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**HIGH TREASON**

**Essays in the History of the Red Army**

**1918-1938**

**Volume II**

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## PART FOUR

### CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE RKKA

Up to now we have spoken of Caligula as a princeps.  
It remains to discuss him as a monster.

Suetonius

There is a commandment to forgive our enemies,  
but there is no commandment to forgive our friends.

L. Medici

Some comrades think that repression is the main thing in the  
advance of socialism, and if repression does not increase,  
there is no advance. Is that so? Of course it is not so.

Stalin



Events after they have occurred become the subjects of investigation. Historians want to know what caused Napoleon to lead the Grande Armée on its catastrophic march to Moscow. Defending their opinions they polemicize bitterly, suggest reasons, cite facts. Even if they, as is usually the case, do not find a single formula, still the general understanding of history is enriched with points of view and conceptions.

The destruction of the Red Army was, in its consequences for the nation, Stalin's most important act. To date it has been very little researched. In the preceding parts of this book we have tried to describe the path that led to this catastrophe. Now we will talk of the catastrophe itself.

Without access to the most important documents we will not be able to discuss the problems with the depth we would like. We will try to re-establish the course of events and suggest probable causes. That is all that can be done today.





## Chapter 17

### The Political Background: Coup d'etat

They unleashed it themselves  
trying to lead, to master the country,  
and 1937 came  
not just misfortune but punishment.

Korzhavin.

After the 17th Congress nothing apparently threatened Stalin's position at the pinnacle of power. Rivals and enemies had been politically and organizationally destroyed. They had admitted their defeat and lost their influence. The cult of the great leader flowered profusely. References to his utterances and toasts in his honor became an obligatory part of every public speech on any topic. Collectivization was accomplished. Stalin's five-year plans were being fulfilled at full speed. The international situation of the country was sufficiently secure. The reorganization of the Red Army had made it one of the best in Europe.

There were difficulties, however. True, as Stalin had said, "our problems are such, that they themselves contain the possibility for overcoming them...they give us the basis for overcoming them."<sup>1</sup> Still the problems remained. Since 1929 the country had been experiencing a severe supply crisis. In 1935 the system of rationing cards was ended, but some products, particularly meat, were still in very short supply. The predominance of heavy industry and the demise of the private entrepreneur had led to deficits of consumer goods. The quality of goods was extremely poor. Industry was

constantly short of metals and other materials, not to mention machinery. Plans were chronically underfilled in ferrous metals, energy and machine construction. Available capital did not cover the demands of huge capital-intensive projects. The government resorted to printing money, which caused inflation.

In 1934 the problems of power became especially acute. Stalin could understand that although he had achieved supreme power, it was by no means guaranteed. The economic failures of the first five-year plan, the dissatisfaction of the population, the opposition's attacks of 1930-1933, the fluctuation of moods at the 17th Congress - all revealed the vulnerability of Stalin's position. Power, achieved at the cost of enormous efforts with the help of painstaking intrigue and risky provocations, could be easily lost in a day. If a rebellious plenum or a disobedient congress should suddenly refuse to accept black as white and remove Stalin from his post, he would immediately turn into a pitiful oppositionist, a former great leader, a toothless lion, a general without an army.

The fact that the opposition's efforts, however feeble, continued between the 16th and 17th Congresses, after the victory over his most powerful opponents, Bukharin's group, must have put Stalin on his guard. As long as thoughts were still stirring in Party minds, he could not sleep soundly. There was little comfort in the apparent fact that the centers of opposition were weak and their methods resembled partisan warfare. Stalin could and did see in these desperate hit-and-run attacks the germs of more general dissatisfaction, nuclei around which that dissatisfaction could be consolidated. Therefore his reprisals came rapidly and sharply, without discussions and organizational maneuverings. It is very likely that it was

precisely these minor manifestations of insignificant opposition which set Stalin finally on the course of mass terror within the party.

Three such little sorties are known. The first occurred in 1930. Shortly after the congress Syrtsov<sup>2</sup> and Lominadze, supported by the Komsomol leader Shatskin, spoke out at a plenum of the TsK against Stalin's economic policy which they labeled "Potemkin industrialization". Stalin was able to take care of them immediately. On December 1 by a decision of the TsK and the TsKK, without a plenum, Syrtsov and Lominadze were declared a "right-leftist group", were expelled from the TsK, and removed from their posts. Syrtsov had been chairman of the Council of the National Economy of the RSFSR, where he had just replaced Rykov.

The second occurred two years later. 1932 was marked by the appearance of the Riutin-Slepkov group. These were apprentices to Bukharin, who in their time had worked heroically to destroy various oppositions. Stalin had hardly begun to go after the rightists when Riutin began to regret the passing of inner-party democracy. An extensive program was worked out that called for a softening of the party regime, policy changes (including policy toward the peasantry), and the removal of Stalin. The program had hardly made its way into Party circles when leaders of the rightists, led by Bukharin, hastened to dissociate themselves from it. Stalin took the case to court, but he did not get Riutin's head. The majority of Politbiuro members preferred not to execute their recent comrade. There are rumors that Kuibyshev, Ordzhonikidze, and Kirov offered active resistance and were supported by Kosior and Kalinin. Voroshilov, Andreev, and Molotov took a temporizing position, while Kaganovich alone remained loyal to Stalin. All three opponents of terror were themselves soon dispatched: Kirov - December 1, 1934; Kuibyshev - January 25, 1935; Ordzhonikidze - slightly later on February 18, 1937. Kosior also perished,

but later and in connection with other, Ukrainian, matters. Kalinin quickly learned to behave, as did his vacillating comrades.

Nonetheless in 1932 the Riutinists got only ten-year sentences, which did not keep them from disappearing in the bowels of the NKVD. Until the Great Purge got under way, any connection with the Riutin group, real or imagined, was certain cause for reprisal. Having known of the Riutin program and not having denounced it was cause for expulsion from the party at the very least.

Third. The Eismont- A.P. Smirnov-Tolmachev group had barely reared its head at the end of 1932. These men, too, were unhappy with Stalin's violence and desired a change. A joint plenum of the TsK and TsKK, meeting January 7-12, 1933 expelled them from the party. It was not announced in the press. There followed, as usual, a secret trial, long sentences, and death.

As we have seen in this brief digression there were real difficulties, which did, however, contain the means for their own liquidation. After the 17th Congress Stalin could no longer only hold off the attacks of the disgruntled. He understood that the next congress might be his last.

It was impossible in Soviet conditions to establish a mechanism for life-long rule - a monarchy or legalized dictatorship. Stalin was sufficiently practical not to copy Bonaparte's career.

Stalin deserves some sympathy. His way was much harder than that of Mussolini or Hitler. Their power was based on nationalism and unquestionable personal authority ("The word of the leader is the highest law"), which had a certain mystical quality. It is even easier for the leaders of the young states of the "third world" today, who act in an historical and cultural vacuum. They need no camouflage. What is comrade (or Mr.?) Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Va Za Banga called: Chairman-Founder of the National Movement of Revolution. In a central African republic another joker, an ex-sergeant

proclaimed himself emperor, and his little country with a population less than two million, an empire. It would be difficult even to imagine such escapades in the USSR. From the pre-Stalinist period there remained the heritage of centuries of history, three revolutions, official doctrine, and ruling party. Traditions, people, books all interfered. They were all falsified, changed until they were unrecognizable, destroyed, but it was impossible to carry this process to completion - something still remained.

There was another way. The political atmosphere could be changed in such a way as to remove all current pretenders to power, real and potential. More than that, conditions had to be created in which such people could not ever appear in the future. In such a case there would be no need to change the government structure, the national emblem, anthem, or flag. It needed only to widen the geography of terror, to include the Bolshevik party within it, and to maximize centralization, concentrating in one man's hands all aspects of state-political life. Both these means had long been within the grasp of Soviet authorities. It is not surprising that Stalin resorted to them to pursue his personal goals.

The danger for the country was not that Stalin had such goals. Aspiration to power and megalomania extremely inflame the imagination, and people with such psychical constitutions are found in every society - in thousandth parts of a percent. Russia's tragedy was that this nightmare came true. The dreams of a paranoid maniac, rather than becoming a subject for psychiatric work, determined the life of the country for two decades. Everyone who is not indifferent to the fate of the Motherland should ask himself the heart-rending question why did it happen.

Until the mid-thirties the punitive functions of the Soviet power were carried out within definite bounds. At the same time the continuity of

repression was never disturbed. True, from the moment of the victory of the Stalin-Burkharin coalition at the 15th Congress the scale and tempo of arrests had steadily, although slowly at first, increased. Late in 1927 and early in 1928 hundreds of Trotskyites were sent into exile. In 1928, after the Shakhty affair, open season was declared on technical specialists and carried out under the slogan of struggle with wrecking. The trial of the Industrial Party (Prompartia), which took place in 1930, led to the sentencing of a number of prominent engineers. The next year important economists and finance experts were tried in the Menshevik trial. The hunt for technicians, whom the country vitally needed, continued, but now purposefully. The Belomor-Baltic canal was being constructed, actually being dug by hand. Because of it a large contingent of highly qualified hydro-technicians fell into the hands of the OGPU, which was in charge of the project. The absolutely useless canal was being dug with feverish haste in the most unfavorable and difficult of conditions, which cost tens of thousands of lives. Work was done almost exclusively by prisoners under the direction of Chekists. This building of the Egyptian pyramids was passed off as the rehabilitation through labor of "socially close" criminals. Political prisoners, as socially distant and foreign, had to perish without the joyful prospect of rebirth. The building of the Moscow-Volga canal was carried out in the same way.

From 1929 to 1933 the system of repression displayed monstrous energy. Under the pretext of "dekulakization" millions of peasants were deported or shot. Propagandists babbled about destroying the kulaks as a class while what was actually going on was the intentional physical destruction of the most enterprising and industrious peasants. The number of victims cannot be known

precisely. Together with those who died of the unprecedented famine that accompanied collectivization they may have been more than fifteen million.

The parade-like spectacle of the 17th Congress signaled the end of that period. Further repression directly served the aims of the state revolution as conceived by Stalin. The signal was given on December 1, 1934 by the death of Kirov. On that day, or according to some sources on the preceding day, the TsIK passed a law, which provided for an accelerated and simplified investigation and trial of enemies of the people. Sentences could be carried out within 48 hours of being passed. Appeal was not permitted. It should be noted that this occurred in peacetime and in the absence of any major social disturbances, such as mutinies or rebellions. Even during the civil war people sentenced to death could ask for pardon.<sup>3</sup>

Not losing a minute, Stalin hastened to avenge himself on his recent rivals in the Politbiuro. Kamenev and Zinov'ev, since the latter had extensive contacts in Leningrad, were named conspirators in the murder of Kirov. The imaginary terrorist organization was for some reason called the "Moscow center". I. Evdokimov and several others were also implicated. The trial was conducted behind closed doors, but it limped along uneventfully and ended unsuccessfully for its organizers. Zinov'ev and Kamenev repented at length for their political errors, as they had a year earlier at the congress, but they categorically denied having had any part in the terror. The confusion was great and the sentences were laughable. Zinov'ev and Evdokimov got ten years and Kamenev five years imprisonment. Kamenev was subsequently tried again on July 27, 1935 and given a "tenner". The charge was that while he was in prison, through his brother's wife, who worked in the Kremlin hospital, he had organized an attempt on Stalin's life, which was of course unsuccessful.

The absence of confessions weakened Stalin's position in the Politburo where Kuibyshev and Ordzhonikidze still opposed the use of extreme measures against party leaders, even former leaders. Stalin dealt with the first of them immediately. The sentencing of the Moscow center was made public on January 18. On the 25th Kuibyshev was officially mourned after his untimely demise. During the trial of Bukharin in 1938 the public learned that Kuibyshev had been medically murdered. Iagoda had ordered his death; Kuibyshev's secretary Maksimov-Dikovskii had organized it; and his doctors Levin and Pletnev had carried it out. In such cases it was usually Stalin who let the cat out of the bag, but others were accused of the crimes.<sup>4</sup> All telephone connections to the office of the seriously ill Kuibyshev had been severed. When his heart attack began, Maksimov could not call the medical department in the Kremlin. Nor could he decide to leave to get help, for there was no one nearby to stay with Kuibyshev. Finally he took Kuibyshev home.<sup>5</sup> Only an hour or more after the attack did Maksimov get medical help. Then they either administered the necessary medicine, or the delay had been sufficient. In any case he soon died. It is interesting that Maksimov's testimony at the trial largely corroborates this version. The misfire with Zinov'ev and Kamenev held up the development of the campaign. Stalin had good reason to be upset with the NKVD and its chief G. Iagoda. The organ had everything needed in their hands, but they had not gotten the results.

The great leader of the world proletariat had to take care of things himself. Another trial was prepared. This time the fallen Bolshevik leaders were put on trial in the proper setting. Fourteen others were tried with them, including Evdokimov (a former secretary of the TsK) again and I. N. Smirnov (a former member of the TsK), a prominent associate of Trotskii. The political geography of the trial was broadened. This was advertised not as a



trial of isolated conspirators, but of a powerful, far-flung organization, the Trotskyite-Zinov'evite terrorist center. They were not just former leaders who stopped at nothing, including political murders, to regain their commanding positions. Things were much more serious. These were agents in a bitter class war, former oppositionists, now enemies of the people, who had behind them the remnants of the exploiters and foreign patrons, the fascists.

This was the first in a series of show trials. Its success was carefully prepared for. First of all, the notion was rejected that the guilt of the accused had to be proven. The Procurator General A. Vyshinskii proclaimed that the presumption of innocence was a bourgeois prejudice, for which he was made an academic. Now it was enough that during the preliminary investigation, while he was entirely in the power of the NKVD, a citizen confess himself an enemy of the people. (Other suspects sometimes did so also, but usually the confession and NKVD custody went together.) He would then automatically fall under the extraordinary law. After that he would be tried in an extra-judicial procedure (which was a widely used phrase in those years). Other evidence of guilt was not required, therefore no material evidence was presented at the trials.

Vyshinskii widely expanded the concept of criminal conspiracy and complicity. People who had not even known of one another's existence until the investigation or trial, but who had allegedly acted on orders from a single center, were now defined as accomplices. This made it possible to select a useful combination of victims.

The investigator had but one task--to extract from the prisoner a confession of guilt which had already been worked out by the NKVD. They could use any means to their ends, including torture. In response to a secret directive from Stalin the TsIK legalized physical torture in 1936. They

managed, for example, to break I. N. Smirnov, a man of strong will and personal courage. They refreshed him with ice baths until he lost all interest in living. He acted detached and indifferent at the trial and shrugged off Vyshinskii's questioning: "You need a leader? I'll be your leader..."

Self-slander was the main weapon of the prosecution but not its only one. The accused were forced to slander one another as well. This cross-pollination yielded bountiful fruit. Entirely isolated from the outside world, a man soon learned that he had nowhere to go. If he insisted on his innocence, he would be convicted by the testimony of other prisoners--old friends, comrades of the underground and fronts, and often by complete strangers. The investigators persuaded him that such evidence was sufficiently damning for the court, and that only candid repentance, that is, accepting the NKVD version, could ameliorate the sentence. All of that was of course combined with torture. Most were unable to stay out of the devilish trap. To the very stubborn other pressures were brought to bear: the families of some were threatened; others were persuaded to give evidence as an act of party discipline (as strange as it may seem, this was from time to time effective).

All these crushing pressures proved nonetheless to be insufficient at first in the preparations for a new Zinov'ev trial. It is said that Zinov'ev and Kamenev resisted all pressures to accept the charge of organizing terror, because it supposedly contradicted their Marxist convictions. That put Stalin in a difficult position. He could not permit a second failure. But Iosif Vissarionovich was not the sort to shrink from problems. It wasn't only coincidence that the song "...who desires shall achieve, who seeks will always find..." was popular at the time. Stalin sought a way to win. He sent his

friend Ordzhonikidze to see the stubborn men.<sup>6</sup> They would not have spoken with any of the other current members of the Politbiuro--Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, or Mikoian. On Stalin's orders Sergo told them roughly the following: You have lost. Stalin's line is victorious on all fronts - you said so yourselves at the congress. Now the party desperately needs a dramatic political trial to help it in its struggle with hidden enemies. If you do not admit to terror, you will be liquidated without a trial, and your families will not be spared. If you confess, you will be given the mandatory sentence, execution by shooting, but your lives will be spared, and your families will not be harmed. I guarantee that on my word as a Bolshevik.

After long hesitation Zinov'ev and Kamenev accepted the deal. They behaved loyally at the trial. All the accused were sentenced to be shot...and were executed.

One other novelty was tried out during that trial. The accused named as accomplices people who were still at liberty, which served as an excuse to bring them to justice. Serebriakov and Preobrazhenskii suffered that fate in August 1936. Cases were quickly worked up against them. A short while later Sokol'nikov and others were linked with them. Allusions to the complicity of the rightists provoked anguished cries from the press. The same reoccurred in January 1937. The question of their prosecution was decided at the February-March plenum of the TsK.<sup>7</sup>

The longwinded confessions and mutual accusations gave the Moscow trials a certain degree of verisimilitude, especially in the eyes of Western observers sympathetic to the USSR. Even an old hand like Leon Feuchtwanger fell for the trap. To fortify the impression regular provocateurs of the NKVD were included among the accused. They readily gave the needed testimony, and then they were executed with all the rest.<sup>8</sup>

Participating in the rehearsals for the August show cost Ordzhonikidze his life. Fiery Bolshevik that Sergo was, he could not free himself of some bourgeois prejudices. When he gave the prisoners his word as a revolutionary, he was sincere and meant to keep it. In February 1937 he learned that Zinov'ev and Kamenev had been killed nonetheless. He had an angry disagreement with Stalin. The great leader understood that his old comrade was a lost man, stubborn in his misconceptions. A week before the opening of a very important plenum of the TsK, of February 18, Ordzhonikidze was shot by a Chekist in the office of his Kremlin apartment.<sup>9</sup> Stalin announced to members of the Politbiuro in top secret that Ordzhonikidze had cracked under the pressure of the struggle and had killed himself. To preserve his good Bolshevik name it was decided to announce to the nation that he had died unexpectedly of a heart attack.

The first show trial achieved its goal. The atmosphere in the country became intense. Stalin considered the moment opportune to seize the punitive organs, all the more so since during his absence on vacation to the south there had been indecisive wavering in the Moscow leadership. Nikolai Ezhov, secretary of the TsK, who had accumulated his power in the bowels of the secret Stalin chancellery, was made head of the NKVD. The smooth success of the August trial did not save Iagoda. His replacement had been foreordained by a telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov.<sup>10</sup>

Ezhov was the ideal man for the task assigned him. In contrast to Menzhinskii and Iagoda he did not have a distinguished revolutionary past or corresponding ambitions. Raised up by Stalin's hands, he viewed the world through his eyes. In bloodthirstiness and suspicion he surpassed even his patron.

The tempo of persecution accelerated. The trial of the parallel terrorist center (Piatakov, Sokol'nikov, Serebriakov, Radek) began in January 1937. The country was told that the enemy had a gigantic organization with many branches to carry on in case one should fail. Hints that military people had participated in the plots, which were first made in August, were repeated more strongly here. (We will speak of that in detail below.) The trials' techniques were improved. Lawyers were now permitted to participate. Sentences were varied--some defendants received prison sentences rather than being shot. A well-rehearsed public raged in the papers and at meetings. Western leftists applauded.

Now the offensive could be opened along the whole front. It remained only to get formal approval from the country's high court. It is said that the TsK turned Stalin down in September 1936. Apparently by spring the evidence presented was sufficient. After meeting for a week the party priests gave Stalin carte blanche for a campaign of terror. The country was put under an unannounced state of emergency. Postyshev tried to protest, but Stalin leaned on him, and the others preferred to remain silent. Myopic, never able to think for themselves, overwhelmed by the roar of propaganda, they pronounced a death sentence--for themselves, and for millions of their countrymen.

After the February-March plenum all the semaphores on Stalin's way to absolute power had been raised. He had won in the center by demoralizing the party leadership, taking control of the NKVD, and frightening the government. The state revolution was a fait accompli. The repression spread far and wide to force acceptance of the new order.

There was still one force in the country which Stalin could leave unsubdued only at risk of his neck. That was the army. Before we begin to

describe the circumstance of its destruction, we must first make a necessary digression.

It is very tempting to blame the terror of the thirties on a single individual--Stalin. We would be wrong to do so, however. Frequent reference to his name was necessary only to make the telling of the story easier. There is too much that suggests that the regime established by Stalin is a natural stage of the development of Bolshevism.

The roots of the Stalin dictatorship, as it became in 1936-1938 and remained until 1953, must be sought first of all (but not exclusively) in the human material from which the Bolshevik party was composed. The Tolstoyans did not flock to the Bolsheviks; nor would they have been welcome. The Bolsheviks were always distinguished by their desire to solve all social problems by a single blow--by violence and terror. Therefore it was natural that the man who made terror a daily part of state policy and perfected hypocrisy as an ideology was able to keep himself at the pinnacle of power for so long. Violence in the name of future justice and dishonesty for the sake of narrow party interest were from its first days the alpha and omega of the regime. It explains very little to blame it all on Stalin. Stalin was great because he relied only on these principles. He never tied his hands with collateral considerations or sentimental memories. He relied not on specific people but on the basic psychology of his party.

His reliance was justified. The mass of the Party accepted and supported the terror. Even those who fell under the NKVD's wheels remained faithful to the Bolshevik idea and Stalin's policy to the end. In the name of higher Party interests they gave false testimony, which proved fatal to themselves and others. They died with the Party's name on their lips. It is terrible to say, but they deserved their fate.

Stalin not only wrote the script and directed the terror. Knowing from the history of the French revolution that instigators of slaughter usually lost their heads, he feared it as much as anyone else. It was a justified premonition. He was later destroyed and defamed by the same psychology, the same system of views, which had earlier raised him up. Stalin was not joking or being hypocritical when he told numerous supplicants that he himself feared the NKVD. Ezhov was personally devoted to Stalin and never thought to harm him even when he found himself on the brink of the abyss. Beria in a similar situation would have behaved more rationally...

Stalin is not an exception, not a pathological accident. He is an organic figure in a communist regime. Just as are Rakoshi, Gotval'd, and Berut, who by the way worked in the USSR under the assumed name Rutkovskii as an investigator for the NKVD. The idealist Dubcek held power for only a few months, while Gomulka, who came into power on a wave of national enthusiasm for freedom and justice, ended his days with anti-Semitic agitation and shooting workers' demonstrations.

It is unscientific and untrue to say that it was only the personal power of Stalin that grew stronger in the thirties. Although the means used to achieve those ends may seem inhuman and insane, the power of the Party was consolidated as well.

We should not forget that already in the early thirties Stalin personified the party for all without exception, even for his enemies. Had Maiakovskii lived until then, he could have quite correctly written, "We say the Party and mean Stalin, and vice versa."

Even Trotskii, who was by then exiled, damned, and slandered in his native land, held to that point of view. He wrote to his son, L. Sedov, that he could not use the slogan "Down with Stalin!" If anti-Soviet forces were ever

to raise their head in the USSR, then he, Trotsky, would have to at least temporarily come out in support of Stalin.

Many party leaders saw the harm of Stalin's political line and opposed it, but they consciously avoided calling openly for the removal of the tyrant. They were more concerned for the authority of the Party than they were for its power. They clung to the Party-Stalin fetish right to the mouth of the grave. In the name of Party discipline and solidarity they did willingly what Iagoda and Ezhov could not achieve with torture. They piled the most absurd slander on themselves and others when every letter of accusation became a mountain of corpses.

We are told: they believed in the Party. We should not doubt their faith. But we should ask: why did they think only of the Party and forget completely about the people to whom, supposedly, they had dedicated their lives? Why did they never look for support among the people?

The answer to that question screams the merciless, murderous truth. They were always strangers to their people. They always stood above them with an admonishing finger or threatening sword. They considered only their Party comrades people, worthy of freedom, justice, well-being. The people were for them the masses, building material, clay, objects, guinea pigs for untried experiments. On the way to power they constantly proclaimed that the good of the people is the highest law, but once they had gained that longed-for power by the hands of the people, they sat on the people's necks and proudly announced that they would not be guided by the backward sentiments of the masses. From the first day they set about driving and herding the masses to the next abyss.

That is why they did not appeal to the people. For millions of their countrymen a Bolshevik was a stranger and an oppressor. In the terrible year



of the destruction of the peasantry Bolsheviks who did not agree with the policy preferred to hold their theoretical debates in Kremlin offices and the halls of the Communist Academy. The Bukharinites, foes of the forced collectivization, did not turn to the nation, did not extend their hand to the little brothers, against whom the NKVD carried out undisguised genocide. Trotskii greeted collectivization sympathetically. He tried only to defend his priority in the matter. He wrote angry philippics from abroad on the occasion of every imprisonment or removal of his proponents, but he did not say a word about the suffering or death of millions of muzhiks.

After that unprecedented violence the Bolsheviks had no way back to the people, whom they had betrayed, and condemned to starvation and death. Instead there was a headlong rush to their own graves, under the party banner, under the leadership of Stalin.

One has only to read Bukharin's political testament. "I am leaving life. I bow my head, not before the proletariat's ax which must be merciless but chaste..." and so on to the end..."earlier the revolutionary idea justified cruelty to our enemies (so it was alright to kill others)...Storm clouds hung over the party." Party solidarity was his only standard: "It has already been seven years since I have had even a shade of disagreement with the Party." (On the eve of the destruction of the peasantry Bukharin disagreed, but now that disagreement has vanished? In 1937 he agrees with the party when it preaches terror? As long as it doesn't get him...?) The blinders of Party thought hindered his vision. Nothing else existed, not the Motherland, not close friends. In the face of death Bukharin could not find a single word of sorrow or of love. Only Party,...struggle...blood.

"I have never been a traitor. For the life of Lenin I would have given my own without hesitation. I loved Kirov. I did

not plot against Stalin...Know, comrades, that on that banner which you carry in the victorious march to communism, there is a drop of my blood."

Period. Nothing more to be said.

If the Party were dearer to them than anything else on earth--the nation, justice, truth--and if Stalin were the personification of the Party, then everything that might benefit him they would have to meet with hymns of welcome. Not excluding their own deaths. The mass destruction of Party members did not threaten the Party's power. On the contrary it fortified its power. It was historically progressive...at least until the time that the process came under Stalin's aegis and was directed by his will. And even after that, however many necks they broke, the Party's primacy was preserved.

If all that squabbling and bloodshed had not gone beyond the pack of professional conspirators, the whole subject would interest only Party historians. To the misfortune of the people, however, there was an extremely powerful amplifier between the Party and the people, and for every Bolshevik who perished, there were five, ten, or more non-Party, simple citizens who had never read Marx, Trotsky, or Stalin, and who could not see the differences among them. They were unable even to begin to understand why they were being sent to camps or killed.

And this wasn't the end of the country's grief, only its beginning. The merciless inner-Party conflict broke out at a time when the smell of powder was abroad in the world, but the ambitious politicians were too maddened to pay heed. On the threshold of war they dealt a fatal blow to the undefended rear of their own army.

## Chapter 18

### Preparing for the Harvest

Such acts as the destruction of a huge army do not happen suddenly or all by themselves. The undermining of the RKKA was begun along with the state revolution. For a long while there were no external marks to betray the progress of the work.

After the military-historical discoveries of 1929 and the bandit raid of 1930, Stalin's relations with the military leadership seemed unclouded. Tukhachevskii was brought back from his Leningrad exile and entrusted with an important post to take charge of rearming the Red Army as he had suggested. Military specialists were freed and returned to work. The reorganized army was filled with strength and worked hard. The generals were showered with favors and distinctions. The stern warriors in their turn found much to praise in their great leader. There was no end to the idyllic alliance, it seemed.

On May 4, 1935 Stalin spoke at a Kremlin banquet for the graduates of the Red Army academics. It was in that speech he introduced the famous slogan "The cadres decide everything."<sup>1</sup>

The timing of the new policy should not be so surprising. Earlier when we were so backward, technical matters had to be in first place. Now when we have left backwardness behind, when we have advanced (very rapidly in just five or six years, but this did not surprise anyone), the main thing has become people, people with technical skills. Technical things themselves, what are they? We have a surplus of them in the army (along with a million horses, which the speaker did not mention), and everywhere you look.

Therefore, armed to the teeth with first class technical weapons, we replace the old slogan with a new one.

There were also in that speech hints that the opposition had threatened to use terror:

We chose the plan of attack (meaning accelerated industrialization) and went ahead on the Leninist path leaving behind those comrades who could see only as far as their noses who closed their eyes to the near future of our country, to the future of socialism.

But the matter had become much more serious. Those comrades . . . did not always limit themselves to criticism and passive resistance. They threatened us with rebellion in the party against the Central Committee. More than that: they threatened some of us with bullets. Apparently they thought to frighten us and force us to turn away from the Leninist path. These people must have forgotten that we Bolsheviks are a special kind of people. They forgot that you do not frighten Bolsheviks with difficulties or threats . . . Understandably, we never even thought to swerve from the Leninist way. More than that, having determined on that path we went more determinedly ahead, sweeping from the road all and every obstacle. True, along the way we had to thrash a few of those comrades. I must confess that I too had a hand in the matter. (Stormy applause, shouts of "hurrah".)

The interpretation of the facts did not seem overly logical. It is one thing when some comrades (without quotation marks) do not see further than

their own noses and close their eyes to the future of socialism. This is a sad defect of vision called myopia. But what were they doing threatening rebellion and bullets . . . ? An explanation was in order. No one noticed the contradiction. They were all saving their breath for the next hurrahs.

Stalin did not insert the passage just for eloquence. No one had threatened him with bullets, but he was busily preparing the way for the opposition's confessions of planning terror. He was just saying what was on his mind. Chronology will help us here. The speech was made on May 4. The first Zinov'ev trial, which was heavily but unsuccessfully embroidered with accusations of plans to shoot the leaders, had taken place in January. Another case was prepared that summer which was not publicized: Kamenev was accused of planning to murder Stalin while he was in prison. Soon after the banquet on July 27 a secret trial took place. That time Kamenev, who admitted to nothing, escaped the firing squad.

Nearer the end of his long moralizing toast Stalin told a little story. In light of later events it reads like a masterpiece of hypocrisy:

I recall an incident from distant Siberia where I was once in exile . . . About thirty men went to the river to gather wood that had been washed up by the huge turbulent river. Towards evening they returned to the village but without one of their comrades. To the question about where the thirtieth man was they answered indifferently that the thirtieth had "stayed there". To my question "What do you mean, stayed there?" they replied with the same indifference, "What's to ask? He drowned." At that point one of them hurried off somewhere saying he had to go milk the cow. To my admonition that they cared more for the

cattle than for people one of them answered to the general approval of the rest, "Why should we care for them, for people? We can always make people. But a cow . . . just try to make a cow."

The moral was even shorter than the story:

It seems to me that the indifferent attitude of some of our leaders to people, to cadres, and the inability to value people is a vestige of that strange relationship of people to people that was apparent in this episode in distant Siberia.

It would add little to comment on more such pearls. They should be learned by heart. The speech's finale was prophetic:

If our army will have real hardened cadres in sufficiency, it will be unbeatable. To your health, comrades! (Stormy applause throughout the hall. All rise and greet comrade Stalin with loud shouts of "Hurrah".)

1935 passed and ended well for the army. A resolution appeared in November about the introduction of personal military titles. Until then the RKKA had managed for seventeen years without them. There were Red Armymen, junior commanders, and commanders. The commanders wore distinguishing emblems on collar tabs: triangles, cubes, rectangles, and rhombuses, which corresponded to their duties. Personal titles demonstrated the concern of the Party, the government, and comrade Stalin personally for our armed forces, and more important they were a step on the way back to old-regime style. Most of the titles still reflected posts: brigade commander, division commander, corps commander, and army commander, but there were also lieutenants, captains, majors, colonels, and marshals. In 1939 lieutenant colonel was added, and in

1940 - general. From there it was a small step to shoulder straps, that very feature by which the enemy was recognized in the civil war.

Nothing was heard about repression of the military in 1935. With one exception. The red commander Iakov Okhotnikov was arrested and shortly thereafter shot.

Stalin, as everyone who knew him has noted, was gifted with an exceptional memory. It was not difficult for him in 1935 to remember an event from 1927. Just before November 7, the tenth anniversary of the October revolution, the struggle between the Stalinists and the Zinov'ev-Trotskii faction reached a critical point. Oppositionist demonstrations were expected in Moscow and Leningrad, in connection with which special precautions were taken. Not only the Chekists but also students of military academics were made to guard the invaluable lives of the leaders lined up on the speakers' platform on the mausoleum. On the day of the celebrations R. P. Eideman, the head of the Frunze Academy, entrusted three of his pupils with special passes and ordered them to hurry to their assignment. They - along with Okhotnikov, Vladimir Petenko and Arkadii Geller were chosen - raced to Red Square. They got into the Kremlin without any trouble, but at the wooden gate to the tunnel leading to the speakers' stand they were detained. The guard, a Georgian, refused to let them pass. The hot-headed trio were not daunted by the insolence of the Chekist. They knocked him aside, breaking the gate in the process,<sup>2</sup> and hurried on. In seconds they were up behind those standing on the tribune. Guards jumped the newcomers, but Okhotnikov got loose and leaped to Stalin, whom he somehow considered responsible for the annoying confusion, and punched him in the head. At that moment Stalin's bodyguard drew a knife - it was forbidden to shoot - and wounded Okhotnikov in the hand. Officers present intervened and ended the scuffle. Okhotnikov was given first aid, and the

three were let go. That night they were sent for. Okhotnikov had prudently spent the night away from home. Geller and Potenko were seized. Eideman managed to hush up the affair.

The night of November 7, Stalin suffered a serious attack of paranoia, for which professor V. M. Bekhterev treated him. That visit, or more accurately that diagnosis, cost the famous psychiatrist his life. He was poisoned on Stalin's orders. Stalin did not try to make anything of the incident at the time; he was not in a position to do so. Eight years later he got even with the man who had insulted him. Okhotnikov, by the way, had been Iakir's adjutant during the civil war. Petenko and Geller perished in 1937.

In 1936 when the physical destruction of the opposition was begun, the army was not forgotten. Military men were taken, not yet in large numbers and without special fuss, but with an eye to the future. Most of the early arrests were made in the provinces.<sup>3</sup> The NKVD worked especially hard in the Ukraine. On July 5 Division Commander Dmitrii Shmidt, commander of the only heavy tank brigade then in the RKKA, and Boris Kuz'michev, chief of staff of large air forces units, were seized. Both were trusted associates of Iakir. Division Commander Iu. Sablin and others suffered the same fate.<sup>4</sup> They included another of Iakir's comrades from the time of the civil war, N. Golubenko, then chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk provincial executive committee. It is said that he had spoken out against repression.

As the repression grew, Stalin began to pay back old debts. As he remembered Okhotnikov, he was bound to remember Shmidt. Dmitrii Shmidt, son of a Jewish cobbler, a projectionist from Priluki joined the party in 1915. He fought bravely on several fronts with a corps of Red Cossacks; after the war he commanded a Cossack division. In the twenties he was an active Trotskyite. A former partisan and a man of desperate courage, Shmidt had



little use for idols or authority. Trotsky's expulsion from the party on the eve of the 15th Congress enraged him. He drove to Moscow and found Stalin during a break between meetings. Wrapped in a long Circassian coat, with a tall sheepskin hat on his head, he strode up to the General Secretary. He swore at him and brandishing an imaginary sword threatened, "Watch out, Koba. I'll cut your ears off!"

Stalin had to swallow that offense. The time had not yet come to accuse the opposition of terror. They were still talking about illegal printing presses. In 1936 he of the long memory not only avenged himself on Shmidt but made political hay of it. At the August trial the first of the witnesses, Mrachkovskii, told of the existence of a "group of murderers" in the army, led by Dmitrii Shmidt. Later Dreitser implicated Putna. I. N. Smirnov repudiated that testimony, but Pikel', Reingol'd, and Bakaev confirmed it. Several days later Procurator General Vyshinskii announced that a number of people mentioned in the testimony of the accused would be tried separately under the laws of special procedure. Among them were Shmidt and Kuz'michev.

Putna was not mentioned, but that is easily explained. At the time he was military attache in London. Had legal proceedings been begun against him, he would likely not have returned. He was simply recalled to Moscow, and in September he was arrested. That is how the first of the eight to be tried in the June 1937 trial fell into the paws of the NKVD. Apparently, however, no definite plans had yet been worked out about what use to make of Putna.

The NKVD and the Procuracy concentrated on Shmidt in the fall of 1936. A military man and a Trotskyite in one person, he would have to be the connecting link between the oppositionists and the conspirators in the army.

There was a slight hitch in the mechanism of the widening repression in September. Someone in the TsK tried to oppose Stalin while he was away from

Moscow on vacation. There was even talk about a secret plenum of the TsK where Stalin was still in a minority on the question of terror. This seems unlikely if only because a plenum could not take place in Stalin's absence. Nonetheless it was in September that signs of an anti-Stalinist movement appeared. An announcement was made on the tenth that the case against Rykov and Bukharin was being dropped. An open circular of the TsK that speaks of the necessity of stopping baseless repression is dated September 21.<sup>5</sup> With it there was also a call to watchfulness and provision for the prosecution of real enemies, but nonetheless this was a slap to Stalin's fist.

In his fateful hour Stalin reacted immediately and effectively. The famous telegram about replacing Iagoda was sent on the 25th, formalities occupied a few days, and already by the 30th Nikolai Ivanovich Ezhov had taken over his job. He appointed two new assistants, Matvei Berman, former chief of GULAG, and Mikhail Frinovskii, former chief of border forces, and set to work.

The second show trial began on January 21, 1937, the anniversary of Ilich's death. Piatakov, Sokol'nikov, Serebriakov, and Livshits freely gave testimony about their reserve (parallel) terroristic center, which had been established in case of the failure of the main center headed by Zinov'ev and Kamenev. As the accused had spent many years in economic work, much time was devoted to describing their various heroic deeds of wrecking, most of which are indistinguishable from normal slovenliness and fraud.<sup>6</sup> And of course their attempts to kill the party leaders, all of which happened to fail, were not left out.

Among the accused was also Karl Radek, the gas-bag, teller of jokes and pen-pusher, who in the early thirties turned from an oppositionist into a Stalinist minion and informer.<sup>7</sup> According to the trial's scenario, Radek was not involved in terrorism or wrecking. His role was his connection with

Trotsky. Radek betrayed Bukharin, he sang the NKVD's praises ("It wasn't the interrogators who tortured us, but we who tortured them."), and dropped most damaging hints about the participation of military men in the plots. At one of the morning sessions he testified: "Vitalii (correctly Vitovt - authors) Putna met with me in 1935 to ask a favor from Tukhachevskii." Somehow Vyshinskii did not pick up on that fact and led the questioning off in a different direction.

The evening of that same day he returned to that theme. (This supports the likely supposition that Tukhachevskii hurried to explain the matter to Voroshilov and Stalin, after which Vyshinskii got orders to formally exonerate the marshal, which he did in a characteristically strange way. Vyshinskii asked Radek why Tukhachevskii had approached him:

Radek. Tukhachevskii had a government assignment for which he could not find necessary material. Only I had the material. He called to ask if I had that material. I had it, and Tukhachevskii sent Putna, with whom he was working on the assignment, to get the material from me. Tukhachevskii had no idea of Putna's role, nor of my criminal role.

Vyshinskii. And Putna?

R. He was a member of the organization. He did not come on organization business, but I used his visit to have a needed conversation.

V. And Tukhachevskii?

R. Tukhachevskii was never associated with our cause . . .  
I affirm that I never had and never could have had any

association with Tukhachevskii along the lines of counterrevolutionary activity, because I knew that Tukhachevskii was a man absolutely devoted to the party and the government.

Radek said the word "material" four times, but the procurator never asked about its contents. He was not even interested in what the conspirators Putna and Radek were talking about. For Vyshinskii the incident was closed, but for Tukhachevskii it would turn out badly. The association of his name with such company threw a long shadow. Further explanations only raised more suspicions. What does an honest man need with a flattering character witness from the known counter-revolutionary Radek? Even the form of Radek's announcement put one on guard. It could seem that in singing the marshal's praises and denying even the possibility of associating with him, he was trying to distract attention from a deeply implicated co-conspirator. In 1937 that interpretation was considered sufficient proof.<sup>8</sup>

One of the eight, Putna, was kept at the Lubianka. Tukhachevskii was publicly shamed. Iakir felt "like a beast in a pen". After all, Shmidt and Kuz'michev were accused of planning to kill the People's Commissar in Iakir's office. Iakir must be given his due. He tried to break the closing ring. He went to Stalin and told him he did not believe either Shmidt or Kuz'michev guilty, and that in general he did not especially trust Ezhov. Stalin, always sympathetic to Iakir, met him half way. He granted him an interview with Shmidt. The prisoner looked terrible; he had the "look of a Martian". The meeting did not last long. Shmidt did, however, have time to tell the commander that the charges were lies and give him a note for Voroshilov.

Iakir visited the People's Commissar, gave him the note, and told him he was convinced that the prisoners were innocent. Iakir had barely returned to

Kiev when Voroshilov called to say that under questioning Shmidt had confessed that he had gulled Iakir and himself. He confirmed his earlier testimony. P. Iakir, the army commander's son, writes:

In this same conversation Voroshilov informed [my father] that Corps Commander Gar'kavyi had been arrested. Father sat down in an arm chair and put his head in his hands.

Il'ia Ivanovich Gar'kavyi was my fathers oldest friend from 1917. He was also a relative - the husband of mother's sister.<sup>9</sup>

When did this happen? According to P. Iakir, his father was at the Lubianka and with Voroshilov on the 17th or 18th, returned to Kiev, spoke on the telephone with Voroshilov, and on the next day returned to Moscow - to be present at the trial beginning on the 21st. Returning to Kiev for only a day or two seems strange. Why would he waste more than a day on the road for only a day at home? If we accept another date from other sources for Gar'kavyi's arrest - April, then this episode must have occurred at the end of April or the beginning of May. This is more likely, as M. F. Lukin, a former subordinate of Iakir and commandant of Moscow in 1937, recalls accompanying Iakir from the city in May shortly before his arrest.<sup>10</sup>

Another of Iakir's old friends, Iakov Livshits, was tried at the January trial. He was an old working-class Bolshevik from before the revolution, who had long worked in the Cheka-OGPU. Most recently he had been Deputy People's Commissar of Transportation. Livshits confessed to everything that was demanded of him, but just before he was shot he cried out, "Why?" Iakir heard of it.



## Chapter 19

### Harvest

In 1937 Tukhachevskii, Iakir, Uborevich, and other monsters were sentenced to be shot. Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR took place after that. The elections gave Soviet authority 98.6% of the vote . . . One asks where are the signs of "decay" here, and why was the "decay" evident in the elections?

Stalin

. . . value the cadres as the gold reserve of the party and state, treasure them, respect them.

Stalin

We will now describe what happened in the army in 1937-1938. We can not draw a complete picture of what happened. Therefore we will concentrate on a few episodes and aspects of the larger events.

Tukhachevskii. In early May 1937 the marshal's scheduled trip to the coronation ceremonies in London was suddenly cancelled - supposedly because of the planned assassination attempt . . . in Warsaw. Flag-officer V. M. Orlov, Commander of Naval Forces (VMS) was sent instead. On May 11 Voroshilov summoned Tukhachevskii and informed him that he had been removed from his duties as first deputy people's commissar and appointed commander of the troops of the Volga Military District. The announcement was curt, completely

official, and without explanation. Tukhachevskii was stunned - all the memoirists agree on that. He asked Stalin for an explanation. The story goes that Stalin reassured the marshal, explaining his removal by his close acquaintance with several of the accused in the recent trial. "But we trust you. It would be better for you to leave Moscow temporarily, and when the rumors die down, we will bring you back."

Tukhachevskii arrived in Samara (now Kuibyshev) on May 26 and set about taking over from his old friend P. E. Dybenko, but that very day he was arrested.

Iakir. On May 23 Iakir, a member of the TsK VKP(b) and the Politbiuro of the TsK(b) of the Ukraine, received an official secret paper, which informed him of Tukhachevskii's arrest and asked for his concurrence about initiating a criminal case. Iakir replied that he did not doubt for a second that Tukhachevskii was innocent, but he would not object to a trial seeing it as the best possible means for explaining all of the circumstances of the case. On the 29th, or more likely the 30th, Voroshilov phoned the army commander and ordered him to come to Moscow immediately for a meeting of the Military Council. There were no more trains that day for Moscow, and Iakir wanted to take a plane. Voroshilov did not permit that, however, and ordered him to use the personal train at his disposal as commander. Iakir set off at about 1:00 A. M. on the 31st. During the night his car was uncoupled at Briansk. Agents of the central apparatus of the NKVD seized the sleepy Iakir and took him by car to the Lubianka.

Primakov . . . was also called to Moscow and set off in a personal train. When Chekists tried to arrest him along the way, he made use of his Red Cossack past and with the help of his personal guard put them to flight. He called Voroshilov. The people's Commissar answered, "There has been a



misunderstanding. Some people are coming who will explain everything." Soon a reinforced detachment of NKVD arrived. Primakov surrendered his Mauser and went to the Lubianka.

Gamarnik . . . was sick during the last days of May and lay at home. One of those days, most probably the 31st, he was visited by his assistant, A. S. Bulin,<sup>1</sup> and the assistant chief of the General Staff Smorodin who asked for the key to a safe that contained materials needed for a meeting of the Military Council. Gamarnik was depressed. He already knew of the arrest of Tukhachevskii and others. His visitors tried to calm him. Soon they left. About an hour later agents of the NKVD arrived. As his daughter opened the door to the new guests two pistol shots rang out in his room. According to another version, Gamarnik shot himself immediately after Bulin and Smorodinov's visit, and they heard the shots as they departed.<sup>2</sup>

In an official communique Gamarnik was called an accomplice of the others on trial. (Stalin referred to him at a Military Council meeting on June 4 as "Gamarnik who is absent from court.") There are two other explanations for his suicide: to avoid being a member of the Military College of the Supreme Court, or to avoid giving testimony against the others accused.

Uborevich . . . was grabbed on May 29. It is hard to say exactly where that occurred. According to his daughter it was on the way from Smolensk to Moscow. According to other sources it happened on the station platform as he got off the train.

We have already mentioned Putna's arrest. Kork, Fel'dman, and Eideman worked in Moscow. They were arrested in the second half of May. If it is true that Fel'dman was relieved of his duties on May 28, that is probably the date of his arrest. It seems that Iakir already knew of it in Kiev. There are some indications that Eideman was arrested on the 22nd during the Moscow

party conference - for association with Kork, who had been seized a few days earlier.

Besides these the NKVD arrested other prominent military men: at the end of April the chief of the international department of the People's Commissariat of Defense Corps Commander A. I. Gekker, and the commander of the Urals district Corps Commander I. I. Gar'kavyi were seized (both were shot on July 1, 1937). Corps commander A. Ia. Lapin, former chief of staff of the special Far-Eastern Red-Banner Army, was arrested on May 11. Exact dates are not known, but in any case before the trial began, even before June 1, the chief of the Administration of Anti-aircraft defense, Commander of the Second Army A. I. Sediakin, Chief of the Academy of the General Staff Division Commander D. A. Kuchinskii, Chief of the Political Administration of the Leningrad Military District, Army Commissar 2nd class I. E. Slavin, and professor of the Frunze Academy Corps Commander G. D. Gai (Bzhishkian) were all arrested.

Gai had to be arrested twice. He was first arrested on the night of June 2-3, 1935 in Minsk. An NKVD special conference in Moscow gave him five years in prison.<sup>3</sup> On the way to the political isolation prison in Iaroslavl Gai managed to break a board out of the floor of the railroad car and jump out. He injured his leg but still had enough strength to reach the nearest field with haystacks. Despite his pain the old soldier covered his tracks well. He made a depression in the hay, climbed in, and fell asleep. A general alarm was soon raised throughout the district and hundreds of eager komsomoltsy led by chekists combed the fields and forests. They looked under every bush, poked bayonets into every haystack and stock of grain. All the komsomoltsy carried enlarged photographs of Gai, but they did not find him.<sup>3</sup>

Gai successfully slept through that ceremony in his honor. When he woke, he decided not to run any further and to ask for help. His leg hurt tremendously, and he had nothing to eat. Reaching a village, he went to the nearest hut. The owner recognized Gai, as he had once served under him. He told the army commander that he was being searched for. Several days later Gai decided to go to Moscow, but the peasant dissuaded him. "Come to the station," Gai told him. "Look. Are the pictures of Lenin and Stalin still hanging?" They were. "That means the Soviet authority still exists!" Gai walked out on the station. He considered his arrest an arbitrary act of the NKVD. The stationmaster recognized him also and advised him to hide. Gai demanded he be connected with Moscow and on a direct line he spoke with Voroshilov, who reassured him that some people were being sent for him who would explain everything. He did not have long to wait. In the Lubyanka Gai was put in the same cell with Putna. He still did not understand what had happened. "When they start to cut the skin from your back, you'll understand it all!," answered Putna.<sup>4</sup>

Bliukher. The first repressions against the army barely touched the Far East. All of 1937 and the first half of the next year passed relatively peacefully there. Only in the summer of 1938 did mass arrests begin in the OKDVA, the Separate Far Eastern Red-Banner Army. L. S. Mekhlis, Chief of the Political Administration of the RKKA, and deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Frinovskii arrived there at the end of May on separate trains. Soon thereafter commanders were seized by the hundreds.

It cannot be said that the moment was well chosen. The situation along the border was extremely tense - thanks to Stalin. The great leader had gotten the idea that the Far East was a powder keg, that the Chinese and

newfangled ideas. He would use artillery, for example, only against a broad front, not against reconnoitered fire points. Such tactics were already outmoded for the Red Army. When Soviet units charged, the Japanese fire points opened up at full strength. Soviet losses were heavy.

Finally at the cost of large sacrifices Soviet troops took the disputed heights. Military action was halted on August 11. The border was clearly demarcated and confirmed in a peaceful agreement. Wars of national liberation did not break out.<sup>6</sup>

During the conflict Bliukher was not mentioned once in the press. A week after the battles ended he was recalled to Moscow. Voroshilov gave him a magnificent snow job and ordered him to take a vacation until a new appointment for him was decided on.

Bliukher left with his wife and brother, commander of a large air force unit, for the Crimea (by other accounts to Sochi). At his leisure the old warrior thought a lot about the recent failure and finally decided he understood the true cause. According to his wife, he wrote a letter to Stalin early in October. "All that happened was the result of provocation . . . I was thoroughly misinformed . . . My boys walked right into the Japanese machine guns . . . Frinovskii and Goglidze should be removed from the Far East and punished . . ." Bliukher was soon ordered to Moscow, and on October 22 he was arrested.

They put the marshal in Lefortovo prison. The new Deputy People's Commissar L. P. Beria took the first interrogation. The charges were serious: association with the Japanese since 1921, and intention to defect to them with the help of his brother, the pilot. Bliukher denied everything.

His death occurred on November 9. By questioning witnesses the late V. V. Dushen'kin, chief of the Central Archive of the Soviet Army, has

studies in August 1937. Two months later he took over the department of operational preparations of the higher command staff in the General Staff. Further promotions followed rapidly: 1939 - assistant chief of the operations department, 1940 - assistant chief of the operations administration, July 1941 - assistant chief of General Staff. Thus a man who had never commanded larger units, who had no experience in headquarters work, who had little education, came to head the country's major military organization. It was enough that his promptness, lack of personality, and industriousness pleased Stalin, himself an absolute ignoramus in military matters.

In 1939-1940 we meet P. V. Rychagov and I. I. Proskurov, both lieutenants in 1937, as lieutenant-generals serving as deputy commissars of aviation. Both were shot: Proskurov in 1940, and Rychagov in 1941.

There were more amazing flights. Captain Peresyarkin from commander of a communications squadron two years later became People's Commissar of Communications of the USSR and from the first days of the war also chief of communications of the Red Army.

Vasilevskii's classmates N. F. Vatulin, M. V. Zakharov, and A. I. Antonov, none of whom had the education or experience for the jobs, became chiefs of staff of the most important regions in Kiev, Leningrad, and Moscow. Fortunately, unlike Vasilevskii, they were able, especially Zakharov and Antonov, to quickly achieve the level of competence demanded by their positions.

Not everyone succeeded at this. It was their misfortune and not their fault, but they often paid dearly for it - they and the country. The commander of the Western Special Military District D. G. Pavlov went in three peacetime years from a brigade commander to general of the army. He was practically the only one of the commanders who literally obeyed the suicidal

pre-war orders of Stalin, Timoshenko, and Zhukov. Because of that the Western region proved the least well defended when Germany attacked. Pavlov lost control of his troops in the first hours of the war and doomed them to almost complete destruction. He was simply unable to take any positive action. For that he was declared a traitor and shot.

Other commanders of border regions - F. I. Kuznetsov (Baltic), Ia. T. Cherevichenko (Odessa), M. M. Popov (Leningrad) - did not share Pavlov's fate, but neither did they achieve particular success. M. P. Kirponos, commander of the Kiev Special Region, is better known. In 1940 he had been commandant of the Kazan infantry school and had begged to be sent to the Finnish front. The colonel got his wish and was given a division. During the war he became a major general. Kirponos' division was the first to get into Vyborg. A month later he was made lieutenant general and commander of the Leningrad Military District, half a year later - colonel-general and commander of the Kiev district. Entering his office he drew his hand across his throat and said, "A division was as much I could handle." Kirponos was an honest and courageous soldier but was not able to save his troops from defeat or his native Ukraine from capture by the enemy. It is possible that his death in battle saved him from repression.

In Marshal S. S. Biriuzov's memoirs there is an interesting description that well illustrates the situation in the army after the slaughter of the command staff. After he graduated from the Academy he was sent as chief of staff to the glorious 30th Irkutsk Rifle Division. When he arrived at his assignment, he went directly to headquarters. A senior lieutenant was sitting in the chief's office. Biriuzov assumed he was an adjutant and asked where the chief of staff was. The answer was, "I am the chief of staff." The young officer was very glad to see Biriuzov's orders. "Go see the division

commander, comrade colonel, we are utterly exhausted here." In the division commander's office sat . . . another senior lieutenant. It turned out that all the senior officers of the division had been arrested. Command according to combat orders had been taken by company commanders and heads of HQ departments.

## Chapter 20

### The Executioners: Modus Operandi

All these people were apparently immune and impervious to the simplest sense of compassion only because they served. They, as serving people, were impervious to the feeling of humanity 'as paved earth is to rain' . . . It may be that these governors, superintendants, policemen, are necessary, but it is terrible to see people deprived of their chief human quality, - of love and pity for their fellow men.

. . . Indeed, they are terrible people, - more terrible than robbers. A robber may have pity, - these never can; they are ensured against pity as these stones are against vegetation.

Lev Tolstoy.  
Resurrection.


When people want to kill a dog, they say it is rabid.

popular saying

It is naive to moralize to people who do not acknowledge human morality.

Stalin





Probably you don't shudder killing a person. Oh, martyrs of dogma, You, too, are victims of the times.

Pasternak

It is still hard today to determine with any precision what Stalin and Ezhov's whole plan was for the destruction of the army leadership. There is no doubt that there was such a plan. Who in the USSR works without a plan?

It would be easy to say that there were several plans, that they changed, became intertwined, and were coordinated, or on the other hand came into conflict. That is not so important. What is important is that from the summer of 1936 there was a wide-spread, deeply conspiratorial plot against the Red Army, against its leadership.

#### The original conception

The basic plan, which did not exclude variations held in reserve, lay in the mainstream of Stalinist policy. The enemies of the people had their own military organization or, worse still, close association with conspirators in the army. Such an assumption led logically to a show trial of military officers, most likely together with civilian oppositionists.

The plan was not so foolish, but it was destroyed when it came up against a powerful obstacle. For the trial to succeed it needed prominent military officers who would agree to take upon themselves the roles of traitors to their country, conspirators, and accomplices of enemies internal and foreign. As bad luck would have it, the NKVD as hard as they tried could not find suitable candidates. In 1936-1937, as later, the officers with very few exceptions refused to cooperate with the prosecution.

Failure haunted the NKVD and Procuracy from the very beginning. Dmitrii Shmidt, who was chosen to get the process started, behaved miserably,

unconscionably, not like a Bolshevik. At first glance he would seem to have been a good choice. His Trotskyite past permitted the prosecution to tie him in with the civilian enemies of the people, as they did in Mrachkovskii's testimony in August 1936.

It remained only to associate him with the criminal activities of the prominent commanders with whom he had been close since the civil war. That made it possible to implicate, for example, Primakov, Eideman, Dubovoi, and less directly Iakir. If association with the opposition was easy to show, and here Shmidt was the object at whom others pointed their finger, his relations with the military officers proved just the opposite. Shmidt was supposed to give testimony that would serve as the basis for bringing charges against his comrades-in-arms.

The NKVD investigators understood that it would be difficult to get an admission of guilt from Shmidt. Therefore they charged him at first only with the intention, together with Kuz'michev, to kill Voroshilov. Very likely Shmidt had little use for Voroshilov, who was a zealous Stalinist, and the investigator, playing on this hostility, implied the possibility of such intentions. Together with torture similar psychological treatment often bore fruit. If they could get Shmidt to crack on that point, they would drag him farther - to admit to a wide-spread conspiracy in the military. They would have suggested to him that once he had admitted to the one part, he would have to admit to the rest. The intention to kill the People's Commissar was sufficient cause to sentence him to death, and he could lighten his penalty by naming his conspirators, the ringleaders, etc.

Nothing came of the NKVD's good idea. Tormented practically to death, Shmidt did not give in. If in moments of extreme torment he admitted to anything, when he came to himself he denied his testimony. But it probably

wasn't even that. While Iakir was in the Lubyanka, he was never shown copies of Shmidt's confessions, only told of them, just as Voroshilov only told of his subsequent retractions.

Shmidt stood firm. The plan for an open trial was destroyed. Putna was also in the Lubyanka. There is some information that he was also tortured, but again unsuccessfully. They saved Putna for the June trial which was carried out secretly. Shmidt apparently looked too bad to present him even at that closed spectacle for invited guests. He was shot on the eve of the trial on May 20, 1937.

The scenario for an open trial still existed - at least it had been thoroughly worked out. Vyshinskii, the chief playwright, regretted the lost inspiration. He determined to get something out of it. Large parts of it went into another show - the Bukharin trial of 1938. Two considerations support the idea that the "military episodes" were not written specially for the event, but were taken from old plans: 1) the criminal association of Bukharin, Rykov, Iagoda, Krestinskii, and Grin'ko with the military added nothing to the criminal visage of the accused; they are completely absent from the prosecution's conclusion and are not at all used in the procurator's speech; 2) Iakir is barely mentioned in the inserted episodes (instead Gamarnik is active in the Ukraine), which is natural since he was added to the list at the last moment.

These are valuable to us as the only charges publicly laid against the Tukhachevskii group, if only after the fact. We include them here in their entirety, preserving the chronology of the trial session.<sup>1</sup>

Evening session, March 2

Examination of G. F. Grin'ko<sup>3</sup>

Grin'ko: . . . first, the association with the right-Trotsky center. My association went along this line - Gamarnik, Piatakov, Rykov. I was connected with Gamarnik through Liubchenko, who was also associated with Iakir and Gamarnik. Through Gamarnik I had connections with Piatakov, and later with Rykov. I carried out foreign policy tasks because Piatakov and Gamarnik had told me that Trotsky had agreed to pay compensation at the expense of the Ukraine for military assistance in our struggle against Soviet authority . . . . My association with Gamarnik, Piatakov, and Rykov began approximately late in 1935 . . . .

On the basis of a number of conversations and associations, and tasks assigned me by Rykov, Bukharin, Gamarnik, Rozengol'ts, Iakovlev, Antipov, Rudzutak, Iagoda, Vareikis, and a large number of other people, it became clear to me that the right-Trotskyite center was relying mainly at that time on military assistance from aggressors . . . . In addition to that the right-Trotskyite center had an alternative plan to seize the Kremlin . . . .

In that period terrorism was one of the main weapons in the common arsenal of the struggle against Soviet power.

Vyshinskii: From whom did you learn this?

Grin'ko: From Rykov, Iakovlev, Gamarnik, and Piatakov . . . .

Vyshinskii: Grin'ko, where did this terroristic line come from?

Grin'ko: From Trotsky. I learned about that from Gamarnik . . . the question was also directly raised about the removal of Ezhov as a man especially dangerous for the conspirators.

Vyshinskii: What does removal mean?

Grin'ko: Removal - that means murder . . . . I heard from Gamarnik that Iakir and Gamarnik ordered the Trotskyite Ozerianskii, who then worked in the People's Commissariat of Finance, to prepare a terrorist act against Ezhov . . . .<sup>2</sup>

A second fact that I know . . . was the preparation of a terrorist act against Stalin by Bergavinov from the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route. I found that out also from Gamarnik . . . . I heard it also from Bergavinov himself, who told me he had accepted Gamarnik's assignment and was trying to carry it out.

There was nothing more to drag out of Grin'ko, so Vyshinskii plugged in Rykov: Grin'ko just spoke of the group of military traitors - Tukhachevskii and others who in their turn were convicted by the Supreme Court. Do you corroborate that part of the testimony which concerns you.

Rykov: I knew of Tukhachevskii's military group . . . . That military group was organized independently of the bloc or of any tinge of Trotskyite or Bukharinites. The military group had as its goal the violent elimination of the government of the Union, and in particular participated in planning the Kremlin revolution . . . . I learned about that from Tomskii in 1934.

Evening session of March 3

Examination of N. N. Krestinskii<sup>3</sup>

Vyshinskii: Accused Krestinskii, tell us, please, what do you know about the participation of the Tukhachevskii group in the "right-trotskyite bloc?"

Krestinskii: About Tukhachevskii's participation I know the following. When I met with Trotskii at Meran in October 1933, he indicated to me that in planning a state revolution we must not rely solely on our Trotskyite forces, because they were insufficient for that, but must strike a deal with the rights and with the military group. He paid particular attention to Tukhachevskii as an adventurer, ambitious to hold the highest position in the army,<sup>4</sup> who would likely be willing to risk much. He asked me to tell Piatakov about this and to discuss it with Tukhachevskii personally.

Vyshinskii: Did you talk with Tukhachevskii?

Krestinskii: I talked with him early in 1934 after Piatakov had spoken with him. I told him of my conversation with Trotskii. Tukhachevskii said that in principle he agreed not only with the idea of joining forces but also with the goal before us . . . . I subsequently spoke with Tukhachevskii about these things several more times. That was in the second half of 1935, in 1936 and 1937 . . . . During one of these conversations in 1935 he named several men on whom he relied. He named Iakir, Uborevich, Kork, and Eideman. Later in another conversation, a very important conversation, which took place at the Extraordinary 8th Congress of Soviets, Tukhachevskii urged upon me the need to hasten the revolution. The problem was that we had

associated the revolution with our defeatist orientation and had timed it to coincide with the beginning of war, with the attack by Germany on the Soviet Union. Inasmuch as the attack was delayed, so was the practical realization of the revolution. The gradual destruction of counter-revolutionary forces was beginning at the time. Piatakov and Radek had been arrested; the Trotskyites were beginning to be arrested; and Tukhachevskii began to fear that if things were put off they might fall through altogether. Therefore he posed the question of accelerating the counter-revolutionary attack . . . .

Vyshinskii: Accused Rozengol'ts, do you corroborate this part of Krestinskii's testimony?

Rozengol'ts: Yes, I corroborate it.

Vyshinskii: Did you speak with Tukhachevskii and with Krestinskii?

Rozengol'ts: I had a talk with Krestinskii at the end of May 1937 about accelerating the organization of the revolution . . . .

Evening session of March 4

Examination of A. P. Rozengol'ts<sup>5</sup>

Vyshinskii: Did Rykov tell you that Tukhachevskii was promising to act, but did not act?

Rozengol'ts: Yes.

Vyshinskii: Who else told you?

Rozengol'ts: Krestinskii told me about it, and Sedov transmitted Trotskii's opinion . . . .



Vyshinskii: Accused Krestinskii, tell us, did you tell Rozengol'ts in 1936 that Tukhachevskii was procrastinating with the counter-revolutionary action? . . .

Krestinskii: Yes. Late in 1936 the question was raised at the same time by Trotskii from abroad in a letter to Rykov and by Tukhachevskii about hastening the revolution and not be timed to coincide with the outbreak of war . . .

Vyshinskii: That means that Tukhachevskii was in a hurry?

Krestinskii: By the end of 1936 Tukhachevskii began to hurry.

Vyshinskii: And at that time did you push him on?

Krestinskii: I agreed with him . . .

Rozengol'ts: The point at which I stopped was the meeting which we had with Tukhachevskii.

Vyshinskii: Where was that meeting?

Rozengol'ts: At my apartment.

Vyshinskii: You had a meeting, with whom?

Rozengol'ts: With Tukhachevskii and Krestinskii . . . . That was in late March 1937. At that meeting Tukhachevskii informed us that he could count with certainty on the possibility of revolution and indicated the timing, that before May 15, in the first half of May, he could accomplish the military revolution.

Vyshinskii: Of what did that counter-revolutionary act consist?

Rozengol'ts: Tukhachevskii had a number of alternatives. One of the alternatives, the one on which he counted most, was the chance for a group of his military supporters to gather at his apartment, to get into the Kremlin under pretext, seize

the Kremlin telephone exchange and kill the leaders of the party and government . . . .

Krestinskii: We spoke with Rozengol'ts and Gamarnik about this. We discussed the necessity of terroristic acts against the leaders of the party and government.

Vyshinskii: Against whom specifically?

Krestinskii: We had Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich in mind . . . . Ever since November 1936 I was decidedly in favor of speeding up that revolution as much as possible. There was no need to push Tukhachevskii as he had the same feeling, and he himself put that question to us - the rights, to me, to Rozengol'ts and Rudzutak . . . . Our feelings on the question of revolution coincided . . . .

Vyshinskii: (to Rozengol'ts). What do you have to say about your meetings with Gamarnik?

Rozengol'ts: I confirm the testimony I gave during the preliminary investigation.

Vyshinskii: What was that?

Rozengol'ts: Concerning Gamarnik the most important point was that Gamarnik told us about his proposal, with which Tukhachevskii apparently concurred, about the possibility of seizing the building of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs during the military revolution. Gamarnik further assumed that this attack would be carried out by some military unit directly under his command, assuming that he had sufficient party and political prestige in the military units. He expected that several commanders,

especially the most valiant, would help him. I recall that he mentioned Gorbachev's name.<sup>6</sup>

Vyshinskii: That means that not only did Tukhachevskii inform you of the plan of his criminal conspiracy, but Gamarnik also informed you of the plan?

Rozengol'ts: Yes . . . .

Second examination of N. I. Krestinskii

Krestinskii: [Narrates the contents of a conversation which allegedly took place between him and Trotskii on October 10, 1933] . . . the first thing was an agreement with foreign governments. The second was the establishment in the Soviet Union of a combined force of Trotskyites, rights, and military conspirators . . . As far as the military men are concerned, when Trotskii spoke of them he mentioned only one name - that of Tukhachevskii, as a man like Bonaparte, an adventurer, an ambitious man who strove to play not only a military, but a politico-military role - who would undoubtedly cooperate with us . . . He asked me to inform Piatakov about these policies and especially about the need to communicate with the Japanese. In addition he asked that I not just have Matakov speak with Tukhachevskii and Rudzutak, but that I meet with them as well . . . When I returned I immediately informed Piatakov and Rozengol'ts of my talks. Piatakov spoke with Tukhachevskii and Rudzutak . . .

In February 1934 I met with Tukhachevskii and with Rudzutak and told them of my conversation. I got from both

confirmation in principle, of their acceptance of the idea of cooperation with foreign governments, of their military assistance, the defeatist line, and the establishment of a united organization within the country . . .

Concerning the timing of the act: From the time of my meeting in Meran it was considered indisputably decided that the act would coincide with the start of war, and that therefore we in the Union could not set the date for Tukhachevskii's action . . . Late in November 1936 at the Extraordinary 8th Congress of Soviets, Tukhachevskii spoke with me excitedly and in grave terms. He said things have begun to fall apart. It is obvious there will be more repressions of Trotskyists and rights . . . He drew the conclusions: we could not wait for interventionists; we would have to act ourselves . . . . Tukhachevskii spoke not only for himself, but also in the name of the counter-revolutionary military organization . . . It turned out that Trotsky on his own initiative had decided the act should be moved up and sent an order to that effect in a letter to Rozengol'ts . . . After receiving that reply, we began to make more concentrated preparations for the act. Approximately in the beginning of February [1937 - authors] Rozengol'ts and I were officially made members of the center. In November [1936 - authors] Rozengol'ts, Gamarnik, and I had to take over the leadership of the Trotskyites. Piatakov was already gone. So was Radek . . . A date was set for the revolution - the second half of May. But at the

very beginning of May it was learned that Tukhachevskii was not going to London . . . He declared that he could accomplish the act in the first half of May.

Morning session of March 7

Examination of N. I. Bukharin

Bukharin: In that period [1929-1930] we had already discussed the question of overthrowing the Soviet government by violent means with the help of a group of military participants in the conspiracy.

Vyshinskii: Tukhachevskii, Primakov, and several others?

Bukharin: Exactly correct . . . The forces of the conspiracy were the forces of Enukidze plus Iagoda . . . At the time [1933-1934] Enukidze had managed to recruit, as best I remember, the former military commandant of the Kremlin, Peterson, who by the way had been commandant of Trotskii's train. Then there was the military organization of conspirators: Tukhachevskii, Kork, and others.

That was all. The literary exercises of academician Vyshinskii need no commentary. We are left only to marvel at how simply the frightening news of widespread treachery in the army command was presented to the people.

#### The Red Folder

A myth about the destruction of the leadership of the RKKA begun by Khrushchev has taken root in Soviet propaganda - that it was the result of an evil plot by the Germans who slipped Stalin false documents about Tukhachevskii's association with the German general staff. That version saves face for Stalin and the system, but only people like Lev Nikulin<sup>7</sup> could possibly believe it.

The only truth to that is that there was a collection of documents, which is usually called "the red folder". It was prepared in Germany, and it did fall into Stalin's hands. The rest accords less well with the truth.

The essential question is who fabricated the folder? All sources - and there are many - although they do not agree in all details, do agree on one thing: the papers were made to order for someone in Moscow. It was the NKVD acting, most probably, on orders from Stalin. That can be considered certain today. Remaining details give the matter entertainment value as a mystery, but they do not change its ominous significance.

The history of the "red folder" is in itself fascinating. We will try to summarize all that has become known. Everything is not clearly known; there are not complete details - which is natural when one has to speak of the activities of the secret services.

At the center of this story stands the Russian general Nikolai Vladimirovich Skoblin (1893- ? ). In November 1918 the twenty-five-year-old captain Skoblin became commander of the illustrious Kornilov division of Whites and remained in that post in emigration. General Skoblin was a prominent figure in the White emigre military organization, the Russian All-Military Union (Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz - ROVS).

Skoblin's biography remains incomplete. He disappeared from Paris at dawn on September 23, 1937, only hours after the kidnapping of the head of ROVS, General Miller, by agents of the NKVD. Even then, however, it was clear that Skoblin played a central role in that act. As long ago as 1930 he had been involved in the kidnapping of the ROVS' first leader, General A. P. Kutepov.

Most likely Skoblin had been recruited by the NKVD through his wife, the famous Russian singer Nadezhda Plevitskaia.<sup>8</sup> Plevitskaia's superior in the

NKVD was the legendary Naum Ettingon. Her contact and bag-man was Ettingon's brother Mark.<sup>9</sup>

Although, as we have already said, recollections about the "red folder" are many, they can be divided into two finished versions. The first is told by Victor Aleksandrov,<sup>10</sup> the second by Robert Conquest.<sup>11</sup>

Strictly speaking, these two versions do not contradict one another in any important way. Aleksandrov's description is much longer, a whole book of almost 200 pages, which reads like fiction. He tries to reconstruct long dialogs between the dramatis personae - Stalin with Radek, Stalin with Voroshilov, Radek with Nikolai, Fel'dman with Tukhachevskii, Skoblin with Heydrich, and many others. Conquest devoted all of four pages to this affair. His sources are many fewer, but they are, perhaps, more reliable.<sup>12</sup>

It should be said that both authors give only an incomplete picture and leave several important circumstances unclear.<sup>13</sup>

Aleksandrov's version. Stalin sent K. Radek on a secret mission to establish contact with the Germans with the aim of further close cooperation. Radek met with Colonel Nikolai in the Polish Baltic town Oliwa near Sopot. After that Ezhov ordered Iagoda to arrest Radek on the grounds that he had had talks with Colonel Nikolai as an agent of the Trotskyite opposition.<sup>14</sup> This is the most difficult part of Aleksandrov's version to verify.<sup>15</sup>

After Ezhov replaced Iagoda he sent to Paris the deputy director of the foreign department of the NKVD, Aleksandr Spigel'glass and a certain Sarovskii.<sup>16</sup> This was part of Ezhov's plan to begin discrediting Tukhachevskii as a German agent. Spigel'glass ordered Skoblin to inform the Czechs (through their resident in Geneva, Nemanov), that the Trotskyites had established contact with the Germans through Radek and Piatakov. Skoblin was to deliver to Nemanov Radek's statement that he (Radek) had agreed to organize

a military coup d'etat with Tukhachevskii and Putna. In exchange for that favor Skoblin was promised that the NKVD would remove General Miller, which would make it possible for him to become head of the ROVS.

But Skoblin was not only a paid agent of the NKVD. He also hated the Soviet regime. He dreamed of its destruction and placed his main hope on Hitler. Skoblin worked on the Germans also: he had close ties to R. Heydrich, the head of the SD. Skoblin figured that he had to go further than the NKVD's instructions. If it were possible to prepare documents about Tukhachevskii's association with the Germans and make these available to Stalin, the latter would be sure to destroy the top leadership of the Red Army, and then Hitler would not withstand the temptation to attack the weakened Soviet Union. Skoblin decided that this plan would find an ally in Heydrich, who was opposed to Nikolai's efforts to bring Berlin and Moscow closer, and who, more than that, knew that Tukhachevskii saw in Nazi Germany the main threat to the USSR.

Heydrich accepted Skoblin's idea to reinforce the information sent to Benes with documentary proof.<sup>17</sup> He found support from his superior, Himmler, and a specialist in Russian affairs, Rosenberg. It remained only to secure the approval of Hitler and Hess. The decisive meeting took place on Christmas Eve 1936 in Hitler's office. The matter was kept in strict secrecy even from the high military command. Besides Hitler, Rosenberg, Hess, and Heydrich, only a few high officials of the SD and Gestapo, including V. Hoettl<sup>18</sup> and Herman Berens,<sup>19</sup> attended. Technical implementation of the operation was entrusted to Colonel Naujocks.<sup>20</sup>

Work went ahead full speed from the first days of 1937. Tukhachevskii was in Germany six times, not including his captivity. From all of these trips there remained authentic documents in his hand. They were used in preparing



the forgeries. Citing SS General Shellenberg, Aleksandrov offers an interesting detail. Tikhachevskii's original letters had been gathered for the most part by military intelligence. Its head, Admiral Kanaris, did not want to give them to Heydrich. At that point M. Borman, with the help of several professional thieves, organized a burglary of the Nachrichtendienst archives.

After that a special team of forgers set to work. It included a Russian emigre counterfeiter convicted of forging English pounds. Skoblin traveled periodically to Berlin. He was the chief expert in evaluating the finished documents.

Ezhov waited impatiently for the work on the dossier to be completed.<sup>21</sup> He promised Stalin that he would put proof of Tikhachevskii's conspiracy on his desk by the end of March 1937. When it became clear that the work would not be done by the appointed date, he sent an emissary to Skoblin to get something he could show to Stalin. Skoblin went to Berlin and got from the Germans a list of the documents making up the dossier.

Finally in mid-April all was ready. Ezhov's deputy Zakovskii arrived in Berlin. He offered to pay the Germans 200,000 marks (in rubles) for the dossier. Berens considered the sum far too high. Zakovskii insisted. He said that no one in the Politbiuro would believe that such important documents could be bought for less; besides that, he needed a formal receipt for the money. Finally the deal was consummated.<sup>22</sup>

Conquest's version. This is shorter and dryer. The NKVD informed Heydrich through Skoblin of Tikhachevskii's secret association with the German General Staff. The security services, understanding that the source of that information was in Moscow, decided nonetheless to make use of it - first of all to compromise the General Staff with whom the SD had strained relations.

It soon became clear, however, that they had a good opportunity of another sort in their hands.

Rumors of Tukhachevskii's German ties were spread by way of the Czech president Benes in the last months of 1936. In March or April 1937 Heydrich and Berens ordered their subordinates to prepare "documentary evidence." That delicate work was carried out by an engraver, Franz Putzig, a specialist in counterfeit documents. The dossier comprised 32 pages. According to Colonel Naujocks, there was a "letter" in the dossier signed by Tukhachevskii and stamped "top secret." The letter mimicked Tukhachevskii's style. The marshal's signature was taken from the Soviet-German agreement of 1926 about technical cooperation in the field of aviation. Signatures of German generals on other letters were copied from their bank checks.

German security services transmitted these documents to the NKVD. The NKVD, it would seem, snuck the dossier to the Czechs "to create the impression in Stalin (to whom Benes sent them) that he, Stalin, received them from friendly foreign hands . . . "

One way or another by the beginning of May the dossier was in Stalin's hands. Such in brief is the history of the "red folder." Despite some disagreement about some details, we can consider as established fact: (1) The Germans fabricated documents slandering Tukhachevskii at the behest of Skoblin, who acted with the knowledge of or according to instructions from the NKVD; (2) when Ezhov got the documents in one way or another, he was aware they were forgeries.

Stalin's role remains incompletely explained. It is entirely possible that the initiative in the affair was not his, but the NKVD's. History knows of many instances of such institutions acting independently. The tsarist Okhrana, to pick a home-grown example, was involved in the murder of a Russian

prime minister, Stolypin. Stalin might have been fooled for a while, but that does not diminish his responsibility. If his favorite child had fooled him, it had acted entirely in his spirit.

### The June 11 Affair

In early May 1937 the "red folder" lay on Stalin's desk. It seemed to be just what he wanted. In May preparations for the trial were speeded up. On the 11th the shake up of the generals was announced. Tukhachevskii resigned from his duties as Deputy People's Commissar and went off to command the remote Volga district. Iakir was transferred from the Kiev district which he had headed for twelve years, to Leningrad. His responsibilities were almost the same with the important difference that moving to Leningrad he automatically lost his important position as a member of the Ukrainian Politbiuro. At the same time Egorov, while he remained Deputy People's Commissar, gave up his post as commander of the General Staff. He was replaced by troop commander of the Leningrad Military District Shaposhnikov. It was then that the restoration of the military commissars was announced.<sup>23</sup>

Of the personnel changes two were especially important - those of Tukhachevskii and Iakir. For some time, however, both stayed where they were. On May 23 Iakir even spoke at the party conference of the Kiev district. Tukhachevskii arrived in Samara only on May 26 and was arrested that same day in the regional Party committee building, where he had been summoned by P. P. Postyshev.

It is hard to explain why Stalin gave such a reprieve to the two main figures of the upcoming trial. All the more since Kork (May 11), Eideman (May 24), and Fel'dman (May 24 or 25) had been arrested before Tukhachevskii left Moscow.

Uborevich's turn came on May 30, and Iakir was seized on the 31st, the same day Gamarnik shot himself. The date of Primakov's arrest is still uncertain.

The reestablishment of the commissars' power was a vital measure that betrayed the evil seriousness of Stalin's intentions. Since the civil war commissars had occupied key positions in the army hierarchy. Without the commissar's signature (as a member of the RVS) none of the commanders or commanding officer's orders had the force of law. This was originally caused by the lack of trust of commanders, especially those in the highest ranks, who frequently did not have proletarian backgrounds.

Unity of command was established in the RKKA in 1934. The Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR (the board of the People's Commissariat of army and naval affairs) was liquidated, as were the RVSs of districts, armies, fleets, etc. The military department received a new name, the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO). From the statute on the NKO, which was confirmed by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on November 22, 1934, we read:

1. At the head of the NKO stands the People's Commissar of Defense. He also stands at the head of the RKKA . . . .
6. Under the People's Commissar is the Military Council, which is a consultative body . . .

Commissars became assistants of the corresponding military commanders for political affairs. There were no consultative organs at lower levels.

The decree of the TsIK and SNK of May 10, 1937, signified a sharp turn of the wheel. From regiment on up, commissars were restored to their former powers. Despite the fact that the law on military commissars was to go into force only on August 15, on that very day, May 10, Military Councils that were

executive rather than consultative were formed in regions, armies, and fleets. From the Law on regional Military Councils, confirmed May 16, 1937:

1. At the head of a Military District stands the Military Council comprised of the commander of troops and two members.
2. The commander chairs meetings of the Military Council.
3. The Military Council is the highest representative of military authority in the region. All military units and institutions located in the territory of the region are subordinate to the Military Council . . . .
5. The Military Council is subordinated directly to the People's Commissar of Defense . . . .
7. All orders for the region will be signed by the commander of troops, one of the members of the Military Council, and the chief of staff.

Regional commanders, who were about to be liquidated, were bereft of unitary command of the troops entrusted to them. It was symptomatic that the new order did not affect the People's Commissar, Stalin's apprentice Voroshilov. The Military Council under him retained its consultative status. It was as if a state of emergency had been declared in the army.

Now, at least in theory, any commander could be held in check by assigning to him reliable members of the Military Council. True, the political workers were pretty well soiled by Gamarnik's hostile activities, and they would soon suffer purges and shake-ups, but the Stalinists never were squeamish about that sort of work.

Stalin had just about everything he needed for the trial by this time except the sanction of some higher organ. We are not, of course, talking about observing constitutional guarantees. It was simply that Stalin did not want to take upon himself sole responsibility for such a decision. He could without difficulty have gotten the approval of the powerless TsIK headed by kindly Kalinin. Molotov stood ready to arm the SNK's resolution. Tukhachevskii's arrest had been approved in a written interrogatory of the members of the TsK including Iakir. All this was not enough for Stalin.

Calling a plenum of the TsK entailed a certain risk: the memory of the problem at the February meeting was still fresh. But that was not the only problem. The General Secretary could in the end force the party to make the right decision. He could say to them, "Remember, I told you of the great damage done by a few spies ensconced somewhere in army headquarters. Now these people have been unmasked and seized." That could leave an unpleasant aftertaste, however. "Someone could say," Stalin calculated, "that the Party had judged the Army. Is that correct from the political point of view? No, it is politically wrong." Stalin decided to let the military have the last word. LET THE ARMY JUDGE THE ARMY.

On June 1 the People's Commissar of Defense summoned the Military Council. That consultative organ included the top army brass - the Deputy People's Commissar, department heads of the Commissariat, regional commanders-in-chief, commandants of academies; altogether 80 people. Official reports of that session of the Council are very skimpy. It was only on June 14, after the trial was over and the executions carried out, that the papers published Voroshilov's order:

From June 1 to 4 the Military Council of the People's Commissariat of Defense met in the presence of members of the Government. They heard

my report on the discovery by the NKVD of a treacherous,  
counter-revolutionary, fascist organization . . .

As a matter of fact, there was no more interesting information in the order, only name calling and curses. It was not even said what decision had been taken or if one had been taken. Members of the Council were almost all liquidated. One of those remaining alive has told us what happened at those historical meetings.

Those present were stunned; no, they were utterly dispirited. Voroshilov's speech, it goes without saying, convinced no one. There was a feeling of impending catastrophe. They waited for Stalin.

Before the great leader appeared, the audience was properly demoralized. Stalin hurled thunder and lightning. The guilt of the eight prisoners, and also of "Gamarnik absent from the trial," was fully proven. They were monsters of the human race, traitors, accomplices of the fascists, spies. They were proven guilty also by the testimony of their accomplices: Army commander Sediakin, commandant of the Academy of the General Staff Kuchinskii, chief of the Administration of Institutions of Higher Learning Slavin. No facts were presented, no documents were offered, but no one dared ask about those things.

Members of the Council sat around a long table. Stalin walked around it. From time to time he stopped behind one of them, and that person would shrink into his chair and hang his head. It was shameful and frightening.

In the silence of the hall Stalin saw his victory. He tried to make more of it. Continuing to walk around the table, he suddenly hesitated and struck up a conversation. Here he met with a setback - minor and personal, but perceptible.

At first everything went well. Stalin turned to Bliukher, "Tell me Bliukher, Aronshtam<sup>25</sup> says that nothing interests you except what women have between their legs . . ." The marshal, who had a reputation in the RKKA as a lady killer, exploded, "The old goat. He maligns me just because he can't get it up any more." Bliukher realized that he was easily provoked and said no more. Stalin, satisfied, moved on. Standing near Budennyi he said, "Here sits Semen Mikhailovich, a real proletarian commander, and these turds say he can only handle a cavalry squadron." The flattered cavalier uttered a few choice curses at the "turds". Then it was the turn of Ivan Naumovich Dubovoi, an old friend and long-time comrade of Iakir: "Tell me, Dubovoi, is it true what your buddy Iakir says, that you are incompetent to command troops?" Dubovoi shot back, "I don't believe this. We still have to examine what Iakir is guilty of." "What, you don't believe this?!", said Stalin, using the familiar form of address in his excitement. He had to give up on trying to feel out the future judges. (There is some evidence that all three of the men questioned were already included in the Special Board of the Military College.) On his way out of the hall Dubovoi was arrested.

Nonetheless Stalin had reason to be satisfied. The generals had not rebelled. They had not demanded real proof and seemed satisfied with what had been said. The external decencies had been observed: the Red Army commanders would not be tried by civilians or the NKVD, but by their brothers - by the military.

Stalin did not flatter himself with what he had accomplished. Dubovoi's prank had shown that not everyone could be convinced, deceived, or frightened, that there were a few who still kept their own council, who would doubt, feel disgust, hate, and maybe eventually act. Above all else Stalin feared a counter conspiracy and retaliatory acts.



It can be assumed that Stalin and Ezhov did not find it easy to decide just how to destroy Tukhachevskii's group. Indeed, at first they rushed ahead, and then suddenly they made a long pause. On May 31 the last of the accused was arrested. On the next day the Military Council met. Haste. But then for some reason it met for four days. And from there it got worst - a whole week passed before the trial. Such delay could certainly have fateful consequences.

If Stalin seriously feared a hostile reaction from some of the generals, then the best thing to do would be to wrap the whole affair up quickly and all at once. Otherwise the displeasure aroused by the arrest of Tukhachevskii, Iakir, and others, might ripen. That whole week the commanders-in-chief were not permitted out of Moscow - back to their troops. The purpose of the isolation is understandable. But there is another danger lurking here, not less dangerous than the first.

After all, all the leaders of the Red Army were together. However many spies there might be among them, they still had the chance to come to an agreement, to join together against their common enemy - the Stalin-Ezhov gang. They still had communications with the troops. With what could Stalin oppose the might of the million-man RKKA? Nothing. Of course, the NKVD was watching in Moscow and in the provinces, but the threat was great and real.

The week's delay is an historical fact. How can it be explained? Most likely, Stalin did not have a clearly thought-through plan. There were so many agonizing, fateful questions to be decided.

The first unanswered question was Hamlet's: would there be a trial at all? It was still not too late to turn back from an enterprise which entailed fatal risk. If they challenged him on this, he would not get away with quotations and theses about escalating the class war. Destruction of the leadership of the army was clearly treason. Bridges were not yet burned; the

press had not yet been notified. The arrest of the Red generals could easily be announced as the intrigues of the enemy, the bloody fool Ezhov could be offered as a scape goat, and the whole venture passed over without excessive publicity. There was no certainty that the army would not act. If the army bestirred itself, Stalin could hope for intercession only from God, who had been repealed, or from the blue caps.<sup>26</sup> But the temptation and the need to remove the army leadership were too great. Stalin risked it. He counted on the passivity and indecisiveness of the victims. It is sad, but such assumptions of tyrants are often justified.

To decide to go ahead with the trial still does not presuppose a precise program. One thing was clear from the start: an open court could not be used in this case. This was a great misfortune, but from the very beginning the illustrious commanders behaved themselves badly. From the political point of view as well as from the educational, it was not possible to drag such inveterate miscreants before the public. There would be no open-hearted repentance. These were lost, hopeless people, and comrades Stalin, Ezhov, and Vyshinskii had given up on them. They did not even bother to torture them in view of the uselessness and risk of such measures. After all Tukhachevskii and his comrades-in-arms had to be presented to the military judges if only at a closed session of the Special Board of the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Marks of torture or revelations about its use might anger the judges, sharpen their unavoidable moral dilemma. It might also have repercussions in military circles, which Stalin did not want.

Alright, torture is unnecessary, we'll do without an open trial, but that was not yet the end of the disappointments. Of what, specifically, were these scoundrels, lowlife, traitors, and double-dealers guilty? The question seems an idle one, but its answer determined the course pursued by the prosecution.

Of course, as one of Kafka's heroes says, guilt is always proven. Nonetheless court procedure requires an indictment and proof - or their surrogates.

The reader would be right to wonder about our questions. Wasn't the "red folder" sufficient accusatory material? And why was such an effort made to obtain it? At this point the most telling, and outrageous, point of the whole matter surfaces. Stalin had nothing to charge the accused with. It was a lot easier to invent the corpus delicti than to bring charges against them.

God knows we do not mean to seek out paradoxes. It is known for certain that the "red folder" did not appear in the Military Council or at the trial of June 11. That fact only initially seems to lead us into a blind alley.

Knowing that makes the circumstances under which the "folder" was ordered seem meaningless and inessential. Whether Ezhov acted on his own or on Stalin's orders, once the Leader of the People had seen the SD's documents, he realized they were useless fakes. What could he do with a photograph of Trotskii with a group of German officials. Who could forget that it was he, Stalin, who had invented the intimate relations between the Jewish Trotskii and the Judophobe fascists. And what was Trotskii doing in the case at all? Trotskii had never been close with Tukhachevskii! Doubts about the marshal himself were even sharper. Who could believe that he, who had escaped German captivity five times in the world war, would be rubbing elbows with the Germans? Glory, medals, the highest military rank at age 42, the most important post in the army - he had all that. What more could they offer him in Berlin? To be sure such categories as love of country and fidelity to duty did not exist for Stalin, and he did not look for them in others. Stalin did not seriously believe in Tukhachevskii's Bonapartism. He destroyed Tukhachevskii because he was a man around whom others in the army who were

dissatisfied with his, Stalin's, usurpatious behavior might rally. But it wasn't possible to actually make such charges publicly.

That is not what we were speaking of, however. The decision to liquidate Tukhachevskii had already been made. It remained only to decide how to dress the act up before presenting it to the army and the people. Thus, if Stalin did not initiate the fabrication of the "red folder," he knew it was a forgery from first glance. Any subsequent checking would only confirm that opinion.

However, the decision not to use the "red folder" was not dictated by doubts of its authenticity. In the end there were two more telling reasons.

First. At the two previous celebrated trials and at most trials of less importance only oral testimony had been presented, no documents. Presenting essential proofs, even fabricated, seriously threatened to diminish the speed of the Stalinist machine, if not to bring it to a standstill. It would be a most dangerous precedent. The public or their appointed representatives would in the future expect proof of guilt - in some form they could touch, read, study, etc. The whole plan of the coup based on massive judicial slaughter was threatened. Stalin did not want to risk open slaughter. That would clearly signify seizure of the state, and the Stalinists feared that. They wanted their seizure to seem a defense against seizure by others. Their cruel protective measures took place under the cover of law, juridically doubtful, logically absurd, but nonetheless law, which by the way was enough for the Russian population who were used to anything. Documentary proof was repugnant to the spirit and idea of that upside-down law. The Stalinist machine was not capable of making up even approximately proper indictments for millions of people. It is enough to glance at the cases of the so-called "enemies of the people": five or six pages of cheap paper covered with the slovenly handwriting of the newly promoted investigator. Today, when our society still

does not groan under the burden of excess legality, one must fill out tens of pages, almost a hundred pages, to bring a known and clearly guilty thief to court. In the end the thief will get - it is hard to say it - a year or so.

Second. Stalin feared the Germans might double-cross him. As long as the accusations against the military officers were unsubstantiated, the Germans could react to them only as to any other propaganda. But they could respond to the published documents or mention them much more harmfully. They could tell the history of the "folder." That would give Hitler a double victory. Not only would the army leadership be weakened, but the political leadership of Russia would also be discredited. Stalin would be held up to universal ridicule.

As tempting as it was to use the documents in this critical trial - they would impart solidity, parry the potential counteraccusation of arbitrariness, etc. - the "red folder" had to be left aside. Stalin made no use of it. He not only showed it to nobody, but he never once so much as referred to it.

The Stalinist brain trust had something to think about in June. They had a week to worry and make a very difficult decision. In the end Stalin, who never was inclined to delicacy, preferred a coarse farce. The most primitive, coarsely malevolent accusations were presented at the secret trial: treason, weakening defense capabilities, the attempt to seize power. Proofs were absurd and unsubstantiated. Of the Special board only Budennyi might have believed them. Only one thing was demanded of the judges: to conduct themselves loyally and not to interfere with Ul'rikh prosecuting the case to the desired outcome. And that is how it was.

The short announcement tossed to the people was knocked together carelessly. Everything in it contradicted logic and common sense, but maybe they were counting on that. Stalin was a greater master of the stunning

propaganda lie than Goebbels. He was also counting on Russia's endless patience . . .

We return to the trial's starting point. Of the sixteen main participants belonging to the military only two died natural deaths. Why then on that June day were some participants executioners, or judges, and others their victims? We will try to evaluate several factors that might have played a role in selecting the two groups. To make it easier, facts about the participants in the trial have been arranged in the following table:

Accused	nationality	former officer	pre-1917 party member	studied in Germany	cavalry	fought with Stalin	associations with members of other group	military intelligentsia	associations within the same group
1. M. N. Tukhachevskii	Russian	X		X			3,7	X	2,5,7,8
2. N. E. Iakir	Jew		X	X			2,3,5	X	1,4,5,7
3. I. P. Uborevich	Lithuanian	X		X				X	1,2,5
4. V. M. Primakov	Russian?		X		X				2
5. B. M. Fel'dman	Jew							X	1,2,6
6. A. I. Kork	Latvian	X						X	1,5,7,8
7. R. P. Eideman	Latvian	X						X	1,2,6
8. V. P. Putna	Lithuanian	X						X	1,6
total		5	2	3	1	0		7	
Judges									
1. S. M. Budennyi	Russian				X	X			8
2. V. K. Bliukher	Russian		X	X			2		5
3. P. E. Dybenko	Ukrainian		X				1,2		
4. I. P. Belov	Russian	X							
5. N. D. Kashirin	Russian	X			X				2
6. B. M. Shaposhnikov	Russian	X						X	
7. Ia. I. Alksnis	Latvian	X					1	X	
8. E. I. Goriachev	Russian				X	X			1
total		4	2	1	3	2		2	

Nationality. The hand of the great expert of the nationalities question is easy to see. We will not have much to say about this either now or later, but you can judge yourself: two Latvians, two Jews, two Lithuanians, and only two Russians. All of their names sound strange to the Russian ear, except one, Primakov, and it seems he may have been a Jew. The average man of the people, contaminated by the remnants of the past, might think they were all . . . kikes. Lord save us, no one need tell him, but he might think it, he certainly might. How common it is to think that all traitors and spies are non-Russians.

The composition of the court, on the other hand, at least sounds entirely Orthodox: Belov, Kashirin, Shaposhnikov, Dybenko, Budennyi . . . Alksnis does not fit, nor does Bliukher seem to, but he is a Russian. His name was given to his serf grandfather by his master who was a great admirer of the Prussian field marshal.

There is no need any longer to prove that Stalin was an anti-Semite. And we have no particular interest in divining whether his anti-Semitism was pathological, religious, or political. He was using that weapon against the oppositionists already in the 1920s. The Bukharin group, which was primarily Russian, was counterposed to the Zinov'ev-Trotsky faction, which was heavily Jewish. Russian party members from these groups were told directly that they did not belong. Stalin is said to have asked Preobrazhenskii, "What are you doing in that Jewish company?"

In the thirties Stalinist propaganda played up the oppositionist Jews' connections with the Gestapo. Strange as it may seem, that did not surprise the public. The Soviet press was usually silent about, or in any case did not emphasize, Hitler's Judophobia. After the signing of the Soviet-German pact in 1939, that became a firm rule. A consequence was to increase the number of

victims among the Jewish population of occupied territory. The Soviet government did not try to evacuate Jews. Earlier, in 1939-1940, the NKVD regularly turned in to the Gestapo German Communists of Jewish descent.

We cannot, of course, claim that the accused and judges were chosen exclusively along national-phonetic lines. BUT . . . it was in 1934 that passports with a blank for "nationality" were introduced; there had already been carried out in Moscow two trials of terrible malefactors and traitors whose names for the most part were very inferior. Sow the good, the kind, the eternal! Something will remain and take root. If not now, then in 1947, 1949, 1953!

Origins and party membership. In this category the two groups A (accused) and J (judges) are almost equal. In the first, five were former tsarist officers; in the second - four. That small imbalance in the unproletarian character of group A is balanced by the greater representation of members of higher party organs: One member (Iakir), and two candidate members of the TsK (Tukhachevskii and Uborevich), while in group J there were only two candidate members (Budennyi and Bliukher). The number of pre-revolutionary communists was the same in both groups.

Cavalrymen and comrades in arms of Stalin. Group J takes the lead in these categories, 3:1 and 2:0 respectively.

Intelligentsia. Here group A unquestionably dominates, by a ratio of 7:2. Except for Primakov they are the flower of the army's intelligentsia; men of great military erudition and expansive, cultured outlooked; authors of scholarly works; major innovators in military science. In group J only Shaposhnikov and Alksnis fit into that category. Bliukher, although he had studied in the German Academy of the General Staff, was primarily a careerist.



Unity of the groups. By this we mean the presence of service and personal associations among members of one group. From this point of view group A appears almost monolithic, while group J seems an artificial conglomeration. That had its pluses and minuses for Stalin. It was easy to present the cohesive group A as a conspiracy. On the other hand it would be difficult to split such a collective; it would be hard to bend them to one's will and to keep them from presenting a unified front at the trial - which is what happened. The individuals of group J could more easily be worked on in isolation. They did not have a chance to agree among themselves on a course of action.

Inter-group associations. The corresponding column of the table shows that there were few connections. The few that there were could serve a specific purpose - camouflage. Inasmuch as information about the trial was skimpy and came mainly from rumors, former personal relations between the accused and the judges created the appearance of objectivity. It was one thing for Tukhachevskii's confirmed enemies Budennyi and Kashirin to condemn him, but quite another for his close friend Dybenko and long-time associate Alksnis to do so. The same could be said about Bliukher, Dybenko, and Kashirin, friends and colleagues of Iakir. Apparently that was the role assigned Dubovoi.

Of course, the forgoing analysis has primarily an illustrative character. It is naive to suggest that Stalin, Ezhov, Voroshilov, and Vyshinskii used precisely these methods to select the two groups. But if only in part, these factors must have been considered by them. We will dare to assert that two of these factors played important, if not determining, roles in their decision: the opposition of Russians to non-Russians and of careerists to the intelligentsia.

Voroshilov was mentioned in the previous paragraph purposely. His name retains a sort of halo - a legendary hero with clean hands, a brave, but simple-hearted warrior, who did not involve himself in politics and was therefore not implicated in Stalin's acts. Alas, that is only another illusion maintained by ignorance of facts. During his career as leader of the RKKA, Voroshilov was more the politician than the military man. Although he did not occupy first place among them, Voroshilov was deeply involved in the affairs of the Stalinists.

Here are some facts. 1. In 1925 it was Voroshilov who publicly proclaimed the false version of Frunze's death to deflect from Stalin and himself the fully justified suspicions of responsibility for murdering him. 2. In 1930 he sanctioned the arrest of a large group of military specialists. 3. In 1937 he was an active and direct participant in the destruction of the command staff, not disdaining the role of provocateur. It is enough to recall his perfidious behavior in organizing the arrest of his friend and comrade-in-arms Iakir. A general picture of Voroshilov's behavior in that period only confirms this conclusion. There is not the slightest hint that Voroshilov protected anyone from repression, or worse yet, that he tried to. To the contrary, he signed everything, he sealed it all with his bloody hand. The people's commissar jotted on a letter written by Iakir asking that he take care of his family, "I doubt the honor of a dishonorable man in general." That was all. Voroshilov preferred to wash his hands of the matter, knowing that shame and suffering awaited Iakir's wife and child.

This has nothing to do with bravery. In battle Voroshilov did not fear death, but Iakir, Tukhachevskii, Primakov, Shmidt, and many others were no less courageous. Voroshilov's courage evaporated in the presence of Stalin.<sup>27</sup>

It is said that in 1936 and early 1937 Voroshilov was opposed, in theory, to the massive destruction of the RKKA's officer corps. The reasons were most prosaic. Voroshilov could not help but understand that without capable commanders he would not be able to lead the People's Commissariat and could not guarantee the army's combat readiness. The turning point occurred on the threshold of the February-March plenum. Stalin and comrades posed the Commissar a question widely used at the time, "Whom are you with? Them or us?" Other considerations, including the defense of the country, had to be put aside. Saving his skin, Voroshilov joined the executioners, with whom, it is true, he had much more in common than with the military. The First Red Officer stopped tormenting himself with doubts and gave himself body and soul to the destruction of the RKKA. Even Tukhachevskii, who did all of the ongoing work at the Commissariat for him, he gave over entirely to the Chekists. Telling him of his dismissal as his first deputy, he found not a single word of justification or comfort.

The main burden of preparing and carrying out the June villainy lay on the valiant men of the NKVD. Stalin hastened to show them his gratitude. A decree on decorating the Chekists was published on June 22. That they were not listed in alphabetical order leads one to think that their place in the list reflects the importance of their work. All the more that first of the honored was L. M. Zakovskii, whose participation in the trial of June 11 is undoubted.<sup>28</sup> N. E. Shapiro-Daikhovskii, P. A. Korkin, and P. E. Karamyshev also received the Order of Lenin. Ten men were awarded the order of the Red Star. Other high-ranking executioners were mentioned. After a decent interval an announcement was made that N. I. Ezhov had been awarded the order of Lenin on July 17. There was a great fuss in the press. A. Ia. Vyshinskii received his commendation on the 20th.

## Proscription

The June trial turned out to be prolog to catastrophe. Repression against the high and middle command staff took on the character of general slaughter. It is not possible to explain why one or another commander perished. It makes more sense to ask why some survived.

There is a certain sad logic to the order in which the victims were destroyed. They first took those who were associated with the participants of the June 11 trial, then they took those who were associated with the victims of the second group . . . They took a few who dared to speak out even timidly against the terror (Kuibyshev, Fed'ko, Bliukher); they took hundreds and thousands who said nothing. They finally reached the rulers of evil - the judges.

Losses in the high command staff can be delineated by the ranks of the victims.\* Lists published in 1935 and 1940 help in the task. This is what we discover:

rank	contemporary equivalent	existed	arrested	returned	perished
1. Marshal	Marshal	5	3	-	3
2. Army commissar I	General of the army	1	-	-	1**
3. Army commander I	General of the army	4	3	-	3
4. Fleet flag-officer	Admiral of the fleet	2	2	-	2
5. Army commander II	General-colonel	10	10	-	10
6. Fleet flag-officer II	Admiral	2	1	-	1
7. Army commissar II	General-colonel	15	15	-	15
8. Corps commander	General-lieutenant	55	49	1	48
9. Flag-officer I	Vice-admiral	6	5	-	5
10. Corps commissar	General-lieutenant	28	25	2	23
11. Flag officer	Rear admiral	15	9	1	8
12. Division commander	Major general	199	136	11	125
13. Division commissar	Major general	97	79	10	69
14. Brigade commander	Major general or colonel***	397	221	21	200
15. Brigade commissar	Major general or colonel***	36	34	-	34
16. Corps engineer	Engineer Lieutenant general	2	2	1	1
17. Corps intendant	Lieutenant general	3	3	-	3

18. Corps doctor	Lieutenant general of medical services	2	2	-	2
19. Corps veterinarian	Lieutenant general of medical services	1	1	1	-
20. Division intendant	Major general	10	6	-	6
21. Division engineer	Engineer Major general	9	7	2	5
totals		899	643	60	583

\*as of January 1, 1937. Therefore our data differ somewhat from those offered by A. I. Todorskii and E. Genri.

\*\*Ia. B. Gamarnik shot himself to death on May 31, 1937 to avoid arrest.

\*\*\*according to responsibilities.

Thus, of those of lieutenant general's rank or higher (lines 1-11, and 16-18 on the table) 93% died in the repression. For ranks corresponding to major general and colonel (lines 12-15, 20, 21) the figure is 58.5%. Lists with names included are in the appendix to this book.

Data on commanders of the rank of colonel and lower are not yet available. It is therefore impossible to say what the RKKA's losses were at those ranks in the Great Purge. There are few references to such losses in official sources, and most are indirect. They do not lend themselves to interpretation. The size of the loss is mentioned only once in a Soviet source and that in relative terms.<sup>29</sup> There it is said that 20% of all officers died in the repression. In all of Soviet military literature, however, it is impossible to learn the absolute size of the officer corps at that time. The estimate we have made, which is necessarily rough, suggests that there were 100,000-130,000 officers on active duty in the Red Army in 1937-1938. That puts the loss at 20,000-25,000. There is reason, however, to think that that significantly understates the loss.

In Iu. Petrov's book Building the Party in the Soviet Army and Fleet<sup>30</sup> it is said that the repression cut the number of communists in the army in

half - from 250,000 to 125,000. For our purposes we can assume that the NKVD's only targets in the military were commanders and political workers. All of the latter were Party members. Of the former, 80-85% were members. That figure climbs to 95-97% in the technical branches. Consequently the losses in the army's Party organization fell mainly on the officer corps. But if we recall that in those years expulsion from the Party automatically led to arrest, then we are led to conclude that practically all of the commanders on active duty at the beginning of the purge were repressed. We must be very careful about such a conclusion.

We cannot definitively solve that problem without more information, and that is not yet available. But we can make a few further observations. We have no reason to doubt Iu. Petrov's statistics. A Soviet author would not exaggerate the scale of the repression in an official publication; no one would let him. On the other hand we cannot significantly increase our estimate of the size of the officer corps, recalling that in early 1937 there were altogether approximately 1,600,000 men serving in the Red Army. We are forced therefore to think that the loss of cadre in two years of purge comprised approximately 100,000 men. This is not an overstatement, because we are assuming admission into the Party was closed for those two years. If there were new admissions, we would have to increase the figures of the loss. It may be assumed, however, that some people who served in the army's Party organization, but who were not at the time military servicemen, became part of that statistic. This does not include wives of commanders or non-commissioned soldiers who were expelled from the Party. They probably fall into the group of 25,000 we subtracted from Iu. Petrov's figures. We are speaking here of men in special services. These men served in the army's counter-intelligence, while attached to the NKVD, but they worked directly in military units and

were registered there on Party registers. There were a great many special servicemen: there was such an overseer in every company; from the battalion on up there were special detachments. The special servicemen numbered between 20,000 and 30,000, and they were liquidated almost to a man as were other categories of Chekists. Subtracting these we can decrease the figure for the loss of cadre to 70,000-80,000. If we also consider Iu. Petrov's statement that the repression took no fewer than 20,000 political workers, then the loss of "pure" commanders (combat officers, technicians, staff officers, instructors) can be set at 50,000-60,000.

Any attempt to explain why the repression was so widespread in the army runs into numerous difficulties. It is impossible to assume that Stalin intended from the beginning to exterminate almost the entire officer corps, but the fact is there. We must guess.

The greater part of the explanation, it seems to us, must be found in the psychology of mass terror, in conformity with its spontaneous development. Stalin had no reason to liquidate everyone in the army one after another. The armed forces had accepted the order resulting from the state revolution. If the dictator could still see potential opponents or rivals in Tukhachevskii or to a lesser extent in Iakir, as hard as he might try he could not have found men of such potential in all the other victims. We must assume other causes. Having set off an avalanche of hate, suspicion, and blood, Stalin found himself unable to stop it until it had exhausted its natural forces, the energy of its momentum.

It does not necessarily follow that after the June trial the Most Brilliant Commander of All Times and Nations became a passive spectator of the developing destruction of the RKKA. He was not that sort of man. If the scale of the repression in the army seemed to him excessive, and he found himself unable to curtail it, he would still take an active leading role in it.

In June 1937 at the TsK plenum Stalin called for a hardening of punitive policy, not excepting the army. In January 1938 a sealed letter of the TsK, "On shortcomings in party-political work in the RKKA and measures to overcome them," was distributed by his order. The document demanded the discovery of concealed enemies of the people. It also attacked "silent" people, who had no criminal associations, but who were "politically spineless" and therefore potential enemies. It must have been easier for the Biblical camel to pass through the eye of a needle than to remain an "honest Soviet man" in such conditions. Righteous anger against enemies, their public defamation, ceaseless denunciations - none guaranteed safety. It was always possible to claim that someone was not exposing enemies with sufficient enthusiasm, or was doing so as a provocateur, or only to advance his career.

Neither were Stalin's subordinates in the army napping. Voroshilov, Mekhlis, and Shadenko ceaselessly demanded that the last-born offspring of Tukhachevskii-Iakir and the minions of the Gamarnik-Bulin gang be rooted out. Throughout the country, as in the army, a psychological climate was created that made mass terror unavoidable.

The people everywhere correctly understood their leaders' call. They rushed to search out live carriers of evil within their field of vision. A flood of denunciations swept through the country. The NKVD gladly made use of them and, more than that, "organized material" on those as yet untouched by denunciations. The higher one was on the scale of ranks, the more visible he was and the greater the probability that someone would denounce him. The motives were various: envy, revenge for old offenses, personal dislike, career ambition - but the result was always the same.

This is how the proscription lists for arrest and execution were drawn up. Thousands of these documents went up the chain of command and landed on



Stalin and Voroshilov's desks. The reaction of the People's Commissar, who was frightened to death, was consistent. He did not dare contradict Ezhov, fearing that tomorrow he might present materials on him to the Great Leader.

Stalin's position was hardly better. Even in the summer of 1938, when it became clear that the repression was growing at a geometric progression and threatened to seize the whole population, even then he could not stop the demonic machine at will. Stalin could not tell Ezhov, "That's enough imprisoning and shooting of innocent people!" He could not because it was he who sired that bloody dwarf, because from the very beginning he had been part of the plot, because among the conspirators they could talk only of whom to take next and when. The word "guilt" was absent from their vocabulary as superfluous and harmful; otherwise they could not have begun the coup. And that is not all. At first the excesses of the repression suited Stalin's purposes and inasmuch as it sucked into its whirlpool numerous informers, provocateurs, executioners, who had become expendable.<sup>31</sup>

There came a moment, however, when it became absolutely necessary to give the order to stop. It was not easy for the Great Leader. He was afraid of the NKVD. He feared he would seem soft, kindly, and consequently weak. He feared a conspiracy against himself and his power that would accuse him of conniving with the enemy. He could not change the policy without changing people. To stop the repression he would have to behead the NKVD and then destroy it thoroughly.<sup>32</sup> And that would take time. For the time being he would have to accept the liquidation of people he would otherwise, maybe, have left alive.

We will return directly to the army. It is possible that Ezhov liquidated some of the commanders with Stalin's coerced sanction or entirely on his own. Of course, that is only a guess, but it might be that that was the case with

Voroshilov's old friends Levandovskii and Gorbachev. When Goriachev, one of the eight judges in the June trial, learned of their arrest, he shot himself.

Fate did not spare the members of the Special Judicial Board, who sent their comrades-in-arms to their deaths.<sup>33</sup> Five died in the proscriptions of 1937-1938. Only Shaposhnikov and Budennyi died in their beds.

Stalin must have had mixed feelings about the judges. On the one hand to leave them alive was extremely undesirable. Having done their dirty work, they were no longer especially valuable. On the contrary they might expect something in return for their valuable service. Stalin must have known that most of them had pronounced sentence against their wills. When they recovered, they might think of revenge. In any case it would be hard to rely on their silence about what really happened at the trial. I. Erenburg has left witness; I. P. Belov, talking about the trial, shared his gloomy forebodings about his own and his colleagues fate. Stalin had to take care of them.

At the same time there were arguments in favor of the opposite. To remove the judges would inescapably throw a shadow over the whole trial and cause doubts about the justness of the sentence.

One way or another the judges had to follow the judged. Shaposhnikov's survival can be explained by the undoubted sympathy Stalin felt for him. Shaposhnikov was practically the only man whom the dictator called by first name and patronymic both to his face and in his absence. Budennyi, who gladly signed the sentence, seems to have been saved by his closeness to the Great Leader which went back to the civil war. There is however, a story, almost legendary, that Semen Mikhailovich escaped arrest only by a miracle.<sup>34</sup> It is worth mentioning that his wife Mikhailova, a singer at the Bolshoi, was repressed.

Egorov, who was also a Stalinist toady from the time of the civil war, was less lucky. In May of 1937 he was temporarily promoted to Deputy People's Commissar in place of Tukhachevskii, but he was later sent to the provinces and soon disappeared entirely.

Stalin took an important step toward ending the repression in July 1938, by which time the repression had exceeded all conceivable bounds. L. P. Beria was made Ezhov's first deputy. In the several months of his decline the bloody Stalinist dwarf managed to take many more victims from the army's ranks. The most famous of them were Fed'ko and Bliukher. If the story that Ezhov shot Bliukher in his office without a trial is true, very likely that incident served Stalin as the formal reason for finally getting rid of his favorite. The coincidence of the dates supports this theory. Bliukher was killed on November 9; Ezhov was removed from his post as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs on December 9, 1938.<sup>35</sup>

Whatever Stalin's original intentions were, by the end of 1938 all that was left of the Red Army was the name. The officer corps had been utterly destroyed. All the Deputy People's Commissars and almost all the leaders of the central apparatus had disappeared. All regional commanders-in-chief, all commandants of military academies, all corps commanders, and the overwhelming majority of divisional commanders, more than half the commanders of regiments . . .<sup>36</sup>

For the second time in twenty years the country would have to rebuild its army.

## Chapter 21

### The Victim: Motives of Inaction

To remember them means to  
regret that they are not.

Kliuchevskii

"Do you really not see where this is leading? He will suffocate us all one by one like baby chicks. We must do something."

"What you are suggesting is a coup. I will not do that." That is how Marshal Tukhachevskii replied to his friend Corps Commander Fel'dman. The conversation took place at the end of 1936 or at the very beginning of 1937. Fel'dman did not stop there. He went to Kiev to another friend, Iakir.

The army commander had company at his dacha, among them the general secretary of the Ukrainian party, S. Kosior. They drank, proposing toasts. Someone suggested, "Let's drink to Stalin, whom we follow to the end - with our eyes closed." The host objected, "Why closed? We follow Stalin, but with our eyes open."

When the guests had departed, Fel'dman told Iakir of his talk with Tukhachevskii. The reaction was the same. Iakir still believed in Stalin.

The above episode, and there is no doubt that it happened, is the only attempt to organize resistance to terror in the army that we know of.

We are too distant from that time, of course, to recapture its moods. Still the question keeps coming back, persistently and poignantly: why did these strong, brave men, who had so many troops under their command, give themselves up to be killed without a murmur? Why didn't they resist?

Of course, a lot was done to keep the officers from acting. Stalin had powerful forces on his side: the aura of power, the NKVD with its extensive

network, and also millions of honest fools who would denounce others without a moment's hesitation.

But the officers were far from weak. Many of them were connected by war-time friendships; they trusted one another to the end. The authority of Iakir, Tukhachevskii, and Primakov in the army was enormous. Many line commanders would have followed them with their regiments and divisions. They had only to call. But they didn't . . .

The enemy was powerful, but the officers were not lacking in bravery and resoluteness. Iakir had accomplished his legendary march in 1919 in less favorable conditions. And then isn't it more honorable to die in battle than in a torture chamber?

Apparently the physical balance of forces did not play a role. These experienced warriors must have had some internal reasons, preventing them from defending themselves.

One simple explanation comes to mind immediately. Courage in war and in everyday life are not the same things. Examples to illustrate this are familiar. The hero returning from war is helpless before the bureaucrat, the boor, the con man, and not infrequently before his wife. There at the front everything tells you to fight bravely - responsibility, discipline, comrades, and finally the enemy seeking to kill you. In peaceful conditions the threat is not usually so sharp, the enemy is almost invisible, the rules of the fight are different. Here you don't advance on the enemy en masse, and a different sort of courage is needed. You have to stand up alone against authority behind whom stands the indifferent and servile masses. In war bravery brings laurels, here it threatens shame and humiliation.

These general observations are true enough, but in our case they are not sufficient. There is something else. We will try to explain what we have in

mind, but the reader must not expect precise definitions, a clear picture, or rock-hard conclusions. The material we are discussing is very delicate and will not stand rough handling. We will base our account on several examples.

Iakir. The revolution made him a military commander. A little past twenty and a student of chemistry, he proved to be not only a capable agitator and organizer, but also an outstanding commander, about whom legends were already growing up during the civil war. Iakir had a tenacious natural mind and a native intelligence. He could rally people round and lead them in unequal battle. The human material the revolution gave him was motley in the extreme: yesterday's underground revolutionary who did not know how to hold a rifle; green youth; Chinese volunteers; former tsarist officers; "the red Robin Hood," Gregorii Kotovskii; Mishka Iaponchik, the Odessa bandit, with his boys.

Iakir was exceptionally brave. He threw himself into battle with the many various whites. He was stirred to fight not only by revolutionary ideals, but also by tragic memories. He grew up Jewish in Kishinev, where he saw the horrible pogrom of 1903 with his own eyes.

After the war the young Iakir's military and party career advanced rapidly. In 1921 he became commander of the Kiev Military District, in 1923 assistant commander of troops in the Ukraine and Crimea under Frunze; 1924, head of the Main Administration of Military Schools of the RKKA; November 1925, commander of the Ukraine Military District; December 1925, member of the TsK of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Ukraine; 1927, member of the Ukrainian Politbiuro.

In 1928-29 Iakir, together with a group of the top-ranking commanders (Tukhachevskii, Bliukher, Uborevich, Sediakin, et al.), attended the course of the German General Staff Academy. He earned highest distinction at

graduation. Field Marshal Hindenburg, the aged president of Germany, gave Iakir Shleiffen's book Cannae and inscribed it very flatteringly "To the best modern commander".

With Iakir's arrival the Ukrainian district became the primary training ground of the RKKA, where the newest methods of warfare were developed. Iakir was not a theoretician; he did not write books; but he may have understood the spirit of modern warfare better than all the other high-ranking commanders. The first paratroop units in the Red Army were created in his district, so was the first mechanized corps, the 45th under A. N. Borisenko. He worked hard to develop methods of cooperation between the branches of the military (land and sea forces, land and air forces) and imparted his style to his subordinates.

From the beginning Iakir attributed little importance to the strategy of destruction. He worked urgently at strategic defense and induced his commander colleagues to do so. The first systems of echeloned defenses were born in the Ukrainian Military District; partisan bases were first developed there in case of retreat. Tukhachevskii's conversion to strategic defense came about under the unobtrusive but firm influence of Iakir, despite the fact that Iakir was not only three years younger than Tukhachevskii but had not attended tsarist military academies or fought in the First World War.

Iakir's authority as a leader and teacher was incontestable. It is no exaggeration to say he was idolized by his subordinates. He tirelessly fought martinets and swaggerers in the army. With junior officers he was even-handed, affable, and benevolent. He thought it more important to educate than to punish. The officer corps of the Ukrainian Military District was always the best in the army. Iakir personally knew almost all the commanders of the district, and from regimental commanders on up that relationship was so close that he was aware of their family problems. Iakir was distinguished by

his genuine democratic spirit. He always resisted attempts to separate the officer corps from the soldiers, to turn it into a closed caste.

Our idyllic picture will not be complete if we do not mention another fact. Iakir was first and foremost a Bolshevik. His Bolshevism was not affected or forced as was many officers'. Iakir held Party ideals sacred. For him the Party's interests, the matter of building socialism, came first, before personal and professional considerations. Here is where Iakir's strength and greatness should be sought: in these high principles combined with altruism, absence of career ambitions, and profound decency. But precisely for those reasons in the decisive moments he was weak and helpless.

Iakir's deep conviction of the rightness of the cause he served at times made him act in ways hard to reconcile with this picture of his morality. In the chapter on Mironov we spoke of his attitude toward anti-Soviet rebellions while he was with the 8th Army. It was quite simple: (1) no negotiations, (2) the complete destruction of all rebels, (3) immediate execution of anyone caught with weapons, (4) in a number of cases the preventive execution of a certain percentage of the male population. The 8th Army left a bloody trail along the Don with thousands of executions. But Iakir was not an inveterate scoundrel or a bloodthirsty fanatic. On the contrary, his behavior after the war said otherwise.

Iakir was an important political figure. He alone among the military commanders was a full member of the TsK. (Gamarnik and Voroshilov were both commissars.) In that capacity Iakir had to deal with matters that were quite distant from military service. His active role in building the Kharkov tractor factory is well known. He also took an active part in carrying out collectivization in the Ukraine. The results horrified him. 1933 was a particularly terrible year for Ukrainian villagers. Despite the drought



Stalin's plan was carried out strictly by the book. It wasn't enough that millions of people in the villages died of starvation, but grain saved for seed was taken from them. Iakir and several other Ukrainian leaders suggested that the grain collection be halted and seed grain be returned to the farmers. Kosior, fearing Stalin, did not agree. Then Iakir, Dubovoi, and secretaries of the provincial committees, Khataevich and Veger, wrote to Moscow. Stalin grudgingly offered concessions, but he expressed his displeasure to Vorshilov: why couldn't military men mind their own business. It may be that his honesty cost Iakir promotion to marshal in 1935 . . .

Earlier, in mid-1930, another more characteristic episode occurred. At the same time the former generals were being arrested in Moscow, the Ukrainian OGPU was cooking up a local affair. A large group of tsarist officers was accused of organizing a conspiracy with the aim of raising an anti-Soviet rebellion. Among other things they were accused of planning to kill the top leaders of the Ukrainian Military District - Iakir, Dubovoi, and Khakhan'ian. Iakir strongly protested the provocation and did not hesitate to lock horns with the chief Ukrainian chekist, Balitskii. The case went right to the top. On December 30 Iakir and Dubovoi were called to Moscow where they were received by Ordzhonikidze. They succeeded in defending the majority of the accused. Balitskii was transferred from the Ukraine. The reader has a chance to compare Iakir's and Tukhachevskii's behavior in the same situation.<sup>1</sup>

Iakir was neither weak nor cowardly. He did not fear the all-powerful GPU, but he was powerless before the Party. In 1937 Iakir tried to rescue Shmidt and Kuz'michev at the risk of running afoul of Ezhov. He asked Stalin to intervene when his good friend Gar'kavyi was arrested. But he could not rebel against the policy of repression because the Party, his Party, stood behind it. The Party was everything for him; serving it gave his life content

and meaning. It was impossible, unthinkable for him to change his convictions. This is the tragedy of the whole generation that made the revolution. Iakir did not quail before any enemy, but to raise his hand against the Party - even such a thought was unnatural for him.

That is why he did not call out his crack regiments, which could have destroyed the NKVD. That is why in the face of death he cried, "Long live the Party! Long live Stalin!" Yes, Stalin, because for Iakir the great leader and the Party were two in one.

Tukhachevskii. Although Tukhachevskii and Iakir spent many years in harness together and faced death together, they were entirely different people. Tukhachevskii was made of different clay from his colleague. This was not just a matter of class origins, but of personality. If for Iakir ideals that he served with religious fervor stood in first place, then Tukhachevskii's primary motivation was ambition. It was not Stalin's unrestrained striving after power, nor Voroshilov's careerism, which drove him to make any compromise with his conscience, but ambition, vainglory, hunger for excellence, glory, the desire to be first, the best. By itself this quality is not necessarily negative. On the contrary, lacking it, it would be hard to be a great commander.

Tukhachevskii's ambitions were serious and far-reaching. In that way he resembled the young Bonaparte, and such a comparison was obvious to many. But in vain did detractors ascribe such ambitions to him. Tukhachevskii was not enticed by the role of political leader. If he was carried away in dreams, he saw himself crowned only with a commander's glory. He considered strategy his calling. That is apparent in his early works.

A lieutenant just yesterday, not yet thirty, but he writes with enviable assurance. On every page one can find naive, immature and basically wrong

statements, but the tone is certain, dry, didactic. The author has no doubts. He trusts his conclusions more than the entire previous experience of mankind.

Tukhachevskii was gifted. Natural intelligence, decisiveness, independence of judgment, courage - all of these qualities distinguished him from the mass of revolutionary commanders. He was handsome, attractive to women, exceptionally strong,<sup>2</sup> and highly cultured. He especially loved music: he built violins, haunted the concert halls, and was among the first to notice and support the young Shostakovich.

However, it was not only his personal qualities that accounted for the success of Tukhachevskii's career. Two circumstances helped him greatly. First, he joined the Party early, in April 1918. For Iakir the revolution was a desired and logical occurrence. Tukhachevskii saw it as unavoidable reality, a natural phenomenon or disaster. When he returned from captivity, he found the old army in its death agony. He went to the only organized power at the center, the Bolsheviks, to participate in building a new army. Joining the Party was not a result of enlightenment or ideological rebirth. It was an entry fee, a necessary condition for a military career. Tukhachevskii was not a time server. He simply decided that the Bolsheviks were here to stay. He did not imagine himself outside the military profession. In tsarist times it was almost impossible to get ahead if you were not Orthodox. True faith was not demanded. Indeed, that was impossible. The military existed to break the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." But external loyalty to the church was required. Now it was necessary to convert to a new state religion; that was all. Tukhachevskii's quick-ripening Bolshevism was and remained mainly for show.

As a young officer working in the military department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Tukhachevskii was soon noticed and valued. He was sent to a high command post in the army. His courageous behavior during Murav'ev's Left-SR revolt was the second most important moment of his career. Now in the eyes of the central authorities and local commissars he was finally one of them, a real Red commander. He was given access to all information. Other commanders, who were thought of as military specialists, were not trusted in this way. As a rule they knew less than the Revolutionary Military Council members attached to them.

Tukhachevskii fought well. Successes on the Eastern Front brought him great glory. Stalin, who was slow to praise, called him "the demon of the civil war". They transferred him to the South against Denikin, and again he displayed his best qualities. Tukhachevskii was a born operations commander. In the civil war operations pushed strategy to the background. Successive battles over a short period decided the fate of a campaign. Many, including Tukhachevskii, took that temporary, specific condition as an unalterable law for all future wars. It is in this conviction that the ideological foundation of the blitzkrieg and the strategy of destruction should be sought. Tukhachevskii became one of its foremost proponents for many years. Even the failure of the Polish campaign did not cool his enthusiasm. As he saw it, the defeat was the result of strategic miscalculation; large operational mistakes on the neighboring fronts were not fatal. Most important was the underestimation of the enemy's resources and his ability to strike back. But the "destructive" form of action had an irresistible attraction for Tukhachevskii. He hoped that the new military equipment would give this strategy the decisive trump. He expended a great deal of energy to establish

the technical basis of the Red Army. Only towards the end of his life did Tukhachevskii partly revise his strategic views.

We will not develop this topic further; it is treated in sufficient detail in the preceding chapters. Other things are much more important in describing Tukhachevskii's personality. During the civil war he performed many valuable services for the Soviets not only on the fronts against the Whites but also in suppressing popular uprisings. The glory of the suppressor was not as great, but it was properly valued by the government. After his success at Kronshtadt, Tukhachevskii was immediately sent against Antonov. (It is interesting that the romantic adventurer G. Kotovskii, who was also active in suppressing the Tambovshchina, fulfilled his role in the punitive expedition with great reluctance.)

These episodes from 1921, which are morally suspect however you look at them, throw new light on Tukhachevskii's personality. They display his political immaturity and his social callousness. Characteristically he not only put the rebellion down, but not long before that he wrote a manual on how to do it.<sup>3</sup> It would seem that had the little civil war dragged on, Tukhachevskii might have become a regular suppressor.

If we keep this side of him in mind, then his methods in the polemic with Svechin do not seem so surprising. For using political labels he logically moved on to persecuting his opponent, who was already in the NKVD's torture chamber. As far as that goes he assiduously played first violin in the Party's orchestra of political persecutors. Neither in 1930 or in 1937 did Tukhachevskii intercede for anyone.

Tukhachevskii thought himself an integral part of the Soviet establishment. He had gotten everything from it - glory, regalia, high position. He would hardly have accepted the post of executioner, but the

power which he served and which rewarded him so generously was in his eyes God-given - itself and its bearers. Thus ambition came to contradict patriotism and paralyzed it, made it abstract, speculative.

Tukhachevskii was organically incapable of social protest, let alone action. He did not confront Stalin in 1936 when he saw that the dictator had taken the wrong course concerning the defense capabilities of the USSR, nor did he later when Stalin attacked the army.

By a bitter irony of history Stalin destroyed Tukhachevskii, fearing he was another Bonaparte, while the marshal was wholly unsuited for the role. In his moment of truth he proved to have nothing inside the cover of his strong and purposeful personality. His pursuit of glory proved expensive. In the face of this mortal danger he felt loneliness, isolation, and spiritual weakness. He did not heed Fel'dman's warning a few months before the catastrophe. After he was removed from his duties on May 11, he no longer doubted he would be killed, but he did nothing to defend himself. His own life, the Red Army, which he had worked so hard to build, even the fate of his Motherland, suddenly meant nothing to him. Everything had been destroyed, it was all in vain, his life had lost its meaning, there was nothing to hope for in his last hour.<sup>4</sup> He could not, like Iakir, die for the Party idea, because he had never believed in it. "It seems to me as if all this were a dream," was all Tukhachevskii could say in court. He put his head in his hands and remained silent for the rest of the session.

The Military Council, June 1-4. Eighty of the highest ranking military leaders of the country accepted, without a murmur, the Great Leader's brazen act which falsely slandered their comrades-in-arms. He forced them to pronounce the death sentence . . . and they complied. Except for Dubovoi no one dared express doubts.

What made them do it? Obsequiousness, indifference to the fate of others, malicious joy at others' misfortune, fear? Possibly fear together with confusion played the major part. S. P. Uritskii has said that after the meeting he, like all the rest, left the hall with the firm conviction that they would all soon be arrested.

It is easier to understand the behavior of Budennyi and others like him who were openly glad to see the fall of the hated intellectuals. But they were the minority. Alksnis and Khalepskii, Tukhachevskii's closest associates, could not have thought that way, and they did not. Iakir's comrades Fed'ko, Krivoruchko, and Khakhan'ian did not think that way. The giant Krivoruchko, who commanded the 2nd Cavalry Corps after Kotovskii, was distinguished by his spontaneity and unrestrained morality. He worshipped Iakir, who, by the way, treated his behavior very gently, like a father. In other circumstances Krivoruchko would have given his life for the army commander without hesitation. Here he kept his peace. He kept his temper; he did not attack the offender, whom he could have crushed with a finger. Only later in prison did Krivoruchko's nature come through. He grabbed an investigator and throttled him and then using his body as a club beat back his guards - until they shot him.

Several dozen brave men, whose profession demanded they not lose their heads in the minute of danger and lead their men in attack, sat shamefully silent. Stalin spat in their faces, and they just lowered their eyes, unable to swear or even to scream in helpless rage.

Four long days they sat together . . . and were unable to come to an agreement. They had several alternatives: passive resistance, open protest, or even physical action against Stalin and Voroshilov.<sup>5</sup> They preferred

servile approval. A year and a half later almost none of them were still alive.

Bliukher. For several years he was the military dictator of the Far East. Conditions on the border, expectation of a clash with Japan, gave him unlimited power. Bliukher's authority among his subordinates was unquestioned. Ten thousand versts from Moscow, linked only by the thread of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, he was well shielded from Stalin.

The few hundred private guards who accompanied Mekhlis and Frinovskii could not, of course, frighten him. One word from Bliukher and they would cease to exist. What could Stalin do after that? Send the Red Army marching against the Far East? Hardly . . .

But Bliukher did nothing, and the NKVD harvested his commanders. Then without a murmur he set off for Moscow, where he could not expect any help. The hero of Perekop had lost courage, laid down his arms. When he recovered his senses a few months later, it was too late.

The twofold treachery in June, accepting the role of executioner of his comrades, had deprived him of his courage and sharp wits. It had even blunted his instinct for survival. In the Far East the Red Army had its last chance to oppose Stalin.

The surprising passivity of the commanders of the Red Army in 1937-1938 will long fascinate psychologists and historians. Today we have too few facts to research the problem fully. However, we can draw one lamentable conclusion now. Iakir, Tukhachevskii, Bliukher, and many other talented commanders, strong personalities, courageous warriors, did not withstand the ultimate test and proved unworthy sons of the Motherland. They did not just give their own lives to the tyrant, they put the whole army at his feet.





## Chapter 22

### Voice of the People

No one is guilty because he is born a slave; but the slave who not only does not strive to be free, but who justifies and prettifies his slavery

. . . such a slave is a groveller and cad who provokes a natural feeling of indignation, scorn, and loathing.

Lenin

We will digress for a short while from the complex intrigues and gloomy secrets of the Moscow court. We will sip the invigorating atmosphere of those years. Let us see how the Soviet public reacted to these events.

We will begin a little before the beginning in the summer of 1936. So as not to bore the reader, we will confine ourselves to material from one newspaper, the official organ Izvestiia (News) of the Council of Workers' Deputies.

The Soviet people had just been given (actually presented for discussion, but no one was about to take it back) a new constitution, the Stalin Constitution. It was undoubtedly a landmark in man's history. A distant precedent might be sought in 1215 in England when the Magna Carta of liberties was accepted, but the scale of the events was vastly different. Our people's joy and gratitude were unbounded.

6 July

The chief editor of Izvestiia, N. I. Bukharin, wrote in an article "The paths of history":

If we were to seek one word to express these changes, we would certainly be right to say: unification, consolidation,

. . . consolidation of the widest popular masses around the party, around Stalin."

#### 11 July

A rhymed message from the Belorussian people to comrade Stalin contained these lines: We heard Kaganovich's word here

In Gomel he helped our party grow

The workers of Vitebsk remember Ezhov,

Who labored hard for the party.

#### 14 July

Through the joyous events shortcomings were not neglected. An article "Why are there no gramophone records?"

#### 16 July

A report by A. I. Mikoian, "We will achieve an abundance of food products." It is appropriate to mention here an anecdote of those years, which, it is true, did not get into the papers:

A delegation of workers came to the Academy of Sciences to ask that the letter "M" be excluded from the Russian alphabet as useless. As they explained it there was no meat, no butter (maslo), no margarine, no macaroni, no soap (mylo). All that began with "M" that was available was the Commissar of Trade Mikoian, but there wasn't much sense in keeping a special letter around just for him.

There was also an order of the TsIK USSR to relieve comrade Sokol'nikov, G. Ia., from his duties as People's Commissar of Forestry and transfer him to local work in the commissariat.

#### 20 July

The tenth anniversary of the death of F. E. Dzerzhinskii.

Photo: the great leader in the embrace of Iron Felix (summer 1925).

22 July

Announcement of the non-stop flight of Chkalov, Baidukov, and Beliaikov, from Moscow to Chita via Petropavlovsk.

24 July

The life of the people became better, more prosperous.

The PRAGUE Restaurant is open

Roof Garden

Meals prepared by experienced chefs

2 August

A speech by L. M. Kaganovich "The Stalinist year in rail transport."

10 August

The Soviet people read with pleasure an article by the well-known publicist Karl Radek, "How to become Chkalov": "If you want to be a Chkalov, heed the call of our great leader and teacher Stalin: study, study, and study to catch and surpass the capitalist world."

12 August

Professor E. Tarle in an article "Historical parallels" compared the electoral systems in the USSR and in the West.

20 August

Pushkin wrote: "We do not have a parade, we have a war." As if to prove the poet's words, the lead article screamed "Trotskyite-Zinov'evite Gang on Trial."

The trial had just begun in open court, but the paper ran in its first column telegrams from workers: "NO MERCY! SHOOT THE FASCIST MURDERERS!"

Below there followed an official statement about the beginning of the trial. The case of the Trotskyite-Zinov'evite terrorist center was in court. The accused included Zinov'ev, Kamenev, Evdokimov, I. N. Smirnov, and twelve

others. (According to the Stalinist Constitution all nationalities of our country were completely equal. Therefore the list of accused included nine Jewish names plus Zinov'ev (Radomysl'skii), Kamenev (Rozenfel'd), one Armenian, one Pole, and three Russians.)

The judges: chairman V. V. Ul'rikh, members I. O. Matulevich and V. G. Nikitchenko, alternate I. T. Golikov, secretary A. F. Kostiusko, state prosecutor A. Ia. Vyshinskii.

The accused admitted the charges against them, but it is not the trial itself that interests us here.

### 21 August

From the lead article "Fascist monsters": "The stimulus of the underground is hunger for personal power."

Headline on the first column: WORKERS OF THE SOVIET UNION UNANIMOUSLY DEMAND THAT PEACEFUL LABOR BE PROTECTED, SHOOT THE FASCIST GANG!

That, so to speak, was the official slogan. What of the real Soviet people? Maybe just a few of them were surprised, even perplexed, by the monstrous metamorphosis of their recent leaders? Not in the least! They immediately understood who was who and what was what. The interrogation of the accused was still underway, but the people were already expressing their firm and final opinion. A schoolgirl from Kadievka expressed it best of all. Here is the end of her poem, published on the second day of the trial:

Thrice scorned, loathsome creatures.

Whom did they dare threaten with death.

No! Expect no more mercy.

There's only one sentence for you: shoot them like dogs.

In truth, from the mouths of babes . . .

There were ten other comments above that one all saying one thing: SHOOT!

The writers of Leningrad. A. Tolstoi, V. Shishkov, Iu. Libedinskii, N. Brykin, G. Belitskii spoke out. Together, unanimously: "This is the vilest treachery of all the treason known in the history of mankind."

The public's favorite, Karl Radek, was not left out. He wrote in an article, "The Trotskyite-Zinov'evite fascist gang and their hetman Trotskii": "The accused do not have and never did have a political program. Only a desire for personal power." He had a few choice epithets for Trotskii: "fascist ober-bandit", bloody bandit", "bloody jester". Radek was sure: The proletarian court will bring in the verdict the "bloody killers deserve . . . The chief organizer of the gang and its deeds, Trotskii, has already been nailed to his shameful post by history. He will not escape the sentence of the world proletariat."

Nor, comrade Radek, will you escape the sentence of the Military College of the Supreme Court, a later historian might say.

#### 22 August

The lead article, "The hour of revenge approaches".

New notes sound in friendly chorus: UNRAVEL THE CRIMINAL TANGLE TO THE END! DISENTANGLE THE THREADS LEADING TO TOMSKII, SOKOL'NIKOV, THE LEADERS OF THE RIGHT OPPOSITION, RADEK, SEREBRIAKOV!

How life hurries on: only yesterday they had run Radek's article.

One of the two leaders of the right opposition, N. I. Bukharin (Tomskii was named), was as before the editor of "Izvestiia". That edition came out under his signature.

The Moscow writers. V. Stavskii opened the meeting. V. Kirshon, V. Inber, E. Zozulia, M. Shaginian, the poets Lugovskoi, Lakhuti, and others spoke of their enormous scorn for the inveterate double-dealers and murderers,

and demanded they be shot. They acknowledged the greetings of comrades Stalin, Voroshilov, and Iagoda.

We promised not to discuss the trial itself, but we can not refrain from mentioning one episode:

Interrogation of I. N. Smirnov

Vyshinskii: When did you leave the center?

Smirnov: I did not plan to leave it, there was nothing to leave.

Vyshinskii: Did the center exist?

Smirnov: What center are you talking about?

In turn the procurator asked several of the accused "Did the center exist?", and they willingly confirmed that it did.

A statement by General Procurator Vyshinskii: Serebriakov and Sokol'nikov have already been brought to trial. The matter of the others is under investigation.

There was no announcement in the papers that on that very day one of the leaders of the rights, M. P. Tomskii, shot himself at his dacha in Bolshevo. Soon thereafter the TsK condemned his act a weakness unworthy of a Bolshevik.

Comments from the provinces--"A secret Trotskyite: Double-dealer excluded from the party."

N. Izgoev, (a former assistant on Miliukov's emigre paper) "Trotskii's divebombers".

23 August

Lead article, "Shoot the rabid dogs".

Headlines on the first column: UNRAVEL THE EVIL TANGLE TO THE END, EXPLAIN ALL TIES OF RYKOV, BUKHARIN, UGLANOV, RADEK, AND PIATAKOV WITH THE CENTER.

WE INDIGNANTLY NOTE THE LOW DOUBLE-DEALING OF THE RIGHTS. INVESTIGATE AND EXPLAIN TO THE END, demand the workers.

Bukharin signed that issue of the paper too.

Speech of General Procurator Vyshinskii. The state prosecutor spoke for four hours and concluded with the very precise juridical formulation, "I demand you shoot the rabid dogs, every one of them."

An announcement of a new altitude record by pilot V. Kokkinaki.

From a poem by N. Sidorenko:

They will not save their slippery skins.  
The sword of the proletarian dictatorship,  
The sword that unerringly strikes.  
Can slice vile creatures.

An article by V. Antonov-Ovseenko "Kill them all."

Still another prophet of his own fate . . .

Everyone speaking out in the paper agreed with the sentence.

A note: "Trotskyite offspring uncovered": on the trail of terrorists in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture in Uzbekistan.

People's artist from Georgia Ak. Vasadze: destroy the villainous people of this villainous case.

#### 26 August

Announcement of the death of S. S. Kamenev, commander-in-chief during the civil war.

There will be no mercy for you, traitors of the people! - Sof'ia Bortman, pediatrician from the Bauman region.

THE COURT'S VERDICT IS OUR VERDICT!

#### 29 August

Botvinnik and Kapablanka are victorious in a tournament in Nottingham.



### 30 August

Announcement of the flight of V. Molokov.

And thus, the first show trial was over. The protests fell silent, the people returned to their creative work. Stalin and the NKVD set about getting ready for the next trial. The experience of August will be analyzed and learned from. The noisy preparation will be noisier and more massive. The sentences will be more varied.

### 25 December

From a speech by T. D. Lysenko at a meeting of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Science: I do not understand how Vavilov can insist on his mistaken conclusions after a conclusive examination. That is not simply wrong, now, but harmful.

N. I. Vavilov had second thoughts, and during the next trials carefully added his voice in support. That was historically progressive, but it did not save him from death in prison.

### 26 December

An all-union conference of the wives of the command and administrative staff of the RKKA. Photo: Stalin, Voroshilov, and Zhdanov among the commanders' wives.

Stalin sat next to S. L. Iakir during the meeting. Talking with her affably, he said, "You take care of the commander. He is very valuable to us."

### 29 December

It was announced that an all-union census would be conducted on January 6.

The census did take place on that day, but the results never saw the light of day, and those who conducted it were shot.

1937 - THE FINAL YEAR OF THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN

3 January

Yesterday Stalin received the German writer Lion Feuchtwanger. Their conversation lasted three hours.

Feuchtwanger was completely charmed and wrote everything Stalin wanted.

16 January

N. I. Bukharin signed for the last time as editor of Izvestiia. From then on it was signed by a faceless editorial board. That was easier.

21 January

THE DAY OF LENIN'S DEATH

Next to that article in the first column: DAMNED TRAITORS

The NKVD under the leadership of Ezhov has unmasked

a parallel center: Piatakov, Radek, Sokol'nikov, Serebriakov

. . .

They were the most dangerous, most evil enemies of our people. These Trotskyite beasts, bloody and cynical, worse than Denikin, worse than Kolchak, worse than the worst White guards, soaked in the blood of workers and peasants.

. . . Radek, that cringing, hypocritical, fornicating scum, poisonous Trotskyite scum, concealing poisonous teeth behind his fawning smile.

. . . and these evil enemies of Lenin, these villains dared call themselves Leninists.

. . . Judge them with all the severity of the law, judge strictly and mercilessly. Destroy all the Trotskyite filth without mercy.

22 January

Session of the TsIK RSFSR: acceptance of the new constitution.

24 January (the paper was not printed on Saturday the 23rd)

A lead article in three columns, "Traitors, lackeys of fascism, base restorers of capitalism": "Crush the Trotskyite scum. That is the unanimous demand of all honest people who love their Motherland and freedom."

No telegrams and outraged protests from citizens yet.

Bruno Iasenskii's article, "The German boots of Mr. Trotskii":

" . . . the professor of double-dealing, Radek . . . " Now it was Radek's turn to wear the abusive epithets. Iasenskii took his place as publicist. He would do his best at that trial, but . . . the NKVD did not believe the articles.

Official announcements about the trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite center. The accused: Piatakov, Radek, Sokol'nikov, Serebriakov, Muralov, Livshits, Drobnis, and ten others.

The court: Ul'rikh, Matulevich, N. M. Rychkov. The prosecutor - Vyshinskii. Defense attorneys: Braude (for accused Kniazev), Kommodov (Pushin), Kaznacheev (Arnol'd).

The organizers of the trial thought it would look better to have some defense attorneys.

25 January

Lead article, "Allies and abettors of the fascist aggressors":

. . . Radek is a fornicating, thoroughly rotten double-dealer, a dishonorable political intriguer, an old scout of Trotskyism, an evil Jesuit, outdoing even Loyola, Talleyrand, and Fouche.

Radek must have been flattered to be put in such company!

. . . waves of popular anger, tumultuous and growing, sweep from all ends of our great country to the doors of the House

of Unions. Thousands, tens of thousands of meetings are held night and day in factory shifts, in mines, at kolkhozes.

And in fact angry comments took up two whole columns, and the court report two more.

Decorated professor of medicine N. I. Burdenko: Punish the enemies of the people without mercy!

If memory does not fail, the Hippocratic oath does not contain such a phrase . . .

"Word of a mother": "I am a woman, I am a mother, I am a grandmother. But my hand would not shake for a second if they told me to carry out the merciless sentence, which the Supreme Court must pronounce on them all.

In all times, despite the large rewards, there has always been a shortage of executioners. Volunteer executioners, grandmothers at that. Here is a heretofore unknown achievement of the Stalinist era! We almost forgot to mention who that courageous lady was. Remember, dear countrymen, Mariia Mikhailovna Vasil'eva, a worker at the "Red Triangle" factory. People should know their executioners.

B. Iasenskii, "Professor double-dealer". It is not hard to guess that that is about Radek.

Lion Feuchtwanger on the first day of the trial:

Already the first day of the court proceedings have shown the desire to carry out this important trial peacefully, with dignity, and impressively. The guilt of the accused seems already mostly proven. However, in the interests of determining the truth once and for all I hope that in the

course of the trial the motives for which the accused have made their detailed confessions will be made clear.

There is no argument that their guilt seemed proven. The problem was only that there was no proof, for example, documents. Everything was based on the testimony of the accused about themselves and others, that is, on slander and self-slander. Therefore Feuchtwanger made this reservation in the spirit of rotten western liberalism. Never mind that, as later articles would show, the progressive German writer was satisfied with what was given. Possibly he remembered the Hegelian postulate "all that is real is reasonable." Apparently the Moscow air has some magical quality that deprives even those who have no use for it of reason.

K. Vol'skii, "The scorned ober-traitor". That was about Trotskii.

AN ANGRY WORD FROM THE WORKERS OF MOSCOW

Weaver Topchevskaia of the Trekhgorka factory:

"For me Trotskii and his gang are worse than Hitler! Hitler at least discarded his mask! That scum Radek, how he fooled us, flattering, and worming his way. I'd like to kill him with my own hands!"

M. M. Vasil'eva was not alone in her noble anger. Maybe we see the start of something new here, a national movement of women executioners.

Secretary of the Party committee Beliaeva:

"We've got to squeeze the Trotskyite-Fascist gang of traitors and the traitors led by Bukharin out of the rightist camp. Hatred boils in the hearts of the workers of Trekhgorka. We must become chekists."

Yes, there are women in the Russian Party committees . . .

"Bukharin, Rykov, and everyone who was with them must be made to answer. It must be thoroughly investigated, what the degree of their involvement was in the crimes of the Trotskyite gang!" Such was the unanimous demand of the workers at the Voitovich factory.

It seemed like Nikolai Ivanovich was to be awarded highest honors, that is capital punishment, for many years of faultless struggle with Trotskyism.

Leningrad. The senior female worker of the Skorokhod factory Voronova: "We are sure that the organs of the NKVD will even more vigilantly guard the interests of our people and, most importantly, save our great leaders. And we will help them in this work however we can."

They used to say, "A woman's path is from stove to door." Now she has two other paths to choose: to be an executioner or chekist.

The Tbilisi locomotive repair shop: "Destroy every last scum."

Academic A. Palladin: "We demand the complete destruction of the whole gang."

People's artist Iablochkina: "We must once and for all clear our land of these despised people."

An article by P. Lapinskii: "The monstrous but logical development."

#### 26 January

Lead article "Trotskyite monsters, stranglers of the people: They will be wiped from the face of the earth."

A. Tolstoi "Plan for world war nipped in the bud". A professional analogy between Trotskii and . . . Stavrogin.

Iakub Kolas: "They have no right to live."

Let history not be confused. That was not Kolas who "called for mercy for the fallen." That was Pushkin.

Aleksei Stakhanov, Makar Mazai: "Wipe Piatakov, Radek, Sokol'nikov, and the whole rotten gang from the face of the earth! We demand the vile roles of Bukharin and Rykov be investigated to the end. Mercy for no one!"

Professors of chemistry B. Klimov, A. N. Nesmeianov, V. I. Nikolaev, O. E. Zviagintsev condemned the traitors.

The Moscow institute of cosmetics opened. About a hundred people visited the first day.

From a poem by Aleksandr Zharov:

Supreme Court!  
Strike the filthy paws  
Of monsters, sowing flames of war,  
So the fornicating suckling of the Gestapo  
Judas-Trotsky feels the blow.

#### 27 January

Lead article "Trotskyite marauders - scouts of the intervention"

Headline: WE WILL BEAT ENEMIES WITH STAKHANOVITE LABOR!

"We demand merciless revenge against the vile traitors of our great Motherland. We demand the destruction of the vile monsters."

Academics: V. Komarov, A. Bakh, B. Keller, A. Arkhangel'skii, N. Vavilov, N. Gorbunov, I. Gubkin, G. Krzhizhanovskii, A. Terpigorev.

Honored scientists: N. Obraztsov, E. Pavlovskii, A. Speranskii.

Professors: V. Veger, V. Vysotskii.

"There is no room on earth for that gang!" - from the resolution of a meeting of Moscow composers and musicians.

#### 28 January

Nikolai Ivanovich Ezhov is awarded the rank of General Commissar of State Security.

Ia. I. Alksnis is confirmed as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and commander of the Air Force; V. M. Orlov as Deputy People's Commissar and commander of the Navy.

Academic Bogomolets: They must be destroyed

A. Korneichuk: Shoot the scum!

An article by Vsev. Ivanov: "Monsters".

General Commissar of State Security G. G. Iagoda is transferred to the reserves.

"Rub out the traitors!" demands the collective of the Arctic Institute: professors P. Samoilovich, V. Iu. Vize, Doctor of Geology N. N. Urvantsev, and others (altogether 170 signatures).

VILE SCUM

"Once and for all stamp out fascist vermin," and so forth. Signatures:

Honored artists: A. Gerasimov. S. Gerasimov, K. Iuon, D. Moor, E. Lansere, E. Katsman, I. Mashkov, I. Grabar', M. Cheremnykh, D. Shterenberg.

Artists: Favorskii, Perel'man, Sokolov-Skalia, Ioganson, and others.

Sculptors: I. Shadr, B. Mukhina, S. Lebedeva, S. Merkurov, and others.

29 January

Popular rejoicing on the occasion of Ezhov's appointment. Congratulatory letters of collectives of workers.

Vyshinskii's speech: I demand only death!

Foreign information: "The Gestapo in disarray."

A Cossack Song

From the Don, Terek, and Ural  
A single cry flies across the country  
You can't just take a viper's sting  
You must take a viper's head off!

From a poem by P. Markish IN RETURN FOR EVERYTHING

We'd drive you to the slaughterhouse with ropes around your necks  
So the eagle eye could watch you with scorn  
of him who suffered in the trenches for the motherland  
of him who became the motherland in the hearts of the people.



Not everything is clear here. Only Stalin could have become the motherland in the hearts of the people. But he never did happen to be in the trenches. Could this be about two people? Then undoubtedly the second must be Voroshilov. His trench exploits are, of course, unknown to us, but we can forgive the author some poetic license. All the more since the image of the great leader watching as the accused are led to the slaughterhouse sounds fresh and authentic. Maybe that is why they did not take Markish immediately, as they did Iasenskii, but only ten years later. Or maybe poetry was more highly regarded in the Cheka than prose.

People's artist Moskvina: THE PEOPLE'S COURT

30 January

The long awaited sentence: thirteen men to be executed, Sokol'nikov, Radek, Arno'ld - ten years' imprisonment, Stroilov - eight years.

Just try to figure the logic of the proletarian court! Radek, on whom so much spleen and ink had been spent, has his life spared, and other practically unknown people get the ax. To give this exercise a religious flavor: approve because it is absurd. They approved.

From Radek's last words:

. . . The investigators did not torment us, we tormented them . . . I am guilty of one more thing. For a long while I did not denounce Bukharin. I waited for him to give honest testimony to Soviet authority. I did not want to take him bound to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs . . . I refer to those who were associated with us. Go with the guilty . . . I want before I die to be of some use.

Someone else can comment on that.

From a poem by V. Lebedev-Kumach

THANK YOU PROLETARIAN COURT

Shaking with indignation  
the nation tolled as an alarm bell.  
Thank you, warriors of the commissariat,  
Guardians of the great republic.

In the title there is gratitude to the court, but in the text to the NKVD. But then everyone knows they are one and the same thing.

HEROES OF THE SOVIET UNION A. Liapidevskii, V. Molokov, I. Doronin, M. Vodop'ianov: They got what they deserved!

People's actress Korchagina-Aleksandrovskaia: I applaud the proletarian court.

Professors Speranskii, Pavlovskii, and others: Truly popular justice.

An obvious and instructive example of civic duty. These learned men were not too lazy to speak out for the second time in the course of this single trial.

L. Feuchtwanger, FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF THIS TRIAL

We can say with satisfaction that the trial did shed light

on the motivations of the accused to confess. Those who

truly strive to determine the truth, will find it easier

thereby to evaluate these confessions as evidence.

There was no evidence, but in their absence they got along with confessions. The honorable writer had not made a discovery. This is Vyshinskii's contribution to jurisprudence. As far as the motives behind the confessions are concerned, they should not be sought in the huge hall of the House of Unions, but in the comfortable offices of the Lubyanka investigators. We need not doubt that had Feuchtwanger wound up there, he could have told the court anything they wanted, even to admit that he was Hitler's adoptive father.

1 February

Announcement of a meeting, which took place of January 30 on Red Square. 200,000 people attended. Speeches by N. S. Khrushchev, N. M. Shvernik, academic Komarov, and others.

Everyone, of course, approves and welcomes

In Leningrad a meeting on Uritskii Square attended by 100,000.

V. Chizhevskii: THE FIRST SOVIET STRATOPLANE

The idea of taking people to the North Pole by stratoplane was mentioned.

An All-union census of cattle would take place February 1.

The country is slowly getting back to normal.

#### 2 February

An order of the TsIK and SNK "On increasing the pensions of invalids of the civil war."

They took care of the enemies and took care of the people. The pensions were not extraordinary, however. Invalids of group I would receive 65 rubles per month. That would only buy 5 1/2 pounds of butter or ten bottles of vodka.

OUR REPLY TO THE ENEMIES - STAKHANOVITE LABOR

#### 4 February

Lead article "Soviet statehood is strengthened."

#### 5 February

N. Krylenko's article "Enemy of the people Trotskii"

The last spontaneous response to the trial.

We beg the reader's pardon for dragging all this . . . material in front of him. Without it, however, much of what happened is completely incomprehensible. We would contend that without this general support much of it would not have happened.

The two trials are undoubtedly important events in themselves. At the same time they are dress rehearsals for the main event of 1937, the trial of the officers, an event which had catastrophic consequences for the nation. For that reason we will describe the months that remained until the trial of Tukhachevskii and his comrades in the same fashion.

11 February

Pushkin celebrations in the Bolshoi theater with the whole iconostasis in attendance led by Stalin.

A. Svanidze "On the question of Hittites and their kinship with Georgian tribes."

18 February

An order of the SNK about scholarly degrees and titles.

19 February

An official announcement YESTERDAY AT 5:30 P.M. G. K. ORDZHONIKIDZE DIED UNEXPECTEDLY

Photo: the great leader at the grave. The paper in a black border, as on the 20th and 21st.

M. Tukhachevskii's article "The commander-in-chief of heavy industry". Many other articles about the deceased.

They got rid of Ordzhonikidze, but unlike Stalin's other victims, they buried him with suitable pomp.

26 February

Mezhlauk appointed People's Commissar of Heavy Industry in place of Ordzhonikidze.

Not a word about the TsK Plenum beginning that day.

4 March

Major Spirin NONSTOP FLIGHT AROUND THE WORLD

6 March

Informational announcement about the TsK Plenum which met February 26 to March 5. Its agenda: (1) On Party work in elections, (2) Economic-party building, (3) On the anti-Party activities of Bukharin and Rykov (expelled from the Party).

A resolution on Zhdanov's report on Party work.

11 March

Zhdanov's report of February 26 at the TsK Plenum.

13 March

20 YEARS FROM THE DAY OF THE FALL OF THE MONARCHY

14 March

M. Moskaev, BUKHARIN AND RYKOV'S FIGHT AGAINST THE PARTY IN 1917: "These men . . . turned out to be agents of the fascist bourgeoisie"

17 March

A meeting of the Moscow Party activists. Khrushchev's report: "Some directors and even some commissars think that there was no wrecking." He tells of Stalin's speech at the Plenum.

18 March

People's commissariats' activists on the Plenum

20 March

L. Feuchtwanger, JEWS IN THE USSR AND IN FASCIST GERMANY

"I experience the greatest comfort and relief when one compares events in Germany with the fate of Jews in the USSR."

21 March

Party activists' meeting in Leningrad. Report by Zhdanov.

23 March

Moscow prepares to receive Volga water.

29 March

Stalin's speech at the Plenum March 3. Yesterday the speech was broadcast on the radio; today it will be repeated twice more.

1 April

Stalin's concluding remarks at the Plenum March 5.

Now the people know that terrorists and wreckers are not isolated individuals, monsters, and renegades, but a massive natural phenomenon.

Prof. E. Tarle, "Espionage and diversion as a continuation of politics of the bourgeoisie state."

Progressive scholars are always available.

#### 2 April

Lead article WE WILL MAKE THE PARTY SLOGAN LIVE: "The nature of Bolshevism abhors idleness just as physical nature abhors a vacuum."

It is just so tempting . . .

Vl. Sorin, THE STRUGGLE OF BUKHARIN AND RYKOV AGAINST THE PARTY OF LENIN-STALIN (historical essay)

THE VICTORY OF THE SOVIET SCHOOL OF MUSIC: D. Oistrakh, E. Gil'el's, M. Kozolupova.

#### 4 April

A report on the removal of People's Commissar of Communications G. G. Iagoda from his duties in connection with the discovery of malfeasance of a criminal nature. The case has been turned over to the investigative authorities.

The post of Commissar of Communications truly is fatal. Rykov held it until he turned out to be anti-Party. Iagoda replaced him for a few months and got involved in a criminal case (later it turned out to be much worse). Ai-yai! Despite all those years he ran the OGPU and NKVD . . . Army Commander I. A. Khalevskii will be appointed, and it will cost him his head. But this time it will happen quietly.

#### 11 April

A guilty plea: "Recently the Criminal Investigation Department in Tbilisi rounded up more than 100 recidivists. Many of them were employed. Juveniles were sent to children's colonies."

Such an idyll! Now they don't bother with the criminals. They are "socially close" to the Kremlin's bosses. And why should they overburden the camps and prisons.

21 April

V. Molotov, OUR TASKS IN THE STRUGGLE WITH TROTSKYITES AND OTHER WRECKERS, DIVERSIONISTS, AND SPIES.

23 April

Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Ezhov on the Moscow-Volga canal.

29 April

On lowering the retail price of industrial goods

1 May

A. Vyshinskii TWO SYSTEMS - TWO DEMOCRACIES: "Proletarian democracy is always higher than bourgeois democracy, representing the next higher step in the development of democratism."

Precisely, representing . . .

8 May

V. Antonov-Saratovskii, ON SEVERAL METHODS OF WRECKING ON THE JURIDICAL FRONT: "Workers in justice, called to struggle with the enemies of the people, . . . have overlooked enemies in their own field."

11 May

THERE WAS NO ANNOUNCEMENT THAT MARSHAL TUKHACHEVSKII WAS RELEASED FROM HIS DUTIES AS FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE AND APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE VOLGA MILITARY DISTRICT

17 May

Lead article SOVIET LAW IS INVIOABLE

22 May

ON MAY 21 ELEVEN BRAVE SONS OF THE SOCIALISTST MOTHERLAND LANDED AT THE NORTH POLE. THE POLE IS TAKEN BY US!

M. Vodop'ianov. BOL'SHEVIKS AT THE POLE

23 May

Lead article BOLSHEVIK ROMANTICISM

Seven issues of the paper, 22-29 May, were filled with the assault on the Pole. Meanwhile on May 26 MARSHAL TUKHACHEVSKII WAS ARRESTED. OTHER MILITARY COMMANDERS WERE ARRESTED IN THE SAME DAYS.

IAKIR UBOREVICH, AND PRIMAKOV WERE SEIZED ON MAY 30 AND 31 ON THEIR WAY TO MOSCOW FOR THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL

THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL TOOK PLACE AT THE COMMISSARIAT OF DEFENSE JUNE 1-4. NOTHING WAS SAID IN THE NEWSPAPERS.

3 June

Workers of the BOLSHOI THEATER are decorated.

4 June

Decorations for:

Music teachers: Stoliarskii, Iampol'skii, Tseitlin, Gnesina, et al. Laureates of musical competitions: David Oistrakh, Emil and Liza Gil'el's, Busia Gol'dshtein, Marina Kozolupova, Iakov Flier, Abram D'iakov

5 June

Lead article POLITICAL AND MORAL RELIABILITY OF OUR CADRES.

It told how Soviet citizens are recruited by foreign residents. In conclusion: "Bolsheviks cannot be frightened. Fighting fearlessly with the enemies of the



people, Bolsheviks direct all the strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the destruction of double-dealers, spies, and diversionists, tearing out every last rootlet and seedling."

Plenum of the TsK KP/b/Ukraine: a new Politbiuro elected . . . without Iakir.

Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad Soviet: "Expel Sveshnikov, Primakov, and Vasil'ev from the Executive Committee as unmasked enemies of the people."

#### 6 June

MOSCOW PROVINCIAL PARTY CONFERENCE. Khrushchev opened the meeting: The work of the Moscow city conference has just been completed . . . including elections to the City Committee in which trusted, dedicated Bolsheviks were elected. However one Trotskyite traitor also became a member of the City Committee, the betrayer of the Motherland, the enemy of the people Gamarnik. This fact shows once more that the enemy evily conceals himself.

Nikita Sergeevich put it very adroitly: trusted Bolsheviks were elected, but the enemy of the people Gamarnik became a member of the City Committee.

#### 8 June

Lead article: GUARD STATE SECRETS AS SACRED

MOSCOW PARTY CONFERENCE. S. M. Budennyi told "of the foul work of spies and diversionists among the Trotskyites and rightists."

#### 9 June

IN THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE USSR: on criminal responsibility for shortage of THREAD

The government is always thinking of the needs of the people!

The MOSCOW CONFERENCE. Member of the Moscow Military District Council

Troianker informed "on attempts by spies and traitors to weaken the might of the country . . . The vile double-dealer Gamarnik carried on wrecking work ..."

10 June

LEAD ARTICLE: BOLSHEVIK UNITY AND SOLIDARITY

Dm. Kutuzov. AGAINST THE FALSIFICATION OF HISTORY. Radek and Tarle's views on Napoleon.

MEDICAL SOCIETY holds in shame the rapist and sadist Pletnev. In 1938 Pletnev would be a defendant in the Bukharin-Rykov trial.

11 June

Lead article: METALLURGY ON THE OFFENSIVE

In the second column: IN THE PROCURACY OF THE USSR

"The case of those arrested at various times by the organs of the NKVD: Tukhachevskii, Iakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman, Fel'dman, Primakov, and Putna." (We include the full text of the announcement in the chapter Assembly of Nikol'skaia Street.)

THE EDITORS object that Tarle was associated with Radek and called a falsifier. Tarle is no Marxist, but the book is good . . .

Apparently Stalin called. He liked the book, and Napoleon even more.

The Basque soccer team comes to Moscow.

12 June

LEAD ARTICLE: A DESTRUCTIVE BLOW TO FASCIST RECONNAISSANCE

"We certainly do not plan to lose battles in the war, into which fascism with all its strength and means is trying to draw us. To the contrary, the enemy who attacks us will be beaten on his territory to complete destruction."

THE COURT'S SENTENCE - AN ACT OF HUMANITY

Announcement of the sentence: ALL TO BE EXECUTED

WORKERS OF MOSCOW'S PLANTS AND FACTORIES UNANIMOUSLY APPROVE

The ball-bearing plant: LET FASCISM'S SCOUTS TREMBLE

The Kuibyshev electric plants: THERE COULD BE NO OTHER SENTENCE

The Lepse factory: THE SENTENCE TESTIFIES TO OUR MIGHT AND TO YOUR MADNESS AND  
INHUMANITY!

"Dynamo": PUNISHMENT DESERVED

"Kalibr": AND IN THE FUTURE MERCILESSLY DESTROY ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE

THE INTELLIGENTSIA WILL NOT LAG BEHIND THE AUTHORITIES

People's artist L. M. Leonidov: SHOOTING IS THE ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH SPIES

Architect N. Ia. Kolli: a just sentence

Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (V. Komarov, N. Gorbunov):

GIVE THEM A SHAMEFUL DEATH

Calm down, old men. They are already dead, your defenders. Writers: WE  
DEMAND SPIES BE SHOT! TOGETHER WITH THE PEOPLE IN ONE ANGRY VOICE WE SAY - DO  
NOT LET ENEMIES OF THE SOVIET UNION LIVE

Stavskii, Lakhuti, Vs. Ivanov, Vyshnevskii, Fadeev, Leonov, Malyshkin,  
Panferov, Novikov-Priboi, Fedin, Pavlenko, Sholokhov, A. Tolstoi, Tikhonov,  
Pogodin, D. Bednyi, Gladkov, Bakhmet'ev, Trenev, Surkov, Bezymenskii,  
Il'enkov, Iudin, Kirpotin, Mikitenko, Serafimovich, Kirilenko, Lugovskii,  
Sel'vinskii, Golodnyi, Pasternak, Shaginian, Karavaeva, Makarenko, Gidash,  
Bekher, Vainer, Vol'f, Slonimskii, Lavrenev, Prokof'ev, N. Aseev, et al.

Passionate greetings to Soviet writers - valorous Chekists of the pen!  
Russians, forget none of those who speak and write in your name! Academic S.  
Vavilov expressed the unanimous opinion of the collective of the Optical  
institute: HAVING DEMANDED MERCILESS REVENGE, etc. A meeting of the workers  
of the 2nd clinical hospital of the 1st Medical Institute: TREMBLE, YOU SCUM!

14 June

Lead article: OUR LAND IS SACRED AND INVIOABLE

" . . . Defeat is not our lot; we can only expect victory . . . The bloody Marlboroughs of fascism cannot set one foot on Soviet soil."

ORDER OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR VOROSHILOV:

June 1-4 the Military Council of the People's Commissariat of Defense met in the presence of members of the government. My report of the discovery by the NKVD of a traitorous, counter-revolutionary, fascist organization was heard . . . The final goal of that gang was to liquidate by any means the Soviet order in our country, to destroy Soviet authority, to overthrow the workerspeasants' government and re-establish in the USSR the yoke of landlords and industrialists . . .

Logical and therefore convincing: first liquidate the order, then destroy the authority, after which there is nothing left to do but to re-establish the yoke . . .

M. I. Ul'ianova DIED

K. Vol'skii, BLACK FRIDAY FOR FASCIST INTELLIGENCE

"ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE UNION CURSE THEM", wrote young women from the kolkhoz sanatorium in Gurzuf.

Academic I. Orbeli: THEIR DESTRUCTION IS OUR SACRED DUTY

A man of enormous culture, director of the Hermitage Museum . . .

Academic S. Vavilov: HISTORY CANNOT BE TURNED BACK

Sergei Ivanovich, you are better at optics, but all the same . . . be president of the Academy.

Aleksei Tolstoi. TO THE MOTHERLAND: Vigilance, vigilance! "Stavrogin was a potential Trotskyite . . . As if every citizen who did not love the Motherland were a Trotskyite, diversionist, and spy. Yes, it is like that. Such is the form of our revolution . . . "

Yes, Count, such is the form of your revolution. After it every citizen becomes a diversionist and a spy. No need for participial constructions. And concerning Stavrogin, you have made an error. On January 26 this year you were gracious enough to say that Trotskii was Stavrogin. By the way, the government values your services. You will be needed for the investigation of the murder of Polish officers in Katyn forest . . .

Academic N. I. Vavilov (among others): HONOR AND PRAISE TO THE GLORIOUS WORKERS OF THE NKVD!

You lick their heels in vain, Nikolai Ivanovich, all the same they will kill you . . .

N. Tikhonov: IF THE EIGHT SPIES HAD NOT BEEN KILLED, HOW MANY VICTIMS WOULD THEY HAVE TAKEN FROM THE RANKS OF THE DEFENDERS OF FREEDOM.

Obviously the poet Tikhonov holds to that view to this time. In any case he has not found an opportunity to publicly repudiate his words.

P. Markish, HENCEFORTH WE SHALL BE LORDS OF BATTLE:

We yoked mountain peaks to mountain peaks.

We stretched our power to the clouds, to the winds.

Where needed, valleys stretch.

Where needed, peaks tower to the skies.

Translated (from Yiddish into Russian) by  
D. Brodskii

Our people remember only too well what happened when Markish's masters became the lords of battle in place of Tukhachevskii and Iakir. But the

flight of fantasy concerning the government's leadership of nature is splendid. Even Aleksandr Khristoforovich Benkendorf would have envied that.

THE ARTISTS AND SCULPTORS OF MOSCOW JOIN THEIR ANGER TO THE ANGER OF MILLIONS OF WORKERS OF THE SOVIET UNION

People's artist Khmelev: ETERNAL SHAME AND DAMNATION TO THEM

People's artist Tarasova: DESERVED PUNISHMENT BEFELL THE TRAITORS OF THE MOTHERLAND

20 June

THE FLIGHT OF CHKALOV-BAIDUKOV-BELIAKOV FROM MOSCOW TO AMERICA VIA THE NORTH POLE HAS BEGUN

21 June

THE FLIGHT SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED

28 June

PARTICIPANTS OF NORTH POLE EXPEDITION DECORATED

This ends our show. In the prolog and epilog feats of aviation are effectively employed - to the pole and across it. The audience has departed to go about their daily routines. But the seeds of hate and violence implanted in their souls bore superabundant fruit. Denunciations, attacks, sentence, executions, camps, and FEAR became part of their daily life. Withering, all-consuming fear, leading to madness, to loss of humanity. What had earlier been the thoroughly camouflaged domain of separate groups and classes splashed over and flowed to all ends of the Soviet land, became the very flesh of the nation's being. In a short time by the efforts of the domestic devil and his cohorts, active and passive, the country was bled dry and demoralized. Bereft of its best defenders, it became a tantalizing object for a foreign conqueror. He did not wait long.

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x

From the papers it is obvious that Stalin did not act alone but together with numerous supporters, or more accurately, accomplices. These were not only the direct accomplices (executors) from the punitive, Party, and other organs, but also those who are usually called society: the more active scientists, workers, peasants, artists. In the USSR this public replaces the people in most social processes, they willingly and garrulously speak on behalf of the people and instead of them. Stalin, like any other dictator, can propose all sorts of far-reaching plans, but without the broad support of society he would not be able to carry out a hundredth part of them.

Because of special Russian conditions our society has an elitist nature. Not all the people are interested in politics and actively engaged in it. In the Soviet Union it is those people who have achieved visible success or influence in their various professions who make up society: scientists with international reputations, famous actors and writers, highly skilled workers, decorated flyers, heroes of the war, etc. We leave aside the question of the authenticity of their merits. It is enough to know that they have distinguished themselves from their colleagues.

The role of Russian society is different from that in the West. Ours cannot actively influence government policy. It is meant solely to publicly approve the acts of the state, certainly not to criticize them. But even in this role they have a powerful weapon. A man who is permitted only to clap can, without breaking any rules, do nothing at all, remain silent, even if he has no possibility of protesting. This form of disapproval is allowed by the Soviet regime. It remains to be explained why society did not use it. We will examine this behavior not from the heights of general human morality but

by taking into account the opportunities and characteristics of the environment in which this society had to operate.

Despotic powers try to remove from their subjects the opportunity to express personal opinions and, alas, they succeed too often at it. They want even more, of course, to have every act of the authorities approved by the population and their representatives. In this undertaking the situation of the leaders is less secure and their success less complete than they would like.

This is not surprising. To keep those who disagree from speaking out, they are suppressed: deprived of forums, fired from their jobs, put in prison, shot. To convert the unbelievers or at least to get their public approval, the authorities must resort to persuasion, to agitation. If you think about it, it could be no other way.

Of course the methods of persuasion can be extremely rough and aggressive, they might be dominated by threats. However, most of the time it is not necessary to actually carry out the threats, which is only natural. In Russia the people have always been silent. In other words, the overwhelming majority prefer not to discover what their relations are to the acts of the authorities or to the authorities themselves. There is nothing to be done about that. The leaders have always been content with this secretiveness, silence, and insufficiency of awareness. It is impossible to prosecute every citizen who says nothing or yells "hurrah" too quietly. It is physically impossible when you come right down to it to find enough oppressors, persecutors, and punishers.

There is another way - to try to influence the representatives of the people and put their opinion forth as the voice of the whole people. That is how it is done in Russia. And it is mainly done by persuasion, suggestion,



bribery, deceit, and flattery - not violence. We do not need to mention any of the above; it is enough to point out that there is no evidence of consistent coercion to make public denunciations. Who would dare, without dissembling, to say that he was forced at the point of a pistol or the threat of imprisonment to write a letter to the paper approving the execution of Tukhachevskii and Iakir? On the contrary, instances are known, they are common enough, when respected citizens sweated and toiled to praise Stalin's acts - and did not lose their heads.

The writers Leonid Leonov and Konstantin Fedin together with other brothers of the pen approved the execution of the military leaders, while Mikhail Prishvin and Konstantin Paustovskii found the strength to say nothing, . . . and remained free and ended their lives with clean conscience and reputation. Names dear to our heart like Mikhail Bulgakov, Osip Mandel'shtam and Andrei Platonov are also absent from the list of the bloodthirsty.

The writer Bruno Iasenskii wrote a series of articles filled with explanations for the executions. He soon died of starvation in the camps. Poet Perets Markish wrote verses, which can only be called cannibalistic, but a dozen years later he was shot down by Stalin's police. Servility to the executioners did not guarantee personal safety.

The motives for cooperation were various. Some were carried along by the herd of maddened rhinoceri, the timid gave in to fear, too many were simply afraid to think. Only a few maintained their humanity and, even if they stumbled from time to time, did not fall entirely.

How many souls are sickened to find among the pack of literary scum the name of the great Pasternak. In the fifties the poet claimed that his signature had been printed in the paper without his permission.<sup>2</sup> It was then he published his novel, which has become the most valuable testimony of

the epoch. Aleksandr Tvardovskii, after he with others had unleashed the smear campaign against Pasternak, felt deep remorse to his death and did a great deal to help Russian literature. He gave Solzhenitsyn to his readers and bravely defended him until he lost his editorship.

There were others, like Bulgakov and Platonov, who continued to create great literature in anonymity and poverty, unenticed by sinecures and publication. Their fate and their behavior are a strong reproach to those who sold themselves, a denial of their shameless lie. And then there were those who, like Mandel'shtam and Pil'niak, died for the right to write the truth.

What we have said about the writers could be said of other groups in society. Nor is it possible to ignore the role and the behavior of the western intelligentsia. We cannot forget that their representatives, the very most progressive, liberal, thinking, sensitive, famous, and conscientious of them, approved Stalin's crimes, regarded them with "understanding", and often welcomed them. More than that, they viciously attacked anyone in the West who tried to expose the Soviet terror.

We will not spare the room to name the Stalinist apologists among the western intelligentsia: Roman Rollan, Bernard Shaw, J. P. Sartre, Leon Feuchtwanger, Henri Barbusse, Berchtold Brecht, Theodore Dreiser, John Pritt, Pierre Dex.<sup>3</sup> This is far from a complete list. It includes only the most famous names. We have neither the time nor the desire to try to explain their shameful behavior. We do not believe that they could not have known the truth. If Andre Gide could renounce the cause, if Koestler and Orwell could understand, then so could have the others. The greatest Russian philosopher of the 20th century, Nikolai Berdiaev, who lived there in the West, wrote after fifteen years in emigration in 1937, "The disgraceful staging of the

Soviet trials alone, in which everyone confesses just like everyone else, can inspire disgust for the whole system."<sup>4</sup>

Leaders of the foreign communist parties were active collaborators with Stalin and sent hundreds of their party comrades to the cellars of the NKVD: M. Toreza, P. Togliatti, H. Pollit, E. Dennis, V. Pik, W. Ulbricht, B. Berut, M. Rakoci, G. Dmitrov, K. Gotwald.

Why did people here in the Soviet Union denounce others and carry on? It seems to us that the primary motivations were baseness and selfishness. We will try to explain.

Let us look briefly at the conditions of power. The authorities need the unanimous support of society, but that is devilishly hard to obtain. There is, however, another way. They can bestow the title of representatives of the people only on those who agree to approve. The rest they can get along without, though they will keep their eyes on them. Let the stubborn ones build bridges, grow the grain, sing arias at the opera. The state would not survive without that in my case. But they must not be permitted to be silent on behalf of the people, only for themselves. It is not a problem that the silent are millions. Silence is frightening and significant only when it is universal, but here it is covered over with the moving voices of those who do approve, and they are sufficiently plentiful.

Where then is selfishness? It is most apparent. Those who loudly (we are not discussing sincerity) supported the authorities were reckoned among the elect. They got their share of honors, medals, titles, and material goods. They were permitted to speak for the whole nation, which, of course, flattered their egos and their hunger for recognition. If they were asked for support, they were needed. The Motherland needed them. These simple-hearted people easily confused the Motherland with the government, just as the state put them

in place of the people. More practically, the massive slaughter cleared the way for careers, removed competitors, freed places at the trough. It was an extremely risky game, and for millions it had a fatal ending, but greed seldom mates with sagacity.

We turn to baseness. Most of the approvers knew that with their signatures they signed death sentences, on behalf of the people they consecrated the axes in the executioners' hands. They took upon themselves the right to predetermine the decisions of these make-believe courts. They usually had no proof whatsoever, as was the case with the officers. Which means they sent to their death people of whose guilt they were at the very least uncertain. In such cases the fair judge, every normal person, must refrain from carrying out the sentence, especially if the sentence is extreme and irrevocable.

They soothed their consciences with justifications like the following: "Even if the accused are innocent (more often they said, they must be guilty of something; the authorities wouldn't try people who were absolutely innocent), they are nonetheless doomed. The authorities are too powerful and merciless. I cannot change their fate. Better to sign - it is just a formality - and then they will leave me in peace."

Such subterfuges do not alter the case. To protest against repression in such cases was suicide - such at least was the common assumption. That would be heroic, and no one has the right to demand that of another. However, it is the duty of every civilized person to maintain his silent dignity and not to join the armed mob in its attack on a single unarmed individual. Whoever for the sake of personal gain or comfort cheers on the murderers is a villain, an accomplice in the crime, and a criminal himself.

Whatever the aims and methods of the state revolution envisioned by the Stalinists, it could not have happened without broad social support. That support gave strength and scope to the repressions. It not only allowed them to continue, but gave them the appearance of legality, justified them in the eyes of our people and the whole world. It shut the mouths and bound the hands of Stalin's opponents, stifled their will to resist. They felt their isolation and helplessness not only before Stalin's punitive machine, but before the people.

In the final analysis the historical success of Stalin's career is based on the large number of academics and weavers, novelists and lathe operators, surgeons and farmers, who were ready to serve him in crime. He entangled them in mutual responsibility for mutually spilled blood, bribed them with special rations and fancy apartments, which were all the more attractive against the background of national poverty. He freed their conscience of doubts and responsibility, taking that burden upon his own conscience, which he never possessed. They followed him and made him their idol, a model to emulate. If they did not resemble their great leader in every way, it was not for want of trying, but simply because not everyone is able to rise to such heights of depravity and perfidy. Soon they were bound fast to Stalin's chariot by invisible chains stronger than any metal. Scraps of these chains still whip about the heads and backs of the people.

They beat their own people without pity, drowned them in horror and blood, and at the same time prepared them for a worse fate. Responsibility for the victims and the destruction of the military lie entirely on Stalin and on those who helped him, zealously or reluctantly, silently or with joyous squeals. Those who clapped their bloody hands and gasped in slavish ecstasy at the destruction of all that was best in the Red Army in June of 1937

brought on June of 1941 with its mountains of corpses, the shame of retreat, and the scorched earth of the Motherland.

One need not be a genius to understand that the army is different from the party and other political institutions. If the politicians fight, and scratch, and bite for positions and influence, those are the natural rules of the game. That is why people joined the party, to get power. It was all the same to the country when one ambitious and incompetent secretary or people's commissar replaced another. One was as bad as the other. It is not the same in the army, which exists to defend the Fatherland, or at least so it is normally supposed. Therefore when the army, which is not participating in that struggle for power, is attacked, nothing good can come of it.

Justice demands that we note that not everyone did remain silent. It is said that Rudzutak, Eikhe, Ordzhonikidze, Postyshev, and a number of others did protest the massive slaughter of the cadres. Kirov and Kuibyshev had already expressed their disagreement with extreme forms of terror. It is significant that they acted for utilitarian rather than humanitarian reasons. But that belated and puny protest had no effect primarily because it was kept secret within the ruling circles. They did not have the courage to share their alarm with the country. Nor did they have the moral right. The memory was still vivid how these same comrades had smashed the oppositionists, pitilessly destroyed the kulaks. Now they had become the oppositionists and would share their natural fate.

The larger part of society did not understand the practical harm of the purges. Having scorned the elementary feelings of justice and compassion, they made speeches, they scoffed at the open graves and danced at the funeral feast of their best defenders. Shame on you, you blind and venal creatures.

You signed your servile, cannibalistic letters with the blood of your countrymen. You brought unprecedented sorrow upon Russia.

These people still insist that they believed: believed in the historical rightness of Stalin, believed in the guilt of his victims. However, faith and sincerity of motives are deeply personal things and are not suitable justification for social behavior. Arkadii Belinkov has said it beautifully:

Sincerity has no bearing on what a person does and cannot serve as a justification for it. That Chingis Khan or Hitler sincerely believed in his misanthropic ideas and following them tried to destroy everything he could get his hands on, makes their crime no less. Man must be sincere. But this may not be the only virtue to justify his doubtful or evil acts. Sincerity does not replace other virtues. Sometimes it may replace stupidity. But it must never replace reason.<sup>5</sup>

Along with everything else, what could we say about the mental capacity of those people who for so many years trusted Stalin and accepted without proof everything he told them. What can be said of their consciences?

Chosen to be the pride of the nation, they became its damnation. The justifications of the menials, who have outlived their master, sound vile and false. We believed . . . We did not know . . . They made us . . .

Were the brother academicians Vavilov as trusting in physics and genetics, or did they subject every little fact there to repeated and detailed confirmation? If they did not care to search out every truth in societal matters, why didn't they prefer to remain silent?

They did not know . . . Raskol'nikov could know, knew and wrote about it. Pil'niak wrote about the liquidation of Frunze in 1926. The rest were smart

enough and had enough information to understand how the NKVD fabricated cases. If they did not know, it was only because they chose not to know the truth.

They made us . . . Another lie. Why then so many years later when the cult was dismantled did none of them explain how they were made . . . or why they did not renounce their own denunciations?

Soviet society, the intelligentsia in particular, knew. They had to know, for they took upon themselves the expression of public opinion. They preferred to act otherwise. They licked the bloody hands of the tyrant and other less appetizing parts of his body, and he in his turn admitted them to the trough, awarded them hastily contrived titles, and distributed coupons for immortality.

Every educated, intelligent man bears unescapable responsibility. It is not a material debt. It does not come from the duty to repay society for his education. The intelligent man must see further than others and use his knowledge for the good of mankind. To tell the people the truth, to warn them of impending disaster, to point out their errors and sins, to work to make life better, cleaner, more just - that is the calling and position of the intelligentsia. That is the responsibility of the seeing to the blind, the strong to the infirm, of men to women, adults to children.

Not understanding this responsibility or scorning it - whether from fear, selfishness, or thoughtlessness, it is all the same - one has no right to call himself an intellectual. More than that, such a person is morally and socially defective. No system runs all by itself. Why is it we always have a surfeit of people to carry out various injustices and abominations and so few for good, honest work?



Let the people know the names of their malefactors - not for revenge and abuse, but for all time to learn the terrible lesson.

## EPILOG

### THE BLOODY HANGOVER

They finally won. They  
defeated themselves and  
their people.

Korzhavin



## Chapter 23

### Conspiracy Against Peace

Or, for example, take Germany. They gave her Austria, ...gave her the Sudetanland, left Czechoslovakia to its own fate, ignoring all obligations, and then began to shout lies in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army", about the "decay of Russian aviation", about "disorders" in the Soviet Union, pushing the Germans further east. They promised her easy pickings, saying again and again: you just start a war with the Bolsheviks and everything will be just fine...that looks a lot like incitement to the aggressor. The noise which the Anglo-French and North American press made about the Soviet Ukraine is typical... It looks like that suspicious noise was meant to anger the Soviet Union against Germany, poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany when there is no apparent reason for it. One might think that they gave the Germans parts of Czechoslovakia as payment for their starting a war with the Soviet Union, but the Germans are refusing now the pay the I.O.U., making them concede more.

We do not fear the threats of the aggressor and are prepared to answer double blow for blow the instigators of war, who are trying to violate the inviolability of the Soviet borders. We must be careful and not let our country be drawn into conflicts by the war mongers, who are used to stoking the fire with others arms... (Stalin, Report to the 18th Congress, March 1939.)

The time had come to celebrate their most recent triumphs, but the joy of celebration had a bitter aftertaste. No, the blood they had spilled and the injustices they had done did not keep Stalin and his valorous comrades from

enjoying the fruits of their victory. They were disturbed by conditions in Europe, which in 1938 smelled strongly of a new war.

The NKVD still worked hard at killing the military leadership while the need for a strong army became ever more vital and immediate. Hitler began his conquests. In 1938 Austria and Czechoslovakia fell. Too late western leaders recognized the suicidal uselessness of the Munich policy. Taking advantage of their shortsightedness and selfishness, Germany had shaken off the chains of Versailles and broken the ring of little countries which France had taken such pains to erect around her.

France was sure of its military might. England for many years had not seriously prepared for war. While Germany had day by day made ever more brazen overtures towards Poland, the western allies had fussed about. Finally appeasement was replaced by intimidation. The guarantees of inviolability, which England and France hastened to give the Poles, were not only a bluff, but also unwitting provocation. Since they had no borders with Poland, the allies could not physically come to its aid. Moreover, their armed forces were not prepared to do so. The Polish army was fairly large, but its organization was outdated, and it did not have sufficient modern weapons. And the Anglo-French coalition was similarly weak. They were also very short of tanks and planes.

Hitler felt tempted to show up the rash acts of the allies. He understood that so favorable a military situation could not last forever. England was already beginning to modernize its army. Their solid economic and engineering potential would enable them to quickly make up for lost time. Moreover, behind them stood the American colossus.

Therefore, the best time to attack Poland was immediately. Under one condition - that Russia did not interfere. Hitler understood that well.

The allies realized it also. They hoped that a renewed Franco-Russian-English alliance would prevent war in Europe. In any case they thought that if the Soviet Union joined in the guarantees for Poland, that Germany would not attack. Therefore in the summer of 1939 the lines of force of European interests came together in Moscow.

The Kremlin was not unaware of this. But at the time the Soviet leadership was entirely comprised of amateurs and parvenus. All of these people were incompetent in international politics and grand strategy. Previously they had all heeded the advice of military specialists and diplomats of the Chicherin-Litvinov school. During the Great Purge, however, the staff of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff, strategic intelligence and the diplomatic corps were all destroyed. Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov, who had only by a miracle survived, was in complete isolation. He was a half-dead fish out of water surrounded by people who all their lives had been busy with intrigues and murders, who had never been abroad, who little understood diplomacy, and who for various good reasons did not even comprehend geography.<sup>1</sup> On May 4, 1939, while policy was in the process of changing, Litvinov was retired.

The new course was worthy of the new leaders of foreign policy. Having come to the center of European attention, they quickly displayed their true nature. They wanted to know what was in it for them. It was explained to them that a war was coming and that Russia would unavoidably become involved, and they thought of immediate advantages to be gained, first of all of territorial acquisitions. (Here and below when speaking of territorial expansion, we will not discuss ethical aspects or questions of international law. We will be interested only to examine national expediency: how did these annexations affect the defense capabilities of the country.)

A. A. Zhdanov, who had risen quickly to power, became the architect of foreign policy. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov, who jointly headed the diplomatic apparatus after Litvinov was fired, took all practical concerns upon himself. Already in the spring of 1939 Zhdanov had expressed the opinion that Germany was a worthy partner and long-term ally. Their political structure, that is Hitlerism, was an internal German matter, and we would be wiser to abandon our one-sided orientation in foreign affairs. Litvinov, who had worked hard for an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement, was opposed, but there was nothing he could do. He was fortunate that he was not denounced as an agent of British imperialism. He had after all lived many years in London and married an English woman.

Zhdanov's idea fell in fertile soil. Stalin had already dropped a few curtseys to Hitler in his speech before the 17th Congress (April 26, 1934):

As everyone knows, during the first imperialist war they also tried to destroy one of the great powers, Germany, and get rich at her expense. And what came of it? They did not destroy Germany, but sowed in Germany such hatred toward the victors, made the soil so fertile for revanche, that to this day they can not, nor will they soon be able to, swallow the disgusting gruel they cooked up there.<sup>2</sup>

So that's what it was all about. World War I was undertaken ("the gruel cooked up") to destroy Germany and get rich at her expense. The trial in Leipzig of G. Dimitrov and his comrades had only recently been completed on December 23, 1933. The accused, who were communists, were acquitted for lack of evidence, but in the sentence the Communist Party of Germany was blamed for the burning of the Reichstag.

Stalin did not say a word in his report about that very important trial, while at the same time he agreed with the Nazis' explanation of the cause of

the First World War. Another part of the speech proves that the excerpt above is no accidental slip of the tongue or carelessness in the wording:

Some German politicians [read Nazis - authors] say that the USSR is aligned today with France and Poland, that having been an opponent of the Versailles treaty, we have become its supporter, and that change is explained by the establishment of the fascist regime in Germany. That is not true. Of course, we are far from celebrating the fascist regime in Germany. But fascism is not the problem here [we willingly believe I.V. - authors], because fascism in Italy, for example, did not prevent the USSR from establishing the best of relations with that country. Nor is the problem our supposed change of attitude toward the Versailles treaty. [Listen, listen in Berlin!] It is not for us, who experienced the shame of the Brest peace, to praise the Versailles treaty. We disapprove only insofar as the world is plunged from that treaty of peace into the abyss of another war.<sup>3</sup>

Thus he has let Hitler know: we are not your enemies. Although you have stuck most of the German communists in jail, we can come to an arrangement. His silence on the Leipzig trial was not accidental. Dimitrov and Tanev had been acquitted by the court, but they were still in jail. Secret talks were going on. On February 15 the Soviet government decided to accept Bulgarian communists as Soviet subjects, and on the 27th the Gestapo flew them in a special plane to Moscow. The first contact with the new German regime led to more constructive results.



In March 1939 at the 18th Congress, Stalin continued the same line. He unambiguously said that Germany and the USSR wanted the English and French ("supporters of nonintervention") to bump heads, and directed the fire of his criticism against them:

I have no intention to moralize about the policy of non-intervention, to speak of treason, of treachery, and so forth. It is naive to tell morals to people who do not recognize human morality. Politics is politics, as the old, arch-bourgeois diplomats say. It is necessary, however, to note that the great and dangerous political game begun by the proponents of the policy of nonintervention might end for them in a serious failure.<sup>4</sup>

Thus in 1939 there loomed the possibility of reestablishing the German-Soviet cooperation, which had been fairly successful in the period between Rapallo and Hitler's coming to power. There had been reciprocity in many spheres, including the military. Soviet commanders had studied at the German Academy of the General Staff. In return the USSR had helped Germany get around the restrictive articles of the Versailles treaty by letting them use airfields and training grounds on Soviet territory.

All of this would have been unimportant if Soviet-German rapprochement were seen as only one of several avenues for foreign policy. Unfortunately the Kremlin completely misread the situation in Europe. A prisoner of his Marxist phraseology, Stalin could only understand a united front of imperialists. From his point of view Germany and England were the same. They arranged their affairs at the expense of third countries, like Czechoslovakia. (This was partly true, but a secret Anglo-German alliance

existed only in Stalin's imagination, who thinking everyone was like himself suspected everyone of boundless perfidy and treachery.)

Thus, when both sides began to flirt with Moscow, the suspicious Leader immediately smelled a conspiracy. There arose the temptation to make his secret allies bump heads, in the words of official propaganda: to disrupt the united imperialist front against the USSR. And also to move the border of the USSR westward as soon as borders in Europe became unstable. That was called: using the contradictions among the imperialist powers. And also to postpone the entrance of the USSR into the war. This had no official name, but was still the greatest foolishness since there was no one to attack: neither England and France, or Germany had common borders with the Soviet Union, and Poland was not an aggressor. These various considerations were not based on a realistic evaluation of the circumstances and poorly agreed with one another.

Greed, incompetence, and a tendency to intrigue had their effect. Stalin accepted Zhdanov's proposed alliance with Hitler. And there was no one in the country to object. The lonely voice of Litvinov, who had personal reasons to attract him to England and national motives to hate fascism, disappeared in the cowardly silence of the People's Commissariat of Defense (Voroshilov), the General Staff (Shaposhnikov), and military intelligence (Golikov).

Tukhachevskii was no longer alive, that Tukhachevskii who in 1935 had warned of the German threat and in 1936 had unequivocally told the chief of the French general staff General Gamelin that Hitler would eventually collide with the USSR, but he would start with France. If we suppose that Stalin had thought of an alliance with Germany before the summer of 1939, for that reason alone he would have wanted to get rid of Tukhachevskii and his comrades. For them such a course would have been unthinkable and organically unacceptable as pure treason.

There was a lot to be said for the choice Stalin made: traditional Bolshevik Germanophilia, the similarities of their methods of wielding power, the amazing coincidence in their propaganda apparatuses.<sup>5</sup> In the honeymoon of the alliance there was excellent mutual understanding not only in economics and politics,<sup>6</sup> but also between the NKVD and the Gestapo.<sup>7</sup> There were two other factors of decisive importance. Hitler was more than glad to agree with Moscow's expansionist designs, while the western allies spoke only of how to guarantee the inviolability of the Polish state or how to create a new system of collective security. Second, the repression had seriously undermined the fighting ability of the Red Army. Stalin knew that; he could not help but see. He instinctively feared a real war. It would be much better to have the pushy Hitler as a friend and ally.

Negotiations with the English and French dragged on lethargically and without result. Finally at the end of August during Ribbentrop's brief visit to Moscow the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded. Secret articles of the pact included agreed upon spheres of interest, more precisely, territorial claims. The partitioning of Poland was the main part of the deal: Hitler got the western regions of the country, Stalin the eastern. Besides that the USSR recognized German acquisitions in Austria and Czechoslovakia; Germany recognized Soviet claims in the Baltic region. The fate of the Rzecz Pospolyta and of peace in Europe had been decided.

Hitler was beside himself with joy:

In this way I knocked their weapons out of the hands of the western gentlemen [England and France]. We put Poland in a situation much more favorable for achieving military success...Stalin writes that this policy promises much good

for both countries. A gigantic turnabout in European politics.<sup>8</sup>

In September the Wehrmacht began its invasion into Poland.<sup>9</sup> England and France declared war on Germany. The Second World War had begun.

Stalin had every reason to be satisfied. Already by the second half of September following the disastrous failures of the Polish army the Soviet Union occupied Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. In the winter of 1939-1940 they seized the Kola isthmus from Finland. In the summer and fall of 1940 the three Baltic states, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, taken from Rumania, were added to the USSR. Only the Finnish acquisitions required actual military action, which did cost large human sacrifices, but it ended in the victory of the USSR (population 190,000,000) over Finland (4,000,000). The other large territories were obtained bloodlessly.

There would be no end, it seemed, to their success. By the end of 1940 France had been defeated. Germany and the Soviet Union had become the masters of the European continent. The touching union of these two great powers gave rise to the fondest hopes. In the fall of 1939 Molotov recognized Nazism as the organic ideology of the German people, against which one might polemicize, but which one must not try to combat with force of arms.<sup>10</sup> Brotherly feelings led him even further. "We believe that a strong Germany is a guarantee of peace in Europe," he declared at a session of the Supreme Soviet. Stalin just to be safe never did make a public apologia for fascism, but to all appearances he seemed to think that everything was going well.<sup>11</sup> True, England had not yet been brought to her knees, but that was Hitler's problem. The USSR still had normal diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, although it carried on hostile propaganda against it.

If Stalin and his inner circle had been capable of sober analysis, they would at once have restrained their joy. The territorial gains were significant and had been acquired at no little cost; however, the strategic situation of the USSR had not changed for the better. It had actually worsened. We will discuss the main points.

The Red Army, or to be more accurate, what remained of it, had gone through a serious crisis. The liquidation of practically the whole higher command staff had sown uncertainty and fear among the ranks. Its fighting ability had been terribly weakened. The new command was inferior to the former in many ways - in leadership, education, and combat experience. There were no especially talented men among the new leaders. All of them in one way or another were unprepared to hold the high posts which these bloody times had forced upon them. The weakness of the command had already been apparent in the limited operations in the Far East, but they were made painfully obvious in the first serious campaign - against Finland.

The choice of the time to begin the campaign promised nothing good. They set off to fight the Finns, who were used to the cold, in the conditions most favorable to them - in winter - as if they were dealing with the warmth-loving French or Italians. The strategic plan of the attack was prepared as badly as it could have been. Shaposhnikov and Shtern's suggestion to attack across the undefended Kandalaksha region was rejected on the grounds that the terrain was too difficult for the troops to negotiate. (How could these neophyte strategists know that in modern warfare traversing difficult terrain gives the attackers a good chance to take the enemy by surprise. The Germans twice proved that with their successful attacks through the Ardennes. The magnificent success of the Belorussian operation of the Soviet Army depended on their striking a blow through a swamp.) Instead the troops were

made to storm the heavily defended Mannerheim line.<sup>12</sup> The attacker's losses were huge. Tens of thousands who fell casualties to the cold added to the losses.

The confusion was complete. Therefore no sooner had the Finnish defenses been broken Stalin hastened to end military operations. Since the Finnish army was still able to fight, Stalin had to be content with rather modest acquisitions.

The failure of the campaign led to changes in the army leadership. Voroshilov was replaced as People's Commissar by S. K. Timoshenko, who was soon given the rank of marshal. Of course, it was alot easier to pass out marshals' batons than to raise up real commanders. If the former cavalryman Timoshenko differed from Voroshilov, it was for the worse. He was even more ignorant; he had no experience in high command, nor did he possess political skills. From the beginning of the Fatherland War even Stalin noticed that.

Another fresh-baked marshal, G. I. Kulik, held the post of chief of ordinance. As a braggart and ignoramus, he was unrivalled even in these Soviet conditions. His career advanced because Stalin had once seen him command ten smallish guns at Tsaritsyn. Kulik worked hard to destroy the accomplishments of his predecessors Tukhachevskii and Khalepskii. He did not give the troops new types of weapons, because his own knowledge had remained at the level of the civil war. Stalin trusted him completely. Because of Kulik's opposition to it, the T-34 tank, which proved to be the best in the Second World War, almost did not become part of the army's equipment. The People's Commissar of Combat Supplies B. L. Vannikov, who actively fought against Kulik, wound up in the Lubianka until the war brought him justice. Vannikov was returned to his former post and earned four Hero's stars, while Kulik in the first months of fighting was demoted first to major general and later to major.

In this shake-up the experienced Shaposhnikov, through no fault of his own, lost his position as Chief of General Staff. Stalin explained that although Shaposhnikov's plan had proved to be right, he had to be fired along with Voroshilov to satisfy public opinion. K. A. Meretskov occupied the vacant post. In January 1941 for no particular reason he was replaced by G. K. Zhukov. In the year preceding the outbreak of the war the General Staff did not have stable leadership.

In the operational-tactical sphere the army was thrown backward twenty years to a linear combat deployment. The theory of deep operations was declared treasonous wrecking. Once again the cavalry dominated the military to the detriment of the armored tank and mechanized troops. In case of war the deployment of 99 (!) cavalry divisions was planned. In 1936 the Germans had two and a half. The cavalry cost the Soviet people more than their whole system of education.

Inclusion of the various new regions in the USSR established a Soviet-German border which stretched for hundreds of kilometers. This was unquestionably a strategic minus. The danger of a surprise attack by Germany increased many times. The aggressor could now at his discretion choose where along the border he would launch an attack, while the defender would have to defend its whole length, which required a huge number of forces. Previously to come into contact with Soviet troops the Germans would have had to cross Poland or the Baltic countries. In those conditions an attack could not come completely by surprise. The Red Army had a certain amount of time in which to prepare a counterstrike. Possible points for invasion could more or less be predicted.

The acquisition of the extensive security zone, which stretched to 300 kilometers in places, complicated the strategic position of the Soviet Union.

The position of the Red Army was further weakened by two glaring errors of the political leadership. During the thirties powerful defensive works, which were in no way inferior to the Maginot line, were constructed along the old borders. Construction of a new line more suited to the new borders was begun in 1940. It would have taken several years to build. Without waiting for it to be completed, however, Stalin ordered that the bunkers and weapons at the old fortifications be dismantled.

The second error is associated with Stalin's fantastic literalism in those matters which he did not clearly understand. Basing his order on the propagandistic slogan "Do not give the enemy an inch of our land", Stalin ordered that the new defense line follow exactly the configuration of the western border. The extent of the defense line grew catastrophically because of that. He absolutely refused to employ mobile defenses. No use was made of powerful natural boundaries, such as the Neman River in its middle course, the August canal, or the Bobr River, only because they were a few dozen kilometers away from the border. Twelve armies plus detached corps and divisions of the Odessa district defended the Soviet border from the Barents Sea to Bukovina. Two thirds of the mechanized corps, those already formed and some just completing formation, were thrown in. Nonetheless these tremendous forces did not suffice for a solid defense.

The territorial seizures of 1939-1940 put the Soviet Union's neighbors, which had formerly acted as buffers, into the camp of the potential enemy. This was most true of Rumania and Finland. The Germans were indifferent to the annexations of Bukovina, Bessarabia, and the Kola Isthmus, although they were not agreed to in the secret articles of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Now Bukharest and Helsinki became true allies of Berlin in the coming war. Germany got new platforms from which to launch an invasion and additional



manpower which it especially needed. The Rumanian episode doubtlessly strengthened German influence in two other Balkan states, Hungary and Bulgaria.

Still Stalin's appetite continued to grow. During Molotov's visit to Berlin the Germans suggested that the USSR join the tri-lateral (anti-Comintern) pact. On November 25, 1940 Stalin informed Hitler of his agreement in principle and of the conditions under which the Soviet Union would join. He asked for "the conclusion of five secret protocols":

1. Concerning Finland, with whom the USSR wishes to come to an agreement without the use of force [but with the threat of force and German pressure - authors].
2. Concerning Bulgaria, which must [not otherwise - authors] conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia
3. About the lease of strong points on the Bosphorus.
4. Concerning Turkey who should be required to join the tri-lateral pact. If Turkey should agree to join, her borders would be guaranteed. If she refused, the diplomatic and military pressure of Germany, Italy, and Russia would be brought to bear. Japan must be made to give up its concession on Sakhalin.
5. Concerning the Russian sphere of influence south of the line Batumi-Baku.<sup>13</sup>

Hitler did not respond to these suggestions. Apparently strengthening the Soviet Union in this way did not enter into his plans. He decided to fight in the east and less than a month later confirmed plan "Barbarossa".

## Chapter 24

### The Blinding

Our state machinery is suited for defense, not for attack. It gives us as much steadfastness as it deprives us of mobility. When we passively defend ourselves, we are stronger than we really are, for we add to our defense forces our inability to understand our powerlessness. That is, our courage is increased so that even if frightened we do not soon run away. On the contrary, attacking we act with only 10% of our strength. The rest is expended to get that 10% into motion...Strength is action, not potential; when not combined with discipline, it kills itself. We are lower organisms in the international zoology: We continue to move after we have lost our head.

Kliuchevskii

The last act of the pre-war drama began at the moment of the Pyrrhic victory in the Finnish campaign. Having paired with Hitler to get the Second World War started, Stalin completely seriously counted on staying out of the main battles. He amused himself with the thought that while Germany and the West were busy destroying one another, he would snap up the tastiest morsels without risk. If he did get involved, it would be at the end to participate

in cutting up the world pie. All Soviet plans foresaw the possibility of entering the war but not before the end of 1942, when according to Stalin's calculations the main battles would already have been fought.

The source of the catastrophe of 1941 must be sought first of all in the absolute incompetence of the Kremlin leadership. Rarely in history has it happened that such a collection of selfish, incompetent, and simply ignorant men gathered at the feedtroughs of a great power. What were all these Stalins, Molotovs, Malenkovs, and Berias thinking about? Only about how to solidify and increase their own power. Even in June 1941, a time of mortal danger for the Motherland, they could not behave differently. While the terrified leader drank heavily in seclusion for two weeks, Beria and Malenkov carried out a quiet coup in their narrow circle. They created the State Committee for Defense headed by the incapacitated Leader, but including only Molotov of the former members of the Politbiuro.

Even looking at things more calmly, it is impossible not to see that in 1940 and the first half of 1941 the Kremlin leadership was doing the same thing that the western allies were in 1938-1939 - nothing, wasting time. Meanwhile Hitler's appetite was growing daily. He went hunting through Europe looking for easy pickings and finding them. France fell. England desperately clung to its existence. Greece, Norway, Denmark, and Yugoslavia were seized.

It all meant nothing to Stalin. In Moscow they continued to lull themselves with the idiotic illusion that Germany would not try to fight a two-front war. (That was worth remembering in December 1941 when Hitler, already fighting on two fronts, and what fronts!, nonetheless declared war on the USA.) The incorrigible doctrinaires, the seminary and high-school dropouts, whose whole intellectual baggage consisted of ten ready formulas, had very firmly absorbed: war is a continuation of politics by other means,

and economic factors play the decisive role in war (and social development). Why would Germany (population 70,000,000) attack the USSR (190,000,000), while they were still fighting England (50,000,000), behind whom stood the USA (150,000,000) with its huge economic potential!? And our productive relations were more progressive than theirs, not to mention our social structure. They must have learned something from history. Bismarck taught the Germans not to meddle in the East; Zhdanov especially emphasized that. No, in no circumstances would the Germans attack. They must not. And if they dared (here the voice hardens), they would find their graves in our immense land. Like Napoleon. That they had learned. They were too busy to remember that Bonaparte had reached Moscow and had spent some time there. They did not want to think that possibility all the way through. But they did let Hitler reach the very walls of the capital - probably so as not to ruin the historical analogy.

A country must prepare for war, and in an orderly, thoughtful fashion. Therefore a plan was approved for putting industry on a war footing. The completion of the project was foreseen in the end of 1942! What was the hurry? Therefore Malenkov did not transmit to the army's political workers directives for immediate combat readiness. That happened on June 3, 1941: "The document was composed as if war would begin tomorrow. Such an approach is completely unacceptable." Stalin agreed with Malenkov. And Georgii Maksimilianovich proved right - the war did not break out for another 19 days. Consequently, nine hours after German troops had attacked in Belorussia, Russian troops still did not have combat orders.

In assessing the possibility of attack by a potential enemy, one can not study only military strengths. That only asks the question who will in the end win the war. But the aggressor does not always act only when he is sure

of success. Otherwise Napoleon, for example, would not have marched into Russia, and the powers of the Triple Entente would not have started the First World War.

It is much more important in analyzing an enemy's intentions to understand the logic and psychology of his strategy. If Stalin were capable of that realistic sort of thinking, he would almost have had to come to the conclusion that Hitler had little choice but to attack the Soviet Union and to do it soon. Stalin and his comrades only hoped in vain that while Germany fought in the west, they could not start a war against the USSR. Hitler had to think differently. England was not yet broken, and Hitler hated and feared England. Behind England stood mighty America, which sooner or later would be drawn into the war. When Molotov visited Berlin in November 1940, he did not respond to the call for the USSR to participate in the war against England. Hitler saw that the Russians were crafty, and that if a good moment presented itself they would fight against Germany. Before he got into the unavoidable clash with America, he wanted to rid himself of the Damocles sword of Russia<sup>1</sup> and at the same time obtain a decisive strategic advantage. As a matter of fact, if the campaign in the east were quick (and he did not think it would be otherwise), then Hitler would have huge material and, very likely, almost endless human resources. Then England would have to face an unbelievably strengthened Germany in Europe and the Japanese in Asia, who were eager to get into the fray. The war would then be settled in favor of the Axis powers. England could not continue the fight and would have to accept German conditions for peace. Even in the case of American intervention, Hitler, as chess players say, would have a stronger position without the Russian colossus at his back.

That sort of thinking might seem far-fetched, but this is what Hitler himself had to say about it at a meeting of the Wehrmacht headquarters staff on January 9, 1941.

The hope that the Russians will intervene encourages the English. They will cease to resist when their last hope on the continent is destroyed. He, the Fuehrer, does not believe that the English are "hopelessly stupid". If they can not see help coming, they will stop fighting. If they lose, they will never find the moral strength in themselves to preserve the empire. If they can go on and form 30-40 divisions, and if the USA and Russia extend help, that will create a very difficult situation for Germany. We can not allow that.<sup>2</sup>

Thus for Hitler the continuing war with England was a powerful motivation to attack Russia, just as Stalin saw it as the guarantee of his security.

...it is necessary to destroy Russia. Then either England would surrender or Germany would continue the war against England in favorable conditions. The defeat of Russia would also permit Japan to turn their forces against the USA. And that would keep the latter from entering the war.

...The question of time is especially important for the defeat of Russia. Although the Russian armed forces are a clay colossus without a head, it is impossible to foresee precisely their future development. Inasmuch as it is necessary in any case to defeat Russia, it would be better to do it now while the Russian army is leaderless and badly

prepared...Nonetheless we must not underestimate the Russians now.<sup>3</sup>

Hitler made a fatal error. But that in no way excuses Stalin. He did not foresee the course of events and displayed complete misunderstanding of the aggressor's motives. It is not so, as the official historians say, that the pact of 1939 gave the USSR needed time to strengthen its defenses. On the contrary, it permitted Hitler to take Poland and make preparations to attack the east. In 1939 Germany could not only not have attacked the USSR, but in the absence of the pact would probably not have dared attack Poland for fear of our countermeasures taken in concert with England and France.

A lot of ink and simple-minded effort has been spent to defend Stalin's behavior. In the end there is the elementary conclusion - the Great Leader made a mistake. The country under the leadership of the Party prepared to repel aggression, but their timing was off, which put us in a rather bad position early in the war.

This formulation deserves our attention only as an example of shameless disregard for facts and as further proof of the happy certainty of its authors that whatever lies they utter they will get away with. We will say more later on the preparedness of the USSR for war and on the difficulty of our position. First of all we note that a statesman who makes such mistakes at the very least is not in the right job, and he should find some other more suitable and harmless occupation.

Let us try to find some justifications for Stalin's behavior. Maybe he really was a great philanthropist trying to save the country from the horror of war? Because any war, even the most just (and who is to be judge of that), brings the people incalculable suffering and causes the loss of human life which is not compensated for by any conquests. The statesman who wisely keeps

his country out of war is blessed. But as hard as we might, we will not find those noble intentions in Stalin. He certainly did not want war. He feared war, primarily because he felt his own incapacity as a leader. He also understood that the real military leaders had been destroyed at his personal orders. The fear of war paralyzed Stalin. He sacrificed the country's security for the sake of intrigue which gratified his imperial ambitions. He paralyzed the preparations for defense and too frequently, through ignorance, did things that helped the enemy.

Might we still be underestimating Stalin? Maybe there was some clever plan concealed in his actions. What if he were trying to avoid that catastrophic error of tsarist policy - when Russia got entangled in a war she was unprepared to fight. If Russia had remained neutral as long as possible, both coalitions would have wooed her - as a potential ally or undesired enemy - and the tsar could have chosen the better deal for Russia.

But there resemblance is only apparent. At the end of the thirties there were not two equally powerful alliances, but a brazen aggressor and the rest of the world, who rather carelessly and then with alarm, but always passively, watched the aggressor. Besides that Stalin's way of keeping Russia out of the war was highly questionable. For someone who was not eager to fight, he certainly was quick to share in the division of the spoils. If Stalin had wanted to wait out the turn of events, as a neutral, he ought not to have begun with a secret deal with the aggressor, providing for territorial acquisitions. That should be the payment, to speak cynically, at the end of the war for the victorious reinforcement of one of the sides. That hurriedly swallowed bite got stuck in his craw.

When he ventured into such a delicate game, Stalin had to understand the intentions and foresee the actions of the contending sides. He had to



understand that Hitler would not tolerate the neutrality of Russia for long - for fear that the Russian card would become the decisive trump in the hands of the western allies. If Russia did not become Germany's military ally, then according to Hitler's logic Russia would have to be defeated and subjugated. Hitler's decision was made easier by the display of the Red Army's weakness in the war with Finland in 1940.

Anyone who had taken the trouble to study Hitler's strategic behavior would have to expect him to attack after the failure in Karelia. Hitler's strategy was based on hypertrophied aggressiveness. Seeing weakness anywhere, he was certain to attack. But first he would try to weaken, disorganize and demoralize the enemy. Signs of all of that were apparent in USSR after 1937, thanks to Stalin and his stewardship. Hitler, unlike Stalin, valued the element of time. He hurried, understanding that favorable circumstances could change. Finally Hitler clearly understood the confusion and indecision of the Kremlin dictator. Informing his generals of his plan for war with Russia, he assured them that for the present the USSR would not act first: "Smart men are in charge in Moscow."

This undermines the belief that Stalin had a well thought through Fabian strategy. Explanations based on Hitler's perfidy, which Soviet propaganda is so quick to use, do not deserve serious discussion. It was irresponsible to take at his word a man who neither in theory nor in practice recognized any treaties except those which were advantageous to him.

There remains one other explanation, which is more believable. Stalin knew without doubt that Russia was unprepared for war and feared it beyond reason. He hypnotized himself and others with a vain hope, a hope for a miracle. And therefore he did not want to hear about even the plainest signs that war was approaching. Such information could not help him much. He still

did not know what to do. His will was paralyzed. He lost all of the chances he had to correct his mistake. A mystical horror reigned in the Kremlin. To moderate the tension of hopelessness Stalin invented the theory of the peaceloving nature of Hitler, with whom the bloodthirsty generals were pushing us into war. Therefore we were to sit quietly, not to provoke anyone, not to give the Germans an excuse for war. Fear and apathy reached such heights in the Kremlin that had Hitler thought to roar more loudly, Stalin might possible have thrown himself at his feet.<sup>4</sup>

He had already gone down on one knee when on the 14th of June, 1941 he issued a TASS announcement, which in black and white assured the people and the whole world that despite the fantasies of hostile propaganda (apparently British) the colossal buildup of German troops at the Soviet border was not aimed against the USSR. Only a week remained until the invasion began. All of the shameful efforts of the Stalin clique were in vain.<sup>5</sup>

History laughed cynically at Stalin. It was he who turned out to be the ally and accomplice of German fascism, not those defendants at the Moscow trials who went to their deaths branded agents of the Gestapo.

Stalin's comrades were a lot like their leader. With dull fatalism they awaited the enemy attack. It did not occur to them to remove the incapacitated dictator and busy themselves with saving the Motherland. Woe to the country which entrusts its fate to such leaders.



## Chapter 25

### RETRIBUTION

We do not have a parade,  
we have a war.

Pushkin

As far as decisiveness, enterprise, and willingness to take responsibility are concerned, the whole system in the Russian army encouraged not the development but the suppression of these moral qualities, the most important for war.

Leadership of the troops has long been the weakest side of the Russian army. In its extensive combat experience over the last hundred years much bravery has been displayed but precious little military skill. Usually Russian commanders do everything they can to lose a war, and if nonetheless war is won, success can be explained only by the selflessness of the former Russian soldiers who atoned for mistakes of the command with their blood, and by the weakness of the enemies with whom Russia has had to clash.

In former Russia they did not attribute special significance to the mental development of military leaders. In government circles until very recently they held firmly to the conviction that brains were not especially needed to command troops in peacetime, and that war would come God knew when

Martynov.<sup>1</sup>

The German attack caught us unaware, but it was an unnecessary surprise. The army's ears had been plugged, its eyes blindfolded, its hands tied. Stalin and the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense had done that.

It is impossible to secretly prepare and send into battle an army of several million men. There was sufficient warning of the approaching invasion. Stalin preferred to ignore them. In normal circumstances he would have been sent before a tribunal for that alone. And beside him in the defendants' box, if justice were served, would be many others, including especially the People's Commissar of Defense Semen Timoshenko, the Chief of the General Staff Georgii Zhukov, and the Chief of Military Intelligence Filipp Golikov.

One cannot justify the actions of that trio by the political circumstances of those years. They maliciously and consistently violated their soldier's obligation - to be always ready to defend the Fatherland. Even if we accept that the tyrant was blind, and ignorant, and ran things according to preconceived notions, that does not reduce the guilt of the others. They occupied the highest military posts in the country, but they did not even try to oppose Stalin; they did not dare try to show him the inescapable fatal consequences of his policies. To the contrary, they worked closely with him and suppressed those people in the army, who tried to do anything about the situation which was deteriorating from day to day.

#### Failures of the early period

Soviet propaganda explains the defeats of 1941 by the unexpectedness of the attack, the numerical superiority of the German army, and its superior weaponry. All of this is a deliberate lie.

Unexpectedness. Soviet intelligence first obtained information about preparation of a plan to attack the USSR in July 1940, only a few days after the German general staff began work on it.

Hitler approved plan "Barbarossa" on December 18, 1940. Exactly a week later the Soviet military attache in Berlin received an anonymous letter informing him that the Germans would attack Russia the following spring. By December 29 Soviet intelligence knew the most important fact of plan "Barbarossa"--its goals and timetable.

Deputy Secretary of State of the USA S. Wallace warned Soviet ambassador K. Umanskii in January 1941 about Germany's plan to attack the USSR.

The Soviet General Staff got hold of extensive material about plan "Barbarossa" on March 25.<sup>2</sup>

On March 25 the Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) reported that 120 German divisions had been moved up to Soviet borders.

Stalin received a warning from Churchill through British ambassador S. Cripps on April 3.

The GRU reported on May 5, "Military preparations are being carried on openly in Poland. German officers and soldiers speak of war as a certainty. To begin after spring field work."<sup>3</sup>

On May 22 the assistant to the military attache in Berlin, Khlopov, sent a report that the invasion would begin on June 15 or slightly earlier. General Tupikov, the military attache in Berlin, reported almost daily on the Germans' preparations for war.

June 6. A report of the GRU on the concentration of 4 million German troops on the border. By a strange irony it was on that day that Stalin, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, confirmed the plan for putting industry on a war footing by the end of 1942.

With such a quantity of information it is a sin to complain of ignorance or unexpectedness. And we have not yet spoken of Richard Zorge!

He sent his first report of a coming war with Germany on November 18, 1940. On November 28 he informed Moscow about the formation of a new reserve army of 40 divisions in Leipzig. 80 divisions were already stationed along the Soviet-German border, 20 more were being transferred from France.<sup>4</sup>

On March 5, 1941 Zorge dispatched a photocopy of a telegram from Ribbentrop to Otto, the German ambassador in Tokyo. In it the date for the invasion was set in mid-July.

Zorge's report of April 11: "The representative of the General Staff in Japan informs me that immediately after the end of the war in Europe war with the Soviet Union will commence."

May 2. Zorge:

"Hitler has decided to begin war and to destroy the USSR in order to use the European part of the USSR as a source of raw materials and grain. The most likely times for war to begin: a) the defeat of Yugoslavia, b) the end of spring harvest, c) the end of negotiations with Turkey. Hitler will make the decision about when to begin war in May."

On May 4 he reported that war would begin at the end of that month.

On May 15 he reported that war would begin between the 20th and the 22nd of June.

On May 19 he reported, "Nine armies, 150 divisions, are concentrated against the USSR."

Zorge copied a map from the German military attache in Tokyo on which were marked military objectives in the Soviet Union and indications of the plans of attack. Objective: to occupy the Ukraine and to use one to two million prisoners of war as laborers. 170-190 divisions would be gathered on the

borders and combat operations would be begun without declaration of war. The Red Army and the Soviet order would fall in two months.

Moscow expressed doubts to Zorge about the reliability of his information on June 12.

The sadly famous TASS Announcement which called the threat of Germany going to war against the Soviet Union an invention of hostile propaganda was promulgated in the west on June 13. It appeared in the Soviet press the following day. That same day after reading that idiotic document an enraged Zorge radioed, "I repeat: on June 22, nine armies, 150 divisions will invade at dawn."

Thus, as far as unexpectedness is concerned the case is more or less clear. Concerning the other two theses Soviet authors have created considerable dialectical confusion. It all depends on the context in which the facts are presented. If it is necessary to explain away the failures of the early period, then the numbers of German troops are exaggerated, and the Soviet troops are said to have had less modern equipment than they did - and that fully justifies our temporary set-backs. In those cases when it is necessary to prove that Stalin and his underlings were not dreaming, that they were prepared for war, the tone and content of speeches change. We learn that our army was supplied with sufficient amounts of all sorts of the most modern military equipment and that the potential of our military industry surpassed that of Germany by one and a half times. The numbers of our troops and combat units do not change much from report to report.

Numerical superiority. As we have already said, there is great confusion in numbering the German troops. Moreover, it is very important to know what sort of troops Hitler threw against Russia in June 1941. Some Soviet sources<sup>5</sup> say that a monstrous army of 8,500,000 men was thrown into plan



"Barbarossa". Another assessment says that 190 divisions comprise 5,500,000 men.<sup>6</sup> But alas these convenient figures do not stand up even under superficial analysis. It turns out that between 1939 and the end of May 1941 7,400,000 men were called up into the Wehrmacht.<sup>7</sup> If the losses of the Polish campaign and on the western front are subtracted, we find the remainder is a round 7,000,000. We must remember that Germany continued to fight in the West and in Africa and maintained occupation forces over the greater part of the European continent.

In the interests of comparability we will take statistics of only the land forces of both sides. We have to do that because these are the only figures available for the Red Army.

Hitler threw against the Soviet Union land forces numbering 3,300,000.<sup>8</sup> The Red Army then numbered approximately five million men, 2,900,000 of whom were in the western regions.<sup>9</sup> Besides that before the war the 16th Army (M. F. Lukin), the 19th Army, and two corps were transferred from the North Caucasus region to the Ukraine. Altogether there were five armies near the western borders. In the European part of the country there were no fewer than four million men under arms.

Several works give statistics on the number of divisions: Germany had 152, the USSR in the western regions - 170 divisions and two brigades.<sup>10</sup> Halder gives slightly different figures in his "Diary": respectively 141 and 213 divisions.<sup>11</sup> We must keep in mind that German divisions were larger than Soviet.

The conclusion is simple. If the Germans did have more men at the front, their numerical superiority cannot be termed impressive or overwhelming.<sup>12</sup> The defenders should most certainly have been able to put up organized resistance.

### Technical Superiority

Here we encounter not only the simple distortion of facts, but also unsubstantiated, brazen, and blasphemous lies. To tell such things to the Soviet people who had gone hungry and literally died of starvation during the five-year plan for the sake of creating defensive power...People who make such assertions carelessly, without bothering to explain the reasons, must have armor-plated consciences. Truly, as the Ukrainian saying says, no conscience - no shame.

It is interesting that they avoid using statistics on this point. If one considers the quality of weapons, then the war showed that in most types of weaponry the USSR surpassed Germany. Our medium tank, the T-34, was undoubtedly the best in Europe; the KV heavy tank was in any case not inferior to its German counterpart. Both of these tanks were available in significant numbers at the beginning of the war. Our artillery was more powerful and more numerous than the Germans'. Such effective weapons as the rocket launchers (Katiushas) were developed long before the war. Only the sluggishness of the leadership (Stalin and Kulik) kept them from being supplied to the troops.

In aviation the picture was not so clear. In numbers of airplanes we were far ahead of the Germans, but many of ours were no longer suited by their technical-tactical characteristics for modern warfare; they were obsolete. It was discovered during the war in Spain that we had been developing our air force improperly. Steps were taken to correct the deficiency. By 1941 new models had been produced that were as good as what the Germans had - the MIG-3, IaK-1, LA-3. The enemy was not able to build an attack plane to match the IL-2 during the whole war. These new planes were put into mass production, and by the commencement of hostilities more than 3,000 had been given to the air force. Our fleet was more powerful than the Germans'.

Where we did lag behind the Germans was in supplying automatic weapons to the troops. Here Kulik, of unhappy memory, with Stalin's protection, had laid his dirty hand.

We will not go into great statistical detail. We hope that these fairly general statistics will be sufficient. Because of contradictions in the sources on Soviet arms, we will offer several variations.

Type of Weapon	The Wehrmacht in the East	VOV <sup>1</sup>	Zhukov <sup>2</sup>	The Red Army Lototskii <sup>3</sup>
Tanks	2800 (including assault guns)	Western regions 1475 <sup>4</sup> (only T-34s and KVs)	7000 altogether Western regions 1800 heavy & medium (two-thirds new) and many light	---
Artillery (guns and mortars)	48,000	of 76 caliber larger one-half as many as the Germans	92,578 total Western regions 35,000	67,335 total (excluding 50 mm mortars) 34,695
Aviation	4950 (including 1000 Rumanian & Finnish	---	17,745 total of them 3719 new models Western regions 1500 new and a larger number of obsolete	

## Notes:

1. Velikaia otechestvannaia, pp. 33, 53.
2. Zhukov, pp. 205, 206, 209.
3. Lototskii et al., p. 157.
4. According to other sources, Soviet factories turned out 1215 T-34 tanks in 1940 and the first half of 1941. See Istoriia Velikoi otechestvennoi voyny, M., 1965, vol. 1, p. 415.

We will permit ourselves a brief comment on the table. The Germans did not have an advantage in tanks. Assault guns and a fairly large number of obsolete tanks, German, French, and Czechoslovakian, were included in the 2800 combat vehicles. The Wehrmacht clearly did not have enough new tanks. German industry produced only 2800 medium tanks in 1940 and the first half of 1941. Heavy tanks appeared only in 1943 and then only 100.<sup>13</sup> The Wehrmacht did not surpass the Red Army in modern medium tanks; in heavy tanks they lagged behind (we had 654 KV tanks in 1941); in light tanks they were far behind.

The enemy's air power is even more questionable. In 1940 and the first half of 1941 German aviation plants produced 10,000 fighter planes, attack planes, and bombers. Losses for that period exceeded 7500.<sup>14</sup>

We should also remember that in manpower and military economic potential Germany was far behind Russia. If you also consider England, the picture looks even worse:<sup>15</sup>

Country	Population in Millions	Military production in billions of dollars (1944 prices)
USSR	190.6	8.5
England	4.82	6.5
Total	238.8	15.0
Germany	69.8	6.0

Even if we add in Italy, which had a population of 43,800,000 and a weak economy, and which fought its own war and did not participate in the war against the USSR, the position of the Third Reich looked pretty doubtful even in June 1941 - before the USA got into the war.

But that leaves us with a paradox. It turns out that the Germans were not stronger than we were. But how do we get from there to the fact that in 1941 they dealt the Red Army a series of stinging defeats, captured Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic region, marched to Moscow, and besieged Leningrad? How could they? Was the German soldier that much superior to the Russian?

Such a suggestion is far from the truth; there are no facts to substantiate it. But if we apply that yardstick to the command staff, the conclusion forces itself upon us. The limits of our book are too narrow for a detailed and exhaustive analysis, but we can reliably conclude: in 1941 the Soviet command, especially the high command, was inferior to Germany's in practically all ways. Our troops' lack of combat experience also had an effect, but secondary. The major cause of our early defeats was that the Germans surpassed us in the quality of leadership on all levels - in strategic planning, in operational, and even tactical thinking. The Germans had their problems. They were hampered by ineffective organization of their higher command and by Hitler's inconsistency, wildness, and diletantism - but to a lesser degree.

The recent destruction of our officer corps played an enormous, possibly decisive role in our weakness. Who is to blame for that is sufficiently clear. But the top leaders of the Red Army, Timoshenko and Zhukov, must bear a large share of responsibility also. However tattered and disorganized their staff might have been, they were still obliged to do all that was humanly possible to keep the enemy from catching us unaware. All the more so, since they had vast human and material resources at their disposal. They neglected much that it was their responsibility to do. They shamefully and spinelessly

followed the tyrant down the path to national ruin. Here is a far from complete list of their mistakes.

Before the war:

- 1) an incorrect evaluation of the strength and intentions of the enemy;
- 2) no plan for strategic deployment in case of war was worked out;
- 3) troops of the western regions were not deployed in combat-ready positions, but remained in garrisons; the regional commands were not informed that war might soon be upon them;
- 4) neglect of border fortifications (the old fortifications were destroyed before the new ones were constructed);
- 5) all precautionary measures usually carried out by the troops were stopped;<sup>16</sup>
- 6) the carelessness of the leadership extended so far, that no specifically equipped command post was built for Headquarters in Moscow in case of war;<sup>17</sup>
- 7) most importantly: Timoshenko and Zhukov did not insist on mobilization. It would not have been too late even at the beginning of June. Such a measure would most certainly have discomposed the Germans' plans and might have prevented the invasion altogether.

In the first hours and days of war the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense did no better. A few examples:

- 1) when they had learned of the German invasion, Timoshenko and Zhukov squabbled for a long while over who should call Stalin. This happened in the presence of Admiral Kuznetsov;
- 2) they lost control of the troops.<sup>18</sup> NK0 directive #1 (order on the commencement of war) was announced no earlier than 7:15, that is four hours after the invasion. The order bore the stamp of confusion. It did

not say that the USSR and Germany were in a state of war. Our troops were ordered to destroy the invading forces, but were forbidden to cross the Soviet border. It almost sounds like a cruel joke. Aerial reconnaissance was permitted to fly only 100-150 kilometers into enemy territory. They could bomb only Königsberg and Memel. Flights over Rumania and Finland without special permission were forbidden.<sup>19</sup>

3) they were guided by the fallacious strategy of defending every scrap of land, which was developed in conditions when initiative was entirely on the side of the enemy.<sup>20</sup> That was like trying to put out a forest fire by piling brushwood in its path. As early as the twenties A. A. Svechin warned of the fatal danger of such a course. We had instead to make a rapid orderly retreat to lines which we could realistically defend. That would have avoided the senseless losses and demoralization of the troops, and the momentum of the attacking enemy would have been partly absorbed by the distance. But where could Timoshenko and Zhukov have read Svechin! Even with the strategy of Barclay de Tolly and Kutuzov they were acquainted only by hearsay.

We cannot omit the figure of Golikov, who headed strategic intelligence before the war. That the intelligence organs continuously warned of the danger of an attack would seem to exonerate Golikov of any blame and even put him among those who suffered for the truth. But things are not that simple.

Golikov did not conceal his agents' reports. He delivered them to the Defense Commissariat, the General Staff, and to Stalin, but...in a most unusual way. He put information about the Germans' preparations for war and about the date of the attack in the category of rumors and other unreliable information. When many years later he was asked why he had done it, he replied that he had acted with the best intentions, that Stalin believed in rumors more than anything else. Possibly admirers of paradoxes will accept



that admission, but the tedious duties of the historian force us to another conclusion: Golikov wanted to please the leadership by telling Stalin what he wanted to hear. Golikov and others like him helped to create an atmosphere in higher Soviet circles that Harrison Salisbury has accurately characterized:

The record strongly suggests that Stalin, Zhdanov and his associates were living in a world turned inside out, in which black was assumed to be white, in which danger was seen as security, in which vigilance was assessed as treason and friendly warning as cunning provocation.

Of course that was not all Golikov's doing. That sort of social pathology was characteristic of the Stalinist system:

Unless there is a clear channel from lower to top levels, unless the leadership insists upon honest and objective reporting and is prepared to act upon such reports, regardless of preconceptions, prejudices, past commitments and personal politics, the best intelligence in the world goes to waste - or, even worse, is turned into an instrument of self-deceit.<sup>21</sup>

Golikov wrote on one of Sorge's last reports that his story was invented by the English who were eager to draw the USSR into the war. Stalin believed him. It was precisely that formula that was used in the notorious TASS Announcement.<sup>22</sup>

However shamefully the intelligence chief conducted himself, he got away with it all. It was much worse for the real heroes of the secret front. A vivid example is the fate of Zorge himself. He was a German who worked many years against Germany and provided invaluable services for the USSR. His reward was distrust. In October and November 1941 he warned of Japan's plans

to attack the USA. That removed the Japanese threat to the Soviet Far East for the foreseeable future and permitted the so-called Siberian divisions to be transferred west where they played a decisive role in the defense of Moscow.

Soon after that Zorge fell into the hands of the Japanese in circumstances which suggest he may have been betrayed. Unbeknownst to him his wife was already in a Soviet camp. He spent almost three years in a Japanese prison. Stalin did not get around to arranging an exchange for him.<sup>23</sup>

### Stalin as a commander

The flattering phrases that were lavished on Stalin's military genius while he was alive did not deserve our attention, all the more so since he wrote the score for the performance. Nonetheless to this day many people, including many high-ranking military officers, continue to think of Stalin as a great commander. The logic in that is straightforward. The Soviet Union won the war. You know who was at the head of the army...Q.E.D.

The venerable memoirists (such as Zhukov, Vasilevskii, Shtemenko) present us with that general conclusion without backing it up with facts. Although when they speak of specific incidents in which the Great Leader participated, another conclusion thrusts itself upon the reader. The more one becomes acquainted with military memoirs, the more he is confirmed in the opinion that Stalin's personal decisions concerning the army and navy were not usually wrong, but they often worked to the advantage of the enemy.

The proof of that thesis as applied to the pre-war period is the whole of our book. As far as the war itself is concerned, we refer the reader to the memoirs of Soviet commanders and invite him to make his own conclusions. Here we will give space to only a few striking facts, picked more or less at random.

1. Stalin, as tyrants often are, was a coward. News of the invasion therefore made him despondent. Not knowing that fate had prepared for him the

laurels of the Greatest Commander of all Times and Peoples, he still hoped against hope that there would be some way to avoid war and come to a friendly agreement with the aggressor. Halder's Diary for June 22 contains the following entry:

12:00 (2:00 P. M. in Moscow) - News has arrived that the Russians have resumed international radio communication which was broken off yesterday morning. They have appealed to Japan to represent Russia's interests in the matter of political and economic relations between Russia and Germany and are carrying on lively negotiations by radio with the German minister of foreign affairs.<sup>24</sup>

These urgent, shameful efforts were futile. Hitler preferred to fight. Now Stalin was really stuck. He secluded himself in his Kremlin apartments and got drunk. Stumbling out he uttered for history the pompous phrase, "Lenin's great work has perished. We were unable to defend it."

To resort to alcohol at critical moments was in character for Stalin. When the tsarist police caught Kamo-Petrosian after the hold-up of the Tiflis bank, Stalin, the main organizer of the raid, conducted himself in a similar manner. He got drunk and shook with fear. (Kamo did not betray him. A grateful Stalin removed him in 1924.) Now it seemed that no miracle would save the erstwhile seminarist. In the June days of 1941, Stalin was more interested in his personal fate than in the outcome of the war. He expected that they would simply take him, the bankrupt adventurer who led the country to the brink of the abyss, and put him against the wall. But time passed, and it did not happen. Finally on the 29th of June, the eighth day of the war, several members of the Politburo came to the hermit. They found him dirty and unshaven. Here we go, thought Stalin. But nothing of the sort. The red courtiers wanted only to ask for a meeting of the TsK and SNK. Stalin

relaxed. Then they very gently hinted that he could retire if he chose to. This was the sort of conversation Stalin could comprehend. If they were not planning to kill him, he was certainly not going to give up his power. They somehow managed to make the Great Leader presentable. On June 3 he made a radio address to the Soviet people.

Stalin took heart and once again picked up all the reins of state and military administration. Naming himself Supreme Commander in Chief did not, however, fill him with martial valor. He preferred not to visit areas where the fighting was going on. He is known to have visited a front area only once, near Viazma in August 1943, and on that occasion, according to A. I. Eremenko, he did not create an impression of bravery.

2. Despite his phenomenal memory, Stalin had a very foggy notion about the organization of a modern army.

Because of that he was receptive to all sorts of fantastic projects. N. N. Voronov writes, "From time to time completely absurd plans would appear at Headquarters. I was surprised that Stalin took them seriously." For example, late in 1943, he was taken by the idea to unite artillery and tanks into a single arm of the service. The consequences of such an innovation - it was not done - were easy to predict. At the same time he thought to reintroduce (thought again to introduce) the institution of commanders-in-chief of groups of fronts, which had failed so spectacularly in 1941.<sup>25</sup>

Still earlier, before the war, Stalin had with one stroke of the pen liquidated the position of commander-in-chief of artillery of the Red Army and had transferred those functions to the Chief Artillery Administration under his favorite Kulik.<sup>26</sup> When the latter failed so completely in the first days of the war, Stalin wondered. "How could it be," he asked Voronov, "that our artillery has no commander-in-chief? By whom and when was that decision

made?" "By you, sir!" I wanted to answer. I reminded him in a few words of the meeting in the Kremlin where that question had been decided."<sup>27</sup>

... July 1941. Stalin asks the Commander-in-Chief of the Antiaircraft Defense Voronov to take charge of constructing defense works in the Ukraine:

Molotov supported him. I had to prove that I was not a specialist at such work. I advised them to assign the work of building defense lines to the commander of the Chief Engineering Administration, that that was in the immediate sphere of his responsibilities. They were both surprised:

- We really have such a thing?

- Of course. Our Chief of Engineering Administration is General Kotliar.<sup>28</sup>

We could tell many such anecdotes. Here is one more. In winter 1942 rear services reported to Stalin a shortage of special packings. That was officialese for ammunition boxes. Commander of Rear Services A. V. Khrulev suggested an order be issued making return of used boxes mandatory. The solution was brilliant. Stalin agreed with it and added a note, "... if any units do not return ammunition boxes, their supply of ammunition should be immediately cut off, no matter how the battle is going." No more, no less. Iosif Vissarionovich did not want to seem any less decisive than Alexander the Great.<sup>29</sup>

3. Stalin was completely incapable of strategic thinking. An obvious illustration is his behavior in early 1942. After Soviet troops had pushed the Germans back from Moscow, the Great Leader was immediately seized with uncontrollable optimism. 'He was sure that that had been the turning point in the war and that victory was just around the corner. How was he to understand that the German commander-in-chief of land forces had evaluated his situation,

found it unfavorable and, had accomplished an orderly strategic retreat to a pre-selected position? In so doing he had managed to preserve his forces: "The 4th Army and the 3rd Tank Group were not destroyed, and the 2nd Tank Group retained its entire strength."<sup>30</sup> Hitler fired Braukhich for that. He, like Stalin, was more impressed by the "butchery strategy", bloody battles for every scrap of land. Nonetheless the German retreat continued.

What did Stalin do? He instructed the Military Councils of the fronts:

Our task is to give the Germans no chance to catch their breath, to drive them west without stopping, to force them to expend their reserves before spring, when we will have large new reserves but the Germans will have no more reserves, and thus ensure the complete destruction of Hitler's troops in 1942.<sup>31</sup>

That stirring order from the Supreme Commander thoroughly disoriented all of the front commanders. Everywhere they saw the enemy's retreat as panicked flight. Even the careful Vatutin was enchanted by the mood. The behavior of the front commanders is to a certain degree understandable. Each might think that Stalin had based his order on an analysis of the whole strategic situation, that Headquarters had information about the critical situation of the enemy.

The general Soviet attack on all fronts quickly expired. It resulted only in the complete expenditures of reserves, which had been gathered with immense effort. But Stalin did not give up his obsession - to defeat the Germans in 1942. In May he supported Timoshenko and Khrushchev's lame-brained plan to attack Kharkov. As a result four Soviet armies wound up encircled by the enemy. Stalin did not permit them to withdraw in time, and they were thoroughly destroyed. The Germans gained decisive superiority on the left

wing of our troops and were able to reach the main Caucasus ridge and the Volga. The airborne operation in the Crimea did not accomplish its purposes. Leningrad continued to agonize in blockade. The spring-summer campaign of 1942 was lost by the Soviet command.

The crown, the peak of Stalin's commander's work as a commander is rightfully considered the Berlin operation. Of course, even without that he would have enriched military science. We have already spoken of some of his exploits, but much more has been left out. For example, the very original suggestion to create another Horse Army put forth in 1942. Only the unconscionable but unanimous opposition of the General Staff kept that thought from being made flesh. But the Berlin operation is a special subject that we can not avoid.

Strategists of the old school saw their main objective not in winning every individual battle, but in gaining final victory, putting the enemy out of the war. Stalin was a strategist of the new school and did not have the right to act according to old precepts. Already in November 1944 he foresaw that the war would be ended by the taking of Berlin. It was then decided that the capture of the imperial capital would be assigned to Marshal Zhukov, who had remained the Supreme Commander's first deputy. With that end in mind he was appointed commander of the Ist Belorussian Front. The question of the expediency of the Berlin operation, of how it would be accomplished, was never discussed by Headquarters.

That the war would have to end with the victorious entrance of Soviet troops into Berlin was axiomatic for Stalin. True, in the First World War Germany had been defeated without the enemy entering German territory. But Stalin was always prone to primitive symbolism, as by the way, was Hitler, who gave Stalingrad such mystical importance, who wasted so many troops in the

fruitless efforts to take it. We can assume without doubt that in 1945 Germany, hard pressed from two sides, would not have been able to hold out for long. The last inches of victory could have been had without a dramatic final assault and without the heavy casualties, the last senseless, unneeded casualties, that did inevitably result. But what did Stalin care for the grief and tears of hundreds of thousands of mothers, whose sons did not survive those last days and hours before peace? Still, since it did not come within the purview of the Soviet command, we will leave the strategic foundation of the Berlin operation in peace.

On January 26, 1945 the troops of two fronts, Zhukov and Konev's, reached the Oder. Both commanders saw their chance to keep moving into an attack on Berlin and asked permission from Headquarters. Stalin, who had taken upon himself coordination of all efforts in the direction of Berlin,<sup>32</sup> confirmed the plan only a day later. A line was demarcated between the two fronts as Zhukov had recommended. That in itself was artificial and limiting. Stalin did not forget that he had already appointed Zhukov the victor of Berlin. Zhukov himself had no desire to share the laurels with anyone else. Therefore the line they drew did not leave Konev a "window" through which to strike at his objective. There arose a paradoxical situation which the then Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Shtemenko, has described in the following words:

The result was an obvious absurdity: on the one hand they confirmed the decision that Marshal Konev would be the right wing in the attack on Berlin, and on the other established a line of demarcation which would not permit him to do it.<sup>33</sup>

The assault on Berlin did not happen in February, however, because at the last moment Zhukov hesitated. He considered the threat of an attack on his flank by the enemy concentrated in Eastern Pomerania too serious. It is hard



to say how well founded his fears were. In any case his subordinate, V. I. Chuikov, whose 8th Guard Army stood 60 kilometers from Berlin, held a different opinion which he maintained after the war. Chuikov claimed that Berlin was practically defenseless, and that he could take it before the Germans could mount a flanking attack. We do not plan to be the judges of that argument. We note only that Zhukov preferred to postpone the storming and to attack without Konev. (Had he attacked with Konev, he could have detached part of his forces to defend his flank.)

By the end of March both fronts, especially Zhukov's, had amassed huge reserves. The capture of Berlin was put back on the agenda. The plan of the operation was reviewed in the General Staff on March 31 with the participation of Zhukov and Konev. The latter, extremely annoyed by his awkward situation, insisted that the line of demarcation be altered. But who could change Stalin's decision?

The next day the Supreme Commander in Chief decided to accelerate the seizure of Berlin. He feared that the Americans and English might beat him to it.<sup>34</sup> A new meeting was called, this time with Stalin present. From the very beginning Chief of General Staff A. I. Antonov objected to such a plan of operation. He had already shown Stalin the faults in the plan, but all he had achieved was that Stalin had forbidden him to raise the question. On April 1 Antonov decided nonetheless to try again, understanding fully how risky such insistence was in relation to Stalin. He expressed the opinion that not letting the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front attack the German capital might make the operation unnecessarily long. Stalin exploded. . . and capitulated. Without saying a word he walked to the map and erased a sixty kilometer sector of the demarcation line from Liuben to Berlin. The road to Berlin was open for Konev's troops.

Stalin valued Antonov's courage. After the war, unlike most of the other leaders of the war effort, he was not made a marshal.

### The Price

With hindsight it is easy to find mistakes and say what ought to have been done. In real life, when time to think is short and information is always insufficient, mistakes are inevitable. No one can choose to fight only when he is sure of success. Why then stir up the past? Especially since we won...

Still there are two questions we want to ask: 1) who won the victory in the Fatherland war? 2) at what cost was victory gained?

The most general, negative reply to the first question flows logically from all our books - not Stalin. But discussing his role once more is not excessive. Too many of our countrymen know too little of the truth about the war.

Stalin himself touched upon that problem immediately after the victory. He wanted above all to give his own interpretation of events and at the same time to close, to settle the question, not to give anyone else a chance to explain. On May 24, 1945, he made a toast at a reception in the honor of the troop commanders of the Red Army. This brief speech is filled with profound political significance:

I would like to raise a toast to the health of our Soviet people and first of all to the Russian people... I drink, first of all, to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all nations comprising the Soviet Union.<sup>35</sup>

"The most outstanding nation" and further on "the leading force" and "the leading nation"... Such a point of view was a sensational innovation in the official lexicon. Until then the leading force had always been expressed in

terms of class - the working class and its Party. Now the ruler had proclaimed the superiority of one, the main, people over the others. It was new and unexpected. It was an important change with far-reaching consequences.

Stalin had openly declared his solidarity with Nazi doctrine. The leading nation" is but a translation of the German expression "nation-Fuehrer". The other peoples of the Soviet nation had been pronounced inferior, which encouraged nationalistic prejudice and rubbed salt in recent wounds. The rewriting of history was immediately begun. It was soon discovered that tsarist Russia was not at all the "prison of peoples", as the Bolshheviks had been fond of saying, that the national minorities, who had for so many years resisted the encroachment of the Russian empire, had in fact joined the empire voluntarily. Even the conquest of the Caucasus, so vividly described by Marlinskii, Lermontov, and L. Tolstoi, was said not to have taken place. Dagestan was presented with a holiday to celebrate its union with Russia; Shamil was discovered to be a Turkish spy. The thesis of the superiority of the Russian people also served as a signal for a new anti-Semitic campaign, which was at its worst from 1949 to 1953. The inferior Jews were removed from important positions, driven from scientific, cultural, and ideological institutions, not permitted to enroll in institutes of higher education, slandered as rootless cosmopolitans... The circle closed: the war with fascism, whose banner proclaimed the final solution, ended with the adoption of their anti-Semitic policy in our country.

But that is not all that can be found in the five-minute toast. At the official reception in honor of the victory Stalin also spoke of recent failures, "Our government made more than a few mistakes. We had our moments of despair in 1941-1942 when our army retreated...because there was nothing else we could do." Stalin did not try to analyze his mistakes. He resorted

to a standard rhetorical gambit - he set up a straw man and then easily demolished it. Another people might say to the Government, "You have not met our expectations, get thee gone. We will erect another government which will make peace with Germany and give us peace."

The alternative was transparently false; there could not be peace with the aggressor. It was Stalin himself who had played that suicidal game with Hitler and had tried to make a deal even after the Nazi invasion. There was another solution: to put an honest and capable leadership at the head of the country. But it was not in the Great Leader's interests to discuss that possibility.

Not long before Stalin had paid the Russian people a generous compliment: "...it has a clear mind, a firm character, and patience." By itself such a characterization is meaningless. It can be said of any nation that it has a dull mind and so forth. This was a cruel and capricious mockery. Here the whole point was in the patience: "But the Russian people did not choose that path, because it believed in the rightness of the policies of its Government and chose the path of sacrifice to ensure the defeat of Germany." The tyrant was flushed with the triumph, and still he could not keep from taunting. The Russian people had taken it all with patience: collectivization, famine, the purges, and the right policies, which had led the country into despair.

The final flourish was easy for Stalin: "And that trust of the Russian people for its Soviet government was the decisive force which gave us the historical victory over the enemy of mankind - over fascism."

Oh, how neat. The victory was gained not by the struggle of the people, not by its desperate efforts, not by its sacrifices (we have yet to speak of

its unthinkable enormity), but by its trust in the government, that is, in Stalin. It was clear who had won - Stalin.

Now we will make our own conclusions. The war was won by the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Russians and all the others. Any reference to the exceptional contribution of any one of them is a mockery of the countless graves, in which our soldiers and citizens lie without regard to nationality. Our soldiers at the front, our women, the old men and youths in the rear won the war despite Stalin and his subordinates, whose policies were treason to the Motherland, committed for the most selfish reasons. Our people defended their homes and their land, not Stalin and the yoke of steel he fastened on the necks of the people.

Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Golikov, Kulik, Mekhlis, Molotov, Zhdanov, Beria, and the others like them lost their war, in vain they ruined millions of human lives. Although they decorated themselves with splendid trinkets, that was not their just reward for the peoples' victory. Zhukov and Vasilevskii, who stood at the wheel of the Soviet war machine, have given us their memoirs. It is futile, however, to expect from them an honest evaluation of their own actions or of the policies of their Leader. They are bound with the same chain to Stalin. Stalin has taken them into a dirty, vile, and bloody history. They hoped to the last that history could be cleaned up, white washed, lacquered, and they could remain in it. They found a pair of unattractive features in their Generalissimo, but on the whole they thought of him favorably and respectfully. Because in him they see and judge themselves.<sup>36</sup>

We have but a bit more to say, but it is the most horrifying - about our losses. When we speak of the difficulties of the Soviet Union in the early part of the war, we must not let that conceal the fact that Hitler's attack

was a mad adventure. He counted on beating the Red Army in six weeks. When that failed, and it could not have succeeded, Hitler was lost. We had important advantages on our side (we will take only those that can be realistically evaluated): 1) enormous territory, 2) greater human and material resources, 3) armaments, which were no worse than the German's at the start of the war and superior later on, 4) stronger allies. In a long struggle the weaker enemy would have to capitulate in the end. Consequently, it makes more sense to speak not of the victory itself, which was foreordained by our superiority, but of the cost which was paid for victory. Only in that way can we make an objective judgment of the quality of the country's leadership during the war.

We might expect that the losses which we suffered for victory would at the very worst be equal to the losses of the defeated enemy. We will begin with those. First we will make a brief observation. Usually the statistics of war include as casualties of all those who were somehow lost to the armed forces - killed, wounded, captured, and missing in action. We will be most interested in those who died, who were killed or died of wounds, that is people who were irretrievably lost to the country.

Casualty statistics were well kept in the German army almost to the very end of the war. Here are the figures for the period from September 1, 1939 to April 20, 1945:<sup>37</sup>

Type of casualty	Eastern Front	Western Front	Total
1. killed	1,044,178	156,796	1,201,974
2. wounded	4,122,041	557,510	4,679,551
3. MIA and POW	1,400,646	987,985	2,388,631
All casualties	6,567,465	1,703,291	8,270,756

According to the table, the German army lost 1,200,000 men killed on both fronts, including over one million on the eastern front. But this is not the answer to the question about the numbers killed. Some of the wounded died of their wounds and some of the MIA were also killed. Besides that this table does not include information on the last 18 days of the war, during which the battle for Berlin took place. Almost a million German soldiers took part in that battle.

A complete accounting would bring us close to the figures given in western sources. The German army lost approximately three million men who were killed or who died of wounds. Losses among the civilian population were also approximately three million.

No such detailed Soviet statistics have ever been published. It is said that they simply do not exist. Our sources speak of casualties unwillingly, sparingly, and every time slightly differently. Immediately after the victory it was announced that the USSR's losses in the war totalled six million people. A few years later the figure was made more precise - nine million; somewhat later - ten million. In the fifties a certain colonel of the MGB defected to the west with a secret figure- of twenty million.<sup>38</sup> Official Soviet organs at first disavowed that statistic, but soon began to use it themselves. Khrushchev once said twenty-two million. These figures all refer to total deaths in the army and the civilian population. As many civilians seem to have died as soldiers.

Now we are told that the Red Army lost ten million soldiers and officers. Alas, that is but half the truth. Demographic calculations by a former Soviet professor Kurganov, based on comparisons of the census of 1939 and 1959, yield even more horrifying figures. Total losses - 45 million; in the army - 22 million.<sup>39</sup>

45 and 6, 22 and 3 - such were the ratios of losses borne by the Soviet and German people. The difference in the size of the population of the two countries does not reduce the enormity. Germany sacrificed 8.6% of its population on the altar of war, we - 23%, almost a quarter of the nation. That is the cost of Stalin's genius, of his policies, inalterably right for all times, the cost of destroying the army in peacetime, of unanimous and enthusiastic approval. God, bless Russia! Spare us from such trials and leaders!





## AFTERWORD

Our book has come to its end. We have gathered - fragmentarily, incompletely, as well as we could - material about the sorrowful fate of the Red Army. As best we could we have told of its fall, which was so tragic for the whole country, which drained its lifeblood, which deprived it of millions of its sons and daughters. We have told you again and again: remember the names of the executioners of the army, the destroyers of the Motherland. Now we will tell you something else.

It would be the greatest hypocrisy to lay the whole blame for the greatest bloodbath in the history of Russia and the memory of man on Stalin and Voroshilov, Molotov and Malenkov, Ezhov and Beria, on the yes-men and their inspirers. Such a conclusion would be comforting and soothe our consciences. The most caustic bleach will not whiten the blackness of the evil done by these people. But it is not the whole truth.

There is something not quite right with ourselves. These evil demons did not come from other countries or worlds. They are our countrymen, our brothers, fathers, uncles, our relations, our twins. Let the modern Russian chauvinists console themselves that all of the problems of holy Russia are caused by the ubiquitous Jews, the Georgians, the Catholic Poles, Latvian gunmen. That is explanation enough for the spiritually empty and the born blind. It is not an answer, however, to the anguishing, soul-devouring question; it is only the twisting of primitive thought.

Let us not feel sorry for ourselves. There is a flaw, a worm-hole in our national consciousness. It is hard to describe it in a few words, but primarily it - it is toleration of evil and submissiveness to unjust authority. We accept the deliberate and obvious lies. So it has been, so it will be. . . You can't chop wood with a penknife. Even that is not enough.

Taking it all, getting used to the stench of falsehood, we lose faith in the ability of our own reason, grow deaf to the voice of moral feeling and subordinate our weak wills to the iron decisiveness of the tyrants. Many go further. They find rapture, passion, and ecstasy in the very loss of personality, vision, and reason. It gets so the people devour themselves following the reckless ventures of the leaders. What would Stalin's cannibalistic thoughts have come to if there had not been millions of executors, most of whom did not manage to save their heads. They presented themselves. They came at the first call to do the paranoid's bidding, and dying they blessed him. Hysterically they mourned his death. Despite the unheard of suffering of their country they found cause to boast and swagger. Even after a small part of the truth of Stalin's crimes were revealed, they (we?) remained secret admirers of the fallen Leader.

This tragedy is not simply a page of history, but an open wound in the heart of Russia, the fetters on its soul, the blinders on its eyes. Words of revenge would be out of place. That would not bring back our dead. And whom to take revenge upon, when the organizers and inspirers of the slaughter are already in their honored graves!? The aged Molotov perhaps, or Malenkov, or hundreds of lesser executioners?

To tell the truth about everything, to hide nothing, to clean nothing up - that is our sacred duty. Before the memory of the innocent dead, before our children, before the future of our Motherland. The spiritual rebirth of the country is impossible while evil remains hidden away, unjudged, while the triumphant lie paralyzes our will, devours our soul, and lulls our conscience.

June 11, 1977

Moscow

## APPENDIX

### APPENDIX 1: A LIST OF HIGHER COMMANDERS OF THE RKKA WHO DIED IN THE REPRESSIONS OF 1937-1939.

#### Marshal of the Soviet Union

1. Bliukher, V. K.
2. Egorov, A. I.
3. Tukhachevskii, M. N.

#### Army Commander 1st Class (General of the Army)

4. Belov, I. P.
5. Uborevich, I. P.
6. Iakir, I. E.

#### Army Commissar 1st Class (General of the Army)

7. Gamarnik, Ia. B.

#### Army Commander 2nd Class (Colonel-General)

- |                     |                         |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
| 8. Alksnis, Ia. I.  | 13. Kork, A. I.         |
| 9. Vatsetis, I. I.  | 14. Levandovskii, M. K. |
| 10. Dubovoi, I. N.  | 15. Sediakin, A. I.     |
| 11. Dybenko, P. E.  | 16. Fed'ko, I. F.       |
| 12. Kashirin, N. D. | 17. Khalepskii, I. A.   |

#### Army Commissar 2nd Class (Colonel-General)

- |                        |                         |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 18. Amelin, M. P.      | 26. Landa, M. M.        |
| 19. Aronshtam, L. N.   | 27. Mezis, A. N.        |
| 20. Bulin, A. S.       | 28. Okunev, G. S.       |
| 21. Beklichev, G. I.   | 29. Osepian, G. A.      |
| 22. Grishin, A. S.     | 30. Slavin, I. E.       |
| 23. Gugin, G. I.       | 31. Smirnov, P. A.      |
| 24. Ippo, B. M.        | 32. Shifres, A. A.      |
| 25. Kozhevnikov, S. N. | 32a. Khakhan'ian, G. D. |

#### Corps Commander (Lieutenant-General)

- |                        |                             |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 33. Alafuzo, M. I.     | 39. Vasilenko, M. I.        |
| 34. Appoga, E. F.      | 40. Velikanov, M. D.        |
| 35. Bazilevich, G. D.  | 41. Gai (Bzhishkian), G. D. |
| 36. Batorskii, M. A.   | 42. Gailit, Ia. P.          |
| 37. Bogomiagkov, S. N. | 43. Gar'kavyi, I. I.        |
| 38. Vainer, L. Ia.     | 44. Gekker, A. I.           |

45. Germanovich, M. Ia.
46. Gittis, V. M.
47. Gorbachev, B. S.
48. Gribov, S. E.
49. Griaznov, I. K.
50. Efimov, N. A.
51. Zonberg, Zh. F.
52. Ingaunis, F. A.
53. Kalmykov, M. V.
54. Kovtiukh, E. I.
55. Kosogov, I. D.
56. Krivoruchko, N. N.
57. Kuibyshev, N. V.
58. Kutiaikov, I. S.
59. Lavrov, V. K.
60. Lapin, A. Ia.
61. Levichev, V. N.
62. Lepin, E. D.
63. Lisovskii, N. V.

64. Longva, P. V.
65. Mezheninov, S. A.
66. Mulin, V. M.
67. Petin, N. N.
68. Primakov, V. M.
69. Pugachev, S. A.
70. Putna, V. K.
71. Sangurskii, M. V.
72. Smolin, I. I.
73. Sokolov, V. N.
74. Storozhenko, A. A.
75. Stutska, K. A.
76. Turovskii, S. A.
77. Uritskii, S. P.
78. Fel'dman, B. M.
79. Fesenko, D. S.
80. Khripin, V. V.
81. Chaikovskii, K. A.
82. Eideman, R. P.

#### Corps Commissar (Lieutenant-General)

83. Avinovitskii, Ia. L.
84. Apse, M. Ia.
85. Artuzov, A. Kh.
86. Berezkin, M. F.
87. Berzin, Ia. K.
88. Vitte, A. M.
89. Grinberg, I. M.
90. Gruber, L. Ia.
91. Il'in, N. I.
92. Karin, F. Ia.
93. Nemerzelli, I. F.
94. Neronov, I. G.

95. Orlov, N. I.
96. Petukhov, I. P.
97. Prokov'ev, A. P.
98. Rodionov, F. E.
99. Savko, N. A.
100. Sidorov, K. G.
101. Troianker, B. U.
102. Khorosh, M. L.
103. Shestakov, V. N.
104. Shteinbriuk, O. O.
105. Iartsev, A. P.
106. Iastrebov, G. G.

#### Corps Engineer (Lieutenant General of Engineers)

107. Siniavskii, M. M.

#### Corps Intendant (Lieutenant General)

108. Khil'tsov, A. I.
109. Kosich, D. I.
110. Oshlei, P. M.

#### Corps Physician (Lieutenant General, Medical Services)

111. Baranov, M. I.

#### Corps Veterinarian (Lieutenant General, Medical Services)

112. Nikol'skii, N. M.

Corps Military Jurist (Lieutenant General)

113. Rozovskii, N. P.

Divisional Commander (Major General)

- |                            |                                |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 114. Alksnis, Ia. Ia.      | 158. Ziuz'-Iakovenko, Ia. I.   |
| 115. Andriiashev, L. P.    | 159. Ivanov, Ia. K.            |
| 116. Aplok, Iu. Iu.        | 160. Inno, A. A.               |
| 117. Artemenko, N. F.      | 161. Kazanskii, E. S.          |
| 118. Artem'ev, K. P.       | 162. Kakurin, N. E.            |
| 119. Atoian, A. T.         | 163. Kapulovskii, I. D.        |
| 120. Bakshi, M. M.         | 164. Karklin, I. I.            |
| 121. Balakirev, A. F.      | 165. Karpov, M. P.             |
| 122. Belitskii, S. M.      | 166. Kassin, G. I.             |
| 123. Belyi, S. O.          | 167. Kariagin, G. B.           |
| 124. Berggol'ts, A. I.     | 168. Kaufel'dt, F. P.          |
| 125. Bergstrem, V. K.      | 169. Kviatek, K. F.            |
| 126. Blazhevich, I. F.     | 170. Kil'vein, G. Ia.          |
| 127. Blomberg, Zh. K.      | 171. Kniagnitskii, P. E.       |
| 128. Bobrov, B. I.         | 172. Kozhevnikov, A. T.        |
| 129. Bobrov, N. M.         | 173. Kozitskii, A. D.          |
| 130. Bokis, G. G.          | 174. Kol'sheiko, F. A.         |
| 131. Bondar', G. I.        | 175. Korolev, D. K.            |
| 132. Borisenko, A. N.      | 176. Kotov, N. Ia.             |
| 133. Brianskikh, P. A.     | 177. Kokhanskii, V. S.         |
| 134. Buachidze, F. M.      | 178. Kuk, A. I.                |
| 135. Bukshtynovich, M. F.  | 179. Kutateladze, G. N.        |
| 136. Burichenkov, G. A.    | 180. Kychinskii, D. A.         |
| 137. Butyrskii, V. P.      | 181. Lazarevich, M. S.         |
| 138. Vakulich, P. I.       | 182. Laur, Zh. I.              |
| 139. Vasil'ev, F. V.       | 183. Lopatin, V. N.            |
| 140. Ventsov-Krants, S. I. | 184. Maksimov, I. F.           |
| 141. Vizirov, G. M.        | 185. Maslov, K. V.             |
| 142. Vol'pe, A. M.         | 186. Mednikov, M. L.           |
| 143. Garf, V. E.           | 187. Melik-Shakhnazarov, A. P. |
| 144. Germonius, V. E.      | 188. Murzin, D. K.             |
| 145. Golovkin, V. G.       | 189. Neiman, K. A.             |
| 146. Gorbunov, M. Iu.      | 190. Nikitin, S. V.            |
| 147. Goriachev, E. I.      | 191. Nikiforov, L. I.          |
| 148. Grigor'ev, P. P.      | 192. Nikonov, A. M.            |
| 149. Grushetskii, V. F.    | 193. Ovchinnikov, G. I.        |
| 150. Davidovskii, Ia. L.   | 194. Ol'shanskii, M. M.        |
| 151. Dannenberg, E. E.     | 195. Ol'shevskii, F. I.        |
| 152. Demichev, M. A.       | 196. Pavlov, A. V.             |
| 153. Derevtsov, S. I.      | 197. Pashkovskii, K. K.        |
| 154. Dikalov, E. P.        | 198. Peremytov, A. M.          |
| 155. Dobrovol'skii, V. P.  | 199. Poga, Zh. Ia.             |
| 156. Zamilatskii, G. S.    | 200. Pogrebnoi, V. S.          |
| 157. Zinov'ev, I. Z.       | 201. Pokus, Ia. Z.             |

202. Rakitin, N. V.
203. Raudmets, I. I.
204. Rink, I. A.
205. Rogalev, F. F.
206. Rogovskii, N. M.
207. Rokhi, V. Iu.
208. Rubinov, Ia. G.
209. Sablin, Iu. V.
210. Savitskii, S. M.
211. Savchenko, S. N.
212. Sazontov, A. Ia.
213. Svechin, A. A.
214. Semenov, N. G.
215. Serdich, D. F.
216. Sergeev, E. N.
217. Sidorenko, V. S.
218. Sokolov-Sokolovskii, P. L.
219. Sollogub, N. V.
220. Stepanov, V. A.
221. Stepanov, M. O.
222. Tal'kovskii, A. A.
223. Tarasenko, V. V.
224. Tarasov, A. I.
225. Testov, S. V.
226. Tkalun, P. P.
227. Tomashevich, I. A.
228. Tochenov, N. I.
229. Trizna, D. D.
230. Tukhareli, G. A.
231. Uvarov, N. M.
232. Ushakov, K. P.
233. Fedotov, A. V.
234. Firsov, D. S.
235. Florovskii, I. D.
236. Khoroshilov, I. Ia.
237. Chernobrovin, S. A.
238. Shalimo, M. N.
239. Sharskov, I. F.
240. Sheko, Ia. V.
241. Shirokii, I. F.
242. Shmidt, D. A.
243. Shcheglov, N. V.
244. Iushkevich, V. A.
245. Antonov, M. A.
246. Bal'chenko, R. L.
247. Barger, M. P.
248. Bauzer, F. D.
249. Blaushvili, N. K.
250. Bogdanov, P. P.
251. Boitsov, D. P.
252. Borovich, Ia. A.
253. Bocharov, L. P.
254. Vaineros, I. D.
255. Genin, Ia. F.
256. Gladyshev, N. Ia.
257. Gorin, G. I.
258. Gornostaev, I. M.
259. Zaitsev, V. E.
260. Zel'dovich, M. E.
261. Zemskov, S. I.
262. Zil'bert, L. I.
263. Zinov'ev, G. A.
264. Ivanov, S. E.
265. Indrikson, Ia. G.
266. Isaenko, M. G.
267. Kavalers, P. E.
268. Kal'pus, B. A.
269. Kamenskii, P. G.
270. Kolotilov, V. N.
271. Konovalov, V. F.
272. Kropachev, A. M.
273. Lavrov, M. V.
274. Levenzon, F. Ia.
275. Markov, G. N.
276. Min'chuk, A. I.
277. Mirovitskii, P. V.
278. Mustafin, I. A.
279. Nevraev, G. F.
280. Ozol, V. K.
281. Padarin, N. I.
282. Pismanik, G. E.
283. Plau, D. D.
284. Rabinovich, I. Iu.
285. Rabinovich, S. Z.
286. Rittel', G. I.
287. Saakov, O. A.
288. Safronov, I. V.
289. Svinkin, I. A.
290. Serpukhovitin, V. V.
291. Simonov, M. E.
292. Skortsov, S. A.
293. Slavin, M. E.
294. Slavinskii, K. E.
295. Smolenskii, Ia. L.
296. Sokolenko, F. N.
297. Suslov, P. V.
298. Tarutinskii, A. V.
299. Udilov, P. S.
300. Usatenko, A. V.
301. Fel'dman, P. M.
302. Kharitonov, Kh. Kh.
303. Khromenko, A. N.
304. Tsarev, Ia. T.
305. Shimanovskii, G. S.

306. Shchegolev, L. I.  
307. Iung, N. A.

308. Iakubovskii, L. G.

Divisional Engineer (Major-General-Engineer)

309. Aksenov, A. M.  
310. Andreev, E. S.  
311. Bandin, A. P.  
312. Barkalov, E. A.

313. Bordovskii, S. V.  
314. Konnert, V. S.  
315. Polischuk, K. E.  
316. Potapov, G. Kh.

Divisional Intendant (Major-General)

317. Ankudinov, I. Ia.  
318. Bakov, P. G.  
319. Bekker, S. I.  
320. Vanag, A. Ia.  
321. Gorshkov, V. S.  
322. Gur'ev, K. P.  
323. Dzydza, G. A.  
324. Zuev, N. N.  
325. Ivanov, B. N.

326. Kniazev, P. G.  
327. Kurkov, P. I.  
328. Maksimov, S. M.  
329. Matson-Krashinskii, O. P.  
330. Peterson, R. A.  
331. Proshkin, I. G.  
332. Sokolov, A. M.  
333. Stan'kovskii, N. V.  
334. Fedorov, V. F.

Divisional Physician (Major-General, Medical Service)

335. Kiuchariants, A. G.

336. Rainer, B. A.

Divisional Veterinarian (Major-General, Medical Service)

337. Vlasov, N. M.

338. Petukhovskii, A. A.

Brigade Commander (Brigadier General)\*

339. Agladze, L. M.  
340. Alekseev, P. G.  
341. Alekhin, E. S.  
342. Andrianov, N. G.  
343. Androsiuk, N. I.  
344. Antonov, P. I.  
345. Arsen'ev, B. N.  
346. Ausem-Orlov, V. V.  
347. Afonskii, V. L.  
348. Bazhanov, N. N.  
349. Bazenkov, B. I.  
350. Balabin, B. N.  
351. Batenin, V. N.  
352. Bakhrushin, A. M.  
353. Bebris, I. G.  
354. Blium, I. E.  
355. Blium, N. Ia.  
356. Bolotkov, M. I.  
357. Bondariuk, G. M.  
358. Borisov, A. B.

359. Buzanov, D. I.  
360. Biuler, V. A.  
361. Vainerkh, D. A.  
362. Vasil'chenko, N. N.  
363. Vasnetsovich, V. K.  
364. Varfolomeev, N. E.  
365. Vishnerevskii, V. A.  
366. Volkov, G. D.  
367. Voronokov, V. M.  
368. Viazemskii, M. F.  
369. Gavrichenko, F. N.  
370. Gavriushenko, G. F.  
371. Genin, V. M.  
372. Glagolev, V. P.  
373. Golikov, A. G.  
374. Gorev, V. E.  
375. Gorshkov, B. N.  
376. Goffe, A. I.  
377. Gravin, N. M.  
378. Grachev, V. G.



379. Grechanik, A. I.
380. Grosberg, I. K.
381. Grudiae, P. I.
382. Gudkov, D. I.
383. Gus'kov, N. F.
384. Daniliuk, G. S.
385. Dashichev, I. F.
386. Dobrolezh, A. G.
387. Dotol', F. K.
388. Dragilev, V. G.
389. Drozdov, A. K.
390. D'iakov, V. A.
391. Evdokimov, Ia. K.
392. Evseev, N. F.
393. Egorov, N. G.
394. Emel'nov, P. V.
395. Zhabin, N. I.
396. Zhivin, N. I.
397. Zhigur, Ia. M.
398. Zhitov, A. A.
399. Zhorkov, V. A.
400. Zaitsev, A. S.
401. Zaks, Ia. E.
402. Zalevskii, A. I.
403. Zaporozhchenko, M. I.
404. Zakhoder, V. N.
405. Zubok, A. E.
406. Zybin, S. P.
407. Ivanov, S. I.
408. Ignatov, N. G.
409. Igneus-Matson, E. G.
410. Ikonostasov, V. M.
411. Kagan, M. A.
412. Kal'van, I. I.
413. Kaptsevich, G. A.
414. Karev, G. S.
415. Karmaliuk, F. F.
416. Kartaev, L. V.
417. Kasinov, S. M.
418. Kevlishvili, P. G.
419. Keiris, R. I.
420. Kirichenko, I. G.
421. Kiselev, M. F.
422. Kit-Vaitenko, I. P.
423. Klein-Burzin, V. A.
424. Klement'ev, V. G.
425. Klocho, I. G.
426. Kliava, K. Iu.
427. Kovalev, D. M.
428. Kozlovskii, V. N.
429. Kolesnichenko, M. Ia.
430. Koltunov, I. S.
431. Kolchuk, F. S.
432. Konovalov, L. I.
433. Korobov, I. A.
434. Korchits, V. V.
435. Kosiakin, V. V.
436. Kosmatov, A. V.
437. Kruk, I. M.
438. Kuzmmichev, B. I.
439. Kuznetsov, I. I.
440. Kunitskii, I. F.
441. Kushakov, V. A.
442. Labas, A. A.
443. Lavinovskikh, B. Ia.
444. Lakovnikov, P. I.
445. Lapchinskii, A. N.
446. Lakhinskii, K. K.
447. Letskii, G. I.
448. Lunev, D. D.
449. Lunev, P. M.
450. Lukin, E. D.
451. Liubimov, V. V.
452. Mager, M. P.
453. Magon, E. Ia.
454. Malovskii, A. D.
455. Malofeev, V. I.
456. Malyshev, A. K.
457. Malyshenkov, G. F.
458. Malyshkin, V. F.
459. Mamonov, P. D.
460. Markevich, N. L.
461. Martynovskii, S. L.
462. Marchenko, P. G.
463. Matuzenko, A. I.
464. Makhrov, N. S.
465. Medvedev, M. E.
466. Medianskii, M. S.
467. Meier, A. P.
468. Mernov, V. I.
469. Meshkov, A. T.
470. Miliunas, I. A.
471. Mironov, A. M.
472. Mishuk, N. I.
473. Mozolevskii, V. A.
474. Molodtsov, P. P.
475. Mosin, A. N.
476. Muev, D. D.
477. Murtazin, M. L.
478. Nakhichevanskii, D. D.
479. Neborak, A. A.
480. Nesterovskii, N. A.
481. Nikulin, I. E.
482. Obysov, S. P.

483. Ogorodnikov, F. E.  
 484. Orlov, A. G.  
 485. Ostrovskii, A. I.  
 486. Pavlov, P. A.  
 487. Pavlovskii, V. I.  
 488. Pavlovskii, K. V.  
 489. Petrenko-Lunev, S. V.  
 490. Petrov, M. I.  
 491. Petrov, M. O.  
 492. Petrusevich, B. V.  
 493. Podshivalov, V. I.  
 494. Podshivalov, I. M.  
 495. Pozniakov, S. V.  
 496. Polunov, M. L.  
 497. Poliakov, V. I.  
 498. Poliakov, N. S.  
 499. Polianskii, N. A.  
 500. Potanepko, P. R.  
 501. Prokopchuk, N. A.  
 502. Rataush, R. K.  
 503. Rachinskii, N. I.  
 504. Reztsov, V. I.  
 505. Rozyenko, A. F.  
 506. Rosman, I. D.  
 507. Rudenko, D. M.  
 508. Rudinskii, N. S.  
 509. Rulev, P. P.  
 510. Rybakov, M. A.  
 511. Rybkin, P. D.  
 512. Ryzhenkov, M. M.  
 513. Samoilov, I. Ia.  
 514. Satin, A. I.  
 515. Svechnikov, M. S.  
 516. Selivanov, V. V.  
 517. Semenov, N. A.  
 518. Seredin, V. P.  
 519. Serpukrylov, M. S.  
 520. Skulachenko, A. E.  
 521. Smirnov, S. S.  
 522. Sokolov, A. D.  
 523. Sokolov, A. N.  
 524. Sokolov, G. I.  
 525. Sokolov-Strakhov, K. I.

526. Solomatin, M. D.  
 527. Sonin, K. A.  
 528. Sorokin, Ia. V.  
 529. Stakhanskii, N. M.  
 530. Stoilov, A. G.  
 531. Suleiman, N. A.  
 532. Suslov, A. A.  
 533. Scheskulevich, A. S.  
 534. Sysoev, P. V.  
 535. Tantlevskii, E. B.  
 536. Tarnovskii-Tarletskii, A. M.  
 537. Titov, A. P.  
 538. Tikhomirov, E. M.  
 539. Tikhomirov, P. P.  
 540. Tishchenko, Z. P.  
 541. Tkachev, M. L.  
 542. Tolkachev, F. A.  
 543. Trifonov, A. P.  
 544. Trukhanov, N. F.  
 545. Turchak, V. M.  
 546. Tylytn', A. M.  
 547. Ulasevich, S. A.  
 548. Ul'man, Zh. K.  
 549. Fedin, A. T.  
 550. Fedorov, N. F.  
 551. Fesenko, P. G.  
 552. Fogel', I. I.  
 553. Fokin, I. V.  
 554. Tsiemgal, A. I.  
 555. Chernov, F. M.  
 556. Chernozatonskii, L. N.  
 557. Chernyi, I. I.  
 558. Cherniavskii, M. L.  
 559. Shafranskii, I. O.  
 560. Shashkin, V. V.  
 561. Sheideman, E. S.  
 562. Shipov, V. F.  
 563. Shmai-Kreitsberg, A. I.  
 564. Shoshkin, M. A.  
 565. Shuvalikov, V. V.  
 566. Iakimov, M. M.  
 567. Iakimov, M. P.  
 568. Iakubov, R. A.

#### Brigade Engineer\*

569. Aleksandrov, V. V.  
 570. Alliluev, P. S.  
 571. Argentov, A. A.  
 572. Bruevich, N. G.  
 573. Venttsel', D. A.  
 574. Geveling, N. V.

575. Gruzdup, A. Kh.  
 576. Dem'ianovskii, V. V.  
 577. Zhelezniakov, Ia. M.  
 578. Zhukov, L. I.  
 589. Zhukovskii, I. P.  
 590. Zhukovskii, N. I.

581. Zemskii, B. M.  
582. Isakov, K. V.  
583. Iudin, S. D.  
584. Kozlov, S. G.  
585. Kokadeev, A. N.  
586. Lastochkin, A. F.  
587. Lilienfel'd, A. E.  
588. Maksimov, N. A.  
589. Mogilevkin, V. N.  
590. Novikov, L. V.  
591. Ogloblin, A. P.

592. Pavlov, I. S.  
593. Petrov, O. D.  
594. Sakrier, I. F.  
595. Saravaiskii, S. A.  
596. Sviridov, V. D.  
597. Stepanov, Iu. A.  
598. Faivush, Ia. A.  
599. Fedorov, I. A.  
600. Khandrikov, V. P.  
601. Kheil', I. G.  
602. Shapiro, S. G.

Brigade Intendant\*

603. Abol, E. F.  
604. Blinov, S. V.  
605. Buznikov, A. D.  
606. Vitkovskii, P. P.  
607. Gludin, I. I.  
608. Evtushenko, N. N.  
609. Zafran, I. I.  
610. Kalinin, S. I.  
611. Klatovskii, N. A.

612. Kupriukhin, A. M.  
613. Pevzner, I. B.  
614. Pertsovskii, Z. D.  
615. Petrovich, N. G.  
616. Pretter, K. A.  
617. Satterup, D. V.  
618. Trukhanin, M. Z.  
619. Chibar', Ia. A.  
620. Shchetinin, P. A.

\*There is no such rank in the Soviet Armed forces now. When the new rank nomenclature was introduced in 1940, those brigade commanders who had escaped the repressions received the title of major-general. A few of the brigade commanders who returned from the camps (Isserson, G. S., Tsal'kovich, I. M., et al.) were made colonels.

## APPENDIX II

### A LIST OF HIGHER NAVAL COMMANDERS WHO DIED IN THE REPRESSIONS OF 1937-1939

#### Flagman of the Fleet 1st Class (Admiral of the Fleet)

- |                    |                 |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| 1. Viktorov, M. V. | 2. Orlov, V. M. |
|--------------------|-----------------|

#### Flagman of the Fleet 2nd Class (Admiral)

- |                    |                     |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| 3. Kozhanov, I. K. | 4. Muklevich, R. A. |
|--------------------|---------------------|

#### Flagman 1st Class (Vice-Admiral)

- |                            |                           |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 5. Dushenov, K. I.         | 8. Ludri, I. M.           |
| 6. Kadatskii-Rudnev, I. N. | 9. Pantserzhanskii, E. S. |
| 7. Kireev, G. P.           |                           |

#### Flagman 2nd Class (Rear-Admiral)

- |                         |                       |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| 10. Vasil'ev, A. V.     | 15. Ozolin, Ia. I.    |
| 11. Vasil'ev, G. V.     | 16. Samborskii, E. K. |
| 12. Vinogradskii, G. G. | 17. Sivkov, A. K.     |
| 13. Galkin, G. P.       | 18. Smirnov, P. I.    |
| 14. Isakov, D. P.       |                       |

#### Flagman - Engineer 2nd Class (Rear-Admiral, Engineer)

19. Aliakrinskii, N. V.

#### Flagman - Engineer 3rd Class\*

- |                               |                          |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 20. Antsipo-Chikunskii, L. V. | 26. Miroshkin, A. F.     |
| 21. Brykin, A. E.             | 27. Motornyi, I. D.      |
| 22. Vasil'ev, V. V.           | 28. Platonov, A. P.      |
| 23. Gorbunov, N. I.           | 29. Posazhennikov, A. D. |
| 24. Gorshkov, V. A.           | 30. Rashevich, F. K.     |
| 25. Messer, P. V.             | 31. Khait, N. M.         |

\*This corresponds to the brigade level of the land forces. See note above to Appendix I.



### APPENDIX III

#### A LIST OF HIGHER COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL WHO WERE FREED AND REHABILITATED AFTER THE JUNE PLENUM OF THE TsK of 1957

Name	Rank at the time of arrest	Rank after rehabilitation
1. Todorskii, A. I.	Corps commander	Lieutenant general
2. Govorukhin, T. K.	Corps commissar	Major general
3. Fishman, Ia. M.	Corps engineer	Major general, engineer
4. Mel'kumov, Ia. A.	Division commander	Colonel
5. Kolosov, P. I.	Division commissar	Major general
6. Isserson, G. S.	Brigade commander	Colonel
7. Iungmeister, V. A.	Brigade commander	Colonel
8. Tsal'kovich, I. M.	Brigade engineer	Colonel, engineer

#### NOTES

To appendices I and II. These lists were made, primarily, by comparing official lists of military promotions published in 1935 and 1940. Because it is impossible at the present to conduct a thorough check, it is possible that there is some inaccuracy at the brigade level.

To appendix III. The list is incomplete. There should be approximately fifteen men in this category, but we were not able to confirm the others.

There was also a large group of commanders, who were repressed but freed before the war and participated in combat action. Among them were Marshal K. K. Rokossovskii, General of the Army A. V. Gorbato, Lieutenant Generals L. G. Petrovskii, and G. D. Stel'makh, and others; altogether 70 men.



#### APPENDIX IV.

#### NAUM ETTINGON

Information about Naum Iakovlevich Ettingon is laughably scarce. Nonetheless he was an amazing man. For many years until the end of the thirties he was the principle organizer of diversions for the NKVD in the West.

Of Ettingon's origins we know only that "his father founded a hospital in Leipzig. A street is named after him there. At his death he left his sons twenty million marks."<sup>1</sup> There were two sons.

Mark Ettingon was a psychiatrist, a student of Sigmund Freud, and a friend of princess Maria Bonaparte. For many years he was the generous patron of Nadezhda Plevitskaia. She said at her trial that "he dressed me from head to foot." He financed the publication of her two autobiographical books.<sup>2</sup> It is unlikely he did so only for the love of Russian music. It is more likely that he acted as messenger and finance agent for his brother Naum.

Naum Ettingon began to work for the Cheka during the civil war. There is some evidence that he recruited Plevitskaia in the summer of 1919. The singer was then performing in Odessa, where she established close contact with the top local Soviet leadership. Together with the popular vaudeville singer, Iza Kremer, she frequently participated in carouses in the building of the military commandant's office. She bestowed her favors on the assistant military commandant Shul'ga.

In the thirties Naum Ettingon pulled the strings for many (possibly all) of the NKVD's foreign diversions particularly the kidnappings of General Kutepov, General Miller, and Trotskii's grandson. He lived continuously abroad, where trade in Soviet furs in London served as his cover. Naum Ettingon stood at the helm of the NKVD's diversion machine and pressed its



many buttons but managed to remain unnoticed. It is interesting that among the many publications on the activities of Soviet intelligence in the Russian emigre press his name is not mentioned. His brother was not quite so lucky. At Plevitskaia's trial it was established that Mark Ettingon had been in Paris in September 1937 and had left on the 20th, only two days before the kidnapping of General Miller. Skoblin and Plevitskaia accompanied him to the station. He left for Florence and from there to Palestine.

The last of Ettingon's large and famous operations was the murder of L. Trotskii. After that he was recalled to Moscow but, unlike many of his colleagues in the NKVD, not to be killed. Ettingon was taken directly from the station to the Kremlin for an audience with Stalin at which Beria was present. He was given the order of Lenin due him, but that was not all. Stalin was exceptionally friendly. He embraced Ettingon and swore that as long as he, Stalin, lived, not a single hair would fall from Ettingon's head.

Ettingon was appointed Deputy Chief of the Main Intelligence Administration of the General Staff. He remained in that position for more than ten years and continued to work in his specialty - he directed diversions, but now from Moscow. In the late forties and early fifties his superior, General Sudoplatov, received complaints that Ettingon had reverted to old habits, was taking too much on himself and acting beyond the limits of his authority. It is quite possible that Ettingon was too independent and did not pick up on new trends in Soviet diversionary policy. But it must be remembered that this was a time of active anti-Semitism when many Jews were removed from responsible positions.

Sudoplatov ignored the signals he was getting for as long as he could. He apparently considered Ettingon expert at his work and trusted him implicitly. Furthermore it would not have been discreet to touch Stalin's protege. In

1952 Ettingon's enemies reached Stalin and presented Ettingon's activities in an unfavorable light. Stalin ordered that Ettingon be removed from his position but did not say anything more about his further fate. It did not happen like that often, but it did happen.

The MGB, lacking precise instructions, did not risk leaving Ettingon at large, but neither did they dare lock him up. They stashed him at a special dacha outside Moscow where he lived in complete comfort and strict isolation - no visitors, no papers, no radio.<sup>3</sup>

After Stalin's death Ettingon was not immediately dealt with. There was much else to do. 1953 was taken up with the liquidation of Beria and his henchmen, and also with the reorganization of the MVD-MGB. But then it was our hero's turn. The investigator of the Procuracy of the USSR called him in for interrogation. Ettingon tried to pretend that he was just an old, sick man with nothing important to say. When the investigator convinced him that he would not tolerate his playing the fool, Ettingon sadly commented, "Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin has died."

"What does Stalin have to do with this?"

"Iosif Vissarionovich once promised that while he lived not a hair would fall from my head. The way you talk to me I know that comrade Stalin is no longer among the living." Ettingon was tried and sentenced to twelve years in prison. Apparently they saw some violations of socialist legality in his activities. More likely they got him as a supporter of Beria. That was at the end of 1953 or in the very beginning of 1954.

Ettingon served his twelve years and returned to Moscow. He was met at the station with flowers and champagne by a group of former colleagues. They had prepared a pleasant surprise for him - an order for a room in Moscow.

Not long after the engaging old man went to work for the publishing house "Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga" (International Book). The new editor knew five or six languages, but he did not write about himself in any of them.

Nothing more is known about the fate of Ettingon.

<sup>1</sup> From the testimony of Leonid Raigorodskii at the trial of Plevitskaia in Paris. B. Prianichnikov, op. cit., p. 353. The family name is spelled differently in this source - Eitingon. Concerning the twenty million marks: even if the witness were right about the sum, the fantastic inflation in Germany in the twenties would have made the money worth very little.

<sup>2</sup> See I. Nest'ev, Zvezdy russkoi estrady (Moscow: Sovetskii kompositor, 1970).

<sup>3</sup> So Ezhov had lived in 1939, and Abakumov in 1951-1954.

## FOOTNOTES



## Footnotes - Chapter 1

<sup>1</sup>Ed. I. F. Gornostaev and Ia. M. Bugoslavskii, Po Moskve i eia okrestnostiam. Putovoditel'- spravochnik dlia turista i moskvicha (Moscow, 1903), p. 183.

<sup>2</sup>Ed. Ivan Timofeevich Kokorev, Moskva sorokovykh godov, ocherki i povesti o Moskve XIX veka (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1959), p. 73.

<sup>3</sup>Osoaviakhim is a syllabic acronym for the Society of the Promotion of Defense and Aero-Chemical Development, a Soviet paramilitary organization established in 1927 to train civilians in skills useful in time of war.

<sup>4</sup>Ed. Vsia Moskva v karmane (Moscow, 1926), p. 63.

<sup>5</sup>Ed. Andrei Ianiuaevich Vyshinskii played the role of chief prosecutor in the purge trials. See below, chapters 19 & 20.

<sup>6</sup>Apparently they tried to observe a Russian state tradition. This is how Nicholas I dealt with the condemned Decembrists: "The sentence was carried out furtively...on the glacis of the fortress where there was an illusion of justice and under the cover of suddenly gathered troops...Relatives were forbidden to take the bodies of the hanged men: at night they threw them into a pit, covered them with quicklime, and on the next day publicly thanked God that they had spilled their blood." Ed. See Mikhail Lunin, Sochineniia (New York: Khronika, 1976).



## Footnotes - Chapter 2

<sup>1</sup>Ed. Tukhachevskii, Novye voprosy voiny. Three chapters of this unpublished work were published in Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh trudakh, 1917-1940 (Moscow: Voennoe izd-vo, 1965), pp. 116-144.

<sup>2</sup>Ed. Tukhachevskii, Voennye plany nyneshnei Germanii (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1935).

<sup>3</sup>Ed. Norbert Wiener, The human use of human beings; cybernetics and society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950). This was translated into Russian as Kibernetika i obshchestvo.

<sup>4</sup>Tukhachevskii, "Kharakter prigranichnikh srazhenii". Ed. This is an unpublished work.

<sup>5</sup>Ed. A. I. Todorskii in Marshal Tukhachevskii (Moscow: Izd-vo Politicheskoi literatury, 1963), pp. 89-90; G. Isserson, "Zapiski sovremennika o M. N. Tukhachevskom", Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 4 (1963): 64-78.

<sup>6</sup>Hitler never did understand that he had an ally in Poland. On November 10, 1937, a year after the Kremlin war games, he announced at a meeting of the political and military leaders of Germany, "If Czechoslovakia is destroyed and border between Germany and Hungary is established, then we can expect that Poland would remain neutral in case we go to war with France...If Germany is unsuccessful, we can expect Poland to move against Eastern Prussia, and maybe against Pomerania and Silesia as well." Ed. See "Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlia komandovaniia!" Strategii fashistskoi Germanii v voine protiv SSR. Dokumenty i materialy, edited by N. G. Pavlenko (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), pp. 58-59.




<sup>7</sup>Ed. Isserson, "Zapiski sovremennika", pp. 64-78.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

## Footnotes - Chapter 3

None



#### Footnotes - Chapter 4

<sup>1</sup>Ed. Cited in K. E. Voroshilov, "Stalin i Krasnaia Armiia" Pravda December 21, 1929.

<sup>2</sup>Ed. The authors found this citation in Soviet archives of the Red Army.

<sup>3</sup>Ed. Voroshilov, "Stalin i Krasnaia Armiia".

<sup>4</sup>Ed. P. N. Krasnov, Ot dvuglavago orla k krasnomu знамени, 1894-1921 (Berlin, 1921). This was translated into English as Krasnoff, From the two-headed eagle to the red flag, 1894-1921 (n.p.p., 1923).



## Footnotes - Chapter 6

<sup>1</sup>Ed. Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny, 1918-1921, edited by A. S. Bubnov, S. S. Kamenev, M. N. Tukhachevskii, and R. P. Eideman (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izd-vo, 1930), vol. 3, p. 261.

<sup>2</sup>Later I. S. Kutiakov, who commanded the 25th "Chapaev" Infantry Division on the Polish Front, together with N. M. Khlebnokov wrote Kievskie Kanny, in which they explained how the 3rd Polish Army escaped encirclement and destruction. Kutiakov showed the book to People's Commissar Vroshilov in 1937. Not long thereafter he was arrested and killed. This manuscript has not been published.

<sup>3</sup>Ed. This quote has not been verified. Lenin said something very similar at the September 1920 Party Conference. "Our army's approach to Warsaw irrefutably proved that the center of the whole system of world imperialism, resting on the Versailles treaty, lies somewhere near to it." Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny (1930), vol. 3, p. 396.

<sup>4</sup>Even Stalin admitted this in "K voprosu o strategii i taktike russkikh kommunistov". Despite that until the Second World War the thesis that the proletariat of countries at war with the Soviet Union would support the Red Army remained a basic part of Soviet military doctrine. It also penetrated deeply into popular consciousness. Ed. Stalin's article is available in English as "Concerning the question of the strategy and tactics of the Russian communists" Works (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1954), vol. 5, pp. 163-183.

<sup>5</sup>See his Pokhod za Vislu (Moscow: Voennoe izd-vo, 1923). It does not necessarily follow however, that had there not been problems in the First Horse, that Warsaw would have been taken and Poland defeated. Our description

concerns only operational conditions. A higher analysis would have to consider that the whole military and, especially, economic might of the Entente stood at Poland's back. Lenin openly called the failure of the Polish campaign a political miscalculation. Concerning the purely military aspect of the campaign he once said, "Who do you know who goes to Warsaw through L'vov...?"

<sup>6</sup>Ed. According to the authors, this is derived from a 1933 brochure, Klim Voroshilov, written by a certain Orlovskii.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

## Footnotes - Chapter 7

<sup>1</sup>Official propaganda is not concerned, understandably, with historical accuracy. In the late 1960's a memorial was erected on the site of the battle for Kakhovka, celebrated in song and poetry, a memorial in the form of a machine gun cart, which immediately brings to mind an image of the First Horse. But at the time of that battle - July 1920 - it was fighting on the Polish Front hundreds of versts from Kakhovka. The victory was won by infantry units of the Lettish, 3rd, 46th, and 52nd divisions. One might suppose that the machine gun cart belonged to Makhno's army, but the insurgent army came over to the Reds' side only in October.

<sup>2</sup>Ed. V. V. Lushenkin, Vtoraia Konnaia (pending)

<sup>3</sup>Ed. Sergei Starikov and Roy Medvedev, Philip Mironov and the Russian Civil War, translated by Guy Daniels (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

<sup>4</sup>It is usual to trace the lineage of the Cossacks from runaway peasants. L. N. Gumilev thinks, however, that on the Don before that there were settlements of surviving Khazars, who along with others lay the foundation stone for the Cossack tribe. After the final conquest of the Don during the reign of Peter I, runaways continued to find refuge there, but they were not taken in by the Cossacks. Thus arose the population of non-Cossacks (inogorodnie). Later former serfs of local serf-owners joined the non-Cossacks.

<sup>5</sup>Ed. Mikhail Sholokhov, And Quiet Flows the Don, translated by Stephen Garry (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941).

<sup>6</sup>Chairman of the Donbiuro Syrtsov instructed after the Veshensk rebellion had begun, "For every Red armyman and revolutionary committee member killed shoot one hundred Cossacks. Prepare staging areas to send the entire



male population from 18 to 55 inclusive to forced labor in Voronezh guberniia, Pavlovsk and other place. Order the convoy guards to shoot five for every [Cossack] who escapes. Require the Cossacks to watch out for one another by a system of mutual guarantee."

<sup>7</sup>During the civil war 48,409 former officers served in the Red Army. Altogether at the end of the war there were 130,000 commanders in the RKKA. See A. M. Iovlev and D. A. Voropaev, Bor'ba kommunisticheskoi partii za sozdanie voennykh kadrov (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1955) p. 18. The overwhelming majority of combat officers from the battalion level on up were tsarist officers. At headquarters level it goes without saying.

<sup>8</sup>Interestingly, when Rosenberg was in Iaroslavl in 1918, he tried to join the Russian Communist Party. He did not succeed because, as a student from a bourgeois family in the Baltic region, he did not know anyone, and he had not shown himself to be a revolutionary. What else would he do but travel to Germany and join another party?

## Footnotes - Chapter 8

<sup>1</sup>Ed. General Aleksei Andreevich Arakcheev (1769-1834), a favorite of Emperor Alexander I, is remembered for his severity of manner and strict discipline.

<sup>2</sup>Today the course and the content of the discussion seems a farce. Trotskii and his ally, Bukharin, openly demanded that the unions be turned into a weapon for the repression of the working class, leaving workers no means with which to defend themselves from the state, which was to become the master of all factories and plants. Lenin and Zinov'ev agreed in principle with this approach (in a resolution offered by Lenin and accepted by the Central Committee the formula "healthy forms of the militarization of labor" was approved), but they insisted on more careful public phraseology ("trade unions are schools of communism"). The "workers' opposition" decried the unbearably hard conditions of the proletariat and the massive exodus of workers from the party, and demanded the transfer of all authority in industry to trade union functionaries in the All-Russian Congress of Producers. Among the leaders of the "workers' opposition" the tone was set by former proletarians Shliapnikov, Kutuzov, and Medvedev, together with a daughter of a tsarist general, Aleksandra Kollontai. In the heat of their polemics they insisted on the domination of the intelligentsia in the Party. At times they spoke even more candidly and said Jews. Not surprisingly the groups headed by Lenin and Trotskii were able to find a common language and put up a common front. Shliapnikov's group earned the epithets "Marxist apostates" and "anarcho-syndicalists". They were routed at the 10th Congress. All that is left of their venture are the sham workers' councils in Yugoslavia.

<sup>3</sup>All of these startling documents are published. See Direktivy komandovaniia frontov Krasnoi Armii, 1917-1922 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), vol. 3, 508-509. The order referred to in the radio appeal for surrender has not been published. Did it ever exist?

<sup>4</sup>Ed. See V.V. Maiakovskii, Sochineniia v trekh tomakh (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia Literatura, 1965), vol.3, 332-333. That section of the poem begins, "The quiet Jew, Pavel Il'ich Lavut, told me." Ibid., p. 327.

<sup>5</sup>Frunze reported to Lenin and the Central Committee that the Red losses in storming the isthmus were "not less than 10,000 killed."

<sup>6</sup>This is the same chivalrous Bela Kun who was named chairman of the Crimean Revolutionary Committee.

<sup>7</sup>An outside observer could immediately see that all was not right with the workers' and peasants' power. E. Colombino, a member of an Italian communist delegation which visited Russia in the summer of 1920, wrote in his book Three Months in Soviet Russia: "many times we were told, repeatedly told, that the basic principle of the Russian revolution was the dictatorship of the proletariat. But in this case we are dealing, at least a little, with exaggeration. A dictatorship exists, one possibly in the interests of the proletariat, but the proletariat itself, poor thing, has little to say about it . . . The dictatorship is run by the communist party, or more accurately, by a fraction of it . . . It is undoubtedly a dictatorship of a few. This socialist tsarism is easy to understand, if not to justify, in a country which has behind it centuries of slavery and tsarist dictatorship. Desiatyi s"ezd RKP(b). Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1933), pp. 884-885.

<sup>8</sup>Ed. Aleksandr Nikolaevich Slepko, Kronshtadtskii miatezh (Moscow, 1928).

<sup>9</sup>Ed. S. Uritskii, in Istoriia Grazhdanskoi Voiny, 1918-1921 (Moscow, 1930).

<sup>10</sup>S. Semanov Likvidatsiia antisovetskogo kronshtadtskogo miatezha 1921 goda (Moscow Nauka, 1973) p. 185. It would be nice to know the names of the men Semanov claims to have interviewed. The emphasis in the quotation are ours.

<sup>11</sup>Ed. Antonovshchina. Sbornik Tambovskogo gubkoma RKP, edited by S. Evgenov and O. Litovskii (Tambov, 1923), p. 14.

<sup>12</sup>Vladimir Dokukin, Pravda o banditakh (Tambov: Gosizdat, 1921).  
Emphasis in the original.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid. Our emphasis this time.

<sup>14</sup>Antonovshchina, p. 12.

<sup>15</sup>The troops sent against the rebels were not to be laughed at. While the main force of the rebels did not even have a rifle for every man, they had to face the heavily armed shock group of Uborevich: the 14th Cavalry Brigade, with 1000 cavalry troops and two heavy guns, Kotovskii's cavalry brigade and three armored detachments.



## Footnotes - Chapter 9

<sup>1</sup>From time to time lower-ranking activists would violate that rule. For example, the "workers' opposition" tried to continue their struggle after the 10th Congress, where they had suffered a crushing defeat. Lenin almost expelled Shliapnikov from the Central Committee for that.

<sup>2</sup>We will explain Trotskii's dismissal in detail in the next chapter. Zinov'ev was at this time chairman and undisputed leader of the Leningrad provincial committee.

<sup>3</sup>Ed. Concluding words 14th Congress.

<sup>4</sup>Ed. The oprichnina was a bloody "reform" carried out by Ivan IV (The Terrible) between 1565 and 1572 to weaken the nobility and enhance his own power as autocrat. Approximately 4000 people perished in the oprichnina, and many more were dispossessed and displaced.

<sup>5</sup>This is to be omitted.

<sup>6</sup>Ed. Glavkontsessskom - the Main Committee on Concessions. A concession was permission for a foreign firm to operate a factory or business in the Soviet Union. For example, Armand Hammer held several concessions in the twenties including a pencil factory in Moscow.

<sup>9</sup>Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov favored pressing the case. Rykov, Tomskii, and Bukharin were against it. The matter was decided by the votes of Kalinin, Rudzutak, and Kuibyshev, who after brief vacillation joined the Stalinists.

<sup>10</sup>Nabokov wrote in the Kadet paper "Rul'" on November 18, 1921, "the Communist Party came to power as a small group of highly-principled, energetic activists, who had a small number of disciplined workers among the peasants and workers. Then the Party gradually, but relatively slowly, grew while the

struggle on several fronts helped maintain iron discipline in the ranks of the Party. Recently a huge number of the petty-bourgeoisie - clerks, office-workers, shop-assistants, and others - have flooded into the Party. The former muscular organism of the Party which could withstand the hardest blows, began to weaken, to get fat . . . The flow of principled people into the Party ceased. For the most part people seeking various ways to make their lives easier rushed to join . . .

. . . Tests included in examinations on the program of the communist party had very negative results. In the great majority of cases, even in the cities, it was impossible to get satisfactory answers . . . "

<sup>10</sup> Arkadii Belinkov, "Poet i tolstiak," Baikal (1968, # 1-2).

<sup>11</sup> Ed. Malinin and Burin were authors of a widely used arithmetic text in pre-revolutionary Russia.

<sup>12</sup> Voroshilov, "Stalin i Krasnaia Armia", Pravda, Dec. 21, 1929.

## Footnotes - Chapter 10

<sup>1</sup> Ed. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, "K derevenskoi bednote," Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th edition (Moscow, 1969), vol. 7, p. 170.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. Lenin, "Voisko i revoliutsii," PSS, vol. 12, pp. 113-114.

<sup>3</sup> Ed. Lenin, "Itogi diskusii o samoopredelenii," PSS, vol. 30, pp. 17-58.

<sup>4</sup> Ed. Lenin, "Dvenadtsat' kratkikh tezisov o zashchite Greilikhom zashchity otechestva," PSS, vol. 30, p. 331.

<sup>5</sup> Ed. These are Marx's words from The Civil War in France, quoted by Lenin in "Gosudarstvo i revoliutsii," PSS, vol. 33, p. 41.

<sup>6</sup> Ed. On Dmitrii Miliutin's military reforms see Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968).

<sup>7</sup> Ed. See chapter 8, note 1, on Arakcheev. On his work with the military colonies see Alan Ferguson, "The Russian Military Settlements, 1816-1866" (Yale University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1954).

<sup>8</sup> I. Berkhin, Voennaia reforma v SSSR, 1924-1925 gg. (Moscow: Voennoe izd-vo, 1958).

<sup>9</sup> This will be eliminated.

<sup>10</sup> This will be eliminated.

<sup>11</sup> Ed. Lenin, "Rech' v den' krasnogo ofitsera," PSS, vol. 37, p. 200.

<sup>12</sup> When his opponents allied as the "military opposition" at the 8th Congress, Trotskii demonstratively departed for the Eastern Front, leaving Lenin to restore order in the Party. Decisively, but not without difficulty, Lenin put down the little mutiny, and the military specialists remained at their posts.



<sup>13</sup> Sklianskii did not have long to live. A doctor by profession, he was appointed director of the Moscow textile trust ("Mossukno"). In the summer of 1925 he drowned at a foreign resort.

<sup>14</sup> These important changes were made not only without Trotskii, but also without the new Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Rykov, who was also away until April.

<sup>15</sup> Ed. Trinadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b), Mai 1924 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1963), p. 240.

<sup>17</sup> This will be eliminated.

<sup>18</sup> Ed. See Pravda, November 11, 1925.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Boris Pil'niak, Povest' nepogashennoi luny (Sofia, 1927). The story was published in the journal Novyi Mir, but at the last minute that whole issue was confiscated and only a few copies were distributed. The editorial board admitted that same year, 1926, that it had been a political mistake to accept the story for publication. It was re-published in Sofia in 1927.

<sup>22</sup> Pravda, November 5, 1925. Authors' emphasis.

<sup>23</sup> Ed. This is from Stalin's speech at Dzerzhinskii's funeral on July 22, 1926. It can be found as "F. Dzerzhinsky (In Memory of F. Dzerzhinsky)", Works (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1954) vol. 8, pp. 203-204.

<sup>24</sup> This will be eliminated.

<sup>25</sup> I. A. Teliatnikov quotes Tukhachevskii in his published memoirs and adds that these words later hurt Tukhachevskii's relations with Voroshilov. Ed. In Teliatnikov's article "Vnikaia vo vse" in Marshal Tukhachevskii: vospominaniia druzei i soratnikov (Moscow: Voennoe izd-vo, 1965), pp. 162-175,

he says Tukhachevskii was friends with Frunze and Ordzhonikidze and that Frunze and Tukhachevskii criticized Trotskii at the 11th Party Congress in March 1922.

<sup>26</sup> That same year, 1925, Stalin removed his potential rival Kviring from the Party apparatus and transferred him to economic work in VSNKh. Later, until his death in 1937, he worked in Gosplan. In the Ukraine the inveterate Stalinist Kaganovich replaced Kviring.

<sup>27</sup> Malicious tongues, for the time being speaking the truth, relate the following episode about Voroshilov's selection. Rukhimovich announced, "We all know Klim well. He's a brave fellow, but why give him the Army to command. A company would be more than enough." Ed. Moisei L'vovich Rukhimovich, a Bolshevik since 1913, served in the Red Army in the Ukraine during the civil war. He was arrested in 1938 during the purges and died in prison.

<sup>28</sup> Ed. This citation was taken from an unpublished review of L. Nikulin, Marshal Tukhachevskii by A. I. Todorskii. The authors possess a copy of the review.

<sup>29</sup> RVS order #698, November 13, 1925. Ed. This document is not published.

<sup>30</sup> Of the military men only the Zinov'evite M. Lashevich, the new deputy chairman of the RVS USSR, fought on the side of the "Leningrad opposition" at the Congress. For that he was exiled to the Chinese Eastern Railroad where he died or killed himself in 1928.

<sup>31</sup> This will be eliminated.

<sup>32</sup> This will be eliminated.



## Chapter 11 - Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>This will be eliminated.

<sup>2-5</sup>Ditto

<sup>6</sup>Ed. See M. V. Frunze, "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia Armia," in Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh trudakh, 1971-1940 (Moscow: Voennoe izd-vo, 1965), pp. 29-40.

<sup>7</sup>L. D. Trotskii, "Voennaia doktrina ili mnimo-voennoe doktrinerstvo," Ed. See Trotsky, "Military Doctrine or Psuedo-Military Doctrinairism," in Military Writings (New York: Merit Publishers, 1969), pp. 31-69.

<sup>8-10</sup>These will be eliminated.

<sup>11</sup>During a discussion at the editorial offices of Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal (Military History Journal) several historians - M. Angarskii, S. Naida, A. Kadishev, A. Golubev, and others - called for an end to the mythological representation of the campaign of fourteen nations. See VIZh (1966, #2). The righteous patriotic anger of the leadership knew no bounds: all of the editors of the journal including the editor-in-chief were sacked. Ed. See N. Pavlenko, "Nekotorye voprosy razvitiia teorii strategii v 20kh godakh," VIZh (1966, #5):10-26.

<sup>12</sup>See Grazhdanskaia voina, 1918-1921 (Moscow, 1930), v. 3, pp. 130-131; also Malaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (Moscow, 1930), v. 3, p. 480.

<sup>13</sup>The lone exception is the article by A. V. Golubev in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. Ed. See Golubev, "Obrashchena li byla v proshloe nasha voennaia teoriia v 20-e gody?" VIZh (1965, #10):35-47.

<sup>14</sup>Chapaev, by the way, possessed an extraordinarily fine mind. He was made a caricature by filmmakers who must have read Furmanov's book with one bad eye. On the orders of their socialist keepers they created a fantastic image, half a red St. George the dragon-slayer, half jester. Chapaev was a talented and brave commander and had none of those foolish quirks ascribed to him by the pseudo-brothers Vasiliev. But - it cannot be denied - he was poorly educated. It is enough to present Chapaev's request to leave the Academy as he wrote it:

Much-respected comrade Lindov [a member  
of the 4th Army Revolutionary Military Council - authors]

I request You most humbly to recall me to the headquarters of the 4th Army in any position commander or commissar in any regiment as I the education of the Academy is not doing me any good what they are teaching I have already gone through in practice you know that I need my general education qualification which I am not receiving here and am bored for no reason in these walls I disagree this seems a prison and ask humbly that you do not exhaust me in this confinement I want to work and not lie about and if you do not recall me I will go to the doctor which will free me and I will lie around uselessly but I want to work and help you if you want me to help you I will with pleasure be at your service be so kind to get me out of these stone walls.

Respectively yours Chapaev

Lindov's response: "Tell Chapaev that we do not have the right to recall him from the Academy as he was sent there on the orders of comrade Trotskii."

Ed. The authors found this in A. Todorskii's review of L. Nikulin, Marshal Tukhachevskii, cited above.

<sup>15</sup>We list only a few editions: V vostochnom otriade (Warsaw, 1908); Vozdukhoplavanie v Germanii (St. Petersburg, 1910); Voina v gorakh (St. Petersburg, 1906-1907); Strategiia (Moscow: Gosvoenizd-vo, 1926), 2nd edition (Moscow: Voennyi vestnik, 1927); Istoriia voennogo iskusstva (Moscow, 1922-1923), 2nd edition (Moscow, 1925); Strategiia v trudakh voennykh klassikov (Moscow, 1924-1926); Evoliutsiia voennogo iskusstva (Moscow-Leningrad, 1927-1928); Iskusstvo vozhdeniia polka (Moscow-Leningrad, 1930); Kiauzevits (Moscow, 1935); Russko-Iaponskaia Voina, 1904-1905 (Oranienbaum: Ofiterskaia stroevaia shkola, 1910).

<sup>16</sup>Ed. Strategiia, which is difficult to find in this country, has been excerpted in Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva. See note 6 above.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 232.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 233.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 243

<sup>20</sup>Ed. General Zhilin has written several books on military history and particularly on World War II. See, e.g., Problemy voennoi istorii (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975); Vazhneishie operatsii Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, 1941-1945; sbornik statei (Moscow: Voennoe izd-vo, 1956); Kak fashistskaia Germaniia gotovila napadenie na Sovetskii Soiuz (Moscow: Mysl', 1965). This last title has been translated as They sealed their own Doom, translated by David Fidlon (Moscow: Progress, 1970).

<sup>21</sup>Ed. From Strategiia, in Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva, p. 245.

<sup>22</sup>This will be eliminated.

<sup>23</sup>Ed. Frunze's writing is available in Sobranie sochinenii, edited by A. S. Bubnov (Moscow: Gosizd-vo, 1926) and in Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva. For this quote see "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia Armia," in Voprosy, p. 33.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>26</sup>Ed. M. V. Frunze, "O kharaktere operatsii grazhdnaskoi voiny v SSSR i budushchikh operatsii Sovetskoi armii," in Voprosy.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>27</sup>Ed. "Front i tyl v voine budushchego," in Voprosy, p. 63.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>31</sup>Ed. M. N. Tukhachevskii, "Strategiia natsional'naia i klassovaia," in Izbrannye proizvedeniia, compiled by G. I. Os'kin and P. P. Chernushkov (Moscow: Voennoe izd-vo, 1964), pp. 31-50. See p. 32.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>34</sup>Ed. See Voprosy vysshego komandovaniia (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1924); Voprosy sovremennoi strategii (Moscow: Voennyi Vestnik, 1926); Taktika i strategii, in Sbornik Voennoi akademii im. M. V. Frunze 1 (Moscow, 1926); Kommentarii k polevomu ustavu 1929 g., excerpted in Voprosy.

<sup>35</sup>Ed. See Voprosy sovremennoi strategii, in Izbrannye proizvedeniia, pp. 244-261.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

## Footnotes - Chapter 12

<sup>1</sup>K. E. Voroshilov, "Stalin i Krasnaia Armia", Pravda, Dec. 21, 1929

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid. This is in a telegram, # 00079, from Sverdlov.

<sup>4</sup>This will be eliminated.

<sup>5</sup>Voroshilov, "Stalin i Krasnaia Armia."

<sup>6</sup>See Chapter 6 on the First Horse Army.

<sup>7</sup>Voroshilov, "Stalin i Krasnaia Armia."

<sup>8</sup>In February 1920 Stalin persuaded Budennyi and Voroshilov to subordinate themselves to a new commander and called Tukhachevskii "the demon of the civil war."

<sup>9</sup>Istoriia Grazhdanskoi Voyny, 1918-1921 (1930), p. 271.

<sup>10</sup>A. I. Egorov, Razgrom Denikina, 1919 (Moscow: Gosudarskvennoe voennoe izd-vo, 1931), pp. 3-4.





## Footnotes - Chapter 13

<sup>1</sup>Ed. See Lenin's note to People's Commissar of Justice Kurskii on terror, 1921. This and similar documents emphasizing Lenin's role in creating the Cheka and approving and urging the use of terror may be found in Lennard Gerson, The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976), and George Leggett, The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

<sup>2</sup>This will be eliminated.

<sup>3</sup>Ed. Trianadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b). Mai 1924 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1963), p. 711.

<sup>4</sup>This will be eliminated.

<sup>5</sup>It may be that three hundred years is as long as any significant phenomenon can last in Russia. Like the Mongol Yoke, like serfdom, the Romanovs outlasted their stay and were chased from the scene.

<sup>6</sup>Apparently as every actress has her admirers, every tyrant, however cruel, after his death leaves sighing admirers. Compared to Stalin Nero was a child, a sissy, but in his time he managed to annoy a fair number of Romans. Seutonius describes the mood of society after the princeps' suicide: "His death caused such rejoicing in society, that people ran all through the city with felt hats on their heads as a symbol of liberation from slavery. Nonetheless there were many others who long after [his death] in spring and summer decorated his grave with flowers; they put images of him on rostra in a wide-bordered toga and with his edicts, just as if he were alive, just as if they expected his imminent return." After that we ought not be surprised that there is a demand for homemade souvenirs with likenesses of Stalin. And not only in Georgia...

<sup>7</sup>Nationalization was not the realization of the goals of the proletarian revolution. The Bolshevik program called for workers' control of industry. Nationalization, as Lenin explained, was revenge against the bourgeoisie for their unwillingness to cooperate with the new regime. Of course for the owners of the nationalized enterprises that distinction was unimportant.

<sup>8</sup>Every household was left a small private plot of about 0.20-0.25 hectares. Individuals who remained outside the collective systems received less land than members of kolkhozes. Only in a few regions with particularly favorable conditions, such as Transcaucasia and Central Asia, was this enough land to feed a family.

<sup>9</sup>Ed. The Collected Works of Sir Winston Churchill, vol. XXV, The Second World War, vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate (London: Library of Imperial History, 1975), p. 322.

<sup>10</sup>The culture has proved amazingly hardy and has now infected many countries. The carriers have many names. Some see them as freedom fighters, others as terrorists, even as common criminals and murderers.

<sup>11</sup>The comparison of Trotskii to Stavrogin made by Aleksei Tolstoi during the Great Purge was a strained interpretation which was meant to be useful, not accurate. It counted on the public's ignorance. Ed. That comparison was made in Izvestiia. See below in Chapter 22.

<sup>12</sup>It is hard to restrain from offering a long quote: "He had everything right on paper... it was espionage. Every member of the society watched one another and was obliged to report. Each belonged to all, and all to every. All were slaves and in their slavery equal. In extreme cases calumny and murder, but the main thing was equality. The first thing was to lower the level of education, science, and talents. A high level of science and talents

was attainable by only higher abilities ... higher abilities were not needed! ...Slaves must be equal: without despotism there never would have been freedom or equality, but in the herd there must be equality. That is Shigalev's theory: "F. M. Dostoevskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Leningrad, 1974), vol. 10, p. 322. Ed. This translation is mine, as are those which follow.


<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 311.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 312.

<sup>15</sup>Ed. See N. Korzhavin Vremena (Frankfurt: Posev, 1976).

<sup>16</sup>A psychiatrist would not find it hard to qualify such escapades as megalomania and exhibitionism. However, as the sad example of Professor Bekhterev shows, it is dangerous to apply professional diagnoses in times of social unrest. More recently the relations between psychiatry and real life have taken a new direction.

<sup>17</sup>Dostoevskii, Polnoe sobranie, vol. 10, p. 323.



Footnotes - Chapter 14


<sup>1</sup>Ed. This is from A. I. Todorskii's review of L. Nikulin, Marshal Tukhachevskii. See above, chapter 10, note 28.

<sup>2</sup>Protiv reaktsionnykh teorii na voennonauchnom fronte. Kritika strategicheskikh i voennoistoricheskikh vzgliadov prof. Svechina (Leningrad, 1931).

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>These are the words Svechin uses to describe the economic policy of wartime: "We will have to temporarily repeal the eight-hour work day and suspend the operation of the Code of Laws on labor. We will have to increase the intensity of labor and the length of the working day, to reduce real wages. Announcing these demands to the people, dooming them to labor as in penal servitude, depriving them of tolerable conditions of existence will go parallel with the struggle - [fought] for these very people... To fight means more than making a demonstration." Unheard of! There was nothing like it in the Fatherland war...



<sup>1</sup>Ed. Shest'nadtsatyi s"ezd RKP(b). Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1931).

<sup>2</sup>Ibid .

<sup>3</sup>Ibid .

<sup>4</sup>The old cavalryman complained bitterly that he was being made fun of in the press because of his passion for horse breeding - both in words and in caricatures. Budennyi was very popular, but the public still enjoyed the ridicule. The stenographic record notes eleven interruptions of laughter, one of general laughter, and another of Homeric laughter, but Budennyi stood his ground. Without horse power the national economy would founder. The same was even truer of the army: "I am not just saying that the horse is enormously important in the country's defense. The defense of the country without horses is unthinkable." Unfortunately, not only Budennyi thought that way. Ed. Budennyi's remarks are in *ibid* .

<sup>5</sup>Ed. Vladimir Kiriakovich Triandafillov, Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armii, in Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva, pp. 291-345.

<sup>6</sup>Triandafillov wrote: "...at the present time, thinking abstractly, it is easier to establish a stable front on defense than it used to be. The problem with defense is that it is purposely conducted by a small force and can not always provide a sufficiently strong front for battle formations." Because of this excessive dogmatism, this assertion has proved wrong. One can point to Stalingrad and the Kursk arc where the exceptional stubbornness of the defense created the conditons for enormously important operational success. Ed. The quotation above comes from *ibid*.



<sup>7</sup>Lieutenant-General Dzenit recalls that in 1930 in order to demonstrate to Stalin and members of the Politbiuro the increasing importance of armoured troops "large maneuvers were conducted outside Moscow with the participation of the only mechanized brigade and motorized detachment, which were attached to the Moscow proletarian division...It became impossible to continue to ignore Tukhachevskii's suggestions. A decision was soon made to allocate significant funds for tanks." Stalin probably saw tanks for the first time and they took his fancy... Ed. The quotation above comes from Dzenit, "S vyshki," in Marshal Tukhachevskii: vospominaiia друзei i soratnikov (Moscow: Voennoe izd-vo, 1965), pp. 130-134.

<sup>8</sup>This will be eliminated

<sup>9</sup>A rather complete presentation of the state of Soviet military thought of the 1920-1930's is given by two recently published anthologies: Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva; Voprosy taktiki v sovetskikh voennykh trudakh, 1917-1940 (Moscow, 1970).

<sup>10</sup>Ed. G. S. Isserson, "Istoricheskie korni novykh form boia" Voennaia Mysl' (1937, #1): 4.

<sup>11</sup>Ed. Isserson, "Evoliutsiia operativnogo iskusstva, " in Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva, pp. 398-399.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ed. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1941). The quote can be found in a more recent edition, Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), p. 328. This work was translated into Russian as Strategiia nepriamykh deistvii (Moscow, 1957). Authors. Liddell Hart, who advanced the theory of indirect actions, began his scholarly career at the same time as Svechin. His first work, Paris, or future War, was published in 1925, two years after Svechin's Strategiia. The

English author is like his Russian colleague in many of his fundamental ideas, although he was not acquainted with his work.

<sup>14</sup>Ed. G. Isserson, "Razvitie teorii sovetskogo operativnogo iskusstva v 30-e gody, " Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (1965, #1): 36-46.

<sup>15</sup>See above, Chapter 2.

<sup>16</sup>This will be eliminated

<sup>17</sup>Ed. Liddell Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach, p. 121.



Footnotes - Chapter 16

<sup>1</sup>It would have been better to express these in tons, but in centners they look ten times as impressive.

<sup>2</sup>This number is figured on the basis of relative indices from the report at the previous congress. It would seem that these indices are overstated by five percent. If we accept them for the following years, then the proper figure for 1929 would be 754 million centners.

<sup>3</sup>We are assuming the given tempo of growth of marketability, 15%/year, continued. It was painfully tempting in 1932 or 1933 to reach the level of 1913.

<sup>4</sup>Based on the growth of marketability we have assumed.

<sup>5</sup>At that time the kolkhozes owned 74% of land under grain. Sovkhozes, or state farms, had another 11%. That left the individual farmers, who were 34% of the peasant population, only 15% of the land.

<sup>6</sup>At the very least, Stalin bragged that the marketability of kolkhoz produce, unlike that of the muzhiks', reached 30-40%. If the procurement was at the upper limit, life must have been very hard for the comrade kolkhozniks. The marketability of grain is now approximately 40%, but the gross yield is 2.5 times greater, and the rural population has decreased by 50%

<sup>7</sup>This is assuming a ratio of harvested grain to seed of 5:1. Generally in these years the area of sown land increased 15-20%.

<sup>8</sup>It is possible (oh, so possible) that these figures on the gross yield are inflated. Later, in the fifties, Khrushchev revealed a little secret about how the grain problem was solved. Instead of weighing the grain put in granaries, the productivity of selected fields (naturally, rather good fields)

was determined, and this figure was multiplied by the area of sown land. Thanks to this rather simple device, grain which was lost during harvesting or transportation, or never produced on poorer land, could be considered collected. If Stalin had discovered this un-Euclidian math in the early thirties, then the peasants' nutrition must have been even worse. . .

<sup>9</sup>If the statistics bore you, please read Kotlovan by the magnificent and honest master Andrei Platonov. People in the starving villages feeling the approach of death would lay down in coffins they had prepared beforehand - to make it easier to bury them. Ed. Platonov, The Foundation Pit. Kotlovan, Translated by Thomas A. Whitney (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ardis, 1973). This is a bi-lingual text.

<sup>10</sup>Grain was the major source of foreign currency, but not the only: lumber, furs, bristles, and leather were sent abroad. . . But all that was not enough, and a real search was begun in the country for currency and gold. The OGPU carried out mass seizures of valuables from the population in 1929-1930. During the first five-year plan the hotels and restaurants of Moscow and Leningrad served only foreigners. A huge number of paintings and other valuable art works from the Hermitage collection and also details of decorations from the ruins of the Christ the Savior cathedral in Moscow were sold abroad in those years.

<sup>11</sup>There were also a small number of Komsomoltsy, who later got the credit for building everything.

<sup>12</sup>This will be eliminated.

<sup>13</sup>There is information that in 1928-1929, 48 people from the Gosplan staff were shot.

- <sup>14</sup>Ed. Shest'nadtsatyi s"ezd RKP(b). Stenograficheskii otchet. (Moscow, 1931), pp.
- <sup>15</sup>Ed. Sem'nadtsatyi s"ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b). 26 ianvaria - 10 fevralia 1934 g. Stenograficheskii otchet. (Moscow, 1934), p. 176.
- <sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 263-266.
- <sup>17</sup>Ed. Shest'nadtsatyi s"ezd, p. 487.
- <sup>18</sup>Ed. Sem'nadtsatyi s"ezd, p. 356.
- <sup>19</sup>According to Ordzhonikidze, 21.5 billion rubles were spent in heavy industry, while the basic fund grew to 13.6 billion. Apparently he included circulating capital in the final sum. Ed. See *ibid.*, p. 178.
- <sup>20</sup>Piatakov also spoke at the Congress. He had been expelled in 1927 and readmitted in 1929, but he had apparently been long forgiven because his speech was exclusively devoted to questions of heavy industry. He was Ordzhonikidze's first deputy. "Prolonged applause" greeted Piatakov's speech. Ed. See *ibid.*, pp. 455-464.
- <sup>21</sup>Ed. The Scientific-Technical Administration is in Russian, the Naachno-Technicheskoe upravlenie. The Main Concessions Committee - Glavkontsesskom. Tsentrosoinz was an administrative umbrella organ meant to organize mainly rural small shops and industries.
- <sup>22</sup>Ed. Seminadtsdtlyi s"ezd, pp. 124-129. The emphasis in this quotation and below is Bukharin's.
- <sup>23</sup>Ed. Dobchinskii and Bobchinskii are characters in Gogol's play "Revizor" ("The Inspector General") famous for lacking any personal opinions.
- <sup>24</sup>Ed. Sem'nadtsatyi s"ezd, pp. 492-497.
- <sup>25</sup>Ibid., 516-522.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 209-212.

<sup>27</sup>Ed. Kirov's speech was entitled "Samyi iarkii dokument epokhi."

Ibid., 251-257.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 236-239.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 245-249.

<sup>30</sup>That means he must have joined the party in 1892. The founding of the RSDRP, from which most Bolsheviks count the years, occurred in 1898. Some, including Lenin, begin to count from their service in the St. Petersburg "Union of Struggle", which was founded in 1895. It is unclear what this old warrior was counting from.

<sup>31</sup>It is only grain that we still have less of than, say, farmers in the U.S. Those who doubt this mystifying information can turn to the stenographic reports published in 1934. Ed. See *ibid.*, p. 641.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 464-465.

<sup>33</sup>Everyone who needed to know that Stalin was hostile to Tukhachevskii and all of his proposals. Once when it was necessary to have the Politbiuro approve an increase in army manpower, Tukhachevskii and his friend Triandafillov resorted to military cunning. Tukhachevskii cited incorrect figures in his report, not those he desired. Triandafillov objected and introduced the correct figures. Stalin was glad of a chance to spite Tukhachevskii and sided with Triandafillov. The proposal was accepted as Stalin and Triandafillov's.

<sup>1</sup>Ed. Shest'nadtsatyi s"ezd, p. 36. Stalin's emphasis.

<sup>2</sup>That same Sergei Ivanovich Syrtsov, who as chairman of the Donbiuro was notorious for his untiring cruelty in persecuting the Cossacks. Ed. See above, Chapter 7.

<sup>3</sup>On August 11, 1936 the TsIK introduced several amendments to the law of December 1: a)open court sessions, b)admission of lawyers, c)72 hours given in which to ask for pardon. The amelioration was timed to precede the infamous trial of 1936 to give hope to the defendants who had been promised their lives in exchange for certain testimony. In fact nothing changed. In 1937 the law, which was so easy to manipulate, was toughened again.

<sup>4</sup>In the twenties statements about such things were very unclear. Later they became quite definite. The facts about medical murders are now openly admitted, and the murderers were selected from a suitable circle of people. The deaths of Gor'kii, Menzhinskii, and Kuibyshev were blamed on their personal secretaries and doctors Levin, Pletnev, and Kazakov. A group of Jewish doctors in the Kremlin were accused of the deaths of Sherbakov and Zhdanov. Stalin's personal physician Vinogradov was included in the group to make the case more convincing. He played his part well. In 1938 he signed several falsified documents about their ill-intentioned healing, which sufficed as death sentences for his colleagues.

<sup>5</sup>His sister who was at home was apparently the source of this version of the story.



<sup>6</sup>That is one of the versions. According to the other, Zinov'ev and Kamenev demanded to talk to the Politbiuro. They were supposedly taken to the Kremlin where they talked with Stalin, Voroshilov, and Ezhov who comprised a special commission of the Politbiuro. The versions agree that they were promised their lives and the security for their families if they accepted the prosecution's line at the trial.

<sup>7</sup>Tomskii shot himself on August 22, 1936 when he recieved the newspaper account of the trial. Stalin played cat and mouse with Rykov and Bukharin a while longer. A short announcement appeared in the papers on September 10 that investigation in their case had been halted "for absence of any evidence of their criminal activity." In the January trial Radek again pointed a finger at the rightists as conspirators.

<sup>8</sup>In the trial of August 1936 there was a whole squad of provocateurs: V. Ol'berg, F. David, Berman-Iurin, M. Lur'e, N. Lur'e. There seems to have been only one in the January 1937 trial - Shestov.

<sup>9</sup>Again there is a parallel version. It dates this episode to the January trial and associates it with Piatakov. Sergo valued his assistant in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry highly and might have dealt with Stalin for his life. It is known that he did visit Piatakov in prison. The nearness of the dates also supports this version: Piatakov was executed at the end of January, Sergo's murder occurred in mid-February.

<sup>10</sup>They telegraphed Molotov, Kaganovich, and other members of the Politbiuro from Sochi on September 25, 1936: "We consider it absolutely necessary and urgent that comrade Ezhov be appointed to the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. Iagoda showed himself to be clearly incapable of uncovering the Trotskyite-Zinove'vite bloc. The OGPU is four years behind

in this matter". The figure had not been chosen at random. It referred to 1932, to Riutin's case. For the time being, until he was eliminated, Iagoda was appointed People's Commissar of Communications, because of which his former chairman Rykov was removed from the Council of People's Commissars.

<sup>11</sup>Pending



<sup>1</sup>Ed. See Joseph Stalin, "Address to the Graduates of the Red Army Academies," in Selected Writings (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 361-365. The quotes that follow are also from this source.

<sup>2</sup>Nothing in history disappears without a trace. The Kremlin command sent the Academy a bill for the broken gate. It has been preserved.

<sup>3</sup>Higher military commanders okayed the arrest of their subordinates. Substantial lists signed by Gamarnik, Primakov, Bliukher, Uborevich, and many others have been preserved. There are none signed by Iakir or Tukhachevskii.

<sup>4</sup>Anastasia Ruban, a worker with the NKVD, told Iakir that the accusation against Sablin, which she had seen, was entirely fabricated. Three days later she shot herself; officially she died of a heart attack.

<sup>5</sup>This will be eliminated.

<sup>6</sup>The trial's scriptwriters, particularly Vyshinskii, were uninventive and humorless. The monstrous acts of their dramaturgy look like escapades of second-rate swindlers. For example, chairman Zelenskii of Tsentrsoiuz gave this testimony at the 1938 trial:

When a person comes to buy things in a store he is overcharged, given false weight or false measure, that is they name a price higher than the real price of the good, or give him less than they should or give something of a lesser quality.

These are merely the basic principles of our trade; it is shameful to pretend it is unusual wrecking. Zelenskii continued.

To illustrate the extent of this wrecking I will say that of 135,000 shops

checked by the inspectorate of the trade-cooperative network, incidents of mismeasure and deceit of customers were found in 13,000.

Another important form of wrecking, also meant to cause discontent in the population, is the freezing of goods, achieved by the incorrect or delayed shipping of goods. For example, there have been cases when summer goods were shipped in the winter, and vice versa, winter goods have arrived in the stores in the summer.

Vyshinskii. That is to say the population has been offered winter boots in the summer, and slippers in the winter?

Zelenskii. Yes.

V. This was done intentionally according to your testimony?

Z. Yes.

V. For those reasons of provocation?

Z. Yes

(The emphasis above is ours.)

We hasten to calm the departed soul of comrades Zelenskii (posthumously rehabilitated) and Vyshinskii (never prosecuted). Wrecking like that in retail trade, "with the aim of causing dissatisfaction in the population," goes on to this day with undiminished success. The public was fed similar flannel at all the open trails. It is not impossible that the accused prompted the prosecution with the funnier examples in the secret hope they could demonstrate to the people the absurdity of the accusations.

<sup>7</sup>The following example demonstrates that Radek was an informer.

Blumkin, the left SR who killed German ambassador Mirbach in 1918, was an NKVD worker. Because of his outstanding capabilities, Dzerzhinskii decided to save him. He was taken out of the public's eye and used for special assignments. For example, he was put in a cell with Savinkov, where he became

so accustomed to the ways of the illustrious warrior that he was able to compose a document that was passed off as Savinkov's last letter when his murder was announced as a suicide. Even Savinkov's son thought the letter authentic. In 1930 or 1931 Bliumkin was abroad on a secret mission and on his own initiative went to see Trotskii on (Printsevy) islands. Trotskii asked him to carry a letter to Radek. Bliumkin carried out his request, but Radek went straight to the OGPU with it. That time Bliumkin was not spared.

<sup>8</sup>The red Montesquieu, comrade Vyshinskii, said that for sentence to be passed probability of a guilty verdict was sufficient.

<sup>9</sup>Ed. Detstvo v tiur'me; memuary Petra Iakira, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 15-17. In English as A childhood in prison (London: Macmillan, 1972).

<sup>10</sup>Ed. This comes from Komandarm Iakir: vospominaniia druzei i soratnikov (Moscow, 1963).



## Footnotes - Chapter 19

<sup>1</sup>He had just been appointed chief of the Administration of cadres of the RKKA on May 23. In the fall of 1937 he was arrested and perished.

<sup>2</sup>This version seems neater, which does not, however, increase its authenticity. Gamarnik apparently killed himself after he learned from Bulin that he had been removed from his post as chief of the Political Administration of the RKKA, and also that Iakir had been arrested.

<sup>3</sup>A. Dunaevskii, Po sledam Gaia (Erevan, 1966), pp. 188, 232-233.

<sup>4</sup>A. Dunaevskii tells very little about Gai's escape and provides no dates. If the story of his meeting with Putna is true, then that episode took place no earlier than September 1936, that is a year after his arrest in Minsk. Gai was sent to Iaroslavl' again to serve his five-year term, but on December 12, 1937 after a new trial he was shot.

<sup>5</sup>The head of the local Cheka, Liushkov, did not wait for his natural end when Mekhlis and Frinovskii arrived. On June 13 he defected to the Japanese in Manchuria.

<sup>6</sup>The fact that the Soviets were not particularly successful in battle is confirmed by the meagerness and restrained tone of articles in the papers. Announced losses were 236 killed and 611 wounded on our side and 600 killed and 2500 wounded for the Japanese. They are hardly accurate. In any case the Japanese began an open attack the next year at Kalkhin-Gol.

<sup>7</sup>This will be eliminated





<sup>1</sup>See Sudebnyi otchet po delu antisovetskogo "pravo-trotskistskogo bloka" (Moscow: Iuridicheskoe izdatel'stvo NKIu SSSR, 1938). Ed. March 2 was the first day of the trial. G. F. Grin'ko was a prominent Ukrainian Bolshevik. In the last years before his arrest he served as People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR. Liubchenko, a former chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine, had committed suicide. The full text of the 1938 trial was published in many languages in 1938. In 1965 Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen edited the full text and published it with a very useful notes and an introduction by Tucker. The Great Purge Trial (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965). This translation is mine.

<sup>2</sup>It is easy to believe that no one closely associated with Iakir or Gamarnik was found suitable for his job. They had to find someone in the People's Commissariat of Finance. The absence of Shmidt and Kuz'michev's names is typical.

<sup>3</sup>Member of the Politbiuro and organizational secretary of the TsK in the first years after the revolution. Prior to his arrest he had been Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Trade.

<sup>4</sup>Immediately after the trial in 1937 no one dared to say such nonsense even in private conversations. When an American diplomat asked a Soviet colleague about the marshal's motives, he was told that Tukhachevskii had taken up with a woman who turned out to be a German spy.

<sup>5</sup>People's Commissar of Foreign Trade. During the civil war he was chairman of the tribunal on Trotskii's personal train.

<sup>6</sup>B. S. Gorbachev served in the First Horse Army as commander of a Special Cavalry Brigade. He was killed in 1937.

<sup>7</sup>The author of the dreadful, pretentious, and thoroughly inaccurate book Marshal Tukhachevskii, the first Soviet biography of Tukhachevskii to appear after the revelations about the cult of Stalin at the 20th and 22nd Congresses.

<sup>8</sup>Biographies of Skoblin and Plevistskaia may be found in a book by B. Priianishnikov, Nezrimaia pautina (The Invisible Web), published by the author in 1979. The reader will find there a very thorough picture of the penetration of the NKVD into all corners of the life of the Russian emigration and its organizations throughout the world, and particularly in the ROVS. Ed. Nezrimaia pautina (Silver Spring, Md., 1979).

<sup>9</sup>Very little is known about the evil figure N. Ettingon. We have put the information we have been able to gather in Appendix 4.

<sup>10</sup>V. Aleksandrov's work, Delo Tukhachevskogo, first appeared in 1960 in the Roman newspaper Giornale d'Italia. For a long while he could not find a publisher. It was immediately noted in the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev ordered it be translated into Russian for a narrow circle of high officials. When Khrushchev spoke at the 22nd Congress of the KPSS of "one foreign source" in connection with the causes of the arrest of Iakir, Tukhachevskii, and others, he certainly had in mind Aleksandrov's publication. As far as we know, the official Soviet version is still based on Aleksandrov's book. It appeared as a book in French in 1962, L'affaire Toukhatchevsky (Paris: Robert Laffont). We have used the American edition, The Tukhachevsky Affair, translated from French by John Hewish (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964).

<sup>18</sup>Aleksandrov and Conquest refer to his book Sekretnyi Front. See note 12 above.

<sup>19</sup>In 1945 Berens was captured by the allies and turned over to the Yugoslavs as a war criminal (as head of the Gestapo in Serbia). In the course of interrogations Berens gave a great deal of testimony about "the Tukhachevskii affair". Aleksandrov states that this information was transmitted to Moscow. He also gives to understand that he is familiar with Beren's testimony. Berens was sentenced to die and was hanged.

<sup>20</sup>Both authors also refer to him.

<sup>21</sup>V. Aleksandrov does not say how the NKVD came to know about the preparation of the documents. As we recall, the idea originated with Skoblin who decided to "outplay" his Soviet bosses.

<sup>22</sup>This money turned out to be...counterfeit. Prianishnikov says this and names the sum of three million rubles. "Three German agents spending that money in the USSR were arrested by the NKVD. Heydrich was incensed that the Soviets would pay for forged papers with counterfit paper." Ed. See B. Prianishnikov, Nezrimaia pautina, p. 347.

<sup>23</sup>Some say that Gamarnik was removed from his post as Deputy People's Commissar, but kept on as commander of the Political Administration of the RKKA at the same time; but those reports are hard to believe. In any case nothing was said about it in the press.

<sup>24</sup>One Soviet source says he was deputy troop commander of the LV0 until November 1936. But we need not accept that as the date of his arrest. It appears that he too was taken at the end of May. The fact that Primakov was officially removed from the staff of the Leningrad Council on June 6 or 7 as an "unmasked enemy of the people" supports that view.

and it turns out he's in bed dead drunk. He killed alot of innocent people. That's why we shot him.'" Too bad Nikolai Ivanovich shirked his duties. Had he stayed in his office during working hours, he would still be alive and well today.

<sup>32</sup>The Great Purge reached more deeply into the punitive organs than into the other branches of the state apparatus. That is another topic, but one fact is worth mentioning. Of the large number of people who were appointed generals in the NKVD in 1935 only one was still at work at the end of the war, S. A. Goglidze. And one other, T. Deribas, remained alive - because he had been put in an insane asylum. This must contain some sort of lesson or at least serve as food for thought.

<sup>33</sup>We are not speaking of Stalin's ober-executioner V. Ul'rikh. He lived out his days in comfort and died after the war.

<sup>34</sup>The marshal supposedly told this story himself to a correspondent of "Komsomol'skaia Pravda" in the brief period of unmasking the cult. Observing how others about him were being arrested, Budennyi decided to take care of himself. He took several machine guns to his dacha and set them up in the garret. He set soldiers on guard around the clock. He slept only at the dacha and frequently led the all-around observation from the observation post personally. Once when Chekists came for him, Budennyi shouted to them through a megaphone about the machine guns and warned them not to cross a line marked in the yard or he would open fire. He then called Stalin. Stalin, as might be expected, answered that he had nothing to do with it. He told Budennyi that he had no more idea what was going on in the NKVD than Budennyi did, that they might come for him the next day. Budennyi responded that he would open fire, which greatly amused the Great Leader. Go ahead, give it to them,

Stalin said, chase them off. That is most probably folklore, but composed with much understanding of the affair.

<sup>35</sup>Ezhov's further fate is hard to follow. At first he remained a candidate member of the Politbiuro and People's Commissar of Water Transport, which position he had held along with his others since the previous summer. In March 1939 he spoke at the 23rd Congress of the Bolshevik party. Apparently not yet understanding the changes that had taken place, he thought to speak of the achievements of the punitive organs under his leadership. Stalin cut him off and called him a fool. Several months after that fallen executioner was taken to his dacha under house arrest. The Chekists assigned to him were ordered not only to guard him but to see to his needs. Ezhov was regularly so drunk he ceased to look human, which was for him natural. At the beginning of December the guards were told to leave the dacha. Other NKVD employees made the arrest. It is said that Ezhov was put through the usual butchery of physical interrogation, forced to sign what he was ordered, and was shot. The reasons: deceiving the party and the people, unjustified repressions, destruction of the cadres, etc. This happened very late in 1939.

<sup>36</sup>See Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow, 1967) pp. 39-40.

## Notes - Chapter 21

<sup>1</sup>Ed. See above chapter 14.

<sup>2</sup>It is said that Tukhachevskii, sitting on a saddled horse, could do a pull up horse and all.

<sup>3</sup>Ed. Tukhachevskii, Strategiia natsional'naia i klassovaia (Rostov na Donu, 1920).

<sup>4</sup>In May of 1937 he told his sister, "When I was a boy, father wanted to give me a violin. It's too bad he didn't. I'd have become a violinist."

<sup>5</sup>They met in the Second House of the People's Commissariat of Defense across from the Kremlin, that is, on army territory. The NKVD guards never came into the hall during such meetings. Brutus and Cassius made better use of their opportunity...





## Footnotes - Chapter 22

<sup>1</sup>Ed. Emphasis here and below is the authors'.

<sup>2</sup>In 1957 he told this story to Dr. Nilson: "My wife was pregnant. She cried and pleaded with me to sign the document, but I could not. That day I weighed everything up and tried to determine what my chances were of staying alive. I was convinced they would arrest me, that it was my turn. It was ready for that. I was repulsed by all that blood, I couldn't stand it any more. But nothing happened. I was saved, I learned later in some roundabout way, by my colleagues. No one dared tell the higher-ups that I had refused to sign." To report of course does take some courage, but apparently one of the literary big-wigs decided to include Pasternak's signature without his knowledge. The motives could have been various. It is possible that there were other similar cases. But no one else has since claimed that to be so, even when there was not threat. Consequently, the others have taken that responsibility on themselves.

<sup>3</sup>Daix was clever enough to write in the thirties, "the camps...in the Soviet Union are an achievement, testifying to the complete abolition of the exploitation of man by man." Years later he wrote a sympathetic foreword to the French translation of Solzhenitsyn's novelette One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. Ed. See Pierre Daix, Une Journee d'Ivan Denissovitch (Paris, Julliard, 1969).

<sup>4</sup>Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma (Paris, 1955), p. 121. This is from the Russian edition. English and French editions were published in 1937. Ed. See The origin of Russian Communism (London: G. Blas, [1939]).

<sup>5</sup>Arkadi Belinkov, "Poet i tolstiak," Baikal (1968, # 1-2).



## Footnotes - Chapter 23

<sup>1</sup>M. Djilas describes how in a conversation after the war Stalin said seriously that only Belgium and Luxemburg were members of Benelux, that the Netherlands was not. Molotov, who was present, did not dare correct the Great Leader, who apparently went to his grave believing that was so. Ed. See Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, translated by Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), p. 181.

<sup>2</sup>Ed. Sem'nadtsatyi s"ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii (b). 26 ianvaria-10 fevralia 1934 g. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1934), p. 11.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 13-14

<sup>4</sup>Ed. Vosem'nadtsatyi s"ezd vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b). 10-21 marta 1939 g. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1939), p. 14.

<sup>5</sup>Mussolini, with whom Stalin, in his own words, had "the very best relations", wrote in October 1939, "Bolshevism in Russia has disappeared and has been replaced by a Slavic form of fascism." Earlier that year a special emissary of the German government, Dr. Shnurre had emphasized, "There is one thing in common in the ideology of Germany, Italy, and the USSR: opposition to capitalist democracy. Neither we nor Italy have anything in common with the capitalist West. Therefore it would be utterly paradoxical to us if the Soviet Union as a socialist nation would wind up on the side of the western democracies." The foundation for such an evaluation was Molotov's assertion in an official speech on May 31 that the anti-Comintern pact was only camouflage for the union of the Axis powers against the War.

<sup>6</sup>The Germans were most interested in the economic side of the pact, and they began with that. The Kremlin, however, made conclusion of the economic agreement conditional upon on general political settlement. They agreed that

both pacts be prepared in parallel. The trade agreement, Shnurre-Mikoian, was concluded on August 19, that is, on the eve of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. An abundant flow of raw materials (oil) and foodstuffs (wheat) immediately poured into Germany. The German deliveries (machines and equipment) were hopelessly delayed and were never filled. The new agreement of February 11, 1940 was again very favorable for Germany: the term for the Soviet deliveries was 18 months, for the German, 24 months. Besides that the USSR obligated itself to buy metals for the Reich in third countries to help Germany get around the British blockade. According to Halder, Germany had a monthly shortfall of steel of 600,000 tons. The Germans, on their side, intentionally delayed shipping goods with military significance. If they did give some things, they were defective. Halder recalls the sale to Russia of a heavy cruiser with construction defects. The fools in the Kremlin scrupulously fulfilled all of their obligations on time. In April 1941 they delivered to Germany: 208,000,000 tons of grain, 90,000 tons of oil, 8,300 tons of cotton, 6400 tons of copper, steel, nickel, and other metals, 4000 tons of rubber. A large part of those goods, including the rubber, was obtained in third countries. As a result on June 22, 1941 German tanks and planes invaded the USSR with Soviet fuel in their tanks. Their crews' bellies were full of Russian bread. Ed. The authors used the Russian translation of Halder's diaries: Frants Gal'der, Voennyi Dnevnik. Ezhednevnye zapisi nach. Gen. Shtaba sukhoputnykh voisk, 1939-1942 gg 2 vols. (Moscow, 1968-1969). These were first available in English: Franz Halder, The Halder Diaries: the private war journals of Colonel General Franz Halder, Introduction by Trevor N. Dupuy, 2 vols. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976). This is a reprint of the eight volume work originally published by the Office of Chief Counsel for War Crimes, Office of Military Government for Germany, in Nuremberg in

1946. For the information in this note, see the Westview Press reprint, pp. 101, 158, 174-175.

<sup>7</sup>The goon squads got on famously. They looked kindly on the heartfelt agreement of their masters. At the banquet to celebrate the signing of the pact Stalin proclaimed, "I know how deeply the German people love their great leader (in German Fuehrer - authors). Therefore I want to drink to his health." The toast was not provided for by the protocol. For understandable reasons, the text of it did not get into the papers. Recalling the banquet, Ribbentrop said that "in the Kremlin he felt just as if he was among old party comrades." Should we be surprised that the executioners began an intensive exchange of experience and instruments of torture, and also of political prisoners? Ed. See Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, "Zakulisnaia istoriia pakta 'Ribbentrop-Molotov'," Kontinent (1975, #4): 300-320.

<sup>8</sup>The Halder Diaries, vol. 1, pp. 21-22.

<sup>9</sup>It is significant that the German invasion began on September 1, the day after the Soviet-German pact was ratified by Moscow.

<sup>10</sup>Here are the words as they appeared in the Soviet press on November 1: The ideology of Hitlerism, like every other ideological system, can be accepted or rejected... But everybody understands that ideology cannot be destroyed by force, cannot be killed by war. Therefore it is not only senseless but criminal to wage such a war, as a war to destroy Hitlerism!" ("Pravda", November 1, 1939; emphasis is ours - authors.) Hitler and Goebbels could not be at the Nuremburg trials, because they were dead. Too bad that for other reasons Stalin and Molotov were not among the defendants.

<sup>11</sup>The people were given to understand that the Soviet-German rapprochement was meant to last a long while. Mein Kampf was published in Russian and for several hours was actually sold in one of Moscow's

bookstores. The ban on Wagner was lifted, and the Bolshoi Theater staged the Fuehrer's favorite operas, "Die Walkuere" and "Die Meistersinger". Richard Strauss' works were begun to be performed. One memoirist tells that "Muscovites jammed the concert halls to hear the 'fascist', 'Hitlerian' music that had been forbidden just yesterday." Ed. Iu. Elagin, Ukroshchenie iskusstv. (New York: Izd-vo im. Chekhova, 1952) (Juri Jelagin, Taming of the Arts, translated by Nicholas Wreden (New York: Dutton, 1951), pp. 238-239.

<sup>12</sup>Shaposhnikov also suggested storming the Mannerheim line, but while simultaneously striking a diversionary blow through Kandalaksha. In Shtern's plan that blow was the main one. Instead, the disposition of the great strategist Timoshenko, who had just been made commander of the Leningrad region (which soon became the Northwestern Front), was accepted. Timoshenko announced, "Never in history have the most powerful fortifications withstood massive attacks. And in general as comrade Stalin teaches us 'there are no fortresses which Bolsheviks can not take.'"

<sup>13</sup>Ed. The Halder Diaries, vol. 1, pp. 51-53.

Footnotes - Chapter 24

<sup>1</sup>Even as it was at that time, the Red Army presented a mortal threat to Germany, which was undefended in the East.

<sup>2</sup>Ed. The quote the authors cite is not to be found where they indicate. Similar information, confirmation of what they say, can be found in The Halder Diaries, vol. 1, p. 751.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>The German diplomat Von Hassel wrote in his diary on June 15, 1941, "A rumor is spreading with astonishing unanimity . . . that a mutual understanding with Russia is inevitable, that Stalin is coming, and so forth." There was a lot of talk in Berlin about a "peaceful capitulation", Stalin's last trump. The rumor had it that in exchange for Germany's agreement to hold back from war he had agreed to let the Germans work the natural resources of the Ukraine and take over the Russian aviation industry. It is highly unlikely, and there is no documentary evidence for it, but how must he have been behaving to give rise to such humiliating rumors . . .

Ed. See Ulrich von Hassell, The von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944; the story of the forces against Hitler inside Germany, as recorded by Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, a leader of the movement (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971), pp. 197-198.

<sup>5</sup>When the German ambassador Von Schulenburg, who not long before had risked his life to warn the Kremlin that an attack was unavoidable, told People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Molotov on June 22 that war had begun, Molotov had cried, "We did not deserve that!" Indeed, Hitler had displayed the basest ingratitude.





## Footnotes - Chapter 25

<sup>1</sup>E.I. Martynov, Tsarskaia armia v fevral'skom perevorote. (Moscow: NKVM i RVS SSSR, 1927), pp. 20-22. The author was a lieutenant-general in the imperial Russian army.

<sup>2</sup>See G. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmyshleniia (Moscow, 1969), p. 239.

<sup>3</sup>Ed. See Harrison Salisbury, The 900 Days, p. 60.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Zhukov, Vospominaniia, p. 204; N. Kozlov and A. Zaitsev, Srazhaiushchiasia partia. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), p. 61; and a large number of equally respectable authors.

<sup>6</sup>See, for example, S. Lototskii, et. al., Armia Sovetskaia (Moscow: Politizdat, 1969), pp. 155-156.

<sup>7</sup>See, "Sovershenno sekretno. Tol'ko dlia komandovaniia", p.713; Promyshlennost' Germanii v period voiny, 1939-1945 (Moscow, 1956), p. 189.

<sup>8</sup>See, "Sovershenno sekretno . . .", p. 658; Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-1945 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967), p. 33; Dnevnik Gal'dera, vol. 3, book I, p. 161.

<sup>9</sup>Zhukov, Vospominaniia, p. 204.

<sup>10</sup>Velikaia Otechestvennaia, pp. 33, 53; "Sovershenno sekretno . . .", p. 88; Porazhenie germanskogo imperialzma vo vtoroi mirovoi voine. (Moscow, 1961), pp. 582, 583.

<sup>11</sup>Dnevnik Gal'dera, vol. 2, pp. 582, 583.

<sup>12</sup>Sometimes the troops of satellite countries are counted along with the Germans - 29 divisions, 900,000 men. See Velika Otechestvennaia, p. 33. We should note, however, that a) these troops were not immediately used, and b) their combat effectiveness was not high.

<sup>13</sup>"Sovershenno sekretno . . .", p. 726.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 730, 731.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., passim.

<sup>16</sup>German reconnaissance planes freely violated our border. It was forbidden to shoot them down. Pilots who disobeyed that order were court-martialed. F. I. Kuznetsov, the Commander of the Pribaltic region began a blackout of cities and other potential targets. On June 20, N. N. Voronov, the newly appointed commander of the anti-aircraft defenses, asked Zhukov for permission to extend that measure to other regions. "In reply I heard curses and threats directed at Kuznetsov. A short while later the commander of the Pribaltic region was directed to rescind his order. N. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), p. 173.

<sup>17</sup>On June 22 after the German invasion Voroshilov asked I. V. Tiulenev, commander of the Moscow Military District about that. Tiulenev was embarrassed. They had forgotten about an underground headquarters. Only Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, the People's Commissar of the Navy, had built such a shelter - on his own responsibility. The leaders of the Navy in general took the threat of war more seriously. As early as March 3, 1941 Kuznetsov, under pressure from the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Tributs, permitted his men to open fire without warning on German planes violating our airspace. German planes were fired at on March 17 and 18 at Libavaia (Liepaia) and near Odessa. Stalin and Beria chewed Kuznetsov out and forced him to cancel the order. Tributs kept up his pressure on the Commissar, and on June 21 the highest state combat readiness was declared in the Navy. Timoshenko and Zhukov did not do the same for the land forces. The war ships of the Baltic Fleet managed to get away into Kronshtadt with few losses. However, the evacuation of the Tallin garrison (50,000 men) was delayed because of

Voroshilov. As a result only 12,000 men broke through to safety. See Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, (1966, #10): 19-31.

<sup>18</sup>This was immediately noticed by the Germans. Halder wrote on the first day of war, "A number of command levels of the enemy knew nothing of the situation, and therefore on a number of sectors of the front there was practically no leadership of the troops from higher headquarters. Dnevnik Gal'dera, vol. 3, book I, p. 27.

<sup>19</sup>We payed dearly for that stupidity. Halder writes: "22 June . . . Border bridges across the Bug and other rivers are seized everywhere by our troops without a battle and undamaged. The complete surprise of our attack for the enemy is testified to by the fact that whole units were caught unawares in their barracks, airplanes stood at the airfields covered by canvas, and forward units suddenly attacked by our troops asked their commanders what they should do. (vol. 3, book I, p. 25 - our emphasis) Commanders who asked for instructions from higher command payed a cruel price. Many of them died in battle, some (including the commander of the Belorussian Military, District Pavlov, and his chief of staff Klimovskikh) were shot as a lesson to others. Their guilt was to wait as usual for orders from above, for orders that either were long delayed, or were senseless.

<sup>20</sup>Halder: "There is no trace of strategic retreat. It is entirely likely that the possibility of organizing such a retreat had been simply excluded . . . It would seem that thanks to their sluggishness the Russian command will not be able to organize strategic resistance to our attack in the near future. The Russians were forced to accept battle in the formations they were in when we attacked. Vol. 3, book I, p. 27.

<sup>21</sup>Salisbury, 900 dnei; blokada Leningrada, translated by Regina Todd (New York: Harper Colophon, 1973), pp. 129, 107.

<sup>22</sup>Sorge's report with Golikov's annotation surfaced in the sixties.

Golikov, at that time a marshal and deputy minister of defense, kept his head. He climbed up on a table, tore at his mouth with his fingers, screamed, etc. The old veteran was retired. There was no investigation. Other facts reveal that Golikov was not an honest man. Shtemenko recalls that during the war Front Commander Golikov often sent false reports to headquarters: "In those days of the most critical development of events on the Voronezh front it was impossible to get an objective picture from the reports of F. I. Golikov." S. Shtemenko, General'nyi shtab v gody voiny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 109; see also, p. 99.

<sup>23</sup>Someone named Kindermann in the Federal Republic of Germany has announced very recently that Sorge was freed on exchange. Kindermann claims to have something to do with the deal. According to his version, Sorge was executed in 1949. Out of the frying pan into the fire.

<sup>24</sup>Dnevnik Gal'dera, vol. 3, book I, p. 26.

<sup>25</sup>Having become Supreme Commander in Chief, Stalin on July 10, 1941 appointed his trusted Horse Army friends to head groups of fronts: Voroshilov (Northwest), Budennyi (Southwest), Timoshenko (West). Soon, in August and September the sickly child was laid to rest. As a result of the deplorable results of the experiment the whole troika had to be removed from commanding troops and were not permitted to do so again until the very end of the war. The incompetent strategists were kept on in honorable inactivity at Headquarters and on rare occasions ventured out to inspire the men at the fronts. In 1944 Voroshilov was even removed from the State Defense Committee.

<sup>26</sup>The Chief Artillery Administration supplies the troops with artillery and infantry arms but does not direct the combat use of artillery.

<sup>27</sup>Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, p. 183. Like Raskol'nikov yelling at Portfirii, "Who killed anybody!" "You did Rodion Romanovich, nobody else."

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 182.

<sup>29</sup>Authors. See the memoirs of L. Grachev, "Doroga ot Volkhova", Druzhba Narodov (1979, #9): 171.

<sup>30</sup>Interrogation of Keitel, June 17, 1945 in "Sovershenno sekretno ...", p. 648.

<sup>31</sup>Cited in A. Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizhni (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976), p. 200.

<sup>32</sup>Several memoirists including I. S. Konev have said that before that, in 1944, Stalin's petty tutelage over the fronts had noticeably weakened and commanders received a certain freedom of action. Ed. See. I. S. Konev, Zapiski kamanduiushchego frontom, 1943-1944 (Moscow: Nauka, 1972).

<sup>33</sup>Ed. S. M. Shtemenko, General'nyi shtab v gody voiny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968-1973); The Soviet General Staff at War (1941-1945), translated by Robert Daglish (Moscow: Progress, 1970).

<sup>34</sup>That was another figment of Stalin's imagination. What importance could it have had after the conferees at Yalta had agreed to four-power control of Berlin? Three-fourths of the city, gained at awful expense by Soviet soldiers, was turned over to the allies.

<sup>35</sup>Stalin, O Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1948), pp. 196, 197. Ed. The following quotations came from *ibid.*, pp. 413-415.

<sup>36</sup>A. Eremenko, I. Bagramian, B. Vannikov, N. Voronov, N. Kuznetsov have written much more truthfully . . . But the careful reader must find the first editions of their memoirs. In later editions careful editors have smoothed

the shaper criticisms with red pencils and scissors. And they were not able to say all that much the first time around . . .

<sup>37</sup>Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (1965, #12): 60. Similar statistics for the period up to March 31, 1945 may be found in "Sovershenno sekretno . . ." pp. 714-715.

<sup>39</sup>This finds unexpected confirmation in an official Soviet textbook, Kurs demografii, edited by Boiarskii (Moscow, 1967), p. 347. There mortality for all of the armies in the Second World War is put at 30 million. German deaths are said to have been six million. If we subtract losses of the allies and Japan, we find the losses of our army were approximately 21 million.

Errata and Addenda for High Treason by Vitaly N. Rapoport and Yuri Alexeev  
Translated and Edited by Bruce F. Adams

Chapter VII, footnote 2

Ed. V. V. Dushen'kin, Vtoraia Konnaia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968)

VIII, 9

Ed. S. Uritskii, "Krasnyi Kronshtadt vo vlasti vragov revoliutsii," in Grazhdanskaia Voina, 1918-1921, edited by A. S. Bubnov, S. S. Kamenev, and R. P. Eideman (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1928), vol. 1, pp. 358-374.

IX, 3

Ed. XIV S"ezd Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi Partii (b) 18-31 dekabria 1925 g. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1926), p. 502.

X, 28

add See also Todorskii, Marshal Tukhachevskii (Moscow: Izd-vo politicheskoi literatury, 1963).

XV, 1

Ed. XVI S"ezd Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi Partii (b). Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1934), pp. 282-289.

XV, 2 Ibid., pp. 476-489; XV, 3 Ibid., pp. 506-508; XV, 4 ibid., pp. 632-634.

XVI, 14

Ed. XVI S"ezd Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi Partii (b). Stenograficheskii otchet. (Moscow; Moskovskii rabochii, 1934), pp. 482-483.

XVI, 15

change Sem'nadtsatyi to XVII

XVI, 17 and 18

change Shest'nadtsatyi s"ezd to XVI S"ezd

XVII, 1

Ed. XVI S"ezd Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi Partii (b). Stenograficheskii otchet. (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1934), p. 36. Stalin's emphasis.

XVII, 11

This will be eliminated.

XVIII, 7

in body of footnote, insert where there appears (Printsevy) islands:  
Princes Islands (Kizil Adalar).

XX, 31

in body of footnote, replace the phrase "hold his tongue" with "play the fool"

footnotes on chart on p. 453

1. Velikaia otechestvennaia voina Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-1945 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969), pp. 33, 53.
2. G. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmyshleniia (Moscow: Novosti, 1969), pp. 205, 206, 209.
3. S. S. Lototskii, Istoriia voin i voennogo iskusstva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970), p. 157.
4. See Istoriia Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-1945, edited by P. N. Pospelov, 6 vols. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960-1965), vol. 1, p. 415.