TITLE: Work Attitudes and Work Organization in the Soviet Union

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WORK ATTITUDES AND WORK ORGANIZATION IN THE SOVIET UNION

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Summary

Over the past two decades there is abundant evidence of Soviet concerns with the problems of job dissatisfaction and poor work morale. The evidence appears in a score of sociological studies of work attitudes and in the more "popular" periodical literature on labor problems. The kind of work discontent which is apparent, however, does not appear to be potentially "explosive" in nature. It manifests itself chiefly in indifferent job performance, poor work discipline, and high rates of job instability. Job dissatisfaction is not confined to any one sector of the work force, but the discontent of relatively highly educated young workers in routine, low-skilled jobs has been particularly troublesome. Continuing problems of poor work morale and lackadaisical job performance have elicited Soviet interest in Western experiments in work reorganization (work "enrichment" programs, job rotation, autonomous work teams), and initial steps have been taken to introduce a modest Soviet version of the "humanization of work." The urgency of mobilizing disciplined work commitment becomes all the more pressing as the Soviets enter a period of intensifying labor scarcity, in which economic growth becomes increasingly dependent on the growth of labor productivity rather than on additions to the work force.

The Emergence of Soviet Studies of Work Attitudes

The burgeoning of Soviet studies of workers' job attitudes is obviously much more than a mere "academic" exercise. It is a response to the reappearance of some old problems in a new setting, as well as to the emergence of unanticipated new ones. Among the old problems are excessive labor turnover and poor work discipline (absenteeism, lateness, intoxication on the job, refusal to follow superiors' orders). The traditional Soviet explanation for such behavior--namely, the difficulty of assimilating a mass of displaced peasants and their children to the unfamiliar discipline of factory work--is clearly no longer applicable. By the mid-seventies the younger generation employed in industrial work was increasingly a "hereditary" working class reared in urban surroundings and drawn largely from second or third generation workers' families. Why, then, should the old problems of job instability and poor discipline be at least as serious as they were when workers were recruited mainly from peasant backgrounds? Both the "scientific" and "practical" importance of this issue has been a stimulus to the study of job attitudes.

The earliest studies of work attitudes in the 1960s pointed to the emergence of a new source of tensions at the workplace. The new problem was the alleged "gap" between workers' increasing educational attainments and the comparatively low-skilled job tasks which many were forced to perform. Since this early warning there is little doubt that the rate of technological change has lagged behind the rate of growth in young workers' educational levels. By the late 1970s close to 4/5 or more of Soviet urban youngsters were receiving a "complete" secondary education (10-11 years of schooling), compared to less than 1/2 in the early 1960s. The
proportion of workers in "low-skilled manual and heavy physical work," however, declined much less rapidly and remained at more than 40% of the total in the late 1970s.

The problem was not only the relatively slow decline in strictly manual, "heavy" labor but the kind of machine-tending jobs that technological progress was creating. For a long time it had been an article of faith in the Soviet Union that the much heralded process of "mechanization and automation," by reducing the prevalence of low-skilled manual jobs, would be a source of job enrichment. It is now recognized that, whatever its long-run consequences, technological progress (particularly in the form of assembly-line operations) may impoverish the work experience by fragmenting and routinizing job tasks. Increasingly, "monotony" at work rather than the "heaviness" of manual labor becomes a source of job dissatisfaction.

The problem is complicated by recent changes in the traditional "career paths" open to secondary-school graduates. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the majority of youngsters completing secondary school could expect college admission and thus access to intelligentsia occupational status. With the "explosion" of secondary schooling in the 1970s, the situation changed markedly. By the end of the decade less than 1/5 of secondary-school graduates could expect admission to full-time college study. The normal career paths for such youngsters now meant entry into workers' jobs or lower-level nonmanual occupations. The "cooling-off" of the traditionally more ambitious career plans of secondary school graduates was not a painless process, and it could not help but affect--negatively--their attitudes toward the relatively low-skilled workers' jobs many were forced to enter.

These intensely "practical" issues which have stimulated Soviet studies of job attitudes have been reinforced by "ideological" considerations. In the Marxian view the approach of a communist society is expected to produce changes in customary perceptions of work. From "an externally imposed necessity," a "means to existence," work should increasingly be transformed into "an end in itself," an "inner need." Put somewhat differently, "intrinsic work satisfaction" is expected to replace satisfaction from the monetary rewards of work. It has become customary in the West to dismiss these concepts as so much empty rhetoric which few Soviet citizens take seriously. But under conditions in which Soviet authorities have encouraged the study of work attitudes as a means of solving more immediate labor problems, it would be surprising if Marxian categories--"alienated" labor, for example--did not provide an "independent" stimulus to the serious study of work. They have in the West.

The recent emergence of "social planning" in the Soviet Union has also served as a vehicle justifying the collection of information on workers' job attitudes. "Social planning" is essentially a code term for stressing the importance of the "human factor" in production and for taking steps to improve the "social-psychological climate" of the enterprise. It involves the formulation of a set of "social indicators" (or "social goals") of the enterprise's activity, one of which normally includes a targeted rise in the level of workers' job satisfaction. In the
job satisfaction. This was interpreted as signalling the approach of "communist labor," the attitude toward work as an "inner need." More recent studies have retreated from this position, recognizing that the subordinate role of wages (relative to work content) as a source of job satisfaction probably reflected the limited effectiveness of money wage differentials under conditions of widespread scarcities of consumer goods. With increased consumption opportunities in recent years, some studies of job attitudes have found that the "motivational significance" of material rewards has increased relative to job content in determining job satisfaction. For at least some workers the new world of consumption, rather than the familiar world of work, was becoming the sphere through which they could "find themselves"—hardly a sign of the approach of "communist labor."

Demographic Variables

Soviet women are substantially underrepresented in the more skilled workers' occupations and their average wage levels are much below those of male workers. But there is a striking contrast between the markedly unequal work roles of men and women on the one hand, and the relatively modest differences in their reported rates of job satisfaction on the other. These rates are of approximately the same order of magnitude for both sexes. Hence Soviet sociologists have concluded that at given occupational and wage levels "work satisfaction is generally higher among women than among men." Until recently the conventional explanation for this has been women's "lesser claims" on their work, their primary orientation to their household roles as wives and mothers, and consequently their limited aspirations for occupational mobility and intrinsically challenging work. But the late 1970s have seen a turning point in Soviet portrayals of women's orientation to work. One of the most serious Soviet investigators has concluded that "their demands (on their jobs—M.Y.) are now just as high as those of men." In the absence of reductions in sex-linked occupational segregation and earnings inequality, it is not surprising, therefore, that this investigator has found reduced job satisfaction in some "women's branches" of the economy (pp. 76-78).

Perhaps the most consistent finding in Soviet studies of job attitudes is that work discontent is substantially greater among young workers than among older ones. Taken alone, there is nothing unusual about this conclusion. The same results have been found in the United States and elsewhere. But the problem is not simply one of "normal" generational differences in work satisfaction. Job satisfaction rates among young workers are not merely "lower" than among older ones. They are also "low" in absolute terms (less than 50% in several studies) and are referred to as such. Nor can the concept of "normal" generational differences be readily reconciled with Soviet sociologists' references to the "serious social problems" and "social tensions" associated with young people's work dissatisfaction. Without seeking to oversimplify the issue, our judgement is that significant increases in young workers' educational levels, accompanied by relatively slow changes in job content and a traditionally authoritarian managerial style, are an important part of the problem.
Chapter I
The Emergence of Soviet Studies of Work Attitudes

The first serious studies of work attitudes in the Soviet Union were initiated in the early 1960's shortly after the official recognition of sociology as a distinct and legitimate intellectual discipline. Since then such studies have multiplied and become a principal component of the Soviet version of "industrial sociology" with its focus on the "social problems of labor." By the late 1970's some of the initial investigations were already being replicated in their original setting and new studies gradually encompassed an increasing range of occupational groups, technological environments and geographic locales. The quality of these studies is highly uneven. Some were obviously intended to serve primarily ideological rather than scientific ends. Others have been published in such bare summary form that it is impossible to assess their value. Nonetheless our judgment is that much can be learned about the nature of work and its discontents in the Soviet Union by a systematic appraisal of these studies and the public discourse which they have generated. This, of course, is the proposition which remains to be demonstrated below.

The Economic and Intellectual Environment

Although the initial studies were made possible by the legitimation of sociology, a number of factors in the economic and intellectual environment of the 1960's and 1970's were particularly conducive to the burgeoning of interest in the study of attitudes toward work. Some familiar labor market problems appeared in a new setting, and some troublesome
new ones emerged which had no obvious solutions—at least in the short run. But both the old and new problems made the period "ripe" for research on job attitudes.

(a) Excessive labor turnover and unsatisfactory work discipline, for example, were certainly not new problems. Indeed the Soviet literature on the labor market during the prewar five-year plans is dominated by a concern with precisely these issues. Moreover the common explanation for the emergence of these problems during the early years of the industrialization drive seemed a fairly obvious matter. New recruits to the rapidly expanding industrial working class were drawn largely from peasants and their children. As a retrospective survey of that period by a group of Soviet sociologists recently put it, the problem of assimilating a mass inflow of peasants and former rural residents, "divorced from the foundations of their everyday life and incapable of adapting immediately to an urban mode of life, led to . . . a decline in the level of urban industrial culture." By the 1960's and 1970's, of course, the situation had changed markedly. The process of "self-recruitment" of a "hereditary" working class was in full swing. In the mid-seventies the proportion of young workers (up to the age of 25) of peasant social origins was not more than 15% in such old industrial centers as Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov. Although this share might reach 40% or more in new industrial centers and construction sites, surveys of young industrial workers' social origins in a variety of geographic locales revealed that a distinct
majority were drawn from second or third generation working class families.\textsuperscript{2} Table I-1 illustrates the dominance of "self-recruitment" of young workers in a range of industrial areas in the mid-1970's. In the words of the study cited above, these were youngsters whose "exposure to the peculiarities of the industrial organization of work . . . to the rhythm of urban life, to the norms and values of the working class begins long before their direct introduction to work activity."\textsuperscript{3} Why, then, have the old problems of excessive labor turnover and poor work discipline re-emerged in a form that seems just about as intractable--if not more so--as when workers were recruited largely from a peasant milieu? Why should it be necessary, some one-half century after the start of the great industrialization drive, to continually stress the need to develop the most elementary habits of an industrial culture (punctuality, precision, stability on the job)?

We are not concerned here with establishing the exact dimensions of these problems. Suffice it to say that recent studies of actual labor turnover commonly refer to it as being "considerably in excess of its normal level," and that poor work discipline (absenteeism, coming late to work or leaving early, intoxication on the job, refusal to follow superiors' orders) is acknowledged to be the source of "great losses" to the economy.\textsuperscript{4} Nor are the answers to the questions posed above a complete mystery. Rather our point
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Origins b</th>
<th>Moscow Region</th>
<th>Urals</th>
<th>Bashkir ASSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-level nonmanual employees</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialists</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a This probably includes workers up to the age of 25.

b By occupational position of father.

is that during a period when Soviet authorities have decided to mobilize the social sciences—including sociology—to aid in the "scientific management of society," problems like turnover and discipline have made the study of the values which Soviet citizens attach to their work activity, their perceptions of and orientations to work, and the sources of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction a matter of both "practical" and "scientific" interest.

(b) The same is true of a relatively new problem which has attracted increasing attention since the mid-1960's—the alleged "gap" between workers' increasing educational attainments and the nature of the work tasks which many are forced to perform. Among the first to anticipate that this could be an increasingly serious problem were the pioneers of Soviet studies of work attitudes, A. G. Zdravomyslov and V. A. Iadov. In a 1967 volume which reviewed the results of a 1962-64 survey of young Leningrad workers they warned that a "disproportion" had already emerged between the expectations of young workers--fostered by prolonged schooling--for employment in "creative" or "high content" jobs, and the still limited opportunities for such employment, given the relatively backward state of Soviet technology. Moreover the problem could be expected to intensify as an increasing proportion of youngsters entered the work force with a "complete"
secondary education (normally ten or eleven years of schooling). In the years since this early warning the same theme has been frequently reiterated, and the idea that the rate of technological change since the early 1960's has lagged behind the rate of growth in educational attainments has been widely accepted in Soviet discussions of labor problems.

Whether the problem should be formulated as an "inflation" of education, however, and what its consequences have been for work attitudes and work performance has stirred considerable controversy among Soviet economists and sociologists. We review this controversy in some detail in ch. 3 below. What should be clear at this point is that there were solid grounds for concern about the difficulties of adapting a new breed of Soviet industrial workers to the kinds of jobs the economy was creating. The average years of schooling for a member of the work force increased by about 50% between 1959 and 1979, rising from approximately 6 years in 1959 to 7.5 in 1970, and to "more than" 9 in 1979. By the late 1970's, with the government's campaign to "universalize" a complete secondary education in full swing, more than 90% of the youngsters graduating from the 8th grade continued their schooling in the upper grades of secondary school (see Table I-2), with perhaps close to 4/5 or more attaining a complete secondary education, compared
to distinctly less than 1/2 in the early 1960's. If Soviet claims are anywhere near the truth, by the end of the 1970's the majority of workers in the 25 and under age group in most industrial sectors had attained ten years of schooling.

There is no simple way to compare these increases in educational attainments with changes in job characteristics and skill requirements. There is a crude measure, however, which both Western and Soviet economists have used as a rough indicator of the technological backwardness of Soviet industry and the continuing importance of "unattractive and heavy labor"—the proportion of workers performing their jobs "by hand, without the use of machinery and mechanisms." Although not all these jobs are unskilled, the relatively slow decline in such jobs (especially since the mid-sixties) is in striking contrast with the rapid increases in workers' educational attainments. The proportion of industrial workers employed in these strictly "non-machine" jobs changed as follows since the late 1950's (in %):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we add to these purely manual workers those whose jobs were only incidentally aided by "machines and mechanisms," the percentage of manual workers (as distinct from those whose
Table I-2

Proportions of Eighth-Grade Graduates Continuing Their Schooling in Educational Institutions Providing a "Complete" Secondary Education (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of secondary educational institution</th>
<th>Eighth-Grade Graduates Continuing Their Schooling (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daytime general education school (9th grade)</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening general education school (9th grade)</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized secondary school (a)</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary vocational-technical school (b)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All forms of secondary schooling</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) These schools provide training leading to semi-professional occupational status (technician, accountant, agronomist, nurse)

(b) These schools provide training for semi-skilled and skilled workers' occupations

jobs may be regarded as essentially mechanized) rises to some 40-50% of the total. A similar order of magnitude is also suggested by V. A. Iadov's remark at the end of the 1970's that "no less than 40% of workers in basic production perform low-skilled manual and heavy physical work which does not provide any particular scope for creativity."\textsuperscript{10}

The problem here is not simply the relatively rapid increase in young workers' educational levels in the face of a slow decline in the proportion of "low-content" jobs. It also involves the frustrations associated with the change in the traditional occupational destinations of secondary school graduates. Until the early 1960's the customary path followed by most youngsters with ten years of schooling was admission to a higher educational institution (VUZ) followed by attainment of intelligentsia ("specialist") occupational status upon graduation. This was made possible by the small contingent of youngsters receiving a full secondary education. Even in the early 1960's Soviet VUZy were able to absorb between 1/3 and 1/2 of secondary school graduates. With the explosion of upper-level secondary schooling later in the decade and throughout the 1970's the situation changed markedly. By the late 1970's no more than 1/5 of secondary school graduates could expect admission to full-time study at a VUZ (see Table I-3). For the great majority completion of secondary school was followed by entry into the labor
force and employment in workers' jobs (sometimes following a brief stint at a vocational school offering training in workers' trades) or in lower-level nonmanual occupations.

Table I-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>In % of daytime secondary school graduates</th>
<th>In % of total secondary school graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-53</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-63</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-73</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


But the process of transforming--more accurately, "deflating"--the traditional educational and career expectations of this group of Soviet youth was by no means a painless one. Abundant evidence drawn from studies of youngsters' "career plans" (or "vocational orientations") in the 1960's and early 1970's showed that a substantial majority of
those reaching the graduating classes of secondary schools hoped to continue a full-time schooling, usually at a VUZ, as a means of attaining "specialists'" occupational and social status. The fact that most were destined to be disappointed did not ease the task of adapting them to "careers" in working class occupations. Some accounts of this process have not hesitated to stress its demoralizing impact on a section of Soviet youth. The "shattering" of career plans was accompanied by the growth of "attitudes of scepticism, a weakening of belief in ideals." Youngsters "roamed" from one lower-level job to another, jobs which they regarded as "temporary evil" which had to be borne pending admission to a VUZ--which usually failed to materialize. By the late 1970's, however, a process we might loosely call "consciousness lowering" had apparently begun to take effect. Surveys of graduating secondary-school students began to report some moderation in the over-ambitious career and job expectations of Soviet youth. We may question, however, whether this process of submission to necessity has been wholly positive in its impact on job attitudes and work morale. For the moment our point is simply that the historical "descent" of secondary school graduates into workers' jobs is part of an economic setting which has been conducive to--and has provided raw materials for--the serious study of the values and attitudes associated with work activity.
(c) We referred above to the slow decline in the proportion of jobs performed "by hand, without the use of machinery and mechanism." But what about those subject to the continuing process of "mechanization and automation?"

One of the endlessly repeated dogmas in the popular--and sometimes in the more "academic"--literature is the notion that technological advance, with its reduction of heavy physical labor, is the ultimate solvent of the economic and social problems associated with the prevalence of low-skilled manual jobs. But a more serious current in the Soviet literature on labor problems has recognized the "contradictory" or "dual" consequences of new technology for the work process:

... in and of itself the acceleration of rates of mechanization and automation under present circumstances does not solve the whole problem of unskilled and low-skilled labor. ... New technology lightens labor, but in the course of doing so it frequently leads to the simplification of work operations and to a reduction in their intellectual content.

The view that "scientific-technical progress" is not an unmixed blessing has been most clearly expressed in connection with the extension of assembly-line operations in Soviet factories. In language that is highly reminiscent of earlier Western descriptions of this production technology, Soviet observers have portrayed it as subdividing the work process into highly fragmented, routine, and repetitive
operations, as increasing the monotony of work, and as required workers whose training for their "elementary operations" can be accomplished in a matter of days. In a word, technological change in the form of "conveyorization" often impoverishes the work experience. Hence the difficulty which some of the most technologically advanced Soviet auto assembly plants, including the much heralded Volga Automobile Plant, had in the early 1970's in recruiting and retaining "stable cadres" of workers. Nor is this simply a short-hand, stylized description of auto-assembly work. Similar accounts of the impact of productivity-increasing technological innovations in machine-building, watch manufacture, and oil drilling have also pointed to the reduction in "the richness of work content," i.e., in workers' skill requirements, that has sometimes accompanied this process.

Even the promise of automated technology--although typically proclaimed in glowing colors--is now recognized as having ambiguous consequences for the content of work and hence presumably for work attitudes. Not only does it create a new type of "worker-intellectual"; it also produces "button-pushers" whose work "does not require any intellectual powers." Some sociologists engaged in research on the new technology have warned that, at least in the near future, automated technology will increase
rather than reduce the number of monotonous types of jobs. The comparatively recent concern for the problem of monotony at work has been extended to "routine mental labor," which some observers now regard as no less harmful in its consequences than monotonous manual labor:

The operator sitting at a control panel does not directly see the results of his activity. He is separated from his colleagues and has very limited opportunity for communication. The more complicated the control panel the greater is the emotional strain which the work requires of the individual. The negative consequences of routine mental work are more profound than the similar consequences of monotonous physical work.

It is hard to believe that a large proportion of the Soviet work force will soon confront the fate of the employee at this control panel, or that if they did, they would reject it in favor of their present jobs. But the increasingly common acknowledgement that progress in "mechanization and automation" may have problematic consequences for the workers affected represents a move away from the simplistic technological optimism that for so long dominated Soviet visions of the future of work. It can hardly be accidental that studies of workers' reactions to their jobs have been encouraged, or at the very least, tolerated, as this optimism has begun to wane.

(d) One familiar but overriding feature of the Soviet labor market deserves at least brief mention at this point. Both the Soviet and Western literature suggest that
since at least the early 1970's it would be appropriate to characterize this market as a "seller's market." Although there is abundant evidence of padded employment rosters and underemployment of hired staffs, the overwhelming impression is one of widespread labor scarcity. As Holland Hunter puts it, "It is therefore literally true that apart from seasonal difficulties, unemployment scarcely exists in the Soviet economy." Moreover there is the expectation, also shared by Western specialists, that recent labor shortages will probably intensify as new additions to the labor force decline sharply in the 1980's. The relevance of this to our theme is that under such conditions the prospects for economic growth have become increasingly dependent on the growth of labor productivity. While none of the sociologists engaged in work attitude studies has claimed a simple functional relationship between work satisfaction and labor productivity, the urgency of increasing the latter under conditions of labor scarcity has been explicitly invoked to justify close attention to workers' job attitudes. Such attention seems all the more justified in light of the decline in annual productivity growth in industry from 6% in 1971-75 to 3.4% in 1976-79.

The Concept of "Social Planning"

The "practical" issues briefly outlined above have had their counterpart in the emergence of the concept of
"social planning." Essentially the same concept has appeared under a variety of rubrics, all stressing the urgency of planning the enterprise's "social development," its "social processes," its "social effectiveness." Emerging in the late 1960's, the Soviet literature on social planning as a supplement to economic planning has now reached sizable proportions and warrants a separate study. Our interest, however, is confined mainly to the manner in which social planning has served as a vehicle to promote the study of work attitudes and the factors which affect them. It has become part of the intellectual environment in which permissible public discourse on the problem of mobilizing work effort now proceeds.

It is not at all clear that social planning embodies a distinct institutional mechanism designed to implement a set of specific targets, or that it has made much difference in the actual functioning of Soviet economic enterprises. At the very least, however, it has introduced and popularized a new vocabulary in Soviet discussions of labor problems. At the most, it has introduced some new ideas which an optimist might regard as auguring institutional changes designed to better adapt individuals to their work roles, to improve their work performance, and indeed to create a heightened sense of participation in enterprise decision-making--in a word, to increase work satisfaction.
In the popular and not altogether precise language that often accompanies expositions of social planning it is represented as focusing on the "human factor" in production, as seeking to improve the social-psychological climate of the enterprise, and as having the "humanization of work" as a principal objective. In the more traditional Marxian terminology, while economic planning has largely meant planning the development of the "productive forces," with changes in the "relations of production" emerging as unplanned consequences, social planning seeks to directly affect the "relations of production." In more operational and modest terms this has meant the formulation of a set of "social indicators" of enterprise activity. A partial list of these indicators includes the following: (a) an improvement in the skill-mix of available jobs; (b) the provision of retraining facilities when required by the introduction of new technology; (c) increased outlays on occupational health and safety measures; (d) the specification of allocations from enterprise funds for housing child-care, and recreational facilities; (e) a rise in the level of workers' job satisfaction.

Although some of the literature on social planning has gone so far as to argue that its goals should be regarded as equivalent in "rank" to those of economic planning, it is difficult to believe that managerial personnel pressed to meet production, sales and profits targets share this view.
Whether these social indicators are taken seriously or not at the enterprise level must depend heavily on the extent to which they seem necessary to enhance work morale and job performance. And if they are taken seriously, their translation into realizable targets requires access to resources which have competing uses and which may be beyond the powers of an individual enterprise to acquire. What is of interest for our purposes, however, is not so much the still dubious reality of social planning, as some of the ideas which have emerged in connection with this concept.

The work of N. I. Lapin and his colleagues may serve as an illustration. For this group of sociologists the discussion of social planning becomes the occasion for exposition of a particular version of "organization theory" with a distinct role for studies of work attitudes. In highly compressed form the links in the argument are as follows. The problem of social planning requires analysis of the interaction between the individual and the organization. The production organization (economic enterprise) imposes certain demands on the behavior and abilities of individuals. These demands flow from the goals or objectives of the organization as a producing enterprise. The individual's "conformity" or "fit" to the requirements of the organization is expressed in his contribution to the realization of the organization's goals. This contribution is indicated by his labor productivity,
the quality of his output, his work discipline--essentially by his work performance. These "parameters of individual behavior" depend partly on the "objective conditions" established at the enterprise--the extent of mechanization of production processes, the pleasantness of working conditions, the system of work incentives. But the individual's contribution to the organization's goals also depend significantly on "subjective factors"--the extent to which he has accepted the "values and norms" of the organization and has a sense of being "included" or "integrated" in it.

By analogy, the individual confronts the organization with certain requirements of his own. The individual's goal in the organization is both the direct satisfaction of certain needs (for "work activity, prestige, communication with others, self-actualization") as well as obtaining the resources necessary for their satisfaction. Thus the "effectiveness of the organization with respect to the individual may be defined as the magnitude of the organization's contribution satisfaction of the to the individual's needs." The latter are distinguished in accordance with Maslow's theory of a "hierarchy of needs," with higher-level needs (for recognition, esteem, creativity) coming to the fore after lower-level physical and security needs are met. In this context the state of work discontent at the enterprise may serve as an important "parameter of social planning." It yields information signalling required
changes in the organization's "working conditions, managerial style, incentive system." The study of work attitudes thus becomes an instrument for improving the functioning of the organization.

Other industrial sociologists have stressed a somewhat different but related use for information on individuals' reaction to their work roles. For N. A. Aitov a principal problem is the need for "the social regulation of technological progress." Although the precise institutional mechanism for implementing this "social regulation" is not specified, Aitov's general point seems clear. The choice of technology should not be based on productivity considerations alone, without regard to its impact on workers' skills and job attitudes. In particular, "social regulation" is required to avoid the multiplication of low-skilled jobs for an increasingly educated work force. Recognizing that his proposal may require "more than one five-year plan" to implement, Aitov has urged that studies of work attitudes be used to design "a model of an optimal structure of implements of labor" geared to increasing workers' job satisfaction.

These discussions in the social planning literature, with their appeal for sensitivity to the "human factor" in production, may be regarded as an expression of a particular variant of Soviet managerial ideology. Information on work
attitudes and the source of work dissatisfaction is to be made available to "formulators of plans," to those who make decisions on the introduction of new technology, perhaps even to those who design it. The information itself is to be gathered by sociologists working jointly with the enterprise's "social organizations" (the Party, Komsomol and local trade union). There are no obvious signs of any recognition that workers may need distinctive institutional channels of their own for the formulation of their attitudes to the workplace and their own interests in "humanizing" it. Thus social planning and its acceptance of the need for monitoring job attitudes seem designed mainly to serve the purposes of a kind of enlightened managerialism grappling with the problems of improving work performance.

The Marxian Heritage

Thus far we have considered mainly those sources of Soviet interest in work attitudes which are rooted in recent labor market problems. What role, if any, has the Marxian vision of work activity played in Soviet studies of the work experience? Although a fuller answer will emerge as we review the Soviet studies in some detail below, for the moment we wish to do little more than to pose the question and suggest some broad outlines of an answer.
But even to raise the question may strike some as an idle or, at best, naive exercise. Isn't the main function of Marxism in the Soviet Union essentially to justify whatever policies the ruling authorities have decided to pursue, and to provide a kind of compulsory vocabulary in which to clothe intellectual discourse, especially in the social sciences? There is no need to dispute this widely shared view at this point except to note that it does not exhaust the uses of Marxism in the Soviet Union, particularly in studies of the meaning of work. What we should not ignore is the possibility that Marxian categories may lend themselves to research on work attitudes, and may even operate as a stimulus to such research—even in the Soviet Union.

In the West, of course, Marxian concepts have had a noticeable impact on studies of the work process and its psychological consequences. This is certainly the case in the United States, where the Marxian tradition has rarely been a major intellectual influence. We refer in particular to those studies which have taken the Marxian category of alienated labor seriously and have attempted to apply it in empirical investigations of the meaning of work. Starting from Marx's basic concept of alienation as the individual's loss of control over both the product and process of his work activity, these studies have sought to make it a more precise and operational concept by specifying a number of
dimensions or indices of alienation—for example, powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, self-estrangement. They have then examined the relationship between work in different technological settings (Robert Blauner), or work differing in scope for initiative, thought and independent judgement (Melvin L. Kohn), on the one hand, and the subjective experience of alienation on the other. 31

It would be strange, indeed, if Soviet sociologists did not draw in some way on this intellectual heritage in their own studies of the work process. In fact the applicability of the concept of alienated labor to Soviet conditions has been explicitly acknowledged since the early 1960's. 32 In its minimalist or "apologetic" version this acknowledgement takes the form of admitting that the socialization of productive property eliminates only the "economic foundations" of alienation, that "survivals" of alienated labor continue to exist and are rooted in the "immaturity" of the productive forces. The latter still require the kind of division of labor which confines workers to narrow specialties for a lifetime and generates substantial inequalities in rewards for work. The objective indicator of alienation appears in "the problem of dissatisfaction with work," which is confined largely to workers unaided by machinery or engaged in routine assembly-line operations. 33
The hallmark of this position is the identification of alienation with underdeveloped technology in the Soviet Union (but with private ownership of property in capitalist societies).

A more sophisticated and fruitful utilization of the Marxian framework appears in the major Soviet studies of the work process. The concept of alienation itself is only rarely explicitly invoked in these studies but some of the ideas traditionally associated with it are elaborated. Thus Zdravomyslov and Iadov distinguish between two basic orientations to work: (a) work activity as externally imposed necessity, as a means of satisfying needs external to the work process, and (b) work activity as an "inner need," an "end in itself" (samotsel'). The empirical question then becomes not simply establishing the levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with work, but determining the values attached to work activity. Attitudes toward work which are governed mainly by the material rewards associated with it point to the dominance of the first orientation. When work derives its meaning mainly from the content of the work process itself, or as Zdravomyslov and Iadov put it, from the opportunity it provides for initiative and creativity, the second orientation dominates. Thus the overcoming of alienated labor is not simply a matter of increased work satisfaction but of the perception of work as an inherently
rewarding, self-fulfilling activity. Progress toward "communist labor" would therefore be signalled by the increasing relative importance of "creative" work content (relative to money earnings) as the principal source of work satisfaction. Anticipating somewhat an interesting issue that will arise when we review the Soviet findings below, this way of projecting the vision of "communist labor" leaves open the possibility that this vision may either recede or come closer to realization with the passage of time.

This highly compressed and perhaps oversimplified summary of a Soviet effort to formulate the problem of work attitudes in Marxian terms should not obscure the possibilities inherent in the Marxian heritage for the serious study of the work experience. Whether the final product turns out to be mainly empty rhetoric, findings of scientific value, or some combination of both, should remain an open question.

The Soviet studies to which we now turn are, of course, mainly a response to immediate labor problems, not to a Marxian vision of unalienated work. But their findings have necessarily been "filtered" through some version of what has become an "official" state philosophy. How much can such studies reveal?
Footnotes

1 Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut mezhdunarodnogo rabocheho dvizheniia, Sotsial'noe razvitie rabocheho klassa SSSR, Moscow, 1977, pp. 22-23.


3 Akademiia nauk SSSR, pp. 21-22.


8 F. R. Filippov, Vseobshchee srednee obrazovanie v SSSR, Moscow, 1976, p. 63 reports that the number of secondary school graduates in 1975 was 88% of the number beginning first grade 10-11 years earlier. The comparable figure for 1965 was 45%.

9 L. Bliakhman in Sotsialisticheskii trud, 1979, No. 10, p. 64.

10 The figures for purely manual jobs are from Akademiia obshchestvennykh nauk pri TsK KPSS, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy nauchno-teknicheskoi revoliutsii,

A partial listing of these studies and their findings appears in M. Kh. Titma, Vybor professii kak sotsial'naia problema, Moscow, 1975, pp. 112-113.

11 M. N. Rutkevich, editor, Zhiznennye plany molodezhi, Sverdlovsk, 1966, p. 35. For a more recent formulation of the tendency of secondary school graduates to regard their initial jobs mainly as "trampolines for springing to a VUZ," see V. P. Kochikian, p. 105.


13 V. Churbanov, "The Young Worker and Low-Content Work," Molodoi kommunist, 1972, No. 6, p. 66.


15 G. Slutskii and G. Shestakova, p. 57.

16 G. Slutskii and G. Shestakova, p. 57.


18 "Man and His Work, Fifteen Years Later," Znanie-sila, 1979, No. 10. This is a report of an interview with V. A. Iadov.


20 Ibid., p. 4.


26 N. I. Lapin et al., p. 109.

27 N. I. Lapin et al., pp. 131-137.

28 N. A. Aitov, p. 112.

29 N. A. Aitov, p. 113.

30 N. I. Lapin et al., p. 137.


33 A. A. Zvorykin, Filosofia i nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress, Moscow, 1965, pp. 35-38.

34 Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Chelovek, pp. 21-27, 131.
Chapter II

Work Attitudes: Conceptual Issues
and Initial Findings

One of our principal objectives here is a systematic review of the available evidence on Soviet work attitudes. But we are also interested in the intellectual discourse which has accompanied Soviet studies in this area, particularly the elements of controversy which have emerged. How have Soviet sociologists responded to their own findings? To what extent have these findings been used as vehicles for proposing changes in the organization of work? How has Soviet thought on the significance of work attitudes and the techniques for assessing them evolved since the early 1960's? Thus our concern throughout is not only with the perception of the work experience as revealed in Soviet studies of job attitudes but in the impact of these studies on the public discussion of problems of work morale and performance. Obviously we refer only to the kind of discussion that surfaces in published form.

The Conceptual Apparatus

The initial investigation of Leningrad workers' job attitudes by Iadov and Zdravomyslov in the early 1960's has had a profound impact on all subsequent Soviet
studies of the work experience. In some cases these later efforts have sought to replicate, in whole or in part, the approach of the Leningrad study in other geographic locales. In other cases, where the analytical categories and general approach have departed somewhat from those used in the early Leningrad study, the sociologists involved nevertheless seemed to be "building on" and responding to this pioneering work. Thus even if its findings are necessarily dated by now, a brief examination of the conceptual apparatus and structure of the Iadov and Zdravomyslov study may serve as a useful introduction to our review of the larger body of Soviet work in this area.

The Leningrad study developed four indicators of work attitudes. One of these was an "objective" indicator in the sense that it was based on an assessment of the respondents' work performance rather than their "subjective" reactions to their work roles. The assumption was that "real attitudes" would be reflected in workers' behavior in production activity. Performance ratings supplied by supervisors included information on workers' productivity (norm fulfillment) and quality of work, "discipline and conscientiousness," and "initiative." These ratings were combined to derive a typology of work-performance groups ranging from "best" to "worst." This method of gauging work attitudes has not played a significant role in most subsequent
Soviet studies, possibly because the association between "objective" and "subjective" indicators was a rather tenuous one, and interest was focused chiefly on the latter indicators. We mention it here to suggest something of the wide range of the Leningrad study, but also because Iadov and Zdravomyslov drew on the "objective" indicator to formulate a conception of "communist work." One of the elements in this "objective" indicator of work attitudes, it will be recalled, was the degree of initiative exercised by the worker. For these Leningrad sociologists, "...the most characteristic trait of the communist attitude toward work is the initiative of the worker expressed in his active participation in the rationalization of production, in his readiness to propose ways of improving work organization..." Initiative means a readiness to "...act against routine in the organization of work, against outmoded technology." This formulation will be worth recalling when we turn later to the policy implications of Soviet work attitude studies.

More important for our purpose at present and for their influence on subsequent studies of work attitudes were some of the "subjective" indicators developed by Iadov and Zdravomyslov. There were three such indicators: (a) satisfaction with work, (b) satisfaction with "specialty" (occupation), and (c) workers' evaluations of the "social value" of work. In contrast to the "objective" indicator, responses
here were obtained directly from the sampled workers by means of questionnaires administered by the team of sociologists.

Of the two satisfaction indicators, satisfaction with work has played the larger role in Soviet studies and we may focus our attention on this measure. Workers' responses in the Leningrad study could range from "highly satisfied" to "highly dissatisfied." They could also choose the option "I am indifferent to my work," and as we shall see a fair number did so. There were additional "control questions" designed to eliminate from the "satisfied" category those workers who expressed satisfaction with work but also indicated that they wanted to change jobs, or would not return to their current jobs if for some reason they were temporarily absent from work. Such workers were classified as having given "contradictory answers" rather than as being satisfied with work. In addition to these general (or "facet-free," in the language of similar American studies) work satisfaction questions, the worker-respondents were asked to rate more than a dozen specific facets of their work situation. The objective here was to isolate the particular job characteristics which contributed to overall work satisfaction or discontent, with special stress on the relative importance of "work content" versus "material rewards." The attempt to assess the relative impact of these factors on work attitudes became an abiding theme in future studies. It should be
apparent from this brief summary that the Leningrad project was a carefully conceived and executed piece of research. Little wonder that the studies which followed should have regarded it as a model to emulate, although relatively few—if any—seem to have matched its standards.

The last of the "subjective" indicators—perceptions of the "social value" of work—was something of a misnomer. What Iadov and Zdravomyslov had in mind here was essentially the worker's conception of a "good job" rather than an explicit evaluation of his current one. The questions were formulated in such a way that the possible answers could fall somewhere between the two extremes of (a) "a good job is any job that pays well," to (b) "a good job is one where you are most useful and needed." This was an attempt to identify the values which workers bring to their jobs or which they develop on the job. Clearly, the answers had implications for assessing the prevalence of "communist attitudes" toward work. However these were to be defined, they obviously would not be characterized by the identification of a good job as "any job that pays well." In more recent years the study of values associated with work activity has moved beyond the rather narrow formulation found in the Leningrad study, but it was the latter which initially posed this issue as an appropriate one for empirical investigation.
Since much of the discussion which follows focuses on various aspects of the work satisfaction studies it is important to ask how "work satisfaction" is conceptualized in the Soviet literature. Assuming it can be properly measured, what does it reveal? How important a measure is it? Why should it be studied? Directly or indirectly, all of these questions have been confronted in the Soviet literature but the answers have not always been the same.

Given the long-standing Soviet concern with improving workers' job performance it should come as no surprise that some of this literature has stressed a "productionist" justification for job satisfaction studies. In its clearest form this approach regards information on work satisfaction (dissatisfaction) as primarily a means of ascertaining available "reserves for increasing labor productivity." While a concern with productivity is never entirely absent in Soviet job attitude studies this formulation would undoubtedly be regarded as simplistic by the more sophisticated Soviet investigators. For Iadov and Zdravomyslov, to identify the study of work attitudes with the search for sources of increased labor productivity represented a kind of narrow "utilitarianism" unworthy of a socialist society. At least in their earlier work these sociologists stressed that the significance of work satisfaction "goes far beyond the limits of purely production problems." It impinges on
the "psychic health" of the population, on the whole moral tone of the society. As for its direct impact on worker productivity, their own studies as well as those of American researchers (here they cited the work of Frederick Herzberg) had found that job satisfaction is "quite weakly correlated with the results of work." This rejection of the simple "productionist" approach simultaneously restricted and enlarged the significance of work satisfaction.

Perhaps the most common Soviet formulation of the general concept of work satisfaction regards it as reflecting the prevailing "balance" between workers' needs associated with laboring activity and the opportunities for their realization. Viewed in this way, a high level of job satisfaction among a particular group of workers is not necessarily an unambiguous blessing. To be satisfied with unskilled or monotonous work bespeaks an impoverishment of the individual's needs and interests. Similarly, the existence of a certain amount of work dissatisfaction is not invariably an unhealthy state of affairs. When it reflects a high level of unfulfilled "claims" which people make on their work, it may generate a kind of creative tension leading to desirable changes at the work place. Thus the degree of satisfaction or discontent should never be assessed in isolation, but always in relation to workers' "claims," "needs," "interests." Where the Soviet literature
specifies the needs whose satisfaction may be either blocked or realized at the work place the list is a wide-ranging one: from "physiological (elementary) needs" to "social and spiritual needs," with the latter category including--in part--"friendship, prestige and recognition, autonomy... creativity, cognitive and esthetic experience." Once the qualifications indicated above are recognized, most Soviet students of work attitudes would probably agree with the authors of a recent handbook on industrial sociology that an increase in job satisfaction over time signifies "progressive changes" in the position of the worker and the organization of production.  

One of the ideas recognized by some Soviet investigators, particularly N.F. Naumova, is that the level of job satisfaction is not only a response of the individual to his own work situation (given the "richness" or "poverty" of his needs and interests), but also reflects his evaluation of his relative position in the work organization or even in the society at large. Why is it that the job satisfaction of a group may remain essentially unchanged although its conditions of work and pay have improved? Partly because there may have been parallel changes in "neighboring" occupational groups. "An individual's conviction that he has less of something than others is much more important for him than the fact that he has more of it than he had yesterday
or ten years ago. Similarly, a process of reliance on traditional "group norms" or "criteria of normalcy" may explain a somewhat different phenomenon: a group's unexpectedly high level of job satisfaction in jobs characterized by "objectively" poor working conditions. Occupational groups in which women predominate—Naumova cites agricultural laborers as an example—may serve as an illustration of this mechanism. The pressure of conventional "group norms" operates to predispose them to accept as "normal" their current work roles. Essentially the same point is made by sociologists who invoke workers' limited knowledge of alternative employment opportunities (or the incapacity to imagine them) as a source of satisfaction with (or at least acceptance of) low-ranking jobs.

Perhaps the most direct challenge to any simplistic interpretation of work satisfaction—whether in the form of the "productionist" fallacy or the view that "the more satisfied the better"—has appeared in some of the later writings of V.A. Iadov. He has sought to redirect the concern of attitude studies to the characteristics of the employing organization, for "the level of satisfaction reveals only the level of adaptation of the worker to the given organization, nothing more." Adaptation, in turn, signifies the worker's assimilation of the "occupational and organizational requirements associated with his work activity...." What
requires study and evaluation, therefore, is the nature of organizational arrangements and the kinds of demands they make on employees. High levels of satisfaction can be expected when there is a close "fit" between workers' needs ("dispositions" in Iadov's more recent work) and the organization's demands. Thus a critical question is whether the latter provide scope for "initiative and creativity," or do they call largely for the mere "execution of tasks (ispolnitel'nost) and punctuality?" At the risk of reading more into this formulation than was intended, we are inclined to emphasize its special importance under Soviet circumstances. By stressing the responsibility of the employing "organization" for both workers' job satisfaction and their productive performance it leaves the door open for a wider range of policy responses than the more traditional reliance on technological advance. Opportunities for more satisfying and more productive work need not wait only on the promise of further "mechanization and automation."

It would obviously be an exaggeration to claim that Soviet sociologists have developed a comprehensive "theory" of job satisfaction. Enough has been said, however, to suggest that their studies of work attitudes have gone beyond the mere tallying of "do you like your job or not" responses. But what about the general reliability of responses to work-attitude questions under Soviet conditions?
Can they be taken seriously? Investigators in Western settings have long been sensitive to the pitfalls of relying on self-reporting of job attitudes. Mechanisms of self-deception, ego-defense and social pressure tend to bias responses in favor of job satisfaction. As a recent study for the OECD by Jack Barbash puts it:

> Job satisfaction is so closely tied in with one's self-esteem that the respondent may not be really answering the question as to whether or not he is satisfied with his job so much as whether or not he feels his life has been worthwhile...What is being measured in part may not be satisfaction in work but a deep need in the worker to say that he has found some acceptable accommodation with his environment.

Are not these problems of reliability likely to be magnified in the Soviet environment? Quite apart from pressures on respondents, are not the pressures on the sociologist-investigator to stress the prevalence of "positive" work attitudes so overwhelming that any substantial evidence of work discontent is likely to be concealed?

Although a more complete response to these objections will emerge as the study proceeds, some preliminary remarks are in order here. What Soviet studies are or are not permitted to reveal is not something to be decided a priori. There are institutionalized channels through which Soviet workers regularly express their attitudes toward their jobs. They change them, and do so with a frequency that has long disturbed
Soviet authorities. But at least in recent years the latter have not imposed serious obstacles to free movement in the labor market. Under such conditions it would be surprising if workers felt unduly inhibited in the self-reporting of job attitudes. Moreover our interest is not primarily in determining "absolute" levels of work satisfaction--which would be a problematic undertaking under any conditions--but in a whole range of related questions: occupational and demographic differences in perceptions of work, the role of specific job characteristics in explaining variations in work attitudes, the use of work-attitude surveys in public discourse and policy discussions. None of this is meant to deny that the sources of distortion which Western investigators have pointed to in their own studies also exist in a Soviet setting, or that Soviet investigators rarely ask certain important types of questions (for example, questions relating to possible conflicts of interests between workers and managers), or that sociologists must be politically sensitive in reporting their findings. The major problem of relying on the Soviet data, however, lies elsewhere--the limited availability of experienced, professionally competent Soviet investigators with the technical expertise to design and execute work-attitude surveys in a manner that approaches "scientific" standards. We can do little more at this point than to indicate our awareness of all these
problems and urge the reader to postpone deciding whether we have been "taken in" until the uses made of Soviet data in this study become apparent.

Some Initial Findings

We may begin at the most general level, with indicators of overall work satisfaction and dissatisfaction. There is no need to burden the reader with excessive detail on Soviet data problems but a word on the available sources and their limitations may be useful. We are unaware of any Soviet "macro" studies based on national samples. All the available surveys apply to particular localities, in some cases to individual plants. The respondents in most surveys are confined to the "workers" (rabochie) occupational category. In some cases only engineering-technical personnel were surveyed, and in a few others representatives of all major occupational groups (from common laborers to higher-level managers) were included. We confine our attention here to non-agricultural jobs. In addition to "satisfied" or "dissatisfied" responses most surveys include an "other" option which may encompass one or a combination of the following: "indifferent," "can't answer," "indeterminate," "contradictory answer."

The results of more than a dozen such surveys are brought together in Table II-1 (derived from the "raw" data
in Appendix Table A-1). Although these findings exhibit considerable variation at the extremes, there is a readily observable clustering of responses in most surveys. Among worker-respondents—barring a couple of extreme cases—approximately 1/2 to 2/3 normally reported satisfaction with their jobs, with the more typical satisfied proportion falling closer to the lower end of this range. In those studies which included nonmanual occupational categories the proportion of satisfied respondents was usually somewhat higher—on the order of 60% to 80% in five out of six surveys. In none of the cases summarized in Table II-1 was the proportion of respondents indicating satisfaction with work in excess of 80%. Where the "highly satisfied" could be distinguished from the total satisfied, the former category generally accounted for some 1/5 to 1/3 of all respondents, reaching 50% in only one case (see Appendix Table A-1). What about the dissatisfied? Aside from one unusually blissful sample of automobile industry workers in a 1974 study reporting a dissatisfaction rate of less than 5%, the proportion of respondents dissatisfied with their jobs ranged from 1/10 to 1/3 of those questioned. A dissatisfaction rate of close to 20% or more was not unusual.

What are we to make of these initial findings? It would be foolish, of course, to attach much significance to any comparison of this scattering of local Soviet studies—
Table II-1
Summary of Responses in Soviet Job Satisfaction Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Scope of Sample</th>
<th>Response categories (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workers</td>
<td>1962-64</td>
<td>2665 workers up to age 30, Leningrad industrial enterprises</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>833 workers, Perm industrial enterprises</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>approximately 3000 workers, Kishine Tractor Plant</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>878 workers, Volga Auto Plant</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>37% of workers up to age 28, Angarsk Oil-Chemical Combine</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>workers in Kazakhstan industrial enterprises:</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- mining metallurgical combine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- cotton-textile combine</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- meat-packing combine</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972-74</td>
<td>workers in oil industry:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Glavtiumenneftgaz association</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Sakhalinneft association</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>385 workers in 4 auto plants (a)</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table II-1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Scope of Sample</th>
<th>Response categories (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineering-technical personnel</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2083 engineering-technical personnel, Bashkir republic industrial enterprises and design bureaus</td>
<td>satisfied 73.2, dissatisfied 26.8, other -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1965-70</td>
<td>2696 engineering-technical personnel, Leningrad industrial enterprises and research organizations</td>
<td>satisfied 62.8, dissatisfied 27.3, other 9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>218 engineers, Leningrad design and research organizations</td>
<td>satisfied 79.4, dissatisfied 13.2, other 7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed occupational groups</td>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>5000 workers and non-manual employees to age 28, auto and tractor industry</td>
<td>satisfied 49, dissatisfied 29, other 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>workers and non-manual employees, Odessa ship repair plant and port</td>
<td>satisfied 59.1, dissatisfied 10.2, other 29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4000 workers and non-manual employees, urban residents in Moldavia</td>
<td>satisfied 63.5, dissatisfied 14, other 22.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For detail on sources and notes see Appendix Table A-1.

(a) These figures are derived by taking a simple average of those shown separately for automated and non-automated work in Appendix Table A-1.
representing the early stages of Soviet efforts to measure work attitudes—with the results of the carefully designed national surveys conducted in the United States by organizations with a tradition of attitude surveys. But even the crudest of such comparisons cannot help but confront one striking point: Soviet respondents seem somewhat more restrained in expressing satisfaction with work and at least as willing to report job dissatisfaction as their American counterparts.

In a review of national surveys conducted in the United States through the early 1970's, George Strauss summarized their finds as follows: "In the typical study, only 10-20% of those who reply report that they are dissatisfied with their jobs." Essentially the same result is suggested by the recent studies of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center (Table II-2) which reported rates of job satisfaction on the order of 85 to 90%. Unlike most American studies the Soviet surveys have a sizable "other" category in addition to "satisfied" and dissatisfied." Removing it from the percentage base would obviously raise the proportion of "satisfied" Soviet respondents (although it would leave this proportion at less than 80% in most cases), but it would do the same to the "dissatisfied," and we have seen that the latter already approximates or exceeds the corresponding proportion typically found in American studies.
Table II-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>very satisfied</th>
<th>somewhat satisfied</th>
<th>not too satisfied</th>
<th>not at all satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2088</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2281</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whatever the limited representativeness of the available Soviet studies (younger age groups are clearly overpresented), whatever the inter-country differences in techniques of measurement, would it be naive to suggest: (a) that the relatively high rates of job dissatisfaction reported in the Soviet studies represent a "real" rather than accidental phenomenon, and (b) that they are in part related to the chronically "tight" state of the Soviet labor market and the widespread consciousness of alternative job opportunites engendered by relatively full employment?

What is clear, in any case, is that the percentage of Soviet respondents reporting explicit dissatisfaction with work tends to understate the frequency of what might reasonably be regarded as "negative" work attitudes--at least by Soviet standards. A "truer" measure of such attitudes may be derived by combining the overtly dissatisfied and the "indifferent." If the former includes mainly those who are poorly adapted to their employing organization, the latter embraces those whose adaption takes the form of apathy or passivity. A society which proclaims work activity as the "decisive" sphere of life, as "the highest moral value," cannot easily regard open expressions of indifference to work with equanimity. For the more vigilant Soviet interpreters such attitudes represent "survivals of alienation of labor in pure form," a characteristic sign of the psychology of individualism" and more
disturbing evidence of survivals of "old attitudes toward work" than overt job dissatisfaction. All the more significant, therefore, that a few surveys of job attitudes have included "indifferent" as an option for respondents. Where this has been done it has not been unusual for the combination of "dissatisfied" and "indifferent" responses to reach some 35-40% of the total (see Table II-3). There are good reasons for Soviet investigators to couple the dissatisfied and the indifferent. Compared to the satisfied, both groups are less likely to take on "social assignments" (to participate in the work of Party, Komsomol and trade union organizations), to attend political education lectures, to read newspapers regularly. Apparently indifference to work (and work dissatisfaction) "spills over" to other indicators of social integration.

Western studies of work attitudes have sometimes utilized indirect measures of job satisfaction to supplement the more direct indicators of "satisfied" and "dissatisfied." Such indirect measures may include the respondent's readiness to seek alternative employment or to recommend his own work to a friend or his children. Some Soviet studies have done the same and, not surprisingly, the indirect measures reveal more widespread dissatisfaction (or less "adaption") than the direct. Here, for example, is a Soviet report on work attitudes in two building material plants in Estonia in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location and type of sample</th>
<th>total, dissatisfied</th>
<th>in-different</th>
<th>and in-different</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-64</td>
<td>workers in Leningrad industrial enterprises</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>varied occupational groups in auto and tractor industry</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>workers in Perm industrial enterprises</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>workers at Volga Auto Plant</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>workers in Kazakhstan industrial enterprises:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-mining-metallurgical combine</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-cotton-textile combine</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-meat-packing combine</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For sources and notes see Appendix Table A-1.
which less than 1/5 of the employees voiced overt "dis-
satisfaction" with their jobs (the coupled figures in each
case refer to the two separate plants):

...to the question, 'Would you return to the same job
if you were far from your factory and could choose
your place of work with complete freedom?' 38.2% and
41.6% of the respondents answered negatively. A large
part of the respondents, 45% and 47.4% respectively,
wanted to change their place of work in the future...
75% and 76.7%...of the respondents did not want to
see their son (daughter) in their own jobs, and 52.7%
and 48.2% did not want him/her to work at their plant.
This does not mean direct dissatisfaction with one's
work or plant, but it does suggest that these have not
become close (blizkami) for a large proportion of the
respondents.

Indirect measures of job dissatisfaction (or the
degree of "distance" between oneself and one's current job)
in other available studies point in the same direction—
namely, they are considerably in excess of direct measures.
There is much that Soviet respondents and the sociologists
who report their preceptions of work may conceal, but neither
group seems particularly inhibited in reporting negative
job attitudes. Perhaps this augurs well for our further
examination of Soviet perceptions of the work experience.

**Occupational Differences**

Whatever the ambiguities in the concept, most
Soviet and American observers would probably agree with the
view that job satisfaction is a "desired, valued, and unequally
distributed outcome of work." In the United States some
students of the subject have sought to assess the extent of class and occupational differences in job satisfaction. Nothing quite so ambitious can be attempted on the basis of the available Soviet materials. But it is clear that there are substantial inequalities in job satisfaction within the broad engineering-technical category and within working class occupations. Some of the available evidence is brought together in Table II-4.

Engineering-technical personnel encompass a highly diversified group of jobs ranging from shop foremen to higher-level managerial positions. Rates of job satisfaction within this group increase markedly as we move up the hierarchy from foreman (with less than 1/2 reporting job satisfaction in a Leningrad study in the late 1960's) to researcher (66% satisfied) and "group chief" (81%). A roughly similar picture of marked inequalities emerges in Iadov's 1970 study of Leningrad design and research organizations in which more than 1/5 of engineers reported job dissatisfaction while less than 5% of "chief engineers" did so. Some of these classifications, of course, are really job titles rather than distinct occupational groups, but the data clearly point to substantial differences between "higher" and "lower" positions in the occupational hierarchy. Among the lower positions in the engineering-technical category--foreman, for example, or even engineer--job satisfaction rates do not appear to differ
### Table II-4

Job Satisfaction Indicators for Selected Occupational Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Occupational Groups</th>
<th>% satisfied</th>
<th>% dissatisfied</th>
<th>index of satisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965-70</td>
<td>Engineering-technical personnel, Leningrad industrial enterprises and research organizations</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- group chiefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- researchers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- technologists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- foremen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Engineers, Leningrad design and research organizations</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- chief engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- group chiefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-64</td>
<td>Workers to age 30, Leningrad industrial enterprises</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- skilled manual workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- workers combining operation and adjustment of automatic equipment</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- assembly line workers</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- unskilled and low-skilled laborers</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Kishinev Tractor Plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- control panel operators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- skilled manual workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- low-skilled laborers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- assembly line workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Volga Auto Plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- skilled manual workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- assembly line workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Alma-Ata Cotton Textile Combine</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- workers on maintenance and repairs of machinery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- unskilled laborers</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table II-4 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Occupational Groups</th>
<th>% satisfied</th>
<th>% dissatisfied</th>
<th>index of satisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-76</td>
<td>State farms, Kazakhstan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-production intelligentsia</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;specialists&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-construction workers</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-skilled workers on agricultural machinery</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-unskilled laborers</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 1962-64 study of Leningrad workers from Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Chelovek, p. 386; figures for state farm personnel in Kazakhstan from Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, Institut filosofii i prava, Nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revoliutsiia i dukhovnoi mir cheloveka, Alma-Ata, 1979, p. 297; all others from sources indicated in Appendix Table A-1.

Notes: (a) 1 = highest possible score and -1 = lowest possible score; derived by assigning a value of +1.0 to the highly satisfied, +.5 to the somewhat satisfied, 0 to the indifferent, -.5 to the somewhat dissatisfied, -1.0 to the highly dissatisfied, and dividing the resulting sum by the number of respondents.
much from those of the more skilled working-class occupations.

Perhaps the most consistent finding in this area is that unskilled laborers and assembly line workers exhibit the lowest satisfaction ratings among working-class occupations, well below those for skilled manual workers and workers employed in the maintenance and repair of machinery. Unskilled laborers are the only occupational group in which the proportion of respondents expressing overt dissatisfaction with work exceeds the proportion satisfied (see Table II-4). These results are hardly surprising, but they have played an important role in Soviet discussions of the sources of job satisfaction and discontent. One reason for this was the finding that the most dissatisfied occupational groups were not always the lowest paid. Iadov and Zdravomyslov were particularly impressed by the fact that the relatively highly-paid low-skilled laborers in their sample of young Leningrad workers exhibited the lowest indicators of job satisfaction among six occupational groups. Similarly, the study of the Kishinev Tractor Plant some years later found that assembly line workers, the most dissatisfied with their jobs among five occupational groups, were among the highest paid workers at the plant. Such findings clearly had a bearing on Soviet discussions of the important issue of intrinsic versus extrinsic sources of work satisfaction, to which we now turn.
Work Content, Wages and Job Attitudes

What job attributes make work satisfying or dissatisfying in the Soviet work environment? The problem of distinguishing the separate effects of different job characteristics on overall work attitudes is a difficult one under any conditions, but it assumes special importance under Soviet circumstances. Knowledge of workers' reactions to specific facets of the job environment is not only a "management tool," a means of better adapting them to their current work roles. It is also a way of gauging the extent to which the underlying meaning of work has changed, if at all, in the direction of "communist labor." Does work continue to be perceived primarily as a "means to life," with workers oriented mainly to the material rewards associated with their work activity? To what extent has it become an "inner need," an "end in itself," with workers oriented mainly to job content, to the work process itself as a rewarding activity? Thus there are good reasons, rooted both in management practice and in ideology, for Soviet investigators to have moved beyond merely establishing general levels of job satisfaction to inquire into their specific sources in the work environment. As noted earlier, our concern is not only with the findings of Soviet studies but with the elements of controversy and changing views which have emerged.

As in almost everything else, most Soviet investigators
of workers' reactions to particular facets of their jobs have been guided by the procedures used in the Leningrad study of the early 1960's. Given the extensive reliance on these procedures, a brief review of the Leningrad methods will be helpful here. Iadov and Zdravomyslov asked their young worker-respondents to rate a variety of "elements of the work situation." These elements or job attributes included such matters as wages, relations with co-workers, job content, opportunities for skill advancement, management's attitude toward workers, sanitary and hygienic conditions on the job. The possible ratings for each element were confined to "positive," "negative," or "neutral" (no answer). Quantitative ratings or scores for each job attribute were derived by deducting the number of negative responses from the positive, and dividing the result by the total number of workers questioned. Thus the numerical ratings could range from +1 to -1. The ratings were derived separately for workers who had expressed overall job satisfaction and those who reported dissatisfaction, and the differences between the ratings of each element by these two groups were then obtained. Table II-5 shows the ratings of the 14 job attributes used in the Leningrad study.

The principal objective of this procedure was to identify those specific factors in the work experience (the "elements of the work situation") which most sharply
Table II-5

Ratings of Various Elements of the Work Situation by Leningrad Workers Satisfied and Dissatisfied With Their Jobs, 1962-64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Work Situation</th>
<th>Satisfied with Job</th>
<th>Dissatisfied with Job</th>
<th>Divergence in Ratings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The work requires mental effort or doesn't require one to think</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good or bad pay</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity for raising one's skill or not</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety or monotony in work</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good or poor work organization</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management's attitude is attentive or not</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of final product an attractive feature or not</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work is physically over-tiring or not</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment in good shape or not</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good or poor safety equipment</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good or bad sanitary and hygienic conditions</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convenient or inconvenient shift</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular or irregular flow of work</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good or poor relations with co-workers</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Chelovok, p. 177.
differentiated the satisfied from the dissatisfied, i.e., those elements whose ratings by these two groups exhibited the greatest divergences. The differences in the ratings of a particular job attribute showed the connection "between job satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) as a whole and the particular element of the work situation." These differential ratings were regarded as indicators of the "motivational significance" of the various job attributes.

A factor like "relations with co-workers," since it was rated positively by the dissatisfied as well as the satisfied, could not be expected to have a sizable differentiating effect on the overall work attitudes of the two groups. The same was true of workers' perception of "sanitary and hygienic conditions," but for a different reason. This factor received a relatively low rating by the satisfied (in some Soviet studies a negative rating) as well as by the dissatisfied. The set of work characteristics exhibiting the most clear-cut differential ratings by the satisfied and dissatisfied included wages, work content ("does the job require mental effort?"); opportunities for skill advancement, and variety in work. These were the job attributes Iadov and Zdravomyslov had in mind when they noted that "satisfaction with certain elements of the work situation corresponds here to satisfaction with work as a whole, and...dissatisfaction with these elements signifies dissatisfaction with work."
Of these elements, work content ranked at the top. Hence the conclusion of Iadov and Zdravomyslov that "the most important feature influencing the degree of work satisfaction (and correspondingly, the most important motive of labor) is the content of work activity." 29

We are not concerned for the moment with the somewhat shaky grounds for this conclusion--particularly the reliance on "mental effort" required by the job as the principal indicator of job content. After all, wages ranked ahead of "variety in work," surely another indicator of job content. What does seem important is that the primacy of job content over "material rewards" became a leading theme in much of the sociological literature on job satisfaction. In part this reflected the high prestige of the Leningrad study. But it also seemed to be reinforced by the results obtained in several other studies which followed the procedures used in Leningrad. We show the findings of two such studies together with those for Leningrad in Table II-6. In all three cases, as well as in some others, the "motivational significance," of wages for overall job satisfaction ranked lower than job content. In fact, it was usually further below the top position than in Leningrad.

How were these findings to be reconciled with the traditional stress on "material incentives" in Soviet discussions of labor problems? Unlike some commentators who
Table II-6
Ranking of Main Elements of Work Situation According to Their Influence on Overall Job Satisfaction, Three Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work requires mental effort</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Work requires mental effort</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Interesting work</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory wages</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Is work overtiring</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Organization of work</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity for raising skill</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Opportunity for raising skill</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Relations with management</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety in work</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Variety in work</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Satisfactory wages</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of work</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Management's attitude toward workers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fairness in distribution of work assignments</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management's attitude toward workers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Satisfactory wages</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Correspondence of job to worker's skill</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is work overtiring</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition of equipment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources and Notes
Leningrad: Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Chelovek, p. 181. The respondents were workers up to age 30.
Table II-6 (continued)


Odessa: I. M. Popova, *Stimulirovania trudovoi deiatel'nosti, kak sposob upravleniia*, Kiev, 1976, p. 171. The respondents were workers and employees up to age 30. The results shown for older respondents were essentially the same.
seemed prepared to remove material rewards from the status of a "leading factor" in job satisfaction, the authors of the Leningrad study interpreted the apparent primacy of workers' orientations to the functional content of work with some care. The Leningrad findings needed verification by means of more representative studies in other regions. The Leningrad respondents, after all, had been relatively young workers, the more educated portion of the working class, whose aspirations for "creative" work content were not necessarily shared by their older colleagues. Indeed, Iadov noted that for older workers job content and opportunities for advancement lagged behind wages and sanitary-hygienic conditions in the "scale of motives." As for the younger workers on whom the Leningrad study had concentrated, their primary orientation to creative job content only suggested the attitude toward work as an "inner need" was in the process of "becoming" (not "had become") dominant. Moreover, the orientation to wages as the second major "motive of work activity" meant that the attitude to work as a means of satisfying needs outside the labor process itself retained its "competitive position" relative to the orientation to creative work content. The latter, together with "material rewards" and the worker's perception of his opportunities for skill advancement constituted the "kernel" of the whole motivational structure of work activity. The dominant position
of job content within this kernel signified that, having attained a certain minimally adequate living standard (прожиточного минимума), the worker's need for creative job opportunities was coming to the fore in the hierarchy of work motives. 31

Whatever the limitations in the empirical support for these conclusions, they seemed a healthy departure from the long established habit of equating work incentives with "material incentives." But even in the relatively restrained form just described, these conclusions were received with scepticism by some sociologists—and not only by those who might be regarded as political guardians of the "official" line on material incentives. For one thing, not all the empirical studies pointed in the same direction. The authors of a study of industrial workers' job attitudes in Perm (N. F. Naumova and M. A. Слискарский) made a point of stressing that for their subjects the relationship between wages and job satisfaction was "no less strong" than that between work content and job satisfaction. When workers were asked, "what needs to be done in order to make people work willingly" (сокотор), the two main factors in the hierarchy of motives turned out to be improved wages and work organization. Similarly, a study of engineers and technicians
found that the desire for increased wages ranked well ahead of "interesting, creative work" when the subjects were asked what was required to make them work "with greater willingness and satisfaction." According to the author (M. I. Zaitseva), "For most engineers, technicians and foremen creativity was not a factor in satisfaction when it was present in work nor a factor in dissatisfaction when it was absent in work."32

It was difficult to imagine a result at greater variance with the Leningrad study than this. The conflict seems even more striking when we recall that the respondents in Leningrad were workers while those in Zaitseva's study were engineers and technicians.

The sociologists who were skeptical of the Leningrad study's finding of the primacy of job content over wages in work satisfaction did not deny that job content occupied a leading role in workers' "value orientations." But the latter were not identical with workers' "motivating needs" (or "real needs"). The problem was that workers' real needs and interests tended to be verbalized in socially approved ways. "Needs and interests in verbally expressed ratings are to a considerable degree corrected by the value concepts of society and of different groups."33 In effect the argument of the sceptics was that workers often
found it easier to openly express their job dissatisfac-
tion (or satisfaction)--or to justify their decision
to change jobs--by invoking work content rather than
wage levels. To the extent that this was the case an
important conclusion followed. The primacy of job
content in workers' ratings of the sources of work
satisfaction (dissatisfaction) could not be easily re-
garded as an indicator of the transformation of work
from a "means of existence to an 'inner need'."

Clearly, this was not an issue that could
readily be resolved by the kinds of job attitude sur-
veys we have reviewed here. The suggestion that the
importance of "material factors" in job satisfaction
was partly concealed ("corrected") by workers' habits
of responding in a socially sanctioned manner sounded
a useful cautionary note against accepting workers'
ratings of job attributes at face value. But it is
not at all obvious that Soviet workers have been par-
ticularly reticent in acknowledging the importance of
"material rewards" in work activity. For example,
when asked about their conception of a "good job"
close to 1/2 or more of sampled workers have regularly
expressed the view that adequate wages are the most
important attribute of such a job (see Table II-7).34
Table II-7

Respondents' Conceptions of a "Good Job" in Three Surveys of Work Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptions of a &quot;Good Job&quot;</th>
<th>Distribution of responses, in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leningrad workers to Tallin workers and employees, 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kishinev Tractor Plant, workers and employees, 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any work is good if it pays well</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay is the main thing, but the meaning of the work is also important</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The meaning of the work is the main thing, but you can't forget the pay</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good job is one where you are needed and useful</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources

Leningrad: Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Opyt, p. 162.


Kishinev: Akademiia nauk Moldavskoi SSR, p. 68.

Notes

(a) The exact year of this study is uncertain but the results were reported in a 1966 publication. They were based on a sample of 1,495 workers in three industrial enterprises in the city of Tallin.
It seems difficult, therefore, to accept the view that socially dominant value orientation lead workers to substantially understate the role of material factors in job satisfaction.

In our view a more effective challenge to the Leningrad study and to others which pointed in the same direction (the dominance of job content over wages in work satisfaction and motivation) came from one of the sociologists whose findings appeared to support these studies. This challenge was directed not at their empirical findings as such but at the conclusions which some had drawn from them. For I. M. Popova the subordinate role of wages in work motivation had "an altogether real basis" in current economic policies. For example, certain consumption needs were met not out of wages but via communal consumption (presumably medical care, education, subsidized rents). But the more substantial argument followed. In the casual and somewhat indirect manner often reserved for making an important point on a sensitive issue, Popova remarked: "It is also possible that a certain significance should be attached to the fact that the range of goods which can be acquired in exchange for wages is insufficiently broad." In somewhat more direct terms this meant that (a) workers' ratings of job attributes which pointed to the subordinate
role of money wages in work satisfaction and motivation were, at least on occasion, quite believable, but (b) rather than providing empirical evidence of new work attitudes and progress toward "communist labor" (the interpretation offered by the authors of the Leningrad study) such ratings reflected the limited effectiveness of money wage differentials under conditions of widespread scarcities of consumer goods and the narrow range of choice in this market.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this discussion was the way in which the essential validity of Popova's views was implicitly acknowledged by one of the co-authors of the original Leningrad study. In 1976 V. A. Iadov replicated the Leningrad study of some 15 years earlier. The objective was to determine how "the great changes which have occurred over the past 15 years have affected the character of needs and work motivation." From the standpoint of the issue we have been reviewing the salient finding of the new study was that the wage factor now had a distinctly greater impact on work attitudes than 15 years earlier. It now ranked on a par with job content ("if the significance of job content is taken as equivalent to one, the significance of wages was equal to .8 in 1962; but in 1976 it stood at one"). These relative values for the motivational
significance of wages and job content were presumably derived in the manner described earlier and illustrated in our Tables II-5 and II-6 above. The magnitude of the change was hardly overwhelming but it was the direction of change that counted. That direction was certainly not in accord with the expectations which had prevailed at the time of the initial Leningrad study in the early 1960's. The principal explanation for the higher ranking of wages among the various elements of the work situation in the late 1970's was to be found in the changes which had affected non-work life (byt)—increased consumption opportunities, the shift from communal to private apartments, the greater availability and range of leisure time activities. The new world of consumption, rather than the familiar world of work, now became the sphere through which increasing numbers of workers could "find themselves." All this signified a heightening of the instrumental value of work, its function as a means to ends extrinsic to the work process itself. But this could be regarded as a retrogression from the goal of "communist labor" only if one accepted the dominant interpretation offered earlier for the primacy of job content over material rewards—that it revealed a "tendency to the full overcoming of alienated labor," "some degree of approach to the
future." It revealed nothing of the kind. That primacy, to the extent that it described a real rather than imagined situation, had been substantially affected by widespread scarcities of elementary consumption opportunities. Thus one could readily agree with Iadov that the "path to communist labor as a prime inner need was not simple and unilinear." \(^{37}\)

This implicit admission of the faulty interpretation of earlier findings reflects a relatively "open" quality in Soviet discussions of the work experience. It suggests that findings and concepts which break new ground can be expected to appear as the study of the labor process unfolds. An additional illustration of this quality deserves brief consideration at this point.

**A New Direction?**

The study of work, both in its "objective" dimensions and in its impact on workers' perception of their job experience, is obviously at an early stage in the Soviet Union. Although we have concentrated thus far largely on a review of Soviet findings on job attitudes, no less important is the process by which new concepts and a new vocabulary have been assimilated into the professional discourse on problems of work. Until the late 1970's the conceptual apparatus developed
by Iadov and Zdravomyslov in the early 1960's served as the accepted framework for organizing the study of work attitudes. This was particularly apparent in their concept of "elements of the work situation" as the set of job attributes having a significant impact on work attitudes and (depending on the ranking of these attributes) revealing the currently prevailing hierarchy of work motives. Even when some sociologists' findings differed from those of the Leningrad study, or when they questioned the meaning which Iadov and Zdravomyslov attached to their results, the discussion remained within the confines of the job attributes (shown in Table II-5) specified by the Leningrad sociologists. Whether these attributes were sufficiently comprehensive to capture the major elements of the work experience was not questioned.38

The dominance of the conceptual apparatus formulated in the original Leningrad study was also evident in the meaning commonly assigned to the concept of "job content." The latter referred to the extent of "creative opportunities" offered by a job. But the important point here is that such opportunities were regarded as mainly a function of technological advance. Thus when Iadov and Zdravomyslov classified occupations according to the "richness" of their job content, the classification
was based on the "different steps along the ladder of technological process." When they found that job satisfaction rates increased and work motives changed as one moved along the spectrum of occupational groups (from unskilled manual laborers to assembly line workers to operators and adjusters of automated equipment) the results were interpreted as reflecting the impact on work attitudes of "the characteristics of equipment, the degree and character of mechanization of the work process." In this perspective, progress toward "communist labor" as indicated by the primacy of job content in the hierarchy of work motives necessarily depended largely on the rate of technological modernization.

This is the view which was challenged by the introduction of the concept of "work autonomy" or "job autonomy" (proizvodstvennoi samostoiatel'nosti) into Soviet discussions of the work experience. In the words of the sociologist who initially posed the issue (A. V. Tikhonov), the traditional meaning assigned to job content confined its attention to the "horizontal" dimension of the work process, the distribution of functions within the 'man-machine system'. Such an approach ignored the "vertical component, the distribution of functions between the execution of work and the control and management of work."
More specifically, work autonomy refers to the degree to which "the planning of the job assignment, the organization of work performance, and the monitoring and recording" of its results all inhere in the worker's job functions. In this sense it reflects the degree to which the functions of "conception" and "execution" of work are joined in the individual's work activity. Job autonomy, therefore, necessarily depends not only on the worker's "technical" functions imposed by the state of productive equipment, but on the social and organizational arrangements at the enterprise, i.e., the degree to which the organization delegates managerial tasks to workers.

Tikhonov had introduced the concept of job autonomy in the context of a discussion of work attitudes. His study of a sample of workers in oil-drilling operations suggested that job autonomy (in the sense defined above) had at least as strong an impact on work attitudes as job content (in the "technological" sense defined by Iadov and Zdravomyslov). Work attitudes here referred to such "objective indicators" as workers' initiative, quality of output and productivity, rather than job satisfaction. But work autonomy was not simply being suggested as one more job attribute to be added to the traditional set of "elements of the work situation."
The failure to consider it as a distinct and strategic facet of the work experience had represented a serious impoverishment of the whole conceptual apparatus used in previous studies of the labor process. The point of Tikhonov's discussion was the need to recognize that the extension of job autonomy was a key element in enhancing work commitment and performance, not to speak of developing a communist attitude toward work, and that such an extension was being impeded by "social and organizational constraints" rather than simply by technological backwardness.42

The selection of work autonomy as a distinct object of study is of both current and long-term significance. In historical perspective we cannot regard the process of enriching work and broadening its creative potential as merely the direct result of scientific and technical progress. One of the major advantages of socialism is the planned improvement of social relations, particularly managerial relations, which substantially determine the creative opportunities offered by the functional content of work, and which also play an important independent role in enriching work and in achieving a high level of work performance.

By the late 1970's and early 1980's job autonomy was in the process of being assimilated into the vocabulary of Soviet discussions of work attitudes and work organization.43 Among those who accepted and helped to legitimate the new concept was V. A. Iadov, the co-author of the initial Leningrad survey which had paved
the way for all subsequent studies in this field. The emergence of the theme of work autonomy was only one expression of a "participatory current" in the Soviet literature on problems of work, but this is a separate matter which deserves its own extended discussion. We return to it in chapter IV.

FOOTNOTES


2Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Opyt, pp. 159-160.

3For an illustration see A. A. Prokhvatilov and G. V. Kirdziuk, "On Some Special Features of Young Workers' Attitudes Toward Work at the Angarsk Oil-Chemical Combine," Angarskii gorodskoi komitet KPSS, Aktual'nye problemy sotsial'nogo planirovaniia, Irkutsk, 1975, p. 258.

4Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Chelovek, pp. 151-152.

5Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Chelovek, pp. 138-139.


8. Murutar and Vikhalemm, p. 141.


10. N. F. Naumova, p. 113.


15. We exclude from consideration here those surveys which seem to reflect very special circumstances, for example an 88% job dissatisfaction rate reported for workers in the Belorusneft combine of the oil industry (A. N. Mal'kov and V. D. Pivovarev, "The Structure of Labor Turnover at Enterprises of the Oil Industry," Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1979, No. 2, p. 80). Similarly, we ignore reports of unbelievably "happy" workers, such as one study which reported that only 1% of respondents disliked their jobs (N. M. Blinov, Trudovaia deiatel'nost' kak osnova sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni, Moscow, 1979, p. 59. We also exclude from consideration those studies in which essentially nothing is revealed about survey procedures and respondents except the proportions "satisfied" and "dissatisfied."


18 A. Kazakhstan study cites a figure of 12-15% as typical for the share of the "indifferent," and 5-6% for the dissatisfied (Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, p. 327). Almost all of the studies at our disposal suggest that the latter figure is an understatement.

19 Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, p. 328.

20 Murutar and Vikhalemm, pp. 155-156.

21 This appears with particular clarity in comparisons of the proportion of respondents expressing job dissatisfaction and those who express a desire to change jobs. The latter group commonly encompasses 1/3 to 1/2 of respondents even where the former is 1/5 or less. For examples see Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut mezhdunarodnogo rabochego dvizheniia, Rabochii klass v usloviyah nauchno-teknicheskoi revoliutsii, Moscow, 1979, pp. 145-146; Akademiia nauk Moldavskoi SSR, otdel filosofii i prava, Sotsial'naia aktivnost' rabotnikov promyshlennogo predpriiatiiia, Kishinev, 1973, p. 42.


23 See Kalleberg and Griffin, pp. 371-400.


26 Akademiia nauk Moldavskoi SSR, pp. 44-46.


29 Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Chelovek, p. 181.

30 Akademiia nauk Moldavskoi SSR, p. 186; Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut mozhdunarodnogo, p. 170.


33 I. M. Popova, p. 172.

34 It is quite possible that this high "vote" for wages in workers' conceptions of a "good job" reflects the limited options offered them in surveys such as those shown in Table II-7. But "importance ratings" of job attributes by workers also show adequate wages ranking higher than such elements of job content as variety in work, independence, responsibility, the need to learn something new, opportunity to develop one's abilities (Akademiia nauk SSR, Institut mozhdunarodnogo, p. 153.

35 I. M. Popova, p. 176.

36 This section draws on the article by V. A. Iadov in Komsomolskaia pravda, February 9, 1978 and the interview with him in Znanie-sila, 1979, No. 10.

37 An additional finding of the later Leningrad study is worth mentioning. The significance of "conditions of work" (sanitary-hygienic conditions, heaviness of work, physical comfort, convenient work shift) as an influence on work satisfaction had apparently increased markedly since the early 1960's. Once again, this seemed to be partly rooted in changes in the non-work environment. According to Iadov, "people are becoming used to living with conveniences and also want to work with conveniences." Komsomolskaia pravda, February 9, 1978.
A partial exception was the study by two Estonian sociologists who sought to elicit their subjects' reactions to the question of whether there was "a conformity of interests between workers and management." There is no evidence that this interesting theme has been pursued further thus far. Murutar and Vikhalemm, p. 160.

This section draws mainly on Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Opyt, pp. 151-155.


A. V. Tikhonov, pp. 35-36.

A. V. Tikhonov, p. 44.

Chapter III
Demographic Variables and Work Attitudes

What do Soviet materials reveal about the impact of sex differences, age and education on the perception of the work experience? Once again our concern is not only to review the statistical findings but to examine the variety of ways in which these issues have generated changing interpretations, policy recommendations and public discussions of problems of work. In particular, we are interested in the way in which the interaction of sociologists' findings and the more "popular" discourse on problems of work have set the stage for consideration of the need for "work reform" in the Soviet Union.

Sex Differences in Work Attitudes

One of the more obvious issues to emerge from Soviet studies of work attitudes is the striking contrast between the markedly unequal work roles of men and women on the one hand, and the relatively moderate differences in their reported rates of job satisfaction on the other. Since it seems so appropriate to Soviet circumstances, we may take as our point of departure the implicit question posed in a U.S. Department of Labor summary of sex differences in work attitudes in the United States:

Considering the large wage gap between men and women and the overrepresentation of women in lower status occupations, it is surprising that sex differences in overall job satisfaction have not been consistently observed. Moreover, even the few differences that have been observed are small.1
The inferior job status of Soviet females relative to males in working class occupations has been abundantly documented in both the Soviet and Western literature and requires little elaboration at this point. We may take it as established that Soviet women are substantially underrepresented in the more skilled workers' occupations, those commonly referred to as involving "high content" jobs. The same is true, if to a somewhat lesser extent, when nonmanual occupations are considered. Since some of the principal Soviet studies of work attitudes apply to younger age groups it is worth noting that sex-linked inequalities in occupational status and wage levels are already quite marked early in the work careers of men and women, and almost certainly increase with age. Table III-1 summarizes the male-female skill and wage gap for a national sample of young industrial workers (up to age 30) in the early 1970s. (Anticipating an issue to be discussed below, this table also provides evidence of the superior educational attainment that accompanies the subordinate job status of young women workers.) The proportion of young male workers employed in relatively skilled jobs (57.7%) was almost double that of young females (29.8%); less than 5% of young women workers were in "highly paid" jobs (more than 150 rubles per month) compared to more than one third of young males.

Whatever the full range of factors generating the early emergence of these inequalities one such factor is surely what Alastair McAuley has described as the pressure on women "to choose jobs that are convenient rather than satisfying."
Table III-1

Sex Differences in Skill, Wage Levels and Years of Schooling, Industrial Workers to Age 30, 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill, Wage Levels and Schooling</th>
<th>Men (in %)</th>
<th>Women (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skill groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low-skilled</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semi-skilled</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skilled</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wage levels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low-paid (60-90 rubles per month)</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium-paid (91-150 rubles</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per month)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high-paid (more than 150 rubles</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per month)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average years of schooling</strong></td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from material in Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut istorii SSSR, Sotsial'nyi oblik rabochei molodezhi, Moscow, 1980, pp. 30, 64, 66, 78-79, 253, 262.

Note: The study from which these figures are drawn was based on a sample of approximately 5200 young workers drawn from the machine-building, ferrous metallurgy, coal and textile industries. Of the respondents, 52.2% were male and 47.8% female. The figures shown above for skill groups were calculated by including unskilled and low-skilled manual workers and assembly-line workers in the "low-skilled" group; workers with "average occupational training" on machines and mechanisms and workers operating automatic and semi-automatic equipment in the "semi-skilled" group; and skilled manual workers and workers operating and adjusting automatic and semi-automatic equipment in the "skilled" group.
The greater constraints on occupational choice for women are reflected in their answers to the question, "How did you choose your occupation?" More frequently than men, the female response was, "circumstances were such that there was no other choice." More frequently than women, the male response was, "the specialty seemed interesting." The reasonable interpretation which Soviet sociologists attach to the "circumstances" cited by women is that the latter are more likely to be guided by such considerations as the proximity of the job to the place of residence and the convenience of working hours—in a word, by the possibility which the particular job offers of combining "household responsibilities" with work in social production. To the extent that any real choice is available, women, more so than men, select a "place" of work rather than a "type" of work. These findings, initially disclosed in the original Leningrad study of the early 1960s, have been essentially duplicated in more recent investigations.4

It seems all the more significant, therefore, that reported rates of work satisfaction fail to reveal the kinds of clear-cut and persistent inequalities we have just observed in the job status, wage levels and occupational choices of men and women. Table III-2 summarizes the results of five Soviet studies of work satisfaction among women conducted between the late 1960s and early 1970s. In all cases the proportion of women respondents reporting satisfaction with their work ranges from 62% to 78%. We do not suggest that a weighty
Table III-2

Responses of Women Workers in Soviet Job Satisfaction Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and coverage of study</th>
<th>fully satisfied</th>
<th>more satisfied than not</th>
<th>more dissatisfied than satisfied</th>
<th>dissatisfied</th>
<th>indifferent</th>
<th>don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966, Moscow confectionary factory, Penza watch factory, Leningrad industrial enterprises <em>(N=427)</em>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966, Leningrad textile, tobacco, electrical equipment and machinery plants <em>(N=540)</em></td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968, Kostroma textile plants <em>(N=480)</em></td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/up, Voronezh textile and machine-building plants</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td><em>(58)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</em></td>
<td><em>(16)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</em></td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td><em>(10)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972, Semipalatinsk Meat-Packing Combine&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
row 1 - Osipov and Shchepanskii, p. 422.

Notes:
a. About 7% of this sample included engineering-technical personnel and non-manual employees.
b. These figures were read from a graph and should be regarded as rough estimates.
c. These figures refer to attitudes toward "occupation" rather than "job."
Conclusion can be drawn from this scattering of figures, but it does seem of some importance that these rates of job satisfaction are of approximately the same order of magnitude as those observed earlier in Table II-1 for men and women combined. Indeed, the responses of women fall closer to the upper range of job satisfaction rates for respondents undifferentiated by sex. There is an important limitation, of course, associated with any such comparison. The figures for women in Table III-2 are drawn from different enterprises and locales than those for men and women combined in Table II-1. It is conceivable, but unlikely, that the relatively high job satisfaction rates of women (high, that is, relative to their typical occupational status and wage level) reflect the unusually favorable local circumstances in which these studies were conducted.

But the picture does not change substantially when we examine the few cases in which separate male and female job satisfaction rates have been derived within the same locales and enterprises. The dominant impression remains one of close proximity rather than consistent and marked inequalities in these rates. Thus in the Leningrad study of young workers in the early 1960s, "sex shows an insignificant correlation with work satisfaction in favor of women...." In a Kazakhstan study of a decade later sex differences in job satisfaction rates were again reported as "insignificant," but this time in favor of men. Of the remaining studies which distinguish
these rates by sex, job satisfaction seems to be somewhat higher for men than for women, but in no case do these differences approach the magnitude of prevailing sex inequalities in job status and earnings. Hence the bulk of the available evidence appears to lend support to N. F. Naumova's generalization: "Given other things equal [presumably occupational and wage levels] work satisfaction is generally higher among women than among men."  

How were these findings to be explained? Until the late 1970s Soviet discussions of sex-related differences in perceptions of work consisted largely of variations on a few basic themes. Before considering these discussions it is well to recall that the great majority of women-respondents in Soviet studies were employed in low-skilled and semi-skilled working class occupations. Perhaps the most common theme in these discussions was that women's "demands" or "claims" on the richness of work content, on the "creative opportunities" of work, tend to be lower than those of men. Women were also more satisfied than men at given wage levels and were less concerned than men with opportunities for increasing their work skills. On the other hand they were particularly sensitive to the "psychological atmosphere" of the workplace—the "socio-emotional" climate of the job—and the comfort aspects of work (sanitary-hygienic conditions, availability of rest periods). On the whole they were more adaptable than men to assembly-line jobs, partly because of their limited aspirations
for intrinsically satisfying work and partly because a psychologically healthy "collectivism" compensates to some degree for the "negative aspects of monotonous work."

All of these characterizations are drawn from Iadov's and Zdravomyslov's study of young Leningrad workers. They will undoubtedly strike some readers as conforming to the stereotypes of women's work attitudes common in the United States until recently, and perhaps still accepted in some quarters. Stereotypes or not, it is interesting to see how essentially similar portrayals of women workers' job attitudes have generated varying degrees of acceptance and rationalization among Soviet sociologists. For Slesarev and Iankcva, investigating a sample of working mothers confined largely to low-level, routine industrial jobs in the late 1960s, the limited involvement of such women in their work--whatever its problematic aspects--also serves a positive function:

...we must keep in mind that the absence of creativity in work activity often corresponds to the demands which women workers make on their labor. At the current stage of development the opportunity of performing primarily repetitive work which does not require large expenditures of nervous energy corresponds to the work aspirations of a considerable proportion of women, particularly those of low skills and cultural levels. The activity of many of these, as the study of assembly-line work has shown, is basically oriented to the family which requires a great deal of additional work from women.... The repetitive character of a job...not calling for the need to think about work operations, is fully satisfying to many women precisely because it is less fatiguing. 9

In Kharchev's and Golod's study of women workers in Kostroma and Leningrad we find the same theme of women's perceptions and evaluations of their jobs as being dominated by
their primary roles as wives and mothers. Thus they exhibit little interest in "opportunities for initiative and creativity," in prospects for job advancement, in continuing their formal education and raising their skills. Their chief job-related concerns—in addition to supplementing family income—are the proximity of the workplace to their homes, the availability of child-care facilities, and the opportunity to work convenient shifts. Their reactions to their work roles are "always refracted in the last analysis through the prism of the family." In brief, working women's central life-interests are outside the workplace.

There is a strangely ambiguous quality to some of these discussions, or at least to the normative overtones in which they are clothed. The picture of women adapting to intrinsically impoverished work roles—indeed, often preferring them—is not a pretty one and no particular effort is made to embellish it. But it also has the air of near-inevitability, for there is little recognition that the care of children and the performance of household management functions need not be exclusively "women's work." Thus while calling for the increased public provision of household services and child-care facilities, and in some cases for reduced working time and increased maternity leaves for women, these discussions have rarely treated reduced role segregation within the family as a means of enriching work opportunities for women. The stress has typically been placed on "lightening" women's overall labor
burden, less frequently on "sharing" household duties. But some of the sociologists engaged in these discussions have gone much further than others in voicing what, under other circumstances, might be called a "feminist" position. Zdravomyslov and Iakov have been among the most forthright in this respect. Although their Leningrad study was among the first to introduce the theme of sex-linked differences in workers' interests in intrinsically rewarding work, there was no element of apologia in their discussion of this issue. Women's lesser interest in "high-content" work reflected unequal "degrees of freedom" between the sexes for personal fulfillment. It was rooted mainly in social arrangements rather than in physiological differences, i.e., in women's position in byt—the non-work sphere of everyday family life. Moreover, "the unequal position of women in the conduct of household affairs under current conditions of urban life has no moral justification whatsoever." The whole moral tone of these remarks seems at the furthest remove from the "managerial" orientation of those Soviet sociologists for whom women's allegedly superior adaptability to assembly-line jobs is essentially a tool for allocating labor in a manner designed to raise overall work satisfaction.

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s Soviet discussions of sex differences in work attitudes rested on the assumption, sometimes fortified by documentation, of women's lesser claims for intrinsically challenging work. In one of its more extreme
forms this was embodied in a sociologist's remark that "men and women workers attach a different meaning to the concept of 'interesting work'."\textsuperscript{14} For women it presumably meant "light" work, for men--"creative" work. But the late 1970s seem to have marked a turning point of sorts in the portrayal of women's orientations to work. It now appeared that the traditional picture of women's more modest claims to intrinsic work satisfaction, whatever its validity for the past, was an unreliable guide to the present. Perhaps the most unambiguous departure from the customary view appeared in Iadov's summary of his 1976 replication of the initial Leningrad study of some fourteen years earlier:

> Considerable changes have occurred during these years in women's attitudes toward wages, job content, working conditions, relations with management, etc. Their demands are now just as high as those of men [our emphasis]. This is a step forward demonstrating the liquidation of remnants of social inequality between the sexes.\textsuperscript{15} 

Both the scholarly stature of the author and the fact that he (jointly with Ždravomyslov) had been among the first to demonstrate women's inferior job claims in the 1960s argue against dismissing this statement as a perfunctory celebration of "social progress." It clearly was meant to signal a new situation. Moreover, Iadov made it clear that increased sex equality in demands on work content had its problematic aspect. While work satisfaction had increased for the Leningrad sample as a whole since the 1960s, it had declined in "women's branches of production." From another source which presents some
results of the 1962 and 1976 studies we can derive a more specific picture of the changes (Table III-3). Those occupational groups in which women predominated in the 1960s (assembly-line workers and workers on semiautomatic equipment) recorded a decline in "satisfaction with occupation." Most of those in which men were a majority showed an increase or essential stability in satisfaction.

Additional evidence suggesting that the traditional view of women's job orientations is in the process of becoming outmoded has appeared in the recent (1980) work of N.M. Shishkan, one of the principal Soviet specialists on women's economic status. Shishkan notes that "until recently" studies had shown that differences in work content had comparatively little impact on women's job satisfaction. The latter had depended largely on such factors as the availability of child-care facilities, convenient working hours, and proximity of workplace to residence. Here we have the familiar picture of women's instrumental work orientation which dominated the sociological literature through the early 1970s, but now presented as applying "until recently" rather than in the present tense. In the new situation women's "value orientations" are such that "satisfaction with work...has become increasingly determined by the content of work." 16 When we recall that "work content" in the Soviet lexicon stands for opportunities for "creativity" on the job, Shishkan's remarks are seen as pointing in the same direction as Iadov's.
Table III-3


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational groups</th>
<th>% of workers satisfied with occupation</th>
<th>% of women in occupational group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-skilled manual work</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly-line jobs</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine operators</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs on semi-automatic equipment</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual work</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operators and adjusters of automatic equipment</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note:
The figures on the share of women in various occupational groups apply to workers up to the age of 30. It is not clear whether the same is true of the figures on the proportion of workers satisfied with their occupations.
It would be too much to say that Iadov's and Shishkan's comments clearly demonstrate a "leap forward" in women's work expectations. But they do suggest reduced differences between the sexes in the standards used to evaluate the adequacy of jobs. There are good reasons for this: the higher levels of general education among women workers in younger age groups, the declining impact of peasant social origins on traditional views of women's work and family roles, and the continuing affirmation of an official egalitarian ethos—at least with respect to relations between the sexes. Even without a "women's movement," as the term is ordinarily understood, these factors have operated to heighten women's "claims" for both intrinsically satisfying and more highly paid work. The real problem is that, at least within working-class occupations, there is no evidence of a reduction in sex-linked occupational segregation and earnings inequality in recent years. Under the circumstances Iadov's finding of reduced work satisfaction in some "women's branches" is precisely what we might expect. The very language used helps explain the result.

Age and Work Attitudes

The Soviet literature on labor problems is pervaded by a concern with the problem of adapting young workers to their jobs. This is not only a matter of reducing excessive labor turnover, but of mobilizing work effort in the broader sense—i.e., developing habits of sustained work discipline, stability, precision and initiative which Soviet writers
associate with the requirements of an "industrial culture." There are good reasons for the focus on young workers in this context. Perhaps the most consistent finding in Soviet studies of work attitudes is that young workers are substantially less satisfied with their jobs than older ones, with the boundary between "young" and "older" workers generally defined as the age of 29 or 30. While the precise age group exhibiting the lowest degree of work satisfaction varies in different studies (19-22-year-olds in some, 22-24-year-olds in others), the greater work discontent of the below-30 age group as a whole is apparently a stable feature of these studies. Such findings have led some sociologists to regard the problem of negative work attitudes "as a specifically youth problem." While this view is almost certainly an oversimplification, it reflects the common linking in the public consciousness of the unstable work commitment of individuals in younger age groups with the more general problems of work morale and poor work performance.

It should be recognized, however, that relatively high rates of job dissatisfaction among young workers are hardly an unusual or recent phenomenon. From a cross-national perspective—if the experience of the United States is a reliable guide—they are altogether "normal." At a time when ominous visions of a "youth rebellion" and a "generation gap" were still being invoked (the early 1970s), the U.S. Department of Labor summed up the historical record of generational differences in job attitudes as follows: "Younger workers have been
consistently less satisfied than their elders for the last 15 years and, probably, even earlier than that. Why this should normally be the case—in both the United States and the Soviet Union—has been explained in rather obvious terms by students of work attitudes in both countries. Thus the U.S. Department of Labor study cited above suggests that "older workers, especially in the case of men, are more satisfied with their jobs than younger workers simply because they have better jobs." Access to these better jobs depends on "job experience, accrued skills, and demonstrated competence," all of which are naturally less likely to be characteristic of younger than of older workers. Soviet commentators point to precisely the same factors. Some have also noted that older workers are more likely to be "reconciled to the existing state of affairs." Their expectations have already been "corrected" by their actual (limited) opportunities.

But these interpretations of "normal" generational differences in work satisfaction are inadequate to account for the tone of serious concern in the recent Soviet literature on young workers or for the recorded levels of their work discontent. Job satisfaction rates among young workers are not merely "lower" than among older ones. They are also "low"—in absolute terms—and are referred to as such. Although we cannot determine trends in these rates, it is difficult to believe that rates of job satisfaction of less than 50% (the levels reported in several studies of young workers in the
1960s and 1970s)$^{24}$ can be regarded as "normal" by Soviet authorities. Nor can the concept of "normal" generational differences in work attitudes be readily reconciled with Soviet sociologists' references to the "serious social problems" and "social tensions" associated with young people's work discontent.$^{25}$ To understand the deeper sources of this discontent and its roots in the specific circumstances of the last two decades requires that we examine the problematic impact of increased education on both the performance and perception of work. This issue has also been at the center of some lively controversies among Soviet economists and sociologists which we review below. Clearly, what is new about the mass of young Soviet workers in recent years is their relatively high level of general education.

**Education, Work Performance and Job Attitudes**

As in other countries, the bulk of the literature on the "economics of education" in the Soviet Union has stressed the positive impact of increased schooling on workers' skills, labor productivity and the growth of national income. In the Soviet case this tradition has its roots mainly in empirical studies conducted during the early post-revolutionary years by the economist, S. G. Strumilin. It is not surprising that Strumilin should have had a considerable impact on later Soviet studies in the economics of education, for some of his early work has been characterized by a Western observer as "a signal contribution" to this field, "unexcelled in the West until the
work of Theodore W. Schultz and Gary S. Becker in the late 1950s and early 1960s.26 Among Strumilin's findings published in the 1920s before the start of the first Five Year Plan were the following:27 (a) the attainment of simple literacy after one year of schooling raised the labor productivity of lathe operators by approximately 30%, while a year of on-the-job experience of illiterate workers increased their output by no more than 12 to 16%; (b) the addition of a year of formal schooling "gives rise to an addition to the degree of skill that is 2.6 times greater than that due to a year of training in a factory," (c) the outlays required to introduce universal primary education (four years of schooling) among Soviet youth would be recouped in five years out of the increased national income generated by the enhanced skills of the newly educated workers. After a long absence from his studies in this field Strumilin returned to it in a 1962 article in which he estimates that something on the order of 1/5 to 1/4 of Soviet national income could be ascribed to the increased skills resulting from investment in secondary and higher education.28 This was the "national economic effect" of education.

Until the late 1950s and early 1960s there was relatively little in the Soviet economic literature that added to Strumilin's findings on the "yield" of education. As late as 1965 it was not uncommon for Soviet writers, seeking to illustrate the profitability of educational outlays, to cite Strumilin's early results (particularly on the greater
contribution of schooling than of work experience to worker's skills) without noting that they applied to a period when few Soviet workers had as much as five or six years of schooling and that Strumilin himself had been mainly concerned with making a case for universal primary education. However, with the greater scope for economic research made possible by the post-Stalin "thaw," and with the Party's 1961 program announcing the goal of attaining "universal" secondary education among youth, a considerable body of new literature on the economics of education began to emerge in the 1960s. Much of this literature reported on the results of "micro" studies (usually based on samples of industrial workers) designed to establish the relationship between workers' educational levels and their work performance, i.e. the degree of norm fulfillment, time required to advance in skill grade, work discipline, participation in work "rationalization." The results of many of these studies seemed to accord—at least in broad terms—with Strumilin's earlier findings in the sense that they documented the favorable impact of increased formal schooling on workers' job performance, with the important qualification that workers' educational levels were now (mid-1960s) substantially higher than at the time Strumilin conducted most of his studies. At the risk of unduly oversimplifying a considerable body of research it might be said that at least some of the newer studies conveyed the impression that, as far as schooling's impact on workers' job performance was concerned, "the more
the better." Here is an example of one of the more optimistic reports on the economic consequences of increased schooling which appeared in the mid-1960s. Summarizing the results of a survey of workers in two Moscow electrical equipment plants, the author noted:

How, then, does the level of education influence the output of labor? The investigation showed that for most workers the percentage by which production norms were fulfilled rose proportionately with the level of general education...Indices of norm fulfillment among workers with a complete secondary education [ten-eleven years of schooling] exceeded those of workers with an eighth-grade education by 25%...As general educational levels of workers increase, the quantity of nondefective output noticeably rises and the amount of tool breakage falls...There is a direct relationship between the educational level of workers and the time they take to master new types of work. Almost all the investigations among those with a ten-year education yielded a speed of transfer to new work twice as fast as for workers with only an eight-year education. In turn, workers with an eight-year education were one-and-one half times superior in this respect compared with workers who had five years of education....Thus the most important consequence of raising general educational levels is the decrease in the time required to raise production skills....The higher the education of the worker the more usefully he employs his free time, the more sensibly he spends his leisure and as a result maintains a normal working rhythm during the course of the whole working week.30

The overwhelmingly positive assessment of increased schooling's impact on productive performance has remained a dominant theme in the economic literature on the "effectiveness" of education. More than fifteen years after the above lines were published we may find essentially similar appraisals--for example in a 1981 article which reports that "the output of workers with a complete secondary education exceeds that of workers with an incomplete secondary education [eight
years of schooling] by 25%, while the output of workers with an eighth-grade education is 35% higher than that of workers with a fifth-grade education. At the macroeconomic level some economists have also sought to update Strumilin's earlier estimates of the "national economic effectiveness" of outlays on education. According to one recent estimate these outlays (and the consequent increase in skills) added about 33% to national income in 1977, compared to 22% in 1960; every ruble of expenditure on education and training yielded 4.95 rubles of national income in 1977, compared to 3.72 rubles in 1960.

The general approach to assessing educations' impact on the economy which has guided the studies briefly summarized here has been clearly formulated by V. A. Zhamin, one of the leading figures in the revival of the economics of education since the early 1960s:

Outlays on education are a particular form of capital investments which are ultimately recouped through an increase in output, economies of working time, an expansion in the assortment and an improvement in the quality of output, and a reduction in the time required to produce it. The measure of effectiveness of any investments under socialism can only be the increase in the social productivity of labor attained as a result of these investments.

It is important to recognize, however, that a quite different general approach to the significance of workers' rising educational levels and a very different set of empirical findings than those we have just reviewed have appeared in some of the sociological literature. This is not simply because sociologists have been concerned with the "social" aspects of
education—the problems of adapting youngsters to labor market entry, the sources of work discontent—while economists have been concerned with the "profitability" or "returns" from increased schooling. The very manner of gauging the economic consequences of increased education and the implication for investment policy have also been in question.

Stated in its baldest terms, however, the principal issue posed in the sociological and more "popular" periodical literature concerned the alleged problem of "overeducation"—the social and economic costs associated with a more rapid rise in workers' educational levels than in the "richness" of their job content. This is the issue which generated considerable controversy out of which there emerged empirical findings and policy proposals which bear directly on the subject of our study. Among the first to invoke the concept of an "inflation" of education was the sociologist, V. Shubkin in 1964-65. His own studies had shown that the great majority of youngsters completing secondary school planned to continue their schooling at a higher educational institution (VUZ). This had been the traditional path followed by secondary school graduates, and success in pursuing it rested partly on the relatively small proportion of youngsters completing a secondary education (no more than 1/3 of the age cohort in the early 1960s). But with the projected "universalization" of secondary education, most graduates' plans for VUZ admission would be frustrated and they would be forced to enter the labor market and settle for jobs
largely in workers' trades after ten-eleven years of general education. Moreover, according to Shubkin, skill requirements for most working-class occupations did not require this much schooling. Hence it must have seemed perfectly legitimate for Shubkin to pose the issue in the following terms:

If the level of education is lagging, this obstructs the development of the productive forces, of scientific and technical progress. On the other hand, the premature transition to forms of education which are not generated by the actual requirements or economic, scientific and cultural development, may lead to an unnecessary wastefulness (rastochitel'stvu), to a peculiar 'inflation' of education, to a diversion of resources required for the solution of other urgent matters, to a restraint on the growth of the productivity of social labor.34

This was more than an appeal to explicitly consider the opportunity costs associated with an extension of secondary schooling and the delay in the labor market entry of youth. It was also a warning that increased educational levels could have certain unanticipated and problematic social consequences: the creation of "needs" for more challenging work, a level of "culture" and standards of living which, under conditions of "limited resources" and prevailing levels of labor productivity, Soviet society would not be able to satisfy.35

Coming on the heels of the revival of the "economics of education" literature reviewed above, with its unambiguously positive assessment of the "returns" from increased schooling, the notion that an "inflation" of education could be a source of new problems under Soviet circumstances obviously struck a discordant note. Indeed, given the customary fanfare with
which projected or realized increases in educational levels had always been announced, it must have struck some as little short of outrageous. With an average level of schooling for members of the work force somewhere in the vicinity of seven years in the mid-1960s, and with distinctly less than 1/2 of Soviet youth reaching the 10th grade, could the prospect of educational "inflation" really be taken seriously?

But the legitimacy of at least posing the issue was reinforced by the results obtained by some of Shubkin's sociologist colleagues in their studies of the relationship between education and workplace behavior. Thus a study of workers in machine-building plants (by V. A. Kalmyk) found that, while increased schooling up to the seventh grade promoted a rise in job skills, further increases in general education had "practically no effect on the growth of workers' qualifications."

Both in this industry and in coal mining an additional year of schooling contributed less to skill enhancement than an additional year of work experience. Clearly, the author noted, Strumilin's old conclusion that a year of schooling was equivalent to 2.6 years of job experience in workers' trades had long since become inapplicable.36 Another sociologist (N.A. Aitov), whose research was conducted among industrial workers in the cities of Kazan and Ufa, found no clear-cut tendency for workers' "production indicators" (norm fulfillment, participation in "rationalization and innovation," ability to work on a variety of machines) to improve with their educational
attainments, particularly if they had already obtained an eighth-grade education. Once again, in contrast to Strumilin's older results and those of the more recent "economics of education" literature, Aitov concluded: "...the growth of work experience by one year adds more to almost all indicators of production activity than the growth of education by one grade."\(^{37}\) Essentially similar results were obtained by the authors of the prestigious Leningrad study of young workers. Zdravomyslov and Iadov reported that the correlation between workers' educational levels and their job performance was "insignificant," that for workers with more than seven-eight years of schooling it was impossible to establish a consistent relationship between skill levels and educational levels, and that in the more "monotonous" jobs (assembly-line operations) and those requiring heavy manual labor--higher educational levels were associated with a deterioration in work discipline, initiative and responsibility.\(^{38}\)

It would be a mistake to assume, however, that any of the sociologists whose studies pointed to the limited "economic effectiveness" of increased general education explicitly called for restricting schooling for workers to seven to eight years, or expressed open opposition to the party's goal of a "complete" secondary education (ten-eleven years of schooling) for the young. All the principal participants in these discussions made it clear that they were not oblivious to the "social" functions of increased schooling: its positive impact
on workers' participation in community affairs, the quality of family "upbringing" in the next generation, the general "cultural" level of the society. What they were pointing to, rather, was that increased schooling—whatever its "social" benefits—would become a source of new problems associated with the need to absorb relatively highly educated youngsters into the large number of low-skilled ("low content") jobs that the Soviet economy would long require.

We cannot unravel the variety of factors behind the conflicting results in the economic and sociological literature. It may well be, as some of the opponents of the concept of educational "inflation" have maintained, that those who questioned the economic effectiveness of increased schooling did not properly control for differences in the work experience of the more or less educated, and ignored the greater capacity of the more highly educated to adapt to anticipated changes in technology. To resolve this issue and to reconcile these conflicting findings in any definitive sense hardly seems worthwhile or possible. For our purposes the significance of Soviet discussions of the theme of educational "inflation" lies elsewhere. These discussions, beginning in the early 1960s and continuing in somewhat muted form until the end of the seventies, provided a vehicle—a forum, as it were—for airing problems of widespread job dissatisfaction, the difficulties of adapting educated workers to routine jobs, and the policy alternatives available to meet such problems. These are the matters
to which we now turn. What kind of evidence on job attitude
and what kinds of policy proposals emerged from these discus-
sions?

Whatever the impact of increased schooling on job per-
formance, it was clear that sizable proportions of young
workers with more than eight years of schooling experienced
their education as excessive relative to their job require-
ments. This perception of a "surplus" of education is appar-
ent in the studies summarized in Table III-4. Workers with
various levels of schooling were asked to respond to questions
concerning the "fit" between their educational attainments
and their work assignments. Among those who had completed
ten years of schooling (a "complete" secondary education) some
1/5 to more than 1/3 reported that "my education is more than
my job requires." In what may be an extreme case--the
Kazakhstan study summarized in Table III-4--fully 42% of work-
ers up to the age of 30 experienced their education as exces-
sive relative to their job assignments.\textsuperscript{41} Obviously, such
perceptions alone cannot be regarded as demonstrating "over-
education." Many of the secondary school graduates in these
studies were probably recent entrants into the work force and
the more long-run "payoffs" of their schooling were yet to be
realized. But it does seem significant that the proportion of
workers with advanced schooling whose responses voiced a sense
of underutilization of education increased between the early
1960s and early 1970s (see Table III-4). The very fact that
Table III-4

Degree of Conformity Between Workers' Educational Levels and Job Requirements, Three Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of sample and educational level of workers</th>
<th>Workers' response to question: &quot;Does your educational level correspond to your job?&quot; (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes, the two correspond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan, 1,000 workers, 1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grades 1-4</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>87.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-11</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four cities in Bashkir republic, 15,000 workers, 1967-68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grades 1-3</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>82.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semipalatinek Meat-Packing Combine (Kazakhstan), 3,500 workers, 1972</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grades 4-6</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: N. A. Aitov in Voprosy filosofii, 1966, No. 11, p. 29; N. A. Aitov, Tekhnicheskii progress i dvizhenie rabochikh kadrov, Moscow, 1972, p. 66; Akademia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, institut ekonomiki, Upravlenie sotsial'nym razvitiem proizvodstvennykh kollektivov, Alma-Ata, 1975, p. 80.
workers' perceptions of the "mismatch" between their schooling and the jobs available to them had become a subject of "professional" (sociological) study suggests that this was not an unimportant problem. It was, in any case, a new problem.

Another type of evidence, perhaps more "qualitative" than quantitative in nature, is simply the frequency with which the notion of a "conflict" ("collision," in more apocalyptic versions) between prevailing job content and workers' advanced schooling has been invoked in the Soviet literature on labor problems. It hardly seems useful to catalogue the many instances in which this alleged "conflict" and its negative impact on work morale has been cited. But the variety of contexts in which it has been acknowledged, and the extended period over which it has been reiterated, merit a brief review. Even those who have explicitly re-rejected the concept of educational "inflation" (i.e., those who have argued that increased schooling almost invariably improves job performance) have recognized that job dissatisfaction among youth is connected with the recent extension of secondary schooling. In such cases, the argument goes, the problem is not workers' excessive schooling as such, but the inability of managerial personnel to properly utilize it in planning work organization.42

Among the first to explicitly link job dissatisfaction among young workers to the "disproportion" between extended schooling and an impoverished work content were the authors of
the Leningrad study on which we have drawn so frequently above. Writing in 1967 Zdravomyslov and Iadov noted that their observations earlier in the decade had already revealed a certain "surplus" of workers with relatively high educational levels whose expectations of challenging work could not be satisfied. They also warned that the slow pace of change in job content combined with rapidly rising levels of schooling threatened to make the problem of work morale among youth a more serious one in the decade ahead.43 Their warning was apparently well founded, for the same theme was to be repeatedly echoed by other sociologists in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Here is a small sampling of essentially similar findings drawn from the sociological literature of that period:

It is no secret that with every passing year it becomes more difficult for enterprises to place yesterday's tenth grade graduates in interesting and creative jobs where they can successfully apply their knowledge. (L. Kogan in 1968)

One of the main reasons for job dissatisfaction among workers with high levels of education is the discrepancy between the low content of their work and their education. (N. Aitov in 1972)

...a certain proportion of youth with a high level of education is forced to take unskilled jobs with no prospects of intellectual enrichment, and this creates dissatisfaction with the work itself to a greater degree than with the level of material rewards for work. (A. Tashubulatova in 1972)44

Perhaps the most free-wheeling discussion of the problem of young workers' job attitudes, and the "disproportion" between job content and education, appeared in the pages of Molodoi kommunist, the organ of the Komosomol, in 1972-73.
Aside from providing abundant empirical evidence which supported the kinds of statements we have just cited, a significant feature of this discussion was the explicit recognition by a number of participants that technological progress alone was not the answer to the problem of increasingly educated workers in unskilled and "low content" jobs. "Her majesty, automatic equipment (автоматика), is not a sorceress." This was the response of a critic to the author of the article which had initiated the discussion. The latter had documented widespread job dissatisfaction among young, low-skilled workers (41% dissatisfied among a sample of workers in Ufa), and had urged the conventional remedy—rapid "mechanization and automation." This remedy was based on the traditional identification of low-skilled work with "manual and heavy" jobs, jobs "unrelated to complex technology." It is difficult to exaggerate the frequency with which similar appeals to technological progress as the principal solution to a variety of labor problems—including the problem of job dissatisfaction—have been voiced in the Soviet literature. At the time of this discussion (the early 1970s), in the midst of the never-ending celebration of the "scientific-technological revolutions," it was hardly a common practice to question this assumption. Hence the significance of the rather casual remark that автоматика was not a "sorceress," in the context of a discussion of work attitudes and job content. The critic's (V. Churbanov) point was a fairly obvious one: Work activity associated with "complex
equipment" was not necessarily more intellectually demanding or challenging than purely manual work. While the former often implied a "lightening" of physically burdensome job tasks, it also could lead to their increased routinization and fragmentation, and a decline in their intellectual content. The creation of "high-content," challenging jobs (confronting the worker with "non-stereotyped tasks") was a more difficult problem than the simple elimination of "heavy" manual jobs. Given the spread of assembly-line work and jobs in "servicing automatic equipment," workers with a secondary education would continue to experience a "conflict" between their advanced schooling and their comparatively impoverished job content. "For an assembler on a conveyor, mental work in general is reduced to a minimum and cannot even be calculated." Indeed, success in attaining universal secondary schooling would probably intensify the sense of underutilization of education on such jobs. "The surplus of education in current production is a phenomenon that is destined to exist for a rather long time."47

The conflict between certain forms of technological modernization and worker's opportunities for an enriched job content was also formulated in unusually stark terms by two other participants in this discussion (the economists G. Slutskii and G. Shestakova). If assessed on purely "production-economic" grounds, the use of conveyor-line methods of production and work organization had distinct advantages: they ensured the continuity of the production process,
reduced the length of the production cycle, diminished labor outlays on intra-plant transportation, and in general improved the utilization of productive capacity. Hence the rapid diffusion of such methods in Soviet industry. But if assessed from the standpoint of "the interests of the individual," the conveyor clearly had negative consequences. Why the "contradiction between the individual and the conveyor"?

The experience of enterprises shows that in order to train assemblers on the conveyor, to teach them its elementary operations, a few days is sufficient. The breakdown of the work process into its fractional, simplest elements inevitably leads to a reduction in the challenge of work, to an increase in its monotony, to a decline in assemblers' interests in the results of their work.48

As if to confirm this generalization the authors reported on their findings at "the most advanced enterprise of native machine-building," the Volga Automobile Plant. Despite its advanced technology--or perhaps more correctly, because of it--the plant, staffed mainly by young workers, was experiencing great difficulties in recruiting and retaining "stable cadres."

One of the main reasons for this situation consists in the fact that the jobs of most workers are reduced here to the performance of routine, monotonous operations in loading and unloading semi-automatic equipment, in carrying out the most simple assembly operations on numerous conveyors. In discussions with us, many young workers expressed their dissatisfaction with the content of work and complained about the absence of opportunities for raising their skills.49

Clearly, since at least the early seventies the more serious Soviet observers of the labor process have been warning that the development of the "productive forces," understood as the replacement of manual work by "mechanization and automation," has been a new source of job discontent, especially among young
workers. But not all of the participants in the *Molodoi kommunist* discussion of "Education and the Labor of Youth" (the official rubric under which the discussion was conducted in 1972-73) saw the problem in precisely the same way. For some of them the problem was not primarily the rapid multiplication of routine machine-tending jobs but the negative attitude of the more educated young workers to working-class occupations generally--whether skilled or unskilled.

It is quite possible that some of the writers who pointed to the spread of assembly-line jobs as a principal source of work discontent among the more educated workers tended to overstate the diffusion of this form of production technology. Official figures on the extent of "conveyorization" are not available, and the estimates in the literature on labor problems differ substantially. Thus one of the contributors to the *Molodoi kommunist* discussion who stressed the impoverishment of job content stemming from the introduction of assembly-line technology assumed (in 1972) that "every third worker is employed on a conveyor," and that the spread of such production methods would soon absorb increasing proportions of formerly skilled metal craftsmen and lathe operators. But the sociologist O. Shkaratan cautioned that no more than 10% of workers confronted "the problems of automation and conveyorization today" (1973), and this figure would probably not increase by more than 10% by the end of the century. Hence there were grounds for questioning whether the main difficulty in adapting recalcitrant
young workers to their jobs lay in the rapid multiplication of low-skilled machine-assembly work. For some of the participants in the Molodoi kommunist discussion (as well as for others grappling with the problem of poor work morale among youth), job dissatisfaction was rooted in the attitudes which educated youngsters brought to the workplace rather than in those which they acquired as a result of their actual job experience.

In the words of one of the adherents of this view, a chief engineer of a Moscow machine-tool plant, many young people entered the work force "more afraid of workers' occupations than of a fire." Why? Because they had an exaggerated conception of the job opportunities which their secondary-school diplomas could provide, as well as of their own abilities. Too many felt that "once the graduation certificate was in hand, I am capable of creative work." The real problem, however, was the "lag" of occupational training in workers' trades behind the growing need for skilled workers. With the tone of impatience characteristic of a certain traditional style of managerial behavior, the engineer's advice to those educated youngsters who found themselves in routine, uninteresting jobs was: "...such work shouldn't frighten those who are capable of more. Just show that you are worth more."51

A more reasoned and sophisticated formulation of this position (minus the advice to show what "you are worth") appeared in the contribution of the sociologist V. Krevnevich. Without denying the negative impact on work morale stemming
from secondary school graduates being forced to accept unskilled workers' jobs, Krevnevich pointed to a more serious and "alarming" problem" the "unwillingness of some youth to seriously master workers' occupations in general," in the face of the economy's increasing need for workers in "challenging, highly skilled jobs." Numerous sociological studies over the preceding decade had demonstrated that 80% or more of secondary school graduates planned to continue their schooling either at a higher educational institution (VUZ) or a specialized school (tekhnikum) leading to semi-professional occupational status. Very few such graduates aspired to become skilled workers. When forced to enter working-class occupations as a result of failure to gain admission to advanced schooling, they frequently regarded these jobs as "temporary" and for an extended period resisted the prospect of making a "career" in workers' occupations. For Krevnevich the responsibility for this situation rested largely on the content of education in the upper grades of the general secondary school, with its "theoretical" orientation fostering expectations of "mental work" among those who remained to graduate.

The view that widespread job dissatisfaction among the more educated young workers often reflected a certain "social orientation" acquired prior to labor market entry was frequently voiced in the sociological literature of this period. "Social orientation" in this context meant essentially...
a striving for "social position," more specifically, for intelligentsia social and occupational status. Whether this orientation was directly fostered by the content of education in the upper grades of secondary school (as suggested by Krevnevich), or whether advanced schooling was seen by some youngsters as mainly an instrument for realizing their aspirations for a higher-level "social position" (as suggested by the sociologist I.M. Popova), the point was essentially the same. For youngsters entering the labor force in workers' jobs after 10 years of schooling, the orientation to college admission and eventual attainment of intelligentsia social position which they brought to the workplace could be a more important source of job dissatisfaction than the actual content of their work tasks.54 The problem was not so much that they were forced into routine, unskilled workers' jobs, but that they found themselves in any kind of workers' jobs. In Popova's words, "The orientation to college admission determines to a considerable degree the attitude of tenth graders to the enterprise" (i.e., to their jobs in working-class occupations).55 In her own study of ship-repair workers Popova had found that the higher the level of workers' schooling the less satisfied they were both with their schooling and their jobs. The greater degree of satisfaction among the less educated--both with their schooling and their jobs--signified their adjustment to and acceptance of working-class status. In Popova's somewhat elusive language, the dissatisfaction of
the more educated workers was associated with "claims" of a "non-production" character--their frustrated aspirations for intelligentsia (professional) social position.\textsuperscript{56}

Enough has been said here to demonstrate the absorption of the sociological and "popular" literature in the early 1970s with problems of poor work morale and job dissatisfaction among young workers. The variety of attempts to identify the sources of these problems stressed two factors--one, "objective" in nature, the other, "subjective." The former referred to the rapid multiplication of low-skilled machine-tending and assembly line jobs increasingly staffed by secondary school graduates. While precise figures on the relative share of such jobs in total industrial employment are unavailable ("official" figures showing close to 3/4 of industrial workers in "skilled" jobs are hardly credible), none of the participants in the Molodoi kommunist discussion challenged the view of one writer who noted that more than 50\% of workers' jobs were still in "low-content and unskilled types of work," or the views of another who remarked that "the future belongs to serial production" which requires mainly low-skilled workers.\textsuperscript{57} The "subjective" factor referred to the negative attitudes toward workingclass occupations as a whole which many graduates of secondary school brought to their jobs. These attitudes were rooted in the inability of increasing proportions of these youngsters to follow the traditional career paths open to the relatively small number
of such graduates in the past—access to higher education and intelligentsia status. Less than 1/4 of these graduates were being admitted to full-time college study at this time, compared to more than 1/2 a decade earlier. It would clearly be an error to regard the greater stress on "objective" factors by some writers and on "subjective" factors by others as representing alternative interpretations of the problem of job discontent among youth. These were the two sides of the same coin—the growing "contradiction" between job content and rising educational attainments.

Although we have focused thus far largely on the late 1960s and early 1970s there is no reason to assume that this "contradiction" and its negative consequences for job attitudes and work discipline have lessened in more recent years. The available evidence points to the continuity rather than the easing of these problems. Thus in reporting on his study of Leningrad machine-building workers in 1976-77, O.I. Shkaratan summarized his findings in terms that were remarkably similar to those used a decade earlier by Zdravomyslov and Iadov: "Leningrad...is training the most highly educated and vocationally schooled workers, but the content and character of work at the city's enterprises is changing much more slowly..."58 The consequences included "relatively high rates of dissatisfaction with their jobs" by graduates of secondary schools providing vocational training (only 48% reported satisfaction with their current jobs). The work
performance of these graduates, as judged by norm fulfillment and the quality of their output, was inferior to that of workers in the same age groups but without a secondary school diploma.

It is hardly remarkable, of course, that workers in low-skilled jobs but with relatively high levels of schooling should express dissatisfaction with their workplace roles. But it does seem significant that in Shkaratan's sample as a whole (which presumably included representatives of occupations of varying degrees of skill) higher levels of job dissatisfaction appeared to be positively associated with higher levels of schooling. Here are Shkaratan's figures (in number of years of school completed) for various job satisfaction (dissatisfaction) groupings among Leningrad machine-building workers in 1976-77:

- more satisfied than dissatisfied with job: 8.9
- more dissatisfied than satisfied with job: 9.6
- fully satisfied with independence on job: 8.8
- completely dissatisfied with independence on job: 9.2

Whatever its long-run positive consequences, therefore, the steady rise in workers' educational levels in the late 1970s continued to be regarded as a source of "additional problems" (in Shkaratan's phrase) for those entrusted with managing the work process. Nor were Shkaratan's findings the only indicator that this was the case. Essentially the same point was made in studies conducted in Moscow and Taganrog during this period. But it seems most appropriate
to conclude this review with the rather casual though highly significant remark made in 1979 by one of the first sociologists to warn of the problematic consequences of the increased schooling of young workers. Reporting on his recent study of changes in the work attitudes and behavior of young Leningrad workers since the early 1960s, V. Iadov noted: "In the period that has elapsed there has been some increase in the indiscipline of workers."61

The evidence is persuasive that job dissatisfaction among the younger members of the work force remained a widely recognized problem throughout the decade of the seventies, and that it was related to the much-discussed "disproportion" between increased schooling and the largely routine, low-skilled nature of most youngsters' work tasks. What have been the principal responses to the evidence of work discontent?

Footnotes


2. See, for example, Alastair McAuley, Women's Work and Wages in the Soviet Union (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1981), Chapters 2 and 5; V.G. Podmarkov, editor, Sotsial'nye problemy proizvodstva, Moscow, 1979, pp. 198-203.

3. McAuley, p. 130.


5. Zdravomyslov and Iadov, Chelovek, pp. 142; Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, Institut filosofii i prava, p. 275.
6. In three such studies (in the Kazakh and Kirgiz republics and the city of Volgograd) the job satisfaction rates of both men and women fell in the range of 62% to 79%, but in each case were higher for men than for women. See Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, Institut ekonomiki, p. 154; N.V. Nastavshev, p. 89; S. Bekkhodzhaeva, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy truda zhenshchin v narodnom khoziaistve Kirgizi, Frunze, 1978, p. 170.


11. This discussion is based largely on Kharchev and Golod, pp. 161-170.


13. For an illustration of this approach see I.E. Stoliarova in Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1975, No. 2, pp. 148-149.


22. Ibid.
23. Akademiia nauk Ukrainskoi SSR, p. 86.

24. See Table II-1 for the results of the initial Leningrad study, the Angarsk Oil-Chemical Combine study, and the report on "mixed occupational groups" in the auto and tractor industry. For a more recent example see Iu. E. Volkov and Iu. S. Loshkarev, Trudovoe vospitanie molodezhi, Moscow, 1976, p. 28.


33. V. A. Zhamin, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy obrazovaniia i nauki v razvitom sotsialisticheskom obschestve, Moscow, 1979, pp. 129-130.

34. This quotation from an article by V. N. Shubkin and A. G. Aganbegian in a volume (not available to us) published in 1964 (Kolichevstvennye metody v sotsiologicheskikh issledovaniiakh, v. 16) is cited in Zdravomyslov and Iadov, p. 282.


38. Zdravomyslov and Iadov, pp. 119, 277, 280.


42. L. Bliakhman, "A Surplus of Education or an Inability to Utilize It," Molodoi kommunist, 1972, No. 11.

43. Zdravomyslov and Iadov, pp. 304-305.


45. V. Churbanov, "The Young Worker and Low-Content Work," Molodoi kommunist, 1972, No. 6, p. 66.

46. Tashbulatova, pp. 59, 62.

47. Churbanov, pp. 65, 69.


49. Slutskii and Shestakova, p. 57.

51. Interview with S. P. Neprintsev, Molodoi kommunist, 1972, No. 8, p. 72.


54. Akademiia nauk Ukrainskoi SSR, p. 88.

55. Ibid., p. 92.

56. Ibid., p. 92.

57. Krevnevich, p. 83; Interview with S. P. Neprintsev, Molodoi kommunist, 1972, No. 8, p. 71; for "official" figures see V. A. Zhamin, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy obrazovaniia i nauki v razvitom sotsialisticheskom obshchestve, Moscow, 1979, p. 50.


59. O. I. Shkaratan, Promyshlennoe predpriiatie, Moscow, 1979, p. 143.


61. Interview with V. A. Iadov, Znanie-sila, 1979, No. 10.
Chapter IV

Postscript: Responses to Work Discontent

A few words of qualification are in order as we turn to a brief review of Soviet efforts to improve work morale and to elicit a more disciplined and committed work effort from the laboring population. Although we have focused in the immediately preceding pages on Soviet concerns with the attitudes and performance of young workers, there is no reason to assume that job dissatisfaction and poor work performance are exclusively confined to the younger age groups. But since the public discussion of labor problems has so often concentrated on the job attitudes of young workers we should not be surprised to find that some of the principal policy responses and proposals for work reform have been directed at this group. It should also be clear that only certain types of proposals to counter work dissatisfaction are like to surface in the public discourse on labor problems. Thus we can hardly expect suggestions for increasing workers' real wages, or for improving the availability of food supplies and other consumer goods, or for establishing effective channels for the airing of workers' grievances to appear in these discussions. The right to raise such issues--indeed, if they are viewed as legitimate issues at all--is obviously reserved for those at the highest levels of authority. Within these limits, however, we shall see that a rather wide range of measures has been proposed. If the actual policy measures implemented to confront the problem of work discontent seem few and far between, the variety of ideas which
have begun to surface in the literature are part of the intellectual environment in which a modest Soviet version of work reform has begun to emerge. Hence in the material which follows we are interested in the ideas and concepts which have appeared in these discussions no less than in the limited range of policy measures thus far adopted.

Finally, the various measures and proposals to be reviewed here have not always been presented as responses to explicit manifestations of job discontent. More often they have been defended as necessary to improve workers' "productive potential," to reduce excessive labor turnover, to heighten work discipline. These formulations should not obscure their obvious connection to the problem of job dissatisfaction. It seems convenient to divide the various responses into two broad categories: (a) those directed at changing the content of schooling, and (b) those designed to improve the work environment.

Changes in schooling

Cautiously worded warnings against excessive investment in workers' schooling have occasionally appeared in Soviet discussions of the proper "fit" between education and work. But they have been subordinate to the stress on changing the content of schooling in the upper grades of secondary education. We have seen that the completion of the 10th grade of a general-education school was long regarded as essentially a stepping-stone to college admission and thus escape from working-class status. Beginning in the late 1960s a serious effort was made to change the career expectations of the vast majority of
youngsters who continued their schooling beyond the 8th grade. The process was one we might loosely call "consciousness-lowering." The principal instrument was to be a substantial increase in enrollment of youngsters in vocational-technical schools (professional'nye tekhnicheskie uchilishche) providing training for semi-skilled and skilled workers' occupations. These schools had long been widely regarded as "second-rate" educational institutions to which "difficult" youngsters who performed poorly in general-education schools were channeled.² The workers' vocational schools had also been "dead-end" institutions in the sense that graduation did not make a youngster eligible for post-secondary schooling. Beginning in 1969, in an effort to enhance the attractiveness of this form of education, an increasing number of these schools were shifted to a three-year course of study (compared to 12-18 months in earlier years) which would simultaneously provide a "complete" secondary education and vocational training in workers' trades. The purpose was not merely to promote early acquisition of workers' skills but to "implant in youth an interest in workers' occupations,"³ i.e., to avoid the development of the kinds of unrealistic career expectations fostered by the general-education schools. Graduates would be considered eligible for college admission (this feature was obviously intended to raise the prestige of these schools) but the principal objective was clearly the early socialization of youngsters to future employment in working-class occupations.

High hopes were placed on the ability of these schools to divert students from the more academically oriented general-
education schools. With the customary enthusiasm accompanying new policy initiatives, some commentators saw the secondary vocational-technical schools as harbingers of "universal vocational-technical education of youth." They were to become "the principal source of recruitment of the working class." But perhaps the most significant feature of this form of schooling has been its relatively modest expansion thus far. By 1978 only 15% of youngsters completing the 8th grade of daytime general-education schools continued their schooling in secondary vocational-technical institutions (see Table I-2 on p. 6a). Over the whole period of the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-80) approximately 4/5 of all youngsters completing a secondary education (10-11 years of schooling) graduated from general-education schools. These are the very institutions so often criticized for orienting their students to "mental labor" rather than working-class occupations. Moreover, in the words of the deputy minister of education in 1981, the general-education schools "will remain ... the principal path for receiving a secondary education." 5

How can we explain these "mixed signals," in particular, the failure to rapidly expand a form of schooling explicitly designed to adapt youngsters to working-class jobs, and the continued dominance of a type of upper-level secondary education traditionally associated with preparation for college entry under conditions in which such entry is impossible for most graduates? Part of the answer lies in what might be called—to borrow a strange phrase from a Soviet commentator—
"sociological resistance" to the expansion of the new vocational schools. The resistance has come from a variety of sources. First, the more ambitious youngsters and their parents can hardly be expected to view with enthusiasm a type of secondary schooling offering the least likely prospect of access to higher education. Graduates of the new vocational schools, although eligible for admission to a VUZ, are clearly at a disadvantage in the competition for college entry compared to the more "academically" trained graduates of general-education schools. But resistance to making the workers' vocational schools the principal form of secondary education has also come from sections of the educational "establishment." Their concern has been that the excessive diversion of youngsters from the general-education schools, under conditions in which the demographic base for recruitment of college students has already begun to narrow (reflecting the low birth rates of the 1960s), may cut into both the number and quality of VUZ applicants. In effect, the effort at early adaptation of school-age youngsters to working-class occupations might prove too "successful." Finally, studies of the work performance and job attitudes of graduates of secondary vocational-technical schools in areas where this type of education has become widespread--Leningrad, for example--have not always been encouraging (see our summary of Shkaratan's findings on pp. 102-103 above). Thus the relatively slow change in an educational system widely regarded as contributing to the problem of negative attitudes toward workers' jobs among the more educated youth.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that efforts to moderate youngsters' career expectations have had no impact. The extension of a more prestigious form (i.e., one offering a "complete" secondary education) of vocational schooling in workers' skills, the increased stress on "vocational guidance" in the schools (essentially "guidance" into workers' trades), and the sheer passage of time since the days when secondary-school graduation meant a high probability of college admission have all operated as part of a "cooling-off" process gradually adapting educated youth to the prospect of a lifetime in workers' jobs. The point is that by its very nature such a process of adaptation cannot be expected to produce a marked and rapid improvement in the job attitudes of young people entering working-class occupations.

Changes at the Workplace

Some of the policy measures proposed or actually adopted at the workplace in recent years have been "external" to the labor process itself in the sense that they have not sought to alter job content or work organization. While such proposals seem less important than those bearing directly on the labor process, they deserve at least brief mention as indicators of the range of work reform measures under consideration in the effort to reduce job dissatisfaction.

One illustration, voiced in the Molodoi kommunist discussion of the early 1970s reviewed in chapter 3, was the proposal for introducing measures of "social compensation" for workers employed in "low content" jobs. "Social compensation" encompassed the elimination ("wherever possible") of night shifts, the
reduction of the normal length of the working day, increased vacation periods, and preferential access to enterprise housing facilities. The context of the discussion made it clear that the proposals were aimed mainly at reducing work discontent among educated youth in "unattractive" jobs. The term "social compensation" was certainly appropriate--rewards off the job (mainly increased non-work time, or more convenient work schedules) would partially offset an unchanged and unrewarding job content. The proposal was not favorably received by most of the other participants in the Molodoi kommunist discussion, nor is this the route which political authorities have recently pursued in confronting the problem of poor work morale. The high costs of such an approach, both in terms of output sacrificed and in its disincentive effect on skill acquisition and occupational mobility, have apparently been effective arguments against its implementation. But it seems unlikely that such proposals would have emerged in public discussion unless they represented one of the options under active consideration. Suggestions in Soviet publications to reduce the working day and extend vacations for a large body of workers cannot be regarded as simply expressions of "one man's opinion."

A more frequently proposed measure, and one that appears to be in the process of implementation, involves the systematizing of promotion and on-the-job training procedures. Such a measure may also be regarded as "external" to the labor process (it affects access to higher-level jobs rather than changes in the content of existing jobs). But why should the establishment of
clear-cut criteria for job promotion and occupational advancement be an issue at all? This seems to be such an obvious, if not trivial, matter that it appears somewhat surprising that it should have to be raised and given special emphasis at this late date. Without pursuing this matter in any detail here, suffice it to note that the absence of consistently enforced formal rules governing the movement of workers within the enterprise has long been accompanied by complaints against arbitrary promotion policies and appeals for creating "a system of promotion that would be equal and clear for all." The importance of institutionalizing such a system has obviously increased with the inflow of secondary school graduates--many of them frustrated VUZ applicants--into low-skilled jobs. The time is certainly propitious for demonstrating to such youth that promising "career ladders" are available within working-class occupations.

The policies in effect at the Volga Automobile Plant are widely heralded as the model for other enterprises to follow. The plant periodically issues an information bulletin announcing the vacancies available in the more skilled job classifications. Preferential access to these positions is reserved for the plant's current employees, with recourse to the "external market" confined largely to filling the less skilled assembly-line jobs. The rules governing eligibility for promotion specify the minimum period of employment required in the lower skilled jobs, as well as the plant's training programs which workers in such jobs must pass through on their way "upward." The impression which these reports convey is that of a genuine effort to institutionalize
a formal policy of "promotion from within." We cannot determine, of course, how extensively such procedures are being implemented. But the whole conception of establishing consistently applied and non-arbitrary practices governing workers' access to higher job classifications is very much a part of the Soviet work reform effort. It is curious that something at least roughly approximating the practices associated with "internal labor markets" in the United States seems to be emerging in the Soviet Union. Given the importance of encouraging job stability and work commitment among the members of an increasingly educated working class forced to begin their work careers in "low-content" jobs, perhaps there is little reason to be surprised. The point is to instill in such workers the sense that disciplined work promises upward movement along predetermined job ladders.

But a more significant Soviet response to job dissatisfaction and poor work performance lies elsewhere—in attempts to "enrich" job content by altering the organization of the work process and creating a consciousness of worker "participation" in plant-level decision making. This is a large theme which merits a more extended examination than will be given to it here. The remarks which follow are intended only as an introduction to this aspect of the Soviet work reform effort.

One manifestation of the search for new forms of work organization may be seen in the process of assimilating into Soviet public discourse the concepts associated with the "humanization of work" movement in Western countries. Thus the Soviet management literature has begun to report in relatively positive
terms on the variety of work reorganization experiments undertaken in Western Europe. This literature includes straightforward accounts of the organization of autonomous work teams (with the authority to "independently plan and organize their own work activity"), the practice of job rotation and job enlargement, the modification and elimination of assembly-line work--especially in Volvo plants in Sweden. Any such discussions must, of course, contain a necessary minimum quote of critical commentary. The introduction of such practices does not alter the "class essence" and "exploitative character" of labor under capitalism. But these critical remarks seem almost perfunctory compared to the predominantly positive characterizations of the enriched "group methods" of work organization which--in the Soviet view--have come to replace Taylorism in the more "progressive" capitalist enterprises. Here, for example, is a Soviet evaluation of the consequences of the Volvo experiments in work reorganization:

. . . the new form of work organization . . . has led to a certain lightening of workers' labor, has made it richer in content, has increased the sense of involvement of working people. Safety measures have been raised to a new level and the quality of the surrounding work environment has been improved.

The clear implication is that Soviet industrial practice can benefit from a study of Western humanization of work policies. If anything signals this recognition it is the explicit invocation by some Soviet commentators of Lenin's characterization of Taylor's "scientific management" methods as being "no less applicable" to the new stress in capitalist work organization on job autonomy and reduced fragmentation of work: ". . . it combines within
itself the most subtle brutality of bourgeois exploitation and some of the richest scientific achievements . . . ."\(^\text{16}\)

It would be a mistake to assume, however, that the popularization of Western work reform experiments represents simply an "importation" or borrowing" of previously unfamiliar and alien concepts. The idea of job rotation has strong roots in the Marxian ideological heritage and proposals to implement it have long been made in the Soviet literature. The same is true of the idea of organizing work on the basis of "group" ("team" or "brigade") rather than individual work assignments, and of "enlarging" and "consolidating" fragmented and specialized job tasks.\(^\text{17}\) But such concepts have long been subordinate to the faith in "mechanization and automation" as inherently work-enriching processes. This is no longer the case. Hence the readiness to assimilate, or at least to seriously consider, the experience of Western efforts to improve both workers' job attitudes and productive performance through changing the organization of work and--within limits--the distribution of authority.

It is often difficult to gauge how much of a difference--if any--in the normal operation of economic enterprises is made by public proclamations of a "new direction" in Soviet policy. What is clear, however, is that such a "new direction," in the sense of a newly announced objective, is in the process of being elaborated and popularized in the sphere of work organization. One element of the new policy direction is that of making the work team the "primary structural unit" of the enterprise's work organization. Taken alone, this objective would not signal a
significant departure in Soviet labor policy. Work teams are not a recent innovation on the Soviet landscape. By 1980 some 48% of industrial workers were nominally included in some form of team or brigade units. The principal innovation concerns not the simple extension of teams as such but the particular characteristics of the favored ("most progressive") form of team organization whose growth is to be encouraged. This involves the kind of work organization that provides "the greatest possible opportunity for each team member to master and perform a diversity of job functions." Special emphasis is to be placed on "composite" or multi-occupational (rather than "specialized" or single-task) work teams, with the team unit as a whole (rather than its individual members) receiving work assignments from managerial personnel, and with each team member having the opportunity to engage in a range of occupational and work roles, "thereby overcoming the narrow limits of the occupational and job-task division of labor." In a somewhat more ambitious and perhaps idealized formulation, one commentator (the industrial sociologist O. I. Shkaratan) has described the new work teams as essentially "small, self-managing work collectives which take on many of the functions normally belonging to line managers." The self-managing aspect presumably refers to the distribution of work assignments within the team by decision of the team members themselves. These general formulations suggest some version of semi-autonomous work groups with opportunities for job rotation "built into" the team structure by the inclusion within the work unit of a diversity of distinct job functions.
It would be too simple to dismiss these descriptions of new forms of work organization as so much empty rhetoric not taken seriously by either Soviet workers or managers. We think this would be a mistake. Accounts of changes in work structures in Soviet plants (which we do not review here) point to a genuine effort to "enlarge" and diversify routine work tasks and to replace individual by "collective" work assignments which limit some of the traditional authority of managerial personnel. That efforts to institutionalize semi-autonomous work teams represent more than empty rhetoric and are being taken seriously is also suggested by the evidence of controversies over the "optimum" degree of work team independence, and signs of managerial resistance to what some regard as excessive autonomy for the new work units. Such resistance may well make these work reform efforts come to naught, but in the late 1970s and early 1980s they represented one of the principal responses to the problem of job discontent and lackadaisical work performance.

Finally, a word on the general issue of worker "participation" in plant-level decisions. The main problem here is to distinguish between the ritualistic celebration of largely fictitious forms of "participation" (socialist emulation campaigns, attendance at production conferences, membership in the plant's "social organizations"—essentially the trade union and Party units), and serious efforts to pose the issue of enlarging opportunities for workers' involvement in enterprise decisions. Understood in the latter sense, there has been a genuine "participatory current" in the sociological and economic literature since the
early 1960s. It has appeared in a variety of forms: in the recommendations issuing from a score of job satisfaction studies (beginning with the work of Zdravomyslov and Iadov), in recurring proposals to introduce "elections" of lower-level managerial personnel, in appeals to limit the principle of "one-man management" (edinonachalie) and to foster less authoritarian styles of managerial behavior, and most recently in the arguments supporting the extension of semi-autonomous work teams.

In recent years the continuing concern with poor work morale and work instability—particularly among the more highly educated working-class youth in low-skilled jobs—and the urgency of increasing labor productivity under conditions of an intensifying labor shortage, have provided a "platform" for this participatory current. Quite apart from proposing specific institutional mechanisms that would enhance a sense of worker involvement, the participatory literature has sought to convey a more general "message," a way of thinking about problems of work that is simultaneously an appeal for taking the issue of worker participation seriously.

Drawing on some recent examples of this literature, its essential "message" might be briefly and loosely formulated as follows.22 Existing "official"forms of participation are comparatively ineffective in mobilizing work effort. At best, they serve only as "compensation for the social costs of strictly regulated, executor-type labor." The enrichment of work is not only (or not primarily) a function of technological advance but of the "social organization" (or "managerial relations") of the workplace.
The improvement of this social organization requires a redistribution of managerial authority, more specifically, "the extension of the worker's functions in managing his own work process, an increase in his on-the-job independence in planning and organizing his work, in monitoring its results." Work organization must be redirected to provide increased scope for "self-organization, self-discipline, self-supervision."

Despite the rhetorical flourishes and the failure to specify the precise institutional forms that worker participation might assume (in fact, some of these remarks were made in the course of arguing for the extension of work teams), it should be clear why we refer to the existence of a genuine participatory current in the Soviet literature on work. At the very least this current seeks to formulate the issue of worker participation as a problem in need of solution rather than an achievement worthy of ritualistic celebration:

What level of independence of workers in the planning, organization and control of their own labor should be regarded as optimal from the social and economic points of view? How should the system of long-run and operational decision-making at various levels of management be restructured? At present it is difficult to get fully substantiated answers to these questions.23

But one question which those who are serious about creating opportunities for more participatory work organization have not posed--at least in public discourse--is whether this objective is realizable in the absence of institutions which workers could reasonably regard as their "own."
Footnotes

1. For a recent example see O. I. Shkaratan, et al. in Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1977, No. 4, p. 40.


4. Slesarev, p. 159.


8. For evidence of this adaptive process, see V. Shubkin, Nachalo puti, Moscow, 1979, pp. 55-56.

9. V. Churbanov in Molodoi kommunist, 1972, No. 6, p. 71.

10. For example, see the articles by G. Slutskii and G. Shestakova, in Molodoi kommunist, 1972, No. 10, p. 56 and L. Bliakhman, ibid., 1972, No. 11, p. 71.


17. See, for example, Slutskii and Shestakova, p. 60; V. Kononov, "Aspects of Progress: Technical and Social," Molodoi kommunist, 1972, No. 12, p. 80.


20. See, for example, Pukhov, p. 127; A. A. Prokhorov, "Searches and Results," Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva, 1979, No. 7, pp. 61-62.


22. This section draws largely on Tikhonov, pp. 32-33, 44, and Nazimova, pp. 50, 52-53, 57-60.

23. Tikhonov, p. 33.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Scope of Sample</th>
<th>Highly Satisfied</th>
<th>More Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Total Satisfied</th>
<th>Highly Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Total Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1962-1964</td>
<td>2665 workers up to age 30 in Leningrad industrial enterprises</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1965-1966</td>
<td>5000 workers, engineers, technicians and employees up to age 28 in 6 plants of auto and tractor industry</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1965</td>
<td>2083 engineering-technical personnel at 21 enterprises and design bureaus in Ufa, Sterlitamaka and Salavata</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1966</td>
<td>833 industrial workers in Perm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 1965, 1967, 1970</td>
<td>2696 engineering-technical personnel in industrial enterprises and research organizations in Leningrad</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1970</td>
<td>218 engineers in design and research organizations in Leningrad</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 1971-1972</td>
<td>Approximately 3000 workers at Kishinev Tractor Plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Workers in oil industry:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--Glvitiumenneftgas Association</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--Sakhalinneft Association</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Individuals employed in variety of jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(from unskilled workers to managerial personnel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in ship repair plant and port, Odessa</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>385 workers in four enterprises of automobile industry:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--201 workers in non-automated jobs</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--184 workers in automated jobs</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4000 urban residents in Moldavia employed in variety of jobs (from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unskilled workers to managerial personnel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table values are not in percentage format as provided in the image.
TABLE A-1: SOVIET STUDIES OF WORK SATISFACTION

SOURCES AND NOTES


4. N.F. Naumova and Sliusarianskii, p. 142. The "other" category includes 9.6% "indifferent," 25.1% "inteterminate," and .9% "no answer."

5. S.A. Kugel and O.M. Nikandrov, Molodye inzhereni, Moscow, 1971, p. 152. The "other" category includes the "indifferent" and those who "cannot answer."

6. V.A. Iadov, editor, Sotsial'no-psikhologicheskii portret inzhenera, 1977, p. 146. The "other" category applies to those who gave "no answer."

7. Akademiia nauk moldavskoi SSR, otdel filosofii i prava, Sotsial'naia aktivnost rabotnikov promyshlennogo predpriiatiiia, Kishinev, 1973, p. 42. This study was based on a sample of "more than 3,300" persons drawn from all occupational groups. We assume approximately 3,000 were manual workers (rabochie). The "other" category here refers to those in the whole sample with a "neutral" attitude toward work ("at least 30"). The 21.3% "dissatisfied" is derived as a residual.

8. I.E. Stoliarova in Sotsiologichekie issledovaniia, 1975, No. 2, p. 143. The "other" category here includes 15.3% "indifferent" and 13.7% with "contradictory" attitudes.

9. Prokhvatilov and Kirdziuk, pp. 259-260. The figure shown for "satisfied" applies to those with a "positive attitude" toward their work; that for the "dissatisfied" applies to those with a "negative attitude." The "other" category applies to those with an "indeterminate" attitude.

10. Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, Institut ekonomiki, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie voprosy razvitiia Kazakhstana v period razvitogo sotsializma, Alma-Ata, 1977, p. 92. The respondents in these studies were divided into three categories: those who "liked" their jobs, did "not like" them, and the "indifferent."

12. I.M. Popova, p. 151. These figures were derived as simple averages of those shown in this source for employees whose work was graded "high," "average" and "low" in quality. These grades are shown for each of the job satisfaction categories. The "other" category applies to employees whose answers were "contradictory" or who found it "difficult to answer."

13. Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut mezhdunarodnogo rabochego dvizheniia, Rabochii klass v usloviiakh nauchno-tekhnicheskoi revoliutsii, Moscow, 1979, p. 145. The "other" category applies to those who were "partly satisfied, partly not."

14. Iu. V. Arutunian, Opyt etnosotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia obraza zhizni, Moscow, 1980, p. 54. The "other" category applies to those who "did not answer."