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TITLE: SOCIAL VALUES IN THE SOVIET UNION:
Major Trends in the Post-Stalin Period

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The attitude of the Soviet people toward the official ideology continues to be one of the key factors determining the evolution of Soviet society and influencing the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet leadership. Simplistic concepts which either deny any influence of ideology on the Soviet people or which assume the acceptance of this ideology by the majority of the population do not help us to understand the real role of ideology in modern Soviet society.

The transition of the Soviet system from a period of mass terror to one of limited repression was accompanied by the significant weakening of the official ideology. Employing the ideology as a means for the integration of the people and the legitimation of their rule, the Soviet political elite has been undertaking a systematic effort to modernize the ideology and prevent its decay. The Soviet leadership pays special attention to the core of ideology: the social values which define the life goals and moral principles of the people.

The modernization of Soviet ideology (as far as it was possible under existing constraints) has retarded its loss of influence on the Soviet people and made popular attitudes toward official values much more complicated than before. But this modernization could not stop the general tendency of the decline of Soviet ideology, an ideology which proved to be strong only when coupled with mass terror.

In order to make the official ideology more acceptable to the public, the Soviet leadership has nearly—and in some cases completely—removed from it certain specific Soviet values. Certain themes, such as the values of social equality, class struggle, revolutionary terror and world revolution, have receded to a nearly invisible locale. The notion of the "radiant future"—the importance of which was linked to its ability to justify delayed satisfaction for the building of the new society—has also nearly vanished from official ideology.

However, this modernization has not affected such specific Soviet values as the leading roles of the communist party and the working class, nor "socialist democracy" and "internationalism". The available information, however,
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The declining role of Soviet ideology as an integrative force has led to a radical change in the system of personal Soviet values that have real impact on the behavior of the population. One of the leading trends in this process is the privatization of personal values. The role of family and friendship in Soviet life has risen significantly in comparison with the past. Even at a verbal level, the Soviet people openly place these values ahead of all other official values. Moreover, Soviet people tend to consider the family and friends as refuges from the state.

A second important trend concerns the growing interest in the Soviet population for individual concerns and self-gratification. Distant from the orientation which places the state and "the people" above all else, the Soviet people have adopted what we have termed a growing hedonistic orientation to life. The quest for consumer goods, prestige, power, sex, and alcohol have become the most influential personal values. When these come into conflict with traditional moral values or official ideological values, the hedonistic values tend to win out. Only family and friendship have much of a restraining force on Soviet behavior. But even these vestiges of earlier morality cannot constrain large numbers of Soviet people from falling into complete demoralization.

The hedonistic approach to life has permeated all spheres of Soviet society. In the last two decades, occupational choice among the Soviet people has been increasingly shaped by the concern for an easy job, with good working conditions and a location where living standards are high. Hedonism also has greatly influenced the Soviet approach to sexuality and the family: pre- and extra-marital sex are widespread, as is the reluctance of many to have families and children.

The collapse of official Soviet ideology as an integrative force has also generated a third trend—the psychological differentiation of the population.

Soviet people evaluate the importance of all values in varied ways: the significance of family, friends, children, work, and leisure are highly variable within and across social groups and strata. This dissensus fosters further moral disintegration.

The issue of morality has become one of the most serious impediments to economic and social progress. Whatever the political orientation of future Soviet leaders, they will need to take action to restore some level of morality and cohesion within the population—unless, of course, they wish to maintain the policies of stagnation and decline established by Brezhnev in the early 1970s.
indicates little widespread internalization of these values: the majority of the population views them either with total indifference or hostility.

Attitudes toward "pragmatic" specific Soviet values--such as "socialist property"--display greater ambivalence. On the one hand, the Soviet people tend to support these values at a verbal or abstract level, a characteristic which distinguishes attitudes toward these values from those toward the "mythological" values, like the leading role of the working class. Yet, while gaining verbal support, these pragmatic values have little impact on the actual behavior of the Soviet people and scarcely influence their approach to practical matters. Thus, verbal support for the concept of "social property" is often coupled with total disregard for this value in everyday life--indeed, it may even be accompanied by overt approval for embezzlers of such property. And faith in the advantages of a system of socialist planning over a capitalist market system is combined with a strong belief in private initiative as capable of solving the limitless problems of everyday life which irritate the Soviet people and propel them against "the system".

In view of the minimal impact that specific Soviet values have on people's conduct, the Soviet elite placed greater emphasis on universal values, such as patriotism, tradition, order, and the family among others. It is these values, and specific Soviet values which really make up the basis of legitimation of the existing political system in the eyes of that part of the Soviet population (mostly the Russians) which can be considered conscious supporters of the leadership. However, even the impact of these values on Soviet behavior is far from following the expectations of the ruling elite. This is true even of patriotism, the strongest official Soviet value.

The positive verbal expressions of the majority of Russians toward patriotism as the central social value is doubtless as is their inclination to regard their government as the guardian of patriotism. However, as soon as we descend from the mythological level of the Soviet mentality to the pragmatic level, the issue of patriotism becomes more complicated. The readiness to translate patriotic feelings in material behavior is strongly weakened if this demands real efforts and sacrifice.

Attitudes toward the West are also very important. Since patriotism in Soviet propaganda is coupled with a hostility toward the Western mode of life, many Soviet people hold a negative image of the West at an abstract level. Still, the majority of the Soviet people seek out Western goods and try to imitate the Western style of life as much as possible. This is especially true among young people.
INTRODUCTION

THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING GOALS

The objective of this project is to study the goals of the Soviet people. This approach differs significantly from another which focuses on the "real behavior" of the Soviet people and only casually touches on the Soviet mentality. This other "behavioristic" approach does have certain important advantages, because it avoids the uncertain terrain of social psychology and ideology. If Soviet data on the "real behavior" of the people are scant and not always reliable, the empirical basis of studies of the Soviet mentality is even more frail. While the Soviet authorities distort statistical data on the economy or consumer behavior today much less often than in the Stalin era, they continue to do everything possible to muddle the real picture of the people's feelings and thoughts.

There can be no doubt that social behavior is one of the most, if not the most, important objects of social science. This is especially true with respect to the analysis of closed and semi-closed societies. Western analysts above all need concepts which can explain and predict Soviet behavior. This consideration explains why experts on the Soviet Union are so eager to obtain "hard" data describing the "real" activity of the Soviet government, various Soviet bodies, and the Soviet people. It is typical that one of the recent collections of articles on Soviet society bears the title, After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s (Byrnes 1983).

However, Soviet behavior (as is true of behavior in any society) cannot be understood without the comprehension of the motivations of the Soviet people, or of their goals. Moreover, studies of goals are of special importance for the prediction of human behavior. It is notable that even those politicians and researchers (such as the authors in After Brezhnev), who are very far from the subtleties of studies of the "Russian soul", when discussing the most practical issues of policy- and decision-making must operate with the intentions of Soviet leaders and the aspirations of the Soviet people. Psychological terminology has become an organic element of any discussion of Soviet society.
Indeed, any significant social issue in the USSR cannot be analyzed without some ideas about the goals of the Soviet people. Two examples are illustrative here: the realms of foreign policy and economic management. First, any debate on the foreign policy of the USSR almost immediately forces the participants to advance their views on the goals of the Soviet leadership in the international arena (see Bialer 1983). The same debates also inevitably raise the issue of the attitudes of the Soviet people toward official foreign policy and the various international actions of the government.

With reference to economic management, even conceding the economic constraints confronting the Soviet leadership, they have various options before them, and their choice of economic policy is strongly affected by their goals (Campbell 1983). Additionally, the reaction of the Soviet masses to improvement or deterioration in their standard of living cannot be predicted without some hypothesis about the life goals of the people. One example demonstrates this: based on prior analysis of rural behavior, almost all Soviet economists in the 1960s were sure that even a modest rise in money income among the Soviet peasantry would immediately be accompanied by a drastic increase in agricultural productivity (see Zaslavskiaia 1970). However, such simplistic "behavioristic" concepts turned out to be wrong. The significant increase in living standards in the countryside did not result in the expected growth in agricultural production (Shlapentokh 1982b). It is clear that the reaction of the Soviet population to a possible deterioration of their living standard, or to a slowdown in social mobility, can hardly be inferred from the study only of the actual behavior of the Soviet people without an exploration of their goals.

The necessity of studying goals becomes especially obvious if we recognize the diversity and fragmentation of the Soviet population today. The differences among the Soviet people have increased significantly in recent years and, as many studies have shown, these differences cannot be attributed solely to differences in socio-demographic (in some way, "objective", behavioral) factors. Such diversity results also from differences in goals. People with the same background, living in the same places, behave in radically different ways—a fact which cannot be explained fully in terms of "objective" variables such as education, social origin, social status, and so on.

The behavior of the Soviet people in the workplace is one example of this sort. In the same offices and factories, people with the same social characteristics (e.g., age, sex, class background) include both devoted workers and
shirkers. The behavior of the Soviet people as spouses and parents is also quite variable. Again, socio-demographic characteristics are incapable of fully explaining why some people are devoted to the family as an institution while others are hostile to the idea of having children. In other words, all the data witness that the Soviet people differ strongly from one another in their life goals, in what they consider deserving of their efforts and interests.

The central objective of this project is to explore the major trends in Soviet personal values. The author advances the hypothesis that since 1953, the system of personal values has undergone radical changes. Among the most important of these trends, in the opinion of the author, are the growing privatization, hedonism, and differentiation in values. As a result of these trends, Soviet society has entered a period of general anomie, in which the majority of people reject the dominant social values and use various methods to avoid them in their everyday lives. The attempts to oppose other ideologies to the decaying dominant ideology have, up to this point, failed.

The author cannot substantiate all these statements with the same rigor, due to the scarcity of sociological data. However, he seeks to do his best, and only in extreme cases to resort to impressionistic data to back up his points.

Sources of information used on this project may be classified in this way:

1. Surveys I Conducted.
2. Data produced by other Soviet sociologists.
6. Soviet literature and art.
7. Surveys of emigrants from the Soviet Union carried out in the West.
8. American data.

A few words about surveys carried out by me. In this project I have used data gathered in the framework of the following investigations:


Results of these studies were published in different books and articles in the Soviet Union and other countries.

Insofar as this project will be based on data produced in previous studies, the methodology of secondary analysis is of special significance (Hyman 1972; Finifter 1975). The character of the data lends a particular importance also to methodology of content analysis (Holsti 1969) and to the methodology of comparative social studies (Armer and Grimshaw 1973; Merritt and Rokkan 1966; Przeworski and Teune 1970; Rokkan, et al. 1969; Szalai and Petrella 1977).
CHAPTER ONE

VALUES IN SOVIET SOCIETY

The Concept of Values: Objective and Subjective Aspects

In modern social science, the concept of "goal" is usually denoted by the concept of "value". The latter concept is broader than the first, and it allows us to link the notion of "goal" to the concepts of ideology and morality. In my treatment of the concept of "values", I am closest to William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, who drew attention to the importance of combining subjective and objective approaches to the study of values; to Abraham Maslow (1964) and Ralph Perry (1954), who linked values to needs and interests; to Clyde Kluckhohn (1951), who delimited individual and group values; and to Milton Rokeach (1973), who differentiated values and attitudes.

I assume that value is the importance ascribed to objects of varying degrees of abstractness, depending on the intensity of the property that the compared objects possess and that appear as criteria of evaluation. The values ascribed to objects by society, groups, and the individual emerge in the individual and group consciousness and in the evaluation of the capacities of these objects to satisfy, directly or indirectly, human needs, whether individual or social.

It can also be said that values are general attitudes or value orientations toward a given object (See Rokeach 1973, for a discussion of the relationship of values to attitudes. See also Iadov 1978; Iadov and Kon 1969). Patriotism is an important value in Soviet society because people evaluate patriotic behavior very highly, that is, because attitudes toward such behavior are very positive. On the other hand, privacy does not have value for many Soviet people because they have no concrete ideas about this phenomenon and thus have no established attitudes about it. Since the majority of the objects around people are of some importance to them, it is possible to speak of objects as values, although this somewhat obscures the fundamental dual nature of values as subject-object relations.
The dual nature of values rests on the division between the two kinds of value-adherents: we can speak of social and personal values. If an entire society or groups within society (or some social body which claims to speak on behalf of society) is seen as the bearer of values, we consider them as social values. In the case of the individual as subject, we are dealing with personal values. Thus, the family emerges as a social value insofar as it is advanced by official Soviet ideology, and is praised in the mass media, educational institutions, and literature. But we treat the family as a personal value if we address the attitudes of the Soviet people toward this institution.

At the same time, following Rokeach and Iadov, I separate general attitudes (or personal values) from concrete attitudes which define people's positions toward concrete situations--such as attitudes toward food shortages, the war in Afghanistan, President Reagan, or General Secretary Chernenko. In this respect, concrete attitudes are similar to "public opinion", and are expected to be less stable than general personal values. I will use the term "attitude" to denote general attitudes or value orientations.

Values, of course, are not created of thin air. Each new generation comes to the world and meets nearly all objects already bestowed with certain importance. Thus, Soviet young people are taught in schools, even kindergartens, of the great value of patriotism, work for the sake of the motherland, the leading role of the Communist Party, and so on. As a result, people's attitudes toward a given object reflect not only their views on the object as such, but also the evaluation of the object by the dominant ideology. Thus, the personal values of the Soviet people are in fact attitudes toward official values, since no one in the USSR can ignore the importance attributed by the state, and by tradition, to a given phenomenon. The general attitudes of the Soviet people toward family and friendship are not their "pure" opinions on these institutions, but also include the views on family and friendship as they are presented in official Soviet ideology, classical literature, art, and so on.

Given this, it is understandable why social values are considered as having "objective existence", in some way independent of the people who share their attitudes to them. Russian classical literature, for instance, is a storehouse of various social values toward romantic love, friendship, altruism, commitment to the cause of ordinary people, and has important impact on the mentality of the Soviet people. At the same time, ideology produces new values, or presents old values in new lights, forcing people to share their attitudes to these values.
Ideology, Values, and Images: People Evaluate Their Perceptions Of "Objective" Things

This author joins those writers who consider values as the core of ideology or who seek to identify ideology with the system of values (see Adorno, et al. 1950; Bellah 1965; Kluckhohn 1951; Rokeach 1973). Images or beliefs are also considered another part of ideology. As a result, ideology is treated as a set of values and images more or less consistent with each other, and which describes people's normative perceptions of the external world, major normative goals of human activity, and moral principles.

There is a strong correlation between values and images. In fact, people evaluate not "real objects", but images of them, objects as they are perceived. Because of this, people can hold views on abstract and concrete phenomena which are outside of their personal experience, such as communism or capitalism, or on historical events, such as the October Revolution or the expansion of the Russian empire before the Revolution.

To a great extent, the character of images predetermines how people evaluate an object under consideration. Many Soviet people have very positive general attitudes toward socialized health services, because their perception of private medicine is negative and because they hold images of socialized health care which only underscore its positive features.

The Soviet political elite influences the personal values of the Soviet people to a considerable degree largely because it is capable of creating ideologically-permeated images of various phenomena in the mentality of the population. The negative attitudes of many Soviet people toward values praised in the West (private initiative, two-party political systems, various freedoms) stem from the fact that Soviet propaganda has succeeded in convincing many people in the negative official images of Western life. (I will return to this issue later).

Since values are linked to concrete images of the object, different evaluations of the same phenomenon (e.g., socialism, democracy, family) often reflect the fact that people appraise not the same, but different objects, even if these objects bear the same name. Different attitudes toward socialism among the Soviet people reflect their different perceptions of this social system. This circumstance significantly complicates studies of personal values.

The organic connection between values and images produces a very important concept--ideal images. Each individual has a stock of ideal images of various phenomena surrounding him/her--images of work, family, friendship,
democracy, etc. In seeking to understand people's views, sociologists must ask people either about their attitudes toward a given object as it is (e.g., attitudes toward one's job) or about their ideal images of the same object (i.e., their perception of an ideal job). While Soviet sociologists more commonly employ the first type of question, they do not ignore the second type.

Terminal and Instrumental Values: Value-Goals and Value-Means

The analysis of important Soviet phenomena will require the conceptualization of various types of social and personal values. Above all, it is necessary to distinguish between terminal and instrumental social values (Rokeach 1973; see also Iadov 1977 and 1978 for the same classification). Terminal values can be considered as "value-goals", while instrumental values are "value-means".

Thus, Iadov considers as terminal values international peace, health, work, family, creativity, social recognition, among others. As instrumental values, he suggests honesty, self-control, tolerance, child-rearing, cheerfulness, industriousness, and independence (1978, pp. 56-7).

This division of values into two groups is very convenient because nearly all values can be regarded under different circumstances as either terminal or instrumental. However, for our analysis, this distinction is useful for it helps to separate values which as goals people or society seek to maximize (e.g., the might of the state, living standards, health, and so on) and values which are considered as "constraints", as necessary conditions for the implementation of the chosen goals (such as honesty, tolerance, etc.). Soviet ideology is significantly more sensitive to terminal values which describe the public goals of the Soviet state, such as equality, internationalism, and peaceful coexistence, than to instrumental values, like honesty, discipline, or education.

Hedonistic and Moral Values: The Sharp Conflict

At the individual level, the distinction between terminal and instrumental values can be translated into the distinction between hedonistic (or cathectic) and moral values (see Parsons, 1951). The first kind of values (or objects imparted with the quality of these values) serve as a source of direct gratification or pleasure. In Soviet society, power, consumer goods, prestige, sex, and alcohol are the most important hedonistic values, the role of which has been growing and which will be the subject of analysis in subsequent chapters.
At the same time, the instrumental values of honesty, tolerance, altruism, and kindness can be considered as moral values which restrict the individual's aspirations to hedonistic values. The conflict between hedonistic and moral values is one of the most important in any society, but in Soviet society this conflict has taken an especially sharp and caustic form.

Declared and Undeclared Values

Soviet ideology tends to treat many hedonistic values as socially negative and pretends that these values have impact on only a minority of the population, the few who have not yet reached the Soviet standard of mentality and behavior. Thus, Soviet ideology seeks to ignore the role of power as a hedonistic value and claims that Soviet apparatchiks hold their positions only for the sake of the people, as their "servants". Power is only one of the undeclared values which, along with sex, consumer goods, and alcohol, are well taken into account when leaders address practical matters (e.g., work productivity). Moreover, these undeclared values constitute the core of the hidden ideology of the apparatus, which represents the real image of the world held by the political elite and the bureaucracy. The image of humanity in this hidden, or latent, ideology is radically different from that presented for public consumption.

Soviet public ideology describes the typical Soviet individual as one who is oriented above all to the interests of the motherland and the production collective, as a person devoted to the family as an institution. The typical Soviet is presented as only moderately interested in an improved standard of living, preferring spiritual values to material ones.

As can be judged from various sources, the latent ideology held by the leadership and the apparatus proceeds from a much different image of the average Soviet individual. As is characteristic of dominant classes, members justify their superior social position by deprecating the qualities of subordinate classes. Thus, from the latent ideology of the superiors, the typical representative of the masses is lazy and searches for any opportunity to shirk his/her social duty. The average Soviet is seen as strongly, even grossly, oriented toward material values and will work devotedly only for a high reward or to avoid punishment. Of course, the typical worker is a drunkard and prefers a binge to any other form of social activity. They will betray their spouses as often as possible and are always ready to neglect, or even leave, the family. Politically, the masses are viewed as highly unreliable and will use any opportunity to defect. It is
this image, rather than the idealized one, that Soviet leaders follow when making decisions concerning social policy.

Given all this, since 1953 Soviet ideologues have had to recognize, even if only to limited degrees, the importance of hedonistic values in the lives of ordinary people. Social prestige is a good example of this process. Even in the 1960s, the term was used only in pejorative ways, as a "bourgeois" concept; but by the early 1970s, the term acquired an almost legal status in Soviet sociological, and even ideological, literature.

Moral Values and Behavior: Words and Deeds

The importance of the sociological concept of "value" depends on its usefulness as a means for the explanation and prediction of human behavior. Thus, the exploration of the correlation between values and behavior is the principal task of this study.

The role of values in human life is multi-faceted. As has been indicated, values, above all, determine the activity of social organizations and individuals both as goals and as constraints on human activity. Yet values can perform such roles only if they have been internalized by the individuals in question. Thus, organizations and people often behave according to value prescriptions not because external forces (e.g., agents of social control) punish those who fail to follow these prescriptions, but because as internalized values they have become internal motives for behavior.

In the period of the October Revolution and Civil War, and even a few years beyond it, a considerable number of Bolsheviks sincerely believed in the concept of World Revolution as the principal goal of the new society, and their behavior was to some degree shaped by this goal. Stated differently, the value of World Revolution was internalized by these individuals and became a part of their mentality. But even by the 1930s, and especially later, this value lost its status as an internalized value, and the majority of Soviet people (including party members) came to only pay lip service to this value and completely ignored it in their behavior.

Noninternalized values do not directly motivate human behavior; the appearance of observation of such values is then traceable to the fear of reprisal. Thus, labor discipline belongs to the most important social (i.e., official) values in the USSR, but many Soviet people, even among those who appear as diligent workers, have not
internalized this value. Their behavior in the workplace is rather influenced by other factors, above all fear of negative sanction.

Nonetheless, even simple verbal allegiance to values is of great importance. Those who verbally support official policy and demand that others follow the precepts derived from official ideology assist the Soviet bureaucracy by compelling others to behave in required ways. This can be illustrated by the following example.

Whatever the strength of patriotism as a value in Soviet society, only a portion of the population is ready to sacrifice anything for the sake of the motherland. Still, the majority of the population respects this value very much, and even those with thousands of excuses who evade their own duty to the nation will exert pressure on others to do so. To some degree, this pressure is effective enough to compel people to perform actions in favor of official policy and against their own will (Shlapentokh, 1982a). And the great support for the late Yuri Andropov’s campaign against "shirkers" and "bunglers" can be accounted for to a considerable degree by the desire of many Soviet people to see others as hard workers, even while finding excuses for their own low labor discipline.

In other words, at the level of the individual, nearly every value can be seen as functioning as a "value for me" and as a "value for others". In cases where individuals consider that value-prescriptions extend to include themselves, we can speak of them operating as "values for me". In all other cases, where persons think that, for some reason, the value is only relevant to other people, we can refer to them as "values for others". As will be shown later, a growing number of Soviet people have shifted important values into the category of "values for others" (see Shlapentokh 1980).

**Mythological and Pragmatic Values: Soviet Ideology and Reality**

A deeper analysis of the relationship between values and behavior requires a distinction between two levels in the public and individual conscience: mythological and pragmatic. The first level consists of values whose purpose is only the justification of an actual situation at a verbal level. While these mythological (or ritualistic) values are not linked to real behavior and belong only to a fictional reality, they still retain great importance for social actors.

On the other hand, the second, pragmatic (or behavioral) level is directly responsible for social
behavior and actually commands the activity of social actors. Of course, the two levels do interact, but a clear distance is also preserved between them and only in rare cases does one level actually interfere in the other.

The two levels are clearly discernable in the realm of public ideology and public opinion, as well as in the mentality of individuals. Such official Soviet values as the leading role of the working class, internationalism, social and national equality, and socialist democracy make up the mythological part of official Soviet ideology. Planning, socialist property, Russian patriotism, science, education, and the family, on the other hand, represent examples of values which are the pragmatic part of Soviet ideology.

The distinction between these two types of values is equally important at the level of the individual. The first, mythological, values perform a very important function in the social lives of the Soviet people. They help people maintain a sincere loyalty to the political system without observing Soviet morality and law. The mythological values aid the Soviet people in maintaining their self-images and their links to social groups which are necessary for psychological comfort. The values of hard work, collectivism, creativity, kindness, and family, among others, constitute the core of this mythological layer for many Soviet people.

The layer of pragmatic values consists largely of hedonistic values which are actually accountable for the "material behavior" of individuals. A key point in this framework for the analysis of the Soviet mentality is that the two layers do not interfere with each other and, in fact, only rarely interact.

There can be no doubt that Soviet people, as is true of people in all countries, dislike discrepancies which emerge in their consciousness and seek to eliminate them in one fashion or another, as is suggested by the theories of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). However, the mechanism for coping with such contradictions tends to deal largely with relatively minor inconsistencies, while the radical gaps between the mythological and pragmatic layers appear to remain organic elements of the Soviet mentality. In consequence, many of the values which represent the mythological layer become treated as "values for others", while the "values for me" are limited to the pragmatic layer.
Universal and Specific Values: Soviet Ideology Versus Other Cultures

A distinction between universal and specific values is also very useful to the understanding of important developments in Soviet ideology and politics. Following Kluckhohn (1951), I define "universal values" as those supported by people in more than one kind of culture, while "specific" values are unique to one type of society or culture. Soviet ideology can be seen as a mixture of values which are unique to Soviet-type societies blended with values which are more universal to a variety of societies or cultures. The leading roles of the working class and the Communist Party, atheism, planning, social property and social production can be viewed (if with some reservations) as specifically Soviet values, while other officially-supported values, such as family, science, education, discipline, love, and order, can be seen as more universal in nature.

The ratio of the relative importance of universal and specific values is one of the most interesting indicators of Soviet developments. Moreover, in many cases, the specific and universal values are in deep conflict. Indeed, one of the central ideological struggles in the USSR pits the political elite, as proponents of specific Soviet values, against intellectuals who tend to advocate more universal values. Of equal importance are divisions among the masses with regard to these categories of values, a circumstance which strongly impacts on the ideological politics of the Soviet leaders.

The System of Values: Central Values in Soviet Ideology

Each internalized value can be seen to reflect some human needs. It is not accidental that some authors define values as objects necessary for the satisfaction of human needs, and assert that the importance of a value relates to the intensity of the need at issue (Perry 1954; Maslow 1964). And since humans live in a world in which needs can, as a rule, only be satisfied to a limited degree, values often exist in permanent conflict with each other.

The apparent inconsistency in Soviet politics, both inside and outside the country, results to a considerable degree from such value conflicts. Some of these value conflicts continuously make decision-making by the Soviet leadership problematic as they are forced to grapple with the contradictions between planning and efficiency, discipline and initiative, innovation and increased production, political loyalty and professional skill, military strength and improved living standards, Russian chauvinism and peaceful coexistence, Russian dominance and national self-determination.
Such value conflicts also rage at the level of the individual. While not all unique to Soviet society, people in the USSR are torn in the conflict between consumer goods (which require working) and leisure time, between political loyalty and the desire for greater freedom, between creativity and political loyalty, between family and sexual experimentation, between family and friendship, between children and a more carefree life, between alcohol and other material needs, between consumerism and spiritual needs, and so on.

All social systems seek to put some order into the collection of social values by introducing some hierarchy of importance, and thereby creating a system of values. Thus, it becomes necessary to proclaim some values as central and to ascribe all other values a level of importance based on their relationship and consistency with the central values.

Soviet ideology has always been explicit in the assertion of the central Soviet values. In the early years of the Soviet Union, as has been indicated, the victory of the World Revolution was declared as the major value of the new society. Under Stalin, this value was replaced by that of the power of the Soviet state and by the notion of developing socialism in a single country. After Stalin and following the emergence of more "people's democracies", the value of building socialism in one country retreated to a less prominent position and the might of the Soviet state emerged as the paramount central value. Indeed, this value alone functions in both ideology and politics as the principal criterion for evaluating the activity of all organizations and individuals.

Unlike the Soviet state, however, the public appears to have no common central values. In fact, the tremendous diversity of the Soviet population, with many groups adopting variant central values, represents one of the most important characteristics of Soviet society. We will return to this issue in greater depth at a later point.

Stratification in Soviet Society: Rulers and Ruled

The study of values necessarily involves the analysis of their relationship to the system of social stratification. This is especially important in the study of official Soviet values, for it is necessary to distinguish between those actors who participate in the "production" of social values and those who only "consume" them.

For purposes of analysis, it is supposed here that Soviet society consists of two major social classes: the rulers and the ruled, the superiors and subordinates. Of
course, the boundaries of these two classes are not always clear, and between them we can also identify an intermediate stratum, the so-called "little bosses", who to some degree belong to both classes, and whose presence may buffer the antagonism between the two major classes.

This distinction between the two classes is not so much a product of theoretical reflection, but of everyday life in the USSR. The majority of the population is well aware of the existence of these two classes; indeed, the brief period of Andropov's rule revealed the degree to which these classes recognize their contradictory interests.

Nonetheless, the ruling class in a Soviet-type society is not identical to the dominant class in other societies. In fact, all strategic decisions in Soviet society are made by only a tiny group of people--the political elite--while the rest of the ruling class merely implements the decisions made by this elite.

This specific character of the Soviet ruling class also reveals itself in the realm of values. Only the political elite decides issues related to official ideology as a whole, and to specific values in particular. Party apparatchiks are effectively deprived of any direct participation in this process and function only in the role of advisors and experts. They can in no way be viewed as an active, cohesive pressure group.

The class of the ruled is also very heterogeneous with respect to this issue. Above all, it is necessary to single out the intellectuals, the highly-educated individuals engaged in creative activity (science, literature, art). As was indicated earlier, this group, along with the political elite, are the most active political agents on the Soviet scene, especially with regard to ideology and social values.

The relationship between the political elite and the intellectuals is marked by extreme ambivalence. Intellectuals, on the one hand, seek after greater privileges and desire the support of the political elite; but at the same time, they are deeply hostile to the leadership. The same is also true from the top: the Soviet rulers are strongly interested in cooperation with the intellectuals as creative people, but also regard them as their committed foes. And while the relationship between the political elite and the intellectuals undergoes significant changes in different circumstances, on the whole these two groups are deeply inimical of each other--a fact that emerges in moments of crisis.

The rest of the ruled class can be divided into the mass intelligentsia, the workers, the peasants, and the
clerks. In the context of this analysis, the role of the mass intelligentsia deserves special attention.

The mass intelligentsia is very close to the intellectuals and emerges as their direct reserve. At the same time, they are also close to the rest of the ruled class, for the high social mobility characterizing Soviet society until very recently links this group socially and culturally with the workers and peasants.

The mass intelligentsia does not participate directly in the process of value change, but it is still very sensitive to these changes and its role in supporting or resisting such change is an important social factor.

The Stages of Evolution in Soviet Society: The Role of Repression

The comparison of the period under Stalin with the post-Stalin era underlies the analysis of the evolution of Soviet values. Of course, in its principal characteristics, Soviet society is the same in both periods. Yet, there are also significant differences between the two periods, and these differences have strongly affected the nature of values in the USSR.

Two key factors account for the radical differences in Soviet society between the Stalin and the post-Stalin eras. First, there has been a significant reduction in the scale and intensity of political repression since 1953. Second, and relatedly, the salience of ideology in the lives of the Soviet people has diminished.

Political repression, or more accurately, the fear of repression, constitutes the most critical feature of a society of the Soviet type. Without repression, the political elite, deprived of "normal" legitimation through free elections, could not prevent the emergence of organizations independent of the state. Without repression, the elite could not impede public and private criticism of the system and its regime, restrict contact with the West, or control the many other activities which are regarded as dangerous to the maintenance of the Soviet system. Yet the scope of political repression is not constant and, in fact, changes under the influence of a variety of circumstances over time. And life in Soviet society is strongly impacted, both directly and indirectly, by the degree of repression existing at any given moment.

The role of political repression is of such significance that it is useful to describe various periods of Soviet history according to the intensity of repression. Thus, we can locate periods of mass repression, as well as
periods of moderate or mild repression. The post-Stalin era, on the whole, can be viewed as one characterized by moderate repression, as opposed to the prior period of mass repression. But even within the post-Stalin period, there are considerable differences between, for example, the 1960s and 1970s.

The acceptance of ideology represents the second factor whose dynamics have had an important impact on human relations in Soviet society. Unlike political repression, which can change in intensity in any direction (i.e., from a period of mild or moderate repression back toward more intensive repression, or the reverse), the role of official ideology changes largely in one direction -- to diminishing acceptance.

While to a considerable degree repression and ideology vary independently of each other, they also tend to reinforce each other. Thus, the relaxation of mass repression tends to result, if with some lag, in the diminished impact of ideology on the population. The degree to which the scale and intensity of repression influences the level of ideological fervor, depends to a strong degree on a "third variable": the historical context. The fear engendered by repression is all-encompassing when people strongly believe in the historical legitimacy of a new power, and when they believe that others support the new system. This is characteristic of the first period following a revolution.

But with the passage of time, when the discrepancies between proclaimed goals and reality become more and more obvious, and when people -- despite the terror -- begin to realize that others, too, are questioning the legitimacy of the system, the foundation for the decline of ideology is laid. The cessation of mass terror then triggers the more rapid decay of ideology, and ultimately this process is irreversible. The political elite may return again to the tools of massive repression, after a period of moderation or even liberalism. However, this time only a few people will reconstruct their mentality to start loving "Big Brother", or even accept his legitimacy. Even new generations, which did not experience the period of disillusionment, are unlikely to be turned, through fear, into sincere advocates of the system. And conversely, the radical reduction in political repression after 1953 could not halt, indeed furthered, the erosion of ideology and its acceptance.

Not only political factors account for the important transformation of Soviet society, even if they play the leading role in these changes--at least from the perspective of this study. Significant socio-demographic changes have also occurred in the postwar era.
Over the last three decades, the composition of the Soviet population has changed drastically. Especially important is the spread of education. The proportion of people with secondary and higher education (complete and incomplete) rose from 10.8 percent in 1936 to 36.1 percent in 1959 and 67.8 percent by 1983. Among those in the work force, the growth has been even more dramatic—from 12.3 percent in 1939 to 43.3 in 1959 and 85.8 percent in 1983 (Ts. S.U., 1983).

The population has also become much more urbanized. While rural residents made up two-thirds (67.5%) of the population in 1940, this figure dropped to 52.1 percent by 1959 and to 35.5 percent by 1983 (ibid, p. 5).

Today's Soviet citizens not only have much higher education than the previous generations of the population, but also have much more access to mass media, a factor which despite the ideological control contributed greatly to the enlightenment of the Soviet people. In 1940 only 156 thousand radio sets were sold to the population, in 1982 1.881 million (in 1975 even 2.312 million). In 1982, 81 percent of all families had a radio set and 80 percent had a TV set (Ts. S.U. 1983, p. 447; Ts. S.U. 1982, p. 413). Since 1940 the number of movie theatres and the number of spectators rose more than 5 times, the number of copies of books by 4 times, the circulation of periodicals by 13 times, and newspapers by 5 times (Ts. S. U., p. 527,530).

Another important difference distinguishing the Stalin and post-Stalin eras is the rate of industrial growth. Having achieved rapid industrial growth in the 1940s--12-15 percent annual growth—the pace has slowed markedly, falling to 3 percent in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This slowdown in industrial growth has contributed to the deceleration in social mobility, a development which has generated a variety of consequences

Summary

The study of Soviet society from a values perspective promises to shed new light on some important phenomena in Soviet life. The distinctions between mythological and pragmatic, and between universal and specific values are necessary for understanding the heterogeneous character of Soviet ideology and its complicated relationships with reality as well as the active manipulation by the political elite of various social values.

At the individual level, the distinction between hedonistic and moral values is essential because it helps to understand the leading conflicts in Soviet society. For many people, values are important not only as a guide for
their own conduct but as a means for influencing the behavior of other people. Because of this, the distinction between "values for me" and "values for others" is a key for understanding the seemingly contradictory activity of the Soviet people.
FOOTNOTES

1It is characteristic that Iadov apparently did not get permission to publish data on the attitudes of his respondents in the Leningrad survey toward all terminal values, such as freedom, equality and some others, while he was allowed to insert all data on instrumental values. (See Iadov 1977, 1978).

2On the cost-benefit approach to values, see Baier and Rescher 1969.

3Ultimately, and most importantly from a political point of view, it is not repression in itself, but the fear of it which is so significant. For this reason, in different historical contexts, the same amount of repression begets fear of varying intensity. Nonetheless, "objective" indicators of repression, such as the number of arrests or dismissals from jobs for political reasons, are quite reasonable predictors of human fear.
Chapter Two

ATTITUDES TOWARD SPECIFIC OFFICIAL VALUES

What We Know About Attitudes Toward Official Values

There is a strong inverse correlation between the importance ascribed in ideology to certain official values and the possibilities of studying them in the USSR. Indeed, attitudes toward specific values, such as the leading role of the working class and the communist party, socialist democracy, and communism as the goal of social development have almost never been studied in the Soviet Union, though these values enjoy the highest status in propaganda.

Many Soviet studies of social values (Iadov et al. 1970, 1977, '1978; Arutiunian 1980; Fainburg 1969) have completely ignored these values, and not of course because the sociologists were indifferent to exploring them. Do we indeed know about popular attitudes toward Soviet ideology, Soviet politics and toward Stalin in the 30s or in the 40s? Only by reading voraciously the memoirs of such individuals as Lev Kopelev, (1978) Raisa Orlova, (1983) Pyotr Grigorenko (1983) and others can we hope to reconstruct the views of Soviet intellectuals and professionals at that time, although remaining completely obscure about the attitudes of the masses.

However, despite the perpetual ban on studies of attitudes toward leading Soviet values, a researcher of contemporary Soviet society is in a better position than a historian. Today a researcher can use various indirect data which, with all their limitations, can give us at least some ideas on the mentality of various strata of the Soviet population.

On the basis of these data, it is possible to say that the hostility and indifference of the Soviet population toward Soviet values diminishes as we move from specific mythological values to specific pragmatic values and to universal values. In other words, the average Soviet individual considers such a value as socialist democracy either with contempt or with indifference, as a nonissue; attitudes are ambivalent toward such a value as socialist
property, and are definitely supportive of the idea of the importance of the family and, in contrast to official values, of friendship.

The Non-Issue Problem: Soviet People Ignore Many Ideological Issues

Despite the growth of education, a considerable proportion of the Soviet population--perhaps even the majority--are largely indifferent to the major mythological official values. To a strong degree, many people simply have no understanding of what these values mean. (See Schuman and Johnson (1976) about the non-issue question).

In one study, Soviet sociologists explored how people in the Soviet Union understood material in the mass media. They established that only 30 percent of the residents of Taganrog, a typical Soviet industrial city, understood the content of articles in newspapers. Thirty-four percent of respondents revealed, as the authors pointed out, "the complete inability to interpret a text." (Grushin and Onikov, 1980)

In the same study, sociologists selected from articles by two leading journalists of Pravda the 50 most-used terms. No one term was strictly understood by more than 9 percent of the respondents. At the same time, 72 percent of all terms were absolutely unknown to one-third of the respondents. It is especially remarkable that among these terms are notions which constitute the chief postulates of Soviet ideology. For example, complete incompetence was demonstrated by 39 percent of respondents about the content of the term "dictatorship", 48 percent about "humanism," 46 percent about "imperialism," 50 percent about "democracy," 53 percent about "opposition," 62 percent about "left forces," 68 percent about "reactionary," and 73 percent about "liberal."

Estimating the level of knowledge of these terms as a whole, the sociologists established that only 2 percent of respondents manifested any mastering of political terminology--they knew at least 44 terms, whereas 9 percent did not know even a half of all words. Moreover, the most common propaganda cliches were not understood by the respondents. The sociologists compiled a list of them, including "fulfillment of the plan," "rise of obligations," "with great inspiration," "creative initiative," "unprecedented scope." In appraising data from the Taganrog survey, it is necessary to take into consideration that the rural population, as well as that in the Muslim republics, is much less educated than that the population of this Russian industrial city.
Our sociological studies, as well as those of other Soviet sociologists, have demonstrated that a considerable part of the Soviet population pay only perfunctory attention to the propaganda on many official values. Only patriotism as a value arouses response in the mind of the Russian population.

Our studies of the mass media established that instead of reading editorials, propagandistic articles, and materials on Marxist theory, economics, and the like, Soviet people prefer to read articles on moral conflict, humorous pieces, and articles on sports. In all newspapers, readers pay much less attention to ideological articles than to factual information and articles about everyday life. Only 18 percent of Izvestia readers paid attention to propaganda articles, whereas 65 percent read lampoons and other materials with critical orientations (Shlapentokh 1969).

Even among Pravda readers (among them 42 percent of Party members and 13 percent of Young Communists), 41 percent did not read articles on Marxist-Leninist theory, 29 percent ignored articles on party life, 26 percent on economic issues. At the same time, only 15 percent did not read materials on moral issues, 17 percent skipped over lampoons, and only 6 percent neglected articles on foreign events (Chernakova 1979).

The indifference of the whole Soviet population toward ideological issues is even greater than that of Pravda readers. In a survey based on a national sample (about this sample see Shlapentokh 1976, Muchnik, Shlapentokh, et al., 1978, Muchnik, et al., 1980) only 9 percent of the respondents told about their interests in "Marxist-Leninist Theory", and the same proportion mentioned their respondents mentioned their interest in "the work of Soviet local authorities, Ministries and other governmental bodies". At the same time, 48 percent told about their interests in international life, 47 percent mentioned morals and education, 32 percent—materials on housing conditions, wages and welfare and so on.

Indirect Data on Attitudes Toward Mythological Values:

The Leading Role of the Working Class and Socialist Democracy

As examples of popular attitudes toward specific Soviet values, we can examine the value of "the leading role of the working class". Despite all the vicissitudes in the evolution of Soviet ideology, this value continues to play a central role. The leadership role of the working class is an important brick in the frail structure of legitimation of the existing order. Especially since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the leading role of the working class has
not left the forefront of Soviet ideology. (The centrality of this value is linked to its use as a means of denigrating the stratum of intellectuals.) The peak of this glorification of the proletariat coincides with the years following the Czechoslovak invasion, from 1968-73. (For example, see Bliakhman and Shkaratan 1973).

Since no Soviet surveys have investigated attitudes toward this value, we have no direct information about the position of the population, including the working class itself, toward this value. However, we have some figures which suggest the nature of attitudes toward this value on a concrete level.

Of special importance are data on the prestige of workers' occupations in the Soviet Union. These data were obtained for the first time by Vladimir Shubkin in his famous studies in the early 1960's. His data, which were sensational and strikingly at odds with official ideology, demonstrated that the prestige of workers, presumably members of the leading class of Soviet society, was one of the lowest in the views of Soviet youth. Shubkin, for example, found in 1963 that boys gave the profession of engineers a 6.75 score (on a ten-point scale), the profession of scholars 6.70, but the profession of industrial workers only 3.68, and the profession of workers in commerce only 2.75 (Shubkin 1970).

Shubkin's data have been confirmed in the subsequent twenty years by a multitude of other Soviet studies. One of the most recent for instance, was the survey of Estonian students, which found that the prestige of scholars was evaluated at 4.74 (on a 5-point scale), while that of a repairer was 2.87, a tractor-driver at 2.80 and a laborer was 1.91 (Titma 1981, p.35).

In concurrence with data on the prestige of workers is information about the attitudes of Soviet workers to the future of their children. A very interesting survey was conducted by a Leningrad sociologist, A. Baranov, and his colleagues in Leningrad and Al'metievsk (a middle-size city in Bashkiria). The workers were asked whether they wanted their children to follow their lives; only 14 percent of Leningrad respondents and 27 percent of Al'metievsk ones answered positively. Only 8 percent from the first city and 23 percent from the second, wished for their offspring the same job or place of work as they had (Baranov 1981, p. 103; see also Faisulin 1978, p. 39). Even Soviet sociological studies conducted by ideological sociologists and by party committees reveal that the majority of workers do not believe they play an active role in so-called "self-management" or other forms of participation in government.
Vladimir Sbytov who stands out even among ideological sociologists with his utter fealty to the current political leadership cites in his recent book data from a survey of 2000 Dnepropetrovsk workers in 1980. The survey was conducted by the regional party committee and the Institute of Sociological Studies, Academy of Science in Moscow. Respondents were asked about their actual and desirable participation in the management of their enterprises. Only 24 percent agreed with the statement that "workers took part in the distribution of housing" (the most sensitive issue in the USSR), 24 percent "in the rating of work and setting wages," 29 percent "in distribution of bonuses" and 35 percent "in setting plans." (Sbytov 1983, p. 193-194)

Moreover, there are various indirect data which suggest that the majority of the Soviet people do not take seriously such a leading official value as "socialist democracy" and its superiority over Western democracy.

Of course the conspicuous indifference of the Soviet people to elections with one candidate on the slate is well known. (See Zaslavsky 1979) However, there are also other data which attest to the same.

Rafael Safarov conducted the survey of 1500 residents of the Kalinin region in 1972-1973 in order to collect data on people's attitudes toward the role of public opinion in government. He found out that the majority of the respondents (despite the loaded character of the survey) did not believe in the significant role of public opinion in the USSR. Thirty-one percent of his respondents declared themselves as incompetent in the evaluation even of local authorities' activity. (Safarov 1975, p. 53) Only 6 percent thought that they were competent in questions related to long-term planning (p. 56) and the same number of respondents supposed that local authorities completely took public opinion into account (55 percent said that they did it partially, 11 percent said they did not take it into account at all) (p. 121).

Attitudes Towards Specific Pragmatic Values: Public Property and Private Initiative

If it is possible to say that the majority of the Soviet population does not take seriously mythological official values and is well aware of their irrelevance to real life, the case with specific pragmatic values is much more complicated. Here we enter the two-level mentality of the Soviet people and their complicated adaptation to Soviet reality.

Having no real possibility of changing the actual social and political system, Soviet people have to
accommodate to facts around them, such as socialist property, social production and planning. This adaptation means that at the mythological abstract level, the Soviet people accept these features of the Soviet system as more or less reasonable and as possessing some virtues in comparison with the capitalist system. In particular, they definitely endorse at an abstract level socialized health care and education. This fact was discovered already by the participants of the Harvard project who to their great amazement found that even defectors from the USSR praised health services and college education which are free of charge. (Inkeles and Bauer 1959)

However, when we move from the abstract, mythological level of the Soviet mentality to the more concrete, pragmatic one, we begin to discern that the attitudes of the Soviet people toward official pragmatic values are much more complicated and that they are very inconsistent on this subject. Accepting social property and social production as a legitimate basis of social life, a growing number believe in the high efficiency of private initiative and private property, do not believe in the efficiency of socialized medicine, and have little moral objection to the "embezzlement" of socialist property. In this way, the pragmatic level works gradually against the mythological one, undermining its postulates and forcing it to change.

In this respect, a very telling indicator is what Soviet people think about stealing something that belongs to the state, what is classified as "socialist property". Moscow sociologist Alexander Grechin explored attitudes of Moscow workers to various violations of Soviet norms. Asked about their attitudes toward pilfering in enterprises, only 17 percent (despite the highly-loaded character of the questions) declared their support of the punishment of such people. Seventy-nine percent openly refused to take a negative position toward this act and 3 percent even approved theft. At the same time, the violation of the interest of a person is condemned much more actively. Thus 85 percent of respondents approved the punishments of those who hurt a woman, 77 percent considered it necessary to punish clerks in stores who cheat on buyers and so on (Grechin 1983, p. 124).

Another Moscow sociologist, Shalenko, interviewed 425 young workers in Moscow, Leningrad and Minsk in the 70's. Among other questions, he asked his respondents whether it was acceptable to steal parts from a plant. No less than 40 percent of his respondents said "Yes". (Shalenko 1977, p. 74)

Other such sacred Soviet values as socialist production, as opposed to private economic activity and accumulation, have also diminished very much in the Soviet
mind. Afflicted by numerous economic failures, especially in agriculture, the Soviet political elite itself under Brezhnev took the lead in the process of attenuating the centrality of these values.

While private plots were officially permitted, Soviet ideology intermittently attacked them and derogated the peasants for their interest in them. The leadership drastically changed its attitudes toward private plots in the mid-1970s declaring their full support of peasant activities on them. A special decision was adopted (though not published, for ideological reasons) which not only removed many legal obstacles to peasant efforts on their plots, but also ordered the official ideologies to shift from condemnation of the plots to praise of them as an important food source. The government even sought to materially aid the peasants with their family agricultural businesses.

This radical shift in official policy toward private plots was reflected in the new Soviet Constitution, adopted in 1977. An article in this constitution confirmed the right of people to have their private plots, and declared that "the state and collective farms have to assist citizens in keeping their private plots" (Konstitutsiia (Osnovnoi Zakon) Souza Sovietskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik, Moscow 1977, p. 10). In his report to the 26th Party Congress (February 1981), Brezhnev spoke of the support of private family plots as a fundamental element of Soviet agrarian policy, as if this policy had always been supported by the state (Brezhnev 1981, p. 64).2

It is remarkable that, at this time, the family has begun to be regarded as having an important place in economic activity. In numerous articles, the Soviet press has appealed to peasants, particularly the young, to understand how good it is to have a cow, some pigs, or chickens in their household, and not to be dependent on the vicissitudes of the state supply of food.

The resurgence of the role of private economic activity, however, is not limited to the private plot. More and more frequently, it is suggested that private initiative plays an almost decisive role, even in social production. In advancing various ideas on how to resuscitate Soviet agriculture, many experts have emphasized the creation of small productive units. These could be responsible for production with minimal governmental interference in their affairs, and granted autonomy for the distribution of income among their members. The best known of the experiment in this area is that conducted by the Kazakhstan agronomist, Khudenko. Indeed, in developing the notion of small production units, more and more the family is suggested as a
natural economic organization, which can be burdened with the responsibility for social production, as well as for its own plot.

This idea, which would have been regarded as absolutely heretical a few decades ago, today has become a nearly normal element of economic thinking. For example, Literaturnaia gazeta recently published an article with a title which would have been unthinkable ten years ago: "Family Farms". This article enthusiastically described the achievements of a state farm in Estonia, where cattle had been distributed among families which were responsible for the production of meat and milk. Answering the question of why the state farm did this, its director, Il'mar Laurits, bluntly explained: "What is our goal? We want the milkmaids and herdsmen to treat state farm cattle as their own." And then he rather sadly added that "business on family farms so far is going better" (Literaturnaia gazeta, November 23, 1983).

Leonid Shinkarev, one of the most prominent Soviet journalists, published in the newspaper Izvestia an article which strongly advocated private initiative in agriculture. The title of the article is also significant: "My land". Shinkarev cites the director of a state farm, Gordienko, who saw only one way to overcome the actual problems in agriculture--state farm land should be for peasants the extension of their own kitchen-gardens to such a degree that children continue to work on state farm land as on their own (Izvestia, March 28, 1983).

Having asserted itself in agriculture, the idea of the new economic role of the family has made its way in other spheres of the economy, particularly in the sphere of services.

Though we do not have at our disposal results of scientific polls, by all accounts the majority of the Soviet population have followed the government drift toward the acceptance of private initiative (even if on a limited scale) as the confirmation of its beliefs in the superiority of private economic activity over public, at least in agriculture, commerce and services.

Reflecting these views, Grigoriants, an editor of Literaturnaia gazeta declares that "in principle we deem that it is necessary to support the enthusiasts of moonlighting". Grigoriants advances a number of arguments in favor of the change from the old negative views on this subject. He said that it would be wrong to think that idleness and low productivity is worse than work for personal enrichment. He proposes to fight "prejudices against those who are ready to display their own labor
initiative and to work extra hours" (Grigoriants 1979, pp. 121-123). The editor from Literaturnaia gazeta is seconded by Mikhail Vasin, a member of the editorial board of the senior Soviet newspaper, Pravda, who ends his article about the private market with such significant words, "Let us lend an attentive ear to the market's language, ponder over questions raised by it--this means we must study the real practice of modern economic mentality, socialist entrepreneurship and business-like efficiency. (Pravda, 1983, September 10)

At the same time, the downgrading of social production and the upgrading of private activity arouses protest on that part of the Soviet population, mostly people of older generations, who cannot easily part with the sacred values of their youth. Vasin, the Pravda journalist, while defending market relations, cites with ostensible contempt, the letters of his compatriots who propose various drastic measures to curtail or almost abolish private activity of peasants and other people who bring their produce to market. One author, from the Stavropol' region "demands immediately to forbid the selling of flowers because it diverts people from the production of vegetables and fruits". Another gentlemen from the Kazakh Republic, goes even further and requires "the liquidation of private gardens and kitchengardens because they divert owners from social production". Most extreme was a certain Romanov from Tula, who simply proposes to "close all markets". Exposing the authors of these antimarket letters as social monsters and describing them as a tiny minority, Vasin got across to the audience that the majority of the Soviet population was definitely on the side of the further development of private activity, at least, in agricultural production. (Pravda 1983, September 10)

Of no less interest (in view of popular attitudes toward private economic activity) is a discussion on horses in Literaturnaia gazeta. This discussion arose from a very exotic development. A worker in a state farm in Bielorussia took a stray foal and raised it. The local authorities, however, referring to the law, required him to hand over the foal, either to the state farm or to a slaughter house. The newspaper got "hundreds of letters" from people who almost unanimously demanded that the foal be left with his savior. Everyone who took part in the discussion realized that the real subject was not the fate of the foal, but the attitudes toward private initiative, to the right of people to have a horse in their household. Only a few of the participants in
the debate came out against "the right to have horse as private property". (Literaturnaia gazeta, March 7, 1984)

Patriotism: A Mysterious Value

Patriotism has a very unique place in the system of official Soviet values. In general, patriotism is definitely a universal value. The best proof of this is that, in the first years after the revolution, patriotism was a bad word in the political lexicon of the new regime. Patriotism at that time was equivalent to allegiance to Tsarism and to Russian chauvinism, and was opposed to internationalism. The idea of the World Revolution as the central Soviet value was regarded as incompatible with patriotism and its focus on the supremacy of national interests. Since that time, however, through a number of intermediate stages (the concept of the victory of socialism in a single country, in particular) patriotism has become the central value of Soviet ideology. (See Agurskii 1979)

Certainly, Soviet ideology has sought to impart this value with a mixed meaning, a sort of blend of Russian chauvinism and Marxism and to link it to other leading Soviet values such as the "leading role of the communist party" and "socialist property".

Since the early 1930's Soviet ideology has mobilized in support of Soviet patriotism the old Russian traditions, which in their turn were fostered by all former rulers of the country in their own interests. As a result, Soviet-Russian patriotism turned into the most influential official value which only a few individuals dare to challenge in the USSR, including the most brave of dissidents.

With all this, the attitudes of the Soviet people toward patriotism are far from simple. In discussing this subject, it is necessary to treat separately the Slavs (and the Russians, above all) and non-Slavs. Since Soviet patriotism is in fact bolstered mainly by Russian chauvinism it is Russians and to considerable degree other Slavic peoples who are the main bearers of this value.

However, the attitudes of Russians towards patriotism is more than complex. For a considerable part of the Russian population, patriotism is really an internalized value and this means that patriotic feelings exert real influence on their behavior and people are ready to make sacrifices for patriotic goals as these goals are formulated by official ideology and the current political elite. Of course, even in this case, it is not easy to separate "pure patriotism" and the desire to acquire public prestige from patriotic action such as going to the Far East for participation in well-publicized constructions or even...
volunteering for the war in Afghanistan. At the same time, for a greater number of Russians, patriotism is a goal-value, a value for "others". Eager to demonstrate their allegiance to patriotism on all possible occasions, mostly at a verbal level and in denouncing of "others", these people are ready to do almost nothing for a patriotic purpose if it demands serious efforts, and especially serious sacrifices. Patriotism is located in the mythological level of the mentality of these people, and has little common with "material behavior".

This group of people willingly and enthusiastically supports any foreign actions of the Soviet government, so far as these actions do not demand any real sacrifices from them. As an illustration, Victor Zaslavsky and his anonymous colleague (1981), in an unofficial survey of workers in 1968, explored attitudes toward the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Seventy-six percent approved of the action, while only 15 percent opposed it. Others did not answer the question.

There is a third group of Russians who are either indifferent to patriotism or even consider it, as it is presented in propaganda, as a means for the political elite to control the population and to manipulate it with its own political interests. It is curious that even some Soviet data cast light on the existence of this third group. In this respect the events in 1983 were of special importance.

Soviet Patriotism and the Fear of Nuclear War: The Polarization of Soviet Society

The diversity of attitudes toward official patriotism was revealed in 1983 when, as a result of many circumstances (the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe and the irreconcilable stance to this event on the part of Moscow in the first place), the Soviet people were for the first time exposed to a regular barrage of information about the threat of nuclear war. Since 1982, and especially in 1983, the Soviet people have been forced to drastically change their image of the external world over a very short time. Now the specter of war has acquired a very prominent place in this image. This rather rapid change in attitudes toward war must be attributed to the fact that, for the first time Soviet people have realized that all the discussion about war was directly relevant to them personally. Now newspapers not only write about wars in Vietnam, Angola, El Salvador, and Afghanistan, but about war which directly menaces their existence. Information coming from diverse sources points to the conclusion that a large part of the Soviet population, for the first time since Stalins's death, are deeply worried about the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and many believe in the strong likelihood
of a nuclear war. Foreign correspondents in Moscow are unanimous on this subject, while Soviet tourists and visitors in the West also tell of the anxiety spreading among the Soviet people.

In May 1983, Pravda published an unusual survey of readers' letters. The author of the survey wrote that "in the first months of the year, the editorial board began to receive many letters with reflections about the dangerous consequences for peace of the eventual deployment of new American middle-range missiles in Western Europe". Usually, Pravda hastens to give specific figures on the volume of mail received. This time they avoided doing so, clearly because these letters demonstrated the kind of panic many Soviet people were showing surrounding the international situation. Pravda tried to suggest, albeit unconvincingly, that its readers remained quite optimistic.

The fact that the Soviet people are not optimistic is demonstrated by another survey by the leading Soviet newspaper, Literaturnaia gazeta. The author of this survey was the famous political scientist and journalist, Fedor Burlatskii. In the introductory remarks to this article, the editor wrote that "the newspaper received thousands of letters on international issues in the last year (1983)". Even the size of this mail is very indicative. It is also notable that, like Pravda, Literaturnaia gazeta violated tradition and chose not to specify the number of letters.

In any case, twelve letters chosen by Fedor Burlatskii for his comments reveal the unusual alarm concerning international developments. The authors of the letters treat the situation in a very pessimistic way, a deviation from Soviet norms.

The fear of war has also managed to penetrate Soviet fiction. In a recent artistically excellent novel by Georgii Semenov, City Landscape, the heroine asks her husband, who has been watching the television news, "What is new in the world? Danger? Tension?". And the husband "answered with a trembling voice, 'Very dangerous'". (Semenov 1983, p. 119)

One of the most eloquent indicators of the intensity of fear among the Soviet people, a fear which has seemingly gotten out of control of the leadership, is the fact that since December of 1983, officials have taken certain steps to reduce it. This slight reversal in approach probably reflects a lack of consensus among the Soviet leaders on their goals and concerning the expediency of the atmosphere which had emerged in the country.

The real fear of war has put to the test the patriotism of the Soviet people. A part of the population was
definitely on the side of the leadership. In his speech to the workers of a Moscow plant, "Sickle and Hammer" in April 1984, Konstantin Chernenko told the audience that the Central Committee received numerous letters from Soviet toilers with the request to "prolong" the working week, i.e., abolish one or perhaps even two free days a week in order to match the deterioration of the international situation (Pravda 1984, April 30). There are no grounds to suspect the Soviet leader of fabricating this event. These letters positively reflect the devotion of many Russians to official patriotism.

The Soviet press provides us with some data on the lack of consensus among the population on international issues and official foreign policy. This can be seen in the letters Fedor Burlatskii cited in his article in Literaturnaia gazeta cited above. Many of the letters stray far from the official interpretation of events, which strongly rejects any notion that both superpowers share equal responsibility for the tension. Two letters explained the international situation as part of some long-term trends which push humankind toward catastrophe, rather than citing the U.S. as solely responsible. Another letter suggested technological progress was the factor which made the competition between the superpowers so ridden with military danger.

The survey of letters to Literaturnaia gazeta also uncovered a number of explanations for the threat of war which deviated from the official line. Given the "organization" of letters by editors, it is likely that these represented only the tip of the iceberg, and that a serious polarization of opinion is developing in the USSR. Many appear willing to assign equal responsibility to the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Previous studies of Soviet public opinion on international issues in the late 1960s/early 1970s brought me to the conclusion that the Soviet population was distributed between groups in the following proportion:

Strong critics of foreign policy: 3-8 percent,
Mild critics: 15-20 percent,
Supporters: 50-70 percent,
Neutral or Indifferent: 10-25 percent.

These data are based on numerous surveys conducted by Soviet sociologists, including my own studies of readers of the mass media. The data, however, can provide an approximate picture of the structure of Soviet public opinion only with regard to the Slavic population, which made up about 71 percent of the country in 1979. If the non-Slavic population is also taken into account, the
distribution would alter in the direction of fewer supporters and more critics of foreign policy.

Attitudes Toward the West: A Combination of Animosity and Adulation

One of the most contradictory indicators of the attitudes of the Soviet people toward official ideology and its leading values is the position of the Soviet people toward the West.

Soviet ideology has made the assessment of Western life a mirror of patriotic feelings. According to the official image, a real Soviet, Russian patriot rejects as unacceptable all sides of the Western mode of life. It can be contended that Soviet propaganda in favor of the Soviet system and the motherland is mostly negative in the sense that it emphasizes not so much the advantages of socialism and Russia, as the negative image of the West. Xenophobic traditions, as well as a focus on the worst human instincts, are used profusely by Soviet ideologues in order to entrench a hatred of the West, and thus legitimate the existing system and prevent dissent in the country.

Grushin and Onikov analyzed the content of public lectures in Taganrog. They established that 80 percent of all statements about capitalist countries were negative, while statements about other socialist countries were negative 60 percent of the time, and about the USSR only 13 percent of the time (Grushin and Onikov 1980, p. 204).

It is unquestionable that Soviet propaganda is to some degree, successful in maintaining the negative image of the West in the Soviet mind. Grushin asked the residents of Taganrog in the late 60s (when the relations with West were much better than now) about some aspects of life in capitalist and socialist countries. Only 2 percent of the respondents thought that the USA enjoyed a high level of democracy, while 60 percent thought this was true of Bulgaria. Again, only 2 percent thought that there were good opportunities for education in the U.S., while 63 percent considered Czechoslovakia as the best country in this respect. Even the standard of living in the U.S. was assessed as high by only 5 percent of the respondents, as against 43 percent who voted for Poland. (Grushin and Onikov, 1980, p. 306)

A national survey of 10,000 adults, organized by the Institute for Sociological Research and Pravda at the height of détente in 1977, found the same results (about the sample, see Shlapentokh 1976; Muchnik, Shlapentokh, et al. 1978; Muchnik, et al., 1980; see also Chernakova, 1979). Using a 5-point scale, with 5 as the highest score,
respondents gave an average score of 1.80 to the West on "opportunities to get a job related to one's training", while the USSR received a score of 4.09 on this item. On the item, "opportunity to obtain an education", the West scored 2.20 and the Soviet Union ranked 4.23. For the "opportunity to get qualified medical service," the West was rated 1.63 and the USSR 3.98. On the "opportunity for good rest, sports, and satisfaction of cultural needs," the West received a score of 2.16, while the Soviet Union was rated at 3.68.

However, with all this, some data reveal that the attitudes of the Soviet population (without speaking about the liberal intelligentsia) toward the West (besides Western consumer goods) is very ambivalent. Interest in life in the West is one of the most conspicuous phenomena in Soviet cultural life. A survey of a sample of all adults in the USSR in 1977 cited above, established that interest in international issues holds first place among 18 subjects named in the question. Forty-eight percent of all 10,000 respondents in this national sample pointed (as I have already mentioned) to foreign information as very important for them, as against 9 percent who named Marxist-Leninist theory, 13 percent--party life, 17 percent--history of the revolution and patriotism, and so on (Chernakova 1979, p. 19).

Readers of Soviet central newspapers, who are more educated and politically active than the population as a whole, also unequivocally demonstrated their preference for international over domestic information. Thus, about 75 percent of Pravda readers declared that they consider international materials as very important to them, while 45 percent named editorials and 41 percent articles on party issues. (Evladov et al. 1969, p. 36; Chernakova 1979, p. 19)

Readers of Izvestia start their reading much more often with international news than with other items. Thus 36 percent of Izvestia's readers do this, while 37 percent start with editorials and 14 percent with economic issues. (Shlapentokh, 1969a, p. 100)

A survey of Leningrad residents in 1979 found that 82 percent of respondents displayed a stable interest in information about other countries and only 75 percent did so with respect to domestic affairs. According to the same survey, Leningrad residents more willingly discuss with each other international rather than domestic issues (67 percent against 61) (Losenkov 1983, pp. 48, 61). The high interest of the Soviet people in material on Western life cannot be ascribed solely to their concerns for peace. This interest was no less intense at the height of detente than now in a period of international tension.
Reading materials on Western life is some kind of escapism from the monotony of information about domestic life. At the same time, these materials satisfy the deep needs of the Soviet people to know about societies that are organized differently than their own and which are capable of creating such attractive consumer, as well as cultural goods.

The reading interests of the Soviet people are very indicative of attitudes toward the West. A study of young Moscow workers in 1975 discovered that 18 percent of the respondents regularly read contemporary Western literature and 12 percent read classical Western literature. Yet only 13 percent demonstrated their interest in literature on the peoples of the Soviet Union, and 7 percent in Russian classical literature. Only contemporary Russian Soviet Literature was more widely read (57 percent) (Ermolaiev 1979, p. 69)

A survey, conducted in the early 1970s of 7200 residents in various regions of the country by Nikolai Mansurov, also detected relatively high interest among the Soviet people in Western literature. In Moscow, for instance, the number of those who expressed interest in foreign classical literature was the same as those interested in Russian classical literature (17 percent). (Mansurov 1979, p. 129).

Education and Attitudes Toward Specific Soviet Values: The Intelligentsia Against Official Ideology

With higher levels of education, people know better the content of Soviet official values and the images linked to them, but their indifference is replaced with hostility. Our data show that professionals, and especially the intellectuals, display the greatest animosity toward specific official values.

Especially important, in this respect, are the results of the survey of readers of Literaturnaia gazeta in the 1960s. This paper had and continues to have the most educated audience of all papers in the country.

To measure the political attitudes of readers under existing conditions, we used the following indicators:

1. the intensity of attention to problems related to political life in the country, labeled in the questionnaire as "problems of socialist democracy";

2. attitudes toward the magazine Novyi Mir, at that time the mouthpiece of the liberal intelligentsia, and toward authors who later became active dissidents or emigrants;
3. attitudes toward the magazine Internatsional'naia literatura and thereby interest in Western culture;

4. interests in the classics of Russian literature frowned upon (like Dostoyevsky) or even prohibited (like Bunin) by the regime in the recent past.

The analysis of the data produces the same conclusion whatever indicator we employ. Scholars are in each case much more critical of the Soviet regime and its ideology than any other group of readers.

Thus, only 2 percent of readers with an elementary education and 6 percent with a secondary education declared they were not satisfied with information about the development of the Soviet Union. The respective proportion for readers with scholarly degrees was 22 percent. Only 7 percent of respondents with an elementary education and 9 percent of respondents with a secondary education said they were regular readers of Novyi Mir, whereas 45 percent of those with degrees said so. The respective data for the magazine Oktiabr, an adversary of Novyi Mir and the mouthpiece of the Soviet Right, were 2 percent, 3 percent and 5 percent.

The highly-educated audience of Literaturnaia gazeta in the 1960s manifested a keen interest in Soviet writers who had shown themselves as critics of the regime. Asked about authors of the best recent novels, readers of the paper indicated Simonov (14.1 percent of all respondents), Bulgakov (13.8 percent), Solzhenitsyn (10.2 percent), and Ehrenburg (10.2 percent). All were regarded in different ways by their readers as authors of works directed against the regime. It is notable that 69 percent of all novels mentioned positively by respondents were published for the first time in Novyi Mir.

Also very significant were the attitudes of readers of Literaturnaia gazeta toward the magazine Internatsional'naia Literatura, which publishes the works of foreign writers. This magazine was named by 11 percent of respondents with an elementary education, 14 percent of those with a secondary education, and by 22 percent of people with degrees.

The reaction of readers of Literaturnaia gazeta to the question about the Russian classics also demonstrated opposition to Soviet ideology, again increasing with the level of education. Readers put Dostoyevsky in third place, after Tolstoy and Chekhov, and Bunin in fifth place, whose works the Soviet authorities reluctantly began to publish only in the sixties. (We will address this again at a later point).
Data we obtained in other surveys confirmed the results of the study of readers of Literaturnaia gazeta. All these surveys showed, with increase of level of education, increased dissatisfaction (Shlapentokh 1969, 1970). The most negative assessments of critical materials in the newspaper Trud were chosen by 8 percent of the readers with incomplete secondary education, and by 16 percent of those with higher education (Shlapentokh 1980). In the survey of Pravda, the respondents had to answer an open-ended question asking for "additional comments and suggestions." This question was used mostly for critical evaluations of various phenomena of Soviet life. Among those who returned a mail questionnaire and filled in this question, 49 percent were people with higher education, while only 37 percent of those who did not answer this question had higher education (Shlapentokh 1980, p. 63).

These findings are corroborated by information from other sources. Andrei Amalrik has analyzed the composition of the democratic movement in the 1960s--in particular, those who signed letters against political trials and the restoration of the cult of Stalin. Of 700 persons whose occupation was known, 45 percent were scholars and 22 percent were engaged in the arts (Amalrik, 1978, p. 26).

Since the beginning of the 1970s, the political atmosphere in the USSR has deteriorated significantly and it has become impossible to conduct surveys even on such a limited scope as in the 60's, when it was possible to investigate in an indirect way, the political attitudes of the population. The new survey of readers of Literaturnaia Gazeta conducted by the sociologists of Moscow University avoided almost all "sensitive" questions which we had managed to include in the questionnaire in the mid-1960s. However, in few cases, where it was possible to compare both surveys it was found that the attitudes of the readers had not undergone any significant changes. For instance, the readers, and especially the intelligentsia and intellectuals, continued to display acute interests in Western culture and Western life. The magazine Internatsional'naia Literatura surpassed all other periodicals in popularity. In 1973, 28 percent of all readers were also subscribers to all party and political magazines taken together (Fomicheva, 1980). When asked about authors whose work they would like in the newspaper, readers clearly displayed their preference for foreign ones--7 percent named Soviet authors, 10 percent named foreign ones and 73 percent said both (Fomicheva, 1980). The growth
of interest in the West with the rise of education was also discovered in the Leningrad survey in 1978-80. (See Losenkov 1983, p. 53)

The few underground sociological surveys conducted in the beginning of the 1980s are of special interest. One of them was devoted to attitudes towards Sakharov (853 respondents), another toward Polish "Solidarity" (618 respondents). Both surveys were carried out in Moscow by unofficial interviewers who were asked to avoid interviewing their acquaintances, known for their liberal political views.

There is no doubt that under Soviet conditions, an underground survey cannot guarantee the representativeness of its sample. The effect of the interviewer should be also taken into account. An important advantage of such a survey over an official survey should, however, not be discounted. Respondents in an unofficial, presumably casual, conversation feel themselves much more free in uttering their true views than in a survey sponsored by the authorities.

In answering various questions related to Sakharov, his exile to Gorky, possible emigration to the USA, etc., 64 percent of all specialists in natural sciences and engineering and 65 percent of all humanists evaluated the behavior of Sakharov positively, (20 percent of the respondents in the first group, and 31 percent of those in the second evaluated him very positively. The respective figures for workers were 20 percent and 12 percent). The second study yielded similar results--61 percent of all scholars, but only 21 percent of all workers spoke positively about "Solidarity".

Summary

Popular attitudes toward official ideology are extremely contradictory. The Soviet people ignore, or display hostility to, all specific mythological values, such as "socialist democracy" or the "leading role of the working class". The majority of the Soviet people support the main specific pragmatic values like "socialist production" and "public property" at a verbal level but are not influenced by these values in their everyday life.

Even attitudes toward patriotism, the strongest official value, are contradictory. Again, at a verbal level this value is backed by the absolute majority of the Soviet population. However, as Soviet people move from verbal recognition of this value to practical action, even the Russians split into different groups, varying by their readiness to observe the prescription of patriotism in
concrete behavior demanding sacrifice. Attitudes toward the West are also far from simple: Soviet people combine animosity inculcated by ideology with adulation of the Western mode of life.
In another study conducted by G. Slesarev, respondents were asked what was the social status desired for their children. Only 10 percent of the workers wanted their children to inherit their social positions. Sixty-seven percent wished their children to become professionals. All groups, and the professionals themselves, thought in the same way (Slesarev 1978, p. 214, see also Faisullin 1978, p. 39).

Now the Soviet press again attacks the peasants. However, this time it is not because they have too many pigs or cows in their households which distract them from their work in collective farming, but because many do not want to have cattle at all. "It is not justifiable," states an article in Ekonomicheskai gazeta, the newspaper of the Central Committee, "that many families living in the countryside do not have cattle at all." (April, No. 17, 1983)

In this respect, the position of Roy and Zhores Medvedev is characteristic. Whatever forces are behind their literary activity, the Medvedevs definitely represent those critics of the system who still support their government in foreign affairs. Rejecting the notion that the U.S. and the USSR are both responsible for the current trends in international events, they argue that "despite the more open character of American society, we will argue that the role of successive American administrations has been, and continues to be, more provocative and less predictable than that of the Soviet Union. (The Nation, January 16, 1982)

And in his recent article, a eulogy to Andropov, Roy Medvedev describes the late Soviet leader as a champion of peace who was "sincerely committed to negotiation and the peaceful settlement of international issues". The New York Times, February 15, 1984) Those familiar with Soviet history will remember that during the Second World War, White Russian emigrants in the West were deeply split, and some of the fiercest enemies of the Bolsheviks wished with all their hearts for a Soviet victory over its enemies.

See, for example:


See, for example:

6 See, for example:
Pravda, December 15, 1983.
Pravda, February 4, 1983.

7 Only liberal intellectuals, despite the enormous pressure, try even now in the early 1980s, to demonstrate that it is possible to combine love of the motherland with respect for Western culture. (See as an example Andrei Voznesenskii's article in Literaturnaia Gazeta, 1984.)

8 By all accounts, respondents were much more critical of the USSR with regard to the "opportunity to improve one's well-being", because the authors did not include the responses to this question in even this classified publication. The West was not rated very highly—at 2.12. But perhaps, the Soviet Union did not score much better on this issue.

9 Boris Firsov, a sociologist who is very sensitive to the ideological implications of his studies, tried to refute the established conclusion about the acute interest of the Soviet people in international information. However, all he could do was oppose rural-dwellers to urban residents: rural people with lower education than people in cities really display a little less interest in events abroad than more-educated urban people (Firsov 1981, p. 107).

10 The proportion of readers with a higher education, completed or incomplete was about 70 or 80 percent, whereas this indicator for Pravda was only 49 percent, and for Izvestia, 47 percent.

No other newspaper was read by scholars as much as this newspaper. Scholars constituted about 17 percent of readers, 8 percent had scholarly degrees, while 6 percent were workers, 12 percent were teachers and 3 percent were members of the Party apparatus and governmental bodies. It was also very characteristic that 16 percent of readers were students—the next largest group after scholars.

11 Attitudes of readers of Literaturnaia gazeta toward poets reveal the same tendency. The highest rankings we given to Yevtushenko (41 percent), Rozhdenstvenskii (23 percent), and Voznesenskii (18 percent). At least two of these, the first and the third, were praised at that time as social critics. Of the twenty most popular poets, four were persecuted in different ways by the regime—Pasternak, Akhmatova, Tsvetaieva and Mandelshtam.
The study of the literary tastes of readers of another paper Trud, carried out at the same time, produced entirely different results. The direct influence of the much lower level of education of its readers was clearly visible. Only 25 percent of them had a higher education and only 2 percent were scholars. Works most popular were conformist, officially endorsed (and of low aesthetic quality) like Doctor Vera by Boris Polevoi. This time, the novels of authors associated with Novyi Mir collected only one percent of all votes.
CHAPTER THREE

THE PRIVATIZATION OF SOVIET PERSONAL VALUES

Rejecting official values as the basis of their everyday lives, the Soviet people look for other values which can constitute a moral ground for their life. Of various universal values which attract the attention of the Soviet people, two values are especially important--family and friendship. The position of official ideology toward these two values is not the same. While the Soviet state supports the family as a universal value, it remains rather hostile towards friendship.

In the first period after the Revolution, the system of Soviet values was openly hostile to universal values. Of course the founders of Soviet society could not completely ignore all universal values. But among all universal values, they chose only one--social equality--and declared war on practically all others. Of course, any other value proclaimed by the leaders of the Russian revolution could, in the end, be related to one or another universal value. However, the first Soviet elite so constrained universal values that they lost practically all connection with their essential nature.

Take the value "human life." The Bolsheviks did not proclaim that they were against this value. But in any conflict between this value and other values like "the dictatorship of the proletariat" or "world revolution," the value "human life" receded and in this way lost its links to the Biblical injunction, "Thou shalt not kill."

Another example: respect for the culture and traditions of the past can be regarded as one of the strongest universal values. The early Soviet elite did not declare itself an enemy of the past. But again, other values that received much more vehement support, like "class conflict" and "internationalism," reduced this value to such a state as to make it impossible to recognize it as the universal value it had been.

But from the beginning of the 1930's, the Soviet elite began to push the system of official values in the direction
of universal values. The cause of this development is not completely clear.

Two different, if intertwined, trends should be singled out. One of them was manifest in the introduction of ritual values that were intentionally remote from real practice. Another trend has to do with those universal values that gradually have really been incorporated into Soviet life.

As an illustration of the first trend we can take the universal value of representative democracy. In the first years of the Revolution, this value was rejected as absolutely incompatible with the concrete value of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin wrote scores of articles denouncing and derogating so-called "bourgeois democracy", which was identified with parliamentary democracy.

However, as far back as 1936, or less than twenty years after the revolution, Stalin introduced a new constitution based in many respects on the principles of parliamentary democracy. This constitution implied free direct elections that formally did not differ at all from the Western type. (A future historian with no other material about political life in the 1930s than the texts of different constitutions would even find some advantages for ordinary people in Stalin's Constitution over the constitutions of some Western countries.) Although more than a quarter of a century has elapsed since Stalin's death, and there have been thousands of changes, major and minor, in the Soviet Union, no one of his successors has made even the slightest attempt to diminish the purely ritual character of elections held in the country (Zaslavsky 1979).

Another trend related to universal values has contributed even more to destabilizing the system of Soviet official values. Here I refer to the growing role of some humanistic values.

As I noted before, Soviet ideology, until the midsixties carried out a harsh struggle against the very notion of "all-mankind values." Denouncing the "abstract humanism" that draws no distinction between Western and socialist moral values remains an important ploy of Soviet officials or Party ideologues in their fight against Soviet liberals or Western intellectuals. However, since the mid-fifties, the ardor of the denunciation of universal values of a humanistic nature has remarkably cooled. In some fields of cultural life it is practically extinguished. Evolution towards the recognition of universal humanistic values began after the death of Stalin. Although he introduced a number of socially-oriented universal values, until his death Stalin maintained an absolute hostility to even the ritual rehabilitation of humanistic values.
In the restoration of these values it was the intelligentsia that took the lead, embarking on the offensive in a number of spheres, of which the most prominent was literature.

Since 1953, Soviet literature has been involved in an active struggle to restore universal values. It is possible to discern two different trends in literature in this connection. One has been related to the attempts to defend universal civic values like democracy, political freedom, and equality. The second function has been related to universal humanistic values like love, friendship, beauty, fairness, honesty, and devotion to parents and to the past.

The trends have picked up their momentum at different periods, depending on many circumstances, especially political developments. Perhaps three periods may be singled out. In the first period—the second half of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties—both trends were more or less equal in force, if we measure them by the popularity of writers representing them. In the second period—the sixties—the civic theme was the most compelling. In the seventies, with its political apathy among intellectuals and with the rise of the Slavophile movement, the humanistic values prevailed.

Many significant events in literary life in the Soviet Union after 1953 were linked to the fight for the restoration of universal values. In the 1960s, the popularity of the magazine Novyi Mir rose considerably thanks to the civic and humanistic, individualistic spirit of the majority of works published in the magazine at that time. The popularity of so-called country prose was also significant. Writers of "country prose" turned their hand chiefly to the defense of values discarded after the revolution.

The humanistic orientation of the Soviet intelligentsia led to the rehabilitation and the fantastic popularity of writers of the 1920s and the 1930s whose works were prohibited up to the sixties. Two names are especially important: Bulgakov and Platonov.

Bulgakov's masterpiece The Master and Marguerita became for all Russian intellectuals a symbol of imperishable universal humanistic values. "Manuscripts do not burn"—this was the major idea of The Master and Marguerita, an embodiment of the intelligentsia's belief in the existence of stable and invariant principles under the changing conditions of the external world.

The longing of the intelligentsia for universal humanistic values was also manifested in the extraordinary popularity of poetry. The role of individual experience and
the concentration on human personality in works of the lyric poets led to the extremely great popularity of five poets, whose poems were proscribed to different degrees in Stalin's time: Sergei Esenin, Osip Mandelshtam, Boris Pasternak, Marina Tsvetayeva, and Anna Akhmatova. Even greater was the popularity of contemporary poets who united civic and humanistic lines in their works. Only this and not aesthetic merit, which was sometimes of a very modest level, can explain the unprecedented vogue in the 1960s of such poets as Evgenyi Yevtushenko and Andrey Voznesenskii.

The same tilt of Soviet intellectuals to universal humanistic values considerably accounts for the rise of bardic poetry—that is, the writing of music and words for songs, performed by the composers themselves. In bardic activity, as in any trend in literary life in the USSR in the 1960s, there were two tendencies—the proclaiming of civic and humanistic values. The leaders of the first tendency were Alexander Galich and Vladimir Vysotsky, and of the second, Okudzhava. In the second half of the 1950s, and in the 1960s, civic values prevailed as factors affecting the public's interests in poetry generally, and bardic poetry in particular. In the 1970s, the accent seemed to shift toward universal humanistic values.

Of no less interest was a trend in attitudes toward classical Russian literature. If Soviet ideology since the revolution has favored those writers who emphasized social conflicts and in this way shored up negative attitudes toward universal humanistic values, the survey of the readers of Literaturnaia gazeta again demonstrated that the intelligentsia had begun to be oriented to those old Russian writers who tried to resolve external problems of human life and who were absorbed by problems that ensued from the existence of universal values. Tolstoy was favored by 36 percent of all respondents, Chekhov, 32%; Dostoyevsky, 21%; Kuprin, 18%; Bunin, 17%. At the same time, socially oriented authors were much less popular.

Soviet intellectuals expressed their feelings about universal values in their preferences among foreign writers as well. At the top of the list of their favorite modern authors, we again meet those writers who have been regarded as champions of human individuality and humanism: Ernest Hemingway was favored by 12.1 percent of respondents; Erich Maria Remarque, and Heinrich Boll, 9.1 percent; Graham Greene, 8.9 percent; J.D. Salinger, 8.4 percent.

The move towards the recognition of universal values in social science has not been so exuberant as in literature and art, because there has always been less freedom in the first field than in the second. For all this, Soviet philosophy and sociology also have made significant steps in the same direction.
As characteristic examples, two publications may be compared—one belonging to Vladimir Tugarinov (1960), another to Oleg Drobnizkii (1977). Tugarinov has been a typical representative of ideological philosophy. Striving to keep abreast of the times, he published the first book in the Soviet Union to have the word value appear without quotation marks in a title. That was in 1960. In it he rejects ideas about universal values as absolutely inadmissible to Soviet philosophy. On the other hand, there is Drobnizkii's book, published posthumously in 1977, with a preface written in 1970. And how differently Drobnizkii approached the same question! Far from rejecting the concept of an ethical absolute as nonsense, he tried to combine the recognition of absolute and universal values with Marxist theory and its moral relativism. Despite all the ideological subterfuge, he legitimized absolute, "all-mankind" values in Soviet philosophical literature.

Along with literature and science, a third field should be noted—religion. The rebirth of religion in the Soviet Union is unquestionable and has been documented by Soviet sociological research even with all the restrictions imposed on investigations of such a sensitive issue. The causes of the religious movement in the country are diverse. Beyond a doubt, one of them is connected with people's search for absolute values, for something that can be used as a touchstone for moral behavior. In this way, almost a third of the religious explained their adherence to religion to Soviet sociologists.

Pressure from the intelligentsia and worry about the legitimation of the regime have compelled the elite to some humanization of Soviet ideology through the addition of some universal humanistic values. The Soviet elite has let up on the constraints against the implementation of some values, and in this way made it possible to present these values as the usual universal, even absolute values. Simultaneously, the elite has ceased glorifying such values as mercilessness, the physical elimination of the enemy, and such. It is certainly curious that with all the boundless, even idolatrous, devotion to Lenin, the Soviet censors have not, since the 1950s, permitted the quotation of any work of Lenin in which he eulogized terror, the killing of enemies, and so forth.

Gradually, Soviet ideologues began to move from the rejection of the concept of humanistic, "all-mankind" values as a product of bourgeois society to the inclusion of these values in their writings and even official documents (such as "The Moral Code of Communism Builders"), and to the assertion that only communists are real defenders of these universal values. Thus, recently, the Soviet philosopher Grigorian, in an article in Pravda with a now typical title, "Humanism of Communist Ideology," contends that "the
concrete and real character of Marxist humanism does not imply the underevaluation of the significance of all-mankind norms and moral requirements... It is Marxism which is the genuine heir of world humanism and which combines the spiritual heritage of the past with the present and the future" (Pravda, June 25, 1983).

As an example of the evolution of official ideology, we can look at such a value as respect for, and care of, parents. Directly and indirectly, the official ideology actively attacked this value after the Revolution. Quite understandably, in the atmosphere of a civil war, collectivization, and purges of various sorts, the authorities wanted their underlings to be ruthless to any enemy even if he turned out to be their parent. The case of the pioneer, Pavlik Morozov, is really symbolic here. In the early thirties, this thirteen-year old boy reported to the authorities that his father, together with some other peasants, had gotten up a plot against a collective farm. This report would have led unavoidably to the arrest and execution of the father and his friends. Learning of his deed, his uncle killed the boy with an axe. This case was put to use by the Soviet propaganda machine as an example of model behavior. There was no child or adult in the country who did not come to know of this incident. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of streets throughout the country, as well as pioneer camps and detachments were named in honor of poor Pavlik Morozov. His exploit was worked into all history textbooks. In treating the period of collectivization and the history of the communist youth movement or the history of the class struggle, no one could omit the name of Pavlik Morozov. The ideological pressure proved to be rather effective. The majority of the population, especially youngsters, sincerely believed in the high moral quality of this boy's act. The Morozov case was among many events used to destroy positive attitudes toward humanistic values.

What is the fate of Pavlik Morozov in Soviet ideology now? He has been altogether forgotten. Soviet ideology almost pretends to know nothing of such a story. The recent fiftieth anniversary of this event went almost unnoticed in Soviet mass media. In connection with the anniversary of the Pavlik Morozov exploit, a New York Times correspondent from Moscow cited an article from the Soviet newspaper, Sovietskaya Rossiia which dealt with children who still do inform on their parents. But, the paper's attitudes was this time was very far from lauding these actions. "There is something fundamentally unnatural in having a child, an adolescent, a youth assailing the holy of holies--respect and love for father and mother." (New York Times, 1982, September 16, p. 4) The present attitude of the elite to
the story is yet another indicator of the changes in the system of values that have taken place in the country since the mid-fifties.

Such a value as respecting and caring for parents is supported now without reservation. There are no attempts to denigrate this value in the mass media, in literature, and so on. We may contend that this value has been restored formally in the country as a universal, in some sense even as an absolute, value. Moreover, the weakening of Soviet ideology and Soviet official values has led to such a strengthening of this value that neither the rank-and-file nor the highest of the elite would hesitate to sacrifice important interests of the state for the sake of their parents or children.

If the Soviet elite is compelled to publicly declare its allegiance to some universal values, this is not the case with such values as self-respect, fairness, personal friendship, altruism, or compassion. No references to these values are to be found in official Soviet documents—in particular, the Constitution or materials of the Party Congresses.

The Family: An Agent of the State or a Personal Refuge from the State?

In the first years after the revolution, the Bolsheviks were destroying the family as a bourgeois institution. Since that time, the official views on the family have undergone very significant changes. (See Stites 1978; Lapidus 1978) Stalin wanted to turn the family into the main agent of the state along with the political police, for control of the Soviet people of all generations.

Though the ideological and operational position of the Soviet political elite toward the family is much more lenient than was true under Stalin, it continues to consider the family as an important agent of its policy. The state expects the performance of a number of functions from the family.

However, it would be erroneous to presume that all activities expected from the family by the state are always at odds with the interests of ordinary Soviet people. The interests of the state and the population do coincide to some degree in the concern for the procreation of new generations. In addition, the Soviet population has no objections to the governmental attempts to increase the birth rate in the country, although on the individual level, they completely ignore the political and economic considerations behind the natalistic policy of the state.
And, there is also a considerable convergence of views between the state and the population with regard to the education of children.

The Soviet elite continues to formally place an ideological function on the family, demanding that parents do their best to inculcate the current political directives of the leadership. The judicial document, The Statute of Marriage and the Family of the Russian Republic explicitly demands from parents the "education of children by the family in organic combination with social education in the spirit of devotion to the motherland, to communist attitudes toward work, and in the preparation of children for active participation in the construction of communist society". Even officials recognize, however, that the family cannot now play any serious ideological role and that, in fact, it serves more the opposite goal.

Yet, the Soviet family, as in the past, continues to be used by the state for its police functions. The family remains responsible for the political behavior of its members, especially children. Parents are in serious trouble if their children, as seniors in high school—or worse, in college—commit actions regarded as politically unloyal or criminal.

The role of the family as hostage to the Soviet authorities is especially clear in the official policy of allowing travel to the West, in most cases, only by those who have family, particularly children. The obvious consequences for family members, in the event of defection, tends to curb drastically the likelihood of people not returning home from a mission to the West. Prohibiting trips abroad by entire families also significantly diminishes the probability of defection.

However actively supported by the state and ideology, the Soviet family, since the mid-1950s, has lost much of its instrumental role as an institution effectively used by the state as a means of social control. Since 1953, the Soviet family has gradually emerged as a cohesive unit that confronts the state, rather than serves it. The family is now a locale for complete ideological relaxation and the expression of genuine views on current events. Here Soviet individuals, from members of the Politburo to ordinary workers, acquire what they are deprived of in official life.

Soviet studies, even those conducted by ideological sociologists like Nikolai Mansurov, indicate that the majority of Soviet people regard the family (along with friends) as the place where they can really elaborate their views on developments in the world. Family and friends are much more important in this role than the educational
system, the place of work, or any other area. Asked who influences them the most in the formation of their opinions on vital matters, residents of the Vladimir region, in a 1976-78 study, put family decisively in first place, ahead of school, mass media, and social organizations such as trade unions. The same results were obtained by Goriachev, et al. (1978), and other researchers.

The family also plays the central role in relations surrounding the "second economy", the enormous unofficial system of distributing goods and services, parallel to the official economy. Members of families trust each other completely about their activities in this realm (e.g., illegal production, bribery, etc.) and serve as important connections to assist each other in obtaining what they need. Had intra-family relations remained unchanged from their structure during the Stalin era, the "second economy" could never have approached the scale it has during the last two decades.

The growing antagonism between the state and the family is revealed in another phenomenon, no less important than the "second economy". This is the problem of protection and nepotism among members of the elite. This protection and nepotism flourishes among both national and regional elites.

The confrontation of the institutions of family and state has also led to the emergence of a greater desire for privacy. Until recently, the notion of privacy was, to some degree, alien to Russian life. While much of this can be traced to long historical traditions, too complex to elucidate here, it can be said that under the Stalin regime, privacy was almost totally eliminated from Soviet life, well beyond traditional patterns. Under Stalin, the family was rather structured against privacy, and in many families people did not feel themselves any safer than in their offices or factories.

With the changing role of the family, and with a glimpse of the possibility of having a place protected from state intervention, the public mind has begun to accustom itself to, and elaborate the principle of, privacy. As one rare indicator of this tendency, we can use some of our data from the 1977 survey of readers of Literaturnaia gazeta. Our questionnaire contained a question designed to elicit how inclined unmarried respondents were to recommend the use of a dating service to their relatives and close friends. In considering these data, we should take into account that only one percent of all respondents were opposed to the existence of such services. While one-fourth of the respondents said they would not recommend a dating service to friends or relatives, and about one-half answered that they would do so, the remaining one-fourth rather unexpectedly responded that the matter was a person's
private business and that they would not impose their advice on others.

This was a closed question and this alternative was available to respondents. However, given the public support for dating services, we assumed that few respondents would select this alternative. Thus, I must confess, we overlooked the possibility that some respondents would focus on another aspect of the controversy—beyond the utility of dating services—and view it in connection with the right of individuals to make their own decisions on such personal matters. It is notable that this position was most commonly taken by the youngest and most educated readers of Literaturnaia gazeta.

The relative disentanglement of the family and state, and their confrontation as social values, has become very much a part of the public mind. This confrontation extends beyond the areas mentioned above (security, material support, privacy), and occupies a central location in the realm of ideology. The family has become a symbol of the institutions which stand in opposition to the state, a development commonly found in non-democratic societies of all kinds.

The ideological atmosphere in the USSR has been shaped by the struggles of the state and the people to mold the family to suit their conflicting needs. Paradoxically, it can be noted that the official recognition and support of the family as a social value has made it possible for individuals to turn these values to their own advantage. For example, university students are expected to repay the state for their education by accepting work assignments, often in far-flung regions of the country. Yet, by appealing to the official support of the family, some graduates can avoid such assignments, arguing that severe familial disruptions would result.

The Family as a Dominant Personal Value

Soviet sociology has accumulated a certain amount of data directly portraying the place of marriage and the family in the value system of the Soviets and it is notable that there is some consensus among the results obtained by different Soviet sociologists on the subject. Moreover, data from other socialist countries (Poland, Bulgaria) are perfectly consonant with Soviet data.

The major finding of studies of the personal values of people in socialist countries is that the family, directly or indirectly, is given a leading, often the leading position on any list of values ranked by respondents. It can be said that a "drift to domesticity", if we measure it
by the change in the role of the family in the system of personal values, has always been one of the most important social and political trends in socialist society (See Inkeles 1980, p. 49).

The family turned out to be first in importance to respondents in the surveys conducted by Zakhar Fainburg among workers and engineers in the Ural city of Perm in the 1960s (1969, p. 93), by Iuri Arutiunian among the Moldavians in the early 1970s (1972, p. 18; 1980, p. 151), and by Gevoros Pogosian in Armenia in the late 1970s (1983, p. 164).

Data produced by Vladimir Iadov in his long-term investigations in Leningrad led to the same conclusion. In Iadov's first study, done with Andrei Zdravomyslov in the mid-1960s, he discovered that young workers oriented toward their families exceeded in number any other orientation: 42 percent of the young workers were family-oriented, 23 percent were education-oriented, 8 percent job-oriented, and 12 percent civic work-oriented (Iadov et al. 1970, p. 248).

Iadov's next study was devoted to Leningrad engineers. This time the dominant role of the family as a "terminal" value emerged even more clearly. In the list of 18 terminal values, the family was outranked only by "peace" and "health". In this survey, as in the surveys of Fainburg and Arutiunian, the family outstrips such values as work, social recognition, active life, and so on (Iadov 1978, p. 56).

The dominance of the family as a value was revealed even more conspicuously when all respondents were clustered according to their orientation in more or less homogenous groups. Of eight groups, only the four smallest included those who did not consider family a dominant value. These groups consisted of only 16 percent of all respondents. Thus, 84 percent of all respondents found themselves in groups characterized by a strong family orientation. What is more, only with one of these groups could the authors affirm that the orientation toward family and job were "balanced". Other groups, with 55 percent of all respondents, are described as predominantly oriented toward the family. In evaluating these data, it should be taken into account that a considerable proportion of respondents—one-fifth—were not married and one-fourth had no children (Iadov 1977, p. 229).

It is curious that such a "bureaucrat" in Soviet sociology as Anatolii Kharchev, the editor-in-chief of the lone Soviet sociological journal and a man who very cautiously (and in many cases very deftly) wanders through Soviet ideology and politics, did not understand (or refrained from pointing out) that data produced by him reveal the denigration of official Soviet values by
respondents. About one thousand people in the Vladimir region, asked in 1976-1978 about the influence of various social factors on their mentality, gave conspicuous priority to the family. School, mass media, social organization, the party, the young communist organization, trade unions, and labor collectives were ranked lower. The same rankings were revealed, as Kharchev says with satisfaction, in the survey in 1969 of students in higher schools and college (Kharchev 1982, p. 17).

Data collected by Sverdlovsk sociologists show that the general mood of the Soviet people depends much more on the quality of their family lives than on other factors, including their work lives. The sociologists categorized groups of people who were satisfied or not satisfied with three elements of their lives: work, family, and leisure. Then it was determined what proportion of the people in each group considered themselves as "happy" and "unhappy". The comparison of groups indicated that people who are satisfied with their family lives are more likely to be happy with their lives as a whole. Among those who were satisfied with all three elements of their lives, 46.7 percent considered themselves to be "completely happy". Among those who were satisfied only with work and leisure, the proportion indicating complete happiness was only 20.7 percent, a difference of 26 percent, which should be imputed only to family. The respective difference for work was 22.8 percent, and for leisure, 22.9 percent (Kogan 1981, pp. 172-73).

The significance of marriage is revealed in other indicators, such as the subjective evaluation of one's marital status. A 1970-75 survey of workers in various Soviet cities found that well over twice as many divorced individuals as married regarded their marital status as negative. Among women, 47 percent of divorced respondents, as against 21 percent of their married counterparts, expressed such negative evaluations. Among men, the figures were 35 percent for the divorced, and 16 percent for married respondents (Fainburg 1981, p. 146).

Friendship as a Private Value

Friendship is another private value which Soviet people oppose to the state and which is now one of the most important pillars of their real morality.

While never having engaged in vituperations against friendship, Soviet ideology has, however, never bestowed upon it the title of a significant social value. This may seem strange, given the role of collectivism as a fundamental of Soviet ideology. Indeed, friendship, as well as less intensive relations such as comradeship, can be treated as manifestations of collectivism (or at least as
its initial forms). Some authors, such as Sokolov (1981) and Zatsepin (1981), are actually inclined to approach the issue in this way. However, official ideology and the most sophisticated writers, such as Andreieva (1980), repudiate (usually implicitly) such identification of friendship with collectivism, simply because the latter involves the interactions of many people. Friendship, in contrast, is normally dyadic and a personal, even private, type of relationship, closer to the individual than to the collective. Moreover, in the Soviet context, the collective presupposes the existence of external control, and it is just this characteristic which endears it so to the mentality of a Soviet apparatchik. However, the essence of friendship as such is the rejection of the idea of the intervention, or control, by any third party.

Thus, it is not possible to locate in official Soviet documents any hint of the importance of close relationships between individuals. Soviet mass media do use the term "friendship" profusely; however, this is almost always at a "macro level", as in "friendship among the people" or "friendship between the working class and peasants". Even if we examine the entire period of Soviet history, it is hardly possible to find in Pravda a single editorial devoted to personal friendships between Soviet individuals, though editorials are frequently addressed to issues of much lower social significance. The few articles in which personal friendship is touched upon generally praise military, or labor, friendship as beneficial to the society or the state, but almost never as relations which may be valuable for individuals per se.

If Pravda's lack of interest in friendship can be somewhat explainable in Soviet ideological terms, the absence even of a word on friendship in such a wordy Party document as "Main Directions in Reforming General and Professional Education" (which took almost the first two pages of Pravda January 4, 1984) can be hardly accounted for other than by enmity to friendship. Devoting a special paragraph to the "moral and legal education" of students, the Central Committee, official author of the document, requires that "collectivism and mutual exactingness" be inured since early childhood and does not mention friendship, mutual support or understanding of two or more people, though party officials could not ignore that friendship was one of the most important life problems for children and youth.

The Soviet system has serious grounds to be, if not hostile to, at least suspicious of, close relationships between people, and especially to close, intimate friendships. In this respect, it does not differ from any other society with a nearly omnipotent state. The leadership of such societies will prefer to have the
individual completely isolated from other people and, thus, more directly at the mercy of the authorities. Zamiatin and Orwell skillfully grasped this important feature of the totalitarian society: friendship is an obstacle to the absolute dominance of the state over the individual. Moreover, friendship frequently constitutes the basis for the creation of underground organizations, and of antigovernmental activities of any sort.

Of course, the state and the political leaders do not regard all friendships in the same way. They are virtually indifferent to close interpersonal relationships among persons who do not hold significant positions in society, in particular among workers or peasants. However, as a person's social status increases, personal relationships become a focus of greater and greater attention on the part of authorities, especially of the political police.

Friendship Against the State

Friendship as an institution serves the Soviet people against the state in a variety of ways. Friends are in many cases sources for information which cannot be obtained from the official mass media. According to our studies, as well as those of other sociologists in the Soviet Union, no less than one-fourth of the population regards word-of-mouth information as a vital source of knowledge about the external world and, especially, about the internal life of the nation (Shlapentokh 1969 and 1970; see also Mickiewicz 1981; Losenkov 1981).

Data obtained in other studies support this important role of informal interpersonal communication as a source of political information. A survey of Moscow students revealed that 23 percent of all respondents regularly seek out friends to gain information about events within the country, and another 41 percent do so occasionally (Goriachev, et al. 1978, p. 39). According to a survey of employees in the Vladimir region, up to 50 percent of the respondents mentioned their friends and colleagues as sources of political information, whereas party workers and agitators were mentioned by only 20 to 25 percent (Mansurov 1978, p. 17).

This exchange of information will only take place if people trust each other. For this reason, information flows most readily between friends. Only friends, for example, will swap news they have learned from listening to foreign radio. And, it is only with friends that it is possible to discuss freely and without reservation, impressions of trips abroad, or even of travels within the country.
In a survey of Moscow students nearly half (48.9 percent) of all respondents declared that in order to check the reliability of new information, they compared it to that of their friends. Less than one-fourth (23.5 percent) checked information with other students, and 20.9 percent with members of their families. Only 2.8 percent asked the opinions of their teachers, who are regarded as representatives of the administration (Goriachev, et al. 1978, p. 40). Even more important is the role of friends in the case of emergency.

Since much earlier in its history, periods of political persecution have been regarded in Russia as the strongest test of friendship. Those who did not desert their friends facing governmental harassment have been regarded as among the most noble of people. However strong and intimate friendship can be, the cost can be high. This was especially true in the Stalin era, when persecution could rapidly extend to those who kept friendships with persons treated as enemies of the state. As the Stalin era became more distant, however, more and more frequently people began to stand the test of friendship when their close comrades found themselves in conflict with the government.

The role of friends in the life of a dissident has been skillfully described by Amalrik (1982), whose work was cited above. Although in permanent confrontation with the Soviet authorities for nearly two decades, Amalrik provides a generally quite positive assessment of the behavior of his friends toward him. Similar impressions can be drawn from the memoirs of General Grigorenko (1982).

I also have some interesting data, which I collected under some very special circumstances, and which serve to demonstrate the role of friendship in Soviet society. As soon as I applied for an exit visa in October of 1978, I began to carry a diary in which I collected observations on the attitudes of people around me. In some respects, this study bears the features of an experiment and a study in participant observation. 7

Taking into account the pressure of the authorities on those who maintained relations with would-be emigrants, it was extremely interesting to register, during my six-month wait for a visa, the behavior of various sorts of acquaintances and to compare this behavior "after" with that "before" my application.

In analyzing this data, I singled out the following categories of people with whom I had been in contact before "the event" of my application: close friends, friends, very good acquaintances, good acquaintances, and ordinary acquaintances.
What my data reveal is that friendship turned out to be the strongest value and that people I regarded as close friends were ready to sacrifice other values for the sake of our relationship. The less close were my friends, the more likely they were to alter their behavior toward me.

TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>PERCENT OF PEOPLE WHO MAINTAINED CONTACTS AT THE PREVIOUS LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close Friends</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Good Acquaintances</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Acquaintances</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Acquaintances</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of special interest is the behavior of my colleagues, the sociologists in my institute and in other research units. My circumstances affected their behavior in the following ways:

TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>PERCENT WHO CURTAILED OR CEASED CONTACT WITH ME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colleagues in the Sociological Institute</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleagues in Other Institutions</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Students</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-colleagues</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As these data reveal, friendship passed the test under the circumstances described above. Of course, if the political atmosphere in the country had been worse than it was in the late 1970s, and if I had not been a "legal" applicant for a visa, but a dissident, all these figures would have been much different.

In the 1970s, Vladimir Sokolov conducted several surveys related to moral issues. He discovered that people even at a verbal level, confess that they are ready to make sacrifices for the sake of a friend or a beloved person much
more willingly than for the sake of society. According to Sokolov's data the difference is 15 percent. (Sokolov 1981, p. 79).

Friends in Everyday Life

Certainly it would be erroneous to reduce the role of friendship in Soviet society to purely political factors and underestimate the other stimuli which drive individuals to close relations with each other. To be sure, friendship plays a central role in the lives of people in democratic countries. Similarly, for many in the Soviet Union, a friend means, above all, an individual to whom you can pour out your soul, who recognizes your virtues and is lenient of your weaknesses, who is your advisor in intimate spheres of life, and with whom it is pleasant to spend your leisure time.

Soviet people provide each other considerable assistance in "beating the system." Friends play an extremely vital role in the procurement of necessary goods, for they constantly buy each other food, clothing, shoes, or other items, should the chance to "take" them arise, i.e., should they appear in stores. As Hedrick Smith (1976) aptly observed, the Soviet people know by heart the sizes of all of their friends, and do not miss the opportunity to buy something that will fit someone they love. Even more important is the assistance of a friend who has access to closed stores or cafeterias. Friends have the moral right to ask to be brought some food or clothes regularly from places that are inaccessible to them.

Friends are extraordinarily active in providing assistance in all other important spheres of everyday life. They are the first to whom people inquire when it is necessary to find a job, place children in a good high school or college, or get to a hospital or health resort. The importance of friends is directly proportional to the unavailability of goods or services, and is inversely proportional to the importance of money in obtaining hard-to-find items.

With friends as the providers of all sorts of goods and services, the emergence of networks of friends-of-friends becomes unavoidable. Indeed, such a network can virtually extend across the entire country, and anyone can reach nearly anyone else through the intermediation of one or, at most, two or three people. This neatly illustrates a phenomenon of the "small world", described by Milgram.

It is, thus, natural that the prominent role of friendship in the everyday lives of Soviet people is closely intertwined with the "second economy", and the relations
based upon it. There are, however, two types of radically different relations involved here. On the one hand, people involved in the "second economy" maintain less intimate relations, based largely on bribes, extra payments, and covert exchanges of goods and services. Friends, on the other hand, render services to each other without material reward or compensation--aside from the emotional gratification of recognition as a friend. Yet, even with this, the rendering of services to friends also forces people to infringe upon rules, or even laws. Because of this, friendship and family obligations in the Soviet context contribute significantly to the maintenance of the "second economy", and to corruption and the general moral decay of the society. The obligations of friendship, as well as those of the family, also tend to undermine the role of objective, universalistic criteria in social life. Professional performance, honesty, and fairness, which ideally should guide the distribution of rewards in a society striving for efficiency and justice, become subordinate to access based on who one knows.

It is characteristic that Buieva, a Soviet social psychologist, and her co-author, Alekseieva, in their article, "Communication as a Factor of the Development of Personality", underscore that "true collectivism" and "the defense of own people" (the authors preferred not to use the term "friendship") are incompatible with each other. They write, "the struggle against the relapses of Philistinism is above all the active denial of communication and knocking together of informal communities (and sometime, even of whole offices), based on the principle "you-me, I-you" and also the denial of the submission of social activity to narrow egotistical interests" (Buieva and Alekseieva 1982, pp. 39-40). Having denounced friendship in Soviet society as it really exists as Philistinism, the authors reflect on a major problem in this society--the orientation of mutual relations between people against the state and official ideology.

The Cult of Friends

The available data suggest that Soviet people attribute to friendship a much more prominent place in their system of values than do Americans. In a survey by Rokeach, conducted at the beginning of the 1970s, Americans located "friendship" in tenth place on a list of terminal values. (Variation existed by education. Those with some college education ranked friendship 12th, while those with a completed college education located friendship a bit higher on the scale, in 7th place). A study by Iadov of Leningrad engineers, conducted at about the same time, found friendship ranked sixth on a list with the same number of values (Rokeach 1973, p. 64; Iadov 1979, p. 90).
Similarly, in a study of married people in Leningrad, when asked about the most important basis for a happy family life, 15 percent named friends, while only 12 percent cited "interesting leisure in the family", "good standing on the job", or "desirable education". It is interesting that the number of respondents who indicated as a pre-condition for a happy family life, "confidence in the marriage", was only slightly higher (17 percent) than those naming "friends". Only "children" (42 percent), "having own apartment" (47 percent), "mutual understanding between spouses" (50 percent), and "material well-being" (50 percent) significantly surpassed the role of friends in the perception of what is needed for a happy family life (Boiko 1980, p. 105).

As in other societies, the valuation of friendship is particularly strong among young people. A survey of Estonian students, conducted in the late 1970s, revealed a first place ranking for "communication with friends" from a list of nine life values, with a score of 3.29 on a five-point scale. "Communication with a loved person" received only 3.01, while "studies in school" scored 3.10. Perhaps most surprisingly, responses to "reading, theatre, concerts, exhibitions" scored only 3.13 on the scale (Titma 1981, p. 77). An earlier study, conducted on young Leningrad residents in the late 1960s, showed that 99 percent of all respondents pointed to "finding reliable friends" as their most important goal in life. Only the goal of "finding interesting work" surpassed the importance of friends among the respondents (Ikonnikova and Lisovskii 1969, p. 91).

Some interesting facts may also be culled from the studies of very ideological sociologists. One study of Moscow students sought to determine the degree to which students had internalized the so-called "Moral Code of Communist Builders". Of all the principles of this code, itself a mixture of Soviet slogans and universal values, students revealed the greatest understanding of "friendship and collectivism", while other principles had been digested less well. "Patriotism" was best comprehended by 22 percent of respondents, while "honesty" (8 percent) and "internationalism" (5 percent) were even less adequately internalized (Goriachev, et al. 1978, p. 59). (In evaluating these data, it is important to take into account not only the different emphases on these values in Soviet propaganda, but also the fact that respondents must adapt themselves to quite loaded questions with explicit ideological objectives). 9

Indeed, the role of friendship occupies so central a role in the Soviet mentality that, in a study of students at Tartu University in Estonia, 25 percent ranked as one of the most important characteristics of an occupation "its capacity to gain esteem among friends". Twenty-nine percent
attributed similar importance to "broadening of their knowledge about the world" and 25 percent to occupations which are "useful to the people". All other qualities of occupations, such as the "creative character of work", "good income", "social status", received much lower rankings (Solotareva 1973, p. 244).

It is curious that in order to persuade single women to have a child, Soviet sociologist Bestuzhev-Lada resorted to the role of friends in the life of Soviet people. He exclaims literally, "How simple, as it turns out, to implement the cherished dream of everybody about friends? How simple to get rid of solitude!" (Literaturnaia gazeta, September 14, 1981, p. 13).

Summary

With the decay of ideology, the Soviet people are more and more oriented toward private values such as family and friendship. Starting with the destruction of the family as an institution, the Soviet state today supports the family and tries to use it to its own interest. However, the family has more and more become an institution directed against the Soviet state. The conspicuous preference of family to all other official values demonstrates how much the Soviet people are in fact estranged from official ideology. The role of friendship in this respect is even more remarkable. Even more than family, friends serve as means to "beat the system", to back the individual in his/her confrontation with the state. Family and friends both constitute the basis of the second economy which could not have developed without these institutions.
FOOTNOTES

1 Until the middle of the sixties these poets were almost totally ignored, not only in school textbooks and reference books but also in professional literature. They also went unpublished for several decades. However, the survey of readers of Literaturnaia gazeta in 1968 revealed that all these poets were among the most beloved by the readers. In the list of the twenty-one most popular poets, Esenin was the sixth with 13%, Pasternak the tenth with 9%, Akhmatova the fifteenth with 7%. Tsvetayeva and Mandelshtam, who are the most persecuted among all the best poets (Mandelshtam died in a concentration camp in 1938 and Tsvetayeva committed suicide in 1942) were the last on this list, with 4%.

2 The number of votes for Yevtushenko in the survey of Literaturnaia gazeta was simply incredible. If I had not conducted this survey myself, I would not believe these data. He was favored by 41% of all respondents; the second highest figure in this part of the survey was 36% (the people who named Tolstoy as their favorite classical writer).

3 So, Saltykov-Shchedrin received 2.5 percent; Herzen, 3 percent, and so on. To correctly assess these data, it must be taken into account that Dostoevsky and Bunin were very poorly published in the country.

At the same time, Western writers like Mitchell Wilson and James Aldridge, who criticized capitalist society, though favored by the Soviet elite, were of very modest popularity: Wilson received 2%; Aldridge, 4% of the votes.

4 This time it is critics of the Soviet system who, on various occasions, remember the name, which has become a symbol of the moral quality of the Soviet system.

5 Valentin Rasputin's novel Live and Remember (1980), is a characteristic hallmark of the evolution of Soviet public opinion on the relations between the state and the family. The appearance of such a novel would have been nearly impossible even a few years earlier. The developments in this novel take place during World War II. By the concurrence of various events, Andrei Gus'kov, a young peasant, becomes a deserter and thereby commits one of the most despicable crimes in Russia. He hides close to his native Siberian village, where his wife, Nastena, discovers him. Moved by contradictory feelings--love of her husband and horror toward his cowardly action--she begins to help her husband to survive and to conceal himself from others, including his father. Finding herself pregnant after a secret meeting with Andrei, Nastena explains her condition
as a result of a love affair and staunchly endures her shame in the village, but does not betray her husband.

For the first time in Soviet literature, family ties are placed above the state. This case, which reminds one of the famous Antigone, is diametrically opposed to the glorification of Pavlik Morozov, the thirteen-year old boy who reported on his father during the collectivization of the 1930s, as well as other cases from this period when family members denounced each other as enemies of the state.

At the same time, it is obvious that many Soviet respondents, being unsophisticated in the subtleties of Soviet ideology, straightforwardly identify "friendship", "comradeship", and "collectivism" as synonymous concepts. This circumstance is important to keep in mind when dealing with Soviet sociological data.

A few words about the sample. It included about 300 individuals with whom I was in more or less regular contact before my declaration to go abroad. The majority of the sample was scholars (79 percent) and other intellectuals--writers, literary critics, painters (8 percent). Fifty-seven percent were men and 43 percent women. Of all "observed" individuals, 22 percent were under 30 years of age, 44 percent were between 30 and 50 years old, and 30 percent were over 50. Thirty-seven percent of all the people in my environment were Party members. Of all the "units" in the sample, 44 percent were Russian, 40 percent Jews, and 10 percent half-Jews. Seventy-six percent were residents of Moscow.

Kvasov, an official in the Party's Central Committee, known for his ideological aggressiveness, published the results of a survey which is rather curious by Soviet ideological standards. The survey was carried out in a Moldavian cloth factory between 1974 and 1979. Asked about attitudes toward certain values, the majority of respondents (mostly women) clearly demonstrated that they assessed human relations much higher than official values. Asked what they value most in people, 77 indicated a dedication to hard work, 74 percent mentioned kindness, and 67 percent said modesty. At the same time, only 49 percent cited "devotion to the cause", and 45 percent "a person of principles"--two officially supported values. Moreover, when asked of their life's priorities, love ranked in first place (73 percent), respect of other people (67 percent) was mentioned second most often, followed by "to be useful to other people" and friendship (both mentioned by 64 percent) (Kvasov 1982, p. 189).

Another, also ideologically-oriented survey of 12,000 employees in various regions of the country in 1978-79 (-sponsored by such institutions as the Academy of Social
Science at the Central Committee, the Higher School of Young Communists, and the Institute of Sociological Research also produced some interesting data (quite inadvertently, given the project's directors). The respondents were asked about which human traits they found widespread among their contemporaries. It turned out that 88 percent of the respondents supposed that "comradeship" was very widespread among Soviet people. However, only 72 percent thought the same about "ideological convictions" and the same proportion thought that a widespread characteristic was that "people's deeds and words did not differ from each other" (Sokolov 1981, p. 67).

The warm and sincere article of Vladimir Voina, "Close Friend or an Ordinary Friend", in the Soviet weekly Nedelia (1984), stands out as an extremely rare example when a Soviet periodical dared to praise friendship as such, without linking it to social duties. "Friendship" writes Voina, "is a sacred thing... Friendship is an invaluable gift, one of the highest existential values". Looking for the most convincing proofs of his thesis, the author cannot help citing examples from his personal life demonstrating that the friend's help when one is in confrontation with the state is the most serious test of friendship (Voina 1984).
CHAPTER 4

HEDONISM IN SOVIET SOCIETY: PLEASURE TODAY. NOT TOMORROW

The Future in the Soviet Mentality Today

One of the most significant trends in Soviet life is the increasing role of hedonistic values. We can now address this issue in greater detail.

It can be argued that the rising concern among the Soviet population for the immediate gratification of desires is directly traceable to a perception that the future promises rather little. The belief in the "radiant future", which surrounded the excitement of building the new society in the first decades after the Revolution, has vanished. And while the post-Stalin period, largely in the 1960s and early 1970s, witnessed a relatively rapid rise in living standards, such improvements have nearly ceased, and in some areas even show evidence of decline. Under Soviet conditions, the individual accumulation of money does not promise much. And while there is no unemployment in the Soviet economy, the rate of upward mobility has slowed drastically and opportunities for promotion are bleak for most of the population.

Under these circumstances, workers and peasants cannot even dream of improving their social position (although they can still hope their children will move up), while members of the intelligentsia and apparatchiks can never be certain that they will not be demoted tomorrow, whatever their prior contributions to society. Even a member of the Politburo--not to mention ordinary bureaucrats or intellectuals--may be downgraded with little warning.

This climate of deep ingratitude on the part of the authorities toward the efforts and sacrifices made by the citizenry for the sake of society, contributes greatly to the general despondency about the future in Soviet society. In this context, the growing fears of nuclear annihilation only exacerbate the refusal of the Soviet people to look hopefully toward the future. The result (not uncommon among certain segments of U.S. society) is a focus on immediate gratification and the disregard of moral constraint.
Indeed, the corruption which has seeped into virtually every sphere of Soviet society—and which directly or indirectly involves majority of the population—is able to thrive in large measure because people see little grounds for self-restraint of this atmosphere. We can now turn to the influence of hedonistic values in some spheres of the Soviet individual's life.

The Me-Orientatio: Health Mania

The most conspicuous and general sign of hedonism in Soviet society is the growing orientation of individuals to themselves, their own needs and pleasures. The American "me-decade" described in the 1970s by Tom Wolfe, has taken, in some respects, much more wanton forms in the USSR. This is directly related to anomie flourishing in this society (I will dwell on this a little later).

One of the manifestations of this new trend in Soviet life is the recent mounting interest of the Soviet people in their health, a phenomenon unknown in the country even two decades ago. To the surprise of a team of Leningrad sociologists, headed by Vladimir Iadov, engineers, both men and women, out of eighteen terminal values, put their health in first place, before peace, and family, not to mention other Soviet values (Iadov 1978, p. 90).

The survey of 4000 Armenian workers in 1978-1979 brought almost the same result. Armenian respondents also ascribed first place to health in the list of 15 values (although when the sociologists used an open-ended question, health turned out to be second to family) (Pogosian 1983, p. 164).

Soviet mass media and Soviet literature reflect the growing mania which has swept all strata of the Soviet population. The magazine Zdorov'e (Health) is among the most popular periodicals in the country. Already in 1967, 38 percent of all readers of the newspaper Trud were subscribers to this magazine (against 10 percent to all party periodicals, 3 percent to all popular political magazines, and 2 percent to all sport magazines). Only two other magazines Rabotnitsa (Woman-Worker) and Navkai Zhizn' (Science and Life), which also devote much space to health issues, were ahead of that magazine (48 and 39 percent, respectively). What is more, among people with higher education, Zdorov'e took first place, elbowing away even Rabotnitsa (Shlapentokh 1969a, pp. 45-47).

Grushin also discovered in his survey of Taganog residents in 1973 that the same magazine made up more than 10 percent of all magazines to which his respondents were subscribing or buying, yielding again only to Woman-Worker.
And at the time of the survey the circulation of this magazine was limited and only a part of those who wanted to read it could do so (Grushin and Onikov 1980, p. 132).

In their recent novels, Soviet writers more and more often portray their heroes as people completely absorbed with the preservation of their health, with the search for natural food and for new physical exercises. The reviewers of some recent novels in Literaturnaia gazeta, Gribovskaia and Bugel'skii, describe with amazement these suddenly emerging new heroes of Soviet literature (they name them "domestic philosophers"). They all are, like Iakushkin in Vladimir Makanin's "Forerunner" or Banykin in Vladimir Lichutin's "Domestic Philosopher" mad about "the struggle with their own stomach", preach fasting, and look for "yogis, needle pickers, palmlayers, telepathers". Even the reviewers cannot hide from readers that these new heroes of Soviet novels are not only far from the official ideology, but even brazenly try to create their "own" domestic philosophy.

The authors of the review lecture "our domestic philosophers" in "books as well as in life" to the effect that "it is impossible to be so much consumed with psychophysiological and even physiological experiments... The mastering of personal hygiene is only to run away from a valuable, harmonious life. Being absorbed only with raw food or vegetarianism, an individual loses very much" (Literaturnaia gazeta, April 4, 1984, p.4)

Prestige-Mania

The almost sudden growth of the role of prestige in Soviet life since the 1960s is another blatant manifestation of the "me-orientation" period in the USSR. The increase of the need for prestige, in the recognition of "others" is, of course, a result of the amelioration of the Soviet standard of living after 1953 as well as the increase of the educational level of the population, including residents of the countryside.

There are two types of prestige--primary and secondary. The first type reflects the real contribution of the individual to social progress, to the well-being of the country or mankind. The second type of prestige is related to the attributes of life typical for outstanding people, those who enjoy the primary prestige (Shapentokh 1977). Soviet people more and more are absorbed with secondary prestige, which is socially a very harmful phenomenon.

This tendency is revealed in the first place in the importance Soviet people attribute to prestigious clothes, furniture, cars and other material goods which testify to
the high social position of their owners. Various sources witness the importance that Soviet people ascribe to foreign goods such as American jeans and sheepskin coats, Japanese electronic devices and so on (Shipler 1983, pp. 347-358).

Prestige considerations command attitudes not only to material goods, but also to occupations, cultural activities, leisure time, travel, and so on. Since the early 1970s, the Soviet press has broken the silence on the prestige mania in the country and started to discuss this issue, suggesting people curb their prestige inclinations (Zhukhovitsky 1976; Bestuzhev-Lada 1983). Recently, Arsenii Gulyga wrote in Literaturnaia gazeta that "Now prestige is in fashion. People are taken away with yoga and karate in order to be the strongest and the healthiest. It is prestigious to have clothes with labels, to be cured in a research institute and, of course, to work in the place of the same sort, to rest only in a prestigious sanatorium and to have their children studying in special schools." (Gulyga 1984, p. 7).

The craving for symbols of prestige has even expanded to include children. For parents, their children's success, as well as their appearance, have become indicators of prestige among growing numbers of Soviet people. Along with promoting their children by all means to good universities and good jobs (quite often not for the sake of the children, but for the satisfaction of their prestigious aspirations), Soviet parents also use them as instruments for demonstrating their social status and wealth, as another manifestation of conspicuous consumption. This selfish motive is quite often combined with parents' readiness to pamper their little ones and to cater to their wishes.

The growing material aspirations of Soviet citizens have strongly stimulated the inclinations of parents to provide children with the most luxurious clothes and gadgets of all kinds, as well as with expensive trips and other forms of entertainment. For example, it has been found that practically all urban families with tape recorders (40 percent of all families in cities) have children. In addition, families with children are the first to buy color television sets, the best record players, books and magazines (Literaturnaia gazeta, October 26, 1983, p. 14).

Moreover, expenditures on children often do not correlate with the incomes of parents, a fact partly traceable to the role of the "second economy" in which influence and connections are more important than money. Soviet parents do not hesitate to buy American jeans or sheepskin coats on the black market for their offspring, though the price of these prestigious clothes in the USSR may be one month's salary, a fact that has been much discussed in the Soviet mass media (Zhukovitsky 1976;
Shlapentokh 1977; Matskovskii 1981). A survey conducted in a school in Evpatoria shed light on parents' ambitions in a small provincial city: 115 senior students were asked about the gifts they had been given on their last birthday. To the great amazement of their teachers, only three children had gotten flowers, and only five had gotten books. Twenty students had been given money, and one-third of the girls something gold. Even more surprising was the average value of the gifts—92 rubles (Pravda, April 18, 1983). (The average monthly salary of Soviet employees is 172 rubles, and average per capita income is much less (Ts. S.U. 1982, p. 420).)

Soviet writer Kamil Ikramov emphasized even more the deleterious role of prestige mania on Soviet children. He writes, "Among many factors which impede the correct upbringing of children is also prestige mania, an adult disease which now has extended also to children. Music or dance on ice, special mathematical or linguistic school, chorus or circle of young naturalists—all these are very important things, however they all are equated to children's clothes—those children are dressed better. By all accounts, children have become even more important indicators of prestige than a country house, a car or cruise abroad" (Pravda, October 10, 1983).

The social significance of prestige mania was recognized by the Soviet leaders themselves. Chernenko devoted to this issue a special place in his ideological report to the Central Committee in June 1983. He said, "We cannot help but be scared by the fact that a part of youth strive to stand out not through knowledge or work, but through valuable things bought at the expense of their parents" (Pravda, June 15, 1983, p. 3).

Hedonistic Values and Work: Soviet Sociologists Leave Their Romantic Theories

In the 1960s and early 70s, Soviet sociologists held two romantic images about people's attitudes toward work. Liberal sociologists advanced the concept of creativity as the motive growing in importance (Iadov, et al., 1970), while ideological sociologists insisted that work for the sake of the motherland was the real impetus for the growing number of Soviet people (Changli 1973, 1978). Of course, ideological sociologists who are impervious to real facts continue to shore up this concept.

However, in the late 1970's the most observant sociologists (including those who previously cherished the romantic concepts about the special role of creativity) started to move to new perceptions of the motivations of Soviet people.
First of all, Soviet sociologists revised the ideas of the 1960s about the minor role of income as a stimulation to work. The leading researchers in the restoration of the role of money as a motivator for work were Irina Popova—a well-known industrial sociologist—and Viktor Moin. They demonstrated that the data, which had been used to minimize the importance of wages as a motivator, were in fact unreliable. They concluded that the "collected sociological information does not provide grounds for the view that work was the first basic need of the respondents, and that material rewards played a significantly smaller role in comparison with, say, the content of work. Our data demonstrate that information of this sort describes, above all, the value perceptions of workers about the 'ideal', desirable (from a societal viewpoint) attitudes toward wages" (Popova and Moin 1982, p. 104).

Their data, which seemingly destroy the results of many studies conducted since Iadov and Zdravomyslov's work, were collected in surveys in 1975 and 1982 (the first sample included 4500 respondents, and the second 320).

The survey involved asking workers to respond to questions as they related both to themselves and to other workers. For example, when asked why they had left a given job, 34 percent cited the low level of wages. However, when asked why others did the same thing, 86 percent indicated dissatisfaction with wages was the central motivation. While only 4 percent explained their motivation for leaving the countryside to work in a city as stemming from a desire to improve their income, 29 percent attributed the same motivation to others.

Comparing data from two surveys of young Leningrad workers—in 1962 (this survey served as the basis for developing the concept of the growing role of creativity in the motivation of workers) and in 1976, Azalia Kissel' came to the same conclusions. She discovered that even those workers who asserted that the social importance of work is the most important factor for them (the number of these workers increased from 23 percent to 33 percent) in fact, only pay lip service to this ideological slogan. Kissel' remarks that "idealized 'normative' attitudes toward work ... remain uninternalized" and it is dangerous to lose touch with reality by exaggerating the role of "communist attitudes towards work" (Kissel' 1984, pp. 49-50).

Finally, sociologists established the very important role of prestige in all decisions pertaining to work. Starting with the choice of occupation, sociologists already in the late 1960s detected the desire to have a prestigious occupation behind the apparent yearnings for creative work (Vodzinskaia 1967).
In the next decade, various studies produced new data showing the real role of prestige in shaping people's attitudes toward occupations as well as other phenomena in Soviet life. Thus, Balandin found in his study of Perm workers that satisfaction with work is directly linked to the prestige of this work (Balandin 1979, p. 22; Loiberg 1982, p. 31).

At the same time, it is significant that in the last decade, the prestige of occupation and of the place of job starts to decline in favor of a big income or access to semi-legal or even illegal deficit goods and services. With this, even the prestige of education, so high still in the 1960s, also begins to demonstrate some decline. Gross, even vulgar, hedonism takes the upper hand over its more subtle forms.

In the 1960s, sociologists discovered the very low prestige of people working in commerce. Now, the situation is not the same. Since work in commerce promises many material advantages, and since hedonism has become rampant, the occupation of a salesgirl does not look today as repellent as in the past. An author in Literaturnaia gazeta cites the following example. He was studying the number of applicants to two vocational schools—one industrial, and the other commercial. The first school promised to its graduates a salary of about 220-240 per month, the second only 120-140. However, the number of applicants to the second turned out to be many times higher (Literaturnaia gazeta, 1983, September 28, p. 12).

Good Occupational Conditions: The Search for Easy Work

The most striking trend in the sphere of work turns out to be a new phenomenon—the growing importance ascribed by Soviet people to the conditions of work. The representatives of the "romantic period" also paid attention to occupational conditions. However, they emphasized occupational conditions in their function as factors influencing efficiency of work, the quality of performance. Unlike American scholars such as Melvin Kohn (1969, 1983) even autonomy in work was perceived mainly, not as a quality of work which is a source of immediate gratification, but as a precondition for the successful accomplishment of creative work.

Now, Soviet sociologists look at occupational conditions not as factors of "input", as production conditions, but as factors of "output", as conditions which can make work less painful, less hard, less tense, more enjoyable, more clean and so on. In many cases good occupational conditions begin more and more often to be preferred to a higher salary. Vladimir Magun went so far as
to introduce in his analysis of labor attitudes the utilitarian concept of the "price of activity", strongly denounced by Soviet ideologues in the past. In terms extremely innovative for Soviet sociological literature, he writes that productivity "is a source not only of satisfaction, but also of the deprivation of human needs, a fact which was practically ignored in the previous model of the relationships between productivity and satisfaction" (Magun 1983, p. 142).

What is more, Magun suggests that since the productive workers usually are the most competent, they are also more demanding for "occupational conditions" and for this reason, they evaluate their efforts higher than others. Data at Magun's disposal show that in his sample of Leningrad workers, the most productive people include those most dissatisfied with the various occupational conditions, such as the state of equipment, rate setting and so on (Magun 1983, pp. 142, 152, 153).

Numerous studies carried out in the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s demonstrate that various "occupational conditions" have moved to the forefront as factors influencing human attitudes toward work.

Leningrad sociologists, using data from two studies of young workers carried out by Vladimir Iadov, came to the conclusion that in 1975, in comparison with 1962, "indicators of dissatisfaction with work conditions increased, while objectively these conditions improved" (Kissel' 1984, p. 53).

Mikhail Loiberg, one of the leading Soviet industrial sociologists, studied workers' attitudes in the timber industry. He concluded that "the role of the content of work as a motive for the selection of occupation drastically decreased." At the same time, he pointed to the extraordinary role of occupational conditions as factors influencing workers attitudes toward their jobs. According to his data, only 27 percent of his respondents considered their physical tension during work as normal (Loiberg 1982, pp. 32-33).

Against the backdrop of the growing role of a hedonistic approach to work, the problem of manual labor has come to the forefront of public attention. Now, more than in the past, people do not want to engage in physically arduous labor. Over the last decades, the absolute number of people who work at manual labor has increased. The army of manual workers consist now of 50 million people (Literaturnaia gazeta, March 7, 1984). The low prestige of manual work and the material rewards, which are seen as inadequate for the hardship of this work, account for the
permanent shortage of people willing to take such work and the very low quality of work generally performed (Grigas 1980, p. 105).

Pleasure Versus Marriage

One of the most blatant manifestations of hedonism in Soviet society can be found in the domain of man-woman relations. Though marriage and family continue to be the leading values for the majority of the Soviet population, a growing number of Soviet people postpone their official conjugal alliance or even plan to stay alone forever.

In his article about negative attitudes toward marriage, the prominent Soviet demographer and economist, Michael Sonin, cites the letter to a newspaper from a Ph.D., 42 years old, who flaunts his reluctance to marry. The man begins his letter with the description of his rather high standard of living, and then puts the question and answers it: "Why don't I marry? Simply because I don't want to", and advises other men not to. "I may ask myself whether loneliness oppresses me. I answer, no, because there are always women around who are ready to brighten up my life." He ends his letter: "Times change. Before, married people lived better than bachelors in every way. But now, everything is different. Freedom and love--it is my ideal. Man's ideal, I mean."

It is notable that Sonin does not deny the man's major thesis, that the life of the bachelor is better than that of a family man who cannot afford the pleasures so accessible to bachelors. Sonin's major criticism is that these egotistical people decrease the birthrate and deprive many women of a "good mood", which in turn diminishes their productivity in the economy by 15 to 20 percent (Sonin 1981, pp. 189-93).

Another letter from a young girl, presumably Russian, published in Pravda, is quite consistent with the results of the study described above. She writes: "In recent times, many people think about family. I am 19 years old, but I do not have the slightest desire to marry. Women are overloaded. Music, theater, books--all this is available only before the wedding. All the more if you do not have a mother. And then the subjects of conversation of married women--spouses and children! Perhaps those who do not need more are really happy" (Pravda, November 13, 1983).

The Trend Toward Smaller Families: Children vs. Freedom

By the same logic, hedonism emerges as an enemy not only of marriage but of children as well. A growing number
of Soviet families are childless, a fact that frightens both demographers and the authorities. In some ways, a childless family can be regarded as a prototype of relations between a man and a woman outside marriage, or to put it otherwise, the number of childless families today may be a good predictor of single people tomorrow for it implies a changing meaning of the significance of marriage.

L. Chuiko found that many Kiev brides and grooms (20.9 percent and 21.5 percent) declared at the moment of the official registration of their marriage that they did not want children at all (Chuiko 1975, p. 107). Among students at Tartu University, 12 percent said that children did not have "any importance" in marriage (Blumfelt 1971, p. 107). Only 7 percent of village-dwellers in Bashkiria considered children the main condition of a stable and happy marriage (Nafikov 1974, p. 84). The survey of working Leningraders brought forth an even more remarkable figure: 26 percent of men and 28 percent of women disagreed with the statement that "children are necessary to family happiness" (Dmitriev 1980, p. 63; Antonov 1980, pp. 174-5).

As Valentina Belova, a well-known Soviet demographer states, children have become too expensive, especially under the conditions of urban life: "Too expensive, and not so much in the material sense, as psychologically, emotionally. A child is becoming a luxury not only because it is difficult to keep him materially, but because it is necessary to spend a tremendous amount of time and emotional effort" (Belova and Darskii 1972, p. 9; Kozlov 1982, pp. 180-1).  

Data obtained by Z. Fainburg in a large survey of Soviet workers in 1970-75, shows that people's evaluation of their life is correlated with the existence of children in the family:

| Percentage of married people who evaluate their current situation positively, by number of children |
|--------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Men                                               |                | Women          |
| No children                                       | 40.4           | 48.8           |
| One child                                         | 30.2           | 33.9           |
| Two or more                                       | 32.2           | 34.6           |

Source: Fainburg 1981, p. 146

Similar data were obtained in a Moscow study (Iankova and Rodzinskaia 1982, p. 51). So, women, for all their stronger
"parental instincts" (or because of them), feel themselves much better off when they do not have to be preoccupied with children.

The same Moscow survey produced some data that partially explain the figures cited above. Parents with children can spend significantly less time on culture and sports than childless couples. Thus, women with two or more children go to the movies 18 percent less than childless couples; the theater 44 percent less; sporting events 30 percent less; take trips 73 percent less; read books and magazines 24 percent less. The difference for men is of the same order--44 percent, 65 percent, 24 percent, 55 percent, and 18 percent, respectively.

Sex and Hedonism: The Relaxation of Sexual Morality

Two things account for the drastic increase in the role of eroticism in Soviet life--one "subjective", the other "objective". The first is a by-product of the process of the general demoralization of Soviet society since 1953. The decaying acceptance of Soviet ideology has in various ways stimulated eroticism in Soviet life. Since romantic love and romantic marriage have the status of official values, they, too, have been victimized as parts of an ideology despised by a growing number of people (I discussed this issue earlier). It is interesting that in the 1920s, immediately after the Revolution, eroticism and sexual pleasure were regarded by young Communists as a direct challenge to the old morality and almost as pillars of a new ideology; now they have come to be treated as something that challenges the hypocrisy of official morality and ideology.

The lie, as an all-encompassing phenomenon of Soviet society, plays a special role in the growing looseness of sexual practice. The system forces practically everyone in the Soviet Union to lie many times a day, to their superiors, colleagues, subordinates, editors, children, and so forth. Because of this, it is so easy to lie to a husband or a wife, for everybody wants to conceal a new affair from the current partner, spouse, or lover. Without the institutionalization of the lie in Soviet society, the present character of relations between the sexes would not have developed.

Sex outside marriage, premarital as well as extramarital, is extensive not only by former Soviet standards, but even by Western ones. This is especially true with reference to extramarital sex.

Beginning with attitudinal data, the information available suggests that Soviet people support a fairly high level of permissiveness in premarital sexuality. The most
serious investigations of this issue were those of Golod (1977) and Kharchev (1979) conducted in the 1960s when sexual freedom was more restricted than now. According to Golod's study of workers in Leningrad, only 24 percent of men and 34 percent of women expressed disapproval of premarital sexuality. Sixty percent of the men reported that they would have sex with a woman, even if they did not love her. Only 14 percent of women, however, would engage in premarital sex (Golod 1977, p. 49).

In Kharchev's study of students and engineers in Leningrad, even greater tolerance for premarital sex was found. Among students, only 16 percent of men and 27 percent of women expressed disapproval. Interestingly, among engineers, fewer women (7 percent) than men (14 percent) disapproved of sex before marriage. And it is notable that, of all students and engineers expressing disapproval, only about one-quarter of men and one-third of women cited moral considerations as important to their decision (Kharchev 1979, pp. 193-5).

Perhaps even greater tolerance still is revealed in a study in Estonia, conducted in 1972. Women who engaged in premarital sex were disapproved of by only 11 percent of male, and 12 percent of female, respondents. When men's premarital sex was at issue, only 5 and 6 percent of men and women respectively indicated disapproval (Tiit 1978, p. 14).

We can now turn from studies of attitudes to behavioral data. In the early 1960s, one of the first surveys on sexuality in Leningrad found that 88 percent of male, and 46 percent of female, respondents had had premarital relations (Kon 1967, p. 152). A more recent study, conducted in Estonia, revealed that 82 percent of men and 71 percent of women had had such experiences (Tiit 1978, p. 142).

In the 1960s, Kharchev and his colleagues conducted a unique survey based on in-depth interviews with women in Leningrad. The results showed more than half the respondents had begun their sexual lives prior to marriage. Many of these, however, had done so with their future spouses, probably the most common pattern. The study also gathered information on the age of the respondents at their first sexual experience. The largest group (44 percent) had their first experience at age twenty or twenty-one. About 12 percent had a sexual encounter between age 15 and 17, another 22 percent between 18 and 19, and 8 percent at 23 or 24. Only 14 percent waited until age 25 or later (Kharchev 1979, p. 196).

The number of children born before marriage, while obviously an underestimation, is probably the best "hard" indicator of the scope of premarital sex. According to data cited by Kon (1982, p. 118), the proportion of children in
Leningrad conceived before marriage has been increasing. In 1968, 23 percent of all births were conceived before marriage, 28 percent in 1973, and 38 percent in 1978. Tolts' study in Perm found one-fourth of married women gave birth to their first child within five months of the wedding (Literaturnaia gazeta, December 21, 1983). These figures include children born at any point before this five-month mark, even before the marriage itself.

The Magnitude of Extramarital Sex

Direct indicators of extramarital sex are particularly scant. In one small survey of married women in Leningrad, Kharchev found that 40 percent of respondents considered it acceptable for married people to have sex outside marriage with people they like (1979, p. 199). Meanwhile, a national survey in the U.S. in 1980 found 69 percent of respondents answering that extramarital sex is "always wrong" (National Opinion Research Center 1980).

Probably more remarkable and meaningful are data on 1200 respondents gathered by Svetlana Burova, who inquired into the causes of divorces in Minsk. Unlike other Soviet investigators of this problem, she paid special attention to the extramarital sex lives of men. She could establish, with more or less certainty, the absence of such relations in only half of all cases considered by the courts, despite the fact that the courts judged that there were such relations in only one out of ten of the cases (Burova 1979, p. 81). If we recall that the annual ratio of divorces to marriages is 1:3, and that the courts grant almost one million divorces per year, this suggests a rather widespread phenomenon.

Permissive Marriage: Combination of Stability and Sexual Diversity

Extramarital sex has become an organic part of Soviet life. What is more, it is possible to speak about the emergence of a special type of marriage—we can call it "permissive marriage"—which assumes the unfaithfulness of spouses as a more or less "normal" phenomenon.

Soviet literature and art can be regarded as an important source of evidence that permissive marriage is perceived by a growing number of people as a normal phenomenon for themselves and, more and more often, even for others. Of course, novelists and playwrights keep a certain distance from their heroes who carry on intimate relations with two women—they do not grant them their open approval,
but these heroes are not at all objects of rebuke; on the contrary, they arouse compassion among readers and spectators.

The wanton sexual life of the Soviets, especially among professionals, is tellingly described in various novels by Iuri Trifonov, one of the best Soviet writers. In his novel, Preliminary Review, all his heroes are involved in love affairs, hampered by a lack of apartments to meet in. The novel, A Gap in the Calendar is very typical. The author, Iosif Gerasimov, describes the life of the scientific intelligentsia. All conflicts in the novel originate in science and are the result of the different attitudes of the main characters to their roles as scholars. Their family life is depicted only as far as is necessary for their professional behavior to be understood. But, by all accounts, the author intentionally gave very prominent treatment to the sexual relations of his heroes. The lives of five couples are at the center of the novel. There is not a single alliance in which the dominant morality is not violated in the most conspicuous way. One couple lives together though not married; in all the other couples, at least one partner is having, or has lately had, an affair. No less remarkable is that the author paints the sex lives of his characters as perfectly normal, and does not show anyone among them condemning the facts of conjugal unfaithfulness. And spouses who learn about their betrayal by their mates are in a hurry to forgive them and to continue their lives as if nothing serious had happened (Gerasimov 1983).

In another recent novel, Nabatnikova's Daughter, as in previous literary work, all heroes are involved in extramarital affairs, including the old father of the heroine, who brings women to the kitchen in his daughter's apartment (where he lives, having left his wife in the village). The reviewer of this novel, Vladimir Sukhnev, does not call into question the plausibility of any of the events in this novel. He only rebukes the author for not explaining why "people ran into such a life" (Literaturnaia gazeta, November 2, 1983).

In Soviet movies, heroes regularly commit adultery without arousing the anger of film producers or spectators. The very positive heroine of the famous Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears maintains a sexual relationship with a married man. The moral anger of the movie is not to blame this woman, but to condemn her partner, and not for his unfaithfulness to his wife, but for his craven behavior toward the heroine: he has always been afraid he would be caught by his wife, and because of this he has always spoiled all the heroine's pleasure in being with him. We find, more or less, the same accent in another movie, The Autumn Marathon, in which the hero is shown as having a
difficult plight—he cannot be everywhere at once, with his wife, his mistress, and his colleagues.

Alcohol as a Hedonistic Value

The growing orientation of the Soviet people to immediate pleasure is also revealed in mounting alcoholism. In some way, alcohol as a value is in conflict with health and other hedonistic values, such as the general standard of living and entertainment. Perhaps, only sex is in some way in alliance with alcohol. The conflicting character of many hedonistic values, fighting for the limited resources of the individual, is one of the factors which leads to the fragmentation of Soviet society, which I will discuss later.  

Grigorii Zaigraiev, a head of a department in the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR says that the consumption of alcohol was rising in the 1950s by 10.5 percent per year, in the 1960s by 6.7 percent per year, and in the 1970s by 3.2 percent per year (Zaigraiev 1983, pp. 97-8). Though the growth of alcohol consumption is slowing, according to this data, it is continuing to grow. According to Vladimir Treml's computations, the annual consumption of pure alcohol per person, 15 years and older, more than doubled in the last two decades, from 7.45 liters in 1960, to 15.24 liters (1982a, p. 68).

That male alcoholism is officially recognized as the most important cause of divorce indicates the extremely great scope of the phenomenon. According to Soviet sources, up to 50 percent of all divorces are due to alcoholism (Chuiko 1975; Goldberg, et al. 1982; Kolokol'nikov 1976; Matskovskii and Kharchev 1982; Sysenko 1982).

With 945,000 divorces in 1979, for example, this means that 300,000 to 400,000 men have been declared intolerable drunks by their wives. Of course, people do not always cite their real motives for divorce; however, in the case of alcoholism, it can reasonably be supposed that the number of people who falsely use it as grounds is at least equal to the number of those who conceal it as the main real cause. If we assume that the majority of alcoholics do not remarry and that the number of subsequent divorces of the same people for the same reason is not significant, then the army of alcoholics must be replenished each year with new contingents and counts many millions of men.

Also of interest, information on the scope of alcoholism in the USSR comes from the Minister of Internal Affairs, Fedorchuk, who in an article in Pravda (June 12,
**FOOTNOTES**

1 Even in the beginning of the 1970s, when the objective indicators of the standard of living were on the rise, only 45 percent of Leningrad residents believed their income would rise during the period of the next Five-Year Plan and only 35 percent expected improvement in their housing conditions (Alekseiev et al. 1979, pp. 23-32).

2 The author of the article, a teacher from Evpatoriia, writes, "some mothers, using the school as an arena for demonstrating their material well-being, encourage their children to show off their ultra-fashionable dresses in class. At a very early age, the girls start to flaunt gold jewelry. All of this engenders unhealthy competition among children". (Pravda April 18, 1983)

3 Velikanov and Balaian, in an article published in Literaturnaia gazeta, "Seventy Million Families and the Thousands of Problems that Worry Them", cite the results of a sociological study (they do not indicate the researcher). "A child costs a great deal in our times, and as he or she grows, the cost of up-bringing rises significantly. While maintenance of a small child demands about fifty rubles a month, 64 percent of all families spend 100 rubles a month on a teenager, and 32 percent over 120 rubles. Two working spouses spend one-third of their income on one child". The average monthly salary in 1982 was 177 rubles (Literaturnaia gazeta, October 26, 1983, p. 14).

4 As two Soviet experts affirm, if one member of the family drinks heavily, it implies that he or she will spend no less than 100 rubles, a month. This means that for a family with two workers and two children, one-third of family income is subtracted from family expenditure. (Mil'ner and Shul'gin 1984, p. 17).

5 Data on deaths from alcohol poisoning indicate that the number of such deaths almost tripled between 1963 and 1978, and reached a level that was more than a hundred times higher than in the U.S. (Treml 1982b, p. 488; Murphy 1983, p. 33).

Of course, alcohol poisoning takes place for various reasons; however, the dynamics of this indicator reflect quite clearly the growth of alcoholism in the USSR.
in the sphere of work. Soviet people more and more often look for easy work. The preoccupation with health is a new phenomenon in Soviet life, which is accompanied by the growing desire to ease family bonds, either by postponing marriage as long as possible, or by refusing to have more than one child or any at all. At the same time, Soviet people do not want to curb their sexual appetite, and they indulge in premarital and extramarital sex with a growing intensity. Alcohol also plays its role as a source of pleasure for many Soviet people. On the whole, the hedonistic orientation of the Soviet population today influences all spheres of Soviet life.
1983), certified that in 1982 more than 800 thousand drivers lost their driving licenses because they were drunk when stopped by police.

The monstrous social consequences of alcoholism are compounded by the self-perpetuating character of the phenomenon. The probability that children of alcoholics will become alcoholics themselves is high. According to Soviet data, 92 percent of hard drinkers were brought up in families in which at least one parent was an alcoholic (Parygin 1982, p. 164).

According to data from a study carried out in Perm, more than 30 percent of children in the first three years of elementary school have already tasted wine. The author of the article in Literaturnaia gazeta who cites this figure exclaims, "What should be said in this connection of those who are in their last year of secondary school!" (Literaturnaia gazeta, December 21, 1983).

The radical change in the role of alcohol in Soviet life that took place in the 1960s is related not so much to the increase of chronic drunkenness, or to the decrease in the age when people start to drink, or even to the growth of female alcoholism—a phenomenon unknown in the past. The change is that people have begun to drink on the job. The drinking area now encompasses not only home, bars, places near liquor stores, parks, and streets, but also factories, offices, research institutes, shopping centers, and all other places where people work. In the year of Andropov's rule, a special Governmental decree, perhaps the first in history, introduced special penalties for those who came to work drunk (Pravda December 30, 1983).

As various sources witness, alcoholism is accepted by the Soviet people as a normal phenomenon. A survey of students in vocational schools in the 1970s established that even at a verbal level, only 35 percent of respondents would condemn drunkenness (Sokolov 1981, p. 171). Even being drunk at work aroused the verbal disapproval of only 59 percent of 2000 Moscow workers questioned in the 1970s. Only 2 percent of the same workers found fault with the extortion of vodka from workers by supervisors, in exchange for a good job assignment. (Grechin 1983, p. 124)

Summary

Along with privatization, hedonism is another dominant trend in Soviet personal values. Having been deprived of hope for the future at a social as well as an individual level, Soviet people have become more and more absorbed with hedonistic values such as consumerism, health, prestige, sex, alcohol. The hedonistic approach becomes dominant even
It should be noted that in last decades, Soviet women have enrolled in a "competition" with men in the realm of alcoholism. As various sources suggest, the proportion of alcoholics among women has been growing rapidly, a fact that probably accounts, at least in part, for the rise of infant mortality in the country over the last two decades (see Literaturnaia gazeta, December 20, 1979; Feshbach 1983, p. 225; Tiit 1982, p. 37).

Noting the growth of alcoholism among women, one Soviet author refers to data from all developing countries (hinting that the Soviet Union is among them), which reveal that in the beginning of this century, the ratio of male to female alcoholics was 10:1, while now it is only 6:1 (see Parygin 1982, p. 166). And according to Sysenko's data on Moscow (1978), problem drinking by the wife was mentioned as the cause of divorces by 4.5 percent of men who initiated divorce (1982, p. 101).

According to Matskovskii and Kharchev (1982, p. 159), alcoholism as a cause of divorce is even more significant in the countryside than in the cities.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION: THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A MORAL VACUUM

General Anomie: The Soviet Case

Official Soviet ideology has always cultivated, above all, the societal values of patriotism and allegiance to the party and the state. All values related to interpersonal relations, with few exceptions, have been neglected or treated with a tolerant hostility. As a result, when Soviet ideology began to lose its influence on the behavior of most of the population, a growing number of Soviet individuals found themselves in a sort of moral vacuum. They found themselves to be deprived, not only of the official collectivist values, but also of other moral values capable of curbing their egoistic drives. Paradoxically, the Soviet people have made a leap from a nearly ascetic society to a rather permissive one, and today they look as much, or more, unbridled and indulgent than the citizens of Western societies, with their glorification of the individual.

In this connection, it is not surprising that the majority of the Soviet people are deprived of any serious and genuine links to any social group whose goals could be regarded as their own. They feel no true allegiance to organizations, such as the party, the young communist organizations, or trade unions. Only a few maintain close ties with a church, and there are no independent professional organizations to which Soviet people can be really devoted. Only in the work-place do we find an area with some importance for the Soviet individual. This is not however, because the office or factory is an organization with which the individual can identify, for any place of work is perceived as simply another arm of the state. Rather it is because among work colleagues, with whom so much time is spent, the Soviet individual finds friends who can be relied upon. Actual allegiance to the work organization is minimal: even official Soviet data reveal that the long-term attempts of the authorities to instill in the minds of people "the feeling of being master of their own enterprise" have failed.

Thus, the Soviet individual confronts the all-powerful state, armed only with nihilism and a readiness to use all
kinds of tricks to "beat the system," and without the real support of any association or small group, beyond family and friends. In terms of "material behavior", moral nihilism is combatted in contemporary Russia only by the values related to the family and friendship (and, of course, by fear of sanctions from the state or public opinion). However, this privatization of the Soviet mentality is not so strong that it can prevent a growing number of people from skidding into the abyss of moral permissiveness.

In many cases in history, the decay of a dominant official ideology has been accompanied by the rise of a new ideology which offered alternatives to the moral values of the ancien régime (see Duvignaud 1973). This occurred in Russia during the period of the revolution, when the religious morals and the values of "class society" were replaced by the new "proletarian morality", which offered no leniency toward wanton behavior and strictly checked the instincts of revolutionaries.

Today in Russia, however, the eroding official ideology is not confronted with an adequate rival. It is true that nationalism and religion are on the rise in the country. But while many are willing to declare themselves as religious, only a few are actually influenced by religious proscriptions in their behavior. With reference to nationalism, insofar as it is not organically linked to religion, it can be said that it advances as a "positive" value only absolute allegiance to a given nationality, and does not profess its own specific values regulating economy, politics or human relations. And while the Western system of values, with its cult of "enlightened individualism", has made some progress among educated Soviet people, it has not rooted itself significantly in the mentality of the majority.

On the basis of these considerations, it is suggested that as a socialist society leaves a period of mass repression, it moves toward a condition of widespread anomie, as people rapidly lose confidence in the dominant values and norms and, indeed, trespass on them in their everyday behavior. What is occurring in the Soviet Union, as well as in other socialist countries, is similar to the responses to anomie Robert Merton described as "retreatism" and "rebellion": not only are the accepted means to achieve goals abandoned, but the very goals approved by the dominant value system are also cast aside (Merton 1949, pp. 140, 153-57).

The majority of the Soviet people have discarded such values as the building of communism or the interests of the state as their life goals, and are rather absorbed in the maximization of their personal interests in consumerism, power, prestige, sex, and alcohol (despite the hostility of
official ideology toward these hedonistic values). The change in the structure of goals among the Soviet population over the last three decades is closely connected with the tremendous rise of aspirations, especially among the younger generations. This growth of aspirations, which represents the most important social phenomenon of Soviet postwar history, is a product of both political factors and of the remarkable growth in education and mass media, especially television (which provides an awareness of high living standards previously unknown).

Though the standard of living in the USSR rose steadily in the 1960s and 1970s, aspirations, themselves a product of this rise, grew even faster. This created a situation, skillfully analyzed in Durkheim's theory of anomie, where aspirations outpace the possibility of their fulfillment (Durkheim 1933 and 1951; also see Ginsberg 1980).

This gap between aspirations and their satisfaction, along with the erosion of the acceptance of official ideology, has been one of the decisive factors accounting for the emergence of the state of "normlessness" in Soviet society. A growing number of people have lost respect for the officially-approved means of achieving their goals and have resorted to variant semi-legal and illegal means to satisfy their aspirations (or even their basic needs).

At the same time, the anomie observable in socialist society has a number of specific features unknown to societies described by theorists of this phenomenon. Virtually every Soviet individual is regularly engaged in the infraction of dominant moral norms and laws. Indeed, few could survive in socialist society without the regular violation of the rules and principles proclaimed by the state.

This anomic behavior takes one of two distinct forms, depending upon the attitudes toward the dominant norms taken by those who violate them--either cynicism or hypocrisy. A growing number of Soviet people, especially the young, only barely conceal their contemptuous attitudes toward official moral values. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the population, seeking to avoid viewing themselves as selfish and egoistic, resort to a relatively sophisticated mental construction, wherein they find regular excuses for the violation of norms. This preserves at least a superficial respect for the norms and even allows them to insist on their observance by others.

The most specific feature of anomie in Soviet-type society, however, is its strong relationship to the state. Most anomic acts committed by individuals in a socialist society are directed against the state. Because of this, many such acts take on a strong political flavor, even
though they may be more directly linked to more intimate spheres of life, such as interpersonal relations.

In fact, the state may actually encourage violations of its own norms, while nonetheless concealing such violations from the public. The role of the "second economy", which is based largely on illegal or semi-legal activities, is illustrative here. The "second economy" is quietly tolerated, for its plays a vital role in making available goods and services which the official economy fails to provide. However, the most important contribution of the state to the problem of anomie is the institutionalized lying on the part of the authorities in socialist society. Mass media, educational institutions, political leaders, and managers lie systematically, providing the citizenry with the justification for their own deceptive actions. Since "the lie" is an organic part of many anomic situations and actions, its existence as a "normal" institution in Soviet society greatly exacerbates the demoralization of the population.

People's Perception of the Morality of "Others"

Sociological and other data suggest that the Soviet people are very aware of the moral atmosphere in the country.

This is illustrated by the deep cynicism characteristic of large numbers of the population, who are convinced that everyone is driven by only the most selfish of motives. For many, it is considered almost unthinkable that people could perform a socially positive act motivated purely by altruism, or even patriotism. Some ulterior motive is always suspected. In fact, this image of the moral atmosphere of Soviet life held by large numbers of people greatly exaggerates the scale of demoralization; but as a classic "self-fulfilling prophecy", this image functions only to hasten the actual process.

Abundant data were provided on this issue by our investigations of the readership of the national newspapers. We can draw some conclusions from this data. The first is that a large proportion of readers expressed their displeasure with articles on moral issues, which under Soviet conditions is an indirect signal of their discontent with moral relations generally. Thus, only 44 percent of the readers of Izvestia declared themselves satisfied with these articles in general. And in judging articles on a particular moral issue--relations between boss and subordinates--they were even more critical. Only 26 percent of the respondents gave a positive assessment of these articles. Among readers of Trud, the figure was lower still, at 15 percent.
A second piece of evidence is data on reader recommendations to the editorial board of newspapers (answers to an open question). Improving the quality of pieces on morality was urged as a first priority by 54 percent of readers of Trud, and by 57 percent of readers of Izvestia.

The third piece of evidence is related to the youth problem. One very important social phenomenon in the Soviet Union is the hostile attitude of adults to the behavior of young people. Such attitudes are widely-shared, even among different social groups and among social actors who are antagonistic to each other. The elite as well as the liberal intelligentsia consider the moral level of young people in the same negative way. Again, reader attitudes to articles on problems of the young provide some insight into the images the Soviet individual holds about the younger generation. Only 18 percent of the readers of Trud were content with these articles--one of the lowest figures to characterize the readership's attitudes to the paper. The number of positive responses by readers of Izvestia was only slightly higher at 28 percent, also the bottom figure in the survey. (See Shlapentokh 1969, p. 9; see also Fomicheva 1980; Chernjakova 1979)

Other data also suggest that Soviet people do not have great esteem of the morality of their compatriots. Vladimir Sokolov reported on 12,000 workers in various regions of the USSR in 1978-1979, who were asked about the moral virtues of people around them. The loaded character of the survey, which was conducted by the Academy of Social Science at the Central Committee, the High School of Young Communists and other similar organizations, should be taken into account. Twenty-five percent blatantly said that few people possessed high moral virtues, and only 34 percent ascribed these qualities to the majority of people. What is more, as Sokolov states, in "some collectives up to 53 percent thought that only a few colleagues can be considered as moral people". Moreover, 35 percent supposed that only a few people follow their principles in behavior and are selfless and cultivated (Sokolov 1981, pp. 64-67).

The deep dissatisfaction with the existing morality of the Soviet people is reflected even in Soviet newspapers. Komsomol'skaya Pravda, the newspaper of the Young Communist League, recently published some excerpts from readers' letters which illustrate the perceptions of young people. One letter states, "I have asked many of my acquaintances about their attitudes toward their contemporaries. I became afraid of their answers because they all, as if competing with each other, answered, 'Everyone thinks only about himself'. I replied, 'However, there are kind people', 'We have not met them'. Then I understood. They were talking about themselves. How has this attitude emerged of thinking
only about yourself? What is the origin of this corrosion? Maybe from our well-being? Has the easy life expelled the soul? Let us look attentively at ourselves" (Komsomol'skaia pravda, December 12, 1983).

Recently, the prominent Soviet philosopher, Arsenii Gulyga joined those who dare to speak on the moral atmosphere in the country. In his article in Literaturnaia gazeta, Gulyga (using all the necessary devices of ideological protection) appealed to people to return to some ideals. He invoked the people to abandon egotism, and make love the center of their lives, suggesting that "spiritual purity" is a requirement of our times. It is notable that he used such an untrivial term as "moral panic" in connection with the actual situation in the USSR, though he requests his readers not to succumb to it because the situation will only become worse. (Gulyga 1984, p. 7).

To a considerable degree the resurgence of religion in the USSR is a reaction to the state of anomie in society. This fact is revealed by Soviet sociologists, such as Martynenko, who found that 97 percent of religious people in the Voronezh region referred to moral considerations as the explanation of their convictions (Martynenko 1966, p. 6). The number of such people in other studies of religious individuals is not as high, but is very significant. For instance, in the Chernovitz region, they made up 24 percent of religious people (see Kostenko 1980, p. 80).

Nonetheless, it would be erroneous to underestimate the degree of compliance to the dominant norms by the Soviet people. There are three reasons which account for most cases in which Soviet people meet the demands of the official ideology. First, the Soviet state remains a very strong force, capable of rewarding conformist, and punishing nonconformist, behavior. The desire to gain the approval of the authorities constitutes an important stimulus for large numbers of people to conform, even if they do not miss the opportunity to cheat on the state when the situation arises.

Second, many people, who themselves do not observe the dominant norms, still demand this from other people, and as a result, create a public atmosphere which chastises the violators of norms and applauds their observers.

Third, some official values, despite the general decay of ideology, continue to be internalized by a considerable number of people. Chief among these values is patriotism. Of course, there is a long distance between verbal, even if quite genuine, support for these values and the behavior which such values prescribe, and not all people who consider themselves inspired by patriotism are ready to make even modest sacrifices for the sake of the nation.
Nonetheless, however significant the factors which force the Soviet people to observe the dominant norms, anomic behavior is still a centrally important phenomenon in society.

The Psychological Differentiation of Soviet Society

As was indicated before, with the decline of ideology has followed the loss of any integrative force in Soviet society. Despite the levelling impact of centralized educational and mass media systems, the Soviet people are divided into numerous groups in terms of their attitudes toward significant social issues.

As an example, I can refer to marriage. There is no consensus among the Soviet population as to the character of the "ideal" marriage. Rather, a variety of marital patterns are supported by variant groups. Such widely divergent patterns as the romantic marriage, marriage based only on psychological compatibility, permissive marriage, serial marriage, cohabitation, single motherhood, sexually-oriented single life—each has its own constituency of substantial proportions. Though often linked to specific socio-demographic groups, idiosyncratic personality characteristics also play a role in defining the type of relationship one will prefer. No less divergence can be observed in connection with attitudes toward children, the place of a career in a woman's life, sexual pleasure, and other issues in this domain of Soviet life.

The attitudinal diversity, as would be expected, extends into all spheres of Soviet life. Behavior in the workplace is particularly notable in this regard. As the acceptance of official ideology has declined, along with fear of the authorities, the leadership has sought to substitute material incentives to enhance labor morale. For a variety of reasons, these attempts appear to have failed, and instead of rejuvenated morale, there has emerged simply further differentiation. The diversity of attitudes here equals that in relation to marriage: the population falls into myriad groups ranging from workaholics to committed "shirkers" and "bunglers" (in the words of the official lexicon). Again, personality differences intermix with environmental and social structural factors in distributing individuals along this continuum. Individuals with similar objective characteristics and social locations display variant attitudes toward work obligations.

The psychological differentiation, stemming from the weakening of social norms, creates a rather unique climate in society, as the Soviet individual interacts with people constantly who differ from each other in nearly every conceivable way. If we were to compare, for example,
professionals in both societies, the diversity of viewpoints
would be greater among the Soviets than their U.S.
counterparts.

Psychological Adaptation to Life Without Common Values

The egotistical approach to life among a growing
proportion of the Soviet people views immediate
gratification as essentially the only worthwhile
practice. However, while followers of this approach are
growing in number, the majority of the population still
feels the need for some emotional ties to society, or at
least some part of society.

A large proportion of Soviet society continues to
adhere at the mythological level of their consciousness to
the values of socialism and collectivism as extolled in
official ideology. The rest of those who have not become
completely cynical about the world, view themselves as
adherents to some other abstract values, such as religion,
nationalism, or democracy. Nonetheless, whatever their
ideological or value inclinations, many still manage to
avoid the impact of abstract values on their behavior.

However, even in the realm of material behavior, the
Soviet people cannot do without some moral values to guide,
and make predictable, their behavior and this reduces, to
some degree, the anomie of society. The most significant
here are the private values, above all those related to
love, family, and friendship. These values (sometimes
combined with those of professional excellence, devotion to
scientific knowledge, support of colleagues, and so on)
constitute the core of the moral mentality of those Soviet
people who have not abandoned all moral constraint. One of
the key messages of liberal intellectuals, writers, and film
makers to the masses is that these universal values make
possible a defense against the moral decay of society.

At the same time, Soviet people are developing new
forms of personal relationships and lifestyles which are
more or less adequate to the increased hedonistic
orientations. Permissive marriage, cohabitation, and single
motherhood are examples of these lifestyles. All these and
some other patterns have been more or less legitimized in
the public mentality and even encroached into official
politics. Moreover, public opinion has increasingly
absorbed the value of privacy, something nearly alien to the
prior Soviet mentality.

Of course, even private values which are conspicuously
directly against the state (friendship, for instance) cannot
avoid the influence of the general moral degradation. The
Soviet satirist, Zhvanetskii, who today probably is the best
locator of trends in Soviet everyday life, has pinpointed it in his recent brilliant sketch, "The Second Half of the 20th Century". Among other changes in human behavior he mockingly describes, he mentions that "friendship has been modified to such a degree that it allows treachery, does not require meeting of friends, or hot exchanges of views between them, and even supposes that the existence of only one friend is enough for friendship. A swinging feeling which includes some mercilessness, cruelty and harshness is known now as kindness. Under a microscope, you can see distinct, but rather weak, forms of mutual assistance and support..." However, with all this, family and friendship remain unique institutions which, with the devotion of some people to their work, withstand the complete demoralization of Soviet society.

The moral vacuum which surrounds the Soviet people is a phenomenon of great importance. Whatever developments may take place "above" in the political structure of Soviet society, whatever type of leaders may emerge there--conservatives or reformers, Stalinists or liberals, chauvinists or "internationalists"--they all have to take into account that they have to rule a society in which people are deeply indifferent to the lives of "others" and who are absorbed only by their own egoistic interests. The cleavage between the state and society, as was observed by Hegel, Marx and other philosophers and sociologists at the time of the decay of absolute monarchies in West Europe, is as deep and great now as then.

Alexander Zinoviev (1976, 1978, 1980), one of the most original modern thinkers, is not inclined to consider the actual state of Soviet society as deeply conflicting or fraught with grandiose future perturbations. His vision of Soviet society is based on the old Hegelian/functionalist principle that "everything that exists is rational", and from this perspective he regards the Soviet society as, in its way, a very smoothly working mechanism which does not need moral values for its normal functioning and which cannot be compared with Western societies. His picture of Soviet society supposes that the majority of Soviet people are well-adjusted to this mechanism and do not feel discomfort because they have to lie and violate officially declared values many times each day.

I do not share this view. For me, the anomic state of Soviet society cannot be stable simply because it engenders problems which are beyond the control of the Soviet political elite and bureaucracy. The economic decline is one example. The social behavior of the majority of the population entails many consequences which will be manifested completely only in the future.
Certainly, there is still a minority in Soviet society which continues, despite the adverse influence of social milieu, to muster examples of highly moral behavior—in the sphere of production, science, culture, and human relations. The role of this minority is important, for it provides norms of positive social behavior for the new generations. However, the Soviet system acts constantly to quiet these voices, or control them—despite the Party's praising of hard workers and those who sacrifice their interests for society.

The skidding of the Soviet population into a moral vacuum is a fact of great domestic and international importance, with many ramifications. This process can hardly be stopped by a resurgence of mass repression and attempts to resort to new ideological brainwashing of the population, especially of the young generations. What will be the ramifications of the actual anomic state of Soviet society is difficult to predict in specific terms. What is clear, however, is that this development will have a great impact on the future history of Russia and the whole world.

Summary

The Soviet people are moving toward a moral vacuum, a state of society where people observe norms and rules only under threat of sanctions. So far, none of the ideologies which oppose the official ideology have managed to integrate a large part of the population and exert influence on people's conduct. Soviet people are aware of the actual moral atmosphere in the country, a circumstance which only accelerates the movement toward a moral vacuum.

The decay of official ideology has led to a strong psychological differentiation of the Soviet people into groups with different value orientations. This differentiation engenders conflict among people who oppose each other's values and ideal images. At the same time, Soviet people try to adjust to a new moral situation and create some moral basis for interaction with each other.

The demoralization of the Soviet population is one of the most important "objective" factors of Soviet reality, and any social or economic program in the country has to take this circumstance into full account.
1 The results showed that Soviet readers read articles on moral problems more avidly than any other kind except those on the international scene. Articles on moral issues were regularly (according to the surveys of the 60s and 70s) read by 57 percent of readers of Pravda (in second place, after international news,) by 62% of the readers of Trud (first place), by 70% of the readers of Izvestia (first place), by 62% of the readers of Literaturnaja gazeta (second place, after lampoons and humor, with 72 percent). In the local press, too, articles about morality got more attention from readers than did other subjects. This was established in surveys of readers in Moldavia and Buriatia.

2 Both Soviet sociological studies, and the best Soviet writers and journalists directly or indirectly suggest that the moral atmosphere in the country is very alarming. Moreover, when Andropov came to power, he also used euphemisms to get across that he considered the moral situation very unsatisfactory (see Andropov 1983). At the same time, Soviet ideology absolutely ignored the real processes in the country, continued to manipulate the reality of Soviet society, suggesting that morals of the Soviet people continue to improve and approach the requirements of communist society. (See for instance, Kharchev et al. 1976; Smolianski 1977; Siniutin 1983, Vasilenko 1983, Kalin 1981, Titarenko 1980; Tselikova 1983) Along with ordinary Soviet ideologues, the same line is supported by a special group of Slavophiles, who also insist that the morality in Russia is much higher than in the rotten West. The best example of this view is Iuri Davydov's book Metaphysics of Arbitrariness and Ethics of Love (1982).
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