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TITLE: MILITARY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MILITARY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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Attempts to develop a theory of civil-military relations for communist states have focussed largely on relationships between the military and the party, and have shown that the variation in level of economic development among communist societies makes such theory-building difficult. Theories of civil-military relations in western societies, by contrast, have not been confined to the analysis of formal governmental or party organization on the civilian side, but rather have concerned themselves with a broad range of social institutions. These theories, which in varying degrees build upon Harold D. Lasswell's developmental construct of the "garrison state," suggest structural convergence along two axis. On the one hand, they suggest that across industrial societies, variations in style of military organization, and in the role of the military in the political process, will diminish as a function of common technological constraints. On the other hand, they suggest that within industrial societies military and civilian organizational forms will be increasingly similar, due to increasingly common technologies. The object of our research was to test these ideas in the context of Soviet society.

Our data base consisted of English language and Russian language books and journals dealing with Soviet military organization, civilian organization, and civil-military relations. For many of the questions we wished to address, there were no unclassified Soviet materials available. In these instances, we made inferences from materials bearing on related matters. We did not undertake a formal quantitative content analysis of the Soviet journals we used, but rather identified themes that were emphasized (or not raised at all), changes in emphasis, etc. reflecting change and stability in the military and civilian sectors, and in relationships between the two sectors.

Our analysis focussed largely on the following themes: the development and autonomy of the military profession; the changing role of the political officer; similarities and differences between the role of soldier and the role of worker; organizational similarities and differences between the armed forces and economic enterprise; the rise of the "human relations" approach to management in the military
and civilian sectors; the role of the military, and of technology, in social mobility processes; organizational relationships and arrangements between the military and civilian institutions; the role of ideology in supporting the military institution.

We found that, in general, the analytic categories that comprise western models of civil-military relations are applicable to the Soviet Union as well. This is not to say that Soviet society is the same as western society. On some of the dimensions specified by the western models, considerable differences exist between Soviet and western society.

The similarities between the systems, as described by these categories, appear with regard to those attributes that are most strongly affected by material and organizational technologies. Thus, the development of a military profession, and the constraints placed on the autonomy of that profession, bear interesting similarities in the American and Soviet cases. Similarly, views of the military as a career do not seem to differ greatly among youth in the two systems. We also find interesting similarities between military organization and work organization within the Soviet Union, although the reasons for this are different than those specified in the western theories. Where the theories have focussed on the decline of conscription-based forces in the Anglo-American nations, the similarity in the Soviet Union is rooted more strongly in the fact that the state is the employer in both the military and civilian sectors.

The differences between the Soviet and American systems appear most strongly with regard to the articulation of the military with civilian institutions, and the ideological underpinnings of military organization. The coordination between the Soviet military and the educational system, and between the military and voluntary associations is high. Economic production is highly geared to military needs, and the civilian economy is organized in a way that would facilitate mobilization to provide logistical support for military organization. With regard to ideology, Soviet society maintains an extensive program of political education that justifies a strong military posture as necessary for defending an embattled homeland and the gains that have been made under socialism.

Our analysis has led us to six basic conclusions:

First, in addressing questions about military organization in the Soviet Union for which direct data are not available, reasonable estimates can be gained from looking at the same phenomena in the civilian sector of Soviet society. The Soviet military tends to be a microcosm of the society it is mandated to defend.
Second, when questions are raised about the Soviet military for which direct data are not available, and for which there are no counterpart phenomena in the civilian sector of Soviet society, reasonable estimates can be gained by looking at similar phenomena in the armed forces of other nations at comparable levels of technological development.

Third and fourth, the Soviet Union is indeed a highly militarized society. However, we do not see this militarism as a newly emerging phenomenon. Rather, we see it as a persisting pattern of Soviet society.

Fifth, we see in the Soviet Union the emergence of some of the characteristics of Lasswell's garrison state construct, particularly in the areas of economic priorities, political process, and social stratification.

Finally, however, while we find that the Soviet Union is more militaristic than the western industrial democracies, and does manifest many of the characteristics of the garrison state, Soviet society has not become the prototypical garrison state. Military leaders are not the dominant elite, but rather are kept under control of the civilian state. The military are not the major manipulators of symbols, and the dominant symbolic thrust is patriotic rather than militaristic. And we do see some evidence in the direction of "civilianism" in Soviet society.
INTRODUCTION

Research on civil-military relations in communist societies has traditionally focussed on single nations and has been largely descriptive (e.g., Kolkowicz, 1967). In recent years, however, models of civil-military relations in communist systems have moved beyond simple descriptions of national circumstances, and into attempts to conceptualize processes and structures on a more abstract cross-societal basis (e.g., Beck and Rawling, 1977). Some of these forays have been grounded in the theoretical formulations that are common to analyses of civil-military relations in western nations (e.g., Herspring and Volgyes, 1977). However, they have assumed that the states with communist regimes are unique, and have limited the application of the models they have developed to this subset of the nations of the world.

The research conducted within the context of these models suggests that there is greater diversity among the communist nations than had previously been recognized in the ways in which the military and civilian sectors of their societies are articulated (e.g., Albright, 1978). More importantly, since the level of socio-economic development seems to be strongly related to the nature of civil-military relations, there are suggestions that the same models that are applied to civil-military relations in industrialized multi-party democracies might be applicable as well to the most industrialized of the communist states (e.g., Segal, 1978). The purpose of our study is to explore the applicability of the dominant "western" models of civil-military relations to the case of the Soviet Union. It is important to note at the outset that where prior research on civil-military relations in the Soviet Union has focussed narrowly on organizational linkages between the military, the government, and the party, our own approach, because of the
nature of the theories upon which we are drawing, will look more broadly at the articulation of the military institution and a range of institutions and organizations in the civilian sector. We also hasten to point out that the progenitor of the models we seek to apply, the "garrison state" construct, was not in itself a western model, but in fact was developed on the basis of the oriental experience, and was intended to be applied cross-nationally, without regard to the ideological underpinnings of particular regimes.

METHODOLOGY

Western analyses of several substantive issues in the USSR have been facilitated by the relatively open publication of Soviet social science research, and the accessibility of this research to Western scholars. While questions of interest to Western social scientists which remain unasked or closed to the public are legion, a considerable literature has emerged which enables Western scholars to draw inferences, comparisons, and generalizations about such aspects of Soviet social structure as the family, education, the professions, and even such social problems as crime, juvenile delinquency, and poverty. With regard to military organization, however, the Soviet research remains the closed domain of social scientists in the military, and only rarely does it emerge in open publications. The books and journals published by the military and open to the public are of considerable value for what they reveal (and do not reveal), but rarely do these publications provide statistics, and seldom do they address the issues germane to our study. Neither do these publications provide a good indication of the degree of militarization of Soviet society. Military publications do not focus on questions pertaining to the civilian sector, although they do reflect major issues of importance in the civilian sector, such as party directives, party congresses,
Thus, for example, the questions of whether the military provides an avenue of social mobility, or what the occupational prestige of the military officer is, are not subjects found in military journals. To analyze these topics, we relied largely on books and journal articles by Soviet military historians (for the military sector) and Soviet sociologists (for the civilian sector). For the period of industrialization and the post-World War II period, we relied on the work of Soviet social scientists. Studies of occupational prestige in the civilian sector by these scientists enabled us to make a variety of inferences about the military.

Our analysis is based upon available Russian language and English language materials. Our primary Soviet military sources were:

Kommunist Vorushennykh Sil, the journal of the Main Political Administration which provides the ideological base and direction for the military.

Voenno Istoricheskii Zhurnal, the journal of the Ministry of Defense which addresses historical questions of the military as well as contemporary issues. Both of these journals were systematically reviewed for the years 1960 through 1978.

Selected issues of the newspaper "Krasnaia Zvezda" for the years 1960 through 1979.

Selected issues of the classified journal "Voennaia Mysl" which have been declassified recently. The journal is geared primarily to senior officers.

Books published in the 1960s and 1970s by the military press.

Journals from the civilian sector:

In addition, books by Soviet social scientists on Soviet youth and Soviet industrial organization and its labor force constituted a major source for comparing military and industrial organization, including superordinate and subordinate relations in the respective sectors.

Civilian sector social science publications provided the basis of our information regarding the issue of militarization of Soviet society and regarding the emphasis on patriotism in the military. Sovetskaia Pedagogika, which addresses theoretical and practical issues of education and educational policy, formed the basis for our analysis of the impact of the 1967 changes in the law on military service. Specifically, we focused on military patriotic education of Soviet youth before and after the changes in the 1967 law on military service.

We did not undertake a systematic quantitative content analysis of the research documents that we used. While content analysis of a publication such as the journal "Kommunist Voruzhennykh Sil" might enable us to pinpoint the relationship between the military and political officer, such an approach would have required the elimination of other issues of interest to us, given the available time and resources for this study. Moreover, our interest in the relationship between the military and the political officer is not limited to a specific period. Our goal was to trace the development of this relationship from the institutionalization of the military commissar during the civil war. Sources for the early years of the commissar system and subsequent changes are not available to develop the necessary indicators on the nature of the relationship. It is worth
noting that a preliminary review of the journal "Kommunist Voruzhennykh Sil" for the 1960s suggested to us that there was little to be gained from content analysis in either rigor or precision.

Throughout our research and analyses we tried to discern patterns of change and stability in the military and civilian sectors, and the interrelationships between the two sectors as portrayed in the Soviet literature.

THE CONVERGENCE ASSUMPTION

The garrison state model and its derivatives, to be discussed below, contains an assumption of two forms of structural convergence in industrial societies. Since this assumption underlies our own argument, it is necessary to make it explicit. In the first instance, it assumes that cross-nationally, there will be a tendency for the social structures of modern social systems to become increasingly similar under the dynamics of industrialization. Schumpeter (1950), for example, argued that, for a variety of reasons, the institutional structures of capitalist society would eventually collapse under the weight of the success of that very system. Capitalism would be replaced by socialism, with collective control located in the public, rather than the private sector. While the capitalist nations were posited to be moving in a socialist direction, communist nations were also thought to be developing social structures based upon democratic socialism. Scholars interested in communist societies argued that, in a system of increased literacy and affluence, the highly centralized "command economy" of the Soviet Union would prove untenable, and that Soviet society would accept alternative forms of economic and political organization (Wiley, 1966; Prybyla, 1964). We do not accept the unicausal economic determinist assumption that may be read into the convergence theme. Neither do we necessarily
share the optimistic view that industrialization will bring about enlighten-
ment and democratic socialism. As Djilas (1957) has suggested, the growth
of industrial bureaucracy is as likely to produce a new oppressor class:
the bureaucrats. And we do not deny that purposive social action can shape
specific industrial societies and therefore contribute to structural differ-
entiation. Thus, our assumption is not that industrial technology produces
developed societies that are the same, but that these technologies tend to
move industrial societies in similar directions, with between-nation variance
produced by other factors: values, ideologies, and their resulting social
actions. We believe that it was the unicausal nature of the convergence
assumption that led to two decades of dormancy in the social science litera-
ture after its popularity at mid-century (e.g., Kerr et al., 1960). The
current reemergence of the assumption is less deterministic.

We find ourselves in agreement with Form (1979:23) who, in noting
a recent revival of the convergence theme, states that "...single factor
theories cannot account for everything.... Nevertheless, the technologi-
cal variable is cross culturally quite robust in explaining social behavior
on the job, in the factory, and in job related social systems...technology
strongly predicts the industrial and occupational division of labor." Our
position is compatible with Inkeles' (1969) argument, regarding developing
societies, that modernization processes, including education and participa-
tion in large-scale organizations, produces behaviors that fall within a
limited range and can be regarded as "modern." This does not preclude
recognition that these societies have differing histories and cultures,
and that these differences will persist. It is on the basis of this assump-
tion that we presume to apply to the Soviet Union theories of military
organization and of civil-military relations developed to explain these
same phenomena in the multiparty democracies of the industrial west.

Since we are positing neither that the Soviet Union and the United States are moving toward the same end state, nor that the American model of liberal democracy is the form toward which the Soviet Union is moving, there is at least a semantic difference between our conceptualization of convergence and the conceptualization tested by Brzezinski and Huntington (1964) a decade and a half ago. Substantively, however, we do not differ from their positions with regard to the ultimate similarity or dissimilarity of American and Soviet societies. While we feel that the term convergence, with change occurring in both societies, better describes the processes we observe than does the more general concept of evolution, which they prefer, we feel that this convergence is more notable at the subinstitutional level than at the societal level, and that the major historical and cultural differences will remain.

The second instance in which we assume convergence of social structures is between the military and civilian sectors of the same industrial society, again drawing upon western theories, and again regarding the effects of technology as powerful. Dore (1973) has shown that the imperatives of technology do not necessarily produce uniformity even in areas most closely related to technology, and Goldthorpe (1964) has argued that stratification systems do not necessarily follow the logic of industrialization, yet disparate socio-political systems show a considerable degree of similarity in a variety of areas. We will focus on those areas where the Soviet experience is consistent with western theories because of these similarities. We will also point out discrepancies between theoretical emphasis and empirical observation. It is interesting to note that the Soviets have rejected the western notion of convergence as something akin to a capitalist plot to undermine the achievements of Soviet socialism (Afanasyev, 1975;
Bliakham and Shkaratan, 1973). However, their preoccupation with the scientific-technical revolution points to similar developments, rather than uniquely socialist forms: industrialization, urbanization, decreasing rural population, rising educational levels, mechanization, automation, and the concomitant changes in other areas of society. And as Brzezinski and Huntington (1964) note, even the Soviets have a convergence thesis. They believe that in the long run, the world will be communist.

THE GARRISON STATE CONSTRUCT

The major issues raised in modern theories of civil-military relations are rooted in a variant of the convergence argument that Lasswell (1941) has identified as "the garrison state." In a world in which modern military technology (aerial and nuclear warfare) would make civilians as vulnerable to armed attack as military personnel would be, Lasswell projected that "specialists in violence," i.e., military elites, recruited on the basis of ability, would develop the skills of modern civilian management, and would become a major force in ruling elites. Among their skills, they would count the manipulation of symbols in the interest of mobilizing the entire population for defense efforts. This mobilization would require extensive articulation of the military with civilian institutions, most notably economic enterprise. Unemployment would be abolished, either in fact or in symbol, and income would be somewhat equalized in order to reduce opposition to the regime. The shape of the new income distribution — flattened at the top and bottom and bulging at the middle levels — would presumably be achieved through imposed social mobility processes. Since under the garrison state the military would assume primacy among social institutions, some, but not necessarily all, of these mobility processes would presumably take place in the context of military organization. Some individuals would be able
to move from the lowest to the middle strata of society through military service, while others would achieve the most elite positions in the new social structure. There is in fact a growing literature in the West demonstrating the importance of military service in the attainment of social status (Segal and Martindale, 1980).

Under the garrison state, economic production would be regularized and geared primarily toward military rather than consumption goods. Democratic elections would be replaced by plebiscite. What was new in Lasswell's thinking was not that military forces would play a major role in the governance of a state. Indeed, there is a large literature on the role of the military in politics (e.g., Nordlinger, 1977; Perlmutter, 1977). This literature, however, emphasizes the experience of preindustrial nations. What was new in Lasswell's construct was the expectation that, as part of the normal course of development, military elites might gain ascendancy in modern industrial states.

Samuel Huntington (1957), in the formulation of his own theory of civil-military relations in the post-World War II industrial world, recognized the importance of the garrison state hypothesis. However, he rejected it on the basis of assumptions in the model which have proven false (see Segal, 1981).

Lasswell (1962) himself recognized the limitations of his model, but was less willing to reject it. A quarter of a century after developing the model, he pointed out that the expectation of violence continued in the world, that the garrison state model was already approximated among the Warsaw Pact nations, and that specialists in violence were already located at strategic points in modern industrial societies. He saw hope, however, that the advent of the garrison state could be forestalled by "civilianism,"
as opposed to militarism. By civilianism he meant the absorption of the military by civil society and the deglamorization of violence. Aron (1979), in his more recent evaluation of the garrison state model, sees it more applicable to the Soviet Union than to the United States, although even in the Soviet Union, civilian authorities (the party and the bureaucracy) maintain control over the armed forces and the police. Other analysts agree with Aron in their evaluation of the Soviet Union regarding the continued subordination of the military to civilian authorities in policy formulation, even as they emphasize the greater militarization of Soviet society than of Western society (e.g., Pipes, 1980).

It is our contention that the major trends observable in Soviet civil-military relations can be subsumed by Lasswell's construct, which established the conceptual agenda and provided us with the vocabulary we use today for the analysis of civil-military relations, and by models based on Lasswell's construct. Some of the characteristics that Lasswell associated with the garrison state have in fact appeared, and the Soviet Union bears a closer fit to the model than do the nations of the west. Even in the Soviet Union, however, the military has not become the dominant elite. What is crucial for our discussion, however, is not the issue of whether the garrison state model, as an ideal type, reflects the empirical conditions of the Soviet Union. The conceptual importance of Lasswell's model is that it defines the five themes which have driven contemporary discourse on civil-military affairs: the issue of civil control of the military; the role of the military in the social stratification system; the issue of structural similarity between military organization and civilian institutions; the issue of interpenetration, at all levels, of the civilian and military
sectors of modern industrial societies; the issue of symbol manipulation in favor of military mobilization. The first four of these are reflected in dominant western theoretical developments based on Lasswell's work. The last is reflected more in theories regarding communist nations, although here too, the debt to Lasswell is acknowledged (e.g., Herspring and Volgyes, 1977). And western theories are becoming more attentive to this area as well.

PROFESSIONALISM AND THE ISSUE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL

Huntington (1957), in rejecting the fusion of the civil and military implied by Lasswell's garrison state model, emphasizes an "objective" model of civilian control, which assumes that in the modern world, the military is professionalized, and that one aspect of military professionalism is political neutrality. The apolitical professional military is assumed to be responsive to a formal chain of command that is controlled by civilian decision makers. The emergence of a professional military is consistent with the garrison state model, but is not sufficient for inferring the existence of such a state.

Janowitz (1960), by contrast, recognizes that formal definitions of professional responsibility establish both the principle of civilian control and the broad parameters of a formal structure to maintain that control, but that these are not sufficient to attain the goal of responsiveness to the civilian polity. To attain this responsiveness, he suggests that the formal controls be supplemented by a system of subjective controls established through the integration of the military institution into its host civilian society. Where Huntington saw the military as largely isolated and insulated from civilian institutions, Janowitz saw them interacting intensively at an institutional interface through which Lasswell's goal of civilianization
might be achieved. Janowitz' model questions Huntington's assumption that military professionalism will guarantee the political neutrality of the armed forces.

Conceptualizations of government, or more appropriately party, relations with the military in the Soviet Union are similarly an issue of some scholarly debate. Kolkowicz (1978) sees the military operating as an interest group with a professional ethic of autonomy, which rather than acting simply as an executor of policy, modifies policies which it does not wholly approve through a variety of organizational tactics. The Party, for its part, must make resources available to the military in pursuit of national goals, but must be concerned about those resources ultimately being used against the regime.

Odom (1978) feels that the adversary nature of the Party-military relationship has been overstated. Drawing heavily on Huntington's notion of military professionalism, he sees the military and the Party having common, rather than divergent, interests on a range of central issues, with the military serving as an "administrative arm of the Party," and acting as an extremely influential partner rather than as a competing entity. At the same time, however, he sees the military not isolated from civilian society, but rather functionally integrated with a wide range of civilian institutions, industry and education among them.

Using both Kolkowicz and Odom as points of departure, Colton (1979) has attempted to construct a "participatory model" of Party-military relations, maintaining that the Soviet military is a bounded system (contrary to his interpretation of Odom), but not necessarily one in conflict with the Party (contrary to Kolkowicz).

The definition of professionalism that underlies the views of Huntington
(1957) and Kolkowicz (1978) is a functionalist one, in which an occupational group having a particular expertise is given certain privileges, among which is autonomy, in exchange for the maintenance of an ethic of public service and self-regulation (Hall, 1969:78-82). In the case of the military, expertise in the management of weapons systems capable of ever-increasing devastation, however, threatens the autonomy of the profession, as felt needs for civilian control increase as a function of the destructive power of military technology (Abrahamsson, 1972). In a very real sense, challenges to the professional autonomy of the military stem in part from the fact that the professional development of the military has expanded the functions of the military to include political as well as combat tasks, and peacetime as well as wartime missions (Segal and Lengermann, 1980). The increasing complexity of military technology, the greater levels of organizational specialization that this complexity requires, and increasing recognition of the political consequences of military autonomy, have altered the nature of the bureaucratic constraints placed on the military professional. Increasingly, decision making is done by teams rather than by individuals, and increasingly, these teams include civilian experts as well as military personnel. These factors change the nature of military practice, as increasingly sophisticated expertise leads to lesser levels of autonomy both in terms of the individual practitioner and in terms of the occupational group. However, from the days of the revolution, political control has been exercised over the Soviet military profession, so assertions of change in the level of military autonomy should not be overstated.

Challenges to the autonomy of the military are also rooted in increasing distrust of the professions generally, and increased unwillingness to accept functionalist assumptions, on the part of social scientists, and publics
more generally. Views of the professions were extremely favorable in the 1950s and 1960s, when professional autonomy was justified in terms of perceived positive consequences for society. This atmosphere of trust in professional autonomy has passed however, as civilian professionals have been shown to have translated autonomy and professional status into personal gain and convenience quite independent of the level of service provided.

During the nineteen-seventies we have seen a rise of distrust and criticism in the treatment of professions by social scientists. It is both a reflection of a demand for accountability and a serious reaction to the naively one-sided view of professions held during the 1950s and 1960s. The conflict, or power, perspective on professions which appears so strongly in the social science of the 1970s, views the distinctive characteristic of professional occupations to be their monopolistic domination of the markets in which they operate and their efforts to control, through certification procedures and other autonomy related measures, as much of the environment related to their activity as possible (e.g., Friedson, 1970). Autonomy is considered still to be a critical factor and indicator of professional status, but is discussed in terms of the conflict and dominance relations between professions and the government, professions and the public, and professions and each other. It is also discussed more in terms of professional self-interest than in terms of service. While there is no all out condemnation of professional principles as such, there is an emphasis on the extent to which professionalism is a self-serving ideology. Efforts at increasing autonomy in the name of service have been countered with descriptions of the self-serving dynamics in the application of those principles by professions today, and with calls for accountability through outside evaluation and/or control. The relevance of this to the military is that it
is important, in analyzing threats to military status and autonomy, to see that many of these threats are directed at professional elite groups generally, not just at the military, and that the accomodations which take place in the face of these threats are also being made and will continue to be made by other professional groups. Such accomodations do not necessarily mean a loss of professional stature relative to other professions, although they may indeed mean a redefinition of the notion of professionalism, in which autonomy, in the traditional sense, ceases to be a characteristic of the professions.

THE EMERGENCE OF A MILITARY PROFESSION

The development of an officer corps as a professional occupational category has been limited historically by technological, political, and ideological constraints. In order for expertise to exist, there had to be a technology and a body of theory to master. In order to justify occupational specialization and differentiation, there had to be a military threat of some continuity. And in order for specialized military roles to be filled on the basis of expertise, stratification and ideological systems had to allow people to be assigned positions on the basis of merit rather than birth, and had to accept a modicum of elitism in society. Officers who served as a function of their station in life by parentage rather than expertise were not military professionals. It was not until the American and French revolutions that officership became achieved rather than ascribed (Segal, Kinzer, and Woelfel, 1977).

Russia had been influenced early by French and Prussian notions of military professionalism, and a professional cadre had been established under the tsarist regime. The issue of professional autonomy of the military since the Revolution has hinged on the relationship between the Party and
the armed forces, in general, and the role of the commissar, or political officer, in particular.

The prevalent view in the West (with the exception of Colton, 1979) of the military in the USSR might be summarized as "If the Party is to continue to exist it must control the military. The MPA (Main Political Administration) is the primary agency through which this control is exercised" (Scott and Scott, 1979:269). Given the nature of the Soviet system, the degree of control exercised by the MPA over the military seemed to require little elaboration, and received little attention. The recent work of Kolkowicz (1967) was an attempt to provide a more thorough analysis of the role of the political cadre within the military. Kolkowicz sees the political officer as a controlling agent. Thus, he quotes a Soviet source: "A well established information system enables the political organs always to be on top of things and to react at the right time to deficiencies in the activities of the officer personnel and in the Party and Komsomol organizations" (1967:72). Such statements are common throughout the Soviet military literature, and do indeed provide support to the notion of the political officer as a control agent. Such statements suggest that the political officer is superordinate to the military officer, and has a right to either interfere with the orders of the officer or to issue commanding orders. But such a reading would be wrong. In fact much of the literature places a special emphasis on the fact that the order of the officer is "law." The reading of the above quote fails to acknowledge that for the political officer "to react to deficiencies," means among other things to ensure that an atmosphere in the unit does not develop which might lead to a questioning of commander's orders. In other words it is part of the role of the political officer to ensure that an order is indeed a "law" for subordinates. As the Soviets, whether military or politi-
cal, so frequently emphasize, "edinonachalie" or one man command is the primary law of the military organization, and the political officer is to explain and educate the subordinates of its importance.

The role of the political officer might be more easily understood when seen in the context of the overall development of the military organization in the USSR. The importance of the military professional, trained in the science and technology of the military art, and possessing unique expertise, was acknowledged in 1918 when former tsarist officers were called into service during the civil war. Former officers were utilized in all the services, and served as instructors in the newly established military schools. According to Fediukin "invaluable help was rendered by the old military specialists in the organization of military schools and the preparation of red commanders" (1965:71). Between 1918-1920 forty thousand officers were trained in the newly established military schools and in courses provided for new officers (Iovlev, 1974).

The inclusion of former officers led to the institution of the commissar system, and raised the issue of professional autonomy still debated today. The commissar system was to ensure that the tsarist officers - who were not exactly supportive of the usurpers of power - did not betray the revolution. The role then was indeed one of control. But it would be erroneous to assume that this was the only function of the commissars. The commissar was to show a "special vigilence," towards the military specialist, as the former officers were called, but he was also charged with the "reeducation" of this officer, and with helping him understand the historical significance of the revolution (Fediukin, 1965; Voropaev and Iovlev, 1956). The educational role of the commissar was not only directed towards the military specialist, but to the troops. He was charged with ensuring discipline and obedience of the troops to the orders of the military specialists.
The signature of the commissar on all orders of the specialist served as an assurance to the soldiers that the order given was not a betrayal. From its very inception the domain of the commissar role was not merely control. It included socialization and education of the masses to the authority of the specialist. He was to be conscious of the importance of good morale, as well as carrying the ideology of Marx and Lenin to the troops and to the military specialist.

The operational realm was the domain of the specialist, not to be interfered with by the commissar. His was the "deciding voice," to be supported by the commissar even if he disagreed with the decision. Leadership in the military sphere belonged not to the commissar, but the specialist. The responsibility for military operations falls exclusively on the military leadership (Fediukin, 1965:86).

While the institution of the commissar role was no doubt a novel one, the importance of the military specialist was in essence a recognition of the role of the professional, as imperative to the success of the revolution.

While the relationship between the commissar and the military specialist during the Civil War may have approximated the rules only rarely, and most likely produced conflict, the interdependence between the political and military officer was likely to lead to a process whereby "control" was not the most important part of the relationship. Regardless of the degree of conflict between these two role incumbents, the importance attributed to the freedom of the military specialist to make decisions of a military nature, and to the educational role of the commissar, provides a clear indication that the political leadership recognized the role of the military professional as necessary, not only for the immediate period, but for the future. And the insistence that the role of the commissar was more than a policeman established the base for the future role obligation. Indeed throughout the
stormy history of the Soviet military the role of the commissar or political worker always included an educational and morale building component.

The changes in the Soviet system during the first decade of the Soviet state brought changes in the military as well. By 1928, when Stalin inaugurated the first Five Year Plan, the roles of the commissar and military specialist were merged. The establishment of the "Zampolit" or The Deputy Commander for Political Affairs was, until the great purge in 1937, a role subordinate to the military officer, generally defined as a helping role for the effective education of the personnel supportive of combat readiness, discipline of subordinate personnel and facilitation of resource procurement.

On the eve of the purge, the commissar role with its control component was reintroduced, and the signature of the commissar was required on all commanding orders. In 1940, the control aspect of the role was eliminated only to be introduced again in July 1941, and finally eliminated in October 1942. The political officer was once more designated subordinate to the military officer, primarily an "educator," supporter of the officer in ensuring discipline and obedience to orders, morale builder as well as overseeing the so-called well being of the troops (Petrov, 1964).

"Edinonachalie," or one man command has remained (since 1942) the organizational mode of the military, and similarly the role of the political officer has remained subordinate.

Professionalism as the mark of the military officer has been nurtured throughout the history of the Soviet state, and considerable resources for the development of a professional military cadre were allocated in the form of educational institutions to train them, establishment of officers' clubs, and development of a military literature, not to mention high material rewards, i.e., salaries, as well as symbolic rewards, such as the institution of military ranks (Petrov, 1964).
Autonomy, or freedom from controls by external agents, has traditionally been regarded as the sine qua non of a profession. This component of the professional role has long been debated with respect to the USSR not only as it pertains to the military but other professionals. The establishment of the MPA was not the primary threat to the autonomy of the officer. In fact the purges of 1937-1938, which devastated the leadership cadre of the military, were no less devastating to the political cadre, the purported controllers. Stalin was set to silence any real or imagined opposition, and the holocaust created by the purges did not single out the military as the managers of violence as any more of a threat than the Party leadership. Stalin destroyed 70 percent of the Central Committee; all supporters of his policies. There is relatively little data to suggest that the political officer constituted a threat to the autonomy of the professional officer, or that the officer feared interference by the political officer.

The death of Stalin, and the emergence of the Khrushchev leadership, has been portrayed as a period of conflict between the Party and the military. But it is important to note that this conflict was at a level of policy which had little bearing on the professional activities of the officer. Rather, it involved questions and decisions which are the domain of the civilian authorities in other societies as well. The fact that high level officers were questioning Khrushchev's views on troop reduction, or commitment of resources to the civilian sector, is indicative of a changed atmosphere rather than greater control of the military. If initiative and independence constitute a component of professionalism and professional autonomy, the available Soviet literature suggests a much stronger emphasis on these characteristics. In large measure these components are a function of changing warfare and technological developments, which lead to similar structural arrangements regardless of the political system.
In the 1960s as well as in the 1970s, Soviet military literature devoted considerable attention to the notion that the revolution in military technology places a special responsibility on the professional military cadre, to train and prepare the new officer cadre (Konoplev, 1974) and that education and training are not only more important today, but given the increased level of educational achievements of young people, requires a different approach, or what might be called a more professional approach (Lisenkov, 1977; Timofeechev, 1969; K.V.S., 1966).

The focus on professionalism is not compromised by an organizational structure which provides room for a political officer. The latter's focus on morale and on the education of the troops in fact enables the officer to focus on the professional domain. It is not at all dysfunctional to the military organization for the political officer to help implement decisions which were made by the commanding cadre. The emergence of the revolution in military affairs, and the influx of new technology has, as the Soviets remind us, made the role of the political officer even more important. Today, the political officer more than ever identifies with the military organization, and this role constitutes a career for him, no less than for the military professional.

In the last two decades, there has been no evidence that the military is subject to anything but one man command. Thus, the Program of the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 reasserted one man command as the major principle of the organization of the Soviet Armed Forces. More recently, following the 25th Party Congress, at the conference of leading political workers of the Army and Navy, the principle of one man command was once more reaffirmed. The political organs are required to actively carry the spirit of "partiness" in the work of military administration, and constantly seek to strengthen one man command and the authority of the Commander, and to be unreceptive to variations in this realm.
Khrushchev's policies did not challenge the concept of one man command. However, in line with his image of the great society, i.e., "communism in our lifetime," while emphasizing discipline and obedience to rules, his notion of democracy in the larger society required a commensurate focus in the armed forces. Thus, he stressed collectivism, criticism, and self-criticism, and the involvement of party organs in the life of the military. In other words the changes that he was trying or hoping to bring about in the civil sector required changes in the military sector as well.

The perceived conflict between the military and civil (party) authorities during the Khrushchev era ignores the significant changes which were taking place in the larger society, and by ignoring these changes the military seems to emerge as unique and a threat, requiring further and greater controls. The perception of struggle and conflict might be better understood in the context of other developments. Stalin died in 1953 and under the leadership of Khrushchev, vast changes were instituted in the USSR, ranging from such simple events as "regular" work hours, as opposed to Stalin's practice of nocturnal sessions, to major industrial reorganization, relatively open discussions in the newspapers, relaxation of censorship, the admission that there was something to learn from Western capitalist societies, the abolition of machine tractor stations, and of course Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Party Congress. In addition, Stalin was condemned for the murder of thousands of honest, innocent Communists, deportation of minority groups, the purge of the military and murder of Tukhachevskii, Iakir, Gamarnik, and others (Bresslauer, 1976; Hough and Fainsod, 1979).

By 1958 Khrushchev had abolished many of the criminal statutes, resurrected the trade union as a "representative" of workers, increased the wages
of the lowest paid workers, brought changes into the educational system in an effort to facilitate access to higher educational institutions to less privileged groups, and supported the publication of Solzhenytsins' _One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch_. As stated by Hough and Fainsod (1979:227),

...the regime...seemed to be encouraging greater and freer communications among citizens and between them and the government...the trend toward more open policy debates continued (for example, many aspects of the economy became the subject of debate), and sociological research was seriously encouraged for the first time in thirty years.

At the 22nd Party Congress, Khrushchev unveiled his "great society" program. The USSR was entering the first stage of Communism and all citizens were to take an active part in building this new society. The state would remain until full Communism was achieved, but many of the governmental functions would be transferred to mass public organizations. A People's Militia, comrades courts and other voluntary organizations were examples of the growth of this kind of democracy and widespread participation of rank and file citizens.

According the the 22nd Party Congress, the creation of the material technical base for Communism required vast changes and improvements in technology, the development of chemical industry, modernization of the building and building materials industry, development of transit facilities, an improved network of roads, development of natural resources, acceleration of scientific and technical progress and so on. With respect to the military, the 22nd Party Congress pointed out the committment of the party and the people to

the defense of the socialist motherland and strengthening of the defense of the USSR...as the most important function of the socialist state....The Soviet
state will see to it that its armed forces are powerful...have the most up to date means of defending the country - atomic and thermonuclear weapons, rockets of every range, that they keep up all types of military equipment and all weapons up to standard....One man command is a major principle of the organization of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In addition to the industrial, scientific, technical, social, and cultural development of Soviet society on the road to Communism, special attention was given to the nature of the new Communist "man," the moral builder of Communism. These characteristics included honesty, patriotism, modesty and unpretentiousness, but also included Krushchev's vision, e.g., collectivism, conscious labor for the good of society, high sense of public duty, comradely mutual assistance, mutual respect, concern for the upbringing of children, friendship and brotherhood for all nationalities.

This image of the Communist was highly congruent with Khrushchev's image of the future Communist society. For Khrushchev, Communism, to be achieved in the lifetime of the present generation, was to be a society different from Breznev's image of Communism. For Khrushchev, the good society was to be a collectivist society in which individuals are involved, participate and share. Life centers around the group or collective. Children are reared (if parents desire) in children's institutions and boarding schools. Academician Strumilin, one of the architects of the Five Year Plan, created a considerable stir when he suggested that all children, from the day of birth through high school, be reared and educated in children's institutions (1960). Khrushchev did not endorse personal ownership of cars. Cars were to be made available to groups rather than individuals. Apartments were to be built with catering facilities rather than individual kitchens, etc.

These developments, coming less than a decade after Stalin, may not
have been greeted by all groups as the ideal society. Nevertheless, they aroused considerable enthusiasm and hope among the people. Khrushchev, it appeared, was not only eliminating the terror of the Stalin era by curtailing the KGB, rehabilitating many of those whom Stalin declared to be traitors and shot, and emptying the vast Gulags, but also improving the daily life of the little people, e.g., increasing wages. Moreover he was asking them to become participants in the achievement of Communism by 1980. The invitation for a public discussion of the draft program of the party brought 300,000 letters with various proposals from readers. The letters in Pravda and Izvestiia manifested an unprecedented experience. The proposals ranged from the view that the party member should not be entitled to special privileges, to a letter from a worker asking that the rank and file party member be able to express his opinion freely at a party meeting and criticise without fear the shortcomings at work. The same worker suggested that more than one candidate be nominated for election in a party organization.

While 1980 was designated as the target date for Communism, its achievement depended on hard work, strict discipline and participation by the toilers. The community that Communism was to be was best approximated in the struggle of the work collective to become a Communist Labor Brigade (CLB).

A CLB consisted of a group of workers dedicated to live and work in a Communist manner, i.e., strive to improve productivity, discipline and workmanship. A participant in a CLB also was to strive for self-improvement, as well as the improvement of other members of the collective, for example, through increased years of schooling, learning a second profession, mastering other specialties, participating in public and cultural life, and providing help to one's co-workers. Essentially CLB propagated role relationships at the work place that were diffuse, affective and collectivity oriented.
The emphasis on the work place as a family, a collective with widespread responsibilities, was a typically Khrushchevian image of the future, to be found not only in factories but in all organizations. While in some sense it was to relieve the alienation of a dull and monotonous job, it also ensured social control without reliance on "policemen," and of course, increased the effectiveness of social control.

The changes implemented by Khrushchev reverberated throughout Soviet society, and the military was not ignored. However, the fact that the military was affected does not imply that these changes were a threat to the position and authority of military leaders.

As noted previously the historic Twenty Second Party Congress, which promised Communism in 1980, reasserted one man command. The new Disciplinary and Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces (Vedomostii Verkhovnogo Soveta:1960) once again underlined the principle of one man command. Marshall Grechko, in his speech on the New Armed Forces Regulations (KZ 1960) noted that the new regulations "place the strongest possible emphasis on the unit (sub-unit) commander's being in sole command and bearing personal responsibility to the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for the constant combat and mobilization readiness of the unit (sub-unit) entrusted to him" (KZ 1960).

As in the civilian sector, the new regulations emphasized the importance of the collective in ensuring strict discipline, military readiness, principles, ethical and moral behavior, and intolerance of shortcomings. Meetings of the group (the collective) and discussions of the serviceman's infringement of discipline, or other forms of deviant behavior, and the use of "comrades courts" to address questions of low level deviations, constituted a form of Soviet democracy. But as in the civilian sector these might be more properly seen as social control far more effective than the reliance on external
sources to ensure desired behavior.

In light of Khrushchev's goals to reduce coercion, it is not surprising to find that the new regulations place a far greater emphasis on education and persuasion than in the past. "Bread and water" confinement was eliminated and length of confinement in a "guard house" was reduced for those below commissioned officer status from twenty to fifteen days, and for commissioned officers from twenty to ten days. The right to arrest servicemen and non-commissioned officers was granted to the company commander and up, and the arrest of commissioned officers to regimental commanders and up, which enlarged the disciplinary authority of commanding officers of regiments.

The commanding officer, with the help of the political and party organs, directs the training and indoctrination of personnel, and the statute leaves no ambiguity as to the legal status of the commanding officer in this area.

Considerable attention is given in the new regulations to enhancing the ideological and moral state of the troops. The importance of correct and courteous behavior of the officer is emphasized. The commanding officer is to be a good comrade, he is to make strict demands on himself and set a superior example to subordinates. Rude and coarse behavior toward subordinates are contrary to the moral code of a Soviet officer.

The so-called democratization of the armed forces does not reduce the superordinate position of the officer, or advocate close and informal relations between subordinates and superiors.

The new regulations, relative to the regulations of 1946, do constitute a significant improvement and are congruent with the changes in the USSR generally. While the regulations did emphasize a greater utilization of the collective, as well as the need to utilize the political officer and party
organization, the reaffirmation of one man command left the authority of
the officer untouched, and, as Grechko noted, the collective is to be
used in ensuring and enhancing one man command.

As in the factories and other organizations, the degree to which
the collective was actually involved in discussions of various decisions
varied from the ideal. The degree to which an enlisted man, or junior
officer or subordinate generally, felt free to criticize a superior was
highly constrained.

The notion of collectivism was manifested primarily in the emphasis
on educating and socializing, or indoctrinating, the troops into such
values as mutual help, comradeship, concern with the public interest, and
morality. An attempt was made to have all soldiers internalize the moral
values of the builders of Communism. This concern with the soldier required
moral behavior on the part of the officer as well. Consequently the officer's
behavior must not be rude or coarse. Professional behavior was required,
including "to get to know one's men" in order to increase the cohesiveness
of the military collective (Dimitriev KVS, 1961:22).

It is necessary to recognize that the demands for improvement in the
work of political organs and the party among the military did not—as is
sometimes suggested—focus mainly on criticism and self-criticism or on
socialist competition. They were not ignored, but the major stress was on
the development of a professional and competent armed forces, ready to
defend the nation. When General Golikov, head of the MPA, called for the
implementation of party principles in the armed forces, he sought further
improvements in the work of the political organs and his focus was on disci-
pline. Specifically, he noted that some political organs in the Air Force and
in Air Defense had not performed at peak in their tasks and responsibilities
to ensure combat readiness (Gulikov, KVS, 1960, No. 1).
The many articles in Kommunist Voruzhennykh Sil emphasized the role of the party in strengthening discipline in the armed forces (Egorov, KVS, 1961: 30), or party concerns with strengthening the authority of sergeants (Filiukovich, 1961:24), or the Communist as a role model of discipline and training (Shivagnov, 1961:6). One man command, or the professionalism of the commanding officer, is not compromised by the imperatives of the principle of party leadership or party guidance of all organizations and groups. The officer of the army, like the director of an enterprise, or the head of a scientific institute, cannot remain politically neutral. The acknowledgement of the "guiding" and "leading" role of the party is the principle of Soviet life. But the professional domain is that of the specialist.

Colonel Timofeechev's model of the commander-edinonachalnik is a man who is a military specialist and organizer, capable of influencing all aspects of military activities as well as daily life. In light of the fundamental changes in the armed forces, the significance of edinonachalnie and authority of the commander has increased. From a commander today one requires a strong will, manliness, independence and high organizational abilities. Victory can be ensured only by strong and steady leadership, ...invested with power and responsibility to direct troops in a given task (KVS, 1968, No. 14:25). Successful leadership of a division or regiment requires of the commander high moral and military qualities, profound military and political knowledge, business-like efficiency, irreconcilability with shortcomings, fair and just requirements of oneself and subordinates, spiritual warmth, a party approach, and the ability to lead, and be guided by the politics of the party (Timofeechev, KVS, 1968:14).

The fact that the model officer appeared on the pages of the journal
of the MPA constitutes a rather firm sign of the officer's role. But this model of the commander appears many times, in all military journals. Initiative and independence are necessary and required components of the commander's role, and given considerable attention in the education and training of the new officer cadre. The military educational system is required to develop in the officer the characteristics of "devotion to the party and nation" as the first and primary requirements, together with a "Communist conviction," followed by discipline and execution of a commander's orders, initiative and independence, a commanding will and organizational ability, high professional preparation and a general military and technical culture, and the ability to train and educate subordinates (Shkadov, 1976:15-16).

While the role of the military professional has persisted in the Soviet Union, the activities associated with that role have changed, in ways anticipated by the garrison state model and its derivatives. Western and Soviet literature call attention to the changes in military organization following the industrial revolution, machine production, and the development of new weapon systems. The growth of mass armies brought about divisions into specialized units which called for separate commanders and the delegation of authority (Abrahamsson, 1972; Van Doorn, 1975). This process of organizational change increased in the modern period, and has led Janowitz (1960) to describe military organization as shifting from heroic domination to managerial manipulation.

Marshall Zakharov (1967) notes the same historical developments. When the battle front was eight kilometers long and four kilometers deep tactical functions were simple. The commander had to be brave, attack, and lead his men. The introduction of new arms, and the emergence of mass armies, changed military organization. The commander could no longer be personally
everywhere, and there was a need to delegate authority to others. The development of new weapons technologies, and rapid forms of mobility on and above the battlefield, necessitated new military staffs who took on new functions and gave considerable attention to various aspects of organization, planning and protection of military personnel. Scientific developments in military affairs call for further changes. Commanders need to show increased initiative, independence and leadership. It is no longer enough to be brave. Today's officers require technical knowledge, a scientific approach, and the ability to teach and share methods with subordinates. Others refer to today's conditions as necessitating the extension of greater autonomy to commanders (Komkov and Shemansky, 1964:11). Army General Kursov, discussing troop leadership under contemporary conditions, sees the role of leadership as belonging to commanders, and while staffs are responsible and important organs of troop administration, their activity is implemented on the basis of the "concepts and decisions of the commanders..." (1963:51). Even superiority of strength may be of little value "if a commander does not manifest initiative...this has not always been true...but in modern conditions the ability to take initiative...to project goals for plans of actions independently...and manifest responsibility are invaluable qualities of the commander..." (Surchenko, 1964:36).

Since World War II and the emergence of new tactical and missile systems, increasing specialization has occurred in the armed forces. Engineers, long part of the military system, have been elevated to command positions. Higher levels of education are required of officers today than in the past. In the USSR in 1929, 4.5 percent of officers had a higher education. Forty-five percent of officers in the army and navy now are engineers or technicians. In the rocket forces over 70 percent are engineers (Pupko, 1976:88). The Soviets tell us that the impact of
the scientific technical revolution has made it "impossible" to do without the participation of scientists in working out the organization and administration of the armed forces, or to teach and educate personnel. At the end of the 1960s more than 600 doctors of science were found in military institutions. Between 1963 and 1966 the number of doctors of science among officers and generals increased 45 percent and of candidates of science 26 percent (Konoplev, 1975:16).

Management as an integral part of the military organization becomes part of the role of the technical specialists. There is a synthesis of the commander and engineer activities. "Working with people" in the past was the major component of the commander role. Today, the commander requires technical know how, and the engineer has to learn to work with people (Shchendrik et al., 1977). Today's military engineer, regardless of his position, is "always an organizer, educator, technical specialist, administrator...he is responsible for the moral, political and psychological preparation of his subordinates" (Shchendrik et al., 1977:76). Military and civilians in the USSR are equally at home with the quote from the 25th Party Congress at which Breznev described the contemporary leader as a person who should organically combine partiness and competence, discipline and creativity, and scientific management.

Thus, in the arena of military professionalism, some of the basic characteristics of the garrison state have appeared. The continued acceptance of a profession of arms, within which recruitment and promotion are meritocratic, reflects the ascent of the specialist in violence. The inclusion of management skills in this specialist's repertoire was anticipated by Lasswell and by Janowitz. And at the unit level, the autonomy of the individual military professional is high, the presence of the political officer notwithstanding. Indeed, organizationally, Soviet military leaders probably enjoy considerably
more independence than do their Western counterparts in the implementa-
tion of military policies. On the other hand, contrary to the
garrison state model, civilian control is maintained over the mili-
tary as a collective entity. Although this relationship of control is
not necessarily adversarial, the military cannot unilaterally make
decisions on weapons systems, force levels, or the waging of war. The
formulation of military policies is under strict civilian political
control (Pipes, 1980:12).

ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORITY AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

The dual authority pattern observed in the military, reflected
in the presence of a technical expert or professional and a represen-
tative of the party, was apparent in civilian enterprise as well. In
both sectors, the new regime was dependent on tsarist experts for
organizational continuity in the short run. In the longer run, however,
an attempt was made to produce a new elite, from proletarian roots.
This served the dual functions of providing the lower social strata with
tangible benefits that might tie them more closely to the regime, and
at the same time replace a tsarist managerial class, who held their
positions on the basis of expertise rather than personnel loyalty
to the regime, with new personnel who held their positions both on
the basis of expertise and loyalty. The two factors of merit and
loyalty are consistent with the social mobility expectations of
Lasswell's garrison state construct.

The organizational arrangements within Soviet enterprise, con-
sisting of a bourgeois expert and a red director, were meant to ensure
the expertise and loyalty necessary to the functioning of industrial
organization. The utilization of the former bourgeois experts and
the intelligentsia generally was not an immediate success, but as
Soviets like to point out today, the untiring work of the communists under Lenin's leadership, coupled with the commitment of the experts to the motherland, as well as their recognition that a new state was in the making, brought the old intelligentsia to work for and support the new state (Fediukin, 1965).

The First Five Year Plan, inaugurated by Stalin in 1928, marked not only the beginning of draft industrialization, but a cultural revolution:

"a political confrontation of 'proletarian' Communists and the bourgeois intelligentsia, in which the Communists sought to overthrow the cultural authorities inherited from the old regime. The aim...was to create a new 'proletarian intelligentsia'. The method of the cultural revolution was a 'class war'" (Fitzpatrick, 1978:8).

The Shakhty trial in 1929, in which a group of bourgeois experts, i.e., engineers and technicians, were accused of "wrecking" and sabotage, initiated the class war against the "treacherous elements," supposedly fighting for a return to the past.

One of the major developments of the class war, epitomized in the Shakhty trials, was Stalin's proclamation and urgent call for the creation of a new proletarian technical intelligentsia, in order to eliminate the reliance on, and the need for, bourgeois experts whose aim was to destroy the gains of the revolution. Stalin articulated a principle which has long guided Bolshevik practice - that the Soviet regime, like any other, needed its own elite, and that this elite should be recruited primarily from the working class (Fitzpatrick, 1979:381).

Stalin's offensive against wage equalization began with the First Five Year Plan, and marked a turning point in the nation's initial commitment
to equality. Faced with immense labor turnover (Baykov, 1947; Inkeles, 1950), he attacked wage equalization invoking no less a figure than Marx and Lenin to claim that equality of rewards can only be achieved under communism. He ordered the promotion of skilled workers to higher positions, and differential wages based on performance and qualifications. In industrial enterprises, a system of grades based on skill was implemented, with considerable differences in wages among the grade categories. A separate scale system for management and technical cadre with special "personal salaries" and bonuses was implemented.

The differences in earnings were not the only measure of rewards. Statutes were implemented abolishing the inheritance tax of 1926, and progressive taxation was significantly curtailed. Distinctions among social groups were formalized by the wearing of uniforms. Officials and responsible personnel, workers in the railway and river transport system, as well as officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Procuracy, were required to wear uniforms which varied in quality, color and style, according to the status of the wearer (Inkeles, 1950:564). The system of social stratification to emerge with the Stalin revolution had by 1940 established a precisely stratified status system with at least ten major social groups (Inkeles, 1950).

The military, no less than the civilians, were included in the distribution of rewards. Stalin's assertion that no society can manage without its own intelligentsia, and that the USSR is no exception, focused on the industrial and technical intelligentsia, including the military. Officer membership in the intelligentsia is specified by the character of their activities. As representatives of mental labor they are organizers of the troops, leaders and educators of Soviet soldiers, and responsible for carrying out administrative functions and developing military science.
As in the civilian sector, high salaries for officers were instituted, and special welfare provisions, housing, access to special stores, sanitaria, and vacation places were made available to officers and their families. In 1935, ranks were reintroduced. In 1940, the rank of general was added. In 1943, commanders became officers. Cadet schools were established in 1943 for boys orphaned by the war (Petrov, 1964). The sharp differentiation of ranks in the armed forces was even a surprise to American soldiers when they encountered the Soviet military at the end of World War II (Moore, 1960:234).

The mobilization of young workers and communists to institutions of higher education, to be trained as a new generation of experts, was beset by many difficulties. Among the difficulties was the absence of a pool of graduates of secondary institutions, of worker and peasant origin, to qualify for higher education.

While during the 1920s, there was considerable emphasis on channeling young people of worker and peasant origin to secondary and higher educational institutions, the vast upheavals created by the civil war, the poverty, and the lack of resources, provided neither the necessary schools nor the financial means for prolonged study. In 1926-1927 workers in institutions of higher education constituted 28.9 percent, peasants 22.2 percent, and others 48.9 percent (Kim, 1968:175). During the NEP period educational expenditures were low. In 1924 a peasant child had an average education of two to three years, and an urban child 3.1 years (Lewin, 1978). The potential student was in essence functionally illiterate.

In order to meet the goal of a "Soviet" intelligentsia, a crash program of preparation began. Special faculties at higher educational institutions
were established - the "rabfak" - to train young workers and peasants for entrance to higher education. The emphasis on the worker and peasant class meant that young and poorly educated workers and peasants who left school years earlier, after completing a few grades, had to be motivated to return to school under conditions not always conducive to the pursuit of education. Shortages in equipment, dormitories, books, and faculty, and the ongoing struggle between the "old" educators and the new "true" Communists was a daily accompaniment to education.

Difficult as the task may have been, 233,000 Communists were full time students at educational institutions by 1933 (Fitzpatrick, 1979:85). The goal of a new intelligentsia provided vast opportunities for social mobility from social strata whose access to elite positions was closed prior to the Bolshevik regime.

Industrialization invariably produces opportunities for social groups to move upward. What was different in Stalin's Russia was the provision of opportunities to the previously most disadvantaged through mobilization and special educational institutions. The new technical cadre being educated under Stalin changed the social and educational composition of the party. The number of specialists in the party grew from 1.2 percent in 1928 to 20.6 percent in 1940 (Lane, 1969:80). The socially mobile of the 1930s were the replacement for the old Bolsheviks destroyed during Stalin's purges.

In 1936, Stalin proclaimed that the bourgeoisie had been eliminated and antagonistic classes ceased to exist in the Soviet Union. The efforts to single out workers and peasants or their children for admission to higher education, and to exclude children from other social strata, came to an end.
In a socialist state, no group is entitled to preferential treatment, and affirmative action programs were no longer considered necessary. To be sure, social mobility did not come to a standstill, but entrance to higher educational institutions followed the traditional pattern of high school to higher education. The special preparatory departments were closed in 1940.

Higher education remained open to all groups, but as in other societies, the socio-economic status of the family had a considerable impact on the student's performance. Moreover, the introduction of fees for the last two years of secondary education, and the establishment of stipends in higher educational institutions on the basis of merit rather than need, made access to higher education significantly more difficult for worker and peasant children than for white collar specialist children. Not surprisingly the proportion of worker and peasant children declined.

Intra-generational mobility, so widespread during the 1930s, declined. A 1965 survey (Aitov, 1971) of 3,200 workers in Ufa and Orenburg showed 92 percent of workers in 1950 remained workers fifteen years later. A more recent study in Ufa (Aitov, 1976) revealed that of those who were workers in 1950, 88 percent remained workers in 1970. Within a forty year span, according to Aitov, 20 percent of workers change their social position to the intelligentsia or white collar strata. The major road to change is through education. In Ufa, workers who completed evening or correspondence VUZ or tekhnikums became part of the intelligentsia. But an education is complex and difficult. Not every one can accomplish it, and those who do start on this path do not always finish. Consequently social mobility is low (Aitov, 1974:314). Nor was there much movement down. Among those who were part of the intelligentsia in 1950, 95.6 percent remained in the intelligentsia; 2.9 percent became workers and 1.5 percent white collar employees.
Those who moved "down" were primarily employees who occupied their positions on the basis of practical experience, shortly after the war, during a time of acute shortages.

Intergenerational mobility has been declining as well. Shkaratan (1970), Rutkevitch and Filippov (1970), and Biakhman and Shkaratan (1973) have noted a sharp decline in the movement of peasants into the working class. Aitov, on the basis of surveys in several cities, found that among 16,594 workers, 74 percent of those aged 50 and above were of peasant origin, but among those under the age of 20 years, only 33 percent were of peasant origin. Dobson (1977) reports on several Soviet surveys showing that the older the cohort of specialists, the larger the share of working class and peasant origins.

In the 1950s and later years, the children of intelligentsia were over-represented in VUZ institutions generally, and in the most prestigious ones specifically. Khrushchev's quest to decrease inequality, e.g., restructuring of wages and eliminating the large differential between the highest and lowest paid worker, included education. He noted that only 30 to 40 percent of students in higher educational institutions were of worker and peasant origin. The educational reforms of Khrushchev, instituted in 1958, were potentially far reaching. He addressed the problem of preschool education as well as higher education. Admission to higher educational institutions was made contingent on two years of employment after graduation from secondary schools. These reforms enjoyed little support from educators and intelligentsia parents. Even before Khrushchev's demise from power the reforms were being undermined. By the mid 1960s they were completely discarded.

The aspirations of children to a VUZ education, regardless of social origin, and the rejection by young people of service and blue collar jobs
in favor of the professions, aroused much concern. There was concern of labor shortages in service and unskilled occupations, concern regarding competition for a place in the VUZ, as well as concern over the declining ideology which claimed that all work in Soviet society is good and desirable.

The efforts to cope with these problems led to an increase in vocational schools, counseling in secondary schools, and an effort to propagandize that all work in a socialist society is valued. In 1969, a decree was passed to establish preparatory departments in various VUZ institutions to prepare workers and peasants for admission to VUZ. This process is a means of democratization of education and integration of society (Ivanov, 1977:104).

In the 1970s, according to Soviet sociologists, there was a sharp decline in the number of students applying to VUZ (Filippov, 1977). Surveys in the 1960s showed that 80 to 90 percent of secondary school graduates were planning to attend VUZ. In the mid 1970s, the percentage of secondary school graduates planning on an immediate higher education dropped to 46 percent. Filippov attributes the change to the "convergence of classes," the changes in the nature and content of work, improved material reward, and the increased network of vocational institutions. These changes Filippov sees as highly beneficial to society, since they reduce conflict accompanying competition for admission to VUZ. Moreover, today's interests of young people correspond more closely to the objective needs of society.

Kondratev (1977:105) notes that there has been a change in the composition of students in five institutions of higher education in the city of Gorkii: a decline of employees and children of employees, in the first year of study and a corresponding increase in children from the working class and even a small number of peasant children. The attrition rate of these students, however, is high in the second and third year of study. Among students accepted in 1973 to the Dabachevski State University, 31.4 percent dropped out
with two years; from the Engineering Institute, 24.8 percent; from the Gordki Pedagogical Institute, 14.8 percent, and from the Dobraliubov Institute of Foreign Languages, 10.5 percent (Kondratev, 1977:105).

While there had been some increase in working class children in VUZ (Kondratev, 1977; Sheremet, 1977), there was also a high attrition rate among these students. Moreover, as Filippov notes, future plans of young people, and apparently completion of a higher education, depend on the educational and social positions of their parents to some extent. Soviet sociologists, not unlike their counterparts in the West, explain the uneven distribution of students in VUZ on the basis of social and cultural differences among social strata. Children of specialists are exposed in the home to values different from collective farm and worker children. Parents with higher educations, e.g., specialists, provide an environment more conducive to educational achievement. Mothers with higher educations valued early training for their children and were more likely to send their children to nursery schools than mothers with an elementary education. Differences in material resources are not mentioned specifically, but the fact that children of the intelligentsia avail themselves of tutors to prepare them for the competitive examination to VUZ is noted.

Thus, despite the declining numbers of students applying to VUZ, among children of worker origins, those who inteded to attend VUZ immediately upon graduation constituted 36.7 percent; among kolkhoz children, 7.2 percent; among children of employees and specialists, 54.6 percent. Among those whose fathers had a higher education, 76.9 percent planned to attend VUZ (Filippov, 1977).

The tendency of children of specialists to follow their parents into
a specialist type occupation (via a VUZ education) is evident in other studies as well. Gentvainite et al. (1977), in a survey of 9,000 young men and women graduating from secondary schools in 1976, found a clear trend toward social inheritance among the children of the intelligentsia. Seven out of ten graduates from homogeneous homes (both parents specialists) planned on occupations requiring a higher education. The social nature of this choice is particularly striking since most of these students had not chosen a specific occupation at the time of the survey. The tendency for social inheritance is a phenomenon of Soviet socialism and American capitalism. While the actual rates may differ, the trend in the USSR began several decades ago and appears to be increasing.

THE CASE OF THE MILITARY

The purges which began with the Shakhty trial and eventually spread to the most trusted and supportive cohorts of Stalin seemed to bypass the military in the short run. Relative to the civilian sector the purges involved only a small percentage of officers. Thus, the social mobility associated with the purges occurred later in the armed forces than in the civilian sector. A total of 3.5 percent of the party members in the armed forces were dismissed and 2.4 percent were shifted to candidate membership. In the civilian sector the figures were 17 percent and 6.3 percent respectively (Petrov, 1964:284). The relatively "gentle" treatment of the specialists in the Red Army, as the Smolensk Archives show, was due to a top secret directive from the Peoples Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs and the Revolutionary War Council of September 23, 1929, which cautioned against a sweeping purge, and demanded "...special care to be used in the purge of the commanding staff...release of persons of the commanding staff should only take place in cases of extreme necessity...in every way preserving in the Red
Army the Commanding Staff which has military experience...and valuable technical specialists" (Fainsod, 1958:219).

The absence of an all-out military purge in the early 1930s was a mere postponement of what was to come later, and did not mean that the old cadre in the military were to be relied on in the future, or that the military did not require an intelligentsia of workers, Communists, and poor peasants. Voropaev and Iovlev (1960:12) state that with proletarian socialist construction there was persistent resistance of capitalist elements, the bourgeois specialists.

The class war became sharper. The 1928 conspiracy of bourgeois specialists in the town of Shakhty and other regions of Donbass was uncovered. The conspirators, closely allied with the former leaders of Shakhty and foreign intelligence, tried to destroy the coal industry of Donbass, weaken the defense of the USSR and hasten the intervention of imperialist states. With the Shakhty affair the creation of a new Soviet engineer technical intelligentsia became imperative.

The need to replace the old with the new, as the above authors make clear, did not require the discovery of a "conspiracy." The conspiracy, it was implied, was widespread, and the need of a Soviet cadre was thus of primary importance. In part, perhaps because the officers were part of the ancien regime, the education and training of a technical intelligentsia of workers and poor peasants for the armed forces was more important than in the other sectors (Kalinin, 1930).

The inclusion and mobilization of the former officers had been made necessary during the civil war for the survival of the new state. After the civil war, former officers remained a major part of the command staff. Their number declined during the 1920s, and in 1929 this group represented eleven percent of the commanding staff. In 1927 the social origins of the command staff of the Baltic Fleet was 71 percent gentry, and 90 percent of the commanders were of gentry origins.
Students of worker origins in the military academies during the 1920s were in the minority. Among the first graduates of the military aviation academy in 1925, only five percent were workers; among graduates of Naval academies between 1922 and 1926, only 1.8 percent were of worker origins (Voropaev and Iovlev, 1960). It must have seemed as though the military cadre was permeated with the values of the officers from the ancien regime, and their allegiance, especially to the new Stalin order, must have been highly suspect.

The preparation of a new and enlarged military cadre was also made necessary by the expansion and mechanization of the armed forces, and the creation of new units in artillery, aviation, and the navy. As in the civilian sector it was imperative that the new cadre be limited to workers and peasants, or to persons with worker or peasant social origins. The goal of Stalin and the party was to make certain that the new military cadre were of proper social background.

On February 25, 1929, the Central Committee issued a decree on the Command and Political Composition of the RKKA (Red Army) for maximum growth of the military and political levels of the armed forces. It called for a systematic strengthening of the worker and party nucleus; for special attention to filling the regular military schools with qualified worker cadre; for improving preparation of worker candidates to VUZ (higher educational institutions); for increasing in every possible way the political education of the young commander; and for increasing the worker nucleus in all units and divisions of the armed forces.

Recruitment into military schools and academies encountered the same difficulties as it did in the civilian sector. The pool of workers and poor peasants who were prepared to enter higher educational institutions was small. In 1928, among those accepted to military schools, 87 percent had an education of less than seven years, and the majority
a mere three to four years. The poor educational background of the students lengthened the time required to train them, and required military schools to devote much time to a general education first, not infrequently at the expense of military and political education (Voropaev and Iovlev, 1960:129).

The quest for a military cadre of worker and peasant origins did not collapse for a lack of students. Central Committee directives charged local party and trade union officials with the mobilization of workers and poor peasants into institutions of higher education. Special preparatory courses or worker faculties (rabfak) were established at institutions of higher education to prepare students for entrance into military schools.

In 1929 in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Tulsa, Kazan, Tashkent, and other cities, preparatory courses were established in which 3,500 workers and 500 peasants were studying. A significant proportion of these students passed the necessary tests and were sent to military schools. In 1929, 25 percent of the students entering military schools came from these preparatory schools. In 1930, these students constituted 30 percent of those in military schools (Voropaev and Iovlev, 1960:131). Students of worker origins constituted 67.3 percent of military school entrants in 1929, and 69.2 percent in 1930. Party and Komsomol membership was on the increase as well: from 78.4 percent in 1929 to 80 percent in 1930.

At the beginning of 1931 the party conducted a special mobilization of workers and peasants to military schools of the navy and army: 7,000 communists were netted, of whom 3,000 were sent to navy and 4,000 to aviation schools. A new party mobilization of students took place in 1932, in which 10,000 communists were sent to military technical schools.
The social composition of the communist mobilization in 1932 was 92.3 percent workers, 6.6 percent collective farmers, and 1.1 percent employees. Among these, 25.3 percent had a complete secondary education and 52.3 percent a seven year education. Party organizations in the industrial cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Ural, and Ukraine mobilized 2,095, 2,012, 450, and 2,127 students respectively for military schools (Voropaev and Iovlev, 1960:132).

The stress on educating communists of worker origin for future commanding positions in the armed forces applied to all services, and the Central Committee of the Party continued to issue directives on the selection of future cadre. In September 1933, a special directive called for the selection of 900 communists from among those who completed higher educational institutions (VUZ) or higher technical institutions (VTUZ) (Voropaev and Iovlev, 1960:132). Recruitment of students to aviation schools between 1931 and 1936 was achieved primarily through directives from the Central Committee of the party, which made it incumbent on the secretaries of obkom, kraikom, and the Central Committee of the Union Republic to personally lead in the selection to aviation schools and to send only those communists and Komsomol members who met the social, educational, physical, and moral qualifications (Iovlev, 1974).

The fear of alien class elements entering institutions of higher education generally, and military schools in particular, led to checking and rechecking of the applicants. With respect to the military, the fear of alien class elements led Voroshilov (1929) to call for careful checking and verification of the social origins of potential students lest they wreck or sabotage the military from within. The care in selection of candidates for military schools and the fear of
alien elements is also seen in the Smolensk archives. In the instructions given to party secretaries to mobilize students for aviation and technical schools, young men were to be selected with great care from among those who acquired some military training, party members, bachelors or those with small families, and those who wish to study in the Air Force. The mobilization was to be carried out primarily among those studying in the rabfak, technicums, party schools and among first year students of universities. All of these students had already been subject to careful scrutiny of their social origins. Nevertheless, a special point was made to giving great care and attention to ensure that those selected were of working class origins (Fainsod, 1958).

The effort to change the social composition of the student bodies in military schools was an apparent success. In 1933 the social origins of students in all military schools reflected 70.4 percent workers, 27.2 percent peasants and 2.4 percent employees. Not only was there a reduction from the small percentage of employees in 1931, and an increase in the percentage of students of worker origins, but within two years there was also a significant increase in party membership, from 44.1 percent in 1931 to 76.2 percent in 1933.

Stalin's decision to create a military intelligentsia was not limited to command personnel. The political officer required a technical education as well, as promulgated in the Central Committee decree of 1929. Political officers attached to specific services were expected to master a course of study appropriate to that service. On February 18, 1930, the Revolutionary Military Council called on each political worker who did not have a military education or who spent less than 9 months on such study to complete a course of military study.
Military education for political workers was not only a phenomenon of the 1930s. Political workers or commissars received military training in the 1920s, which enabled many to shift from political to command positions. In 1931, about 800 political workers were made company, battery and squadron commanders, 33 were made regiment and battalion commanders, 10 were made division commanders. In addition, 180 political workers who were preparing to enter command work entered higher military schools (Petrov, 1964:290).

The shifts from political to command work created shortages among political workers, and the military political academies were graduating only 100 political workers a year. In the early 1930s, the shortage of political workers reached 1,300. In an attempt to replenish the political cadre, party workers from the civilian sector were brought in. In February 1930, minimum requirements were instituted for all political workers; in the Ground Forces they were required to pass examinations by the end of 1931, equivalent to secondary education in military schools. Higher level political officers in Aviation were required to pass an examination commensurate with senior pilot and aerial observer, and so on down the line. Analogous requirements applied to the political cadre in the Navy. In 1932, all political workers in the Air Force and Navy passed the required examinations (Petrov, 1964). The overall improvement in the training of military political cadre enabled them to fulfill their obligations and help the military commanders ensure military readiness of the personnel (Petrov, 1964; Voropaev and Iovlev, 1960).

Given the problems of training, and the shortages of properly educated young people, the education and training of political cadre relative to the command cadre was likely to be less pressing. The greater importance of
educating and training command cadre, and the shift of political workers 
to command positions, created large shortages of political personnel 
during the purges. According to Petrov the shortages amounted to 10,500 
men, or about a third of political workers. At the senior level the 
shortages were even higher (Petrov, 1964:308). This led to the inclusion 
of Communists from the civilian sector, of whom many were sent to study 
at the Lenin Academy. Six two-year military political schools were estab-
lished during 1938-1939 to prepare men for the Political Administration 
of the Red Army, and eighteen one-year district military political schools 
were established as well. This enabled all politruks to achieve a secondary 
military political education in a short time. In 1939, six-month courses 
were organized for 6,000 junior politruks.

In January, 1938, following a Central Committee decree, assistants 
and helpers to the politruk were introduced in the Army, and three months 
later in the Navy. The selection of this category of political worker 
was given to the political commissars and heads of political departments. 
From these groups, several months later, 5,000 were chosen for inclusion 
in cadre political work, and were sent to study for the position of junior 
political worker. Upon completion of their study they were appointed to 
middle rank levels. In 1939, six-month courses for junior political workers 
were completed by 9,000 assistants of politruks (Petrov, 1964:308-310).

Within a period of a little over a decade, from 1925 to 1937, military 
schools prepared 135,000 commanders and political workers and the military 
academies about 13,000. In 1937, 79.6 percent of the commanders had com-
pleted secondary and higher military education, and among the higher leader-
ship cadre the number of commanders with technical or specialist educations 
had significantly increased (Lisenkov, 1977:117-118). The new cadre 
may not have been the best of trained cadre, but they were Stalin's best.
The purges in the military began with the arrest of Tukhachevskii and continued through 1938. The arrest and execution of about half of the officer corps, military and political, provided considerable opportunities for social mobility for the newly trained cadre, including civil war veterans who were occupying middle or lower level ranks. In 1940, names not often heard were appointed generals and admirals. Among these were Malinovskii, Vasilevskii, Sokolovskii, Rokosovskii, Zhukov and Konev.

Viewing the military organization there are a number of factors which emerge as significant for a cooperative relationship between political and military officers: common social origin; interdependence of functions in organizational goal attainment, i.e., training the troops; interchange of command and political positions which has continued into the 1960s; and opportunities for social mobility in a new socio-political system with high social rewards.

Command and political positions were occupied by men of similar social origin, products of the educational system of the 1930s. The large numbers of junior political personnel, placed in lower and middle level positions of the military, encountered men of like social origin, i.e., workers and peasants. The similarity of social origin and lingering fear and repression were likely to contribute to increased cooperation between the political and command personnel. The recognition that neither a political nor command position provided safety, coupled with the responsibility placed on both the command and political officer for their respective contributions to the training and education of the troops, was likely to lead to a cooperative relationship rather than conflict. The presence of the secret police (a separate organization) whose domain included both political and command personnel, must have added to greater cohesion between them.

Conflict during World War II between the head of the political adminis-
tration and command cadre did take place, but this was the exception and not the rule. On the other hand, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, who during World War II were high ranking political commissars, appointed the commanding cadre with whom they worked during the war to positions of leadership (Hough, 1980), during their regimes.

In the post war period the trend toward social inheritance of the employee stratum was apparent in the social composition of VUZ students. Data on the military are not available, but occasional articles in Krasnaia Zvezda refer approvingly to the continuity of generations in the military.

According to Konoplev and Kovalev (1971), in 1970 the social origins of generals and admirals were 54.3 percent peasant; 24.4 percent workers; and 21.3 percent employees. Given the age of senior officers, these percentages seem to be accurate. The data on social origins of young officers are less accurate. Eighty-two and a half percent of young officers are said to be of worker and employee origins and 17.5 percent of peasant origins. The authors collapse workers and employees, blurring the class origins of these officers. There is no indication as to whether any of these officers are second generation officers. Military officers, are, however, officially part of the intelligentsia stratum and the employee category may well include military social origin.

The 17.5 percent of peasant social origin is likely to be a low estimate, partly because it includes only those who are from collective farms. Peasants on state farms are by definition workers and officially part of the working class. The peasantry then is likely to constitute a significantly larger proportion of the military than 17.5 percent. Most likely, the proportion of officers of peasant background is closer
to about 30 percent. The proportion of officers of employee origins, including military origins, is likely to be about 30 percent and the remaining 40 percent of worker origins.

Based on studies in the civilian sector, an officer career does not appear to be very desirable among young people. A variety of studies suggest that while the occupation of military officer enjoys considerable prestige in society at large (Shkaratan and Rukavishnikov, 1977), and is recognized by young people as prestigious, nevertheless personally they do not see it as attractive relative to other professions. In a study of occupational prestige among graduating secondary students in Leningrade (Vodzinskaia, 1973), 80 occupations were rated in terms of attractiveness. On a ten point scale the military occupation was rated about 4.5. In rankings of several characteristics of occupations, the military officer received a higher rating, but was not among the top ten occupations. In terms of personal attractiveness to the student, opportunity to be creative on the job emerged as the most important occupational characteristic. The creativity of the military officer was rated thirteenth among 80 occupations.

Boys and girls unanimously give the first place to scholarly occupations in the fields of physics, medicine, mathematics, philosophy, radio engineer, chemists, workers in literature and art and... physicians (Vodzinskaia, 1973:175).

Young people in a 1969 study, in Kursk region, of induction age youth (Deriugin et al., 1973), when questioned about the desirability of a military education and thus profession, showed little enthusiasm. Thirty six percent and 21.8 percent would chose military aviation schools, and a general military education school respectively. Naval, radio tech-
nical engineer, and artillery schools were of interest to less than 12 percent of the Kursk students. Given the widespread interest among Soviet youth generally and rural youth in particular in flying aircraft (Shubkin, 1965), the choice of aviation school is not surprising.

The greater interest among children of military personnel in a military profession is noted by Shkadov (1976) and Deriugin et al. (1973). In a 1970 study of students in a military institute, "family tradition" was given by 30 percent of the students as the reason for attendance (K.Z., 1979, Jan. 17:3). Colton (1979) notes that several commanders of military districts are sons of generals.

Various articles suggest an increased interest among secondary students in a military career. Thus, for example, in the Moldavskaja Republic, the number of applicants to military schools rose from 880 in 1970 to 2,500 in 1973 (K.Z., 1974, Dec. 10). But there are also warnings about the proper screening of applicants, and dropping out constitutes a waste of resources and time. The emphasis on the need to determine whether the potential military student has had a long and persistent interest in a military career suggests that at least some secondary students apply to military schools in a burst of enthusiasm following military patriotic education, only to find out that a military profession is not quite what they anticipated.

Military service may also provide a path for social mobility in the civilian sector. Rural servicemen may be discharged possessing a skilled trade enabling them to enter that occupation in the civilian sector. Others
may avail themselves of the opportunity to enter a preparatory department to qualify for entrance to VUZ. As noted previously, these departments were established in 1969 to prepare disadvantaged youth for higher education, and have been open to discharged servicemen. Whether their performance and retention rate in VUZ is higher than those who have not experienced military service is difficult to determine. But if the military is as effective in instilling discipline and perseverance as the Soviets would like us to believe, the attrition rate in VUZ should be considerably lower for discharged servicemen.

How many of the veterans avail themselves of these opportunities is not known. However, a recent study by Sheremet (1977) notes that between 1970 and 1974, the percentage of former servicemen in the preparatory department of Kharkov University increased from 21.1 percent to 37.6 percent, with a corresponding decline of worker students from 67.1 percent to 51.1 percent. The declining proportion of worker students, coupled with a suggestion by the author that preparatory courses should be established at the enterprise, suggests that priority in these departments is given to former servicemen.

While our data are highly incomplete and speculative, nevertheless, there is evidence indicating that the military profession is personally not of much interest to secondary students with social origins in the intelligentsia, that as in other societies, the Soviet Union manifests a generational continuity of the military profession, and that for rural youth, the high prestige of the military occupation offers a path for social mobility which would be more difficult to attain in the civilian sector.

Industrialization invariably leads to social mobility, but the mobility promulgated by Stalin and the party was a conscious and directed effort, at considerable cost in resources, to ensure the mobility of a specific social group. The systematic method through which Stalin
and the party established their own technically trained intelligentsia in the civilian and military sector indicates considerable forethought and planning. A crash program of education which leads the poor, the illiterate and the disadvantaged to positions of respectability and elite status is likely to provide an identification with the revolution. The socially mobile were reaping the rewards instituted in the 1930s. These are usually attributed in the Western literature to the growing influence and independence of the military during the 1930s. It is more likely, however, that the social and economic rewards achieved by the military were part of larger changes in the social and political structure. High material and social rewards were also achieved by scientists, managers, and other social groups whose allegiance Stalin thought necessary. It was a major shift from the equalitarianism of Lenin to differentiation by Stalin.

THE ISSUE OF STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY

Prior to World War II and the formulation of Lasswell's garrison state model, there were important differences between the nature of civilian and military organizations, between the military and civilian work forces, and between the nature of military service and civilian employment. There were crucial technological differences between the two spheres, rooted in the fact that military personnel spent their time doing different things than did civilians. Warfare was a land-based event, with the infantry and, increasingly, armor (which had only recently replaced the mounted cavalry) being the core of the army. The military world was overwhelmingly male, predominantly young, and predominantly unmarried. The military work force was elastic, expanding rapidly in times of war, and demobilizing rapidly thereafter, with most personnel returning to civilian life. For those who
were mobilized, military service was seen as a short-term obligation to the
state, rather than as part of a career.

With the increased use of air power between the two world wars, and
the advent of nuclear technology in World War II, warfare became more capital-
intensive in the middle part of the twentieth century, and military organiza-
tion began to increasingly require personnel with skills that were needed
in the civilian economy as well. By the 1950s and 1960s, military sociology
was stressing the increased similarity of military and civilian sectors of indus-
trial society. Janowitz (1965:17), for example, argued that "to analyze
the contemporary military establishment as a social system, it is ... neces-
sary to assume that for some time it has tended to display more and more
of the characteristics typical of any large-scale nonmilitary bureaucracy."
Thus, the convergence, or fusion, of military and civilian organizations
was anticipated.

Scholars quickly recognized, however, that common technologies, leading
to common organizational forms, could not lead to total elimination of the
fundamental difference between that which is military and that which is
civilian. By the early 1970s, some scholars were defining the convergence
function as an asymptotic one, with military and civilian structures becoming
increasingly similar, but failing to reach a point of intersection (e.g.,
Segal and Segal, 1971). Janowitz (1971) pointed out that "the narrowing
distinction between military and nonmilitary bureaucracies can never result
in the elimination of fundamental differences." Moskos (1970:170) took an
extreme position, that he has since rejected, that in fact the trend had
been reversed. "The over-two-decade long institutional convergence...is
beginning to reverse itself...the military...will increasingly diverge along
a variety of dimensions from the mainstream of developments in the general
society."
The position that Moskos (1973) moved to subsequently became the basis for a more refined model of civil-military convergence. Rather than regarding convergence in gross organizational terms, he argued that some elements of the armed forces would be divergent and traditionally military, particularly the ground combat forces, while others would be convergent and civilianized, particularly clerical, technical, and administrative areas. This theme of differentiation of the force, and its elaboration into a two-force structure, one convergent and civilianized and the other divergent and military, was further developed by other analysts, and Moskos (1978) more recently has modified his own formulation somewhat, and now advocates a two-tier personnel system based upon the differentiation of "citizen-soldiers" from "career-soldiers," rather than combat from non-combat personnel.

In addition to the growing agreement among analysts that at least some parts of modern military establishments are coming to resemble civilian corporate bureaucracies, there is an emerging body of theory that argues that, at the level of the individual soldier, sailor, or airman, military service is increasingly growing to resemble civilian employment.

Historically, the nature of military compensation, the conditions of service, and the system of traditional symbolic rewards in the armed forces, imposed upon military service a definition as something other than a civilian job. Although not well paid by civilian standards, military personnel were involved in an activity that was as much a community as it was a workplace, they shared a fraternal spirit with brothers-in-arms, and they received societal respect for their fulfillment of a responsibility of citizenship.

More recently, in the west, econometric models of military manpower, and military personnel policies influenced by industrial psychology, have changed the conditions of military service to make them increasingly similar to
civilian employment. These organizational changes have, in turn, been hypothesized to change the nature of military service at the level of the individual service person. Moskos (1977) describes this change as the transformation of military service from a calling, legitimized by institutional values, to an occupation, legitimized by the market. In terms of this conceptualization, a member of the armed services comes to see his service in much the same terms as does an employee in a civilian organization. Instead of being motivated by a desire to serve his country, he is concerned with pay, benefits, and quality of working life. The nature of the individual's relationship with the organization is transformed, with the traditional implied contract of mutual obligations between the service person and the service being replaced by an explicit contract in which work and time are exchanged for economic remuneration. The installation, base, or post is seen less as a community, and more as a workplace, where the uniformed employee spends only his working hours.

To the extent that this hypothesized change is, in the west, a consequence of the trend away from conscription-based armed forces and toward voluntary military systems, we would not expect to find the same pattern in the Soviet Union. However, the pattern was beginning to emerge in the United States under conscription, as a manifestation not of changing personnel accession systems, but rather as a reflection of the application of modern management techniques. Since we have noted above commonalities in management philosophies, the hypothesis may be less inappropriate than it would appear at first blush. It is also the case that it is inappropriate to describe civilian employment in the Soviet Union in terms of a free-choice labor market model. Civilians in the Soviet Union are employees of the state, and allocation of individuals to positions in the labor force is
highly constrained, particularly for the first job. We would not expect to find military service and civilian employment in the Soviet Union coming to closely resemble the western market model. This very fact, however, increases the relevance of the convergence model, for it places both military personnel and civilian workers in the same labor pool: one dominated by the state. Thus, the likelihood of similar conditions of employment, and similar motivations in the two sectors, is potentially increased rather than decreased.

The factory in the U.S.S.R., like factories elsewhere, is a hierarchical organization, based on the division of labor, occupational specialization, machine technology, differential rewards, material incentives and discipline. As in the armed forces, the presence of the party, as well as management, constitutes a dual hierarchy.

It has been argued that the interlocking hierarchy of the administration and the party is a means of control, and interferes with organizational efficiency (Bendix, 1956; Fainsod, 1967). Hough (1969:97-98), however, casts doubts on these arguments. "...the rationale for the present role of the primary party organization goes beyond the desire to establish a control system in the limited sense of the term. [The Party]...believe[5]...that a Weberian type organizational structure...is not, in fact, the best form of organization for producing optimal decisions from a rational-technical point of view."

One of the essential points in Kerr's (1971:532) hypothesis regarding convergence is the notion of "pluralistic industrialism" in which the state (or the trade union), the enterprise (i.e., management), and the individual share a degree of power and influence over productive activities. This process, Kerr noted, is not uniform, at times it is slow and even reversed, "but it is a long run development of fundamental significance. It points to the general direction of change." In the U.S.S.R., where the party is
dominant, Kerr's thesis of pluralistic industrialism is at best highly problematic. Bendix (1956) has argued that in the Leninist ideology of management, workers and managers were subject to the dictatorial rule of the party, which was fully congruent with the ideology of tsarist autocracy. To be sure, the Soviet state inherited a system in which the scope of government extended to all realms of life, and the mark of a good citizen was obedience to the tsar. However, Bendix' analysis of Leninist ideology equates the early period of Bolshevik power with the Stalin era. One need not see Lenin as a defender of social democracy to acknowledge the differences between Lenin and Stalin.

The ideology of Leninism included "participation" of all people in the management of industry and the government. While never officially abandoned, it was gradually discarded (Bendix, 1956). But the notion of participation remained part of the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism seized upon by Khrushchev in the 1950s.

The dictatorial rule emerged in all its awesomeness during the Stalin era. Rules regulating labor relations were made by the party, or Stalin, and the trade union was merely a transmission belt for party directives. In the 1940s, the worker was bereft of rights, and even lateness was subject to criminal penalties. Only after the death of Stalin did the trade union begin to emerge as an organization for the protection of worker rights and interests (Brown, 1966). Khrushchev resurrected the dormant Leninist concept of workers as participants in the management of production, and this participatory feature of the labor law reform, as noted by Sharlet (1980), has been given a prominent place in the clause on worker's collectives in the new 1977 constitution.
The revival of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism is not meant to imply that workers became "participants," or that the authority relations in the enterprise changed overnight. The Stalin era, during which management was taught to behave in a way that "the earth should tremble when the director walks around the plant" (Lewin, 1978:63), and workers, lacking protection, remained docile, was not conducive to major changes in management-worker relations. Moreover, the party, whose dominant role has not changed, defines the area and degree of what is called worker participation.

Soviet sociologists and labor specialists discuss and evaluate participation in terms of attendance at and participation in trade union meetings, and participation in "public organizations" in the factory. These public organizations are officially under the jurisdiction of the trade union and include, for example, such groups as the Standing Production Conference (PDPS), the Scientific Organization of Labor (NOT), and the Bureau of Economic Analyses (OKB). We will discuss attendance and participation in the trade union meeting, and the nature of participation in a public organization, i.e., the Standing Production Conference. We chose the PDPS for analysis because according to Soviet social scientists, it is designed particularly for worker participation and constitutes a major form of socialist democracy.

PARTICIPATION IN THE TRADE UNION MEETING

For employed men and women, trade union membership is nearly universal. Organized on a branch basis, the factory trade union includes the director as well as the unskilled workers. Total membership as of 1976 was 107 million persons (Shchiglik, 1977).

Participation in trade union meetings involves making suggestions and recommendations pertaining to labor norms, discipline, work organization, distribution of the social and material funds, increased labor productivity,
etc. These suggestions are incorporated in negotiations with management prior to the conclusion of the collective agreement, which becomes legally binding when approved by the majority of the workers.

Attendance at the trade union meeting involves a high number of workers. About 50 percent attend "practically always" and an additional 20 to 30 percent attend "frequently" (Sirotkin, 1973; Timush, 1973; 1977). Engineer technical workers (ITR) have a higher attendance rate (60 percent), and men generally attend meetings more often than women (Ostapenko, 1976; Sirotkin, 1973). Young workers, those below the age of 30, are less likely to attend a meeting than older workers; the proportion of young workers attending varies from 26 to about 43 percent (Sirotkin, 1973; Mukhachev, 1978).

While attendance at trade union meetings is high, actual participation, such as making suggestions, or raising questions, is considerably lower. In fact what Soviet studies show is that large segments of the working class feel powerless to influence the decision making process, and isolated from the administration and the trade union.

In a study of the Kishinev tractor building plant in the Moldavian Republic (Timush, 1973), among those who attend meetings, 60 percent make proposals on such questions as improvement of production, labor norms, or improvements in the organization of labor. The majority of these suggestions, however, originate with the ITR's rather than the workers. Thus, within the span of one year, 18 percent of workers, 44 percent of ITR's and 16.3 percent of employees (white collar workers), have addressed a meeting 3 to 10 or more times (Timush, 1973:14). Worker responses as to why they have not spoken out at meetings centered on "did not think they would listen to me," or "I had nothing to say."

Studies in Estonia in the Talinn Excavator Plant (TEZ) and in Armenia at the Leninakansk Textile Plant (LTK) reveal that many (60 percent in the TEZ plant, and 40.6 percent in the LTK plant) have not addressed a meeting
in the last three years. The cause of this high rate of passivity was similar to that in Moldavia. Half of the responses (50.1 percent in the LTK plant and 46 percent in the TEZ plant) involved reasons such as, "No one seemed interested in my opinion," "My views are not significant," or "I did not think they would listen to me" (Maslennikov, 1973: 315).

Close to 50 percent of workers who remained passive during the meetings did not know that they had a right to offer recommendations, some stating that "this is not the practice in our enterprise" (Maslennikov, 1973: 316), or were unaware of the form of offering proposals.

Length of employment appears to have no impact on worker perception of influence. Regardless of whether a worker has worked a short time or has been employed over ten years, 66 percent in the TEZ plant feel that their suggestions for the distribution of the socio-cultural and housing fund were not taken into account. The responses of Communist Party members and YCL members were somewhat lower, but the majority, 57.1 percent, felt that their suggestions were not considered in the distribution of these funds, a reminder that even party members are not immune to feelings of powerlessness.

Remoteness from the administration and the trade union is reflected in other responses. According to Maslennikov (1973), less than a third of the workers are aware of what the trade union or administration does. An additional 27.4 percent claim partial knowledge about the role of the trade union, and 24.2 percent about the role of the administration, but this information is "superficial" (p. 313).

Even in the realm of instrumental concerns, the trade union is not viewed as a significant organization by workers. Only 32.8 percent are aware of the role of the trade union in decisions about the distribution of premiums. In all other areas less than 20 percent of the workers perceive the trade union as an organization whose role might affect their working conditions or the work process itself. While 43 percent of these
workers are dissatisfied with their level of knowledge and would like to be better informed, 16.9 percent answered that "they have not thought about it;" 16.7 percent "did not know;" 8.7 percent did not answer (1973:317-318).

The limited level of knowledge about managerial and trade union activities is found in other cities as well. In Sverdlovsk enterprises, one third of the labor force did not know whether the needs and desires of the workers were reflected in the collective agreement, and an equal proportion did not know whether the administration fulfilled its obligations under the collective agreement (Iovchuk and Kogan, 1972:205).

Worker participation in rural areas follows the same pattern. In a recent study of collective farm, state farm, and factory workers in rural areas of the Moldavian Republic (Timush, 1977), about half of the respondents stated that they have not participated in any discussions or worker meetings, but "...more than 2/3 of specialists spoke out at meetings from one to six times during the year" (Timush, 1977:263).

Responses to questions about why they remain passive did not differ from workers in urban areas: "Cannot speak at meetings; see no reason for it; think that others will speak out; suggestions are ignored" (Timush, 1977:264). Almost a third of collective farmers took no part in meetings because it was of "no personal benefit." Similar responses were given by 10.1 percent of state farm workers and factory workers. About an equal proportion of workers in each group (9.9 and 9.3 percent respectively) felt that their suggestions were ignored.

Arutiunian (1971), in his study of rural areas (Krasnodar territory, Kalinin region, and the Tatar Republic), addressed the question of participation directly, i.e., workers perception of their influence in the work collective. He found that unskilled and semi-skilled peasants on collective farms and workers on state farms and other enterprises on the average reported the highest percentage of "no influence" in the work collective (65 percent
in Krasnodar; 58 percent in Kalinin; and 69 percent in the Tatar Republic). Only machinists, regardless of type of organization (state or collective farms and other enterprises), reported a somewhat lower percentage of "no influence" in the work collective.

There are studies in which worker responses are significantly different. A recent comparative study in automated and nonautomated plants (part of an international study in five socialist societies), reports 98.4 percent of workers attended trade union meetings, and 77 percent participated in these meetings "frequently" or a "few times" (Nochevnik and Usenin, 1977:16). Workers evaluated the activities of the trade union as highly significant in such areas as improvement of work conditions, the development of mass cultural work, provision of vacation places, the resolution of complaints and labor disputes, and in promotions.

Of interest in this study is the emphasis that workers place on the collective agreement as a tool through which the trade union performs its protective role, as well as a means of eliminating conflict between management and workers.

Among possible explanations for the significantly different rates of response in this study is the recent demand that the trade union address worker concerns and needs more effectively than in the past, and educate the workers about their rights and responsibilities. Secondly, workers in automated plants are among the better educated workers, and are often referred to as the "worker intelligent" (Rutkevitch, 1976), thus hardly representing the average worker. The fact that low education ranks high among the major explanations for lack of participation supports this hypothesis. A considerable literature has emerged that ties educational levels to participation (Bliakhman and Shkaratan, 1973; Chulanov, 1974; Ossovski, 1973; Semenov, 1974; Timush, 1977; Volkov, 1974). Arutiunian (1971), for example, suggests that some of the variance in reports of "no influence" within the
same occupational group is usually related to differences in education.

Soviet studies on the relationship between education and participation are not at variance with studies in other societies. In the United States, the more skilled and educated are more likely to be involved in union activities. As Bok and Dunlop (1970:84) have noted, "employees with higher education (and) greater skills tend to be more involved in their union than (the) poorly educated (and) low skilled." In Yugoslavia, where workers' councils are said to come closest to a form of industrial democracy, participation is tied to skill and education. Tannenbaum et al. (1974:222-223) suggest that the past traditions in Yugoslavia, coupled with low educational achievement, represent one of the major obstacles in achieving a participative organization. In part this is the case in the USSR as well. The Soviet labor force is of relatively recent rural origin, and past traditions are not significantly different from Yugoslavia. However, the educational achievements of the labor force are rapidly changing. Universal secondary education, instituted in 1971, is creating its own set of problems.

Important as education is, participation is not only a matter of educational achievements and past traditions. It is also a reflection of what the worker perceives as legitimate, the daily experience of the job, and the saliency of questions and issues raised in worker meetings. As Timush (1977:232) stated, when worker meetings ignore important issues, attendance at trade union meetings is a mere formality. It is important that the meetings examine questions of vital interest to every collective farmer and worker.

Serious questions...which have to do with work norms and earnings, labor discipline, material and moral incentives are seldom discussed at meetings.... The agenda...is often the same... with the same orators from management.

The problems elucidated by Timush are not the only problems which prevent the involvement of workers in the trade union meeting. The trade union
itself is often timid in pressing the legitimate rights of workers. There are areas in which the trade union is powerless. While the right to safe working conditions is stipulated in the law, when safety measures interfere with production, the latter invariably receives priority. When funds for housing are not available, the union remains silent. Favoritism, and at times corruption, take their toll. Consequently, when workers respond to the question of whether they participate in the trade union meetings by stating that they do not, or that this is not the practice in the enterprise, it reflects some, or all of the above conditions.

Throughout the history of the Soviet state the worker was threatened and punished, begged and cajoled, to work better and harder. Today, persuasion remains a mode of making Ivan and Masha work better and harder, but it is not the sole method.

Growing concern with labor shortages, discipline, and turnover has generated much debate on what should be done. A recent article in Literaturnaja Gazeta (1978) presents two opposite viewpoints, by citizen Svetlanin and citizen Temchin. Svetlanin, an engineer designer, calls for tough penalties for breach of discipline. He notes that if a foreman asks a worker to stay a half hour overtime the worker gets premium pay and a profitable task as an inducement. But if the same worker shows up on the job a half hour late, he gets a few words of modest criticism, and, at worst, a polite reprimand on the factory bulletin board. Svetlanin proposes an amendment to the labor statute to authorize deduction of a percentage of wages for late arrival. Absenteeism and intoxication should be an unconditional cause for dismissal. Poor performance of engineering, technical, administrative and scientific personnel should be penalized by a demotion to a lower level. Poor worker performance should be penalized by lowering their pay categories.

Temchin, on the other hand, himself a former engineer designer and today a writer, points out that times have changed. Workers are better
educated and more cultured. They need to be involved in enterprise affairs. Heavy manual work leads to labor turnover. People are unwilling to push heavy carts by hand, when in the factory next door, workers ride in electric carts. I cannot imagine, states Temchin, how today one can force a worker to work better at the job if the worker does not like the job. It is necessary to interest and encourage the worker. What people put up with twenty years ago is anachronistic today. Today, workers no longer tolerate rudeness or lack of understanding. He cites with approval such measures as increased vacation days, better working conditions, the introduction of labor saving devices, and improved housing conditions.

Social scientists, jurists, and labor specialists, tend to side with Temchin. Armed with a variety of studies, they attribute labor turnover to poor management — labor relations, to poor working conditions, and to the inadequate integration of the young worker in the enterprise (Blinov, 1978; Kaidalov and Suimenko, 1974; Kotliar and Talai, 1978; Kovalev, 1975; Rogovskii, 1980; Sokhan, 1975).

The vast propaganda machinery designed to inculcate a respect for the law and labor discipline has not ceased to operate, but, as Western scholars have noted, there is a special effort to make the law part of the general education of the Soviet citizen (Berman, 1966). The emphasis is on the obligations of the citizen, but rights are not ignored. Thus for example, in the Podolsk Machine Building Plant the legal department conducts a series of lectures on labor and family law, the Labor Disputes Commissions, bonuses, pensions, how to calculate work seniority, strengthening of labor discipline, and instilling respect for the law (Juviler, 1976). The journal, Soviet Trade Unions, (Sovetskie Profsoiuzy), published articles on legal issues in the transfer of workers (Korshunov, 1980), and the legal status of Soviet trade unions (Smirnov, 1980). Books on labor disputes are published in 200,000 copies (Arkhipov et al., 1975).
Soviet social scientists speak out on the importance of educating the workers about their rights, and about the role of the trade union in protecting these rights (Maslennikov, 1973). Svidorova and Svistunova (1977) advocate participation as a means of strengthening the trade union's role as the worker's representative on all issues that may arise.

The call for the improvement of labor discipline is more strident today than it had been in the last decade or so. A 1980 decree has made job changes more difficult. Instead of two weeks, the employee is required to give one month's notice of quitting. But special incentives have been provided in the form of housing, pensions, and vacations to induce the worker to remain on the job (Resolution, 1980). There is also an increased emphasis on participation and on educating the worker. Worker participation has been called for by Breznev at the 25th Party Congress, and Shibaev (1977:54), chairman of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), stated that one of the most important tasks of the trade union is to involve workers in participation. Education is intended to make the worker cognizant of the role of khoziain (proprietor), to inculcate responsibility and discipline, and also to encourage initiative from below and the articulation of worker interests. To be sure, the party in its guiding and leading role ensures that the general good of society does not become lost in the process of interest articulation.

How effective this process will be remains to be seen. Given the increasing educational levels of the worker, initiative from below is likely to increase. For the time being however, participation in the management of production through the trade union meeting involves at best 10 to 15 percent of the workers, and the effectiveness of their participation is by no means clear.
The previously discussed studies address a type of participation which Mukhachev and Borovik (1975) call "lower level participation." Since participation in the Standing Production Conference is considered "higher level of participation," providing the worker with the opportunity to participate in administration, this form of participation is examined next.

THE STANDING PRODUCTION CONFERENCE (PDPS)

The PDPS, under the jurisdiction of the trade union, is composed of representatives of the workers, the Communist Party, YCL, management and the trade union. Members are elected in plants employing over 100 persons. The elected members choose an executive committee of five to 25 persons (depending on the number employed).

The PDPS, instituted in 1958, perhaps as an answer to the Worker Councils in Yugoslavia, is considered an "especially important form of socialist democracy, social control, and practical involvement of the masses in administration" (Alekseev and Riazhskikh, 1977:264). As such the majority of the membership in the PDPS should be representative of the workers in the factory. From its very inception the PDPSs were plagued by problems of management ignoring their recommendations, and overlapping activities into other participatory type organizations in the enterprise. According to Brown (1966), the PDPSs have made successful decisions on a variety of issues affecting enterprises, such as the reorganization of shop or production lines, mechanization of equipment, and improvement of services. But there have been considerable problems such as duplication of work and ignored recommendations. Soviet social scientists have noted similar problems: work duplication, pro forma activities, infrequent meetings, and ignored recommendations (Ostapenko, 1969; Sovetskie Profsoiuzy, 1980a).
Throughout the 1960s the need to empower the PDPS with legal authority to make their recommendations binding on management, and to eliminate the duplication of activities among existing organizations, was discussed in the press. For example, the party newspaper Pravda stated that the law governing the PDPS has outlived its usefulness and the time has come to enlarge the scope of PDPS activities. As presently constituted, noted Pravda, the administration need not discuss the basic problems of production or the economic and financial activities of the enterprise, and the PDPS has no right to examine these activities. The time has come, according to Pravda, to reevaluate the activities of the PDPS, and to widen their rights (Pravda, July 6, 1965, quoted by Ostapenko, 1969:448).

The statute governing the PDPS was revised in 1973 and the scope of their activities increased. The PDPS was given "the right to control" (pravo kontrolia [Kolosov, 1974:38]), which means the right to check and verify the activities of the administrators. But the PDPS was not granted the legal authority to make management accept their recommendations. As in the past in case of disagreement, the issue in question is examined by the trade union committee, a representative from the PDPS, and management. But it is the manager (rukovoditel) who decides on the substance of the conflict (Alekseev and Riazhskikh, 1977:268). As Ostapenko (1976:94) noted, the work of the PDPS is "consultative" (soveshchatel'nye), but their authority is sufficiently high that managers regard them as serious helpers. As an example of the seriousness of their help, Ostapenko points out that between 1966 and 1971, 78.7 percent of the PDPS recommendations were implemented.

Nor did the revised PDPS statute address the problem of overlapping activities. In fact, the increased scope of the PDPS added to the duplicative
process, since it included functions which were already the domain of other organizations. Checking and inspecting the financial activities of the administration is part of the NKN role, a more powerful organization, not only because it is juridically empowered to make management responsive to their recommendations, but within the enterprise the NKN is under the direct "leadership and guidance" of the primary party organization (Turovtsev, 1974).

The changes in the PDPS statute instituted in 1973 might be said to be of a symbolic nature. These changes signify the role of workers as proprietors who have a right to inspect and verify the activities of the group, which in the organizational structure is superordinate to the workers. On the other hand, the activities of the PDPS are not purely symbolic, since there is the objective reality that their recommendations are in the majority of cases accepted. In 1974, 82.2 percent of PDPS proposals were implemented. To implement this many proposals made by the "working masses" would not be a trifle, but would constitute a significant input into the managerial domain. But "working masses" is not an accurate description of the PDPS, since within each enterprise the representation of workers is considerably lower than the representation of the engineer technical workers (ITR). Thus, while workers in all PDPSs constitute a majority, the percentage of workers declined from 69.2 percent of the membership in 1962, to 67.3 percent in 1964; to 66.4 percent in 1968, and 64.4 percent in 1971 (Ostapenko, 1976:94). Recent references to the total membership of the PDPSs is 5.4 or 6 million members (Gulikov, 1975; Blyakhaman and Shkaratan, 1977; Shkaratan, 1978; Shibaev, 1977), which is about the same as the 1971 membership and suggests that more recent figures have not been released, and raises suspicion about further declines. The Mukhachev and Borovik study of 21 enterprises shows a higher percentage of workers than the Timush or Sirotkin studies and may be indicative of an effort
to increase worker representation which has been on the decline since the early 1960s:

Since its inception, the path of the PDPS has been fraught with problems of a lack of authority, and relatively low representation of workers. In the mid 1960s, it appeared that the PDPS was about to be given an added measure of authority in the form of legal rights, but this change did not materialize. The 1965 economic reforms elevated the managers to a position of greater autonomy than in the past and, as noted by Hardt and Fraenkel (1971), made them more assertive. Thus, for example, in a study of several enterprises in Cheliabinsk, managers, when asked, "What can be done to improve the system of management," nearly all (97 percent) responded with "enlargement of managerial rights," and make "hiring and firing subject to the sole discretion of management" (Stul and Tischenko, 1970:277).

In light of these responses, the proliferation of such groups as VOIR, NOT, NTO, etc. was no doubt more than managers hoped for and interfered (or were thought to interfere) with managerial prerogatives. To provide the PDPS with additional rights would have been perceived by management as a further erosion of their own rights, and a hindrance to the successful operation of the enterprise. Consequently, the 1973 changes in the PDPS statute increased the scope of PDPS activities, and provided symbolic rights, but their role remained exclusively consultative.

While this situation suggests that management is more influential than the trade union - which no doubt is the case - it is also important to note that the trade union, which has gained considerable rights in recent years, may regard the legal rights of the PDPS as superfluous and without major significance to the worker, relative to the so-called bread and butter issues.
The much touted notion of participation in the management of production, may be a nonissue to the trade union.

The Soviet worker has failed to become the participant that Khrushchev thought he or she might become, but the Breznev leadership has not turned away from the notion of the worker as participant. In fact, the question of workers electing their managers emerged in the latter part of the 1960s (Afanasev, 1968; Seliukov, 1971), and studies were initiated to tap the views of workers and managerial personnel on the desirability of such elections: Not surprisingly, workers were significantly more supportive than managers of such elections. Thus for example, Gorbovsky (1975) reports on a study in which 85 percent of workers and engineers, 66 percent of junior production managers, and 52 percent of senior production managers approved of the idea of an elected manager. The previously referred to study in Cheliabinsk found that 63 percent of workers and 13 percent of foremen approved of such elections (Stul and Tishchenko, 1970).

In a survey of the enterprise "Serp and Molot" the responses of supervisors and shop and department heads to the idea of the election of the "rukovoditel" show 46 percent approve of such elections; 27.1 percent think it worth further study; 13.5 percent find it difficult to answer; 5.4 percent disapprove; 5.4 percent are skeptical about it and 2.6 percent did not answer (Seliukov, 1971). An elected managerial cadre continues to interest social scientists, but there are also arguments against it. Changlii (1973) notes that "workers do not have the required knowledge to elect managers." The election of managers is tied almost solely to the notion of how such elections will increase the productivity of workers and eliminate conflict. As Popov and Dzavadov (1972:99) note, the election of higher-level supervisors is
premature, but...the election of lower level supervisors, the "sergeants of industry" whose leadership affects the workers directly, would eliminate the problem of compatibility of the formal and informal group leader in the primary collective and significantly increase the responsibility for the results of labor, not only of the supervisor (руководитель), but the whole collective...and have a beneficial influence on the psychological climate of the collective.

The election of even the foreman remains at best a concept, not likely to be implemented. The surveys, which revealed the vast disparity between workers and managers to the notion of election of managers, has apparently convinced the leadership that such elections, even under the controlled system of Soviet elections, is premature. There no doubt was fear that legitimizing the notion that the manager is as much a responsibility of the worker as of the party is not what is needed today, when the young Soviet worker is less docile than he was in the past. Educationally the worker today does not resemble the worker of 1958-1959 when the changes in the role of the trade union were instituted and the various participatory schemes began. In 1959, among manual workers, 322 per thousand had at least eight years of schooling. In 1975 the number more than doubled, to 664 per thousand.

The rising educational levels of the labor force are a source of pride to the regime, but also a source of concern. As Kuzmin et al. (1974:9) noted, the educational achievements of today's worker, "no longer permit the manager to lean on the advantages of a formal education, or on official position." Others note that managers at all levels complain that the higher educational achievements of workers "makes it significantly more difficult to manage today than in the past" (Stul, 1973:249). Young, well educated workers are critical and questioning of managerial directives; they resent what is frequently referred to as uncultured and coarse (grubal) behavior
of the rukovoditel. Letters by individuals complaining about housing, the improper attitude of the manager, the lack of attention to legal norms, or problems relating to wages are frequently published in the Soviet press, and serve as a safety valve. But a recent article in Sovetskie Profsouizy (Zhelnina, 1980), was no mere complaint by an individual worker. The letter was signed by 70 workers, or a third of the workers in the enterprise, detailing abuses and corrupt or illegal actions by the chairperson of the trade union committee. Such a letter, if signed by one or two people, is perfectly acceptable. But when signed by a third of the workers it constitutes collective protest. Such organized action is not merely highly unusual, but a phenomenon which the party does not view in a benign manner. The fact that the letter was discussed, and the organizer of the signatures was not viewed in negative terms, suggests a considerable change in the attitudes of the trade union leadership, but a far greater change in worker attitudes, and entitlements.

For the post-war generation of young workers between 20 and 30 years of age the Stalin era is history. They are less acquiescent and submissive than were their grandparents, who experienced the terror of the purges, or their parents, who reached maturity on the eve of the Second World War, and for whom the work experience was a long and arduous day of heavy manual labor, punitive labor laws, food shortages, and a country ravaged by war. Relative to the parental generation, the young worker is affluent, perhaps having a family apartment, and a refrigerator, and being able to seek a better or more interesting job. Relative to the parental generation, the world outside the USSR is less of a puzzle. Exposed in varying degrees to broadcasts from the West, to the culture of jeans and rock, the young worker has moved a considerable distance from the silent subjects that their parents were.
A Soviet novelist characterized Soviet youth as follows:

today's young people are the institute student whom educators do not know how to teach and the young worker whom superiors do not know how to direct...a typical pattern followed by young people today is highly romantic: Moving from one construction project to another - Kondopoga, Madagan, Nurek... - frequently at the expense of obtaining a higher education. ...(they) rapidly acquire experience and become decent workers but they are not dependable ones; the routes of their wanderings are determined by their own fickle desires, not by the needs of the economy (Zhukovitsky, 1977:1-12).

Soviet sociologists note that the value of work - the sine qua non of the new Soviet man and woman - is questioned by a significant proportion of "the best of the best," the members of the Young Communist League, (YCL). Posing a question somewhat similar to the version in the United States, of "if you had enough money would you continue working," workers were asked "if you were paid the same amount of money that you are earning today regardless whether you worked, would you continue to work?" Sixty four and six tenths percent of YCL members would continue to work. These YCL members do not appear to reject work per se. What they seem to reject are boring and monotonous jobs. When asked what they would do if given a chance to chose a more complex job, or a more simple job, without a change in earnings, 84.5 percent chose a more complex job and 1.2 percent a simpler job (Changlii, 1978:188).

It is perhaps not erroneous to suggest that what is occurring in the USSR, especially among the younger generation of workers, is similar to the United States. As has been noted (Kanter, 1978; Kerr, 1979; Yankelovitch, 1979), a better educated labor force is a more critical and demanding labor force. Today's young worker is no longer awed by the manager; the worker seeks a job which provides challenge and growth. Material security remains
important, but it is no longer the sole concern.

The young Soviet worker who moves from construction site to construction site, and from factory to factory, may seek more than work satisfaction or a creative job, or participation. But social scientists in the USSR seem to assume that even a small measure of involvement or participation will at least in part reduce labor turnover and improve work discipline. They seek ways to include the worker in some decisions which affect them directly. The recent interest in human relations constitutes such effort.

HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE SOVIET ENTERPRISE

In the past, Soviet doctrine on the unity of social groups, and harmonious relations between the manager and the worker, precluded the need for human relations in the enterprise and such discussions were taboo. Following the economic reforms a new model manager emerged - a manager concerned not only with meeting the quota ("pogon za shtukami") but with sales and profits, and well versed in the science of administration. Courses and seminars were introduced to acquaint, inform and teach the "rukovoditel" how to manage. American literature on the science of management and the Harvard School of Business Administration became a popular subject for discussion and emulation (Aunapu, 1967; 1971; Afanaseev, 1968), with an admonition not to copy bourgeois methods blindly.

Soviet theories of human relations follow American developments closely. To insure good relationships with the worker, the manager is advised to control his or her own behavior and remain conscious of the self-esteem of the worker. There is no room for an absolutist manager. The principle of a just and fair manager is paramount. The model manager is always open to worker opinion and responsible for such tasks as explaining the reason for a directive in order to show that managerial actions are not arbitrary
(Seliukov, 1971:14). Good communications are seen as imperative. They prevent rumors which interfere with the effective functioning of the organization, prevent misunderstandings, and clarify expectations. Workers are encouraged to express their views without fear of repercussions in the workplace (Kovalev, 1975; Podmarkov, 1976; Seliukov, 1971).

Attention has been given to the informal group whose support is necessary for organizational goal attainment. The informal group arises on the basis of sentiments and mutual sympathies. It is small and has its own traditions and norms. Efforts to impose structure upon it, to enlarge it, or make it subject to administrative rules will bring about its disintegration (Vasilev, 1974:335). Awareness of the informal group will enable the effective manager to work cooperatively with the informal group leader, and knowledge of group norms will enhance his or her understanding of "why at times the group norms will protect the worker who deviates from the official norm and at other times the collective will show solidarity with the administration" (Seliukov, 1971:12).

The seriousness with which the Soviets have approached the notion of human relations is evident in the demand for supplemental courses for middle and higher level management to increase their knowledge of business and psychology. Five hundred courses in enterprises, institutes, universities, etc., have been developed with descriptive titles such as the "Leader and the Subordinate," "The Art of Dealing with People," the "Foreman as Educator" (Kaidalov and Suimenko, 1974; Mikheev, 1975). The notebooks and recommendations prepared as a result of courses developed in Kiev, Talinn, and Volgograd enterprises have spread throughout the country. In a notebook that was developed in Dnepropetrovsk, the chapter on style and method of leadership gives 26 "do's" and "don'ts" for the manager. For example: "A
good manager must think not only about the techniques of industry but must be a 'guardian' of his subordinates, think of their moods. Do not wait for the subordinate to approach you in a friendly manner; begin first. Subordinates of a poor leader live in a world of rumors" (Kaidalov and Suimenko, 1974:67-68).

As in the United States, Soviet social scientists have moved beyond a concern with good communication. Interest in the nature of management, or what is called "managerial style," has followed the work of Argyris (1960), Leavitt (1965), Lewin (1948), and McGregor (1960). In contrast to American social scientists, who tend to see democratic management as a form of "power equalization," as autonomy, or self-actualization of the worker, for the Soviets democratic management means first of all worker responsibility and discipline. The differences in emphasis are differences in style, and should not obscure the fact that productivity and worker discipline are primary goals in the Soviet as well as the American case.

A notion akin to Maslow's "hierarchy of human needs" has emerged in the USSR. According to Mikheev (1975:4), the growth of cultural and educational levels of the people have changed their needs, customs and tastes. The more complete satisfaction of material needs has shifted people's needs to the spiritual realm. The need for psychological comforts - feelings of satisfaction with one's position on the job, with interpersonal relations with one's comrades, and specifically with managers has become a major requirement. New forms and methods of management, and greater attention to socio-psychological aspects of management are required today. The changing needs of the people have made autocratic management inappropriate. Autocratic management was widespread in the past, and provided the worker with
a psychological advantage, i.e., the worker was relieved of responsibility. Today, however, as the study of 18 enterprises shows, 68 percent of workers prefer a democratic style manager (Minayeva, 1977). While Gorbovsky (1975), for example, sees autocratic management as proper among workers with low education, performing unskilled labor, the prevalent view is that autocratic management should be part of the past. Such a manager is characterized as "drunk on power" and ineffective (Mikheev, 1975). "Characteristic of the autocratic type," asserts Vendrov (1969:61), "is centralization of power, exaggeration of the administrative role, (and) autocratic decisions on almost all issues pertaining to the work collective...."

Democratic management widely endorsed is not meant to eliminate the professional manager. The citations to Lenin are not to make every cook an administrator, but to recognize the necessity of training good and effective managers. The democratic manager informs subordinates of the "state of affairs," and the difficulties which need to be overcome, and reacts properly to the criticism of subordinates. While placing more and more questions for evaluation by the collective, and turning over some problems to the discretion of the collective, the major decisions remain the domain of the manager. "The delegation of responsibility does not mean shifting more and more problems for decisions to the collective...(this is) contrary to the essence of scientific management" (Mikheev, 1975:56). The democratic type manager resembles the counterpart in the United States. Consultation and persuasion are the major, and outstanding, characteristics. Democratic management encourages initiative, responsibility, participation, and leads to work satisfaction, productivity and a stable labor force (Mikheev, 1975; Sventsitskii, 1975; Vendrov, 1969).

Of considerable appeal in democratic management is the reliance on
the group. According to Sventsitskii (1975:94), democratic management is based on decentralization of power, and consultation with subordinates who are given sufficient information to participate in the decision making process. The activities of subordinates are controlled by the strength of the collective. Reliance on group control or group pressure, as noted by Bendix (1956), is significantly different in the Soviet enterprise from group pressure in the American enterprise. In the Soviet enterprise the work group is manipulated, and controlled from above and from within. Workers are bereft of "strategies of independence" available to the American worker in the form of the informal group in the enterprise.

Relative to his/her Western counterpart, the strategies of independence for the Soviet worker remain restricted. But there have been significant changes from the time when the worker was confronted by constant surveillance, suspicion, manipulation, informers, elimination of privacy, and terror, of the Stalin era - on which Bendix based his analysis. Moreover, there have been changes since Khrushchev's demise from power. Thus, while Khrushchev curtailed the role of the secret police (among other things), there was an increased effort to rely on the work group to foster so-called communist relations at work, home, school, leisure, best exemplified in communist labor brigades (Schwartz, 1975).

During the Breznev period, the work collective has received major recognition as an important source of labor stability and discipline, but the work group is no longer expected to resemble a familial unit or to be involved in the supervision of relationships external to the work place. The leisure sphere, home and family, and the informal group provide a modicum of autonomy, or what in Bendix' terminology are strategies of independence. In fact, Whyte (1974:28) goes a step further, noting that Khrushchev's emphasis on collectivism has been
undermined or deemphasized... (and) the general trend has been away from command and manipulation from above and toward developing general support and initiative from below... fairly autonomous peer groups... are emerging which may support some of the elite's demands and reject others according to how these demands match group norms."

The Soviet approach to human relations, and the efforts to make the rukovoditel more responsive and open to subordinates and involve the subordinates at least in part in some form of participation, does not significantly differ from Western efforts. It is manipulative, and does not mean sharing power in the decision making process within the enterprise. On the other hand, as Blumberg (1968), and Pateman (1970), have noted, the Hawthorne studies revealed that the reduction of external control over the small work group did lead to group autonomy, and to some form of self-government within the work unit.

Such experiments are taking place today in the United States (Batt and Weinberg, 1978; Guest, 1979; Woltan, 1975; 1979), and Soviet sociologists report similar experiments. Considerable problems are evident as well. Yet given the difficulties that the Soviet Union is encountering with labor shortages, turnover, and discipline, some measure of work group autonomy cannot be ruled out—mainly because it is less threatening to the supremacy of the party, than the consequences of labor turnover, lack of discipline and increasing social problems.

While the problem of participation remains severe, nevertheless the changes in the trade union rules in the last two decades might be characterized as a form of semipartnership, in which the trade union is the junior partner, and together with the party-state, and management, shares a modicum of authority over the rules of labor. Of course in a centrally planned economy, in which the state is the employer, and the party is dominant, the role of the trade
union even as a junior partner is not a stable one. Yet, there appears to be little doubt that today there is considerable involvement of the union in the protection of workers' rights and interests, and that no decisions affecting the worker are made without the participation of the trade union (Materialy, 1977; Smirnov, 1977; Kondratev, 1973; Brown, 1966; Hough, 1979; Ruble, 1979). None of this implies that the trade union has ceased to be interested in, or responsible for, increased productivity, or that the trade union can encourage strikes. The extent to which the trade union influences policy is an empirical question, but the shift in the role of the trade union is in the direction suggested by Kerr, and has not been curtailed.

HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE MILITARY

Just as management theory in the west has moved from highly rationalistic "scientific management" toward the incorporation of human relations concerns, so have theories of military leadership focussed less on coercive domination and more on manipulation. Janowitz (1959), for example, identified this shift in military organization relatively early. He also recognized, however, that particularly in the military, manipulative authority was extremely unstable. Because of the extensive training needed for the effective application of human relations approaches, because of the gap between formal regulations and informal realities of command, and because of the inherent conservatism of the military institution, he noted that the new, more indirect forms of command would be resisted and/or ineffective, and that there would be strains to return to more traditional patterns of authority. One potential outcome of this tension, he thought, might be a "fraternal type" of authority, which would encompass both modern bureaucratic management and an emphasis on the social group.

Just as this western human relations orientation became a focus of
management concerns in Soviet economic enterprise, so too did it appear in the Soviet military. Indeed, it did so to a greater degree than Janowitz anticipated in the west. If the involvement of individuals in a spirit of collectivism was an ideal in economic enterprise, it was carried to an extreme in the military. The importance of the collective as a means to create mutual dependence, control and intolerance of those who deviate, and its emphasis on a superordinate goal, has been of special value to military organization. The isolation of the serviceman from other groups, and the importance of "combat readiness" make the military collective not only a "reference group," but a source of support and well being, where the serviceman feels comfortable, needed, and useful. The dependence on the group and the need to feel part of the group lead to the internalization of group norms, social cohesion and conformity to the standards of the group (Glatochkin and Platonov, 1975).

Of major significance in the development of discipline among servicemen is the social control of the group, or as the Soviets call it the "public opinion" of the collective. The collective is a regulator of the behavior and actions of its members. The organizational power of the collective emerges when it conforms to the requirements of the military oath and rules, and when it defends one man command and the authority of the commander. It is imperative that the commander gives special attention to the unity of the collective, and through judicious use of persuasion and praise, and when necessary coercion, ensures that there are no deviations from rules (Kulakov, 1977; Sulimov, 1973). The discovery of the "informal group" in the enterprise, and its impact on organizational goals, has not been lost on the military. While generally the Soviets reiterate that there is no conflict between the formal and informal group in Soviet society, their studies reveal that the informal group in the enterprise differs little from the western
counterpart (Olshanskii, 1966).

In military organization, the informal group or "microgroup" is based on personal relations and sympathies, similarity of characteristics, and mutual ties. Microgroups strengthen the social psychological unity of the collective, add to the morale of the collective, and create a favorable climate for the education of servicemen. Of course, this is true only when the microgroup does not develop characteristics which are contrary to the larger organization. In some groups, deviations in the form of drunkenness may appear (Diachenko et al., 1978; Glatochkin and Platonov, 1975; Shchendrik, 1977; Shramchenko, 1973). The multi-national nature of the military organization may lead to the creation of a microgroup of a specific nationality in which members have failed to free themselves from their national limitations, or survivals (perezhitki) of nationalism. It is thus regarded of major importance that commanders, political workers, and the YCL localize and neutralize such manifestations (Kulakov, 1977:178-179).

The role of the commander and political worker is of major importance, but much of the emphasis is on the fact that the collective has the means to regulate itself. The group is seen as much more effective in ensuring discipline and desired behavior than are disciplinary measures taken by the commander. Similarly, in the literature on the enterprise, studies have shown that group criticism is more effective than the criticism of the supervisor as a means of ensuring discipline (Sventsitskii, 1975).

Reliance on the collective as a regulator of behavior is of course manipulative, and while the change to manipulation is a means of accommodation to changes in military organization arising from technology, changing warfare, and the imperatives of specialization and interdependence, the general pattern does not significantly differ from the United States.
To be sure, the Soviets devote more time and words in their literature to "combat readiness," and military training in the U.S.S.R. is said to be longer, more vigorous, and more realistic. The greater efforts to prepare the serviceman (psychologically) for war, should not detract from the similarities.

There are indications that, despite the continuation of military conscription in the Soviet Union, military service may not be regarded as a calling. We suggest that the attention to the theme of patriotism which appears in such journals as Sovetskaia Pedagogika (1972; 1975), or in sociological collections of papers on Soviet youth (Borovik et al., 1978) and the premilitary training provided in schools reflects a concern with a perceived decline of military patriotism and the military as an institution.

Writing recently in the military newspaper Krasnaja Zvezda, Khorev (1979), a military journalist, reports on a document pertaining to procedures for preparing ideological and military training of junior officers. What prompted the development of this document were several cases of junior officers resigning their commissions and transferring to the reserves. Of particular interest is the case of an officer, a graduate of the Kaliningrad Higher Engineers School for Engineer Troops, who after one year of service in the Far East Military district asked to be transferred to the reserves. His request was granted. The lieutenant based his position on the fact that he did not feel himself a "soldier by nature." "...I cannot inflict punishment on subordinates or even reprimand them. I am burdened by the requirement to constantly wear boots and tie and to button up all my buttons..." (1979:2). The other cases are hardly as dramatic. In each, however the young officer found military service not what he wanted it to be, or expected it to be. The military journalist comments that each case
could have been "saved" had the military organization taken greater care to integrate the young officer. What is of interest is not merely that the young officer had problems in punishing subordinates, but the burden of the uniform as a symbolic rejection of the organization. The Soviet press does not often report such cases, and Soviet studies merely tell us for example, that 96 percent of servicemen regard their military service as a debt to the fatherland (Konoplev, 1975). A debt does not mean that it is valued.

Research in Soviet industry has shown high labor turnover, problems of discipline, a concern with, and desire for self-determination and independence at work, and a low interest in work among the purportedly most dedicated young people, i.e., the Young Communist League (not to mention rising rates of juvenile delinquency, drunkenness, and the presence of dissidents). The response of the Party-State has been generally moderate, i.e., an attempt to institute changes in work organization, of a semiparticipative or human relations nature, some changes in the role of the trade union, exhortation to work better and harder and a promise that under communism work will be more creative, interesting and autonomous.

While such promises are not about to be made with respect to military organization, efforts have been made to generalize from administrative practices in the enterprise, by emphasizing increased initiative and independence not only for the officer, but even for the enlisted man (Pupko, 1976; Bondarenko, 1976; Serebriannkov and Iasiukov, 1976). The most frequent theme in the military literature is for commanders to rely on persuasion. Coercion cannot be ruled out, but it should always be secondary. Persuasion should be used with encouragement and praise. The achievements of the serviceman should be acknowledged by the commander. Praise builds self-esteem and a desire for further achievements (Sulimov and Sheliag, 1973:210-214).
Relations with subordinates must be fair and considerate. Under no circumstances should the commander raise his voice to a subordinate, regardless whether officer or enlisted man. There is no place for coarse or crude behavior in the military (Epishev, 1973; Kulakov, 1977; Psipov, 1964; Volkogonov, 1977; Kovalev, 1980; Diachenko et al., 1978; Sheliag, 1973).

Indirectly and directly, there is also recognition of the changing character of Soviet young men in the armed forces. The problems noted in the civilian sector, which make management more difficult today, e.g., labor turnover, poor discipline, boredom with routine jobs, as well as increasing assertiveness and independence of young people, have emerged in the military organization as well, albeit less directly. Higher educational achievements of today’s enlisted men, as noted by Lisenkov (1977), requires a different approach in their training. Better selection and training of political cadre is necessitated not only by the scientific technical revolution, but by the need to be a creative and experienced leader, Baratanschikov and Vdovyuk (1971) call attention to the proper methodological principles and pedagogical tact required of young officers in relations with military personnel. Pedagogical tact is a professional quality of an officer and a leader. "...it expresses a sincere respect for the individual...the ability to control oneself and observe...effective modernization in...training and indoctrination...(p. 89). Orders should be given without presuming and belittling the personality of a subordinate, one should give instruction without overemphasizing one's superiority in knowledge and skills (Baratanschikov and Vdvyuk, 1971).

The importance of strengthening legality, and law and order, is directed primarily to strict observance of military discipline and regulations (Novikov, 1979; Petrov, 1975; Romanov and Belyavsky, 1971), but as in the
civilian sector the educational role of the law is stressed, and the importance that no decision of a commander differ from the law. But there are still deviations among commanders "who violate the requirements of the law," e.g., they exceed the disciplinary rights, depart from procedures on the granting of leaves, make incorrect judgements for material liability (Romanov and Belyavsky, 1971).

Most important, the commander must be an educator and a leader. He must develop trust in his subordinates. He must be approachable and ready to help with problems of an organizational or personal nature. He should have the qualities of a father and be capable of dealing with problems of the service as well as of the family, or interpersonal relations with friends. To fulfill the requirements of his role, he must learn as much as possible about the young serviceman. This knowledge will enable him to integrate the individual in the service, and when problems occur to handle them. Tests, informal talks, experiments, and biographies, are to be utilized not only to get to know the individual but to place him in a unit most compatible with his interests and previous training. To place the soldier where he can perform best increases his self-esteem and belief in himself. These themes are common in most books on the military, and hardly an issue of the military newspaper (Krasnaia Zvezda) passes without some attention to one or more of these qualities of the commander. The steady exhortation suggests that these qualities and characteristics are so far problematic.

In short, in the Soviet case, the nature of work and of military service have historically been more similar than in the west, largely because of the authoritarian nature of social organization in both realms during the Stalin era. Indeed, at least in this respect, the Soviet Union
approximated a militarized society more closely than it does today. In the present era, both sectors have become less coercive, more persuasive, and more strongly oriented toward human relations in the work place. It may be less appropriate to describe this as convergence than simply as change, in a direction that traditionally has been regarded as more civilianized. These changes can in large part be attributed to technological changes and changed conceptions of management. The similarity of technologies between civilian and military sectors, and the consequences of these similarities for training, were emphasized by Marshall Sokolovsky in his book on Soviet Military Strategy (cited in Baxter, 1980:31).

Under present day conditions there are possibilities for more rapid training and instruction of enlisted men and noncommissioned personnel because much of the equipment is similar to the equipment used in the national economy. Indeed, such specialists as the operators and mechanics of diesel, gasoline and electric engines, radio engineering, radio electronics optics and others are fundamentally identical in the military and civilian production.

It remains true that the Soviet Union continues to conscript large numbers of young males, and that the military need not compete for personnel with civilian employers on a market basis. Thus, in a literal sense, young Soviet citizens continue to be "called" by the state. It is unlikely that those who serve have more positive attitudes about the military as a form of employment than those who are in civilian vocations. And while the reported percentages of young people who regard military service as a debt to the fatherland is high, such findings are common in the United States as well. In this latter case, when the analysis is carried a step further, we find that those who feel that military service is a worthwhile way to serve the state also feel that it is a poor way to make
a living (Segal, 1980; Blair, 1981).

THE INTERPENETRATION OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SECTORS

Where the issue of professional autonomy is central to the perspectives of Kolkowicz and Huntington with regard to understanding civilian control of the military, the issue for Janowitz and Odom is the articulation of civilian and military institutions. Indeed, perhaps the most interesting issue raised by the garrison state model is the fusion of military and civilian institutions. It is interesting theoretically because it is the main characteristic of the militarized society that Lasswell feared. It is the key element of Lasswell's formulation with which Huntington disagrees, and it is the process that Janowitz seeks to institutionalize in order to guarantee civilian control over the military. Obviously, Janowitz and Huntington disagree regarding the dilemma that Lasswell raised: will a fused structure represent civilizationalization of the military, or militarization of civilian society?

The issue is also interesting empirically because of the range of indicators available to measure various aspects of interpenetration or fusion (e.g., Segal, Blair, Newport, and Stephens, 1974). Indeed the major difference between the theoretical positions of Janowitz and Huntington may be rooted in the indicators that the theorists have in mind when they think about interpenetration. Much of the empirical treatment of the interpenetration in the United States focusses on the existence of a power elite (Mills, 1956) or a military-industrial-complex (e.g., Lieberson, 1971). These perspectives focus on military elites and in many ways are redundant with the issue of military professionalism. Consideration of the interpenetration of civilian and military sectors of society, as it bears
upon the issue of civilian control of the military, must involve a broader view and focus on the general level of permeability of the civil-military boundary. Under a conscription system, which the Soviet Union still has, the permeability of the civil-military boundary is guaranteed by the flow of draftees through the military. These citizen-soldiers came into the armed forces without shedding their primary self-definitions as civilians, thereby bringing civilian views into the military system. At the end of their military obligations, they return to the civilian world, bringing with them personal military experiences that are incorporated as part of the fund of information about the military.

In the Soviet military, the civil-military interface is managed much more routinely than is the case in the United States, and is largely the responsibility of the political officer. A major responsibility of his role is to ensure that the soldier or sailor does not become isolated from civilian society, and remains conscious of the leading and guiding role of the Communist Party, and the significance of the decisions made by the Party for the people, and thus the armed forces. Whether it is a plenum of the Central Committee, a party congress, an upcoming anniversary, or a decision to increase production of the chemical industry, the soldier and the sailor is to learn about it, through discussions and appropriate lectures on the subject, and appraised of its significance for society.

It is, no doubt, of little significance to the average soldier, that the XXII Party Congress declared that the Soviet state which emerged after the revolution as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has reached material and political maturity, and is now an "all people's state," expressing the interest and will of all the people. Correspondingly, the armed forces
changed as well: from a "tool of the proletariat," it has become a genuine "All Peoples Army" (KVS, 1964:3). On the other hand, it cannot be completely ruled out that for at least some servicemen this constituted a significant political event.

Improvements in the production of state farms and collective farms are not considered irrelevant to the servicemen, and not ignored in the "lectures." The moral code of the builders of communism, as it emerged at the XXII Party Congress, was a common theme in the work of the political officer for several years.

The armed forces in the U.S.S.R., as in other societies, are functionally and analytically distinct. But the role obligations of the citizen-soldier seem to a considerable degree to follow the role obligations of the citizen-worker. Socialist competition, criticism and self-criticism, rationalization and invention, the desirability of mastering several skills, the importance of education, public participation and voting, and the importance of so-called "cultured" behavior are no less emphasized as requirements of a citizen-soldier than of a citizen-worker. These behavior patterns constitute a significant link with the civilian sector. These linkages and ties to civilian values are consistently nurtured, and may well be a reminder of civilian authority to the military officers.

Structurally, the linkage between the Soviet military and other social institutions is strong, with much pre-military training taking place in the context of educational institutions, workplaces, and voluntary associations. The military, for its part, provides training in skills that are later used in the civilian labor force, and participates widely in sectors of the economy that in other societies are almost exclusively civilian domains, such as construction and transportation.
A significant factor was the change in the Universal Military Law in October 1967, which shortened the conscription period in the armed forces from three to two years in the army, and from four to three years in the navy. To make up for the lost year in the army and navy, and the problems this may have created in the proficiency of the military arts of soldiers and sailors, part of this education was shifted to the last two years of secondary school, the 9th and 10th grades. The new program instituted consists of 140 hours of preinduction training (Beginning Military Training) supplemented by five to ten days of Summer field exercises, the latter resembling military exercises as much as possible. The training is given by reserve or retired military personnel and instructs the students in military drills, rifle marksmanship, military regulations, etc.

The shift of even a small part of military training to civilian institutions might readily be seen as tending to militarization. The use of a civilian institution, i.e., the school, during the formative stage of adolescence provides, among other things, a form of anticipatory socialization into the martial arts and ideology generally, and occupational and career choice specifically. Indeed at the All Union Conference on Military Preparation in Secondary Schools, those representing the military organizations did call for closer ties between military patriotic education and the regular school subjects. "The overall development of military patriotic education in schools throughout the U.S.S.R., can have a significant impact if it is incorporated into the daily lesson" (Averin, 1973). This has not been the case so far, complained Averin. Some teachers claim a lack of experience with the military, but a few have no such problems. For example, some state that the study of *War and Peace* can be related to the patriotism of the Russian peasant as well as the experience of the war; history classes can
make use of World War II films. It is seen as important to keep in close touch with the graduates of the school who enter military service or military schools.

It is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty the exact impact of this education, but it does constitute an intrusion into the civilian sector. Yet, a significant consequence of the 1967 law is the fact that the military organization is denied one year of military socialization and education of young Soviet men.

The armed forces is a total institution. The eighteen year old remains under the jurisdiction of the military, planning not only his daily routine, but his leisure. The movies he sees, the books he reads, the sports he engages in, the lectures he attends, are significantly more ordered and directed than were he to receive double the hours than the designated 140. The military regulations, the uniform, the salute, and the ordered social relations are tightly structured. And the long arm of the military exerts an influence on the servicemen even when on leave, attested to by the not infrequent articles in the military press admonishing servicemen to wear their uniforms properly, and not to wear their hats in too rakish a fashion. In the secondary school, by contrast, the training is not only "just" another subject of short duration, but the structure and jurisdiction of the military organization is absent. Thus, what was the domain of the military has come under the domain of civil authorities. The military instructor, a retired military officer or reservist, is under the jurisdiction of the school.

The secondary school is only one institution providing support for military training. Students who leave the school prior to graduation receive their training at their place of work, as well as through the voluntary organization DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy). Organized in 1951, it offers a variety of leisure time activities
for the population at large, e.g., sailing, parachute jumping, hunting, and a variety of sports. While DOSAAF provides military training for preinduction youth, the same activities are available to the civilian population. Perhaps it is worth noting that many of the activities provided by DOSAAF, and considered military specialties, e.g., driver training, are standard for American youth, and the same holds true for a variety of sports activities.

The development of basic patriotism among the young today, as in the past, is the duty of all social and political institutions. But the major part of this work falls on the YCL, one of the major functions of which today is the training and education of the young. Membership in the YCL is open to those between the age of 14-28, and as of 1978, there were 38 million members of the YCL (Hough and Fainsod, 1979:300). As leaders of the Young Pioneers, the organization for younger children aged 8-14 years, the YCL worker is very involved in their organization and education. As far back as the 1950s, the YCL was organizing excursions to old battlefields, and to places where the young could become acquainted with old Bolsheviks, military heroes, and communist shock workers. Young Pioneers were asked to gather relics of the revolutionary past, and to discuss their patriotic and political significance. Old Bolsheviks have been sent to children's camps, to lecture and share their experiences of the past with the young (Kassof, 1964).

To speak about militarization of Soviet society and the involvement of the varied groups in this process, it is important to see it in the larger context of the Soviet system. Relative to the United States, the USSR constitutes a system with multiple group involvement in the rearing of young people into patriotic citizens. The more recent emphasis on military patrio-
tic education, relative to the traditional process and emphasis, is a relatively minor shift, reflecting broader social changes.

The development of institutions to bridge the gap between the civilian and military sectors was not limited to the pre-service years. A network of so-called cultural-educational institutions began within the armed forces as early as 1919. Party-political work in the Red Army received further attention in 1922, when a network of "clubs" emerged for political purposes.

The network of educational-political circles, Red Army Houses, etc., while organized primarily for the benefit of the armed forces, were also meant to bring about close relations between the soldiers and the people. "Barrack life" was not to be separated from the life of the civilian inhabitants of neighboring villages and cities. Close interaction was expected between local party groups and the military.

Whatever the intent of these organizations, Gabriel's (1980) interviews with 113 Soviet emigrees to the United States who had served in the armed forces presents a picture of relative isolation from civilian life. In terms of social support networks, the majority of respondents reported that their families were resigned to, rather than supportive, of their military service. Similarly, almost 90 percent reported that their peers' most positive sentiment toward their military service was tolerance. While in service, the soldiers found themselves not to be respected for their service by the local population: rather, they were pitied. Relations were particularly bad for ethnic soldiers stationed in Slavic areas, and Slavic soldiers serving in non-Slavic Republics. And, according to Gabriel, participation with the local populace in common projects such as harvest, road construction, and irrigation projects, frequently provided an abrasive, rather than smooth, interface.
If interpenetration is more ideal than reality at the level of the individual soldier, the degree structural interpenetration is another matter. Beyond the institutional arrangements that align voluntary associations and the educational system with the interests and needs of the armed forces, the Soviet Union devotes a great deal of its economic production to the military sector. The Ministries of Defense Industry, Shipbuilding Industry, Electronics Industry, Radio Industry, General Machine-building, Medium Machine-building, and Machine-building, and the enterprises subordinate to these ministries, are closely coordinated with the military, and are privileged in terms of the allocation of resources (Spielman, 1978). More generally, the civilian economy is organized to provide much of the logistical support that, in western nations, is integral to military units (Baxter, 1980).

THE MANIPULATION OF SYMBOLS

If there is any element of Lasswell's formulation that has been overlooked in the course of further developments in western theories of civil-military relations, it is Lasswell's emphasis on the manipulation of symbols. Research on morale and motivation in World War II suggested that national ideologies ranked very low in motivating soldiers to participate in combat (e.g., Shils and Janowitz, 1948). Subsequently, western armies and the social scientists who study them have downplayed ideological issues, although more recently, western military sociologists have returned to the theme of citizenship as a motivation for military service (e.g., Janowitz, 1980).

The USSR has always placed a greater emphasis than the USA on the formal training and socialization of the rising generation into such virtues as patriotism, devotion to the socialist motherland, as well as the social and moral superiority of Soviet socialism and party leadership. The military
has received a considerable share of this patriotic attention, although this laudatory image is always refracted through the party leadership. As noted earlier, one of the major components of the role of the political officer is the inculcation of military-patriotic values, which in the early 1960s, received relatively little attention in the civilian sector.

Indeed, Minister of Defense Malinovskii called upon writers and artists to focus more on this theme in their work, not to belittle the achievements of military men, and not to glamorize those whose behavior was not exemplary. Within the armed forces, there was concern over the proper socialization of the soldier and sailor. The journal KVS (the Journal of the Main Political Administration) called for increased utilization of the mass media, and particularly movies and the theater, to foster patriotism, and military rituals. Poor use, it was said, was being made of the movies. The Leningrad military district within a period of one year showed over 100 films but only eight dealt with a historical or revolutionary theme (KVS, 1964).

Military history as a powerful source of patriotic education was subject to an editorial in the military journal Voruzhennyi Istoricheskii Zhurnal in 1963 (v. 12h, 1963:2) and may have served as an impetus for wider implementation when military service was cut by one year in 1967. But as a specific theme, military patriotic education of youth did not appear on the pages of this journal until 1972. Interestingly, on the whole, the papers on military patriotic education are short (2-3 pages), and not significantly different from what is found in the civilian journals, e.g., the education of children in military traditions (Alyazin, 1975); fulfill Lenin's Legacy (Mikiene, 1974); Veterans Remember (Mendeleev, 1974). With the decade of the 1970s, patriotic themes in various social science journals increased, and even the preschool literature showed a considerable interest in the themes of patriotism and defense of the motherland (Kaitukov, 1972; Koguchev,
Soviet explanations for the need to increase the military patriotic education of youth invariably include such themes as the aggressive nature of imperialism, increased military budgets of NATO countries, and the militarized policies of Peking (Vasiutin, 1978). The concern with military patriotic education, it is said, is necessitated by an increased ideological struggle. "Imperialist propaganda," states Vasiutin in a recent collection of sociological articles on youth, "aims to weaken Soviet youth, to tear its class consciousness, its devotion to the ideals of Communism, the Communist Party, and the glorious traditions of the older generation. Bourgeois ideologists aim to develop among Soviet youth political nihilism, create a conflict of generations, and discredit our heroic achievements..." (1978:224). It is noted also that the USSR is a young country: "today's boys and girls did not experience the severe school of revolutionary struggle which fell on the back of the older generation. More than a third of our population was born after the war...and did not experience the difficulties of those years..." (1978:225).

This theme is repeated by others (Korbutova, 1966; S.P., 1963). The fact that today's young people did not experience the struggles, or the poverty, makes them susceptible to foreign ideology. In addition, the pacifism of Soviet youth makes them easy targets of anticommmunist propaganda. "While our children learn about peace and friendship and peaceful coexistence, no attention is given in our schools to the enemy out there who prepares to fight us" (Korbutova, 1966:29). America aims to blacken the name of Communism; a system of widespread antisocialist propaganda has developed; anticommmunist courses in schools aim to portray Soviet youth as dull and stupid: a grey countryside; a narrow minded youth. They refuse to acknowledge our
achievements and developments (Korbutova, 1966).

The task of patriotic education is not simply a defense against anti-communism or a glorification of the military. Foremost, it aims at the formation of a Marxist-Leninist world view, political maturity, and unlimited commitment to the ideas of Communism, Leninist thoughts on war and peace, on the defense and love of the socialist motherland, responsibility for the fate of the nation, and respect for the armed forces and military service.

The emphasis on military patriotic education increased between the early 1960s and the 1970s. Examination of papers published in the journal Sovetskaia Pedagogika (Soviet Pedagogy) in 1963, 1966, 1975, and 1976, suggests that the number of papers is less significant than the changing and more inclusive theme of patriotism. In 1963 there were four editorials calling for the need to increase attention to the development of communist ideology in youth and the need to improve the education of people, and youth specifically, into the revolutionary traditions of the party, workers and peasants. In ideology there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with bourgeois ideology (S.P., 1963:7). The task of secondary and higher schools is to develop highly qualified specialists of science and culture, who have a firm world view based on Marxism-Leninism: conscious communists and citizens of high qualities.

Patriotism is important in order to struggle against bourgeois influence, and against manifestations in our youth of foreign influences, asserted one editorial (S.P., 1963:18). A Soviet world view through the study of the humanities, e.g., literature, history, etc., should be the goal of educators, to enable the students to see the achievements of socialism and the significance of the October Revolution (S.P., 1963:9). The ideological political education of students should reach a new level. The educational
system should provide the young with a clear view of the wonderful revolutionary and labor traditions of their fathers and grandfathers. Soviet youth, when thus educated, will jointly with the older generation build communism. Some people like to create a generation problem between fathers and children - a gap in mutual understanding. They forget that this is not the time of Turgenev when the social and political conditions provided a real gap between generations. Today, in each city and village there are experienced people who can teach and share with the younger generation (S.P., 1963:6).

In 1966 there were only two editorials, but four articles on the question of communist ideology and the proper education of the young. The theme of a gap between the older generation and the younger continued. There was concern over the young who did not experience the struggles of the older generation: 70,000,000 people today were born after the war. Three quarters of the population was born after the October revolution (Kurbatova, 1966).

Lenin continued as the model for youth to study and emulate, as did revolutionary heroes who built the factories and created Soviet might, but the military as important contributors to Soviet achievements emerged as well. Bourgeois ideology as the enemy of the Soviet people continued to be a culprit.

Military patriotic education took the form of studying "the traditions of the fathers." In many schools, there are discussion groups centering on the revolution and its achievements. Clubs have developed to study revolutionary, military and labor heroes. Excursions to World War II sites have become widespread. Groups of Friends of the Soviet Army and Navy have been established (Kusatova, 1966). The importance of excursions to study the past is often emphasized (Shnekindorf, 1966, S.P., 1966:10), leading editorial to warn that learning of traditions is not only trips and meetings, but
ideological hardening of boys and girls: the formation of moral qualities. "Youth is our future." It is necessary that they feel the ties with the revolution (S.P., 1966:4-3).

In 1975, the number of papers on military patriotic themes increased to 12, but almost all were in one issue devoted to the 30th anniversary of World War II. The education of students on military and labor traditions was a common and unifying theme of the issue. "The education of students on the traditions of the older generations has a central place in the communist education in our school" (Bonsov, 1975:49), stated a member of a secondary school in Moscow. The school is named after Zoia and Aleksander Kosmodemosianskii, former teachers who died during World War II. The museum established in the school has become a center of educational work. The principles on which the activities of the museum are based include a patriotic education of the students exemplified by the work and achievements of the heroes, mass involvement of students in the work of the museum, and development among students of an interest in collecting material about heroes. Expeditions in search of material about the school's heroes has made the lives of Zoia and Aleksander more meaningful for the students. Similar educational experiences are related by others (Fatkuliina, 1975).

Military patriotic education is greatly facilitated by the fact that many, if not all, of the teachers have either had personal war experiences or know sources with such experiences. World War II, while receding into the past, is nevertheless still real to many, and continues to be a powerful experience, which is widely shared. While this facilitates the organization of military patriotic education, it is not merely a glorification of war or the military as warriors. Rather it appears to present an image of an embattled nation, which despite many odds emerged victorious and strong. The military heroes, whether officers, enlisted men, or the partisans, are portrayed as protectors and defenders of the nation, not as conquerors of foreign lands. The message to the young is not to cherish war, but to defend the
accomplishments of socialism.

There are some who are eager to make military patriotic education an integral part of each subject, whether mathematics, or literature (Aksenova, 1975), and according to Aksenova, Kalingrad State University has established special courses for prospective teachers on how to include military patriotic education in their subjects. In literature the question of war and peace is natural. In science, the teacher can explain how scientific achievements contribute to military technology (Aksenova, 1975). This program, according to the author, is not yet fully developed and requires further study.

Sovetskaia Pedagogika gave little attention to military patriotic education in 1976. The number of articles declined to three, and dealt less directly with military-political education. Magomeitov (1976), in an article on the unity of international and patriotic education, devoted his attention to the internationalism of Soviet people, and the increasing number of ethnic or nationality group children studying Russian.

The development of patriotism is the duty of all social institutions, but much of this work falls on the Young Communist League (YCL), a traditional role of this organization. While there appears to be a greater emphasis on the need to "love" socialism and "hate" imperialism, today military patriotic education or inculcation differs from the past mainly through the inclusion of the military. But much of this education differs neither in content nor quality from the education of patriotism in the 1960s. There is then no break or discontinuity and while this may make the inclusion of military phenomena easier, and lead to militarization, relative to the historical emphasis on patriotism in the USSR generally, it most likely constitutes but a small measure of making Ivan or Masha more patriotic: militarily or otherwise.

The range of what is considered political and important for service-
men to know and to be informed about is highly diverse. The aim, at least superficially, is to make the citizen-soldier aware of why he wears a uniform today, and why if need be, he will be called to fight. What the Soviets call the revolution in military affairs has made it important for the soldier to be ideologically "steeled." Modern weapons and the threat of thermonuclear war have rendered personal bravery insufficient to remain tenacious in battle, and this necessitates greater ideological training and further development and commitment to the party and communism. This in turn increases the responsibility of the political officer and the primary party organization to education and socialize the personnel of the armed forces.

OVERVIEW

Recent attempts to deal with the issue of civil-military relations in communist states on a comparative basis have tended to assume that different models are needed for understanding the communist world than those that apply to the Western European and North American industrial democracies (e.g., Herspring and Volgyes, 1977). We argue, by contrast, that level of economic development, with its attendant effect on military technology, is a more important determinant than is politico-economic ideology. Thus we feel that the Soviet Union has more in common with the United States in this regard than it might have with less developed communist nations (Segal, 1978).

It is clear that, without asserting that the Soviet Union has the same social structure as the United States, or that Soviet military organization, and its relationship to the state, is the same as in the western case, one can find the analytic categories that comprise western models of
civil-military relations applicable to the Soviet Union. The similarities between the systems, as described by these categories, appear with regard to those attributes that are most strongly affected by organizational and material technologies.

The assumption of structural convergence between advanced industrial societies, contained in Lasswell's "garrison state" construct, derives a degree of empirical support, for example, from somewhat parallel developments in military professionalism between the United States and the Soviet Union. In both systems, a career-oriented military officer corps, which is afforded high social status on the basis of its expertise, has emerged. In neither case, contrary to functionalist theories of professionalism, is this officer corps assumed to be neutral with regard to policy preferences. In both cases, therefore, structural elements have been built into political and military organization to guarantee the principle of civilian control.

As the power of military technology has increased, so too have concerns about the policy autonomy of the military in both nations. At the same time, however, formal structural constraints to maintain civilian domination - what Huntington refers to as "objective" civilian control - has been progressively supplemented by more general but less formally structured patterns of integration of the military into the broader fabric of society - what Huntington refers to as "subjective" civilian control. The role of the political officer, for example, has evolved from one of explicit control to one of education and socialization, and while representing the interests of the state and the party within the military, he nonetheless serves to support and enhance, rather than to challenge, the authority of the military commander. The commander, for his part, seems to be more autonomous now than in the past not only from the political officer, but from his military superiors as well, with regard to operational matters. While policy considerations are centralized and
controlled within the civilian government, operational considerations follow a different pattern. Here, military technologies that allow and require greater mobility on and above the battlefield, more rapid response times, and greater geographical dispersion of personnel and equipment, have led to greater delegation of authority down through the chain of command than has characterized the Soviet armed forces in the past. This indeed may be the clearest example of the impact of technology on structural convergence that we have observed in military organization. The U.S. Army has in the recent past been considerably more decentralized than the Soviet Army in this regard, but currently seems to be undergoing strains toward greater centralization. We might speculate that both systems are moving—albeit from opposite ends of the spectrum—toward that level of decentralization that is most appropriate given contemporary technologies.

At the same time, we do not want to overemphasize the impact of technology to the exclusion of other considerations. We do not view convergence as unicausal, and do not expect the American and Soviet systems to end up looking the same. Our expectation is that they will find themselves within a narrow range of organizational arrangement that are appropriate at a given technological level, but that within this range, their actual positions will be determined by other factors. In that regard, it is important to stress that the changes that have been occurring in relations between the military and the party in the Soviet Union are similar to changes occurring with regard to other institutions and the party. We are looking not at the unfolding and potential resolution of a power conflict between the generals and the commissars, but rather a reflection of broader social changes, particularly in the role of the party, in Soviet society.

The expectations regarding social stratification derived from Lasswell's model have likewise been realized to some degree, and again, similarities between the United States and the Soviet Union are obvious in at least one
important domain. As anticipated by the model, unemployment has been abolished, at least symbolically, in the Soviet Union, in part through the use of labor rather than capital, in part through the acceptance of inefficiency, and at least in part through the maintenance of a military conscription system that removes from the labor force a considerable proportion of the population that contributes greatly to unemployment in the United States: young males. Although the United States does periodically manipulate unemployment symbolically by defining out of the labor force elements of the population that are not working, e.g., young men who return to school because of inability to get a job rather than because of educational aspirations, admission of the fact of unemployment remains an important difference between the two systems. The difference, in turn, has interesting implications for the military personnel systems in the two nations. In the Soviet Union, as noted, one of the latent functions of military conscription is a contribution to the abolition of unemployment. In the United States, by contrast, youth unemployment contributes directly to the recruitment of military personnel in a nonconscription environment.

There has been some convergence, however, with regard to the anticipated shape of the stratification distribution. The growth of the middle of the distribution and the truncation of the extremes, as a means of reducing internal class-based social conflict, has become the dominant pattern in the industrialized nations of the west (Janowitz and Segal, 1967). Similarly, the upward mobility of peasants and workers generated by Stalin's program to produce a Soviet intelligentsia produced relative growth in the middle strata of the distribution, while subsequent social inheritance has helped that pattern to persist. This mobility took place through the military as well as through civilian enterprise, and within the military, it took place through political as well as command careers. The interchangeability of
political and command personnel, and the recruitment of both new political and new military specialists from common social origins, in turn, probably contributed to the pattern of cooperation that evolved between those fulfilling political and command functions, and the atrophy of the more coercive elements of control in the role of political officer.

The intergenerational heritability of the military occupation in the Soviet Union, the general sense that the military is an acceptable occupation - but not for oneself, the unattractiveness of the military to the children of the intelligentsia, and, conversely, the attractiveness of the military to rural youth, are patterns reminiscent of findings in the United States, and point to important similarities between the two systems.

Our overview thus far has focused on convergence between societies. The second axis of the convergence theme is intra-societal: the similarity of military and civilian institutions within the same nation. Recent theory in this area is more uniquely western than is theory on international convergence, and may be less applicable to the Soviet case. In particular, some recent conceptualizations of intra-societal convergence see this phenomenon as a consequence of the decline of conscription in the Anglo-American nations. To the extent that the dependent variable is indeed the mode of military manpower acquisition, these theories are not relevant to systems that have maintained military conscription and where, therefore, the mode of acquisition is constant over time. There is, however, an alternative theoretical tradition that argues that the organizational styles of the institutions in a society tend to be compatible (e.g., Eckstein, 1966). And within this tradition, some analysts argue that similar transformations are likely to take place within civilian and military organizations in the same society regardless of the style of military manpower acquisition that characterizes the
society. Indeed, one might argue that while military service and civilian employment may have become more similar in the United States with the end of conscription and the application of market dynamics to military manpower, the two sectors have always been similar in the Soviet Union, where military personnel and civilian employees are both working for the State, and market dynamics, particularly for the first job, apply to neither. If military organization has been austere, authoritarian and nonparticipatory in the Soviet Union, these same characteristics can in large measure be used to describe traditional civilian enterprise as well, several schemes for worker participation notwithstanding.

More recently, however, there has been movement toward greater participation, of a sort, and it has appeared in both civilian enterprise and in military organization. Soviet managers have been influenced by the "human relations" movement in the American management literature, and faced with a more educated labor force, are adopting more democratic and participatory styles of administration. In particular, there has been increased dependence upon the work collective, both for making lower-level decisions, and, probably more importantly, for maintaining social control over work-group members. The collective has similarly been recognized as important in the armed forces, largely as a means of maintaining discipline and social control. The recognition of the importance of morale and commitment to organizational goals within the work-group has increasingly required that the political officer play the role of behavioral science specialist, toward the objective of achieving these outcomes through manipulation rather than coercion. This phenomenon reflects the tendency in the U.S. armed forces to borrow from civilian industry organizational strategies rooted in behavioral science theory that involve lower level personnel in decision-making and, presumably, improve job satisfaction and performance. Not only is there similarity between the Soviet
armed forces and civilian enterprise in this regard, but there seems to be convergence as well between the function of the Soviet political officer and the behavioral specialist in the U.S. Army, the Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer.

If there is evidence of similarities between the Soviet Union and the United States with regard to military organization, there are equally impressive dissimilarities with regard to the articulation of the armed forces and other social institutions, and with regard to the ideological underpinnings of military organization. While these dimensions appear in western theories of civil-military relations, thus justifying our basic proposition that similar theories can be applied to communist and non-communist industrial societies, it is equally true that the two societies have differing values on these important variables. Thus, the theories specify not only where the systems are similar, but also where they differ.

The American military is not well articulated with civilian social institutions. Except for veterans' organizations, which are generally supportive of the military, and occasional units of youth groups such as Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts sponsored on a voluntary basis by military units, there is little structural contact between the military and the wide range of voluntary civilian associations (although individual members of the armed forces may, of course, belong to such groups). With the rather extreme exception of the clubs affiliated with the National Rifle Association, there is no presumption that voluntary associations are teaching or helping to maintain military-relevant skills. Neither is premilitary training provided on a broad scale by secondary schools, and the legitimacy of the relatively few Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps units in American high schools is frequently challenged.
Relations between the armed forces and the institutions of higher education in the United States reached an all-time low during the Vietnam War, when several colleges and universities that had previously required their students to enroll in the Reserve Officers Training Corps made such registration optional, when R.O.T.C. was in fact removed from several college campuses, and when military recruiters had difficulty doing their job on campus. Relations have improved in the last decade, and R.O.T.C. enrollments are high, but strains still exist between the two sectors, and it would be an overstatement to regard higher education in America today to be generally supportive of the military.

Structural relations certainly exist between economic enterprise and the armed forces in the United States. Many high technology industries are absolutely dependent upon the armed forces as a client. Such relationships tend to be regarded with suspicion, however. Critics of the military constantly remind the American public that the military-industrial complex may be influencing the expenditure of large sums of public monies on weapons systems that are not really needed. And at the level of the individual soldier, we find that one of the reasons given for not signing up for reserve service after completing one's active military duty is that one's civilian employer is not anxious to lose the work time that summer training sessions would require.

The situation is very different in the Soviet Union. Educational institutions, voluntary associations, and economic enterprise all fulfill training functions for the armed forces. At the highest levels of government, planning for economic production is carefully coordinated with the needs of the military in mind, and military production is given priority over consumer production. Equally importantly, the civilian economy is designed for relatively easy mobilization in support of the armed forces. In general, there is no doubt that structurally, Soviet Society is more highly militarized than are the industrial societies of Western Europe and North America.

Great differences also exist in the realm of ideology and symbol manipula-
tion. Early education in the realm of civics seems to have been decreasing in the United States in recent decades, and to the extent that it has persisted, it has focused on norms of participation in domestic politics, e.g., voting and jury duty. The military elements of political education, e.g., the study of wars and heroes, and the role of military service as an obligation of citizenship, have been greatly reduced. Until very recently, moreover, the world environment was interpreted as benevolent. Detente was interpreted as friendship. With no apparent enemy in the international system, it was difficult to demonstrate a need for a large, expensive, standing military force. And it was difficult to convince young Americans, particularly those from middle class backgrounds, that there was a reason for them to serve in the armed forces.

The Soviets, by contrast, have maintained an active program of political education, and have increased the military content of that program. Moreover, they have continued to portray their state as embattled, so that calls to military service are justified not on the basis of imperialist expansion, but rather on the basis of the necessity to defend the homeland and the gains that have been made by socialism since the Revolution.

Several conclusions can be derived from our analysis. Two refer both methodologically and theoretically to the general thesis of convergence. First, in addressing questions about military organization in the Soviet Union for which direct data are not available, reasonable estimates of what is going on can be gained from looking at the same phenomenon in the civilian sector of Soviet society. While some differences will exist between the two sectors, such data are better than no data. As in other modern industrial states, the Soviet military tends to be a microcosm of the society it is mandated to defend. Second, where questions are raised about the Soviet military
for which direct data are not available, and for which, due to the unique
nature of the military, there are no counterpart phenomena in the civilian
sector of Soviet society, reasonable estimates can be gained by looking
at similar phenomena in the armed forces of other nations at comparable
levels of technological development. Technologies seem to constrain organi-
zational arrangements within the same optimal range, and the experiences
of other nations can suggest the limits of this range.

Our third conclusion, and one that has been suggested by many others, is
that the Soviet Union is indeed a highly militarized society. This is evi-
denced by the articulation of civilian and military institutions in support
of military preparedness, by the priority given to military over consumer
production, by the amount of manpower removed from the civilian force for military
purposes, and by the widespread ideological justification of military strength.

Fourth, unlike Lasswell's developmental approach, we do not regard this
militarism as a newly emerging phenomenon. Rather, we see it as a persisting
pattern of Soviet society.

Fifth, we do see the emergence in the Soviet Union of some of the char-
acteristics of Lasswell's garrison state construct. In addition to the
factors mentioned above, we have noted the replacement of democratic elections
by plebiscite, and the structural social mobility to bring the lowest classes
into the middle levels of the stratification system, strengthening thereby
their loyalty to the regime.

Finally, however, while we find that the Soviet Union is more militaristic
than the western industrial democracies, and does manifest many of the char-
acteristics of Lasswell's garrison state construct, Soviet society has not
become the prototypical garrison state. In particular, we note that the
military leaders are not the dominant elite in Soviet society, but rather are
kept under the control of a dominant civilian party-state. Second, the
military are not the major manipulators of symbols, and the dominant ideological theme is one of patriotism rather than of militarism. Militarism is used in support of that dominant theme. Third, we in fact see some movement over time in the direction of civilianism, in the sense of increased concern over the maintenance of civilian control over the military, the delegation of responsibility for some military training to civilian institutions, and the advent of a "human relations" component to the management of the armed forces paralleling developments in the civilian sector.
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