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TITLE: Specialists and Professionals in the Policy Process in Czechoslovakia and Poland

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

Professors Jane Curry and Sharon Wolchik analyze the role of professionals and specialists in the policy-making processes of Poland and Czechoslovakia through an examination of both countries' manpower, regional planning and investment as well as information policies. Their research indicates that the political sensitivity of any particular issue area plays an important role in limiting media discussion and open exchange of opinions in public forums. Nonetheless, Curry and Wolchik conclude that political sensitivity does not determine the level of policy activity.

The authors identify considerable policy activity on the part of specialists and professionals in both countries. Polish and Czechoslovak research specialists identify and document problems with which public policy must deal. Various actors in the policy process use research results to support their positions. Specialists also lay out options and advocate different policy positions.

Professionals (factory managers, social workers, teachers, doctors, lawyers and journalists) play somewhat different roles in this process. Some are actively involved in the implementation of policy through their various bureaucratic roles. Others control the flow of information upon which the policy process depends. Finally, professionals may choose to serve as links between specialists and higher level policy makers. These various forms of behavior become more evident during periods of liberalization.

In general, the authors suggest, the primary problem confronting the political leaderships and professional communities of both countries is more one of how to best utilize those specialist skills which are available rather than one of control.

Important national patterns exist within the above generalizations. Most significantly, the Polish leadership was relatively capable of controlling professional and specialist input. For example, in comparison to Czechoslovakia, bureaucratic administrative personnel and controls in Gierek's Poland filtered out more potentially critical information from reports to the political leadership. Such practices also inhibited policy discussions in the media. These relative constraints kept Polish experts further from the policy process thereby preventing their expertise from triggering a liberalization process of the type which occurred in Czechoslovakia during 1968.

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**Introduction**

From the earliest days of the Soviet system, Western analysts have been interested in how policy is made in communist states. But, while a view of the policy-making process is often implicit in more general treatments of politics in communist countries, explicit focus on the policy-making process, and particularly on the role of actors other than the top political leaders in this process, is less common. Given the difficulty of studying the topic in these societies, much of Western scholarship has focused on policy outputs or the consequences of particular public policies. Other scholars, however, have attempted to examine the policy-making process itself, either by analyzing the making of public policies in particular areas or the role of various kinds of actors in policy-making,¹ or by formulating more general models of the policy-making process.² In recent years, in particular, they have come to ask how political actors other than the top political elite are involved in making and carrying out policy. Our research for this project focused on the role of one important group of political actors, specialists and professionals, in policy-making in three issue areas of varying political sensitivity in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Focusing on specialists and professionals, whose position in the policy-making process is legitimated by their specialized knowledge and skills and influenced by the values and styles of action of their profession, we have looked at the way specialized knowledge and professional skills are brought to bear on the making and implementing of public policies in these countries.
The role of specialists and professionals in policy-making in communist states is a question which has received a good deal of attention since these states were established. It is also a question which has become increasingly important, for scholars and policy-makers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as observers in the West, have argued that the continued economic development of these societies will depend on the efficient utilization of specialized knowledge. While analysts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union agree with the expectations of certain West European and American scholars that specialists will play an increasingly important role in policy-making in socialist states as these states become more developed economically, their framework for discussing such issues and their main areas of concern differ. East European and Soviet discussions of the role of experts tend to be couched in terms of the scientific-technological revolution. Drawing on terminology which was introduced first in the Soviet Union, these analysts argue that economic progress in the future will depend heavily on the extent to which scientific knowledge and technical expertise can be generated and incorporated into the day-to-day working of the economy and society. From this perspective, the chief concern is how efficiently such knowledge and expertise can be utilized in the making of public policy.

Western observers also point to the needs of economic development and modernization as the primary factors leading to increased participation of specialists and professionals in decision-making in these societies. The argument is often made, for example, that greater reliance on objective, rational criteria in the making of decisions and greater attention to the input of specialists are key factors in
overcoming the difficulties which socialist elites face in achieving desired levels of economic development or running advanced industrial economies. However, Western scholars also point to a second set of influences which may lead to an increased role for specialists and professionals in decision-making, that is, the impact which modernization has had in increasing the resources of specialists as well as the need for their skills. Thus, certain analysts argue that modernization has produced greater social diversity in socialist states and established the groundwork for the development of group identities and interests on the part of specialists and professionals. Given this perspective, Western scholars have tended to be more concerned with the implications which greater specialist participation in policy-making would have for the continuation of current political systems than have analysts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This focus on the potential political consequences of greater specialist input in policy-making and the corresponding problem of political control of specialist activities was particularly evident in earlier analyses of the question, but the argument that an increased role for specialists will eventually lead to a decrease in the Communist Party's control in certain areas of society, if not to political liberalization or democratization, is still found in more recent discussions.

Earlier studies of how scientific knowledge and specialized skills are dealt with in communist states have approached the question from several different perspectives. First, scholars have looked at the social background characteristics and previous experiences of members of the political and specialist elites, in an effort to trace changes in the ability of elites of different kinds to either use scientific
knowledge or specialized skills themselves or be receptive to the advice and input of others who possess such knowledge or skills. Although studies of this type sometimes have raised the question of how effectively scientific knowledge has been used in decision-making, their main focus has been on the issue of political control or the extent to which there has been an increase in expertise within the party and political leadership itself.

Other scholars have examined the training and characteristics of specialists and professionals and their interactions with others of similar training and skills. Guided in many cases by insights drawn from Western studies of professions and interest groups, these studies analyzed the resources, opportunities for organization, degree of cohesion, and similarity of attitudes of various groups of specialists and professionals, both within and outside of the bureaucracy. However, studies of this type seldom examined the way these factors influenced the actual participation of specialists and professionals in policy-making.

More recently, numerous scholars have looked at the way actors of these types have taken part in the making of policy in specific areas. Thus, scholars have analyzed the role of specialists in the formation of environmental policy, science policy, family and criminal law, and agricultural and educational policy, as well as their contribution to more general political reform. Most of these studies have focused on a single policy decision or area and are therefore limited to relatively short periods of time. With few exceptions, they also examine the Soviet rather than East European case.
Our research is closest to the approach taken in the latter group of studies. Thus, we investigated changes in the characteristics of different groups, training programs, the degree of interaction with specialists and professionals working in the same specialization, and affiliation with the formal associations open to individuals with different specializations of many of the professional and specialist groups involved in the making and implementing of demographic, industrial investment and location, and information policy. But, we were primarily concerned with how individuals with specialized knowledge and professional skills entered the policy-making process. Our research also differs from most previous research in this area in its focus on the role of such actors in policy-making in three different areas over an extended period of time. Although much of our discussion focuses on the role of specialists and professionals in the 1960s and 1970s, we also have looked at their role in policy-making in these areas prior to and after that time.

Our research focused on six main sets of questions. First, how do specialists and professionals influence the formation and implementation of public policy measures in each country? Are there consistent differences between the role of members of these groups in the two countries or within each country over time? Second, to what extent does the role of these actors vary according to the nature of the policy issue involved? Are the differences in the process by which policy is made according to the nature of the issue found in other political systems also evident in communist states, and do they influence the role of specialists and professionals in the process? Third, are certain specialists and professionals more likely than others to play a role in
policy-making and if so, what are the factors which explain these differences? Fourth, at what stage of the policy-making process and with what tools do specialists and professionals have an impact? What resources do specialists and professionals bring to bear and at what point? To what extent has the input of members of these groups into policy-making become institutionalized? Fifth, how do specialists and professionals interact within their own groups, with other groups of experts, with political leaders, including party and government officials, and with members of broader social groups? That is, to what extent do coalitions of specialists and professionals form which transcend disciplinary or professional boundaries? And how do members of these groupings interact with those actually responsible for making and carrying out policy? To what extent do members of the groups we are examining transmit mass desires to policy-makers? Finally, what are the political implications of the policy-making roles of specialists and professionals? To what extent do the activities of specialists and professionals in policy-making pose a threat to the continued dominance of the political leaderships in these countries and, conversely, to what extent do such individuals serve as agents for political change in their societies? How effectively is the input of these actors used in policy-making?

Given the similarity of the political structures of the two countries, we hypothesized that specialists and professionals would take part in policy-making in similar ways in Czechoslovakia and Poland despite important cultural and historical differences. We also expected to find an overall increase in the role of these political actors as these societies became more developed economically. This hypothesis was
based on the expectation that expert advice and the skills of professionals and specialists would become more important in policy-making as the economies advanced technologically and the issues facing policy makers became more complex. At the same time, we also expected that the extent of such influence, as well as the means available to specialists and professionals to enter the policy-making process, would depend a good deal on the political climate in each country at any particular time. While we expected the willingness of party leaders to solicit and use input from specialists and professionals in policy-making to be greater in the post-Stalin era than earlier, we also anticipated that there might be short-term variations in the ability of specialists and professionals to take part in policy-making that would correspond to fluctuations in the extent of openness in the political arena or emphasis on ideological control.

We also expected that the nature of the policy-making process itself, as well as the type of conflict involved, would differ the nature of the issue considered. This expectation was based in large part on the work of William Zimmerman and Donald Kelley, who have specified a number of factors that they argue will influence the role of particular actors in the policy-making process in communist states and, in the case of Zimmerman, the nature of the policy making process itself. Drawing on a framework developed by Theodore Lowi in the American context, Zimmerman argues that policy issues may be categorized as redistributive, regulatory, distributive, or protective/interactive, according to the extent to which the political goods involved are tangible and subject to disaggregation. He also argues that the policy-making process, and particularly the number and kind of actors
involved, differ according to these categories. All three of the policy areas we examined fall into Zimmerman's regulatory category, and are therefore areas in which we would expect specialists and professionals, as well as other groups, to play an important role. At the same time, the issues we examined differ significantly in their political sensitivity, a factor that Kelley argues has an important impact on the way policy is made in communist states. Thus, while we expected some involvement of specialists and professionals in all of the areas we examined, we anticipated that there would be less specialist and professional input into policy-making in more sensitive areas. In terms of the issues we examined, we hypothesized that specialists and professionals would play a larger role in policy-making in the demographic area than in industrial investment policy and a larger role in the latter issue area than in information policy.

We also expected that the ability of various types of specialists and professionals to take part in policy-making would depend on their resources, as individuals and as members of particular occupational or institutional groupings. The actors we examined are among those whom analysts such as Skilling posit would have the greatest chance of influencing policy in communist states, as they are generally well-educated, have specialized knowledge and professional skills, and channels of access to political leaders. In addition to the possession of specialized knowledge or professional skills which legitimate the entry of specialists and professionals into policy-making and are common to all the actors we examined, we hypothesized that other factors (personal contacts and other informal channels of influence as well as location in the capital rather than in the provinces) would give certain
specialists and professionals greater access to policy-makers and, therefore, allow them to play a greater role in policy formation. We also expected such access to vary according to the importance and type of institutional affiliation of the specialist or professional. In the case of professionals in particular, however, we also expected that, when they needed to make modifications of policy to fit their professional needs, those whose work was determined by the policy might benefit from their distance from the central authorities.

With regard to the stage of specialist and professional intervention in the policy-making process, we hypothesized that such actors would play a role at all stages of the process. We expected specialists to play a particularly important role in bringing new problems to the attention of political leaders and professionals to play a large role in implementing policy measures, but we expected actors of both types to participate at all stages from the recognition of a new problem to policy formulation to implementation and policy evaluation.

In terms of the interactions of specialists and professionals with others within their own specialization or profession, other groups of experts, and political leaders, we expected that the most relevant interactions from a policy-making perspective would take place in the informal, ad hoc groupings of persons with similar policy preferences H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths argue characterize policy-making in the Soviet Union. Thus, we anticipated that specialists and professionals within particular disciplines would share similar values, methods of analyzing problems and a propensity toward similar policy preferences. But with few exceptions we did not expect to see them entering the policy-making process as members of interest groups
organized and articulated along professional or disciplinary lines. Rather, our preliminary work led us to believe that, while the growing professionalization of occupations evident in these countries and sense of identity with one's career undoubtedly would have an influence on how particular actors would view particular policy problems, specialists' and professionals' concrete intervention in the policy-making process would reflect the influence of more immediate factors such as professional and personal values and needs, institutional affiliation, center-regional location, and personal or political ties to various sectors of the political leadership. The main exception to this tendency, we hypothesized, would occur on those issues which directly affected professional prerogatives or the status of particular professional or occupational groups.

Finally, we had conflicting hypotheses concerning the implications of specialists' and professionals' participation in policy-making for political control and political change in these societies. On the one hand, certain analysts have argued that increased input by these groups would eventually challenge the command nature of the political system. On the other hand, it is clear that the political leaders in these countries possess many resources to deflect such a challenge. As numerous scholars have argued, political leaders may coopt specialists and professionals by giving them material and other rewards for their cooperation and allowing them greater professional autonomy within certain bounds. It is clear that communist leaders also can control potential challenges to their authority by their large role in selecting, at least indirectly, those specialists and professionals who
will participate in policy-making and by their ability to structure the environment in which specialists and professionals carry out their work.

We used information from a variety of sources for our analysis. These included first of all written materials produced by participants in the policy-making process, including specialists and professionals, bureaucratic officials, and political leaders. Thus, we reviewed party and government documents, the mass media, specialized journals and magazines, and published and unpublished research reports of various research institutes and organizations.

We also used interviews with specialists, professionals, and policy-makers. These included thirty-seven interviews conducted in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1981, ten interviews conducted with specialists from Czechoslovakia in Western Europe and the United States in July 1982, and seventy interviews conducted in Poland in the summer of 1983. We also used earlier interviews Curry conducted with journalists and other professionals in Poland and Western Europe as well as her interviews with numerous Czechs and Slovaks involved with the mass media in Czechoslovakia.

Finally, we drew on secondary sources written by Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and Western scholars. These include descriptions of policy-making processes by former and current participants as well as theoretical analyses of policy-making and studies of the policies themselves.

As the case studies to follow illustrate, specialists and professionals play an important role in policy-making in both Czechoslovakia and Poland. Their role in this process is conditioned by several factors. The first of these is the fact that Czechoslovakia and
Poland both are communist political systems, in which one party dominates the political process and in which the political elites adhere, at least formally, to Marxism-Leninism as an official value system. These features of political organization and values have a number of implications for the way policy is made in these countries. In respect to the actors we examined, the most important of these is the fact that a single group of actors plays a clearly predominant role in decision-making. The organizational principles of communist states also mean that there are certain limits on the activities of specialists and professionals not found in non-communist political systems. These occur in terms of both intellectual options that may be considered and the means available to specialists and professionals for mobilizing support for particular policy alternatives. In the first area, policy problems must be addressed within the framework of Marxism-Leninism and the existing institutional and political structure. Although in practice, specialists and professionals may justify many potential policy prescriptions in Marxist-Leninist terms, there are certain conventions that must be respected in terms of how issues are discussed and presented to political leaders and, although debate among professionals and specialists tends to be less subject to ideological considerations than public discussions of problems intended for mass audiences, certain alternatives are ruled out because they conflict with central ideological values. In addition, there are clear limits in normal political times on the opportunities specialists and professionals have to organize independently of existing organizations and institutions to gain support for their particular policy preferences. In normal political times, the nature of the political system also means that
public opinion is a relatively weak resource for specialists and professionals, who must instead seek to manipulate the opinions of political leaders and the bureaucratic actors who oversee the formation and administration of policy on a day-to-day basis.

But, while these countries are one-party states, they are also complex, bureaucratic political systems. This fact means that there is a relatively large number of institutions and individuals involved in the making and administering of policy in any given area and thus, that there are a number of different targets and opportunities for input into policy-making at various stages, despite the Communist Party's ostensible dominance of the process. It also means that there is a great potential, if not likelihood, for conflict in the policy prescriptions of different institutional and individual actors as well as ample room for change in policy to occur at the stage of implementation.

The sections to follow illustrate how these factors influence the role of specialists and professionals in the specific policy areas we examined. We then discuss our results from the more general perspective of what they tell us about how policy is made in communist states, as well as the considerations of the political control of experts and the effective use of specialized knowledge and professional skills raised earlier.
Policy decisions related to demographic and manpower issues were the least politically sensitive of those issues we examined. However, even within this issue area, the political sensitivity and significance of issues varied somewhat over time in both countries. The significance of demographic issues also has differed in the two countries due to different demographic trends, different leadership perceptions, and the particular position of the Catholic Church in Poland. Specialists and professionals have been involved in policy-making in this area in both Czechoslovakia and Poland; however, the extent of their involvement and the extent to which their input has been reflected in actual policy measures differs substantially in the two countries. In Czechoslovakia, there also have been important differences in these respects in different time periods.

Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia, demographic issues have been the subject of considerable concern throughout the post World War II period. Czechoslovakia is also one of the East European countries which has adopted an explicitly pro-natalist approach to demographic questions. As the variety and frequency of measures adopted illustrate, demographic policy is an important and problematic issue in Czechoslovakia. Elite concern centers around the low birth rates, which date from the mid-1950's. To a certain extent, this decline in the birth rate, which persisted with
slight variations to the late 1960's, paralleled the drop in rates of natural increase which occurred in many Western countries as they industrialized. However, in Czechoslovakia, as well as in several other East European states, the decline in the birth rate has been greater than the level of economic development alone would suggest and reflects the additional impact of certain aspects of the strategy of economic development chosen after the establishment of communist-led systems, including high employment rates of women in the productive ages, severe housing shortages, and insufficient child care facilities and services. The liberal abortion law introduced in Czechoslovakia in late 1957 also contributed to the decline in the rate of natural increase.

The consequences of such low birth rates include the aging of the population and the reduction of the future labor force. The latter effect has been particularly disturbing to Czech and Slovak leaders because the country already has experienced labor shortages. In addition, the fact that rates of reproduction in Slovakia, although also declining, remained higher than in the Czech Lands, raised the possibility of eventually upsetting the ethnic balance.

Measures to improve the birth rate also, however, have their costs, as Czech and Slovak elites were to discover. Pro-natalist policies which encourage women to pay more attention to their maternal roles and in practice remove young women from the labor force for long periods of time decrease the current labor force. They also pose problems for economic managers and enterprise directors who must accommodate the maternity leave and return of women in the childbearing ages. Determined efforts to increase the number of births also pose certain medical problems and raise the possibility that unwanted children will
not receive a proper upbringing. The problematic nature of policy decisions in this area, then, and the resulting need for specialists to evaluate the relative merits of various approaches, may be expected to create favorable conditions for specialists to have an input in policy-making.

At the same time, demographic policy does not involve issues which are particularly sensitive in ideological terms. With the exception of the early post-World War II period, discussion of the birth rate problem did not involve any major contradiction of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Nor did it represent a threat to the leading role of the communist party or the power of incumbent party leaders. Specialists could thus depict policy questions in this area as largely technical ones, that is, issues which should be decided on the basis of judgments made by those with the specialized knowledge to evaluate population trends and the probable impact of various policy measures.

Discussion of population related questions has gone through several stages in the post-World War II period in Czechoslovakia. These stages differed in terms of the political sensitivity of demographic issues, the latitude available to specialists and professionals for entering the policy-making process, and the extent of specialist and professional input into policy-making. They also differed in terms of the main issues under discussion. As the discussion to follow illustrates, specialists and professionals in Czechoslovakia played a large role in bringing population problems to the attention of political leaders. They also have been involved in proposing public policy measures to deal with these problems, debating the outcomes of possible measures, and implementing and evaluating the results of measures.
adopted. Further, their input into policy-making in this area has become increasingly institutionalized.

In the immediate post-World War II period, demographers, statisticians, and officials responsible for public health focused on the question of how best to overcome the effects of the war on the population. During this period, however, as well as in the early communist period, demographic policies were seen as part of larger social and medical questions, and policies which affected population trends were enacted as part of more general social welfare programs or economic plans. 24

As the Stalinist system was consolidated in Czechoslovakia after 1948, open discussion of population problems ceased. Political leaders, as well as certain intellectuals, accepted the Marxist dictum that the population should increase automatically under socialism, and little serious attention was given to the population issue. Statisticians continued to monitor population trends, but it was not until the mid-1960s that the population situation was openly identified as a problem and public discussion of demographic issues once again emerged, this time focused on the decline in the birth rate.

Specialists and professionals, particularly those working in the State Statistical Office, played a key role in bringing about a change in the approach to population issues. Hampered in the early 1950's by ideological constraints as well as the undeveloped state of demography and the other social sciences, 25 they nonetheless continued to monitor population trends and were eventually able to persuade political leaders of the need to address demographic questions more systematically. 26 Their ability to challenge the earlier approach to
demographic issues was facilitated by both objective demographic trends and the change in the political climate after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the first area, the birth rate continued to decline, despite elite expectations; particularly after 1953, it became increasingly obvious that previous expectations and explanations concerning population issues were not adequate. The change in the political climate in Czechoslovakia which occurred after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU facilitated this realization, for demographers and other specialists were able to use the slight relaxation of ideological pressure which occurred during this period to conduct the first empirical investigations of the causes of population problems. Organized by the State Statistical Office, these studies focused on women's family plans and employment status; factors influencing women's desire to limit family size; fertility levels in newly built housing developments in Prague; and other population-related issues.27

The development of an empirical orientation toward population questions and the ability of specialists and professionals to play a role in policy-making in this area were aided by the establishment of the State Population Commission in 1958. Set up to oversee the operation of the 1957 law legalizing abortion,28 the Population Commission eventually came to play an important role in formulating demographic policy. In cooperation with the State Statistical Office, the Commission organized further research on a number of population-related issues, including expenditures for children; the adequacy of urban and rural living conditions; marriage, contraception, and abortion; the success of students with working mothers; and women's situation at work.
and at home. The results of these studies formed the basis of a more realistic approach to population issues.

The growing self-awareness of demographers and the development of demography as a profession also had an influence on policy-making in this area. Members of the State Population Commission wrote the first post-Second World War textbooks for use in new courses on demography in several university departments, and the number of courses also increased, particularly in faculties of natural sciences and economic geography departments. In 1959 the State Statistical Office began publishing a specialized journal, Demografie, four times a year to report the results of demographic research. It also issued several collections of demographic research results in 1959, 1961, and 1962.

As the result of these developments, demographers and other specialists working on population-related issues began to acquire both the legitimacy and the tools to enter policy debates concerning population problems. But their opportunities to use these tools to influence policy and the number of specialists involved during this period appear to have been rather limited. Certain specialists were able to conduct research, and an institution was available to serve as a forum for articulating policy prescriptions and contacting members of the political elite. The widespread participation of demographers and other specialists in the formulation of population policy, however, occurred only in the 1960's and was influenced by the more general theoretical renewal that led up to the political reform of 1968.

Whereas demographers and specialists in the State Statistical Office and elsewhere working on population-related issues were the main specialists involved in discussing demographic policy in the 1950's, in
the 1960's a number of other specialists, such as economists, psychologists, and sociologists, as well as managers, educators, physicians, other health-care professionals, and representatives of the mass organizations took part in debates about demographic issues. For a short period, larger groups of citizens were also involved, particularly members of the women's organizations.

The nature of specialist involvement in the policy-making process also changed during this period. Whereas the main role of experts during the 1950's and early 1960's was to bring a new problem to the attention of the political elites, specialists in the 1960's took active roles in arguing for the adoption of various population measures and evaluating the success of policies after they were adopted. In doing so, they continued to use scientific expertise as a primary tool of influence; however, particularly in the mid- to late 1960's, they also used other resources, including links with broader groups of citizens, to support their positions. 33

During the early 1960's specialists used professional meetings, articles in specialized journals, and formal and informal contacts with the political elites to raise previously undiscussed issues and point out possible conflicts which might arise from the adoption of particular policy measures. 34 This phase, which coincided with the renewal of theoretical activity that preceded the reform era, saw a gradual extension of the limits of debate on many types of social issues. At the same time, however, debate over various policy alternatives remained confined to the elite level.

In the mid- to late 1960's the number of groups involved in discussion of population issues increased. Although the most important
actors continued to be political and specialist elites, debate over the consequences and desirability of various population measures spread beyond the elite level to include certain members of those groups which would be most directly affected by the outcome of the debates. In these conditions certain specialists came to serve as a conduit for bringing the desires of citizens to the attention of political decision-makers.

The debates over demographic policy in the 1960's centered around several issues. First, specialists, professionals, and policy-makers debated the best means of increasing the birth rate, including the relative merits of positive incentives and such measures as restricting the grounds for abortion or access to contraceptives. Specialists also discussed the role of women in contributing to the low birth rate and how best to deal with the fact that women were both workers and mothers. A related issue involved the costs and benefits of supporting women to remain at home to care for small children or expanding public child care facilities. Finally, specialists and policy-makers considered the economic aspects of various pro-natalist measures, including the immediate and long-term economic costs of having sizeable numbers of women temporarily withdraw from the labor force to have children.

In the course of these debates, specialists and professionals formed informal coalitions with other experts and bureaucratic officials to support particular policy positions. At times these coalitions also included representatives of the mass organizations and members of broader social groups. One of the most important of these coalitions in terms of its impact on the making of demographic policy included members of the State Population Commission, sociologists and demographers employed in state research institutes, such as the Research Institute
for the Study of Public Opinion and the Research Institute on the Living
Standard in Bratislava, and intellectuals who were members of the
Women's Committee. Particularly during the late 1960's, specialists and
officials from these organizations worked to encourage party leaders to
take action on a wide variety of population-related issues. They also
translated the desires of women as reflected in survey research and
public opinion polls on a number of demographic questions to political
decision-makers. 37

This and other coalitions often included specialists and
professionals from a variety of different disciplines, and experts with
the same speciality frequently held opposing views on particular demo-
graphic issues. There were at times certain common aspects to the
analyses of experts in the same discipline which contrasted with those
of other specialists. Most demographers, for example, appear to have
favored the use of positive incentives to encourage childbearing and
opposed restricting the grounds for abortion; on the whole, demographers
in their published works also tended to support efforts of leaders of
the women's organization to improve women's situation and ensure women's
right to work. At the same time, however, opinion among demographers
was extremely divided concerning the best solution for care of small
children, and certain demographers adopted positions which, in their
opposition to the employment of women with small children, were closer
to those most often taken by economists. 38

Thus, similar policy perspectives and personal acquaintance
were more important factors in the formation of policy coalitions than
disciplinary training or institutional affiliation. Specialists in
Czechoslovakia, that is to say, did not, even during the reform period,
take part in policy-making in this issue area as members of interest groups based on occupational or institutional grounds. Rather, even though members of certain of the professions and specializations involved did participate in organized action to further the interests of their particular occupational group, their participation in policy debates concerning population issues occurred in the *ad hoc*, shifting, informal coalitions Skilling and Griffiths argued characterize specialists' intervention in policy-making in the Soviet Union. However, certain of these informal coalitions have lasted for fairly long periods of time and, although the coalitions are informal and based on agreement on policy preferences rather than purely formal position or institutional affiliation, members of particular coalitions have used formal organizations and groups called into existence by the political leadership, such as the Population Commission and interdisciplinary research teams, to pursue their aims.

The group of specialists and professionals who appear to have the greatest influence on the making of population policy in Czechoslovakia, for example, has remained remarkably stable since the early 1960's despite normalization and the many changes associated with the end of the reform period. Working through established channels, such as the Population Commission and the various research teams set up to conduct research on population issues, as well as through informal contact with party and government officials, many of the same individuals have been involved in discussion of policy in this area for the last twenty years. 39

The impact which specialists had on the formation of policy during this period is evident in a number of the pro-natalist measures
adopted in the late 1970's and early 1970's. Research conducted by
demographers and sociologists formed the basis for the adoption of
numerous policy measures, including increased aid to families with young
children and young married couples; expanded paid maternity leave;
increases in children's allowances; and the one-time payment after the
birth of a child.\textsuperscript{40} Formally recommended by the Population Commission,
these measures were adopted by the government and form the core of the
government's pro-natalist policy. Demographers and other specialists
and professionals who opposed restriction of the grounds for abortion,
however, were less successful in influencing policy. Despite the
efforts of numerous specialists, and in contradiction to the results of
survey research which showed the majority of Czech and Slovak women to
be against restricting abortion,\textsuperscript{41} substantial limitations on access to
abortion were imposed in the late 1960's and early 1970's. But, as the
fact that most women who want abortions eventually have them illustrates,
specialists and professionals have an important influence on this aspect
of demographic policy at the stage of implementation.

The end of the reform era had an impact on policy-making in
this area as in others in Czechoslovakia, but it does not appear to have
resulted in any greatly diminished role for specialists and professionals.
Certain specialists who played a major role in the debates of the 1960's
and were active in the reform movement are no longer in their previous
positions and appear to take no part in policy-making at present.
Others, however, have been removed from formal positions of responsibil-
ity, but continue to practice their specialties and participate in
discussions of population issues from less visible research positions.
There are also certain limitations on the subject which may be debated,
and discussion of policy issues is once again confined largely to the elite level.

However, in spite of these limitations, specialists continue to take part in the making of policy in this area at both the policy planning and policy evaluation stages. The input of specialists and professionals into policy-making in this area also has been increasingly institutionalized. Thus, while greater care must be given to framing research questions in acceptable Marxist-Leninist terms, empirical research continues on a broad variety of population-related issues. Researchers at the Institutes on the Living Standard and Public Opinion in Bratislava, for example, completed several major surveys of the impact of pro-natalist measures on family life and women's status in the mid-1970's. Sociologists and demographers employed in the section of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs established in 1969 to deal with questions relating to women and the family continue to conduct surveys on demographic questions, and the Population Commission also has sponsored several research projects. There are a number of interdisciplinary research teams devoted to population issues, and research on demographic trends is one of the main research tasks in the most recent five year research plan. In addition, the Research Institute on Public Opinion in Prague continues to carry out short-term polls related to population issues.

The coordinating body for this research, as well as the focal point for specialists' participation in the making policy in this area, remains the Population Commission. Now headed by a vice-premier of the federal government, the Commission continues to be charged with monitoring the effects of population policy and fostering pro-natalist attitudes
on the part of the population. Comprised of representatives (usually deputy ministers) of the various ministries involved in making population policy (including Health, Labor and Social Affairs, Culture, Education, and Finance), representatives of certain mass organizations, such as the unions and the women's organization, and specialists from the universities and research institutes, the Commission meets several times a year to discuss and evaluate population policies. Its Secretariat, headed by a well-known expert on demographic questions, also coordinates research on population-related topics. The impact of the Population Commission in determining demographic policy was summarized by an official of the Secretariat of the Commission who noted that its influence depended not so much on the quality of its deliberations, but on the fact that its recommendations now carry the weight of law, as they are signed by a vice-premier of the government. Nonetheless, although the body's authority clearly derives from its status as an organ of the government, specialists and professionals on the commission play an important role in determining what recommendations the Commission will make, and its recommendations clearly reflect the results of research conducted by specialists and professionals.

Since the adoption of the comprehensive measures discussed above in the early 1970s, specialists and professionals have had an impact in this area largely in implementing and evaluating the existing pro-natalist approach. This change in role appears to be due not so much to the changed conditions in Czechoslovakia after the end of the reform period as to the (often temporary) closure which appears to follow periods of extensive debate and controversy once a decision is reached in many political systems. Asked by the government to conduct a
review of population policies and recent demographic trends in late 1981, for example, the Population Commission proposed only minor modifications of current policies. But, while most experts who have an input in this area appear to share the view of those affiliated with the Population Commission that the basic direction of the existing approach is correct, there is some indication that a new approach to population issues is being considered currently as an alternative to the aggressively pro-natalist orientation which now informs policy in this area. Bureaucrats responsible for population-related policies in a number of ministries for example, recently have echoed the doubts expressed by certain demographers and other specialists who follow population trends concerning the usefulness of pro-natalism. Certain specialists and professionals thus appear to be contributing at present to a re-evaluation or redefinition of the terms of the problem in this area.

Poland

In Poland, demographic problems have been particularly complex in the post-war period. At the same time, although population problems were initially far more serious in Poland than in Czechoslovakia and the government's battle with the Catholic Church focused in the fifties and sixties on ethical questions like abortion, political leaders in Poland have taken population policy much less seriously. In effect, they have referred to population levels and the issues of women's place in the work force and of family development in speeches but then not formulated or encouraged the formulation of real policy. This has meant that demographic and manpower questions have been propaganda issues while
research and policy formulation have remained academic exercises to a larger extent than in Czechoslovakia.

The dramatic losses in population caused by World War II as well as the postwar settlement problems legitimated research on demographic and manpower problems from the beginning of the communist era. Specialists and professionals (many of whom were trained and had worked in the pre-war period) documented the population discontinuities caused by the massive wartime losses in population and the potential of a natural postwar "baby boom." They also documented, to the extent possible, the destruction of both housing and industry and the need for a massive commitment of labor to rebuild and begin the initial industrialization programs. Finally, along with Party and government leaders, demographers and geographers mapped out the massive population turnover and resettlement resulting from the western shift of Poland's boundaries and the construction of new industrial centers like Nowa Huta, built outside Krakow to dilute the conservatism of the population. Because of the immediacy of the postwar population problems and the availability of politically convenient solutions -- labor intensive construction and industrial projects coupled with promises of a "new life and new Poland" -- their work focused not on necessary mechanisms for changing policy but on mapping out and documenting the problems emerging from the war and population resettlement. In effect then, there was no policy made that was deliberately keyed to either manpower needs or pro-natalism. Instead, the imperatives of rebuilding the country and its infrastructure as well as the baby boom that was a natural outgrowth of a return to normalcy and an optimism among the younger, childbearing generations that life would improve brought a natural population increase. Pre-war
laws, prompted by the Polish Catholic Church which blocked abortion and family planning, remained on the books.

In the years after the Six Year Plan and the liberalization of 1956, the question of population and of women's place in the workforce and society was taken up, on an ideological level, by both the top political leaders (Gomulka and Gierek) and, in opposition to them, by the Catholic Church hierarchy. But debate over these issues, even when it appeared in the press, centered not so much on developing either an anti-natalist or pro-natalist policy, or on increasing women's equality or insuring women's commitment to the home. Rather it reflected other "veiled" issues: the rights of individuals to determine their own lifestyle patterns; the failure of the consumer sector and decreases in standard of living and the availability of basic necessities; and the need to "buy off" or depoliticize contentious sections of the population. The result of this was that, even when there have been dramatic shifts in leadership positions on these issues, they have had relatively little impact on actual policy. There have not been significant shifts in policy or in the positions held by professionals and specialists dealing with this area, despite change at the top.

Leadership postures on demography and manpower issues changed dramatically with Gierek's rise to power. For Gomulka, the number of children born in Poland after the War was a convenient explanation for the low standard of living. In 1959, for instance, Gomulka gave what became his classic explanation for the economic growth slow down in the consumer sector after the promises of 1956:

... there are still people in Poland who belly-ache against socialism because of the lack of meat on
market. If capitalist England had the same natural increase as Poland does, its standard of living would be dropping constantly. 47

He went on to add, in this talk, that "our numerous children" put "considerable burdens and difficult obligations on us, their fathers." 48

The Gierek regime's public posture, on the other hand, was that the natural birthrate would have to increase to three children per two parents and that, as he promised, "it is essential that a broad program be developed prescribing forms of assistance for families rearing children and in particular for large families." 49 The broader propaganda that was based on this position further stressed that in Poland in the year 2000, life would be set up for individual family development.

Ironically, as the regime of Edward Gierek began to take a more and more articulated pro-natalist stand and encourage women to give more importance to "family," as opposed to the work world, the investment made in housing, childcare, and consumer goods dropped dramatically. 50 The impact of this drop was further increased by the simultaneous maturing of the "baby boom" generation into a childbearing cohort group and the increased inflation rate and pressure on managers to produce, whatever the social cost. All of these factors made single-wage earner multiple-child families problematic. At the same time they also decreased women's employability, since factory managers neither wanted to take the risk of hiring women who might quit to have children, or make investments in on-site daycare. 51

To a much larger extent than in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the church has been a significant actor in this policy area. Pressure for a pro-family and pro-natalist posture throughout the
post-war period has come from the Catholic Church either as a part of its religious activity or in veiled political statements. The two major themes of the Church have been a demand for a return to anti-abortion legislation and attacks on the policies of the secular authorities as leading to a breakdown in family structures and stability.\textsuperscript{52}

On the first theme, the Church has been basically unsuccessful in pushing its cause so far. Abortion legislation has not been changed in Poland since 1957, either in response to Church pressure or to follow the models of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Instead, it stands as a symbol of secularization.\textsuperscript{53} The major impact of the Church on the actions of individual doctors, resulting in the public or private refusal of some doctors to do elective abortions, and on the individual decisions of women about whether to elect abortions or not has not been reported or studied.\textsuperscript{54} However, this impact on individual decisions appears to have been particularly strong in the peasant areas, keeping the peasant birth rate disproportional to the urban birth rate, in spite of the low quality of services available to rural populations.\textsuperscript{55} It has been taken as more symbolic opposition to government policy by many urban dwellers who ignore the Church's exhortations in this area.

In the area of social morals, the Church has made a far broader case for investment in and encouragement of the family unit. In the process, it has also made use of its own journalists and specialists from outside the Church's institutional limits. Catholic journals and documents have argued that the pressure for women to leave the home and enter the workplace and the failure of the state to provide family services and support have caused many of the social problems which now exist in Poland. In arguing this, they have stressed the need for large
families and for a family centered (as opposed to state institution centered) life. In the Gomulka era this issue was marked as a battleground between the state and the Church. In the Gierek era, the state and Church ostensibly shared common interests in the development of the family and the encouragement of population growth. But, in fact, the Church's own family council (composed of secular specialists and priests) was formed and active before the Gierek regime responded by setting up a Population Commission (also set up as a result of the deadline set by the United Nations Population Council's international meeting of national Population Commission representatives in 1975); requesting its own Institute of Marxism-Leninism to provide documentary evidence of the needs of families in Poland; and sanctioning population growth as a key research topic for the latter half of the seventies.

Within this institutional framework and the environment of low investment over long periods of time in consumer goods and services (including housing and medical care) as well as the particularly Polish problem of a very cyclical growth rate pattern, specialists and professionals have focused on demographic and manpower problems from a very different perspective than their colleagues in Czechoslovakia. This has been facilitated by the larger margin for at least "veiled criticism" of the regime which has existed in Poland throughout the postwar period rather than simply in times of liberalization. In Poland, rather than encourage a pro-natalist policy, which many demographers concerned with population growth rates have argued is both unnecessary and dangerous, those interested in population questions have focused on the questions of social policy and quality of life instead. As a result, professional and specialist opinion on demographic and manpower questions has
concentrated on medical issues related to mortality and life span
(referring both to the problems of poor medical care and the problem of
an uneven birth rate resulting in periods with a smaller population of
working age than in the pre- and post-working age groups); issues
related to the social minimum, living standards and expectations, and
living conditions as well as the perceptions of them among different
groups in the society; and the process and impact of social and regional
mobility. Inherent in all of these concerns has been the basic question
of the viability of existing economic strategies and foci of government
investment. In both the sixties and seventies, discussion of these
issues often also involved criticism of economic programs.

There have been marked differences in the opinions of professionals
and specialists on many of these issues. On questions directly related
to the role of women, for example, professionals and specialists held
widely divergent views on the utility of women's work in the home and
its social and economic consequences. This division of opinion, however,
related less to views concerning population control or expansion than to
different opinions concerning the proper way of rearing children and the
economic needs of women and the state. As a result of the failure of
the issue to be resolved at any point, the split and the composition of
professional and specialist actors on each side has remained relatively
constant over the entire postwar period. And, even apparent shifts in
elite policy preferences do not bring with them the rise or demise of
specialists or their policy preferences. 59

As in Czechoslovakia, specialists and professionals have
formed informal policy coalitions around these issues. The divisions
among them are not based strictly on disciplinary lines, although there
does tend to be a distinction between sociologists who concern themselves with women's issues, demographers who wish to see stability in the population rate, and those sociologists and educators concerned with social policy and education who have tended to highlight the need for mothers to be present in the home to substitute for the services not available from the state and to provide children with a "warm mother" and supervision. Finally, there has been a tendency, given Poland's long periods of limited or no growth economy, among economists to regard women as a reserve and ultimately disposable labor force.

The membership of each of these groups has been fairly stable since the mid-fifties. Individual specialists who advocate, on the one hand, facilitating childbearing by women or, on the other, encouraging their presence in the workforce, coalesce into and shifting patterns of informal contacts cutting across institutional and disciplinary lines.60 These are periodically brought together at conferences and in collaborative efforts initiated by scholars in ministries and scholarly institutions with or without the visible support of policy-makers themselves.61 Individuals have developed reputations as to their basic lines of arguments and are called upon when a given line of argument is sought. This was clearest in the seventies. Established scholars and researchers were able to get their research funded in spite of attempts in the early seventies to tailor research to current regime concerns--they simply attached themselves to a project team doing research with policy implications they advocate.62 This tactic, which is also used by specialists in Czechoslovakia, has resulted in many interdisciplinary research teams emerging under broad titles and encompassing a number of ministry and scholarly institutes in the funding process. And, even though there are
clear sponsors for much of this research (institutes or ministries which fund the project), the policy interests of the funding agency or their need for support appears to have been largely irrelevant to all aspects of the research development except the selection of a research director. In this case, much depended on the institutional and personal ties of the leading scholars seeking funding.

The policy advocacy process by specialists in both the sixties and seventies involved the informal presentation of data to policy-makers. In general, this occurred either through personal channels or through a search for information by middle level bureaucrats leaning in a specific policy direction. These individuals (ministers, department chairmen, or Party department officials) would use scholarly data that had been published in journals, used in mass media articles, or put out as conference papers or reports. Most often, individual specialists, unless they had become politically active and visible, would not be involved or referred to directly. Occasionally, one would be asked for data or to write a speech or consultancy report. These requests, however, were very infrequent in Poland and involved the same few individuals repeatedly. The choice of these individuals reflected their political involvement (very uncommon among population experts), the visibility of their work in popular journals, and the 'fit' of their known positions and the policy preferences of the elites. The fact that research and data were used either indirectly or ex post facto encouraged the production of data supporting a variety of policy directions. This pattern of usage also discouraged the passage of comprehensive legislation since most of the points on which data was sought were limited and usage specific.
In the Gomulka era, there was far less reference to scholarship by the top leadership. It was essentially allowed to develop and organize itself with little internal direction. And, it had little reverberation unless occasionally it became a part of a mass media campaign and was then responded to as such. Most of the policy patterns that emerged in the area of demographic and manpower policy were the result of broader social phenomena. Or, in some cases, interest groups which coopted scholars to do research for them used that research to justify policy changes that they sought.

Among the most active of these interest groups in the sixties and seventies were the League of Women, the Polish Family Planning Association, and the Catholic Church groups. Their power depended, in part, on the broader political climate. Open advocacy by these groups began in 1956 when a liberal abortion law was passed after a relatively open press discussion of the dangers and uncontrollability of backroom abortions and open opposition from the Catholic Church and Catholic organization delegates in parliament. Its passage, not really supported by the medical profession initially, was a result of political factors, including the desire of the regime to counter-act the growing power of the Catholic Church in a time of liberalization, to follow the Soviet example, and to appeal to the newly urbanized and liberalized female population, rather than a reflection of the actions of specialists and professionals. However, the statisticians and medical workers that had kept track of what were abortion related injuries and deaths were helpful in providing information to justify this new bill and in allowing it to be considered a social issue. With the passage of this law, there was encouragement for a group of women, political activists, and a
few individual doctors to form a Family Planning Association and begin
to provide birth control information and to distribute birth control
pills. Specialists who had been involved in researching these questions
(the number of uncared for children, problems with high birth rates in
low income areas, and the needs of women in the workforce) came together
to form the core of this group.67

The Family Planning Association and the League of Women have,
since the middle fifties, sponsored research to support policy issues,
usually limited in scope, of concern to them. In some cases, special-
ists and professionals have initiated this collaboration. In other
cases, officials of the organizations have sought out particular indivi-
duals to do research for them. Researchers interested in women's needs
in the workforce and the childcare problems of women, for example, went
to the League of Women for funding or for a publishing forum.68 Those
concerned with health care, problems of large families, and negligence
in child care have worked with the Family Planning Association. The
representatives of these organizations, aware as they are of leadership
policy directions, use the data that their scholars have presented when
they take their case to policy makers.69

In the sixties, specialists doing research sponsored by these
groups focused on the question of whether the existing policy positions
were actually being carried out. There was thus much reporting of
managers' unwillingness to hire women because of their family obliga-
tions and the unequal burden of women in the home. Pro- and anti-
natalist groups sought medical and sociological opinion as to the
medical and psychological dangers of large and small families, the
necessary funding for providing the facilities increases in population
would require, and the actual medical and childcare facilities available in workplaces. The results of this research, however, had little resonance. Ministries were more concerned with production than with social policy, so no attempt was made to sanction managers or medical personnel.

The post-1956 period also saw the beginning of attitudinal surveying in Poland. The most prevalent subject related to demographic issues was the perceived needs and lifestyle of different groups in the population. Research was also done on the problems of working women and the behavior patterns and ideological stances of populations in new settlements as well as on patterns of settlement. Much of this research, coupled with increasingly broad and detailed statistical collections on various issues, was published in the various scholarly journals of sociologists, demographers, economists, and social policy experts or circulated in limited numbers of copies. These research projects were not, however, large scale or repetitive.

In this period too, the advocacy patterns of various popular journals emerged. These were based, to a large extent, on the readership base of a given journal and, in the sixties, its political posture vis-a-vis nationalist issues. During this period, some limited advocacy of pro-natalist policies as well as clear criticism of state social welfare policy emerged in various journals both in the form of advocacy on specific and limited issues and the use of issues such as manpower distribution and pronatalism to veil broader issues — criticism of the state bureaucracy or attempts to appeal to the Church for support. In this way journalists came to use and publicize specialists' research.

In the Gierek period, there was an initial appeal to
professionals and specialists to join in the policy formulation process. Formal and public advisory commissions were also called together to provide Gierek with specialized expertise with which to make policy. The Institute of Marxism Leninism, for example, became a well-funded socio-logical and economic research institute having on its staff or as consultants some of Poland's top economists and sociologists. It organized a national and regular comprehensive survey of attitudes and living conditions using as research bases some of Poland's largest industrial centers. This data was to be the base for the resource papers that were produced. In addition, although the strictures and controls were increased on research topics— at least formally— increased money was promised for research, for social welfare projects and for investment in the consumer sector. On this model, ministries and government commissions also increased their investment in their own research groups. As a result, a large number of research projects, groups and institutions were activated and supposedly directed toward the actual formulation of policy. But, in reality, there was little coordination of investment with the promises and advice.

This was particularly true in the area of demographic and manpower policy where the promises were, themselves, in conflict. On the one hand, the Gierek regime stressed that it was going to increase industrialization in Poland and construct new factories. This would require increased labor. On the other hand, it promised increased benefits to families and stressed the importance of the extended family. Going along with this was an increase in the early seventies in maternity benefits. Ultimately, it was the interests of industrialization that
were paramount, and the needs of the consumer sector were responded to only as long as there was loan money for imports.

The impact of specialists on policy during this period seems, at best, to have been minimal. Even as much empirical research was going on in all areas, specialists reported that they were not heard, their reports not read, and when they had direct access to any policy maker, it was clear that criticism was not sought. A State Population Commission was not formed until 1976 and then was left largely to specialists and not policy makers. And, no Family Commission was ever actually organized—although one was announced in the mid-seventies.

The increase in maternity benefits in the late 1970's is an illustration of the limited impact of specialists and professionals on policy-making in this area under Gierek. Although there was some foreboding about the overheating of the economy, there was little support among specialists for the increase in maternity leave benefits. Statisticians and demographers, for example, saw pressure to increase the birth rate as dangerous since it would merely further disbalance the age cohort groupings: without it, they predicted that the baby boom generation would replicate itself in a limited fashion. The statisticians and those who worked with them to draw up questions for survey research were simply concerned primarily with demonstrating the problems of real daily life. The pressure for these maternity benefits seems rather to have come from high level policy makers in the Ministry of Labor (headed by Anton Rajkiewicz, a prominent professor in social welfare who had long advocated maternity leaves as socially responsible), and advisors to the Party leadership who served on committees with vocal advocates of increased benefits for women. They perceived that this
would please the baby boom generation in a relative cheap fashion since managers reported that women were not stable workers anyway, Solidarity demands had included maternity leaves, and research had long stressed the problems of working women, either to call for increased aid for women or to encourage pro-natalist policy. It also got support from those who advocated that mothers should be in the home — although their support was limited by the nature of the maternity leave policy that was passed. 81

In this period, as before, demographic and manpower policy was of direct relevance to many in the professions. Managers were concerned with the special provisions that were made for women. Their response was, typically, to ignore the directives on the employment and special benefits for women. In doing this, they created a situation where women were unemployable or underemployed. And, although there was some criticism of this in the press, there was little real interest in the situation on the part of economic ministries. Health professionals concerned with childcare and maternity care worked largely through their relations with their patients to push whatever natalist policy they individually advocated, although demographers and doctors were increasingly concerned at the end of the seventies about the increases in infant and maternal mortality as a result of the poor economic conditions. Childcare professionals, on the whole, responded to the needs that were presented them and were parts of ministries that had little or no influence (the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health). Journalists used this issue as a rallying point if they were looking to a largely female or Catholic audience.
With the eruption of Solidarity, specialists and professionals shifted the focus of their concern from the leadership to the popular movements. A number of "social policy" specialists became advisors for Solidarity. Others moved into top positions (including the position of minister) at the Ministry of Labor. These specialists were directly involved in the policy process—often publicly battling with each other, but, at the same time, working together. Because of the changes in control over the publication of information, much of the critical data that demographers, statisticians, and sociologists had collected appeared in public for the first time. In addition, sociologists, economists, social policy specialists, and demographers took positions connected with Solidarity as researchers. Their preference was to do large scale public opinion projects.

The press of political concessions and economic crisis, however, made demographic questions secondary to the popular movement. On the whole, criticism was made of the use of public funds and the lack of adequate care but, at the same time, the one demand that workers were willing to concede on was the demand for three year maternity leaves for women. Also, because of the politization of these issues, there was only a limited interest in linking Solidarity's discussions with the reality of policy-making.

Professionals working in this area were largely concerned with organizing their own institutions to insure better management and treatment of workers and professionals and, in the case of factory managers, protecting their prerogatives. In this area, there was little interest or pressure for a change of public policy.
The flow of events in the Solidarity period had a dual effect. It brought individuals together to criticize management and specific policy processes and it divided experts by involving them directly as advisors to one or another group. Most discussion, however, centered on broader social issues rather than demographic or manpower questions. But these issues were discussed in connection with larger, higher priority issues such as Poland's foreign indebtedness and the overall modernization strategy. There was increasing concern voiced among those who dealt with the question of foreign loans and import of technology, for example, concerning Poland's failure to pay its loans and the general debt situation. One of their arguments for keeping Polish loans solid was that factories would be idled if Poland could not buy raw materials and parts. Based on this, calculations were done by individual ministries and the Planning Commission. These calculations, assuming labor productivity and based on a concern raised against ignoring foreign loan obligations, led to the conclusion that there would be massive unemployment when foreign lending stopped. In response to this in the last days before martial law, proposals were commissioned for diminishing the labor pool. Given that individual specialists had circulated the ideas of removing women from the labor force and decreasing the blocks to employment of the technically trained baby boom generation, these were the proposals that seemed to come to mind. There is, in fact, little indication that industrial ministries were willing to submit proposals for cutting employment or closing down. As a result, according both to those involved and to specialists, there was no prior research done on the impact of early retirement and three year childcare leave provisions in general or under varying political conditions. Instead, the policies
were passed and announced after the declaration of martial law. Specialist input and professional responses did not occur until it became clear that the new policy was creating problems and that some change would have to be made. Specialists were then asked to propose options for drawing individuals back into the labor force.

In the post-martial law period, ironically, there was also a move to greater policy coordination and consideration. This reflects the leadership's desire for legitimacy for the regime. It also reflects the political and economic legacy of the seventies: given the limited options the government has, there is a move to coordinate options. To do this, the leadership has formed a number of commissions including one on Family Policy for the government and Social Policy in the parliament. These include specialists, activists from involved committees, and institutional representatives. The role that is played, particularly by the Family Policy Committee, is to raise problems and discuss ways to maximize benefits as well as to revise legal provisions. Effectively specialists and professionals on these—including a number directly connected with Solidarity—function as advocates for specific limited policy either in the commission or through their position in the larger system. These demands, though, are limited by the perception-reinforced by what they are told on the commissions—that, economically, Poland has few options. They also continue to strengthen their personal ties with others in their field of interest.
Industrial Investment Policies

Decisions related to industrial investment policies and location of industries are somewhat more sensitive politically than demographic issues, for they are part of larger policy issues with clear political and economic significance in these countries. The identification of the political leadership with industrial development also increases the political sensitivity of these issues, as does the fact that the location of industry is an issue of major concern to regional elites in these battles to strengthen their own positions. However, unlike the area of information policy, in all but unusual political times issues in this area can be discussed openly, as long as the discussion is couched in Marxist-Leninist terminology.

In this area, our focus was on decisions relating to the location of industry, regional investment patterns, and the territorial and environmental planning questions these decisions raise. Thus, we did not examine other more political aspects of economic planning such as the overall allocation of resources between various sectors of the economy in any detail. While we investigated the relationship between territorial planning and economic planning, we examined the latter area only as it related to issues of regional industrial development and physical planning.

Although less central to the political leadership than certain other economic issues, policy decisions in this area have been important issues throughout the post-war period in both Czechoslovakia and Poland.
In addition to the implications noted above for economic performance and development, this issue has also involved questions of regional imbalances and inequalities. These considerations have been particularly important in Czechoslovakia, where regional disparities largely coincided with ethnic divisions. In Poland, such considerations also have been important, given the very different levels of development of various parts of the country, particularly immediately after World War II. In both countries, decisions in this area also involve coordination of plans by a large number of bureaucratic and industrial actors, including ministries, planning institutes, regional and local governments, and factories. They also involve questions of central versus regional prerogatives. Finally, decisions in this area also have implications for other policy problems, including social issues and demographic and manpower questions in both countries.

As in the area of demographic policies, the significance of these issues, as well as the concrete decisions taken, differ to some extent in the two countries examined. These differences in turn reflect differences in the amount of wartime destruction, level of industrialization at the start of the communist period, relative levels of regional inequality, and ethnic homogeneity. They also reflect differences in elite policies concerning levels of investment and modernization strategies.

In both Czechoslovakia and Poland, however, the involvement of specialists and professionals in policy-making and implementation in this area has been extensive. As our discussions of some of the concrete issues raised in each country illustrates, political leaders in both countries clearly recognize the need to seek expert opinion and involve
other actors in decision-making in this area. However, the actual impact of specialist and professional input has varied within each country according to the particular issue considered and the general political climate. There are also some fairly clear differences in the extent to which the input of different types of specialists and professionals is heeded by policy-makers.

Given the type of issues involved in this area, the nature of the policy-making process differs somewhat from that involved in making demographic policy. Due to the regimes' identification with the results of economic performance and the intimate connection of decisions in this area to overall modernization strategies, it is more difficult to present issues related to industrial investment and location as technical issues or separate them from larger, more politically sensitive economic and political issues. As a result, most specialists and professionals involved in this area clearly recognize that decisions are frequently made on political grounds and expect that their recommendations may at times be disregarded due to political considerations or broader economic requirements. Furthermore, even in those cases where expert opinion appears to have been accepted in the making of policy, financial or other considerations (including administrative or political considerations) frequently prevent the policies based on expert advice from actually being implemented. To a larger extent than in the demographic area, conflict in this area involves institutional interests. It also has a significant regional or territorial component not found in the area previously discussed. Thus, although analytical issues are involved, policy positions frequently revolve around institutional prerogatives and/or competence.
Efforts to plan the territorial or physical development of the country date to the early communist period in Czechoslovakia, when the decision was made to regulate the growth of towns and cities, as well as direct the overall development of the economy. However, since that time, the role and tasks of various institutional actors in the planning process, as well as official views on the objectives of planning in regard to the territorial dimension of development, have changed considerably. The role of various actors in the planning process also has been influenced by a number of broader sociological, economic, and political factors.

One of the most developed East European countries prior to World War II, Czechoslovakia entered the post-war period with its industrial base largely intact. Occupied early without being the scene of major battles or resistance, the country suffered relatively little material or human loss during the war. At the same time, however, there were important differences in levels of development within the country. While the most significant of these from a political perspective were those between the Czech Lands and Slovakia, there were also large differences in levels of development within each of these regions. In the Czech Lands, southern Bohemia and Moravia were substantially less developed than the industrial region around the capital city and the northern borderlands. In Slovakia, regional disparities also existed between the western regions around Bratislava and central and eastern Slovakia. While development levels in western Slovakia approximated those in the Czech Lands, eastern Slovakia in particular was a land of very poor farming villages inhabited by peasants, many of whom were
illiterate. Thus, with the exception of the height of the Stalinist period, decisions in this area have been conditioned by the need to take regional disparities into account, and ethnic considerations have been a paramount factor influencing the policies eventually adopted.

Policy-making in this area has also been influenced by broader economic factors and trends in Czechoslovakia. In the early communist period, regional investment decisions and location of industries took place in the context of ambitious industrialization programs designed to increase the industrial capacity of the nation. From the early to late 1960s policies in this area were influenced by the general discussion of economic reform. From the mid-1970s to the present, decisions in this area have been made in a very different economic climate, one in which policy-makers and economic planners have been forced to come to terms with the negative impact of world economic conditions and chronic domestic inefficiencies on economic performance. No longer interested in promoting rapid growth as in the early post-war period, they are now seeking to limit investment in all areas and encourage conservation and more rational use of scarce resources. Finally, policy-making in this area has been conditioned to some degree by the results of modernization. Economic development has raised citizen expectations concerning income and standard of living. It also has created additional problems for planners to consider in this area, including environmental problems such as air and water pollution. Recent austerity measures and the scarcity of hard currency to buy Western products have reduced the impact of the latter factors to some extent, by making measures to protect the environment more difficult to enact, but they remain important considerations for policy-makers in this area.
Decisions related to the location of industrial investments have been an integral part of the effort to plan economic development since the institution of a communist system in Czechoslovakia. In contrast to the situation in the area of demographic policy, political leaders have recognized the importance of decision-making in this area and the need for including specialists and professionals in this process from the beginning of the post-World War II period. But while specialists and professionals thus have a long history of involvement in the making and implementing of decisions in this area, both the types of specialists and professionals involved and the institutional setting governing their participation in policy-making have changed substantially. These changes have been accompanied by a broadening of the number and kinds of specialists and professionals who participate in policy-making, although not necessarily by an increase in their influence in the process.

To a greater extent than in the area of demographic policy, input into policy-making in this area is dominated by specialists and professionals associated with a single planning apparatus. But while specialists and professionals who work on the State Planning Commission or on research tasks related to economic planning in a number of research institutes still appear to wield the most influence on decisions in this area, there has been a gradual expansion of the number and kinds of specialists and professionals brought into the policy-making process. This expansion of participation, which occurred as the result of changing perceptions of the problems involved in decision-making in this area and corresponding changes in the definition of factors necessary to consider, is evident in the role of various kinds of specialists and professionals
in both routine planning activities and their participation in decision-making involving larger, long-term questions such as the settlement strategy and the redefinition of the overall planning process itself.

In the early communist period, decisions regarding industrial investment and location were influenced by both the demands of rapid industrialization and concern with regional inequality, but the former consideration appears to have predominated. Officially, decisions in this area were to be guided by several partly incompatible objectives during this period: industrializing Slovakia, settling the Bohemian and Moravian border regions, promoting the development of the more backward regions, and planning the development and use of existing industrial centers. As part of the attempt to reduce regional inequalities, many new industries were located in small and medium towns throughout the country, and several "new towns" were built. While territorial and regional considerations thus played some role, decisions in this area were handled largely as subordinate questions in the area of economic planning and within the framework of the institutions responsible for national economic planning. Territorial or physical planning was seen largely as an adjunct of economic planning during this period. As a Czech analyst noted, "In the period of extensive development, the relationship [between economic and physical planning] was one-sided . . . physical planning merely located investments that had already been set by the economic plans."

The specialists and professionals involved in policy-making in this area thus were primarily those connected with the apparatus of the State Planning Commission, including economists and regional geographers, as well as specialists in building and construction engineering who
worked in the "resort" institutes attached to the commission and the relevant ministries. Judging from published accounts of the planning process and interviews with participants the role of these actors was two-fold during this period. First, certain specialists and professionals collaborated with the political leaders in determining overall economic targets and plans and in elaborating the general principles governing settlement patterns. But most specialists and professionals working in this area were involved largely in translating objectives determined by the political leadership into concrete economic plans and proposals concerning the location of enterprises. Drawing heavily on Soviet location theory and responding to the targets set by the economic plan, these specialists and professionals drew up plans for the location of particular enterprises and the development of new settlements which were then sent to the appropriate ministries for implementation. A rudimentary physical or territorial planning apparatus existed in Czechoslovakia during this period, but the numbers of specialists engaged in territorial planning were small, and specialists and professionals working in this area appear to have had little authority vis-a-vis the economic planning apparatus.

This situation began to change in the early 1960's, when a broader range of considerations became part of the planning process, and a broader variety of actors was brought into the planning process. One of the more important, as well as earliest, of these changes occurred in the area of territorial planning. Beginning in the early 1960's, a number of architects, urban and territorial planners, and sociologists working in a variety of workplaces began trying to upgrade the status of territorial planning as a profession and its role in the making of
economic plans and location decisions. These efforts, which are evident in numerous articles in the journals related to territorial planning as well as in the publications of the territorial planning institutes and other research institutes responsible for work on topics related to territorial planning, focused in the early 1960's on the need to revise the 1958 law governing construction and planning. They also included criticism of previously accepted overall settlement strategies, including the earlier emphasis on the development of a multitude of small and medium-sized cities scattered throughout the country, and efforts to carve out a broader mission for territorial planning and strengthen the organizational bases of territorial and urban planning.

Efforts in regard to the latter objective were particularly evident in the reform period, and included far-ranging discussions concerning the role of territorial planners in the planning process. In 1968, specialists and professionals working in territorial planning in both the Czech Lands and Slovakia attempted to form new unions of urban and territorial planners separate from the Architects' Union to represent the interests and common objectives of territorial and urban planners.

As in the case of demographic policy, the end of the reform era brought about some change in the issues debated and roles of particular specialists and professionals involved in policy-making and implementation in this area. But, once again, although the end of the reform era led to a certain restriction in the terms of debate and to an increased emphasis on the political reliability of participants, many of the objectives of those who advocated an upgrading in the status of territorial planning have been met in the post-reform period.
Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon is the new law governing territorial planning and construction adopted in 1976. The culmination of efforts to change the 1958 law governing territorial planning and the numerous revisions of the law governing construction, the 1976 law was adopted only after over a decade of discussion and debate which included, both during and after the reform era, extensive and widespread input from numerous groups of specialists and professionals associated with the various planning hierarchies.

As in more routine planning decisions, much of the input of specialists and professionals in this case was solicited by political leaders or occurred as specialists and professionals performed their routine occupational or bureaucratic functions. Specialists and professionals working on the State Committee for Technical Development in 1966, for example, were responsible for coordinating nine working teams composed of 100 specialists and professionals assigned to analyze the 1958 law on construction and propose changes in light of the new system of economic management. The results of these analyses were discussed at a conference in Jihlava in February 1967 and formed the basis of the proposal for the new law. Specialists and professionals on the State Committee for Technical Development also prepared a draft of the new law for discussion and consideration by the ministries involved at the end of 1967. Although the adoption of the new law was delayed for some time after the end of the reform period, experts from this as well as other institutions were involved in discussions and modifications of the proposed changes in the early 1970's, and specialists and professionals associated with the Federal Ministry for Construction and Technical
Development were responsible for preparing a proposal for the law finally adopted in 1976.99

Other specialists and professionals, through their research and writing, provided the theoretical and empirical work that became the foundation for the new legal regulations.100 Although many of the specialists and professionals involved in this process were either territorial or economic planners, other specialists and professionals, including lawyers and sociologists, also took part in the process. Given the impact that change in the laws governing territorial planning and construction would have on lower-level governmental bodies, legal experts, for example, were involved in discussions of the changes not only in their roles as framers of the legislative proposals, but also as experts in intergovernmental relations.101

The 1976 law, which attempted to clarify the relationship between economic and territorial planning, was to some extent a vindication of those who argued for a larger role for territorial planners in the planning process, for economic planners are now required to take territorial plans into account in formulating their objectives and, for the first time, certain territorial planning documents are legally binding.102 As the result of the law and earlier efforts to strengthen the institutional bases of territorial and urban planning as professions, specialists and professionals working in research institutes and territorial planning divisions of governmental ministries now are engaged in a wider variety of activities than earlier. In addition to considering the optimal location of projected investments (activities which still form a large part of the work of many specialists and professionals in these institutes), territorial planners and urbanists also are involved
in a number of more ambitious, long-term research projects and plans. Thus they are now responsible for preparing the longer-term territorial planning prognoses and documents set out in the 1976 law, including projections concerning the development of large regions from a 25-30 year perspective, and more limited territorial plans, which are in part legally binding, for individual cities and districts. Territorial planners and other specialists also are engaged in efforts to determine the optimal long-range settlement strategy for the country as a whole, the proper size of large urban agglomerations, and the best method of achieving both adequate economic development of all regions and optimal use of existing economic resources.

To a certain extent, there appears to be a division of labor among the main institutions involved in territorial planning at present. The main territorial planning institutes (TERPLAN and URBION), which are "resort" institutes of the ministries responsible for construction and technical development, have some capability to do basic research, but specialists and professionals associated with these institutes are more frequently involved in more applied tasks, such as working out territorial plans for particular regions and districts, and providing expert opinion concerning the location of very large or important industries. Researchers at VUVA and USTARCH, on the other hand, as well as specialists in the various academic departments and institutes of the academies of science, are responsible for conducting longer term studies of the factors that influence urbanization and territorial development. In this way they continue to do the basic research and gather the data on citizen preferences, population trends, and settlement patterns that form the empirical foundation for judging existing overall strategies in
this area and proposing new directions. Drawing on these studies, specialists and professionals in these institutions contributed to the change in overall settlement strategy that occurred in Czechoslovakia in the early 1970's and continue to debate and discuss possible directions for the future.

In addition to considering the impact new investments and location decisions will have from a territorial planning perspective, planners must now also give some attention to environmental considerations. Public discussion of the need to take environmental factors into account in planning economic development began in Czechoslovakia as early as the late 1960's and was reflected in the development of a number of institutions and publications devoted to environmental issues. Drawing on research conducted by a number of different scientific institutions, including the Biological Section of the Academy of Science and the specialized research divisions of the numerous ministries formally charged with overseeing particular aspects of the environment from the late 1950's, and referring to the increasingly articulated official concern with the environment in the Soviet Union, scientists and other professionals tried to convince political leaders of the need to develop a more comprehensive approach to safeguarding the environment. In addition to calling for more attention to environmental issues in planning decisions and further funding of research to determine the extent of environmental damage in particular areas and investigate possible solutions to pressing environmental problems, they also urged political leaders to create a single unified central institution to coordinate environmental protection to replace the system which divided responsibility among numerous ministries and central bureaucracies.
Scientists and other experts on the Commission for the Protection of the Environment of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Commission for Architecture and the Environment of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, for example, made this as well as numerous other recommendations to the government at the end of 1968. They continued to press for more unified and effective action on environmental issues, as well as to warn of the continuing deterioration of specific aspects of the environment, in specialized journals, seminars, research reports, and meetings with bureaucratic and political leaders throughout the 1970's, with mixed results in terms of concrete action.

On the positive side, as Jancar notes in her discussion of environmental management in Czechoslovakia, environmental factors now must be considered in the economic planning process. Specialists and professionals currently conduct research on a larger number of projects related to both the technical and administrative aspects of environmental protection. Their research clearly is the basis for the technical aspects of existing environmental standards, and certain specialists and professionals working in this area continue to play an active role in arguing for changes that would stop the continued deterioration of the environment or improve the existing system of environmental regulations. At the same time, the call for institutional changes to increase the effectiveness of environmental protection has not been heeded, and environmental considerations in fact appear to be given relatively little weight in concrete planning decisions either in terms of longer-range territorial planning or in locating specific industries, housing complexes, and other aspects of land use.
Recently, there has been an effort to introduce yet another element into the planning process, that is, consideration of social factors. Based on the argument that human beings and their concrete social and human needs are often left out of the planning process, the effort to include social indicators in planning decisions appears to be concentrated largely in Slovakia and remains in the experimental stages. Thus, researchers in the sociological section of USTARCH, the Institute for Construction and Architecture of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, were involved in the early 1980's in conducting research that eventually was included in the territorial plan for the city of Bratislava and several other areas in Slovakia. However, at present, consideration of social factors, including the adequacy of services, cultural and sports facilities, and other indicators related to the quality of citizen's lives, is still voluntary. Efforts by specialists and professionals in USTARCH and other institutes to increase the weight of such factors in planning continue, but most territorial plans do not include such indicators, and planners are not required by law to take such considerations into account in drawing up territorial plans or economic plans for regions or agglomerations.

As in the area of demographic policy, specialists and professionals take part in policy-making in this area as members of informal, ad hoc coalitions united by common policy perspectives. Demographers, sociologists, urban planners, and certain economic planners, for example, were all involved in the discussion and debate over the need for a shift in the settlement strategy in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and their positions did not depend solely on disciplinary training or institutional affiliation. Similarly, there are clearly divisions of opinion
within particular professions and among specialists working in the same area concerning many of the issues involved in this area, including the optimum institutional arrangements for territorial planning, the role of various governmental organs in the planning process, and issues related to the content and nature of urban planning. 119

However, institutional affiliation as well as regional location and loyalties appear to be more important in determining the policy perspectives of particular specialists and professionals in this area than in the case of demographic policy. The perspectives of specialists and professionals affiliated with the different planning hierarchies discussed above, for example, frequently varied according to their institutional affiliation. Differences in the perspectives of central and regional or local officials, as well as in the views of specialists and professionals at various levels, also are commonplace. At the regional and local level, regional perspectives often appear to overcome functional differences, such as those among planners, managers, and local officials, who unite to propose certain types of development opposed by central planners, although conflict among such actors also occurs. 120

As the above discussion illustrates, there are numerous provisions for including specialists and professionals in policy-making in this area in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, compared to the situation twenty years ago, decision-making in regard to territorial development and the location of industrial investments is now a more complex process that involves a broader group of actors. But, despite the clear and long-standing acknowledgement on the part of political leaders of the need to involve specialists and professionals in policy-making in this area and the high level of institutionalization of their input, there are a
number of obstacles to the effective use of specialized knowledge and professional skills in policy-making in this area.

First, despite recent efforts to upgrade the legal position of territorial planning and give greater weight to environmental factors, the planning process is still dominated by the economic planning apparatus. In routine, short-term planning decisions concerning the location of particular industries and enterprises, the work of territorial planners and specialists and professionals working on environmental and social issues continues in practice to be subordinated to economic considerations as dictated by the current five year or one year plan. In the area of long-term planning, specialists and professionals responsible for territorial planning have an assured place in policy-making at the formulation stage, and attention to certain environmental considerations is also mandated legally. However, as will be discussed in more detail in the following section, territorial plans, even when they have been approved by the appropriate governmental body and thus have the force of law, are often modified to such an extent that they are virtually ignored in practice. Environmental indicators mandated by law are few in number and also frequently ignored in practice, while social indicators have been included in long-range plans only in a few cities and on an experimental basis. In addition, more purely political or international considerations (including Czechoslovakia's commitments to the Soviet Union and other members of COMECON) also take precedence at times.

This subordination appears to be accepted by at least certain of the specialists and professionals in the territorial planning apparatus who see their role at least in part as a largely technical one, i.e.,
that of finding the most appropriate or least harmful way (from a territorial or environmental point of view) to achieve objectives determined by economic or political needs. Other specialists and professionals, however, while noting that political leaders must act as ultimate decision-makers, continue to argue for greater attention to rational territorial planning and environmental considerations.

A further problem related to the effective use of specialized knowledge and professional skills in this area arises from the lack of coordination of the different planning processes. Despite the 1976 law on territorial planning and the 1980 law on regional economic planning, the relationship among the various types of plans and the legal status of territorial and regional economic plans in relation to each other is still unclear. In part, this problem arises from the different time perspectives of the different planning systems. The long-term perspective of territorial planning, for example, is particularly difficult to coordinate with the shorter, and more frequently revised, economic plans. Similarly, the time frames of territorial and regional economic plans do not coincide in most cases. Aside from concluding that there is a need for closer coordination of various types of planning, experts appear to have come up with very few concrete means of coordinating them. Recently, there has been a good deal of discussion concerning the possible advantages of combining regional economic and territorial planning at the district and local levels, for example, but these discussions have yet to be reflected in any institutional changes.

In addition to the problems discussed above, which occur largely at the stage of policy formation, there are also a number of obstacles to
the effective use of the input of specialists and professionals at the implementation stage. In practice, many of the officially adopted policies in this area, particularly those dealing with long range territorial planning and measures designed to protect the environment, are either ignored at the regional or local level or so changed by their method of implementation that their original intent, which was based at least in part on the input of specialists concerned with territorial planning and environmental protection, is lost. These difficulties are evident in a number of areas, including the tendency of local and district officials to ignore guidelines emanating from the center concerning types of construction and investments to be favored or prohibited; the failure of economic enterprises to observe existing environmental regulations; the conflict that occurs between economic managers and local officials, and between local managers and officials and central specialists, professionals, and officials; and the failure of district and regional governments to prepare or abide by the territorial and regional economic plans required by law. The latter problem is evidently a particularly acute one. Despite the requirement that all district and regional governments prepare territorial plans and give particular attention to protecting the environment from further deterioration, many lower level governments lagged far behind the projected timetable in preparing the required planning documents, while others evidently based these documents on faulty materials or did the least possible to comply with the law.

In sum, the input of a wide variety of specialists and professionals into policy-making in this area has increased in Czechoslovakia. But broader consultation has not reduced the predominance of the economic
planning hierarchy and political factors at the policy formulation stage significantly, and political and other considerations often mean that policies adopted after widespread input by specialists and professionals are changed substantially in their administration.

Poland

Regional development and industrial investment policies were immediate issues for the postwar regime in Poland. Most of Poland's industrial infrastructure had been destroyed during the war, a large portion of its industrial workforce had either been killed or left, and the nation itself had its boundaries redrawn so that it was faced with populating and developing a large section of formerly German lands and settling and organizing the population which left Eastern Poland when it became part of the Soviet Union. In addition, major cities like Warsaw were either totally destroyed or had suffered from some losses of property and population as a result of the fighting and German repression. Finally, the leadership had to deal with the problem of dramatically different levels of development stemming from the partitions and only initially dealt with in the interwar period.

These problems were not resolved by the ending of the war. Instead, directly or indirectly, they have continued to plague the postwar Polish system. Specialists and professionals today who are involved with issues related either to spatial or economic investment planning must deal with the impact of the rapid and ad hoc construction of factories and housing units immediately after the war: simultaneous and often early obsolescence, the ignoring of environmental or logistical problems, and the lack of investment in infrastructure. They also
continue to juggle with the problems of unequal and unrelated development in various areas of the country made worse by different patterns of investment and resource allocation. Finally, they must deal with the housing, social service, and employment problems created by the destruction of the war; the rapid expansion of the population after the war; and the social and political differences between rural and urban areas.

Ironically, although regional development and regional leaders have always been critical in national politics and a number of laws have been passed and commissions or organizations formed to regulate and guide both economic and spatial planning, the basic pattern of specialist and professional influence has remained as it was in the immediate postwar period. At that point, the pressures of the need to begin reconstruction and reorganization of the devastated nation forced communist leaders to recognize and involve pre-war, non-communist planning authorities in drawing up city, regional, and national plans for both reconstruction and investment. These plans were drawn up, however, in the context of uncontrollable movements of the population and the need to give priority to immediate, emergency construction rather than organized and planned development. In addition, the political significance of the newly acquired western territories and the promises that communist leaders made to industrialize the country ultimately were far more significant than the professional judgements of those urban planners, architects, or investment specialists who were involved.

Given the disjunction between actual policy decisions and the plans drawn up by the various planning bodies or the institutional and legal regulations that were established, professionals in factory
management, bureaucrats in ministries, and other professionals involved in questions of industrial and spatial development came to view experts as theoreticians and not as relevant contributors to their decisions. The reference points for their considerations came to be the regional and national Party authorities and ministry decision-makers who had the political contacts and clout to make their own decisions irrespective of the plans' dictates. Their relationship to the specialists who are charged with planning (and by inference to the planning process as a whole) was as sources for theoretical training that qualified them for their jobs, as occasional critics to be blocked from information, and as potential sources to draw on to prove a point in a policy debate.¹³³

These realities for specialists and professionals have remained relatively stable in spite of a progression of legal and institutional changes. Unlike demographic and information policy issues, this is an area in which there have been a number of legislative initiatives and also institutions developed both as oversight commissions and as new ministries and functional bodies. This series of legal provisions began in 1951 with the passage of the Town Planning Act mandating that long and medium range plans be drawn up for each town and region and specifying the areas that had to be included in these primarily spatial plans. This Town Planning Act has been followed by a succession of others including a Spatial Planning Act of 1961, the establishment of a Committee for Spatial and Regional Planning in 1958, the establishment of Large Economic Regions in 1972, the regional reform act of 1975 dividing the country into small regions, and the regional government reform of 1983. Whatever the change, however, the discussions of specialists and professionals in 1980-83, as well as, in less direct form, in earlier
years, and the statements of the professionals and specialists interviewed indicated that the balance of power rested with the economic ministries and powerful regional political figures rather than with any of the bodies charged with spatial and economic planning. As a result, major investments were determined by regional political strength and not necessarily need or appropriateness of the investment. Minor development has occurred to a limited degree in terms of the plans drawn out and presented by the planners but these plans have been complicated by the search of regional political leaders for economic power and investment opportunities. The instability of funding, which is based on shorter term allocations than the term of the plan and reflects on the exigencies of local and national budgetary decisions also has diminished the impact of these plans. As a result, although there are structures and the authority for long-term spatial planning with a significant influence on investment decisions, the reality is that planners, architects, and geographers concentrate on ideal plans with a hope that only a small percentage will be funded and realized (often a clear calculation that involves significant padding of the budgetary request) or focus on limited construction projects. To increases their authority, planners also frequently attach themselves as paid consultants to regional planning and national planning bodies.

Throughout the postwar period, the reaction of those who specialized either as professionals or as academic specialists in urban, regional, or architectural planning was to use their association and its journal to encourage the development of younger cadres of specialists, highlight good work and reward that which was done by professional standards, and indicate regions or localities where there are
Given the fact that urban planning was never a coherent specialty but rather an amalgam of individuals from different specializations focusing on urban areas and that any spatial planning decision also required coordination with those who dealt with financial planning (the Planning Commission), investment policy (the economic ministries), social welfare (the Ministries of Education, Health, and Labor and Social Policy), and regional policies (regional authorities in the government and Party apparatus), urban, spatial and regional planners were active throughout the postwar period in sponsoring conferences and consulting arrangements. In doing this, they mined the resources of the specialists who did work relevant to their interests. They also made themselves at least a presence, if often a lost one, in the Planning Commission and the various ministries as well as the regional governments. Finally, known and established planners and planning specialists in major Warsaw centers were involved as consultants in the drafting of legislation and the marshalling of support for that legislation. They concerned themselves with details and with stressing the importance of such planning. Other issues which they raised less successfully were the question of coherent budgetary planning and permanent direction by the planners or architects of a project or regional plan.

In the aftermath of 1956, regional and industrial development were not major issues in calls for liberalization or systemic change. They were significant only to the degree that the aping of Soviet architecture and urban planning as well as the disaffection that was felt because of economic weakness played out in discussions and debates. At this point, specialists and professionals working in this area were primarily interested in seeing that the professional associations became
internally self-governing and that the existing laws on the books from
the pre-war and immediate postwar years were realized. Action to
realize these aims occurred spontaneously in all the relevant profes-
sional groups and, in the course of the debates, the errors of planning
and the failures of control were discussed vis-a-vis specific cases.

In the area of spatial and economic planning, the Gomulka
years were a time of regional strength and independence limited by a
slow growth economic policy. Decentralization of decision-making was
key. Specialists doing academic research and writing focused on either
questions of planning in nations other than Poland or on broad national
or macro-region plans with general guidelines for roads, development
areas, and natural resources. These plans gave particular attention to
major industrial and urban centers such as the Warsaw district, the
Krakow district, port areas, and Silesia. However, they had little
specific relevance to investment decisions other than suggesting what
might be preserved and what might be considered. It was in this
period that urban planning and design became a popular, self-organized,
and active specialty.

Specific planning was done, normally, at the behest of the
various regional leaders who would commission architects, urban planners,
housing specialists, or sociologists and economists to do surveys of
specified needs and make recommendations or draw up plans. These
studies sometimes dovetailed with work that academic specialists were
doing or had done for scholarly purposes. Other times, they were
brought in simply because they were well known specialists in a field
willing to consult. In these roles, however, they were brought in to
facilitate an already formulated goal. Their reports were then used not
simply as bases for a policy decision but also as evidence in battles for money or investment with central authorities. In the case of the construction of a given facility or development, plans were submitted to the city architect for approval and review, put up for a period of community discussion, and then realized by construction companies (state, regional, or cooperative) that bid on the job. In some cases, these construction companies had connections with individual planners or architects.

The budgetary process involved other actors in this period and, in spite of promises of change, in the seventies as well. Local leaders depended for their limited local initiative investments (community facilities, some small housing investment in reconstruction or small rural dwellings, and social service centers) on money allocated to them by regional governments and on money essentially dedicated to the community by existing industries or new industrial developments. This made industrial investment and maintaining good relations with local factory managers and central industrial ministries key to local leaders being able to provide some evidence of new housing (even if it was for outsiders brought in to work in a plant), sites for day care, and community recreation facilities. And, although promises were often made that the community had an infrastructure prepared to handle new investment and residents, town governments often counted on factory construction to force funding by the economic ministry of essential infrastructure for water, sewage, transportation, and power. At this level, in areas with their own academic centers, there was an imperative to have architecture, town planning, and economic investment included in the curriculum so that there were "in house" experts available whose
work could be used to lobby potential investors and regional officials. This also resulted in a refusal on the part of any regional leaders to be classed as a nonindustrial region.  

Regional leaders had much the same budgetary imperative. Their budgets came from allocations from the central budget, locally allocated taxation, and the earnings of regional government enterprises like construction enterprises. They, in turn, engaged in using specialists as resource people to provide justifications for greater investment in their areas. In this, they were in competition with other regions and did not benefit by following the national plan, especially if it consigned them to being an agricultural region. Again, the professionals with whom they were primarily concerned were those related to industrial development and investment, since this was a major source of new income, and the bureaucrats in the Planning Commission who determined the distribution of national budgetary funds. Given the unpredictability of this budgetary process from year to year, they were further concerned with going beyond the plan and generating new projects or getting allocations for costs beyond the initially programmed costs for any project. At this level, too, although professionals and specialists advocated rational planning and investment, their interests both as residents and workers of a region in need of continual infusions of investment, if only to fund necessary but often ignored infrastructure and social welfare programs, and as individuals whose incomes were increased by their involvement in any of these projects, were to encourage maximum investment and funding for their regions.

At a national level, individuals trained in planning, architecture, regional economics, social services, and urban sociology worked
in the Planning Commission, the Institute for Territorial Planning, central ministries, and urban planning offices that either worked for specific regions or bid on specific projects to be done in various regions. These individuals did long term research and planning and submitted it to their superiors as required by the various planning laws. Those with whom they both worked and fought were the journalists who tried to report on problems in investment decisions but who also sought their counsel in reporting on projects that had been begun or were planned—thereby raising the stock of the completion of the project—and the investment policy makers in the various industrial ministries who targeted and funded projects, usually without reference to the long-term plans. These planners, like their colleagues in the industrial ministries, were also courted by regional specialists, professionals, and leaders seeking permission and sanction for further investment, particularly those from weak regions. They were largely ignored or circumvented when an individual leader, strong in the political arena, decided that he wanted to do a project.

Ironically, this system functioned in the Gomulka era simply because there was so little new investment. Much of what was generated was based on the expansion of existing facilities where local leaders could build on existing industrial bases. In Silesia this was carried to its greatest potential with Gierek constructing his own core of specialists, giving them special privileges, and essentially reallocating money earned by Silesia in Silesia. No national plan was followed and national budgetary pressures were relieved by the wealth of the region. Local infrastructure and facilities were constructed because it was more profitable for factories to use all of their budgetary
allocation rather than return a surplus to the center for lack of broader investment possibilities. And, given how little funding there was available and how low the expectations for further funding were, large scale projects and inflated budgets were not normally projected. The plans had some influence simply because there were not opportunities for new investments which would violate them.

The Gierek years changed the stakes in the regional investment game. They also, at least initially, added a new dimension with both the promises of housing and improved living conditions and the addition of a program to industrialize the nation as a whole through "new towns" and increases in the industrial labor force. Finally, simultaneously, both a centralization of decision-making institutions and a proliferation of governing entities went on.

In this period, the initial policy was to concentrate on a massive and across the board increase in industrialization through imports of technology, moves to an export economy, and increases in production stimulated by promises for improved living standards. This was a policy that had been sought explicitly and implicitly by a large segment of the technical intelligentsia in the latter half of the sixties. It was one that they stressed in internal writings that would require the use of the talents of Poland's well trained but under-used technocratic generation and would have to be based on rational planning and consultation coupled with clear budgetary commitments.

Planners' interest in the development of new towns where there was space for large and complete residential centers and the construction of new industries was clear in the sixties. But, in this period, there was little possibility of funding or support for these centers
since investment was determined by the strength of local leaders, and by extension, the existing resources in a region. The emphasis on "new towns," however, fit with the Gierek program. He was committed not to the upgrading of existing facilities but to the rapid import and development of a new industrial base. This required new plants. He also made an ideological commitment to broader development of the country and to new housing construction. And, although it was costlier to abandon old housing and build new units, new construction was far quicker and easier to organize. Finally, by stressing the construction of "new towns," there was the possibility of developing labor forces who were still close to their peasant areas, thereby making the benefits of industrialization apparent to all, but reducing the dislocation.

In the early seventies, then, the area of regional planning and economic investment was one in which Gierek's predilections fit with the perceptions of what should be held by specialists and professionals. Factory managers and those trained in this area had a much larger financial pool to work with. Regional planning and planners were encouraged to plan new towns and regions in the flush of a new commitment to investment and development. Local leaders, even those from established centers, saw the new funds that were available as new opportunities for local gain. Journalists, economists, and other professionals were supportive of Gierek's apparent move to modernization and rationality. Bureaucrats in the industrial ministries, the Planning Commission, and the various social service agencies all found that their requests for funding were positively taken and their ability to do something increased with the willingness of the regime to borrow money and invest.
Paralleling these increases in funding possibilities and the opportunities they offered to specialists and professionals, the Gierek regime initially made moves in the area of regional and economic planning that appeared to institutionalize experts' participation. An economic council of advisors for Gierek was formed and charged with doing research and giving advice on regional development and investment potentials.\textsuperscript{168} Local and regional government and party officials were also charged with involving local experts in developing and evaluating plans. The commitment of the Gierek regime to the kind of regional planning that planners had sought, one that dealt with natural planning units rather than political units, was demonstrated by the establishment of macro-regions for long-term planning.\textsuperscript{169} Advisory commissions for these macro-regions, as well as the already drawn up urban agglomerations, became more active. (The exception was the Warsaw Committee of scholars and bureaucrats dealing with local government, planning, housing, architecture, and history which had long been active and influential, the given fact that Warsaw was a capital city rebuilt under the guidance of such a committee.\textsuperscript{170} Their sphere of work increased, as did the promise of development and investment.

In this context, industrial interests continued and even increased their activities. They, after all, now had new plants to build and increased funds to invest. Local and regional officials courted them and had to accept their decisions on where and how to invest when they were made. The primary role of planners in this process was to develop, either for the benefit of specific regions or for what were presented as national interests, a number of alternative proposals that outlined the pros and cons of various investment options.
These were either done internally or commissioned by the interested industrial ministries. Regional officials also commissioned studies and used them to support their cases.171

The rush of new money and investment possibilities brought with it the involvement of specialists and professional bureaucrats in developing individual and specific programs. There was, however, no involved group of specialists or professionals responsible for coordination and ongoing evaluation. Therefore, investment was massive but uncoordinated. For the regime, the difficulty this brought with it became apparent by the mid-seventies. At this time the request of the head of the Planning Commission for a new computer system to collect, store, and process all information about the development and the production of Polish industry and agriculture was granted. This provided them with the kind of facility that their colleagues in the West had.172 The regional development proposals and plans of the Poland 2000 commission of experts and the commission for national planning connected with the Planning Commission were encouraged and supported. These plans, done by some of Poland's top planners from all over the country, were to lay out the direction of development and the communication, environmental, and social needs for that development.173 Other institutions were developed to control the actions of regional and ministry agents. Large Economic Organizations (WOG) were established to coordinate the work of related industries so that they developed and produced apace. Although these WOG's were potential limits on the autonomy of industrial ministries and individual regional leaders, they also provided a new layer of positions for upcoming professionals.174 In addition, during the summer of 1975, without any prior discussion by either regional government experts or
planners and regional leaders, the Gierek regime announced the fragmentation of Poland into 49 administrative units and the abolition of the traditional regions (województwo's). As the program was put into effect, it became clear that regional authorities, regional specialists and policy-makers, and regional journalists had lost their autonomy, and that a massive centralization of decision-making had been instituted. As a result of this, bureaucrats, journalists, and specialists were no longer beholden to local authorities. Instead, they became local delegates of the central ministries and institutions. Furthermore, there was pressure on them to move from the large regional centers to the smaller capitals of the new administrative units.

The latter changes, once their impact was realized, were not popular with specialists and professionals in the regions or specialists who had not been consulted in Warsaw. Their unpopularity was, however, reduced by the laxness with which they were carried out. The industrial ministries basically ignored the WOG units and followed their own development plans and initiatives. Regional leaders who had strong ties to the Gierek leadership were able to get major development projects, like Huta Katowice (the steel plant) and the Northern Port, allocated to them and therefore increase the number of jobs and the amount of investment funds they had available so the national plan and the controls that it was to exercise over development were non-issues. Finally, professionals and experts who would have been moved to the smaller administrative towns presented arguments as groups against this relocation, emphasizing the need for broader resources or broader units to do their work efficiently, and were able to develop new organizations that allowed them to stay where they had been and continue to do their work.
Professionals, who had long worked as parts of regional or local government with their prime contacts with local leaders, continued informally if not institutionally to work as a part of a local "Mafia," since local leaders still had control over housing and the day-to-day supervision of bureaucrats' activities. So, while the institution of these reforms signalled to professionals and specialists that they were not really the "policy partners" Gierek had promised, the deviations that were possible also signalled that individuals could protect their interests, although they could not so easily influence policy in their area.

In the latter half of the seventies, the growing foreign debt and the failure of the economic promises on which Gierek's rule had been based resulted not in the inclusion of specialists and professionals in the search for alternatives to resolve Poland's difficulties but in their exclusion. Those involved, even in Gierek's Council of Economic Advisors, reported that, as time passed, not only did they have to provide short summaries of each report so that Gierek did not have to read more than a page, but he also was unwilling to tolerate negative reports. Not only did the possibility of internal presentation of problems and discussions of alternatives diminish but the censorship process, centralized in the Press Department, cut off virtually all discussion of investment programs and regional problems.

In the area of regional planning, although there were increasingly specific regulations requiring prior approval of developments, long and short term plans for each region, and even environmental reviews, the reality was that plans were not fulfilled. Housing developments and even industrial plants planned in the first half of the
seventies were not completed as planned, since the funds were not available by the time the actual construction was underway. Budgetary problems conditioned every decision and every attempt to enforce regulation. Planners and architects increasingly talked in professional publications of trying to upgrade existing housing but could not get funding for this.

Concern about the environmental problems which had been caused by years of investment without regard for its impact was articulated only in the mid-seventies. This was first articulated in terms of demographic statistics -- many oblique to all but the specialist audience and many circulated informally underground -- indicating early and unusually large death rates from environmentally related diseases and then discussions in the late seventies of the problems of some port areas. In this period, the Ministry of Regional Affairs had a section -- upgraded in the late seventies to have an equal position in the title -- for environmental problems. Using the statutes which did exist, the director of this section and his regional deputies would go to areas where complaints had been lodged or where there were considered to be significant environmental issues, test the levels of pollution, and then complain to both regional government officials and factory managers. On the whole, though, the regulations which they tried to enforce went unfulfilled as adding environmental safety devices to already existing factories was not considered necessary or fundable. Only in the eighties did the extent of the environmental pollution problem become a matter of public discussion by specialists, professionals, and interested citizens. At that point, the government's response
was to create a separate ministry to deal with this area with expanded, if still limited powers. 188

In the late seventies, specialists and professionals working in this as well as other areas were caught trying to maintain their own living standards and aware that there was very little possibility that they could actually be effective in their specialties. Increasingly, specialists focused on doing academic research which would indicate the problems that existed vis-a-vis the planning process with an interest only in distributing this information in their own circles. Professionals were also demoralized and concentrated on maximizing their own positions. In these circumstances, information came to be circulated or leaked through informal friendship networks and circles of critics or dissidents. By 1979, the general perception among specialists and professionals, even those with connections at the top, was that regional development and investment policy were not only out of their control but were unchangeable without major reform of the entire system. 189

The eruption of Solidarity changed all of this. Regional and investment planning were major and immediate subjects of criticism. Workers attacked the failure of the Gierek system (and implicitly those who had been charged with planning and development) to provide the basic conditions for living -- housing, shopping and recreational facilities, hospitals, childcare facilities, and schools -- and to make rational investment not only in terms of the level of foreign debt but also the placement, construction, and organization of industry. They further demanded that the corruption and misappropriation of funds and planning which violated the national and regional plans by local and regional leaders be ended.
Their actions liberated professionals and specialists in the areas of regional and investment planning to begin to engage in criticism and to make moves to change the situation. The level of the debt, the political changes, and the general internal collapse of the economy, however, prevented them from finding viable solutions.

Planners, regional government experts, architects, and specialists in social welfare supported Solidarity's demands for better and more stable planning and also called for increased regional autonomy and responsibility. To this end, the Polish Association of Urbanists, the Club of Economic Journalists and Regional Journalists, and the Institute for State and Law of the Polish Academy of Sciences began almost immediately to plan and push for a major new law on regional government and autonomy. The various groups, each concentrating on increased autonomy for its profession, drew up draft proposals for the law much as in the past professional organizations had drawn up draft provisions for laws or parts of laws in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice or the relevant policy agency. All of these drafts were circulated and discussed with a variety of groups as well as the Solidarity commissions (on which a number of these experts served as advisors). In addition, individual scholars and participants in the policy-making process had formerly unpublishable manuscripts published. In the end, the drafts for regional reform were so widely divergent that they had to be reviewed and resolved in the parliament. The original compromise, advocated by specialists involved in the drafting negotiations and approved by the Solidarity commission, was rejected by the second session of the Solidarity Congress.
The relationship of regional spatial planning and economic planning was another subject of discussion in all of the various economic reform groups that formed. Ironically, the strongest and most vocal opposition to reform and to regional reform came from the Polish Managers' Association. For these managers, to concede regional autonomy was to submit to control by not only political elites but also citizens. Their organization pressed through private channels for modifications of the reform laws which substantially weakened them. They also put out anti-reform and anti-regional autonomy literature. 193

Measurement of the reality of the change in reform regulations and in the impact of specialists and professionals on regional planning is not possible for the post-martial law period: the lack of resources and the presence of martial law regulations and military supervisors made the situation far from normal. 194 Internal Party reports, though, do show that there has been continued pressure to industrialize in various local areas. They also show that, even without formal legislation, specialists and professionals have come back to functioning as parts of the old wojewodstwo apparats rather than as parts of either centralized ministries or the small governmental units. Given the disorganization at the local levels, these specialists and professionals are actualizing low budget plans and projects which they advocated before for their areas using the personal contacts that they have developed over the years. 195 Ultimately, however, these reports and the discussions of the problems and issues of the present period in regional planning show that there remains the same division between long term planning, investment, and reality. In this fragmented situation, professionals and specialists focus on their narrow interests and on immediate
problems or long-term theoretical research rather than on actualizing the plans that are drawn up.
Information Policy

The most politically sensitive of the issues with which we dealt was the question of public information, its content and its management. Throughout the postwar period this was an issue that was considered by the leadership central to its power and control. Public discussion of either of the two basic concerns in the area of information (the unwillingness of officials at all levels to give journalists and other specialists access to information or responses to their questions and the actual blocking of the publication of materials) suggesting that these were policy problems for which there were a number of different legitimate alternatives to the existing situation had a political character far beyond a simple discussion of a policy. In the periods of major liberalization and leadership weakness (1956, 1970, and 1980 in Poland and 1968 in Czechoslovakia) when Party leadership and authority was weak enough not to be able to block protests about information restrictions, the issue of information was a major source of protest and point of concession for the political leaders. Once this concession to public discussion and decreased controls on information access and publishability was made, professionals and specialists had enough momentum to push the level of information presented far beyond the limits the leaders considered tolerable.

The sudden appearance of press discussions and a broad range of information in periods of political crisis and leadership weakness and division does not, however, demonstrate that the leaderships were able
to totally control professional and specialist action in periods of normalcy. Interviews, retrospective reports from periods of open press discussion, and the relative speed, coherence, and universality with which professionals connected with journalism and specialists using the media take advantage of any division or weakness of the political leadership is evidence that professional goals are set and individual actions taken to manipulate and push back the limits and prohibitions set by the Party and state leaders in periods of even intense political involvement in the mass media. When discussion and public action is prohibited, the activities of journalists and writers highlight the extra-institutional channels and informal points of access used in the policy process. These nonlegislative actions are far more significant during periods of relative normalcy than are what is symbolic professional representation in the discussion and presentation of legislation in this area. In fact, professional journalists and writers made it very clear in both countries that, for all periods but the Solidarity period of 1980-1981 and, for some, the Dubcek era in Czechoslovakia, they considered legislation irrelevant if not restrictive and did not involve themselves in the specifics of its proposals. Furthermore, in periods of relative normalcy when such legislation was considered and passed (other than the Polish Law on Censorship passed in July 1981, during the heyday of Solidarity and the June 1968 revisions of the Czechoslovak press law) invitations for involvement were made from the ministries or the Party departments only to professional association representatives whom they had approved in the first place.

In looking at the roles of specialists and professionals in the making of information policy, we focused on two main issues. The first
of these is the question of information access, or the ability of journalists to acquire the information they need for their work and the resulting obligation of other specialists, professionals, and bureaucrats to cooperate in making information available to journalists. We also looked at the related, but distinct, issue of how information, once obtained, is controlled by both formal and informal systems of press control and censorship.

Both of these issues tend to bring out different kinds of coalitions than do the issues involved in demographic policy or regional planning and investment. To a larger extent than on many other issues, professionals and specialists often come into conflict with each other in the area of information access. Journalists and specialists, for example, frequently complain to higher Party and state officials about bureaucrats or other professionals or specialists who refuse to give them information in professional circles. They also raise this issue with the larger public when they see such action as tactically viable and not harmful to their public status and when such complaints are allowed by those who control the media. At the same time, it has been white collar workers who complain the most strongly and publicly about the failure of journalists to get and present the negative facts in policy areas that do not touch their personal positions. In this area, because top Party and state leaders have taken the position that journalists have a right to information and should not be blocked by low-level bureaucrats or managers from getting it, they serve as allies both ideologically and often personally of journalists or specialists trying to get access. Political leaders are, of course, unwilling to give journalists or specialists access to information that would hurt their individual
positions or bureaucracies. While journalists and specialists are aligned with political leaders on this issue because they have a professional imperative to inform, Party and state leaders cooperate with journalists and support them, in some cases, in their quest for information because they need the information to control the economy. This "scapegoating" or highlighting of specific abuses of power and poor performance also aids political leaders by shifting attention away from their responsibility for policy failures.

In the area of information control and publishability, professionals and specialists (especially journalists and journalist-editors) are pitted against officials of the Party and state bureaucracies. Although they form alliances as individuals with high level Party or state leaders who, for whatever personal or political reason, may sometimes override the decisions of those charged with information control, this type of cooperation occurs far less frequently than it does on issues related to access to information. The issue of information blockage has always been too politically sensitive, however, to be allowed into public discussion except in periods of dramatic liberalization and in closed professional meetings. 199

Interestingly, given the distinct differences between the Polish and Czechoslovak experiences in the areas of planning and demographic policy, in the area of information policy relatively comparable patterns emerged in Poland and Czechoslovakia, although the nature of legislation has in no way been parallel. In both countries, when controls on information were strong, journalists and specialists attempted to manipulate policy to their advantage through their actions on individual stories or through redirecting what they regarded as
professional work to involve not simply publication but also the collection and storage of information and the circulation of that information through informal channels. How formal and public the pressure for more access and less control over what can be published depends on the attentiveness of the top political leadership to this issue and the coherence of elite positions. In Czechoslovakia, the liberalization that began in the mid-sixties and was put down by Soviet tanks in 1968 was the first major opening and movement by journalists for more open access and discussion in the postwar period. Certain journalists, however, particularly those who worked on the cultural weeklies, were involved in the growing ferment in intellectual circles that occurred in the early and mid-1960's and played an important role in making the general public aware of new developments in many areas.

In Poland, leadership control was never as consistent, and periods of relative press freedom and power occurred as a result of turmoil within the top leadership in 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1980. Journalists lived through these victories and defeats, gaining a sense of what they should be able to do and a retinue of connections as well as a public image from their involvement in periods of liberalization. Furthermore, Gomulka was far less interested in the media than either leaders in Czechoslovakia or Gierek, who treated the press as he treated much of the rest of society, by constructing bureaucratic channels and barriers. All of these factors increased the quantity of professional action, although they did not alter the basic content of such actions, and culminated in the schooled policy advocacy of the professional journalists in the 1980-81 action on a censorship law.
Information Access

The issue of information access was dealt with formally by Party and government decrees ordering lower level officials to be forthcoming with journalists and other experts in both Czechoslovakia and Poland. These periodic decrees, although sometimes referred to by journalists' representatives in discussing the problems and limits of the profession, were not products of pressure from journalists or other specialists; nor were they considered significant by members of the profession. For, while the decrees emphasized that journalists were important parts of the Party leadership and should be aided, it was also clear from common practice and the decrees themselves that open access to information did not allow for the criticism of Party officials or high-level Party or government policy, and that there were no sanctions for those who did not cooperate with journalists or specialists and give them information. Their lack of impact was further demonstrated by the fact that the same calls for journalists to have access to information were constantly repeated.

In reform periods, discussions concerning information access have been far less significant than discussions about the publishability of information. When the issue has been raised, it has more often centered on political leaders' controls over information availability than the refusal of other professionals to turn over information. The disinterest of journalists in trying to legislate this issue is also a product of their ability to get information from their own sources when they want it and their resulting sense that this is an issue good professionals can handle by their own efforts and the ties they have developed as
specialists in the area about which they write. So, access has been treated as a personal issue rather than a policy issue. When journalists were not given the kind of information they sought or academic specialists were unable to get data for their research, they relied on their accumulated contacts with individuals dealing with the subject at hand from different perspectives. Either on the basis of friendship or as professionals seeking to do a story, they simply went around the block to others with access to the information they needed. In exchange for the information, either implicitly or directly, journalists promised to try and resolve a problem or to make it known through their writing and their personal contacts. If they cannot do that, they lose credibility with their sources and are less able to draw on them for information in the future.

Journalists have also reacted to their long-term access problems by becoming specialists in a given area with their own store of information and an ability to trade information with sources. Their ability to use these informal channels depends, however, on their individual and institutional prestige. Therefore, journalists tend to specialize in very limited fields about which they can publish often and critically, thereby gaining public prominence. The distribution of information also tends to favor those with editors who are both politically well connected and willing to use their prestige to help journalists get critical information. As a result, it also favors prominent national journals with a reputation for critical writing that is well developed. New, young journalists or those from unknown papers without editors willing to engage in criticism or advocacy, however well they write, do not have these "weapons" to use. For them information access and the bitterness that accompanies it between
journalists and those about whom they write is a problem. But their weakness is such that press discussion of the problems to put pressure on their reluctant sources is more difficult or impossible.

This status-and tenure-based difference in access led to generational, center-periphery, and specialist-daily-generalist divisions in the profession both in terms of actual ability to amass information and in journalists' needs in this area. Since this difference did not decrease over time but rather grew larger as precedents built on each other, the profession was divided as to appropriate actions. Journalists from prominent, central journals were able to adequately rely on their own personal contacts and their resources both to collect data and to pressure those holding it to turn it over. Other professional journalists and specialists needing information turned beyond their weak editors to their professional organizations both to express their frustration and to seek institutionalized if behind-the-scenes advocacy.207

It was this latter group of journalists and writers who accepted the government-initiated and controlled press offices of various ministries and industries. These press offices, established in Czechoslovakia in the late fifties and in Poland given life under Gierek (and, ironically, expanded and centralized under martial law), were restrictive for those who had their own channels of access. But for journalists who had no other personal points of access, they were a guarantee of at least some information and access.208

In the Polish case, the content of the Party and government decrees was formulated into law in 1964 as a part of the Code of Administrative Behavior not in response to professional or specialist advocacy but as a result of the desire of what was apparently a limited number of Party
leaders to encourage more individual citizen protest on misadministration. The code that was proposed and ultimately even the revised code did not fit the needs of journalists. Journalists and the lawyers they involved in their cause inadvertently, by using the legal journal (Prawo i Życie) and holding small formal and informal conferences on the law and its problems, objected to the law because there were no sanctions built into it; mass media demands for information were treated in the law like those of individual citizens; and deadlines for the provision of information were so late that most of the news would be almost useless to journalists. Although journalists and legal specialists made clear in private channels that these were their objections to the law, they did not address these issues in the media. Instead, as long as the leadership allowed it to go on, they treated the law as symbolic of a broader problem: the failure of the system to develop enough to be self-regulating.

In Poland, this issue of access to information and response to criticism has not been raised again as an issue for legislative debate since 1964. Journalists and other writers have used, wherever possible, informal channels and the public media to press their demands for information or responses to their criticism. Bureaucrats and possible targets of critical articles have simply refused information or presented falsified information.

In the late Gierek years, the pressure for information was reduced by the sense among journalists that it would not be published anyway. But, with the rise of Solidarity, the public demand for "information" and for critical press articles both pushed journalists and gave them an opportunity to get information and publish it. However, the plethora of
informal papers and office newsletters done by individuals involved in a given bureaucracy in this period meant that little could be kept a secret, so journalists did not push for any protection of their right to information. 211

Under martial law, the move of prominent journalists from their prominent and established journals to work outside of journalism or to minor journals took away the group which had the best "storehouse of information" and the greatest power to push for that information. It also led, in the initial period, to the militarization, and therefore exemption from criticism, of large segments of the economy. At the same time, former prominent journalists (Jerzy Urban, Wieslaw Gornioki, and Theodor Toeplitz), who were in the government exerted internal pressures for the establishment of strong government press offices paralleled in the countryside by regional and ministry press offices. These offices were typically more active than the press offices of the Gierek era. The same individuals, along with some journalists delegated from the pro-regime Association of Polish Journalists that replaced the former professional association of journalists and university experts on press law, also pressed for the inclusion of a guarantee of journalists' rights to information and protection from retribution for criticism in the press law that was published after the ending of martial law. All indications are that, although the Association did protest as did the Church about other parts of the law, the passages on information access and protection from criticism were not of interest to the bulk of the profession. Instead, most journalists, particularly the young, found themselves struggling to build up their own data banks and network of
connections in order to be able to do their work effectively and profitably. 212

Thus, journalists in both Czechoslovakia and Poland see information access as a problem to be resolved not by legislation but by individual action and position. The same holds true for researchers and scholars seeking information. Ironically, even in periods when legislative protection is possible, there is little interest in such protection — in part because it does not seem necessary during periods of crisis when information is relatively easily available and, in part, because journalists, scholars, and freelancers are in competition with each other to demonstrate their ability to get information. This competition divides the interests of the profession. It also reinforces the view that individual contacts and power are more important in guaranteeing access to information than either legislative regulation or professional group action.

Information Control

On the issue of information publishability, informal methods of influencing the administration of controls in specific instances were the norm in both Czechoslovakia and Poland, and public discussion was, at best, not common except in periods of the most dramatic conflict. In Czechoslovakia, censorship came to be one of the most important issues in the mid to late 1960's. However, the problems created by censorship were first raised as a political issue not by journalists and editors, but by the creative intellectuals, particularly the writers. In Poland, although working journalists and editors (with the exception of those who were purely political appointees) were hurt by censorship and the
sanctions for those who presented unacceptable information, there was no active movement among professionals to have censorship legally regulated or to replace the outdated 1938 press law with a modern version regulating publication, the profession, and the rights of journalists, their publishers, and their public until the Solidarity period.

In 1956 in Poland, there were initial inquiries into the possibilities of developing a press law that would protect journalists' right to publish, but the censorship office had disbanded itself and so the issue was moot. Once censorship had been reinstituted, journalists were too weak to bring about the legislation that they wanted. Thus, until the Solidarity period in Poland, journalists (both in the bureaucracy of the professional association and in the profession as a whole) were opposed to the passage of legal regulation of the press and censorship as they felt that it would increase the power of the officials and take away their ability to negotiate around the law. Those interested in this area also referred to the fact that the press laws that were enacted in other communist states were general and placed the responsibility for what appeared in the media on journalists and editors, thereby reducing their maneuverability.

Czechoslovakia had a censorship law as of 1966 that legalized censorship more openly and explicitly than earlier decrees had. Representatives of the Union of Journalists were involved in framing the new law, but several of their recommendations, including the proposal that censorship should be abolished, were ignored in the law as it was adopted, and most journalists showed little interest in it. In fact, the law had little effect on the liberalization which was occurring in Czechoslovakia or journalists' part in it. The provisions of the law
essentially shifted the responsibility for control of what was published from an official censor to editors and journalists. However, it left the provisions as to what was censorable vague enough to allow the ministries to protect themselves as they saw fit. The amendment of this law in June 1968 ended formal censorship in Czechoslovakia. However, it was a party decree in March 1968 -- much contested within the Party leadership and then simply announced -- that removed the censorship apparatus from Party apparatus control and protection. This action did away with external information controls because there was no force behind the censors' directives, and journalists simply went their own way. For them, the much more powerful pressure was from the public precedents that were being set as journalists successfully pushed the boundaries of acceptable writing back and others followed them.

Censorship and the control of information were extremely critical and important issues during the political reform period in 1968, and numerous specialists and professionals, including journalists and writers as well as scholars in various fields, took part in the increasingly open discussions of the need for free access to information and the right of the press to publish critical opinions. They also participated in the effort to amend the law governing censorship, as members of the various commissions charged with formulating draft amendments and, less formally, in discussions with political leaders in the state and party apparatus. However, many journalists in particular were less interested in working to secure legislative guarantees than in using their new freedom in a practical way in their daily work.

With the imposition of control by the invasion force and the immediate curbing of the press and broadcast media that the invading
forces required the leadership to carry out, there was little possibil-
ity of manipulation by journalists, editors, writers, or contributing
specialists. In fact, their reaction was to impose strict self-restraint
when it was clear that there was no possibility of continuing the
reform. The impact of this was increased as journals and journalists
were blacklisted by the new rulers so that the profession was peopled
after a year largely by unknowns and newcomers willing to take these
compromising positions. The additional reimposition of censorship was,
for this reason, delayed until 1969. Even then, the reimposition was
not of a fully active censors' office but of a formal review office for
state secrets and other "slips." On the whole, journalists who were on
the press were forced to restrain themselves or lose their jobs and risk
further sanctions. This has continued to be a major pressure for
restraint and self-censorship for the past 14 years with journalists
unsure of themselves and the regime uninterested in allowing even
restrained criticism to appear.

The Polish censorship law passed in July 1981 and put into effect
in November 1981 came about by a process unique in Eastern Europe during
the communist period. It was, first of all, not a direct product of
journalists' lobbying for a change in the censorship legislation. Up
until the demands of Solidarity, journalists in Poland had been resigned
to dealing with the censorship as representatives of individual journals
and with the time-honored tactic of having only the first run copy of an
issue submitted to the censors (thereby allowing the censor to see the
entire issue as a whole and check stories in the context of their layout
and insuring journalists that censors were under pressure to make
decisions quickly and with the understanding that massive revisions
would be costly and time consuming for the journal). There had been little discussion in the profession or sense on the part of prominent journalism professors or students that legal regulation of censorship was of interest to the profession or a feasible policy. But, in the course of negotiations between Solidarity advisors and government representatives, the drafting of a law structuring and restricting censorship became the most viable compromise between the workers' desire for a truthful and critical media and the government's desire to keep control of what appeared in that media. Therefore, out of these advisors' consultations came the concept and the promise of a censorship law. Such a compromise was drawn up by advisors, some of whom were representatives of the Catholic press and others of whom were government journalists. But, it was a tactical compromise, not a realizing of the profession's interests. 220

The signing of the Gdansk accords, which included as their third point the drafting and passage of a law regulating and restricting censorship as well as the promise of Church access to the broadcast media, triggered a long process of negotiations and intergroup conflicts that would end with the presentation of two drafts to the Polish parliament. Treating this demand for legislation from the accords as it did other directives for the formulation of legislation, the Ministry of Justice assigned one of its specialists on press related law to handle this drafting. An internal committee was charged with collecting information, legal models, and specialist advice from the academic centers. To facilitate this, the Ministry itself appointed a professor from the university long associated with the issue of censorship legislation (Michalski), the head of the censors' office, and officials from
the Association of Polish Journalists to a drafting committee. As the
process continued and information about the discussions leaked out, two
processes occurred simultaneously: the various non-Ministry officials
on the committee began to commission or encourage research on the
subject of censorship from their students or subordinates, and the
Association of Creative Associations (a coordinating body of profes-
sional and scholarly organizations in Poland) reacted to the gossip
about the provisions being discussed by forming its own committee with
representatives from the various professional groups for whom this law
was relevant to draw up its own draft. In doing this, the representa-
tives of each group focused primarily on the specific provisions that
would protect their professions' interests. Solidarity itself pushed
only for the insurance that Solidarity journals would not be censored.
Artists concerned themselves primarily with the blocking of censorship
for art exhibits. Scholarly group representatives focused on the
exemption of scholarly publications from censorship. The broadest
legislative positions were taken by the representatives of the Writers'
Union and the Association of Polish Journalists. This draft was dis-
cussed internally by the delegates assigned from the various associ-
tions. It was simultaneously discussed formally and informally at
professional gatherings and in the press.

This dual drafting process took far longer than the negotiators had
projected. The Ministry of Justice draft was frequently delayed and not
presented when it was promised. Joint meetings of all the involved
parties were called and then cancelled. Compromises were not made by
the Ministry of Justice or the Commission. In addition, other more
pressing issues such as the printers' strike over the increases that
printers saw in the number of censors' interventions (which journalists objected to as an infringement on their professional turf and tried to mediate) and the variety of strikes and crises that broke out throughout 1980-81 took precedence over the drafting of any legislation.

In the end, there was no compromise and the decision was made to bring both drafts to the parliament for resolution. The issues on which compromise proved to be impossible were the questions of whether review of the censors' office should be located in the parliament or in the Council of Ministers (a move the professional association representatives felt would locate control in the hands of those most interested in restricting the press); the specificity of the provisions concerning what could be censored (government representatives wanted general statements and professional association representatives wanted very specific provisions as to the material and subjects that could be censored); and the issue of time limits on how long the censors could hold an article or submission. The pressure of Solidarity was such that it was able to insure that the provision in which it had a direct interest -- the independence of union publications -- was not a matter of discussion, although later interpretations of the exact meaning of the "internal union publications" clause were clearly attempts to control the union's writings through bureaucratic decisions. Professional groups were largely able to get the provisions that they sought concerning exemptions. The demand for specificity in what could be removed by the censors was also a victory for the professional associations. But, review and control of the censors was placed in the hands of the administrative organs as proposed in the draft submitted by the Ministry.
The concession to professional demands and the potential benefits professionals and specialists, as well as other citizens interested in the law, gained from the censorship law proved to be temporary victories. Although it gave professionals the kind of protection that they had said other socialist laws regulating censorship did not give writers and journalists, it was a law that was observed only in exceptional cases. The censorship bureaucracy continued to increase its interventions and only the Solidarity weekly and the Catholic papers either moved in court against the censors' decisions or were preparing to do so. The law, ultimately, had only been in effect six weeks when it was suspended with the declaration of martial law. The return to "normalization" brought with it reforms of the censorship law which broadened the categories that could be censored and made the language on what could be removed far more general. This reform, claimed in the Polish media to have been initiated primarily by Wieslaw Gornicki and Jerzy Urban, government press spokesmen, as well as the head of the censors' office, was not fought by the profession -- although some protest was lodged by the Association of Polish Journalists -- but was treated as a fait accompli of little relevance to reality. 222

Because the process was more open than usual, the story of the development of this law gives us more detailed information than is usually available concerning the normal process of legislative drafting, testing, and presentation and the way members of different groups are involved in the passage of legislation relevant to them. It also indicates what professionals and specialists feel their needs are in the area of information freedom and the potential for individual specialists and professionals to use the lifting of controls to organize as formal, associational groups. Ultimately, given the declaration of martial law
and the fact that the bureaucracy of the censorship apparatus treated
the law as a "nuisance" rather than a sign for new directions, however,
the issue of censorship remained one in which individuals used their
personal connections to protect themselves from censorship or to appeal
censors' decisions as they had since the 1956 period and relied very
little on formal guarantees either in structuring their actions or in
attempting change.
Conclusion

Our research confirms the conclusion reached by numerous other scholars (particularly in the Soviet case) that we are dealing with complex societies in which a multitude of groups and individuals in addition to the top political elite are involved in the making and administering of policy. As in other states, given the multiplicity of groups and institutions involved, policy in particular areas is frequently not a coherent set of coordinated measures but rather a loosely related or contradictory collection of measures adopted and implemented by a number of different actors. Both of these factors condition the role which specialists and professionals, as well as other political actors, play in policy-making in these countries.

As the preceding discussion illustrates, specialists and professionals are involved in policy-making in all three of the issue areas we examined. Although their input and effect differ to some extent according to the sensitivity of the issue, time period, and country involved, actors of this type play an important role at all stages of the policy-making process from recognition of a problem to implementation and evaluation of policies adopted.

Specialists and professionals use a variety of tools and resources to take part in policy-making. These include their specialized knowledge and professional skills, as well as institutional or professional position, that formally legitimate their entry into the policy-making process. However, as our research demonstrates, less
formal resources, including contact with bureaucratic officials and political leaders, as well as with other specialists and professionals, are also important.

In both Czechoslovakia and Poland, specialists and professionals use established channels and institutions to take part in policy-making. Much of their input into the policy-making process in all three of the areas we examined occurs as they engage in their routine occupational duties. As members of interdisciplinary research teams, scientific colloquia, and working professional groups, specialists and professionals collect the data and prepare the longer range studies that form the basis for recognizing and understanding public policy problems. They also frequently are involved more directly in elaborating possible solutions to particular policy problems, debating and assessing the potential results of particular policies, and implementing or evaluating the policies adopted. Particularly in less sensitive areas, their participation in these activities has been institutionalized to a large extent, as routine consultation of experts and professionals in the area involved in particular decisions has become part of the policy-making process itself. This tendency has been particularly evident in Czechoslovakia, where most ministries have their own research groups and where expert discussion and evaluation is a routine part of decision-making in many areas. Specialists and professionals in both countries also use specialized journals, professional conferences, and meetings of professional associations to discuss policy-relevant issues and raise particular policy options with representatives of the political leadership. In addition to these activities, however, which take place in the framework of established institutions and organizations, specialists and
professionals also make use of less formal channels, including personal contact with political leaders, their advisors, and other specialists and professionals, to discuss and advocate particular policy options.

In taking part in these activities, specialists and professionals sometimes act in accordance with institutional or professional affiliations. But, as we hypothesized, more often they enter into the policy-making process as members of informal, ad hoc coalitions of individuals united by common policy preferences or common perspectives on particular policy-related issues. These coalitions, which frequently operate through study teams, commissions, or other groups set up by the political leadership to examine particular problems and make recommendations, often consist of individuals who work in a variety of institutions and have diverse professional and occupational experiences and perspectives. The main exceptions to this pattern appear to occur in those instances in which the professional prerogatives or institutional interests of particular groups are involved. At the same time, many of the groupings involved in policy-making in the areas we examined were remarkably stable in terms of the specialists and professionals involved. Despite certain changes related to changes in the political climate (which tended to be greatest in both countries in the area of information policy), many of the same individuals have been involved in policy-making since the institution of communist systems. The stability of these coalitions, which is a finding that runs counter to the expectations of scholars like Griffiths, is related to and reinforced by the influence top specialists and professionals have in determining the subjects of scientific research and in selecting other specialists and professionals for positions that bring them into policy-making.
Although specialists and professionals use many of the same tools and take part in policy-making in similar ways in Czechoslovakia and Poland, there were several important differences in their participation in the two countries. These differences were particularly great in the area of demographic policy and industrial investment policy where, despite the possibility of open research and discussion of these questions throughout the communist period in Poland, expert input appears to have had relatively little impact on the actual policies adopted and administered. In Czechoslovakia, in contrast, despite the change in the political climate that occurred after the end of the reform period in the late 1960s, the consultation of experts and the involvement of specialists and professionals in the policy-making process have become more routinized, particularly in the area of demographic policy, but also to a large extent in industrial investment policy. The differences were greatest between the two countries, however, in the most recent past, i.e., the 1970s, and may reflect the unusual situation which developed in Poland under Gierek whereby specialists and professionals were given a good deal of formal power to take part in policy-making as members of government sponsored commissions and study groups, but had a very limited role in actually formulating policy.

As noted earlier, we expected specialists and professionals to play a larger role in policy-making in issue areas which were less sensitive ideologically and less important to other policy goals. This hypothesis was only partially confirmed. In Czechoslovakia, the consultation of experts appears to be more institutionalized in the less sensitive areas of demographic and industrial investment policy than in information policy. In Poland, with Gierek's emphasis on institutions
for professional and specialist input, consultation on all issues was structured in such a way as to minimize its impact. Low political sensitivity meant that research and input was done for its own sake, a fact professionals and specialists were well aware of. On such policies, decisions could often be made largely by experts but they had little or no control over how policy was administered.

In both Czechoslovakia and Poland, the sensitivity of the issue area appears to have more influence on the visibility and openness of the consultation process than on the extent of specialist and professional input. Even in the sensitive area of information policy, specialists and professionals in both countries are drawn into the policy-making process when the political leadership feels the need to do so, and professionals redraw policy individually by their own actions. In addition, while consultation with specialists and professionals may take place more openly in the other issue areas we examined, experts as well as bureaucrats openly acknowledge that criteria other than professional or specialist opinion frequently take precedence in policy decisions. Nonetheless, our study suggests that the number and type of actors involved in policy-making does vary by the sensitivity of the issue involved in communist as well as non-communist systems. Expert input also appears likely to be disregarded more frequently or taken into account less in decisions perceived to be extremely sensitive ideologically or politically, or in those cases in which the political leadership is completely disinterested in investing politically or economically in a policy.

There were also certain differences in the activities of specialists and professionals and the extent to which they were involved
in policy-making in the areas we examined in different time periods in both Czechoslovakia and Poland. Our findings provide some support for those analysts who argue that the role of these actors will increase as communist systems become more developed. This tendency was particularly evident in Czechoslovakia, where there appears to have been an increase in the extent to which specialists and professionals are brought into the policy-making process over time, as well as in the extent to which such input has become institutionalized at the stage of policy formation. In two of the three areas we examined, this institutionalization increased since the late 1960's, despite the reversal of the political reform, although normalization did lead to changes in the role of particular individuals.

At the same time, the actual impact specialist and professional input has on policy, as well as, in certain cases, the opportunities of such actors to become involved in policy-making, depend on the political climate of the moment and the willingness or lack of willingness of particular political leaders to solicit and heed expert input. The Polish experience under Gierek, in which elaborate mechanisms were set up to involve specialists and professionals in the making of policy, but little attention was given to their contributions in the policies adopted, and many policies made with attention to expert opinion were not enforced, is a warning against assuming that institutionalization of the role of these actors in the policy-making process will ensure either that their advice will be heeded or that the policies that result will be implemented effectively.

Our research illustrates the complex nature of the relationship between political leaders and those who have specialized knowledge and
professional skills in these societies. On the one hand, political leaders at various levels (particularly middle level party and state bureaucrats), play a key role in bringing specialists and professionals into the policy-making process; they also have the ability to determine which specialists and professionals will be included and the conditions of their participation. Specialists and professionals do at times enter the policy-making process at their own initiative to bring a new problem to the attention of political leaders, challenge existing policy orientations, or influence the implementation of policy measures. More often, however, these actors enter the policy-making process not at their own initiative but either at the specific invitation of political leaders or bureaucrats or in the course of performing their ordinary professional or occupational duties.

With some exceptions, specialists and professionals appear to accept the division of labor between experts, whose function it is to give advice and expert opinion, and policy-makers, whose task it is to make the final decision. In addition, many specialists and professionals seem quite aware of the fact that their opinions will not necessarily be reflected in the policy measures adopted. This issue currently does not appear to be as salient to most professionals and specialists in Czechoslovakia as it is in Poland, although it has been a major point of contention in both countries at various times. In Czechoslovakia, certain specialists and professionals used the political opening of the early and mid-1960's to call for and expand their roles in policy-making. With normalization, there is little room to question the dominance of political considerations openly, although individual specialists and professionals occasionally discuss the need for greater attention to
their input. In Poland, under Gomulka, specialists and professionals sought a more responsive and active leader. Under Gierek, the development of centrally controlled institutions which gave experts a forum but no hearing, as well as the failure of the economic policies and the visible corruption and misadministration, alienated specialists and professionals as well as broader segments of society. But, until the Gdansk accords of August 1980, they saw themselves trapped in an irresolvable situation, cut off by the overwhelming bureaucracy. The Solidarity period allowed them to write and speak more openly about this but also presented them with an economic situation that offered few resources for change. Although only journalists of the groups involved in these case studies were heavily attacked during the martial law period, it seems that many professionals and specialists have elected a modified internal emigration and disengagement in Poland.

There thus appears to be little reason to expect that the current, or even significantly expanded, roles of specialists and professionals in policy-making will pose threats to the control of political leaders in these countries. There is little indication that the majority of specialists and professionals involved in any significant way in policy-making desire or have the resources to challenge the existing division of power in Czechoslovakia or Poland. In part, of course, this situation reflects the fact that political leaders have a variety of resources available to coopt specialists and professionals by rewarding them for cooperating. It also reflects the ability of the political leadership to select those specialists and professionals who will take part in policy-making, particularly at the policy formulation and debate stage, and control the occupational activities of specialists
and professionals. It is more difficult for political leaders to control how professionals or specialists in administrative positions act in carrying out policy once it is adopted. However, in these cases, the chief outcome is likely to be less effective policy rather than any real challenge to the existing political system.

But, while political leaders clearly have a good deal of control over the way specialists and professionals take part in policy-making, they also are dependent on these actors at all phases of the policy-making process. Even in the case of Poland under Gierek, which illustrates the influence that top political leaders and changes in the general political climate can have on policy-making, political leaders relied on specialists and professionals to generate and gather information and data, elaborate and analyze possible policy options, and evaluate the results of policies adopted and enacted.

Thus, while top party and government leaders articulate the general dimensions of policy, our investigation indicates that they rely on input from a variety of intermediary actors, including specialists and professionals as well as middle-level bureaucrats in both the party and state apparatus. Actors in the latter category play a particularly important role in bringing specialists and professionals into policy-making. Dealing with particular policy issues on a day to day basis and responsible for overseeing the implementation of policy in particular areas, these actors, who in some cases are trained specialists or professionals themselves, frequently determine which specialists and professionals will be consulted and how the input of various specialists and professionals will be channelled. Top party and state leaders are dependent on these bureaucratic actors for information concerning
problem areas and possible solutions. This dependence and the fact that there is a high degree of stability in personnel at the middle levels give bureaucratic actors a good deal of control over what policy options will be considered and therefore what policy will be made in areas under their jurisdiction.

Party and state leaders sometimes have sought to overcome their dependence on actors of this type by providing themselves with alternate sources of information, such as the Polish Institute of Marxism-Leninism or the various party schools in Czechoslovakia. They also have appointed individuals personally loyal to them or viewed as both politically skilled and competent in given areas to head ministries or Party departments. However, there have been problems with both of these strategies. In the first case, although researchers at these as well as at other institutes sometimes perform research specifically requested by party leaders, much of the research they do is determined by the staff and researchers of the institute, who in turn, are frequently part of the same community of specialists and professionals as those experts who work in or for the ministries. As such, they appear to be influenced by the same general perceptions of what is significant and worthy of investigation at any particular time or, more directly, follow research programs drawn up with the input of the same individuals. The effort of top political leaders to use loyal individuals to put their stamp on the activities of the established bureaucracies typically has run into a different set of problems which result from the fact that, while these individuals have generally have had some relevant experience in a given area, they have not worked their way up professionally through that
bureaucracy or been part of the bureaucracy they come to head for a number of years.

This fact was particularly significant in the Polish case. Glierek, the first Polish leader to come in with a commitment to policy-making as opposed to preserving, appointed men from his own province who had few if any ties to the center, and the Jaruzelski regime, in a deliberate move to get legitimacy for its policies, appointed academics, journalists, and military officials to head its ministries—officials who were better known for their criticism than for their support of the ministries they tried to direct. Because these leaders did not have personal ties and roots in the bureaucracies they were trying to control, they had little real ability to change either the policies or administrative patterns they found. Instead, established department leaders and regional deputies were able to pursue their established policies and administrative patterns with little or no risk (according to present and former ministerial officials in Poland) of losing their positions. Ultimately, unless they had a strong commitment to a given policy or their own personal predilections, these officials were in the position of judging the information, policy recommendations, and external input they received from lower levels of their own bureaucracies and outside actors including specialists and professionals, and reconciling them with the sense of leadership interests and concerns gathered from personal or official contact with top leaders. They were not, however, in a position to control the actions of their subordinates in interpreting policy.

Coordination of policy and communication between various ministries and between ministries and outside specialists and
professionals also seldom occurs at the top level. Instead, these activities frequently take place, in both Poland and Czechoslovakia, through small group contacts or individual contacts with Party and state leaders in the same fields. Deputy prime ministers and secretaries in the Party responsible for particular policy areas play a particularly important role in this respect, for they are frequently the actors who are responsible for attending meetings with representatives of other hierarchies or attending the professional conferences and meetings of the advisory commissions in which specialists and professionals participate.

The role of middle level bureaucrats in soliciting and channeling the input of specialists and professionals into policy-making, then, and the relative lack of resources top ministry officials have to radically alter existing routines or, perhaps more important, perceptions of particular policy areas, are two factors that constrain top political leaders in policy-making in these countries. The role specialists and professionals play in setting the agenda for research and determining what problems are seen as significant and worthy of investigation is another constraint. The ongoing nature of research and professional discussion on particular problems, which continues whatever the momentary interests of the political leaders, and the high degree of job security in the academic and research world as in other areas, create a set of predictable experts with views known both to those in their own specializations and professions and to bureaucratic and political actors with responsibilities in particular areas. These factors also result in a number of cadres trained by the same specialists and professionals who, working in research and administration,
offer a bureaucratic audience for various specialists and a body of research which specialists and professionals can marshal to support various policy positions when the political climate allows. The many opportunities specialists and professionals have for both formal and informal interaction with others in their own and other fields, as well as with bureaucratic officials, reinforce existing perceptions of particular policy issues among specialists and professionals and are important channels for shaping the perceptions of decision-makers as well.

The real problem communist leaders face in regard to specialists and professionals, then, is not so much how to control those who possess specialized knowledge and professional skills, but rather how to incorporate this expertise into the policy-making process more effectively and how to coordinate varied approaches to a problem. As noted earlier, the extent to which specialists' and professionals' inputs have been used effectively in policy-making has varied over time within each country and between the two countries examined. It has also varied to some extent according to the issue area involved.

But in all areas, there are evident obstacles to the efficient use of expert opinion and the skills of professionals in policy-making. These obstacles occur in two main areas: obtaining adequate expert advice and incorporating this input into the policy-making process. In the first area, one of the main problems arises from the fact that the system that has been established for controlling and funding research and getting information makes it difficult for political leaders to obtain divergent opinions and objective information. To some extent, of course, these difficulties occur in any political system. However, in
communist states there are also systemic factors that contribute to the problem. As we have noted earlier, the participation of specialists and professionals in policy-making is for the most part solicited and channeled through central institutions. With the exception of unusual periods, or in times of perceived crisis in a given policy area, only those who are well-known and well-established in their professions have a role in the process, particularly at the policy formation stage. The requirement that participants in policy-making show a certain degree, if only minimal, of political conformity also limits the range and diversity of opinions available to policy makers. This requirement, however, does not appear to be as serious as the pressures toward conformity that arise from other factors. The channelling of specialist and professional input through a limited number of institutions and the role of top professionals and specialists in influencing the selection of others to become members of study commissions and research teams, as well as in pinpointing new issues for investigation, for example, both limit the diversity of specialist opinion brought into policy-making. For professionals, who generally perform their work in less supervised conditions, such pressures to conform are less evident in the policy impact they have in the course of their ordinary work, but do affect their participation at the policy formation stage.

The structure of scientific research is another obstacle to obtaining adequate input from persons with specialized knowledge in these countries. As noted earlier, top specialists have an important influence on the topics that are chosen for inclusion in the state research plan. However, because research is planned in five year periods, with set research tasks and quantitative output indicators,
there are many obstacles to original, innovative research. Although research tasks are determined with reference to perceived economic and social needs, and the results of scholarly research are available to the political leadership more directly than in non-communist societies, the quality and diversity of research produced in many cases is not as high as it might be. Further, irrespective of the quality of the research actually done, this system makes it very difficult for specialists, including those working in the research institutes as well as in the universities, to shift direction to follow new leads, use new approaches, or work in areas outside the mainstream.

Finally, the organizational structures and official ideology of these countries pose further limits on the number and type of opinions brought into policy-making. As we have noted above, specialists and professionals possess numerous channels for communicating among themselves, with others with different specializations or occupations, and with political leaders. They also are able, in most periods, to debate issues and discuss alternatives far more freely in specialized journals and small circulation research reports and professional publications than in the mass media. These journals, however, tend to publish what their audience knows and agrees with rather than radically diverse views. There are limits on the alternatives that can be considered in many policy areas, and although debate among specialists and professionals is more open than in the mass media, there are certain limits on discussion which cannot be surpassed in normal times. There are also clear limits during most normal political times on the ability of specialists and professionals who hold unorthodox views to openly organize with
others of similar views or use the mass media to bring new problems to public attention.

In addition to barriers to obtaining adequate advice and input from specialists and professionals, there are also a number of obstacles to using the input of members of these groups in practice. These occur at the policy formation stage, where, as noted earlier, political, personal, and institutional factors sometimes override the recommendations of specialists and professionals. They also occur at the stage of policy implementation.

Policy implementation and the coordination of various policy measures in particular areas have been problematic in both Czechoslovakia and Poland. However, these problems appear to have been greater in Poland where, particularly under Gierek, there was very little effort to coordinate or supervise the implementation of policy. Thus, even in those areas where expert opinion was heeded in the making of policy and where top leaders were committed to a particular policy direction (which did not occur in the area of demographic policy but did to a greater extent in some aspects of industrial investment and regional development policy), the imperatives of coordination and control were not recognized. Although macro-planning regions were established in the 1970's, for example, to coordinate the planning and investment in the fragmented regional centers in Poland, neither the macro-planning regions nor the various commissions that were set up to demonstrate the regime's commitment to a given policy were charged with coordinating, reviewing, or approving existing policy. Their mission, rather, was to discuss the existing situation and report their findings to top party leaders. But their reports were seldom read and thus had very little
impact on the situation in particular policy areas. Power continued to be concentrated, in this area as in others, in the long-established ministries. Given the lack of commitment on the part of the leadership to marshalling forces and streamlining policies to fulfill a given goal, these ministries functioned very much in their own interest without any regard for the impact of their individual actions on policy as a whole. Individual ministries also continued to use financial resources for their own projects or needs. Without a financial commitment to a coordinated set of policy measures, the research of specialists thus often came to be more academic exercises than policy-relevant projects.

Similar problems in coordinating the interests and activities of various bureaucratic and political actors and in effectively administering adopted policies also exist in Czechoslovakia. In the area of demographic policy, the inputs of various institutional and political actors were coordinated to some degree in the set of pro-natalist measures proposed by the Population Commission and enacted by the government in the mid 1970's. Administration of the various components of the policy approach remains divided among a number of bureaucratic actors, and various aspects of the approach remain vulnerable to being poorly implemented by professionals as well as political leaders at lower levels, but there clearly has been an effort to elaborate a unified, coherent set of measures. In the area of industrial investment, there has been less success in coordinating the actions of individuals in the ministries, planning hierarchies, and political bodies at various levels, and stated policy goals frequently are vitiated in practice by the activities of lower level actors.
Ironically, in Poland, the first, and still relatively primitive, commissions comparable to those set up in Czechoslovakia to examine and coordinate policy measures in a number of areas appeared in the Solidarity and post-Solidarity period. These commissions were developed in problem areas defined both by the economic realities that the regime had to face and by the popular demands and criticisms that had arisen in the course of the popular ferment. Comprised of individuals appointed to represent a variety of ministerial, professional, and special or regional interests, these commissions were charged with raising issues that needed resolution in their various areas of competence and proposing possible solutions. Much of this work involved directed and small scale reordering of administrative priorities or procedures. A further task of the commissions was to review the process of policy implementation and alert the political leadership as to problem areas. Interviewees report that this system worked better than the figurehead commissions of the Gierek era. However, they still have not been able to overcome the entrenched interests of ministries and other bureaucratic or political organs sufficiently to insure that major policy decisions are passed and implemented as a package or even approved by the relevant commission before political leaders take action on them.

positions of members of various social groups advanced in the mid-1960's, in some cases by intellectuals who were part of research teams commissioned by political leaders. Zdenek Mlynar and Michal Lakatos were particularly active in formulating these ideas. Similar views were also expressed by sociologists and other scholars at numerous seminars and conferences held in Czechoslovakia in the mid-1960's. For examples of new views on the nature of socialist society see the essays presented in Pavel Machonin a kolektiv, Socialni struktura socialisticke spolecnosti (Prague: Nakladatelstvi Svoboda, 1966).


6 See Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress in the USSR (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 153ff, for an early discussion of the problems of political control the use of specialized knowledge poses in communist societies. While more recent discussions do not generally see the issue as involving a struggle for control between specialists and party leaders, or view specialists and professionals as necessarily desiring to wrest political power from the
existing leadership or dramatically change the political system, numerous scholars see a basic contradiction between the party's need to grant specialists and professionals (or intellectuals, more broadly speaking) greater autonomy in order to obtain better input into decision-making and the maintenance of the party's monopoly of power in other areas. See Rudolf L. Tokes, "Intellectuals and Their Discontent in Hungary: Class Power or Marginality?" in Michael J. Sodaro and Sharon L. Wolchik, eds., Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in the 1980's (London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martins, 1983), esp. pp. 172-74; and David Joravsky, "Political Authority and the Learned Estate," Survey, Vol. 23, No. 1 (102) (Winter 1977-78), pp. 36-41, for recent discussions of the elements of cooperation and conflict in intellectual-regime relations. The link between greater respect for the input of specialists and professionals and political change was also frequently made by reformers in Czechoslovakia in the late 1960's who argued, for example, that economic reform could only succeed if there were change in the command political system. It is also clear that communist leaders frequently see greater roles for specialists as a challenge to the authority and power of the party. See Breslauer, pp. 262-64, for example, for a discussion of Brezhnev's concerns in this area.


Exceptions include Solomon; Gustafson; Korbonski, "Bureaucracy and Interest Groups;" and the works cited above on the Czechoslovak reform era.

Exceptions include the works cited above on the Czechoslovak reform era.
12 See Lowenthal, pp. 47-48; Griffiths, p. 373; and Burks, pp. 308-09 for discussions of the impact of this factor.

13 See Skilling, "Groups in Soviet Politics: Some Hypotheses," pp. 19 and 400-03; and "Group Conflict and Political Change," in Johnson, ed., pp. 230-31; and Griffiths, p. 372. Skilling also emphasizes, however, the importance of political factors in determining the leeway given to groups in communist societies.

14 Ibid. Solomon, for example, argues that certain specialists and professionals were more active than previously thought in the Soviet Union even during the Stalinist era.


18 Skilling, "Groups in Soviet Politics," pp. 30-31; Griffiths, pp. 336-37. Griffiths, who argues that we might better understand Soviet
policy-making by focusing on tendencies of articulation rather than reified groups, nonetheless indicates that a tendency "would be indicated by a pattern of articulation associated with a loose coalition of actors operating at different levels of the political structure, whose articulations tend in the same direction," although such actors would be "unlikely to be fully aware of the common thrust and consequences of their activity."

P. 358.

19 See Joravsky and Moore.


22 The number of live births per 1,000 population decreased from a post-World War II high of 24.2 in 1947 to 21.2 in 1953 and continued to decline, with the exception of a few years, throughout the 1950's and 1960's. Vladimir Srb, Demograficka prirucka (Prague: Nakladatelstvi Svoboda, 1967), p. 183 and Statisticka rocenka, CSSR, (Prague: SNTL,


24 Although Czechoslovakia did not experience the massive population losses which occurred in some other European countries during the war, World War II did lead to high rates of newborn and infant mortality in the post-war period. The expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from the Czech Lands and the Hungarian minority from Slovakia also were population-related issues discussed at the war's end. See Vladimiar Srb, Deti nam umiraji (Prague: Ministerstvo informace, 1947) for an early discussion of the infant mortality problem.

25 Although Czechoslovakia had a well-developed tradition of demographic studies prior to the Second World War, demographers experienced the same restrictions on their work as other social scientists.

26 Several of the specialists interviewed in Czechoslovakia in 1981 noted the important role Dr. Karl Fajfer, the first head of the State Statistical Office after 1948, played in this process. Part of what was described as a group of "progressive" statisticians and demographers centered in the Statistical Office, Fajfer was responsible for monitoring population trends. He evidently, however, was also interested in some of the larger issues related to population trends and it was under his
direction that the earliest empirical investigations of the causes of the decline in the birth rate took place.

27 See Srb, *Demograficka prirucka*, pp. 214-18 for a brief summary of the results of these studies. Certain specialists employed at the Vyskumny ustav vystavby a architectury (VUVA) in Prague also began to carry out research on population-related issues at this time. One of the earliest of these was a study of the inhabitants of newly constructed suburbs. See Jiri Musil, *Urbanizace v socialistickych zemich* (Prague: Nakladatelstvi Svoboda, 1977), for a summary of this study.


29 The results of many of these studies are summarized in Srb *Demograficka prirucka*, pp. 224-48. More detailed reports may be found in *Demografie* and *Zpravy statni populacni komise* as well as in Vladimir Srb, *Demograficky sbornik* (Prague: SNTL, 1959). The latter work also includes a contribution by some of the other specialists working in other institutions who would later play an active role in discussing population issues and formulating population policies.

30 See Srb, Kucera, and Ruzucka, *Demografie*, pp. 50-51 for information concerning the expansion of courses in demography during this period.
Srb, Kucera, and Ruzicka, *Demografie*, p. 49 provide an inventory of works published during this period. Compared to later periods, the results of demographic research were not widely distributed.

An illustration of this limited influence is the law liberalizing abortions, which was adopted over the objections of numerous demographers who were concerned about the potentially negative effects of such a law on the birth rate.

The role specialists and professionals played during this period was conditioned by several factors including the continued development of demography as a separate and legitimate discipline; the more general changes taking place among intellectuals in the early and mid-1960's, and the continued decline in the birth rate. It was also influenced by the greater receptivity on the part of political leaders to input from specialists and professionals, as evident in the many interdisciplinary study commissions and research teams which political leaders commissioned to investigate numerous legal, economic, and social problems. See Wolchik, *The Scientific-Technological Revolution*, pp. 112-13 and 120-21 for a more detailed discussion of these factors. See Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*; Korbonski, "Bureaucracy and Interest Groups;" Galia Golan, *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973) and *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis, 1962-1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Vladimir V. Kusin, *The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) and *Political Groupings in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1977) for discussions of the more
general renewal of theoretical activity among intellectuals during this
period and the role which specialists and professionals played in
setting the conditions that eventually led to the reform era in Czecho-
slovakia. During the reform era itself, many experts put themselves at
the disposal of the reform leadership. As Kusin notes, "The Dubcek
leadership could, from the very beginning, count on unprecedented
expertise, such as the previous regime was partly denied and partly
refused to accept.... (F)ew regimes had ever been able to rely on such
formidable theoretical support." Political Groupings, p. 118.

See, for example, articles in Demografie during 1962 and 1963
and reports of research in Zpravy statni populacni komise, hereafter
ZSPK, including "Vdana zena v rodine a zamestnani," ZSPK, 1962, no. 2,
pp. 60-61; Milan Kucera, "Orientacni sonda o pricinach vzestupu porod-
nosti v roce 1963," ZSPK, 1964, no. 1, pp. 9-12; Vladimir Wynnczuk,
"Vysledky sondaze o prodlouzene materske dovolene ve vybranych okresech,"
ZSPK, 1964, no. 4, pp. 28-9; and Jiri Prokopec, "K nove uprave predpisu
o umelem preruseni tehotenstvi," ZSPK, 1963, no. 4(1), pp. 24-26 for
indications of some of the issues raised by demographers during this
period. Elite concern with demographic trends was reflected in the
consideration of population issues at the 12th party congress in 1962
and the adoption of certain pro-natalist measures at that time. See
Heitlinger, "Pro-natalist Population Policies," pp. 130-31 for a review
of these measures.
These discussions took place at a number of conferences organized to deal with population related topics, as well as in less formal meetings and seminars organized by various workplaces and professional organizations. They also were reflected in the specialized journals as well as, during the mid-to-late 1960's, the mass circulation press. One of the more interesting of these conferences was that held in late 1962 to discuss possible revisions of the abortion law. See Jiri Prokopec, "K nove uprave predpisu o umelem preruseni tehotenstvi, ZSPK, 1963, no. 4(1) for the proceedings of this conference, which reflect clear differences of opinion concerning the abortion law and its revision.

Many of these debates also involved reconsideration of the position of women under socialism. See Hilda Scott, Does Socialism Liberate Women? (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1974), Ch. 6; Alena Heitlinger, Women and State Socialism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1979), Chs. 15 and 16; and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Politics, Ideology, and Equality: Changes in the Status of Women in Eastern Europe," Ph.D. dissertation, the University of Michigan, 1978, Chs. 7 and 8 for discussion of these debates. See Wolchik, "Demography, Political Reform, and Women's Issues," for further discussion of the various poles in the debates over population issues.

See Wolchik, "Politics, Ideology, and Equality," Ch. 7 for illustrations of the actions of specialists in this regard.

See Heitlinger, "Pro-natalist Population Policies;" Scott and Wolchik, "Politics, Ideology, and Equality," Ch. 7 for discussions of
these perspectives. See Wolchik, "Demography, Political Reform, and Women's Issues," pp. 140-42 for examples of the attitudes of demographers in regard to these issues.

Many of these individuals are members of the Population Commission, while others take part in research teams the Commission's Secretariat and the Czechoslovak Demographic Society oversee. There was a high degree of agreement among specialists, professionals, and bureaucrats interviewed in Prague in June, July, and August 1981 as to who the most important and influential specialists involved in this area are. Specialists and professionals interviewed often referred to the frequent contacts, of both a formal and informal nature, among specialists and professionals in different institutions and locations.


Numerous social science surveys showed that most women were against restriction of the grounds for abortion. Articles and seminar reports indicate that most demographers and specialists working in the area also opposed such restrictions. See, for example, the views expressed in "Zkraceny zaznam z jednani celostathino seminare k problemum
zakona o umelem preruzeni tehotenstvi," ZSPK, 1968, no. 3 and in Marie Krchova, "Zakon o umelem preruzeni tehotenstvi a jeho vliv na populacni vyvoj," ZSPK, 1971, no. 2, pp. 52-54. Despite this opposition, a law passed in 1973 prohibits abortion for all but medical reasons; however, its administration is such that most women who want abortions are able to get them.

42 After a brief period when it did not function, the State Population Commission was reconstituted as the Government Population Commission in 1971. Much of the actual research work of the Commission appears to be carried out by experts working in other research institutes. The Commission, and particularly its Secretariat, which is housed in the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, serves as a coordinating body. In addition, several sub-commissions have been set up to deal with particular aspects of population policy. See Vergeiner, p. 112 for information concerning recent projects.

43 Interview with official of the Research Institute on Public Opinion, Prague, July 1981. These included surveys concerning parents' reactions to the recent increase in the price of children's goods and popular opinions concerning what would increase the birth rate.

44 Interview with official of the Secretariat of the Population Commission, Prague, July 1981.

45 Interviews in Prague and Bratislava, July and August 1981 with specialists and professionals in the State Statistical Office, Research
Institute on the Living Standard, Slovak Academy of Sciences, and Sociology departments of Charles University and Comenius University.

46 Interviews with officials in the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the Presidium of the government of the Czech Socialist Republic, June and July 1981. The growing acceptability of challenging the pro-natalist orientation of current policy is evident in the increasingly frequent discussions of the problems of unwanted children and the quality of the population. See Z. Dytrych, Z. Matejcek, and V. Schuller, "Vyzkum o nechtenych detech," Populacní zprávy, 1974, no. 5, pp. 23-28 for an early report on research on these topics. See Zdenek Zuntych, "Zdenek Pavlik," Rude pravo, December 6, 1982 for an interview with the head of the Czechoslovak Demographic Society, who teaches demography at the Department of Economic and Regional Geography at the Natural Science Faculty of Charles University. In this interview, Pavlik publicly advances many of the same critiques of pro-natalist he offered in a July 1981 interview. Noting that Czechoslovakia's population would most likely stabilize itself at approximately the same level or even decrease in the near future, Pavlik criticized those who complain of lack of sufficient numbers of people in the labor force and stated: "Once someone asked me at a conference what results this 'shortage' of people would have for the development of society. I answered, and I hold to this to this day, that in any case the number of people is less important than their placement in the social and economic process, than their qualifications and general quality. For this reason, it is not necessary to fear even a certain decrease in the population. If we do not succeed in improving planning, if we persist in a poor organization of work, if
we don't improve management and planning in ways such as this, then many of our current problems will become worse."

47 Trybuna Ludu, October 18, 1959.

48 Ibid.

49 Trybuna Ludu, March 7, 1975.

50 See, for example the paper produced by Lydia Beskid, "Wzrost Tendencji Kryzysowych w Gospodarce Polskiej" at the Institute of Basic Problems in Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee PZPR in fall, 1979 as reprinted in Diagnozy Spoleczne w Okresie Narastajacego Kryzysu, ed. by Zbigniew Sufin (Warsaw, May, 1981), pp. 13-55


52 For a survey of the Catholic position on these issues, see Besemeres and Andrzej Micewski, Kardynal Wyszynski Prymas i Maz Stanu, (Paris: Editions Du Dialogue, 1982). According to Catholic journalists and officials, these issues were considered critical by the Church hierarchy and also by the lay Catholic humanists not only for their immediate impact on the Catholic community in Poland but also for the broader implications that they had for the moral tenor of the society. These were also issues on which Church teachings and publications could
and were expected to differ from the state and points of tolerated critical dialogue. Interestingly enough, however, state social scientists and demographers never dealt with the question of the impact of religious beliefs and teachings on demographic patterns.

53 In the early eighties, a Church Committee for the Family was formed to actively lobby against the abortion law and for prohibition of contraception and abortion. This organization was allowed to organize meetings with the Polish Demographic Association, meet with government officials, and publish literature against contraception and abortion. In addition, the Association has made special pleas to Polish doctors not to violate their religion by carrying out abortions. In 1983, many specialists in the area of demography even expressed the concern that the state would concede to papal and Church demands and amend the abortion law.

54 Although there were prohibitions on doctors that did not allow them to counsel against abortions or refuse to perform them included in the 1957 bill, these have not had any real effect on medical practice. Press discussions in the Catholic press sometimes cite Catholic doctors as claiming that abortions are dangerous -- even when there was an explicitly proabortion and anti-natalist policy under Gomulka. In addition, in 1983, a number of experts involved claimed that doctors were sometimes willing to report to the Church on women who sought abortions so that priests could go out and press these women to change their decisions.

56 A major statement of this position, stated regularly throughout the sixties and seventies in Catholic lay publications by both the progovernment PAX organization and the ZNAK groupings as well as in bishops' and primates' statements and letters, came in 1975 with the presentation of a long and comprehensive Church Report on the State of the Polish Family.

57 Interview data, 1983.

58 Interview data, 1983.

59 A review of Studia Demograficzna and discussions with those sociologists, economists, and educators concerned with women and the
role of the family showed that there was no major change in the specialists who were on commissions, publishing, or cited in professional and popular literature over the 20 year period. Interviews showed that those new individuals who entered did so at the behest of senior scholars. In addition, interview data demonstrated that the actors not only knew each other but saw each other in established policy positions and with specific individual agendas and affiliations.

60 These individuals not only work together and develop social relations but they tend to have personal contacts, although not professional contacts, with individuals holding diametrically opposed views.

61 In two of the conferences observed this summer, one was called for by the Planning Commission as a way to make use of the research being done by one of its research commissions and one was called by the research group itself and then members of the Planning Commission (the funding organization) were invited to increase the chances for further funding of the organization in the future. Scholarly journals report major meetings and presentations of various permanent and ad hoc groups in the profession among themselves or with invited individuals from other professions.

62 The Gierek plan required that research funds be funnelled through a research committee (made up in part of government officials and in part of heads of the Polish Academy of Sciences) which set priorities as to what issues were the critical issues for the nation and its development. Leading researchers from government research institutes,
academic centers, or professional associations were then requested to take over the leadership of research on specific topics. They were then charged with finding and commissioning sections of the total project from individuals with the necessary expertise from other institutions and using only the administrative money to supplement their institutions budgets. The exception to this was in technical areas where factories and ministries were permitted to use their extra funds to commission relevant research for improving their production.

In fact, the research funding system was turned to the benefit of scholars. Prominent and well connected scholars had enough personal prestige and pull to get "fundamental research questions" assigned to them. They then defined the question in terms of their own interests and brought in specialists with whom they wanted to work or whose research needs were comparable to the project. In effect, then, individuals bargained for funding and then defined the issues they were to research so that there was little discontinuity between their work and the new work they were to do. And, although individuals in smaller academic centers and government offices were sometimes able to use their personal prestige to get project funding or to get a part of the funds of a major research project to do their research, this system tended to benefit established and prestigious academic institutes more than the less established institutes (something it was supposed to prevent from happening since the criticism in the past had been that good academic specialists were hurt by the funding of research directly into the research budget of academic institutes and the further possibility for individuals to get individual commissions to do research).
63 Interview data, 1983. In spite of the fact that most of the research commissions were multi-disciplinary, the research that was done was highly specific, the interaction between researchers largely limited to periodic presentation of research papers without any significant cross-fertilization, and the results presented not as policy recommendations but as summaries of findings. Other research, primarily that done in ministry research groups, was highly specific with individuals known as the specialists on maternity leave, early retirement, flexible time work hours, or childcare provisions. These individuals often focused on their particular interest for long periods and had little or no contact with individuals doing related research in other ministries or even in their own ministries.

64 For a brief English summary of this discussion, see Besemer, pp. 144-45.

65 Interview data, 1983. In effect, the medical profession was not surveyed. The Ministry of Health, made up of managers, statisticians and legal experts, clearly promoted the legislation but there appears to have been opposition or unwillingness particularly on the part of many prewar and Catholic physicians.

66 Interview data, 1983

67 Interview data, 1983.
Interview data, 1983. See, for example Kobieta w Rozwijajacym Sie Sploczenstwie, a volume sponsored by the League of Women.

Interview data, 1983. The data is then used in two ways: specialists generated data which is then used by heads of special interest organization to push their cause or those specialists and the heads of the organizations who appear as specialists with this data, become regular members of policy commissions that discuss or review policy as representatives of specific interests and also groups.

See work done by Beskid, Sufin, and the SGPiS group on the needs and expectations of the population. This research, done in part on a limited field survey and later among the workers in 118 major factories, was intended in the 1970s to be repeated but funding and then the options for this research dried up before it could be repeated. (Reprints of most of the 1970 work appear in Instytut Podstawowych Problemow Marksizmu-Leninizmu KC PZPR volumes: Spoleczenstwo polskie w drugiej polowie lat siedemdziesiatych, Diagnozy społeczne w okresie narastającego kryzysu, Warunki Zycia i potrzeby społeczeństwa polskiego, Vol. I and II). In addition, see the series put out on local government and popular demands by the Institute of Sociology including Systemy wartości a wzory konsumpcji społeczeństwa polskiego (1980) and Władza lokalna u progu kryzysu. Finally, there are studies done periodically by the demographers, social policy experts, and economists at SGPiS. Many of these appeared in supplements and internal publications of the State Statistical Office and the Polish Association of Economists from the 1956 period on.

In the area of research on the new populations settled in the newly acquired territories, see the work done at the Institute for the Western Territories in Poznan, the Institutes of Geography and Sociology in Katowice and Krakow.

For a brief discussion of the issues that were raised on the question of state intervention or encouragement of childbearing, see Besemeres and for a more detailed breakdown of the nationalist issue, see Curry and Johnson, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication: Case Studies of Media Debates* (Rand: 1981).
In doing this, personal policy and friendship links were formed by Polish journalists and specialists which further determined their later presentations of issues.

One hundred and sixteen of Poland's top industrial enterprises were selected and the organization begun to provide regular, computerized surveys of opinions. This organization was put into effect in the middle of the seventies and only operational for one survey period. The operation has now been transferred away from the Institute, and merged with the Higher Party School, and new government public opinion research institutes have been opened.

Interview data, 1983.


See Rakowski Rzeczpospolita and interview data, 1979 and 1983.

Interview data, 1983.
79 Interview data, 1983. A survey of the literature on demography shows a regular raising of this issue of the instability of population growth in Poland. Demographers concerned themselves with the question of the potential aging of the population with a large postwar baby boom generation and then a long period of low reproduction. (See, for example, the report on Optimalizacja procesów i struktur demograficznych w Polsce Ludowej produced by the Komitet Nauk Demograficznych, 1983.) There was, however, a sense that this drop in reproduction, given the large number of baby boomers coming of age was not as dangerous as starting another upsurge in the birthrate among that generation. It was this very policy, then, that was objected to by demographers and put into effect for political reasons in the post-Solidarity period. It is also clear from interview data, that demographers, sociologists, and social policy specialists were not asked to do preliminary estimates of the impact of the policy or the reaction of women of childbearing age to it in a time of economic crisis before the policy was enacted.

80 Interview data, 1983. This data was particularly common in the Polish Association of Economists and some research groups of the Main Office of Statistics and the Planning Commission. Their research did not, however, deal with the impact of these difficulties on family planning decisions. And, their work was largely circulated among other specialists since it did not pose acceptable policy options for the leadership, but only emphasized the difficulties of the future.

81 Interview data, 1983, and unpublished internal reports from 1980-83.
Interview data, 1983.


Ibid., p. 27. This assessment was echoed by numerous other observers and participants in the planning process. See "Urbion-informace o cinnosti," Uzemni planovani, 1973, no. 4, pp. 7-8; Emanuel Hruska and Jan Krasny, "Tricet Let Urbanismu v CSSR, Jeho Teoreticky vyvoj i prakticke realizace," Architektura CSR, 1975, no. 4, pp. 153-54; Zdenek Saman, "Uzemni planovani a architektura ve vztahu k
ekonomii investicní vystavby," Architektura CSR, 1975, no. 4, p. 189;
and Zdenek Saman, "Ukoly a perspektivy uzemniho planovani z hlediska
tricetileteho vyrocí osvobozeni CSSR," Uzemni planovani, 1975, no. 3,
pp. 5-6.

87 Interviews include those with officials of Terplan, the main
institute responsible for territorial planning in Prague, currently
under the Federal Ministry of Investment and Technical Development;
USTARCH, the territorial planning and construction institute of the
Slovak Academy of Sciences; VUVA, the Research Institute of Construction
and Architecture in Prague, now also under the Federal Ministry of
Construction and Technical Development; members of the Geography and
Sociology faculties of Charles University in Prague and Comenius Univer-
sity in Bratislava and the Higher School of Economics in Prague; and
researchers at the Institute of State and Law and Institute of Philosophy
and Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

88 See Hruska and Krasny, and Saman.

89 Numerous Western scholars have examined the making of location
decisions in the Soviet Union from a more technical perspective. See,
for example, V.N. Bandera and Z. L. Melnyk, The Soviet Economy in
Regional Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973); Judith
Pallot and Denis J.B. Shaw, Planning in the Soviet Union, (Athens,
Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1981); F.E. Ian Hamilton,
"Aspects of Spatial Behavior in Planned Economies," Regional Science

90 See Hruska and Krasny; Saman; Musil; and the contribution of Milos Stepanek, head of Terplan, at the 1968 June conference on territorial planning held in Prague as reported in Uzemni planovani, 1968, nos. 4/5, pp. 4-7.

91 A sign of the effort to upgrade the status and importance of territorial planning was the journal Uzemni planovani, which Terplan began publishing in 1967. Available only by subscription or in libraries, the journal was to serve as a means of disseminating information concerning territorial planning to specialists and professionals working in planning institutes and related areas. Although a good part of the journal's contents typically has been devoted to explanations of changes in legal regulations governing territorial planning and other practical topics of use to planners in regional and district offices, it also includes more theoretical and general articles related to territorial planning and urbanism.
92 See, for example, the articles by Hruska and Krasny, and Saman, "Ukoly," concerning the shortcomings of the 1958 law's provisions concerning territorial planning. Discussions during this period also included reference to the need to improve the working conditions, training, and pay of specialists and professionals working in this area. See J. Lanc, "K navrhu zasad zakona o uzemním planování a stavebním radu," Uzemní planování, 1968, no. 2, pp. 5-8.

93 Critiques of the overall settlement strategy and plans for industrial development remained confined to scholarly reports and conclusions drawn in more theoretical studies until the late 1960's. See Hruska and Krasny, p. 154 for a discussion of the changes in urban-istic studies and also for reference to the more theoretical territorial planning works conducted at VUVA in Prague in the early to mid-1960's.

94 Discussions of the mission of territorial planning and efforts to upgrade the status of the profession were most open in the period just prior to and during the reform period but evidently had been occurring for some time. In early 1968, the editors of Uzemní planování introduced a new rubric entitled "Discussion by our readers" in order to facilitate exchanges of views on the issues involved. The proper role of territorial planning and its relationship to economic planning were also frequently discussed topics at seminars organized by the Architects Union and the State Technical Committee during this period. See the report of one such conference of 50 Czech and Slovak experts and officials and 18 foreign participants held in June 1968 in Prague in Uzemní planování, 1968, no. 4/5. See also P. Potuzan, "Doplnění projektu

95 See the speeches given at the 1968 June conference on territorial planning for examples of these discussions.

96 See, for example, reports of such efforts in I. Michalec, "Sympozium urbanistov a uzemnych planovacov Slovenska," Uzemni planovani, 1968, no. 3, pp. 2-3 and "Stanovisko architektu-urbanistu Terplanu k soucasne situaci v uzemnim planovani," Uzemni planovani, 1968, no. 3, pp. 4-5. In Slovakia, the effort to create a new union was justified by reference to the developing orientation of territorial planning as a profession and its multidisciplinary character, which created the need to include specialists who were not architects in the work of the new union. In the Czech Lands, the effort to create a new union involved more explicit criticism of the existing Union of Architects for not paying enough attention to the needs of those specialists and professionals involved in territorial planning.


Several other conferences of specialists and professionals involved in territorial planning were held to discuss the proposed changes in the law before it was adopted in 1976. See the report of the Minister of Construction and Technical Development Zdenek Saman, "K navrhu zakona o uzemném planování a stavebním radu," *Uzemní planování*, 1969, no. 6, pp. 1-2 for a discussion of the status of the law in 1969. See "Informace o semináři v Banskej Bystrici," *Uzemní planování*, 1972, no. 4, pp. 5-7 for information concerning a 1972 seminar on the proposed law.

Much of the more theoretical work on topics related to urbanism and territorial development issues was done at VUVA in Prague and Brno. See Musil, *Urbanizace*, and Hruska and Krasny for summaries of the types of studies done during this period.

Long term territorial plans, however, continue to be merely advisory.


At Terplan, for example, in addition to more technically trained territorial and urban planners, architects, and engineers, there are also sociologists and specialists in particular areas such as housing. For the most part, however, specialists at this institute rely on the data provided by others, including specialists and professionals working at the Federal Statistical Office, VUVA, and university departments as the basis of both their short and longer term planning documents.

Interview with officials of Terplan, VUVA, and USTARCH, July, 1981.

See Musil, *Urbanizace*, and Hruska and Krasny for summaries of some of these studies conducted by VUVA and other research institutes.


108 Political leaders in particular, but also certain specialists and professionals, note that concern with the environment, in terms of the state's responsibility to safeguard the health of its citizens, has been one of the commitments of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia since its inception. However, open and frequent discussion of environmental issues and emphasis on the need to protect the environment only began in Czechoslovakia in the mid-1960's. New publications devoted to the environment, such as Zivotnie prostredie, and new rubrics devoted to environmental issues in existing journals, such as Uzemni planovani, were manifestations of the new concern with environmental issues in the late 1960's and early 1970's. See J. Mikolas and L. Pittermann, Riadenie starostlivosti o zivotnie prostredie (Bratislava: Alfa, 1980), for an overview of the current organization of environmental protection in Czechoslovakia.


110 See M. Ruzicka's contribution to the 1970 seminar on the environment as reported in Uzemni planovani, 1970, no. 4, pp. 5-6 for an example of such proposals. Ruzicka, as well as numerous other specialists involved in environmental research in both a technical and administrative sense, continued to make this argument throughout the 1970's, with little visible response on the part of the political authorities, at least regarding their institutional suggestions. Ruzicka notes that "the initiative (for greater attention to the environment) came from the side of scientists who already for a long time were aware that only conscious and major care on the part of the state would help in creating and safeguarding a healthy environment."

111 Ruzicka, Uzemni planovani, 1970, no. 4, p. 5. See Zivotni prostredie, 1969, pp. 104-05 for a summary of these recommendations.

112 See Uzemni planovani, 1970, no. 4 for a report of one of these seminars.
See Mikolas and Pitterman. The Council, however, is only an advisory body; its chief function is that of providing information and propaganda concerning the need for environmental protection.

Planners and officials at Terplan and USTARCH noted that territorial plans and plans for new construction now must take environmental considerations into account; however, they also discussed the frequent disparity between goals and reality and the constraints economic possibilities, including the scarcity of hard currency, place on efforts to improve the environment. See Jancar for a concurring analysis.

Sociologists at USTARCH, VUVA in Prague and Brno, the Institute for Research on the Living Standard, and other institutes have conducted research related to the social aspects of urbanization since the early 1960's in Czechoslovakia. However, it was only in the late 1970's and early 1980's that the need to make consideration of social factors an explicit part of the planning process was discussed. See Jiri Musil, "Goal-setting in urban planning: A Case Study from Czechoslovakia," Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 227-44 for a discussion of the results of a sociological study of the city of Ostrava that took place between 1966 and 1970 and efforts to incorporate some of the findings of that study into the development plan of the city. See Jan Zemko a kol, "K problematike planu socialneho rozvoja okresu Trnava," Sociologie, 1978, no. 4; Jan Zemko a kol., "Moznosti aplikacie vysledkov sociologickych vyskumov v urbanistickej praxi," in Zbornik z celostatnej

117 By the early 1980's, social indicators had been included in the territorial plan only for the city of Bratislava. The long-range development plan for Prague has social aspects, but no specific social indicators. In Pardubice, a proposed territorial plan containing social indicators was not approved by the regional authorities. Interviews with officials at USTARCH, July 1981.

118 See Musil, Urbanizace, pp. 120-21; A. Anderle and M. Pojer, "Poznamky k rozvoji nasich mest," Uzemni planovani, 1974, no. 2, pp. 15-18; and Vaclav Havlik, "Prognoza perspektivniho vyvoje osidleni a urbanizace CSR," Urbanismus a uzemni planovani, 1974, no. 3, pp. 5-7. Discussing the debate concerning whether the number of regional agglomerations should be reduced in order to concentrate labor resources and settlement or increased in order to promote greater equalization of different regions of the country, Havlik also notes that scientific and
built . . . that is taken as a given. We must simply decide where in a
given territory it can best be put."

122 The impact of Czechoslovakia's international commitments on the
tasks of planners was mentioned by TERPLAN officials, who again noted
that certain factories and other facilities, including those related to
the production of nuclear energy, had to be taken as givens by territo-
rial planners. The impact of domestic political considerations is
frequently discussed in terms of the need to take broader economic
possibilities and strategies into account in decision-making in this
area, as well as in published comments concerning the tendency for local
authorities to disregard established goals in the area of investment in
order to further local projects.

123 Interview, officials at TERPLAN, VUVA, and USTARCH, Prague and
Bratislava, July-August 1981.

124 See, for example, the arguments contained in Mikolas and
Pittermann, Riadenie, especially, pp. 70 and 82. See Jancar for further
detail concerning the efforts of specialists working on environmental
issues to improve environmental protection. Specialists and professionals
associated with USTARCH and other centers of urban studies also continue
to argue, in research reports and through individual connections to
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drawing up research plans and regulations governing planning, for
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to argue, in research reports and through individual connections to
political leaders or other specialists and professionals involved in
drawing up research plans and regulations governing planning, for
greater use of social indicators in planning.
This conflict is most severe in the case of territorial and economic planning. According to the provisions of the 1976 law on territorial planning and construction, territorial planners are now responsible for preparing territorial prognoses, which are long term plans for the development of particular territories; territorial plans, which are more concrete development plans that cover expected developments for approximately 20 year periods; and territorial projections, which present estimates concerning the concentration and location of construction for five to ten year periods, in addition to location studies related to the placement of particular industries in concrete locations. Regional economic planning, which is carried out by special departments in the economic planning apparatus at the federal, republic, and lower levels, also involves long range projections, in this case related to the overall economic development of particular regions; however, the time frames involved in the two kinds of planning do not coincide and territorial and regional economic planning also takes place in two separate sets of institutions. See Frantisek Kutta a kol, pp. 315-17; Karol France, Narodnohospodarske planovanie (Bratislava: Vysoka skola ekonomicka, 1975), pp. 94-95; Mojmir Zboril, "Vazby narodohospodarskeho, oblastniho a uzemniho planovani," Investicni vystavba, 1978, no. 7-8, pp. 245-252; and M. Bucek and M. Hamlova, Oblastne planovanie (Bratislava: Vysoka skola ekonomicka, 1975) for discussions of the tasks of the various planning hierarchies and the relationship among them.

See Kutta a kol, pp. 316-18 and 321 for examples of this discussion.
127 Interview with officials of TERPLAN, July 1981, who noted the tendency for local authorities to ignore state-wide considerations in proposing territorial plans for their localities.

128 See Jancar, pp. 19-20 for discussions of these problems by Czech and Slovak experts on environmental issues. Problems in this regard, while seldom discussed openly in print, are sometimes referred to obliquely in terms of remaining problems in safeguarding the environment, discussions of a more technical nature concerning the extent of environmental damage in particular instances or areas, or discussions of the difficulty of uniting the proposals for new construction made by particular enterprises with society wide interests in a safe and healthy environment. See Mikolas and Pitterman; "Ochrana prirody a krajiny," Prace a studie, 1979, no. 11; and Jan Stepan, "Investicni vystavba a krajina," Investicni vystavba, 1976, no. 8, pp. 255-56.

129 Interview with officials of TERPLAN and USTARCH, July 1981. See also Stepan, p. 255.

130 See Kutta, pp. 321-33 for a discussion of these problems. Oldrich Kolar, Zdenek Nagorsky, and Jindrich Lanc, "Poznatky z prakticke tvorby smernych uzemnich planu," Urbanismus a uzemni planovani, 1971, no. 1, pp. 5-9 and Milos Lexa, "Register smernych uzemnich planu," Urbanismus a uzemni planovani, 1974, no. 2, pp. 28-29 indicate that many localities had no territorial plans, despite the legal requirement that they develop them. In addition, many of the existing plans, particularly those at the district level, were found to be based on inadequate or
faulty information. See also R. David, "Nektere zkusenosti v uzemnim planovani," Uzemni planovani, 1969, no. 6, pp. 9-11.


132 Interview data, 1983. For summary discussions of the initial process of urbanization, see City and Regional Planning in Poland, ed. by Jack C. Fisher (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966) and Kiri Musiel, Urbanization in Socialist Countries (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1980) as well as the rather more theoretical review, PAN, Procesy urbanizacji kraju w okresie XXX-lecie polskiej rzeczypospolitej ludowej (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1978). There have also been periodic retrospective reports done in the Polish Association of Urbanists journal, Miasto, that have dealt with individual experiences. The similarity between the problems of the late forties and early fifties and the immediate situation, however, have prevented large scale professional discussions of the past from appearing in print.

133 Interview data with past and present planners and local leaders, 1983.

134 Interview data, 1983. Anecdotal evidence about this was legion in the Solidarity period. Not only were there reports about the ability of Silesia to have any project it sought funded either on its own request or with its own funds, but there were also anecdotes about local and national party leaders making decisions, against the advice of
professionals, about the placement of whole developments simply on the basis of their own predilections. In one case, in the fifties, the Warsaw subdivision of Bielany was said by a number of sources to have been built as a workers' suburb simply because the Party leader in Warsaw did not want a worker concentration on his side of town — therefore, the urban planners' opinions that this placement would heavily pollute the Warsaw air were ignored. In another case, a professional planner claimed that, because the planners felt strongly about constructing the highway that surrounds Warsaw, they took a major economic figure out on a drive in the early seventies, talked about the need for a highway like those that surround Western capitals, and then stopped the car when he seemed committed so that he would make a public commitment to the construction of the Wislastrada in that place. For discussions of poor investments, some of which simply reflect local decision-makers commitment to their own private interests, see St. Albinowski, *Alarm dla gospodarki trwa* (Warsaw: Interpress, 1982).

135 Interview data, 1983.

136 For full and systematic discussions of budgetary planning, see Stanislaw Kaluzny and Tadeusz Zawadzak, *Kontrola gospodarcza w PRL* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Geologiczne, 1983); Jozef Kaleta, *Planowanie budżetowe* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1982); and Krzysztof Porwit, *System planowania* (Warsaw: PWE, 1981). With this data, however, there are gaps in the discussion of the reality versus the theory. In the 1980s, in discussions of the failure of the economy and the problems with planning, cases were continually raised of plans being
made and then costs outrunning allocations or budgetary priorities shifting so that there was no longer any commitment to funding an area or an industry.

137 Interview data, 1983.

138 Interview data, 1983. Most planners and planning experts held that their greatest influence on a broad scale was through their membership in commissions where they were in contact with other specialists and with the actual decision makers and could, in the course of discussions, repeatedly push their positions.

139 See Miasto. There were yearly contests for the best planning proposal for various kinds of projects as well as for the best student proposals. There were also discussions of the programs in various schools which dealt even incidentally with planning. And, finally, there were local reports of problems and gains which were phrased as examples or warnings.

140 See Miasto and also the reports of the Association of Urban Planners (TUP) and the Polish Architects Association.

141 Interview data, 1983. For some reflection of how this played out at the top levels, see Pawel Bozyk, Marzenia i rzeczywistosc (Warsaw: PIW, 1983).

142 Interview data, 1983.
Little of this was ever recorded in the professional journals or the national press, as the architects and planners were slow to take action in 1956. In large part, these discussions either took place in formal and informal meetings of the various professional associations or in the popular press where individuals and journalists complained about the newly built cities and their architecture, and the architects and planners responded that this was forced on them.

Interview data, 1983.

Interview data, 1983. Also, see internal reports of the professional association meetings.

Interview data, 1983. See also, Problemy gospodarki przestrzennej ed. by A. Kuklinski (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1980); Juliusz Goryński, Polityka przestrzenna (Warsaw: PWE, 1982); and Jerzy Regulski, Ekonomika miasta (PWE, 1982).

See Miasto reports on the growth of the profession. In this period, that is the early sixties, TUP became an active organization apart from the Architects Association (SARP). In addition, there was a dramatic growth in the number of planning programs in higher education from three to more than 12. Planners also spread into other departments and disciplines.

Interview data, 1983. In the journal Miasto and in the internal journal for regional officials there were annual reports of which
regions construction firms and planning firms were the most active in contracting out of their region.

149 Interview data, 1983.

150 Interview data, 1983.

151 Interview data, 1983. See Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Rzeczpospolita na progu lat osemdziesiątych for some discussion of the problems this bargaining created. Also see Albinowski, Bozyk, and Kazimierz Secomski, Ekonomia regionalna (Warsaw: PWE, 1982) which discusses the theoretical mode in which this should occur.

152 Zbigniew Sufin, Pulawy (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1979) provides an example of the problems of industrialization without the real infrastructure that is necessary. Interview data confirmed that this was the norm and done consciously.

153 Interview data, 1983.

154 For examples of the scholarly attempts to avoid this tag, see the works of the Bialystok Academy of Sciences and Economists Association. These works were not only studies of the region but attempts to meet its needs for development and for funding.

155 Kaelta, Planowanie and Kuklinski as well as Stefanik, Cieciorka, Terenowe organy a gospodarka narodowa (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1977) and

156 Ibid. and interview data, 1983.

157 Interview data, 1983.

158 See Porwit and Gorynski.

159 Interview data, 1983. The examples most often given were of the construction of Nowa Huta and the construction of various plants in Silesia and Warsaw.

160 See statistical yearbooks for construction from 1957 to 1970.

161 Interview data, 1983.

162 Interview data, 1983. This problem was rather extensively discussed in Tygodnik Solidarnosc and Zycie Gospodarcze in the eighties.

163 See Polityka letter of 1969 to a selected number of top leaders who they felt were potential contenders for Gomulka's power. This letter stressed the need for massive investment to soak up the pool of talent that had been created by the postwar educational system. It represented the sense of the Polish intelligentsia.
164 See ongoing discussion in *Miasto* and the reports of the Association of Polish Architects (SARP) on the need and the potential plans for "new towns" in Poland. In this period, although there were severe housing shortages and also problems in getting funding for new housing, there was virtually no discussion of the possibilities of reconstructing old housing stock or renovating old areas. In this period, there was also support both in the policy making elite and among professionals for strict population limits on major cities in Poland in order to limit urban growth. In response to this, there was a basic pressure for new towns, although there was popular pressure by individuals to come to the major cities.

165 Interviewees noted that, even before there was substantial investment in prefabricated housing units, the establishment of large construction enterprises and units made projects renovating individual or even apartment housing impossible. Instead, even in the sixties, it was often thought to be cheaper to abandon old housing and construct new housing. Limited renovation was left to private craftsmen paid by private owners. See also, Ewa Kaltenberg-Kwiatkowski, *Mieszkanie analiza socjologiczna* (Warsaw: PWE, 1982).


Interview data, 1983. The workings of this committee have been followed by the publications *Stolica* and *Warszawa* (a more professional journal). *Miasto* also includes yearly reports on this committee.

Interview data, 1983.

Bozyk, ch. 5.

Ibid. as well as K. Secomski, "Planowanie perspektywiczne -- gospodarka przestrzenna -- polityka i ekonomika regionalna," A. Kuklinski,

174 Interview data, 1983. Internal documents indicate that these WOGs became the major employers of new graduates in planning and investment-related topics as well as management in the seventies.


176 Stasiaki, p. 1. This change was discussed and reviewed only after the regional reforms were announced and put in place.

177 Interview data, 1983; Jawor, ch. 4.1; Bozyk, pp. 138-144, and internal reports and articles from the Planning Commission on the failure of coordination and centralization.

178 Interview data, 1983.

179 Interview data, 1983.

180 Interview data, 1983.
181 Interview data, 1983. See also Boyzk, pp. 195-199 and Albinowski, pp. 60-70 and 139-144.


185 Ibid. These discussions, originally ruled out by the censors' regulations (see The Black Book of Polish Censorship), pointed out that the pollution in port areas blocked not only the use of the beach for tourism but also fishing and some shipping. They were particularly sensitive since they reflected on Poland's foreign shipping and trade potential.

186 Interview data, 1983.
In fact, in 1980 after the founding of Solidarity, environmental problems were taken so seriously that there was a regular discussion program with the head of the environmental protection service and one of Poland's prominent journalists on Polish television that continued after martial law was declared. The problems were presented as another indication that industrialization was unplanned.

Interview data, 1983. Those being transferred from the Ministry of Regional Development and the Environment felt that the change would not be beneficial but would rather lead to some loss from the creation of a smaller ministry with even less access to funds.

Interview data, 1983. An example of this on a broader scale was the organization of the Experience and Future Group of specialists and professionals dealing with all areas of policy. It was this group that was intended to highlight and propose solutions to Poland's problems. After an open meeting, the organization was ordered disbanded. Subsequently, open-ended surveys were done and collated into reports that were widely circulated in Poland. In addition, the Poland 2000 group from the Academy of Sciences expanded its membership and its subgroups, including the groups dealing with planning and regional development, not only funded research but also circulated their reports informally. The same phenomenon occurred in various professional groups as well. The urban planners, architects (to a lesser degree), and managers' associations held meetings and encouraged discussions of the problems and failures in the economy. These meetings were often not reported. Some of the key groups in this area were the Polish Association of Economists
and the Polish geographers and sociologists. In all of these groups, there was ongoing critical research and discussion of the problems that had developed and the need for reforms.

190 Interview data, 1983.

191 Interview data, 1983.

192 See, for examples of participants' views, Mieczyslaw Nasilowski, "Propozycja reformy systemu planowania i zarządzania w Polsce," Cele i zakres reformy gospodarczej (Warsaw: PWE, 1981); Władysław Baka, Polska reforma gospodarcza (Warsaw: PWE, 1983); and Reforma gospodarcza: propozycje, tendencje, kierunki dyskusji (Warsaw: PWE, 1981). The latter presents eight proposals and different arguments for economic reform in Poland.

193 Interview data, 1983. Their public argument is presented in Reforma gospodarcze: propozycje, pp. 423-599.

194 It must be noted that over one-third of Polish industry was militarized at some point during the martial law period. In addition, although those involved made it clear that the military advisors were not significant forces in anything but threats on lax workers to work harder, the imposition of military commanders on civilian ministries and departments made reform difficult since it merely added a second level of command.
195 Internal Party reports prepared for the Central Committee Commission on regional development (involving, as other commissions do since the IX Party Congress, experts and Central Committee members) in June 1983, indicated that local authorities and specialists were moving ahead with local construction plans and development projects without any support or direction from the center.


197 Interview data, 1983. In fact, in Poland in 1981, the initial move of the Ministry of Justice was to invite representatives of the Journalists Association, experts on press law from the School of Journalism, and representatives from the publishing houses (particularly the Party press association, RSW Prasa). It was only as a result of informal activity by intellectual groupings that had formed the Association of Creative Associations, after the formation of Solidarity, that discussions on the Press Law included, inside the Ministry of Justice final legislative discussions, in the Sejm presentations, and between Solidarity and various intellectual groups, a broader segment of society and those not designated by the Ministry of Justice experts. In Czechoslovakia, discussions of the law, although not as central as the discussion of the Censorship Law in Poland, were held largely in informal settings with those interested in the law involving themselves.

198 Party leaders' statements and Central Committee directives stress the importance of the media being able to get information and

199 Interview data, Poland, 1976 and 1983, and with Czechoslovak emigres, 1982.

200 Interview data, 1983. In both cases, journalists reported (and in the case of Polish journalists stated in surveys) that they were both impatient with political controls on their access to information and committed as professionals to developing and maintaining independent channels for information and making policy relevant statements. To be able to do this by having one's own network of sources and protectors was considered the sign of a competent professional in both states. For a detailed discussion of this attitude complex in Poland see J. L. Curry, "The Professionalization of Polish Journalists and Their Role in Policy Making" (Unpublished dissertation, 1980), ch. 3.

201 The role of writers and journalists in the period leading up to the political reform of 1968 and the reform period itself has been very well documented by other scholars. Numerous observers, including several who were personally involved in this area in the mid-to-late 1960's, have commented on the relative uninvolvedment of most journalists in the renewal process prior to January 1968. Those journalists who worked on the cultural weeklies were notable exceptions to this pattern. See Dusan Hamsik, Writers Against Rulers (New York: Random House,

202 For a telling contrast of the Gomulka position (which was reflected at lower levels in individual regional and ministry officials feeling free to try and manipulate the media) and the Gierek position (which involved a deliberate provision in the regional reform provisions that removed the local press from the supervision of local authorities and also involved a policy which required that all requests for the control of information be channeled through the Central Committee Press Department) see the following two descriptions of the press: "Every revolution has its enemies. Because of them, the new governments must limit freedom. As the revolution goes forward, the possibilities of criticism broaden. If you look at our dailies, you will find broad and free criticism of the government, state institutions, and ministries. That criticism is useful as it allows us to fight against our failings."
Editorial collectives have "a feeling of unity with the collective, pride in the collective... They have become loyal and successful units, in which commanders as well as individuals solidly fight effectively under the banner of our party in the first rank on the ideological front." (VI Zjazd PZPR, "Słowa uznania, które zobowiązują," Prasa Polska (January, 1972), p. 5.

203 These decrees are a regular part of the Central Committee Ideological Congress statements and nearly yearly directives by the Council of Ministers. Interview data, 1982-83. There are predictable formulations appearing in Central Committee documents regarding ideology and in the Council of Ministers' nearly yearly directives.

204 In the survey done of Polish journalists' attitudes in 1976, only 25% claimed to have had trouble getting information and only 10% felt that there should be some legislative provision to protect journalists' rights to information. Prominent Czech and Polish journalists who were interviewed all maintained that this had not been an insurmountable problem for "established and competent professionals."

205 It was this link that journalists most often made as the professional imperative for their publishing what they had researched and
for their concern with readers' and sources' attitudes toward their production.

206 Polish censors' data show that national journals were the ones with enough of an ability to get and generate information that they had to be censored for revealing sensitive information. These journalists in Poland both in 1976 and in 1983 cited their ability to use their name and that of their paper to "open doors" while journalists on lesser papers said that they had no pull. This differential, as well as the greater circulation of national journals, helps to explain the prominence of these journals in leading the reform movements as revealers of information.

207 In Czechoslovakia, the Journalists' Association has seldom played an independent role. Many Czech and Slovak journalists appear to have shared the views articulated publicly in 1968 concerning the organization's weaknesses and inability to represent journalists' professional interests. Interview, Summer 1982, Geneva, with Dusan Havlicek. Jedzinsky, in Kusin, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement also makes a similar point. As in numerous other professions, journalists openly criticized the conformist actions of their professional organization in 1968 and many of the more prominent journalists, who were centered in Prague, set up an independent local journalists' organization. This organization was disbanded when the reform period ended.

In Poland, on the other hand, there have been periods when the professional journalists' association has been a leading force for the profession in pushing for change and advocating its own interests. In
the early sixties, some of Poland's most popular and prominent journalists were high officials in the Association. In the crises of 1956 and 1980, the Association and its new leaderships became major forces in organizing and mobilizing the profession and public values. Throughout the post-1956 period in Poland, the Association has been an organ which in more or less direct fashion has complained about and pushed for change in the functioning of specific and general bureaucracies and state institutions vis-a-vis the press.

208 Interview data, 1983. These press offices had dual roles. They were to monitor the coverage given their institution in the press and to assist the media in getting information and access to individuals and issues that would help their image. In the martial law period, the press offices in many industries were legally able also to limit the access of reporters to approved sources.


210 Ibid.

211 Interview data, 1983.

212 Interview data, 1983.
213 Stenogram, SDPZ jazd, October, 1956 (Report on the Censorship Board).

214 Stenogram, SDPZ jazd, February, 1957.

215 Interview data, 1976. In the graduate course on Press Law taught at the School of Journalism, the University of Warsaw, the Professor, Bogdan Michalski, typically had students do research papers on the various socialist states' press laws. Journalists' standard concerns about the Romanian and Czechoslovak laws were that these laws placed the burden of responsibility for what appeared in the press on the editors and removed the censors as a safety net. Journalists considered this a danger to their freedom.

216 Prior to 1953, censorship in Czechoslovakia was done informally by the editors-in-chief. From 1953 to 1966, censorship was regulated by an unpublished government decree which established a government agency to oversee the press. See Havlicek in Kusin, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement for a fuller discussion of the organization of censorship in Czechoslovakia.

217 Dusan Havlicek, who was head of the Central Committee's information department during the reform period, notes that journalists tended to favor the early government draft, which did not permit any post-publication censorship, rather than the law drafted by the National Assembly. Journalists criticized the National Assembly law because it
applied to state agencies, but not to Party or national front organiza-

tions.


219 See Kaplan, Ch. V-VII, and Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, especially pp. 367-68, for discussions of the importance of these issues.

220 Interview data, 1983.

221 Interview data, 1983.

222 This presentation of the process by which the censorship law was drawn up, discussed, and drafted is based on interviews with individuals involved with the preparation of the draft in the Ministry of Justice, the group of professional experts, the Association of Polish Journalists, the Association of Creative Professional Associations,
Solidarity, and the extensive reporting on the issue of censorship that appeared in the press in this period, a dissertation done in the School of Journalism by Jozef Goslawski, "Ustawa o Kontroli Publikacji i Widowisk i Jej Realizacja" (Warsaw, 1983), and Jozef Baśta, Prawo o Cenzurze, (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1983).