unheard thirst for independent thought, in the feeling of freshness and virginity of this reborn world, which it seemed could be settled over again—all of this, if you like, made up the essence of the cultural renaissance of de-Stalinization. And precisely for this reason it immediately had to take the form of debate and confrontation. The point is not only that censorship existed, as before, but also that the striving of some to reinterpret the world encountered the resistance of others whose interests demanded precisely the reverse—the defense of the departing dead kingdom of dogmatic Party scholasticism, which had given them birth and without which they could not survive.
Thus, on one side, the Middle Ages seemed to have collapsed and the time to expect new Descartes to have come, and on the other, a wave of reaction had arisen, promising new Loyolas. An irreconcilable battle raged, and there was no common ground between the two Russias--no room for compromise; the victory of one apparently promised the doom of the other.

However, everything did not turn out this way. The party of the renaissance did not give rise to its Descartes, but neither did the Oktiabrists put forward their Loyolas. The debate on de-Stalinization was suppressed--and everything swiftly began to darken, to lose its colors and to solidify. Ideas no longer spread like a forest fire, but rotted slowly in hiding. At the beginning of the 1980s, samizdat also began to die out. The country's honeymoon with its liberated thought--in the remarkable interval between the death of the dictator and the Brezhnevist dead season--ended. The Russian cultural renaissance which had begun so gloriously and had promised so much did not take place.

Does this mean that it has withered forever? Or does the liberated thought have a new blossoming in store for it after Brezhnev?

I don't think that we can answer these questions right now--particularly if we continue, as we do, to ignore the historically developed patterns in the behavior of the Russian political system in situations of major crises; in essence to ignore history. As a result our operational field is reduced to two or three generations, and leaves almost no room for intellectual maneuvering: any more or less non-trivial situation begins to look unprecedented, any change unpredictable. There are two major schools contending in Western Sovietology--the "totalitarian" one (which stresses the monstrosity of the Soviet system of total political control),
and the "revisionist" school (which in its extremes emphasizes that the Soviet polity is simply one more modern political species as "lawful" as the democratic one.) Both schools fight violently and disagree on every possible issue. Except one, namely that this species is unheard of in history in its fundamental parameters—to the point that the long and dramatic, and patterned, history of Russia is practically of no use in comprehending its behavior today and tomorrow.

Precisely for this reason the concluding part of the present work will be essentially an attempt to expand the operational field for possible prognoses, by including the historical dimension in our political discussions. Here I wanted only to register my fundamental disagreement with this artificial separation of the past from the present, history from the political sciences—and also to have the reader feel for a moment the atmosphere which we breathed in the 1960s—the atmosphere of the traditional struggle of Russia versus Russia, in which the very name of Novyi Mir ("New World") so aptly symbolized the renaissance, and the name of Oktiabr', (it was named after the October revolution of 1917), reaction.

I do not intend to write a history of the debate. At this point, I am just a witness and a participant. Only what I myself have remembered, found out, felt and understood, will be presented in this work. I proceed from the assumption that behind the two-party structure of the Soviet literary establishment, embodied in the confrontation of two fat journals, there stood the conflict and the confrontation of two bodies of their readers, or constituencies. And this conflict went far beyond the limits of a literary war. The journals were only the theater of this war, only the spokesmen for two worlds which divided Soviet literature and society—worlds which are called Novyi-Mirist and Oktiabrist only
for convenience. Therefore, it makes sense to begin our analysis of
the debate with an attempt to describe the constituency of Oktiabr'.

3. THE "PRIESTLY" GROUP

The Oktiabrists often complained of the destructive critical salvos
of the Novyi Mir party, and published detailed martyrlogies of the victims
of these attacks. Behind their complaints stood destroyed reputations
of writers, books devastated, hopelessly undermined prestige.

Here is one of these martyrlogies: "(Novyi Mir) has given a
ferocious critical thrashing to. . . V. Ocheretin's novel, The Siren,
the two last novellas of E. Karpov, N. Pochivalin's novella, Our Years
Fly Past, two novellas of A. Kalinin, M. Alekseev's novella Bread is a
Noun, V. Firsov's book Devotion, V. Chivilikhin's novella The Bobbin-
Trees, V. Tel'pugov's short story "The Wonder Tree," A Isbakh's and V.
Pertsov's books of literary criticism; it devastated the novel The Eagle's
Steppe by M. Bubennov and The Minefield by M. Godenko, Vladimir Fedorov's
story Mars Over the Cossack Pinegrove, and E. Dolmatovskii's poems."11
The words quoted, which are so reminiscent of the table of contents
of a journal, are those of I. Stadniuk, who was himself the victim of
critical attacks in Novyi Mir. Here are some more examples: "We have
been greatly harmed by the one-sidedly captious, group. . . line of Novyi
Mir"; "[On the pages of Novyi Mir] there has been carried on for a long
time a critical 'game without rules'. . . whole works are ground up and
raked over the coals, texts are torn apart, and the living soul is pressed
out of them. . . Such things did not happen, it seems, even in the worst
of times."12 The complaints quoted are by A. Dymshits and V. Chivilikhin,
who, of course, also suffered severely from the critical salvos of
Novyi Mir. It is very easy to carry on this mournful martyrlogy.
The writers who publicly complained of their critics were correct. Their books were actually "raked over the coals," "ground up," "torn apart," or, as one of the sufferers said in another place, "put before a firing squad." There is not the slightest doubt that the high priest of the Oktiabrists, Kochetov, is right in describing this mass attack as "the practice of literary murders." The suffering Chivilikhin is also right in declaring: "Such things did not happen even in the worst of times." In Soviet history it had never happened.

Of course, if Kochetov or Chivilikhin had been better read in the literary history of their country, they would have known that a precedent for mass "literary murders" of writers devoted to the regime had taken place—a century before, in the 1860s, when, after the death of another dictator, in the words of the tsarist chairman of the censorship committee, "the public literary organs, having acquired, or taken upon themselves, a misunderstood freedom, hastened to discuss and develop subjects which had previously lain outside the literary sphere."

One of the "Novyi Mirists" of that time, also grouped around the fat journals (Sovremennik and Russkoe delo), Dmitrii Pisarev, wrote with the same annihilating contempt for the "ground up" books of the Oktiabrists of that time: "Usually... literary compositions by ungifted writers are ignored by sensible critics... Everyone sees that this is trash,... and that no criticism can get rid of such trash, because there are always many people in the world who combine the genius of a six-week-old lamb with the ambitions of Alexander the Great. But when the ambitious lamb gains nationwide fame for its curlicues, then the critic must involuntarily break his contemptuous silence."
However, Pisarev (like, let us parenthetically remark, his heirs of the Novyi Mir party in the 1960s) was mistaken in thinking that he was making war only on "ungifted writers" who had composed "trash" and "curlicues." It is sufficient to look into any issue of Novyi Mir for the 1960s (there were 168 of them, and none, it seems, was without a couple, and sometimes a dozen, of "literary murders"), in order to become convinced that we have before us the systematic destruction of an entire literature and that the victims of it numbered in the hundreds, and that consequently it is a matter of a social phenomenon of primary magnitude.

The authority of Novyi Mir in literary matters was absolute with the broad public; and for this reason an author who had been anathematized in Novyi Mir was essentially expelled from literature, continuing to exist only on its obscure margins. The road to glory and influence was as a rule cut off for him. His material losses were no less severe. Soviet writers usually publish their work first in journals, then reprint it as separate books, and then publish it again—with other publishers, or, if they are lucky, in the publication of the so-called "Novel Newspaper" (Roman-Gazeta). Thus, the main income of the writer is from reprints. But it was difficult, scandalous, and caused a great deal of trouble to reprint pieces which had been panned in Novyi Mir. Only the generals of pseudo-literature could accomplish this. In short, the Oktiabrists could flourish (and become rich) only if they had a monopoly on the literary scene—the same monopoly which was destroyed by the very fact of the existence of the Novyi Mir party. This by no means signified—as might superficially seem to be the case—that in the changed circumstances, the Oktiabrists simply would have to sing a different tune. Their drama consisted precisely in the fact, as we will soon see, they did not know how to sing anything else. For them, being out of tune was equivalent to being out of business.
Who were they, the victims of these brilliant escapades, dagger-thrusts, venomous remarks, and destructive critical essays of Novyi Mir? It suffices to put this question in order to pass at once from the sphere of literary criticism to the sphere of social analysis. For it was a matter of a particular group in society with quite definite interests. These were the officially recognized artists, playwrights, directors, literary scholars, writers, whose books were published in editions of at least 100,000 (or a million, if they were reprinted in the Roman-gazeta, even two million if they were printed in, for example, Ogonek). Their incomes were unimaginable from the point of view of the average Soviet citizen, their status was unattainably high, their reputation as "engineers of the human soul" and "educators of society" was inviolable. This was a group of people, connected with the gigantic industry of pseudo-culture, created in the Stalin period, and able to exist only on condition that it observe a whole network of artificial rules and values upheld by the ideocratic state, and worked out for it by a whole army of ideologists and censors.

Under the conditions of the Soviet intellectual desert, where all living matter was either exterminated or frightened to death, these people imitated the intelligentsia of a great country.

Imitating writers of belles-lettres, they wrote books; imitating directors, they put on plays; imitating scholars, they wrote textbooks. There were thousands upon thousands of them. I am not in a position here to analyze either their works or their biographies. Their books, as a rule, were not translated into foreign languages, so that the reader cannot form a direct impression concerning them. However, I knew many of them, and had nodding acquaintances with others; I read almost
all the books which were "ground up" and, for my sins, "ground them up"
myself, and in this matter the reader will have to take me at my word. I
bear witness that the vast majority of them were grey, mediocre people
who wrote servile and semi-literate books (plays, scenarios, scientific
treatises, dissertations, poems, and textbooks). Thus, what we are
concerned with is by no means an inoffensive "grinding up" of literary
"trash." In a certain sense, the writings of the Oktiabrists certainly
represented what in civilized countries is known as "mass culture."
However, their pseudo-culture is by no means reducible to this pheno-
menon. It was instituted not for the sake of earning profits (although,
as we have seen, it was extremely profitable), and still less to entertain
the public, but for the sake of total ideological control over the popula-
tion of Russia, which has always been, as distinct from many other
countries (for example, the United States), a "nation of readers." It
is precisely this ideological function of pseudo-culture which made it
such a serious enterprise in the eyes of the late dictator that he was
willing to invest in it an immense amount of money and thereby to trans-
form it into one of the basic branches of the economy. The industry of
pseudo-culture produced, so to speak, the spiritual bread which was intended
in a certain sense to replace the real one. It created a special moral
climate in which work without adequate compensation turned out to be, not
a distortion but, on the contrary, in the dictator's words, "a matter
of honor, a matter of valor and heroism." The pseudo-literature worked
out a particular means of socializing the youth, which is almost incompre-
hensible to the inhabitants of civilized countries and which more than
compensated the dictatorship for the capital invested in the industry
of pseudo-culture.
One can imagine, although with a considerable effort, a situation in which "mass culture," is officially declared to be the sole permissible form of culture. It is difficult to imagine, however, the destructive consequences of a phenomenon under which people cease to be aware that they are surrounded exclusively by "mass culture," in which they do not even understand that it is "mass," taking it to be the only possible, and what in civilized countries is known as "high culture" is looked upon as rebellion or, in any case, a perversion. For this very reason, the workers in the industry of pseudo-culture must have constituted a quite definite, internally coherent, and extremely influential interest group. This is why undermining the monopoly of pseudo-culture went far beyond the limits of "clearing away of literary trash," and was transformed into systematic elimination of one of the important groups of the Soviet establishment, which (inasmuch as it was, so to speak, the custodian of the traditional ideological values of the ideocratic state) would perhaps be appropriately called the priestly group. The colossal investments taken from the economy and invested in the industry of pseudo-culture, were systematically de-valued and thrown to the winds by the criticism of Novyi Mir. The foundation of the gigantic trough out of which not only the pseudo-writers and pseudo-scholars, but also other more numerous and more powerful elements of the priestly group were fed (and in which, consequently, they were vitally interested), was systematically undermined.

I have in mind in the first place the "inculicators" (if it can be expressed in this way) of these traditional values--that is, the tens of thousands of teachers of the so-called ideological disciplines ("Marxism-Leninism," "dialectical materialism," "scientific Communism")
and the like), who taught from textbooks written for them by pseudo-
scholars and used as sources books written by pseudo-writers. I have
in mind, secondly, the professional ideologists and propagandists (on
the local and central levels) who were responsible for the smooth functioning
of the industry of pseudo-culture. As we will see, the interests of
all the elements of the priestly group were tied up in a single indissoluble
knot. A blow to one of these elements meant a blow to the entire industry.

And now there had appeared from nowhere, as if from underground,
"high-brow" critics, well-read in Russian classical literature, brought
up on Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Chekhov, who suddenly began to measure the
"trash," excreted in millions of copies by the priestly group, with the
criteria and measuring sticks of the Russian classics. The talk had
suddenly been switched to what is called in Russia Hamburg-style
scoring. This refers to the annual wrestling matches held in Hamburg in
which the bouts were scored and fought honestly in order to determine
the real rank of the contestants (as opposed to the usual practice in which
the bouts were commonly "fixed"). What could one expect from this other
than "literary murders?"

4. UNDER FIRE

Feeling their obligations to their constituencies, the Oktiabrists
naturally tried to present them to the reader in the best light possible.
Whether the heroes of their books were military people or Party profes-
sionals and activists or the pseudo-writers themselves, they were all
described in glowing terms as the embodiment of goodness and progress.
But, alas, whatever the Oktiabrists wrote about was turned by the fire of
Novyi Mir critics into its opposite. Where the former saw goodness, merciless
analysis discovered evil, and where they saw progress, their critics found reaction. Here is L. Lazarev reading G. Polityko's novella *Comrade Officers*, where the Soviet army, naturally, is represented as the source of valor and heroism, as a model to be imitated. The critic did nothing special other than string together quotations from the book itself—and suddenly the regular army appears before us as a sewer full of perversion and envy.  

The Oktiabrists provisionally and tediously swore love for the people: this was one of the rules of the game, and was so to speak in the order of things. But N. Il'ina took M. Alekseev's book, *About My Rolling Stone Friends*, and Iu. Burtin took another of his books, *Bread is a Noun*, and on the basis of the text showed both the fearful poverty of the Russian countryside and the horrifying indifference of the Oktiabrists to it. Il'ina virtually "put before a firing squad" a band of pseudo-writers drunk on the misery of a backwoods village (including one of the Oktiabrists' leaders, Nikolai Gribachev, editor of the journal *Sovetskii Sojuz*).  

S. Rassadin took a book of poems by the Oktiabrists poet A. Garnakerian, *Lyrical Attack*, full of high-flown oaths to the effect that the author is "free as the raging storm," that he is "winged," that he is "flying to the stars," etc., and shows—once again on the basis of the text—that the poet in fact is a self-infatuated and ignorant idler, and that he was taking pains to receive "wings" which were designed to carry him to the stars, "in a bureaucrat's waiting-room." You will agree that this is a surprising characterization of a book presented as a candidate for the highest literary award in the USSR—the Lenin prize (but, of course, it didn't receive anything). E. Isakov took the positive hero of E. Karpov's novella, *Don't be Born Happy*, and by a not particularly
complex critical procedure showed the "shabbiness" and "spiritual mediocrity" of the figure whom the author had glorified. On the other hand S. Papernyi, analyzing M. Kochnev's almost one thousand-page epic, The Shaking of the World, irrefutably demonstrated the shabbiness and spiritual mediocrity of the author himself.

This was not only a scandal but a kind of interminable nightmare: well-known writers with established reputations and solid incomes were openly accused not only of professional incompetence and human worthlessness but also of lying. Furthermore, they were accused of being ready to use any means to struggle for their astonishing privilege of getting money and official laurels for their lies. Analyzing Iu. Fedorov's book, The Eternal Flame, Iu. Roshchin calmly and murderously demonstrated the readiness of the ignorant Oktiabrists youth not to stop at baseness and slander in the fierce struggle for their monopoly.

The Novyi Mir critics went further, by hinting at the connection of this priestly monopoly with the very essence of the ideocratic state. "Grinding up" a dozen of Oktiabrists' books in his article, "On Craft Literature," F. Svetov demonstrated their common defect: the ideas, the "political postulates" on which they were based had outlived their time and were therefore false.

I cannot analyze here--nor, probably, is there any need to do so--the dozens of analogous critical salvoes loosed by Novyi Mir, which left behind them on the field of battle hundreds of wounded literary reputations. I will only say that this was a fantastic spectacle: orthodox literature based on the orthodox ideology and defending unshakable orthodox values, was caught in a murderous cross-fire--before the eyes of the State which silently observed this literary terror.
V.

THE TECHNOLOGY OF "LITERARY MURDER"

However, in order to give the reader a feel for, and a clear conception of, the technology of this "terror," let us describe here a single--but exemplary--critical salvo by Novyi Mir, which literally wiped from the face of Russian literature the novel by the high priest of the Oktiabrists, Kochetov, The Secretary of a Provincial Committee, with the mention of which we began this work. The marksman was Aleksandr Mar'iamov, who was legitimately guilty, as the reader will see, not only of a literary, but also in this case of a political "murder." He began his essay review (which took up 42 pages of brevier in the journal) by pointing to the same phrase which we have already quoted, where Kochetov contrasts the "soldier" to the "epicure," and the "cup of boiling, bubbling-hot water" to the "refined dishes" of snobbish literature. It isn't surprising that the review should begin this way. This phrase could indeed serve as the model for the whole Stalinist pseudo-literature, which naturally considered craftsmanship, talent, and artistic expressiveness as something highly non-essential (in another place, Kochetov said that "language, composition, craftsmanship of exposition are a matter of time").

One of the heroes of the novel, the writer Baksanov, is developing this thought of his alter-ego the following way: "Generally speaking, . . . I'm not much concerned about immortality. I'm more concerned about how I do my civic duty today. . . Mayakovsky said: 'Die, my poem, die like a common soldier!' Let my novels die in battle as common soldiers, as long as they fight."23

This open denial of literary professionalism--this, we might say, apologia for amateurish exercises--is turned by Mar'iamov into a spark
which is intended to blow up the entire arsenal of Oktiabrist pseudo-literature. "If we read these words attentively, it is not hard to notice that, in speaking of a campaign, Baksanov fails to penetrate into the essential nature of the old symbol, and that in quoting a line by Mayakovsky, he avoids its chief meaning. . . Yes, Mayakovsky said: 'Die, my poem, die like a common soldier. . .' But in the very same place, addressing his 'comrade descendants,' he wrote that 'my poem by labor will dig through the mass of years. . .' And this is what he says about literary labor: 'Poetry is the same as mining radium. You work for a year and get one gram.' An undemanding. . . hasty approach can lead only to the author's being in no condition to fulfill the tasks which he has taken upon himself not only tomorrow, but even today."24

"After all, in order to take one's rightful place in a campaign, one ought to be as well prepared and equipped for this as possible (you have to be skilled even at wrapping puttees) and in order to speak legitimately of the 'soldier's death' of a poem or a novel, one must consider a literary work as a formidable weapon--that is, one which is perfect and always ready for use: But the idea that craftsmanship is 'a matter of time' is a sign of disdain of one's weapon, obliviousness of the basic rules of campaigning and war. Continuing the same analogy, we can think of more than one instance where under battle conditions, an uncleaned and neglected weapon wounded the person firing it, instead of hitting the target."25

Thus, by taking up and turning around Kochetov's metaphor, Mar'iamov points it against Kochetov. This resulted in an amusing paradox. It was precisely Kochetov, as we already know, who declared that "the perfection of the weapon has always decided the outcome, and still decides it." And
carefully--word by word, sentence by sentence--analyzing his text, the critic demonstrates with murderous thoroughness, that the "weapon" which Kochetov offers the readers is "unclean, neglected," or in a word, useless and capable only of injuring the person who fired it. Consistently and ineluctably, he convicts the author of being "illustrative," "ignorant," "vulgar," "gray," and finally "banal." As a result, the reader who is following the development of the literary dimensions of the polemic finds spread before him an irrefutable picture of the most trivial kind of non-professionalism, not to say graphomania, dressed up in the bullet-proof vest of "fulfillment of present civic duty." The Oktiabrists simply don't know how to write in any other way, and they're outside of literature: such is the critic's verdict.

And here, essentially, the paradox ends. For it is now obvious to the reader that by the term "weapon," the author and his critic mean two quite different things. For the critic, this is something from the artistic realm—that is, a metaphor referring to a level of literary craftsmanship which can conquer the heart of the reader. For the author this is something from the realm of politics—that is, something intended to have the effect of "boiling water" which is sprayed on the enemy, an instrument of political murder. The critic understands this from the very beginning. His analysis is intended to make it transparent to the reader as well, and to leave him in no doubt that what he has been offered is a forgery, or rather pseudo-literature, blatantly and openly claiming to be exempt from generally accepted literary criteria. And at the moment when the reader understands this, literature ends, and politics begins.
We already know that the basic feature of the novel, as the critic formulates it, is "a tendency to portray from life particular persons (transferring them directly into the novel, sometimes by an idealized portrait, and sometimes by a caricature)." We also know that Kochetov places special emphasis on "similarities" which could be recognized in a narrow circle of 'initiates,' more or less veiled references to traits and actions of persons who are "spoken of in high society." That's all. Here the critic has come to the boundary which must not be trasngressed in the censored literature. "Persons who are spoken of in high society" must not be named. You can't say that Artamonov is a caricature of Khrushchev and that Denisov is an idealized portrait of Kozlov. The rules of the game don't permit this. But since the critic has before him not a literary work, but a political pamphlet, he can disarm his opponent only by means of political polemics. The problem is how to do this.

It is, I think, most important for the reader to understand how political polemics were possible at all under conditions of censorship (which was even more rigid for Novyi Mir than for Oktiabr'), and it is important for him to get a notion of its mechanics, of its levers and springs, so to speak. For this reason I prefer to refrain from comments, merely reproducing the critic's texts. Since it is impossible to proceed by the natural course of demonstrating "who is who" in Kochetov's novel, the critic goes by a roundabout route. Since Kochetov contrasts the positive Party professional, Denisov, to the negative Party professional, Artamonov, it is perfectly suitable for the critic to show that because of his inherent literary impotence, the author does not attain his goal here either. That is, both of his Party professionals are equally negative—ignorant, envious (in relation to each other), and insufferably
arrogant (in relation to their subordinates). All of this, however, does not go beyond the bounds of literary criticism: in the final analysis, this concerns only characters in the novel, although they are Party professionals of unusually high rank. But the critic continues:

"And in order to understand this [that is, that 'Artamonov and Denisov are not at all antagonists'] one has to remember the page in the novel which tells of Denisov's return from the 20th Congress of the Party. Kochetov gives us this story through the prism of the reminiscences of Sof'ia Pavlovna [Denisov's wife]. This passage should be read attentively, and therefore I permit myself an extended quotation: 'Sof'ia Pavlovna will never forget the days in which Vasilii Antonovich [Denisov] returned from the 20th Congress at which the cult of Stalin and the consequences of this cult were so sharply criticized. He told her everything, and together they experienced the whole thing over again. For several weeks, they felt physically ill, as though a piece--large, very important, living, and pulsing with blood--had been torn out of the heart of each of them. "Sonia, Sonia," he said, suffering, "our whole life has gone with him, it was unthinkable without him. We thought: we will die but he will go on and on living. We loved Lenin in him. You remember how he taught us to love Lenin; you remember Problems of Leninism [a collection of Stalin's articles]. They took down the Problems of Leninism and read again the inspiring chapters about Il'ich. "Sonia, Sonia," he said, "after all, in him we loved the Party, our dear Party, which brought us up, you and me, which armed us with an idea that made life three times as meaningful and understandable. Sonia! . . . Standing before the photograph of Stalin, . . . he once said 'no, I can't
judge him. . . Taken individually, I'm too small for that. Sonia, can you understand me or not?" What could she answer him? She wept with him.'

Then we are told how Vasilii Antonovich and Sof'ia Pavlovna gradually 'separated the objective from the subjective, their feelings from the historical reality. . . They remembered that there was a time when they were annoyed and grieved at the fact that the name of Stalin overshadowed the name of Il'ich [Lenin]. . . But the years of struggle with the deviationists passed by, and the years of industrialization, and then the war years. . . In the common difficult trials, the name of Stalin was raised to an inaccessible height.' Finally, 'the crisis situation and the sickness itself gradually died down.' Vasilii Antonovich appeals to Sonia: 'We will correct the shortcomings which did occur: they did, you can't deny that, can you?' But even afterwards, as Sof'ia Pavlovna remembers, Denisov 'never forgot to say that. . . for him Stalin was always a prominent Marxist and revolutionary.' Remembering those days, Sof'ia Pavlovna dwells only on how her husband condemned those who 'made haste to ally themselves' with the criticism of the cult of personality, but on the essence of this criticism she cannot add anything to the incantations which he has already addressed to her: after all, 'there were. . . shortcomings; there were, you can't deny that. . .'

For Denisov, as is clear from the memories of Sof'ia Pavlovna, the unmasking of the cult of personality was primarily a tragedy of the loss of his deity. He had even been able to reconcile himself at one time to the fact that the name of Stalin overshadowed the name of Il'ich' and he could even justify this to himself internally. In the solitude of his home, Denisov seeks the support of his wife. But as we've already read: 'What could she answer him? She wept with him.' The feeling of
'physical illness' passes away from Denisov only as a result of the separation of 'his feelings from the historical reality.' But this sounds like merely a compelled external reconciliation. It is no accident that Denisov so hysterically demands confirmation from his wife: were there 'shortcomings' or were there not? It seems that in the meeting hall of the 20th Congress, where the restoration of justice to thousands of people who had suffered and been killed for no crime (was spoken of), he had been overcome by a sudden deafness, and everything which was said there never reached him at all.

Such an attitude toward the cult of personality might be present in the character of Artamonov, and might shed additional light on the nature of his actions. But the author characterizes not Artamonov, but precisely Denisov in this way, and this is no accident--because the anti-democratic traits characteristic of Denisov are also a part of that alien growth which was formed by the cult of personality on the body of our society...

It may be that all of this is the result of haste, lack of time for reflection--the result of striving to spray the reader as soon as possible with 'that same boiling, bubbling-hot water.' But, regardless of the reason, some passages sound like evidence of the lack of understanding of the decisions of the 20th Congress. The same thing may explain the 'physical illness' and tears in the Denisov family in V. Kochetov's new novel.

After all, Denisov was not a guest at the 20th Congress. The Communists... elected delegates... in the belief that they... would consciously and actively participate in the adoption and implementation of the decisions of the 20th Congress... by renouncing his right to judge, by internally resisting [the Party's] judgment, and not
accepting it, Denisov failed to justify the trust of the Communists who had sent him. From N. S. Khrushchev's report to the 22nd Congress and the speeches of the delegates to it, we all now know of the events which took place in 1957—a year after the cult of the personality of Stalin had been condemned. An anti-Party splinter group made up of adherents of those methods and principles which prevailed under the cult of personality, tried to seize control of the Party and the country. 'The members of the Central Committee, who were at that time in Moscow,' Comrade Khrushchev related in his report, 'having learned of the divisive actions of the anti-Party group within the Presidium, demanded the immediate convoking of the Plenum of the Central Committee.' At this Plenum, the anti-Party group was routed. The members of the Central Committee who were spoken of in this report were for the most part secretaries of provincial committees of the Party. Let us try to ask ourselves the question: Can we imagine among them Denisov, the secretary of a provincial committee, with all his doubts, lamentations, and sufferings? It is impossible to imagine this."34

I understand, of course, that all of this will sound rather indistinct to the Western ear—the stormy sufferings of a little Stalin, provoked by the tyrant's death, and the critic's very complex skein of arguments, and all of the verbose, almost Byzantine craftiness with which he leads the reader to the irrefutable conclusion that Kochetov's hero is an unrepentant Stalinist. One cannot however deny the genuineness of all this. This is how we felt and argued at that time. Both in our feelings and in our arguments there was a great deal of confusion, infantilism, and chaos. Awakening from a quarter-century of sleep, the country found itself faced with an intellectual challenge of first magnitude. Well,
how else but with tears, one might ask, should the secretaries of provincial committees, the regional dictators, have reacted to the death of the great dictator, who, like Abraham, had created them out of stone? In this sense, Kochetov, who knew these people much better than his critic, was quite right in shedding tears over the abused deity. But on the other hand, Mar'iamov was also right in saying that in June of 1957 it was precisely these little Stalins who blocked the attempt at restoration of the big "heirs of Stalin" in the oligarchy, i.e. the Presidium of the Central Committee. Two rightnesses collided here--that of the adherents of dictatorship, who were sure that its overthrow was only a short intermezzo in Soviet history, and that of its opponents, who desperately wanted to believe that the dictatorship was ended, from the 20th Congress onward. The author knew that he was correctly describing the feelings of his heroes relative to the dead idol. But the critic also knew that the author's description contradicted the real actions of these heroes. How is this charade to be explained? How are we to join together and build into a logically consistent conception facts which clearly contradict each other?

We make such an attempt in the second part of this work. For the time being, let us say only that the political position of the little Stalins in 1960 and 1961, which Kochetov describes, differed substantially from their position in 1953-1957, to which Mar'iamov refers. Returning to the technology of "literary murder," let us state the degree to which the Oktiabrist and their heroes, the secretaries of the provincial committees, must have felt uncomfortable under the conditions of de-Stalinization, when the Novyi Mirist critic was able to publicly accuse them of "failing to understand Party decisions"--that is, of treason to the same Party which was for them the soul of the universe. To
judge by Kochetov's novel these people did not feel themselves to be traitors. They were prepared to accuse others of treason—and not only the Novyi Mir party, but also those who were its patrons and those to whom it appealed. It was precisely this consciousness of his own rightness which provoked, apparently, the unexampled courage of Kochetov, who dared to accuse Khrushchev himself (the aesopian form of the accusation, to which we were all accustomed, by no means reduced the power and significance of this act). But since the critic also feels that he is right, he opposes the Oktiabrist challenge with his magnificent skill at political polemics under censorship, which sufficed not only to bury Kochetov's novel as a literary phenomenon, but also to put the author himself in the stocks—as Novyi Mir saw it—for Stalinism.

Having settled accounts with the high priest, the critic now goes after the Oktiabrist small-fry, the rank-and-file of the pseudo-culture, since Kochetov has given him an excuse for this by advancing into the foreground of the novel, as we already know, the writer Baksanov with his "boiling water." We see right away how the Novyi Mirist critic does this. While riding "in the same car with Denisov, Baksanov prompts straight out to the secretary of the provincial committee that it would not be a bad idea to show respect to the writer: 'If I were given, let us say, in the name of the provincial committee a fountain pen, with a nice inscription: "From the provincial committee, to the communist writer so-and-so," this would be the most precious gift although it would cost only a few rubles. The money isn't the point, the attitude is. . ." Even before Baksanov began to talk about the "little fountain pen," he shamelessly tries to get Denisov to take a particular line toward writers. Beginning by saying that Denisov's opinion is by no means a matter of
indifference to him, Baksanov, he asks the question: 'Why do you never mention our product in your reports—the product of the writers of the province, of our artists, of our composers?' It is no accident that he resorts to this impersonal word, 'product,' which is quite inappropriate in the given case. Certainly, if one were to measure 'boiling water' in liters, throwing aside the qualitative evaluation of the work, one could include in the report (of the provincial secretary) statistical data: so many tons of cast iron, so many, let us say, refrigerators or phonographs, three novels, four plays, two symphonies. . . Baksanov. . . oversimplifies and vulgarizes the essence of the matter by insisting on the superiority of 'boiling water' over true artistic values. . . And with all this depressing baggage—assembly line 'production' in place of creative labor, with petty quarrels and tattling, with cliques and book-licking—they (the Baksanovs) always try to hide themselves behind the back of the provincial committee, to gather support, to saddle the Party with petty tutelage in place of broad ideological leadership of art. . . We must not unload onto the organs of the Party and the state the decision of the artistic questions which writers can and should decide for themselves.

'I think that there is hardly any need for me to take up time in my own speech by discussing your works. As you know, I am not a literary critic and therefore do not feel myself obliged to deal with your literary work. . . I don't think that you would wish this unpleasant labor to be placed on my shoulders. You write, and therefore you, first of all, should criticize what is written.' So spoke N. S. Khrushchev at the Third Congress of Writers. But Baksanov wishes at all costs to unload precisely this obligation on Denisov's shoulders. And, in asking for a fountain pen, he does not even try to hide the fact that in the mention of his name in a report, and later in an inscribed gift from the directorate
of the provincial committee, he sees precisely the 'first steps' of the ladder up which he will climb to the heights of honor and literary glory for which he strives with all his might."

Today's writers would give a lot to hear from the head of the state: "You write yourselves and you criticize yourselves." One has only to think that in Russia there was once a time (and not so long ago) when a critic writing in Novyi Mir could publicly accuse an Oktiabrist scoundrel of "trying to hide behind the back of the Party," in "petty quarrels and tattling," by which he sets the Party onto writers in an attempt to make a career for himself, to move "toward the heights of honor and literary glory," not through his books, but through "an inscribed gift," official support, an intimate alliance with the Party professionals. The Western reader may be embarrassed by the generous compliments to the Party and to Khrushchev. The reader of Novyi Mir, however, took them as a "permit." Imagine that in a building where you have to go in order to settle accounts with your enemy, there is a watchman. He will not let you in without a "permit." You stick your "permit" on the end of his bayonette, go in—and rout your enemy. Baksanov, the alter ego of Vsevolod Kochetov, and Denisov, the alter ego of Kozlov got theirs. Their portraits, passed through the filter of Novyi Mirist criticism, looked truly loathsome. This is how Novyi Mir tried a literary case. Such is the technology of "literary murder."

VI.
OKTIABRIST COUNTERATTACKS

Of course, the Oktiabrists fired back (that was what the debate consisted of). They succeeded, however, only in the genre of "portrayal from life of particular persons," and "more or less veiled
hints”—that is, to speak plainly, in the genre of political denuncia-
tions. They furiously accused their literary (and, as we have seen, also political) opponents. They declared them not only "alien to the people," but, as we will soon see, a "fifth column." With everything else, they were, alas, sterile. In particular, they proved incapable of a constructive ideological dialogue. They simply did not know how to compare the ideas with the reality, the facts with facts. They compared them with dogma. Naturally, the Novyi Mirist "high-brows" appeared in the writing of the Oktiabrist as evil-minded heretics whose goal consisted, as for example, B. Solov'ev said in his fundamental work Poetry and Its Critics, in "representing militant, Party poetry, directly and openly... serving the great cause of the struggle for communism as 'obsolete,' 'old fashioned,' 'primitive,' limited to the level of political 'axioms'... This poetry is contrasted to the poetry of subjectivist self-will—that is, everything which is intended to deprive art of its ideological and politi-
cal direction."37

The Oktiabrist, however, put the target in the wrong place: their opponents did not recognize their 'political axioms.' It was by no means obvious to them that poetry should "serve" the "great cause of the struggle for Communism." In poetry, it was poetry that interested them above all. Secondly, it was not "the great cause" but the reality, the flavor, the truth, the genuineness of it, which concerned them. And thirdly, it was the glory of Russian culture. One could scold, for example, Andrei Siniavskii, as much as one liked for the fact that his analysis of Pasternak's works "leads... to the justification and exaltation of subjective-idealistic and clearly anti-social tendencies" in the verses of a poet who "was far from the people, its life, struggle, and creativity."38 But here
is what is contrasted to Pasternak:

My great Party!

I sing, and make a song of brotherhood.

I speak in the name of those who have taken sides,

And in your honor I make my song. 39

It is true that in this poem by A. Prokof'ev, an idol of the Oktiabrists, which we have quoted, there were neither "subjective-idealist" nor "purely anti-social tendencies." But there was also no poetry abiding in them, no connection to reality, no concern for the Russian culture. Just a servile job. As we see, the opponents in the debate simply had no common ground on which they could work out any kind of compromise.

One could assert as much as one liked (as, for example, did Vladimir Maksimov, now a passionate editor of the emigre journal Kontinent, but at that time just as passionate a member of the editorial board of Oktiabr') that "the notorious problem of fathers and sons (i.e., "the generation gap") picked out of a finger tip by captious literary kids together with a group of esthetizing elders, has never arisen before the young people true to the revolutionary traditions of Soviet literature."40 But the "notorious problem" turned, before the reader's eyes, into an irreconcilable debate between the Oktiabrist V. Solov'ev, a graduate of the Stalinist Academy, and the iconoclast and Novyi Mirist Andrei Siniavskii. V. Solov'ev himself openly recognized this, declaring, for example, that certain poets "have too often spoken in the name... of the captious and politicking section of youth, consigning to oblivion their duty to the people and to the Party."41 What could this mean other than that they actually existed, these Novyi Mirist "sons" who rejected the heritage of the Oktiabrist "fathers?"
Matters were still worse for the Oktiabrists, however, when the debate moved from the ground of esthetic criteria to the ground of that same "ideological and political tendency" which they monopolized, and where, to judge by their own declaration, they should have felt themselves invincible. The knife of Novyi Mir analysis ineluctably approached their own territory when such symbols of de-Stalinization as the "economic reform" or the "revolution in science and technology" began to be spoken of. Here there was unexpectedly discovered the most vulnerable spot of Oktiabrism. Its own monumental argument that literature "must serve the great cause of struggle for Communism" was turned against it; for in reality the Oktiabrist literature by no means served even this cause. It served no cause. It was a servant of the dictatorship to the extent to which the dictatorship needed the pseudo-culture for its own legitimation.

The critique by Novyi Mir put the question on the most dangerous level for the priestly group: were the reforms of de-Stalinization compatible with pseudo-culture at all? Did the post-Stalin regime need a Stalinist form of legitimation? Had not the "ideological and political tendency" of Oktiabrism been transformed into a chain which held back the movement of society and prevented its becoming conscious of itself and its anti-Stalinist nature?

This line of Novyi Mir's criticism in various forms penetrated the debate in the 1960s, until finally it emerged on the surface at the very beginning of the 1970s in a long essay of mine, "The Worker as a Theme." This was an open discrediting of Oktiabrism on its own territory. In formal terms, the essay constituted a standard "grinding up" of a book by one of the most aggressive Oktiabrist critics, A. Vlasenko's The Hero and Contemporary Life, but its real meaning consisted in contrasting Novyi
Mirist literature to Oktiabrist criticism, and in demonstrating the professional and political inadequacy of the latter. "If we were to judge the actual state of affairs from Vlasenko's books, we would, alas, inevitably come to the conclusion that a somnolent quiet and grace reign in our world, and good will toward men, and that it contains no serious problems other than those invented by some conscienceless literary folk... In this metaphysical 'reality' there is no room for contradictions, conflicts, and collisions. And, therefore, there should be no place for them in literature. ... We note that the book *The Hero and Contemporary Life* ([*Geroi i sovremennost*]) saw the light on the eve of the adoption of the economic reform, when the country was deep in difficult thinking about means of overcoming real collisions that had arisen in its production and socioeconomic mechanism... Society had taken them into consideration in carrying out an enormous economic reform... but books of the kind we have just quoted took no part in that. For the nonexistent 'reality' they depicted was beautiful as it was, and did not need any reforms. [Now let us look at the matter from the other side.] It might be said that the problem of the negative hero is a kind of theodicy for any ideological concept, a justification of its 'god,' its ideal. A concept that is incapable of explaining the origin of evil cannot explain good either. And so the question is: where do Val'gans come from in a 'ringing' reality in which only 'inspired songs' exist? And the Tonkovs? And the Denisovs? How do they fit into this rhetorical system? The very fact that these figures, who have the opportunity to block progress... have appeared in life, the very fact that bearers of social evil exist, demands some kind of explanation—not a rhetorical but a logical and historical one. It requires explanations that our critics cannot give.
In their 'reality' there is no place for these dark figures to come from. Here a direct question demands a straight answer. Either there actually were not and are not any dramatic collisions in society, or that idyllic world which some of our critics by some misunderstanding call 'life' does not exist. Here no compromise is possible. Here as well, as we see, there was no common ground between the two Russias.

Of course, the priestly group did not sympathize with the Stalinist terror. Of course, it was also in the interests of this group that no one—not even the powers that be, whom it truly and faithfully served—should be able to beat its representatives, whether by a denunciation from an envious colleague or merely by the arbitrary whim of the police. Who wants to wander all his life in a mine field? In other words, the Oktiabrists were in favor of that part of de-Stalinization which meant guarantees of physical security. But the debate showed something entirely unexpected. Contrary to expectations, it turned out that de-Stalinization was by no means reducible to this one guarantee. It also meant the formation of the Novyi Mir party, and with it the literary terror which crippled the priestly group no longer as individuals (as had been the case under the dictatorship) but as a corporation—as a group of pseudo-cultural workers. In other words, what Clemens calls the rebirth of critical analysis and I call the cultural renaissance of de-Stalinization, turned into a collective catastrophe for these people. They were placed under conditions of a struggle for group survival.

The Oktiabrists were devoted to the regime, and this devotion was essentially their sole capital. Now it began to seem that they had been betrayed by the regime—that their capital had been devalued. Some horrible confusion had taken place. On the one hand, nothing seemed to have happened
to Soviet power: the "struggle for the great cause of Communism"
continued; the censorship was alive and well; the same old Soviet soil
was underfoot. But on the other hand, something seemed to have changed
ineluctably and fatally—to such a degree that the ground had begun to
slide from under their feet. Naturally, they remembered how dangerous
the dictatorship was—with its "class struggle" which was supposed to be
permanently growing sharper and with its "fifth column" which always had
to be exposed, and with its "capitalist encirclement" generating hatred
and terror within the country. But at the same time, when these fearful
traits of the dictatorship disappeared, things became even more dangerous
for them, the Oktiabrists. How were they supposed to react to these
strange changes? One has to assume, in the same way as a dying species
reacts to a fatal change in the environment. They became nostalgic—for
the good old times, for the "class struggle" and the "capitalist en-
circlement," for the "fifth column" and the dictatorship. Here is one of
the documentary testimonies to this nostalgia

"I can say definitely,
It has become as clear as day
That the concept of the 'fifth column'
Has not left the agenda of our days,
And when those creatures put forth their stench,
And call on enemy troops for their help,
Our dear dictatorship
do not hasten to grow weak and die away."

The appeal of the Oktiabrist poet Sergei Smirnov to the thunder
and lightning of the "dear dictatorship" was met, according to the journal
Oktiabr', with "universal applause" by the gathering of writers at which it was first declaimed. 47 It certainly reflected the mood, so to speak, of the broad Oktiabrist masses, which expressed in such rhymed form a vote of no confidence in the regime of de-Stalinization. And here we seem to have come to an important conclusion. The point was not only that the poet publicly calls his literary opponents a "fifth column." The point is also that he deliberately identifies the threat to the interests of his group, emanating from the critique by Novyi Mir, with a threat to the Soviet system. Thus, in the heat of the Oktiabrist counterattacks, the nucleus of the stereotype of the "threat from the left" was crystalized out.

VII

THE N. M. TEAM

The moment was well chosen. The appeal to the "dear dictatorship" was sounded after the famous Siniavskii-Daniel trial— the third scandal, after the Larionov case and the ouster of Khrushchev in the Soviet establishment household. It would have been a piece of tactical incompetence not to try to turn the trial of the "slanderers" into a trial of Novyi Mir. Such an attempt was made, for example, by A. Dymshits (the chairman of the Jewish section of the "union of the Russian People," 48 as he was called by the Moscow wits): "When it became known from the speeches of the delegates at the Congress of the Party, and from the speech by Mikhail Sholokhov, that there were literary people [read: Novyi Mirists] who were trying to defend our direct enemies, and the slanderers of our Fatherland... who had attacked the Soviet people, the Party, and Lenin, we again remember the best of Vladimir Il'ich, who taught us to... stand up to the enemy harder than iron." 49 Thus, to the "dictatorship" recommended
by Smirnov, Dymshits adds "iron." And by "enemies," he obviously means
not only Siniavskii and Daniel as individuals but also all those who were
in no hurry to have recourse to "iron"--that is, simply to shoot the
"slanderers," as Sholokhov had advised the Party Congress.

But those who were in no hurry to follow these recommendations included,
among others, the Brezhnevist regime. While it condemned the "slanderers,"
it nevertheless did not agree either to have recourse to "iron" or to
condemn Novyi Mir, which continued to "grind up" the Oktiabrists. It
stopped halfway where it should have gone to the end, not being able to
outlive Khrushchev's reformist impulses. It was just as far from restoring
the dictatorship as the government which it had just ousted. Furthermore,
it was trying to implement that in which Khrushchev had not succeeded--
the broadening of relations with its mortal enemy across the sea. As
the Oktiabrist poet N. Ageev sadly observed:

"We are always hurrying and hastening,
Always catching up to someone,
Always comparing ourselves with them--
With those States,
With the flame of neon advertisements.
There at midnight and at noon
Hatred of us is being ground out."50

Speaking in prose, the coup d'etat foretold by Kochetov in The
Secretary of a Provincial Committee had by no means yielded the expected
results. There was still something fundamentally wrong with a regime
which refused to recognize the connection of "literary murders" within
the country with its "capitalist encirclement."
Western comparative literature, not to speak of Sovietology, has not concerned itself with the Oktiabrists. It is not only that articles, let alone books, on them are not written. I suspect that people are not reading Oktiabr' either. It is mentioned rarely and scornfully, if at all, as one of the orthodox journals, as ordinary Party hacks which—unlike the liberal Novyi Mir—defended the status quo. From the material which we have quoted, however, it is evident that this opinion is mistaken. The status quo did not by any means suit the Oktiabrists. They had to fight the censorship, use Aesopian language, and skillfully encode their messages, sometimes almost as much as Novyi Mir. One of the most vivid examples of this is Kochetov's essay "A Dirty Trade." In essence, this is the same, if expanded and moderated, as the poem by Smirnov. At least, it tries to prove the same thesis: if (a) the interests of the Soviet system are identical with the Oktiabrists, then (b) the interests of the Novyi Mir party are identical with the "capitalist encirclement." In other words, the threat to the Soviet system comes "from the left," and (this is in a carefully orchestrated subtext) the only reliable guarantee against it is the "dear dictatorship."

Being unable to say all this directly (just as Mariamov could not say directly that the threat comes "from the right," and the triumph of Oktiabrism is fraught with a new GULAG), Kochetov masterfully steers his political message through the reefs of the censorship. His political maneuvering deserves no less detailed an analysis that Mariamov's did.

He begins a long way off, by describing in detail a special subdivision of the American military—the "Alpha-Team"—which he calls a "school of professional murderers," working according to the technique of the German Nazis. These people are taught that "a person's most vulnerable
place is the bridge of the nose," and they "master the art of killing a person by the bone of his nose." Later in Cuba and Viet Nam they "did a super dirty job. . . by exterminating a peaceful people—that is, they did the same thing as Rudolf Hoess did with his lieutenants in Auschwitz."  

Then he asks, what kind of people these "super-murderers, who in the United States are called super-soldiers" may be. "Wouldn't it be simpler and easier for oneself and for all of mankind to consider such a super-soldier a degenerate, a cocaine addict, a bastard, a half-breed?" But this should not be done: 'It would be a mistake to consider the good ol' boys of the 'Alpha Team,' and their bosses, and those who supervise the training of such teams in the Pentagon and the CIA as degenerates, vampires and perverts.' On the contrary, as individuals they are completely normal. After all, Siniavskii, in the institute where he works, "was spoken of as the model of a civilized man and an intellectual."  

And in the journal "where he was usually published, he was listed as one of the promising young critics." (The reader of course understands that Novyi Mir is being spoken of.) Let us note that although the standard treatment of this affair in the Soviet press required mention of the "Siniavskii-Daniel case," Daniel's name is not mentioned in Kochetov's text. Why? Because Daniel took no part in the "literary murders," and for this reason he does not exist for Kochetov. The author needs, so to speak, a pure association: Siniavskii--Novyi Mir.  

But "what is involved, if this hatred for mankind does not derive from degeneracy?" It derives from ideological struggle; for "there is no fiercer and more irreconcilable struggle than the struggle of camps whose ideas are opposed to each other." Just as, for Solzhenitsyn the world's evil is focused in the ideas of Communism, so for Kochetov it
is subsumed in the ideas of capitalism. In such a formulation, the struggle of the "two camps" assumes the character of a religious war, and there can be in it neither compromise nor coexistence. Now we understand why the difference between Nazi Germany and America disappears under Kochetov's pen: both of them struggle against the same idea. "At Auschwitz the 'great fuhrers Hitler, Himler, and others, defending the positions of imperialism, over which hung the threat of Communist victories on a world scale, destroyed four million people. . . . What else but the same idea of Communism are the militant circles of the United States trying to deflect from the doomed imperialist world, by creating special military detachments?" 61 The ideas of Oktiabr' are identified in this religious war with the ideas of Communism. It is naturally assumed that the ideas of Novyi Mir are identified with the "opposite camp."

But how is such a conclusion to be drawn in a censored press concerning a legally functioning journal—the organ of the Union of Soviet Writers? Kochetov does not draw it. He merely informs the reader that the British journal "Encounter" (where, incidentally, Siniavskii "published one of his first works"62) "belongs to this special American detachment. . . . so to speak, to the team. . . . whose name is not 'Alpha,' (but) 'EN.' As we see, Siniavskii is here used as link between two journals, one of which is equated with a "school of professional murderers."

Now, coming to grips with the Siniavskii case, Kochetov again comes out against those who declare Siniavskii a "moral monster,"—that is to say, a corrupt individual. No, he declares, "Rudolf Hoess. . . . and the kids of the 'Alpha' team and the 'EN' team and Siniavskii-Terts are entirely normal people, but they serve the other world; they
are its hirelings." For what was Siniavskii doing in Novyi Mir? The same thing that all the "professional murderers" from the American special detachments are doing.

Thus the physical murders which the Nazis committed, and which in Kochetov's opinion, the American "super-soldiers" are committing, are identified with the "literary murders" committed in a Soviet journal: "The last whom Siniavskii settled accounts with in the Soviet press [read in Novyi Mir] was... Evgenii Dolmatovskii. It suffices to read what the Soviet poet asserts in his new book of excellent poems, and what Siniavskii wrote about him, in order for it to become clear at once: the kid from the 'EN' team did not strike his usual studied blow at random, but precisely to the bridge of the nose. All of them use the same tricks. These are not degenerates, no, these are 'super-soldiers' from different detachments of our ideological adversary's army." Here it is: the "Rolling Stone Friends," swollen with drink, are equated with the victims of Auschwitz, and the criticism of them in the Soviet press with the actions of "our ideological adversary." Considering that, in Kochetov's opinion, Siniavskii "tried to do his assigned job just as zealously as Rudolf Hoess had performed his function," and--most importantly, that he had the opportunity to carry on this dirty business in the heart of the country, in Moscow, in a legal journal, using legal means, the reader was supposed to understand that the regime was committing terrible errors. In the first place, it condemned Siniavskii not for "literary murders," but only for publishing his works abroad. In the second place, this smothered the very essence of the affair. Siniavskii was presented as a corrupt individual, and Novyi Mir, so to speak, the "NM Team"--remained on the sidelines. Its connection with the "Alpha team," with
the "EN" team, and with others "formed by our ideological adversaries" was covered up. In the third place, this covered up the total and irreconcilable character of our ideological war—the basic fact that "the world of imperialism can in no way reconcile itself to coexistence."66

"A Dirty Trade" was a desperate protest against the policy of coexistence which, in the opinion of the Oktiabrists, opened wide the gates of the Soviet fortress to the "fifth column." This was perhaps the boldest critique of the regime from the right—next to The Secretary of a Provincial Committee. Kochetov's message is obvious: if a really orthodox regime had been at the helm of the country, it would have used the "Siniavskii case" to rid itself completely of the Khrushchevist heritage. At least, it would have frozen the reformist process, minimized the contacts with the West, and broken up the "fifth column."

Nevertheless, prose clearly lagged behind poetry in the degree of openness possible. What Kochetov gave the reader to understand in his essay was certainly no more than the minimum program of the Oktiabrists. The maximum program would have required the liquidation of the very possibility of the establishment of a "fifth column"—that is, of a cultural renaissance with its Novyi Mirist party and its literary terror. The maximum program was formulated in the same poem by Smirnov which we have already quoted. It consisted, as we remember, in an appeal to the "dear dictatorship."

VIII
IN SEARCH OF ALLIES

If we, however, credit the Oktiabrists with at least the rudiments of political thinking, we will have to recognize that they understood their own impotence. They could not by themselves compel the regime
to fulfill even their minimum program. This was shown by fact. I'm not
even talking about the fact that Novyi Mir continued to exist, that literally
every month the Oktiabrists incurred heavy losses, and literally each
of them might tomorrow find himself the next victim. Still worse was
the fact that the Khrushchevist impulse of reform showed surprising vitality
in the upper crust of the state. The leadership demonstrated absolutely
no desire to return to Stalinist cultural-political isolationism. Quite
to the contrary, as if ridiculing the preaching of the Oktiabrists, the
regime quickly moved toward detente with the very "world of imperialism"
which, as we already know, was using all its cunning, even under conditions
of mere coexistence, to create a "fifth column" in the country. As
though bewitched, the country headed into the trap made for it. What
was the priestly group, for which this was a matter of life and death,
supposed to do under these conditions? What were its spokesmen, the
Oktiabrists, supposed to do? It seems natural to me that they would have
to seek allies. They would have to look attentively at the arrangement
of forces in the Soviet establishment, and try to establish precisely which
influential and powerful groups in it found themselves in the same position
as they. My hypothesis is that in the search for allies the Oktiabrists
would have to carry out a huge "research job," which is beyond our powers,
to identify the groups which had an interest in freezing the reformist
process. Of course, we can derive some notion of this by analyzing, let
us say, the experience of the perturbations of the Khrushchev period and
the Kosygin reform. But the sources of information at our disposal are
not comparable to the sources of information which the Oktiabrists had.
They worked within the system. They had a ramified network of contact,
both personal and political ties, going right to the "top." They knew
about facts and tendencies of which we cannot have the slightest notion. Besides, for them this was not an academic but a vital problem, on the solution of which their whole future depended. For all these reasons, I assume that they had to find answers to their questions. They knew precisely who were their allies and who were their enemies in the environment. In any case, this is the assumption from which I am proceeding here. I will consider their essays, novels, and even poems as documents. If this line of inquiry seems logical to the reader, then I have only to compel the priests to speak.

9. METHODOLOGICAL PREREQUISITES

It is, however, by no means simple to do this. Dozens of novels, novellas, short stories, poems, and critical essays appear in a fat journal every year. Their heroes come from various walks of life, from the "heights" and "depths" of society, from the past and from the present. How is one to find one's way in this many-voiced and many-faced crowd, in this human comedy which is always playing itself out before us? Is it possible to find one's way in it at all? It is perhaps not surprising that the rare attempts to use belles-lettres to scholarly purposes (for example, in sociology, or in economics) have not found imitators, and have not grown into a school of using literature to study the social and economic structure of "closed" systems. I am not even talking about the use of belles-lettres for the analysis of the political process or for the identification of interest groups in the Soviet establishment.

Everyone will certainly agree with Alexander Gerschenkron that "a social scientist can...receive from [Soviet novels] a feeling of immediacy and
intimacy for life in the Soviet Union and its manifold problems, a sense of human closeness, which no other source can match. But what is being talked about here is a certain additional flavor, so to speak, essentially illustration of the knowledge which is obtained by other, "hard" methods--let us say, by the analysis of statistics or documents. The problem, consequently, is whether a work of belles lettres--with its by definition subjective world thought up by the author--can be looked upon as a document. And if so, how representative is it? How accurately does it reflect the objective reality of life? And how is it to be verified?

I cannot go here into complex methodological arguments. I will refer only to two examples, which I would propose to review as perhaps test cases, but still models of political analysis of literature. One of these is contained in an old (and, I fear, forgotten) book by Louis Perlman, Russian Literature and the Businessman. In it, the author carefully traced the changes in the attitude of Russian writers to one of the literary protagonists representing the middle class. It turned out that before the 1860s they felt chiefly contempt for him. Even such a first-class craftsman as Gogol suffered defeat trying to depict the businessman as a positive hero. From the 1860s to the 1880s, the attitude of Russian writers to this protagonist passes over into hatred. In other words, he appears in their books, as a rule, in the capacity of a negative hero. And suddenly, in the 1890s and 1900s (long before the Revolution of 1905 and before the creation of political parties and the convening of the State Duma), the businessman acquired, even at the hands of second-rate writers, what even Gogol himself could not give him before--the status of a positive hero. Hatred is replaced by sympathy.
Can there be any doubt that this paradoxical evolution of a representative of the middle class in Russian literature (for all its subjectivism) not only reflected the sharp leap in the social weight and political role of this group in pre-revolutionary Russia, but even in a certain sense predicted it? In the given case, literature proved to be not only a document, but a document possessing astonishing prognosticative powers. (We restrict ourselves at this point only to the case of Russian literature with its specific and powerful tradition of "association of art with politics," in the words of Rufus Mathewson.71 Similar cases can probably be made about other literatures as well, for example, Dickens, William Dean Howells, and Balzac.)

Another example: without even knowing about the works of Dunham, Mathewson, and Perlman, in two long essays in Novyi Mir I made an analogous attempt to trace the evolution of the businessman (delovoi chelovek, i.e., a managerial type) in Soviet literature. And the most surprising thing about this was that its result (though in a changed sequence) essentially coincided with Perlman's conclusions. The evolution of the businessman in literature was repeated (from hatred in the 1920s to contempt in the 1930s and 40s to sympathy and even admiration—that is, to the status of positive hero—in the 1960s.)72

Thus, we can, it seems, begin to sense a kind of guide to the many-faced throng of literary protagonists. It could probably be formulated in this way: to verify the social and political roles in real life of representatives of various groups in society, we can use the direction of evolution of their status in the minds of writers. The same Kostanzhoglo out of Gogol's Dead Souls, who suffered defeat as a positive hero in the
1830s felt quite comfortable in this role in the 1890s. Turgenev's Bazarov could not be a positive hero in a literature in which Lermontov's Pechorin was dominant. And, on the other hand, the same Pechorin was transformed into a negative hero in the literature of the 1860s. Precisely the same thing happened in Soviet literature. It is impossible—and this was clearly demonstrated in my essay—to imagine, let us say, Bakhirev or Cheshkov in the role of positive heroes in the literature of the 1930s. And, on the other hand, it is impossible to imagine Korchagin or Chumalov in an analogous role in the 1960s. It turns out that literary heroes actually do somehow personify the socio-political forces of attraction and repulsion in the social system. It appears that they can turn into their opposites. It turns out, finally, that their evolution is irreversible (provided, of course, that a revolution does not complicate matters, erasing from the face of the earth the entire system's political establishment together with its heroes).

But this is not all. In fact, the fate of literary heroes can tell us something even more interesting. In particular, in the situation of a two-party structure in the literary establishment, created by the debate on de-Stalinization, the heroes of both parties (both positive and negative) differed sharply from each other. It may be said that as a rule, the positive heroes of one party proved to be the negative heroes of the other. And they evolved, naturally, in different directions.

One can take various attitudes toward these strange adventures of literary characters and even toward the very phenomenon of the positive hero in Russian literature. One can regard it as a vulgar and anti-artistic tradition, derived from the ultra-rationalist criticism of the 1860s, and
later galvanized and enacted into law by the ideocratic state, as, for example, Rufus Mathewson thought. One can even regard it as "nauseating Marxist pseudocriticism," as one of my opponents described my essays in Novyi Mir, in the characteristic manner of emigre polemics. I do not intend to argue about this here. I will only say that from my point of view, a phenomenon which has existed in literature over the course of a century, in both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Russia, must obviously have some historical justification. Perhaps it is to be explained by the specific functions of Russian literature, which, along with its aesthetic role, must also fill others, which are carried out in more civilized polities by, let us say, parliaments, public organizations and the free press. In any case, this phenomenon is a historical fact, and I do not see why it cannot be used for the political analysis of literature. I am disturbed here by something else: If, in both of the examples of such analysis which I have cited, the length of the period studied (half a century) made the metaphorosis and the evolution of the positive hero obvious to the point of being trivial, the extreme concentration of this evolution in the course of the debate of the 1960s makes my conclusions considerably more vulnerable. The difference in time embraced by the analysis (5 times less) reduces proportionately the degree of its verifiability. Therefore, I must caution that the stages of evolution of positive heroes of both parties to the debate which are proposed here are more subjective than I would wish. Here is the way they look to me.

At the beginning of the debate, the role of positive hero in Novyi Mir was taken by a person "from the people," who had been wise enough to preserve his or her soul in the Stalinist hell: Matrena of Solzhenitsyn's story Matrena's
Household might serve as an embodiment of such a hero. By the middle of the debate this figure is displaced by a hero (also of populist type) who was trying, however, to save not only his soul, but also, so to speak, his body as well—that is, who was actively seeking his place in the new post-Stalin epoch (the hero of V. Mozhaev's novella "From the Life of Fedor Kuz'kin" might serve as the personification of this tendency). At the end of the debate (after the ouster of Tvardovskii's editorial board in the 1970s, when the moderate Valerii Kosolapov tried to save what could be saved from the liberal heritage of the "old" Novyi Mir), a new hero appeared in its pages, a representative of the middle (managerial) class, trying not so much to adapt himself into the new life, as to adapt it to himself—that is, essentially to reform the system; literary heroes glorified as positive in my critical essays might serve as embodiments of this tendency. The negative hero of Novyi Mir is chiefly a Party professional of Stalinist type (Borzov in "Ordinary Days in the Region" by Valentin Ovechkin, from whom the famous term borzovshchina is derived), or a careerist-bureaucrat from the central apparatus (Drozdov in Not by Bread Alone by Vladimir Dudintsev), or a representative of the priestly group from the sphere of pseudo-culture or pseudo-science (Denisov in "I Head into the Thunderstorm" by Daniil Granin).

We see a quite different picture when we read Oktiabr' systematically. At the beginning of the debate its positive hero is a Party professional (Denisov in Kochetov's "The Secretary of a Provincial Committee"), then the bureaucrat from the central apparatus who at the same time appears as a negative hero in Novyi Mir (Samarin in Kochetov's "What Do You Want?"), and finally a military person (Voloshin in "The Island of Hope" by
A. Perventsev). The negative heroes of Oktiabr’ are "weak, shook up little intellectuals," who are of course bearers of "unconditional nihilism," and naturally "sickly, suspicious, and defective"; and at the end of the debate the negative heroes are representatives of the middle class (Vaganov in "The Island of Hope"), who again precisely at this time were becoming the positive heroes in Novyi Mir, as well as certain unnamed "political muddle-heads," of whom we will speak later.

10. THE "HUNGARIAN" PATH OF DE-STALINIZATION

The Party professional appears most vividly before us in the role of positive hero in "The Secretary of a Provincial Committee," which we have already mentioned. However, in the archaic prehistory of the debate, at the very dawn of the existence of the Novyi Mir party, one of its founding fathers, Valentin Ovechkin, also devoted a series of sketches, which later became a kind of Novyi Mirist classic to the problems of Party professionalism. This circumstance gives us an opportunity to carry out, as it were, a parallel analysis of both publications. When we read them together a striking picture unfolds before us: the positive Party professionals of the Novyi Mirists and the Oktiabrists prove to be antagonists and political adversaries.

This is the more striking in that Ovechkin's and Kochetov's views of the world are essentially identical. The theme of both men is the political and cultural crisis of socialist society, manifested in the inflation of its ideals and in the corruption of key social groups. The difference is that the source of this corruption in one case is Stalinism (and, accordingly, the recommended remedy is de-Stalinization), and in the other case the
source of corruption seems to be precisely the reforms of de-Stalinization, (and the recommended remedy is to freeze them).

In at least one respect, the argument between Ovechkin and Kochetov is reminiscent of the argument between Democrats and Republicans in American life. Ovechkin sees the root of the crisis in the fact that the system is crippled by all-embracing government regulations, whose instruments are the Party professionals of Stalinist type, smothering the initiative of the managers (the leaders of the economy) and thereby putting the system in decline. Accordingly, his ideal is the Party professional of the new (we may call it Khrushchevist) type, whose main merit consists in subordinating Party work to the interests of the economic functioning of the system, and in measuring its effectiveness by precise economic criteria (with the, so to speak, secularization of Party professionalism which derived from this). In the ideal case, the intervention of Party professionals would be limited to the competent selection of managers, who—once put in place—from then on work independently, entering into "horizontal" relationships with each other and functioning quite independently of the Party leadership, even though under its supervision. 86 If one can imagine some economic organization which (under socialist conditions—that is, conditions of complete takeover of production by the state) comes as close as possible to the self-regulating market, automatically reconciling economic conflicts—this is certainly what Ovechkin recommends. 87 Considering that all of this was written between 1952 and 1955, we can marvel not only at the writer's intuition—but at the prognosticating function of literature, which we have already mentioned. For Ovechkin essentially predicted both Khrushchev's attempt to dissolve Party work into the
economic one (in the early 1960s) and Kosygin's attempt to achieve managerial autonomy (in the middle 1960s), and apparently even the success of Kadar's reforms in Hungary (in the 1970s).

For Kochetov, all of this is Khrushchevist heresy. His positive protagonist, the Party professional Denisov, is the complete and undisputed lord of his province. Contrary to Ovechkin's recommendation, he subordinates work in the economy to the interests of "Party" work. He regulates everything and intervenes in everything. The maximization of Party controls is the source of his inspiration, his credo, and the meaning of his activity: "And in his sleep he is always disturbed by the same things with which he is busy during the day. He inspects the factories; he rides around the fields. In the factories, the plan is not always correctly fulfilled; in the fields, rain hinders the work. In one place, someone has strayed from the Party path, and in another place, there is a shortage of building materials; a scientific institute where the director was poorly chosen is working to no good purpose; more and more children are being born each year, and there are not enough places for them in the nurseries and kindergartens; some foreign tourists are detained on the territory of the military post--what were they doing there with their everlasting cameras? From Borsk and from Drozdov it is reported that for some days already there has been no sugar for sale..."88 On the one hand, "after the recent liquidation of the MTS, not all collective farms have behaved properly,"89 and on the other "matters have gotten completely out of hand in the field of literature and art."90

In case the reader has not at first noticed the strange similarity between the obligations and responsibilities of Kochetov's Party professional,
and those of the Lord God, the rain (which, according to Kochetov's notion, obviously will cease to hinder the work in the fields when the First Secretary "rides around") will return him involuntarily to this analogy. In any case, the First Secretary's functions seem to be as complex as Lord God's. They include "the strain of the time of sowing, and waiting for daily reports from the districts, and constant readiness to go wherever a bottle-neck or a log-jam has occurred--wherever, you assume, matters will not right themselves or proceed in orderly fashion without your [personal] presence."\(^91\)

Certainly, as we learn from Kochetov, he went "only where matters are not proceeding, where there are delays, where people can't cope."\(^92\) But--what a strange thing!--it somehow turns out that there is always someone who can't cope with something, or who has run short of something. The builders are short of materials--and building projects stop in their tracks. The agronomists are short of knowledge--and weeds grow in the fields. The military lacked vigilance--and immediately "everlasting cameras" appeared on the scene. Writers "were allowed to get out of hand"--and rebellious monsters appeared. Provincial cities were short of sugar--and people rebelled. Artists were short of aesthetic advice--and the exhibits were filled with hideous abstractions. Husbands lacked fidelity to their wives--and family dramas arose. Individual Party workers lacked devotion to the Party--and "comrades have strayed from the Party path." In short, the provincial world under the First Secretary's supervision constantly wallowed in sin. Now he appears to this sinful world--in all his might, like a sorcerer, like a deus ex machina--correcting everything, smoothing over everything, consoling everyone. Of course, to do all this he must be
all-seeing and omniscient, equally competent at once in agronomic and 
aesthetic and construction and moral matters. He is a regional Olympian. 
His power could not be a little greater or a little smaller; it was by 
definition absolute, not to say supernatural. He could not allow himself 
to appear before his subjects as an ordinary mortal. Who would otherwise 
believe that he is able to cut through all knots, to resolve all conflicts, 
to assuage all griefs? In short, the secularization of Party professionalism 
would be equivalent for him to death.

Truly, it is an impressive picture which arises before us in Kochetov's 
novel. The only trouble is that Ovechkin, who spent all his life travelling 
around among the cities and villages of the country, and knew personally 
most of these thunderers, does not agree with this picture. Kochetov's 
Denisov also functions in Ovechkin's sketches--sometimes under the name 
of Borzov, First Secretary of the District Committee, sometimes under the 
name of Maslennikov, Secretary of the Provincial Committee, and sometimes 
under the name of Lobov, First Secretary of the Provincial Committee. But 
these people did not have surrounding them the imposing romantic mystery 
with which Kochetov surrounds his hero, or the halo of infallibility and 
 omniscience which so depressingly reminds us of the halo created at one 
time around the Boss of the nation himself, the General Secretary of the 
entire Party, Stalin. In place of all this, the reader finds in them vulgar 
pretention and cheap vanity, horrifying incompetence and crude, high-handed 
power, which breaks the initiative of subordinates and cultivates an intel-
lectual desert around itself. "Can a Party leader of this type," Ovechkin 
asks, "inculcate in others, in his associates, the creative boldness of 
thought, the initiative, the real and not ostentatious efficiency, the
principled integrity, which are the most valuable qualities of a person holding a responsible post in the service of the state?...In the vicinity of these people, there is not created—let us resort to a term from agronomy—a favorable microclimate for the growth and blossoming of talents. As this kind of Party professional "surrounds himself, as though deliberately, with colorless and ungifted people as his closest associates." As a result, "the interests of the state are sacrificed to vanity."

Ovechkin does not deny the efficiency of these people in carrying out concrete and extraordinary actions which require the total mobilization of the efforts of all participants in them, such as a war or the restoration of a ruined economy. He is talking about something quite different: in peacetime, when life follows a normal and not an extraordinary channel, the thundering First Secretaries (who try artificially to create the extraordinary conditions of war mobilization, which is the only justification for the absolute nature of their power) are transformed into anachronisms, into antediluvian mammoths who trample down every living thing around them. He sadly relates how the people in one province "joked dolefully (about their boss): he is the secretary of the Provincial Committee, and the Secretary of the City Committee, and the chief agronomist of the Province, and the head of all construction projects, and the artistic director of the theater, and the chief architect of the city, and the editor of the provincial newspaper. The only things he hasn't taken charge of are the Young Communist League and the Pioneer Organization: his age won't permit it."

Ovechkin is an eminently practical man. He demonstrates his thoughts with figures. The inefficiency—the plain impossibility--
of direct control by Party organs under ordinary conditions is obvious to him: not only in a huge province but even in a small rural district, where "there are 20-25 collective farms... and 50-60 tractor brigades, and where the collective farms sow 2,000 - 3,000 hectares. At harvest time, 100 - 120 combines are working the fields. Even if the secretary of the district committee were to use a helicopter to transport him around the district, he wouldn't have time in a day to stand beside each sower and harvesting combine and to check and to expedite their work. Even if you sent the entire Party staff of the district as 'deputies' to the sowing and harvesting units, and to gardens and farms and construction sites of collective farms, there still wouldn't be enough personnel to do the job."97 And what are we to say about provinces where there may be 15, 18, or even 25 such districts? This is why Ovechkin concludes that under ordinary conditions it is impossible to achieve economic efficiency except by "cultivating talented new managers of the economy in the collective farms themselves"98— that is, by creating a managerial elite and letting it work according to its understanding:

But this is precisely what Kochetov's hero cannot permit. For what does he have left to do where life takes its normal course? Where the peasants sow grain, and not weeds? Where the work of factories is controlled by the "socialist market" and by their own managers? Where husbands resolve their conflicts with their wives eye to eye, and the books of writers are evaluated by those for whom they are written, and where artists consult their own inspiration for advice instead of—as in Kochetov's novel—asking the Party boss? Here we approach the deepest mystery of the situation of the provincial thunderers in the
epoch when the national government was playing dangerous games with reforms and "collective leadership"—that is, in the epoch of de-Stalinization. If and where the reforms succeed (as, we will see further, was the case under Khrushchev in 1962-64), the role of the thunderers disappears, just as the role of the Party priest disappears in a society with a normal cultural process.

Now, it seems, we begin to understand why the Oktiabrist Kochetov depicts Denisov, not only as a positive hero, but as some kind of almost mystical "personality" around whom there is created an aureole of infallibility and omnipotence—a kind of "personality cult" on a regional scale. The provincial Committee Secretary is for him the guardian of the sacred fire of Stalinism, a little Stalin, a regional shadow of the great chieftain.

At the same time we begin to understand why for Ovechkin and the Novyi Mirist critics both of them—Kochetov and Denisov—are antediluvian mammoths who do not want to die, and therefore artificially represent the life around them as still abnormal—still, as in Stalin's time, extraordinary. If Kochetov needs for this purpose "capitalist encirclement" and a "fifth column," Denisov needs constant "bottle necks," "log jams," and "shortages." The contradictions between supplier and consumer enterprises, interruptions in supply, deficits, failures, mistakes, scandals, the non-fulfillment of the plan—'in a word everything which the Soviet press calls "temporary difficulties"—all of this is Denisov's daily bread. He needs to have these temporary difficulties permanent, for he lives only by the absurdity, clumsiness, and fundamental irrationality of the economic process. Like a vulture, he feeds on carrion. This is why the rule of the little Stalins in the economic process seems
to the Noyyi Mirist party a destructive force. It leads to a decline in the economy just as inevitably as the role of priests in the cultural process leads to a decline in culture. This, at any rate, is Ovechkin's point of view.

My own journalistic experience tends to confirm its correctness. I had occasion to meet personally, in the course of my journeys around the country, about a dozen little Stalins on the provincial scale. I knew relatively well only two or three of them, with whom I so to speak broke bread and talked on non-official topics. My experience is a drop in the ocean compared with Ovechkin's, and I do not consider it to any degree representative. On the other hand, I have talked about these people with dozens of representatives of middle management, directors and chief-engineers of plants, heads of shops, and chairmen of collective farms. They speak of the little Stalins not only willingly, but with passion and excitement, as of people to whom they are connected by profound personal feelings. I never met with so much bile, poison, contempt, and fear in the relationships between people in Russia. If the expression "class struggle" has any meaning at all, then only the struggle between salespersons and customers in the Soviet Union can be compared in its degree of intensity, fury, and openness with the struggle between the managers and the little Stalins. The latter are the object of the all-consuming hatred of the former. Thus, it is not for me to argue with Ovechkin. From the point of view of people whose views I tried to articulate in the Soviet press, the power of the little Stalins is similar to a plague. Speaking in contemporary terms, this power is ineluctably leading the USSR to a "Polish" situation in the 1980s— that is, to economic bankruptcy, and to a truly extraordinary situation
in which the power of the little Stalins can no longer be called into question. For a regional dictatorship can be justified in the final analysis only by the restoration of the "dear dictatorship" on a national scale—which would naturally mean the end of the regime of de-Stalinization.

Thus, as opposed to the Oktiabrist stereotype of the "threat from the left," the Russia of Novyi Mir advanced the thesis of the "threat from the right." In this context, the literary terror proved to be only a part of its program of "de-Nazification," if we may express it that way: that is, the ridding of the country from the cultural, ideological, and institutional remnants of Stalinism. And it was against these remnants that its entire proposed alternative to the "Polish" path of de-Stalinization, if we may call it this, was directed.

As far as our materials permit us to judge, this alternative consisted in the following: a) to the Stalinist hypertrophied "vertical" in the management of the economy, Novyi Mir contrasted a "horizontal" managerial autonomy, and regulation by the "socialist market"; b) to the Stalinist dominance of the priests in the cultural process, it contrasted the criterion of classical Russian literature, trying by its own efforts to destroy the Stalinist industry of pseudo-culture; c) to the Stalinist chronic stagnation of collectivized agriculture, it contrasted the fundamental reorganization on the basis of the "link system" (we will speak of this in more detail in the second part of this work) and the liquidation of regional "personality cults"; d) to the Oktiabrist's mystique of Party professionalism, it contrasted the secularization of Party work, and its subordination to rational economic criteria; e) to the Oktiabrist stereotype of hostile capitalist encirclement, it contrasted, so to speak, the "human face" of the West.
To put it briefly, in the 1960s the Russia of Novyi Mir in fact proved capable of proposing a program for a Second Historical Experiment, what might be called an alternative path of development of de-Stalinization (which now, in the 1980s, it is more appropriate to call "Hungarian").

It seems, it is now more or less clear to the reader why in this irreconcilable struggle of Russia versus Russia (in what may be arbitrarily called the conflict between the "Polish" and "Hungarian" alternatives), the priests and the regional dictators were on the same side of the barricade and saw each other as allies.

Both of them could exist comfortably only in a milieu which imitated the Stalinist emergency situation in the economic and cultural life. For both of them the "collective leadership," the intensification of the de-Stalinizing reforms, the "socialist market" and the flirtation with the West, which destroyed the situation of cultural and political isolationism, represented an immediate threat. Both of them were placed in a situation of struggle for political survival. They needed each other. The priests needed the support of the regional dictators in the organs of power where strategic decisions were made. (And in fact, if we are to believe the rumors which consistently circulated in Russia during the 1960s, at each Plenum of the Central Committee, it was precisely the little Stalins who pounded on the table, demanding that Novyi Mir be liquidated.) But the regional dictators also needed the legitimation of their role and their status as positive heroes in post-Stalin society. Only Oktiabrists literature could give them this legitimation.

On the basis of these considerations, it seems quite appropriate to hypothesize that along with those in the industry of pseudo-culture, the nucleus of the constituency of the Oktiabrists was made up of Party
professionals in the provincial cities. Here is what we learn on this score from the only sociological study devoted, at least indirectly, to the confrontation between Novyi Mir and Oktiabr'. In 1968, Novyi Mir proved most popular in large cities (there it was read by 31.5% of the readers of Literaturnaia gazeta), while the greatest concentration of readers of Oktiabr' was discovered precisely in medium-sized towns and provincial centers (15.6%). Novyi Mir was read chiefly by writers, journalists, and people in the liberal professions (more than 50% of the readers of Literaturnaia gazeta) and also by scientists (40%), while Oktiabr' was most popular precisely among Party professionals (14.7%). Thus, the study we have cited seems to confirm our hypothesis.

But, leaving dry figures and turning for a moment to living emotions, we must note that the Oktiabrists and their allies were mistaken in being so suspicious of the West, and particularly of "those States," where, as we remember, in their opinions, "at midnight and at noon, hatred to us was ground out." In any case, it was by no means everyone, apparently, who "ground out hatred" here. For example, just when the above cited survey showed that the Oktiabrists had not at all accidentally created a mystical halo around the "Soviet prefects," a solid monograph, complete with very complex tables, appendices, and computations, appeared in America; its author set himself the quite Oktiabrist goal of legitimizing the "Soviet prefects" by showing that they represented "the basis for a model of one possible 'modern' political system." Furthermore, he seems to have consciously validated another monumental Oktiabrist thesis, according to which the little Stalins are actually worthy of the status of positive heroes in post-Stalin society. He asserted, for example, that "the involvement of the local Party organs in the administrative
process... has been, in large part, a positive, a necessary development rather than a harmful one."102 The little Stalins required that "the local party organs have been interpreted not as an intrusive element that interferes with the effective operation of the administrative system, but as an important role in promoting its effective operation."103 And of this, precisely, the author tried to persuade his readers.

Thus, the people whom the Soviet managerial elite perceive as antediluvian mammoths—as living relics of the "dear dictatorship" that is, the essentially medieval Russian political organization of Stalinism, and as people who are leading the country to disaster were represented by a young American scholar as a necessary and positive element in a modern and effective political system. Apparently without even having an inkling of the confrontation between Novyi Mir and Oktiabr', and in the context of a quite different argument—with S. M. Lipset, rather than Valentin Ovechkin, and with Barrington Moore and not with Gennadii Lisichkin—Jerry Hough has somehow turned up on the same side of the barricade on which the Oktiabrists and their allies, the regional dictators, were fighting. He supplied the mystique of Oktiabrism, so to speak, with a respectable scholarly basis, thereby involuntarily making his contributions to the extension of the life of the Stalinist myth.

The problem of what I would call the "de-Stalinization of consciousness" in the West, will be the subject of a chapter in the concluding part of this work. Here, I wish only to show by one example that the ignoring of the internal political struggle in the Soviet establishment, which was focused in the 1960s with such remarkable openness in the debate on de-Stalinization, is in fact fraught with undesirable and even dangerous aberrations.
XI

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORRUPTION

It would probably be unfortunate if, in analyzing The Secretary of a Provincial Committee, we miss the chance to look at, so to speak, the philosophical depths of Oktiabrist. They are interesting both in and of themselves and because they give us the opportunity to describe more precisely its political evolution. The exposition of Kochetov's philosophy in the novel is fuzzy and muddled. By setting it in order as much as possible we get the following picture. Soviet society is divided into four major elements—the laborers, the intelligentsia, the Party professionals, and the leader. At bottom, all of these are perfectly good: we should not forget that the novel appeared at the beginning of the debate, when the country was in the grip of a utopian fever, and the tone of Oktiabrist—in common with the general mood—was optimistic. Even then, it did not like de-Stalinization, of course, but this seemed merely a harmful Khrushchevist growth on the healthy Stalinist root. However—and this, one must assume is a fundamental lesson taken by the Oktiabrists from the Khrushchev reforms of the 1950s—all four of the elements mentioned are subject to corruption; and the source of corruption is different in each case. For the laborers, for example, the source of corruption is the excessive growth in material welfare which gives rise to "the consumer urge," inciting an unhealthy private-property instinct.104 For the intelligentsia, it was access to Western bourgeois culture, which developed in it an element of individualism that led to the creation in the country of a kind of "pro-Western lobby" (in the Oktiabrist jargon of the mid-60s this was transformed into the "fifth column.").105 For the Party professional, as we already know, it was
the dissolution of Party work into economic work, which harmed its sacred mystique. Finally, for the leader it was flattery, which Kochetov considers the main cause of the "personality cult," leading to the excesses of the "dear dictatorship."

We have before us, if you like, a philosophy of the corruption of socialism. Just when the new--Khrushchevist--Party program, solemnly promising world economic primacy for the USSR by 1980, a consumer paradise, and the final ideological victory of Communism, was being enthusiastically discussed in Moscow, Oktiabrism was offering for discussion another program pointing to the fateful danger of Khrushchev's promises. It was not that Kochetov doubted the final victory of Communism. He did not escape the utopian fever of the epoch. His attitude toward the goals advanced in the Khrushchev program was no less enthusiastic than Khrushchev's own. During this time he had occasion to write in Oktiabr the following: "It is not hard to understand that twenty years from now we will have climbed to such mountain heights that in comparison even the most highly developed country will seem to lie in the most distant lowlands. . . Our work asks for heroes perhaps even more significant than, let us say, 20 to 25 years ago: our cause is great, and our people must also be great. . . We have envied those who by the will of the Party stormed the old world in October of 1917. But the people of the future will envy us who are participants in today's unheard-of building projects!"

For all this, the philosophy of corruption gave the Oktiabrists the opportunity to see another side of the matter: the serious danger of temptations created by the Khrushchevist program--temptations which could lead to the irreversible degeneration of socialism. For the Oktiabrists
the question was different from what it was for Khrushchev: not only to achieve the goal but to achieve it while preserving the purity of socialism. The first—and main—thing which was needed for this was the removal of temptation: material (for the laborers), ideological (for the intelligentsia), reformist (for the Party professional), and finally, the temptation of flattery (for the leader). As one of the heroes of the novel says: "If there are temptations, there are also people who are tempted, aren't there? We must be very attentive and very vigilant toward the appearance of factors of temptation. We don't have the right to listen to and spread seduction. Once, in the struggle against theft, the hands of thieves were chopped off in certain countries. We must chop... and chop without mercy."109

Thus, led by the philosophy of corruption, Oktiabrist, in essence, advanced an alternative Party program. Its main points were directly opposite to those of the Khrushchevist program: to the consumer paradise it contrasted a healthy "socialist asceticism"; to peaceful coexistence, cultural isolationism; to reformist zeal, the halting of reforms; and to the profanation and secularization of Party work, the glorification of its sacred and mystical quality.

The reader can easily see the insuperable internal contradictions of the Oktiabrist program: it tried to reconcile the irreconcilable. On the one hand, it promised, just as Khrushchev did, that in twenty years the grandiose economic competition with capitalism would be won, leaving "the most highly developed capitalist countries in the distant lowlands," and on the other hand, it called for the removal of material incentives and the stopping of the economic reforms, without which the fulfillment of these programmatic promises was unthinkable. Kochetov,
however, did not feel this contradiction. He apparently also did not understand the extremely oversimplified nature of his stratification of Soviet society. Other more sophisticated Oktiabrist leaders had to come—and they will come—who (on the basis, among other things, of his philosophy of corruption) will revise his stratification and will remove the contradictions in his program. He himself proved incapable of this. In any case, at the end of the debate, in 1969, when he wrote his last novel, *What Do You Want?*, bitter, sarcastic, and filled with despair (a few years later he was to commit suicide)—there was no trace left of his optimism. His worst fears had come true: socialism seemed to him irretrievably corrupted.

Nothing remained in the nation’s blood of the utopian fever of the early 1960s; the promised "great heroes" had not come; and no one envied the participants in the "unheard-of construction projects." The laborers were primarily concerned about raising their standard of living, without caring about the purity of socialism; the intelligentsia was being transformed before his eyes into a "fifth column"; the mystique of Party professionalism was irretrievably lost, and the new leaders followed the footsteps of the deposed Khrushchev; the flirtation with the West was in its heyday. In place of the promised "mountain heights," the country turned out to be in the "swampy liberal lowlands." The hero of the last novel, an elderly Stalinist and high official of a central ministry, Sergei Samarin, bitterly reproached his son Feliks, and in his person the entire new generation: "The horns of a new war are sounding, and you kids are taking it easy. You concentrate all your power on pleasure on earth, on recreation, that is to say, on consumption. The consumer urge!... You trusted the sirens of pacifism too much—
both those abroad and ours. The biblical dove with the olive branch
has become your emblem. Who put this over on you, in place of the
hammer and sickle? The dove is from the Bible... it isn't from Marxism.110

But Feliks, the young Stalinist, boldly counterattacks: "You're
the main ones who are taking it easy. Why did you open the gates to
all this? It wasn't we who did that! You, you! And why? You were
afraid, it seems, that you would be accused of conservatism, of dogma-
tism... You were afraid and you moved backwards; you retreated from
the heights which dominated the ideological adversary into the swampy
liberal lowlands. Now, if you like, you're in between—not conservative,
and not liberal, and everyone is sick and tired of you all, of such
confused, half-hearted people. That's what it means to get out of date:
not to acquire the new and to lose the old--or, more precisely to let
it be taken away from you by shouters and demagogues."111
12. "ECONOMIC MUDDLE-HEADS"

Kochetov is distraught; he is in retreat along the entire front. Of course, he goes on scaring his readers with the "horns of war," just as he did a decade earlier, but for some reason they are no longer scared. The very bitterness and fury of this argument, the mutual reproaches of the old and the young Stalinists indicate that the thesis of Novyi Mir about the generation gap has not been lost even on Kochetov. In any case, the picture of Soviet society looked more complex than his stratification allowed. The appeal to the new positive hero--the representative of the central economic administration (the establishment group which suffered most heavily from Khrushchev's reforms, and which was bleeding and demoralized after the dismissal, in 1957, of most central ministries)--indicates his disillusionment about the Party professionals' being able by themselves to stop the country's slide into the abyss. The picture becomes still more complex: the new group does not fit into his stratification.

Certainly, Kochetov is not yet entirely free of the old illusions. But his very appeal to the proletarian masses, which sounds unmistakably from the pages of the novel, smacks of utopian thinking, if not panic: "The foundation of everything in the country is the restless laborers, and not those muddle-heads--both from the arts and from the economic field--whose voice unfortunately often is heard more frequently and louder than the voice of people who do their work honestly, without noise or stir. If the voice from the factory sounded more often and louder, the muddle-heads would not have so much room to operate."¹¹² There remains, however, the major question: Who, after all, are these "economic muddle-heads," who
have not only been able to survive the ouster of Khrushchev but have become so strong after him that the Stalinist old guard continues to retreat before their attack into the swampy liberal lowlands? Who are these people who have succeeded in replacing the imperial hammer and sickle with the Biblical dove of peace? Who are they of whom both the Party professionals and the representatives of the central economic administration were "afraid and before whom they moved backwards?"

Who would have believed Kochetov if he had asserted that all of these unimaginable misfortunes were brought on by mere "artistic muddle-heads," Novyi Mir crowd, or "literary snobs," or even "shouters and demagogues"--"economic muddle-heads?" The problem is, who were the patrons of these muddle-heads, now that Khrushchev was no longer there? The picture had become even more complex: it literally required the presence of some new group of powerful "muddle-heads," which Kochetov was not able to define (let us for the time being call it "group X") but which, nevertheless, was lodged somewhere near "the top"—again breaking up his stratification model.

In saying all this, I by no means wish to denigrate Kochetov's political intuition. Even in this state of severe disillusionment he was able, as we have seen, to feel out new positive heroes, new allies of the priestly group. In his novel, Oktiabrism entered decisively into the debate, which had then reached its peak, on the decentralization of management of the economy, in opposition to the proponents of the Kosygin reforms, who were entrenched in Novyi Mir. His hymn to the "passengers of black Volgas" is inimitable and deserves to be reproduced. (There is a certain symbolism in who rides in what car in the Soviet establishment; for example, the people involved here, who are, as we already know, the
leading staff members of the central ministries ride as a rule in black "Volgas," whereas the higher Party leaders ride exclusively in black "Chaikas"): "When he saw these men in their black Volgas, dressed in not very skillfully tailored overcoats, which looked as though they had been cut by one and the same apprentice hand, and wearing identical fur hats, of a model prescribed somewhere by someone, just like the one his father had, Feliks did not jest or ridicule the dowdy appearance of these passengers in black Volgas. From his father and from his father's many comrades he knew that these people were absorbed beyond measure in a great and difficult job, inconspicuous when seen from the street, but without which the state could neither live nor develop successfully... They had neither the time nor the desire to follow fashion or the shifting winds... coming from the West."113

Nevertheless, we can say, in summing up, that in the light of the situation at the end of the 1960s, Kochetov's picture of Soviet society, which inspired Oktiabrisms at the beginning of the debate, has proved to be archaic, over-simplified, and obsolete. His philosophy of corruption was bursting at every seam. New Oktiabrists ideas, new generalizations, new definitions were required--of the groups responsible for the corruption of socialism in the post-Khrushchev epoch, and particularly of the groups which were really capable of resisting this corruption, before it was too late. Alas, Kochetov had proved powerless to revise his own philosophy and to adapt it to the new times. He continued to reign in Oktiabrisms, but, like the Queen of England, he no longer ruled.
13. IDEAL HEROES

But Kochetov, who repeated, like a prayer, that "the horns of a new war will sound any minute," had his prejudices about preparation for this war and about the conditions necessary for winning it. He derived these prejudices from orthodox Stalinist doctrine. In listing the conditions necessary for victory, Stalin, as we know, had once given a decided preference to fortifying the rear, rather than to the number of divisions or the quality of armaments. The routing of the potential "fifth column," and the liquidation of the very possibility of development of an opposition in the country were for him an absolute priority. This may have been an attempt to justify retrospectively the "Great Purge" of the 1930s and the military unpreparedness of the USSR at the moment of the German invasion. But the causes of this phenomenon may have been deeper. The traditional Bolshevik suspicion of the tsarist "military experts" at the time of the Civil War may have been at work here too. The no less traditional Bolshevik fear of "Bonapartism" on the part of the military, which dictated to Stalin the destruction of the Soviet high command before the war, and to Brezhnev, the appointment of a civilian Minister of Defense, may also have been at work. However this may be, Kochetov shared this Party prejudice. He never attempted to make military people the positive heroes of his books. Nor were his heroes prone to make apologies for the army. The same aged Stalinist, Samarin, refuting in the novel What Do You Want? the Novyi Mir thesis that the Soviet Union was unprepared for World War II, emphasizes the traditional Oktiabrist thesis: "/We/ were not taking the job light-heartedly: day and night, on weekdays and on holidays, we
were preparing--preparing for the fact that we would sooner or later be attacked, learning to fight, and to defend our power."\textsuperscript{114} To his son's objection that "you were attacked suddenly just the same ... Just the same as they write everywhere, Stalin was unprepared and panicked."

Samarin answers firmly, underlining what he and Kochetov really meant by "defending our power": "There was no 'fifth column,' because the kulaks [wealthy peasants] had been liquidated and all forms of opposition in the country had been removed. \textit{This was the main thing--and this was not missed.}\textsuperscript{115}

In other words, the main merit of the "dear dictatorship," in the eyes of Kochetov and of his heroes is the terror and the extirpation by force of the illusion that peaceful coexistence was possible--the constant expectation of war and constant preparedness for it: in a word, precisely what \textit{is not done} in the flabby epoch of de-Stalinization. Here there was an open apologia for the dictatorship. But there was no apologia for the military. This strange paradox in Kochetov's thought apparently cut him off from the one group which, from the point of view of the new Oktiabrist ideologists, continues, even in the flabby epoch of de-Stalinization, to be saturated by the Oktiabrist foreboding of the inevitability of a new war. Just as fearless as Kochetov, the new ideologists were free from his prejudices. Without hesitation, they are going to the military for support. They are prepared to see in it allies and positive heroes.

Over the entire course of the debate, there was of course no lack, in the pages of \textit{Oktiabr'}, of stories and novels about the military. But they were chiefly devoted to glorifying the heroism of Soviet warriors during World War II. The new element, which arose at the end of the
debate, consisted not only in the fact that writers sought their heroes in the contemporary army, but also in the fact that they sought them among the most modernized—the most, so to speak, intellectually emancipated—part of it: the rocket troops—that is to say, in what would seem to be the last place where one could look for fossilized Stalinist stereotypes. However, the new ideologists looked for them right there—and found them. It is precisely the rocketeers whom they now tried to surround with the same sacred magic and the same mystical aura which Kochetov—faithful to the Party banner to the end—reserved exclusively for the Party professionals.

The new heroes are not inspired by the discredited promises of a consumer paradise or the construction of an ideal Communist society. They are traditionally alien to the "consumer urge." They are not guided—at least as depicted by the Oktiabrists—by group interests, as, let us say, are the little Stalins, concerned for the preservation of the regional dictatorships, or as are the passengers in black Volgas, concerned for the preservation of the Stalinist "vertical," which is to say the super-centralization of the economy. The military heroes are ready at any moment to "throw out everything personal"—but only "when the matter at issue concerns the highest interests of the defense of the motherland." That is how they talk: "the motherland," without always even bothering to add the epithet "socialist" which Kochetov held sacred. They are concerned about something more fundamental in the face of which all particular group, and even political interests pale—the survival of Russia in the face of "a ring of blocs closing around her—a sinister necklace encircling the motherland." Apparently the instinct of group survival attracts the Oktiabrists irresistibly to these people at the end of the
debate. At a time when all of their other allies showed their vulnerability—when the Party professionals "retreated from the heights which dominate the ideological adversary," and when, in the words of the young Stalinist, "everybody is sick and tired" of the "half-hearted, panicky" passengers in black Volgas—the new Oktiabrist ideologists seemed to have felt in the military something firm, not subject to corruption and infinitely reliable. Unlike the old Oktiabrist heroes, these people are not "afraid of being accused of conservatism." They do not put over on the country the Biblical dove of peace in place of the imperial hammer and sickle. They are not subject to temptation. In brief, they are the ideal heroes whom Kochetov sought with so much effort—and so tragically never found.

Here for example is how N. Gorbachev describes (in the novel Striking Force, devoted to the prehistory of the famous episode of the shooting down of the U-2 plane piloted by F.G. Powers) the worldview of the commander of Soviet rocket troops (my namesake, alas) Marshal Yanov: "In that sinister breath of the 'cold war,' when the inevitability of an avalanche... was maturing, and preparing to turn from a 'cold' war into a new 'hot' war still more cruel and all-embracing... the shrewdness of a military man suggested precisely that conclusion: it might become hot." Like a nightmare, the "new blocs and alliances" growing "like mushrooms" pursue the new Oktiabrist hero. He literally feels that the country is surrounded by military bases "as by a visible, tangible ring," and that "armadas of 'super-bombers' and 'fortresses' are coming at us from all the bases." If we are to believe the author, this nightmare pursues not only the commander, but also his subordinates from generals to officers and
sargents. Given their foreboding, it is not surprising at all that they were prepared to interpret even the unfortunate flight of F. G. Powers as the beginning of a "hot" war.

If we now remember for a minute that all these passions of the military were played out, according to the Oktiabrist author, in 1959 and 1960 when not only was there no smell of "hot" war in the air of Europe, but even the "cold" one was quickly dying down, and when Khrushchev was stubbornly seeking a "summit" meeting with the leaders in the West, and when the Soviet army, just reduced by more than a third, was being prepared for a new reduction (as a result of which its numbers were to be reduced to 42% of what they had been at the moment of Stalin's death)--if we compare the state of mind on the part of the military which is described above with these facts, we get an impression which is, to say the least, curious.

Can there be any doubt that such people as Marshal Yanov and his generals, living in a permanent nightmare of hostile "encirclement" of the country would have not only desperately resisted the reduction of the armed forces and the plans of "coexistence" in general, but also to try to destroy these plans? As sober military realists, they would undoubtedly have to consider Khrushchev's peaceful gestures as dangerous utopianism, which threatened to destroy both the moral and the military-industrial capability of the state. Is it surprising in the light of this, that the novel is literally saturated with the feverish striving to create as soon as possible a rocket capable of shooting down the U-2? Is it surprising, further, that the military regards as a decisive victory what for Khrushchev was a decisive defeat, which compelled him to leave the
conference already assembled in Paris and to cancel the already declared reduction of the Soviet armed forces? However it may have been, in this episode the military showed themselves true heroes in the eyes of the Oktiabrists, and a force capable of actually correcting the course of the country, even against the will of its leaders. They could rely on the military—and on the rocket troops in particular, which is not subject to the erosion of the "consumerist" ideology and peaceful coexistence. This is the conclusion which follows from the novel Strike Force.

This new military orientation of the Oktiabrists (like their new philosophy) is most fully and openly set forth in a novel by Arkadii Perventsev, one of the most prominent Oktiabrist leaders, who would probably have replaced Kochetov in the role of "high priest" had the debate continued.

14. PURIFICATION FROM THE ULTIMATE FILTH

Perventsev's novel is called The Island of Hope. This title is full of symbolic meaning—even a double symbolic meaning. In essence, Perventsev behaves like a kind of Oktiabrist Columbus who suddenly sees firm ground after tormenting years of a long journey across the stormy and dangerous ocean of "temptation," "frivolity," "the consumer urge," "confusion," and "half-heartedness"—everything which he calls by the biblical term "skverna" (the ultimate filth) which is shocking in the mouth of an ordinary Oktiabrist. He saw this firm ground in the army.

The opposite pole from this "skverna" (which, as the reader will understand, serves as something like the most general synonym for de-Stalinization) is designated by the word "safety." This word is always
in the mouth of the journalist Ushakov, the author's alter-ego, who has arrived at the secret base of the most up-to-date rocket-bearing submarine in search of "safe" people, free from the "skverna" of de-Stalinization. He announces his intentions openly, at the very beginning of the novel—for example, in the following conversation with a local Party (or military-party, to be quite precise) professional:

"'What are you looking for?'
"'Spiritual qualities.'
"'Such as?'
"'The purification of skverna.'
"'Where?'
"'There . . . under the water, dammit!'

"'That goes without saying . . . It's crystal clear down there. All the baseness of earth is reduced to zero. All earthly passions depart as soon as you cast off. There's no other place to look for something like that: it's a nucleus of communism.'"\(^{125}\)

In this "atmosphere of cosmic abstraction from the external world which was left behind,"\(^{126}\) in this atmosphere where there lived "true enthusiasts . . . who have shaken out of themselves all base alloys,"\(^{127}\) where "there's no need . . . to wear bright socks or things like that,"\(^{128}\) and where "the commanders are tested and safe,"\(^{129}\) and where everyone "is united by a clear and precise goal"\(^{130}\)—here the "ideal structure of the future society,"\(^{131}\) or, in a word, the Oktiabrist Island of Hope, begins to be outlined before Ushakov.

However, the novel also has a second symbolic meaning, as we have already said. It is designated by the words "transition to globalism,"
which also never leaves the mouths of the inhabitants of the Island of Hope. We will talk later of what these words mean. What interests us now is something else. The Oktiabrist Ushakov came to the rocket-bearing submarine base of the Northern Fleet not only to rest his soul in this "nucleus of Communist society" (the plot of the novel deals with the first round-the-world voyage by a Soviet nuclear rocket carrier, which gives Perventsev the opportunity to feel not only like an Oktiabrist Columbus, but also like a kind of Magellan). In fact, the hero is here in order to ask the bosses of the Island of Hope for support. With a boldness worthy of Kochetov, he complains to one of the leaders of the rocket-carrying fleet, Admiral Maksimov. Can the reader imagine of whom he complains? Of the civilian "bosses." Unlike Kochetov, Perventsev already knows quite well that the most dangerous and powerful enemies of Oktiabrism in post-Khrushchev Russia are concentrated precisely there, "at the top."

Of course, for him, as for Kochetov the "shouters and demagogues" of the Novyi Mir party, the "artistic muddle-heads" are enemies--this is true. The "economic muddle-heads," who oppose the passengers in black Volgas, are enemies too. But behind all of them stand other people, whom we might call "political muddle-heads." And these people are far more formidable, since they participate in power, since they are "on top," and since they have it in their power to break the fate of the Oktiabrists and block their political message.

The Admiral, however, is cautious. He clearly did not know that matters "up there" were so perilous. He doubts that the people there are really on the border line of spiritual capitulation, as Ushakov describes them as being. He asks what in that case may be the motives of these
people. Ushakov, who apparently has entrée to high circles, tells him of an unguarded conversation with one of them: "If you sluff off the verbal shell, the meaning of his speech was approximately this: ... yes, once there was the 'Battleship Potemkin,' or Mother [Gorky's novel ... A. Y.]. But the times now are different. The bourgeois has become more penetrating and far-sighted. He must be put to sleep, and then overthrown." 132

In Ushakov's interpretation, this is not only nonsense, but a pious justification for capitulationism and political paralysis. More than that, this is a deliberate attempt to shut our eyes to what is taking place in the country, and to what, from Ushakov's point of view, indicates that it is not we who are putting the bourgeois to sleep but the bourgeois who are putting to sleep us. Not he but we are faced with the problem of survival. Ushakov exclaimed indignantly: "It is inexplicable for me who is blind-folding their eyes? Who is pushing them in the back? For whom are they clearing our minefields?" 133 In answer, the Admiral asks: "Do you believe that they will succeed? ... Are they so powerful?" 134

The first thing that strikes the eye here is that both interlocutors consciously separate themselves from "them," thereby compelling the reader to assume that "they" are some group which is powerful enough so that it can skillfully and secretly "clear our ideological minefields" and send the country into the "swampy liberal lowlands." Isn't the same "group X" being spoken of, a hint of which flashed before us at one time in Kochetov's novel? However this may be, the Admiral accepted Ushakov's message: "I have nothing to do with all this, as you yourself guessed," he says, "But I will not pass this by in silence, and therefore, I will try to figure it out ... It's too bad that you didn't fill me in earlier." 135
If we agree that what is being spoken of is really "group X," then we must also agree that before our eyes the Oktiabrists are proposing to the military a political alliance against it. This is the first attempt of this kind known to me, and furthermore, made with such captivating openness. The alliance is not yet in existence, that much is clear. Furthermore, the Admiral does not even promise it (he promises only to "figure out"), but he is clearly interested. He is sympathetic to the Oktiabrist. "In spirit," so to speak, he is already with him. Nevertheless, what seems to me most interesting is clearly something else. To the Admiral's question as to whether they are powerful enough to finally "clear our ideological minefields," the Oktiabrist answers in the negative: "There are people, and they are in the majority, who will not allow the revolution to come apart at the seams. They certainly know the power of the screw and the nut. Strip the screw and the biggest bridge will collapse." It is hard to resist the temptation of concluding from this answer that in 1968 Perventsev (like Kochetov, who predicted in 1961 the ouster of Khrushchev), is prophesying the end of "group X."

15. "GROUP X"

For all of Perventsev's openness, "group X" remains anonymous in his novel, as it does in Oktiabrist literature generally. No one was bold (or keen-witted) enough to describe it even in Aesopian language, as, for example, Kochetov described Khrushchev in the character of Artamonov. "Group X" is, rather, suggested as some kind of behind the scenes dark force, before which the Soviet "conservatives" are compelled to retreat, which, unlike the passengers in black Volgas, very attentively follow the
winds of fashion blowing from the West," which does not wear "identical fur hats, of a model prescribed somewhere by someone," and at the same time act as patrons to the "economic and artistic muddle-heads," "putting over on" the country the Biblical dove of peace, blocking the Oktiabrist message of alarm and covering its capitulationism with vague and disingenous talk of the "far-sightedness" of the \textit{contemporary} bourgeois."

This group does not appear on the pages of \textit{Okkiabr}, but I have many times met its representatives. They are very easily distinguished from the little Stalins and the passengers in black Volgas. They are not only always wearing neckties, but usually have advanced degrees to boot, they speak foreign languages, are urbanized, civilized, and as a rule concerned exclusively with the interests of their careers and the privileges connected with these. Sometimes they fly very high. Well known examples are the Academician and Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Georgii Arbatov, the Academician and Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Politics, Nikolai Inozemtsev, and the former assistant Secretary of the Central Committee and editor-in-chief of the journal \textit{Voprosy Filosofii}, Ivan Frolov. These people are "high-brow" experts. They head institutes and edit journals, (although not all institutes and not all journals). They are in the waiting-rooms of the Ministers and Secretaries of the Central Committee and on the staffs of some members of the Politburo. They write reports for them, select data, and prepare decisions.

I devoted a chapter in another work\footnote{137} to the question of where these Westernized elite had come from in the post-Stalin USSR. They constitute the hard core of what I called there the Soviet "aristocratizing elite" or
the "new new class." And if they proved not powerful enough to prevent
the destruction of the Novyi Mir party, then on the other hand--and here
Perventsev is right in his complaint to the Admiral--they were powerful
enough to make the priests pay for that with the dismissal from the
political arena of their Oktiabrist avant garde.

We will not discuss here the political preferences of "group X." Let
us say only that this is a motley group, greedy for the good things in
life and therefore entirely absorbed in the "consumer urge," cynical and
without any lofty ideals. It is sick of the missionary's zeal and the
ascetic ideals of the Oktiabrists. It does not fit well into the gray,
tedious, "dowdy" crowd of passengers in black Volgas and little Stalins; it
stands out in this group like a white crow. It has difficulties circulating
there, obtaining the precious access to trips abroad and to black caviar.
Just as the priests need for their survival cultural isolationism and
the "dear dictatorship," these people need (also for their survival)
peaceful coexistence, if not detente, with the West, and "collective
leadership." Dictatorship and cultural isolationism would most probably
mean their political, if not physical ruination. Dictatorships do not
usually tolerate white crows. For this reason, white crows are likely to
resist the dictatorial urge of the Oktiabrists. And their main positive
function in an autocratic polity consists in this, Ushakov is probably
right to complain to the Admiral that "group X" if it had its way, "would
tear the revolution apart at the seams." Group X, however, knows as well
as Ushakov does that in this case "a great bridge would collapse"--the
same great bridge across which it moves towards its privileges. It does
not know another thing--how to "tear the revolution apart at the seams,"
and at the same time preserve its privileges. Let us return, however, to Perventsev.

16. WHO IS TO RECEIVE "ACCORDING TO HIS NEEDS?"

It was no accident that Perventsev chose as the object of his study the Rocket Fleet (as Gorbachev had chosen the strategic Rocket Troops): the "transition to globalism," of which his heroes proudly speak, is most clearly visible precisely here. Earlier, says one of them, "we were much poorer. But now the soul rejoices. The range has been increased so much... to almost the whole globe." "From a trawler to a nuclear submarine, from a miniature cannon to a nuclear rocket!" reports another with pride. "And all this within the lifetime of one generation... a miracle!" These people do not forget for a minute to whom they owe these miracles. "The state gives us food and drink and looks after us. Say thank you to the collective farmer in Riazan' and the miner in Karaganda. They deprive themselves for the likes of us; the people, the country, gives us the ideal technology by not getting enough to eat and not getting enough sleep and depriving themselves;" "None of us have to struggle for our daily bread or take it from someone else. We are furnished with flour, ovens, and yeast. Who furnishes us? The producers of products... The country pulled in its belt, and did not refuse us. It gave to us according to our needs."

In all of these admissions, one feels a tormenting unsureness. In their enthusiasm over the miracle of "increase in range" to a global scale, these people still seem not to be convinced that the Riazan' collective farmer will actually thank them for taking their "daily bread" out of
his mouth, or that the Karaganda miner is really happy "not getting enough to eat, not getting enough sleep, and depriving himself" to give them ideal technology. Between the lines of these admissions, there is an unasked question: Is the people depriving itself, or is it being deprived for them? They, the military people, seem to be expecting from the Oktiabrist ideologist a confirmation and legitimation of this paradoxical situation in which in peacetime a country where people continue as before to struggle furiously for their daily bread and to "pull in its belt," are giving to the military, "according to its needs," without even dreaming of this for themselves. The Oktiabrist complains to the military, and the military complain to him. He asks their support, and they ask his.

The military people are confused. In some strange way in their consciousness, the political ideology has ceased to move in tandem with political reality. In fact, as distinct from the Soviet economy, which has suffered repeated defeat and in the final analysis has proved powerless, not only to create the promised consumer paradise, but even merely to furnish the people with an acceptable standard of living, the Soviet military has never been defeated. Its vestments are clean; there are no stains on its banners. "Not a single submarine has been seized by the enemy, just as not a single warship fighting under the Soviet flag has struck its banners before the enemy."142 Furthermore, again as distinct from the Soviet economy, the armed forces are in a state of rapid and unrestrained expansion (both in the sense of uninterrupted modernization and the acquisition of new weapons systems, and in the sense of uninterrupted expansion of the scale of their activities). The conclusion seems obvious. It seems quite clear to them where is our strength and
where our weakness is. These are the facts. This is the political reality. But this is not the political ideology, which declares not a military, but an economic miracle to be the highest goal of socialism. The Soviet economy must overtake the Western one, and the level of consumption in socialist society must be higher than in the capitalist countries: this is what all Soviet leaders have declared from the very beginning of de-Stalinization. Precisely such an economic miracle was solemnly promised in the 1961 Party Program, which the post-Khrushchev leadership has not renounced. "We are guided by strictly scientific calculations," Khrushchev announced at that time from the tribune of the Party Congress, "and these calculations show that in 20 years we will have built a Communist society."\(^\text{143}\) And that society constitutes a direct opposite of what Perventsev's heroes proudly describe. In it, no one, by going hungry, will have to give his daily bread to the military. Quite to the contrary: Khrushchev describes this society as a "cup of plenty, which must always be filled to the rim."\(^\text{144}\) It was precisely to fill this cup that in 1953, Malenkov reduced defense expenditures from 23.6\% to 20.8\% of the national income. As a result, in 1958, the Soviet armed forces underwent a dramatic reduction from 5,763,000 to 3,623,000 men under arms—more than one third. In 1960 a new reduction of 1,200,000 was declared. In 1963, Khrushchev announced: now we are going to reduce expenditures on defense, and this money... will be directed toward the production of mineral fertilizers."\(^\text{145}\)

Thus, there seems no doubt that the "cup of plenty" for the Riazan' collective farmer (who in this context functions as a synonym for the Soviet consumer) required that the armed forces by "depriving themselves" give
him "flour, ovens, and yeast." The political ideology of de-Stalinization assumed that one group—either the armed forces or the consumer—must receive "according to its needs." The other group must go hungry. Under Malenkov and Khrushchev the deprived group was the army. Under Kosygin and Brezhnev, the situation was reversed: the armed forces began to receive "according to needs," and the consumer got the short end of the stick. The paradox was that the political ideology did not change.

Having deposed Khrushchev, Brezhnev continued to press the same line, stubbornly refusing to recognize the obvious fact that the roles had reversed themselves, and that it was now the consumer who had to go hungry. Like a parrot, he repeated that the material welfare of the Karaganda miner remains the "highest goal of socialism." In short, he sowed confusion in the minds of the military. They were simply not sure that the "flour, ovens, and yeast" were coming to them on a legitimate basis—and for good. There was no guarantee that a new "political muddlehead" would not come to the helm of the country—a new Malenkov or a new Khrushchev, capable of compelling them again to "deprive themselves" or "go hungry."

This "shilly-shallying and confusion" of the regime which demoralized them was intensified by the fact that its leaders did not even promise to remove this terrifying confusion in the foreseeable future. Quite to the contrary, they intensified it, apparently deliberately, by, for example, making speeches in an entirely Khrushchevian spirit: "Having advanced as the main task of the ninth five year plan the improvement of the welfare of the working people, the Central Committee has in mind that this course should determine our activity not only in the coming five
years, but also the general orientation of the economic development of the country over the long term. In setting such a course, the Party proceeds primarily from the assumption that the fullest possible satisfaction of the cultural and material needs of people is the highest goal of production in the public sector under socialism."  

From Ushakov's point of view, this entire confusion derived from the fact that the leadership of the regime was in captivity to "group X," and to "forces which have set themselves the goal of diverting us from clear and integral tasks." These were the ones who had thought up the economic miracle as the highest justification of socialism, these were the ones who had chosen an inappropriate arena for competing with the West--economics, material welfare, consumer expectations. These were the ones who diverted Khrushchev from the right path and continue to divert Brezhnev, not having understood--and not now understanding--that in this arena we are doomed to lose, if only because economic competition inevitably gives rise to "temptation" and "the consumer urge" which corrupts socialism. Here is not our strength, but our weakness. Our strength is in something else. One of the Admirals who are Ushakov's interlocutors, formulates it this way: "Such a many-sided, powerful conglomorate with the most modern ships could be created [in the course of one generation] only by a regime which concentrated all the national resources, experience, and productive forces." In other words, the true strength of socialism lies in its amazing ability to militarize the country. As against the economic justification of socialism advanced by "group X" (which on the one hand has demonstrated its untenability, and on the other hand has given birth to all the "skverna" of de-Stalinization), the Admiral proposes an alternative, military justification of socialism.
Through the mouths of his military protagonists, Perventsev essentially reports to us the conditions under which the armed forces will agree to become an Island of Hope for the country—that is to say, to save it from the "skverna" of de-Stalinization: they must have guarantees of the irreversibility of the process which provides them with "flour, ovens, and yeast." But this is possible only when the political ideology is brought into conformity with the political reality—when the "going hungry" of the Karaganda miner is legitimized. The obsolete and compromised Khrushchevist doctrine of economic competition with the West must be replaced by a modern and realistic doctrine of military competition. Incapable of an economic miracle, socialism is still capable of a military one. Here we can win—and furthermore, are already winning: "We sail under water clearly better than they do. In space and in the atmosphere, at least no worse. In essentials we are immeasurably better . . . Our rocket cutters are better than any." Here's our chance to become an Island of Hope for the whole world: only a militarized socialism is capable of saving mankind from the "skverna" of capitalism. Its real "highest goal" lies in this. And here is the second, and, so to speak, global meaning of the title of Perventsev's novel.

I assume that the reader now understands not only why the Oktiabrists at the end of the debate turned to new allies, but also why they were needed by the military as allies. In order to make this ultimately clear, let us give the armed forces the floor.

Admiral Maksimov explains why he allowed Ushakov into the top-secret military base: "The appearance of an 'alien' in the holy of holies . . . is justified only when that 'alien' completely becomes one of us and
compels the broad masses to believe in the reliability of defense . . .
Let them find out that we're not eating dry crusts of bread for nothing."150

The second motive is reported by the chief positive hero of the novel, Voloshin—a Soviet superman, who rules his super-ship with an iron hand:
"Political work is a profession, an especially complicated profession. . .
It is easier to become a helmsman, a commander, a mechanic . . . Anyone can be taught these specialties. But political work is a profession of another kind . . . We don't need a political worker who knows how to run a ship; we need a specialist in managing hearts and minds."151

As we see, it is a question of people who are able, in the first place to "make the miner from Karaganda believe" that he should "deprive himself" in the name of a "reliable defense," and in the second place able to manage—that is, to manipulate—"hearts and minds" by inculcating in them a mythologized image of the armed forces, courageously fighting with "skvena" both within the country and on the "whole globe." In short, not even the military can do without priests. The Oktiabrists put themselves at their disposal. They will honestly try to "make people believe" and "manage hearts and minds," by creating a myth of an "Island of Hope." But here as well, Novyi Mir stands in their way.

17. A WAR ON TWO FRONTS

Let us take only two examples. In M. Grekova's novella "At the Tests," the army appears not as a "mighty conglomerate" filled with "cosmic detachment," but as an ordinary Soviet collective, penetrated through and through by all of the same prosaic conflicts, all of the same human passions and flaws—selfishness, envy, careerism, and nastiness—as any
other collective. In other words, "skverna" triumphs on this "island" just as much as on the entire socialist mainland. Furthermore, Grekova shows with disarming authenticity that even in the sphere of military progress, of vital importance to the army, success is achieved by the same "sickly, unstable, little intellectual" (the old negative hero of Oktiabr') and the same completely de-ideologized experts, scientists, and engineers, who appear in Perventsev's novel as the new negative heroes, who violate the "cosmic detachment" of the Island of Hope. The matter is exacerbated by the fact that "skverna" triumphs in Grekova's novella in the last years of Stalin's reign when--from the point of view of the Oktiabrist postulates--it could not exist by definition, let alone "in the holy of holies" of the regime, the armed forces. Grekova's political message was precise and sacrilegious: any progress, including military progress, happens not thanks to, but in spite of the "dear dictatorship."

Still more disruptive was the political message of V. Bykov in his novel The Dead Can't be Hurt which practically destroyed the Oktiabrist myth of the victory in World War II achieved thanks to the leadership of Stalin and his Party professionals. Bykov shows a quite different war, and a different army. In this war, the people fight essentially on two fronts--against the enemy and against the Party professionals, those same "specialists in the management of hearts and minds," whom the Oktiabrists describe with such enthusiasm. And here again, Bykov's war is won not thanks to but in spite of the "dear dictatorship"--by the valor of the soldiers and the talent of the generals.

As we see, the salvos of Novyi mirist criticism were directed not only at the Oktiabrists. They struck the entire front of the latter's
allies. The works of Grekova and Bykov are only the tip of the Novyi Mir iceberg. The de-mythologization of the armed forces and the war were one of the major directions in the struggle of Novyi Mirist Russia against Oktiabrist Russia. This is shown by Perventsev himself: "Some literary people in search of a conflict have turned their back on the enemy. They seek the enemy among their own people. Their enemy is a member of our own special political detachment. They whine and stir up the graves."155

Here, I think, lies the third reason for which the military needed the Oktiabrists. As long as the Novyi Mir party's challenge existed and the debate on de-Stalinization continued, the dominance of the myth of the armed forces as an Island of Hope was unthinkable. Consequently, it was also unthinkable that "all the national resources, experience, and productive forces" be concentrated on the militarization of the country. The fundamental change in the "highest goal of socialism" which was needed for this required the destruction of the consumer expectations of the population. It required that the "broad masses" should come to believe in the armed forces as their sole defense from the hostile world surrounding them, and as the sole means of national survival.

The military understood all this beyond a doubt. This is shown both by the heroes of Oktiabrist novels, and by the fact that in the second half of the 1960s, at the end of the debate, the political administration of the armed forces forbade the military libraries and regular officers to subscribe to Novyi Mir (and the journal Junost', which was close to it). Of course, I never saw this document. More than that, I do not know anyone who ever saw it. But for those who were close to the editorial board of Novyi Mir and Junost' this was an open secret.
CONCLUSION

The time has come to sum up the results of the first part of this work. What have we obtained from all these attempts at political interpretation of literary materials published in two fat journals over the course of a single decade, apparently already consigned to oblivion? Are not my interpretations too subjective? And does not this fact negate the results of the analysis? I candidly recognized at the beginning of this work that it contained a significant amount of subjectivity. Furthermore, this subjectivity is hardly removable. One can hardly find two critics on earth capable of interpreting (or in our case deciphering) the content (in our case, the political message) of the same novel or essay in the same way. Certainly the selection of works for interpretation is also subjective. A different author might have chosen, for example, the critical essays of V. Lakshin (in place of A. Mariamov), L. Kriachko (in place of V. Kochetov), M. Shkerin (in place of B. Solovyev), or I. Vinogradov (in place of A. Siniavskii), and so forth. I do not think, however, that this rearrangement of items would have substantially changed the total.

The image of a merciless confrontation of two literary parties with opposed—and irreconcilable—aesthetic, moral, economic, social, and, in the last analysis, political programs, would have stood before the reader, just as it was here, independently of the subjective tastes of the critic. I have just tried to explain this confrontation not only as a literary war, which for some unknown reason disappeared at the beginning of the 1970s, but as a collision between the interests of the constituencies of both journals—as a confrontation between the party of Khrushchevist secularization and the party of the Stalinist myth, the party of reform and that of counterreform.
In a word, between European Russia and medieval Russia. And here, from my point of view, the kingdom of subjectivity comes to an end and the territory of reality begins. In any case, the fact that at least one group in the Soviet establishment (we have called it the priestly group) was deprived under the conditions of de-Stalinization of its legitimacy and faced a situation where its political survival was at stake, is indisputable.

But this is not the extent of the "territory of reality" in our interpretation. The sympathies and antipathies of the priests—in what circles, among what establishment groups they found their allies and enemies—doesn't this tell the reader something, entirely independent of the tastes of the author? Further, take the evolution of the positive heroes of Oktiabrism (Party professionals, passengers in black Volgas, and military people) and compare it with the evolution of its negative heroes ("artistic and ideological muddle-heads," "economic muddle-heads," "political muddle-heads"). Even a cursory glance will reveal in this evolution a quite objective and rigorous parallelism and synchronicity. Isn't it remarkable that the "economic muddle-heads" arise at the negative pole of Oktiabrism precisely when their antipodes—the passengers in black Volgas—arise at its positive pole? Furthermore, when these same "economic muddle-heads"—that is, the proponents of managerial autonomy—become the positive heroes of the Novyi Mirists? In addition, the "political muddle-heads" also arise synchronously with their opposites—the military people.

The political sophistication of the Oktiabrists increases, as we see, literally before our eyes. At the beginning they see the root of evil in the individual personality traits of Khrushchev, who was the patron of their immediate opponents—the critics contributing to Novyi Mir whom they brand as "a fifth column." Then they begin to wake up, noticing
that the root of evil goes much deeper, to some traits of the regime which is the patron of "economic muddle-heads," just as Khrushchev was for the liberal writers. And finally they discovered this root in the regime of de-Stalinization itself, dominated, in their opinion, by some political muddle-heads who were trying to "clear out ideological minefields" and to "pull the revolution apart at the seams." Whereas at the beginning of the debate, Oktiabr' could publish an essay in defense of managerial autonomy or of the link system, at the end of it these subjects disappear from its pages as though by magic, and migrate to Novyi Mir. At the beginning of the debate Oktiabr' permitted itself to print clearly anti-Stalinist pieces about the war. At the end of the debate, when military people had acquired the status of its positive heroes, there was no longer any place for demythologizing literature in Oktiabr', and it naturally found a refuge in Novyi Mir. Doesn't all of this call for explanation?

And what are we to make of the fact that all of the allies of the Oktiabrism (or all the groups in which it sought allies) turn out in some strange way to be marked by a single common feature: the deepening of the reformist process called into question their political status in the system? Is it not true that Khrushchev, in completely liquidating a whole category of little Stalins (the First Secretaries of rural District Committees) and setting the rural Secretaries of the Provincial committees on the urban ones, called into question the status of the Party professional? Is it not true that the passengers in the black Volgas were dealt a crushing blow by the dismissal of the majority of the central ministries, and then, when they had hardly had time to regenerate their power, by the stubborn attempts of the leadership (in 1965 and 1971) to impose on them the
decentralization of management and managerial autonomy? Was not the military compelled to "go hungry" and to "deprive itself" in favor of the consumer in the times of Malenkov and Khrushchev? And could they then even dream of receiving at some time "according to their needs" (just as, probably, the Chinese military cannot dream of this today--at least under the auspices of the Peking Khrushchev Teng Hsaio-Ping)?

However--and this is one of the most interesting features revealed in the course of the debate--even when it receives "according to its needs," the military still feels vulnerable, mainly because it has no guarantee that the reformist process is permanently stopped. And in fact, can it have such a guarantee until the leadership publicly renounces the Khrushchevist political ideology, which posits the interests of the consumer as "the highest goal of socialism" (and, the Oktiabrists add, as long as "group X" is in a position to "clear our minefields" and "dismantle the revolution")? Isn't it true that under these circumstances some unexpected political turn of events could bring a new Khrushchev to power? From the Oktiabrist point of view, the only real guarantee against the spectre of a new Khrushchev, is the resurrection of the "dear dictatorship," with everything that accompanies it--confrontation with the West and cultural-political isolationism, restoration of the Stalin myth and the ideological monopoly of the priestly group, the liquidation of "temptation" and the declaration of military competition as the "highest goal of socialism."159

But do the military people share this point of view? Here we enter the realm of questions to which the materials of the debate do not give us answers. There are quite a few such questions. They arise from the fact that we essentially only hear one side. We know that the Oktiabrists have
offered their services as ideologists both to the military and to the little Stalins and to the passengers in black Volgas, apparently trying to unite all of them into one powerful anti-reformist ("right wing") coalition, but we do not know whether all of these groups recognize the Oktiabrists as their ideologists. We do not know whether they understand the common nature of their interests and are capable of joint action.

On the one hand, the capitulation of Brezhnev in 1973 (that is, the abandonment by the regime of the accelerated tempo of growth of light industry, which for the first time in Soviet history was planned in 1970-75, as well as the abandonment of the reforms enunciated at the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971) seemed to indicate that the pressure exerted on him by the anti-reform groups was extremely strong. On the other hand, however, Perventsev proved a worse prophet then Kochetov, since the destruction of "group X" in the 1970s, which he predicted, did not occur. Why was this?

On the one hand, it is obvious that the conditions of Stalinist super-centralization of the management of the economy are ideal in terms of providing for the military "according to its needs" (and that, consequently, they must feel themselves the natural allies of the passengers in black Volgas). But on the other hand, the fundamental revision of the "highest goal of socialism," proposed by the Oktiabrists, has not occurred. Why is this?

On the one hand, the threat of the secularization of Party professionalism must have made the little Stalins staunch defenders of Oktiabrists. On the other hand, however, they were not able to defend Oktiabrist from collapse after the death of Kochetov. Why was this?
Still less do we find an answer in the materials of the debate to the
question of whether Oktiabrism is destined to be reborn in the 1980s or
whether its place has already been taken by the Russophile intelligentsia,
which is trying to seize from the priests both the ideological initiatives
and their former allies--primarily the military.160

We don't find the answers to these questions in the materials of the
debate, but would they have occurred to us in the absence of these
materials?

It is probably all the more appropriate to ask this question in view of
truly fundamental problems which, apparently, have dawned on us in
connection with the debate--problems relating to the very nature and patterns
of political behaviour in systems of the Soviet type. Can we, having
familiarized ourselves with the materials of the debate, continue to take
seriously, for example, the thesis which posits the existence of a
homogeneous "new class" which rules the USSR? There is no doubt that this
thesis was well grounded during the quarter-century-long dictatorship
(whether we call it "Stalinist," or "totalitarian," or simply "dear"), when
the Soviet elite looked rather like a political process than like political
matter. But does it continue to work under the conditions of the regime
of de-Stalinization when this elite was hardened and transformed into an
establishment--that is, acquired weight and mass and became capable of group
quantification? Under these conditions, doesn't the thesis as to the
existence of a homogeneous "new class" become a myth--a kind of internal
political dimension of the myth of the world communist conspiracy?

Another example: if we consider the materials of the debate in the
context of the history of systems of the Soviet type generally, does not the
replacement of a regime of "dear dictatorship" by one of de-Stalinization
turn out to be--as far as we can judge from 64 years of their existence--a
universal model of their political behavior (it is true that in this case
linguistic difficulties arise, because the designation for this pattern
proves each one more hideous than the last: in China it is called
"de-Maoization," but what will there be in North Korea after Kim Il Sung--
"de-Kim Il Sungization"? In Cuba--"de-Castroization"? In Romania--
"de-Ceaucescuization?")? Under conditions of de-Stalinization, however,
this pattern seems to lose its universality and be split in a strange way in
two. The dominant model (A) proves to be the replacement of a period of
reform (which gives rise among other things to a cultural renaissance, a
two-party structure of the literary establishment and a debate on
de-Stalinization) by a period of economic and political stagnation. The
model (A), which might be arbitrarily called the "Polish path of
de-Stalinization," seems to lead inevitably to economic bankruptcy. The
materials of the debate, however, permit us to establish that systems of
the Soviet type are capable of setting up in contrast to the "Polish" model
an alternative model, (B), which might be arbitrarily called the "Hungarian
path of de-Stalinization," and is marked by the deepening of the
reformist process.

The fate of model (B) in post-Stalin history has been dramatic. It
was destroyed by force in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. It was three times
defeated (in 1964, 1969, and in 1973) in the USSR. But at the same time
it won a victory in Yugoslavia in the 1950s and in Hungary in the first half
of the 1970s. The Chinese leadership has been flirting with it in the
second half of the 1970s. It may finally win out in Poland in the 1980s
(with the participation of a new actor on the political scene—the working class, and generally the Consumer).

The major meaning of this "fork"—this splitting of the pattern—consists from my point of view in the fact that as distinct from a dictatorial regime, systems of the Soviet type acquire under conditions of de-Stalinization a certain freedom of choice: between economic reform and economic stagnation, between the deepening of de-Stalinization and the restoration of the "dear dictatorship." Their political behavior is no longer automatically given. Groups appear among them which are capable of advancing and defending (in certain cases successfully) model (B). The materials of the debate leave not the slightest doubt that at least in the Soviet establishment, such groups do exist. The question to which our materials do not give an answer is: under what conditions can they defend model (B).

In conclusion, I will say that, without trying to write here a history of the debate, I have had to concentrate the reader's attention primarily on the materials in Oktiabr' which, as distinct from Novyi Mir, seem quite unknown in the West. I hope, however, that the content of the program of Novyi Mir—that is, the nature of the Soviet model (B)—is nevertheless clear to the reader. I will add that, after I became familiar with the materials of the debate, an equally dramatic revelation arose before me personally: how meager, not to say over-simplified, the "schematic view" of the structure of the Soviet establishment which I proposed in 1977 turned out to be. (A comparison of Appendices 1 and 2 will suffice to let the reader see how I tried to solve the problem.) In any case, it really seems that the materials of the debate do in fact give at least some of us
an opportunity to ask ourselves questions which might otherwise not have entered our heads. The most important of these is: where does the threat to the regime of de-Stalinization come from? From the "left," as the treacherous Oktiabrist stereotype would have it--that is, some Novyi Mirist Russia, fighting for the single possible path (as it understood the matter) of Europeanization of the country under conditions of autocracy, or from the "right" from Oktiabrist Russia, which arose out of a quarter-century medieval dictatorship and was poorly adapted to the regime of de-Stalinization? I wish to believe that this is precisely the question to which the materials of the debate give an unambiguous answer. Whether I am right is for the reader to judge.
FOOTNOTES

1. As the reader will see in the third and final section of this work, I am not inclined in principle to adopt the terminology of the "right-left" continuum to Russian political reality and in general to politics of the Soviet type. The "right-left" continuum arose in the epoch of the French Revolution, and is therefore suitable, in my view, only for the description of politically modernized systems, while I consider the Russian political system autocratic, non-modernized, and in this sense medieval. Here I speak of "left" (in the sense of reformist) and "right" (in the sense of conservative) sections of the Russian establishment only because such is the current usage in the circle of the Soviet liberal intelligentsia from which I came. I should remark though, that this usage is a direct opposite to that which is widespread among Western Sovietologists, who—in accordance with the tradition of Communist parlance—call radicals such as Trotsky or Mao "leftists" and moderates such as Bukharin or Dubcek "rightists."

2. The very fact of a severe conflict, extending to the dimensions of the literary war, between the two journals does not require proof: it suffices to look into any issue of either of them for the 1960s. Even the usually unemotional Pravda (January 27, 1967) described this conflict in terms of confrontation. Stephen Cohen reports that he had occasion to hear in Moscow comments on Novyi Mir and Oktiabr' as "the organs of our two parties" (Slavic Review, June 1979, p. 192). These parties waged what was literally a "war to the death." It is true that
only one of them failed to stop at political denunciations (see, for example, the reply of V. Lakshin to the insinuation of the Oktiabr'ist M. Gus, who had accused him of "non-conformism" "between the lines": "not content with the sphere of literary history, Gus wishes to set me at odds with the organs of justice and the police" (Novyi Mir, 1968, No. 12, p. 263).

What will interest us here, however, is not so much the literary war between two journals as the socio-economic and political programs of both parties, worked out in the course of this war: not so much the history of the confrontation as its historical meaning. The dating of the debate involves real difficulty. Whereas its beginning is undisputed (No. 2, 1961 when Kochetov became the Editor-in-Chief of Oktiabr'), its end is not so clear. It is usually dated from the ouster of Alexander Tvardovskii's editorial board, which deprived the Novyi Mir party of its head (the last issue for which this board was responsible was No. 12 of 1969). And in fact, 1970, when V. Kosolapov headed the new board, was a year of relative quiet--and of sharp decline in the literary level of the journal, particularly in terms of its prose.

However, 1971 was marked by a new explosion of confrontation. The critical salvos of Novyi Mir seemed suddenly to reach a new peak (it suffices to refer to the essays by A. Nuikin "Dukhovnoe, Ideinoe, Nравственное" ["The Spiritual, the Ideological, and the Moral"] in No. 1, A. Yanov "Работа тема" ["The worker as theme"] in No. 3, V. Ognev "Literatura i нравственность" ["Literature and Morality"] in No. 7, and the book reviews by V. Bocharov "Po vspakhannomu" ["Over Plowed-up Ground"] and D. Tevekelian "Roman na rabochuiu temu" ["A Novel on the Theme of the
Worker""] in No. 9). On the other hand, _Oktyabr'_ in two novels (N. Gorbachev's "Udarnaia sila" ["The Strike Force"] Nos. 6 and 7 and Arkadii Perventsev's "Sekretnyi front" ["The Secret Front"] Nos. 8-10, which, unfortunately, is not analyzed in the present work for lack of space) took important new steps in formulating its program, and in D. Chirov's comment "O partiinosti literatury" ["On Party Spirit in literature"] dealt return blows to the Novyi Mir party. The impression was created that the debate had taken a new start. In 1971, Novyi Mir bore little resemblance to a decapitated giant taking its last steps by inertia. Quite to the contrary: it proved able to advance new ideas and to discover new fields of struggle. This was probably connected with two circumstances: first, the brief—and final—outbreak of reformist passions in the Soviet establishment connected with the reforms proposed by Brezhnev at the 24th Congress of the Party. The possibility arose of using the now-fashionable slogan "the revolution in science and technology" for deepening the debate on de-Stalinization. In the second place, in 1968 the specter of the New Russian Right, which split off from _Oktyabr'_ and began to develop a new national-socialist program, appeared in the journal _Molodaia gvardiia_. Thus, Novyi Mir acquired both an unexpected opportunity to hoodwink the censorship and a serious new opponent. In 1972, this illusion of the possibility of resurrection from the ashes where the party had been dumped by the ouster of the old leadership continued. It seemed that a new flight of Novyi Mir was still possible. In 1973, however, everything was already over. The process of reform in the country gutted out. The new "stabilizational consensus" in the
leadership doubled censorship pressure on all three journals. The editor-in-chief of Molodaia gvardiia and then the editor-in-chief of Novyi Mir were fired, and the editor-in-chief of Oktiabr' committed suicide. The debate on de-Stalinization, which had formulated the programs of all three literary parties, was virtually ended. All of this apparently gives us sufficient grounds for dating it between 1961 and 1972.

3. Each book appearing in the USSR which is new or significant—in either a literary or political sense—is generally discussed by readers in the author's presence at dozens of well-attended gatherings, called Readers Conferences. As a rule, these conferences are conducted in libraries or educational institutions.

4. V. Kochetov, Sobranie sochinenii [Collected Works], vol. 4, Moscow, 1975, p. 272.

5. Ibid., p. 362.

6. Ibid., p. 233; emphasis added.

7. Ibid., p. 252.


9. "The fact is that Russia's mass society, governed by almost faceless bureaucrats, has yielded individuals whose creative brilliance is not excelled even in the lands of free speech and xeroxing," Ibid., p. 7.

10. "The first great generation of postwar scholars behaved virtually like archeologists...They interviewed the emigres in their professional experiences and details of their lives rather than push them to generalize at scholarly conferences about their society," Studies in Comparative Communism, Nos. 2-3, 1979, p. 272.

12. Ibid.


16. Iu. Burtin, "O pol'ze ser'eznosti" ["On the advantages of being serious"], Ibid., 1965, No. 1 (see the same author's "Svoe i obshchee" ["One's own and common property"], Ibid., 1964, No. 4); N. Il'ina, "Skazki Brianskogo lesa" ["Tales of the Briansk Woods"], Ibid., 1966, No. 1.

17. S. Rassadin, "Nuzhna mne rozovaia dymka" ["I need a rose-colored haze"], Ibid., 1964, No. 2 (see the same author's "Chto skazal by Maiakovskii" ["What would Maiakovskii say"], Ibid., 1966, No. 11).


19. S. Papernyi, "Chitatel'skii marafon" [A Reader's Marathon], Ibid., 1965, No. 4.


21. F. Svetov, "O remeslennoi literature" ["On craft literature"]. Ibid., 1966, No. 7 (see also the following analogous "salvos": I. Travkina, "Avtoru roman nравится" ["The author likes the novel"]—on A. Perventsev's book "Olivkovaia vetv'" ["The Olive Branch"] in Ibid., 1965, No. 9, and the same reviewer's "Konflikt ili skloka?" ["A Conflict or a Squabble?"] Ibid., 1968, No. 7; G. Makarov, "Knigi-bliznetsy" ["Twin Books"]—on books

23. Ibid., pp. 219-20.
25. Ibid., p. 220.
26. Ibid., pp. 221, 223.
27. Ibid., p. 237.
28. Ibid., p. 238.
29. Ibid., p. 239.
30. Ibid., p. 234.
31. Ibid., p. 220.
32. Ibid., p. 221.
33. Ibid., p. 224.
34. Ibid., pp. 226, 7, 8, 9.
35. Ibid., pp. 231-2.
36. See, for example, A. Vlasenko, "Kto zhe on, novyi geroi?" ["Who is he, the New Hero?"], Oktiabr', 1961, No. 4; V. Solov'ev, "Legkii nesesser i tiazhelaia klad"" ["A Light Toilet Case and a Heavy Suitcase"], Ibid., 1961, No. 6, 7; S. Ivanova, "Razmyshleniia o proze molodykh" ["Reflections on the Prose of Young Writers"], Ibid., 1961, No. 8; K. Pozdniaev, "Zvezdnyi
bilet--kuda" ["A Ticket to the Stars--But Where To"], Ibid., 1961, No. 10;
N. Sergovantsev, "Tragediiia odinochestva i sploshnoi byt" ["The Tragedy of Loneliness and Undifferentiated Everyday Life"], Ibid., 1963, No. 4 (the same author's "Mirazhi" ["Mirages"], Ibid., 1966, No. 3); D. Starikov, "Terkin protiv Terkina" ["Terkin against Terkin"], Ibid., 1963, No. 10;
L. Kriachko, "Sut' i vidimost'" ["Reality and Appearance"], Ibid., 1966, No. 2; I. Kuz'michev, "Puti i pereput'ia" ["Roads and Crossroads"], Ibid., 1966, No. 6; P. Strokov, "gor'kovskie vysot" ["Gorky's Heights"], Ibid., 1968, No. 3; A. Peredreev, "Chego ne umel Gete" ["What Goethe Couldn't Do"], Ibid., 1968, No. 5.

38. Ibid.
42. Val'gan is a general, a Hero of Socialist Labor, the director of a major tractor plant, and a negative hero G. Nikolaeva's novel "Bitva v puti" ["A Battle Along the Way"], Moscow, 1958; "A Hero of Socialist Labor" is the highest (non military) Soviet decoration, received by the most successful people who live long enough and stay out of trouble.
43. Tonkov is a professor, the head of an academic department, and the negative hero of D. Granin's novel "Iskateli" [Researchers].
44. Denisov is an academician, the head of a school of thought in
science, and the negative hero of another novel by D. Granin, "Idu na grozu" [I Head into the Storm].


47. Ibid.

48. The "Union of the Russian People" was the official title of the party of Blackhundreds (1905-1917). In order to make this witticism clear to the American ear, let us imagine how, let us say, this title would sound here: Chairman of the Negro Section of the Ku-Klux-Klan.


51. In any case, when I've had occasion to take Oktiabr' out of the University library in Berkeley, I proved, as a rule, to be its first borrower: volume after volume, year after year, no one had opened the journal.

52. V. Kochetov, "Skvernoe remeslo" ["A Dirty Trade"], Oktiabr', No. 3, p. 211.

53. Ibid., p. 212.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., p. 213.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p. 214.

58. Ibid., p. 217.
59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., p. 214.

61. Ibid. Excuse the poor English, but Kochetov used to write in an equally poor Russian.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. 217.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. I have in mind the brilliant work by Vera Dunham *In Stalin's Time*, Cambridge University Press, 1976, which for the first time provides documented confirmation from literary material of M. Djilass' hypothesis about the "new class" in Stalin's USSR.


72. In addition to the essay "The Worker as Theme," already referred to, this evolution is also traced in the essay "Dvizhenie molodogo geroia" ["Movement of the Young Hero"], *Novyi Mir*, 1972, No. 7.


75. One of the protagonists of Fathers and Sons, Pavel Kirsanov, looks like a caricature of Pechorin. In reality, however, he is not a caricature, but Pechorin himself, only in the 1860s.

76. Bakhirev is an engineer and the positive hero of G. Nikolaeva's novel "Bitva v puti" [A Battle Along the Way].

77. Cheshkov is an engineer and the positive hero of I. Dvoretskii's play "Chelovek so storony" [A Man from Outside]. Teatr 9 (The Theater) #10, 1972.


83. I am speaking here of the heroes of essays published not only in Novyi Mir but also in other publications which at one time or another
(and sometimes only in some of their departments) were close to the Novyi Mirist Party. See, for example, "Polozhitel'nii ieroi ili Don-Kikhot?" ["A Positive Hero or a Don Quixote?""] in Voprosy Literatury, 1966, No. 8; "Chelovek dlia ludei i chelovek dlia sebia" ["A Man for Other Men and a Man for Himself"], Ibid., 1967, No. 7; "Proizvodstvennaia p'esa i literaturnyi geroi 1970-kh" ["The Factory Play and the Literary Hero of the 1970s"], Ibid., 1972, No. 8; "Kino i nauchno-tekhnicaskaia revoliutsiia" ["The Movies and the Revolution in Science and Technology"], Iskusstvo-Kino, 1972, No. 7; "Ratsionalist podnimает perchatky" ["A Rationalist Picks up the Gauntlet"] in Literaturnaia gazeta, April 5, 1967; "Pomogite sil'nomu" ["Help the Strong"] in Molodoi Kommunist, 1970, No. 2.


85. In 1965, this series was included in the book Izbrannoie [Selected Works] published in Tashkent where the author, in disgrace, ended his days. It is curious that the first sketch in this series, "Borzov i Martynov" [Borzov and Martynov] was published in Novyi Mir in 1952, during Stalin's lifetime. This was undoubtedly a serious political act. Its history, from my point of view, represents no less interest than the history of the publication of Solzhenitsyn's Ivan Denisovich. Unfortunately, I do not know a single work in the Western literature devoted either to this history or to Ovechkin in general.


87. It goes without saying that what was later to be the program of the Novyi Mirist party was only traced out so to speak with a dotted line in Ovechkin's sketches. It was precisely in the 1960s in the course
of the debate that the basic tendencies of this program were covered with living flesh if I may say so,—argumentation, reflection, the technology of evading the censorship, experimental examples, hypotheses, and images. A large group of talented people worked on this—economists, sociologists, historians, public affairs writers, and literary critics. I cannot here analyze the contributions of each of them. And this is a great pity, for Novyi Mir was without doubt a kind of encyclopedia of independent Russian thought. But there were no encyclopedists among the Novyi Mirists. At the beginning of the 1970s the program was too rich in elements to be synthesized under the pen of any single author, and too complex and specialized. All of its basic components, however, are contained in Ovechkin's sketches as in embryo—the secularization of Party professionalism, managerial autonomy, the decentralization of the management of the economy, the "socialist market," and respect for independent thinking, and, in the final analysis, the demythologization of socialism. Precisely because of the synthesizing nature of these sketches, I have preferred (despite all the immaturity of the thoughts contained in them) to direct basic attention to the works of the forefather of the Novyi Mirist program. He had no intention of subverting the regime of de-Stalinization, just as there was nothing of the sort in the minds of his followers. All of them strove only to tear the regime from its Stalinist roots, to burn out those roots, thereby transforming the country into a normal human place, where one could live without hypocrisy and privation. In order to give the future historian of the debate, if he should ever come, some kind of initial guide to its labyrinth, I will name here only a few key
[The Nucleus of Sound Bookkeeping] (1968, No. 4); same author, "Neposledovatel'nost'" [Inconsistency] (1968, No. 7); V. Kantorovich "Sotsiologiiia i literatura" [Sociology and Literature] (1967, No. 12); For an English translation of this work, see "Soviet Sociology," vol. VII, No. 1; Iu. Chernichenko "Pomoshchnik--promysel" [The Trade as a Helper] (1966, No. 8); L. Ivanov "Litsom k derevne" [Facing the Countryside] (1966, No. 5); I. Dedkov "Stranitsy derevenskoj zhizni" [Pages from Rural Life] (1969, No. 3); N. Verkhovskii "Iskusstvo upravliat'" [The Art of Management] (1965, No. 6). All the works cited in this footnote appeared in Novyi Mir.

88. V. Kochetov, Sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 4, p. 19.
89. Ibid., p. 26. MTS stands for "machine tractor stations." They were established by Stalin in 1929 for the technical servicing of the kolkhozy and political supervision of them. They were abolished by Khrushchev in 1957.
90. Ibid., p. 136.
91. Ibid., p. 69.
92. Ibid., p. 27.
93. V. Ovechkin, Izbrannoe, p. 517.
94. Ibid., p. 520.
95. Ibid., p. 521.
96. Ibid., p. 508.
97. Ibid., p. 512.
98. Ibid., p. 513.
99. See for example V. Nekrasov, "Mesiat's vo Frantsii" [A Month in France] (Novyi Mir 1965, No. 4); I. Kon, "Razmyshleniiia ob amerikanskoj intelligentsii" [Reflections on the American Intelligentsia] (Ibid., 1968,
No. 1; I. Konstantinovskii "Avstriiskie vstrechi" [Meetings in Austria] (Ibid., 1968, No. 12). It goes without saying that it was not a matter of "ideological coexistence"—this was taboo for any public affairs writing under censorship. However, the Oktiabrist myths to the effect that in the West "at midnight and at noon hatred towards us is ground out," looked like absolute nonsense against the background of these publications by the Novyi Mirists.

100. What we are talking about here is a survey of readers of Literaturnaia Gazeta made in 1968 by sociologists of Novosibirsk University headed by V. Shliapentokh (now an emigre in the US). The attempt to determine the constituencies of the opposing sides in the debate among the leaders of Literaturnaia Gazeta was made in this survey in an extremely aesopian form which seriously complicates the exact formulation of the results. Nevertheless, even in this form, the full text of the results of the survey was never published. A shortened version of it, "Chitatel' i gazeta" [The Reader and the Newspaper] may be found in Informatsionnyi biulleten Instituta Konkretnykh sotsial'nykh issledovanii AN SSSR, No. 36. A more complete exposition is in Politicheskii dnevnik, Vol. 1, No. 63, Amsterdam 1972. The vast majority of works of belles lettres liked by readers of Literaturnaia gazeta was published in Novyi Mir. Kochetov took first place among writers whom they did not like.


102. Ibid., p. 78. Emphasis added.

103. Ibid., p. 289.

104. V. Kochetov, Sobr. soch., Vol. 4, p. 158, 178, 260-268, 312-314, 335.
106. Ibid., pp. 37, 272, 329, 362.
108. Oktiabr', 1961, No. 8, pp. 4-5.
111. Ibid., p. 71.
112. Ibid., p. 64. Emphasis added.
113. Ibid., p. 61.
114. Ibid., p. 69. Emphasis added.
115. Ibid., emphasis added.
117. Ibid., p. 55.
118. Ibid., p. 52.
119. Ibid., p. 55.
120. Oktiabr', 1971, No. 7, p. 47.
121. Ibid., p. 89.
122. Ibid., p. 116.
123. Ibid., p. 55.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., p. 62.
127. Ibid., p. 67.
129. Ibid., p. 85.
130. Ibid., p. 103.
131. Ibid., p. 120.
132. Ibid., p. 31.
133. Ibid.; emphasis added.
134. Ibid.; emphasis added.
135. Ibid., pp. 31-2.
136. Ibid., p. 32.
137. Alexander Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev,* Institute of International Studies, 1977, Chapter 1, "The New New Class?"
139. Ibid., p. 92; emphasis added.
140. Ibid., p. 74; emphasis added.
141. *Oktyabr',* 1968, No. 2, p. 120; emphasis added.
142. Ibid., p. 80.
143. XXII s"ezd Kommunisticheshoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza. Stenograficheskii otchet, [22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Stenographic Record], Vol. 1, Moscow, 1962, p. 163.
144. Ibid., p. 106.
148. Ibid., p. 66; emphasis mine--A.Y.
149. Ibid., p. 69.
150. Ibid., p. 35; emphasis mine--A.Y.
151. Ibid., p. 93; emphasis mine--A.Y.
154. V. Bykov, "Mertvym ne bol'no [The Dead Can't be Hurt], Novyi Mir, 1966, No. 1-2.
155. Oktiabr', 1968, No. 1, p. 43. The special detachments are the political police for the army.
156. See, for example, A. Shevchenko, "Vzgliad vpered" [A Glance Ahead], Oktiabr', 1961, No. 3; I. Vinnichenko, "Ledolom" [The Icebreaker], Ibid., 1965, No. 5; A. Bylinov, "Drobot, Shevchenko i ia" (Drobot, Shevchenko and I], Ibid., 1961, No. 7; V. Titov, "Novyi koren'" [A New Root], Ibid., 1961, No. 6.
157. See, for example, B. Mozhaev, "Zemlia Zhdet" [The Earth is Waiting], Novyi Mir, 1961, No. 1, same author, "V Soldatove, u Nikolaia Lozovogo" [In Soldatovo, at Nikolai Lozovoi's House], Ibid., 1961, No. 9, K. Grishin, "Riazanskaia nov'" [What is new in Riazan'], Ibid., 1961, No. 11.
158. See, for example, A. Pervomaiskii, "Dikii med" [Wild Honey], Novyi Mir, 1963, Nos. 1-3.
159. It goes without saying that such formulas as "minimum programs" and "maximum program" should not be taken literally, and that the Oktiabrist have no party program in which it was stated point by point what they were against and what they were for. One can get a notion of their "program"
(or "programs") only by deciphering and comparing the political messages of different authors in the journal. In order to make this clear, let us look at the single case, connected with the main demand of their "minimum program"--the freezing of the reformist process. A great many people took part in the Oktiabrist discussion, "Za partinnuiu printsipial'nost' v nauke" [For a Principled Party Approach in Science], 1966, No. 2. It was connected with the decoronation of Trofim Lysenko, the dictator of Soviet biology, who in 1948 had declared genetics an evil invention of bourgeois reaction, and had unleashed a total terror in the field, as a result of which numerous scientists perished (or were driven out of science) and were replaced in university departments and laboratories by scoundrels and lickspittles of Lysenko. The little Stalins were by no means only a territorial phenomenon at that time: they were also a phenomenon in government departments and in the professions; they headed almost each branch of science and each school of thought within it. They were pillars of the pseudo-culture. In brief, the fall of Lysenko was equivalent to the de-Stalinization of biology. Having fallen behind the level of world standards by almost a decade, Soviet genetics being rid of Lysenko underwent a rapid rise. But, as in all other fields, this rise was connected with the "de-Nazification" of biology--with the expulsion from it of the terrorists and scoundrel priests. In the words of the Novyi Mir writer D. Bilenkin: "It is a question of changes in the make-up of the leading personnel--heads of departments, directors of institutes, chiefs of laboratories, editors of journals, etc." (Oktiabr', 1966, No. 2, p. 158). There began in biology the same "purge" and the same "literary murders" which Novyi Mir had practiced against the Oktiabrists: the priests of biology found themselves in their turn faced with a struggle for political survival. All this was set forth in more cautious form and
in aesopian language in B. Kedrov's article, "Puti poznaniia istiny" [Ways of Finding Truth] (Novyi Mir, 1965, No. 1). Oktiabr', of course, rushed to the defense of its constituency, replying with the article by G. Platonov, "Dogmy starie i dogmy novye" [Old Dogmas and New Dogmas] (1965, No. 8). The author, it is true, did not defend Lysenko personally in it, just as Kochetov did not defend Stalin personally. Nor did Platonov speak in favor of the terroristic methods of the fallen dictator. He defended only the "indisputably valuable elements in what T. D. Lysenko has given us." Kedrov's (and Novyi Mir's) political message in the given case was that Stalinism in science was just as sterile as Stalinism in literature. And therefore, Lysenko (and his followers) constituted not a scientific school of thought, but a band of scoundrels and cut-throats, the embodiment of obscurantism and pseudo-culture. The political message of Platonov (and Oktiabr') was that the Stalinist school in biology has to be preserved at any cost, even if we sacrifice the little Stalin himself. Oktiabr' commented: "The tendency to represent classical genetics as absolutely infallible, and Lysenko as an ingrate and a scoundrel, is pernicious." (1966, No. 2, p. 145). The action of Oktiabr' was an obvious attempt, if not to turn back then at least to freeze the advance of the reformist process in science, while thereby saving the Stalinist scientific personnel. And these personnel made a lively response to the action of their journal, emphasizing that only priests were capable of preserving the traditional Stalinist values ("the Party spirit in science") and safeguarding the indoctrination of young people in accordance with these. "B. M. Kedrov makes every effort to seek in the works of bourgeois scientists only what can be accepted, without paying attention to what is
not only unacceptable, but also extremely harmful to our young people."
(Ibid., p. 149). "The church and the reactionary classes have always tried
to use biology in their interests . . . This struggle has not only not
ceased in our time, but on the contrary has become even sharper. All the
schools of thought of reactionary bourgeois philosophy and sociology strive
to use the achievements of contemporary biology to validate idealism and
religion. We know in what difficult circumstances the progressive
scientists of the capitalist countries conduct this struggle . . . And now
scientists turn up among us who, under the guise of criticism of the mistaken
methods of T. D. Lysenko, deny the Party nature of the struggle around
biological problems . . . Thus, they not only do not help the struggle of
our foreign comrades, . . . but on the contrary complicate it, and in
addition, disorient our young people, create unhealthy moods among the
students, consciously or unconsciously, provoking in them a skeptical
attitude towards Marx-Leninist philosophy." (Ibid., p. 146). The logic
of these people is obvious: the reformist process has already given rise
to a "fifth column" in science, and if it is not frozen, it will undermine
all the traditional Stalinist values. The freezing of the reformist
process was thus, just as for the Oktiabrists, an imperative for them. But
they did not dare to go further than this. In their message, we do not find
either the preaching of cultural-political isolation, or criticism of the
regime, to say nothing of a demand for a change in the "highest goal of
socialism" or a restoration of the "dear dictatorship." Oktiabrism had its
hierarchy: what was permitted to Jupiter (V. Kochetov, A. Perventsev,
S. Smirnov) was not permitted to the bull (G. Platonov, P. Strokov,
D. Starikov, Iu. Idashkin, S. Vasil'ev, and M. Bubenov). Only by comparing
the messages, so to speak, of "Jupiter" and the "bull" can we grasp the difference between what we call the "maximum program" and the "minimum program" of Oktiabrism. And only in this sense can we say that in 1974, the Oktiabrist party ceased to exist: the messages of the former Oktiabrists lost their political edge; their ferocity and passion left them; one could no longer distinguish the former "programmatic quality" in them, they were transformed into a tedious grumbling and spread to the most various publications. The stagnation of the Brezhnevist dead season proved universal.

It cannot, certainly, be denied that the Oktiabrists nevertheless achieved their immediate goal. The Brezhnevist regime, in realizing their "minimum program," preserved the industry of pseudo-culture, removed the immediate threat in the person of the Novyi Mirist party, and stopped the reformist process. However, as previously, the priests have no guarantee that all this will not begin anew in the post-Brezhnev 1980s.


162. Compare Appendix I (which followed Detente after Brezhnev) with the Appendix to this work.
The Soviet Political Spectrum During the Period of the Debate on De-Stalinization in the USSR. Preface to the appendices.

The comparison of the two tables offered here is a graphic indication of how the analysis of the materials of the debate has changed my view concerning the Soviet political spectrum. First of all, this spectrum is now more differentiated: the number of its elements has increased by a factor of two. In part, of course, this is due to the inclusion within it of non-establishment groups. In particular, the history of the "link movement" shows that in this process there takes place a differentiation (and politicization) of the peasants who are drawn into it. The food crisis also leads to the politicization of the masses and the same is true of the trade union movement and the dissident Resistance. All of this invests the non-establishment groups with a political potential which we are not entitled to ignore. In this process the interests of the mass of consumers (workers, peasants, and white-collar people) are, as it were, split. While the skilled strata (consumers A) tend toward the "left" part of the spectrum, the unskilled stratum (consumers B) are more likely to share the chauvinism, the conformism, and the nostalgia for the "Boss" characteristic of the Russian New Right.

The Oktiabrist "passengers in black Volgas," the members of the Central Economic Administration (CEA) who apparently represent to a considerable degree the interests of the military industrial complex, are added to the "right" part of the spectrum. The priestly group has also been added, and the military has been set apart into a separate group (at least as the Oktiabrists interpret it, the military possess their own conception of the future of the country, which we have called "the military justification of socialism").

The most important changes have taken place, however, in the central part of the spectrum, where the aristocratizing elite (group X) has separated from the Leadership, which appears as a special group--invested with two functions difficult to combine. On the one hand, as we may conclude from our materials, it represents the interests of the consumers (against those establishment groups which are concerned--for reasons considered in the present work--to liquidate the "consumer urge"). On the other hand, it appears in the role of mediator (within the establishment). I say that these functions are difficult to combine, because representing one of the sides in the conflict over the resources available for distribution, the Leadership thereby minimizes its authority as a mediator. Apparently it is precisely this interweaving of contradictory political roles of the Leadership that is the cause of the internal instability of the regime in its transitional phase--between the first and second historical experiments.

Appendix 2 also permits us to explain the at first glance paradoxical phenomenon of the literary terror of Novyi Mir, which lasted more than a decade--in the face of what would seem to be the clear predominance of the "right" part of the spectrum over the "left." This explanation unites into one the literary, economic, and political dimensions of de-Stalinization. As the Oktiabrists accurately defined the situation, the literary terror was possible because the Novyi Mir party had group X as a patron. But it was also possible because the influence of group X on the Leadership was at a maximum precisely when the reformist process was developing. As soon as this process was frozen under pressure from the "right" part of the
spectrum and the influence of group X fell sharply, this group betrayed
Novyi Mir, and sacrificed it like a pawn in order to survive. This ex-
traordinary gambit saved it during the period of "consensus." However,
it had nothing else to sacrifice. Now its own political life is at stake.
Is it capable of going once again on the offensive? Will it recognize
that realization of the Oktiabrists' "maximum program" threatens not only
its political, but also its physical survival? The complexity of the
Soviet political spectrum, as it appears to me now, does not incline me
to oversimplify answers and recommendations.
### A SCHEMATIC VIEW OF YANOV'S IMAGE OF THE SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT

<--Political Left-----------------------------Political Right-->

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<tr>
<td>Elitist-liberal intellectuals</td>
<td>New managers</td>
<td>Aristocratizing elite; new “New Class”</td>
<td>Military-industrial complex</td>
<td>Local Party officials; “Little Stalins”</td>
<td>Neo-Russian intellectuals</td>
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Which bloc of groups will determine the Soviet future?

- **Current coalition** = (3) * (4) * (5)
- **“Coalition of Hope”** = (1) * (2) * (3)
- **“Coalition of Fear”** = (4) * (5) * (6)

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THE SOVIET POLITICAL SPECTRUM
DURING THE DEBATE ON DESTALINIZATION OF THE USSR

**POLITICAL RIGHT**

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<tr>
<td>The Russian New Right</td>
<td>Consumers-B</td>
<td>The Priests</td>
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<td>The Party Prefects,</td>
<td>CEA</td>
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<td>Party of Oktiabr'</td>
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<td>Little Stalins</td>
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<td>&quot;Group X&quot;, Aristocratizing Elite</td>
<td>The Leadership</td>
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**POLITICAL LEFT**

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<tr>
<td>The New Managers</td>
<td>Establishment Left, Party of Novyi Mir</td>
<td>Consumers-A</td>
<td>The Dissident Resistance</td>
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