

THE DISSENT/COERCION NEXUS IN THE USSR

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Coercive control over the behavior of its citizenry has long been considered to be a core characteristic of the Soviet political system. Yet, there is evidence -- especially given the rise of the dissent movement in the 1960s and 1970s -- that some unsanctioned political and cultural activity can exist without being immediately repressed. How is this possible? Did the regime change? Did society change and bring forth a new phenomenon unanticipated by the regime? Or is the change less one of reality than one that is needed in our conceptualization of coercion?

I intend to show that all three propositions are true. There has been some regime change, nonconformist individuals developed innovative approaches in their fight for more autonomy, and recent theories shed new light on the meaning of coercion in the Soviet context.

The need for a systematic analysis of the relationship between dissent and coercion in the USSR is acute. Most studies of the contemporary Soviet system note the end of mass terror in the mid-1950s and imply there has been a major change, but they have come to say less and less about how the regime assures compliance and deters opposition. And while there is a respectable literature on the various dissent movements of the last two decades, there is a need for more discussion of the context in which they arose.

The core of the theoretical problem to be analyzed is how exactly dissent and coercion are related: does an increase in one cause an increase in the other, which is the decisive factor, and under what conditions? Studies of dissent in the USSR have tended to implicitly assume that the association between the two is linear and that coercion is always the

decisive element. If dissent rises, coercion is bound to increase too; conversely, if coercion rises, dissent will evaporate. This conceptualization of the nexus¹ between dissent and coercion has to be revised. Surveys of the theoretical literature² show that the correlation between opposition and government coercion is not necessarily either direct or inverse. It can fit various curves, and the direction of causation can vary. One of the reasons for the complexity of this relationship is that coercion may either escalate or de-escalate conflict by opposition groups. While there is evidence showing the deterrent effect of government coercion, there is also evidence that repression increases the future mobilization of dissidents,³ in part because coercion itself becomes a new target of protest.

Furthermore, coercion as a concept needs clarification. There is a tendency to think of it purely in terms of sanctions, yet theories of coercive power show that it involves structural characteristics of political systems and frequently is prophylactic. Deterrence too is coercive if it involves manipulating someone's behavior by threats⁴ or otherwise.

Coercion is related to the type of dissent engaged in. In the USSR entirely new forms of dissent that evolved in the 1960s and 1970s partly neutralized the regime's coercive powers and then triggered their gradual readjustment. The emphasis on constitutionality and publicity that formed the hallmark of the dissident movement in the Brezhnev era put Soviet authorities at a disadvantage. Much of the change evident in the relationship between nonconformists and the regime was due to the nature of these innovative approaches, just as the Solidarity movement in Poland put the authorities off balance for more than a year.

It is the purpose of this article to clarify the linkage between dissent and coercion in the Soviet polity. I begin with a conceptualization

of the meaning of "dissent" and then examine data on it from a recent major survey of former Soviet citizens now in the West. Key aspects of coercion are specified and the difference between purely attitudinal dissidents and those who also engage in behavioral dissent analyzed. An examination of the patterns and logic of sanction application follows, including a discussion of the regime's calculus of coercive strategy.

The Modes and Meaning of Dissent

The forms of dissident behavior differ from one political system to another based on regime norms regarding unsanctioned activism. In democracies unorthodox political behavior typically involves protest demonstrations, riots, and armed attacks,⁸ but in the USSR dissent includes much milder behaviors such as attending unofficial study groups or distributing unofficial publications. As Feldbrugge notes, the samizdat phenomenon is linked to the Soviet system of censorship: if none existed, "self-publication" would not be a dissident act,⁹ as in fact it is not in democracies. Unsanctioned political behavior has to be defined and evaluated contextually.

One way of defining something is to say what it is not. Here terms such as "dissent" or "unsanctioned political behavior" are used rather than "opposition" because the latter suggests activities extinct in the contemporary USSR. The Bolshevik leaders early on eliminated every institutional basis for opposing political parties and autonomous civic organizations. Alternative illegal modes of organized political opposition such as conspiratorial groupings were dealt with so decisively in the Stalinist era that the preconditions for them also appear to be nonexistent. Violent covert opposition disappeared with the defeat of the Baltic guerrillas in the early 1950s,

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and the nonviolent covert organizations that sporadically arise --including Marxist student groups such as the "Party of True Communists"-- continually experience immediate and complete repression.⁷

Because organized opposition is not feasible in the USSR, protest typically is expressed through spontaneous demonstrations or anonymous symbolic acts. In addition, an innovative form of dissent⁸ emerged in the late 1960s that adapted its tactics to counteract instant repression. Theorists have noted that basically powerless protest groups can gain leverage if they are successful in activating new reference publics.⁹ For Soviet dissenters in the Brezhnev era these were various audiences abroad and a network of sympathizers within the Soviet Union. Dissidents deliberately emphasized openness and relied on self-created publicity at home and abroad. In addition, most of their protests, petitions and samizdat documents dealt with official violations of the legal and constitutional rights of individuals and groups. While the emphasis on legalism in part was a tool against the political arbitrariness of the authorities,¹⁰ it was also essential to its nature as "within system" dissent. The Democratic Movement largely involved activity in defense of civic and human rights, taking Soviet laws and international commitments such as the Helsinki Accords at their word. To avoid charges of illegality based on Soviet restrictions on autonomous organization, participants refused to call the movement an organization, relying instead on informal networks of friends and colleagues who held similar views and enough trust to get together to express them. Even groupings such as the Helsinki Watch Committees emphasized that they were free associations formed on strictly legal grounds and operating openly.¹¹

Because Soviet authorities have not only been concerned with limiting dissent but also with limiting disclosures about it, official sources were of

little use to the present analysis. Unconventional sources such as samizdat as well as interviews with expatriates had to be used. The empirical part of this analysis is largely based on the Soviet Interview Project (SIP), the most systematic emigrant survey to date. A sample of 2,793 former Soviet citizens who came to the USA between January 1, 1979, and April 30, 1982, (see appendix) were surveyed by Russian-speaking, trained interviewers using a highly structured questionnaire. Every effort was made to safeguard the scientific character of the study, but it goes without saying that an emigrant sample poses methodological problems. No claim is made here that the sample constitutes a representative cross-section of the Soviet population. The emphasis is on analyzing the significance of variance between subgroups of respondents. Findings are discussed within the framework established by comparative studies.

Research based on emigrants has obvious liabilities, but it also has some special advantages. Most studies of Soviet dissent analyze the behavior, outlook, and fate of known activists. It is the singular advantage of the SIP dataset that it allows the analysis of a varied population ranging from the most passive and politically uninterested individuals to those with intense nonconformist tendencies. This makes it possible to study the correlates not only of dissident involvement but also of passivity. The latter is especially important since -- as will be argued below -- coercion affects both active and passive individuals.

The empirical referent for behavioral dissent is a list of questions dealing with unsanctioned activities during the respondents' "last normal period" in the USSR defined as the five years before emigration attempts disrupted their lives. For most respondents (79%) this period falls between 1974 and 1979¹² and my analysis thus focuses on the late Brezhnev period.

The applicable questions were: "During your last normal period, did you ever: (1) attend an unofficial art show, poetry reading, or concert? (2) Take part in an unsanctioned study or discussion group? (3) Distribute samizdat (4) Take part in an open protest against some Soviet policy? (5) Take part in a strike or protest at work? (6) Belong to any (other) unofficial groups or take part in any (other) unsanctioned activities? (SPECIFY)." If any of the answers was "yes", the respondent was asked whether he or she had a leadership role.

These questions provide a useful -- albeit imperfect -- empirical definition of dissent. Unavoidably, the composition of the sample (87% Jews, 9% Russians, 4% others) precluded the mentioning of some forms of dissent, for example the Crimean Tatar activities for the return to their homeland. Other limitations were set by the questionnaire. The survey's focus on the "normal" period before the upheavals created by emigration meant that protests linked to the latter were mostly excluded. And the wording of the questions favored responses about group based unsanctioned activities. Typically, respondents omitted individual acts such as unofficial meetings with foreigners¹³ or the reading of unofficial publications, but 31% said yes when asked directly whether they had read samizdat or tamizdat.

Thus, the focus is on participation in unofficial groups and cultural events, the distribution of samizdat, and collective protests or strikes.¹⁴ Although this definition of dissent is limited and our sample unavoidably has limitations as well, it is the basic premise of this paper that due to the importance of the topic even a limited case study is valuable both in itself and as a means of triggering discussion about the relationship between dissent and coercion.

The Concept of Coercion

Coercion as a concept needs clarification. The initial impulse is only to think of openly repressive acts such as arrests, but numerous analysts have argued the importance of deterrence. In the words of Bayles: "the essence of successful attempts at coercion lies in getting persons to act by means of threats alone without having to impose sanctions."¹⁵ My conceptualization of how compliance is achieved too goes beyond the pure application of sanctions. Deterrence is crucial and it includes institutional prophylactic structures such as censorship as well as the long-term impact of a history of coercion.

As most phenomena in political science, coercion can be analyzed on both macro- and micro-political levels. The former deals with the structural components of coercion in the entire political system and its development over time; the latter, as undertaken below, focuses on individual citizens and their ability to engage in certain behavior. Micro-level analysis has the advantage of highlighting the effects of the system on individuals. But because all individual behavior takes place within the context of a given political system, its coercive structures have to be considered first.

Traditional studies of coercion have described the evolution of the institutional instruments of coercion as well as the actual use of repression in various historical contexts. For the Soviet Union, this literature is vast.¹⁶ Cross-cultural quantitative studies of the relationship between protest and coercion constitute an alternative genre of macropolitical analysis, but they too focus on systemic characteristics such as censorship, the scope of civic freedoms, the role and size of police and security forces, etc. The coercive capacities of regimes are taken as measures of the coercive balance between authorities and dissidents.¹⁷ Both types of studies define coercion in terms of institutional instruments, the intensity

of control, and the use of threats, but while the quantitative analyses tend to look at one point in time, traditional studies emphasize the evolutionary context.

It is important to consider the repercussions of the extensive use of terror and coercion during the formative decades of the USSR. Stephen Cohen has recently reminded us of the enduring political importance of the past and the outcomes that are crucial to the present.¹⁸ Such outcomes are the destruction of all organized political opposition under Stalin and the inculcation of terror in the Soviet population. The consequences are that certain modes of opposition have become impossible because their institutional bases, as well as their proponents, have been eliminated and the system has fostered a political culture of fearfulness and self-censorship. Amalrik has referred to the deterrent role of past terror on self-initiated activities of the citizenry as "part of an unwritten contract of fear that was established in Stalin's time,"¹⁹ and others have spoken of the "internalization of terror" or the "inertia of fear".²⁰

This is not to say that coercion never changes, to the contrary, it appears that the requirements of coercion change after a system has been consolidated. What could be called a developmental theory of coercion has been outlined by Dallin and Breslauer, who relate the incidence of terror to various stages in the development of communist systems.²¹ They talk about the "functional equivalents of terror" in the advanced stage once the regime has consolidated itself and has undertaken the basic political change it aspires to. There is more emphasis on the use of material and normative power both because terror is needed less and because it has some negative consequences such as increased resistance. Coercion persists, but it takes different forms. Friedrich too, has argued that terror in advanced communist

systems takes the form of intimidation which "to be effective, ... must be selective or differentiated -- this is one lesson which Communist rulers have learned from their own past excesses."²² Other analysts have pointed to the level of control achieved by administrative power,²³ manipulation, and "economic and psychic bribery".²⁴ Control over the means of socialization also matters, as has been noted by both Marxist and non-Marxist analysts.²⁵

In sum, past writings on coercion propose that its deterrent core includes numerous elements such as police powers, censorship and socialization, the breakdown of autonomous societal organizational links, administrative control over careers, and the inculcation of fear. This implies that dissident behavior can take place only when one or several of these elements are weakened or neutralized. How and when this can occur is illuminated by the following section.

Dimensions of Prophylactic Coercion

The workings of prophylactic coercion can be analyzed with the data from the SIP survey by comparing those respondents who are inclined toward unsanctioned activity, yet do not act on this inclination, to those who do. The underlying assumption is that compared to the passive individuals, the activists are least affected by coercion and I want to know why. The focus is only on people with dissident attitudes because even though the theory of systemic coercion presented above implies that system characteristics such as censorship and lack of civic freedoms result in everybody being coerced to some extent, it would be foolhardy to ignore that there are true supporters of the regime as well as those who are apolitical. For purposes of this analysis I conceptualize the Soviet population as consisting of four sub-groups (1) people who are non-dissident both in behavior and attitudes,

(2) people who have nonconformist views yet do not act on them, (3) people who are dissident in both behavior and attitude, and (4) people who engage in nonconformist behavior without attitudinal backup. The various dimensions of deterrent coercion can best be studied by comparing groups 2 and 3 and by discussing the differences between them.

Behavioral dissent is measured by participation in one or more of the six modes of unsanctioned behavior as determined by the survey, and attitudinal dissent is measured by respondents' reasons for leaving the USSR. They could list up to three emigration motives. If at least one motive was political I take this as a sign of a critical attitude toward the system and if no political reason was mentioned, the respondent is considered to be politically non-critical. While this indicator of basic attitudes toward the Soviet system is rough, it is adequate for our purpose and has the advantage of relying on a question that clearly is at the core of the political identity of an emigrant sample.

This use of the "Why did you leave" question deliberately challenges the assumption that emigration per se signifies political disaffection. As empirical studies of emigration from the USSR have shown²⁰ people leave for varied reasons and familial, economic, and ethnic motives are highly significant. Although one could argue that the quest for a better material life or more ethnic and religious freedom is political in a broad sense, it hardly constitutes a form of direct political disenchantment with the Soviet system of government. The SIP emigrant respondents represent a varied group of people whose motives for emigration provide an indicator of different political attitudes.

Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical relationship between attitudinal and behavioral dissent and shows that most respondents (58%) had abstained

from unsanctioned activity and had no political motive for emigration. The

(Figure 1 about here)

second largest group (26%) consists of individuals who expressed some political criticism but had not acted on it. A further 16% were both critical of the system and active, and the smallest subgroup (8%) includes the "noncritical activists." The numerical relationship between the last two subgroups shows that most of the participants in dissident activities also held critical political views. This is further shown by Table 1 which also illustrates that the activists who did not mention political disenchantment are most likely to be those attending unofficial cultural events. The

(Table 1 about here)

intensity of dissenting political views among the participants in various unsanctioned activities -- although generally strong²⁷ -- differs from one activity to another.

As argued above, the 26% of respondents who were critical of the system yet abstained from dissident behavior are of most interest for analyzing the impact of prophylactic coercion. Even though people have many reasons for not acting on their inclinations, and the gap between an attitudinal predisposition toward dissent and actual protest has been noted in comparative studies,²⁸ one may assume that this is the group most affected by deterrent coercion. Comparing these people to those who did engage in dissent shows both the workings of deterrence as well as the conditions under which purely attitudinal dissidents might become active. Thus, the pursuant analysis

focuses on a comparison of the "critical passives" with the "critical activists." Of all the respondents who expressed critical views of the Soviet system (N=1,163), 62% were passive and 38% were active dissidents. The latter will be used as the benchmark figure in data presentation (Tables 2 and 3), but by implication, the data of course also refer to the 62% who were passive.

Factor analysis of the six items indicating dissident behavior reveals a single dimension of nonconformism, and therefore an additive scale was constructed to indicate intensity of participation. However, for the sake of simplicity in presentation, a dichotomous measure that allows percentage comparisons is used in the tables below. (When the additive dissent scale is used the strength of the associations shown in the tables usually increase with more intense involvement.)

The literature on dissent includes many cogent arguments about the characteristics of prophylactic coercion, and I shall refer to them as the discussion proceeds, yet the uniqueness of the SIP data also compels one to be open to new insights. Therefore data analysis included numerous demographic and socio-political variables available in the dataset; here I present those dimensions that emerged as being the most significant.

The statistically significant demographic differences between politically critical respondents who engaged in dissident behavior and those who did not are age, education, occupation, and region. A comparison of the various data in Table 2 suggests that region is the main correlate of dissident behavior in our sample. Respondents who lived in the RSFSR, mostly Moscow or Leningrad, were much more likely to have engaged in unsanctioned activities

(Table 2 about here)

than people who resided in other republics. This difference remains in force if one controls for other variables,²⁹ and region is thus the first correlate of deterrent coercion.

The role of region can be explained in many ways, one of them being the historical development of the Democratic Movement. It made Moscow and Leningrad the centers of dissent for the two main population groups represented in our sample, Soviet Jews and Russians. While this points to the influence of overall context, it has been argued that the behavior of peers constitutes a further situational variable, since it either encourages or discourages participation.³⁰ In addition there is a difference in access to publicity. Moscow and Leningrad are thoroughly covered by foreign correspondents, whereas activities in the "provinces" more easily go unnoticed. International publicity has encouraged Soviet dissidents and acted as a partial shield against repression. Anonymity deters dissent in less central regions, as does increased isolation from like-minded people.

Respondents' sex is only slightly correlated with dissident activity, but the effect of belonging to a younger age group stands out even if one controls for associated variables such as education. Again, the explanations can be manifold. Age is one of the main demographic variables known to have a bearing upon protest behavior worldwide.³¹ This is normally a result of life-cycle. In the case of the USSR, however, the more dissident behavior of younger people appears to be mostly due to the regime change between the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras. The deterrent of fear inculcated in the Stalinist period is stronger the closer personal exposure to that era is; but since this and other generational change is discussed in other analyses of the SIP dataset,³² it will not be elaborated upon here.

As Table 2 illustrates, less educated persons as well as blue-collar workers are also less likely to be active. This is in part a function of the modes of dissent represented in the SIP sample, since Crimean Tatar, Baptist, and Lithuanian Catholic dissenters show a strong involvement of workers and other groups with lower levels of education.³³ But the general literature on Soviet dissent confirms SIP data showing that dissident action for more cultural autonomy and broadly based democratic rights is associated with higher education and status as a professional. This makes sense if one considers the importance of autonomy to intellectual work, but there may also be a link to better resources. Comparative studies have shown that high levels of protest participation result from a combination of high political alienation and high personal and political resources.³⁴

Among the occupational groups shown in Table 2, administrative leaders and managers stand out with comparatively low levels of nonconformist behavior. Their exposed position presumably acts as a deterrent. As shown below, job loss or demotion is a major and effective form of regime sanction.

The comparative literature on dissent and coercion suggests that individual sociopsychological profiles also influence whether people are active, but concrete findings are ambiguous. Muller notes that some authors cite a sense of powerlessness as an antecedent to protest, whereas others have argued just the reverse.³⁵ Some say that a feeling of efficacy, defined as "the feeling that one has the capacity to influence government,"³⁶ provokes protest. Seligson has shown that it is cynicism about existing institutions associated with a perception of personal efficacy that leads to protest action.³⁷ This helps to clarify the theoretical paradox, since it shows that efficacy can either relate to the established institutions;

one's own capacities; or, more broadly, the chances of success.

Feelings of cynicism or efficacy in dealing with official institutions are broadly indicated among SIP respondents by whether they had contacted an official in regard to some problem during their "last normal period" in the USSR. I take an affirmative answer to indicate efficacy; the answer that it would have done "no good," as an indicator of political cynicism; and the response that there was no problem, as a neutral control category. As Table 3 illustrates, both efficacy and cynicism emerge as being correlated

(Table 3 about here)

with dissident behavior. This suggests that two types of people engage in dissent, those who feel that it is possible to achieve something within the system and those who have no such trust and are cynical about official channels. For the latter, unsanctioned activity is the alternative way of doing things, whereas the efficacious individuals seem to feel that it is possible to work with established institutions yet participate in some unsanctioned activities. This finding agrees with those of the general literature on Soviet dissent which has differentiated between "within system" and anti-regime critics.³⁰

The split among the nonconformists in the degree to which they are "within system" is confirmed by another survey question. Respondents who said that they wanted to "keep nothing" of the present Soviet system were more likely to have engaged in dissent than those who saw something worth keeping (Table 3) yet there are many of the latter type too, showing that by no means everybody engaging in unsanctioned activities was altogether hostile to the present system.

If studies of Soviet dissent say anything about the passive citizens, it typically is to stipulate their widespread fear of involvement. Fear is maintained through networks of informers.³⁹ The best indicator of fear available in the SIP survey is whether or not a respondent would have criticized a government official to his closest friends. As shown in Table 3, an affirmative answer is strongly correlated with dissident activity, and conversely, fearfulness is dominant among those respondents who, despite critical views of the system, failed to engage in unsanctioned behavior. Thus fear is not all pervasive, yet continues to be a major deterrent to autonomous behavior in the contemporary Soviet Union.

But fear is not the same as awareness of risk. Fear is mostly an emotional impulse, whereas risk awareness is primarily a matter of cognition. Fear inhibits action, while just knowing about a risk not necessarily does so. This is illustrated by the one survey question directly asking about the riskiness of unsanctioned behavior: 84% of those who had read samizdat said "yes" to whether they had felt that they were taking a risk in doing so. The reading of material dealing with human rights or labor camps is most strongly

(Table 4 about here)

associated with the perception of riskiness (Table 4). More important for our analysis, individuals who had participated in dissident activities were somewhat more likely (by 5%) to see any risk than those who had abstained.

Risk awareness thus does not appear to have the same behavioral effect as fear, and the same is true for the experience of repression. Although this is a counterintuitive notion, fear is not necessarily related to having personally experienced repression. This is illustrated by the association

between fearlessness and three survey measures of repression experiences: While a total of 57% of all respondents were fearless, the percentage is 80% among those who experienced sanctions for dissident behavior during their LNP, 79% among respondents who had had a repressive contact with the KGB in the period up to their LNP,⁴⁰ and 66% among those who had had a close family member arrested for political reasons.

And returning to the impact of deterrence on dissident behavior, the arrest of a family member in theory can make someone less willing to be a dissident due to effective intimidation or alternatively, more willing due to resentment or solidarization. The data support the latter response. There is a significant correlation between dissident activity and having had a political arrest in the family (Table 3). That the experience of repression may lead to more dissent rather than less is also suggested by the correlation between dissident activity during the LNP and the pre-LNP personal history of a repressive contact with the KGB (Table 3). One explanation for this is that the personal contact with the repressive organs reinforces political disaffection and makes people more likely to disregard potential costs and what may be in the best interests of their person.

A similar finding going against the grain of rational choice assumptions is noted in a recent survey dealing with rebellious political action in Hamburg and New York. Here too the expectation of negative sanctions is associated with more intense activism and sanctions thus "do not appear to be a disincentive for such behavior, and they may even have some weak incentive value."⁴¹

The proposition of the initially cited theoretical literature that the deterrent effect of repression can be limited is also supported by previous studies. In the Harvard refugee interview project conducted in the 1950s,

anti-Soviet hostility was positively correlated with a previous arrest of the respondent or family members,⁴² and it is known that the victims of the Stalinist terror became a formidable source of anti-Stalinist opinion and politics in the 1950s.⁴³

To this one may add another intriguing point about the history of political arrests of family members in the SIP sample. As is to be expected, arrests were most frequent in the Stalin era: the majority (62%) were arrested between 1937 and 1953, with only 31% before 1937 and 7% after 1953. However, this does not mean that younger respondents were less likely to report an arrest, it only means that the generation of the family member arrested differs. As illustrated in Table 5, an average of 11.4% of respondents said "yes" when asked whether any close family member had ever been arrested for political reasons. Nearly the identical percentage shows up for each age cohort. The difference is that while younger people mostly refer to

(Table 5 about here)

arrests of grandparents, the middle-aged refer to parents, and the elderly to siblings or spouses. This shows how past repression can live on in the memory of generations to come and the correlation between family arrest and dissident behavior suggests that repression has a longterm disaffective political impact.

In sum, deterrent coercion is more evident among people who lived outside of Moscow or Leningrad and so had less opportunity to participate in unsanctioned activities or meet like-minded people and had less access to publicity. Lower education also acted as a deterrent, as did higher age. The latter appears to mostly reflect the generational experience of having

grown up in the Stalinist era. There is no single attitudinal and experiential profile of the critical activists. While a subgroup was efficacious in contacting Soviet officials about a problem, others were cynical and believed that such activity did no good. Dissident behavior was strongly associated with fearlessness, yet at the same time the past experience of having had a close family member arrested tended to spur people on in their activity rather than deter them. This suggests that the nexus between dissent and coercion differs according to the type of coercion applied. Instilling fear is an effective means of prophylactic coercion, whereas actual repression can backfire. This finding complements the conclusions of the next section analyzing the sanctions dissident respondents experienced.

Sanctions and the Logic of Their Application

The pattern of sanctions applied can be analyzed for the SIP sample from the replies of behavioral dissidents to the question "Was any official action taken against you because of this?" As Figure 2 illustrates, a leader is much more likely to have been sanctioned than a mere participant. Activities can also be ranked by likelihood of sanction. Attending an unofficial

(Fig.2 about here)

cultural event or study group was considered relatively "harmless," whereas strikes, open protest or participation in other groups or activities that usually had to do with the defense of human rights had more consequences. Although the frequencies in Figure 2 have no absolute significance, the number of participants in each mode of dissent shows that, quite naturally,

the largest numbers engaged in less dangerous forms of unsanctioned activity.

Thus there is logic in the application of sanctions, and people appear to be well aware of it. Sanctions are also much more likely to have occurred if someone participated in several activities. The correlation between an additive participation measure and an additive sanction measure is $r = .49$ and there thus is a strong direct association between dissent and repression in this instance. In other words, the nexus between dissent and coercion emerges clearly once one examines a range of dissent activities and regime reactions within a specific time period.

It has been argued that certain subgroups, such as women or residents of Moscow, have been less likely than others to experience sanctions. Unfortunately, this cannot be analyzed with the SIP data because once one introduces controls for the type of activity engaged in, the total case numbers are too small for significance tests. Due to sample composition, it is also impossible to test the thesis that Ukrainian and other non-Russian republic nationals have been repressed especially harshly.⁴⁴

The respondents engaging in dissident behavior experienced a total of 100 sanctions, and in 88 cases they specified who had applied them: 44% cited the KGB; 23%, the boss or personnel director; 15%, the regular police; 8%, various party organizations; and the rest, other organs. This tends to support the traditional image of the KGB as the principal repressive instrument, but the role of superiors at the place of work is also noteworthy and indicates that material power is often used in coercion.

As to the type of sanctions applied, Table 6 shows the dominant form to be a warning or threat, mostly expressed by the KGB. Examples of specific

(Table 6 about here)

experiences are : "My apartment was searched and I was interrogated by a lieutenant of the KGB"; "The militia warned me that if such incidents continued they would bring criminal action against me"; "I was called to the osobyi otdel at my place of work and was advised to change my circle of friends if I wanted to continue working", and "The dean of the university summoned me and gave me a talking to." Material sanctions such as fines, demotions, or loss of job also stand out and here examples include a musician whose concerts were cancelled, a student being thrown out of his college, and others being demoted at work or losing privileges.

That general threats as well as sanctions linked to one's work are favored tools against nonconformists is supported by the general literature on repression in the USSR. Dissidents have reported that typically several warnings are given first. The warnings are not always brutally threatening and may consist of a "friendly" admonition.⁴⁵ Warnings are said to be quite effective in making people desist from further dissent, especially if the career of a professional is threatened.⁴⁶ Feifer, who has analyzed why people refrain from open dissent, has argued that the type of reprisal most feared is the "loss of previous privileges, rewards, and comforts."⁴⁷

Being forced out of the USSR was another sanction used in the 1970s -- with Solzhenitsyn being the most prominent example -- but it does not show up in Table 6 because respondents were asked to refer only to their "last normal period" before emigration. Even though involuntary exile was not cited in the responses focused on here, thirteen respondents said that they were "kicked out" by the KGB when asked why they had left.

The severest sanction reported was incarceration in a mental hospital. To quote one respondent's experience: "They came at night and put me in

a psychiatric hospital for two months so that I wouldn't cause any trouble during the upcoming political celebrations". Some others experienced arrest and short stays in prison, an example for this being a fifteen day prison sentence for alleged hooliganism. Illustrations for some of the other sanctions listed in Table 6 include being beaten up by a druzhinnik at an unofficial art exhibit, a home being searched for samizdat material, and a respondent no longer being allowed to travel abroad.

It is surprising that there was no case of lengthy imprisonment, since a good number of Soviet dissidents end up in labor camps.⁴⁸ Other analysts have argued that even though this form of harsh repression is designed to frighten others, it is applied selectively because labor camp sentences are costly. Bureaucratically, they are taken as a sign of the KGB's failure in its prophylactic work⁴⁹ and since sentencing to a labor camp requires a trial, they can result in negative publicity and new protests at home and abroad. For this reason judicial sanctions are avoided if possible and "lower profile repression"⁵⁰ is applied.

In sum, other sources as well as our survey data reflecting the period from 1974 to 1979 suggest that sanctions for dissident behavior most often involved threats, administrative harassment, and extrajudicial measures such as incarceration in mental hospitals and exile. There was a strong proclivity to avoid the more visible forms of repression.

Even though sanctions were applied and one can discern a logic in their application, Figure 2 also illustrates that by no means all participation in unsanctioned activities had repercussions. Why not? Why wasn't repression more pervasive and intense?

Various explanations are possible. For one, there were surely cases when unsanctioned behavior went unnoticed by the KGB. In fact, anonymity

is a precondition for some modes of dissent, the distribution of samizdat being a prime example. Some of the KGB's passivity can also be explained by bungling, bureaucratic inertia, and contradictory actions by subunits of the administrative structure, as has been argued by some.¹¹

In the 1970s lack of full immediate sanction was also related to the authorities being caught off-guard by the legalistic approach of dissidents who argued that their activities were legal according to international covenants or the Soviet Constitution and demanded that the authorities observe their own laws.¹² Thus, even respondent replies about "open protest" could have involved activities such as group complaints addressed to the authorities, that were unsanctioned by established regime practice but not by the letter of the law.

It has been argued that the application of sanctions tends to go in cycles and depends on the overall threat to the system.¹³ The political challenge posed by nonconformists such as those in the SIP sample and most Soviet dissidents was significant, but it was not great enough to warrant an instant and total repression at all cost.

Other explanations focus on special constraints, the most frequently mentioned being foreign policy concerns and sensitivity to negative publicity undermining closer ties with the West or the image of communist movements abroad.¹⁴ In the 1970s dissident appeals to various external audiences succeeded in putting the regime on the defensive. Publicity was a major deterrent in the hands of the dissidents, since the KGB has tried to keep repression behind a veil of secrecy.

It also bears remembering that parameters of replies are set by question formulation. The survey's focus on "official action" means that respondents were unlikely to mention unofficial sanctions. Informal mechanisms of

compulsion include peer pressure and denunciations by colleagues at staged "self-criticism" sessions and vague threats about hopes that may be thwarted in the future.⁶⁶

But the main explanation for the relative restraint of the Soviet authorities in the period studied appears to lie in the adoption of a more sophisticated calculus of repressive strategy. If so, it was based on awareness of the counterproductive potential of repression as evidenced by the correlations between individual repressive experiences and higher dissident activism analyzed in the previous section. The Soviet policymakers could have found more evidence for this link in the theoretical literature on coercion, but their own experience probably played a decisive role. The dissent movement of the 1970s evolved out of the flood of protests about the trial Daniel and Siniavsky in 1966. After that every new case of repression, especially political trials, triggered new protests, to the extent that Feldbrugge speaks of an "endless chain reaction of protests."⁶⁷

A "safety-valve" argument has also been used to explain why milder forms of nonconformist activity have been tolerated. If people are given some leeway in autonomous behavior they may desist from more militant dissent.⁶⁸ While this argument makes sense, so does the counterargument that by appearing less resolute the regime provokes more dissent.⁶⁹ This again illustrates how hard it is to specify the dissent/coercion nexus. Analysts make a variety of assumptions and so do policymakers. It appears that in the 1970s Soviet authorities accepted the "safety-valve" logic to a greater extent than they did in the first half of the 1980s, which were marked by increasing repression not reflected in the SIP survey, but noted elsewhere.⁷⁰

Conclusion

Besides inquiring about the general manner in which dissent and coercion are associated with each other, the primary question analyzed here is the puzzle faced by students of Soviet affairs since the rise of the dissent movement in the late 1960s. The puzzle emerges from the assumption that there is a simple linear association between repression and dissent. Thus, if there is considerable dissent, why isn't there more repression, and conversely, if repression is not always instant and intense, why isn't there more dissent?

The answer lies in rethinking the meaning of dissent and coercion and what affects their relationship in the Soviet context. Coercion implies much more than applying sanctions against individual citizens. It refers most of all to the structural make-up of a political system including the type and extent of its police powers and censorship standards, its limits on civic autonomy, and its lack of guaranteed civil rights. Systemic characteristics determine what modes of dissent are possible and so does the political history of a system. That some forms of dissent, such as institutional opposition or covert organizations, are not found in the USSR today can only be explained by past policies of the regime of making them extinct. Or, to phrase this conclusion in terms of a dissent/coercion nexus, both historical and systemic coercion preclude the emergence of certain forms of dissent.

Past terror also constitutes an element of contemporary coercion because a political culture of fearfulness and self-censorship has been created. People know the limits of unsanctioned behavior and react accordingly. As a result less concrete repression is needed, since dissent, if it appears, is "self-limiting," to borrow a term from Poland.

Thus, the relationship between coercion and dissent in the USSR cannot

be understood without considering the political evolution of the system. Both dissent and coercion are structured by precedent and historical processes. The forms of coercion applied in a non-democratic system depend on its stage of development. Once opposing forces are eliminated and the new system is stabilized politically and economically, coercion relies less on terror and more on normative and material power. Also, prophylaxis tends to supercede direct sanctions. A similar conclusion has been reached concerning repression in Latin America: "in recent years, the reactive element of coercion has been clearly overshadowed by the proactive element."⁴⁰

The deterrent side of coercion can be studied on the systemic or the individual level. Besides distilling the decisive macropolitical givens from the general literature I have focused mostly on the microlevel by comparing participants and non-participants in dissent activities among the politically critical respondents in the SIP survey. Findings point to the role of situational factors such as opportunity for group action and peer contagion. Unsanctioned behavior has been more intense in Moscow and Leningrad than in other areas, due partly to the circumvention of censorship in these cities by both samizdat and the presence of foreign journalists. In this instance the coercive system has been partly neutralized.

In addition, people are spurred on or deterred from dissident behavior by their individual traits. Passive and complacent individuals are least likely to engage in dissent, whereas those who approach officialdom with feelings of either efficacy or cynicism are more active. Deterrent coercion is most effective among older and less educated people. While lower education is related to fewer resources and narrower cultural and political interests, age mostly reflects generational differences in fearfulness between those raised during the Stalinist era and those raised after it.

The level of apprehension about the consequences of unsanctioned behavior is highest among older people. Thus the long-term deterrent impact of fear induced in the past is mitigated by generational change.

But the data also suggest that the actual experience of repression, for example through the arrest of a family member, can have the opposite effect than fear and may lead to more dissent in the long term. This means that the nexus between dissent and coercion differs according to the type of coercion applied. The instilling of fear is associated with less dissident behavior, whereas past repression experiences are linked to more intense involvement. From the regime's point of view this suggests that the most effective coercive policy is one that maximizes fear and minimizes repression. The way this can be implemented is through selective harsh treatment of dissident leaders and "incorrigibles" and a subtler approach to minor unsanctioned involvement.

The analysis of actual application of sanctions shows that in the 1970s the authorities followed this logic and chose a graduated policy toward dissent. They apparently regarded this as the most effective approach, in addition repressive impulses were contained by foreign policy considerations and the innovative approaches of the dissent movement. The dissidents' success in creating publicity abroad and at home escalated the costs of regime repression. Thus we find that coercion not only influences the dissenters' choice of tactics,⁴¹ but also that dissent tactics influence coercion. The fate of dissent in the USSR has always depended not only on the regime's policies but also on the courage, adeptness, and determination of dissenters.

Insofar as the regime chose repression, it is evident that it applied a range of sanctions beginning with mild threats and ending with selective

harsh treatment. The application of these sanctions exhibits a clear logic. Unsanctioned activities focusing on cultural pursuits or uncensored communication were dealt with less harshly than work protests, other open protests, and group activities for the defense of civic rights. Also, leaders were sanctioned more intensely than mere participants.

In sum, there are three major reasons why repression in the period studied was rarely instant and intense. First, there was little need for it because the historically developed systemic coercion precluded the emergence of system-threatening organized opposition; the modes of dissent appearing are mild in comparative perspective. Second, the dissidents of the Brezhnev era partly "outsmarted" the authorities by creating a protective shield of publicity and constitutionality. Thirdly, the regime adopted special tactics of coercion based on the assumption that a combination of threats and selective harsher repression can be most efficient in preventing an escalation of dissent.

Having pinpointed a number of conditions explaining the pattern of sanction application against nonconformists in the period under study, can we conclude that changes in some of these conditions explain changes in policy since 1979/1980? There is reason to think that this is indeed at least partly so. For one, the timing of the clampdown on dissent in 1979/1980 coincides with the invasion of Afghanistan and the pursuant deterioration of Soviet international relations. Due to this and other international developments foreign policy constraints on the repression of dissent decreased greatly. By the late 1970s the Soviet authorities also had had enough time to develop countermeasures to the innovative tactics used by dissidents. Legalistic arguments were undermined by new restrictions in Soviet law and the access to international publicity was limited by a curtailment of

personal as well as phone and mail contacts with foreigners.⁴¹

Although there is no direct evidence of a change in the thinking of the Soviet decisionmakers, the logic of the argument presented here also implies that the official calculus about the relationship between repression and dissent changed. After 1979, the primary assumption apparently was that more repression would lead to less dissent. As our data indicate, this is not necessarily true. It is quite possible that such a policy results in dissent that is both quantitatively and qualitatively more intense. This may well explain the most recent reversal under Gorbachev, although foreign policy and other factors presumably also play a role.

Notes

1. This formulation is inspired by references to the "repression/dissent nexus" in Mark Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? A Microeconomic Model of Opposition Responses to Government Coercions." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1985.
2. Ibid. and Ekkart Zimmermann, "Macro-Comparative Research on Political Protest", in Ted R. Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research (New York: The Free Press, 1980), pp. 167-237.
3. Lichbach, pp.2-3.
4. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 2nd. ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), p.11.
5. Alan Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 33.
6. F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Samizdat and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union

(Leyden: A.W. Bijthoff, 1975), p.2.

7. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), pp. 303-305.

8. There are many definitions of dissent. This paper will follow Leonard Schapiro's distinction between 'dissent' and 'opposition'. The former involves an effort "merely to criticize, to exhort, to persuade, and to be listened to," while the latter refers to "an organized political group, or groups, of which the aim is to oust the government in power and to replace it by one of its own choosing." Cited in David E. Powell, "Case Study: Controlling Dissent in the Soviet Union", Government and Opposition, VII, no.1 (Winter 1972), p.85. For unusually broad definitions of dissent and attempts to put it into a historical perspective see Walter D. Connor, "Dissent in a Complex Society: The Soviet Case", Problems of Communism, XXII, no. 2 (March-April 1973), pp.48-52 and A.Y. Shtromas, "Dissent and Political Change in the Soviet Union", Studies in Comparative Communism, XII, nos. 2&3 (Summer/Autumn 1979), pp.212-244. Gordon H. Skilling, "Opposition in Communist East Europe", in Robert E. Dahl, ed., Regimes and Oppositions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) and others have also used the term "dissent" to refer to factional politics within the communist party and other regime--supporting elites, but I exclude them from my definition to focus on unsanctioned activity outside the realm of official Soviet politics.

9. Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource", American Political Science Review, LXII, no. 4 (December 1968), p.1146.

10. Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union", Current History, LXXIII, no.430 (1977), pp. 114.

11. Alexeyeva, p.294.

12. More specifically, for 36.4% of respondents the "last normal period" is from 1974 to 1978, and for 42.2% from 1975 to 1979. The LNP period is quite close for the rest of the respondents: for another 10.8% it is 1976 to 1980 and for 4.4% it is 1973 to 1977.

13. Only one respondent cited contact with foreigners in the series of questions about unsanctioned activity he had taken part in, yet, when asked another question about harassment by the KGB, thirty of those responding affirmatively listed contact with foreigners as the reason.

14. For consistency's sake I omit from my dissent measure the few cases where respondents mentioned reading samizdat or meeting with foreigners. I also omit responses (N=9) about illegal economic activities. A few other cases were recoded to be included namely, instances where replies to the question about contact with the KGB revealed that the respondent had participated -- during his LNP -- in a nonindividual unsanctioned activity after all. For example three respondents said "no" when asked whether they had distributed samizdat but later said that they had gotten into trouble with the KGB because of distributing samizdat. In such cases both the activity variable and the sanctions variable were recoded.

15. Michael D. Bayles, "A Concept of Coercion", in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Coercion (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, 1972), p. 17.

16. See especially Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (London: Macmillan, 1968); Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); and Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR: Some Sources of Change in the Soviet Dictatorship (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).

16. See Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence", in Burr, op.cit. p. 153 and other chapters in the same

volume.

18. Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp x-xi.

19. Andrei Amalrik, Notes of a Revolutionary, trans. Guy Daniels (New York: A. Knopf, 1982) p. xii.

20. Valentin Turchin, The Inertia of Fear and the Scientific Worldview, trans Guy Daniels (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

21. A. Dallin and B. W. Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), passim.

22. Carl J. Friedrich, "The Uses of Terror", Problems of Communism, XIX, no.6 (November, December 1978), p.48.

23. Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," World Politics, XVI, no.4 (July 1964), pp.558-575.

24. Rudolf L. Tokes, "Varieties of Soviet Dissent: An Overview," in Rudolf L. Tökés, ed., Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology, and People, (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975) p.2.

25. See, for example, John Hoffman, "The Coercion/Consent Analysis of the State under Socialism", in Neil Harding, ed., The State in Socialist Society (London: Macmillan, 1984) pp.129-149.

26. See the discussion in Rasma Karklins, "Soviet Elections Revisited: The Significance of Voter Abstention in Non-Competitive Voting", American Political Science Review, LXXX, no. 2 (June 1986) p.459 and Brian D. Silver, "Political Beliefs of the Soviet Citizen: Sources of Support for Regime Norms", Soviet Interview Project Working Papers, no. 6, (December 1985), pp. 13-15.

27. For comments on the association between other political attitudinal measures in the SIP survey and unconventional political behavior, compare

Silver op.cit. ,pp.37-8.

28. Marsh, p. 17, and Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis", American Journal of Political Science, XXVI,no.2 (May 1982),pp.248-264.

29. Controlling for the higher level of education among the RSFSR residents does not change this basic finding, nor do other controls such as one for nationality. Russians in the sample tend to be more dissident than Jewish respondents. I do not consider this to be a "true" demographic difference but rather a reflection of Soviet emigration policies, which have not allowed Russians to leave unless they were dissident or had Jewish family members who were leaving.

30. Thomas W. Likens and C.W. Kohfeld, "Models of Mass Compliance: Contextual or Economic Approach?", Political Methodology, IX,no.4 (1983), pp.377-486.

31. See, for example, Marsh, p. 69.

32. Karklins, pp.462-464 and Donna Bahry, "Politics, Generations, and Change", Soviet Interview Project Working Papers, no. 26 (April 1986), passim.

33. Alexeyeva, p. 481.

34. Lester W. Milbrath and M.L. Boel, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? 2nd ed., (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), pp. 73-74 and Edward N. Muller, "The Psychology of Political Protest and Violence", in Burr, op.cit., p.95.

35. Muller, p. 94.

36. Marsh, p. 114.

37. Mitchell A. Seligson, "Unconventional Political Participation: Cynicism, Powerlessness, and the Latin American Peasant", in Mitchell A. Seligson and

- John A. Booth, eds., Political Participation in Latin America, Vol. 2 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), pp.134-146.
38. For example Tokes, p. 17.
39. George Feifer, "No Protest: The Case of the Passive Minority", in Tokes, op.cit., pp. 418-439 and Theodore Friedgut, "The Democratic Movement: Dimensions and Perspectives", in ibid. p.128.
40. This variable includes all respondents who reported a contact with the KGB for other than administrative reasons up to and including the first year of their LNP. The first year of LNP is included because some of the experiences most likely fell into the pre-LNP period by months and the inclusion of other borderline cases makes sense substantively.
41. Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action", American Political Science Review, LXXX, no.2 (June 1986),p. 483.
42. Raymond A. Bauer, "Some Trends in Sources of Alienation from the Soviet Union", The Public Opinion Quarterly, XIX, no.3 (1955), pp. 279-291.
43. Cohen, p.98.
44. Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Post-Khrushchev Campaign to Suppress Dissent: Perspectives, Strategies, and Techniques of Repression", in Tokes, op.cit., p.77 and Alexeyeva,chapter 16.
45. Barghoorn, p.68
46. Friedgut,p.129, and Victor Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State: Class, Ethnicity, and Consensus in Soviet Society (Armonk,N.Y.:M.E.Sharpe,1982)p.19.
47. Feifer, p. 432.
48. Several thousand labor camp sentences are listed in S.P. de Boer, E.J. Driessen, and H.L. Verhaar, eds. Biographical Dictionary of the Dissidents in the Soviet Union, 1956-1975 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).

49. Peter Reddaway, "Policy Toward Dissent Since Khrushchev", in T.H. Rigby, Archie Brown, and Peter Reddaway, eds., Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p.165.
50. Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Changing Patterns Since Khrushchev", International Journal, XXXIII, no. 4 (Autumn 1978),p.777.
51. Rein Taagepera, Softening Without Liberalization in the Soviet Union: The Case of Juri Kukk (Lanham, Md: University Press of America,1984), pp.285-286, and Friedgut, p. 127.
52. See, for example, Amalrik, pp. 29 and 34.
53. Friedgut, p.127.
54. Tokes, p. 23 and Sharlet, 1977, p. 116.
55. See Jeremy R. Azrael, "Is Coercion Withering Away?", Problems of Communism, XI,no.6 (1962)pp.9-17; Turchin, passim, and Taagepera, p. 99.
56. Feldbrugge, p. 2.
57. Leonid Plyushch, History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography, trans. and ed. Marco Crynnyk (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977) p. 244, Reddaway, 1983, p. 6.
58. Taagepera, p. 284.
59. Peter Reddaway, "Soviet Policies on Dissent and Emigration: The Radical Change of Course Since 1979", Kennan Institute Occasional Paper no. 192 (1984);also Alexeyeva, pp. 366-395.
60. David Pion-Berlin, "Theories on Political Repression in Latin America: Conventional Wisdom and an Alternative", Political Science, XIX,no.1, (Winter 1986) ,p.51.
61. Lichbach, p.18.
62. Reddaway, 1983, p.175, also Reddaway 1984,passim.

**Figure 1. Hypothesized Relationship between Attitudes
Toward Regime and Dissident Activity**

		Dissident Activity	
		None	Some
Critical View of Regime	None	non-critical passives N = 1401	non-critical activists N = 229
	Some	critical passives N = 718	critical activists N = 445

Total N = 2793

Figure 2. Dissent Activities by Percentage of Participants Sanctioned




Table 1. Association Between Nonconformist Modes of Behavior
And Critical Political Attitude

Activity		Percentage of Participants With Critical View of System
Unofficial cultural event	(N=554)	66%
Strike or protest at work	(N=45)	69%
Unsanctioned study group	(N=207)	75%
Open protest	(N=37)	81%
Distribution of <u>samizdat</u>	(N=132)	87%
"Other" groups and activities	(N=72)	92%
Total sample	(N=2793)	42%

Table 2. Demographic Correlates of Dissident Behavior Among Politically Critical Respondents

	Percentage Engaging in Dissident Activity	Total Number of Critical Respondents
TOTAL	38%	1,163
REGION*		
Russian republic	49%	653
Other republics	24%	510
SEX		
Men	40%	612
Women	36%	551
AGE*		
17-26 ^a	46%	239
27-36	39%	365
37-46	43%	312
47-56	27%	146
Over 56	20%	100
EDUCATION*		
Some higher or more	47%	715
Secondary or less	24%	448
OCCUPATION*		
Administrative		
leaders and managers	32%	89
Professionals	47%	462
Engineers	40%	199
Low level service		
or technical	36%	146
Workers	22%	226

* Chi-square significant at .05 or below.

^a1977 is the median reference year for age during the "last normal period" in the USSR.

Table 3. Attitudinal Correlates of Dissident Behavior
Among Politically Critical Respondents

Attitude or Experience	Percentage Engaging in Dissident Activity	Total Number of Respondents Critical of Regime
TOTAL	38%	N=1,163
EFFICACY/CYNICISM		
Contacted official about some problem	47%	N=268
"No good" contacting officials about problems	42%	N=412
No problem existed	30%	N=483
HOSTILITY^a		
"Keep nothing" of Soviet system	44%	N=100
Keep something of Soviet system	33%	N=277
FEAR^a		
Felt free to criticize official with friends	43%	N=130
Did not feel free to criticize official with friends	18%	N=268
PAST REPRESSION		
Political arrest of close family member	55%	N=188
No political arrest of close family member	35%	N=973
Repressive experience with KGB before LNP	53%	N=61
No repressive experience with KGB before LNP	38%	N=1102

^aQuestion was asked only of a random one-third of respondents.

All Chi-squares are significant at .03 level or below.

Table 4. Perception of Riskiness of Reading Samizdat by
Types of Samizdat Read

Type of <u>samizdat</u> ^a	N ^b	Felt risk in reading <u>samizdat</u>
Human rights	139	90%
Camp or prison stories	189	87%
Soviet politics	110	86%
International politics	71	85%
National culture, religion	54	85%
Erotica	38	84%
Soviet or Russian fiction	143	83%
Language texts	48	81%
Foreign fiction	79	77%
Professional material	25	68%
Total	280	84%

^aThe question refers to riskiness of reading any Samizdat or tamizdat, but respondents could specify several types of samizdat that they had read. Thus, the link between the two variables is indirect.

^bTotal number of respondents reading specific type of samizdat.

Table 5. Arrests of Family Members by Respondent Age

Arrest of Relative	Total N=2793	By Year of Birth				
		1905-1920 N=497	1921-30 N=460	1931-40 N=653	1941-50 N=731	1951-60 N=451
Any Relative	11.4%	10.7%	11.7%	11.8%	10.9%	11.1%
Specific Relative: ^a						
Grandparent	4.5%	0.2%	2.0%	4.1%	7.3%	9.0%
Parent	5.5%	5.6%	9.1%	6.3%	2.6%	2.0%
Sibling or Spouse	2.0%	6.6%	1.7%	1.0%	0.7%	1.0%

^aThe percentage total for specific relatives is higher than for any relative arrested because some respondents reported more than one arrest.

Table 6. Sanctions Applied for Unconventional Participation

Type of Sanction	Percent (N = 100)
Interrogation/warning by KGB or police	26
Reprimand/warning at work or school	11
Other warning/threat/harassment	14
Search/phone-tapping/confiscation	10
Fine/other material loss	4
Loss of job/demotion	14
Beating	2
Arrest (imprisonment for a few hours up to 15 days)	6
Arrest, incarceration in mental hospital	4
Other	9

APPENDIX

Sampling frame Population and Sampling Procedures

The population eligible for the survey was composed of Soviet emigrants who arrived in the United States between January 1, 1979, and April 30, 1982, who were between the ages 21 and 70, and who were listed by immigration aid societies permitting the development of a systematic list of this population. Biographical abstracts yielded a sampling frame population totaling 33,618 individuals, of which 3,738 were selected into the General Survey sample. The response rate was 79%.

The primary goals of sampling were to safeguard the principle of random selection while at the same time approximating certain characteristics of the Soviet population more closely than a purely random sampling would allow. Consequently, a stratified random sample was selected, the four sampling dimensions being nationality, region of last employment in the USSR, highest education attained, and size of city where last employed. Since 98.4% of the people in the sampling frame were Jews, a strategy of "take-all" non-Jews was adopted in order to maximize ethnic diversity in the sample (resulting in 13% of the respondents being Russians and other non-Jews). The regional distribution of the emigrant population was quite varied, and thus the Soviet model could be approximated. As the sampling frame population was more highly educated than the Soviet adult population in large cities, the latter were used as a proportional guideline for stratifying on education. Only limited adjustments could be made for the overwhelmingly urban origin of the emigrants, although people from medium-sized cities were oversampled.

The referent Soviet population whose experiences the survey population can be expected to resemble most closely is the adult European Soviet population in large and medium-sized cities (Silver & Anderson, 1986, Tourangeau, O'Brien & Frankel, 1983).