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TITLE: HELSINKI WATCH COMMITTEES IN THE SOVIET REPUBLICS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET NATIONALITY QUESTION

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EXEC 1

Overall Executive Summary

HELNSINKI WATCH COMMITTEES IN THE SOVIET REPUBLICS:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET NATIONALITY QUESTION

by

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August 1, 1975, after more than two years of intensive negotiations, 35 Heads of Governments—President Ford of the United States, Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada, Secretary-General Brezhnev of the USSR, and the Chief Executives of 32 other European States—signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This Conference has a long pre-history. February 10, 1954, in the course of the Berlin Conference in Germany, the Soviet Union submitted a "Draft General European Treaty" on collective security. Its purpose was to prevent the integration of West Germany into NATO and to remove the United States from Europe (the US was not to be a member, only an observer). That proposal was rejected. But Soviet policymakers persisted in calling for an all-European security treaty, which would also serve as a surrogate peace treaty and legitimize the Soviet territorial expansion during and after World War II. West European states such as the German Federal Republic became interested in the conclusion of such a treaty, if it would include provisions on human rights, specifically those allowing a repatriation of ethnic (Volga) Germans from the Soviet Union and if it did not exclude the US. The USSR made concessions: by 1970 she agreed to the participation of the US and Canada; August 12, 1970, a major non-aggression treaty was signed by the Federal Republic of Germany; September 3, 1971, was signed the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin; in May 1972 the German Soviet treaty was ratified by the Bundestag; and at the Moscow Summit (May 1972) promises were made that the USSR would engage in serious talks on Multilateral Balanced Force Reduction in Europe. The USSR and some East and West European States went to Helsinki eagerly, the US went there reluctantly. The resulting Final Act was not a treaty, but a solemn promise to observe certain principles. The USSR obtained promises of the inviolability of the existing frontiers and of economic and scientific aid (in Baskets I and II); the West Europeans and the US, too, obtained provisions on human contacts, reunification of families, improvement in travel for personal and professional reasons, and "improvement of the circulation of, access to, and exchange of information" in Basket III. The USSR and her leader Leonid I. Brezhnev personally regarded the compromise Final Act as a diplomatic triumph. The USSR was not worried about certain concessions in Principles VII and VIII in Basket I (Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief and Equal rights and self-determination of peoples). Brezhnev felt that Principle VI (non-intervention in internal affairs) would be protection enough. The US policymakers at first did not attach much significance to the CSCE Final Act.

Ironically, it was Soviet citizens who came upon the idea that the human rights provisions of Basket III and especially of Basket I, Principle VII, should
be given teeth, especially in the light of Basket IV, which called for a Review Meeting in Belgrade in two years, in 1977. Out of the Liberal Democratic Center of the multi-faceted dissent movement in the USSR (see Chapter 3), from the circle around Academician Sakharov, emerged another physicist and brilliant organizer Yuri Orlov. Orlov had the idea that public (i.e., non-secret) groups should be formed in the Soviet Union and in as many other signatory countries as possible to further the implementation of the Helsinki accords. They would accept and investigate information brought to their attention by Soviet citizens and in especially serious cases would call for authoritative investigations by international bodies. Already in August 1975 a group of Soviet dissidents including Jewish activists had planted the idea of monitoring the implementation of the Helsinki human rights provisions in the minds of a visiting American Congressional delegation. In May 1976 a double event took place. First, after many delays due to the opposition of Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger, Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, and his allies in the Senate and Mrs. Millicent Fenwick, also of New Jersey, and her allies in the House of Representatives were able to establish and promptly fund the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (US CSCE) composed of six US Senators and six Representatives and three representatives of the Executive: one from the Department of State, one from Defense, and one from Commerce. Chairman of the US CSCE became The Hon. Dante B. Fascell, Democratic Representative from Florida. Second, in Moscow, May 12, 1977, Orlov announced the formation of an eleven-member (Moscow) Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, under himself as Chairman, and including such well-known dissenters as Mrs. Elena Bonner-Sakharov, Aleksander Ginzburg, Lyudmila Alekseeva, Malva Landa, Anatoly Shcharansky, and former Major-General Petr Grigorenko (Petro Hryhorenko).

In preparation for the Belgrade Review Meeting, the private Moscow Helsinki Group plunged into publicizing violations of human rights in the USSR. At the same time, the official US CSCE held brief hearings on East-West economic cooperation prescribed in Basket II of the Final Act, then began to investigate in great depth the implementation of Basket III and, even more, the violations of Principle VII of Basket I.

Another important development occurred which was not foreseen by either American policymakers nor possibly even by the Soviet dissidents in Moscow. The drafters of Basket I had scrupulously tried to separate individual human rights (contained in Principle VII) from collective nationality rights of self-determination (Principle VIII). But already the members of the Moscow Group (see Appendix, p. A-02) found that they could not neglect nationality rights: roughly one-fifth of all the titles of documents issued by the Moscow Group refer to nationality problems (see Appendix, p. A-07 ff). Given the increasingly strained nationality relations in the Soviet Union (see Chapter 2) some non-Russian dissenters in the USSR decided to establish Helsinki Watch Committees of their own, that would cooperate with the Moscow Group but would not be organizationally tied to it and would not under any circumstances be subordinate to it. (As it soon turned out, this suited the Moscow Group perfectly, for it has had reservations about taking over any responsibility for what it considered to be relatively inexperienced groupings.)
The first non-Russian Helsinki Watch Committee to be formed was the Ukrainian Helsinki Group under Ukrainian writer Mykola Rudenko, an ex-member of Stalin's NKVD guard division, a political commissar in World War II and Secretary of the Party organization of the Writers Union of Ukraine from 1947-1950. It was formed November 9, 1976, and Rudenko had the good sense of enlisting as one of its founder-members Major-General Hryhorenko, a Ukrainian who together with several Jews and Russians was a charter member of the Moscow Group. The second republican Helsinki Watch Committee was the Lithuanian one (established November 25, 1976), the Georgian followed (January, 1977), and then the Armenian (April 1, 1977). By and large the Ukrainian Group continued the moderate nationalist dissent of the 1960's: demands for cultural rights, protests against Russification, publicity given to prisoners of conscience, and similar. Some Ukrainian documents, however, deal with individual human rights (see Nos. 4, 8, 9, 11, pp. A-44 ff in Appendix). The Ukrainian Group also protested against the Ukrainian SSR not being allowed to sign the Helsinki Final Act. The Lithuanian Group tried to unite the Lithuanian Catholic dissent with the Lithuanian secular, cultural dissent and with Lithuanian Jewish dissent. The Lithuanian Group was the most cosmopolitan in its outlook, it attempted to act as a nucleus for a regional Baltic Helsinki Watch Committee. The Georgian Group published but little: its members had for some time been concerned with such issues as excesses committed by the authorities in battling economic corruption and excesses in Russification. The Armenian Group raised the issue of mistreating Armenian political prisoners, of Armenia's entry into the UN and the injustices committed against Armenians in Mountainous Karabagh, an Autonomous Region that Soviet authorities had turned over to Azerbaidzhan. In summary, the Ukrainian Group was badly needed to combat the anti-Ukrainian course of the regime since 1958, but particularly after 1972; the Lithuanian Group tried to coordinate three robust dissent movements in their republic and in the Baltic states in general; the Georgian Group sprung up to help moderate Shevardnadze's excesses (he had become Georgian First Secretary in 1972), otherwise it was not absolutely needed in view of the strong "official" Georgian nationalism; the emergence of a Helsinki Group in normally pro-Russian Armenia is somewhat of a surprise, unless we consider that even the Armenians were becoming restive over what they considered to be Moscow's neglect of such Armenian national interests as having the Turks officially admit the Genocide of 1915, possibly have them give up Armenian lands, and certainly have Azerbaidzhan give up Mountainous Karabagh with its overwhelming Armenian majority.

The Soviet regime, stung by President Carter's serious commitment to human rights (as expressed, e.g., in the sending of a letter to Academician Sakharov, February 5, 1977) and suspecting a collusion between the US CSCE under Congressman Fascell and the Soviet Helsinki Groups began to arrest the leaders and activists of the Groups beginning with Ginzburg, Rudenko, Tykhy (another Ukrainian) and Orlov in the first two weeks of February 1977. Despite very harsh sentences, it is only the Georgian Helsinki Group that has been destroyed, and even there, we suspect, Gamsakhurdia was able to successfully plea bargain with the regime: his publicized confession against steps to end corruption in the Georgian Church and to halt the deterioration of the status of the Georgian language (we investigate at length the Georgian language demonstration of April 14, 1978). The Soviet Helsinki Groups have been contained but they have not been crushed.
Other topics presented here are: the very successful role played by the US CSCE and the press in monitoring the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. A major subchapter is devoted to the analysis of the Belgrade Review Meeting in 1977-78 (see Chapter 7). In the following chapter we consider the increasing participation in US foreign policy concerning the Helsinki Final Act of the Baltic and Ukrainian emigré communities (Chapter 8).

The study is based on documentary evidence (about 200 pp. of documents have been reprinted in the Appendix) and on selected interviews.

The following twelve concrete recommendations are respectfully offered for your kind consideration (Chapter 9 gives our reasons for offering them):

1. The United States should rapidly rearm.
2. Once President Carter had started an explicit and fairly aggressive human rights campaign, had started naming cases, neither he nor his successor should mute it overall, and certainly not vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
3. The Helsinki Act should not be rescinded.
4. The United States should try to persuade West Germany and France to take a stronger and possibly also a less ethnocentric position on human rights.
5. The United States should continue to extend moral and diplomatic support to the Soviet human rights movement in general and members of the Helsinki Groups in particular despite Soviet cries of interference in their internal affairs.
6. The Soviet political dissenters are too valuable to be compromised by any contact with American intelligence agencies, even through any kind of middlemen, roommates, etc.
7. As a minimum, the US Government should always keep insisting that the imprisoned Helsinki Monitors be released.
8. As a maximum, the United States should already now consider the possibility that in a critical contingency—a scenario similar to that of Andrei Amalrik’s—some or all of the Soviet republics we have discussed will secede and become independent.
9. Already now this country can prepare itself for the strong possibility that should the central power weaken, all three Baltic republics will immediately secede and become independent.
10. As far as the Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia are concerned, the US Government should, for the time being, as a minimum, insist on national self-determination as specified in Principle VIII of the Final Act as accepted by the Moscow Helsinki Group . . . . But we feel it would definitely not be in the interest of the United States to hinder those nations from becoming independent if, in a different world situation, they should take their fate into their own hands . . . . America's true ally would be a strong democratic Russia very roughly within the boundaries of the present Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) not a huge multinational Empire with global aspirations that can only be fulfilled at the cost of suppressing democracy in Russia.
11. The mixed Congressional-Executive Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe should continue to enjoy the full support of Congress and of the Executive Branch. More specifically, it should continue to be made part of the Helsinki review process as for instance in the Madrid Review Meeting scheduled for November 1980. On the whole, it has done a superb job.

12. Native or naturalized Americans of Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Georgian, Armenian, and Russian stock will continue to participate in the American foreign policy process—this is an inevitable outcome of the plural structure of the American body politic. They need not be particularly encouraged (if they are strong they will assert themselves) but they must not be discouraged as a certain Secretary of State vainly tried to do in 1975.
This is not the place to comment on the significance of our work: this is set down in the introduction and the conclusion and it is up to the reader to judge whether or not our efforts have been worthwhile. Here we would like to address ourselves to more mundane concerns, namely how to help the busy reader cope with a very long report, which may or may not be a monster (sometimes, we, too, thought that it was one indeed, and a very demanding one, to boot). In our interviewing in the United States Government we have found that the elected and appointed officials were really and frightfully busy. Permit us to offer the following suggestions on how our report may be read. The fastest way to get acquainted with the main argument is to read the 5-page Overall Executive Summary, which has been inserted in front of this preface to this very purpose. The overall summary gives the gist of the report and all of the concrete policy recommendations minus the reasons for each recommendation. The Overall Executive Summary may be followed by the nine Executive Summaries immediately preceding each chapter. Alternatively, the busy reader may do what most of us have been doing for a long time: read the conclusion first, the introduction second, and then decide whether to attack the "meat" in between. We are firmly convinced that the decision will be positive, even though the execution of the decision may be delayed (not indefinitely, we hope).
For technical reasons the page numbers do not run consecutively: those in Chapter 1 are marked 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, etc., the corresponding notes are marked N1-1, N1-2, etc., the materials in the Appendix are marked A-1, etc., consecutively, the Bibliographic References are marked R1, R2, etc., Supplementary References are marked SRI (for technical reasons we have decided to give a bibliography supplementary to that in the grant proposal). Executive Summaries can be easily distinguished in that they are marked EXEC 1, etc., for Overall Summary or EXEC 1-1 for summary of Chapter 1. They are also all single spaced.

This being a joint work, the reader may wonder which one of us is responsible for what part. We have worked closely together, reading and criticizing each other's chapters, exchanging sources, shifting parts of chapters to and fro. Both of us are ready to defend everything in this report. Bilinsky wrote the first draft of Chapters 1, 3, 5 (except for the subchapter on Lithuania), 7, the Ukrainian section in Chapter 8, and Chapter 9. Parming reworked Chapter 1 and wrote the first drafts of Chapters 2, 4, the Lithuanian section in Chapter 5, 6 and 8 (except for the Ukrainian section). Parming is responsible for assembling and editing the Lithuanian documents in Appendix II, Bilinsky compiled and edited the rest.

As to the transliteration, we have used a modified version of the Library of Congress system, dropping their fancy ligatures, etc. One feature of the Library of Congress system was retained, however:
there is no satisfactory way of rendering the Ukrainian 'i' except typing it as is. The translations from Armenian have been by the Berlitz translation service, those from Georgian by a translator who wishes to remain anonymous.

After working on the project for more than a year and assembling the typed pages in a great rush, we would like to pause to express our sincere gratitude to the wide circle of first-hand participants, government officials and scholars who have set time aside for us to share with us their experiences and insights. We would also like to sincerely thank those who for many reasons have chosen to remain anonymous.

Bilinsky would like to thank the following members or associates of Soviet Helsinki Groups who gave him interviews (in alphabetical order): Mrs. Lyudmila Alekseeva, Foreign Representative of the Moscow Helsinki Group; Mr. Victor Borovsky, of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group; Major-General Petro Hryhorenko, of the Moscow and the Ukrainian Helsinki Groups, Foreign Representative of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group; Mr. Ambartsum Khlgatyan, of the Armenian Helsinki Group; Mrs. Nadiia Svitlychny-Stokatelny, of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group; Professor Tomas Venclova, of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group; and Mr. Petro Vins, of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

In Congress: The Honorable Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Mr. Michael Kraft, former Executive Assistant to US Senator Clifford P. Case, now Legislative
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In the Ukrainian-American community: Professor Lev E. Dobriansky, President, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

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Professor Vahakn N. Dadrian and Dr. James H. Tashjian, Editor of The Armenian Review granted permission to reprint Dr. Dadrian's translations of Armenian documents, most of which have been published in the Armenian Review.

In cordially thanking all these persons we would like to stress that it is only we, the authors, who are responsible for any errors of commission or omission.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Notice of Intention to Apply for Copyright .............................................. ii

Overall Executive Summary...................................................................... EXEC 1 to EXEC 5

Preface and Acknowledgments................................................................. iii

Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Executive Summary</th>
<th>EXEC 1-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1-1 to 1-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>THE SOVIET NATIONALITY QUESTION</td>
<td>2-1 to 2-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationality Assertiveness in the 1970's</td>
<td>2-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Demographic Recovery.</td>
<td>2-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Modernization Processes</td>
<td>2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) The Ideology of Nationalism</td>
<td>2-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>SOVIET DISSENT.</td>
<td>3-1 to 3-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Some Opposition Groupings under Stalin.</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Dissent under Khrushchev.</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Brezhnev's Decision to Clamp Down on Dissent.</td>
<td>3-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) The Variety of Dissent under Brezhnev</td>
<td>3-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.</td>
<td>4-1 to 4-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Security Conference Idea.</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Helsinki - Geneva - Helsinki.</td>
<td>4-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Final Act Itself.</td>
<td>4-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Special Issue of the Baltic States.</td>
<td>4-23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5  
Executive Summary ......................... EXEC 5-1
THE SOVIET HELSINKI WATCH COMMITTEES . . . 5-1 to 5-85
(a) The Moscow Group ....................... 5-1
(b) The Ukrainian Group .................... 5-17
(c) Lithuanian Group ....................... 5-41
(d) The Helsinki Watch Committee in Georgia 5-48
(e) The Armenian Group .................... 5-69

Chapter 6  
Executive Summary ......................... EXEC 6-1
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET NATIONALITY QUESTION . 6-1 to 6-49
The Internationalization of the Human Rights Issue 1975-1980 .......... 6-4
Soviet Domestic Consequences .................. 6-19
(1) The closure of dissident groups ............ 6-19
(2) Legitimation of Dissent and Nationality Rights ........... 6-22
(3) Interaction Across Ethnic Group Lines .......... 6-25
(4) Local Versus All-Union Scope of the Issues .......... 6-26
(5) Cooperation by International Elements of Ethnic Groups .......... 6-28
(6) The Relationship of Human Rights and Nationality Rights .......... 6-30
Nationalism and Human Rights .................. 6-39

Chapter 7  
Executive Summary ......................... EXEC 7-1
THE US COMMISSION, OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE MEDIA: THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT . . . . . 7-1 to 7-57
(b) The Activity of the US Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (July 1976 through 1979) .......... 7-12
(c) Other Organizations Monitoring The Implementation of the Helsinki Accords .......... 7-26
(d) The Belgrade Review Meeting (October 4, 1977-March 9, 1978) .......... 7-29
(e) The Media .......... 7-50
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>EXEC 8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ETHNIC GROUPS AS INTERNATIONAL ACTORS</td>
<td>8-1 to 8-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Ethnics as International Entities</td>
<td>8-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Toward and Beyond the Helsinki Final Act.</td>
<td>8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Communities</td>
<td>8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion.</td>
<td>8-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>EXEC 9-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>9-1 to 9-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i. Specific Conclusions from This Report</td>
<td>9-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii. More General Findings from Other Sources.</td>
<td>9-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iii. Concrete Recommendations.</td>
<td>9-23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NOTES
- Chapter 1 | N1-01 |
- Chapter 2 | N2-01 to N2-09 |
- Chapter 3 | N3-01 to N3-13 |
- Chapter 4 | N4-01 to N4-14 |
- Chapter 5 | N5-01 to N5-32 |
- Chapter 6 | N6-01 to N6-15 |
- Chapter 7 | N7-01 to N7-19 |
- Chapter 8 | N8-01 to N8-19 |
- Chapter 9 | N9-01 to N9-05 |

### Appendixes
- Appendix I: LISTS; DOCUMENTS OF UKRAINIAN GROUP. A-01
- Appendix II: DOCUMENTS OF LITHUANIAN GROUP. A-81
- Appendix III: DOCUMENTS FROM GEORGIA AND ARMENIA. A-129

Documents of the Human Rights Movement in Georgia, 1977 (After the Establishment . . .) A-154

Documents of the Armenian Group to Promote the Implementation of Accords (Nos. 1-7) and Related Materials on the Armenian National and Human Rights Movements (Nos. 8-12). A-162

References. R1 to R20

Supplementary References. SR1 ff
Executive Summary

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This particular chapter is a general introduction to the study. It introduces the main points which are later brought forth and relates issues to each other. We note that the Soviet Union, which initially proposed a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the mid-1950s, finally had to make some compromises. First, the United States and Canada were to participate as full members, and second, human contacts and rights provisions were to be included in the Final Act. Although the Soviets saw the conference as a surrogate peace treaty to World War II, which would confirm its current borders and acknowledge its hegemony in Eastern Europe, the Final Act's (1975) human rights provisions exploded into an international issue in the second half of the 1970s.

The Final Act had a serious impact on the Soviet scene by leading to the formation in 1976-1977 of five public monitoring groups on the implementation of the Act, and on its violations. It also gave the restive minorities a new basis for legitimizing their demands. It also caused an unprecedented focus of the West on Soviet domestic affairs. The events in the USSR also impacted on the American scene by leading to the formation of a special, investigative, joint Executive Branch-Congressional Commission, and the activation of ethnic groups here in an attempt to influence American policy on the Helsinki accords.
On 1 August 1975, after more than two years of intensive negotiations in Helsinki and Geneva, the leaders of thirty-five countries in Europe (all, except Albania) and in North America signed in the Finnish capital the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This event in many ways crowned twenty-one years of Soviet diplomatic efforts to conclude a European peace treaty or security agreement. However, in the end the Soviet negotiators, and their Warsaw Pact allies, had to make what to them were major concessions. Among these were the participation of the United States and Canada in the conference as full partners and not as mere observers, the inclusion of human rights and human contact (the flow of ideas, culture and people) provisions in the Final Act itself, and the holding of a follow-up conference in Belgrade two years after the Helsinki summit. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, after the mid-1975 Helsinki signing ceremonies, had reason to display the public euphoria which it did. After all, the political provisions of the Final Act do not leave much doubt that the current borders of the Soviet Union and Europe, and even Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, were certified by all signatories (even though Western leaders insisted that the Final Act was not a legal treaty and the acknowledgement of the status quo was not, therefore, a de jure statement). These political provisions were the plum sought by the Soviet Union in its own perception of the CSCE as a
surrogate World War II peace conference. As it was, the counterbalancing paragraphs insisted upon by the Western European and North American participants, especially the human rights ones, were structured with qualifying wording to a degree that in mid-1975 one might easily have concluded that they would not be of major international significance.

The Soviet glee was short-lived. Within the space of two years human rights had become a prominent international issue, and the West’s critical eye was focused on the Soviet violations of these rights under the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. An American delegation of 18 Congressmen went to the Soviet Union a few days after the Helsinki Final Act was signed. When this delegation in August 1975 "met with Mr. Brezhnev we spoke to him about this [the human rights and emigration issue] and rather resignedly he sighed and said this was the 150th time the basket three provisions had been brought to his attention..." ¹ On 12 May 1976, Soviet human rights activists founded in Moscow a Public Group for Assistance in Fulfillment of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR. This Moscow "Helsinki Watch Committee" ended its founding document with a hope that a similar body would be created on the international scene. And indeed, this occurred, with public or parliamentary groups sprouting up in a number of Western countries, with the most important one being the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, founded in June 1976. As we shall see, the creation of this Commission was in many respects a direct outcome of the American Congressional delegation’s visit to the USSR in 1975, and its meetings there with Soviet dissidents. During 1976-1977 Helsinki Watch Committees were founded also in other areas of the Soviet Union:
Ukraine (9 November 1976), Lithuania (25 November 1976), Georgia (early January 1977) and Armenia (1 April 1977).

The International Sakharov Hearings, first held in Copenhagen on 17-19 October 1975, less than three months after the Helsinki Final Act was signed, also brought sizable media publicity to Soviet human rights issues. Furthermore, by the time of the first follow-up meeting to the CSCE Final Act, in Belgrade beginning in October 1977, the human rights provision of the Act's Basket One (Principle VII therein) and those of human contacts of Basket Three had become the only ones to receive major public attention, both in the Warsaw Pact countries and in the Western ones, albeit with a different focus and purpose. In 1977-1978 the trials of Soviet dissidents and related issues began seriously to affect American-Soviet relations, and by 1979-1980 scientific exchanges were coming to a halt because of this.

This was clearly an unforeseen development. During the early period of preparations for the CSCE, human rights were not an issue at all. Rather, the early Western concern was with human contacts, which pertains to the movement of people, ideas, culture, information, etc., and here it is important to emphasize that the primary advocates of both the human contacts and later human rights provisions were the European countries, not the United States. As it was, NATO countries -- at least the more powerful ones -- agreed to the CSCE idea predominantly for strategic reasons, relating it to a resolution of the Berlin question and to the issue of a divided Germany, and as a means of stimulating the Soviets toward some form of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) agreement. Indeed, there was appreciable opposition, foremost among conservative political
circles, in major Western countries to the signing of the Final Act.

If the Helsinki accords provided a new framework for the legitimation of human rights demands, it was the assertiveness of the East European, and especially Soviet, dissident human rightists, which turned the matter into an important international issue. In turn, the Soviet human rights issue has been closely identified with the matter of nationality rights from the outset of the "Democratic Movement" which began in the mid-1960's. This is evidenced by the prominent mention of the subject in the major personal and group memoranda of the human rightists before Helsinki, and the frequent feature of nationality issues in the documents of the five Helsinki Watch Committees in the USSR after Helsinki. As it is, four of these committees are nationality-group based. Many Soviet human rights violations, both at the individual and group levels, are related to the nationality issue as well. Thus, the cases of the Jews, Crimean Tatars, and Volga Germans are favorite ones among the Soviet human rightists who are "universalists." And the problems of Russification, and the oppression of group members for cultural, religious and other types of expression guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution and the Final Act, are among the favorite topics among the "particularists," the human rightists who have rooted their activism in their own ancestral group. Lastly, many of the giants of the Soviet human rights movement are not Russians, but rather members of "the other half" of the population of the USSR.

The Helsinki Final Act, then, brought to the international center stage both the Soviet human rights and nationality rights issues, matters which in fact at least in the USSR are virtually inseparable. The elements
of current Soviet nationality groups abroad have also played a role in
the internationalization of the human rights and nationality questions.
In terms of historical accuracy it should be noted that not all in these
groups should be summarily categorized as "Soviet emigrees." Many are 19th
century migrants from Czarist Russia (but also from the Austria-Hungarian empire).
In addition, the 1944 Baltic and many Ukrainian "displaced persons" are
not Soviet emigrees. The three Baltic states were sovereign before the war,
and what is now the northwest Ukrainian SSR, was earlier a part of Austria-
Hungary and interwar Poland. They are thus people who fled the imposition of
Soviet rule in their place of residence, not from the USSR as such. The Soviet
emigres are the small group of postwar Soviet residents who have departed,
legally or illegally, or who have been exiled by the regime.

While Western public and governmental groups have come to scrutinize
the Soviet human rights scene as a result of the Helsinki Final Act, the
Soviet Union has denied that there are any such violations on its territory.
But it has simultaneously exiled (both domestically and abroad), imprisoned,
or placed in psychiatric institutions those citizens who assert that violations
of human and nationality rights have been proliferous in the USSR. The
oppression of the Soviet human rightists has drawn additional world attention
to its domestic affairs. The documents of the five Soviet Helsinki Watch
Committees, one in Moscow and the others in the Union-republics, and the
testimony of their exiled leaders now in the West, have been primary sources
of information on human rights and nationality rights in the USSR. The many
volumes of Hearings and the numerous separate compilations of the actual
Soviet Watch Committees' documents, attest to the special role played by the U.S.
Commission in contributing a crucial historical record to the world.
The Helsinki Final Act has had a serious impact on Soviet nationality processes. It facilitated a closure of several different strains of dissent, provided a new integrative basis for legitimizing nationality rights, led to closer cooperation of nationality groups in their demand for the implementation and observance of those ethnic rights guaranteed by the Soviet 1936 Constitution (which was in effect until the end of the 1970's) and reaffirmed by Principles VII and VIII in Basket One of the Final Act, and most importantly, conceptually related nationality rights to human rights. It is pertinent to note that this latter linkage, which is firm in both the two aforementioned principles of the Final Act and in the formulations of the Soviet Watch Committees, is not equally firm, or even present, in Western thinking. It appears, rather, that the attention in the West thus far drawn to the Soviet nationality question by the Helsinki Final Act is not because of a perceived theoretical linkage between it and human rights, but for three very different reasons. First, the Soviet Watch Committees have included nationality issues very often in their documents and testimony. Second, the coincidence of human rights violations with the ascribed ethnicity of individuals, and the brutal treatment of whole groups, such as with the Crimean Tatars, does not allow the nationality issue to be ignored in scrutiny of the Soviet human rights situation. And third, the Soviet dissidents themselves, especially those strongly rooted in their non-Russian ancestral group, and the Western members of the same ethnic group, insist that attention be paid to it.
There is no question whatsoever that the Soviet human rights and nationality rights issues came to public attention in the West hand-in-hand, and that the Helsinki Final Act, both directly and indirectly, impacted on Soviet nationality processes. It is also clear that these matters, alone and jointly, have influenced international relations, and especially American-Soviet relations. But to comprehend fully the import of the nationality issue, it is necessary to look at the matter in historical perspective. Basically, the Soviet Union inherited the "nationality problem" from its predecessor state, Imperial Russia, which in the course of three centuries before the Revolution had been able to conquer vast amounts of territory and a multitude of people, most very different from the Russians. They also had very different social, cultural and political histories, at times were racially different as well and had been exposed to several diverse civilizational influences.

From the outset, the Soviet Union has been influenced by competing macro-forces, one set which is centrifugal and the other centripetal. It is the high tension between these which explains a significant share of the nationality dynamics of the USSR. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union believes in a universalistic class-based society, rooted in Marxist-Leninist thought. Based on the laws of materialism and scientific Communism the nationality problem, a legacy of a bourgeois phase of societal development, is supposed to go away. Indeed its existence is believed to hinder social progress, which has made the Party somewhat theoretically hostile to the existence of nationality groups. At the most abstract level, the Party is class-assimilationist; a socialist society eventually is supposed to have a universalist ethnically-neutral identity based on class consciousness. In
practice, the Russians are more equal than the other groups. They are not only overrepresented at the highest decision-making level of both the Party and the civil government, but they also have privileges of institutionally preserving and advancing their own cultural heritage in historically non-Russian areas, whereas other groups do not have such benefits outside their own ancestral area. There is no public or Party pressure for Russians to learn the languages of the non-Russian areas to which they have emigrated, but the other people must learn Russian.

In the opposite vein, early Bolsheviks had correctly labelled Czarist Russia a "prison of nations." Lenin had realized sometime between 1905 and 1917 that the nationality problem was so serious that it could spoil the Revolution. Thus, tactically he promised self-determination, hoping for an immediate reintegration along Communist lines. Indeed, virtually in the whole border-ring around the Russian heartland the non-Russians in 1917-1918 strove to break away. By 1921 the Soviet Russian government had succeeded in retaking Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the three Transcaucasian republics. Only Finland, the three Baltic states and Poland succeeded in shaking off the Russian shackles. With World War II, the USSR reincorporated the Baltic, imposed a satellite status on Poland, and effectively neutralized the foreign policy of Finland.

The Communist Party was wrought by its internal debates in the early 1920s over the nationality issue. The Constitution of 1923 nevertheless made the USSR a federated state, with the administrative-territorial areas defined largely on the basis of ethnic areas of settlement, as Union-republics (SSRs), autonomous republics (ASSRs), or lesser autonomous regions. Thus, contrary to its underlying ideology, the forces of
reality created a multi-ethnic Soviet Union. In the 1920s what appear to be sincere attempts at fostering ethnic pluralism were implemented. At the time a Ukrainian, Georgian or Armenian could obtain his entire education from kindergarten to college in his native language, could effectively compete with Russians for a good position in his own republic or even in Moscow, could aspire to become a regional or even SSR Party Secretary and Chairman of the SSR Council of People's Commissars who would defend the interests of his people and of his republic in Kharkov, Tbilisi and Yerevan, and, if need be, in Moscow. The liberal policy of the 1920s had set into motion a complex process of socio-economic development: the once predominantly illiterate rural Ukrainians were becoming educated and were moving slowly into the predominantly Russian cities; the Georgians similarly began to settle in towns and cities of Georgia, whose character for decades had been determined by Russians and Armenians. In Armenia itself the Armenian middle class became even more firmly rooted in the urban centers.

But in the 1920s, partly as a result of the all-European 19th century "national renaissance" and romantic nationalism, and partly due to Soviet nationality policy, in all these areas--Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia--national consciousness was shaped not only by historical memories, not only by traditional national culture, but by a common goal for the future. And this was, the rapid development of the Ukrainian, Georgian and Armenian nations, in toto. Thus, already in the 1920s we find the roots of what by 1969 even the Soviet sociologists had come to characterize as the "new nationalism:" highly educated non-Russian professionals, managers, technocrats and intellectuals evincing hostile attitudes toward the Russians whom they regard as competitors for jobs and--by implication--for power. In
short, already in the 1920s the nationality question in the Soviet Union was turning from a question of traditional cultures and languages into a problem of old and of modern national elites, or to use the Soviet term, a question of national cultures and national cadres.

Stalin, however, changed course in the late 1920s, and by 1934 he had chosen Russian nationalism as the bulwark of a more conservative Soviet Union. Although the use of the Russian language was now emphasized throughout the Soviet Union, it did not make much headway in Georgia nor Armenia, only in Ukraine. And even here Stalin's turn to Russian national values did not significantly interrupt the educational advancement of the Ukrainians. More consequential were the collectivization and the Great Purge, which hit some republics disproportionately hard. World War II saw the incorporation of former border areas from the Baltic to the Black Sea, territories whose populations had been historically the most politically nationalist in Czarist Russia, and who, during the brief two interwar decades had further advanced both a cultural and political national identity. Especially in the Ukrainian and Baltic areas a native partisan resistance remained active for five years or so. The brutal deportations in these areas between 1940 and 1949 already had provided a ready-made mechanism for political dissatisfaction with Soviet rule, and by inference, with renewed Russian domination.

World War II had also demonstrated how fragile the Soviet Union was along its ethnic points of social differentiation, as millions of men defected to the German side or fled westward. As Alexander Solzhenitsyn has so memorably put this, it was an ignominious act which reflected poorly not on the defectors, but on the society which they felt forced to reject.
because it had brutalized them. Indeed, Russian nationalism was never far from the surface of official Soviet politics ever since Stalin's toast of 24 May 1945 to the Russian people, and Brezhnev's praise of the Russians in his speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet Union, which interestingly enough was delivered on Stalin's birthday, 21 December 1972. After Stalin's death, first Beria and then Khrushchev called on the support of dissatisfied but ambitious Party cadres in the non-Russian republics to help them in their personal quests for power. Indeed, Khrushchev surrounded himself with loyal Party apparatchiks from Ukraine: in December 1957 A. Kirichenko was made a high ranking Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; for the first time in Soviet history an Uzbek Party leader, N. Mukhitdinov, entered the Party Secretariat together with Kirichenko. (The former was dropped for unexplained reasons from the Secretariat in January 1960, and the latter in October 1961; but in November 1962 V. Titov from Ukraine was taken into the Secretariat and entrusted with sensitive personnel affairs; in June 1963 his political patron N. Podgorny entered the Secretariat as a counterweight to Brezhnev.)

When Khrushchev's nationality policy changed in a pro-Russian direction in 1958, and when Brezhnev by and large continued the assimilationist policy of Khrushchev of 1958-1964, the autonomist non-Russian cadres could not but be upset over first being used and then discarded. They appeared to have been within grasping distance of real political power in 1953-1957. In September 1965 Brezhnev also put an end to Khrushchev's half-hearted experiments with the decentralization of economic administration (henceforth the more important factories in the republics were to be supervised by the Ministries in Moscow). This too could not but have an adverse
impact upon the republican level cadres. In the early 1970s Brezhnev talked even of doing away with SSRs in favor of economic regions, and issues related to the new Constitution caused more nationality ire at the end of the decade.

In summary, in comparison to the Stalinist years, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a more virulent kind of unofficial, that is, not openly endorsed, Russian nationalism come to the fore, possibly even as a reaction to the increasing non-Russian dissent. As an ironic twist of fate, also in the late 1960s, the non-Russian dissidents established a cooperation with the "other Russia," the emergent Democratic Movement of Russian neo-Leninists and human rightists. Before moving onto the topic of the partial closure of Soviet human rights and nationality rights during the 1965-1975 years, and more intensively so during the post-Helsinki half-decade 1975-1980, a few additional points about nationality assertiveness need to be brought forth. The Soviet "nationality problem" at the most general level may be seen as the dissatisfaction with some aspect of Soviet society on the part of the non-Russian half of the population. Yet, not only is the actual source of dissatisfaction different for the various nationality groups, but the channels along which this is acted out also varies. In addition, the underlying dynamics of the Soviet nationality problem should not be seen as a simple problem of Russian domination and non-Russian response.

The post-World War II era has seen an intensification in the application of political nationalism to the world scene. The socio-political philosophy and belief that all people have an inherent right to sovereignty, in its roots a European political force, was the basis for demanding and legitimizing the decolonialization of the Western empires in the Third World. These currents had already affected at least the Western nation-
alities in Czarist Russia, not to mention the Russians themselves, in the 19th century. The non-Russians did not let it go unnoticed that the principle of national sovereignty was extensively applied to the Third World, and often championed by the USSR at international forums. In this sense it should not be surprising that the non-Russians would also demand the application of the principle to themselves. Not insignificantly, some of the non-Russian people—especially the Baits, the Georgians and the Armenians, and the Central Asian Turks—had already an earlier legacy of political sovereignty.

Furthermore, Soviet domestic policy had brutally treated not only individual citizens during the Stalinist years but also whole ethnic groups—for example, the Crimean Tatars and the Volga Germans. Later, the migration issue disproportionately affected the Jews. Also, in the case of the Estonians and Latvians, for example, there was a real threat of demographic displacement in the ancestral areas due to a relatively huge Russian influx from the latter half of the 1940s. In these cases, the groups were often fighting, from their own perspective, for national survival. It was the general coincidence of ethnicity and oppression which helped to stimulate the interest of the Democratic Movement in the nationality question. And indeed, the oppression existed both at the individual and group levels in blatant violation of Soviet Constitutional guarantees. By the 1970s the Movement had related nationality rights to human rights, a linkage which solidified after the Helsinki Final Act, providing it a more concrete basis.

The Democratic Movement emerged in the mid-1960s perhaps due to the frustrations encountered in the wake of the post-1956 thaw. By 1968 the movement was taking on a consolidated form with the appearance of the
Chronicle of Current Events, the "appeal of the twelve" to the Communist parties meeting in Budapest, and Sakharov's Reflections. The pollution of the freshness of the Prague spring with the exhaust fumes of Soviet tanks also frustrated the neo-Leninists' ideas about a domestic loyal opposition, of Party based social reform. As the crackdown against dissidents grew, their criticism of Soviet society intensified.

The Democratic Movement also had, early on, a notable non-Russian input, among which the Ukrainians especially stand out. For example, Leonid Pluyshch was a member of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights. Mykola Rudenko was a member of the Soviet branch of Amnesty International. Pyotr Grigorenko was in general a giant in the Soviet human rights movement, a signer of the 1968 appeal of twelve to the Budapest meeting of Communist parties. Jews, Georgians, a Tatar, and others were also involved from the outset. Parallel groups appeared in the Union-republics, although the movement was centered in Moscow. Nevertheless, most among the activists were ethnic Russians.

It was not only the existence of oppressive and discriminatory behavior on the part of the State and Party toward members of nationality groups, and towards whole groups, which attracted the attention of the Moscow human rights and democratic movements. It is evident that the individual non-Russians involved in Moscow, themselves at this time "universalists," contributed to molding the opinions of their Russian counterparts, and thereby played a role in the development of the linkage between nationality rights and human rights at the conceptual level. By the time of the Helsinki accords, this trend was already strong; the Final Act, however, made the linkage more important in terms of advancement and application, in a way, crystallizing it.
The 1970s was a decade of unusual nationality assertiveness, from Central Asia to the Polish border. Jews were up in arms over renewed anti-Semitism, Lithuanians rose up in a major demonstration after a self-immolation in 1972 and gave birth to a strong Catholic movement. The Estonians and Latvians protested with international memorandums from both inside and outside the Party, the Ukrainians demanded an end to overt and covert pressures of Russification and the reemphasis of Ukrainian culture and history in the schools. There was rioting in the Caucasuses over the Constitution. Perhaps worst of all from the Soviet viewpoint this found unprecedented coverage in the Western media. The Helsinki Final Act, which was supposed to be a simple international affirmation of Soviet borders and status as a major power, an important political achievement, came instead to haunt the country's leadership. It brought to the forefront something entirely new, the makings of a united human rights-nationality rights movement. One result was more repression. The Party's fear of the new development was sociologically understandable; as Western analysts have indicated, when instrumental goals (human rights) are based on affective ties (ethnicity), the consequence is a very effective and explosive socio-political mobilization of the population.

We are accustomed to think of states— that is, countries—as the primary international actors. Critical analysts also would include the multi-national corporations. Yet the events before and after the Helsinki Final Act evidence a third major actor—ethnic groups whose elements are strategically located in several countries and who act in concert toward a common goal by attempting to influence the policies of their countries of residence. They build alliances not with governments and corporations,
but with other ethnic groups with similar interests, thus multiplying their global leverage. In the present study, we are dealing with ethnic groups which have an ancestral core in some part of what is now the USSR and elements in the most important Western countries.

The present study deals first, in Chapters 2 and 3, briefly with the key structures of the domestic backdrop—the nationality question and Soviet dissent—of our major concern, the impact which the Helsinki Final Act has had on Soviet nationality processes. Chapter 4 examines the political and diplomatic road to Helsinki and the salient points in the Final Act itself. Chapter 5 analytically looks at the consequences which the CSCE movement and the Final Act had on the Soviet domestic scene. Chapter 7 covers in greater detail the international monitoring of the Helsinki Final Act, with special attention to the U.S. Commission. And Chapter 8 focuses on ethnic groups as international actors. In addition to general conclusions in Chapter 9, the study also has an appendix featuring the documents of the Union-republic level Watch Committees in the USSR. Since the documents of the Moscow group have already been published and are more readily accessible to the reader, they were not included here; however, a listing of those Moscow documents which pertain to the nationality question is enclosed in the appendix.

To the maximum extent possible, the research has been based on primary documents, whether of dissent or of the Helsinki Watch Committees, on the speeches and addresses of national leaders, on the testimony of key figures before various forums, interviews with a number of Soviet activists now in exile in the United States and with others importantly involved in the road to Helsinki and its wake. Many of the issues uncovered will require
further research; unfortunately, many of the most important source materials are in the archives of various governments and will not be readily available for some time. Yet our main conclusion, that the Helsinki Final Act indeed had a serious impact on Soviet nationality processes during the 1975-1980 period is, we feel, sustained by currently available materials. Whether this impact will be lasting remains to be seen.

Examples of factors which could undo the changes or alter their path would include the following. First, it cannot be predicted what the future Soviet tolerance for domestic dissent will be (or what the consequences of the burst of dissent in the 1970s and the sustained pressures exerted by the non-Russians will be for a society which is potentially fragile along its points of ethnic differentiation in the population), especially with the problem of succession in leadership so acute. Second, it is not at all clear that a major Western interest in human rights will be sustained; this international forum has been crucial in bringing external pressures to bear on Soviet domestic processes. Third, we know from the testimony of exiled Soviet dissidents that Radio Liberty especially has been an important feedback source for them. But throughout the 1970s American liberals have attempted to end these broadcasts, virtually agreeing with the official Soviet position that Radio Liberty is "cold-warish," even reactionary. Funding is almost an annual crisis. Yet without these broadcasts the Soviet dissidents: (1) have little feedback on the impact of their activity on the world scene; and (2) have little timely information on many crucial domestic developments in the USSR. And fourth, the Western—and Soviet dissidents'—definitions of "human rights" as individual civil rights, may not remain the dominant perspective in the years ahead. It is possible that the official
Soviet view, which finds a receptive echo in the Third World and even among American minorities—the right to have jobs, health care, food—will be in the world limelight in the 1980s. Soviet domestic problems may also become irrelevant to a Western world caught in the throes of global North-South conflicts, in which case the USSR is more likely to find itself with the rest of the North, not the South. But intriguingly, the nationality issue is also in the "South's" civil rights package—in the form of sovereign rights of people, the freedom to develop one's unique culture without external imposition, the freedom from racial-ethnic discrimination. Thus, the nationality issue in the Soviet Union is unlikely to disappear, even while it continues its historical pattern, which is to change form and focus. In the years ahead, the demand for nationality rights could be easily shifted from the civil rights provisions of the Soviet Constitution to the socio-economic ones, or even combined with them.
Executive Summary

Chapter 2

THE SOVIET NATIONALITY QUESTION

The Soviet Union inherited from Imperial Russia a multi-ethnic population. This factual multi-ethnicity has presented problems since the outset for the USSR because of its own systemic contradictions. On the one hand, Lenin's nationality policy resulted in a federalism based on ethnicity, with a Constitution which guarantees a number of nationality rights. On the other hand, after a brief period in the 1920s in which the policy was implemented, the Soviet Union has seen a recurrence of Russian chauvinism, which creates fears of Russification among the one-half of the total population which is not Russian. The problem has been further aggravated by the sizable Russian migration to historically non-Russian territories, which results in some institutional pressures of Russification.

Some groups in the Soviet Union are clearly separatists—for example, the Balts, who were only in 1940 brought into the Soviet fold, and who before this had sovereign states. But other groups—such as the Jews, Crimean Tatars, and even the Georgians and Armenians—are not separatists. Rather, they are demanding the implementation of constitutionally guaranteed ethnic rights or an end to discriminatory behavior by the state. Actually, a great deal of the nationality unrest is related to the simple fact that human rights violations and political repression coincides with ethnic differences in the population. And thus, political mobilization to fight for these rights is often based on ethnicity. Importantly, the nationality rights and human rights issues in the USSR are closely related, both factually and theoretically.

We find that on top of the systemic issues, the Soviet nationality cauldron will remain boiling vigorously in the years ahead for a number of additional reasons as well. For example, the world is in an age in which political nationalism is highly valued generally, expressed as the inherent right of people to be sovereign. Also, the general societal forces of modernization and demographic trends have affected Soviet nationality processes. The internal strains may be serious enough to rupture the society along its ethnic seams under great external pressure on the system.
Chapter 2

THE SOVIET NATIONALITY QUESTION

Professor Edward Allworth of Columbia University has summarized the topic of this chapter as follows: 1

The Soviet nationality question may be usefully seen, then, as a composite of the many general problems necessarily connected with nationality (the strongly felt, express desire of members for identity with their larger community or ethnic unit) in the USSR. Such problems may be raised by tradition, political inequality, particular genres of artistic expression, governmental policy, peculiar social organization, and the like.

Among the "general problems connected with nationality" one could include the following major ones: fears of Russification—-the displacement of the ancestral collective identities of the many non-Russians who make up about half of the total Soviet population  (in some cases culturally, as in Ukraine, in others, demographically, as in Estonia and Latvia); overt discrimination against whole groups by the central government (as in the case of the Jews, and the Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans, if we include coercive geographical displacement under discrimination here); manipulation of history through the "great friendship theme" as well as the imposed Marxist-Leninist perspective by the Party, combined with cultural restrictions imposed by policies of socialist realism (which affects all groups in the USSR, including the Russians); the overt antireligiosity of the state and the Party, which has an impact especially on those groups where religious and ethnic identity coincide (which to some degree exists in most of the major groups because of the extensive coincidence of religious and ethnic differentiation in the Soviet population; but the best example
would be the Lithuanians); the failure of the Soviet system to live up to its Leninist nationality policy (which has left the Russians in a more equal position than the other nationalities, that is, with a disproportional share of national power, both in the Party and the civil government, and much greater ethnic privileges) and Constitutional rights.

In sum, the underlying fibres of these problems have to do with dissatisfaction with some aspect of Soviet society. Nationality dissatisfactions are clearly not the only ones which inflict the USSR, but they are perhaps the most important ones in sum total precisely because of the coincidence of instrumental issues with affective ties among the dissatisfied, which provides an especially powerful base for socio-political mobilization. In part, the dynamics of strain along nationality lines are built into the Soviet system, which basically inherited the nationality problem from Czarist Russia. Although almost all of the major nationality groups in Czarist Russia attempted to break off from the historical core state during the Revolution, most were quickly brought back under Moscow's control by 1921. The Baltic states followed in 1940; Poland has a satellite status and Finland walks a very taut tightrope of neutrality. But in essence, the territory and ethnic make-up of the Soviet population are not much different than those of Imperial Russia. On the one hand, the official underlying ideology of the Soviet Union, Marxism-Leninism, asserts that ethnic identities are remnants of a capitalist phase of societal development and will disappear under socialism. The socialist nation is presumed to have a common solidarity and identity built around a notion of class. This ideological heritage both specifies a goal-ideal of an "homogenized" or assimilated population and, by viewing ethnicity partially as an obstacle to social progress, makes the repository of integrative political power in the
system, the Communist Party, somewhat hostile to the existence of ethnicity.

Related to this, the rather dominant role of the ethnic Russians, in fact as well as visibility, means that it is rather easy for the non-Russians to think foremost of the final socialist Soviet society as a Russian-core one, not an ethnically neutral one. Hence, when Leonid Brezhnev in 1972 talked of a new sovetskii narod, to the non-Russians this implied coercive assimilation, that is, Russification. In addition to the centripetal forces provided by Marxism-Leninism and Great Russian chauvinism (which is at least in part real), a third factor which advances centralized integration rests in the general nature of the modernized state.

On the other hand, the political realities of the Revolution forced Lenin to make a compromise on the nationality issue. The Soviet Union was—temporarily—to be an ethnically federated entity (while the Party was to be unitary). If Lenin was not a Russian chauvinist, he nevertheless believed in political centralization and, in the long-range future, in identity closure toward some undefined socialist unity. The basis of Soviet federalism was in fact nationality, on which rests the administrative-territorial structure and the formal governmental system. As a tactical measure, the Constitution of 1923 (and in turn its successors) guaranteed a host of ethnic rights. This temporary compromise has remained a part of Soviet reality for sixty years, and is carried forward both by the new Brezhnev Constitution and the momentum of practice. Thus, one could say that the Soviet system as it was established and has been operated, itself fosters the perpetuation of ethnic distinctions and even divergence.
The seemingly genuine attempts in the 1920s both to preserve, and literally to advance non-Russian cultures was remarkable.\(^4\) To be sure, the Soviet Union's political system itself was repressive even then, but in terms strictly of ethnic developments, the USSR of the 1920s had few rivals in the world for fostering cultural pluralism. This enlightenment began to slow already in the 1930s, as the Great Purge and the brutalities of collectivization left their legacy differentially on the nationality scene. After World War II Russian chauvinism raised its head directly under Stalin, slackened, but was reasserted under Khrushchev, and became "unofficial" and hidden under Brezhnev. Hence, two systemic sources of ethnic strain are already evident here. First of all, there is a sizable discrepancy between what the Constitution allows and the system in reality permits. And second, the underlying official ideology of the society advocates an identificational homogenization which no nationality group seems to want, while the practice of the society is sufficient for half the population to fear assimilation to a Russian mold.

To make matters worse, the post-1956 thaw under Khrushchev created expectations of true reform, of political liberalization and of cultural renaissance. While there was clearly some destalinization, the shifts did not satisfy either the Party conservatives or the liberal expectations. The political system remained essentially repressive and culture stifled. The shattered illusions quickly gave birth to a noteworthy domestic opposition, both of people basically loyal to Marxism-Leninism and of individuals opposed to it.\(^5\) The emergence and development of the Democratic Movement, and of the human rights movement in general, will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter, and its full relation to nationality
processes primarily in Chapter 6. Suffice it to say here that because the political violations of Constitutionally guaranteed rights included both strictly civil ones and specifically ethnic ones, and because individuals victimized by the regime were often members of nationality groups to begin with, not infrequently repressed for their ethnic assertiveness, for the practice of a religion closely identified with an ethnicity, and for demanding the full implementation of ethnic rights, from the outset of the Soviet Union the issues of human rights and nationality rights are closely intertwined. Not all human rights issues concern nationality rights, and few would at all if the society were less ethnically heterogeneous in its demographic composition. But it is precisely because of the factual multi-ethnicity that many socio-political, cultural, and economic issues, which in and of themselves have nothing to do with ethnicity, are interpreted in ethnic terms. As it is, the Soviet system had brutalized whole ethnic groups, not just their individual members as in the case of the forced relocation, or collective deportation of the Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans, or in the case of anti-Semitism and the Jews. Hence, the response to such collective repression was inherently vested in ethnicity.

In the Ukraine, the major issue of dissent appears to revolve around the threat of cultural Russification. It is perhaps not unimportant that Russians and Ukrainians are more closely related to begin with, say than Russians and Lithuanians. Hence, on the one hand the cultural distinctions which exist become an important marker of the social boundary separating the groups, which if they disappear, leave few other bases for effective group differentiation. The Ukrainian culture is thereby unusually significant to the core identity of the group. But on the other hand, in the circumstance of relative initial cultural closeness, only
small amounts of policy manipulation and other stimulants are necessary to lead to factual identity closure, or assimilation. In other words, there is a theoretical explanation for the Ukrainians' sensitivity to the cultural issue. But in addition, the actual pressures of Russification are a reality in Ukrainian publishing, education and cultural life. The Ukrainians are furthermore faced with a unique dilemma: more than other groups, their members have reached the higher ranks of the Party, but without any seeming real ability to influence policy in a positive direction from the Ukrainian perspective. The result overall has been appreciable cultural assertiveness, political frustration, ensuing repressive responses by the government, and then more assertiveness, but now more strictly along nationality lines.

While the Baltic is a small region, there is appreciable variation in issues of dissent and of paths of nationality assertiveness between the Lithuanians on the one hand, and the Estonians and Latvians on the other. The Lithuanians had a medieval glory which is a repository both of national pride and of national longing. Like the other two Baltic people, the Lithuanians were brought under Russian political control fairly late, and successfully reestablished independence between the two World Wars. Both the cultural and political consciousness of the Lithuanians are strong, providing a natural basis for nationalism. The secular channel of Lithuanian dissent, from the abortive Simas Kudirka defection in 1970 and resulting trial, through the rioting after Roman Kalanta's self-immolation in 1972, to the complaints of intellectuals about cultural restrictions, and to the symbolically important appearance of Ausra in 1975, is adequate demonstration of this powerful striving for sovereignty.
religious channel of national assertiveness, built around the virtual unity of the Catholic religion and the Lithuanian collective identity, only adds further breadth, strength and sustenance to this force.\textsuperscript{14} The \textit{samizdat} Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church had published 30 issues between 1972 and 1977, and petitions by believers to various Soviet and foreign organs have contained over 17,000 signatures.

In both Estonia and Latvia the main cause of nationality dissent is not so directly related to the demand for a restored past, although this too is present.\textsuperscript{15} Rather, it is a question of national survival in the face of strong demographic-based pressures of Russification.\textsuperscript{16} Both SSRs are being inundated with immigrants, mostly Russians, to the point where the Estonians and Latvians may in the not-so-distant future find themselves numerical minorities in their ancestral homeleand, a drastic shift from pre-war times. Neither group has been demographically challenged in this respect earlier in its history, and does not appear capable of coming to grips with the threat which the changed situation factually and perceptually presents. The situation in Latvia appears especially difficult, the threat to the national identity more serious than in Estonia.\textsuperscript{17} The Latvians have protested noticeably even through Party channels, the Estonians outside it. The three Baltic people have evidenced some cooperation, although not as much as one might expect; but in general they have been, together, the most prolific producers of nationality-issue related \textit{samizdat} documents and memoranda sent abroad of all Soviet groups.

The situation in Georgia and Armenia sharply contrasts with that in Ukraine and the Baltic.\textsuperscript{18} While ethnocentrism is strong, political nationalism does not appear to be very important. This situation is both
theoretically and practically rather understandable. The Georgians and Armenians both have very ancient and strong national identities, which have been more often cultivated under foreign than native rule. Which is to say, both people have learned to cope with national survival without political sovereignty. Furthermore, neither group is currently threatened by Russification, which removes an important basis of socio-political mobilization in Soviet nationalism. Moreover, political sovereignty may not be fully a blessing because of the proximity of an historical adversary, namely, the Turks. Nevertheless, the same types of problems of political and cultural repression as elsewhere do affect Georgia and Armenia as well, and since these coincide with ethnicity here as elsewhere, some nationality-based dissent is inevitable even if it is not political-nationalistic. In summary, while similar qualitative issues are present among Armenians and Georgians, as among the four preceding groups which were discussed, the quantitative side of direct national assertiveness appears much weaker.

Since the Central Asian Turkic people are not central to most of our analysis in the present work, we will pass them by here. 19 Suffice it to say that the population explosion among these Moslem people may provide dynamics to the Soviet nationality scene on an all-Union level in the next few generations independently of what happens among the other groups which are of more immediate interest to us. Also, we will not dwell on emergent Russian nationalism, even though its forceful appearance would undoubtedly aggravate the Soviet domestic scene by further politically mobilizing the non-Russians. 20 In addition, the full analysis of demographic changes are beyond the scope of the present effort. 21 But importantly, because of differential rates of natural increase and of domestic migration, demographic
processes contribute to both the centripetal and centrifugal forces. And the migration and geographical disposition especially of Russians has and will likely have in the future a fundamental impact on nationality processes because of the resentment which the non-Russians all have for such an encroachment on their ancestral homelands, and because of the Russians' politically and institutionally privileged position, on their ancestral group identities as well.

Nationality Assertiveness in the 1970s

The historic dimensions of the nationality problem and of Soviet nationality policy have been extensively studied. So have the specific nationality groups which interest us here. An issue of central importance to the present study, one which has been inadequately researched to date, is the question, why the strong ethnic assertiveness in the 1970s, the decade of Helsinki? It does not appear that this can be explained adequately by the tension between the centrifugal and centripetal forces discussed above. Nor can it be sufficiently explained as a mere nationality response to a sudden onslaught of Russification, or of general systemic repression. We offer here four interrelated sets of factors, which require, however, further validation.

(1) Demographic Recovery.

Of the five nationality groups of greatest interest to us--the Armenians, Georgians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians--the last four had suffered tremendously during World War II because the war rolled eastward and then westward across their territories, because of a sizeable flight westward of people who wanted no part of Soviet society,
because of the losses through the early postwar partisan resistance, and be-
cause of the deportations which occurred between 1940 and 1949. The losses
were between one-fourth and one-third of the prewar populations, and dis-
proportionately affected young males. If there is such a thing as a
critical demographic mass for meaningful national assertiveness of any
type—and most active resistance seems to use young adults in their 20s and
30s, especially males—then the base for this was lost with the war. The
recovery did not occur until the second half of the 1960s and the 1970s.24

It might be useful to keep in mind that the best national leader-
ship had been deported by the Soviets, fled to the West, or died in the
partisan movement. A generation was also necessary for new national elites
to emerge in culture as well as politics. These elites, and the new
generation from the general demographic recovery, could hardly have been
as assertive if Stalinism had continued on. Khrushchev's post-1956
thaw was essential for the domestic opposition to grow, and this is as
true for the universalists in the Democratic Movement as it is for the par-
ticularists in specific nationality groups.25 Lastly, it was very helpful
to have available the 1959 census results, which indicated the scope of
demographic change, in the nationality groups as well as in regard to
Russian migration patterns, and then the 1970 census to affix the more
exact direction in trends.

(2) Modernization Processes.

According to both Marxists and other Western general theorists,
the process of societal development, which we may summarize as moderniza-
tion, is supposed to make societies more similar to each other globally,
and lead to the disappearance of particularistic identities within socie-
ties. In other words, a certain type of collective identity closure was supposed to occur both at the intersocietal and intrasocietal levels. This was common wisdom in the 1950s and well into the 1960s. As often happens with common wisdom on social processes, even by social scientists, it was wrong. The 1970s was a decade of ethnic resurgence globally. And so also in the Soviet Union. Our point here is precisely that since we are dealing with a global phenomenon, not everything about Soviet nationality processes should be attributed to domestic variables.

To say that the macro-theorists were wrong is appreciably easier than to explain why. Nevertheless, some of the reasons why modernization may lead to divergence instead of closure are identifiable. First of all, universalism and particularism are not exclusive; the two identities may be effectively compartmentalized and situationalized by individuals. Second, we have tended to define the peoples who underwent modernization first as universalistic, and the late ones particularistic. However, the processes of modernization also allow the folkethnicities to be transformed to modernized, that is, universalistic form. Which is to say that ethnicity and universalism are not exclusive, either at the individual or the group level. The contemporary English or French are no less particularistic than the Yoruba in Africa; they merely display it differently, even while in their own perceptions they are terribly universalistic. But the Yoruba in fact can transform their own group identity as a consequence of modernization to the same plane as the English or French. What happens, then, with modernization is that the essence of collective identities changes, while the social boundaries between groups are maintained. The displacement of currently non-modernized ethnic identities is not
inherent in the modernization process; their transformation is.

Further, modernization not only allows a redefinition of the nature of group identities, but it creates new ethnic elites which provide various forms of both affective and instrumental leadership to the group, essential for all forms of group mobilization and assertiveness. In addition, the educational and occupational mobility which occurs during modernization allows a social class transformation, the emergence of a sizable group of individuals who become a ready market and create a demand for more contemporary forms in their ancestral group's culture. The modernization process also brings individuals of different groups into increased levels of social interaction. Contrary to early prejudice theorists, an increase in interethnic contact does not lead inherently to greater tolerance; it may instead exacerbate the sense of group differences, thereby heighten one's own sense of ethnicity.

And in a multi-ethnic society the potential for conflicts over resources is great. In the Soviet Union one is reminded of the presence of the Russians in historically non-Russian areas, and the competition this causes when the Russians occupy positions which the natives themselves covet, and increasingly so due to the class transformations which ensue from modernization. A disproportionate Russian urban presence in these instances can also easily lead to conflict with the natives over cultural production, general language usage, etc. Lastly, modernization can, at the psychological level, lead to feelings of alienation and a sense of rootlessness, to a general identity crisis, one consequence of which may be a quest for affective ties, and often this seems to mean ethnicity.

In summary, it may be said that Soviet society made noteworthy strides in
modernization during the 1960s, and is now suffering the consequences.

(3) The Ideology of Nationalism.

We live in a time when political nationalism is a powerful force. This ideology hit most of Europe already in the latter half of the 19th century, including Russia proper and the major Western non-Russian nationalities. It was the basis for the consolidation of most European states, and the decolonialization of the Western empires in the 20th century. The idea of national self-determination, the belief that people have inherent rights to be sovereign, have been written into major international agreements and covenants, including the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet Union has often championed this principle when it could be used to needle the Western countries.

Given the ethnically based dissatisfaction which exists in the Soviet Union, the fact that all of the major as well many minor nationalities have been exposed to the ideology of political nationalism, and that three of the Soviet nationalities—the Baltic ones—have a very recent history of sovereignty, it should not be surprising at all that this basis of appeal is used as a primary one for legitimizing nationality objectives. Furthermore, the Soviet Constitution conveniently allows voluntary secession, not to mention all types of domestic ethnic rights. The Helsinki Final Act reaffirmed these rights as well. Hence, most nationality demands can be legitimized on the basis of the country's fundamental law and a recent international agreement it signed. We might keep in mind that not all assertive nationality groups are "separatists"—witness the Jews, Crimean Tatars and the Volga Germans, or even the Georgians and Armenians, for whom this is a minor strain in demands. The Ukrainians and the Balts
are the only ones who extensively demand sovereignty. But even here two points are noteworthy. First, as the Estonians and Latvians emphasize emphatically, sovereignty is more pursued as a means to national survival than an end in itself. In this sense, the separatist tendencies must be seen more a product of the Soviet system, a product of its nationality repression, than of fervent nationalism among the non-Russians per se. And second, the separatism evident in samizdat documents does not indicate an opposition to socialism, but to the repression of individual and group rights and to the dangers of Russification which the Soviet system generates for the non-Russians.

(4) The Emblematic Decade.

There are events in the histories of all individuals, social groups, nations and states, which are more important than others. The commemoration of special events draws unusual public attention not only to the specific event but to its antithesis and cognate issues as well. The observations and celebrations are saturated with emotions. The decade beginning in 1967 was unusually replete with such special dates and events, both from the viewpoint of the state (and its operator, the Communist Party) and of its nationalities. On one side of the ledger, there was the 50th anniversary of the Revolution, of the creation of Soviet Russia, the formulation of its Constitution, and so on. There was also the centennial of Lenin, the quarter century marking victory in the Great Patriotic War. The Party organized innumerable celebrations, and speeches virtually without limit were made, the rollers on presses were hot from churning out appro-
propriate articles, pamphlets and books, and the media bombarded the citizens with relevant information.

The Party, naturally, found cause to pronounce the righteousness of its past and present visions and courses of action. The leaders promulgated visions of finally achieving a Communist society, naturally under the prudent Party's guiding hand. There was no question about the message or its medium. But the impact on the nationality scene was different. Talk of the future society conjured visions of a new wave of overt Russification; the human rightists looked in vein for justice and the actual implementation of the visions, past, present and future. As it was, many of these events had a connotation to the nationalities which was very different from that which it had for the Party. Consider, for example, that in the Baltic this was the period of the: centennial of ethnically very important song festivals; the 50th anniversary of sovereignty, the 30th year of the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which had divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence and of the brutal deportations of the 1940-1949 years. These events could not be publicly observed. But they were evidently observed—flowers were placed at grave-sites and even at sites were the prewar statues and markers commemorating these events had been; unofficial rallies were held; prewar flags appeared; national songs were sung, etc. In Armenia the slaughter at the hands of the Turks was again evoked, Jews remembered the holocaust.

Indeed, then, the end of the 1960s and the 1970s were an unusual period. It was a time when many societal and global processes, and emotion-laden issues converged. One could argue that these events themselves made the nationality scene in the Soviet Union unusually volatile during the
1970s. But it would appear that although the 1970s was a burst-period in nationality assertiveness, it also heralded the advent of a period of increased unrest. The global ideological trends, the intricate consequences of modernization, the potentially explosive impact of demographic developments in Central Asia, the coincidence of human rights violations with nationality, and the demographic trends and systemic contradictions and dilemmas noted in this chapter appear sufficient to insure that the nationality cauldron will continue boiling vigorously in the USSR. Andrei Amalrik in 1969 was perhaps very bold when he asserted in WILL THE SOVIET UNION SURVIVE UNTIL 1984?, that the Soviet Union, under strong external pressure, would probably come apart at the seams marked off by nationality. When Helene Carrere D'Encausse advanced a similar type of thesis a decade later in her L'EMPIRE ECLATE. LA REVOLTE DES NATIONS EN U.R.S.S., it was still bold, but it could at least be more accurately substantiated on the basis of what was happening in Soviet society. But the bottom line is simple—at the root of the Soviet nationality problems are not the nationalities but, rather, the Soviet system itself.

In ending this chapter, we should reemphasize that nationality dissent is only one type of dissent in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in the 1970s the demand for human rights—a response to general repression in the society—and for nationality rights—a response to violated constitutional guarantees to groups—have advanced hand in hand. The linkage is present in the Democratic Movement from the outset, in the mid- and late-1960s, and it is further reenforced and conceptually refined after the Helsinki Final Act. Before moving onto the Final Act, which had a rather serious impact on the Soviet nationality question, we need to review the development of general dissent.
Executive Summary

Chapter 3

SOVIET DISSENT

This chapter looks at the Helsinki Watch Committees which emerged in the Soviet Union as a result of the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in terms of the historical context and evolution of dissent there. The new small wave of emigrés from the USSR in the late 1960s and 1970s attested that dissent had existed even under Stalin, although little was known about it in the West. However, as one result of Khrushchev's destalinization moves after 1956, dissent became more public. By the mid-1960s it was so strong that the regime began cracking down, which only bred more dissent and gained publicity for it.

By the late 1960s—with 1968 a landmark year—a rather extensive apparatus of dissent had surfaced. It may have been helped by the disillusionment of neo-Leninist system reformers after the Czechoslovakian affair. The nationalities also became restive. But the mainstream of dissent was involved with general human rights. The Helsinki Final Act in 1975 intensified the dissent trend further by giving it international legitimation and visibility. But the 1970s also saw the emergence of a sizeable nationality-based dissent movement. The two channels of dissent were in many respects connected. It is unclear what the future trends and implications of dissent are. Although dissent is concentrated among the various scientific and intellectual elites, it is widely dispersed geographically and cuts noticeably across every sector of social differentiation in the population, includes a wide array of issues, and has inflicted the Party itself. The Party leadership has cracked down increasingly without being able to eliminate all dissent.
CHAPTER 3

SOVIET DISSENT

The Soviet Union is a great power. It also has a sizable, internationally recognized number of dissenters, including the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize winner Academician Andrei A. Sakharov. The dissenters show a great degree of continuity, an even greater extent of variety, and have at last exhibited signs of being able to tap more than one root of mass discontent. Long terms in labor camps have not shaken their resolve to criticize the regime, have only strengthened them in their contumacy to demand changes. So long as the ruling institutions—-the Party, the Army, the KGB, and the State Bureaucracy—are not yet affected in a major way, the Government may consider dissent a less than critical problem. In any real emergency, there are also the time-tested recipies of Stalin who succeeded in suppressing dissent for more than a decade (from the early 1930's to the end of World War II). Nevertheless, there are signs that the regime is becoming increasingly nervous in dealing with dissenters. Well it might: the gadflies keep multiplying, and they are remarkably persistent.

(a) Some Opposition Groupings under Stalin

Dissent arises when the legitimacy of the regime is called in question by a considerable number of responsible persons (both members of the elite and public spirited citizens) and when the regime either cannot or will not silence them by means of terror. From its very establishment,
the legitimacy of Soviet power had been questioned by workers, peasants, soldiers (admittedly a minority of the latter, but sizable nonetheless, from the "Whites" in the Civil War to the "Reds" at Kronstadt), by intellectuals and non-intellectual bourgeois and last, but not least, by autonomy or independence-minded nationalities. Even among the supporters of a Soviet order there was opposition to Lenin and even greater opposition to his unwelcome but also "undisplaceable" successor Stalin. In the early 1930's Stalin succeeded, however, in terrorizing the opposition into silence.

It was the initial Soviet defeats in the Second World War which raised the question of legitimacy again, in a more acute form. The regime based its title to rule on Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Yet the Party itself seemed to be infested with enemies, recently had to undergo a bloody purge to become healthy again. Stalin's policies of break-neck industrialization, collectivization and the Great Terror sapped the will of large sections of the Soviet population to resist the onslaught of the Nazi armed forces. The Soviet regime was saved by Hitler's maniacally brutal occupation policies and by American Lend-Lease. Many a Soviet citizen wondered whether the real victor in World War II was the Soviet Union or the Western democracies. Tightening the totalitarian screws, as Stalin did in 1946, was apt to be interpreted as a sign of weakness, whereas Stalin's fulsome tribute to the Russian people in May 1945 caused resentment among the non-Russians. It was remarkable indeed that after the Soviet Union had won the Great Patriotic War (as World War II has been dubbed by official Soviet
historians) and while the secret police was still working with unflagging zeal some students dared to engage in secret opposition circles, in what Rudolf L. Tökés has called "subversive militant" activity.\(^5\)

Basing himself in the memoirs of Brigitte Gerland, an East German Communist, who spent eight years in Stalin's concentration camps, until she was finally released by Khrushchev and Malenkov in December 1953, George Saunders draws attention to the neo-Leninist, Trotskyite underground study circle called Istinny Trud Lenina (Lenin's True Work) that even issued a manifesto in 1948. It was started by a dozen Moscow University students, in a few months the Istinny Trud Lenina "counted hundreds of adherents and had adherents not only in Moscow but also in the Universities of Leningrad, Kiev and Odessa."\(^6\) Another neo-Leninist grouping about which little is known was the underground youth organization called "Lenin Group." It was discovered and smashed by the secret police in 1947.\(^7\) These groups are of double interest for us: they hark back to the program of the Left Opposition of the 1920's even though all the prominent members of that Opposition had been physically destroyed and the young neo-Leninists and Trotskyites of the 1940's had to start from documentary evidence; and secondly, in the fall of 1963 a similar study group composed of adults was set up in the Pacific Maritime Province under the name "Union of Struggle for the Revival of Leninism." The group is described by Saunders as follows:

The group studied Lenin's State and Revolution. Some of the leaflets they distributed were about the repression of mass protests in Tbilisi, Novocherkassk, and Temir Tau. One of the leaflets was entitled "Why There is No Bread."\(^8\)
The founder of the 1963 "Union of Struggle for the Revival of Leninism" was Major-General Petr Grigorenko (Petro Hryhorenko) who had been an assistant professor at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow in the late 1940's and may easily have heard of the existence of the Istinny Trud Lenina group. Later Grigorenko became a founding member of both the Moscow and the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Committees.

In the late 1940's there were also secret non-Marxist, nationalist circles in some of the Soviet republics. Miraculously two former members of such study groups have survived and have later entered the Helsinki Watch Groups. The Ukrainian Petro Sichko was tried in 1947 for starting at the West Ukrainian Chernivtsi University an underground student group, a branch of the Organization for the Liberation of Ukraine. He received the death penalty but his sentence was commuted to 25 years hard labor. The Armenian Ambartsum Khlgatyan, as a student, helped to organize the liberal Armenian Democratic Union. To escape arrest, he unsuccessfully tried to cross the boundary in 1949. He was helped by the fact that in 1949 the death penalty was temporarily abolished. Consideration of the objectives and ideologies of the Lithuanian and West Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas is beyond the scope of the work: they do not seem to have had a direct impact upon the Helsinki movement.

To sum up, surprising as it may seem given the increased power of the USSR at the end of the war and the energetic work of the Soviet security services, in the last eight years of his life Stalin was not able to stamp out dissent as he had done in the 1930's. Some of the
graduates of Stalinist concentration camps have resumed their dissent later under Brezhnev in the framework of the Helsinki Groups.\textsuperscript{12}

(b) \textbf{Dissent under Khrushchev}

Stalin died under somewhat mysterious circumstances March 5, 1953. For the dissenters it was in the nick of time: clouds had been gathering along the horizon ever since the fall of 1952 threatening another purge, this time with distinct anti-Semitic overtones. The uncovering of the notorious doctors' plot in January 1953 had a double purpose: to discredit Beria and his men and to fan popular resentment against the Jews. Stalin's death for the liberal minded Soviet intelligentsia was like an escape from a living nightmare. Furthermore, it appeared that the expectations for a change in the regime which had been held since the middle of World War II and then so cruelly disappointed in 1946, would finally be fulfilled. In the nationality field, under Beria's prodding, the new Party Presidium (ex-Politburo) adopted a major decision on June 12, 1953, repudiating the excessively centralist and Russifying policy of Stalin's and calling for appointment of indigenous Communists to the highest offices in the republics (as First Central Committee Secretary, Prime Minister of the Republican Governments, and similar).\textsuperscript{13}

The system appears to have easily weathered the arrest and subsequent trial and execution of Beria and the shunting aside of Malenkov. But Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech really shook the regime to its depths: for the first time a high ranking Party leader implicitly questioned the legitimacy of Soviet rule. Abraham Rothberg is correct in noting:
In great measure, de-Stalinization was undertaken for reasons of state, but among the motives was also an almost visceral revulsion against Stalin's terror and personality, a revulsion rooted in the fear and degradation under which even the highest leadership had lived during the Stalin era, as well as, in some measure, a moral recoil from the frightful crimes of the Stalinist dictatorship.

With his "secret speech" Khrushchev set in motion forces--political, social, juridical, cultural--which he could neither measure nor control. The forces continued to broaden and deepen and intensify beyond his intentions or those of the leadership who shared his views, not to speak of those of a more conservative cast of mind. For, once you deposited an icon, where did you stop the iconoclasm? And how? 14

Literary and artistic dissidence as such is beyond our scope, though it may be a sensitive barometer of the eruption of more pointed political dissent. 15 When the Hungarian rebellion was bloodily suppressed in November 1956, students at Moscow University, in Leningrad, in other major Soviet cities, including in Central Asia, began to ask sharp questions. The questioning spread even to the Komsomol of the Moscow army garrison. Between one-fourth and one-third of the student body is reported to have shown open political discontent in 1956. The students were "sometimes sympathetic, sometimes uncomprehending, but rarely hostile." 16 A clandestine group of ten to fifteen graduate students and young research workers in history at Moscow University, led by students Krasnopevtsev and Rendel printed and distributed leaflets calling for Soviet democracy and attacking Khrushchev personally. They were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms in mid-1957. 17 At Leningrad, another clandestine group in 1956-57 put out the journal Kolokol. 18 There have
been reports that the relatively well-documented mass demonstration against sharply increased meat and dairy products prices, which took place in Novocherkassk in June 1962 and which was suppressed with heavy casualties, may have been a badly organized outgrowth of the wave of protest strikes in the Donbas region. A planned coordinated demonstration supposedly instigated by students and intellectuals and abetted by a few Ukrainian nationalists, did not take place because of the tumult over drastic price increases.\textsuperscript{19}

In the nationality field the two greatest challenges to the regime appear to have been the mass demonstrations in Georgia in March 1956 in protest against Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin, which were suppressed with some 500 young people killed and wounded,\textsuperscript{20} and the challenge over economic policies in Latvia: twenty-eight high ranking Party and Government officials, headed by Latvian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Latvia E. Berklavs, were more or less discreetly removed from office.\textsuperscript{21} In the Ukraine, in 1960-61 several Ukrainian lawyers tried to organize the Union of Peasants and Workers of the Ukraine, which was to agitate for a referendum on whether or not the Ukraine was to secede from the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{22} On the very borderline of dissent was an officially sponsored five-day conference on the use and culture of the Ukrainian language in Kiev, February 11-15, 1963, which was attended by more than one thousand Ukrainian writers, linguists, journalists and teachers. Speakers at the conference apparently exceeded their prescribed limits when they condemned the officially inspired tendency to regard Russian as the second
native language (this had not been explicitly endorsed in the 1961 Party program, but followed its assimilationist spirit) and demanded that Ukrainian be widely used as language of instruction in all schools in the Ukrainian SSR and in those in other republics, where there were substantial Ukrainian minorities. A very interesting aspect of the conference was that when the Soviet press censored out any references to those bold demands, some Ukrainians managed to spread news of the Conference's proceedings in a Ukrainian-language newspaper published in Poland—the first and to our knowledge the only successful attempt to circumvent Soviet censorship by publishing sensitive materials in a neighboring Communist country, where the policy was then more liberal. It is perhaps a unique example of Communist tamizdat.

Khrushchev suppressed the mass demonstrations by force, as was to be expected. But toward non-violent individual or group-dissent Khrushchev does not appear to have followed any coherent policy: the reaction was apt to be ad hoc, as were many other policies of Khrushchev in foreign affairs or economics. Most importantly, it can be agreed that when it suited political tactical goals, Khrushchev would encourage selected dissidents. Thus Yevtushenko was allowed to print his poem "Stalin's Heirs" in Pravda itself and Solzhenitsyn, with Khrushchev's consent, published One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich in Novy Mir, both in 1962 when Khrushchev was battling Stalinists. For cynical political reasons Khrushchev himself helped to legitimate political dissent in the Soviet Union, starting with his anti-Stalin speech in 1956 and continuing with his flirtation with Yevtushenko in 1962.
To sum up, under Khrushchev dissent became widespread especially after his anti-Stalin speech of February 1956, and on occasion—as in Tbilisi and Novocherkassk—it would burst forth in a mass demonstration. But the dissent was not well organized, there do not appear to have been any strong ties among the clandestine groups, and nationality questions were not very pronounced, except possibly in Georgia, Latvia and the Ukraine. Paradoxically, Khrushchev may have provoked, encouraged and legitimized some of the dissent himself.

(c) Brezhnev's Decision to Clamp Down on Dissent

Brezhnev's deliberate decision to put a firm lid on Soviet dissent once and forever, which must have been taken in the summer of 1965, resulted in another paradox: dissent became even more widespread and it also became open. With only a touch of exaggeration Rudolf L. Tököcs speaks of the early Brezhnev years 1965-71 as the period of a "nationwide [dissent] movement."26

In the late summer of 1965 the KGB arrested a score of Ukrainian nationalist intellectuals who had been critical of the Russification policy in the Ukraine, which had been instituted in Khrushchev's last years and continued under Brezhnev. In rejoinder, in December 1965 the Ukrainian literary critic Ivan Dzyuba wrote an—initially—confidential letter of protest to the then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine Petro Shelest and then Ukrainian SSR Prime Minister Volodymyr Shcherbitsky, to which he attached a lengthy treatise on Internationalism or Russification? The burden of his well-reasoned
argument is that the current nationality policy in the Ukraine had more in common with the policies of the Russian Tsars than with the more flexible and possibly more liberal policy of Lenin. In Western public opinion the arrests of Ukrainian dissidents were soon overshadowed by the arrests (in September 1965) and trial (in February 1966) of two Soviet Russian writers: Andrei Sinyavsky (pseudonym: Abram Tertz) and Yuli Daniel (pseudonym: Nikolai Arzhak). Sinyavsky is Russian, Daniel is Jewish. For the first time in Soviet history two writers were tried for what they had written—and published abroad. Despite unfavorable reaction in the world, including criticism from West European Communists, Sinyavsky was sentenced to seven years of labor camp, Daniel to five.

Correctly interpreting the arrests in Moscow as a sign that Brezhnev was turning to neo-Stalinist policies at home, writers in Leningrad and in Moscow sent two petitions to Brezhnev requesting that the convicted writers’ sentences be reduced. A group of eminent public figures including physicists Igor Tamm, Pyotr Kapitsa and Andrei Sakharov sent a third petition to Brezhnev a month before the convening of the first Party Congress after Khrushchev in which they warned against a rehabilitation of Stalin.

The trials of Russian the Ukrainian dissidents which took place in Moscow and all over the Ukraine in the winter and spring of 1966 provoked a chain reaction of protests. Aleksander Ginzburg who compiled a "White Book" on the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, which was circulating in samizdat and Yuri Galanskov who continued to distribute his samizdat journal
Phoenix in January 1968 were sentenced to five and seven years at hard labor.\textsuperscript{29} Those and similar sentences were the subject of a protest by twelve Soviet dissidents to the conference of sixty-six Communist parties meeting at Budapest in February 1968.\textsuperscript{30} In August 1968 Pavel Litvinov, in turn, compiled materials on the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial and he, too, was punished with five years of exile.\textsuperscript{31} The Ukrainian trials produced the so-called Chornovil Papers, for which its compiler Viacheslav Chornovil drew a three year prison sentence (of which he served eighteen months, being freed under a general amnesty).\textsuperscript{32} Even more importantly, the Ginzburg-Galanskov and Ukrainian dissidents' trials provoked a number of signed petitions and protests: the "Petition of 31," "The Protest of 12," "The Protest of 52 Scholars and Professionals," the "Petition of 170," etc., in the Ginzburg-Galanskov case,\textsuperscript{33} and the "Letter of the 139" in the Ukrainian case.\textsuperscript{34} At least in the beginning, Brezhnev's decision to stamp out dissent had backfired.

\textbf{(d) The Variety of Dissent under Brezhnev}

For the purposes of this study it will suffice to divide the various dissent groupings in the Soviet Union into four broad categories: the Marxist anti-Stalinist Left, the Liberal Democratic Center, the Nationalist and/or Religious Right, and the Workers' Opposition, which might perhaps call for a category of its own since it addresses itself primarily to economic and social concerns of the workers.\textsuperscript{35} (A fifth category, the opposition of writers and artists qua authors is beyond the scope of this work).
On the Marxist Left there were such underground publications as Russkoe Slovo (Russian Word) in July 1966, Tetradi Sotsial-Demokratii (Notebooks of Social Democracy), of 1964-65, and the second Kolokol, also of 1964-65, published by the Union of the Communards. Foremost among the Marxist Left dissenters were the seventy-two-year-old (in 1968) Russian writer Aleksei Kosterin, the sixty-four-year-old scientist Sergei Pisarev, former Major-General of the Red Army Petr Grigorenko [Petro Hryhorenko], also in his sixties, and two younger persons: the theoretical physicist Valery Pavlinchuk and former school teacher and former collective farm chairman of Polish stock but born and educated in Latvia Ivan Yakhimovich. Very well known was also the historian Petr Yakir. A younger Marxist dissident in the Ukraine was mathematician Leonid Plyushch. Very well known in the West, but somewhat distrusted by some dissidents was the Marxist historian Roy Medvedev: he does appear to be the dissident who stands closest to the regime.

The Marxist Left were aghast at the violation of civil rights of such publicists as Ginzburg and Galanskov and of the national rights of the Crimean Tatars and others, they had high hopes that "socialism with a human face" would triumph under Dubček in Czechoslovakia. It must be emphasized that by the early 1970's the Marxist Left, with the exception of Roy Medvedev, effectively merged with the Liberal Democratic Center on the issue of human and national rights. General Hryhorenko told one of the authors that when he and his Left associates would attend a meeting of the Democrats the question was raised "And what be the views on this of our Communist fraction?", but this was done in a friendly bantering...
tone, as if to emphasize that now they were all united in the defense of human rights.  

The liberal Democratic Center was at first not organized: following the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial the centrists would predominantly engage in non-public protest. "Nonpublic protest would be closer to the established mores of the dominant political culture." Another spate of non-public protests followed the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial of January 1968. But when the regime did not explicitly answer all those initially non-public petitions (eventually, however, they would be made public through samizdat) and began to repress the signatories anyway (they were dismissed from work, severely reprimanded, etc.), the dissenters would go public. It was the shocking Ginzburg-Galanskov trial which galvanized the democratic dissenters into increasingly public action. In the wake of that trial appeared the first number of the Chronicle of Current Events, the famous organ of the Liberal Democratic Center. (The Chronicle was temporarily suppressed in October of 1972, after publishing 27 issues. It resumed its publication in May 1974, has been publishing information steadily ever since.) George Saunders has aptly characterized the significance of the emergence of the Chronicle:

The Chronicle was the clearest expression of the fact that the trial had brought a general ferment to a head. Scattered individuals and groups fighting for democratic rights in different parts of the country now began to communicate with and defend one another, to grope toward more organized efforts.

The journal was made more credible by scrupulous attention to the facts and a moderate, unemotional style. It fulfilled "the dual function of
alliance building among the dissident intellectuals and public protest aimed at additional audiences."  

The single most important member of the Liberal Democratic Center is Academician Andrei Sakharov. His outlook was already remarkably broad when he wrote his 1968 memorandum, his ideas on some topics (such as the nationality question have further evolved over time toward greater sympathy for national self-determination via referenda). In essence Sakharov appears as an energetic champion of civilized human and national rights, taking the rights guaranteed in the USSR Constitution as a point of departure, but by no means the end goal. Together with two other physicists, Dr. Andrei Tverdokhlebov and Dr. Valery Chalidze, Academician Sakharov on November 4, 1970, established the (Moscow) Human Rights Committee, also known as the "Sakharov Committee," the only human rights organization which Sakharov joined directly. The Moscow Human Rights Committee (HRC) was consciously modelled on similar "non-governmental" human rights organizations in Western countries. In June 1971 the HRC became affiliated with the International League for the Rights of Man in New York and in August 1971 with the International Institute on Human Rights in Strasbourg. Sakharov has had considerable difficulty in keeping the membership of the Moscow HRC intact: one of its founder members, Dr. Chalidze was deprived of Soviet citizenship while on a lecture tour in the United States in December 1972. Dr. Tverdokhlebov from 1973 on has chosen to work through the Soviet Chapter of Amnesty International which was established by October 1973, with him as secretary, Valery F. Turchin as chairman, and Sergei Kovalev as a founding member (Turchin and
especially Kovalev are very close to Sakharov, though). In the Moscow HRC by 1978 the only two active members left were Sakharov himself and mathematician Igor Shafarevich (the latter has been concerned about violations of religious rights, stands close to the circle around Aleksander Solzhenitsyn).47

Sakharov’s Moscow HRC was actually not the first human rights organization in the Soviet Union. That credit goes to the Initiative Group for Defense of Human Rights in the USSR. The Initiative Group (IG) was founded in Moscow in May 1969, with fifteen members including Petr Yakir (Marxist Left), Scientists S. Kovalev and G. Podyapolsky (Liberal Democratic Center, close to Sakharov) and A. Levitin-Krasnov, a publicist from the Religious Right. Besides being the first human rights group it is remarkable in three additional respects. First, either IG members or their associates have been involved in the publication of the Chronicle of Current Events. In any case, Petr Yakir and V. Krasin were arrested in June 1972 and confessed their role in publishing The Chronicle at a show trial in August 1973. This eliminated the two from any future leadership role in the dissent movement. Second, the IG from its very inception has had a geographically and ethnically broader membership than the later Moscow HRC. Among the IG’s founder members were: the Armenian-born engineer G. Altunyan, from Kharkov, Ukraine; the Ukrainian mathematician Leonid Plyushch from Kiev, Ukraine; and the Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa D. Dzhemilev, from Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Its first appeal was further supported by physician Z. Asanova (from Begovat, the Uzbek Republic, presumably a Crimean Tatar), R. Dzhemilev (from the Krasnodar
region, probably a Crimean Tatar, too), as many as eight more engineers from Kharkov, who judging by their names, were Jewish, Russian and Ukrainian, and by journalist Viacheslav Chornovil, a moderate Ukrainian nationalist then living in Lviv.48 Furthermore, in 1974 a parallel IG was established in Georgia, with Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Merab Kostava, and Victor Rtskhiladze and unnamed others as founding members.49 Thirdly, the Soviet IG of May 1969 deliberately appealed to the UN Human Rights Commission—like the Moscow HRC it looked outward for support, but less toward Western organizations as such than toward the more neutral UN, unlike the HRC it sought to broaden its membership among non-Russians. For all its accomplishments or rather because of them, the IG, too, has had a membership problem: selective arrests and emigration permits and the death of Podyapolsky in 1976 by 1978 reduced it to two active members, the linguist Tatiana Khodorovich and the mathematician Tatiana Velikanova.50

Still in the Liberal Democratic Center we find an unusual organization with great ambitions, not to say pretensions: the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union or DDSS in Russian abbreviation. The anonymous DDSS in 1969 published a detailed Program remarkable for its pro-Western democratic orientation and for its emphasis upon the decolonization of the Soviet Empire by means of popular UN supervised referenda on secession. The authors would sign the DDSS documents as "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine and Baltic States" or would use pseudonyms; thus, e.g., a certain K. Volny claimed that the DDSS had an active membership or even leadership of 20,000, which was highly unlikely, to put it mildly.51 The DDSS also launched a major publication program.
According to Boiter, in December 1974 and early January 1975 the KGB succeeded in pricking the DDSS bubble: its five most active members appear to have been all residents of the Estonian capital Tallinn, four engineers and one medical doctor by profession, viz., Sergei Soldatov, Kaliu Myattick, Matti Kiirenel, Arvo Varato and Artem Juskevich. Unfortunately, Boiter has not disclosed the nationality of the five; Soldatov's name sounds Russian; Myattick, Kiirenel and Varato are apparently Estonians; and Juskevich could be a Ukrainian, Bielorussian or possibly even a Lithuanian. During the trial it was revealed that in 1970 the DDSS had begun "to issue documents and journals in Estonian, under the imprimatur of an organization called the 'Estonian Democratic Movement' . . . The DDSS and EDL [Estonian initials for Estonian Democratic Movement] were thereby shown to have a common origin and a parallel complement of activists from the technical intelligentsia as early as 1968 . . .

The DDSS was apparently seen as a potential all-Union organization, and the EDL as constituting one of its first component parts."52 Furthermore, it is even more interesting that in the labor camp Soldatov has continued his activity as "ideological secretary" of the EDL and has been endorsed not only by DDSS members M. Heifets and G. Ushakov, from Leningrad, and A. Bolonkin, from Moscow, but also by such known dissidents as Paruir Airikyan, the Secretary of the Armenian National United Party (ANOP or NOP); Vladimir Osipov, the editor of the Russian nationalist journal *Veche*, and exiled Ukrainian nationalist and poet Vasyl Stus, who, incidentally, in the fall of 1979 joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Group.53
Another group of the Liberal Democratic Center, the Working Commission to Investigate Misuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, established January 5, 1977, is too specialized to be considered here. 54

On the right of the Liberal Democratic Center we find Aleksander Solzhenitsyn who has won a Nobel Prize for Literature for his crushing indictment of Stalinist oppression. As far as his positive political views are concerned they are those of a Russian patriot and neo-Slavophile, tinged with mysticism in the tradition of Lev Tolstoy. 55 However critical one may be of Solzhenitsyn's political views, as a Christian and humanitarian he is unchallenged and unchallengeable. After being expelled from the Soviet Union in February 1974, from his considerable royalties Aleksander Solzhenitsyn set up what has later been named "Russian Public Fund to Aid Political Prisoners (and their families) in the USSR," and which is popularly known as the "Solzhenitsyn Fund." Under its administrators Aleksander Ginzburg and (after his arrest in February 1977) Tatiana Khodorovich and Malva Landa it has provided support to political prisoners irrespective of nationality and the nature of the formal indictment. 56

Slightly to the right of the Democrats stands the brilliant historian and publicist Andrei Amalrik, a disillusioned Russian patriot who is well aware of the Democrats' weakness but unlike Solzhenitsyn shudders when he delves into the psyche of the Russian muzhik (peasant). In 19th century terms, Amalrik would be called a Westerner. 57
The group around Vladimir Osipov and his journal *Veche* (The Common Council) which started appearing in January 1971 stand much further to the right. They have tried to restore a sense of pride in Russianness, in Russian patriotism. In the opinion of some critics, *Veche* may have gone rather far in justifying Russian imperial exploits. By the end of 1974 the journal *Veche* was suppressed, after publishing ten thick issues.\(^{58}\) The *Veche* group was preceded by a somewhat more religiously tinged small Russian underground patriotic organization on the right, which was "directed to the overthrow of the dictatorship of the Communist oligarchy," the *Vserossiiskii Sotsial'no Khristianskii Soiuz Osvobodezhdeniiia Naroda* (VSKhSON) or All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People, which was established in 1964 and suppressed by the KGB in 1967.\(^{59}\)

Finally in our survey of the Russian nationalist right we must say a few words about the extremists, the "Ultras," the author (or authors) of the anonymous pamphlet *The Nation Speaks* (*Slovo natsii*) and, specifically, about Gennadii Shimanov. *The Nation Speaks* is a sharp rejoinder to the program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, it attacks their orientation toward a Western type democracy and even more it ridicules any prospect of the break-up of the Soviet Union into independent states. It carries definite Fascist overtones.\(^{60}\) Gennadii Shimanov is equally blunt in rejecting democracy and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Empire:

> In Russia there has been too much suffering and God will not permit it to be resolved in the comical and miserable democratic nothing. There must be no Western democracy among us.\(^{61}\)
The Soviet Union is not a mechanical conglomeration of nations of different kinds . . . but a MYSTICAL ORGANISM, composed of nations mutually supplementing each other and making up, under the leadership of the Russian people, a LITTLE MANKIND--the beginning and the spiritual detonator for the great mankind.62

Polemical though he is, Alexander Yanov may be right in expressing his fear that the "extremes touch" or as he puts it, "that the new Russian nationalist movement which began in the mid-1960's in the USSR might repeat the paradox of the last century--that is, it could pass from a mortal confrontation with the regime to a fraternal union with it."63

Meanwhile, as a reaction to the increasingly centralizing and Russifying tendency in official government policy since the late 1950's and possibly also a reaction against the new Russian nationalism in samizdat, several nationalities developed a rather robust samizdat of their own. Some of the issues raised in non-Russian samizdat will be commented on in connection with our analysis of the Helsinki groups in Chapter 5, below. But a quick overview with a few illustrations is in order here.

The champions in the volume and periodicity of samizdat publications are the Balts, especially the Lithuanians. Through 1977, thirty issues of the Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church had been published: the first issue appeared on March 19, 1972.64 In January 1972, 17,054 (!) Lithuanian Catholics signed a petition to Brezhnev protesting against official persecution of their Church.65 The Catholic Church being the national church of the Lithuanians, it is very difficult to distinguish
between the Lithuanian religious and the Lithuanian national movement. Since October 1975, however, a second Lithuanian _samizdat_ periodical _Aušra_ (The Dawn) has been published— it is secular in orientation. The Latvians have weighed in with an unusually well-informed and trenchant "Letter of Seventeen Latvian Communist Leaders," of July-August 1971, which, by the way, is superior to the earlier international appeal of "Ukrainian Communists," of December 1964. Estonians produced among other things two well-reasoned memoranda addressed to the UN General Assembly and UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, calling for the restoration of an independent Estonian state with UN help. A memorandum of a National People's Front in Lithuania, dated June 1974, denounced Soviet rule as colonial, and it demanded sovereignty. This, as well as other Baltic secular documents proposed the achievement of sovereignty through a United Nations supervised plebiscite. One of the important trends of the latter half of the 1970's was the issuance of joint Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian memoranda, implying an emergent cooperation between various Baltic activists, dissidents, and organizations. Issues relevant to Estonia and Latvia have also been raised by the Lithuanian Helsinki Group.

Remarkable is also the voluminous output of the _samizdat_ of the Crimean Tatars, the overwhelming majority of whom want to be allowed to return to their native Crimea, and of the Soviet Jews whose attitudes are split: a number of Soviet Jews would like to assimilate and protest against discrimination and other official and unofficial barriers, another part have become so alienated with Soviet policy and popular anti-Semitism that they want to emigrate to Israel or to the West.
The Ukrainian dissenters, in addition to Ivan Dzyuba's masterpiece, which he himself, alas, repudiated under strong official pressure, November 9, 1973, protested Russification and administrative centralization in eight issues of the Ukrains'kyi visnyk (Ukrainian Herald), published from January 1970 through the "spring" of 1974. Of double interest is the following excerpt from the *Ukrainian Herald* No. 5. First of all, it presents the attitude of influential circles in the Ukrainian dissident movement towards the Moscow dissidents. Secondly, this excerpt has come to us through a reprint in *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 22 (the *Ukrainian Herald* No. 5 has not been received in the West so far):

The Ukrainian reader has welcomed the appearance of the *Chronicle*. It is notable for its objectivity, extensive coverage, and relative accuracy of information, providing a rounded picture of the political trials unknown to the majority of people in the USSR.

However, some have raised their voices to point out, without denying the importance of the *Chronicle*, that it has rather unilaterally and pretentiously assumed the stance of a supranational or all-union journal, when in fact it is the product of Russian (and possibly, in part, Jewish) circles. It has also been noted that the sparse informational reports from the republics are worked in as though they were supplementary to the quite extensive description of events in Russia, mostly Moscow--this in and of itself creating a false impression of the situation in the USSR.

It is very hard to obtain information on the attitude toward the national question held by the various underground groups, organizations, and "parties" that have arisen in recent years in Russia... The impression obtained is that the participants in these groups, while aiming at very radical changes in many spheres of social life, wished--to one degree or another--to preserve the status quo on the national question.

Along with organizations and groups that raise the question of democratic transformations in the USSR, others have appeared that criticize the government and the "liberals" from reactionary, openly chauvinist positions, seeking even a
formal liquidation of the USSR and the creation of a military-democratic unitary state "of all the Russias."
Let us quote the brief description of one such document of Russian samizdat given by the Chronicle in its issue No. 17, "Message to the Nation."72

On balance it would seem that the Ukrainian criticism of the Chronicle is exaggerated: verifiable material from Moscow and Leningrad was more easily available in Moscow than reports from the Ukraine and Central Asia, e.g. This may have accounted for a somewhat unbalanced presentation, not any alleged conscious desire to use non-Russian material only as filler. At the same time it has to be admitted that no systematic efforts were made by the Moscow groups, even the IG, to reach out to the non-Russian republics. It also stands to reason that the emergence of the anonymous The Nation Speaks group was, though not entirely unexpected, still very shocking: Fascism apparently did not disappear with the execution of Mussolini and the suicide of Hitler. In any case, with a superb sense of historic responsibility the Chronicle reprinted the sharp Ukrainian critique and thereby may have saved it from oblivion.

The Georgian political samizdat is not voluminous: two issues of the Georgian Herald have appeared so far. But judging by an anonymous 1974 treatise "Review of Relations Between Moscow and Georgia Before and After 1917," which has not been included in Georgian Herald No. 1, Georgian samizdat can be pugnaciously anti-Russian and anti-Armenian, too, for good measure. To provide the flavor of Georgian nationalist dissent the following brief extracts will suffice, the first being a quotation from Russian writer Andrei Belyi:
"The blood of the Georgians is like very old wine that has been drawn from deep suffering. We had still been walking around in animal skins, when Georgia was suffering to her innermost self (a Cruziia vystradala). She was the first to accept the blows of the Mongols and the Persians.

... All of Georgia is a song: a noble motive, the words being very severe and sad.

... Yes, Georgia was overflowing (perеполнілась') with culture, when we, like animals, were wandering in the woods; they are older [than us], we have to learn much from them" (A. Belyi, Vетер с Кавказа [Wind from the Caucasus], 1978).

If the majority of the people in Russia had been like [Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov] we, the representatives of a small people would have renounced our nation and would have said, "We, too, are Russians." This is because A. Belyi, A. Solzhenitsyn, A. Sakharov and their like already show the features of a supra-national, genuine cosmopolitan. On the contrary, the plan to introduce by compulsory administrative measures a "Soviet citizen's" internal passport and to mechanically delete nationalities will provoke only irritation and hatred. 73

We are far removed from the idea to preach the overthrow of the Soviet regime. The Soviet political system must however transform itself. The Soviet Union has to admit civil rights and abandon the colonial regime, has to give its proples the right to self-determination. This would make it a genuinely leading progressive state. 74

Religious dissent as such, e.g., the writing of the dissident Orthodox and the Reform Baptists goes beyond the purview of this work. But it should be stressed that in the long run, the widespread religious dissent and the great suffering which it entails cannot but help undermine the legitimacy of the Soviet order. The more so, since religious persecution beautifully lends itself to help by co-religionists abroad. Witness, e.g., the moving though not completely precise testimony by Pastor Georgi Vins, Secretary of the Council of Churches (Reform Baptists)
in the USSR before the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, June 7, 1979:

From 1929 to 1941, 25,000 Evangelical Christians and Baptists were arrested, for the most part pastors and preachers; 22,000 of them died in prisons and labor camps.

From 1945 to 1973, 20,000 Evangelical Christians and Baptists were arrested and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment.

Today there would be hundreds and thousands of them in prisons and labor camps were it not for the mercy of God, and the prayer, support, and petitions from Christians throughout the world. 75

Pastor Vins, in whom President Carter had taken a personal interest, has been part of the prisoner exchange of April 27, 1979: two convicted Soviet spies against five leading Soviet dissidents. 76

Secondly, in the short run religious dissent is tightly interwoven with some political dissent groups: e.g., it is hard to find a Lithuanian nationalist who is not an active Roman Catholic, Russian Orthodox faith has influenced the thinking of the Russian political Right, from Solzhenitsyn down to Osipov and Shimanov, some dissenting Georgian nationalists seem to have been obsessed by the malpractices in the Georgian Orthodox Church, 77 and some Armenian dissenters have stood very close to the Armenian Apostolic Church. 78 Late in 1979, an Orthodox priest who is a Ukrainian by nationality joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Group. 79

Thirdly, the practising Christians in the Soviet Union have become organized to politically defend the persecution of religious rights qua human rights and have thus entered the mainstream of the Soviet human rights movement. Admittedly there are now three such Christian "political action
committees"; the Christian Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers, the oldest of the three (formed December 27, 1956), defends the Russian Orthodox; the Group for the Legal Struggle and Investigation of Facts About the Persecution of Believers in the USSR of the All-Union Church of the Faithful and Free Seventh-Day Adventists (formed on May 11, 1978) apparently stands up for the Protestants; while the Catholic Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers (established November 13, 1978) defends Catholics, primarily in Lithuania. 80

Finally, a few words about the new workers movement which has tentatively joined forces with the intellectual dissenters as of early 1978. Concluding a sober assessment of Soviet dissent in the early 1970's Walter D. Connor wrote:

If the Soviet intelligentsia, or its dissident sections, can ever find a common cause with the workers, one may expect surprising and perhaps revolutionary events. But for now that base is missing, and if it ever develops this will happen only in the distant future. 81

Professor Connor may have been unduly pessimistic. In early December 1977 a group of outraged Soviet workers called a press conference in a Moscow apartment at which they publicized their grievances against the regime in the factories, mines, guest houses, and closed restaurants. Vladimir Klebanov, their leader, had worked sixteen years in the Donbas coalmines, found the safety at work shocking, was sent to a mental hospital when he started badgering management about it. 82 The political dissenters around Academician Sakharov, including Sakharov himself, were at first wary of the new workers' dissidents. "Dr. Sakharov told some [Western] reporters he had refused to get involved because he feared that some of
the workers who had signed protests did not understand the risks of
open dissent. He told others he doubted Mr. Klebanov's commitment to
individual liberty.83 Sakharov's liberal scruples notwithstanding,
Klebanov persevered and February 1, 1978, organized a Free Labor Union
Association of the Soviet Union. That month about 200 people expressed
their desire to join it.84 February 9, 1978, the Moscow Helsinki Group,
over the signatures of Sakharov's wife Elena Bonner and four others
courteously took note of the formation of the Free Labor Union Association
without, however, fully endorsing its activity: the tenor of the Moscow
Group's Document No. 36 was that the workers organized themselves, that
they had the full right to do so, and that insofar as the Free Labor Union
Association would protest the violation of workers' rights established
by law and international treaties the Moscow Group would help them in their
activity.85 Already February 7, 1978, the authorities had arrested
Klebanov: they later placed him in a psychiatric hospital. The advocates
of workers' rights regrouped and in late October 1978 established in Moscow
the Free Interprofessional Union of Workers (Russian abbreviation: SMOT)
which has incorporated some old members of the Free Labor Union Association,
has broadened its membership to include some intellectuals (salaried
workers) and has tried to hide it at the same time by not publishing the
names of all of its members. SMOT has also set out to defend the economic
as well as the social, cultural, political and religious rights of
workers.86 All in all, the Moscow Helsinki Group has devoted to workers'
rights some 14 documents.87

Moral support and help with international publicity are not perhaps
the pursuit of a common cause as envisaged by Professor Connor. Nonetheless,
it is a major step forward on the road to collaboration, which would have been unthinkable ten-fifteen years ago.

To conclude:

Soviet dissent in the late 1970's reaches back into the Stalinist postwar period. There had always been a substantial number of persons in the Soviet Union who questioned the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. Their number increased after the Stalinist Great Purge and the early defeats in World War II, it increased even more after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956. Brezhnev tried to clamp down on political dissent and, at least in the beginning, provoked a very chain reaction of non-public and then public protests. The Soviet dissent movement shows a bewildering variety of groupings from the Marxist anti-Stalinist Left through the Liberal Democratic Center to the Nationalist and/or Democratic Right, and the Workers Groups. Somewhat imperfectly a modicum of unity has been maintained through the organ of the Democratic Center, the relatively impartial Chronicle of Current Events. To a larger or smaller degree almost all the groups--the workers group excepted--have interpreted national rights as part and parcel of human rights, as twins of civil individual rights (this interpretation was strongly pronounced in Kosterin and Grigorenko [Hryhorenko] on the Left, less so in early Sakharov in the Liberal Center, the Russian nationalists on the Right rejected that interconnection insofar as they were interested in individual rights at all, e.g., Solzhenitsyn was a champion of individual rights in
Arkhipelago GULAG, Shimanov obviously was not. The non-Russian nationalists—especially the Ukrainians—wanted the Soviet human rights movement to be more sympathetic to non-Russian national rights. To force the issue the Ukrainians and also the Lithuanians and Georgians established their own samizdat organs. By 1975 the Soviet dissent groups could use a new distinctive and, above all, wide umbrella under which they could all fit in their pursuit of both individual (civil) and collective (national) rights. Somewhat unexpectedly perhaps, in the light of the preceding negotiations, such an umbrella was provided by the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.
Executive Summary

Chapter 4

THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

World War II had ended without a peace treaty legitimizing its results, among the important ones of which were divided Germany, the very territorially restructured Poland, the Soviet Union's sizeable gains of new territory from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, and the Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. In these circumstances the USSR pushed the peace treaty or a surrogate security conference idea from 1954 onward. However, the West was not receptive until the appearance of the Nixon-Kissinger policies of détente. Various treaties over Berlin, between the two Germanies, West Germany and Poland, and West Germany with Russia in the early 1970s removed the last obstacle. However, the materialization of the Conference should not be seen as a simple Soviet maneuver. The Eastern European states, especially Poland, also supported it, as did, by the late 1960s and early 1970s the European neutrals, and the smaller NATO members were more receptive early on than the large ones. The United States was passive through the signing of the Final Act in 1975, having related the whole matter to other strategic issues rather than an end in itself.

The preparatory meetings in Helsinki in 1973 proved positive, and for two years the actual work for a security agreement shifted to Geneva, returning for the final signing on 1 August 1975 to Helsinki. Although the Final Act contained the political provisions desired by the USSR, it also contained important human rights statements and provisions on human contacts (the flow of people, ideas, culture, information), etc. Within one year, due to the assertiveness of Soviet dissidents on the basis of the Final Act, and the Western receptivity to their actions, these humanitarian aspects became the most publicized ones internationally. By 1977 when the first follow-up meeting convened in Belgrade, human rights dominated the agenda. The bulk of the attention was on Eastern Europe and especially the Soviet Union. Interestingly, human rights were not a key part of the Western position until fairly late (the emphasis was on the human contacts provisions), and these were pushed by the smaller countries. The European neutrals played the central role in forging compromise positions during the Geneva phase.

There is some disagreement on the legal meaning of the Final Act. The Soviet Union quickly considered it more or less binding; the West did not. The latter saw it simply as an agreement, not a treaty. All European countries except Albania, plus the United States and Canada signed the Helsinki Final Act.
Chapter 4

THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

World War II, in at least one sense, concluded in a peculiar manner: there was no peace treaty. Among the important political functions of such postwar agreements are that they legitimate boundary changes and new forms of government in old and successor states. In the case of World War II, one of the major belligerents, Germany, was split into four, and finally two, components as a consequence of the allied occupations. Another, the Soviet Union, had made territorial gains from the Baltic to the Black Sea (parts of Finland, the three Baltic States, a large part of Poland, the Western Ukraine, and part of Rumania). As it was, three prewar neutral states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania—had disappeared de facto as sovereign countries through annexation by the USSR. And finally, the Soviet Union, through armed force had imposed its political will on the whole of Eastern Europe, restructuring the geopolitical nature of the continent.

While the border changes which had occurred for the most part could be confirmed by a series of bilateral treaties, the occupation of the Baltic states and the general hegemony over Eastern Europe were matters which could be best resolved for the Soviet Union through a peace treaty. In a way, the Cold War was a statement by the Western part of the war-time alliance, joined finally by the western half of Germany, that political recognition of the Soviet gains was not granted. Under these circumstances it should not be surprising that the Soviet Union would play the initiator role in regard to
convening an appropriate international meeting, in this case in the guise of a European security conference. While the political dimension of the security and cooperation movement, which concluded in Helsinki in mid-1975, was the central element in the Soviet initiatives, it was clear already by 1976 that the small human rights component of the accords had become and was going to be internationally the most publicized part of the document.

Because we are dealing with a contemporary diplomatic issue, important archival documents of governments are not accessible. The present chapter is thus written on the basis of governmental public pronouncements, accounts in leading international newspapers and periodicals, publications issued by various non-governmental organizations, and selected interviews. Thus, in large part, while one can accurately chronicle events, the intentions of the key international actors—the various governments—can only be inferred. Only when the archives of all of the participants become accessible to scholarly scrutiny can the definitive story of the road to Helsinki be told. Yet the identity of the travelers and their paths are already a part of the public record.

**The Security Conference Idea**

The idea of convening a security conference in essence originates with the Soviet Union in its insistence that a European peace treaty be concluded. This particular demand goes back at least to 1954. To the degree that the Soviet leaders during the preparatory meetings and negotiations on the road to the final accord, from late-1972 to mid-1975, continually emphasized those elements which had to do with the sovereignty of states, the
inviolability of borders, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and so forth, it may be inferred that the political dimension was central to their thinking. In other words, for the Soviets the purpose of any security conference was to produce a document which would be a surrogate peace treaty legitimizing the existing borders of the USSR, and acknowledging that Eastern Europe is in its sphere of influence. Indeed Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev himself in his 31 July 1975 speech in Helsinki stated: "The Soviet Union regards the outcome of the Conference not merely as a necessary summing up of the political results of World War II...," and the introduction to a 1977 documentary collection of Soviet materials on the topic states explicitly:

The Helsinki Conference coincided with the 30th anniversary of the victory over fascism in the Second World War. It collectively formalized the war's main political results and confirmed the inviolability of the postwar European frontiers.

The seed, from which after many graftings would grow the Helsinki Final Act, was the Soviet Union's Draft European Security Treaty proposed by its Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, at the Berlin Conference on Germany on 10 February 1954. All European states, irrespective of their social systems, were invited to adhere to a general European treaty on collective security in Europe (Article 1). Article 8 of the Draft Treaty provided for regular or, when required, special conferences and for the setting up of a permanent consultative political committee. Article 9 allowed the United States government and the government of the Chinese Peoples Republic qua permanent members of the United Nations Security Council "to designate representatives to the organs set up in accordance with the Treaty in the capacity of observer." Also in 1954, agreements reached in Paris by the
United States, Great Britain and West Germany laid the path for the latter's entry into NATO. The idea of a European security conference found little sympathy among the Western powers at this time. On 9 May 1955 West Germany became a member of NATO, and five days later the Eastern Bloc concluded the Warsaw Pact Treaty. Interestingly, the Warsaw Treaty had the following provision in its Article 11:

In the event of a system of collective security being created in Europe and, with this aim in view, should an all-European treaty on collective security be concluded, a goal towards which the participants of the treaty will untiringly strive, the present treaty becomes invalid on the day on which such an all-European Treaty becomes valid.

By this time the Cold War was in full swing, and no movement toward an all-European security agreement seemed possible. In December 1964 the Polish delegation to the UN General Assembly raised the issue again, suggesting the participation of the United States. From this time onward the call for convening such a conference became an important component in the Warsaw Pact's policy of relations with NATO. Nevertheless, NATO remained cool. Among the main obstacles were the issues of Germany, including the special problem of Berlin, and the seeming U.S. coolness to the general idea and its relating such a conference to other major negotiations. For example, as a State Department summary issued in the early 1970s notes:

Communiques issued after periodic ministerial meetings of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in recent years have addressed and refined the purpose and content of the conference. During this period the Warsaw Pact members pushed for an early convening of the conference. However, the NATO Ministers viewed the Four Power negotiations aimed at improving the situation in and around Berlin as the touchstone of East-West detente efforts, and linked the opening of multilateral preparatory
talks on CSCE to the satisfactory conclusion of those negotiations. At the Moscow Summit in May, 1972, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev agreed that the conference should be prepared to consider specific problems of security and cooperation, and that it be convened without undue delay. With the June 3, 1972 signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, the NATO-Warsaw Pact "dialogue of communiques" now holds out the prospect of a CSCE sometime in 1973. [The Quadripartite Agreement had been signed on 3 September 1971; however, it did not go into effect until the Final Protocol was agreed upon in 1972.]

Actually, a string of "breakthroughs" began in the spring of 1969, when the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact met in Budapest. The countries represented here in essence indicated a willingness to recognize two separate Germanies and a special status for West Berlin. The emphasis was thus still on political issues. The next important move was by neutral Finland, whose government in May 1969 sent a memorandum to all European countries as well as the United States and Canada, calling for a "preparatory meeting" for a conference and offering Helsinki as a suitable site. By the end of October 1969 the Warsaw Pact countries had all replied positively to the Finnish initiative. Although individual NATO countries showed conditional receptivity to the idea, the NATO Council of Ministers at its April and December 1969 meetings provided no direct reply either to the Warsaw Pact feelers or to the Finnish initiative. 8

The advent of the Brandt government in West Germany proved to be the next important step in the gathering momentum in moving toward a conference. On the one hand, Foreign Minister Scheel already in November 1969 called for allied cooperation on this issue, implying a conditionally positive response in principle. On the other hand, the Social Democratic
government took the initiative in coming to grips with the issue of a divided Germany. Willi Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, and Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, met in Erfurt on 19 March 1970 and again in Kassel on 21 May. These meetings had three crucial consequences within the space of a few years. First, West Germany acknowledged de jure the border changes which had occurred on Germany's eastern frontier, that is, with Poland (the appropriate treaties were signed in the second half of 1970, but they were not ratified and did not go into effect until mid-1972); second, it led to the mutual acceptance of two Germanies. And third, it paved the way for a resolution in the status of West Berlin. (This agreement was reached in the fall of 1971, and it too went into effect in mid-1972.)

In between the meetings of Brandt and Stoph, the foreign ministers of the Scandinavian countries convened in Helsinki on 22 April 1970, coming out in favor of a conference on security and cooperation; in the same year, another neutral country, Austria, publicly supported the holding of such a conference. Indeed, the neutral and smaller NATO-affiliated countries, and especially Finland, played a crucial role in this period, as also acknowledged in Soviet sources. The meeting of NATO's Council in Rome on 24 May 1970 indicated a basic willingness to accept the convening of a conference on security and cooperation, but made: its consent conditional on progress in the talks between the USSR, Poland, GDR and FRG and the four powers talks on West Berlin. It was also suggested in the communique that the agenda of the conference should include: a) the principles of relations between states, including that of renouncing the use
of force; b) issues to promote freer movement of people, exchange of ideas and information.

A month later, the Warsaw Pact's counterpart body met once more in Budapest, on 21-22 June 1970. There the member countries' foreign ministers signed a memorandum:

which was sent to the governments of the NATO member states and to those of the neutral and non-aligned countries. The document precisely defined the socialist countries stand on the conference and took into consideration the realistic suggestions of a number of European countries, with which the socialist countries had been consulting intensively at various levels. The following more important elements of the memorandum are worthy of mention: agreement to the participation of the USA and Canada in the conference; acceptance of the Finnish proposal to hold the conference in Helsinki; the statement that the conference should be held with no preconditions; extension of the previously suggested agenda to include matters of the natural environment, development of relations in the field of culture and the establishment of a permanent body to deal with matters of security and co-operation in Europe.

An interesting point is made by a Polish source. Namely, communications in the dialogue were not between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, but from each to the other's member countries and the neutral countries. Thus, what had transpired in the space of one year was a formal Warsaw Pact call for a conference with political goals, the amplification of the call by European neutrals, the acceptance of this by NATO with a counterproposal to include the flow of ideas and information, and the reciprocal acceptance of this by the Warsaw Pact countries, which further formally acceded to having North American participation. In response to the June 1970 Warsaw Pact memorandum, a West German government spokesmen is quoted as saying:

"A step in the right direction" is the German Federal Government's reaction to the latest Warsaw Pact (East European) position on the proposed East-West meeting about security in Europe.
The next initiative came again from Finland, whose government in a 24 November 1970 memorandum sent to all European countries as well as the United States and Canada, reportedly stated that:

> the political will existed to push forward the issue of European security, but that further efforts were necessary to achieve such agreement that would allow a common action to strengthen security in Europe.

The communique further recommended that the addressed countries' diplomats consult both with the Finnish Foreign Ministry as well as at multilateral meetings to keep the momentum going.

The Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, meeting in East Berlin, in a 2 December 1970 communique "expressed its readiness to take part in the preparations for the conference that had been suggested by Finland." The NATO Council's communique of 9 December 1970 was more reserved. Importantly, the treaty laying the groundwork for normalizing relations between West Germany and Poland had been signed in Warsaw on 7 December 1970. But early in 1971 President Nixon was reported to favor the conclusion of a Berlin agreement before any conference on security and cooperation was convened. There was also the unresolved issue of the multilateral reduction of forces, a key component in the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy of the United States. Yet it should be emphasized that the senior NATO partner was not alone in its placement of emphasis on the MBRF issues. For example, in late 1969 this had also been an expressed concern of West Germany.

The congresses of the Communist parties of the Warsaw Pact countries during 1971 all emphasized the need for convening a security conference. On 3 September 1971 the text of the four-power agreement on
West Berlin was worked out. On 19 September 1971, Willy Brandt, at a meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow was reported as favoring a conference on security and cooperation. In early 1972, French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann is reported in a leading West German newspaper as stating that the French government had advocated such a conference more actively than the United States, and he was further quoted as follows:

“We desire specifically that Europe, thanks to this meeting, could see those barriers fall which at some points continue to obstruct the free movement of persons, the exchange of information and the unrestricted development of ideas.”

The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, meeting in Prague, issued a declaration on "peace, security and cooperation in Europe," on 26 January 1972. In May 1972 Nixon met Brezhnev at the Moscow Summit. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (agreed upon on 3 September 1971), and the treaties concluded between the USSR and West Germany, and Poland and West Germany (agreed upon on, respectively, 12 August and 7 December, 1970), were ratified and went into effect at almost the same time as the Nixon-Brezhnev summit. A treaty between the two Germanies was concluded on 21 December 1972. As a Polish overview of the path to Helsinki very appropriately comments:

“The so-called German problem, which had for long blocked the possibility of European-wide solutions, was no longer present on the agendas of discussions on security and co-operation in Europe. The way to start the Helsinki preparatory talks for the conference Security and Co-operation in Europe was thus open.

And, indeed, so it was. The foreign ministers of the Common Market, including also Great Britain, Norway and Ireland, met in Hague on 21 November 1972 to formulate a common position for a security conference.”
The ministers of "the nine countries said they would seek greater freedom in the exchange of people and ideas between East and West in Europe." On 22 November 1972 the ambassadors of 32 European countries, plus Canada and the United States, met in Helsinki to hold preparatory talks for convening a conference on security and co-operation. [Note: Monaco was not involved in these talks but was present at the three phases of the conference itself.] Of European countries, only Albania refused to participate. These preparatory meetings lasted until 8 June 1973.

From November 28th until December 15th 1972 the participating states presented their basic positions; between January 15th and February 9th 1973 proposals concerning the subject matter of the conference and its agenda were presented; these proposals were discussed between 26th February and 7th April, 1973 dividing them into four headings popularly called "baskets." Between 25th April and 8th June, 1973 a document containing recommendations and guidelines for the conference proper was worked out. It was agreed that the conference would start on 3rd July, 1973 in Helsinki at foreign minister level.

Throughout the process leading to Helsinki, the United States had remained passive. There were also obvious divergencies between it and other NATO members. For example, the Washington Post on 22 November 1972 reports, concurrently with the aforesaid Common Market foreign ministers meeting and the opening of the ambassadorial level meeting in Helsinki: "In Bonn, a NATO Committee yesterday criticized the private U.S.-Soviet talks began by President Nixon in Moscow and said that they have caused 'grave stresses and strains' in the Western alliance." Yet it is also true that the road to Helsinki had required one crucial first step: the resolution of the "German issue." The Nixon-Kissinger detente policy and its execution provided the necessary international context for
this event, although it was Brandt's *ostpolitik* which allowed its resolution. While the convening of a security and cooperation conference was not a keystone in American foreign policy at the time, the Nixon-Kissinger initiatives were thus important contributory facilitators. Furthermore, it appears that the United States government saw this whole matter foremost as an European affair. And lastly, the American public position may have been cooler than its internal one. A leader of a major Baltic-American organization writes:  

> On 28 January 1972, some members of the Baltic American Communities, including the author, participated at the US State Department's briefing on foreign policy for editors and broadcasters. This was an opportunity to learn about the shift of American foreign policy toward a closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State William Rogers spoke about the "cold war" as a policy of the past, and spoke in terms which were somewhat new and unexpected. Whether a shift had in fact existed is problematical, but the State Department's counsellor, Henry Kissinger's chief adviser, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, only a few years later was reported talking by the *New York Times* (6 April 1976, pp. 1, 14) of policies which advanced a "more natural and organic union" between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The implication was clearly of an ongoing shift toward accepting Soviet hegemony there as legitimate. Such a shift found quick official denial in America. And whatever the historical record in this case turns out to be, the matter became an important issue in the 1976 Republican Presidential primaries.  

> There are two additional points to note before turning to the mid-1973 conference itself. First of all, none of the material up to the ambassadorial meeting in Helsinki in late November 1972 had indicated a great
concern with either human rights in general or nationality rights in specific. And second, the key participants had very divergent interests in convening such a conference. As noted, for the Soviet Union there was the issue of legitimizing boundary changes and hegemony in Eastern Europe. Poland, which lost a large share of its Eastern prewar territory to the USSR and gained in compensation former eastern areas of Germany, required some international confirmation of its new western border. The neutral countries stood to benefit from the general reduction of tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Western Europeans could look, at best, for a ray of hope in a new climate on the continent, and, at worst, toward a continued status quo which directly did not affect them on a day-to-day basis. And the United States in pursuit of its global power politics, within a Nixon-Kissinger framework, acquiesced to a conference in order to gain larger benefits in its relationship with its major adversary. These divergences of perspective and purpose are aptly summarized in a mid-1972 State Department public statement, as follows: 38

Warsaw Pact objective: For the Warsaw Pact the core of the conference would be a declaration in which the participants renounce the threat or use of force and declare that they "recognize and unconditionally respect the territorial integrity of all European states within existing borders" -- an endorsement of the status quo in Europe

NATO objective: The conference should emphasize substance over atmosphere; help heal, not confirm, the division of Europe. For specific terms it should:
- Affirm the principles of nonintervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of states, whatever their social or political systems;
- Broaden East-West cooperation in increased trade, expanded exchanges of science and technology, and efforts to improve the environment;
- Promote the freer movement of people, ideas, and information beyond traditional cultural exchange patterns.
Long-range U.S. view: We see the conference as yet another step in a long and difficult process aimed at solving the complex problems of a divided Europe. We do not expect easily to achieve significant results from a conference of more than 30 sovereign states, each with its own goals and perceptions as to what the conference should seek to accomplish. Its true significance lies in the fact that nations ranged for so many years in hostile confrontation against each other are now increasingly pursuing the path of conciliation and negotiation. In this developing climate, with careful preparation and with a focus on real and specific problems, some improvements, however modest, could be achieved in a CSCE which would further enhance stability in Europe.

Thus, the conference was all things to all participants. An intersection of the foreign policies of 35 states, its major aftereffect, an unprecedented focus on human rights, was unforeseen by all, reverberating especially strongly to the Soviet Union, as will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6. However, before getting there, we need to look at the substantive side of the preliminary debates from late 1972 through the spring of 1973, at the deliberations which took place between then and mid-1975, and at the final document signed by the participants in Helsinki in mid-1975. In addition, we must briefly examine the special problems generated by the legal status of the three Baltic countries, which had been absorbed by the Soviet Union in 1940.

Helsinki - Geneva - Helsinki

The ambassadors of 34 countries met in Helsinki on 22 November 1972 to hold preparatory talks for the conference. 39 (Monaco was not involved until the actual conference.) The purpose of these talks, lasting through 8 June 1973, was to enable the participating states to present
their basic positions and to agree on the subject matter of the subsequent conference and its agenda. The substantive issues were thereby divided into four categories, popularly called "baskets," and the administrative-protocol questions were formalized in a document containing guidelines and recommendations. During these ambassadorial-level meetings the opposing approaches to security and cooperation on the part of Western Europe/Canada/the United States on the one hand, and on the part of the Eastern European countries/the USSR on the other hand, were very much in evidence. The latter emphasized the political issues, especially the acknowledgment of borders and their inviolability, while the former championed individual problems and the human dimension.

Importantly, throughout this stage human rights per se are not the crucial point of debate, as evidenced by news reports from Helsinki, foreign capitals and Washington, and by the text of speeches of the ambassadors, and later, foreign ministers and heads of state in Helsinki. While human rights are mentioned, the important Western point of emphasis is actually human contacts, which was pushed initially especially by West Germany. This should not be surprising since the reunification of families, for example, was of disproportionate interest to West Germany in comparison with the other participant states. The other important dimension of the fairly unified Western position was exchange — of tourists, of journalists, of culture, of information, and of ideas. Indeed, human rights per se remains a low-key issue throughout the road to Helsinki; it becomes explosive afterwards. One of the few important exceptions to this before the signing of the accords on 1 August 1975 was President Ford's comments on 25 July 1975, when he met with representatives of emigre groups and a Congressman in the
White House, as cited in the *New York Times* (26 July 1975):

the European security agreement he will sign next week in Helsinki will provide a "yardstick" to gauge human rights for subjects of Communist rule in Eastern Europe.

It is unknown whether this represented a key tactical shift in American thinking. Given the subdued interest of the United States government in the CSCE, this may have been more of an attempt to appease the Baltic-American community, a subject covered later. But even Ford's address in Helsinki during the final phase of the CSCE does not evidence strong concern with human rights. The central debates were essentially political in nature.

The first or foreign ministerial stage of the CSCE opened in Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and ended four days later with the adoption of a final communique. This particular stage was largely symbolic and ceremonial, as was the final third stage. The actual work was done by the second stage in Geneva between 18 September 1973 and 21 July 1975, resulting in an agreed upon text of a final act. That anything was accomplished at all is truly surprising given the enormous changes which occurred during the interval in the political leadership of the major Western countries: West German Chancellor Willy Brandt was forced to resign because of a security scandal and President Richard Nixon because of a political scandal; France's President George Pompidou died, and the Conservatives were displaced in Great Britain with a Labor government. On top of this, 1973 saw another Middle East war and 1974 the crisis over Cyprus.

Our primary Polish source is correct when it states in regard to this second stage:
The basic divergences of the Conference centered on the problem of the "third basket." As has been said that the NATO states had been trying to sabotage the Conference by proposing the so-called free exchange of people, ideas and information. This had been evident in the press campaign launched in the West...

The United States by and large appears to have played a passive role in Geneva. Again, the primary Polish source is correct when it asserts:

The neutral countries (Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria) played an active role at this stage, often initiating a search for constructive solutions based on a reasonable compromise. In the course of informal and laborious diplomatic negotiations aimed at achieving agreement on the most controversial matters, the representatives of these states played the role of coordinators; in particular they smoothed the way to the drafting of documents constituting a compromise concerning the follow-up to the Conference (Sweden) and the problems of the third basket: contacts (Austria), information (Switzerland), culture (Finland), and education (Sweden).

In regard to the principles which in the final document are the substance of Basket One, it was France which attempted to codify the proposals of the Western countries; West Germany favored the principle of refraining from force and the issues of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity; Netherlands championed the principle of self-determination of nations, Britain and the Holy See the issue of human rights, and Belgium cooperation among states. Of the Warsaw Pact countries, Poland appears to have been especially active, which probably reflects more than a surrogate role for the bloc and the USSR. After all, Poland had suffered more during World War II than any other belligerent, and its territorial restructuring by the Soviet Union at the expense of Germany was one of the most sensitive political issues in postwar Central and Eastern Europe. The principles of legitimized territory, non-use of force, and inviolability of borders were of
the utmost interest to Poland.

The heads of states of 35 countries of Europe and North America gathered in Helsinki for the third and final phase of the CSCE on 30 July 1975. Aside from the brief speeches made, this final phase was foremost symbolic—an unprecedented political summit. The Final Act was signed on 1 August 1975. It is fair to conclude that the Final Act was received with much greater glee in the Warsaw Pact countries than in the West. The Soviet Union especially attributed extraordinary significance to the Final Act, as evidenced by many articles in Pravada/Izvestia, speeches by Leonid Brezhnev, and various resolutions by the highest Communist Party and civil governmental organs. Additionally, immediately following the conclusion of the CSCE, a host of high ranking foreign dignitaries, including many from the West, visited Moscow, where joint declarations of cooperation and praise were issued. Yet one must note that the initial reaction of the Soviet opposition (or, dissidents) to the CSCE was not especially warm, and even the popular attitude in Eastern Europe in 1973-1974 was split down the middle in terms of seeing an advantage or disadvantage in it.

Contrary to the official Warsaw Pact reaction, the act was accepted with some reservation in the United State. For example, Time magazine on 4 August 1975 (p. 16) wrote: "Unlike the Congress of Vienna... the Helsinki Congress will probably not be remembered by history as much of a landmark."

Some American political action groups, discussed later in Chapter 8, had strongly urged President Ford not even to go to Helsinki, and in general, American conservatives were opposed to the Final Act. In West Germany, according to the New York Times (26 July 1975), "the opposition Christian Democratic Union demanded during a special session of the West German Par-
liament today that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt refuse to sign the closing declaration of the European security conference next week." In all fairness it must be noted that the United States and West Germany were exceptions in this regard among Western states. As we shall see in the ensuing chapters, if anyone had foreseen the impact of the human rights issue on especially the Soviet domestic scene as an aftereffect of Helsinki, the locus of glee and gloom might very well have been reserved.

The Final Act Itself

The Helsinki Final Act, also referred to as accords or agreement, is a very lengthy document consisting essentially of a preamble, and of four substantive baskets. The first is a declaration of principles guiding relations between participating states; the second concerns economic, scientific, technological and environmental cooperation; the third, human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational contacts; and the fourth, follow-up procedures. For our purposes, two substantive issues are the most important: what does the final act say about human rights and about nationality (or, ethnic) rights? Relative to the overall length of the document very little is devoted to these topics, but they clearly are not ignored.

Principle VII of Basket One specifically addresses "human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief." It has the single longest text of any of the ten principles and is rather explicit in its clarity, reading as follows (in full):
The participating states will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.

Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating states on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

The participating states recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all states.

They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavour jointly and separately, including in co-operation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating states will act in conformity, with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligation as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.
An additional relevant item in the Final Act is Principle VIII, which is entitled "equal rights and self determination of peoples," and reads as follows:

The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.

In spite of this pledged practice of lofty idealism, the Final Act is in many respects replete with internal contradictions. Thus, Principle III on the inviolability of frontiers states:

The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.

In addition, Principle IV pledges, in part, that "the participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States," and Principle VI on non-intervention in internal affairs, in part, states:
The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.

Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.

Thus, while everyone is to observe human rights, actual violations may be defended as simply a domestic matter by any state, domestic complaints on the denial of the rights may be simply dismissed as being subversive. And while people have the right to self-determination, existing borders are defined as inviolable and territorial integrity is cemented. The document thus basically champions a potential for political change without allowing the status quo to be altered.

As it is, what constitutes human rights becomes, at the international level, problematical in spite of the clarity of the text of Principle VII. The West defines human rights largely in terms of individual freedoms and civil rights. In the Soviet case, it refers instead to:

"those rights which create the material basis of human life: the rights to life, work, housing, recreation, education, social security and medical care.

Elsewhere, Soviet sources refer to the "most important of human rights—the right to life, to peace and peaceful international co-operation," Additionally:

However, it should be borne in mind that fundamental rights and freedoms are, of course, understood dif-
ferently: this understanding depends on the socio-economic system in which they are exercised. In this situation some bourgeois circles feel tempted to use this principle to impose the practices and institutions of some states on others. For that reason this principle cannot be applied in isolation from the principle of respect for sovereign rights and non-intervention in internal affairs: it operates in close connection with the spirit and letter of the eight principle [on equal rights and self-determination of peoples].

Importantly, while the West saw human issues, especially Basket Three as a whole, as a central element of the CSCE Final Act, the Soviets clearly emphasized the primacy of the political, trade and economic paragraphs. Ironically, the West itself was vulnerable on the human rights issues; the United States and a number of Western countries have never even signed or ratified many important international documents in this area, including, in some cases, the International Covenants of Human Rights.

In any case, in the end the Helsinki Final Act offered and meant something different to everyone. The Soviet Union thought that the postwar boundary changes were now ratified. Western leaders insisted that the Final Act did not recognize the borders de jure, but implied instead a reaffirmation of an acknowledgement of a de facto situation. The West found great fault with East European and Soviet human rights practices; the latter answered that these were minor matters of the Final Act, internal affairs which were therefore none of the West's business, and that the complaints in any case were by subversive or mentally demented individuals. All seemed to agree that the Final Act was an agreement of some sort, but perceptions vary on the legal interpretation. Thus, the official American position even before the signing was that the CSCE documents are: "state-
ments of political resolve or declarations of intent, not agreements legally binding upon governments. The Conference will not produce a treaty." Contrarywise, the Soviets state:

...the dubious debates over whether the Declaration and the Final Act as a whole have judicial force under international law have the appearance of being scholastic, to say the least. The significant point is that at the Conference the participating states unambiguously pledged to respect and apply the principles enunciated in the Declaration and to take into account and implement the provisions of the Final Act. This is the main thing from the political and moral standpoint and from the standpoint of international law.

In addition, at least as regards the recognition of current frontiers, the Soviet Union considered the Final Act explicitly as "binding for all European states." The Special Issue of the Baltic States

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the status of the Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—is of special significance to many of the issues discussed in our work. The three states, members of the League of Nations, had proclaimed their neutrality at the outset of World War II. While other countries suffered territorial adjustments, the three Baltic states were the only European countries to disappear de facto as a consequence of the war, through annexation by the Soviet Union in mid-1940. Most Western countries have never accorded legal recognition to this incorporation, and while they have had no governments to represent for four decades, sovereign Baltic diplomatic missions still exist in a number of Western countries, including the United States.
In view of this situation, the Baltic issue was bound to cause special diplomatic and political problems, as it indeed did. In the United States the matter was so serious as to cause some conflicts between the staffs of President Gerald Ford, who had long-term contacts with Baltic constituents and appeared basically sympathetic to their cause, and Secretary of State/National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who was reported to have favored ending US non-recognition of the Soviet annexation, favoring the granting of de jure recognition. Furthermore, the issue of the Baltic states, a subject of an extensive early 1950s Congressional inquiry to begin with, became hot again in Congress between 1970 and 1977. For example, even right after the Helsinki Final Act was signed, House of Representative hearings in a subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations in the 94th Congress, 18 November 1975-4 May 1976, on a resolution expressing the sense of the House on continued nonrecognition of the Soviet annexation, and on a bill to establish a US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, are in fact reported in a single volume. Nearly 100 Congressmen and Senators in 1975, before the Final Act was signed in Helsinki co-sponsored a resolution which directed that:

\[
\text{the United States delegation to the European Security Conference should not agree to the recognition by the European Security Conference of the Soviet Union's annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and it should remain the policy of the United States not to recognize in any way the annexation of the Baltic nations by the Soviet Union.}
\]

Indeed, Baltic political activists from the West were arrested in Helsinki in 1973 for attempting to argue their cause at the first phase of the CSCE. Additionally, the democratic opposition movements in the Soviet Baltic addressed memoranda specifically to the Helsinki participants,
and a Helsinki Watch Committee was formed in Lithuania. We will look at these matters in detail in Chapter 8, when ethnic groups are examined as international actors. Suffice it to say here that the Baltic issue was inherently important because of the implications for international law which the widespread policy of nonrecognition had instilled. But in addition, the three Baltic groups are perhaps the most important of the ethnic actors during the 1970s due to the ramifications which the Helsinki accords had for continued de jure status. That is, this issue, as opposed to human rights as such, was at the root of an incredible Baltic political mobilization. And because the Baltic groups are unusually well organized and internationally located in the key Western countries (as well as in the Soviet Union, of course), the Baltic issue had far more serious domestic political consequences than would have been the case if there had been no implications in the Helsinki accords for the de jure status of the three countries.

As an endnote here, it might be pointed out that both the State Department and President Ford publicly stated just before Helsinki that the United States' long-standing position on the Baltic issue would not change because of the Final Act, and the State Department and President Carter insisted afterward that, in fact, it had not. Indeed, Baltic diplomatic missions still exist in America. And thus even here the contradictions of Helsinki are evident. On the one hand, the United States signed a document the wording of which leaves little ambiguity on the acknowledgement of the political status quo in Europe and in a way thus legitimizes politically the Soviet borders. On the other hand, the United States keeps stating
that the Final Act was not a legal document and therefore was of no 
de jure consequence in this case. There is no record of any Western state, 
which did not already do so before, of according de jure recognition to 
the 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltic states as a result of the CSCE.
Executive Summary

Chapter 5

THE SOVIET HELSINKI WATCH COMMITTEES

During 1976 and 1977 five public groups—so-called Watch Committees—to monitor the implementation and violation of the Helsinki Final Act sprouted up in the Soviet Union. The first one was in Moscow, the other four in Union republics. The former was more universalistic, the latter particularistic in the sense of being nationality-group oriented and, generally, based. However, none were really nationalistic; the human rights focus of the five groups is remarkably similar. There are both organizational and personal contacts between the five Watch Committees, but they are not centralized or centrally coordinated. Rather, they are separate groups with a common focus.

The individuals who became affiliated with the Moscow Group had contacts with a visiting American Congressional delegation in 1975, which was a significant stimulus to the formation of an American investigative commission. The large numbers of documents generated in three (1976-1979) years by the Watch Committees on human rights violations in the Soviet Union is an unprecedented source of such information. It is not only extensive but also covers a wide array of areas, most of which having nothing to do with nationality groups. Nevertheless, nationality group problems are frequently brought forward by even the Moscow Group (especially the case of the Crimean Tatars), and the human rights violations investigated by the four Union republic committees have largely to do with nationality issues because the republics themselves are structured along ethnic lines. Also, the Soviet Constitution guarantees both human and ethnic rights.

A sizeable number of the founding members of the five committees have been arrested, and domestically banished or exiled to the West. Nevertheless, the groups keep functioning, especially in Moscow, Lithuania and Ukraine, and producing new monitoring documents. The Georgian and Armenian committees, less active in any case than the other three, remain subdued at present.
Chapter 5

THE SOVIET HELSINKI WATCH COMMITTEES

The Moscow Helsinki Watch Committee was organized because the established dissenters in the Soviet capital were looking for a new, fresh way to legitimize their activity. Within one year similar groups were founded in the Ukraine, in Lithuania, Georgia, and Armenia because the feeling had grown in the republics that for all its genuine good will the Moscow Group would not be able to fully defend the specific national interests of the non-Russian dissenters over and above their common concern for civil or individual rights. It is perhaps a sign of maturity of both the Moscow and the republican dissenters that they smoothly worked together despite many occasions for friction: the Moscow Group never insisted on the subordination of the republican organizations, and the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Georgians, and Armenians never disavowed the special role that the Muscovites played in publicizing their objectives abroad.

(a) The Moscow Group

May 12, 1976, the establishment of the Moscow Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR (Obshchestvennaya Gruppa Sodeistviia Vypolneniiu Khel'sinkskikh Soglashenii v SSSR)—to which, for simplicity's sake, we shall henceforth
refer as the Moscow Group or the Moscow Watch Committee—was announced to Western reporters who had gathered in Academician Sakharov's apartment. Sakharov introduced to them the leader of the Group, fellow-physicist and eminent Russian political dissenter, Corresponding Member of the Armenian Academy of Arts and Sciences Yuri Orlov. Other founding members were, in alphabetical order: the Russian historian Lyudmila Alekseeva; a second historian, Mikhail Bernshtam, who was Jewish; Elena Bonner-Sakharov, a pediatrician of Jewish and Armenian descent, Sakharov's second wife and an ardent dissenter; the publicist Aleksander Ginzburg, the son of a Russian father and a Jewish mother; Pyotr Grigorenko (Petro Hryhorenko), a Ukrainian, a former Major-General of the Soviet Army turned leading dissenter; a second physicist Aleksander Korchak (nationality unknown); retired geologist Malva Landa, whose parents were Jewish; the Russian worker and writer Anatoli Marchenko; Professor of Sinology and Jewish activist Vitali Rubin; and the young computer scientist and Jewish activist Anatoli Shcharansky. Altogether the Moscow Group included eleven members in May 1976.

Of those eleven charter members three (Ginzburg, Hryhorenko, and Marchenko) had a record of legal persecution, the rest had escaped imprisonment and psychiatric asylums so far, but sometimes only by the skin of their teeth. Particularly enlightening is the career of the leader of the Group, Yuri Orlov. Orlov had run afoul of the Soviet authorities while he still was a graduate student at the Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics in Moscow. After Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress, Orlov and his friends
at a secret Party meeting at the Institute passed a resolution calling on all members of the Party Central Committee to account for their activity under Stalin. Khrushchev was furious, had the Party organization at the Institute dissolved and their resolution cancelled. Orlov lost his Party membership and would have been dismissed from his studies but for an ultimatum given by venerated Soviet nuclear physicist Kurchatov who told Khrushchev that if such a brilliant young man as Orlov would be excluded from scientific work he, Kurchatov, would also refuse to do scientific work. Khrushchev compromised: Orlov was allowed to pursue his studies but only in Armenia, far away from Moscow. After Khrushchev’s overthrow, Orlov came back to work at the Moscow Institute of Earth Magnetism and Dissemination of Radio Waves of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Undaunted, Orlov plunged into dissent again and again was excluded from his scholarly position in 1973.2

In general the Moscow Group included a fair number of persons who, had they been more cynical and less honest with themselves and their fellow-men, could have made brilliant academic and political careers. Lyudmila Alekseeva (born in 1927) came from a very pro-Soviet family: both her parents were Party members. In 1950 she graduated from Moscow University, with a diploma in history specializing in Russian archaeology. A firm believer in Marxist-Leninist truth, she felt that it was sullied only by unworthy individuals who had climbed to high Party offices. She resolved to enter the Party, make a career herself so that, once established herself, she could push those individuals aside. In short, she worked to reform a basically good system from within. A year after
entering the Party, she, a recent university graduate, was put in charge of the historical-social science section of the lecture group of the Moscow Komsomol obkom (Province Committee), with 40 lecturers under her. She was then offered a full-time job in the Komsomol obkom, a nomenklatura position calling for both Komsomol and Party Central Committee clearance. In two years, however, she reached the conclusion that while she could make an individual career, she could not change the system from within. This conviction was reinforced when she signed up as a graduate student of Party history and read all the works of Lenin, whose lack of any political principles shocked her. She refused to write a Ph.D. dissertation on Lenin. Nevertheless, she was offered a position as lecturer of Marxism-Leninism, which she did not accept. Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech shocked her even further, revealing as it did the full extent of Stalin's terror. But basically she had rejected Leninism, not just Stalinism, already about 1954, and in 1965, most naturally, she found herself a member of the human rights movement in the USSR.³

Even more remarkable is the career of Major-General Petro Hryhorenko⁴ (Grigorenko), who was born in 1907. Had it not been for his decision to challenge the regime as early as September 7, 1961, at a district Party conference in Moscow, which elected delegates to the 22nd Party Congress, he would have risen high and then retired in full honors, instead of having been stripped of his Soviet citizenship on February 13, 1978, and being forced to spend his old age in foreign exile. In September, 1961, he was a highly decorated general officer (one order of Lenin, four lesser ones and seven military medals), the author of 83
works in military science, the Head of the Department of Cybernetics at the Frunze Military Academy, with a completed dissertation for the highest Soviet academic degree, Doctor of Science. Within a few months his career would be in ruin: he lost all his positions at the Military Academy, his dissertation was taken off the schedule for defense and would soon be plagiarized ("they took it away, and carried it away stealthily, piece by piece, those . . . jackals," as he bitterly told one of the authors during an interview in March 1979). Hryhorenko in 1961, at the age of fifty-four, began a second career: that of a defender of human rights (he dislikes the Western term dissident).

Like Yuri Orlov, the tall general is of peasant stock. He worked on the railroad and in industry, however; became politically active. In 1927 he headed the Komsomol organization in his factory and was accepted into the Party. In 1929, on a special workers' quota, he was admitted to the Kharkov Institute of Technology, where he majored in construction engineering. In 1931 he was drafted into the Red Army that sent him to complete his engineering education to the Kuibyshev Military Technical Academy. His breakthrough came in the remarkable year of 1937, the height of the Great Purge, when on political grounds alone (i.e., not because of any academic military qualifications) he was admitted to the Academy of the General Staff. He made good progress, however: two years later he was graduated from the Academy with highest distinction (diplom a otlichiem). After a distinguished war record he obtained the degree of a Ph.D. (kandidat) of military science and the position of an Assistant Professor (dotsent) at the Frunze Academy in 1949.
What turned Major-General Hryhorenko against the regime were infringements of Party democracy (abridgement of the freedom to criticize, repression of the critics, high supplemental salaries paid to top Party officials). Hryhorenko's bold speech at the September 1961 Party meeting was witnessed by then Secretary of the Central Committee Boris Ponomarev, who has remained his enemy ever since. Stripped of his positions in Moscow, Hryhorenko was banished to Army service in the Soviet Far East. In the fall of 1963 he and twelve of his friends founded a secret circle for the rebirth of true Leninism. In February 1964 he was arrested and soon put into a special psychiatric hospital. Almost as soon as he was released in April 1965, Hryhorenko returned to defending human rights. Thus in September 1965 he protested against the arrests of the Soviet writer Sinyavsky and Daniel, and in the spring of 1968 he protested against the threat of an invasion of Czechoslovakia.

It is through his defense of the rights of the Crimean Tatars since the spring of 1967, however, that General Hryhorenko has achieved initial fame as dissenter. It is a good indication of his lack of national prejudice, since differences over the rights of the Crimean Tatars and those of the Russians and Ukrainians who are now settled in the Crimea are bound to occur. The eventual return of the Crimean Tatars is such a sensitive topic that First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party and alternate All-Union Politburo member Sh. Rashidov (in whose republic most of the Crimean Tatars are presently living) undoubtedly committed a telling slip of the tongue when he said at a Party meeting that Hryhorenko's protest against the persecution of the Crimean Tatars
was being distributed in eight million (sic) copies. Academician Sakharov sent Hryhorenko a copy of his world-famous 1968 memorandum on Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom for comments, which were readily accepted by the author. (Hryhorenko finally met Sakharov in person in 1974 and has been a member of his circle ever since.) Hryhorenko's second arrest in Tashkent in May 1969 and his second incarceration in two psychiatric hospitals until June 1974 further added to his great prestige among defenders of Soviet human rights.

In short, it would have been difficult for anybody but tolerant Yuri Orlov to assemble a more varied and more distinguished Moscow Helsinki Watch Committee. When within a year of its foundation the Soviet authorities allowed three of its founding members to emigrate: Professor Vitaly Rubin to Israel June 17, 1976, Mikhail Bernshtam to Israel September 29, 1976, and Lyudmila Alekseeva to the United States February 22, 1977, they were replaced by electronic engineer and Jewish "refusenik" Vladimir Slepak (June 17, 1976), by Doctor of Sciences physicist Yuri Mniukh (January 5, 1977) and Doctor of Sciences mathematician Naum Meiman (January 14, 1977). Those were the members of the Moscow Group at the time that the establishment of the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Georgian, and Armenian groups became an issue (early November 1976 to early April 1977). But why had the Moscow Watch Committee been founded in the first place?

The establishment of the Moscow Group resulted from several long-term factors and several more immediate causes both inside and outside the USSR. One of the veterans of the human rights movement in the USSR,
the exiled Valery Chalidze writes that the dissenters who had previously
sent appeals to Soviet governmental authorities were turning outward:

With time we began to address our documents and
appeals to international public opinion, Communist
parties abroad, international organizations and even
foreign governments.\textsuperscript{8}

Dr. Chalidze attributes this turn outward to a philosophical reason, the
belief in "the responsibility of a government for its human rights
violations before the international community of nations."\textsuperscript{9} This was
undoubtedly in the minds of the leaders of the movement. But other,
more practical considerations may also have been involved.

As has already been suggested in the preceding chapter 3 a
decade of fairly widespread dissent legitimized by appeals to the Soviet
Constitution and to a lesser extent the UN Universal Declaration of
Human Rights did not strongly influence the popular masses in the Soviet
Union. The dissenters were, however, warmly welcomed by liberal Western
public opinion, though not always by Western governmental leaders such
as President Gerald R. Ford, who, on Dr. Kissinger's advice, refused to
receive Alexander Solzhenitsyn when he came to the United States in 1975
on the last leg of his exile.\textsuperscript{10} The power of non-official Western opinion
leaders helped Solzhenitsyn to go into exile in 1974, as the year before
the intervention of Dr. Philip Handler, President of American Academy
of Sciences had helped to cut short the attacks on Academician Sakharov.\textsuperscript{11}
In the beginning at least, Soviet dissenters may have found greater
sympathy abroad than among the popular masses at home.

Western radio stations such as \textit{Radio Liberty, BBC, Voice of
America, Deutsche Welle} were also indispensable to publicize the
activities of the dissenters to potential adherents in the USSR. In hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Mr. Vladimir Bukovsky said:

Such radio stations as Radio Liberty and Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation are for all practical purposes the only source of information for people who live in the Soviet Union. Even the wardens in Vladimir Prison are very careful to listen to what the radio says from the West. And quite a few of them informed us secretly, on the sly, what they had heard on Western radio.\textsuperscript{12}

According to Mrs. Alekseeva, even people who are loyal to the regime but curious to find out what was "really" going on in the Soviet Union would tune in to Western stations. Questions about the ability of the receiver to catch "you know what" had become so common that salespeople in Moscow department stores would themselves tune the receivers to foreign stations, to demonstrate the sets' acceptability.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, no matter what the philosophical and legal arguments may have been, very practical considerations worked in the same direction: to better reach their Soviet fellow-citizens the dissenters would have to mobilize Western public opinion.

Another long term factor which predisposed the dissenters to turn to the Helsinki Final Act rather than other international obligations, was their growing disillusionment with the United Nations. Evidence for this is, admittedly sparse, but it does rest on two independent sources. A Ukrainian dissenter who was very close to the Ukrainian Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in an interview mentioned seemingly offhandedly that her fellow dissenters had after some reflection grasped the Helsinki Final Act as a good base for action, they had been
disappointed in their earlier reliance on the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovsky who admittedly has not been directly involved in the work of the Moscow Group, is quite bitter about the West in general and the UN in particular. He writes:

I had never entertained any illusions about the West. Hundreds of desperate petitions addressed, for example, to the UN, had never been answered. Wasn't this sufficient indication? Even from Soviet institutions you got an answer--maybe senseless, but it came. But over there the ground just swallowed them up.

Several short-range factors made the dissenters' appeal to the Helsinki Final Act understandable. Brezhnev had become personally identified as a strong supporter of the Helsinki Conference, the signing of the Act was presented as a Soviet diplomatic triumph, and the Act itself was more publicized in the Soviet press than in serious American papers. There is at least anecdotal evidence that some simple Soviet citizens took the obligations of the Soviet government quite seriously. If eventually the Final Act turned out to be another solemn international obligation that the Soviet government would honor more in the breach, in 1975 and 1976 it was at least fresh in the minds of many Soviet citizens, not only among the dissenters.

Secondly, within several weeks of the signing of the Final Act, some activists among the Soviet dissenters had made contact with a visiting American congressional delegation. They had successfully persuaded the Americans that the human rights provisions of the Act should be taken seriously. Major advances in setting up some kind of Congressional monitoring body had been made by May 1976.
Thirdly, the American Presidential campaign of 1976 was warming up. President Ford was criticized for not receiving Solzhenitsyn even from within his own Party, by Governor Ronald Reagan and Senator Jesse A. Helms, Jr., Senator Henry M. Jackson, a Presidential contender again as in 1972, was very well known in Soviet dissenters' circles as the author of the Jackson amendment to the US-Soviet trade bill of 1974. The then Governor Carter could also be regarded as a defender of human rights: he could certainly not be worse than President Ford who tended to defer on that issue to Dr. Kissinger.

If considerable public interest in the Final Act in the Soviet Union and an acute political interest in the Helsinki Conference in Congress and in the Presidential primary campaigns of early 1976 were not enough to push the Soviet dissenters into organizing, there was one last inducement: the prospect that in 1977 the performance of each country would be reviewed at the Belgrade follow-up conference. Obviously the Soviet government would try to make a farce out of Belgrade, and the leaders of the Soviet dissenters were just as determined to work to keep the Belgrade Conference honest.

In its first announcement the Moscow Group promised to accept and forward to other signatories of the Final Act any complaints by Soviet citizens about violations of their rights as outlined in the Final Act. The Group would also conduct investigations of its own and would request from the signatories the establishment of International Investigating Committees to examine especially inhumane policies such as the taking away of children from religious parents, the abuse of
psychiatric hospitals for political purposes, etc. (nationality problems, however, were not mentioned). The Moscow Group expressed hope that its materials would be taken into consideration at all future meetings provided by the Final Act (i.e., implicitly at the Belgrade Conference) and called on the public in the signatories' states to form their own national Groups for the Promotion of the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords (later an International Committee for the Promotion of the Helsinki Accords could be formed).20

What has been the relationship of the Moscow Group to the non-Russian nations and nationalities? Several members of the Group, as we have already seen, were not ethnic Russians and the Group should have been sensitized to the nationality issue. At the very least, members of the Moscow Group helped to publicize abroad the establishment of all the four non-Russian groups and continued to transmit to Western correspondents materials about their subsequent activities. There were simply not enough Western correspondents and diplomats in the republican capitals: all the correspondence abroad appeared to go via Moscow. More than that, from the very beginning there was a good working relationship established between the Moscow and the Lithuanian Group, and that between the Moscow and the Ukrainian Group was relatively smooth in that the Ukrainians had wisely requested Major-General Hryhorenko to join the Ukrainian Group as well and to serve as representative of the Ukrainian Group to the Moscow Group. The Moscow Group and the republican Groups also issued a number of joint documents (e.g., document No. 1 of the Lithuanian Group on the persecution of the Lithuanian bishops Julionas Steponavicius and Vincentas Sladkevicius was signed by all members of
the Lithuanian Group and was cosigned by Moscow Group leader Yuri Orlov and by Lyudmila Alekseeva (reproduced in Appendix, pp. A-84ff). The Moscow Group over the signatures of Lyudmila Alekseeva, Malva Landa, Yuri Orlov, Aleksander Ginzburg, Anatoly Shcharansky and Vladimir Slepak on November 12, 1976, warmly welcomed the recent establishment of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group "as an act of great courage." 21 The two Groups—the Moscow and the Ukrainian Group—in the summer of 1977 jointly issued two moving and long documents in which they protest against the persecution of all Helsinki Group members in general and those of Ukrainian Group members Rudenko and Tykhy in particular. 22 A formal documentary analysis would reveal the weight of documents on nationality issues among the total output of the Moscow Group. By May 22, 1978, the Moscow Group issued 51 documents, 47 of which had been identified by title by Dr. Albert Boiter in Volume 30 of Sobranie dokumentov samizdata. Out of those 47, 14 deal with non-Russian issues (see list of titles in Appendix, pp. A-7ff). By the end of August 1979 the number of documents issued by the Moscow Group had grown to at least 99. Of the second group of 48 documents, 7 dealt with nationality questions. Thus 21 Moscow documents out of 99 or a little over 20 percent were devoted to nationality questions (see in Appendix, ibidem).

Closer documentary analysis would reveal that while the original announcement of the Moscow Group of May 12, 1976, did not mention the nationality problem, two later memoranda addressed to the Belgrade Conference, of February 27, 1977 and November 21, 1977, do make references to national discrimination against Crimean Tatars, the Meskhetians, and the Jews and do include protests against the persecution
of non-Russian political prisoners qua individuals, not so much qua representatives of their particular nationality. It would seem that while the Moscow Group would give full treatment to nationalities that have not been represented by their own Helsinki Watch Committees, e.g., the Crimean Tatars, in the case of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Georgians, and Armenians the Moscow Group would comment on the fate of individuals—apparently leaving it to the non-Russian groups themselves to deal with broader ethnic issues.

What have been the organizational relations between the Moscow Group and the republican groups? Given the centralized nature of the Soviet Party and Government structure and given the fact that the Moscow Group originally called itself Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR it might be assumed that the Moscow Watch Committee was the central "All-Union" Helsinki Committee and the republican committees only branches. This impression is misleading, and in order to counteract it the Moscow Group started calling itself the Moscow Helsinki Group after the formation of the non-Russian Groups, though perhaps not very consistently. On the basis of three interviews which one of us conducted with two members of the Moscow Group and a competent outside observer the following can be stated.

The Moscow Group regarded the republican Helsinki Groups as fully independent entities and vice versa. In the interests of the common cause, the Moscow Group made available to them its experience and its superior access facilities to Western correspondents and diplomats. The Moscow Group did not want to even try to subordinate the non-Russian
Groups. First, it would not have succeeded and only caused unnecessary resentment in Kiev, Vilnius, Tbilisi and Erevan. Second, members of the Moscow Group felt that in their relative lack of experience in the open struggle for human rights the national Groups might come out with some document which the Moscow Group could not endorse. Legally, the Moscow Group could not and would not accept responsibility for the output of the republican Groups. Morally, the Moscow Group did feel obliged to help the republican Groups to advance their objectives. Does this imply that all members of the Moscow Group viewed with sympathy possible demands by their republican counterparts for such national rights as independence as opposed to only civil rights of individuals (all members of the Moscow Group were, of course, in favor of the latter)? Not necessarily. Though it has not been recorded in any document that we know of all members of the Moscow Group agreed that the nationalities should have the right of national self-determination; with which the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Georgians and Armenians could not but agree. Acceptance of his right of national self-determination was a good political strategy since—if only on paper—that right is still guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution and a cardinal principle of the Helsinki Groups was that they would act within written Soviet law. But what would happen if under presently unpredictable circumstances a non-Russian Soviet people would actually opt to leave the Union? Our considered impression is that members of the Moscow Group would abide by the will of the people without any hesitation in the case of the separation of the Baltic republics (the incorporation of the three Baltic states in 1940 was considered such a shocking violation of international law and
morality) but only with a heavy heart in case of the Ukraine. Their attitude toward a possible separation of Georgia and Armenia might lie in between those two extremes, and the secession of those two republics—or at least that of Armenia—might be considered to be less likely than that of Lithuania and the Ukraine, e.g. To repeat, nothing on this has been committed to paper on behalf of the Moscow Group, it is merely an impression gained in interviews.

To conclude the sketch of the Moscow Group, a few words about repressions by the regime. Yuri Orlov at first outwitted the KGB in that he announced the establishment of the Moscow Group to Western correspondents May 12, 1976, before they could deliver a summons to him to appear at the KGB offices May 13, 1976, to be given a formal warning against the formation of the Group. In February-March 1977 the KGB retaliated by arresting Orlov (February 10, 1977) after having arrested Ginzburg a week before (February 3, 1977) and before arresting Sharansky (March 15, 1977). In well publicized trials, Orlov was sentenced to 7 years of strict regimen camp and 5 years of exile for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (May 18, 1978), Ginzburg drew 8 years for the same offense in a special regime camp (a stricter camp) on July 13, 1978, and Shcharansky, with the help of an agent-provocateur who volunteered his services to the CIA, was tried for treason and sentenced to 3 years in prison followed by 10 years in a strict-regimen camp (July 14, 1978).

While in terms of numbers the Moscow Group has not been hard hit (e.g., the proportion of the Ukrainian, Georgian and Armenian Group members who have been jailed is higher than in Moscow), the severity of
the sentences is still shocking. At first the KGB investigation was conducted on the basis of the capital charge of treason for all three: Orlov and Ginzburg, as well as Shcharansky. It was only later, after many death threats to Orlov and Ginzburg, that only Shcharansky was actually put on trial for treason. Of Orlov Ginzburg, who was one of the five Soviet political prisoners who, April 27, 1979, were exchanged against two convicted Soviet spies had the following to say:

Since the days of Stalin, no scientist of his stature has been imprisoned in Soviet camps . . . Ten years of manual labor, during which he will have no opportunity to practice his profession, will kill him as a scientist. To him this prospect is surely more bitter than actual physical death.

At the time of writing (February 1980) it is still too early to assess the impact of the exile to Gorky of the two Sakharovs on the work of the Moscow Group. It is likely to be a major blow. But the Group seems to have weathered the arrest of Orlov, Ginzburg and Shcharansky, it might perhaps also overcome the exile of Elena Bonner and Academician Sakharov. If it really comes to the worst, a kind of international Helsinki Group or Groups will be established in the camps.

(b) The Ukrainian Group

The first nationality group to become organized were the Ukrainians: November 9, 1976, the establishment in Kiev of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords was announced. Its founding members were the writer, poet and former
Party official Mykola Rudenko, as Group Leader, the poet and writer of
science fiction Oles Berdnyk, the former Major-General Petro Hryhorenko,
the lawyer Levko Lukianenko, Mrs. Oksana Meshko, and Mrs. Nina Strokata-
Karavansky. These are the names that are listed in the brief press
release of November 11, 1976. A few others were apparently either in
the process of joining the Group (the press release mentions "and others")
or applied for membership within a few days. Thus the first formal
Declaration of the Ukrainian Group has also been signed by lawyer Ivan
Kandyba, historian Mykola Matusevych, electronics engineer Myrosla
Marynovych, and former secondary school teacher Oleksii Tykhy (see
Appendix below, pp. A-09ff). Of Kandyba we are told that he joined the
Group by November 14, after hearing of its establishment on radio, i.e.,
on one of the Western broadcasts to the USSR (see Open Letter by M.

There were fewer natural scientists in the Ukrainian Group than
in the Moscow Group, and the Ukrainian writers were perhaps more
professional (e.g., in a roundabout way through a censor's instruction
one can learn that Rudenko is the author of 19 books with a combined
printing of 1.2 million copies), but the only real strength of the
Ukrainian Group might have been in having two lawyers from the very
beginning. In terms of age the Ukrainian, similar to the Moscow Group,
ranged from Matusevych (born in 1946) and Marynovych (born in 1949) to
Oksana Meshko (born in 1905).

But the three most important differences in the composition of
the two Groups were the following. The Moscow Group included members
of several nationalities: Russians (Orlov, Alekseeva, Marchenko), Jews and part-Jews (Bonner, Ginzburg, Landa, Rubin, and Shcharansky) and one Ukrainian (Hryhorenko), the nationality of Bernshtam and Korchak is not known. The Kievan Group has been composed exclusively of Ukrainians (three of the charter members—Kandyba, Marynovych and Matusevych were originally from Western Ukraine, the others from Eastern Ukraine).

Secondly, a higher proportion of Ukrainian Group members had been political prisoners than members of the Moscow Group. Apart from Ginzburg, Hryhorenko and Marchenko, all the other members of the Moscow Group could be considered by the regime as first offenders. The Ukrainian Group on the contrary, bristled with "recidivists"—Peter Vins, who joined the Group in February 1977, testified: "The Ukrainian Helsinki Group can quite rightly be called a Group of former political prisoners—a fact that reflects the overall situation in Ukraine." Apart from Hryhorenko, there was Oles Berdnyk (in labor camps from 1949-1956), Ivan Kandyba (had served 15 years, 1961-1976), Lev Lukianenko (initially had been sentenced to death in 1961, his sentence was commuted to 15 years imprisonment, which he served in full), Oksana Meshko had been in labor camps from 1947-56 (or at least until 1955) her son Oleksander Serhiienko in 1976 was a political prisoner in Vladimir Prison; Nina Strokata in 1971 had been sentenced to four years in strict regime camps for energetically defending her husband Sviatoslav Karavansky (his total imprisonment was 30 years) and lived in exile in Russia when the Group was formed; and Oleksii Tykhy had spent some seven years (1957-1964) in strict-regime camps. Apart from General Hryhorenko,
the best known of the dissenters were Lukianenko and Kandyba: in 1960 they had advocated a Ukrainian Workers and Peasants' Union that would peacefully agitate for a separation of the Ukraine from Russia, they were tried in the secret jurists' trial of May 1961. Karavansky himself, though not his wife, had briefly belonged to the West Ukrainian right-wing Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) but essentially was a literary scholar and human rights activist; Berdnyk and Meshko appear to have been persecuted by Stalin for a variety of cultural Ukrainian nationalism. Altogether, out of the ten founding members of the Ukrainian Group only three—Rudenko, Marynovych and Matusyevych—did not have any previous imprisonment record.

Thirdly, though Mrs. Alekseeva, Major-General Hryhorenko and Professor Orlov, of the Moscow Group had been active Party members, they never held a high Party office like Rudenko.

Mykola Rudenko, the leader of the Ukrainian Group, can serve as another fascinating example of the disillusioned Soviet elite, like Petro Hryhorenko and like Andrei Sakharov. (Rudenko, by the way, had become personally acquainted with both.) Rudenko was born in 1920 into the family of a part-time coal-miner in the Donets Basin, one of the most heavily Russified provinces in the Ukraine. In 1937, while still in high school, Rudenko published his first poem, for which he won a prize of the Ukrainian SSR People's Commissariat of Education. In 1939 he entered Kiev University, where he stayed only one month before enlisting for military service, despite his poor eyesight. In 1939 Rudenko was considered an absolutely loyal Soviet citizen, with just the right
proletarian background. At the age of 18 he was already a candidate Party member. Young Rudenko was not assigned to a regular army unit, but to the most privileged, the Dzerzhinski Cavalry Division of the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, predecessor of the MGB and KGB), the elite of the most trusted internal security troops. In Rudenko's own words:

It was a division for special assignments, its mission being to guard the Government, the Kremlin, the [Lenin] Mausoleum, Stalin's villa and the road which he would use to drive to his villa. We manned the horse patrols in the [nearby] forests. We would take part in military parades, after which we, Beria's sky blue cavalrymen, would hide by squadrons in the neighboring homesteads. Our satchels full of live ammunition. What for, why?38

Rudenko chafed under his privileges: he wanted to fight at the front, not spend the Great Patriotic War in a special NKVD division guarding Stalin's residence. (Later he learnt that his old NKVD division took part in the forcible resettlement of the Crimean Tatars.) Promoted to full Party member, Rudenko finally succeeded in being sent to a school for political commissars in the Leningrad area. He took part in the defense of Leningrad, was seriously wounded (an explosive bullet tore off a chunk of flesh from his back, he spent a year in a military hospital, has been suffering grievous pains even today, almost forty years after being wounded).

After the war, Rudenko made a brilliant literary and political career. From 1947-1971 eleven collections of Rudenko's poetry were officially published in the Soviet Union; also two novels, one of which, Viter v oblychchia (Wind Blowing into One's Face) went through three
editions and two printings of a Russian translation, with a total press run of 375,000 copies in Ukrainian and Russian; and a volume of short stories and essays. It helped Rudenko initially that he was a Party member, a former NKVD man, and a wounded war veteran, but ultimately many Ukrainians and Russians came to admire him as a talented, but readable poet and able prose writer.

In the later 1940’s Rudenko was also the model of political orthodoxy. In 1946 he wrote a highly laudatory poem dedicated to Russia. He enthusiastically embraced Zhdanovism, decried the "burden of national narrow-mindedness" in the work of Ukrainian fellow-poets, including that of the dean of Ukrainian neo-classicists Maksym Rylsky, who for a long time was under attack in 1947. It is not without interest today to read Rudenko’s apparently sincere outburst of that year: "The [Ukrainian] nationalists were and have continued to be the most evil (zleishimi) enemies of the Ukrainian people." Rudenko reaped his political reward: from 1947-1950, i.e., at the height of the Stalinist period, he held the position of editor-in-chief of the Kievan literary journal Dnipro and was simultaneously Deputy Secretary, then Secretary of Party organization of the Union of Writers of the Ukraine: the political commissar from Leningrad had become the chief political watchdog of the Ukrainian writers.

What went wrong from Rudenko’s point of view? Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin speech of 1956 really shocked him.

I felt that I, too, was responsible for [Stalin’s] crimes. I, too, had shown off the sky blue hat [of the NKVD]. I prided myself that I had once guarded the Leader."
In the early 1960's Rudenko started to write some poetry for his "writing desk drawer," i.e., not for official publication, and he also began methodically sending off secret complaints to the Party Central Committee, in which he questioned the value of orthodox Marxism and criticized government policy. Unfortunately those letters have not reached the West, their contents may be inferred from his Economic Monologues. Nevertheless, the regime continued to publish Rudenko until 1971. His anti-Marxist Economic Monologues were read in manuscript by Academician A. Sakharov and even more by Sakharov's associate Professor Valentin F. Turchin—they offered him criticism and advice on scientific matters. Rudenko was profoundly impressed by both, especially by Sakharov. He wrote: "As far as my political views were concerned, that question was not discussed at all. A. D. Sakharov and V. F. Turchin possess such a broad perspective and such tolerance, which make them genuine democrats."44

Turchin being the Chairman of the Soviet Chapter of Amnesty International since October 1973, Rudenko joined that chapter some time between then and April 1975 (the exact date of his admission could not be established). April 18, 1975, Rudenko was arrested for membership in Amnesty International but released after two days of preliminary detention (another member of AI, Andrei Tverdokhlebov who had been arrested at the same time was held over for trial).45 Prior to his arrest, Rudenko had already been expelled from the Party; May 27, 1975, he was expelled from the Union of Writers of the Ukraine; and in February 1976 he was committed to the Kiev psycho-neurological clinic
for psychiatric observation. After two months, however, he was released.

Another leading member of the Ukrainian Group is the lawyer Levko Lukianenko, whose political career is widely known. He is a fascinating person. Born in 1927, he was only an adolescent when the German-Soviet war broke out. As a fourteen year old he was forced to transport on a horse cart German ammunition, from one village to another. Levko arranged for Soviet partisans to steal three boxes of ammunition. For this the Germans sentenced him to be shot. Literally at the last minute a German officer commanded that his life be spared. He then served nine years in the Soviet Army, from which he was admitted directly to Moscow University Law School. According to a fellow student, he was average in his studies, but excelled as a civic minded activist. Lukianenko's joining the Ukrainian Group in the same year that he was released from camp (after his life had been spared a second time, by Khrushchev in 1961) was an act of heroism and self-sacrifice. An associate of the Group has described him as a dedicated, moral and deeply religious man (in the 1950's he had been a Party member, but had been expelled by 1961). Because of his suffering, his legal expertise and his ability to harmoniously work with others he has been one of the most respected members of the Ukrainian Group.

Why was a separate Ukrainian Group set up at all in November 1976? A key concept which underlay the formation of the Moscow Group was the involvement of the public in each of the signatory states in watching over the implementation of the many promises made in the
Helsinki Final Act. This would help their being fulfilled and incidentally it would also help to spread the responsibility of the organizers vis-à-vis their own potentially hostile governments. Orlov and his associates in Moscow did not want to be the only group from among the thirty-five signatory states: the establishment of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the summer of 1976 was welcome news indeed. A delicate question, however, was posed by the Ukrainian defenders of human rights: what should be the attitude of the Moscow Group if some of the major nationalities demanded the establishment of separate but allied Helsinki Watch Committees? From the formal legal view the challenge would have to be rejected: none of the Soviet republics had signed the final Act. But would such a rejection have been really fair in terms of both official Soviet politics (that gave lip service to federalism) and in terms of the realities of the politics of dissent (mass dissent often flourished outside of Moscow, witness, e.g., the Crimean Tatars and the Lithuanian Catholics). Ultimately, the Moscow Group did nothing to discourage the initiative of the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Georgian, and Armenian dissenters to form their own Groups, the more so since personal ties between the leaders in Moscow and in the republics already existed. Rudenko and Orlov, e.g., had worked together in the Soviet Chapter of Amnesty International. It should be stressed that the initiative to form the Ukrainian Group did come from Rudenko. One sentence in the Moscow press release of November 11, 1976, announcing the establishment of the Group appears to say precisely the opposite: "In response to the appeal of the Group to Promote the Implementation of
the Helsinki Accords in the USSR to establish national groups

November 9, 1976, in Kiev the Ukrainian Group was founded . . . "

The sentence is deliberately misleading: it had been written to shift
the responsibility for the organization of the Ukrainian Group onto
the relatively strong and established Moscow Group, which would serve
as a kind of protective umbrella for the brand new Group in Kiev. 49

Why did Rudenko take the initiative when he did? The timing
itself is easy to explain: in 1977 there was to be the first review
conference in Belgrade. The reason why Rudenko did act at all can be
inferred from the First Declaration of the Ukrainian Group and even
better from Memorandum No. 2. The Declaration states briefly in the
first paragraph and then again as Group objective No. 3, and
Memorandum No. 2 argues at length, that the Ukrainian SSR should have
been represented by its own delegation at the Helsinki Conference.
There has been a plausible rumor in the diplomatic community, which we
could not confirm from independent sources, that the Foreign Ministry
of the Ukrainian SSR had requested the USSR Government for permission
to go to Helsinki in 1973, but was turned down. Be it as it may, there
are more cogent reasons for the representation at Helsinki of the
Ukrainian SSR than that of such microstates as San Marino and
Liechtenstein. If the rumor is correct, as we would be inclined to
assume, Rudenko's action becomes even more understandable: he and his
associates would act to defend human rights in the Ukraine and would
also make up for the glaring omission of the republic from the Helsinki
Conference, despite the "request" of the official Ukrainian Party elite.
There is at least one indication of resentment of highhanded central policies in official Ukrainian circles, and the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Committee may have felt that they were also acting on behalf of the latter and could, therefore, expect discreet protection for their efforts. Such a protection, however, would have been easier to obtain in the 1960's under Party Secretary Shelest than since 1972 under his successor Shcherbitsky.

There was, of course, no lack of violations of general human rights in the Ukraine such as widespread arrests, mistreatments of prisoners of conscience, and similar. But in addition, there were specific conditions in the republic, and the Ukrainian dissidents felt that they would be more effective in combating them than even the most sympathetic Group in Moscow. Implicitly, six members of that Group—Lyudmila Alekseeva, Malva Landa, Yuri Orlov, Aleksander Ginzburg, Anatoly Shcharansky, and Vladimir Slepak—may have recognized this when they wrote November 12, 1976: "The formation of the Ukrainian Public Group under the conditions that reign in Ukraine is an act of great manliness." In the second section of Memorandum No. 1 of the Ukrainian Group the tone is set: "From the first years of Stalinist dictatorship Ukraine became the scene of genocide and ethnocide" (see Appendix, p. A-16). The implication—perhaps unwarranted—is that other republics have avoided that fate. The Ukrainian language is no longer heard in the streets of Ukrainian cities (see p. A-17). In the 1960's, the national (i.e., nationality) question is paramount (p. A-18). The long impassioned section ends with the assertion:
We could cite dozens of examples where Ukrainian nationalism, real or imagined, leads to inhuman sentences. This clearly shows that it is not Soviet authority that conducts the trials (for Soviet laws do not permit trials for nationalism protective of legal rights), but fanatical Great Russian chauvinists. Power, not Law, sits in judgment (p. A-23).

In his open letter of November 14, 1976, Mykola Rudenko is more restrained and more explicit:

Our objective is an exclusively humanitarian one: to promote the implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the field of human rights. But we cannot bypass the nationality question: the majority of the Ukrainian political prisoners have been sentenced for alleged or real nationalism (see p. A-37).

Finally, the last reason for the Ukrainian defenders of human and national rights to organize themselves in November 1976 was Rudenko's thinking that so long as there was only the Moscow Group, other republican Groups would not come forward. The establishment of the Ukrainian Group, however, would act as a precedent for other republican Groups to get organized. This is what happened: by April 1, 1977, the Lithuanian, Georgian, and Armenian Groups have been set up.52

What did the Ukrainian Group do? What has been its impact on the citizens of the republic and on the regime? Essentially the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Committee publicly continued the protests of the anonymous authors of the Ukrainian Herald, that central journal of the Ukrainian samizdat of the early 1970's.53 There were two additional differences, however. In theory at least, if not always in practice, the documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group were more pointed by reference to the Helsinki Final Act (the Herald would refer
to the Soviet Constitution, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, intrinsic human and national rights). Secondly, the implicit dialogue between the Moscow based *Chronicle of Current Events* and the *Ukrainian Herald* has emerged onto the surface with the Helsinki Groups. The movement for human and national rights in the Ukraine clearly joined forces with the prominent and better known movement in Moscow.

The documentary output of the Ukrainian Group has been high. Since its establishment in November 1976 through late summer 1979 the Group, according to the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, published over thirty declarations and appeals and ten informational bulletins. Included are two programmatic documents (its initial Declaration of November 9, 1976 [see Appendix, pp. A-09ff] and its first anniversary Manifesto, which latter was signed only by Oles Berdnyk), eighteen memoranda on violations of both individual and collective rights, and the ten informational bulletins. Of the memoranda that have reached the West (Nos. 1-2, 4-9, 11, and 18—all of them in Appendix, pp. A-14 to A-80) Nos. 4, 8-9, and 11 dealt with individual cases alone, while the others were addressed to violations of national rights, with infringements of individual rights as a secondary theme. The authoritative collection of Ukrainian Group documents published in 1978 in Ukrainian by the Washington based Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee comprises fifty-six documents exclusive of the more recent informational bulletins. Included in that collection have been letters that are directly relevant to the work of the Group, written by individual members or jointly by several members, miscellaneous appeals, etc.
One of the most impressive recent documents is that by new Ukrainian Group member Yuri Lytvyn, who formally entered the Group March 6, 1979. Writes Lytvyn in his individual article "The Movement for the Defense of Rights in the Ukraine, its Principles and its Perspectives":

In its activity the Ukrainian Group is guided by legal principles which have been expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of the Rights of Peoples and Nations, both of which have been ratified by the majority of world's powers as well as by the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords (sic), which has been signed by thirty-five world powers. In its defense of rights the Ukrainian Group does not exclude the nationality question. Especially not the Ukrainian question which has neither been solved by the "Great October Socialist Revolution" nor by the sixty-years' rule "of the government of the Soviets" in the Ukraine. The question of national self-determination is the most urgent problem in the life of the Ukrainian society.

Had the Ukrainian Group for the defense of rights excluded that problem from its activity, it would have lost its national and social individuality and would not have been able to truly fulfill its functions in the defense of human rights.

The defense of rights and freedoms of man without the defense of the rights and freedoms of the nation is utterly unfounded.

According to its principles, the Ukrainian Group for the defense of rights has to wage its struggle with the policy of official and unofficial great power [i.e., Russian --Y.B.] chauvinism in all of its various manifestations, must defend the right of the nation to its independent development, without which one cannot wage an effective struggle for social and personal freedom.

The Group will likewise combat any manifestations of any national hostility whatsoever [that may emerge] in the Ukrainian SSR.

Admission to the Ukrainian Public Helsinki Group is not limited by nationality background, by professional, educational and other characteristics. Into the Group are
admitted all those persons who share the general principles of the movement for the defense of human rights as a whole and their national specificities in particular. The Group wagers and will continue to wage a struggle against any political tendencies whatsoever in the movement for the defense of [human] rights.59

A possible weakness of the activity of the Ukrainian group which Lytvyn alludes to in his semi-polemical statement, has been the inability of the Group to attract non-Ukrainian, specifically Jewish, members. This was not for lack of trying on the part of the Ukrainian Group. Non-Ukrainians were, however, among the informal associates or "corresponding members" of the Group: e.g., the Moldavian Vasili Barladianu, a teacher at Odessa University, helped to distribute Group documents, and Iosif Zisels, a Jewish physicist from Chernivtsi, was both concerned with victims of psychiatric repression in the Ukraine and was actively defending the rights of believers in Western Ukraine. Unnamed Jewish activists were offered membership in the Group but they declined, evidently fearing that this would have exposed them to even greater persecution.60

How have been the relations of the Ukrainian Group with other non-Russian Groups and with the Moscow Group? Shortly before his arrest in February 1977 Rudenko is said to have discussed the desirability of establishing systematic direct ties with the Lithuanian and Georgian Groups so as to exchange experiences with them. But nothing came of these plans due to the quick repressive action of the regime. Whatever personal contacts existed between the Ukrainian and Lithuanian defenders of human rights, e.g., were strictly episodic.
Relations with the Moscow Group were much better, organized as they had to be, for Moscow served as the channel for the distribution of the Ukrainian Group documents abroad. Rudenko also had had the foresight of persuading General Hryhorenko to act as the Ukrainian Group's representative to the Moscow Group. The arrangement, as Gen. Hryhorenko told one of the authors was as follows: All the documents of the Ukrainian Group were channelled to Hryhorenko. If Hryhorenko agreed with them, he signed them and passed them on abroad, without having to obtain any permission from the Moscow Group who trusted him and did not demand that they be kept informed. If Hryhorenko disagreed with a document he advised the Ukrainian fellow-Group members in Kiev and other places of his reasons. They could agree with him and subsequently modify or at least delay the document in question, or if they disagreed with Hryhorenko's judgment the document was forwarded abroad without Hryhorenko's signature. General Hryhorenko told Bilinsky that he disagreed with other members of the Kievan Group twice. He found Memorandum No. 2, dated January 20, 1977, to be too provocatively nationalistic in tone: he feared that it could bring about immediate repressions against the Ukrainian Group, which was still very young. Only for tactical reasons did he advise that it be delayed, and other members of the Kiev Group agreed. When Rudenko and Tykhy, however, were arrested February 5, 1977, and Memorandum No. 2 was found in their possession, there was no reason to hold that memorandum back any longer. Hryhorenko signed the original and forwarded a copy to the West. The absence of his signature under Memorandum No. 2 as published in the West is due to an oversight. Secondly, not only Hryhorenko but
all the other members of the Kiev Group disagreed with the futuristic Manifesto of November 9, 1977, which had been written by science fiction writer Oles Berdnyk: it went out with the names of the other members excised.

An interesting aspect of the relationship between the Moscow and the Ukrainian Group was that the former did not delegate General Hryhorenko to be its representative to the Kievan Group. This was done on purpose to allow members of the Moscow Group to deal directly with any members of the Ukrainian Group if they so desired and vice versa: members of the Kievan Group were not obligated to work through General Hryhorenko exclusively, they could approach anybody from the Moscow Group if they so wished. Bilinsky has learned that one of the founding members of the Moscow Group travelled to Kiev on matters indirectly related to Helsinki Group business and was turned back by the local KGB.

Finally and most obviously, among the documents issued by the Moscow Group we find a goodly number that defend the rights of the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Committee and Ukrainian dissenters in general. They are Document No. 12, of December 2, 1976 (on Ukrainian refugees); two documents in defense of Petro Vins, to wit, No. 28, of December 31, 1977, and 84 of April 14, 1979; two documents in defense of Lukianenko (No. 31, of February 2, 1978, and 59, of August 20, 1978; one document protesting Petro Hryhorenko's deprivation of his Soviet citizenship (No. 41, of March 15, 1978), though General Hryhorenko was, of course, also a member of the Moscow Group; and two
documents commenting, among other things, on repressions against Ukrainian dissenters (No. 82 of March 15, 1979, and No. 99, of August 1979).

What effect has the Ukrainian Group had upon the public in the Ukraine? In their summary report covering the first four months of its existence (Memorandum No. 7) the Group said that they had received "hundreds of letters and complaints from all over the Ukraine" (see Appendix, p. A-61). The existence of the Group was widely publicized by Western radio: Voice of America and Deutsche Welle reached the cities, the more outspoken Radio Liberty could be best heard in the countryside. Sometimes the complaints were impossible to deal with, the role of the Ukrainian Group being sometimes misconstrued as that of an unofficial ombudsman (one example that was given by a former associate of the Group was that of an old woman complaining that the authorities had taken away her cow, could the Ukrainian Helsinki Group please help?). But there were also more conventional complaints by political and non-political prisoners against abuses of the authorities. Most interesting in this respect is Informational Bulletin No. 4 of November 1978. It contains among other things summaries of nine petitions of prisoners, seven of which had been addressed to the Ukrainian Group. One such petition is by Alexander Stepanovich Levin, probably a Jew, who had again been sentenced to nine years and nine months for "especially malicious hooliganism" after already serving ten years. He complains of a juvenile delinquent being brutally mistreated in camp. Another prisoner's petition is from Yuri Leonidovich Fedorov,
who, judging by his name, could be either a Russian or a Ukrainian. A third, Vladimir Ivanovich Shatalov, is most probably a Russian. All of them are serving sentences in a labor camp in the Ukraine and have protested their treatment to the Ukrainian Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. It would seem that at the very least news of the Group's existence had spread to mistreated prisoners--both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian--and to some very ordinary citizens, quite apart from the dissident Ukrainian intelligentsia.

What has been the reaction of the regime? Rudenko is said to have feared immediate repressions, but on his better days, "hoping against hope," he would console himself with the thought that the KGB might want to put the Group on a long leash if only to find out how extensive its popular support was. Rudenko, the pessimist, was, alas, right. On the second night after the Group was formally established and news of this appeared on Western radio (November 10, 1976) unknown "hooligans" heaved several bricks into Rudenko's apartment in a normally very well policed suburb of Kiev. Rudenko himself was not in, but they hit and wounded another member of the Group, the seventy-one year old Mrs. Oksana Meshko (see Rudenko's Open Letter, of November 14, 1976--Appendix, pp. A-37 to 38). After numerous house and body searches Rudenko and Tykhy were arrested February 5, 1977, i.e., less than two months after the establishment of the Group. After an almost perfectly hidden trial in a small town in the Donetsk oblast, some 1,000 kilometers from Kiev, July 1, 1977, they were given very harsh sentences: Rudenko, the war invalid who needs constant medical attention was
sentenced to seven years of hard labor (labor camp with a special [osobogo] regimen) and five years of exile; as a recidivist Tykhy was sentenced to ten years of special regime camp and five years of exile. For several months, however, Rudenko was not sent to camp: the regime wanted to obtain a confession from him in return for a reduced sentence, but failed. The next to be arrested were the two youngest charter members: Martynovych and Marusevych (both on April 23, 1977). March 29, 1978, they were sentenced to seven years in a strict regime camp and five years of exile each. Levko Lukianenko, a leading member of the Group, was arrested December 12, 1977—as a recidivist he was sentenced to ten years of strict regimen camp and five years of exile on July 20, 1978. After the de-facto exile of General Hryhorenko in November 1977, in early 1979 only four founding members remained at large: Oles Berdnyk, Ivan Kandyba, Oksana Meshko and Nina Strokata (Strokata was in fact living under administrative surveillance in Tarusa, Kaluga oblast, RSFSR). Oles Berdnyk was arrested March 6, 1979—December 21, 1979, he was tried and sentenced to six years' imprisonment and three years' exile. November 30, 1979, Nina Strokata was allowed to emigrate with her husband Sviatoslav Karavansky to the United States. When 1979 ended, only two of the original ten members of the Ukrainian Group were still "free": Ivan Kandyba, who is being constantly harrassed, is under resumed administrative surveillance and, though an attorney by profession, has had to work in an electrical appliance factory in a small town in Lviv oblast (he is not allowed into the city itself); and Oksana Meshko (born 1905), who, too, is being constantly harrassed.
Even the early arrests of 1977 could not but have a negative impact on the activity of the Group: some of its Memoranda (notably Nos. 5 and 7 [Appendix, pp. A-47]) bear the imprint of futurologist Berdnyk, who writes well, but not very realistically, very politically. To counteract the repressions, the Ukrainian Group began to accept new members from among its sympathizers: three new members joined in 1977, two in 1978, and as many as fifteen joined in the course of 1979. Petro Vins (born May 1, 1956), who joined the Group immediately upon the arrest of Mykola Rudenko is the most fascinating person from the 1977 contingent. A third generation dissenter at the age of twenty, son of Baptist Minister Georgi Vins, he could have been the Group's link to the well-organized dissident Baptists. After spending two 15 day stretches in jail on a "hooliganism" charge, he was rearrested in February 1978 and sentenced to one year in a standard regimen camp on the charge of "parasitism." Released in spring 1979 he was detained and beaten by the KGB. He emigrated to the United States in June 1979, following his father, who with four other Soviet dissidents had been exchanged against two convicted Soviet spies April 27, 1979. With Vins's departure a promising link to the reform Baptist community had been cut short. (Possibly because the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine is no longer a Ukrainian institution and the more nationally oriented Ukrainian Catholic Church has been outlawed since 1946 there have been no strong ties between the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and the official Orthodox Church even though Lukianenko is a deeply religious man and was a church activist in his home town of Chernyhiv.) The other dissidents who joined the Group in 1977 were engineer and former
political prisoner Vitali Kalynychenko (October 1977) and English teacher Vasyl Striltsiv (same month). In 1978 the Group was joined by engineer and former political prisoner Petro Sichko (April 30, 1978) who followed his son, journalism student at Kiev university Vasyl Sichko (February 26, 1978).

What are we to make of the huge new contingent of 1979? The majority (eight out of the fifteen new members) joined the Group while being far from the Ukraine: either in prison camp: (the nurse Oksana Popovych in late summer 1979; the teacher Bohdan Rebryk at the same time; Yuri Shukhevych, the son of killed Ukrainian Insurgent Army Commander Roman Shukhevych, from a prison in the Tatar ASSR, in the summer of 1979; the writer Danylo Shumuk, from prison camp, same time) or in exile (journalist Viacheslav Chornovil, from distant Yakutia, in the fall of 1979; Father Vasyl E. Romaniuk, from the same region, at the same time; the poet Iryna Senyk, who had been a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, from Kazakhstan, in the fall of 1979; and artist and tapestry weaver Stefania Shabatura, from the Kurga oblast in the RSFSR, in the summer of 1979). The only new members who were in the Ukraine when they joined the group were seven: the poet and philologist Zinovii Krasivsky (summer 1979); physical education instructor Yaroslav Lesiv (late summer 1979); publicist and translator Yuri Lytvyn (not even an approximate date of his entry is given, only the year 1979); Volodymyr Malynkovych, a radiologist and former Red Army physician who refused to go with his unit to Czechoslovakia in 1968 (spring 1979); English teacher Petro Rozumnyi
(late summer 1979); journalist Ivan Sokulsky (in the summer); and poet Vasyl Stus (in the fall of 1979). Given the restrictions in the camps or in distant exile, some of the new members might be essentially symbolic ones; though the ability, energy and dedication of Viacheslav Chornovil should under no circumstances be underestimated: it was he who acquainted the outside world with the first major wave of arrests in the Ukraine in 1965.69

To make sure that the new members who were still at large when they joined the Group would be severely restricted in their activity, the regime arrested the majority of them in 1979. In order of joining: Kalynychenko was arrested November 29, 1979, Striltsiv was arrested either on October 25 or 26, 1979. Sichko Father and Son of the 1978 contingent both were arrested July 5, 1979, and on December 4, 1979, were sentenced to three years' imprisonment each.70 Of the 1979 contingent: Yaroslav Lesiv was arrested in mid-November 1979; Lytvyn, who had been arrested already August 6, 1979, on December 17, 1979, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, allegedly for resisting authorities.71 Petro Rozumnyi was arrested October 26, 1979. Thus three out of the seven free new 1979 members were arrested. Three (Krasivsky, Sokulsky and Stus) have not been touched so far at the time of writing (February 1980). One, Dr. Malynkovych was allowed to emigrate with his family to Austria December 30, 1979.72

The several waves of arrests, from February 1977 (Rudenko and Tykhy) to October-November 1979 (Kalynychenko, Striltsiv, Lesiv, Rozumnyi) do not seem to have immobilized the Group completely and
certainly none of the accused has broken down and recanted, but the quality of the Group's work appears to have declined. We base this sad conclusion on the fact that in the summer of 1979 Mykola Rudenko, Oles Berdnyk, Levko Lukianenko, and four other members of the Group (Kalynychenko, Marynovych, Matushevych, and Tykhy), not to speak of soon to be inducted Group members Father Vasyl Romaniuk and Yuri Shukhevych cosigned the somewhat puzzling Petition to the United Nations of 18 Ukrainian political prisoners. (The seven or nine Group members are counted among the eighteen.) There is just a fleeting and semi-pejorative single reference to "The Final Act of the Helsinki Conference (Chapter VIII)" (sic): it sounds fine, but does not work. The point of this petition is expressed in the following sentences:

[We are] asking for assistance in the struggle for independence through registration of Ukraine as a colony in the Special Committee of 24 on decolonization, inclusion of the Ukrainian question on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly session and other actions that the United Nations usually employs in similar matters.

... In light of the anti-colonial direction of the United Nations and taking into consideration the 1960 U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, we persistently ask that you include the Ukrainian question as an urgent problem on the 1979 agenda of the General Assembly.

Quite apart from the delicate question that this petition raises about the role of the Ukrainian SSR—formally a charter member of the United Nations—the document shows a complete misunderstanding of the political realities at the United Nations. It would also indicate a return to the vague and really unsuccessful petitions that had been directed at the United Nations in the 1960's. We hope that the signatures of the
Ukrainian Group members under that document represent a temporary aberration born of despair, for the June 1979 petition is clearly inconsistent with the Ukrainian Group Memorandum No. 2 of January 1977 demanding that the Ukrainian SSR be part of the Helsinki process and the numerous appeals of the Ukrainian Group to the Belgrade Conference, which imply that the Ukraine is more than just an underdeveloped colony, that it is a submerged state.

(c) Lithuanian Group

The formation of the Lithuanian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements was made public on 25 November 1976, about a half year following the creation of the Moscow Group. In its founding document, the Lithuanian Committee declared:

The aim of the Group is to promote the observation and fulfillment of the humanitarian articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Group intends to concentrate on those articles which relate to human rights and basic freedoms of thought, conscience, religion and belief, and also contacts between people (the reunification of families, meetings with relatives, residence in other countries, etc.).

We are prepared to accept statements from individuals, groups, and organizations on matters relating to violations of the (humanitarian) articles of the Final Act on the territory of Lithuania, relating to Lithuania or specifically to Lithuanian problems.

We hope, that the participant states of the Helsinki Conference will consider that the contemporary status of Lithuania was established as a result of the entrance of Soviet troops onto her territory on June 15, 1940, and will pay special attention to the observance of humanitarian rights in Lithuania.
While this document specifies the field of concern to be largely delineated to Lithuania and Lithuanians, and in this sense is particularistic in orientation, it simultaneously focuses on the broad range of human rights delineated by the Helsinki Accords, and it is thus also universalistic in concern. It is precisely in the context of this duality that one must note the general Baltic perspective that ethnic or national rights are a type of human right.

The Committee had five members at the outset: Tomas Venclova, Karolis Garuckas, Ona Lukauskaite-Poskiene, Viktoras Petkus, and Eitan Finkelshtein. It is in these persons that the closure of the various currents of dissent in Lithuania became more evident. Viktoras Petkus, had had a long-time relationship with the Catholic youth and dissent movement, dating to the second half of the 1940's. Arrested in 1947 for these activities, he served six years in prison, but was rearrested in 1957. Between and after these sentences, Petkus graduated from the University of Vilnius with a major in Lithuanian literature. Petkus was arrested once more in August, 1977, and tried in July of the following year, simultaneously with Anatoly Schcharansky in Moscow and Aleksander Ginzburg in Kaluga.

Father Karolis Garuckas, born in 1908, was the other prominent Catholic activist in the Committee. Educated in prewar Lithuania and Western Europe, he was ordained as a Jesuit in 1941. Deported to Siberia, he became active in supporting petitions demanding religious freedoms upon his return to the Lithuanian SSR. Garuckas died of cancer in April 1979. Mrs. Ona Lukauskaite-Poskiene, a poet, came out of the
intellectual side of the dissent movement. Eitan Finkelshtein is a physicist doctor of science; he is Jewish. Born in 1942 in Sverdlovsk, he was involved in the Soviet space program, and his request to emigrate to Israel had been refused in 1970. Afterwards, he had become active in the Soviet Jewish dissident movement and had befriended Andrei Sakharov.81

Tomas Venclova, who was allowed to emigrate in January 1977, and now resides in the United States, also came from the intellectual side of the dissent movement.82 Although his father was a prominent Lithuanian communist,83 Venclova wrote to the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party in May 1975 that "the Communist ideology is alien to me . . .",84 and asked permission to emigrate. His letter complains especially about the lack of literary, scholarly, and cultural freedoms (he himself is a writer, translator and literary scholar), and professes a friendship with Jonas Jurasas. The latter had been the Senior Director of the Kaunas State Theater in Lithuania, who in August 1972 had circulated an "open letter to the Soviet authorities," in which he denounced the Party's interference in cultural life, especially the theatre.85 It might be appropriate to add that Venclova's wife was Jewish, and this, in addition to Finkelshtein, who was especially involved in issues of emigration, provided a second bridge to the Jewish community in Lithuania.

As an example of organized dissent, the Committee was not unique in the postwar Lithuanian SSR. The late 1940's had seen a significant, armed partisan movement which began to disappear with the
collectivization of agriculture in 1949. The late 1960's and early 1970's had seen a sprouting of religious dissent, including petitions to various SSR, all-Union and international bodies signed by tens of thousands of Catholics, and the appearance of the samizdat periodical, Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania (from mid-1971). The early 1970's also witnessed some strictly intellectual and secular nationalist dissent. Major national outbursts occurred in 1971-1971 during the affair of seaman Simas Kudirka, whose defection was aborted by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the self-immolation of student Romas Kalanta in May 1972.

However, the 1976 founding of the "Lithuanian Watch Committee" was nevertheless a singularly important event for several reasons. Foremost, it was in essence a coalition of all major dissent groups in Lithuania, brought together under, and legitimized by, the Helsinki Accords of 1975. In addition, the Committee appears to be the first significant move in postwar Lithuania to expand the dissent movement beyond the confines of a narrow ethnic base. This is evident within the SSR, in the Baltic region (where the Lithuanian Committee was the only one formed), as well as at the all-Union level. Lastly, through the subsequent exile of one of the founding members of the Committee, the Group has cemented stronger ties with the emigre Lithuanian and Baltic communities, contributing to an integration of national political efforts globally.

The Committee clearly has a diverse membership and cannot be labeled merely "nationalist" or "ethnic." The types of issues which
the Lithuanian Committee's documents have addressed attest to its broad interest in human rights, as promised in the founding promulgation. For example, the first two documents address religious matters. Document 4 is concerned with a family reunification case. Document 9 focuses on the situation of former Lithuanian political prisoners. And Document 12 is a commentary on a psychiatric imprisonment case.

The second unique feature of the Lithuanian committee, noted at the outset, was its transethnic flavor and activities. Although the founding declaration was by-lined Vilnius, the announcement itself was made public, in Moscow, in the apartment of Yuri Orlov, a founder of the Moscow Committee, and one of the most prominent figures in contemporary Soviet dissent. As noted, the Lithuanian Committee contains a Jewish member, Eitan Finkelshtein, and a further Jewish connection existed through Venclova's wife. Finkelshtein's presence is especially significant because it linked the Group directly to the general Soviet Jewish dissent movement of the 1970's. Additionally, Finkelshtein was a friend of Andrei Sakharov, the most prominent Soviet human rights activist in the contemporary USSR. Indeed, when Sakharov was in Vilnius at the trial of Sergei Kovalev, in December 1977, he stayed at Finkelshtein's apartment. Significantly, as Finkelshtein himself has noted, "the fact that a Russian dissident [Kovalev] had openly supported the Catholic Church of Lithuania and had paid for his actions with the loss of freedom made a big impression on the population of Lithuania. The government was pressed to halt demonstrations in support of Kovalev. Throughout Lithuania, hundreds were taken into custody."
Other examples of the Committee's human rights activities beyond issues pertaining only to Lithuanians is mirrored in its public documents. This is already evident in Document 3, of December 1976, which begins: "Twelve Lithuanians came to us requesting that we intercede on behalf of the Estonian, Mart Niklus, since they knew him to be an honest and decent man. They said he was a fine friend who visited Lithuania many times a year and who feels a deep attachment to their country." Document 6, from March 1977, is a statement of principles in support of the Volga Germans, ending on the following note: "The Lithuanian Helsinki Group declares that the continued persecution of the Volga Germans violates both the letter and the spirit of the Helsinki Agreement." Further, Document 7 of May 1977 again brings attention to an Estonian dissident, Erik Udam, who complained of KGB attempts to recruit him for the purpose of establishing a false dissident group in Estonia. The ensuing Document 8 of June 1977 is in support of Russian Pentecostals living in Vilnius. Document 11, also of June 1977, once more advances an Estonian activist's harassment by the KGB. Hence, it is clear that the Lithuanian Group could not be accused of ethnic chauvinism, nor of a narrow, nationalist interpretation of human rights. Contrarywise, it has championed publicly issues of civil, religious and intellectual rights across the broad spectrum of ethnic groups, both inside the Lithuanian SSR and elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

As already noted, Venclova was allowed to emigrate in January 1977 to the United States and stripped, thereafter, of his Soviet
citizenship. Although personally abroad, documents issued in Lithuania continued to bear his signature. Importantly, Tomas Venclova became the Lithuanian Group's public voice in the West. Already on 24 February 1977 he released a statement to the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.\textsuperscript{100} He has subsequently participated in several special symposia and hearings on Soviet human rights.\textsuperscript{101} Venclova's presence also added to the small number of Lithuanian intellectuals and activists exiled in the 1970's, thereby potentially strengthening the link between the emigre community and the majority of Lithuanians, who reside in the Lithuanian SSR. As argued later in the present study, the activism of the 1970's in the Soviet Baltic has provided a basis for the closure of the emigre and Soviet segments of the three Baltic groups along a path of political activism.

Two years after Venclova's departure from Lithuania, another of the five founding members, Father Karolis Garuckas, died of cancer. Viktoras Petkus, the original spokesman of the Lithuanian Group, was sentenced to fifteen years' internment and exile at a prison in the Tatar ASSR after his trial in mid-1978. Thus, only two of the five are now in Lithuania, which perhaps accounts for the Group's lack of activity during the past year and a half. Nevertheless, civil, religious and national dissent and activism have continued in the Lithuanian SSR.
At first sight, the Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in Georgia (in Russian: Gruppa sodeistviia vypolneniiu Khel'sinkskikh soglashenii v Gruzii), established in January 1977, shows a paradox: in a republic where national pride is running very strong, where the Georgian language is heard in the cities as well as in the countryside, where the number of Russians has actually decreased between the population censuses of 1959 and 1970, and where the indigenous population is both culturally and socio-economically very advanced, the republican Helsinki Watch Committee is relatively inactive, is perhaps the weakest of all the Watch Committees outside of Moscow. Only a single document issued by the Georgian Group as such appears to have reached the West and it is not a programmatic declaration, nor do we have any information that such a program had been written at all. After the arrests of the leading members of the Group and especially after the trial and public recantation of its leader, the writer and literary scholar Dr. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the Helsinki Watch Committee in Georgia appears to have become inactive. A weak Group in a strong country?

The solution of this paradox may lie in three factors. First, there had been a vigorous human rights movement in Georgia long before the Helsinki Watch Committee was established. Several of the leaders of the Helsinki Group had already left their mark on Georgian and international public opinion through their activity in preceding human rights groups, and they may not have attached sufficient importance to their work under the Helsinki Act. It is interesting, e.g., that after the
formal establishment of the Watch Committee in Georgia its leader Dr. Gamsakhurdia issued two important documents which he signed qua individual citizen, not as member of the Committee (one was cosigned by Merab Kostava, another Committee member, but it, too, was not presented on behalf of the Group). (See Georgian documents Nos. 11 and 12, in the Appendix, pp. A-158ff.) Second, the regime moved fast to arrest the leaders of the Group. Third and most importantly, given the strength of Georgian nationalism among the population and given the tendency of the Georgian Soviet government to make concessions to that nationalism, it can be argued that the existence of the Helsinki Group in Georgia was less needed than, e.g., in the Ukraine. It would also appear that rather discretely but still noticeably, concessions were also made to some members of Helsinki Watch Committee in Georgia, possibly in return for their virtual suspension of activity. Only in Georgia was the leader of the Helsinki Group allowed to plea bargain with the regime, which on balance may be a sign of hidden strength rather than weakness.

Georgian nationalism may be so strong because though the Georgians have a distinguished history and though Georgian culture had reached rare heights as early as the Middle Ages, in a modern socio-economic and political scene the Georgians are still a young nation, dynamic, even a little bit aggressive. One bond that kept the Georgian nation together through all the vicissitudes of Mongol invasion, Turkish and Persian occupation and annexation by Russia in 1801 was the Georgian language, which "is neither Indo-European, Turkic nor Semitic." The Georgian language is very difficult to learn, it is in no way related to
Russian (unlike Bielorussian or Ukrainian, e.g.) and, once mastered, it is an object of great national pride. The Georgian alphabet does go back to the fifth century A.D. According to a Western observer, the Georgians in Georgia simply do not take to learning foreign languages, especially Russian. The Georgian Church, however, which had helped to develop the Georgian language, has not been such a strong force for national unity as the Church in Armenia.

No matter how ancient Georgia culture may be, well into the 19th century the Georgians had been basically a rural people with a rural, landowning elite. This was another factor which kept them together as a nation: they were basically an ethnically homogeneous rural pre-capitalist society. It was in the 20th century, under the Soviet rule, that Georgian society was transformed into a modern, sociologically balanced nation. In the words of Professor Ronald G. Suny:

For Georgia the years of Soviet rule have witnessed the creation of a technical intelligentsia and civil service and involved the gradual re-establishment of Georgian political control and ethnic dominance over their historical homeland. Whereas before the revolution Russian officials and Armenian businessmen had held the most important posts both in government and in the economy while Georgians remained on the fringe of the emerging urban society both politically and culturally, after the fall of the Menshevik republic Georgians steadily displaced the Armenian middle class and began to establish their own demographic and cultural hegemony in the towns of Georgia, especially in their own capital where they had long been second-class citizens. This trend toward ever greater Georgian political control over Georgia has continued unabated to the present day, though that control is exercised within the limits established by the central party leadership.\(^{105}\)

In his paper Suny documents "The demographic, political, and cultural re-nationalization of the Georgians" which has become particularly
noticeable after the fall of Beria and the establishment of a new Party leadership in Tbilisi under Khrushchev's protégé Mzhavanadze in September 1953.\textsuperscript{106} An interesting aspect of the political renationalization of Georgia is the attempt by Georgians who especially since 1972 have themselves been put under the pressure of the central policy of Russification to assimilate smaller ethnic minorities to Georgian language and culture. Mark Kipnis speaks of a peculiar manifestation of a "law of compensation":

Moscow tacitly permitted an oppressed nation to oppress others, and the Georgian party and state apparatus sought complete or partial assimilation of its minorities.\textsuperscript{107}

But most obviously during the long 19 years' rule of Mzhavanadze the Georgians developed vigorous free enterprise and "honest graft" (patronage politics) that would have done a Tammany Hall boss proud. The official economy suffered, of course, and everybody in Moscow was—or pretended to be—scandalized. Zviad Gamsakhurdia characterizes those years (1953-1972) as follows:

As is well known at that time Soviet Georgia was actually run by Mzhavanadze's wife, Victoria Tyriskevich. She, as has later become clear, appointed Party District Secretaries, Ministers and Directors in exchange for large bribes, as well as the Patriarch of the Georgian Church.\textsuperscript{108}

In September 1972 Mzhavanadze was eased out and Eduard Shavardnadze, who had previously served seven years as Georgia's Interior Minister, took his place as First Secretary. Shavardnadze then instituted a major purge involving some 30,000 persons.\textsuperscript{109} At the same time, Shavardnadze, probably under pressure from Party leaders in Moscow, started to curb Georgian nationalism and open the doors to accelerated Russification of
the educational system. The combination of the economic and political purge with somewhat unsubtle efforts at Russification in turn strengthened the human rights movement in Georgia, both among the ethnic Georgians and the national minorities. To summarize, the situation in Georgia in the early 1970's was so confused since there were three distinct tendencies both battling and reinforcing each other: first, the official nationalism of the Georgian Party and State apparatuses (admittedly somewhat curbed under Shevardnadze); second, the unofficial, more liberal nationalism of the dissenters; and third, the nationalism of the non-Georgian minorities. (The majority of the Georgian people stood between tendencies one and two.) The Helsinki Watch Committee in Georgia attempted to combine tendencies two and three, but was largely overcome by tendency No. 1, which in turn had to make concessions to the political realities (pressure from Moscow on the one hand and the attitudes of the Georgian masses on the other).

The first human rights group to arise in Georgia in the 1960's was that of the Georgian Meskhetians. They are the native Moslem population of southern Georgia whom the regime had deported to Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the Caucasus. The Soviet authorities had alternately considered them as Turks or Azerbaidzhanis, not Georgians; though most of these people had been Georgians that had been converted to Turkish nationality. Like the better-known Crimean Tartars the 300,000 Meskhetians were pardoned. This was done in 1956, i.e., eleven years before the Tatars. Like the Crimean Tatars they were not allowed to return to their homeland either by the Moscow or by the Georgian republican authorities. They became organized in 1964 and in 1968 "seven thousand [Meskhetian]
delegates congregated outside Government House in Tbilisi, demanding to be received by the highest officials of the republic, only to be dispersed by force. Gradually the Georgian intellectuals have embraced the cause of the Meskhetians. Writes Kipnis:

At present the Georgian intelligentsia supports the Mesketians' endeavors to have the nationality recorded in their internal passports changed from Azerbaijani to Georgian. This movement has as its motto the ethnic and cultural consolidation of the nation, the endeavor of the brethren, dispersed by fate, to return to Georgia.111

One of the staunchest champions of the Meskhetians turned out to be the Georgian art-historian Victor Rstkhiladze. Born in 1941, Rstkhiladze worked in the late 1970's as Director of Historical Monuments in the Georgian Ministry of Culture. He is also the author of a samizdat monograph on the Fate of the Meskhetians.

Next to become organized were the Georgian Jews. The first collective appeal by Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel was by eighteen heads of Jewish families in Georgia, in 1969. Eventually, the Georgian Jewish community who had been living in that country for two thousand years were singularly successful: over one-half of them were granted the right to go to Israel. Not so fortunate were two prominent Jewish scientists: the Goldshtein brothers. Dr. Grigori Goldshtein, born in 1931, studied physics at Tbilisi University, from which he graduated in 1955. In 1969, in Leningrad, he defended a kandidat (Ph.D.) dissertation in computer science. He is the author of eleven scientific works and inventions. Since 1969 he was supervisor of a laboratory engaged in non-classified work on measurements.112 His younger brother Isai, born around 1938, also has a "candidate" (Ph.D.) degree in computer science,
has worked as a senior scientist (starshyi nauchnyi sotrudnik) in the field of control of measurements, and has taught physics and mathematics. In December 1971 the two Goldshtein brothers applied to emigrate to Israel only to be refused (allegedly their work had been secret). Despite all their persistent efforts they were not allowed to emigrate, got only official harrassment in return.

In the early 1970's dissident ethnic Georgians began to organize. In the early summer of 1974 a group of Georgians founded the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in Georgia. Its members were: Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Merab Kostava and Victor Rustkhaladze. Gamsakhurdia was also a member of the Soviet Section of Amnesty International (as was Rudenko).

Merab Kostava, born in 1939, a writer and musicologist, has taught music at the Tbilisi "Polytechnical Institute of Music." A close collaborator with Zviad Gamsakhurdia until their arrest April 7, 1977, Kostava has become known for his defense of the Georgian language against attempts of Russification. Unlike Gamsakhurdia, Kostava had been arrested once before as an adult in 1972, was released April 7, 1973. (In 1956, as youths, both Gamsakhurdia and Kostava, had been arrested on suspicion of having founded an illegal nationalist group. Their juvenile arrest record, however, had been later "expunged.")

It is Dr. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who—at least in the beginning—has become the undisputed leader of the Georgian dissidents. Born in 1939, he is the son of famous Georgian writer and historian Constantine Gamsakhurdia. Young Gamsakhurdia would regard Eduard Shevardnadze as a
very old acquaintance (давнишний знакомый) to whom he could freely talk on the telephone. Soon after Shevardnadze became First Secretary, November 8, 1972, he called on Gamsakhurdia, Sr., at the latter's apartment, to wish him a happy eightieth birthday. But it would not be long before Gamsakhurdia, Son, would challenge his father's friend.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who had been baptized in 1948, first studied theology, then English and American literature. In the late sixties he was given a professorship of English and of American literature at Tbilisi University. His fresh lectures on contemporary American literature were very popular among the students. An American who met him said that his command of English was quite good. But instead of enjoying the officially sanctioned success like his father had done, Dr. Zviad Gamsakhurdia started organizing Georgian nationalist dissent: in May 1975 he founded a Georgian-language samizdat literary journal, The Golden Fleece and in late 1976 he and Merab Kostava established a new Georgian-language political journal, The Georgian Herald. At least two issues of the latter journal have appeared. To judge by Georgian Herald No. 1, Gamsakhurdia was interested in the violations of the following human rights: the right to have the history of one's country respected; the right to education in one's native language, even at university level; the right to religious belief and also the right of the believers to have corrupt and larcenous priests discharged and prosecuted; the right to humane treatment while imprisoned; and the right to justice in general, specifically excluding abuse at the hands of the KGB.

Very significant for Gamsakhurdia's thinking is the conclusion of Tvaltavadze's account of the wave of arson and sabotage in Georgia in 1976.
Gamsakhurdia's piece on "Anti-Governmental Protest in Georgia in 1976" closely parallels Tvaltvadze's. Dividing the arson and bombings into two categories: measures to cover up economic corruption and escape prosecution and genuine steps of political protest both Tvaltvadze and Gamsakhurdia come to the following conclusion (the words are Tvaltvadze's):

We may assume that until the economic condition of the people improves perceptibly in Georgia, until wages rise, prices fall, until the harsh measures taken against "economic crime" stop, and until the politics of Russification cease fires and bombing will continue. We should look on these events as failings of the system and not as single anarchistic events caused by guilty persons (see Appendix, p. A-145).

If anything, Gamsakhurdia is more pointed:

We can assume that so long as the Kremlin and Shevardnadze do not stop their Draconian measures against "economic crimes" in Georgia, as well as the policy of Russification, the fires and explosions will continue.

But Gamsakhurdia went considerably farther in talking to American correspondents, especially the N.Y. Times bureau chief in Moscow David K. Shipler. During an interview September 21, 1976 (i.e., approximately at the time that Georgian Review No. 1 was being put together Gamsakhurdia mused that Georgia was "maybe half-independent already" and added, "Maybe it is possible to be in the Soviet Union formally but in fact be independent."

He asked rhetorically:

Why must the Russians swallow other people? They have them in their stomachs, but they are not yet digested.

Mr. Shipler writes further, implicitly stressing Gamsakhurdia's defiance (another American noted Gamsakhurdia's flamboyance and disregarding for taking prudent precautions):
When the inflamed language failed to get him the attention he desired from American correspondents, who reported on him only occasionally, he admonished them for ignoring the Georgian "liberation" struggle. It was in this context, amid pleas for American interest and help, that he made a statement welcoming military intervention by the United States to aid Georgia's secession from the Soviet Union. It would have been considered a seditious remark in any country, so when it came over dinner in a well-bugged Moscow apartment early in 1976, it brought stunned silence and then expressions of disbelief from the Americans at the table.

He said it again several months later in Tbilisi and told this correspondent he could print it.\textsuperscript{122}

Incidentally, Shipler did tone down Gamsakhurdia's call for US military force to help liberate Georgia and published it in the International Herald Tribune on May 19, 1976 (he called him a nationalist and a separatist, an extreme right conservative by American standards, for he and his 20 or 30 associates "would welcome US military force to help 'liberate' Georgia").

The regime struck back at Gamsakhurdia, but only secretively at first (his father's name served as a protection). Already in November 1972, a certain illiterate Col. Sh. Zardalishvili, the assistant in ideological matters to the Chairman of the Georgian KGB, blocked the publication of a collection of Gamsakhurdia's poems after they had already been delivered to the printer. Zardalishvili also unsuccessfully tried to bully one Georgian writer into denouncing in print the samizdat journal Golden Fleece edited by Gamsakhurdia (see Appendix, p. A-148ff.).

In 1975-76 more pressure was put on Gamsakhurdia, which intensified after his father's death on July 17, 1975, "following breathing irregularities."\textsuperscript{123} After the appearance of the Golden Fleece,
July 10, 1975, Gamsakhurdia had already lost his teaching position at Tbilisi University. Gamsakhurdia remained, however, a member of the Workers Union and Senior Fellow (starshyi nauchnyi sotrudnik) of the Institute of Literature. In September 1975, complained Gamsakhurdia, the screw was given another turn by the KGB, when he refused to cooperate with the Procuracy in a mysterious "Iuza Dzhangiani" affair: September 20 and 23, 1975, he, his wife (a physician) and her sister-in-law were subjected to a poison gas attack (the ensuing symptoms were: vertigo, accelerated pulse, breathing difficulties, elevated blood pressure, inability to swallow any food). A doctor diagnosed poisoning and prescribed bed rest.

June 26, 1976, Gamsakhurdia was intercepted by Soviet plain-clothesmen in Moscow on a pretext, interrogated for four hours and had some incriminating literature taken from him. Dr. Gamsakhurdia defended himself by invoking the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Final Act (of the Helsinki Agreement) "according to which, in the USSR, the exchange of information is not forbidden, personal freedoms are protected and freedom of thought and speech exists," but the investigating officer "did not listen to my words." Also in 1976, the Queen Mary College in London invited Gamsakhurdia to give some lectures about Georgian translations of English literature. He was prevented from accepting the invitation by a Secretary of the Party Central Committee who insisted: "First stop all your activity, and then we'll see about England."

Finally, in January 1977, after some anonymous threats, the brake cables on his car were cut.
A Western correspondent has—by implication—dismissed all of Gamsakhurdia's charges against the KGB "as so bizarre that even other dissidents discerned traces of paranoia." In our judgment, charges of attack by poison gas should be taken seriously. First, as Gamsakhurdia notes, another dissident Soviet fellow-writer Voinovich had experienced very similar symptoms in the Hotel Metropol in Moscow in the spring of 1975. Second, Herr Schwirkmann, an electronic technician attached to the West German Embassy in Moscow, with diplomatic status, had been the subject of a poison gas attack in September 1964, causing a major diplomatic scandal. Third, poison gas has been used against anti-Communist guerrillas by Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and by their proxies in Laos and in Vietnam.

Given the extensive airing of complaints in the Georgian Herald in 1976 and the stepped-up persecution by the KGB, the establishment of the Group for the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in January 1977 by Gamsakhurdia and his associates was a rare act of courage, perhaps even foolhardiness: the Group probably would not be able to add much to the documentary record, but the very fact of its being organized would fan the already smoldering anger of the KGB. It was a challenge in short. Why then was the Group formed? Probably it was a matter of national pride for the Georgians to become organized after the establishment of the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Groups in November 1976. The scheduling of the Belgrade Review Conference for the summer and fall of 1977 also made the establishment of the Georgian Group advisable given the fact that abuses of human rights in Georgia had always existed and had even multiplied in connection with Shevardnadze's purges.
The founding members of the Group were Beglar Bezhuashvili, a laboratory technician in the Art Department at Tbilisi University. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the apparent leader of the Group; the two Goldshtein brothers, Grigori and Isai, Taimuraz Dzhanelidze, a singing teacher at the music vocational secondary school (tekhnikum) in Rustavi, and Victor Rosthikladze. An immediate controversy arose as to whether or not Merab Kostava was a member of the Group—he was. Later members of the Group may have been Valentina Pailodze and Elisaveta Bykova-Goldshtein (the wife of Isai Goldshtein). According to a very competent and careful oral source, neither of the two had really joined the Group, Mrs. Pailodze belonged, however, to the kindred Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in Georgia.

Unfortunately, unlike the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and the subsequently established Armenian Group, the Tbilisi Helsinki Watch Committee did not issue a founding declaration. From the membership of the Group, however, it can be inferred that the choice of the name Group for the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in Georgia rather than Georgian Group for the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords may have been deliberate: the Group did from the beginning include the two Jewish "refuseniks" and Rosthikladze, who was best known for the defense of the Meskhetians. Soon after March 9, 1977, the Tbilisi Group issued its only document that has apparently reached the West: a denunciation of the job related harassment and dismissal from his position of Rosthikladze on March 9, 1977. Most probably his dismissal was part of a coordinated KGB drive—the harassment at his place of work started shortly after Rosthikladze's materials were found among Orlov's possessions during a
house search of his apartment on January 4, 1977. Orlov was arrested February 10, 1977, a week after the arrest of Alexander Ginzburg and five days after the arrests of Rudenko and Tykhy. April 1, 1977, after repeated denunciations in the Soviet press, Gamsakhurdia was expelled from the Workers Union of Georgia. 131 Possibly because the Group in Georgia was the youngest one, and it took some time to prepare the case, its leaders, Gamsakhurdia, Kostava and Rtskhiladze, were not arrested until April 7, 1977. Both Gamsakhurdia and Kostava were detained for the trial, which eventually took place May 15-19, 1978. Their pre-trial detention included several months' psychiatric investigation near Moscow (Gamsakhurdia, e.g., spent four months in the fall of 1977 in the notorious Serbsky Institute in Moscow) 132. Rstkhiladze, who had a weak heart, was arrested and released the same day, April 7, 1977. January 25, 1978, Rstkhiladze was rearrested 133 and charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda: eventually, September 7, 1978, he was sentenced to 2½ years in camp and two years exile, remaining term conditional, 3 years probation. 134 For good measure, Dr. Grigori Goldshtein, who had been arrested and held a week in January 1978 was tried March 20, 1978, and sentenced to one year's detainment in a moderate regime labor camp for "parasitism." He was the first member of the Tbilisi Group to be sentenced and the first to be released after serving his full term. Energetic as ever, after his release in March 1979, Dr. Grigori Goldshtein and his brother Dr. Isai Goldshtein were reported planning to sue the Soviet Government under Articles 58 and 59 of the new Soviet Constitution because they claim that Grigori was illegally arrested, illegally charged, and illegally sentenced to imprisonment. 135 Though the Goldshteins have not
left the Tbilisi Group, the Group as such appears to have ceased to be active and to issue documents after the April 7, 1977, arrests. 136

How successful has been the Tbilisi Helsinki Watch Committee in attracting popular support? This is impossible to say without assuming that at least until his trial in May 1978 Gamsakhurdia was speaking for the Group and without projecting some of the themes of the Georgian Review or Herald from late 1976 into the possible activity of the Group in 1977. In the spring of 1977 Gamsakhurdia's personal popularity was very high: when he was expelled from the Workers Union April 1, 1977, some 200 chanting people gathered outside his house to demonstrate their moral support. 137

The Georgian Herald group, part of whom in turn founded the Tbilisi Helsinki Watch Committee, did win perhaps their greatest moral victory when the regime backed down on the question of Georgian ceasing to be a state language. (The question of Russification had been one of the main themes of Georgian Herald No. 1, it had been put first in the collection after the announcement of the formation of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in Georgia). The background of the famous confrontation before the building of the Georgian Central Committee in Tbilisi, on Friday, April 14, 1978, is as follows. When Shevardnadze was made First Secretary of Georgia in September 1972, he was evidently given a double mission: to clean up the economy and to deal with unorthodox Georgian nationalism. 138

Whether the Party leaders in Moscow simply wanted to kill two birds with one stone, or whether they had become genuinely alarmed by the
upsurge of nationalism in Lithuania (in May 1972) and the pro-Ukrainian policy of First Secretary Shelest (dismissed in May 1972) and did not want to face a repetition of this in Georgia we do not know, but we infer from Shevardnadze's pro-Russian cultural policy that he did receive certain instructions. In some elementary boarding schools a number of subjects were to be taught in Russian from the 5th grade on, by way of experiment. In 1976 at Tbilisi University "The teaching of various subjects in Russian [was to be] introduced and leading Russian specialists [were to be] invited." (An excellent illustration of this new policy is provided in the samizdat piece "Attempts to Russify the University of Tbilisi," in Appendix, pp. A-135 ff.). College textbooks were to be written in Russian not Georgian and dissertations for advanced degrees were also to be only in Russian. Georgian scholars were upset by this, they emphatically did not want Georgian to be banned from scholarship, did not want it to be degraded to the language of the dinner table, for home use only. No wonder that when the Georgian writer Revaz Dzhaparidze eloquently attacked the new Russification policy at the Eighth Congress of Georgian Writers in April 1976 he was given ten to fifteen minutes' applause and effectively prevented another speaker from presenting his case--ironically, for improving the teaching of Georgian. It is not clear whether the instructions on the exclusive use of Russian in scholarly dissertations were revoked, but on the teaching of courses in Russian at Tbilisi University the regime seems to have beaten a retreat.

When the new republican constitutions were to be adopted in the spring of 1978 somebody in Tbilisi or, more likely, in Moscow decided to mindlessly disregard the Georgian language skirmishes of 1976 and to
water down into wishy-washy nothingness, what had been clearly promised in the 1922 and 1937 constitutions of the Georgian republic, viz., "The state language of the Georgian SSR is Georgian." All Western accounts agree that there was a major demonstration of young people. The figures differ, from a low of several hundred people (American lawyers Robert McKay and S. Eric Rayman, who were in Tbilisi at that time) to a high of up to 50,000. The most detailed account is that by the UPI Moscow correspondent. According to him, several hundred persons led by members of the University of Tbilisi Georgian Philology Department led the demonstration, or according to an anonymous caller to Mrs. Sakharov, the public demonstration before Government was preceded by a series of demonstrations first at the University of Tbilisi, then other colleges and institutes in the city. Then, in a demonstration lasting for five hours, some 5,000 students marched to Government House at Friday noon. Two accounts agree that the demonstrators carried placards of Gamsakhurdia and other imprisoned Tbilisi Helsinki Watch Committees: of Gamsakhurdia, Kostava, Rtskhiladze and Pailodze (apparently many did consider her a member).

Shevardnadze allegedly addressed the crowd twice--in Georgian--and assured them that the old provision of Georgian being a state language would be restored in the 1978 Constitution. Shevardnadze did fulfill his promises: to the Central Committee Session of the Georgian Communist Party which was considering the final constitutional draft that Friday, April 14, he said:
The Georgian CP Central Committee and the Constitutional Commission, guided by the principle of continuity and proceeding from the democratic nature of our society and of the constitution, and considering the results of the discussion of the draft constitution by all the people, came to the conclusion during the period of preparation for this session that it is expedient to allow to remain in force the well-known wording in the existing constitution to the effect that the Georgian language is proclaimed the state language. 146

It may have been indeed expedient: March 9, 1956, about 500 people had been killed and wounded in Tbilisi during the protests connected to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech, 147 there had been bombs exploding in Tbilisi in March and April of 1976, and the last thing that Shevardnadze wanted was more bloodshed, and over a symbolic constitutional question at that. A shrewd observer of Soviet politics has speculated that the demonstration may not have caught Shevardnadze completely by surprise: if he ever thought of backing down, he needed a strong reason.

A relatively public trial of Gamsakhurdia and Kostava took place a month after the demonstration, May 15-19, 1978 (Orlov was being tried at the same time in Moscow). Gamsakhurdia confessed that he was guilty of dissemination of anti-Soviet literature, and he expressed his repentance. Kostava did not. Both Gamsakhurdia and Kostava were given a sentence of three years' labor camp and two years of exile (the prosecution had asked for four and three years, respectively). On the day of the sentencing Gamsakhurdia's confession, which apparently was not taken from the trial, but had been filmed in advance, was shown on television. For the Tbilisi Helsinki Watch Committee Gamsakhurdia's behavior during the trial and especially his televised confession was a
shock, from which they do not seem to have recovered until at least January 1980, the time of writing.

In some respects the trial was worse for all the Helsinki Watch Groups than this bare account implies, in other respects it was better. From an incomplete summary of the trial which has been circulating in the samizdat we find that not only did Gamsakhurdia accept the regime's contention that it had not violated any rights (Question to G.: "The defense of what rights did you have in mind?"--Answer by G.: "I was mistaken. In the USSR no rights are being violated.") but that he cooperated with the prosecution in stressing the external stimuli: the Western radio stations such as Voice of America, Deutsche Welle and Radio Liberty, which had picked up and, by implication, distorted his ideas; his meetings with American diplomat Igor Belousovich and Western correspondents such as Bertman from Agence France Press, Shipler (N.Y. Times) and Friendly (Newsweek). Another bad aspect of the Gamsakhurdia trial was that nowhere was the Tbilisi Helsinki Watch Committee mentioned, as if it had not existed at all, though the older Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights was. Furthermore, another bad aspect, Rtskhiladze testified for the prosecution reading from a prepared text. He tried to show that Gamsakhurdia had successfully forced him to sign a very controversial article, with which he did not agree; that Gamsakhurdia had persuaded him to abuse his official credentials of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Culture. Rtskhiladze concluded that he did not presently share and had never before shared the positions of Gamsakhurdia and Kostava. Rtskhiladze's testimony was the second break in the Tbilisi Helsinki Watch Committee.
On the positive side, Gamsakhurdia tried to limit the scope of his confession. He said the first day that he had changed his opinion on many questions but had not changed his national-patriotic positions and that he considered that the [Georgian] church, language and school should not be touched upon. The judge thereupon said: "Zviad, we do not consider you guilty of that." (Had there been a secret plea bargaining before the trial?) Gamsakhurdia accepted all of the guilt for editing the Georgian Herald and then some, trying to exonerate his fellow defendant Kostava in the process (Kostava, however, refused to yield his share to Gamsakhurdia). Finally, Gamsakhurdia lambasted Solzhenitsyn and Amalik, who were safely abroad, and Western diplomats and correspondents, who, too, were relatively immune to prosecution.

The Gamsakhurdia case became even more involved when June 26, 1979, Shevardnadze devoted four long paragraphs in his speech on ideological questions to the fate of Gamsakhurdia. He explicitly admitted that there had been unnamed but highly placed Georgians who had considered Gamsakhurdia to be a genuine patriot. He said:

The lessons of life, as we know, are the most memorable lessons of all. All [of you] probably remember the court investigation in the case of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. At the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia we voiced serious demands (pretensii) addressed to those comrades whose moral and civic duty had been not to allow the fall of the man but who, after the event, chose the policy of neutrality (nevmeshatel' stva). I do not have in mind the Union of Writers: there the comrades approached the matter in a very principled way. It is to be understood that to those who took the approach of an "ostrich" it never occurred that the actions of Zviad Gamsakhurdia had nothing in common with genuine patriotism. Here is the answer to those comrades who had taken such a position [here Shavardnadze reveals that Gamsakhurdia had put in a petition for pardon].

149
For the first time, a Soviet leader of stature had publicly discussed the case of a dissident in detail and even with a measure of sympathy ("the fall of the man"). Among Soviet dissidents and Western diplomats rumors were circulating that in return for his public confession Gamsakhurdia was able to extract some concessions from the regime, specifically that Soviet artillery would not train their gunners on an area containing invaluable ancient Georgian cave monasteries, that the authorities would prosecute a corrupt bishop of the Georgian Church, and that the old article on Georgian being a state language be retained in the 1978 Georgian constitution. So far as the language was concerned, the protest march by some 5,000 students, some of whom were Gamsakhurdia's adherents, undoubtedly helped. In the summer of 1979 the Metropolitan (Bishop) Gaioza, whose secular name was Bidzhina Keratishvili—the object of a passionate campaign by Gamsakhurdia and his closest associates ever since the spring of 1972—was finally brought to justice: the Tbilisi City Court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison for stealing religious objects. 150

At the end of June 1979 Gamsakhurdia was pardoned. 151 There was a samizdat report that Gamsakhurdia had spent his term as manager of the "house of culture" of the small hamlet Kochubei, in the Gadamovskii District, in the Daghestani Autonomous Republic, where Georgian herdsmen would lead their herds of Caucasian goats for the winter. There were also reports that Gamsakhurdia was suffering from tuberculosis. 152 In any case it was an unusually light sentence. His former friend Merab Kostava was not so fortunate. This is an extract from a letter by Mrs. Irina Orlov of August 27, 1979:
My husband spoke of the difficult situation of Merab Kostava, a member of the Georgian Helsinki Watch Group. Merab Kostava was placed in the PKT (camp prison) in May for not fulfilling his quota and for other violations. His diary was confiscated. Kostava went on a hunger strike for a month and was later fed intravenously. Apparently, they are going to keep him in the prison until October. Kostava requested that he not be confused with Gamsakhurdia. As the head of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, my husband is defending Kostava who is subject to severe pressure on the part of the administration.

Was there a fatal flaw in Zviad Gamsakhurdia's character (one of his enemies spoke of his vanity and his love of comfort)? Was he defeated by a combination of non-lethal poison gas attacks, a near-fatal cutting of the brake cables and the unnamed horrors he had to endure at the Serbsky Institute? Or did he feel that he could successfully bargain with the regime: his personal honor against political concessions to his entire people? It would appear to us that the latter was the predominant motive. The cost, however, was clear: The Tbilisi Helsinki Watch Group never recovered from the succession of shocks. Even Kostava broke with his former friend (he requested that "he not be confused with Gamsakhurdia").

(e) The Armenian Group

April 1, 1977, the Armenian Group to Promote the Implementation of the Provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference (in Russian: Armianskaia Gruppa Sodeistviia Vypolneniiu Reshenii Zakliuchitelnogo Akta Soveshchania v Hel'sinkii) was established, of which Western correspondents were notified at a press conference in the apartment of General Hryhorenko in Moscow. The date notwithstanding, the founding members of the Group were serious persons having serious concerns.
The formal leader of the Group was Eduard Bagratovich Arutyunyan (born in Mountainous Karabagh in 1926). Until April 1967 he, a Ph.D. (kandidat) in Economics, worked in the Armenian branch of the Scientific Research Institute for Planning and Norms of the USSR Gosplan. He was dismissed from his position in connection with "reduction of staff," but actually because of serious ideological and personal disagreements with his superiors. He had been the victim of official harassment, spent a brief time in a psychiatric hospital in 1970. Then, in the 1970's, he established contact with Academician Sakharov and Moscow representatives of the Solzhenitsyn fund to aid political prisoners. In the Armenian Group he is said to have been the foremost advocate of transferring his native province Mountainous Karabagh under Armenian rule.

The second founding member and its real moving spirit was Robert Kachikovich Nazaryan (born in 1948). Nazaryan is a fascinating figure. His parents had been members of the Armenian diaspora, they had been repatriated from Romania to Armenia in 1946, two years before his birth. He may have been native born, but spiritually he does not appear to have been altogether Soviet (e.g., he would loudly and publicly insist that the Armenian Helsinki Group was a legal group and that the authorities could not touch it). In 1966 Nazaryan graduated from a special secondary school emphasizing mathematics, entered the physics "faculty" (i.e., Department) of Erevan University. He had some difficulties with the University Komsomol organization, of which he was an active member: the issues are not clear, but it does appear that as far as the regime was concerned Nazaryan was in the right: two Komsomol officials who had
brought about Nazaryan's expulsion from the Komsomol in 1969 were in turn removed from their posts and Nazaryan was readmitted. In June 1970 Nazaryan was expelled from the University but he appealed on procedural grounds (the University authorities had never made clear why exactly they wanted to expel him) and in October of the same year, i.e., within four months he was readmitted to the University. He graduated from it with flying colors in 1971. His major was theoretical physics and his professors recommended him for graduate study.

A self-less humanitarian, with deep religious convictions, Nazaryan did not surprise his friends--but practically everybody else--when he did not continue his study of physics, but entered the Echmiadzin Theological Seminary in Armenia in 1971. He finished it with an honors diploma two years later and was ordained a deacon in the Armenian Apostolic Church. By 1976 Nazaryan had also established contacts with Armenian political prisoners who had been sentenced for nationalism and started to collect contributions on their behalf (see Appendix, pp. A-181ff.). To earn a living Nazaryan between 1973 and September 1977 worked at the Byurakan Astrophysical Observatory, at the Erevan State Design Institute, as senior engineer at the computer center of the Armenian Agricultural Machinery Works, as head of a group in the department for automation at the Armenian State Technical Design Institute. To the Armenian Helsinki Group, Nazaryan brought firm dedication to the defense of human rights including those of Armenian political prisoners and a fine appreciation of the national patriotic role of the Armenian Church.
The third founding member of the Armenian Group was engineering student Samvel Osyan, who was in his twenties. Under strong pressure from the regime he became inactive by the end of 1978.\textsuperscript{158}

Within half a year of its establishment, two other members joined the Armenian Watch Committee: Shagen Arutyunyan and Ambartsum Khlgatyan. Shagen \textit{Arutyunovich} Arutyunyan (born 1937), according to Ambartsum Khlgatyan who knew both of them, is not a brother of Eduard \textit{Bagratovich} Arutyunyan, not even a relative. When Shagen A. Arutyunyan's and Ambartsum A. Khlgatyan's having joined the Armenian Group was announced at a press conference in Moscow October 30, 1977, it was also reported by a Western correspondent that the two new members "stressed that the predominance of intellectuals in such groups made it especially necessary that representatives of the working class join."\textsuperscript{159} Shagen Arutyunyan was indeed supporting himself by working in a shoe factory, but he was not a dyed-in-the-wool proletarian. In the 1960's he had been studying at the Erevan Pedagogical Institute (in the historical-philosophical faculty), when the regime learnt of his involvement in the United National Party (\textit{Natsional'naia Obyedinnonnaia Partiia} or NOP). He was dismissed from the Institute, arrested in July 1968, and was, on January 3, 1969, sentenced to three years in prison camp, as a member of the Initiative Group of NOP. The leader of NOP, Aikazun Khachatryan drew a five years' sentence, one of his aides Stepan Zatikyan got a four years' term. After release from the strict regimen camp in 1972, Shagen Arutyunyan could not continue his studies and began to work in a factory. In 1976 he renounced his Soviet citizenship and unsuccessfully tried to emigrate to the Federal Republic of Germany.\textsuperscript{160} In the Armenian
Helsinki Group Shagen Arutyunyan constituted a living link with the nationalists of the United National Party (NOP).

Ambartsum Agasiefich Khlgatyan (born in 1927) in the late 1940's as a student of philology at the University of Erevan, had been a member of the secret Armenian Democratic Union that advocated a genuine democratic government for the republic, a dissenters' group that preceded the NOP by almost twenty years. When in 1949 State Security got wind of the Union, Khlgatyan tried to escape by crossing the frontier. Caught by border guards he was tried for treason and given the maximum penalty then: the death penalty having been abolished, he was sentenced to 25 years of special (i.e., the most severe) labor camp. In 1958 the maximum term of imprisonment was reduced to fifteen years, but it took three formal applications to the authorities and a good work record in camp to have his sentence commuted to fifteen years. He served the reduced sentence in full, until 1964. Since 1964 Khlgatyan has willy-nilly done manual factory work. A fanatical listener to Western radio stations, he heard of the establishment of the Armenian Helsinki Group and soon made discreet contacts with persons close to the Group. He secretly joined the Group already in July 1977, announced his joining together with Shagen Arutyunyan October 30, 1977. In November 1977 he renounced his Soviet citizenship, wrote an eloquent declaration in which he characterized himself as a proponent of philosophic idealism, a humanist, a pluralist, and an admirer of West European and particularly of American political institutions. An eloquent, spellbinding speaker and a dissenter of thirty years' standing, Khlgatyan appears to have brought to the Group the broader viewpoint of a liberal defender of human rights.
in Armenia, less ethnocentric, more pro-Western than that of the younger members.

Why was the Armenian Group organized in April 1977? Given the traditional rivalry between the Armenians and Georgians in the Caucasus we are tempted to remark that once the Georgian human rights activists organized their Group in January 1977, their Armenian counterparts were soon to follow. We are not persuaded that such a motive was altogether absent in the minds of Nazaryan and Eduard Arutyunyan, but it would be an exceedingly shallow interpretation to see in this the main, perhaps even a major reason. Another explanation has been provided by Robert Nazaryan himself when he told Western correspondents at the April 1977 press conference in Moscow: "At a time when authorities wanted to crush the Moscow and Ukrainian Groups we have started our own group to show our solidarity in this dangerous moment." Orlov had had many ties with Armenia (he was corresponding member of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, e.g.) and the press conference was held in the apartment of General Petro Hryhorenko, a member of both the Moscow and Ukrainian Groups. Nazaryan was sincere in stressing the motive of solidarity. Nevertheless, it might perhaps be argued that the main reason for the establishment of the Armenian Group was a recent shift in the attitudes that many Armenians had toward the Russians: traditionally, anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic and, therefore, pro-Russian, in the 1960's and 1970's many Armenians began to re-evaluate their position vis-à-vis the regime and the Russians.
At first sight it would seem that the Armenians need not fear any infringements of their status as one of the most ancient, self-conscious and strong nationalities of the Soviet Union. Writes Professor Vahakn N. Dadrian:

Long before Armenia was Sovietized Armenians had forged a collective consciousness in which a sense of antiquity had always figured prominently. That sense was moreover accented by a sense of tragedy through which Armenians viewed themselves and related themselves to the rest of the world. This distillation of a twin self-image of an ancient nation and of a tragic nation has for a long time distinguished Armenian ethnic consciousness. Underlying the absorption into this twin image is a mechanism of subjectivity which lends content, color and meaning to that image. 164

The sense of tragedy is rooted in the centuries of foreign subjugation (since the mid-eleventh century for Armenian upland and since the late fourteenth century for "Lesser Armenia" or Cilicia) and above all in the genocide of the Western Armenians at the hands of the Turks in 1915. 165 The latter is rendered more poignant by the fact that many descendants of the survivors of the genocide emigrated to Soviet Armenia where they would settle particularly in cities. 166 (The parents of both Shagen Arutyunyan and Ambartsum Khlgatyan, e.g., are from the Van region in Turkish Armenia.) 167

The demographic position of the Armenians in some ways is enviable. Dispersed as they may be (out of a total of some 5 million Armenians, 3.6 million live in the Soviet Union and "more than 1.5 million" live abroad) in Soviet Armenia in which 56% of all Soviet Armenians live the Armenians make up as many as 88.6% of the total republican population, 99.8% of whom gave Armenian as their native language, an increase of
0.6% over 1959, when 99.2% self-declared Armenians in Armenia gave 
Armenian as their native language.\textsuperscript{168} April 14, 1978, the regime 
allowed the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR to restore a clause in 
the republican constitution declaring Armenian to be the state language 
of the Armenian SSR, on the very day that demonstrations took place in 
the capital of Georgia. (It almost looks as if the Armenians received 
el"Earlier and gratuitously what the Georgians had to obtain by public pressure--in fact, it appears to us that the Armenians qua rival 
Transcaucasian people were given the concession won by the Georgians 
"Later, at the last minute, without any publicity.\textsuperscript{169}

The central institution in Armenia is indeed the Church. Every 
child born of Armenian parents automatically becomes a member of the 
Armenian Apostolic Church. The Church has held the dispersed Armenians 
together, in Armenia the Church has served as a near-substitute for the 
State, which for centuries had been subjugated by the Turks, the 
Persians, and the Russians.\textsuperscript{171} The Soviet regime had wisely tried to 
work with, rather than against the Armenian Church, which was considered 
the freest and most independent in the Soviet Union. According to Bruce 
Nelan's interview with Catholicos Vasgen "some 80 percent of the popula-
tion attends the 60 active churches in the republic, . . . at least 75 
percent of the republic's children are being baptized." Armenians are 
proud to be Christians. An unnamed waiter told Nelan: "You can't be 
Armenian without being Christian." Asked if he were a Christian himself, 
the waiter said, "I have been a Christian since the year 301" (i.e., when 
Armenia accepted Christianity - Y.B.).\textsuperscript{172} Finally, the connection 
between the Armenian Church and Armenian nationhood has been put
exceedingly well by Robert Nazaryan who wrote in a letter to Catholicos Vazgen I:

Beginning with the fourth century the Armenian has allied his fate with that of the Church and found in it not only a spiritual center but also the means of saving his own national individuality, a means of saving all that which is tied to and which tied him to the past: national customs and traditions, language, literature, and architecture. In this sense, an even greater threat has now arisen for Armenians, and Armenians today must in the same way find salvation through the Church.173

As a supreme symbol of official Armenian Soviet nationalism, of "renationalization" to use Suny's term, and of the attempted union between the State, the Nation and the Church stands the magnificent monument to the victims of the genocide erected by the Soviet State after the 50th anniversary of that tragedy in 1965. In the monument there is an eternal flame and music is being played. Part of the music is a religious song taken from the Armenian Liturgy. There is the Soviet State commemorating the national martyrs of Armenia by playing, among others, religious songs.174 What more did the Armenians want? Why did they dissent?

The small and secret Armenian Democratic Union of the 1940's (Khlgatyan and others) did not have any concrete territorial or political goals besides introducing genuine democracy in Armenia. Members of the Union argued that it was the Western democracies that had really won World War II, not Stalin and that it was in the interests of Armenia to learn from the United States and Great Britain how to nominate and elect responsible democratic leaders. Members of the Union were quickly arrested and the Union itself was suppressed.
It is in the 1960's, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev that Armenians began to assert themselves on a large scale and more publicly. With Stalin's terror removed and provided with the challenge of an assimilationist modernization, the carefully fed official Armenian nationalism threatened to leave the narrow channel and overflow the banks established by the regime. When in 1962 the Armenians celebrated the 1600th anniversary of the invention of the Armenian alphabet a bit too enthusiastically, "the result was a swift and tense reaction from Moscow as well as [E]revan issuing warnings of dire consequences."\(^{175}\) Three years later, April 24, 1965, on the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide the regime was openly challenged by thousands of young people who were not satisfied with the relatively outspoken yet restrained official celebration but kept shouting "Our lands! Our lands!," finally breaking into the opera house where the official ceremony was taking place and routing the audience, which included the top Party and Government functionaries. Even Catholicos Vazgen was unable to control the tumult.\(^{176}\)

Behind the differences between the two celebrations—"the restrained official one and the emotional outburst of the people"—were differences of interest between Erevan and Moscow. Many adult Armenians, not just the students wanted to have the Turkish government acknowledge its guilt for the 1915 massacres and wanted Moscow to exert pressure on Turkey to do so. (Turkey officially did not even admit that the massacres had taken place!) The Soviet government, however, refused to listen to the Armenians because in 1965 it was interested in diplomatically penetrating Turkey and the rest of the "northern tier" of the Middle East. There may also have been a few Armenians who wanted Moscow to help Armenia
recover the Armenian lands in Eastern Turkey, but they were most likely to be in a small minority: some acknowledgement of Turkish guilt for the massacres was the real, operative demand.

Somewhat related to the Turkish issue was the issue of two Armenian territories presently located in the Azerbaidzhan SSR: the Autonomous Region of Montainous Karabagh, where some four-fifths of the population are Armenians and the Nakhitchevan Autonomous Republic, where the majority of the people are non-Armenians but which for a long time has been historically tied to Armenia. (The Azerbaidzhaniis who are now in control in both areas are a Turkic people.) There does not seem a great deal of passion generated by the Nakhitchevan ASSR, but tiny Karabagh (1,699 square miles and 153,000 people) is responsible for many samizdat protests, a number of which we have purposely reproduced (see Armenian documents nos. 8, 10-12, in the Appendix, pp. A-183 to -187, -195 to -205). The documents show that the ruling Azerbaidzhani minority has badly mistreated the Armenian majority in Karabagh, that the Armenians from within and from without Karabagh have been complaining to their fellow Armenians and to Moscow ever since around 1964, and that nothing has been done about those complaints because for the sake of some 100,000 Karabagh Armenians Moscow does not want to anger the Turkic and Islamic Azerbaidzhaniis and potentially all the Moslems in and outside the Soviet Union. For the Armenians Karabagh is important by itself. In addition, it is even more important as a touchstone of Soviet good will toward Armenia: if Moscow is not willing to transfer Karabagh to Armenia, will it ever help the Armenians vis-à-vis the Turks?177
In 1966, in the aftermath of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of genocide, the National United Party of Armenia (NOP) was set up under Aikazun Khachatryan, Stepan Zatikyan, Shagen Arutyunyan and student Paruir Airikyan. The goal of the Party was: "the solution to the Armenian question: the establishment of a national state governing the entire territory of historic Armenia, the unification of all Armenians in diaspora throughout the world into a territorially and governmentally established Homeland, and a national renaissance." The first intermediate goal was the achievement of independence by Armenia through a peaceful referendum in which "an absolute majority vote of the population of Armenia as well as citizens of Armenia temporarily living in other countries" would decide whether or not Armenia would secede from the Soviet Union. The regime clamped down hard sending the NOP activists to jail and prison camp for many years. 178

This is the background against which the Armenian Group was established in April 1977. What did it do? Ambartsam Khlgatyan summarizes its work as follows:

The small number of the Group was compensated for by the activeness of its members. In a short time, a substantial fund to aid the families of political prisoners was created, legal and extra-legal correspondence with camps and Armenian prisoners of conscience was organized, petitions and appeals on behalf of their release were written and circulated, work was undertaken to distribute samizdat, and so on. 179

The Group did issue seven documents which we have reproduced (in the Appendix, pp. A-163ff.), including the almost desperate final appeal to Armenians abroad of February 8, 1978, starting with the possibly premature statement: "The Armenian Helsinki Group has been
The following general points can be made: First, the quality of the documents, particularly that of the first declaration and the announcement (or memorandum) to the Belgrade Conference and of its supplement are high. The documents bristle with facts, contain closely reasoned arguments. Second, as in the case of the Ukrainian Group, human and national rights are considered inextricably intertwined. The Declaration is particularly effective in that it presents thirteen concrete demands often firmly anchored with legal references: demands 1-5 are general human rights (e.g., point 1: "to defend the civic, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms which are inherent to human dignity and are vital for man's free and full development") whereas points 6-9 present specifically Armenian demands (point 6: "free movement in and out of the country ... but cooperating all the while with the activities aimed at encouraging the concentration of Armenians within the boundaries of the Armenian Republic"; point 7 on the admission of the Armenian SSR to the UN; point 8 on the reintegration of Karabagh and Nakhichevan; point 9 on more widespread use of Armenian as a state language). Points 10-13 are more instrumental and procedural in nature (see pp. A-164ff.). Thirdly, the most urgent concern of the Armenian Group, to judge from the third paragraph of the Declaration and from the repeated appeal for collections of February 1976 with a postscript of May 1977 (see document 7, pp. A-181ff.) is to help the eighteen victims of the nine secret political trials of 1973-1974, which involved members and sympathizers of NOP.
How effective has the Group been? In its first memorandum to the Belgrade Conference of June 1977 the Group complained:

Decades of pervasive suspicion, intimidation and fear inherited from the past, hamper Group activity. Citizens wishing to join or work with the Group in the data-gathering process on human rights violations refrain from doing so for fear of direct reprisals and from their sense that the struggle for basic human rights and freedoms in the Soviet Union is hopeless and cannot produce any positive results (see Appendix, p. A-169).

This pessimistic evaluation may be rather accurate particularly in the light of the regime's counteraction. (It should be repeated, however, that though the number of documents issued has been relatively small, its quality is high.) The regime struck back both directly and indirectly. December 23, 1977, three of the four really active Group members were arrested: Robert Nazaryan, Shagen Arutyunyan and Ambartsum Khlgatyan (Eduard Arutyunyan was spared for the time being, Osyan was gradually withdrawing from the Group under police pressure). Khlgatyan was detained and released. Shagen Arutyunyan on January 18, 1978, was tried and convicted of the trumped-up charge of resisting a representative of authority, he was sentenced to three years in a standard regimen camp. Nazaryan, the soul of the Group, was held over for trial which finally took place in November 1978. Nazaryan's trial was a shambles (at first, due to a misunderstanding, the police did not admit Nazaryan's defense lawyer into the court; up to fifty witnesses were supposed to be called but only thirteen were, of whom twelve gave testimony in favor of Nazaryan, the thirteenth, a woman, testifying against him for personal reasons such as an alleged breach of promise), Nazaryan did not plead guilty to the charge of anti-Soviet propaganda—nevertheless December 2,
1978, he was sentenced to five years of strict regimen labor camp and two years of exile. June 26, 1979, Ambartsum Khlgatyan left the country under extreme pressure to emigrate to the US. July 13, 1979, Eduard Arutyunyan, the formal Group leader was arrested. June 29, 1979, already in the West, Khlgatyan had announced that two new members had joined the Group: the ex-Party member and engineer Rafel Oganyan (born in 1926) and the young and energetic woman Sirvark Avagyan (born in 1952) who has been working as a technical control inspector in a radio factory.* The arrest in mid-July 1979 of Eduard Arutyunyan, who at the time of writing (February 1980) is awaiting trial, has been evidently designed not to allow Oganyan and Avagyan to learn to work together with or without Arutyunyan.

A much more dangerous attack on the Armenian Helsinki Group has been the indirect one through the secret trial and quick execution of three Armenians Stepan S. Zatikyan, Akop Stepanyan and Zoven Bagdasaryan in the last days of January 1979. The three had been accused and allegedly convicted of placing a bomb in the Moscow subway January 8, 1977, which caused the loss of several lives. The entire case is murky from beginning to tragic end: Zatikyan never confessed to having placed the bomb as did Vladimir Zhvaniaa, and during his relatives' last visit which lasted only twenty minutes he told them that during the fifteen months of his imprisonment he did not tell them a single word. When his brother specifically asked him whether he had taken part (in the bombing) Zatikyan replied that he was guilty only of leaving his two children behind in this world and that there was no other guilt.181 Friends say that Zatikyan was a good family man, that he loved his young

*March 15, 1980, A. Khlgatyan told Bilinsky by phone that Aleksander Malkhazyan, a secret associate member of the Armenian Group, had just been allowed to emigrate.
children and his wife (the sister of political prisoner Paruir Airikyan) and that he was looking forward to the latter's discharge from exile in 1984 to resume political activity together. The regime has not publicly produced any witnesses nor any physical evidence, which is most astounding in a politically charged capital case. For though Stepanyan and Bagdasaryan were just friends of Zatikyan, Zatikyan himself had played a prominent role in the establishment of NOP in 1966 and had been sentenced in 1969 to four years of imprisonment.

The reason for mentioning the involved and tragic Zatikyan case in our context is twofold: for the first time since Stalin, an Armenian nationalist was put to death essentially for his convictions, for—by civilized standards—the Soviet government failed to prove his guilt in the Moscow subway bombing. Secondly, in talking to Nazaryan and Eduard Arutyunyan the KGB—unsuccessfully—tried to convince them that Zatikyan had indeed placed the bomb. Shagen Arutyunyan, however, who had collaborated with Zatikyan in NOP in the 1960's and also Paruir Airikyan, Zatikyan's brother-in-law, were intensively questioned in 1978 in Moscow to establish Zatikyan's guilt. It is possible, as assumed by Hélène Janvier, that at one time the KGB had toyed with the idea of involving the members of the Armenian Group in the affair of the Moscow subway.\(^\text{182}\) In any case, they were not above intimidating the members of the Armenian Watch Committee with the prospect of walking Zatikyan's last steps.

Did Orlov, Rudenko, Petkus, Gamsakhurdia and Nazaryan when they established their Helsinki Groups ever dream that in retaliation the KGB
would stoop so low as to kill a presumably innocent man just to issue
a warning to his friends? Would they still have gone ahead with their
plans had they known of the secret trial and execution of three young
Armenians? We think they would, but they would have done so with a
heavier heart and fewer illusions.
Executive Summary

Chapter 6

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET NATIONALITY QUESTION

We argue that the Helsinki Final Act had had serious implications for the Soviet nationality issue. The impact goes beyond the creation of the five Watch Committees inside the Soviet Union, which became clearing-houses for information and often addressed the nationality issue directly. More broadly, the Final Act: allowed an effective link to be made, both conceptually and practically, between human rights and nationality rights; it provided a new basis for the legitimation of nationality assertiveness; it facilitated a closure of various dissent groups and dissenters, which is important because four of the Watch Committees were largely nationality based to begin with; it stimulated interaction across ethnic group lines, and thus made both nationality and human rights dissent more widespread throughout the community; it helped to make the issues national in scope; and it allowed an unexpected basis for cooperation between nationality groups in the USSR and their elements abroad.

The Final Act also brought unprecedented international attention to the human rights issue and thereby to the Soviet nationality problem. The dissidents themselves helped to create this "internationalization" of the issue, which global forum was functionally very useful for their activities in the USSR to be effective. But this should not be seen solely as a political matter; we contrast this to scientific relations between the United States. The human rights and nationality rights issues caused serious strains in American-Soviet relations in 1977-1978 and led to a virtual collapse of scientific relations, independently of the US government in 1979-1980. The international attention and the linkage between human and nationality rights may be sufficient to keep the Soviet ethnic scene heated in the years ahead.
Chapter 6

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET NATIONALITY QUESTION

It is a statement of fact that the Helsinki accords resulted in the creation of Watch Committees in Moscow, Lithuania, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia, as discussed in the preceding chapter. These committees in essence became clearinghouses for information about the violation of the spirit and substance of the Helsinki Final Act in the Soviet Union. Without these bodies the world would know appreciably less about the relevant issues in the USSR. Yet the impact of the Final Act on the nationality question was more indirect, a matter which is not at all self-evident, but is, nevertheless, a part of the contemporary Soviet reality. The impact of the accords was multi-faceted: it allowed an effective link to be made between human rights and nationality rights; it provided a new basis for the legitimation of nationality assertiveness; it facilitated a closure of various dissenters and dissent groups; it stimulated interactional activity across ethnic group lines; it made the salient issues national in scope, whereas earlier nationality demands tended to be local; and it allowed an unexpected basis for cooperation between nationality groups in the USSR and their elements abroad.

To understand fully what transpired in these areas, it is necessary to take note of a rather broader impact of the Helsinki Final Act. Namely, in the second half of the 1970s, human rights became a very important international issue. On the one hand, it may be argued that this
development provided a forum, an international receptivity, to Soviet human rights and nationality complaints, without which the impact of Helsinki on the domestic affairs of the USSR would undoubtedly have been far more minimal than they were. On the other hand, it is very pertinent that the activism in the Soviet Union immediately following the signing of the Final Act, and even during the two preceding years of negotiations for this, was central to making human rights an international issue. Furthermore, the role of "Soviet ethnics," or nationality groups, was crucial in the latter process.

In arguing the points of the present chapter, we draw on Soviet and Western reporting and commentary on the 1975-1980 period, both official and public, interviews with selected American officials and Soviet human rights activists currently in the West, the statements of the latter to Western investigative bodies and groups, documents of Soviet dissent and of the Soviet Watch Committees, and other relevant sources. It is true, of course, that the 1970s was a "special decade" in many regards. For example, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, there were reasons why these were years of perhaps unusual dissent and assertiveness by Soviet dissidents and nationality groups. In addition, there was the serendipitous advantage of having an American President elected in 1976 who insisted on making human rights central to the country's foreign policy and relations, and individuals in Congress, such as New Jersey's Millicent Fenwick, who had strong personal records of championing civil/human rights.

However, "the internationalization" of the human rights issue in the second half of the 1970s was not a mere product of chance nor of indi-
vidual dispositions. Rather, one must look at these matters in the context of, and in interaction with, societal-level and intersocietal developments. After all, individual human rights activists and champions, as well as the violation of human rights, whether in the Soviet Union or elsewhere (including the United States), and the Soviet nationality question, had been with us for quite some time. The primary catalyst in bringing issues to center stage was the Helsinki Final Act. And here the peculiarity of developments is, perhaps, even astonishing. After all, human rights were not the major component of the Final Act, nor is there any information which we have uncovered which would suggest that the human rights provisions, especially Principle VII, and even those of human contact (Basket Three), were pushed by the Western delegations consciously to needle the Warsaw Pact countries. Rather, their introduction may be seen more appropriately as a Western means of counterbalancing the heavily political proposals of the Warsaw Pact bloc. In this sense these provisions made the Final Act politically more acceptable to the West, while they had to be acceded to by the Warsaw Pact participants, as the basic sponsors of the CSCE idea, in order to achieve their own political goals. It would be safe to assume that if the major participants had known beforehand, that it would be the brief human rights provisions which would dominate international public and political attention in the second half of the decade, the Final Act might never have materialized in the form that it did.
The Internationalization of the Human Rights Issue 1975-1980

Human rights had most obviously been an issue on the global scene before Helsinki. Several international bodies and organizations, such as the various United Nations organs and Amnesty International, had been devoting attention to pertinent issues for some time. What separates the pre-Helsinki from the post-Helsinki period is not a qualitative but a quantitative shift. More organizations became active—both public and governmental—and appreciably more publicity is given to human rights in the media. The former is evidenced by the creation of new parliamentary investigative bodies, and the conduct of investigations, in the United States, Great Britain and West Germany, the appearance of the Sakharov Hearings (Copenhagen in 1975, then Rome, and Washington in 1979), and other such organizations. The media outburst is demonstrated in newspaper and periodical indexes. There is also a sharp increase in scholarly writings.

It is important to note that this quantitative shift in attention to human rights has occurred not only in the West, but in the Soviet Union as well, as evidenced by the increase in the frequency of articles and public statements and proclamations on this topic over time. If it is true that Western post-Helsinki critical examinations focus foremost on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it is also true that the Soviets have devoted their attention to criticizing the West. Yet there is a qualitative difference here. While the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in dealing with the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, has critically looked both at Soviet and American domestic violations and shortcomings, and while the American President's semi-annual report issued by the Department
of State is critical of its own allies as well as Warsaw Pact countries and
the non-aligned ones, the Soviet viewpoint is that there is absolutely no
human rights problem in the USSR.

Indeed, a *Pravda* article of 12 February 1977 states:¹

A hullabaloo has been raised also over the wretched
handful of anti-Soviet scum who smear their mother-
land and people. It is alleged that in the USSR
they are persecuted for "dissidence"...

They pose as martyrs persecuted for their convictions
and in this they are given every support by their in-
spirers and backers in the West. In the Soviet Union
nobody is persecuted for convictions. But under
Soviet law persons are liable to be punished for en-
gaging in anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation with
the purpose of undermining or weakening the country's
socio-political system or for systematically spread-
ing deliberate inventions smearing the Soviet state
and social system. It is thus a matter of punishment
for premeditated offense envisaged in articles 70 and
190 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the rele-
vant articles in the criminal codes of the other
Union republics.

Ironically, it was the Soviet Union itself which apparently was the first
to attempt use of the Helsinki Final Act to its own advantage in criti-
cizing domestic events in another country, in this case, Portugal, and
almost before the ink had dried on the document.²

There is no disagreement between Western or Eastern European/
Soviet sources that the first CSCE follow-up meeting, in Belgrade in late
1977, was dominated by the human rights issue and matters related to
Basket Three (human contacts, cultural exchange and informational flow).³

That this reflected Western emphasis, with the United States being the
most vocal advocate (although by no means the only one, since Sweden,
Holland and Canada were also very active in the human rights debate at Belgrade, is also quite clear. What is less known is the Warsaw Pact's own attempt also to influence the human rights issue at Belgrade, but through negotiation. On the one hand, they insisted: 4

that the participating states should reaffirm their determination to enforce the Final Act in its totality and develop their political, economic and cultural relations on the basis of treaties in conformity with principles of the Final Act.

This, of course, would minimize the overall visibility of the human rights issue, which in the text of the Final Act is indeed a very small component. By implying that enforcement should be on the basis of further treaties rather than current public scrutiny, the principles of Basket One become guidelines and means for implementing the substance of the other three Baskets rather than important ends in their own right, and they would be further shoved aside because of the diplomatic and political haggling which always takes place during the negotiation of treaties.

On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact's representatives proposed: 5

the suppression of the activity of fascist, neo-Nazi and revanchist organizations, which are prohibited by international law and the Helsinki Final Act [which is a serious overinterpretation of both, TP and YB], and the prohibition of their propaganda.

What this proposal would effectively have done, is to have allowed the Warsaw Pact countries to condemn their own domestic critics as criminals, by labeling them as fascists, neo-Nazis or revanchists, and to demand simultaneously that Western countries both silence Soviet/Eastern Europe-oriented critics resident in those countries and halt all scrutiny of the Soviet/East European domestic scene, not to mention the banning and prohibition of designated media, cultural and general informational flow.
In any case, then, it is evident not only that human rights became unusually visible as a global issue in the second half of the 1970s, but also that the one part of the Helsinki Final Act to achieve international attention was the human rights provision. The latter event is perhaps ironic, for both Soviet and American evaluations indicate significant changes and progress in areas covered by Basket Two and Four, and in those areas of Basket Three not directly related to human rights. That the Helsinki Final Act was the catalyst in the internationalization process is evidenced by the very fact that the new active investigative bodies were established specifically because of it, by the fact that much of the media attention as well as the scholarly writings specifically refer to it in the new discourse on human rights, and by the fact that the emergence of the Soviet Watch Committees reflected its execution.

We will look at the role of Soviet nationality groups in the internationalization process directly. That the internationalization in fact was strongly facilitated because of Soviet dissidents in general, regardless of whether they were particularistic, universalistic or mixed in their human rights outlook, is very evident. First of all, there was a clear-cut continuity from dissent during the 1960s and early 1970s, as centered in Moscow, to the post-Helsinki period. Indeed, the creation of the Moscow Watch Committee in 1976 was announced in Andrei Sakharov's apartment. Also, the United States Commission was in large part the result of the visit of a Congressional delegation to the USSR soon after the Final Act was signed, and the discussions and meetings which the delegation's members had with Soviet dissidents at this time, as discussed
in greater detail in the next chapter. Furthermore, it was the Soviet dissidents, and the violations they reported, especially through the formation of monitoring groups in 1976 and 1977, who became the primary objects of Western media, public and parliamentary attention. This was further reinforced by the Soviet suppression of such dissidents and groups. In addition, the extensively publicized "Sakharov Hearings" were a product of Soviet dissidents and their Western supporters, and exiled dissidents became primary sources of public information in the West about Soviet violations of human rights. Although our attention is focused on the USSR, it should be noted that parallel developments occurred in the Eastern European countries.

A reader should not misconstrue that all of the post-Helsinki attention to human rights was political. The "explosion" of the human rights issue on the world scene is illustrated also by developments in scientific interaction. The review of events in this area is intended to illustrate two related points—the internationalization of the human rights issue after Helsinki and the role of Soviet dissidents in this—and not to offer a thorough study on this otherwise important and fascinating topic. It is true that both the human rights issue and the treatment of Soviet dissidents by authorities there had already penetrated the scientific scene in the West, and we will use the example of the United States here, in the early 1970s. For example, the Committee of Concerned Scientists was organized already in 1972 (by 1977 it had some 4,000 members), the first major such group of American scientists. Its early concern was the Soviet treatment and problems of scientists applying to emigrate, almost all of whom were Jewish. Yet in the first half of the
1970s, although an increasing number of Soviet scientists, a group disproportionate among dissidents, was persecuted, and although prisoners of conscience were being routinely subjected to psychiatric abuse, American psychological and psychiatric organizations could not agree to condemn such Soviet violations of human rights.

William D. Carey, publisher of the prestigious weekly, *Science*, of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, wrote editorially in November 1976 as follows.11

Out of the Brezhnev-Nixon handshake cementing detente in Soviet-American relations in 1972 has come a brisk traffic of shuttle diplomacy in science and technology. As the original bilateral agreement comes up for renewal next year, how should the American scientific and technological community assess the value of the work accomplished to date, and the merits of Round Two?...

[And he ends the editorial by saying:] All things considered, the case for Round Two is a good one.

We will see directly how wrong Carey was. Before discussing his mis-

Prognosis, three additional points should be introduced. First of all, very similarly to events in the political realm, scientists here did not focus exclusively on the Soviet Union. Thus, in the second half of the 1970s there was diverse scientific concern with the human rights, for example, of tribal people in Brazil and violation of the human rights of Argentinian scientists.12 Indeed, with the 1970s' politicization of many scientific issues, particularly in America—e.g., involving nuclear power, sociobiology, heredity in intelligence, abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, etc.—the decade was replete with scientific activism.13 But the important point is that most of the scientific concern with human rights came to involve the Soviet Union.
Second, the increased attention again was a fairly direct consequence of the Helsinki Final Act, which, relevant to this particular case, featured a call for closer scientific and technological exchange and cooperation in addition to human rights. This is evidenced foremost by the frequent legitimation of protests and demands after mid-1975 on the basis of the Final Act. And third, it is the fact that Soviet scientists are active dissenters that we once more have the very crucial input of events on the Soviet domestic scene in influencing the internationalization of the human rights issues. It is not only that the Soviet dissenters who are scientists themselves use the Final Act in criticizing Soviet society and violations of human rights, and that their appeals find an echo in the West through collegial empathy. It is also important that the Soviet repression of scientist-dissidents evokes attention, concern and finally action by American scientists. Ironically, it was the mid-1972 Brezhnev-Nixon meeting in Moscow which launched greater scientific ties and cleared the way to the CSCE, the Final Act of which further intensified scientific exchange. It may be argued that greater personal contacts between American and Soviet scientists, whether there or here (including with Soviet emigre and exiled scientists), sensitized the former to the plight of the latter. Before the 1970s American scientists as a group, and scientific organizations in general, evidence no significant concern with human rights violations or the repressive treatment of Soviet scientists by authorities there.

That a shift had occurred in the mid-1970s was first evidenced in the case of the renowned Soviet electrochemist, Benjamin G. Levich, who had tried from 1972 onward to emigrate to Israel. Denied this, he
suffered hardships in his scientific life as well and was refused permission in 1977 to attend an international conference at Oxford University honoring him on his 60th birthday. Because of this travel refusal, the American Chemical Society and the Committee of Concerned Scientists held a special news conference in New York on 11-13 July. As Science (22 July 1977, p. 349) appropriately remarks:

The Levich press conference was yet another of many signs of the significant shift that has occurred over the past couple of years in the approach American scientific societies, including the Academy [of Sciences], have taken towards the plight of beleagured colleagues in other countries. Only last year (Science, 16 January 1976) Levich figures in a flare-up between the Academy and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) over the value of public gestures, as opposed to discrete private intercessions, in behalf of politically oppressed scientists. At that time Handler [President of the US Academy of Sciences] contended that behind-the-scenes pressure was more appropriate and expressed fear that public actions could jeopardize delicate private communications.

The arrests of Anatoly Shcharansky and Yuri Orlov helped the shift immeasurably. The Shcharansky case in 1977-1978 had attracted enormous publicity because he was accused of being a CIA spy, which could have led to a death sentence for treason, and because President Carter publicly stated that the Soviet scientist had no link to any United States intelligence agency. On Christmas Day 1977 the National Academy of Sciences announced the unprecedented step that its President, Philip Handler "had cabled Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev for permission to send a legal observer to the expected trial of Anatoly B. Shcharansky."

It was also in 1977-1978 that the human rights committees of the National Academy of Science and the American Association for the Advancement of
Science became active. The latter held an important human rights workshop in Washington on 6 June 1977, while the former "adopted 16 scientists and scholars whose situation is 'particularly grave and well documented'. Five are in Argentina, three in the Soviet Union, four in Indonesia, two in Czechoslovakia, and one each in Uruguay and Mali." In 1978 it became increasingly typical that individual American scientists, and groups of them, began to boycott scientific meetings in the Soviet Union. The Orlov trial especially (which was before those of Alexander Ginzburg and Shcharansky) elicited reactions. The sentencing of Orlov again evolved a strong protest from the National Academy of Science's Handler, which was another turning point because the president had been one of the early advocates of discrete private as opposed to public protest.

But even as late as mid-1978 there was some caution among American scientists and scientific organizations, an aversion "to politicizing" science; they clearly did not want a termination of American-Soviet contacts. Yet the Orlov-Shcharansky-Ginsburg trials, as well as the detention of an American businessman and Soviet expulsion of two American newsmen for slanderous reporting, forced the human rights issue into the limelight irreversibly. In the summer of 1978 American President Jimmy Carter ordered the cancellation of advanced computer sales and restrictions on some high-technology exports to the USSR. The scientific debate over contacts and boycotts intensified. In the early fall, Philip H. Abelson, editor of Science, editorially cautioned that "the issue of human rights has lent urgency to an assessment of scientific relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union."
In March 1979 *Science* reported that as a result of the Orlov-Shcharansky trials: 22

Now, in the largest protest of its kind, 2400 U.S. scientists have pledged to end or restrict their cooperation with the Soviet Union until the two prisoners are released. And these protests, according to several U.S. scientists, have already had an impact.

The group, known as Scientists for Orlov and Shcharansky (SOS), includes 12 Nobel laureates and 113 members of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). They announced their protest at a press conference in Washington, D.C. on 1 March. More than 70 percent of the 2400 signed a pledge "to withhold all personal cooperation with the Soviet Union until Orlov and Shcharansky are released."

Since the convictions of Orlov and Shcharansky,... several international meetings in the Soviet Union have had to be canceled, and many others have had greatly reduced attendance... And according to Dan McCraken, president of the 40,000 member Association of Computing Machinery (ACM), the ACM Council has decided "not to cooperate with or co-sponsor any meetings held in the U.S.S.R."

Added Christian Anfinsen, a Nobel laureate biochemist at the National Institutes of Health, "The Orlov and Shcharansky cases were the last straw."

Interestingly, at this time it is the Department of State which becomes skeptical of such harsh action, and the National Academy of Sciences still remains more cautious than professional scientific organizations. 23

Later that same spring, the health of Sergei A. Kovalev, another imprisoned Soviet scientist-dissident, once more became an issue. 24 In late April the Soviets attempted to appease Western public opinion by releasing five dissidents into exile in America: Aleksandr Ginzburg, a prominent civil rights activist and poet; Valentin Moroz, a Ukrainian historian and a leading member in the Ukrainian national rights movement; Georgi P. Vins, a Ukrainian Baptist activist; Eduard S. Kuznetsoy and Mark Dymshits, accused of an attempted Aeroflat hijacking to Israel.
By early 1980 it was evident that a serious wedge had been driven into American-Soviet scientific exchange. Indeed, a January 1980 editorial in Science, penned by leaders of the Committee of Concerned Scientists, is entitled "Helsinki Final Act." The occasion was the forthcoming 18-29 February 1980 conference in Hamburg, which was to evaluate the progress of scientific exchanges under the CSCE Final Act. The editorial states in part:  

In particular, delegates from the United States and other countries should discuss, in a constructive but forthright manner, the obstacles that exist to the kind of free scientific interchange envisioned in the Helsinki Final Act. They should attempt to determine why Soviet and Eastern bloc governments and academic officials exclude from scientific activities those who have sought permission to emigrate, in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, or have spoken out for the full implementation of the Act itself. They should also ask why Soviet and Eastern bloc scientists invited to international conferences are frequently not permitted to attend.

At the Hamburg forum scientists from the 35 Helsinki Final Act signatory countries met in a somewhat strained milieu, with sharp verbal exchanges between the Warsaw Pact country and West European/North American delegates. The final communique was mild but unanimously endorsed by the over 300 individual participants, and it re-endorsed in principle the Helsinki human rights provisions. It was reportedly "the first expression of support for human rights in a document signed by representatives of the Soviet Union since Helsinki."  

The tension in Hamburg reflected the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and even more so, the internal exile imposed on Andrei D. Sakharov, the USSR's most prestigious dissident. The Soviet punishment of
Sakharov was "the straw that broke the camel's back" in Soviet-American scientific exchange. At the end of February 1980 the National Academy of Sciences' cancelled workshops, seminars and symposiums with the Soviet Union for at least six months in protest..."27 It was an unprecedented decision for the Academy. Reaction by American professional organizations was also strong.28 As with the political limelight discussed earlier, it should be noted that the American scientists have not been alone in their criticism of the Soviet treatment of scientific colleagues. For example, in the Kovalev case, as early as mid-1975 some 48 cardiac electrophysiologists worldwide appealed on his behalf to the Soviet government, and later 55 European scientists sent a similar appeal.29 Also, at the aforesaid Hamburg forum, the message delivered by the president of the British Royal Society, Alexander Todd, and by other Western scientists, was no less critical of the Soviet treatment of scientists than that of the American Academy's president, Philip Handler, who in earlier years had been cautious about all such public criticism.30

The fact that scientists, especially in the West, tend to have a particular distaste for politicizing their own work and affairs, and that in the first half of the 1970s they did indeed not want to get too involved over Soviet human rights, but that in the second half of the decade they did so, illustrates the important point that the internationalization of the issues was not simply political or a product of politics. It is quite possible that had not the Soviet dissidents been also prominent scientists, the attention in the West would have been appreciably weaker. After all, Western scientists were not protesting Soviet human rights violations per se,
but the "persecution of Soviet scientists." The fact that the Western scientific protest drew on the Helsinki Final Act, perhaps inevitably because of the science provisions and perhaps tactically because of the human rights provisions, to legitimize its criticism of the Soviets, and the fact that the Soviet scientists such as Orlov, Shcharansky and Sakharov, were among the most prominent human rights activists there, is what actually linked the science and human rights issues. But it was the existence of this linkage that allowed the matter to gain such great publicity in the West. After all, how many American scientists protested the arrest and trial of Soviet human rights activist Viktoras Petkus, who was not a scientist, in the Lithuanian SSR, even though these were contemporaneous with the proceedings against Orlov and Shcharansky? For that matter, how much Western publicity or scientific concern does the persecution of internationally unknown scientists in the USSR, not exactly an uncommon phenomenon, evoke? Finally, contrast the publicity given in the Western media to the tribulations of a Levich as opposed to Orlov, Shcharansky and Sakharov; all four are very well-known scientists and all evoked great concern among Western colleagues. But the importance difference was that Levich is not simultaneously a well known Soviet human rights activist like the other three, but rather, a mere "refusenik," and therefore his case attracted less overall attention.

In transition to the more direct impact of the Helsinki Final Act on the Soviet domestic scene, it should be noted that the Soviet nationality issue had already entered the picture before mid-1975 along two parallel paths. First, and the more important of the two, was the attention drawn by the nationality groups to the Soviet domestic scene in the first half of the
1970s, a matter which was discussed at greater length in Chapter 2. Although events in Ukraine and in the Caucasus were not unimportant, the two key activist groups at this time were the Lithuanians and the Jews. It was the actions of both in the first few years of the 1970s which had resulted in an extraordinary Western media focus on Soviet domestic affairs and had, in fact, turned the Soviet nationality issue into an international political one. The reference here is specifically to the issues over Jewish emigration, the Simas Kudirka affair, the Lithuanian unrest of 1972 and the strong emergence of the Lithuanian Catholic opposition.

The Jewish issue in particular has even wider ramifications than the Lithuanian one. While both evoked unprecedented media attention to Soviet nationality problems and affected American-Soviet relations, the Jewish issue was further intertwined with the science issue. Namely, many of the Soviet Jews refused emigration were scientists, forming the group known as "refuseniks." It was the plight of the latter which was crucial to the initial mobilization of concern among American scientists. The primary early core of activists in the Committee of Concerned Scientist here were also Jewish. It is clear that after Helsinki the American scientific concern became ethnically neutral. But it is also evident that the early link between American Jewish scientists and Soviet Jewish scientists was present, an ethnic tie which should not be surprising. The record shows rather clearly that while American activists, whether scientists or not, speak about Soviet human rights and nationality issues generally, they also address these issues more proliferously in relation to their ethnic kin-group in the USSR. Thus, there is virtually no evidence that
American Jews show special concern about the human rights of the Soviet Baltic people, the American Balts of Soviet Armenians, the American Ukrainians of Soviet Central Asians, etc. It was a chance occurrence that members of the Jewish group were present in large numbers in the ranks of scientists in both American and Soviet society. The point is that had Soviet Jewish scientists not wished to emigrate, or had they been freely allowed to do so, the early mobilization of American scientists and scientific organizations would not have been likely, nor would the attention of the American media and politicians to the Soviet nationality problem have been as extensive.

The Jewish issue was a further catalyst for some public attention and Western scientific mobilization in the 1970s because of the charges that there was a sudden strong surge of anti-Semitism in Soviet science, specifically in mathematics. The Jewish and Lithuanian events had already sensitized the Western public, political figures and media to the Soviet nationality problem and to aspects of human rights violations in the few years immediately preceding the Helsinki Final Act, years during which the preparatory negotiations were already underway. Furthermore, the Soviet nationality groups were not in the dark, unknowledgable or politically blind about the CSCE.

"Representatives of the Estonian and Latvian Democrats," in a memorandum symbolically dated 17 June 1975, the 35th anniversary of the Soviet military occupation of the Baltic states, and addressed specifically to the participating states at the concluding phase of the CSCE in Helsinki, raise a whole host of relevant points. It must be recalled here that
Western radios, and the coverage in the Soviet press, were not the only sources of public information available to the Baltic opposition. People in northern Estonia can, and all indications are that they extensively do, watch Finnish television (Finnish is closely related to Estonia). This particular 1975 document is not merely a nationalist statement, although it does decry Russification, especially the demographic Russian influx, (referring to the Russians as a civil garrison which is "an ominous tumor in the body of the Estonian and Latvian nation"), and ends in a call for restored full sovereignty as the only remaining hope for national survival. It is also a communication addressing issues of religious, civil and national-cultural rights in the light of the impending final Helsinki document as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also points out the routine violation of such rights in the Soviet Union. Thus, already before the Final Act was signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, elements of the Soviet domestic opposition, in this case of the nationality kind, were using its provisions to legitimize demands, and the CSCE itself as another world forum for expressing views. Furthermore, already in this joint Estonian-Latvian document of June 1975 it is evident that in the Soviet Union nationality rights and human rights would be firmly linked, both conceptually and practically.

Soviet Domestic Consequences

(1) The closure of dissident groups.

The late 1960s and early 1970s had seen the development of dissent in the Soviet Union along several parallel, if not divergent paths.
Among the major ones were the following: civil rights in the broad sense; religious rights; moral-ethical concerns; and nationality rights. Among the civil rights dissidents one could refer, for example, to the activities of the Moscow group which emerged around Andrei Sakharov,33 and the 1969 memorandum of the "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic Region."34 Also a part of this would be the group of dissidents who gathered around the Chronicle of Current Events which began publication in April 1968.35 It is not untypical in Western analyses to refer to these dissidents collectively as "the Democratic Movement."

Among religious dissidents one could find examples among believers in all religious groups, but the best one here would be the energetic Catholic movement in Lithuania.36 The moral-ethical strain of dissenters would include those who believe in Marxism-Leninism and are therefore primarily intellectual reformers of the Soviet system (even if the reforms are "radical"), such as Roy Medvedev and the New Left in Estonia,37 or the opponents of the system who see Marxism-Leninism itself as empty, such as the authors of the 1968 memorandum of the "numerous representatives of the technical intelligentsia in Estonia,"38 and the pronouncements of both Lithuanian intellectuals and believers.39

The nationality dissent is among the most intensive of these several paths, and it is manifest throughout the Soviet Union in the form of political nationalism by all major nationality groups.40 National assertiveness has been particularly strong in the Soviet Baltic and Ukraine,41 and its goal has been simply national survival, most often seen endangered by Russification but also by the Soviet system per se. Typically there is a
call for political sovereignty, that is, secession from the USSR. Yet Jewish, Volga German and Tatar demands, for example, are not secessionist. "Nationalism" has been found inside the Communist Party as well. 42

It should be noted here that all attempts at a taxonomy of Soviet dissent border on the nonsensical. Neither the dissenters nor the issues fall neatly into discrete categories, and most often the individual dissidents, and even groups, are devoted to several areas. Our point here is to emphasize, nevertheless, that there has been a diversity of issues and individuals involved in Soviet dissent during the decade preceding the Helsinki Final Act, and unquestionably, after this milestone as well. But what the Helsinki accords did, we argue, is to have provided a basis for legitimizational and to a degree organizational consolidation or closure of the various Soviet dissent movements. The Act had, in other words, an "umbrella affect."

In a broad sense, this may be illustrated in three ways. First, the composition of the Helsinki Watch Groups, in the four SSRs as well as in Moscow, contained individuals of very diverse backgrounds: scientists and poets; believers and atheists; nationalists and generalists; reformers and separatists, etc., but in general, people who had earlier been active in very different strains of dissent (see Chapter 5 and the documentary appendix). This is not to say that the Watch Committees centralized dissent, but rather, that they brought diverse individuals (and representatives of dissent groups) together in a single organizational context.

Second, the documents of the Watch Committees began from the outset to address a broad range of issues related to human rights in
general and to the Helsinki Final Act in specific (see documentary appendix): the plight of believers, the tribulations of political prisoners, the violation of civil rights, the difficulties in emigration and family reunification, the complaints of nationalities, etc. It is not that these matters were not appealed before Helsinki, but rather, that there had been no unified outlet for complaints. The documents of the Helsinki Watch Committees, and the testimony of their members exiled to the West, provided a great breadth of coverage which achieved unprecedented attention in the West. And third, the Helsinki Final Act provided a single document—one recently signed by the Soviet Union and highly publicized domestically (and internationally) by it—on the basis of which a very broad range of human rights, and nationality rights, appeals could be advanced.

(2) The Legitimation of Dissent and Nationality Rights.

Prior to Helsinki, Soviet nationality groups, in asserting their rights, and dissidents such as Sakharov who addressed these rights, appealed to four different sets of documents, facts and ideologies to legitimate their positions and demands. This may be most effectively illustrated with the documents which emanated in the early 1970s from the Baltic region. First, and most broadly, the appeal was made to the ideology of political nationalism, one of the major tenets of which may be summarized as the belief that the highest form of expressing the collective identity of peoplehood (that is, the identity of a nation) is statehood. The notion that statehood and nationhood should coincide became a powerful political force in the 19th century, and has been formally expressed in the 20th century in the Atlantic
Charter and pronouncements/documents of the United Nations as the "inherent right of people to sovereignty." Indeed, decolonialization of the Western empires was rationalized on the basis of this principle. Similar demands were advanced by Baltic activists, who did not let it go unnoticed that the Soviet Union itself was often the most outspoken champion of the principle, but applied only to Western colonial rule especially in Africa and Asia.43

Second, in the Baltic (although not in Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and generally nowhere else in the Soviet Union) an appeal could be made on the basis of recent political sovereignty. After all, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were internationally de jure recognized countries between the two World Wars (including by the Soviet Union), and had been members of the League of Nations. The annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union had been based on military occupation and force, and it is not recognized by most Western countries to this day.44 Indeed, diplomatic missions of the prewar three states still exist in quite a few countries, including the United States. The Baltic opposition in the early 1970s also clearly was cognizant of this, since the memoranda it sent to Western public opinion and to the United Nations explicitly refer to current Soviet rule in the Baltic as a mere continuation of the 1940 occupation. There is a very simple cognate demand—that the occupation be ended by a withdrawal of Soviet military garrisons and administrative apparatus.45

Third, appeals were advanced on the basis of international documents, such as those sponsored by the United Nations—for example, the United Nations Charter, the International Declaration on Human Rights, etc.46
But this was a particularly frustrating channel because the United Nations and its organs were the addressees, and that body as a whole was notorious for ignoring events in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Yet documents were sent by both Baltic believers and secular activists to the United Nations, with, of course, no result. This basis of legitimation is particularly interesting because Ukraine and Byelorussia are both full-fledged United Nations members. And this did not go unnoticed on the part of the Ukrainian Watch Committee, which in its very first document, and again later, demands that Ukraine participate separately from the USSR at Helsinki follow-up meetings (see documentary appendix).

And fourth, appeals could be made to organs of the civil government and the Communist Party on the basis of the Soviet Constitution which importantly, contains not only civil rights, but also specifically ethnic or nationality rights, provisions. And indeed, Baltic activists, both religious and secular, used this channel of legitimation as well. The Soviet Constitution as well as the international documents the USSR has signed and publicized, have been the most important basis of legitimizing Soviet human rights dissent, as well as a great deal of nationality dissent.

What the Helsinki Final Act did was to provide one single comprehensive document for appeal, one which the Soviet leaders had not only signed but had also proclaimed to be a landmark agreement in European history, and, from their own viewpoint, binding, as discussed in Chapter 4.
The Final Act, especially in its Principles VII and VIII of Basket One, provides a breadth of ammunition for dissidents in all countries. And the Final Act further had specified in Principle VII that:

in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating states will act in conformity, with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligation as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.

This gave the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accords even much greater breadth than would have been possible on the basis of the Final Act's own specific wording.

We have already noted that Baltic activists from Estonia and Latvia appealed to the states participating in the CSCE on this basis even before the Final Act was signed. The documents of the five Watch Committees from 1976 to 1979 are even more important testimony to the wide-ranging application of the Helsinki Final Act to the Soviet domestic scene by dissidents and human rights activists. The use of the Final Act in general and its human rights provisions in specific will find further elaboration later in the present chapter.

(3) Interaction Across Ethnic Group Lines

While the Moscow dissent group gathered around Sakharov had already taken public stands on the behalf of several Soviet ethnic groups, especially the Tatars, Jews and Volga Germans, prior to Helsinki, and while this Moscow group, as well as some elements of the secular opposition
movement in the Baltic, particularly in Estonia, were multi-ethnic in composition, in general nationality dissent before the Final Act was particularistic. That is, dissidents of particular Soviet nationality groups were foremost, if not almost fully, concerned with issues pertinent to their own group. A noticeable shift occurs, especially in the Baltic region, but in general as well, after 1975. For example, as noted in Chapter 5, the membership in the Watch Committees is ethnically diverse, although less so in the Armenian, Georgian and Ukrainian case than in Lithuania and Moscow (see also the documentary appendix). The divergence between the latter two and the former three finds elaboration subsequently.

In addition, we might draw attention to the documents produced by the Watch Committees (see documentary appendix). Not only are issues of human rights and nationality in general raised by these, but documents of the Moscow and Lithuanian Watch Committees especially address nationality problems and human rights violations relevant to a diversity of groups. Again, the Ukrainian, Georgian and Armenian documents are more particularistic.

(4) Local Versus All-Union Scope of the Issues

Again, it cannot be denied that already before Helsinki the Soviet nationality problem (and human rights) was seen as all-Union in scope, especially, once more, by the Moscow and some Baltic dissident elements. However, there is a noticeable intensification of this after the Final Act, due in large part to the formation of the Watch Committees. The roots of this trend are not entirely clear, but enough is known to offer a realistic, and probably correct, interpretation. First of all,
the diversity of membership in the Watch Committees clearly helped this. The Lithuanian committee had a Jewish member, Eitan Finkelstein, a scientist who had been active in the Jewish dissent movement concerning emigration, and who further also had good connections with Moscow dissidents. Sakharov stayed in Finkelstein's apartment when he visited the Lithuanian SSR during the trial of Kovalev; see Chapter 5 and the documentary appendix on the Lithuanian committee. Another founding member of the Lithuanian committee, Tomas Venclova, had a Jewish wife, and he too was clearly cognizant of Jewish issues. The Watch Committee in Moscow contained Russians as well as Jews. One of its founding members, Pyotr Grigorenko was Ukrainian. Another founding member, Elena Bonner, wife of Andrei Sakharov, was part Jewish and part Armenian. And so forth.

In addition to this type of personnel structure, there was also organizational interaction, although clearly no centralization in Moscow (the five committees were at the outset, and are now, most definitely separate entities in pursuit of a common goal). For example, the formation of the Lithuanian Committee was announced in Moscow (see Chapter 5 and the documentary appendix). Pyotr Grigorenko was a founding member of both the Moscow-based and the Ukrainian Watch Committees. Thus, it is very evident that ties between the committees existed, giving the Soviet dissident movement a national organizational structure, even if only in very loose goal-alliance form, for really the first time.

It appears, furthermore, that in general dissidents across the Soviet Union have come to know each other personally—which is rather ironic in the face of the restricted communications and physical movement
in that totalitarian system—based on a simple common denominator, namely, time in the gulag. Hence, even the repression of the activists by the Soviet authorities provides some all-Union structure to the dissidence movement. Lastly, because the human rights issue, and the Soviet nationality issue as well, had become international ones in the late 1970s, Soviet dissidence activities were echoed back to the general population by both Western radio broadcasts and the strong negative response in the Soviet media itself.

(5) Cooperation by International Elements of Ethnic Groups.

All major Soviet nationality groups have sizable elements abroad, whether in the West, in China, South Asia or the Middle East, some of which represents historical patterns of settlement, some 19th century migration and flight, World War II-era political flight, or recent emigration/expulsion. In virtually all cases these elements abroad have acted as lobbyists on the behalf of their ancestral body now in the USSR. The Baltic people, Ukrainians and Jews have been particularly active in the Western countries. In the case of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians the activism has had as its core the goal of national sovereignty, with primary critical attention targeted at real or perceived threats of Russification inside the USSR. Between the early 1950s, at which time the postwar partisan resistance had basically come to an halt, and the late 1960s, the elements abroad and in the ancestral homeland were waging parallel struggles (as it is, the homeland component was fairly quiet in the 1950s and most of the 1960s, as noted in Chapter 2).
In the past decade, and particularly after Helsinki, the activism evidences a degree of interactive closure. Namely, especially the Baltic, Jewish, and Ukrainian political organizations become the primary, although certainly not exclusive conduits for the circulation of the documents of Soviet dissent in the West. In addition to this role, the elements in the West also were active as lobbyists in the political arenas of Western Europe, North America, and even Australia, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. Furthermore, the decade saw the establishment of entities in the West the purpose of which was direct aid to prisoners of conscience in the USSR.

A point worth emphasizing here is that this link between internationally located elements of the same ethnic group, much closer after Helsinki than before, was not at all as "natural" as it might seem to a neutral observer. In the Baltic and Ukrainian communities in the West contact between the group's elements here and in the USSR was a "hot potatoe."52 The political leadership here did not at all look favorably on personal visits to the Soviet Union nor to contacts with Soviet citizens visiting the West. Nor was it tolerant toward the consumption of cultural and other publications and products originating in the Soviet Union by group members in the West. In other words, human contacts were opposed by both emigre and Soviet leaders of a given nationality group; the major exception to this among the groups which interest us here were, perhaps, the Jews. Yet one should not be left with the impression that this was an "ethnic peculiarity." During the Cold War and even into the 1970s such contacts were not only very limited but also eyed with grave suspi-
ments. Indeed, until 1965 visits to the Baltic and Ukraine were very restricted and it was not until after the post-1956 thaw that cultural production in the Soviet Union returned to a quality which would interest a person in the West. The years immediately prior to the Final Act, and especially the half-decade afterward, somewhat altered this situation. In a way the change reflected nothing more than the emergence of an active, and organized, political opposition inside the Soviet Baltic and Ukraine, one whose publications and actions the groups' elements in the West could support insofar as they were either politically nationalistic or politically critical of the Soviet system. Once this linkage had begun to take hold, it provided the Soviet opposition and human rights activists a welcome ally. As will be argued in Chapter 8, it was the domestic activism of the elements in the Western countries which was responsible not only for a great deal of the media attention, but also more critically for Western political attention, toward Soviet events. In summary, the internationalization of the issues reflected a push both by Soviet ethnic groups as well as the elements of these groups in the West.


It is not customary in American thought and tradition, and one might argue, in Western European as well, to consider nationality or ethnic rights as a type of human or even civil right. Such matters are not typically covered, for example, in the respective constitutions nor fundamental laws. Indeed, in the sector of public policy and practice, with the theoretical emphasis on nation-states, the historical fate of
ethnic groups in these societies has strained toward involuntary assimilation.  
When nationality issues are raised, it is in the political context of sovereignty, that is, in regard to the creation of new nation-states. Or, at the domestic level, the primary debates are over issues of socio-economic opportunity. A somewhat different theoretical tradition has existed in Eastern Europe, where even the socialists found that they had to deal with the issue of ethnicity. Importantly, the socialist and liberal intellectuals of Eastern Europe were influenced probably more by Otto Bauer and his school than the theoretical work of people further west.

In addition to this, nationality rights were a matter of serious international political debate in Europe after World War I in the League of Nations. Indeed, in a way these issues were imposed on some of the East European successor states by the League. As a consequence, the Constitutions of the interwar Baltic states contained specific paragraphs on ethnic rights of citizens not of the titular nationality, and the ideals were applied in practice rather more pronouncedly than in the Western European countries, especially so in Estonia. This heritage is significant because of the backdrop it provides for current activists in the Baltic. Indeed, the Baltic prewar tradition in this area has not gone unnoticed on the part of the dissidents in the region, who specifically refer to it in their samizdat and memoranda targeted to a world forum.

Whether the federated Soviet administrative structure reflects a completely pragmatic compromise made by Lenin because of the volatility of the nationality question at the time of the Russian Revolutions or whether it also reflects a certain influence of the East European theoretical
tradition, is immaterial here. The more important point is that Soviet Constitutions, from the first to the present, also contain provisions which specifically guarantee ethnic, or nationality, rights as if they were just another type of civil or human right.\textsuperscript{56} Thus some Soviet dissidents, particularly in the Baltic, not only have a heritage which both theoretically and practically has linked nationality and civil/human rights, but they also have a Soviet Constitution on the basis of which the concepts and practices of this heritage can be legally appealed at present.

The nationality issue enters the general picture of Soviet human rights dissent fairly early, but not so much for theoretical as seemingly accidental reasons. Namely, those Soviet activists who first called for complete de-Stalinization, the members of the so-called neo-Leninist movement, such as Pyotr Grigorenko, Aleksei Kosterin, Pavel Litvinov, Yuri Glassov, and others, almost at the outset demanded the rectification of the injustices wrought by Stalin against the Crimean Tatars, that is, their mass relocation through collective deportation. The 1968 appeal of these dissidents to a world Communist forum, specifically to the consultative conference of Communist parties in Budapest, 26 February - 5 March, 1968, contained the following paragraphs:\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{quote}
We also call your attention to the fact of discrimination against small nations and the political persecution of people who are struggling for national equality, which is particularly clear in the case of the Crimean Tatars.
\end{quote}

It is perhaps not irrelevant in this case that the twelve appealers were themselves ethnically mixed, containing Russians, Jews, a Ukrainian (Grigorenko), a Tatar (Asanova), etc. Yet none of these people were
nationalist activists; they were fighting for the humanization of Soviet society in general. Had there not been a "nationality problem" to begin with, especially on the scale of the Tatars, the nationality issue may never have been introduced so early as it was into the Soviet human rights movement. As an historic footnote it may be noted that this particular appeal was, undoubtedly by chance, dated on the 50th anniversary of the declaration of Estonian independence, 24 February 1968.

The document in question appeared in the first, 30 April 1968, issue of the Chronicle of Current Events. The nationality question was also raised already in Sakharov's landmark 1968 essay, Reflections, where once more the issue of Crimean Tatars appears central. 58 Among the first respondents to Sakharov's Reflections were those from the Baltic region, the "numerous representatives of the technical intelligentsia in Estonia." 59

The nationality question appears in the writings of other Soviet human rights activists at about this time as well, for example, in the work of Alexander Solzhenitsyn and politically most forcefully in the famous book by Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?, which was published in the West in 1969.

The roots of this issue in the Soviet human rights or democratic movement are particularly relevant because of the clearcut continuity of thought, of conceptual development, to the point where nationality issues are not seen merely as a political problem but in their essence a component of human rights per se. In this development Andrei Sakharov is a key figure. 60 Yet it is unclear as to how the transition occurred in the man. We know, of course, that the Crimean Tatar and Jewish issues were among the catalysts in focusing attention among human rights activists
toward the nationality problem. But the influences on Sakharov the individual in the broader theoretical sense are what remain unresearched. It appears to us that Aleksei Kostërin may have been an early influence on Sakharov, but we cannot document this. The role of three Ukrainians—Ivan Dzyuba, Valentyn Moroz, and Pyotr Grigorenko—is also significant. It has been noted by other observers that Sakharov's views on the subject are in "striking agreement" with those of Dzyuba, and Moroz appears among the first to have perceived a connection between the Soviet nationality question and international documents such as the various United Nations covenants and declarations. The ideas of Dzyuba and Moroz, and undoubtedly of other dissidents as well, were circulated in samizdat and probably reached Sakharov by word of mouth as well. Grigorenko, in an interview conducted during the research for the present work, stated that he personally kept telling Sakharov of the importance and centrality of nationality issues. Sakharov, of course, has been the single most important individual in the recent Soviet human rights movement in general, while Grigorenko was not only just another giant in that movement, but in addition, a founding member of the Helsinki Watch Committees both in Moscow and Ukraine.

Theodore Friedgut is basically correct, in his analytic overview "The Democratic Movement: Dimensions and Perspectives," when he critically notes the divergence between the universalists in Moscow and the particularists in given ethnic groups, remarking: "nationalist influences are reported to outweigh that of the democrats in the Baltic states and the Ukraine." Yet it is precisely a crucial point in our perspective
that this was particularly true before the Helsinki Final Act and the formation of the various Watch Committees, and not necessarily afterwards. It is correct that the focus of attention by the Committees in the Union republics, as opposed to the one in Moscow, is on human rights violations in the particular SSR and involving members of the titular nationality of the SSR, but it is not exclusive. The fundamental purpose of all of the committees is identical as evidenced by their founding documents. The statement of objectives in document number 1 of the Ukrainian committee (see appendix) is no less universalistic in its underlying perspective than that of the Moscow group, even though the scrutiny of violations is delimit ed to Ukraine and to Ukrainians. In the Baltic case, the Lithuanian committee most certainly has dealt with a number of ethnic groups and issues beyond the SSR, as noted already earlier in the present work (see also the documentary appendix).

If the Helsinki Final Act does not devote much space to human rights, it devotes even less to nationality rights. But even this document itself relates the two, since the following paragraph is indeed to be found in the text of Principle VII, the primary repository of the Final Act's human rights provisions:

The participating states on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedom and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

Importantly, the Soviet Constitution, as noted, contains quite a few specific references to ethnic or nationality rights. Hence, from the
viewpoint of the aforesaid Helsinki paragraph, any violations of such domestic legal rights, a negation of the equality before the law phrase, becomes inherently a civil/human rights issue. In addition, the Final Act's Principle VIII allows self-determination for peoples, and the Soviet Constitution specifically also allows secession. It was these types of linkages which Dzyuba, Moroz, Sakharov and others had noted already in the late 1960s. The Helsinki Final Act placed the principles into a new fresh form, and was a document which could be more effectively applied in the circumstances of the global forum created during the CSCE movement and in its wake.

Emigration, another matter raised by the Helsinki Final Act, was also closely related to the Soviet nationality issue because most of the applicants, and thereby sufferers due to denials, were Jews. Indeed, next to the case of the Crimean Tatars the Jewish issue has been the primary ethnic concern of the Moscow human rightists as well as the Watch Committee there (the third frequent group of concern is the Volga Germans). Andrei Sakharov addressed the emigration issue and its relationship to the nationalities already in September 1971, and the Moscow Watch Committee did so in one of its first documents in July 1976. In the early pronouncements of the Moscow human rightists the call to correct the situation of discrimination against members of ethnic groups, and indeed against whole groups, was an attempt to rectify just one more shortcoming of the Stalinist era, a part of an attempted return to true Leninism. But by the early 1970s the nationality issue was becoming to be seen as one which was moral and legal as well political in nature. The very first
document (18 May 1976, No. 1) of the Moscow Watch Committee was a plea on the behalf of a Crimean Tatar. 67 And Document 10 of 10 November 1976, entitled "On the Flagrant Violations of the Right of National Minorities to Equality Before the Law," the first major one in a series on this topic, although devoted again to the issue of Crimean Tatars, leaves no doubt of a perceived linkage between human rights and nationality rights. 68 Indeed, the case is argued on the basis of the Final Act's Principle VII, citing the paragraph that we have also quoted above. Very importantly, this was a joint document of the Moscow Watch Committee and the older Initiative Group for the Protection of Human Rights in the USSR. The rights of nationality groups are advanced and legitimized on the same basis in the documents of the other four Watch Committees (see the appendix).

This conceptual or theoretical evolution was, however, not the only basis on which the nationality rights-human rights linkage came to the forefront after Helsinki. The simple fact is that a great deal of all dissent was inherently related to the nationality issue because of the existence of the "Soviet nationality problem," as outlined in Chapter 2. This meant that nationality dissent was itself bound to be the most prevalent form of all dissent. And also, because of the regime's suppression of national assertiveness, the violation of human rights—the rights of Soviet citizens to demand in practice the civil, religious, intellectual, ethnic and other rights guaranteed by their Constitution—was inevitably directed at people based on an ascribed social characteristic, their nationality or ethnicity. Also, since Ukrainian historians and Estonian writers are in-
interested, respectively, in Ukrainian history and Estonian literature, their oppression by the authorities was not only that of an historian and a writer, but simultaneously that of a Ukrainian and an Estonian, and of Ukrainian history and Estonian literature. In other cases, for example, in Lithuania, the Catholicism and the ethnic collective identity of the Lithuanian people were so intertwined, that attacks on the religion were simultaneously assaults on the nationality group’s total identity, and therefore evolved a simultaneously religious and ethnic response.

Furthermore, fears of Russification, whether through demographic processes, cultural encroachment, manipulated historiography with its "great friendship theme," and so forth, have been a main factor in all nationality activism in the USSR. To comprehend the great degree of political mobilization which this has caused, one must step outside typical American conceptual frameworks of ethnic analysis. The Soviet nationality groups were not composed of immigrants to an alien land, who insisted on being separatists. To the contrary, excepting the Volga Germans and Jews, they live on their ancestral turfs, in homelands where they have literally always been, encroached upon first by a purely Russian imperial state and then by a Soviet state dominated by Russians. The non-Russians correctly or incorrectly perceive their own identities to be threatened through Russification and, in this sense, are waging a struggle for national survival. Some of the Soviet nationalities have glorious political and cultural pasts of their own, predating for practical purposes any Russian state or Russian high culture.

The national activists are not rabid political nationalists as
the regime at times attempts to portray them. Indeed, Baltic samizdat, for example, while demanding sovereignty as an inherent right of people, just as frequently rationalizes the demand on the basis of the argument that continued existence in the Soviet system will lead to national extinction. It could be noted that the Balts back in 1917-1918 were not necessarily demanding political sovereignty. They would have settled for autonomy in a democratic Russian federation. Indeed, Baltic documents do not demand restored sovereignty based on violent change, but instead would like to have the process supervised by the United Nations, and to have the decision even reaffirmed by a UN-controlled plebiscite.

The point is that the nature of Soviet society breeds nationality dissent, whether political, cultural, intellectual, or religious in form, and the reaction of the regime to this in further oppressive ways inherently links the nationality rights issue to the human rights one. As it is, in the case of groups such as the Jews and Crimean Tatars undeniable blatantly prejudicial and discriminatory behavior has been exhibited by the central organs of the state. The Helsinki Final Act merely provided a new, centralized basis for legitimizing appeals of nationality dissent and to relate these more effectively to the human rights issue, which had exploded into the public limelight globally in the second half of the 1970s.

Nationalism and Human Rights

Nationalism is an enigmatic force. It is decried by universalists for being particularistic, it is denounced by centralists as being separatist, it is attacked by "enlightened humanists" for breeding ethno-
centrism and prejudice, and found by twentieth century historians to be a prime root of intersocietal conflict. Even Tomas Venclova, a founding member of the Lithuanian Watch Committee, has said: "after Communism, nationalism is doctrine number two which I cannot condone" (see colloquium with him in the documentary appendix). Were it so easy! Nationalism simultaneously is the basis on which most countries in the contemporary world have been established, and it has been revered to a degree that it has become a key element in many international documents—"all people have a right to be free and sovereign." Indeed, nationalism has even penetrated the marrow of Communism, which in its own roots purports universalism based on class, as attested to by the recognition in the 1970s of "national Communism." Importantly, it is nationalism which is at the root of much intra-societal conflict because dominant groups impose coercive assimilationist policies on other groups, which, however, aspire to survive and flourish themselves. This particular problem is universal insofar as about 90% of all countries at present have multi-ethnic populations. The opposite end of the spectrum of societal organization to nationalism is not Communism, but rather some form of cultural pluralism, which theoretically separates the need to have a coincidence of nation and state.

The point is that nationalism as a political force must be seen from both above and below, as much as property of the central regime and the dominant ethnic group on which it rests in a multi-ethnic society, as of the "ethnic minorities" who keep demanding rights. Our focus typically is much more on the latter than the former aspects of nationalism, and in the study of Soviet society Western generalists or universalists not in-
frequently miss the significance of the former, while observers themselves rooted in a particular group underestimate the import of the latter. In the multi-ethnic Soviet society, political nationalism displayed by the non-Russians, generally although not exclusively with a goal-ideal of secession from the core state, is not the only perpetrator or initiator of tension and, intrasocietal conflict. It may be argued that it is not even the major culprit.

If one reads the *samizdat* documents of national dissent carefully, and particularly the documents of the Helsinki Watch Committees when they deal specifically with the nationality questions, two common underlying threads are evident. One is related to ethnic-neutral identity closure, a sort of universalist assimilation, the other specifically to Russification. The latter is the more significant of the two in evoking nationalist responses on the part of non-Russians. As the leading Ukrainian dissident Valentyn Moroz so appropriately put it, it is a struggle against the "mincing-machine of Russification." This is the essence of Baltic *samizdat* and memoranda as well. It is not that there are no outright demands in Ukraine and the Baltic, respectively, to create and to restore sovereignty as an inherent right. Rather, the point is that it is the fear of Russification which appears to be the primary evoker of political assertiveness among even the most nationalistic of the Soviet non-Russian groups, the Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. Indeed, even the mid-1975 CSCE-targeted memorandum of "Estonian and Latvian Democrats" specifically states that the restitution of sovereignty "would be their [the Estonians' and 'Latvians'] only chance for preservation and
Thus the separatist tendency is not only a mere inherent goal, but more importantly a means to group survival per se.

The other strain, the minor one, has to do with the Communist Party's Marxist-Leninist goal-ideal of an ethnically neutral society, the creation of a "new Soviet people," as it is called in official pronouncements. On a fully neutral theoretical plane this implies that the historical Russian ancestral identity and heritage would also be displaced. It is not a prospect which is palatable to any Soviet ethnic group; indeed, there is no known case in world history of any group of people voluntarily renouncing in toto its collective identity for any reason. Unfortunately, in the Soviet Union things in real life are not ethnically neutral in this regard. Even a classless and ethnicless socialist society, in its Marxist-Leninist utopian form, will have to have a language, will have culture, arts, architecture, place names, etc. And these will not be in the tradition of Esperanto or some newly invented socialist medium. It is a justified fear on the part of the other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, that when the Party and its leadership talk of a "new Soviet people" they mean Russification. The Russian heritage would be preserved, the others displaced. Thus, non-Russian dissidents attack both the Soviet system and the dangers of Russification this yields as detrimental to their own groups' survival.

The seemingly more universalist generalists among the Russian dissidents in Moscow might be appreciably more particularistic themselves if it was the Russian heritage the displacement of which was threatened by the Soviet system. In fact, recent observations in the West have been
that Russian nationalism is also rising, in part because the Soviet system per se has attempted to neutralize the heritage of the Russian people in that which is now allowably Russian by the Party.\textsuperscript{74} But the clear-cut universalist position is not the only one found in the Communist Party. For example, the native elements in the Baltic SSRs were purged for "bourgeois nationalism" in the early 1950s, and in the Latvian SSR Khrushchev seems to have personally supervised a follow-up purge at the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{75} The latter was related in part to complaints of the Latvian Party members in the SSR leadership over the dangers of Russification, a theme raised again by the 1972 memorandum of seventeen Latvian Communists addressed to Western comrades.\textsuperscript{76} One might recall that the Communist Party and the nationality issue were in fact also related from the outset. In the case of Jews, Ukrainians and Latvians, for example, the Bolshevist movement was strong already before the Revolution. Most recently, Estonian theoreticians have boldly asserted that the existence of ethnicity is not inherently contradictory to the essence of a socialist society.\textsuperscript{77} One wonders whether this is a display of nationalism and ethnic chauvinism, or whether it is simply the continuance of a theoretical tradition in Estonia which had some time ago separated the notions of \textit{state} and \textit{nation} both among "bourgeois" and "socialist" thinkers.

Be this how it may, the 1970s also witnessed a shift in general theoretical writings in the USSR, toward a distinction between \textit{capitalist} and \textit{socialist} ethnicity. If this takes root it has serious implications for the Soviet nationality question, because it will provide a theoretical, or Party-ideological, basis for legitimizing nationality
demands. It is not, as some may think, a dislocation of universalism by particularism, but rather, an acknowledgement that the two are not inherently mutually exclusive. In the socialist society, regardless of how one would define such a society, whether in strict classical Marxist, Soviet Communist Party, or Western social democratic terms, this would allow a more effective resolution of the intrasocietal conflicts generated by nationalism in multiethnic populations, at least at the theoretical level. Since discriminatory behavior toward individuals on the basis of their ascribed ethnicity, or toward whole ethnic groups, is however not solely a function of the theoretical-ideological underpinnings of a society, the "nationality question" may still remain with us, as groups fight to gain practical rights promised by lofty ideals.

That the ethnic groups themselves are the primary interest groups fighting on their behalf in the Soviet Union should not be surprising. It is a global pattern. Anti-semitism and racial discrimination at the institutional level in the United States, and cultural and socioeconomic disadvantage suffered by the French in Canada, did not crumble because of the activism of universalistic humanists. The existing state of affairs began to yield because the affected specific groups would no longer put up with it, and challenged it, legally as well as through violent confrontation, but generally through a persistence of political activism. The universalists are necessary allies in this process, not the quintessential stimulants of change. And so it also appears to be the case in the Soviet Union. The nationality assertiveness is taken up as a cause by the universalists such as Sakharov as a general issue. Their efforts help to
sculpture the larger framework, in which the nationality assertiveness may be even more forcefully acted out.

Finally, the fact that there is variation between the degree of ethnic particularism in the documents of the SSR-level Watch Committees, indeed in the pattern of general nationality assertiveness, should not surprise us. Although dissatisfaction with Soviet society clearly affects all major nationality groups, what the issues are in any specific case, and the channels for acting these out vary by the particular group. For example, the Georgians and Armenians, with their very ancient cultural and national-political identities are stifled by socialist realism, which seems to lead to ethnic cultural stagnation among all groups, including the Russians, but they are not directly threatened by either cultural or demographic Russification. The Armenians also may not find full political sovereignty a blessing because it makes them more vulnerable to threats from their primary historical adversary, the Turks. The Ukrainians, with a strong sense of nationhood have been unsuccessful in finding a political outlet for this historically, and have, therefore, what is probably the worst case of frustrated political nationalism in Europe. Furthermore, although the Ukrainians are the next largest Soviet ethnic group after the Russians, they are linguistically and culturally close enough that even mild pressures by the central government may facilitate Russification, and thereby create a threat to the continued existence of the Ukrainians as a distinct people.

The Lithuanians have a grand medieval past on which to draw, and together with the Estonians and Latvians, have a recent past of full poli-
tical sovereignty. In addition, due to the intertwined nature of Cathol-
icism and the ethnic collective identity of the Lithuanians, the anti-
religious pressures of the central government have serious nationality
consequences. Estonia and Latvia both are in a precarious demographic
circumstance due to a massive postwar influx of Russian and other Soviet
nationalities. Both people also have historic ties to Scandinavia and
Western Europe, and in the Lithuanian case to Rome, which have been inter-
rupted by the Soviet regime.

Whether the Helsinki Final Act will have a lasting impact on the
Soviet nationality question remains to be seen. However, its short-term
consequence, 1975-1980, has been quite evident. At the action level, it
has facilitated dissent closure and a concentrated channeling of group
energy in assertiveness. Perhaps the more important long-range implications
are the theoretical relation of human rights to nationality rights which it
facilitated, and the international attention to the Soviet domestic scene
which it caused. In the second area, it is useful to keep in mind, as we
move on to the substance of the ensuing chapter, that it was the Moscow
Watch Committee which ended its founding document of 12 May 1976 as follows:
"We hope that in the future a corresponding International Committee to
Promote [the Observance of the Helsinki Agreements] will also be formed.

In the first area, the linkage between human rights and nationality rights
has not yet been made international. For example, the key founding mem-
ers of the American Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
implied in late 1979 that they do not consider nationality rights ex-
plicitly a human right because of the political dimension involved.
Yet the Commission has been forced to deal extensively with the nationality issue precisely because of the way it is related to human rights in the USSR. Undoubtedly, this is a particularly sticky and difficult area; Principle VIII (but not VII) specifically allows self-determination. If the American Commission came out, for example, strongly on behalf of Ukrainian independence, it would be a stand which appears contrary to the foreign policy of American governments, past and present. The Baltic issue in this regard is much simpler—but only in principle alone—because the United States does not legally recognize Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to be a part of the Soviet Union. But even in this area, the international scene may be undergoing change, as major Western countries—the United States, Canada, Sweden and others—have been forced by their own domestic pressures toward some form of cultural pluralism.

On the world scene, it also remains to be seen whether the Western concern for human rights is sustained. Without it, the international forum which is so necessary for Soviet human rights activists to exist and to argue their cause successfully, including in the area of nationality rights is endangered. President Carter's early active concern for human rights in general, which led to critical Department of State publications in a wide range of human rights areas, and which may have peaked in 1977–1978 during the Orlov–Shcharovsky trials, was not fully shared by other major Western leaders. On 14 July 1977 the New York Times reported that:

President Carter assured Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany today that the United States would avoid turning the current Belgrade conference into a forum for
singling out the Soviet Union for its human rights policies and would also avoid engaging in East-West polemics there.

A few days later, on 17 July 1977, the New York Times reported from Ottawa that:

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in an apparent warning to President Carter, declared this week that taking an "extreme" line with Moscow on human rights could lead to a revival of the cold war and close off a movement of people from Communist countries to the West that began under detente.

On the same day the Times' Paris correspondent, Jonathan Kandell notes:

Among the authors of the 1975 Helsinki declaration the Western Europeans, not the Americans, were the main proponents of human rights provisions... Yet today, some Western European officials are voicing concern that the United States is pursuing the human rights issue too zealously... The opinion is by no means uniform among Western European governments.

He adds that Schmidt of West Germany is critical of Carter's policy, Prime Minister Gallagher of Great Britain is supportive, the French and Italians are inbetween. In any case, then, the permanency and forcefulness of the Western position cannot be taken for granted. To date, as the next chapter will evidence, the Americans have been, through the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and also directly
through the Department of State, have been the most vigorous investigators, with the Soviet dissidents, of how the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act are being implemented and violated. Importantly, it appears that the United States Commission exists only because of Congressional insistence, not Presidential and executive branch enthusiasm. This is not unimportant given the fact that Congressional representatives are much more vulnerable to public political pressure than the faceless bureaucracy and staffs of the executive branch. Chapter 8 will indicate how East European groups have contributed to the public pressure to keep Congressional investigations and interests alive, and even brought these about. In summary, while the implications of the Helsinki Final Act for the Soviet nationality question are identifiable, the long-range consequences cannot be prognosed effectively at present. It depends on how important the human rights issue remains on the international scene and on whether or not the human rights-nationality rights linkage is advanced successfully. It is quite possible that as Third World countries and minorities in the United States push their case, the Soviet and not the Western interpretation of what human rights means might dominate.
Executive Summary

Chapter 7

THE U.S. COMMISSION, OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE MEDIA:
THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

Although the United States was a passive actor on the road to Helsinki, after the Final Act was signed in 1975 it became a primary monitor of the human rights provisions outside the Soviet Union. It has accomplished this through a special body founded in mid-1974, the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is a joint Executive Branch-Legislative Branch organization. However, the enthusiasm for its creation and operation have clearly come more from Congress than the White House. The seed of the idea was planted in the mind of an American Congresswoman, Millicent Fenwick (R., N.J.) in Moscow by Soviet dissidents. It was Fenwick who introduced the legislation for the Commission's creation, assisted in the Senate by Clifford Case (R., N.J.). From the outset, its Chairman has been Dante Fascell (D., FL).

The Commission has done a remarkable job in collecting and recording material, especially on human rights and human contacts issues affecting the Soviet Union. Recently the Commission also looked at the American domestic scene. There are other monitoring groups as well—a New York Helsinki Watch founded in 1979—and public and parliamentary investigative organs have existed in most Western countries, but no one with a scope and enthusiasm of the US Commission. A follow-up meeting to Helsinki was held in Belgrade in 1977, almost fully dominated by the human rights issue. A second follow-up will occur in Madrid in 1980. A specialized science forum to assess the science and technology provisions of the Final Act met in early 1980 in Hamburg, and there too the human rights issue predominated.
Chapter 7


On May 11, 1979, i.e., within two weeks of his and his four dissident companions' dramatic exchange against two convicted Soviet spies Alexander Ginzburg, a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Committee, testified before the US Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is chaired by the Hon. Dante B. Fascell. He said that after his arrest in February 1977 the KGB meticulously investigated the information the Soviet Helsinki Groups transmitted abroad. He continued:

Although the investigation showed that the information we sent to the West was accurate, our situation did not improve. For over a year the investigation was conducted on the basis of the capital charge of treason. My interrogators constantly reminded me that I faced the death penalty.

... I know that they also threatened Orlov and Shcharansky with the death penalty. Incidentally, they charged Orlov with organizing the Moscow Helsinki Group at the behest of U.S. Congress. They also charged that Orlov managed the Group on the orders of Congress and at the personal direction of Congressman Fascell. [Laughter.]

The assertion of the KGB investigators that the Soviet Helsinki Group had been organized at the urging of Congress is clearly wrong: on the contrary, it can be shown that the Congressional Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe was organized partly at the behest of unnamed Soviet dissidents, not vice versa. But the Soviet authorities are right in pointing out that international links had been built into the very foundation of Soviet Helsinki Watch Committees. International monitoring of the Helsinki Final Act is implicit in its provision for international follow-up meetings. International, not just national monitoring of the adherence of the Soviet Government to the Helsinki Accords is a keystone in the structure of the Soviet Helsinki Groups.

This chapter addresses itself to the process of international monitoring of the Helsinki Final Act. It will focus on the establishment and activity of the US Helsinki Commission and on the Belgrade Review Conference of 1977-78, in which the members and staff of the Commission participated prominently. It will touch upon the role of other organizations and that of the media. The part played by various emigré groups in the international monitoring process and in supporting the Soviet Helsinki Groups will be the subject of the following chapter (8).

(a) From the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act to the Establishment of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (August 1, 1975 - June 3, 1976)

Two weeks after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, in the middle of August 1975, a delegation of 18 Members of Congress visited the Soviet Union. The delegation broke up into several working groups. Democratic Representative Sidney R. Yates, from Chicago, Illinois, and Republican Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick, of central suburban New Jersey,
co-chaired an ad hoc committee that met with Soviet dissidents in general, with Jewish "refuseniks" (Soviet Jews that had been refused an exit visa) and with dissidents who complained of religious persecution. The Americans had rather mixed feelings about the newly signed Helsinki Final Act. Very much to their surprise, the unnamed Soviet dissidents took the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Act very seriously and urged Americans to press strongly for the implementation of the Act. As an authoritative American source put it later, Pithily: "Their hopeful interpretation of the [Helsinki] accord was new to U.S. politicians, many of whom had tended to dismiss it as a marginal bargain in the overall scheme of détente."²

It was the Soviet dissidents who planted the seed of a permanent official monitoring body in the minds of American Members of Congress—Representatives and Senators alike. Mr. Sidney R. Yates, a Democrat, a distinguished jurist (he holds a Doctor of Jurisprudence degree from the University of Chicago, awarded in 1933) has served his Chicago constituency in the House of Representatives ever since 1948, with an interruption of two years (1963-64), when he served as U.S. representative to Trusteeship Council of the UN with rank of Ambassador. Among other organization he is a member of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.³ Even greater interest in the setting up of some kind of an official US monitoring body was taken by Mrs. Millicent Fenwick, Republican Representative from New Jersey's Fifth District. Her district embraces a number of medium-sized towns such as Princeton, Middlesex, and Passaic. Mrs. Fenwick
attended the Foxcroft School in Middleburg, Va., in 1923-24; attended Columbia University, 1933, and the New School for Social Research in 1942; she had been associate editor of the Conde Nast Publications, 1938-52. Mrs. Fenwick has compiled a strong human rights record in her community work: she is the former vice chairman of the New Jersey Committee for the US Commission on Civil Rights; former chairman of Somerset County Legal Aid and Blue Ribbon Committee to Study Drug Abuse; first recipient of Humanitarian Award given by Somerset County Mental Health Association; former chairman of the Governor's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. She was elected to the US House of Representatives relatively late, at the age of 64 in 1974, has been re-elected in 1976 and 1978.4

Some time after her return from Moscow, Mrs. Fenwick conceived the idea of having a monitoring commission composed of both Members of Congress and representatives of the Executive Branch. But to advocate the establishment of such a commission for Mrs. Fenwick was both difficult and delicate. First, the Executive Branch under Republican President Ford but speaking through Dr. Kissinger was opposed. In a nutshell, Dr. Kissinger felt that despite its representatives from the Executive Branch the new Commission would be essentially another Congressional Committee trying to meddle in the sophisticated and exceedingly sensitive conduct of foreign affairs.5 It was a delicate task for Mrs. Fenwick personally, for she was only a "freshman" Representative, was not a member of the House International Relations Committee. Fortunately, Mrs. Fenwick's bold initiative was brought to the attention of Republican Senator from New Jersey
Clifford P. Case. The catalyst may have been a member of Senator Case's legislative staff. But Senator Case by himself was ready for such an idea: among other things he had received a letter from a Lithuanian constituent in which the author complained of inordinate humiliating difficulties he had to go through to visit his 80-year-old mother. (He was not allowed to travel to Lithuania, and she could not go to the US, they had to pick a third country in between.)

Senator Case quickly decided to support Mrs. Fenwick's initiative. Moreover, he decided to pool forces with Mrs. Fenwick by introducing joint bills in the Senate and in the House and by having their legislative assistants jointly work out the details (the leading roles were played by Mr. Michael Kraft, Senator Case's new Executive Assistant since August 1975, and Mrs. Fenwick's Legislative Assistant William F. Canis). The monitoring body was to focus on violations of human rights. In the staff discussions, however, there was no discussion of a possible impact of such rights upon ethnic issues, upon the centrifugal tendencies in the USSR.

The rationale for setting up a mixed US Legislature-Executive Commission to Monitor the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act by the Soviet Union, East European countries and finally the US was as follows. The Soviet dissenters and ordinary Soviet citizens could and would use the provisions of the Helsinki Accords to turn a spotlight on Soviet violations. The offices of Senators and Representatives with Soviet and East European emigré constituencies would receive letters calling for help in cases A, B, and C. But the information was very fragmented. Nowhere in the American
Government was there a single agency to put those bits and pieces of information together to see a pattern, neither in Congress nor in the Executive. In the Senate, e.g., such appeals would presumably go to the European subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That subcommittee in 1975 had only one staff member! Nor was the situation in the Executive much better. In some Congressional circles, e.g., the Soviet desk of the State Department had the reputation of tending toward pulling the punches, because it had to deal with the USSR Government on a day-to-day basis, as one would deal with a particularly difficult "client."
The Intelligence and Research Section in the State Department clearly did have the capability of putting together a coherent picture on Soviet dissent, but would it be allowed to do so given the Department's alleged greater sensitivity to dealing with their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union, i.e., with governmental structures and policies rather than extra-governmental developments. In rebutting the idea that all that was needed was to have the Executive (i.e., presumably the State Department) submit more and better reports to Congress, that a mixed monitoring Commission was not necessary, Mrs. Fenwick remarked that Executive Departments deal in official matters such as what American publications are being permitted in the Soviet Union, how many visa applications are being denied. Officials seemed not to notice full records of injustices that were brought to their attention by organizations. Senator Case, in arguing for a mixed Commission, freely admitted that monitoring would not necessarily assure compliance. He said, however: "But it would have the effect of providing at least a mechanism to evaluate the degree of compliance and to focus international attention on possible violation."
The full legislative history of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (henceforth referred to as the Commission, or US CSCE) is beyond the scope of this work. In summary it is as follows: Not entirely unexpectedly the idea ran into some difficulty in the House where Mrs. Fenwick's seniority and standing were still low. The proposal was scheduled for hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House International Relations Committee. It was that Subcommittee that had held hearings May 6, 1975, on the soon to be concluded Helsinki Conference. Chairman of the Subcommittee was the Honorable Dante B. Fascell.

Mr. Fascell who had been born in Bridgehampton, L.I., N.Y., in 1917, is an old Floridian: he received the J.D. degree from the University of Miami in 1938, served in the Second World War in the African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns (was separated from the Armed Forces as a captain), practiced law upon demobilization, served as a State representative (1950-1954), was elected to the 84th US Congress November 2, 1954, and has been re-elected to each succeeding Congress. While in Congress, Mr. Fascell was member of the US delegation to the 24th Session of the UN General Assembly. An experienced legislator with a great deal of seniority, a person who enjoyed a lot of respect among his fellow-Representatives (later, in 1979, I was told by an informed insider that he was looked up to as being next in line to take over the Chairmanship of the full House International Relations Committee), Mr. Fascell was understandably cautious in supporting Mrs. Fenwick's initiative inasmuch as it appeared to be a radical departure from the established way in which the House participated in the making of
foreign policy, which was stressed in no uncertain terms by a very popular Secretary of State, 1973 Nobel Prize winner Dr. Kissinger. (Proponents of the establishment of the Commission had also gained the impression that Mr. Fascell's Staff Consultant Mr. R. Michael Finley was also not enthusiastic about the initiative.) In answering the question by one of the authors, "How has been the cooperation between the Executive and Congress on issues handled by your Commission at various times, under the Ford and the Carter Administration?" Mr. Fascell, on October 30, 1979, gave an answer, the first part of which has direct bearing upon the establishment of the Commission:

When the idea of setting up the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe - Y.B.] Commission was first proposed under the Ford Administration, there was some initial hesitation and even opposition to Congress getting involved in foreign affairs in this way. Dr. Kissinger felt that such involvement was contrary to the separation of powers of the executive and the legislative under our system of government.10

To maintain the momentum the proponents of establishing the Commission conceived the idea of working through the Senate first and letting the House follow. Senator Case was in an excellent position to do so: he was not only the ranking Republican member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but he had also a good working relationship with the then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator John J. Sparkman, and he was close to Democratic Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and liberal Republican Senator Jacob K. Javits (we have heard the word "triumvirate" used in connection with Senators Case, Humphrey, and Javits). Being a very independent-minded person, former Senator Case had "crossed swords" with President Nixon and Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger before.
At the same time Senator Case did not always feel that human rights should be the overriding priority in every issue. But he felt strongly that a monitoring Commission should be established. November 15, 1975 Senator Case introduced in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the bill S2679 providing for such a Commission. Mr. Fascell's Subcommittee held hearings three days later, November 18, 1975, on a related House Resolution 864. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported S2679 April 23, 1976, by voice vote (!) and the whole Senate approved the measure on May 5, 1976, equally by voice vote. Meanwhile the House had swung into fast action: May 4, 1976, Mr. Fascell's Subcommittee held hearings on the establishment of the Commission as proposed by HR 9466, a House version of S2679, which former was sponsored by Mrs. Fenwick and co-sponsored by almost one hundred other Representatives. Mrs. Fenwick argued that there was already a European Cooperation Research Group active in London, which proceeded from the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, the new Commission was not to limit itself just to the humanitarian provisions of Basket III of the Act, but was to investigate the implementation of the Act as a whole, lest the Soviet Government use this as a propaganda point against the new body (the Soviet Union was particularly interested in the economic and scientific cooperation provisions of Basket II, not so much in Basket III, which on balance could be used against the USSR). May 6, 1976 (one day after the full Senate approved S2679), Mr. Fascell's Subcommittee referred Mrs. Fenwick's bill to the full House International Relations Committee, which also considered the parallel Senate bill (S Rept. 94-756, ex-S2679).
The House International Relations Committee reported the bill with amendments on May 14, 1976 (H Rept. 94-1149). May 17, 1976, on a motion by Mr. Fascell the House suspended the rules and passed the bill by 240 to 95 votes (such a motion called for a two-thirds majority vote, or 224 ayes in this case). May 21, 1976, the Senate accepted the House version of S2679 by voice vote without debate. The Administration, which had opposed the establishment of the Commission, did not take the defeat very gracefully. In the evening of June 2, 1976, Mrs. Fenwick and Senator Case were invited to witness the signing of the bill by President Ford the next morning at 9 o'clock. They were the only legislators invited to the White House. The press were not invited but Miss Helen Thomas finally did get in. No outside photographers were invited either, and the official White House photographer took an unsatisfactory picture.

The last hurdle to overcome was that of financing. Surprisingly, this did not seem to be much of a hurdle at all, the sentiment in both the Senate and the House being overwhelmingly favorable towards the establishment and immediate start of activity by the new Commission. The Commission had not been, of course, provided for in the President's budget request and in the original appropriation bill. During a floor debate in the House Mr. Sidney R. Yates (Democrat from Chicago, Ill.) who had been with Mrs. Fenwick in Moscow in August 1975 offered an amendment to the appropriations bill to provide $300,000 for the new Commission. His amendment was accepted by voice vote. In the Senate, June 24, the increased House appropriation bill was accepted. In addition, Senator Case who was also a member of the Appropriations Committee, tacked on an amendment raising
the Commission's funding by $75,000 to $375,000 so as to enable the Commission to start working already June 1, 1976, not October 1976 as provided by Yates's House amendment. The Senate accepted the Case amendment, but June 28, 1976, the conferences whittled down the supplementary appropriation to $40,000, so that the Commission finally started out with a budget of $340,000.\textsuperscript{14}

Altogether it would seem that until April-May 1976 the road toward the establishment of the US CSCE was long and uneven, despite the popular sentiment to help Soviet citizens to emigrate and to call the Soviet Union to account for harassing its citizens—including Academician Sakharov—so soon after signing the Helsinki Final Act.\textsuperscript{15} The breakthrough came with the Senate approval of May 5, 1976. It should be recalled that about this time, May 12, 1976, in Moscow Dr. Orlov announced the formation of the Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR; later called the Moscow Group.\textsuperscript{16} On the surface it would appear as though the two actions—establishment of the US CSCE and of the Moscow Group—were coordinated. In fact, it was the Soviet dissenters who first conceived the idea of a monitoring committee and most likely they would have established one whether or not Mrs. Fenwick's idea was crowned by success. To see in Orlov's group the agents of US Congress is historically incorrect. Furthermore, the differences between the US Commission and the Moscow Group are really striking. The first is an independent advisory agency of the US Government. It is funded by Congress. The second is actually a private group of Soviet citizens who are concerned about the implementation of the
human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act (the word "public" in its title may be misleading, it really means that it is a relatively open, above ground organization of Soviet society). Those Soviet groups have, of course, not received a single kopeck from the public treasury. Secondly, though it would be an exaggeration to say that Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger and President Ford were very pleased with the formation of the US Helsinki Commission at no time were members of the US CSCE threatened with criminal action as was Dr. Orlov in Moscow. Finally, Soviet authorities had reason to be even less pleased with the establishment of the US CSCE. The US Commission and the Moscow Group and, later, the republican Groups, were de facto independent but they did help each other with publicity and moral support.

(b) The Activity of the US Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (July 1976 through 1979)

The two most important provisions of (US) Public Law 94-304, of June 3, 1976, which established the US Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (henceforth referred to as the Commission or US CSCE) were undoubtedly Sections 2 and Section 5. Section 2 delineated the mandate of the Commission, Section 5 obligated the US President to submit to the Commission semi-annual reports on the Implementation of the Helsinki Accord. As reproduced below:

Sec. 2 (22 USC 3002). The Commission is authorized and directed to monitor the acts of the signatories which reflect compliance with or violation of the articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, with particular regard to the provisions relating to Cooperation in Humanitarian Fields. The Commission is further authorized and directed to monitor and encourage the development of programs and activities of the United States Government and private organizations with a view toward taking advantage of the provisions of the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation and a greater interchange of people and Ideas between East and West.

Sec. 5 (22 USC 3005). In order to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties, the President shall submit to the Commission a semiannual report, the first one to be submitted six months after the date of enactment of this Act, which shall include (1) a detailed survey of actions by the signatories of the Final Act reflecting compliance with or violation of the provisions of the Final Act, and (2) a listing and description of present or planned programs and activities of the appropriate agencies of the executive branch and private organizations aimed at taking advantage of the provisions of the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation and to promote a greater interchange of people and ideas between East and West. 17

It should be noted that the Commission's mandate has purposely been made very broad: the Commission is to monitor the actions of "the signatories." This immediately raises the question whether the Commission should also monitor US compliance with the Final Act and the actions of the West European signatories as well as that of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries (eventually, in 1979 the question was answered in the affirmative with respect to the US implementation of the Helsinki Final Act). The Law seems to have an anti-Soviet point in that provisions relating to Cooperation in Humanitarian Fields (apparently Basket III) is stressed. But that point is skillfully hidden—though not entirely blunted—by reference to the provisions on expansion of "East-West economic cooperation and greater interchange of people and ideas between East and West," which appears to be an allusion to Basket II, which has
been warmly endorsed by the Soviet Union. In short, the Law of June 3, 1976, has been sufficiently broad to allow the Commission to chart its own course: to investigate violations of human rights in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries or to examine US compliance with the Final Act, to stress or not to stress the economic and scientific cooperation provisions. A great deal would depend on the leadership and the members of the Commission.

Altogether the Commission had fifteen members: twelve from Congress and three from the executive branch. As Chairman of the Commission was appointed by the Speaker of the House the Hon. Dante B. Fascell. Five additional members of the Commission from the House of Representatives were: Democrats Jonathan B. Bingham, of New York, Paul Simon, of Illinois, and Sidney R. Yates, also from Illinois; and Republican Representative John Buchanan, of Alabama and Mrs. Millicent Fenwick, of New Jersey. Senator Claiborne Pell, a Democrat from Rhode Island, has been Co-Chairman of the Commission, appointed by the President of the Senate (then Vice-President Rockefeller). Three additional Democratic Senators were Dick Clark, of Iowa, Patrick Leahy, of Vermont, and Richard Stone, of Florida. The two Senators from the minority party were Clifford P. Case, of New Jersey, and Robert Dole, of Kansas. The US President appointed one Commissioner each from the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce. The first Ford appointees, Messrs. Monroe Leigh, from State, James G. Poor, from Defense, and Mansfield Sprague, from Commerce, resigned in January 1977. President Carter appointed to the Commission
Ms. Patricia Derian, from the Department of State, Mr. McGiffert, from the Department of Defense, and Mr. Frank Weil, of the Department of Commerce (all except Mr. Weil have served with the Commission through 1979, in November 1979 the Commerce Department seat on the Commission was vacant). After the Congressional elections of 1978, when Senators Clark and Case were not re-elected, Senator George McGovern, Democrat from South Dakota, evidently replaced Senator Clark, and liberal Republican Jacob K. Javits took the seat of his friend and political ally Clifford P. Case. From one point of view it should be stressed that the Commission's Chairman, his Co-Chairman and all of the Members of the Commission—in 1979 as well as in 1977—share a vast fund of experience in foreign affairs and that all of them have been very sensitive to the plight of the members of the Soviet Helsinki Groups and that at least some, including the Chairman, have shown interest in the special position of the Soviet nationalities.

We have examined the extraordinarily rich and qualitatively very high published output of the Commission. We have attended one of its public hearings. We have interviewed its Chairman, Hon. Dante B. Fascell, and one of its leading members and founders, Hon. Millicent Fenwick. We have also interviewed Mr. R. Spencer Oliver, the personable and extra-ordinarily able Staff Director and General Counsel of the Commission, and we have vastly profited from the advice and help with documents and interviews given by the Commission's Staff, notably Miss Catherine Cosman, the Commission's dedicated yet critical expert on the Soviet Helsinki Groups. Our findings—as objective as is humanly possible—are as follows:
(1) The Commission has firmly established itself in the power structure of Congress and the United States Government. It serves definite needs of the American people and of the local constituencies of the Congressional Commissioners. It serves those needs well.

(2) In the first two and a half years of its existence (from July 1976 through 1978) the Commission has quite legitimately focused its attention on human rights violations in the so-called Warsaw Pact countries (i.e., primarily in the Soviet Union itself and its East European Communist allies). All that time the Commission has not overlooked certain weaknesses in the US stance on human rights.

(3) In late 1978 and in 1979, as if to redress the balance, the Commission has devoted "a major portion of its staff and resources to examining the US record." The Commission has certainly not neglected its monitoring of human rights violations in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the third major report of the Commission, that of November 1979, is exclusively devoted to the record of the United States, whereas its first major report, that of August-September 1977, dealt primarily with the Soviet and East European performance and secondarily did touch on American shortcomings. The Commission's second major report specifically dealt with the
Belgrade conference, its content is somewhat different than that of Reports No. 1 and No. 3.

(4) There are some good reasons for wanting to set the American record straight, warts and all, but we are somewhat concerned that unless in the summer of 1980 the Commission comes out with an equally solid and hefty document on human rights violations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in the climate of US opinion after the collapse of Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan the Commission may run into harmful political controversy.

For all its weaknesses, the American performance in observing human rights is so much qualitatively superior to that of the other superpower as to make a comparison of the two performances, either explicit or even implicit, possibly misleading and, therefore, inadvisable. It is not a question of seeing a splinter in your opponent's eye while overlooking the beam in your own, and having, therefore, to make amends but it is rather a question of conscientiously counting every single splinter in your own eye and as a result having that much less time to measure the beam in your opponent's eye.

(5) Until 1979 the overall thrust of the Commission had been properly directed outside the United States. We hope that in 1980 the balance will be restored and that the Commission will be able to investigate violations of human rights in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with even greater credibility than it had done in 1976, 1977 and 1978.

The entrenchment of the Commission in the Congressional and Executive power structure rests on intangibles or near-intangibles. If they cannot be precisely measured, they can nevertheless be felt. It is evidenced in the quality of the Commissioners and that of its Staff. A source inside the Government but not on the Commission volunteered the information that Chairman Fascell and Mrs. Fenwick were looked up to in the House and that Mr. Buchanan, a Republican Congressman from Alabama, was also highly respected. On the Senatorial side we have such well known liberal Senators as George McGovern and Robert A. Javits, who joined the Commission in 1979. The Staff is first-rate. The facilities of the Commission are a little removed from the three House Office Buildings, but they are still easily accessible; their appointment is not luxurious, but is comfortable and functional. In our interviews in the State Department the Commission was referred to with respect, more respect perhaps than "Foggy Bottom" usually extends to "Capitol Hill." A contributing factor may be the ease with which State Department officers are assigned to the Staff of the Commission where they seem to do a tour of duty before reassignment to the Department. Last but not least, we have already commented on the relative smoothness with which the Commission was funded in the summer of 1976.

President Carter and Secretary of State Vance have greater understanding of and show support for, the work of the Commission than did their predecessors. In replying to a written question about the
cooperation between the Executive and Congress on issues handled by the Commission at various times, under the Ford and the Carter administrations, Chairman Fascell wrote:

Under the Carter Administration . . . a good working relationship has been developed. Various Commissioners and members of the Commission staff were part of the American delegation at the Belgrade Review Conference and expect this arrangement to be continued at the Madrid Review Conference next year [i.e., in 1980 - Y.B.].

In response to our question " . . . Sir, how much understanding and support is there for the Commission's work among your constituents?"

Chairman Fascell replied:

In my Florida district, there is great interest in the emigration and other human rights aspects of the Helsinki Accords among my constituency. In Miami, for example, live many Jewish Americans who are concerned with the situation of Jews in the Soviet Union and in other Eastern European countries. Many Cuban Americans also live in Miami. As people who have been forced to leave their native country due to political repression, they are well aware of the importance of bringing the Soviets and others to account for their human rights violations.

In fact, I would say that there is broad support among all Americans--regardless of their ethnic background--for Carter's human rights policies. In a world which is increasingly interdependent, it is essential for us to speak out--on our own shortcomings as well as those of other CSCE signatories.

A systematic analysis of the composition of the Commissioners' constituencies will be presented in Chapter 8. Chairman Fascell is correct, however, in saying that support of human rights transcends the interests of the individual American ethnic groups, that it has appealed to a broader political clientele. So long as the American people do not "come home" and turn completely inward, the foreign oriented activity of the
The Commission will enjoy sympathetic support; should the atmosphere change to neo-isolationism, the US CSCE can still win friends by stressing the violations of American civil rights.

In its first two and a half years (from July 1976 through 1978) the Commission has most diligently and resolutely investigated the violations of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act outside the United States, in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. One almost received the impression that the Commission was racing to make up any time lost in 1975 and 1976, while it was being established, to prepare a good case for the review conference in Belgrade which was scheduled for the fall of 1977. In November 1976 members of the Staff travelled to 18 West European nations to consult with officials and private citizens on rights violations and governmental policies to deal with them. In February 1977 members of the Staff travelled to Austria, Italy and Israel to interview recent Soviet emigrés. Staff surveys were administered to 1,035 recent Soviet emigrants. 22

The most publicized aspect of the Commission's work were its public hearings. The first public hearings of the Commission on January 13 and 14, 1977 (still under the outgoing Ford Administration) were devoted to the then relatively non-controversial subject of East-West Economic Cooperation. But with the hearings on February 23 and 24, 1977, with recently released Vladimir Bukovsky as one of the two lead-off witnesses (the first was Mr. Leonard Garment, former US Representative to the UN Commission on Human Rights), 23 the Commission inaugurated its hard-hitting
and very informative Hearings series entitled Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. Altogether seven such volumes of hearings have been published in 1977 and 1978, all of them focusing on the violations of the Final Act in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Four volumes of Basket III hearings were published in 1979, of which two really substantial volumes (No. VIII, 498 pp. and Vol. IX, 179 pp., dealt with implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the United States. One, a thin pamphlet, dealt with human rights violations in the Soviet Union (Vol. X). The last volume, on the Soviet Union (Vol. XI), ran to 150 pages. In addition, from February 1977 through November 1978, the Commission published four volumes of documents totalling 513 pp., three of which dealt exclusively with the various Helsinki Watch Committees in the Soviet Union and the fourth also touched upon similar developments in Eastern Europe. A fifth, 136 pp., volume of documents relates exclusively to the Belgrade Conference. The Commission was particularly hospitable to exiled members of the various Helsinki Watch Committees in the Soviet Union.

From this bare account it appears that the Commission had set itself the task to go to Belgrade with a full dossier on the violations of the Helsinki Final Act provisions in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. By arresting the members of the Helsinki Groups such as Ginzburg, Rudenko, Tykhyy and Orlov in February 1977 the Soviet authorities were almost asking for such a confrontation! In its first major report, the Commission justified its focus on the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries as follows:
The focus on U.S. implementation is self-explanatory for an American agency . . . .

Analyzing the Final Act sections on which it was directed to comment, the Commission determined that the Helsinki Accord language fairly reflected what are already standard practices or patterns of conduct in most of the West European signatory states.

The most difficult adjustments in existing and traditional patterns of conduct are required, in contrast, of the seven Warsaw Pact signatories. Theirs are the more sweeping restrictions—varying from nation to nation—on freedom of movement for the citizens, disseminating of information, facilities for contact with foreigners and circulation of ideas from abroad.

Although Western societies in general already meet Final Act standards of openness, the Eastern regimes in general, again, are relatively closed. Therefore, in examining the impact of the Final Act—actions reflecting compliance with or violations of its articles—the Commission staff has directed most of its research to those nations on whose domestic conduct the Helsinki accord should be having the greatest impact.24

It appears to us that such an emphasis was reasonable. Furthermore, the Commission did make some critical comments about US lack of progress in the human rights field: specifically the American government was chided for not yet signing, quite apart from ratifying, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant and its companion, the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant.25 President Carter, by the way, heeded the Commission's recommendation and signed the two Covenants shortly after the US CSCE report was published. (They have still not been ratified as of October 1979.)26

Late in 1978 the Administration dramatically stepped up its efforts to monitor US compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.27 The
agency chosen to report on that compliance was the US CSCE. April 3 and 4, 1979, the Commission held hearings exclusively on US compliance with the Act. The two prime witnesses were two American Helsinki Monitoring Groups: The Helsinki WATCH based in New York and the Washington Helsinki WATCH Committee for the United States, which will be briefly described in the next subchapter. Those two hearings underly in part the massive (382 pp.) status report on how the United States has been fulfilling the provisions of the Helsinki Act.

There were undoubtedly good reasons for switching gears (not completely, though, for several recent Soviet emigrés were invited to testify before the Commission in the spring and summer of 1979, and in September 1979 the Commission helped the AFL-CIO to hold the 3rd international Sakharov hearings in a Senate Hearing Room in Washington, D.C.).

The first reason is to insure credibility in the long run. In the words of the Commission:

The Commission felt that to insure the long-term success of the CSCE process, the U.S. should make a special effort in the post-Belgrade period to demonstrate its good faith by taking an honest, comprehensive look at its own performance.

(The Commission's experience at Belgrade is so important that it will be singled out in a special subchapter.)

The second reason for the report was the emergence of the US Helsinki Monitoring Groups in Washington and in New York. The third reason was a decision by President Jimmy Carter that the Commission should do such an investigation. Not surprisingly, the Commission has tried to garner good publicity from this report by pointing out that such a
self-examination by an official agency at that was unprecedented in world history.31

So it may be. There may, however, be good Machiavellian reasons, or reasons of statecraft, why sovereign governments have not chosen to publicize their own violations of international acts. Such a critical self-examination may persuade perhaps some European neutrals and one or two wavering European allies that the US is not merely using the human rights issue as a political weapon against the Soviet Union. But it would be lost on the Soviet Union government who prefer to interpret American actions in whatever way suits them best, a rational Soviet response might be to translate the US CSCE report and distribute it among their ruling and dissident elite. The Soviet Union will certainly not be shamed into publishing a report on its own compliance with Helsinki. The question might be raised what really had changed since August-September 1977 when the Commission issued its first report. Had the Soviet Union really changed its contempt for the restrictive provisions of the Helsinki Final Act? Hardly: they had arrested Helsinki activists in 1977, they continued to arrest and mistreat them in 1979. Admittedly, the US was somewhat embarrassed when Rev. Ben Chavis, of the "Wilmington Ten," the closest American equivalent to genuine political prisoners addressed an open appeal to the Belgrade Review Meeting. The two American Helsinki Watch Committees had to be given some kind of outlet. But was it really necessary to produce a thorough report on alleged and real US infractions of close to 400 pages?
The truth appears to be in 1979 as in 1977 that despite some defects the US performance is immeasurably better and therefore basically incomparable to that of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. For all its minor defects, the US is basically an open society, the USSR a closed one—this has not changed between 1977 and 1979. The Commission acknowledged it itself when it wrote in its overall conclusion:

There are limitless opportunities structured into American society and its institutions to provide oversight, public criticism and governmental correctives for practices deemed to violate the sense of the Helsinki accords. There are scores of private and public agencies in the United States monitoring, year-round, the degree of compliance of American institutions . . . . There are also governmental agencies that actively monitor with administrative, judicial and legislative power, the practices of both private and public entities.32

If this be so, why carry coal to Newcastle, or American misdeeds to Helsinki? The time spent on the outstanding and unprecedented US compliance report is time lost for monitoring the closed Eastern states. Our advice to the Commission is to top the American report with an even more comprehensive, more thorough and hard-hitting report exclusively on Soviet and East European performance. If the American report be regarded as such a challenge, time spent on its preparation is time well spent.
(c) Other Organizations Monitoring

The Implementation of the Helsinki Accords

The US Commission is undoubtedly the best established official Congressional-Executive body monitoring the implementation of the Helsinki Accords, but it is not the only watch committee in the West. In the United States two private American organizations have sprung up. In early 1978 the Washington Helsinki Watch Committee for the United States was set up. It has characterized itself as "a coalition of approximately twenty organizations working on civil rights, civil liberties and poverty issues in this country." Chairman of the Helsinki Watch Committee for the US is Mr. Morton Sklar, of the Center for National Policy Review. The Washington Committee appears to be exclusively interested in US compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

Somewhat more internationalist in outlook is the New York-based Helsinki Watch. It was formed in January 1979 with a $400,000 two-year grant from the Ford Foundation. Its chairman is Robert L. Bernstein, President of Random House. Vice Chairman of the New York Helsinki Watch Committee is Orville Schell, former president of the New York Bar Association, other very prominent members out of over 50 are the presidents of the University of Chicago, MIT, New York University and the University of California; authors Arthur Miller and Robert Penn Warren; and former UN Ambassador and Justice of the US Supreme Court Arthur Goldberg. The four main objectives of the New York Watch Committee are: "One, to monitor, encourage, and report on U.S. implementation of the Final
Act; two, to encourage, and assist when appropriate, the activities of citizens' Helsinki Watch groups in other signatory countries; three, to help in the process of educating opinion-makers and the American public on the significance of the Helsinki process and to inform them of the record of the participating states; and four, to develop information and proposals for the follow-up conference in Madrid. The New York Committee is further interesting in that it had acknowledged the "moral paternity" of the Moscow Helsinki Group and because it continues to publicly support the Helsinki Monitors in the USSR and Soviet dissenters of equal stature.

In Canada there exists the Canadian Parliamentary Helsinki Group but it appears to be more of a study group or at best a lobby of interested Canadian parliamentarians (foremost among them is Senator Paul Yuzyk) than an established advisory commission, with representation from the executive branch.

In Western Europe, according to a Soviet source, there exist Parliamentary Groups in both the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, which have investigated non-compliance with provisions of the Helsinki Final Act in other countries. At the NATO Assembly level (a conference of Parliamentary delegations from NATO countries, including France) there has been created a special commission which semi-annually publishes an information Bulletin on the implementation or lack of implementation of the provisions of Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act. Finally we have heard of, but cannot immediately document, the existence
in the Netherlands of a private group to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki Accords.

As part of its duties, London based Amnesty International watches over the fulfillment of certain provisions of the Final Act. Especially noteworthy are the International Sakharov Hearings on human rights, of which three have been held to date (February 1980): in Copenhagen (in 1975), in Rome (1977) and in Washington (1979). The main testimony at the Copenhagen hearings has been published by a Ukrainian-American group, a member of which was invited to testify at those hearings (nine testimonies out of twenty-six were devoted to the nationality question).\(^4\)

The Washington hearings concentrated more on the workers' question in the USSR.\(^2\)

Finally two emigré organizations should be mentioned which to our knowledge are the only ones that have systematically monitored the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in the country of their origin. The Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee, based in Washington and Baltimore and headed by Dr. Andrew Zwarun (one of its activists is chemist and journalist Osyp Zinkewych), an offshoot of the Smoloskyp group, since 1976 has been very active in translating and publicizing the documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.\(^3\)

Older, more broadly based and not exclusively directed to monitoring the Helsinki Final Act in the Ukraine is the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, of New York. Among its leading activists are Ukrainian-Americans Roman Kupchynsky and Adrian Karatnycky (the latter has also been Assistant
Director of International Sakharov Hearings, Third Session - U.S.A.

Like the Smoloskyp Group they have been engaged in publication. 44

(d) The Belgrade Review Meeting

(October 4, 1977 - March 9, 1978)

The Belgrade Followup Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or Belgrade Review Meeting in short, was held, with a recess for Christmas, from October 4, 1977, to May 9, 1978. It was preceded by the eight weeks' preparatory meeting, also in Belgrade, from June 15-August 5, 1977. The holding of such a meeting had been mandated in the final section, "Basket IV," of the Helsinki Final Act. 45 Representatives of all the 35 states which had signed the Final Act, appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of these States, met at Belgrade to review the signatories' compliance with the Act's provisions. Altogether some 400 representatives were present at the Belgrade Meeting proper. The plenary sessions at the opening and the conclusion were public, the working sessions at which most of the sharp discussions took place were closed to the public and the press. 46

Under the impact of President Carter's human rights policy and the persecution of human rights activists in the USSR and in Eastern Europe, most notably that of the members of the Soviet Helsinki Groups, much of Western public opinion came to see in the proceedings of the Belgrade Review Meeting a battle royal for human rights, no more. In the witty expression of the US CSCE report: "The Helsinki accord—actually
an omnibus of détente cargo—began to be perceived in Western media as
an express train on the track of civil, political, and religious liberty.
Similarly, the Belgrade meeting—even in its preparatory stage—was
sometimes portrayed as a major way station at which the human rights
flyer would be either derailed or given a fresh load of high-powered
fuel."47

To the great disappointment of the Western advocates of human
rights, the Concluding Document of the Belgrade Review Meeting did not
acknowledge that the "human rights express" had even been running, quite
apart of whether it had been derailed or been given new fuel to
accelerate: the document did not use the words "human rights" at all, the
closest that it came to admitting the existence of a problem was
contained in a pledge "to implement fully, unilaterally, bilaterally
and multilaterally, all the provisions of the Final Act." A whiff of
the battle smoke is also contained in the allusion:

It was recognized that the exchange of views consti-
tutes in itself a valuable contribution toward the
achievement of the aims set by the CSCE, although different
views were expressed as to the degree of implementation of
the Final Act reached so far.48

In fact, a NATO draft of February 21, 1978, had contained an explicit
reference to human rights, viz.:

The participating States recognized that the human
aspect of the CSCE process and its significance for
peoples and individuals have still to be fully realized.
They reaffirmed that the respect, by all of them, for
human rights and fundamental freedoms in all their aspects
is of fundamental importance and constitutes an essential
basis for substantial improvement of their mutual relations.
They expressed their resolve fully to comply with their
international commitments and obligations in this field.
In so doing, they will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 49

But under the unanimity rule it had no chance of being adopted, and by March 8, 1978, the Western representatives gave in to the Soviet insistence on issuing a bland report which did not mention human rights by name.

The significance of the Belgrade Review Meeting in this work is fourfold. First, Soviet dissidents—the members of the Soviet Helsinki Groups in particular—saw in the Belgrade Meeting a supreme test of the implementation of the human rights provision of the Final Act. Second, the meeting is important in that it showed somewhat different approaches on the part of America's West European allies. Third, the Belgrade Review Meeting established a valuable precedent for intensive, day-to-day cooperation between the Executive and Congress—the Department of State and the US CSCE—in foreign affairs and thus further helped to entrench the US Helsinki Commission. Fourth, the Belgrade Meeting showed the possibilities and limitations of direct lobbying by emigré activists.

We will deal with the first three aspects here, will reserve the fourth for brief consideration in Chapter 8, below.

The members of the Soviet Helsinki Groups were very much interested in the Belgrade Review Meeting. Nay, it can be argued, as we have done, that the prospect of that meeting was one of the most important immediate causes for establishing the Moscow Group, and the other republican Groups as well. 50 The Moscow Group alone issued seven documents relating to the Belgrade Review Meeting, not counting an eighth, which is a survey
of the state of human rights "Three months before Belgrade." The Ukrainian Group issued four documents relating to the Belgrade Review Meeting, the Lithuanian—two, the Georgian—none, and the Armenian—two. The Crimean Tatars have addressed two appeals to the Belgrade Meeting. In addition, we have at least three blunt comments on Belgrade by Soviet political prisoners.

The first Moscow document, of February 2, 1977, "To the Heads of Governments which Participated in the Helsinki Conference—An Appeal on the Eve of the Belgrade Conference" requests help for would-be emigrants from the Soviet Union. It is technically not a Moscow Group document: it has been signed by 19 human rights activists. But it also bears the signatures of Yuri Orlov, the Group Leader, and of Naum Meiman, Vladimir Slepak, Anatoly Shcharansky, Lyudmila Alekseeva, and Malva Landa, Group Members. Two other Moscow Group documents are similar one-issue appeals. But the remaining four are more interesting in that they represent a well-reasoned lengthy memorandum sketching the ideal Western negotiating position from the viewpoint of the Moscow Group and three comments on the success of the Belgrade Review Meeting.

The memorandum considers three "logical possibilities." First, in the face of Soviet violations of human rights the Western negotiators can look the other way and declare that the Helsinki Final Act has been "almost satisfactorily" implemented apart from "a few isolated occurrences" (отдельные случаи). That would render the Act an object of scorn. Second, the West can frankly acknowledge that the USSR has completely violated the
humanitarian provisions of the Final Act and that the idea of linking human rights to international relations has suffered a debacle. Option A in this case would be to denounce the Helsinki Act in toto. The authors of the memorandum—Elena Bonner, Petr Grigorenko [Petro Hryhorenko], Malva Landa, Naum Meiman, Yuri Mniukh, and Vladimir Slepak, of the Moscow Helsinki Group; Viacheslav Bakhmin, Irina Kaplun, Aleksander Podrabinek, Feliks Serebrov, of the Working Commission to Investigate the Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Ends; and Valentin Turchin, Chairman of the [Soviet] Section of Amnesty International—oppose Option A: it would lead to greater international friction, to increased military expenditures, would make the prospects of a stable peace and genuine international cooperation more remote. Option B would be either to formally renounce the humanitarian (i.e., human rights) provisions of the Final Act or to ignore them de-facto, while preserving intact the remaining provisions, those on the inviolability of international frontiers in particular. This would be a terrible blow to human rights not only in USSR and Eastern Europe, but also in the developing countries. The "security and cooperation" thus obtained by the West would be illusory only. The third possibility which the authors favor is for the West to propose for discussion at the Belgrade Review Meeting more or less formal criteria for the implementation of human rights. Should the USSR refuse to discuss such criteria, the onus for breaking the Helsinki Accords would rest on its government. As a prerequisite for any serious discussion the authors suggest that the West demand the immediate release from imprisonment of members of Soviet Helsinki Groups. "So long as those persons remain
locked up, the discussion of criteria for the fulfillment of the Helsinki Accords would be an insulting farce, a mockery of common sense." Furthermore the authors suggest a consideration of the questions of state secrets (they even attach Orlov's detailed blueprint for an international conference on the declassification of information!), emigration, admittance of foreign observers to political trials.54

The rest of the documents issued by the Moscow Group that touch on the Belgrade Review Meeting were more or less critical comments and warnings: The most restrained is Document No. 26: "To the Belgrade Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords," of November 21, 1977, which was signed by six Group members (Elena Bonner, Petr Grigorenko [Petro Hryhorenko], Naum Meiman, Tatiana Osipova, Viktor Nekipelov and Vladimir Slepak) and co-signed by Academician Andrei Sakharov and ten others. The document asks the rhetorical question whether the authors are satisfied with the position of Western countries in Belgrade in pressing for human rights. The USA and small European countries (the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium and others) have acted fairly consistently, but the big Western countries "to date have not taken any consistent position whatsoever" thereby undercutting the efforts of countries that insisted on a complete fulfillment of the human rights articles of the Helsinki Final Act. A breakup of the Meeting due to the insistence of Western countries on the fulfillment of human rights and the Soviet refusal to do so would be bad, but even worse would be yielding to Soviet blackmail to wreck the Meeting. The document further suggests a number of issues and persons that ought to be discussed at
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the Meeting, most notably the fate of the imprisoned Helsinki monitors and other prisoners of conscience. Document No. 35: "Statement to the Belgrade Conference," of February 1978, repeats the warning against yielding to Soviet blackmail to break up the Conference. Document No. 39: "On the Belgrade Conference," of March 14, 1977, comes to two sad conclusions:

The Concluding Document does not refer to human rights. In general, it represents a step backwards from the Final Act itself which affirmed the unbreakable link between the observance of human rights, security and cooperation.

Secondly, not mentioning human rights is potentially dangerous in that it will partly set the terms of the Madrid Review Meeting of 1980.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Group has submitted the original and interesting Memorandum No. 2, of January 20, 1977, in which it complains that the government of the Ukrainian SSR has not been represented at the Helsinki Conference, while a number of European micro-states have been. The second Ukrainian submission to the Belgrade Meeting, Memorandum No. 5: "Ukraine of the Summer of 1977," of February 15, 1977, has alas, been marked by what appears to be Berdnyk's emotional, rambling, "futurological" style. Ukrainian Group Memorandum No. 6: "Concerning the So-Called 'Internal Affairs' of a State," of February 21, 1977, is a little more subdued and much shorter. It appeals to the nations of the Belgrade Forum to recognize that "the struggle for Human Rights is not the internal affair of this or that state, it is THE INTERNAL AFFAIR OF UNITED MANKIND." Memorandum No. 18: "To the Belgrade Conference of 35 Countries: On Discrimination Against Ukrainians in the Area of the Right to Emigrate..."
[from the USSR]," of December 1977, complains with a little exaggeration
that while Russian dissenters are allowed to emigrate, Ukrainian dissenters
are being thrown into labor camp. 61 The Ukrainian Group Memoranda have
one virtue, however: unlike some documents of the Moscow Group, they do
not tell Western (mostly, American) negotiators what to do or what not
to do at Belgrade. In other words, they are fairly straightforward
appeals. This lack of self-confidence on the part of the members of the
Ukrainian Helsinki Group may be due to the fact that unlike the Muscovites,
the Ukrainians have not had extensive contacts with Western diplomats.

The Lithuanian Helsinki Group in addressing the Belgrade Review
Meeting on June 19, 1977, submitted one statement "On the Situation of
the Roman Catholic Church and of Other Believers in Lithuania,"62 and
another one "On the Present Situation in Lithuania," on July 17, 1977,
in which they complain that some Lithuanian political prisoners are being
kept in indefinite exile without trial, that the situation of the
Lithuanian language is difficult, that Lithuanian history is being
distorted, and, above all, that the Catholic religion is being
persecuted. 63

The Georgians have not addressed the Belgrade Review Meeting:
in general, the output of the Georgian Helsinki Group is rather slim.
The Armenians sent a very thoughtful announcement (really, a memorandum)
to the Belgrade Review Conference in June 1977, complaining that the
civil rights of the Armenians continued to be violated, that political
prisoners continued to be detained under inhuman conditions, and that the
free flow of information and of people was being impeded (foreign radio broadcasts were being jammed, foreign books and journals were being confiscated, and would-be emigrants were being harassed). They also complained that the rights of the Armenians as a national minority were being grossly violated (through linguistic Russification, through official "stonewalling" on the Karabagh question) and added for good measure that the new Soviet Constitution did not offer any hope for improvement. The second Armenian submission to the Belgrade Review Meeting, the "Supplement" of September 12, 1977, complains about the mistreatment at the hands of the KGB of friends of Armenian Group member Nazaryan. Altogether it would appear that members of Soviet Helsinki Groups were vitally interested in the outcome of the Belgrade Review Meeting and were not bashful about making more or less diplomatic suggestions to Western representatives.

The Crimean Tatars sent an open mass petition, signed by 2,500 persons and addressed to the Belgrade Review Meeting, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the USSR Supreme Soviet, requesting mass repatriation to the Crimea. An individual appeal of the same content was sent to the Belgrade Meeting alone by Crimean Tatar historian and former political prisoner Aishe Saitmuratova. She also requested help in her quest for emigration.

Of particular interest are the comments on Belgrade by some Soviet political prisoners that have been expressed with the customary "Zek" bluntness. Approximately in October 1977, 18 political prisoners
of Perm Camp No. 36 including biologist Sergei Kovalev, a close friend of Sakharov's, warned the outside world: "Be careful: your negotiating partners are jailers, not diplomats." A similar individual comment by Kovalev himself, of October 3, 1977, predicted that the Soviet delegation at Belgrade would be lying as usual to cover up the USSR government's crimes. After the conclusion of the Belgrade Meeting, March 14, 1978, nine political prisoners from the Dubrov labor camp, including the Leader of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group Rudenko, the Armenian nationalist Airikyan, the Russian editor of the right samizdat journal Veche Osipov, and Soldatov, Ushakov and Heifetz, the last three from the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union (DDSS), wrote a declaration to the Moscow Human Rights Committee. It said in part:

Yes, the adoption of the Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting, which document Soviet citizens regard as a point [won] in the propaganda game with the West, has been duly noted (otmecheno) by reducing the volume of the punishment cells (kartserov), by [giving the camp administration] the right to install camp inmates into the inner prison for indefinite terms (see the new rules, to be introduced on March 15, 1978).

As far as the Soviet political prisoners were concerned, the Belgrade Meeting was a failure for the West, which the KGB immediately celebrated by increasing the abuse of political prisoners.

Fearful that the Warsaw Pact countries and especially the Soviet Union would attempt to make a tragicomedy out of the proceedings of the Belgrade Review Meeting, the US delegation made an early decision to pursue violations of human rights aggressively. In doing so the American delegation was taking account of the unprecedented attention human rights had achieved in the international media. Even Soviet scholars admit
that human rights dominated the Belgrade Meeting, although they attribute it to American machinations. Writes Yuri Kashlev, who has been identified as a "participant in international conferences," possibly also in the Belgrade Meeting:

The debate on human rights, imposed on the Belgrade meeting by the US delegation, showed that the main aim of the US delegation was to advance Washington's present policy of proclaiming the United States as the "greatest champion of human rights" in the world and using this pose and the issue of human rights as a veil for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries without any actual intention to grant human rights to its own citizens or to commit itself to international documents on human rights. By creating a conflict over human rights, the United States was seeking to divert the Belgrade meeting from its main work—to strengthen security and expand co-operation in Europe. 74

While it is true that the United States was the most vocal advocate of human rights in Belgrade, the Soviet interpretation underestimates the degree to which these issues had become significant throughout Western Europe. Indeed, the Soviet Union itself, after the signing of the Helsinki accords, began to give unprecedented coverage to human rights issues in its mass media—but with a focus on its interpretation of what human rights is and on violations and shortcomings in the non-socialist countries. 75

It is also true, however, that while human rights were discussed up and down in Western Europe, some West European governments, notably those of France and the Federal Republic took a somewhat different attitude on the problem of how best to assure the implementation of human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was a question of different tactics and possibly also of strategy, which brings us to
the second major aspect at the Belgrade Review Meeting, that of relations among the Western Allies. In its Document No. 26 the Moscow Helsinki Group, Sakharov and others already noted that the big Western European powers were not so consistent in defending human rights in the Soviet Union as was the US and some smaller West and North European countries.\textsuperscript{76}

The report of the US CSCE also hints at tactical disagreements among the Allies:

Throughout the detailed discussions of the 10 principles, which lasted through much of October and November, the U.S. delegation emphasized not only the well-known cases of the monitoring groups in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, but the problems faced by religious minorities in the Soviet Union, the difficult situation of Ukrainian and other ethnic dissidents, and the misuses of psychiatry in that country. While the U.S. delegation was the most consistently outspoken, other Western countries and many of the neutral delegations followed in expressing dissatisfaction with the human rights records of the Soviet Union and several of its allies.\textsuperscript{77}

What is behind the complaint of Sakharov and others and behind the hints in the official US CSCE report?

For understandable reasons, the full extent of the initial and continuing disagreements among the Western States is one of the better kept secrets in Washington: in probing for this among officials of the Department of State one of us encountered polite denials. The truth appears to be that prior to the opening of the Belgrade Review Meeting in October 1977 after many consultations American diplomats indeed considerably narrowed but did not completely overcome the disagreements that had virtually broken into the open in February-March of that year. January 21, 1977, on the day of the Presidential inauguration, Sakharov had written an urgent appeal to Mr. Carter to struggle for human rights
in the Soviet Union and specifically to continue the efforts to liberate a number of well-known political prisoners. Very much to the Academician's delight President Carter answered his letter February 5, 1977. Carter's letter was delivered to Sakharov February 17 in the American Embassy in Moscow. It read on a White House letterhead:

Dear Professor Sakharov,

I received your letter of January 21, and want to express my appreciation to you for bringing your thoughts to my personal attention.

Human rights is a central concern of my Administration. In my inaugural address I stated: "Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere."

You may rest assured that the American people and our government will continue our firm commitment to promote respect for human rights not only in our own country but also abroad.

We shall use our good offices to seek the release of prisoners of conscience, and we will continue our efforts to shape a world responsive to human aspirations in which nations of differing cultures and histories can live side by side in peace and justice. I am always glad to hear from you, and I wish you well.

Sincerely yours,

Jimmy Carter.

But among America's West European allies President Giscard d'Estaing of France was much less than jubilant. While the Belgrade preparatory meeting was going on, July 25, 1977, President d'Estaing's interview with Newsweek's Arnaud de Borchgrave was published. The French statesman at first indirectly accused President Carter of having broken the code of détente, then softened it a tiny bit to criticize the American President of having "compromised the process of détente." The relevant extracts from his interview follow:
DE BORCHGRAVE: Why do you think President Leonid Brezhnev is so angry with President Carter's public approach to diplomacy? Did he tell you whether it was style or substance?

GISCARD D'ESTAING: It's both. Mr. Brezhnev feels that some of President Carter's decisions have broken what I will call the code of conduct of détente. But beyond style, there is, of course, substance. Brezhnev does not understand the objective sought by breaking the code. The code, for example, calls for noninterference in the other's internal affairs, and you will never find in the Soviet press direct or personal attacks against the leaders of countries that subscribe to détente.

Q. What are your impressions of Mr. Carter's foreign policy and what worries you about it as you've seen it evolve?

A. I am not here to pass editorial judgment. That's your job. I am most gratified by the excellent relations I have established with President Carter. But what seems clear in Mr. Carter's foreign policy is that he has introduced a fresh ideological dimension. This undoubtedly met certain needs--such as nonproliferation, arms limitations and human rights--just as it met some of my own preoccupations, but it has compromised the process of détente. The question now arises whether or how new ideological themes can be applied without provoking negative reactions.

Q. Why then are European leaders expressing fears about Soviet geopolitical designs privately that they don't share with their people publicly?

A. Unless the superpowers can re-establish a common language, there is little doubt in my mind that we will soon be living in a quite different climate from the one we have known in recent years. What has happened in the last three months confirms this. There is a profound misunderstanding between Washington and Moscow. And faced with this misunderstanding, there is an increasingly common European attitude. France and West Germany are in complete agreement in this respect. Chancellor [Helmut] Schmidt told me he shares our perceptions of détente and the need to respect the code of conduct.80

President Giscard d'Estaing's sharp reaction was not over President Carter's human rights policy alone, in March 1977, President Carter had submitted to Brezhnev a highly controversial arms control proposal, to
which he alludes in his interview. Giscard d'Estaing's outburst in mid-1977, however, was not an isolated event. In a follow-up interview in July 1979 he repeated in a milder form his criticism of US foreign policy, blaming primarily the United States for a breakdown of the dialogue with the Soviet Union.81 An American scholar writing on French foreign policy has emphasized that the French government of President d'Estaing, true to de Gaulle's spirit, would like to be the "privileged interlocutor" in East-West relations.82

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, of the German Federal Republic, for whom President Giscard d'Estaing spoke in his July 1977 interview, has been less outspoken in public, but in private he is reported to have characterized Carter's open human rights policy as "rattling the bars of the bear's cage." This is not to say that Herr Schmidt would not like to advance the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union. The West German government is interested in particular in the repatriation of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union. But as Angela Stent Yergin put it more diplomatically:

The disagreement between the United States and the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] is one over means, not ends. Both Bonn and Washington would like to see the Helsinki agreements implemented but they differ over the tactics of negotiating with the Russians.83

The British appear to have been even more discreet than Chancellor Schmidt. It would, however, appear to us that the conclusion of an article by an English international lawyer may reflect the majority view in the Foreign Office (admittedly, the article was written after the disappointing Concluding Document was issued). Professor J. E. S. Fawcett
carefully weighs the legal arguments for and against the proposition that Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act (the classic catalogue of human rights) should be given priority over Principle VI on non-interference in a state's internal affairs. He appears to incline toward the affirmative. But then he comes to the following conclusion on pragmatic, policy grounds:

Given then greater co-operation in Europe as the prime objective of the Helsinki Final Act, it is reasonable to conclude that the manner in which human rights issues were raised at the Belgrade Conference was a wrong tactic, that diplomatic action in various contexts is an alternative and more effective course for governments, and that it at least should be pursued in anticipation of the Madrid conference, if the Final Act is to make progress.

Given the disparity in the approaches toward human rights violations among the Western countries, American diplomats had their hands full in creating a united front. Their job was not made easier by President Carter's decision to appoint as head of the Delegation to the Belgrade Review Meeting former US Secretary of Labor, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and UN Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg instead of Class 1 career Foreign Service officer Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, who had headed the US Delegation to the Belgrade preparatory conference. Goldberg's appointment was an indication that the US attached great weight to the outcome of the Belgrade Review Meeting. The appointment, however, was made rather late, August 23, just six weeks before the scheduled beginning. It was also generally known that unlike Ambassador Sherer, Justice Goldberg would not seek to minimize the difference between this country and the Soviet Union but would aggressively "push compliance" by the Soviets.
"Goldberg found Western Europe reluctant to anger Moscow."  

The Canadians, the Dutch, the Belgians and Norwegians were admittedly less reluctant to follow Goldberg's lead on human rights enforcement. Yet by and by, the new head of the US Belgrade Delegation, loyally backed by Ambassador Sherer, persuaded the more reluctant West Europeans--the French and the West Germans--to give the American position a try. In the words of the usually well informed columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, replete with nuances of diplomatic bargaining:

The EEC [European Economic Commission] produced a policy in early October and sent it to a caucus of NATO nations. "We cannot engage in platitudes," it said. "Therefore it is agreed to mention countries and categories"--for example, religious groups like Jews and Baptists.

Goldberg insisted on the following addition: 
"... countries, categories and, where appropriate cases"--meaning Soviet Helsinki monitors such as Anatoly Shcharansky or Prague's Charter 77. The addition was agreed to.

Since then, U.S. allies--particularly the French and West Germans--have shown some offensive flexibility.  

Conversely the Soviet delegates failed in splitting the Western front: for some reason the Soviet Chief Delegate Vorontsov had tried very hard to split the United States and Canada.  

Encouraged by the new Western unity and fulfilling, incidentally, one of the recommendations made by the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (US CSCE), Ambassador Goldberg in his plenary speech on November 9, 1977, named individual cases:

It is in [the] spirit [of former Swedish Prime Minister Palme] that we raise the cases of Orlov, Shcharansky, and Ginsberg (sic) in the Soviet Union, and we raise them by way of illustration because they
have been seeking to monitor the implementation of the Final Act in the Soviet Union. It is clear that the Final Act endorses such peaceful activities, and persons engaged in them should be free from harassment, arrest and imprisonment. 90

In the same spirit Mr. R. Spencer Oliver, Counselor of the US delegation and Staff Director and General Counsel of the US CSCE, on December 12, 1977, explicitly defended Mykola Rudenko and Oleksii Tykhy, founder members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group who were then the only Soviet Helsinki Group members to have been already tried and given maximum sentences, 12 and 15 years loss of freedom. 91 As the US CSCE report puts it:

After [November 9], any mention of specific cases in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe . . . [was] met with a barrage of familiar Soviet arguments on the deplorable state of social and economic rights in the United States as well as mention of various civil rights problems, including even the Sacco-Vanzetti case. The U.S. response to such criticism of its own human rights record was to welcome this implicit recognition that human rights implementation was a legitimate topic for Belgrade review, to accept that our society is not perfect and to encourage the Eastern speakers to pursue the subject in further detail but with equal candor regarding their own countries' records. 92

The NATO draft concluding statement of February 21, 1978, which was joined by Ireland but not by France, though France had participated in the NATO caucus (the Assembly) September 17-24, 1977, in Paris, did include an implicit defense of the Soviet Helsinki Groups:

They recognize that institutions, organizations and persons have a right to assist governments in the tasks of ensuring the full implementation of the provisions of the Final Act including where necessary to point out instances of non-implementation. 93

But the Soviet Union stood firm: neither Rudenko nor Orlov were released, and exercising its veto right, the USSR swept the entire discussion of human rights under the gray rug of the official Concluding Statement. 94
Finally, the last major aspect of the Belgrade Review Meeting was the conscious merger of high and middle-ranking State Department officials with Members of the US CSCE. Some Delegation members representing the public were also involved, but the cooperation was particularly close between the Department of State and the CSCE: it extended to US CSCE staff members and State Department officials who now worked as a team, despite the earlier misgivings of Dr. Kissinger and his friends. Mr. Justice Goldberg was laudatory but correct when he said:

When we embarked for Belgrade, there was a great deal of skepticism as to this unique operation when Congress joins with the Executive in a multilateral international conference of this type.

I did not share this skepticism, and indeed, the experience proved that my confidence was warranted. 95

There were some minor frictions between the CSCE members and staff and the State Department officials, which the press may have exaggerated. 96 One Communist delegate, who may have read those reports, in late October even tried to drive a wedge between US career diplomats and Delegation members from outside the Department of State, by attacking "certain delegates, not delegations." 97 But by and large, the US Delegation remained united and worked as a team. This is of tremendous importance for the further entrenchment of the US CSCE in the American body politic, far more important, e.g., than the fact that by law the President of the US (i.e., certain designated officials in the Department of State) submits semi-annual reports to the US CSCE on the state of implementation of the Helsinki accords. 98 The importance of periodical review meetings has been brought out beautifully in Mr. Dante B. Fascell's answer to one of our follow-up questions:
QUESTION: Sir, your Commission has been superb in publicizing violations of human rights. But who will follow up on your hearings and recommendations? Is there any way by which the concern, dedication and skill of the Commissioners and the Staff will carry over into actions of Congress, of the Executive, possibly of the American Allies in Europe as well?

THE HONORABLE DANTE B. FASCELL: As you know, the Helsinki Final Act is not a treaty. Rather, it has the status of an international agreement, a document of intent. Similarly, the Commission does not have legislative power. The Commission, as you have indicated, has the dual role of alerting public opinion to human rights abuses and of working within the US governmental structure.

In terms of carrying through on suggestions made by the Commission, there are several ways in which this can be—and has been—done. I have already mentioned the most effective mechanism for presenting US views on Helsinki implementation: the fact that the Commission is an integral part of the US delegations to the Helsinki review conferences. Examples of other ways in which our suggestions have become part of US governmental policy are the following: We recommend that the Senate hold hearings on the UN Covenants and this is being done; we suggested that the issue of improving the teaching of foreign languages in the US be further examined and the Presidential Commission on the Foreign Language and Area Studies was the result of that suggestion.

As far as our NATO allies are concerned, the Belgrade Review Conference provided an opportunity for us to work with our allies in formulating a strategy for dealing with the full range of Helsinki issues. We expect that this situation will be the same at the upcoming Madrid Review Conference as well.

To conclude this long subchapter: On balance, has the Belgrade Review Meeting been a success or a failure? Given the fact that the US has had to reckon with its West European allies who really had held the initiative in the negotiations leading up to the Final Act, given the fact that the USSR like any other state (Liechtenstein or Monaco, e.g.) had the veto power over the wording of the concluding document, the
Belgrade Review Meeting must be pronounced a qualified success, despite all the harsh comments by such members of the Soviet Helsinki Groups as Elena Bonner-Sakharov and Mykola Rudenko. The Helsinki review process has been useful in that it has helped to bolster the standing of the Soviet Helsinki Groups by way of an international feedback. We agree with the following interim assessment in an editorial in the New York Times:

Had the conference been public, the Russians might well have walked out long ago. Their embarrassment under such a Western barrage has surely been great. Moreover, the publics of Eastern Europe have learned a good deal about the conference from the broadcasts of the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. (That the Yugoslavs accredited correspondents from the latter two radios itself caused Moscow no little distress.) The approach of the conference had been used for more than a year by human rights advocates throughout the Soviet orbit to give international standing to their allegations of violations by their own regimes. These allegations have now been amplified in Western statements at Belgrade. And protests made after the Belgrade meeting will be grist for the next review two years hence, probably in Madrid. 100

The review meetings are also helpful to the US CSCE as an institution. But it is a qualified success: one swallow, especially a lame swallow, does not the summer make. The Western powers must repeat their straightforward approach to human rights violations at the Review Meeting in Madrid in November 1980, even though this may be displeasing to a great power. If, after misreading the significance of Belgrade, the West gives in to Soviet demands not to raise those issues, Belgrade may still have to be reckoned a failure. In other words, the Belgrade Review Meeting will be justified only if it is taken as a precedent and followed at Madrid and successive review meetings. If Soviet negotiators admire anything, it is Soviet-like consistency and persistence. As The Honorable Dante B. Fascell put it much more eloquently:
... Belgrade accomplished two things of real consequence. It established the human rights issue as a legitimate element of East-West diplomacy, and it provided for the continuation of the Helsinki process, which has already brought some progress in the human rights field.

... The Helsinki ideals now have a constituency. All the parties now know what to expect during the next conference. Names will again be mentioned and countries will be identified where concern for Helsinki violations is strongest. The Soviet Union and its allies, having been introduced to this practice without having the sky fall on them, will be better able to absorb its repetition and, perhaps, more disposed to discuss the issues raised in a constructive manner.

... The quest for basic human freedoms—slow and tortuous at times, disappointing at others—must continue, because the spark of justice refuses to die.101

(e) The Media

The role of the Soviet media in publicizing and selectively monitoring the Helsinki Final Act should not be underestimated, for those are the media most readily available to Soviet citizens. A count of items bearing on "human rights" and presented under that rubric in the Index to Pravda is very revealing. In 1975 Pravda carried four such items, in 1976 there were eleven items, in 1977, possibly in connection with the Belgrade Review Meeting, there were as many as 218 human rights items published. Barring a radical reclassification of the items by the indexer this is really a jump! Soviet media do talk about violations of human rights in South Africa, in Chile, and in the US, and most Soviet citizens have had a sufficient level of education to identify the missing
country or countries in the official presentation. On the other hand, official Soviet sources such as trial summaries do not refer to Soviet Helsinki Groups at all, as if they did not exist. Soviet sources may also give free publicity to US CSCE documents and the CSCE itself. For instance in August 1977 the Soviet news agency TASS attacked the "Congressional" report about human rights in the Soviet Union (evidently, US CSCE's Two Years After Helsinki) as a "collection of lies and slander" and members of the CSCE were called "arrogant ignoramuses" by Literaturnaia Gazeta. 102

The role of Western newspaper reports and radio commentators should not be underestimated. In the words of Gayle Durham Hollander:

... Dissenters have received a good deal of support for their activities from outside the Soviet Union. In a sense, Western reporters and foreign radio are for them a "transmission belt" to the larger world, particularly to people in their ethnic or professional groups whose support may be useful. Much of the openly political support is in the form of letters and petitions by foreign individuals and groups to important party or government bodies, and these are often broadcast to the Soviet population as well. Appeals and letters from Soviet citizens are often sent to foreign stations, which then broadcast them to the Soviet audience. Such documents of the internal opposition (which also include literary and other types of material) is known as radizdat. Tape recordings of foreign broadcasts and other materials circulate as magnitizdat. Foreign media thus have become an extension of the domestic alternative network, "amplifying" the activities and writings of the democratic movement. 103

The dissidents we interviewed agree that foreign radio was an almost indispensable communications link with their own fellow-citizens and with the outside world. They do have their favorites among the Western radio stations. The BBC was the model of objective, reliable
reporting but its signal, alas, was relatively weak. The Voice of America had a much stronger signal but its editorial policy was criticized. First, it offered too much news of no particular interest to Soviet dissenters (such as the elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia). Secondly, and this is perhaps an exaggerated criticism, it would give the news a particularly "American twist" which might be damaging to the cause of Soviet dissidents. One of us was told in no uncertain terms that though the VOA might be honest in its presentation it would sometime fall into a Soviet trap in political warfare. For instance, the Soviet government has launched a propaganda campaign to depict the Soviet dissent movement as a Zionist inspired intrigue, of benefit only to Soviet Jews, which makes the Russian members of the dissent movement wince. They wince even more, when VOA unwittingly reinforces the Soviet line by presenting the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act as one benefitting Jewish emigration. Though this is indeed the popular impression of the Jackson-Vanik amendment in the United States, technically it is incorrect (the amendment does not refer specifically to Jews) and stressing the Jewish aspect of the amendment in broadcasts to the Soviet Union might be counterproductive. Radio Liberty can be well heard in certain spots in the countryside, which have attracted enterprising dissidents with tape recorders. Radio Liberty is best on commenting on new developments in Soviet dissent politics and publicizing Soviet samizdat, a kind of project "feedback and amplify." One Soviet emigré criticized Radio Liberty, however, for broadcasting insufficient material on the emigré communities in the West, the United States in particular.
The possibilities and limitations of Western newspaper correspondents are perhaps best illustrated by the Whitney-Piper case. As we have already briefly commented in Chapter 5, above, two American newspaper correspondents, Craig Whitney, of the New York Times, and Harold Piper, of the Baltimore Sun, were summoned before a Soviet court in a civil, not a criminal case, June 27, 1978, for daring to suggest that, according to Gamsakhurdia's friends, Gamsakhurdia's famous confession on TV may have been fabricated by the authorities. On July 18, 1978, the trial took place which neither of the two correspondents attended as permitted under Soviet law in a civil case. The court found for the State Radio and Television Committee and fined both Whitney and Piper 50 roubles each for not publishing a retraction and $1,647 each in court costs (mainly to pay for the transportation of Gamsakhurdia who testified in court and reaffirmed the authenticity of his confession). Most interesting are Whitney's reflection on the episode, which have been filed on August 21, 1978, but have not been published by the N.Y. Times because just at that time the paper had been struck. Writes Whitney:

Two things ought to be said here.
First, it seems clear now that Gamsakhurdia's friends and relatives were wrong when they suggested that his original confession had been faked. He appears to have been broke during his 13 months of pretrial imprisonment. Whatever led him to do it, it seems that he did make the confession that was broadcast, with three and a half minutes of cuts, on May 19.
One of the most important reasons for not participating in the trial was that under Soviet law, to prove innocence of slander on this charge, I would have had to prove that Gamsakhurdia's confession was false--something I had never written in my story.
Proving that I had only reported that his friends and relatives had said it was fabricated, and that I had balanced their claims with officials' denials, was no defense under the Soviet statutes, our Russian lawyers told us—and Judge Almazov ignored our contentions in his ruling July 18.

Taking a legal position that violated the cardinal professional principle of impartiality, as attempting to prove Gamsakhurdia's confession was false would have done, was clearly out of the question.

Second, it seems clear that the authorities' prime aim in bringing this particular case was to re-establish the authenticity of the confession beyond any reasonable doubt in the minds of the Soviet audience—particularly in restive Georgia. If a showdown with Washington, or punishment of Piper and me personally, had been uppermost in the authorities' minds, the case would not have been dropped and probably we would have been expelled.106

Whitney remarks that after all that trouble he was allowed to return to the Soviet Union July 30, 1978, was received "courteously, even jovially" by Soviet officials and that his work had been "remarkably normal." The authorities evidently wanted to reaffirm the authenticity of the confession, not punish Whitney and Piper. In the conclusion of his filed, but as far as we know unpublished, story, Whitney raises some points of journalistic ethics. It is best that he be allowed to speak for himself:

Some critics of the American press have argued recently that it cannot go on covering Soviet dissidents as a major story without taking into account the feedback the stories have in the Soviet Union, through Russian-language broadcasts on the Voice of America, for instance. We would never have been sued, I believe, if the V.O.A. had not picked up, translated, and broadcast both our stories to millions of Soviet listeners, Judge Almazov even ruled as evidence against us partial transcripts from these broadcasts as if we are responsible for them as well as for what our own newspapers print.

This is profoundly troubling. One of the things every foreign correspondent often has to do here is to convince his Soviet friends—dissidents as well as officials—that he is not a propagandist. We do not work here as transmission
belts to the Voice of America, but many dissidents treat us as if we were, and so has the Moscow City Court. Officials and dissidents care most deeply about what we write when it is translated and disseminated here in those broadcasts. And the Soviet government views them as propaganda.

The loop is one that raises troubling issues and deserves closer scrutiny than it has yet had in the United States.

But it would be a mistake for correspondents here to write stories with an ear to how they will sound when broadcast in Russian back to the Soviet Union by a U.S. government-supported agency. The American press should stick to its own definitions of what a legitimate story is and use the same criteria of thoroughness, objectivity, and fairness to which it is bound in any other country.

The Soviet Union, unfortunately, is a country where facts are often hard to come by, and the Government cloaks much of its activities in deep secrecy. The Soviet government's definition of what is "factual" is what its official says is factual, nothing else—and certainly not what dissidents say about it.

We do not accept that definition of "factual" reporting in our own country. And to refuse to listen to what outsiders say about the Soviet government or to report on dissident activities would be tantamount to accepting the Soviet definition of journalism.

As our case now stands, the outcome has been a draw—a compromise that should allow correspondents to continue working here in a normal fashion. Neither chest-pounding nor breast-beating seems like an appropriate way to ensure that there won't be another trial like ours. I hope the case is closed.

Some criticism of American newspaper correspondents in the USSR can be made: they tend to congregate in Moscow, seldom venturing into the republics, which does not please non-Russian dissidents. Understandably, the correspondents are frightened (zapugannye liudi, as one Moscow dissident characterized them), tend to rely on established, trustworthy channels such as Academician Sakharov, e.g.; "non-established" dissidents would have had cause for envy, except for Sakharov's great tolerance of viewpoints other than his own.
Generally, however, the coverage of human rights violations in the Soviet Union and the subject of human rights in general by the American media has been very uneven. This has been acknowledged by none other than the Chairman of the New York based Helsinki Watch Committee, Mr. Robert L. Bernstein, who is also President of Random House. Said Mr. Bernstein in a statement before the US CSCE that will bear quoting and quoting again:

It constantly surprises me that members of the press, particularly the editors who decide what goes into the newspapers and what prominence each story will receive, have rarely, in the long period since 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed, given major space to conferences and events concerning the very freedoms that enable their own craft to exist.

I have read brilliant statements by prominent Americans presented to this very committee on which there has never been a line of press. It is one of the hopes of Helsinki Watch that we will be able to draw their consistent concern and coverage in this crucial area.108

Mr. Bernstein's stricture against American editors rarely giving major space to human rights conferences was remarkably prophetic. The Third Session of the International Sakharov Hearings took place in the nation's capital, Washington, D.C., September 26-29, 1979, only to be practically ignored by the nation's two most prestigious newspapers, The New York Times and The Washington Post, if one does not count a slim unsigned column in the Sunday New York Times, September 30, and Robert G. Kaiser's good but somewhat condescending feuilleton (a kind of human interest story, i.e., not straight coverage) in the Washington Post of the same date. 109 A perceptive State Department official said that after the trials of Shcharansky, Orlov, Ginzburg and Petkus in 1973 that were widely
written up in the American press, particularly that of Shcharansky who was facing a possible death penalty for treason, the American editors had come to the conclusion that the Soviet dissident movement was finished, broken up, and no sympathetic stories in the American press could put it back together again. So they deliberately ignored the extremely informative International Sakharov Hearings. Thus "history is made": bad history and bad journalism!

But papers are also read by American ethnic groups, including such papers as the New York Times and The Washington Post, and on occasion those groups have protested strongly against what they considered deliberate under-reporting or non-reporting of bona fide newsworthy events. It is to the international role of American ethnic groups that we must turn our attention now.
Chapter 8

ETHNIC GROUPS AS INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

The present study has uncovered a new type of formidable international actor—the ethnic or nationality group with active, highly mobilized elements in several countries acting in concert toward a specific goal. On the domestic scene of every country involved the group attempts to influence public policy to its own advantage. On the international stage, the group also engages in completely independent political-diplomatic activity. In the present case, we look at the three Baltic groups and the Ukrainians with a primary focus on the United States, but with attention also given to Europe.

The groups in question have a tradition of political activism in America going back to the turn of the century, and they have been particularly active during the two World Wars and the events surrounding the Conference on European Security and Cooperation and its resulting Helsinki Final Act. During the 1970s the elements of these groups in the Soviet Union had also become very active in demanding nationality and human rights. The elements of the groups in the West echoed these demands, but the three Baltic groups were also highly active because the Helsinki Final Act had implications for the United States policy on the de jure recognition of the ancestral countries, annexed by the USSR in 1940. The groups in question lobbied in the Congress and in the Executive Branch, were active publishers, attempted to gain access to the media, and sent their own representatives to Helsinki, Geneva and Belgrade, where the relevant issues were pursued diplomatically by the participant states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The ethnic groups appear to have been effective actors in this particular international diplomatic event. Since their views generally were also in congruence with those of the United States the groups were especially successful here, and in view of the congruency cannot be considered subversive. However, the displacement and dispersement of populations after World War II through political flight and labor migration may make ethnic groups increasingly important international actors in general, a new international political force.
Chapter 8

ETHNIC GROUPS AS INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

We are accustomed to viewing international relations in terms of issues and of the primary actors, states. More recently other organizational entities, such as international bodies—whether the United Nations, Amnesty International, or the Trilateral Commission—and multinational corporations have been identified as additional important actors. We know, of course, that ethnic issues have affected international relations for some time—for example, between Japan and the United States at the turn of the century because of the shabby treatment accorded to Japanese immigrants here; in the League of Nations' pressures on East European successor states after World War I; and between the United States and the Soviet Union most recently, due to Jews and emigration, the Baltic issue, human rights violations, etc. But we are not accustomed at all to thinking of ethnic groups as international actors. Fixed in the American collective mind is an image of ethnic groups as people who dance in peasant costumes, cook peculiar foods, and create a political nuisance of themselves by demanding rights.

Yet our research has uncovered something which is quite startling. Namely, ethnic groups are important international actors, at least they have been in regard to the CSCE movement and the impact which the Helsinki Final Act has had on the Soviet nationality issue. Our focus here is on several groups who have their roots in territories which now are part of the USSR. Elements of these groups, through late 19th and early 20th century emigration and World War II-era flight, are currently found in most Western countries, and they are especially heavily concentrated in Sweden,
Great Britain, West Germany, Canada, the United States and Australia. While each of these countries may view its particular Armenian, Estonian or Ukrainian community as a local entity, the groups think of themselves as unitary bodies with scattered parts. These internationally located elements are linked by organizational structures and by common goals in political purpose, even while they all also evidence a degree of internal fragmentation or splintering. During the events which interest us in the present study, these transnational bodies concerted their actions, and were, on the one hand, domestic lobbies in their countries of residence, and, on the other hand, players of roles independent of any country, roles as international actors. Unlike states which create alliances with other states, and corporations which have ties to other corporations, the ethnic groups in question forge alliances with other ethnic groups and thus appreciably multiply their effectiveness.

American analysts have been long cognizant of the leverage which this country's Jewish community has attained in foreign policy relevant to the Middle East. Historians and students of ethnicity in the United States often point out appropriately the role played by the American Irish in Ireland's ability to throw off the English yoke. More recently, the combined "Greek and Armenian lobby" asserted itself on the Turkish arms aid issue. The Eastern European and Soviet emigre communities often bombard Washington with appeals because the foreign language broadcasts of Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty are endangered due to appropriation or budget cuts. Indeed, we are very aware of ethnic groups as national, or domestic lobbies. But we have very little comprehension of them as current international actors. And indeed, this particular phenomenon may become
much more significant in the future because the post-World War II period has been characterized by huge population movements—dispersals of peoples across the globe—because of political dislocation and the new labor migration (both of the "brain drain" and labor—agricultural and industrial—types) to the current industrial countries. And because of this, what goes on in Yugoslavia may become a domestic issue, even a violent one, in Sweden, the Palestinian issue may be fought out in the United States, and things which happen in Lithuania can cause tremors in Australia.

Because this is such a novel issue, our treatment of the subject will be necessarily brief. Nevertheless, it is related to our main theme rather directly because the policies of the Western countries in regard to the CSCE and the Final Act, both in the drafting and implementation stages, were in part influenced by ethnic groups in the West, groups which are elements of a larger body with its ancestral roots in the current territory of the Soviet Union. They also appear to have influenced the media and general informational flow on the Soviet violations of the Helsinki Final Act and in relating the Act's human rights provisions emphatically to the nationality question. In this sense, they helped turn the Soviet human and nationality rights issues into international questions. Our purpose is not to analyze this matter in great detail, but it is rather to identify the role of the ethnic groups as international actors and to assess in some way their effectiveness in the pursuit of their goals. Most of our intrasocietal comments will be based on the United States. Also, our concentration will be on the three Baltic groups and the Ukrainians (we had insufficient material on the Armenian and Georgian diasporas). If we were to add the Jews, who played a very key role throughout the 1970s in focus-
ing world attention on the Soviet domestic scene, and all of the other East European groups, who were all just as active as the Jews, Balts, and Ukrainians on parallel courses, the impact of what we illustrate is multiplied manyfold.

The Ethnics as Organizational Entities

The major nationalities in question migrated to the United States in large numbers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In the Ukrainian and Lithuanian case, they came directly here, while in the Estonian and Latvian case, the migration was often by way of an earlier emigration to inner Russia (which had occurred from the 1850s onward). The first two groups were more typical of the overall "East European pattern"--the migrants were mostly peasants, not untypically illiterate, who settled due to the circumstances in America's major industrial cities, and whose ethnicity was closely related to a church or parish. Contrary to this, the Estonians and Latvians, who had benefitted earlier from modernization, were fully literate, had strong emergent national identities, and were socially mixed. Large numbers settled in rural areas to farm, while many were urban artisans; their communities developed strongly along both secular and religious paths. The abortive Revolution of 1905, which had been especially violent in Estonia and Latvia (and Finland), brought a new wave of immigrants as political refugees, typically activist socialists or even bolsheviks. All of the communities saw a radicalized workers' movement here between 1906-1919, which was a minor strain in the Lithuanian and Ukrainian groups, but a major element in the Estonian and Latvian one.
The post-World War I decades saw the gradual disappearance of the radical element and the emergence of fairly unified ethnic communities. Reenforcement from Europe was minimal during the interwar decades: with political sovereignty achieved, emigration from the Baltic died to a trickle; and whereas emigration from Czarist Russia was at least possible, the new Soviet Union literally locked its borders, thus preventing, among others, the departure of Ukrainians. As it is, with the restrictive quotas implemented in the 1920s, few people from the Baltic or Ukraine could have even entered the United States. A new wave of emigration moved westward as the Soviet armies reentered the Baltic and Ukraine in 1944, essentially a political flight of huge proportions. Tens of thousands of these people came onto the United States under special legislation as "displaced persons." Although there had been some movement to other areas of the world during the earlier period of migration, for example, South America, Australia and Canada, most of it had been to the United States. This was not the case in this second wave. Many people from Estonia had gone directly across the Baltic Sea to Sweden (some 30,000 individuals in 1943-1944); the Latvian and Lithuanian communities in Sweden are very small. The Baltic Germans, around 100,000 people, had resettled from Estonia and Latvia in Germany in 1939-1940. Of the refugees in postwar West Germany, most were resettled in the United States, followed by Canada, Australia, Great Britain and West Germany itself. It is this wave, by scattering people to the four winds, which effectively made the groups into internationally located bodies.

In the United States, each of the four groups had developed an organizational structure from the outset—churches/parishes, schools, newspapers, cultural groups, political groups, credit unions, etc. Also from
the outset, the groups in the United States, alone and jointly, were politically active. For example, in May 1919 the League of Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians and Ukrainians in America held a rally in New York with over 5,000 people. The purpose of this League was to:\(^5\)

- aid the American people and the American government in reaching a better understanding of the political, economic and social conditions in Eastern Europe;
- to induce the United States Government and the Allies to recognize the sovereignty of \textit{these new} countries;
- to aid the four \textit{newly proclaimed} republics from aggression and invasion....

A joint Baltic-American Society was established in New York already in 1922 by the "American Friends of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia."\(^6\) In the preceding year Baltic delegations called on President Harding to argue the case for American recognition of the newly proclaimed countries. On 28 July 1922 the United States accorded \textit{de jure} recognition; the size of the Lithuanian vote in Chicago may have played an important role in exerting political leverage toward this decision. Actually, some European states had already accorded \textit{de facto} and \textit{de jure} recognition to the Baltic countries, and the Soviet Union had also done this through separate peace treaties. Ironically, with the Peace Treaty of Tartu (1920), in which the new Soviet Russia renounced forever its claim to Estonia, Estonia became the first country to recognize \textit{de jure} the new Russia (later renamed the Soviet Union). Ukraine, although it also had proclaimed independence, had been factually retaken very early by Soviet troops, and its efforts in the West did not lead to recognition. In general, it might be appropriate to note that the Eastern European successor states were not the creations of Western powers, as the Soviets have come to argue. The new sovereignty was domestically won, and
The fact of Western recognition reflects in part intensive lobbying at the Paris Conference and in the key Western countries. The Western great powers were, in fact, against "the dismemberment" of Imperial Russia. When even intervention could not topple the new Soviet Russia, the West begrudgingly accepted the sovereignty of the successor states. But they did this not because of the application of the principle of the inherent right of people to self-determination, but to create a cordon sanitaire, to keep Russia's revolutionary Communism out of Western Europe.

In any case, then, the history of politically motivated ethnic activism, and of domestic leverage, in the United States among these four groups goes back two-thirds of a century. The same play was acted out during World War II, but with greater energy and fury. The problems of refugees and destitution in the war-torn homelands were cause enough to establish group-based aid organizations. In addition, the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940, followed by outright annexation, brought the whole issue of recognition of sovereignty onto center stage in the United States, both because it was a strict diplomatic issue and because the Baltic communities here insisted on shaping the nature of the American decision on that issue. The displacement of Soviet by German rule in the Baltic as well as in Ukraine raised anew hopes of sovereignty. But the Western allies were not willing to support such claims with military force even after the Germans retreated again, and thus the dream remained unfulfilled. Soviet authority was reasserted.

The outcome of the war provided many causes for mobilizing all four communities here. In the Baltic case, the de jure recognition issue once more came up; it was and has remained favorably resolved from the
Baltic groups' viewpoint—the United States still does not acknowledge the
Soviet annexation of 1940 de jure, and prewar Baltic diplomatic missions
still exist here, albeit without governments to represent. Then there were
the problems of the refugees. The horror of forced repatriation was real,
and the ethnic communities here helped to prevent its full execution and
finally to do away with this heinous policy. They also worked to enact
the legislation allowing refugees to settle in the United States, and did
almost all of the factual sponsorship work necessary to bring them here.
The Baltic problem and the status of refugees were discussed at all of the
known major meetings between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. Thus, just as
there is a history of ethnic activism among the groups in question, there is
also a history of some of the issues related to the Soviet nationality ques-
tion being matters of concern in international relations, in diplomacy.

The organizational structure of the communities in America was
stronger by World War II for internal as well as external reasons. First,
the earlier immigrants had achieved slightly higher socioeconomic status, and
some of the major internal squabbles (between leftist radicals and everyone
else) had significantly receded in the 1930s. Also, people in increasing
numbers had become citizens and would therefore influence policy by voting,
and general lobbying sophistication had slowly advanced. Second, the trickle
of immigrants in the 1920s and 1930s brought individuals with stronger per-
sonal nationality-based identities, even from Ukraine (many Ukrainians were
under Polish rule then), giving a firmer dimension of modernized ethnicity
and political nationalism to the communities. Third, for the three Baltic
groups there was a stronger relationship to the ancestral homeland than be-
fore. Not only were the countries now sovereign, but organizations were
founded there to create a sense of world community in the diaspora. These organizations did have extensive contact with the communities here. And fourth, the United States now had Baltic diplomatic missions, which also had close ties to the communities here and which became in their own right important active fighters because of the Soviet takeover of the Baltic in 1940.

The organizational structure advanced appreciably after World War II. Importantly, the displaced persons were not peasants but largely "middle class" individuals, well educated. They were also political activists to the extent that the quintessential component in their sense of what ethnicity means was political. They were people who had a conscious goal of freeing the countries from which they were displaced, and were willing to devote an incredible energy to this. The consequences of this new immigration were several. First, the group provided a new, fresh leadership to the older immigrant community. They were well educated, had a contemporary sense of their own ethnic culture, and were very successful individually in American society. Second, a whole host of new organizations were founded. Some were intended simply to sustain the group here, others specifically to wage a political struggle, here and abroad. Third, the group "politicized" ethnicity itself, and since the new immigrants were more modernized and socioeconomically better situated than most of the older immigrants, this caused new intracommunity frictions. It is not fully correct to speak of politically unified ethnic communities in any of the four groups. Instead, it is accurate to say that there is a sense of unity in terms of belonging to the same ethnic group—a shared sense of peoplehood—but ethnic community participation and political action takes place on different sets of tracks, which more or less are parallel toward the same goal, but which at times
also criss-cross at unexpected points, leading to serious squabbles and strains. Actually, it would be fairest to say that the ethnics in this sense are normal—they are like the rest of the society, the country at large.

**Toward and Beyond the Helsinki Final Act**

(1) **The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Communities**

The postwar period saw a very crucial organizational development for the present analysis. Namely, the population dispersal in resettlement led to organizations emerging in all countries thus affected, but in addition, across country borders.\(^8\) There were several reasons for this. It must be recalled that some such interaction existed already before the war. In the Baltic case, many prewar homeland organizations were reestablished as a matter of course in all societal sectors, already in refugee camps. In other sectors, new organizations grew up in the refugee half-decade of 1945-1950. When people were dispersed in resettlement, the organizational elements went along. New national and international parent coordinating bodies ensued for the scattered elements. Some of the trends were purely functional: schools, youth groups, veterans, choirs, and congregations in many localities were located in many places, and parent bodies were simply a natural coordinational outcome. A personal base for transnational ties also exists because families, kin groups and friendship circles were scattered globally because of the peculiarities and differences in policies affecting resettlement. But foremost, in the political sector, new organizations were founded to pursue the supreme political goal; the ethnic groups are international in structure not only on the basis of a communality in ancestry but on the basis of sharing a common political purpose. Some of
the new organizations have roots in the homeland. For example, the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, now in the United States, dates to the war years in Lithuania, where it was a consolidated resistance group fighting the German Nazi occupation and then the Soviet Communist one. Elements of the Estonian organizational structure in Sweden also reflect this type of origin. Other groups were created for the first time abroad; an example would be the Estonian World Council, located in New York City. Each of the four groups have several such organizations. Estonian organizations in Sweden and those in the United States have competed for dominance in leading the exile struggle. The four Baltic groups further have local domestic, and international coordinating central bodies.

The Cold War also helped to establish some political organizations, especially in the United States. For example, the 1950s saw the creation of the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN) and the Committees for a Free Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and so on. However, these organizations by the late 1960s had lost much of their significance as the detente of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger became the new keyword. Nevertheless, the "captive nations' movement" was important in forging some political cooperation between various emigre groups, which otherwise has not been all that pronounced. Importantly, almost all of the organizations which will interest us are in fact products of group-based initiatives, not creations of the Cold War or the American government.

If the 1950s were a decade in which the new refugees consolidated their own communities, the 1960s were a period when, in the case of the Baltic groups, alliances were forged, both for domestic and foreign actions. Thus, 1961 had seen the establishment of the Joint Baltic American Committee,
which came to be headquartered in Washington and serves as a central lobby for the three groups with the Federal government. The same year had seen another joint movement emerge on the West Coast, on Lithuanian initiative—Americans for Congressional Action to Free the Baltic States. This group was particularly effective in the 1960s in getting the United States Congress in 1966 to adopt a resolution directed to the Department of State. In essence the resolution stated that it was Congress' sense that the United States should not recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, and should raise the issue of Soviet withdrawal in the United Nations (which has not occurred). The year 1965 marked the 25th anniversary of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, and the Baltic communities, on the initiative of Lithuanians, organized a Baltic Freedom Rally in Madison Square Garden in New York on 12 November. The approximately 15,000 participants marched through the streets afterward to the United Nations. It was a major political demonstration in the city (the American anti-war movement had not yet emerged). It was also the largest such rally in Baltic-American history. Out of this grew the action group known as BATUN/UBA (Baltic Appeal to the United Nations/Baltic United Appeal). Since 1966 BATUN/UBA has conducted a quiet but persistent campaign at the United Nations, visiting delegations, preparing topical media and information kits; it also has organized demonstrations and vigils.

On 18 November 1972, as the CSCE issue was again coming concretely into the limelight, the Estonian World Council, the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, and the World Federation of Free Latvians, all headquartered in the United States, joined forces, issuing a declaration which led to the formation of the Baltic World Council. Its primary aim was
to coordinate global activities with the purpose of freeing Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from Soviet rule and domination. Parallel developments had taken place in Sweden, and actually somewhat earlier, because the refugee community was reintegrated into normal life more quickly than elsewhere. In the United States, the Lithuanians often played the major role in joint endeavors, although the actual leadership posts were rotated. This is understandable since the Lithuanians are the largest group numerically. In Sweden, the initiative and leadership posts have been more clearly in the hands of the Estonians; there are few Latvians or Lithuanians there. In Sweden it also appears that more Swedes have been politically activated to the Baltic cause than is the case with non-Balts in the United States.

During the 1960s the Baltic groups also become more active in American politics. Only in Chicago were the Balts numerically large enough to constitute an important voting bloc, and here we are talking actually of the prewar Lithuanian community. Through this group, the Balts have had leverage in the Democratic Party. But most among the displaced persons were sympathetic to the Republican Party, where by 1968 they had managed to gain important posts in the Party's ethnic structure. As a result, quite a few group-based Republican committees were set up around the country, primarily in the key industrial states, where the Balts disproportionately reside. This manner—the bureaucratic path—of participating in politics allowed good contacts to be made with the Party leadership at the national level, and at the state level, as opposed to the local. Since Balts have been almost exclusively interested in foreign policy as opposed to domestic policy issues, this proved rather effective.

The Balts also in the 1960s began to address informational issues.
The American press and media up to this point were not particularly interested either in American or Soviet ethnic issues. The Baltic complaint has been somewhat substantiated recently by Robert L. Bernstein, Chairman of the New York-based American Helsinki Watch Committee. In recent testimony to Congress, he stated:

On the other hand, it constantly surprises me that members of the press, particularly the editors, who decide what goes into the newspapers and what prominence each story will receive, have rarely, in the long period since 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed, given major space to conferences and events concerning the very freedoms that enable their own craft to exist. I have read brilliant statements by prominent Americans presented to this very committee on which there has never been a line of press. It is one of the hopes of Helsinki Watch that we will be able to draw their consistent concern and coverage in this crucial area.

Indeed, the International Sakharov Hearings in their first round in 1975 in Copenhagen found great coverage in the European press, but at the third in 1979 in Washington, the American press hardly mentioned it at all. In relation to this issue, the following incidence is relevant. In October 1970, in connection with the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, BATUN/UBA organized a huge rally demanding freedom for the Baltic states in front of UN headquarters in New York.

It was deplored that The New York Times could not spare a reporter to cover a rally of this size, yet give disproportionate space to smaller radical demonstrations. [The Baltic Youth for Freedom group] decided to do something about this and organized a sit-in at the entrance of the TIMES offices blocking the movement from and to the building... A condition for withdrawing their forces was an agreement reached with the management of The Times to meet with the representatives of the Balts. ... The meeting resulted in a promise...
that in the future newsworthy Baltic items would be published.

It also happened that the newly forged liaison with the New York Times came in handy three weeks later when we learned about the Simas Kudirka tragedy. American newspapers had passed it up with 3-5 line notices somewhere in the back pages. After the New York Times published the story on its front page, it suddenly became NEWS all over the world.

But most informational work was of a different nature—letters to elected representatives, letters to editors, information kits, memorandums, pamphlets, visits to UN delegations, to Congressmen, to the White House, to bureaucrats, etc. Also, information forums were organized both to coordinate Baltic activities and to address informational needs. Nevertheless, the response of the American media was not too noticeable in the 1960s; if we look at the subject indexes of the 1970s for the New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, and other leading newspapers, the situation improved vastly in those years. This was not of Baltic doing. Rather, as noted, events in the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, the Lithuanian rioting and the Jewish emigration issue, were magnets for media attention, and the human rights issues played the same role after 1975.

Related to this, American journalists until the end of the 1960s could not readily visit the Soviet Baltic; this changed in the 1970s. Lastly, 1968 had seen the founding of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies in the United States. This interdisciplinary organization, through conferences and publications, has vastly added to our knowledge of the contemporary Baltic by stimulating and disseminating research. The overwhelming majority of scholarly work in the United States concerning the Baltic is done by scholars of Baltic ancestry and dates to the 1970s.
Thus, as we enter the early 1970s, when the CSCE issue takes on real possibilities, we find in the West a very extensively and well organized Baltic community both in the major countries of settlement and internationally. It was highly mobilized politically, and reasonably well prepared for the events which followed. The community's consciousness had already been raised toward the end of the 1960s because the 50th anniversaries of the Baltic had been commemorated then. The Simas Kudirka affair and the Lithuanian rioting, of 1970-1972, had a significant impact on political mobilization, foremost among Lithuanians. The publication of the 1970 Soviet census also demonstrated to Estonians and Latvians how difficult their groups' position was in the ancestral homeland. As it is, the early 1970s suddenly indicated that there was an active and organized national resistance in all three Baltic republics. It was time to rally to arms, and then came the CSCE in concrete form. We will look here at only the major types of actions; a thorough investigation of the myriad efforts in local communities, and the full breadth of the actions on the national and international levels would require several large separate studies.

Although the communities were monitoring the CSCE issue, no action was deemed necessary until early 1972, when it was clear that at least some preliminary meeting would occur in Helsinki. By late 1972 it was agenda item number one in terms of political priorities. The CSCE was also the subject of the first session at the Second Baltic Information Conference of North America on 15-16 April 1972. The concrete knowledge that things were in motion toward the CSCE had become apparent to the Baltic leadership at a Department of State 28 January 1972 public briefing, where the then Secretary of State William Rogers personally
spoke. The Baltic community swung into action. However, it is important to emphasize that at this phase of developments, human rights were not an issue. The focus was entirely on the *de jure* status of the Baltic states. This is evident from the written documents which the resulting activism generated, and the initial proposals on which the actions taken were based.

This was not, of course, surprising. As noted earlier in this work, the human rights issue in general enters the CSCE deliberations fairly late. The Balts were more concerned with what the CSCE would imply politically for them, than what a Final Act, the content of which no one could then foresee accurately, might be tactically used for. It should be noted that Baltic activists in the West had raised the issue of human rights in the Soviet Baltic already at the Paris Conference in 1946 and at the United Nations in 1950. But at this time the effort was political. What the practical consequences of an American *de jure* recognition to the Soviet annexation would be is problematical. But it would clearly have been a symbolic blow to the Balts, and it would have meant the closing of the old diplomatic missions here, followed probably by similar steps in other Western countries. Indeed, it appears that Kissinger was advocating such a move before Helsinki. The political goal was agreed upon by the competing central organizations headquartered in New York and Stockholm. Nevertheless, attempts at achieving a united front in activity between the two centers did not succeed even with this important issue. The struggles were waged in parallel.

Activities were many-faceted. The Joint Baltic American Committee initiated intensive contacts with American political figures and the Department of State. Individuals and groups around the country
began to bombard their representatives with letters, telegrams and visits. Parallel actions occurred in the other countries. Various organizations began to prepare memoranda for the parliamentary bodies, Governments and CSCE delegations on this topic: for example, the Estonian Government in Exile, the Baltic diplomatic missions, and the central national and international organizations. BATUN/UBA began collecting appropriate materials and intensified its UN-delegation visits in New York.

Undoubtedly, the boldest move was in July 1973, with Baltic delegations sent directly from Stockholm and New York to Helsinki. The New York group represented the Baltic World Council and consisted of nine people: the President of the Council (US citizen), the President of the World Federation of Free Latvians (US citizen), President of the Estonian-American National Council (US citizen), a representative of the Estonian Central Council in Canada (Canadian citizen), the President of the Latvian European Community (a British citizen), a representative of the Latvian Council in Sweden (a Swedish citizen), a second representative of the Baltic World Council (US citizen), and representatives of the Lithuanian Community of the USA and the Lithuanian-American Council (both US citizens). The mission of the group was: "to present the Baltic case to the diplomats and journalists attending the [CSCE]." The group visited most of the diplomatic missions at this initial phase of the CSCE and passed out special information and press kits, including to over 400 journalists gathered in Helsinki. The chairman of the Latvian contingent, Uldis Grava, of the United States, was invited to, and attended a press reception at the East German legation.
In his discourse there with the British Foreign Minister, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was nearby, and Grava raised the Baltic issue directly with Gromyko. As a result of this confrontation, the Soviet delegation reportedly sent a stern memorandum to the Finnish government on the emigre Balts, and on 5 July 1973 the group was arrested and held incommunicado. Fortunately, the arrest did not take place all at once, and one member arrested early was able to communicate in Lithuanian to another unarrested one, and this immediately allowed the word to get back to the United States. Here a small storm brewed up in Congress, and American Balts inundated the Department of State with inquiries. Thanks to this action, Secretary of State Rogers, then also in Helsinki, interceded and the Balts were freed quite soon, but forbidden by Finnish authorities to engage in any more activities in Finland, and in essence they were expelled from Finland. Not only had they accomplished their informational and lobbying mission, but their scandalous arrest and "expulsion" from the CSCE deliberations gained them and the Baltic cause extensive publicity in both the European and American press. It probably also forced the Department of State to become more extensively involved in Baltic affairs at the time than it appears to have really wanted.

Between 1973 and the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki in August 1975, the CSCE proceedings moved to Geneva, where the actual content of the accords was hammered out. The Baltic community worldwide remained active. Memoranda and visits to participating governments from the West remained intensive, as did the lobbying efforts with parliamentary bodies, at every possible international forum, and
the attempt to attract media attention. It helped, of course, that the
Baltic people in the USSR were also active, and were themselves attrac-
ting direct attention from the West. The Jewish emigration issue and
the repression against the Moscow human rightists were also drawing
Western media attention to the Soviet Union, especially to the nationality
issue. The Joint Baltic American Committee in March 1974 met in Washing-
ton with the chief American negotiator at the CSCE. At the end of May
1974 the Committee's leaders met with then Vice President Gerald Ford,
talking about the CSCE as well as two related issues - the plight of
Simas Kudirka and the need for Baltic language broadcasts by Radio Li-
berty. The Balts found Ford basically sympathetic; and indeed, when
he ascended to the presidency with Nixon's resignation, Ford intervened
on Kudirka's behalf directly with Brezhnev. Ford's role was also
important in the creation of Radio Liberty broadcasts in all three Baltic
languages, which began on 18 September 1975. It was crucial, direct
feedback channel to the Baltic on Western actions and concerns.

The Balts also again moved directly into the international
stage. At the United Nations in New York, BATUN in its annual series
of visits to the delegations there featured CSCE issues, and began to
pick up the themes of the future Final Act's Third Basket as they began
to emerge. BATUN's prisoners of conscience program had led to the
creation of some dozen groups to plead the cause of Balts in Soviet
prison camps and to funnel assistance to them. BATUN also carried out
several public demonstrations in New York. The Joint Baltic American
Committee meanwhile sent a representative, Gerhard Buschmann, an Es-
tonian, directly to Geneva, where as an accredited reporter he was able
to gather valuable information on the deliberations in September 1974. Other Baltic observers were also in Geneva, both from North America and Europe, including from Sweden. Later in 1975 the Stockholm group reported that the chief West German negotiator at Geneva, Guido Brunner, stated in private conversation that at the Geneva phase of the CSCE, the Balts were the best organized and most effective of the many activist groups there.

In the United States, a major struggle ensued over the de jure recognition issue because of Henry Kissinger's position on this. On 27 February 1975 leaders of the Baltic communities succeeded in meeting with President Ford, thanks to the intermediation of Congressman Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois. Derwinski had already become the Balts' best friend in Congress, and in November 1971 had directly raised the Baltic issue in the UN General Assembly while a US delegate to its 26th session. Kissinger's National Security Council was reported as objections to this meeting and wanted Ford to talk only about domestic issues with the Baltic delegation. Kissinger's staff lost to Ford's, and the Balts presented their CSCE case once again forcefully and directly to Ford. A scandal resulted when because of apparent National Security Council intervention, the Voice of America was censored and forbidden to broadcast news of this meeting to the Soviet Union. This move caused further suspicion among the Balts that in spite of the President's assurances, the United States was in fact moving toward de jure recognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states. The Baltic-American communities had at this time also launched a massive Congressional campaign, and the CSCE hearings on this were replete with instances of the
Baltic issue being raised. 40

On 7-8 June 1978 a Baltic Forum was held at Upsala College in New Jersey, where the final strategy and tactics of the American Baltic communities were agreed upon. 41 A final memorandum by the Joint Baltic American Committee was sent to the President and a meeting took place with his special counsellor, John Marsh Jr. On 25 July 1975, just before leaving for Helsinki to sign the Final Act, President Ford met with American ethnic leaders. There he was explicit that the United States would not change its policies on the Baltic states. 42 However, at a press conference at Andrews Air Force Base at enplaning, the Baltic issue was dropped from Ford’s statement, and this had the Balts concerned about duplicity. The White House was immediately hit with over 2,000 telegrams. A full-page ad appeared in the Washington Post on 31 July. BATUN had already organized a vigil in front of the UN headquarters in New York to protest the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and a week-long vigil was organized in front of the White House as well. 43

When Ford returned from Helsinki, both he and the Department of State stated publicly that the American position had not shifted in regard to the Baltic issue, and indeed it had not, as discussed at the end of Chapter 4. The Baltic diplomatic missions still exist in the United States, and the continuance of this policy has been reaffirmed by President Jimmy Carter. On 2 December 1975 by a unanimous vote the House of Representatives passed Resolution no. 864, in which it reaffirmed its own longstanding position on the Baltic states, and the Senate followed on 5 May 1976 with its own resolution on the same topic. 44
On 15 February 1979 the Congress passed Concurrent Resolution no. 49 introduced by the House of Representatives, which again specifically states that it is the sense of Congress that the United States not recognize the illegal annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the Soviet Union. 45

Thus, nothing had changed. Within a very short period of time it had become evident that the human rights principle in Basket One and the human contacts provisions in Basket Three were matters of unprecedented international concern and media attention, with the primary focus on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Baltic groups swung immediately into action in publicizing human rights violations in the Soviet Baltic. One primary task was information flow to the media, and to public and governmental figures world-wide concerned with these matters. The three Baltic communities separately and jointly began gathering information, translating documents from the Baltic, which in the second half of the 1970s became proliferous, and in circulating them. 46 The human rights issues were now forcefully pressed at the United Nations not only by BATUN, but in part by the Estonian Democratic Union (EDU), based in Stockholm, but with elements abroad. 47 BATUN's 10th annual meeting in mid-1976 indicated that the human rights sector had become its major priority in activities. 48 In addition to its work at the United Nations in New York, BATUN sent delegates in February 1976 directly to Geneva to the 32nd session of the UN's Commission on Human Rights, with materials on violations in the Baltic. 49 This was repeated in 1977 and 1979, and the press kits passed out by the BATUN
representatives in Geneva were used by Reuters and other wire services in their coverage of the UN Commission's deliberations. In 1976 the chief United States representative at the United Nations, William W. Scranton, his deputy, W. Tapley Bennett Jr., and a Department of State delegate, Sidney Sober, all raised the Baltic issue in the context of human rights directly at the UN General Assembly.

On the American domestic scene, Balts also remained active. One channel was to feed relevant materials to Senators and Representatives in Congress, to the President and the bureaucracy, and to testify before Congressional Committees on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. On the initiative of Lithuanian youth, a Baltic Freedom Rally was organized in Washington DC in September 1977, with preparations headquartered in Detroit. The event among other things illustrated how much influence the decade of intensive lobbying had gained in Congress. The actual rally at the Lincoln Memorial had been preceded on 22 September by a reception sponsored by Congressmen in the Rayburn House Office Building. And although only about 2,000 to 4,000 attended the rally, the speakers included four senators and eight Congressmen. In addition, Andrei Amalrik and Pavel Litvinov were featured as speakers.

And then there was Belgrade. At the first follow-up to the Helsinki Final Act, dominated by the human rights issue, the Balts had many friends. Not only was the chief US delegate, Arthur Goldberg, basically sympathetic, but Congressional representatives there, such as Senator Robert Dole, spoke out forcefully specifically on the human rights issue in the Baltic. The Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Canadian
and other Western delegations all spoke about human rights problems and issues as well. The Balts again sent their own delegations to Belgrade, both from North America and Europe. The Balts' lobbying led already on 5 October 1977 to the expulsion of two activists, one from the United States and the other from Sweden, and just like in Helsinki two years earlier, this forced the American delegation to become involved in Baltic matters and gained extensive media coverage. A replacement Baltic delegation was sent to Belgrade, and their press kits and lobbying were picked up by Reuters and other wire service dispatches from there. On top of this, the Baltic global organizations, the Estonian government in exile, and so on, were again dispatching numerous memoranda and documents to the governments of states participating at the CSCE follow-up deliberations in Belgrade.

Actions based from Sweden also merit attention, especially because of its status as a neutral country, and the role of the European neutrals in regard to the CSCE, as identified in Chapter 4. In many respects the events parallel those in the United States. A major difference is that while the New York and American based groups were targeted foremost to the global scene per se, the Swedish group played the main role specifically in Europe, in addition to its parallel global role. In addition in Sweden most of the key Baltic (mostly Estonian, a smaller contingent of Latvian) action organizations are older than in North America, dating to the 1940s: the Estonian National Council and the Latvian National Council both to 1947, the Baltic Humanitarian Association to 1944, etc. Lastly, many of the related action groups in Sweden went well beyond a Baltic membership but had Baltic roots:
for example, the Swedish Freedom Council and the East European Solidarity Committee. During thirty years, 1944-1977, the Estonian National Council had sent out some 1,500,000 copies of published material on Estonia and the Baltic. During the 1975 Helsinki phase of the CSCE, the Baltic Committee in Sweden distributed some 25,000 copies of materials and memoranda in eight languages.

The Balts in Sweden, especially the Estonians, also have excellent relations with all Swedish political parties. Unlike in America, the Estonians in Sweden have successfully invited major party leaders to deliver keynote speeches at the annual assemblies commemorating Estonia's declaration of independence in 1918, and at other events. Prime Minister Olof Palme personally delivered the opening remarks at the Third Conference on Baltic Studies in Scandinavia, in Stockholm in June 1975, and the 5th Conference in June 1979 was opened by a Cabinet Minister, Gabriel Romanus. In 1976 the leader of the centrist Folk-party spoke at the commemoration of independence; the new Liberals' Prime Minister Ola Ullsten spoke in person in 1978; in 1979 the conservatives' leader Gösta Bohman appeared; and in 1980 the socialists' leader Olof Palme. In general, Swedish parties have been sympathetic to Baltic problems as a result of the excellent contacts, both in and out of Parliament. Lastly, Anders Larsson, a young Swede active in the Baltic Committee, the Youth Freedom League, the Swedish section of the World Anti-Communist League, etc., evidences the ability of the Balts to attract non-Balts to their cause and to build alliances in the general population.

Within Sweden, the Balts and their allies have organized and
participated in numerous public rallies, much more so than in the United States. In the summer of 1979 the Latvians in the Western world held a major song festival in Sweden, in Visby on the island of Gotland, a very short distance across the Baltic Sea from their ancestral homeland. It irritated the Soviets so much that they had attempted to pressure Sweden into cancelling the event, and attacked it in Izvestia. In 1980 the Estonians in the West are holding their Third World Festival in Stockholm. The Balts in Sweden have also been closely associated with the exposure of general Soviet human rights violations. They actively participated in the first International Sakharov Hearing in Copenhagen in 1975, and were instrumental in the first public observation of United Nations International Human Rights Day in Stockholm. The 1977 press conference of recently exiled Soviet dissidents Andrei Amalrik and Yevgenii Vagin took place in the rooms of the Stockholm Estonian Society, with an Estonian translator. The Soviet arms expert Igor Glagolev who defected recently held a press conference in the rooms of the Baltic Committee in Sweden, as did Yuri Orlov's British lawyer, John McDonald, both in 1978.

On the international scene, during the second half of the 1970s the Swedish Balts took their cause to a host of forums: for example, the World Federation of Liberal and Radical Youth meeting in Luxembourg in 1975; The European Agricultural Congress in 1976; to the meetings of the Lutheran World Federation and the World Council of Churches; the World Anti-Communist League's meetings from South Korea to South America to Washington DC; to the Liberal International meeting in Brussels in 1976; the European Council in Strasbourg in 1977; to the Socialist In-
ternational Congress in Vancouver in 1978; the European Conference in Lucerne in 1978; the European Council for Freedom and Human Rights in Copenhagen in 1979, etc. The East European Solidarity Committee in Göteborg evoked a direct response from US Senator Edward Kennedy, and letters from Sweden were sent directly to President Jimmy Carter in response to an appeal from BATUN. Such activity was evident elsewhere in Europe as well. The Baltic Society in West Germany organized conferences and gained publicity there on the Baltic states, various European publications picked up the Baltic information, and an Amnesty International Norwegian branch took an Estonian dissident under its wing. A Swiss, Joseph Ehret, wrote a pamphlet on the Baltic, which was translated by the Lithuanian American Council in 1974 and distributed in the English-speaking world.

Estonian and Baltic dissidents in the USSR, in the second half of the 1970s, also appealed with memoranda directly to the states participating in CSCE and even to the White House. August 1977 saw the creation in the Soviet Baltic of a Supreme Committee of the National Movement of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, an umbrella organization for several separate national organizations. Thus, the post-Helsinki 1970s saw a closure among Baltic activists in the ancestral homelands as well. In August 1979 Sakharov and the Moscow Helsinki Watch Committee helped 45 Balts present a memorandum directly to Western journalists in Moscow. The document was signed on the 40th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939, and was addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the governments of the two Germanies and the USSR, and all signatory states to the Atlantic
Charter. It called for the cancellation of this pact, which had placed the Baltic states in the Soviet sphere of influence, and thereby to demand the restoration of Baltic sovereignty. At the end of the 1970s we thus see a unity of the Balts in the West and in the ancestral homelands in regard to the issue of a political goal, and a mutual concern about human rights violations affecting the groups' main bodies, inside the Soviet Union.

2. The Ukrainian Community

The Ukrainian-American and the Ukrainian-Canadian community have considerably contributed toward the support of the Soviet Ukrainian dissidents including the members of the Helsinki Group by publicizing their plight in their legislatures, making representations to their governments, trying to catch the media's attention. This brief sketch will be primarily devoted to the Ukrainian-American community, but a few remarks on the distribution of Ukrainians in the Western world are in order.

The majority of Ukrainians in the West reside in the US; publications of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (henceforth: UCCA) have consistently claimed over two million American citizens of Ukrainian ancestry. It would be interesting to see what figure for Ukrainians the 1980 census comes up with—our guess is that it will be lower, due to assimilation. The absolute number of Ukrainians in Canada is smaller,
approximately 700,000 in 1967. But in Canada they make up the fourth largest nationality, after the Anglo-Saxon, French and German groups. Furthermore the relative political position of Ukrainian-Canadians is better than that of the more numerous Ukrainian-Americans. In Canada the Ukrainians are strategically settled in three prairie provinces: Alberta (now, the Canadian Texas), Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. The Ukrainian community in Canada had an especially good rapport with the former Conservative Prime Minister, the late John G. Diefenbaker. In the years 1892-1967, Canadian Americans have held provincial (63 provincial members) and federal elected offices (13 federal members and 3 senators), have produced one federal minister. Ukrainian Americans still have to produce their first Representative in Congress.

An estimated 125,000-150,000 Ukrainians live in Argentina, some 120,000 in Brazil. A smaller number lives in West Germany (about 25,000): at one time Germany had been the hub of the post-World War II emigrants' activities (342,800 Ukrainians at the end of 1946). An equal number live now in Great Britain (25,000-30,000), a somewhat larger one in France (35,000). A similar number live in Australia (37,000). There are relatively few Ukrainians in Austria, Belgium, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela; even fewer in Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, and Mexico.

May 24, 1940, more than one thousand delegates representing over 2,500 Ukrainian-American organizations met in Washington, D.C., for their first Congress and established the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA). One of the speakers was Representative Boland, of Pennsylvania,
Democratic whip of the House. In the same year, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) was set up.

The resolutions of the UCCA founding Congress of May 24, 1940, showed the concern of the Ukrainian-Americans for the country of their ancestors. They read in part:

Once more do we state before America and the whole world that the Ukraine wants to, can and shall, be an independent state and that recognition of her right to self-determination is in the interest of her population and in the interest of peace in Europe.

The Congress of American Ukrainians is conscious of that an independent Ukrainian State can only be the work of the Ukrainian People's own forces in its native land. It is turning to the Government and People of the United States and to all Peoples, with the appeal to recognize and support the historic right of the Ukraine to [lead a] free life in her own democratic republic in peaceful coexistence with her neighbors.

First President of the UCCA was Nicholas Murashko (1940-1944), its second President was Stephen Shumeyko (1944-49). Third President in November 1949 became native-born Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, a very energetic and most articulate conservative economist who had taught at New York University and then at Georgetown University. He has been re-elected UCCA President ever since.

In November 1967 the World Congress of free Ukrainians was set up, as a kind of "intercontinental umbrella" for the various national Ukrainian organizations. It appears that the real reason for the World Congress was an attempt to tighten the cooperation between the two strongest branches: the Ukrainian-Americans and the Ukrainian-Canadians. After
the 3rd World Congress of Free Ukrainians in November 1978, the Presidency passed for the first two years to Mr. Mykola Plawiuk, of Canada.

The Ukrainian-American Community has had a number of successes, such as President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Proclamation 3303 on the celebration of the first Captive Nation's Week (in accordance with a joint Congressional resolution such Captive Nations Weeks have been proclaimed by successive Presidents to date in July of each year), and US Public Law 86-749, also signed by the late President Eisenhower September 13, 1960, authorizing the American Ukrainians to erect a statue in Washington, D.C., to the greatest Ukrainian poet and national prophet Taras Shevchenko, at Ukrainian expense. (The latter campaign is interesting in that it succeeded against strong editorial opposition of the Washington Post thanks, among others, to the liberal Republican Senator Jacob K. Javits, of New York, who later in 1979 became a member of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe [US CSCE]. Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower unveiled the statue and gave the major address at the ceremony on a very hot June 27, 1964.) The UCCA has also been partly successful in soliciting the help of the US Government in releasing several Soviet Ukrainian political prisoners, notably that of Valentyn Moroz, April 27, 1979. The yeoman's work was, of course, done by community organizations working in the framework of the UCCA such as the Committee for the Defense of Valentyn Moroz in Philadelphia, Pa., under Mrs. Uliana Mazurkevich. Even more important than those concrete individual successes is the fact that under the leadership of Professor
Dobriansky the UCCA established a good working relationship with prominent members of Congress. For instance, in the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the UCCA in 1960, the following Senators and Congressmen sent greetings, among others: both US Senators from Maryland (J. Glenn Beal and John Marshall Butler), Senator Clifford P. Case, of New Jersey, who had joined in sponsoring the Captive Nations Week Resolution and who later in 1975-6 helped to establish the US CSCE; Senator Jacob K. Javits, of New York. Among the US Representatives who sent greetings were, in alphabetical order: The Hon. Carl Albert, of Oklahoma, who later became Speaker of the House; The Hon. Dante B. Fascell, later to become Chairman of the US CSCE; The Hon. John V. Lindsay, of New York City; The Hon. Harris B. McDowell, Jr., of Delaware, and The Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, of Wisconsin, the present (1980) Chairman of the House International Relations Committee.87

But while the Ukrainian-American community was doing well in Congress (e.g., every January 22 chaplains would start the day in both House and Senate by praying for the independence of the Ukraine on Ukrainian Independence Day), critics would point out that many of the achievements were symbolic and that Ukrainians could not make any headway with successive Presidents and Secretaries of State on the issue of concrete American diplomatic support for Ukrainian independence. Symbols would, of course, become a political reality in the long run, but for the present the Ukrainian-Americans were not doing well in influencing US foreign policy. A friendly critic, Dr. James H. Tashjian, a leader of the Armenian community and editor of the *Armenian Review*, e.g., cites the following
extract from a speech delivered before the 8th UCCA Congress, October 12, 1962, by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, the Hon. Carl T. Rowan:

The attitude of the United States Government toward the aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet Union which sometimes has been termed a policy of 'non-predetermination,' is in fact a corollary of our fundamental policy favoring the right of self-determination. . . What this policy is that, while continuing to affirm our sympathy and support for the just aspirations of the many peoples of the Soviet Union, the United States Government does not presume here and now to define these aspirations as they exist, or may develop, or to prejudge the political arrangements which might be preferred by these peoples if they were free to choose them, tomorrow, or ten years hence.

From our interviews in the Department of State in 1979 we have become convinced that this policy has not changed to date (February 1980).

What has been the attitude of the UCCA and the Ukrainian-American community toward human rights, nationality rights in general and the Helsinki Final Act in particular? There are no formal policy statements on these issues by the UCCA, as a matter of fact, the Helsinki Conference is not even mentioned in the resolutions of the 12th Congress of Ukrainians in U.S.A. of October 1976, nor was it contained in Dr. Dobriansky's Quadrennial Report to the 12th Congress. Evidently the organized Ukrainian community was far less concerned with the implications of the Helsinki Final Act than were the Balts, for whom the Conference could spell the end of the continuing de jure recognition of their pre-war countries. But this does not imply that in less publicized, possibly ad hoc documents, the Ukrainians were not referring to those issues. First of all, as early as April 1968, the UCCA presented a well-reasoned
memorandum to the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran (April 22-May 13, 1968) arguing that the Soviet Union was violating the individual human rights as set forth in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) ("freedom of thought, conscience and religion") and Art. 19 ("freedom of opinion and expression"). Furthermore, the UCCA argued that the Soviet Union was destroying non-Russian nations in the USSR by violating what we might tentatively call the collective, nationality rights embodied in the UDHR, viz., Article 2:

> Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political and other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

The USSR were also accused of violating Article 15 of the UDHR:

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Those rights in Articles 2 and 15 might perhaps be considered as "nationality-tinged" personal rights, but they come very close to being collective national rights. The most interesting hypothesis which we cannot fully prove is that this concern with human cum nationality rights, as opposed to the old (1940) insistence that the Ukraine had a right to independence may have been carried to the Ukrainian-American community from the writings of human rights activists in the Ukraine. The cited memorandum repeatedly refers to Sviatoslav Y. Karavansky as a prime witness on violations of human and nationality rights. Karavansky, furthermore transcends the exclusively Ukrainian concerns: he speaks of the violations of rights of Jews in the Ukraine, of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians.
Dr. Dobriansky's thinking on the issue of human rights is best brought out in his written statement at the hearing on April 27, 1977, before the US CSCE:

Thus, in the order of human rights, there is first the category of personal rights. These rights cover a broad, metaphysically-based range of the right to live, to multiply, to hold property, to develop, to express oneself and so forth in the ways of personal choices for free action, and always without encroachment or coercive effect upon others with similarly founded rights. When personal rights to mobilize, associate and socialize are exercised, the sphere of civil rights is entered into. On this higher and broader plane of collective expression, civil rights of group assembly, worship, work, oral and written speech, opportunity for development, representation and the like come into more aggregative play. Lastly, and still more extensive, the highest category of national rights, expressive of a moral organism called a nation with all its attributes of geographical territory, history, language, religion and so on, encompasses crystallized rights of existence, development and growth, the balanced and responsible exercise of which safeguards the expression of personal and civil rights and also contributes to international order, law, peace and an expanding community of free and responsible nations in whatever form of chosen state.

Nationality rights are still being stressed, as are the civil rights of group assembly; but overall this is a sophisticated attempt to come to terms with general personal human rights (the staple fare of American and West European negotiators) and to combine them with the right to national independence (the preoccupation of American-Ukrainians since at least 1940).

On a more practical level, unlike some Balts and some Ukrainians with whom he exchanged views informally (no organizational resolutions had been taken), Dr. Dobriansky did not oppose President Ford's decision to go to Helsinki to sign the Final Act. On the contrary, in a meeting
of ethnic leaders with President Ford on July 25, 1975, in the White House. Dr. Dobriansky suggested that the President use the trip to Helsinki to publicize certain parts of his (the President's) excellent summation of why the US should sign the Final Act. Dr. Dobriansky suggested that when leaving Andrews Air Force Base, the President might, in his remarks,
reiterate his promise that the pre-war independent Baltic states would not be "un-recognized," at the next stop in Bonn, the President might say something about the absence from the Helsinki Conference of the Ukrainian and the Belorussian SSR, etc. President Ford did not promise that he would do so, but he listened to the suggestion sympathetically as seemed to be Mr. Hartmann, a high official from the Department of State. The following day the President studiously avoided mentioning in his departure statement at Andrews Air Force Base any of the controversial points that he himself had made to ethnic leaders the day before. This was done on Dr. Kissinger's advice. President Ford, in his debate with Governor Carter in San Francisco, on October 6, 1976, expressed the opinion:

There is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and there never will be under a Ford administration.

Dr. Dobriansky who had known Congressman Ford as a staunch advocate of the independence of East European nations sensed Dr. Kissinger again speaking through President Ford, and though he was a conservative Republican in 1976 he voted for Carter.

Some of the young Ukrainian-American human rights activists who had been holding vigils and fasts to help release Valentyn Moroz entered the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukrainian Committee and the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, which we have already briefly described in Chapter 7, to help pass the views of the Ukrainian-American community to the delegates to the preparatory Belgrade Review Meeting in the summer of 1977, right there on the spot. As the Finnish police in
Helsinki in 1975, Yugoslav secret police arrested Andrew Fedynsky and Adam Mishtal, of the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee, and arrested and expelled Yaroslav Koshiv, of the New York Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners. Two colleagues of Fedynsky and Mishtal, Andrew Karkoc and Konstantyn Huytan, managed, however, to evade the Yugoslav police and held a press conference elsewhere. Their exploits were written up in the emigré press, but were ignored by the N.Y. Times, to judge from the 1977 N.Y. Times Index. The UCCA submitted to the American Delegation to the Belgrade Review Meeting a solid factual memorandum.

We wish that we could end our sketch of the involvement of the Ukrainian-American community in monitoring the Helsinki Act on a positive note. Unfortunately, some of its leading members, not including Dr. Dobriansky, December 15, 1979, have publicly attacked one of the foremost founder members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in Kiev and head of its Foreign Representation in New York, Major General Petro Hryhorenko in what to us seems to be a case of bad political judgment. They similarly attacked Mr. Mykola Plawiuk, the current President of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians.

In the summer of 1979, 18 Ukrainian political prisoners, including Mykola Rudenko and eight other members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, addressed a petition to the United Nations requesting that the Ukraine be registered as a colony and brought before the UN Committee of 23 on Decolonization. In the same petition, they also authorized the president
of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians "to implement the range of
diplomatic and other efforts that are necessary for the secession of
Ukraine from the USSR and the establishment of an independent Ukrainian
state." The appeal was technically presented as an official document
of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement, not a document of the Ukrainian
Helsinki Group, but prominent members of the latter did sign it.100

That appeal of 18 Ukrainian political prisoners raises more
questions than it answers. First of all, it shows a remarkable parallel
to the Resolution to the UN General Assembly concerning the Decolonization
of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics submitted by the Conference
of Free Byelorussians, The Estonian World Council, the Lithuanian World
Community, The World Congress of Free Ukrainians, and the World Federation
of Free Latvians. (The fact that the top organizations of many East
European exile groups have collaborated on this beautifully-printed and
excellently documented Resolution is of great value, though we are
somewhat skeptical of any appeals to the United Nations and its Committee
on Decolonization on the part of European nations.) There are obviously
channels of communication open between the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and
the Ukrainian community in Northern America. The question is whose
initiative has it been: that of the Ukrainians in Toronto and in New York
or the Ukrainian political prisoners? We hope that it has been the latter,
for it would be most unfortunate if the Ukrainian emigrés would use the
Ukrainian political prisoners to legitimize their particular conceptions
of effective international politics. In any case, we have seen one
unfortunate result already: the struggle for power within the World
 Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU). At its meeting December 15, 1979, the National Council of the UCCA voted 31 against 17 with 3 abstentions to demand the resignation of Mr. Plawiuk because he had, after the November 1978 WCFU Congress, which elected him President of the WCFU for two years, become the head of the Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists (PUN), which is the successor of the Melnyk wing of the old Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). That PUN is opposed by the former Bandera-wing of the OUN, now known as the Liberation Front which is perhaps stronger in the United States than in Canada. It would seem that the last thing the Soviet Ukrainian political prisoners--whether members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group or not--need is to become embroiled in a US-Canadian Ukrainian intra-Nationalist power play and it certainly is not the height of political responsibility to expose them to it.

The emigre resolution to the UN General Assembly contained a document of unquestionable value, the joint declaration on Ukraine by Russian dissidents and East European emigre leaders of May 1977. Over the signatures of Andrei Amalrik, Vladimir Bukovsky, Natalia Gorbanevska, Vladimir Maksimov, and Victor Nekrasov--all of them well known in the Russian dissident movement, though not members of the Moscow Helsinki Group, and by Jerzy Giedroyc, the editor of the Polish monthly Kultura, Tibor Meray, editor of a Hungarian paper, and Pavel Tigrigd, editor of a Czech quarterly, and others, the declaration advocated self-determination for the Ukrainians. It contains the following remarkable passage:

... There will be no truly free Poles, Czechs or Hungarians without free Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians. And in the final analysis--without free
Russians. Without Russians freed from imperialistic ambitions, who care about the development of their own national life and respect the right of other nations to their self-determination. 101

The person in the Ukrainian community whose thinking is close to the Bukovsky-Maksimov (the Kontinent) group is exiled Major-General Petro Hryhorenko, a charter member of the Moscow and the Ukrainian Helsinki Groups. He joined the editorial board of Kontinent and published in it (and in other journals) an article which could be considered the continuation of the dialogue between democratic Russian and democratic Ukrainian dissidents begun by Bukovsky and Maksimov. Hryhorenko's conception is as follows:

... The USSR is a partocratic colonial empire [in the article's beginning he also called it the legal successor of the Russian colonial empire - Y.B. and T.P.]. And this is not only a theoretical conclusion around which one could lead interminable academic discussions. No, this is a radical, most basic question of the practice of the national liberation struggle in the USSR.

If this be a Russian colonial empire, then the whole Russian people constitutes a firm and reliable (nadezhnoi) support for the government in its struggle against the national liberation movements. In this case the Russian people will not allow the disorganization of its government and the national movements will be able to count only on the sympathy of a few (otdel'nykh) Russian humanists. Under such circumstances the cause of national liberation is hopeless. If the governmental structure is firm, is not disorganized, by having contemporary weapons it can crush any eruptions of national protest.

It is another matter if it is not a national Russian but a partocratic empire. In that case the Russian people is interested in the very same thing that the other nations of the USSR are interested in, viz., the liquidation of the empire, and will act (vystupit) together with them as an ally. It is the position of the government that will then become hopeless. I am convinced that we are dealing not with a Russian, but with a partocratic empire. 102
On the initiative of that very same Conservative-Nationalist coalition (the resolution was introduced by UCCA Executive Committee Secretary Ignatius Billinsky, editor of the Catholic paper Ameryka) on December 15, 1979, the UCCA National Council by a vote of 42 for, 11 against and 7 abstaining, voted

... The UCCA National Council feels that such a political concept of Gen. Grigorenko's is false and damaging to the Ukrainian liberation efforts, and it will not support the activity of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, which he heads.103

In vain did opponents of the resolution point out that in voting the resolution, the members present in fact repudiated the "Reconfirmation of Principles of UCCA Politics," of March 20, 1965, point seven of which says that the UCCA does not recognize any collective guilt of the Russian people for crimes of the Communist regime and its colonial imperialism.104

In vain did the opposition point out that Hryhorenko was too big and too deserving a man to be publicly attacked in the United States and that the entire resolution was procedurally tainted ("review of the work of the Helsinki Group is beyond the competence of the [UCCA] National Council, that the order of the day was not submitted in time [i.e., that the resolution was a surprise move] and that the proceedings had been conducted arbitrarily [the new UCCA Executive Vice President Volodymyr Mazur had called the question without letting Gen. Hryhorenko's friends speak first, only his opponents].")105 From an informed source we know that this decision is being appealed. But whatever the final decision turns out to be, the damage has already been done. Gen. Hryhorenko's bold concept of working with democratic Russians has been publicly criticized by a group
of emigrés with little understanding of Soviet realities but attuned to
the extreme Russophobe sentiments shared by many Western Ukrainians
who are in the majority in the Ukrainian American community, but not
in the Ukraine itself. It is certainly not the best situation for a
sound cooperation between the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, its Foreign
Representatives, and the Ukrainian communities in the USA and in Canada.
Conclusion

It is perhaps not fully justifiable to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the Baltic and Ukrainian efforts at this point in time. A great deal of further detailed research would be necessary for a fair and impartial evaluation. Nevertheless, some judgments are possible in two major areas even at the present: information flow on relevant issues and political leverage. There is very little question that the ethnic role in regard to information mediation along three paths—scholarship, publication and dissemination—has been important. The record shows quite clearly that most American scholarship on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine has been produced by scholars of the respective descent, in the most recent years by such group-founded or sponsored organizations as the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, the Ukrainian Research Center at Harvard University, the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, etc. No "universalist" American body has published the Ukrainian Herald, Ausra, or the Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, or the large volume of general samizdat documents and memoranda which we have referenced in the present study. Contrarywise, they are all the work of the ethnic communities, both in the production end inside the Soviet Union and the dissemination end in the West. Even the proceedings of the first, 1975 International Sakharov Hearing in Copenhagen was issued in the United States by the Ukrainian Smoloskyp Publishers. It is also the groups themselves which have often received the coverage for the Baltic cause in the press, and occasionally on radio and television, through pestering the American editors, writing letters to editors, and by holding demonstrations and rallies.
Which is to say in summary that most of the information produced and disseminated on the Baltic and on the Ukraine has been the work of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians. The same holds true for the other Soviet nationality groups and, in many respects, for the Soviet nationality and human rights issues in general.

That the Baltic, Ukrainian and general Soviet nationality-human rights questions have been brought to the attention of political figures, governmental bureaucracies, Governments, parliamentary bodies, and to the forum of all types of international bodies, also does not appear to represent the benevolence of Western "universalists," but rather almost fully the persistence and recalcitrance of the ethnic group-based activists and their organizations. At the United Nations, the activities of BATUN have won a great deal of respect, and it is not only the United States delegates who occasionally speak up. At various occasions in the General Assembly and other UN organs, representatives from countries as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Barbados have brought the Baltic case up publicly. The Soviet Union becomes so furious when this occurs that BATUN itself has aptly commented:

Quite a few of our people think that the Baltic states have never been mentioned at the Security Council. This is not true, the Baltic states are mentioned at the Security Council with a certain regularity: every time the speaker wants the Soviet representative to become very angry.

And this occurs at the oddest time: in discussions having to do with Lebanon, Indian-Pakistani conflict, the problems of Bangladesh, etc.

In addition, it appears that it is not the personal orientations
of national political figures which accounts for their political support for the Baltic, Ukrainian and general Soviet nationality/human rights cause, but years of cultivated contacts, Party-bureaucratic work, and in Chicago, voting leverage. The same appears to be the case in Sweden, Canada, Australia and in other countries. There are, of course, serendipitous circumstances which have been important. The Swedish socialist leader Olof Palme has a grandfather who was a Rector of the Riga Polytechnic Institute in Latvia, and Palme in his youth, before the war, spent many summers there and even learned the language. One of his successors, who became Prime Minister in 1977, the Folkparty's Ola Ullsten has an Estonian wife. Gerald Ford, even after the anguished pressure exerted on him by the Balts in 1975, the next year was willing to be Patron of the Second Estonian World Festival, which occurred in Baltimore only a year after the Helsinki Final Act had been signed. Also, President Jimmy Carter's wife's brother has an Estonian wife, and a high-ranking member of the United States delegation at the United Nations in the late 1970s, Melissa Wells, is in part Estonian.

These types of personal connections help, but in our perspective are not the crucial determinants of the general influence. Yet the individual factor can never be fully ruled out. The parent of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick, has an impeccable record of personal concern and involvement in civil rights and human rights, issues independent of any Soviet element or focus. Yet another important friend in the United States Congress, Senator Robert Dole, also has been generally concerned with human rights issues, especially in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, throughout the 1970s. What leads us to conclude that in the United States, other than such personal factors, we should look at the Baltic, Ukrainian, Jewish and other ethnic groups as the key determinants in the political leverage achieved is a simple fact. Namely, in looking through the Congressional Quarterly for 1969-1978 under certain key words, it was discovered that a very large number of individuals of both parties, of conservative and liberal persuasion, touch on the relevant issues in their speeches, introducing legislation, documents, etc. The frequency of entries, shown in Tables 1 and 2, also indicates that the Soviet nationality issues come into greater focus concurrently with the CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act.

As it is, almost all of the key figures in Congress who raise general Soviet, or Baltic and Ukrainian issues, represent Congressional districts or states with very heavy concentrations of population of East European and Soviet Backgrounds (including Jews here). The following pertinent information emerges. Of key individuals, Congressman Edward J. Derwinski (Republican, Illinois) himself is of East European background. Congresswoman Millicent H. Fenwick (Republican, New Jersey), has had contact with both Ukrainians and Balts. In 1976 she was the recipient of the Ukrainians' Taras Shevchenko Freedom Award, at which ceremony representatives of the organization, Americans for Congressional Action to Free the Baltic States, were also present. An ethnic newspaper reports on this occasion that Fenwick specifically said that Ukrainian and Baltic pressures on President Ford had helped release allocated funds for the US Commission's investigative work on Eastern Europe, over the objections of the Department of State.
Table 1

FREQUENCY OF THE APPEARANCE OF CERTAIN KEYWORDS IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: 1969-78

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*Refers to all human rights references, not only those dealing with the Soviet Union and Helsinki.

Table 2

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ENTRIES WHICH APPEAR UNDER SELECTED KEYWORDS IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: 1969-78.

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Fenwick was also one of the hosts of the Congressional reception preceding the 1977 Baltic Freedom Rally in Washington. Senator Robert J. Dole (Republican, Kansas) was Chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1971-1973 at the point when the displaced persons-era immigrants had become very active in the ethnic structures of the party. Dole afterward has had quite a bit of contact with Chicago area Baltic Republicans, although he has no personal Baltic constituency in Kansas worthy of note. Congressman Dante B. Fascell (Democrat, Florida), Chairman of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, has a sizable Jewish constituency. Thus, the personal factor often coincides with the constituency and ethnic contacts factors. Lastly, in our random check of Congressmen and Senators, those with no East European/Soviet personal ancestry, with no pertinent ethnic contacts, nor constituency, rarely have acted or spoken out on the issues which concern us here.

In summary, then, the "universalists" have not championed the Baltic, Ukrainian or in general the Soviet nationality/human rights cause unless there was political pressure to account for this. The leverage which the four ethnic groups have achieved is remarkable given their small number. In closing, while we do not find the commitment of universalists to particularistic issues, the reverse is true. The documents prepared by the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Armenian and Georgain activists, in particular by their four Helsinki Watch Committees, are important statements on general human rights and nationality issues, even while they tend to focus on a given group. The same can be said for Baltic and Ukrainian material
originating in the West. Indeed, the Balts have spoken out publicly on
behalf of Soviet Jewry especially in the Baltic and even demonstrated
on behalf of Namibia. Without the incredible level of activities
by dissidents in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, and
the political lobbying of their kin groups in the West on the world
stage, there would probably be immeasurably less concern about any
type of human rights anywhere than there now is globally.
General conclusions are divided into two parts—those drawn from the research project directly, and those based on our general expertise on Soviet society. A third part here contains broader policy implications and recommendations. We have found the Soviet human and nationality rights inextricably intertwined. We find that even the creation of Watch Committees in four Union republics after a Moscow group had been founded is related to the historic Soviet nationality problem. Interestingly, Soviet Russian dissidents in the central groups in Moscow are even supportive of national separation from the core state, which is allowed by the Soviet Constitution and reaffirmed in the Helsinki Final Act. It was the thinking of the five Soviet Watch Committees and the nationality assertiveness in general which caused the nationality issue to also be examined at times by the US Commission.

We find the Soviet-American relationship to be one basically of adversaries. In this perspective, the Soviet Watch Committees are allies of the United States. The shifting military balance to Soviet advantage, may force a change in the currently dominant global perspective on human rights, which is based on ideas of individual civil rights, to the advantage of the Soviet perspective, which sees human rights as a socio-economic issue related to the societal system as a whole. Détente in the long run cannot bring about change in long-standing Soviet expansions and ideology, especially if the Soviet Union becomes a clearly dominant power militarily, unless some internal systemic reforms toward democratization take place. And this is rather difficult if the West is not supportive of those elements in Soviet society who basically are a loyal opposition whose aim is to reform Soviet society from within, to move back from moderated Stalinism to idealistic Leninism. In this context, even the most assertive Soviet nationalities should not be seen as rabid nationalist troublemakers and separatists. Many nationalities are not inherently separatist at all, but see that path as the only one left for their collective survival in the face of threats of Russification and systemic repression. The system has had a big part in creating the nationality problem which it currently faces. A democratically federated Soviet state would probably alleviate most strains.
Chapter 9

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will be divided into three parts. In Part I we will discuss the conclusions that flow directly from the evidence we have presented in Chapters 1-8. No synopses of the individual chapters will be provided—that role is played by the executive summaries preceding each chapter. Nor are we going to present the conclusions chapter by chapter. Using the assembled evidence we will try to answer the broad analytic questions we have posed elsewhere.¹ In Part II of our conclusions we will raise some more speculative questions bearing on our topic, the answers to which cannot be fully documented from the evidence at hand: they rest upon a combined total of 47 years' experience in dealing with Soviet affairs, as advanced students, professional researchers and academic teachers. In other words, Parts I and II are our findings, which both of us are prepared to defend: Part I with material contained between these two covers, Part II with evidence from our intellectual arsenals. Part III will present concrete policy recommendations based on Parts I and II.
Specific Conclusions from this Report

We have analyzed all the output of the Helsinki Watch Committees and related public groups, with special attention to the following non-Russian SSRs: the Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, and Armenia. A rich selection from this output has been reprinted in the documentary Appendix. In the course of our research we have soon found that we had to give a substantial amount of attention to the Moscow Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. Not only was it the first established, in May 1976, but it also included a number of non-Russian members (several Jews and one Ukrainian). In its publications, the Moscow Group paid substantial attention to the nationality question in the Soviet Union: 21 documents out of the 99 that were published by the end of August 1979 or a little over 20 percent, explicitly dealt with aspects of the nationality problem. The other documents were concerned with traditional individual human rights (protests against unlawful arrests, etc.) and such collective rights as workers' rights. But it should also be pointed out that in practice the line between individual civil rights and collective nationality rights is very difficult to draw. For instance, we have not counted in that total of 21 several documents of the Moscow Group on the "right of citizens" to emigrate. It can be argued that so far the most determined and most successful to emigrate have been Soviet Jews. The general citizens' right to emigrate has thus acquired a more or less specific nationality connotation. More of the efforts of the Moscow Group have been devoted to nationality
problems than the titles of the Group's documents would indicate.
In the case of the Crimean Tatars, e.g., to which the first of the Moscow
Group's documents was devoted, it is impossible to disentangle human
rights in the broad sense from specific nationality rights. The entire
activity of Moscow Helsinki Group is supreme proof of the proposition
that in the Soviet Union today human and nationality rights are
inextricably intertwined. On the basis of three interviews (two with
members of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Committee and one with an informed
outsider) we have also found that members of the Moscow Group realized
this and that, moreover, they were sympathetic towards the cause of
national self-determination, an attitude that the Moscow Group inherited
from the Liberal Democratic Center and even more from the Marxist Left,
but an attitude which could not but evoke profound reservations among
the moderate and extreme Russian nationalists on the Right. The Muscovites
did more than extend sympathy: they helped the non-Russians to publicize
their documents abroad, by feeding them into the foreign correspondents'
and foreign diplomatic channels.

The question then arises why were the Ukrainians, the Lithuanians,
and Georgians, and the Armenians not satisfied with the concerned, the
sympathetic and really helpful members of the Moscow Helsinki Group but
established Watch Committees of their own, as they did in November 1976,
January and April 1977? Furthermore, what were the issues addressed or
dealt with by the republican Watch Committees? To what degree were their
demands concerned with general human rights and to what degree did they
advocate nationality rights? To what extent do these new demands differ
from earlier nationality-based demands in terms of issues, goals and pattern of legitimation? To what degree are the new developments an outgrowth of the Helsinki accords, as opposed to a continuation of earlier trends? And, finally, in what measure did the Helsinki accords enable closer cooperation between the émigré and the USSR-based components of the nationality groups concerned?

The only general answer that can be given to the basic question, "Why not let Moscow do it?," is that the dissenters in Kiev, Vilnius, Tbilisi, and Erevan doubted that dissenting Moscow could do the job, that the Muscovites in the long run would be able to effectively present the concerns of those four nationalities, even with the best of will. This is a position which is nowhere clearly articulated in the main official documents (such as memoranda) but comes out between the lines and in such related auxiliary documents as Mykola Rudenko's open letter of November 14, 1976, and the pre-Helsinki criticism of the editorial policy of The Chronicle of Current Events by Ukrainian Herald No. 5.

To answer the question, "Why not Moscow?," more specifically and thus more satisfactorily we have to turn to the individual republics. The Ukrainians in the mid-1970's were aghast at the second wave of arrests of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which had swept through the republic in January 1972, they opposed the combined pressure from the central regime and from their assimilated fellow-countrymen to give the Russian language absolute priority in all institutions of higher learning, in publishing, administration, politics. The Eastern Ukrainians, except
for a brief period of independence in 1918-1920, have always been united with the culturally related Russians since the mid-17th century: being vulnerable to linguistic and possibly also identificational assimilation made them the more resentful toward the rather heavy-handed efforts by the center to turn the clock of history back and reconver the Ukrainians into obedient Russian-speaking Little Russians who might or might not be left the emotional outlets of ethnographic paraphernalia—the hopak, the Ukrainian borshch and possibly even the embroidered shirt. The Ukrainians in short have been fighting for their national survival. This is a fight which cannot be entrusted to any one else, even to genuinely sympathetic Moscow liberals. Another contributing reason was that the Soviet Ukrainian elite felt that they had been insulted as well as injured, when the regime in Moscow refused to allow a Soviet Ukrainian delegation to participate in the Helsinki process, which brought together the two superpowers, the medium powers but also a sprinkling of European microstates. (There is no documentary evidence to back up the proposition that the Soviet Ukrainian Republican Government had indeed expressed such a desire, but there has been a persistent rumor to that effect in the diplomatic community, which in turn originated with anonymous Soviet Ukrainian diplomats.)

Paradoxically, the Lithuanian Helsinki Group appears not to have been set up because its founders were afraid of being disappointed by the Moscow Helsinki dissenters in their quest for human rights in the short run (the cooperation between the two Groups was particularly close), but because the Lithuanian Helsinki Watchers were dissatisfied with the
somewhat divergent trends within the otherwise robust Lithuanian national movement and the non-Lithuanian dissent in the republic. In the simplest terms, the organization of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group in late November 1976 reflected the desire to bring under one "human-national rights umbrella" the Lithuanian Catholics, the secular Lithuanian patriots, such as defenders of the Lithuanian language and culture, and Lithuanian Jewish activists. That delicate task of building intra-Lithuanian unity could also not be entrusted to the Muscovites. The Lithuanian Group also appears to have been designed to act as a possible nucleus for similar Groups in the Baltic. An element of emulation may also have been involved; once the Ukrainians established their Group in early November, the proud Lithuanians did not want to be left behind. (There is neither documentary nor specific oral evidence to back up this last proposition; but we are prepared to defend this as a hypothesis.)

Why a Georgian Group? Again there is the emulation hypothesis. Even more probable as a reason is the fact that the new Georgian First Party Secretary Shevardnadze profoundly disrupted ancient Georgian ways by battling the quasi-feudal patronage and corruption that had flourished under his predecessor Mzhavanadze and by trying to strengthen in universities and cultural life, the position of the Russian language which the Georgians have always regarded as an object of scorn, possibly even abomination.

Why a fourth republican Helsinki Group in Armenia? Like the Georgians the Armenians are intensely proud of their nationality. In the words of Bruce Nelan:
Although their sons sometimes are arrested for overt political nationalism, Armenians impress a visitor as being, primarily, non-Soviet, rather than anti-Soviet. Their sense of cultural identity is so strong that it must be difficult for them to idolize any leader who is not one of them.\(^6\)

Out of pride, the Armenians did not want to be left behind after the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and especially the Georgians had established their Helsinki Groups. The Armenians had to defend the eighteen Armenian political prisoners of the nine secret political trials of 1973-74, which could perhaps have been handled by the Moscow Helsinki Group. But the issue of Mountainous Karabagh, where the Azerbaidzhani Turks were trying to persecute, nay, to shoot Armenians with utter impunity, with Moscow looking the other way, as well as the issues of the Genocide of April 1915 and of Western Armenia, could only be grasped by Armenians (Eduard Arutyunyan was from Mountainous Karabagh).

Thus issues specific to each of the four non-Russian republics were responsible for the establishment of spiritually related by organizationally distinct Helsinki Groups outside of Moscow: the struggle for cultural and national survival in the Ukraine, accentuated by the snub of the Ukrainian efforts to join the Helsinki Conference; the ambition to unite all trends of the Lithuanian and non-Lithuanian dissent movement in Lithuania and to establish the nucleus of a Baltic Helsinki movement; the fight against Shevardnadze's double-pronged attack on Georgian culture and Georgian free-enterprise economy and politics; Moscow's indifference to the plight of Karabagh and Moscow's de-emphasis of the Genocide and Armenian claims to Western (Turkish) Armenia.
The issues to which the republican Helsinki Watch Committees addressed themselves varied from republic to republic. The Ukrainian Group has stressed nationality issues. But as Mykola Rudenko has pointed out in his Open Letter, this is quite understandable insofar as "the majority of the Ukrainian prisoners have been sentenced for alleged or real nationalism." At first sight the Ukrainian documents appear undistinguishable from the anonymous nationalist samizdat in the Ukrainian Herald, e.g. But among the documents of the Ukrainian group there are those that stress individual rights such as the right of a wife of a political prisoner not to be persecuted for her husband's beliefs, the right of a released political prisoner to live in her old apartment with her family, the right to fair procedure at the trial. The underlying issues in all the documents were Ukrainian nationalism and the authorities persecuted the Ukrainian Group members precisely for that saying as they did to Mr. Petro Vins that they were nothing but Ukrainian nationalists hiding behind the smokescreen of the Helsinki Final Act. But given Rudenko's collaboration with Tverdokhlebov in Amnesty International, given Petro Vins's ties with the Reformed Baptists' movement and given the feelers that had been—not quite successfully so far—extended to Jewish activists in the Ukraine, it would have been only a matter of time before the Ukrainian Helsinki Group would have defended unjustly imprisoned Christians and non-Christians alike, would have turned its attention to the non-nationalist minority of the political prisoners from the Ukraine.
Did the Helsinki Act matter for the Ukrainian dissenters? It reinforced their legitimacy at least as they and their supporters saw it (the regime, of course, denied their claim). It emboldened them to openly apply to such an émigré organization as the newly-formed Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee in Washington, D.C. But most unfortunately in the Ukrainian case moderation on the question of national self-determination as expressed in the writings of one of the foremost charter members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, the exiled Major-General Petro Hryhorenko, i.e., his insistence that the Ukraine become independent in cooperation with Russian democrats who in turn would have to foreswear any support of the "partocratic Soviet Empire," have embroiled the general personally and the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in New York, which he is heading, in the politics of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. In that Committee, as in the Ukrainian-American community in general, a strong influence is wielded by leaders of the so-called Liberation Front, a successor to the Bandera wing of the old Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Recruited mostly from Western Ukrainians, Galicians in particular, they are as sweeping Russophobes as they are ardent nationalists. Unlike most of the Eastern Ukrainians, who, of course, are in a strong majority in the Ukraine herself, the members of the Liberation Front do not draw any distinctions between Russians with whom Ukrainian patriots can cooperate and Russians with whom such a cooperation is impossible—though it is precisely such a discriminating attitude which has made the emergence and activity of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group possible. So long as the final decision is not made regarding that unfortunate criticism or "censure"
of General Hryhorenko at the December 15, 1979, meeting of the National Council of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (as of February 1980, it is under appeal) we have to leave the question of the impact of the Helsinki Act upon closer cooperation between the emigré and the USSR-based components of the Ukrainian nation open.

The contents of the Lithuanian Group documents is much more varied than that of the Ukrainian Group: it defended the position of the Catholic Church, expressed its concern in a matter of family re-unification, focused on the situation of former Lithuanian political prisoners, on a psychiatric imprisonment case, the plight of Estonians, the persecution of Russian Pentecostals living in Vilnius, and even the state of Volga Germans. In other words, the Lithuanian Helsinki Group paid much attention to non-Lithuanian human rights. The reason for this would appear to lie in a genuinely novel conception underlying the Lithuanian Group: it was to be a coalition of all major dissent groups in Lithuania, brought together under, and legitimized by, the Helsinki Accords of 1975. (The Ukrainian Helsinki Group was, in the beginning at least, more the continuation of the repressed single cultural and political nationalist movement of the 1960's, it had plans to branch out, but was prevented from doing so.) Another reason for the more cosmopolitan flavor of the Lithuanian documents is the membership of Dr. Eitan Finkelshtein, who was Jewish. So far, at least, the relations between the American-Lithuanians and members of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group, both in Lithuania and in the United States, have been harmonious.
The output of the Armenian Group as such is fairly slim (7 documents). Judging from these and related documents it appears that they are more like those of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, i.e., squarely addressed to nationalist Armenian questions without, however, neglecting individual civil rights. To put it differently, the Armenian Group has not spoken up for non-Armenians. Several documents of the Armenian Helsinki Group are addressed to the question of the proper treatment of Armenian political prisoners. This is clearly one of those questions that straddle the categories: is the continued imprisonment of young Armenian nationalist Paruir A. Airikyan a violation of the human right to speak one's conscience or is it rather the violation of an Armenian national right to organize into the United National Party? So far as we can judge, the Armenian diaspora has warmly supported the Armenian Helsinki Group.

It is extremely difficult to say something about the very slim output of the Georgian Group (one, possibly two, documents—we have reproduced the one undubitably authentic document). Our impression from reading related Georgian documents is that it would have clearly stressed nationality-related issues (like the Ukrainian and Armenian Groups). On the other hand, the two Goldshtein brothers are both very articulate and energetic: they would have tried to steer the Georgian Group to broader human rights concerns. While it existed, the Georgian Group was strongly supported by the Georgian emigrés in France, where most of the Georgians who live outside the Soviet Union are domiciled. Alas, the question of what the Georgian Group might or might not have
done is more academic than most: the Georgian Helsinki Group appears to have been effectively destroyed with the continuing imprisonment of Kostava and confession and pardon of Gamsakhurdia.

Our second major question has been: Has Soviet society become more fragile by further irritation of an underlying strain in the areas of civil and nationality relations? This question can only be answered in Part II of our conclusions when we introduce our conception of the increasing destabilization of Soviet society.

Our third major question has been: To what degree did Soviet and American (the latter chosen as the Western leader) foreign policy makers take into account the potential effect of the Helsinki Accords on the Soviet nationality question? There appears to have been no wide publicity given to the scope of such an important principle adopted at the Helsinki Conference as that on self-determination (Principle VIII), nor has a widely publicized enquiry been made of the relation between that principle and certain provisions in Principle VII concerning national minorities. The first paragraph of Principle VIII on Equal rights and self-determination of peoples reads:

"The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States." 15

The clause on national minorities in Principle VII, Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, preceded by the opening paragraph of that same Principle,
reads as follows:

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.16

We thus notice that the nationality rights in the Helsinki Act have been disjointed: persons belonging to "national minorities" (or perhaps nationalities within a larger state) will be given equality under the law and "full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights" without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion (Principle VII) and "peoples" will have the right to self-determination (Principle VIII). In the Helsinki Act, "national minorities" as such do not seem to have any cultural rights at all, only their members enjoy them qua individuals. Human rights are conceived as individual rights. But in Soviet official and dissident thinking the national question, on the contrary, is considered as one single package: political self-determination (i.e., a modicum of political autonomy expressed in the form of a Union-Republic, Autonomous Republic, etc.) plus a modicum of cultural autonomy (elementary, secondary and some higher education in the republican languages, books published in the republican languages, and similar). Was this disjuncture of human rights from the peoples' (or nationalities') right to self-determination a deliberate one?
To judge from a major article, written by Harold S. Russell, the principal US negotiator for that part of the Final Act, the separation of those rights may have been deliberate. Once they had realized that a Final Act without human rights would not be accepted by the West, the Soviet negotiators tried to minimize the potential damage to their country by putting an entire catalogue of such rights into a single principle. This would make Principle VII akin to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and make it possible to invoke the escape clauses of that Covenant.17

As to the Principle on Equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the Soviet government, apparently realizing that that Principle could be turned against them, objected to the inclusion of the statement on self-determination "on the ground that self-determination has been traditionally associated with the right of colonial peoples to establish their independence."18 But it was West Germany that insisted on self-determination of peoples, hoping that this principle could later be used to justify the eventual reunification of the two Germanies. The USSR gave in to the demands of the German Federal Republic. But on the insistence of Canada and Yugoslavia with their militant "minorities" (or nationalities!) the principle on self-determination was toned down with the help of a "balancing element," i.e., the provision that relevant norms of international law be observed, "including those relating to territorial integrity of States."19

In brief, we can answer our third major question as follows: the Soviet negotiators at Helsinki did take into account the potential effect
which the Act might have on the Soviet nationality question. But they did not consider that effect so serious as to insist on the suppression of Principle VIII on self determination, against the wishes of West Germany that was advocating it. As far as the American government was concerned, its representatives at the Helsinki Conference do not appear to have attached to that link much importance: there is no mention of any specific American position at Helsinki on the Soviet nationality question in Russell's long article, nor were we successful in eliciting a clear-cut position on that question at Helsinki in our interviews in 1979 in the Department of State. It was mentioned, however, that the US negotiators did not perceive a necessary linkage between human rights and nationality rights. On the Congressional side we were told explicitly that in setting up the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe its potential impact on the Soviet nationality question was not taken into consideration. It has been the burden of our report to show that it was the members of the Soviet Helsinki Groups—those members in Moscow, e.g., who published the documents on the Crimean Tatars and the members of the nationality Helsinki Watch Committees—who addressed that linkage between individual "human" and collective "nationality" rights foursquare. They triggered off the persecutions by the Soviet authorities and forced the US CSCE to hold a considerable number of hearings on the Soviet nationality question.
II

More General Findings from Other Sources

This being a policy-oriented study, we owe it to our readers to make our findings and recommendations as lucid and unambiguous as possible. Our readers are also entitled to an explication of our premises on which our conclusions will rest.

We see the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union as one of adversaries, limited—though not absolutely—by the horrible prospects of a nuclear war, which neither power wants, but an adversary relationship above all. Since the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 the Soviet Union has been gradually whittling away at the limitations and has come to emphasize the essence of hostility. In this situation the Soviet political dissenters, including Members of the Soviet Helsinki Groups, however worthy in themselves, can be regarded as our Allies.

We are strongly concerned about the growing impression that the overall military balance has shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. This may or may not be objectively true—we feel it is, especially in the Central European theater—but it is bound to have an impact on human rights. With the shift in the military balance there may occur a shift toward the Soviet and Third World concepts of human rights, away from the Western emphasis on individual freedoms. The human rights provisions of the Final Act have been inserted by a coalition of Americans, Canadians, West Europeans and some neutrals (such as Switzerland), but if the French and the West Germans start waver ing those provisions would be very difficult to defend.
The positions of some West European allies are often trying. During the Belgrade preparatory meeting, President Giscard d'Estaing roundly criticized the Administration's foreign policy. In answer to a question why Western countries had extended $60 billion credit to the Soviet Union and Eastern countries when the Soviet Union was arming to its teeth (85 percent of those $60 billion having been extended by West European countries) the President of France offered the following alternative: "Western countries had to make a fundamental choice between collapsing the Soviet system or helping it evolve." While it is true that to go "the liquidation route" would have called for rapid rearmament to achieve military superiority, which would have entailed a state of perpetual tension and the danger of one spark triggering conflict, it is simply not true to imply as does Giscard d'Estaing that détente between an ever stronger Soviet Union and an ever weaker Western alliance would be any more stable—on the contrary it would increase Soviet temptation to capture the Western scientists and engineers together with their technology. We have become convinced that the idea of "Gulliverization" (first tying down and then transforming the Soviet Union) through innumerable trade and scientific agreements can only work if the Western-oriented democratic Soviet intelligentsia start transforming the system from within and achieve substantial success in their endeavor. So far the Soviet regime appears to have avoided wholesale transformation.

How stable is the Soviet system and how effective have been the dissenters (the Helsinki Group Members in particular) in destabilizing it? Have they further irritated the underlying strain in the area of civil
The arguments for stability are very strong. The regime has endured for more than two generations: albeit at tremendous costs it has gone through collectivization of agriculture and industrialization, it has weathered the humiliating defeats of 1941-42, the harsh postwar years, the death of Stalin and the ouster of Khrushchev. The Party apparatchiki reign triumphant. The Army appears to be loyal and well armed. The KGB, not allowed full employment Stalinist style, has developed a new form of individualized, demonstrative terror which would have done the Mafia and the Nazi storm troopers proud. For instance, in 1979 "unnamed individuals" threatened one of the contributors to the dissent journal Searches that they would deal with him "without going to court"--he just might have an accident and fall under a train. Or the brake cable in Gamsakhurdia's car would snap under stress. Or the Russian translator Bogatyrev is beaten into coma and eventual death, again by persons unknown, in the mid-1970's. Or, the very popular Ukrainian non-conformist rock composer Ivasiuk, leaves the conservatory in the company of a stranger during Easter, April 22-24, 1979, within days the militia speculate that he probably committed suicide, and in about a month his body is discovered hanging high up in a tree in a forest. Moreover, if the samizdat reports rather than the official version are correct, his eyes had been gouged out, which would make it the strangest suicide ever. It takes bravery to stand up to courts and labor camps, it takes even greater courage to persevere in the face of officially sanctioned and inspired banditry. As for the survivors among the dissidents, even if they refuse to be frightened into inaction, they are
handicapped by not coming up with an alternative to the present regime, with a coherent program. Truly, the system is stable.

Two of the most cogent arguments in favor of the regime's basic stability are those by the political scientist Dr. Seweryn Bialer and the sociologist Dr. Walter D. Connor. Bialer points out that the Soviet political elite has responded well and adapted to the somewhat inchoate pressures and demands from within Soviet society. He stresses gradualism, stability, and continuity as being the dominant features. Connor stresses the "apoliticality of the mass political culture," the conviction of one's own impotence, and the scaled-down economic expectations of the population as allies of the present regime. As he puts it in respect to the last:

Modest but steady improvements in housing, in the availability of consumer durables, in the provision of food, have apparently been sufficient to keep the rank and file from Minsk to Omsk satisfied with their lot until that day when "communism achieved" will banish scarcity.

At the same time—and this is very important—both Connor and Bialer make an exception for nationality based dissent as a destabilizing factor (Bialer also has factor No. 2, the probability that the succession to Brezhnev will be destabilizing because of the numbers involved: Brezhnev has hired too many old men for too many responsible positions, they would have to go more or less at once). Connor feels that national ethnic (and also religious) forms of dissent are different from the rational "programmatic" dissent of Sakharov in that: "[h]ere, there is a commonality of concern that links dissident elites and the masses in a common enterprise—-the protection and
advancement of national and religious identity."\textsuperscript{28} Connor is optimistic in arguing that although policies would have to be changed, the political structures would not. Bialer is more pessimistic: to him the "potentially extraordinarily explosive national problem, . . . may be contained in the coming decade but seems insoluble within the existing political framework."\textsuperscript{29} Like Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Bialer sees in the nationality problem "one of the major brakes on the evolution of the Soviet system away from authoritarianism and on innovative impulse of the Soviet political leadership."\textsuperscript{30} It is also significant that Connor explicitly and Bialer implicitly point out that given external pressures (a war with China, or a change in the Middle East situation) could, by putting excessive demands on Soviet resources, destabilize the system.\textsuperscript{31} Perhaps the Soviet system is not really stable, except in peace time and when bolstered by Western economic credits?

We believe that the Soviet Union is entering a period of lesser stability, though it will not break up immediately short of a war, on a regional or world scale. The Soviet economy has not been working very well. As Boris Rabbot put it:

... Only 15 percent of the orders for goods placed by the State Committee on Material-Technical Supply are actually filled . . .

... You have the paradox of huge lines forming outside a major Moscow department store for East German toilet paper while Soviet sputniks circle the earth.\textsuperscript{32} The economic expectations of Soviet citizens may be modest but all those shortages sixty years after the Revolution—even though Rabbot's image be drenched in vitriol—do get on some people's nerves. The more
enterprising characters resort "to illegal ways of supplementing their abysmally low incomes"—this makes the more timid of them even more nervous: they have that constant feeling of being a potential criminal. We have documented the emergence and quick near-suppression of the potentially mass membership workers' dissent movement. In the field of nationality relations, another area of potential mass dissatisfaction which could lead to mass dissent, the regime seems to court unnecessary confrontations by trying to impose the Russian language in universities in Georgia and Armenia and teaching the Russian language from kindergarten on in all of the republics as per the recommendations of the Tashkent Conference of May 29, 1979.33 Do the non-Russian children really know Russian so badly, or is it a political rather than a pedagogical or linguistic problem? Purposely, we have not expanded on the implications of the differential birth rate in the Moslem republics as opposed to that in Russia.

To conclude the long discussion of stability and instability, we believe that in this strained climate the political dissidents no longer are automatically dismissed by the working people as middle-class Don Quixotes. There is a beautiful anecdote about an Azerbaidzhanian from Severodvinsk, in the Arkhangelsk Oblast (possibly not the most typical Azerbaidzhanian!) who was looking for dissidents in Moscow for five years, because he had heard that they were defending your rights. The beginning paragraph of his account is very revealing:

I think that I will not discover America by saying that in the USSR the citizens have political and moral rights (if they have them at all) only until that time that they get
into conflict with any employee of the State or Party apparatus. As soon as the conflict starts, i.e., if there is the slightest disagreement with their opinion, from that minute on begins the open demonstration of the absence of any rights of that citizen.\textsuperscript{34}

As if anticipating Rustamov's story Valery Chalidze comments:

The point has not been reached where people can effectively defend their rights with the assistance of the human rights movement. But the point has been reached where people are beginning to realize which of their rights should be defended by the state, and which of their rights are being violated. This is important, and it undoubtedly restrains the Soviet authorities from many violations of rights.\textsuperscript{35}

Chalidze also stresses that the open dissidents have many sympathizers among their fellow-workers, fellow-scientists, among people of their social milieu.\textsuperscript{36} Professor Barghoorn is also rather optimistic, he points to "a momentum of protest that is likely to endure."\textsuperscript{37} Also, while elites are admittedly involved in dissent, they talk to other elites both within the republic and across its boundaries. The cumulative impact of those dissents can be quite great.\textsuperscript{38} Has Soviet society become more fragile by the Helsinki Groups' further irritation of the underlying nationality strain? The answer is yes in that most obviously the Groups--the republican Groups as well as the Moscow Group--have publicized the existence of that strain abroad: in the hearings of the US CSCE and at the Belgrade Conference.

Less obviously in the longer run the Groups could have made Soviet society more fragile in that, as we see it, the Helsinki movement in the Soviet Union embodied a very ambitious plan: a coalition of the rational "programmatic" dissenters in Moscow with the republican dissenters
and eventually the workers' dissenters. Both the republican dissenters and the workers' dissenters, but especially the ethnic dissenters, could give the democratic movement a mass base. The regime struck back, of course, almost immediately: it contained the Helsinki movement before it sank deep roots, but it did not crush the movement completely.

III

Concrete Recommendations

1. The United States should rapidly rearm. This would greatly help this country to impress its enemies and to keep its friends and would also enable it to continue an effective human rights policy.

2. Once President Carter had started an explicit and fairly aggressive human rights campaign, had started naming cases, neither he nor his successors should mute it overall, and certainly not vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Persistence counts heavily in international relations, especially with Soviet negotiators and their superiors. Presidential letters need not be sent to all leading dissenters but the one sent to Dr. Sakharov was appropriate: How many of the dissenters have won the Nobel Peace Prize?

3. The Helsinki Act should not be rescinded. The Final Act plus the biannual review of its implementation are too valuable from the American
point of view: they put the Soviet Union on the psychological
defensive vis-à-vis its own citizens, its Eastern European allies,
and West European nations. Moreover, since adoption of the Act had
been a process actively pursued by West European States, any motion
to repeal it would needlessly strain the Western alliance.

4. The United States should try to persuade West Germany and France to
take a stronger and possibly also a less ethnocentric position on
human rights. Otherwise the Soviet Union is apt to play the European
countries up against the US in the human rights field as it has been doing
in trade relations. But this requires a lot of patience and forbearance.
The record of the Belgrade Conference on achieving a high degree of
Western unity is fairly encouraging, it should be repeated or possibly
even improved upon in Madrid in 1980.

5. The United States should continue to extend moral and diplomatic support
to the Soviet human rights movement in general and members of the
Helsinki Groups in particular, despite Soviet cries of interference in
their internal affairs. On balance, the Soviet Union will only respect
this country's government for doing what Soviet leaders had been
engaged in since the October Revolution; viz., waging "ideological"
(read: political) warfare against their adversaries. Moral and
diplomatic support should include the support for cultural and similar
nationality rights as specified in Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act.

6. The Soviet political dissenters are too valuable to be compromised by
any contacts with American intelligence agencies, even through any kind
of middlemen, roommates, etc. (It is well known that Shcharansky may have been unwittingly compromised by a KGB agent-provocateur who volunteered his own (the agent's) services to the CIA. The contact was later terminated by the CIA, but not after the damage had been done to Shcharansky, who had been his roommate.)

7. As a minimum, the US Government should always keep insisting that the imprisoned Helsinki Monitors be released. It has been said that Soviet negotiators at all European conferences would insert in their speeches a reference to the holding of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The idea finally prevailed at Helsinki. American negotiators should not leave any meeting with Soviet negotiators without saying "Furthermore, we declare that Orlov, Rudenko, Petkus, Kostava, Eduard Arutyunyan, and Anatoly Shcharansky must be liberated (liberandi sunt)." This may sound terribly boring, as Cato must have been boring even to the Romans, but it works in the end.

8. As a maximum the United States should already now consider the possibility that in a critical contingency—a scenario similar to that of Andrei Amalrik's—some or all of the Soviet republics we have discussed will secede and become independent. In a subcritical situation the United States cannot, of course, openly advocate the break-up of the Soviet Empire without this being considered a hostile act. But there is nothing to prevent the US Government from making long-range contingency plans in case events occur independently of any US action.
9. **Already now this country can prepare itself for the strong possibility that should the central power weaken, all three Baltic republics would immediately secede and become independent.** This appears to be taken for granted by Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Soviet Russian dissenters from the Democratic Liberal Center. The US should not, therefore, change its old policy of not recognizing *de jure* the incorporation in 1940 of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. As long as the *jure* recognition is not extended it provides an additional impetus for the Soviet Union for putting into practice its own constitutional provision on voluntary secession and for implementing Principle VIII of the Helsinki Final Act. 

10. **As far as the Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia are concerned, the US Government should, for the time being, as a minimum insist on national self-determination as specified in Principle VIII of the Final Act and as accepted by the Moscow Helsinki Group.** The present policy of the State Department is not to help those republics to secede while supporting the cultural, religious and similar individual human rights of their citizens, as per Helsinki Principle VII. This is perhaps a reasonable position for now, in a subcritical situation, while the Soviet Union appears to be very strong. But we feel it would definitely not be in the interest of the United States to hinder those nations from becoming independent if, in a different world situation, they should take their fate into their own hands. We feel at least one of them (the Ukraine) will do so in the not too distant future. The Georgians may also secede, the Armenians less likely. The very fact
that the normally anti-Turkish and, therefore, pro-Russian
Armenians, are beginning to seriously entertain the notion of
independence (in the United National Party) shows the growing
failure of Soviet nationality policy. America's true ally would
be a strong democratic Russia very roughly within the boundaries
of the present Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR)
not a huge multinational Empire with global aspirations, which can
only be fulfilled at the cost of suppressing democracy in Russia.

Finally, two organizational recommendations:

11. The mixed Congressional-Executive Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe should continue to enjoy the full support of
Congress and the Executive Branch. More specifically, it should
continue to be made part of the Helsinki review process as for
instance in the Madrid Review Meeting scheduled for November 1980.
On the whole, it has done a superb job. Prudence, however, may
dictate that the Commission do not attach too much importance to
investigating the US record of compliance with the Helsinki Final
Act. As an alternative, such investigations must be carefully
balanced with a no-holds-barred investigation of the Soviet and
East European records of compliance. Our society is open, their
societies are being kept as closed as possible.

12. Native or naturalized Americans of Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Georgian, Armenian, and Russian stock will continue to
participate in the American foreign policy process--this is an
inevitable outcome of the plural structure of the American body politic. They need not be particularly encouraged (if they are strong, they will assert themselves) but they must not be discouraged as a certain Secretary of State vainly tried to do in 1975. Their seeming preoccupation with their native countries or with the countries of their ancestors may sometimes appear trying to busy officials and the internal politics of the American ethnic groups may not always be edifying. (But what politics has ever been that?) But it should be borne in mind that they are loyal American citizens and that in building a living bridge to the peoples of the Soviet Union they may render this country a great service as they have already done in helping to sensitize Congressional and Executive Branch opinion to the importance of the members of the Helsinki Watch Committee.

To conclude:

In Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act the signatory states pledged "to confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field [of human rights]." Several score of brave men and women in Moscow, Kiev, Vilnius, Tbilisi, and Erevan have taken this pledge to heart and grievously suffered for it. It behooves us to help them to the full of our ability: they have sacrificed their freedom to transform the Soviet Union into a more democratic, liveable society. They are America's friends.