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Chinese Perceptions of the Soviet Union

Executive Summary

This project has explored the almost unknown world of Chinese studies of the Soviet Union. Both the existence of more than twenty specialized Chinese journals on the Soviet Union and the utility of bibliographies that identify close to 200 relevant Chinese articles a month are important discoveries made during this project. Access to such journals and reference materials has been complicated by the presence of an internal distribution system (neibu), which includes most important publications in the field of international affairs. Although as a result of the neibu system my access to sources was by no means complete, I managed during the course of my research to draw on hundreds of useful neibu articles from many of the most important journals. On this basis, I can testify that the Chinese literature on the Soviet Union is much more substantial and informative than had previously been indicated.

The results of my research are presented in three formats. The July 1985 issue of World Politics carries my article, "China's Soviet-Watchers in the 1980s: A New Era in Scholarship." In September 1985 I submitted to a publisher my 500-page manuscript on Chinese views of the Soviet Union. In it I include a chronological chapter, reviewing year-by-year changes from 1976 to the middle of 1985. Other chapters parallel those in my previous book, A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China. There are separate treatments of how Chinese evaluate Soviet policies toward peasants, workers, the intelligentsia, and officials. This report is the third product of my research and overlaps with the concluding chapter in the new, book-length manuscript.

Chinese writings on the Soviet Union are useful for investigating at least three topics: 1) to ascertain Chinese views of the history of socialism, its relative strengths and weaknesses, and its prospects for reform; 2) to uncover differences in viewpoint about the Soviet Union and to relate them to the struggle between reform and orthodoxy that has been taking place in China from 1978 to 1985; and 3) to examine Chinese perceptions in the context of continuously changing relations between the Soviet Union and China during this period. Other goals such as to study the shaping of public opinion in China and to investigate similarities between Chinese and Soviet history were secondary in this project, but remain long-term objectives. The materials on the Soviet Union are valuable because of the controversial issues they discuss and the sharp differences in viewpoint they reveal. Among publications listed in Chinese bibliographies, there is every indication that these are the most valuable for understanding the place of socialism in China and the evolution of Chinese thinking on international relations. Relatively inaccessible and controversial, Chinese writings on the Soviet Union open our eyes to a deeper view of the recent period of flux in Chinese thinking, when world opinion has been confused about how fully China's leaders are committed to socialism and how seriously they are interested in "normalizing" relations with the Soviet Union.
Writings about Soviet history reveal convergence between Chinese and Soviet interpretations. In Chinese publications Lenin's stature has risen since Mao's death. He is almost a god-like figure, and he clearly stands out as first among Marxist thinkers and leaders of the past. Stalin continues to be judged seventy percent good and thirty percent bad. His serious errors, apart from his economic management system, are not examined closely. Cliches such as the "cult of personality" or the "widening of the purges" substitute for careful investigation of how socialism can go wrong. Notwithstanding debates in China about the Bukharin-Stalin political struggle of the 1920s and the collectivization that followed, the prevailing position is largely sympathetic to Stalin. Economic policies that would be characterized as inappropriate today are, in large part, excused as a response to difficult circumstances, such as the threat of war and class struggle or the lack of prior experience with socialism. Chinese take the same basic approach to Stalin as they do to Mao: although his contributions outweigh his errors, he made mistakes in his later years and left his successors with a pressing need to make far-reaching reforms.

Chinese views of the post-Stalin era find each successive leadership era (apart from Chernenko's brief term) superior to its predecessor. The Maoist condemnation of Khrushchev, above all for his mishandling of de-Stalinization, is essentially retained in the 1980s. Khrushchev receives some credit for early economic reforms, but most evaluations stress his serious mistakes—in economic policy during later years and in literary policy for a longer period. He is seen as a bungler who acted hastily and inconsistently. Moreover, Khrushchev is faulted for fanning the flames of anti-socialism. For instance, a 1984 book on the Soviet "thaw literature" roundly attacks Solzhenitsyn and at least 15-20 other well-known authors as anti-socialist. Rarely mentioning Khrushchev's name, the Chinese have followed the Soviet example of making him a non-person.

Articles on the Brezhnev era give it mixed reviews. In coverage of the first decade, the positive side clearly outweighs the negative. The Soviet Union is admired for its continued, rapid economic growth, its political stability, and its correct handling of the arts, the social sciences, and education. Chinese authors frequently note that China should learn from the Soviet experience. The late Brezhnev years are cited as evidence of what happens to a socialist system that is timid about reforms of the economic management system and remains bound to a rigid ideology that prematurely advances the country's stage of socialist development.

Writings on the post-Brezhnev reforms are overwhelmingly positive; yet vary in their optimism that reforms will be carried far enough to raise the economic growth rate sharply. Andropov received a very favorable press in China and Gorbachev has been greeted with similar support. Doubts about Chernenko were somewhat concealed although he was eventually criticized for his handling of Sino-Soviet relations and the tone about his reform efforts tended to lack enthusiasm. Overall, the period since Brezhnev's death is treated as a single reform era, although that may be changing as Gorbachev brings in a new leadership group in 1985.
As official Soviet views of the slowness of reform under Brezhnev have become harsher and Chinese views of the post-Khrushchev periods have become more favorable, convergence has been taking place. Differences still exist. The Chinese would like to see more boldness in Soviet reform because they think it is necessary to revitalize the economy, and they want the Soviets to acknowledge the diversity of socialist economic models including more positive recognition of China's reforms. On the whole, however, as far as the Chinese are concerned, on domestic matters the Sino-Soviet rift is over. By late 1979 China recognized the Soviet Union as socialist, dropping the label "revisionist." Increasingly Chinese writings have stressed the common starting point of socialism from the Stalin model and the reform process that socialist countries share in common. Although the specific reforms—and models of reform—may differ, the results, Chinese predict, will demonstrate the superiority of socialism to capitalism.

Orthodox and reform advocates struggle to alter the official consensus on the Soviet Union. Publications disagree on a wide array of issues, without directly challenging the basic tenets of the official consensus. The orthodox group maintains the stronger position. Nevertheless, the reform viewpoint has been much in evidence: in reevaluations of the writings of early Marx and late Lenin; in efforts to "reverse the verdict" on Bukharin; in attempts to shift the balance on Stalin to no better than 50:50; and in far-reaching critiques of contemporary Soviet conditions that suggest the need for major political reforms as well as economic ones. In my manuscript, I have attempted to examine, one by one, the issues which separate reform and orthodoxy. China's leadership is itself divided. As the pendulum swings from one side to the other, academic specialists seize the opportunity to promote their own position more vigorously. Cycles of reform and orthodoxy in domestic policy toward ideology and politics have been reflected in Chinese publications on the Soviet Union. More than any other factor, China's internal debate over the reform of ideology and politics sets the course for Soviet studies.

Analyses of Soviet foreign policy were slower to lose their vitriolic tone, and they remain in 1985 less inclined to the Soviet side than studies of Soviet history and domestic policy. Nevertheless, the neibu materials draw our attention to important debates that reveal shifts in the Chinese position during the first half of the 1980s. There was a debate around the beginning of 1982 about the advantages of pursuing "normalization" that led to the opening of Sino-Soviet negotiations in October 1982. There was a debate by the end of 1983 about China taking a position of "equidistance" between the Soviet Union and the United States that, despite the setback in Sino-Soviet relations for a half year in 1984, facilitated the agreements later in 1984 and in 1985. The Chinese have continuously reassessed Soviet foreign policy and at each stage they have become less negative about it. Moscow is now portrayed as mostly on the defensive in world relations. The United States is portrayed negatively as shifting more to the offensive in the 1980s. Yet, Chinese criticisms of certain Soviet policies, especially in Vietnam, continue to be strongly worded. It still seems that a major Soviet initiative on one or more of the "three barriers to normalization," perhaps most importantly the military situation in Kampuchea and Vietnam, is required to propel relations
forward beyond the rapidly expanding economic cooperation and scientific and
cultural exchanges to which the two countries have agreed. In any case, the
trend is toward improving relations, and every indication in Chinese sources
is that this trend will continue.

My project has covered seven years of Chinese writings (a period when
roughly 10,000 publications appeared in the humanities and social sciences on
the Soviet Union) and a wide range of topics. It is the first of what should
be many studies on recent Chinese perceptions of other countries. The most
obvious policy implication is that the old methods of "China-watching" must be
replaced by more thorough scholarship. Specialists should, in many cases, do
research simultaneously on China and one other country in order to analyze
changing mutual perceptions and relations. We must find a way to gain more
regular and comprehensive access to the most important Chinese sources. More
contacts with Chinese specialists should be arranged, but only if Americans
are prepared for these scholarly interactions. Such meetings serve little
point unless we are familiar with the writings of our Chinese counterparts and
can interpret them within a broader context.

The People's Republic of China, even more than the Soviet Union, has
sought to conceal information from foreign scholars. Its leaders prefer a
considerable degree of secrecy about internal debates on foreign countries and
foreign policy. The American side must seek to maximize access to
information. This will only be useful, of course, if American specialists
have the background and interest to make use of this information. It will
only be possible if American organizations insist on access. First of all, we
need to receive copies of Chinese bibliographies in our libraries to know what
is being published in China.

My own success in gaining substantial access was without the permission
or, I believe, the knowledge of my Chinese host institutions. The very fact
of my being received in China as part of the scholarly research exchange and
given appropriate opportunities for meetings and library entrance is testimony
to the existence of some research possibilities. Yet, it is unlikely that I
could gain similar access to internal circulation publications again.
Moreover, Chinese authorities may react negatively to the fact I am using such
materials in my publications. What I have accomplished on this one occasion
is no substitute for an agreed-upon mechanism to facilitate communications
about scholarship in world affairs and other areas. This should be a high
priority if we hope to achieve a relationship of trust between our two
countries.

If secrecy persists, American policy will often be made without adequate
information. On the basis of my findings, I would not presume to suggest what
policy changes on global strategic or economic affairs might be desirable.
Whatever they are, they should be preceded by careful debates within both
academic and official circles of what we can learn about Chinese perceptions
of the world.
Although a bystander to Sino-Soviet negotiations and to assessments of socialism in socialist countries, the United States can indirectly affect the outcome of these discussions. Through the flow of accurate information this country can encourage reform forces. Both in China and the Soviet Union, reform scholars have struggled to present the truth about the history of socialism in the two countries and elsewhere, and to compare socialism and capitalism. Unfortunately, foreign scholars have shown little appreciation for their struggle and have not been very effective in promoting the flow of accurate information that could influence the course of debates within the socialist world.

In brief, the old methods for studying current policy debates in the People's Republic of China are outdated and misleading. Neither the published sources currently being translated into English nor the Chinese journals long deemed authoritative provide substantial information on the important debates that have focused on the Soviet Union. The Chinese have concealed vital information concerning their understanding of foreign affairs and the nature of Soviet socialism. Westerners have failed to probe available Chinese sources deeply or to seek out additional sources with sufficient vigor. This research project reveals a vast world of research, conferences, and debates about which much has been reported in Chinese (often internal circulation) journals. From it we learn that Chinese views of the Soviet Union have been for about five years (the amount of time varies by subject) more positive than widely assumed in the West. They have been growing increasingly positive, even on foreign policy matters. At the same time, sharp debates have persisted between orthodox and reform viewpoints, covering a wide spectrum of Soviet and Marxist history. Negative views of the Soviet Union are not negligible and still exert an influence, which could increase depending on domestic and foreign policy developments.

The momentum toward improved Sino-Soviet relations can be examined through Chinese publications, and less informatively through Soviet publications, but other factors must be taken into account in order to predict the future of these relations. The analysis of Chinese perceptions provides a necessary background for understanding developing relations, yet it is not sufficient to make confident predictions. Policy decisions in Moscow, especially concerning Southeast Asia and the acceptance of China's reforms as socialist, may still be crucial for moving relations substantially forward. Although the United States remains largely a bystander, this country should be drawing on the best information about the state of Sino-Soviet relations in order to establish its own relevant policies.

In 1983 I began research on Chinese views of the Soviet Union. With Sino-Soviet negotiations underway and with both countries engaged in attempts to reform their socialist systems, it seemed important to understand how the Chinese were reinterpreting Soviet history and assessing new developments in that country. The topic had potential value for predicting the extent to which China would break with the Soviet model and the likelihood that substantially closer relations would develop between these two powerful states. I gathered several hundred articles from Chinese journals on various aspects of the Soviet Union and calculated that in the course of a two-year research project from 1984 to 1986 I could add appreciably to this collection and arrive at a deeper understanding of Chinese views.

As I prepare this report in September 1985, I look back on the results of my research. Through fortuitous circumstances I managed to finish the project this month, almost a year ahead of the original schedule and in accord with a revised schedule worked out late in 1984. My findings are reported in an article that appeared in *World Politics* in July, in a manuscript submitted for publication this month, and finally in this report. Above all, I look back to many gratifying research surprises of this project and unexpected substantive findings. I had not anticipated that I would find so much information or learn in such depth about so many aspects of Chinese thinking about the Soviet Union. The results of the project far surpass those of my previous project on Soviet views of China in at least three respects:

1) for revealing sources and information which were previously unknown to the academic community; 2) for showing changing views over a critical period; and 3) for casting light on the interrelations between domestic and foreign policy. An entire world of scholarship has been opened up, of the existence of which I was scarcely aware just two years ago. To my surprise, the
manuscript I was able to write and submit for publication is considerably longer than my earlier study of Soviet perceptions, *A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China*. It currently numbers about 560 pages.

**THE UTILITY OF CHINESE WRITINGS ON THE SOVIET UNION**

Of the highest priority for understanding Chinese views of the Soviet Union are two journals, *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi neican* (Internal Reference on World Economies and Politics) and *Sulian dongou wenti* (Problems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe). I rely on them more than other sources although I have also used tens of other *neibu* journals. Even so, it is necessary to mention that my access to *neibu* publications was incomplete, and there exist journals such as *Jinri Sulian dongou* (The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Today), of which I was able to see no more than a single issue.

Altogether the more than 2,000 articles about the Soviet Union in the social sciences and humanities offer a wide range of interesting information. They open our eyes to reexaminations that have been taking place into most periods of Soviet history. Along with writings about Marxist ideology, they reveal sharp differences between reform and orthodox viewpoints and document the evolution of the struggle between them from 1978 to 1985. Chinese sources on the Soviet Union and on the international balance between the Soviet Union and the United States also provide valuable background material for examining changing bilateral relations between China and the Soviet Union. In all of these dimensions, Chinese materials have proven to be much more informative than I anticipated at the beginning of this project.

Because I am submitting copies of my *World Politics* article along with this report, I shall not repeat the information presented there on the impressive scale of Chinese publications concerning the Soviet Union or the restrictive forms of distribution that make access problematic. My report
concentrates instead on the major findings obtained from reading these publications.

CHINA'S EVOLVING WORLDVIEW

Chinese discussions of Soviet revisionism lasted for twenty-three years. Beginning indirectly with the two People's Daily articles (liang lun) in 1956 on Stalin and the dictatorship of the proletariat and continuing through the force of inertia into 1978 and 1979 even after China's domestic policies were becoming reform-oriented, criticisms of Soviet revisionism reached a peak during the fifteen or so years from the time of the nine commentaries in the first half of the 1960s to the last outburst of radical campaigns in 1976-77. Mao Zedong remained the guiding spirit. Although Kang Sheng had formal responsibility for the nine commentaries which mapped the terrain of revisionism--beginning first with Yugoslavia and then turning directly to the Soviet Union--and the "Gang of Four" orchestrated the most intemperate condemnations more than a decade later, Mao's judgments are widely assumed to have prevailed throughout. Even after the theme of revisionism was dropped, certain of Mao's views were retained in the 1980s.

There are at least three continuities in Chinese interpretations of Soviet society from the era of Mao to the mid-1980s. In 1977 Deng Xiaoping said that Chinese would never do to Mao what the Soviets did to Stalin. This consciousness of a parallel between de-Stalinization and de-Maoization helps explain one continuity: The official Chinese position has held steadfast to the ratio of thirty:seventy for Stalin's errors and achievements. Perhaps because this ratio was essentially worked out in 1956, it is seen as a collective decision by China's leadership that does not reflect Mao's arbitrary exercise of authority when he stopped seeking agreement from other veteran communist leaders. Second, and also a consequence of the Chinese
reaction to the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress of 1956, China's official line persists in condemning Khrushchev as a leader who brought great harm to the Soviet Union and to socialism throughout the world. He is still faulted for completely repudiating Stalin, exaggerating his errors and ignoring his achievements. Third, Chinese give Mao credit for the idea that China should not blindly follow the Soviet model of socialist development. Consistent with the general restriction on criticisms of Mao beyond certain stock phrases, Chinese publications do not review, let alone take exception to, his ideas about the Soviet Union. It is sufficient to note briefly and only occasionally that mistakes in analyzing Soviet socialism were made before the Third Plenum of December 1978, and even to suggest that Mao Zedong Thought survives in China's independent view of this subject.

Views of Early Soviet Leaders

These continuities show that the old-time radical views have, in a limited way, endured and now lend support to the new orthodox views of the Soviet Union. They set rather strict limits on reform-minded critiques of Soviet history. As a result, reformers cannot be very harsh on Stalin and his decades in power—the focus of the most severe criticisms by students of Soviet history elsewhere in the world. Reformers also cannot say much that is positive about Khrushchev or his period in office. In openly distributed publications, Khrushchev is essentially a non-person. The proscription on sympathetic explorations of the de-Stalinization process removes the possibility of comparisons with most of the politically or ideologically oriented reform steps in the Soviet Union from the 1950s on; this acts to stymie efforts to introduce far-reaching reform themes into writings on the Soviet system.
Perhaps the closest thing to a litmus test in the Soviet field is the way Stalin's purges are handled. Over and over again one finds a stock phrase that dispenses briefly and almost noncommittally with the purges rather than exposing them to careful scrutiny. Chinese express approval of the purges, but regret that they were widened to claim innocent victims, especially those in the communist party. How many victims? What types of people were innocent? Who were the properly punished victims? These and other questions have been addressed in a few sentences only by a few bold, reform-minded authors, but normally they are ignored.

Deng Xiaoping may himself be motivated not to delve deeply into the Soviet purges. In 1957 he was a leading figure in carrying out China's repressive anti-rightist campaign. Later he looked back on these purges in almost the same terms employed in China for Stalin's purges: The campaign itself was necessary even if in many cases an incorrect judgment was rendered. Reformers would prefer that the purges of China's Cultural Revolution were equated with Stalin's purges; this would open the way to Deng's unconditional condemnation and their own fuller critiques. In practice, they can only seek out small successes such as slipping in a reference to Khrushchev or amplifying in a few sentences on Stalin's purges.

The verdicts on some of the more sensitive points have been subject to waves of closer, if on the whole indirect and partially concealed, scrutiny since 1978. At the end of 1979 and in 1980 articles on Stalin clashed rather openly in their interpretations of him; the 30:70 guideline was attacked from both sides, but held when the same guideline was fixed for Mao. In 1980-82 one finds evidence on discussions of Bukharin and the political struggle of the 1920s. By 1983 there was sharp debate over Soviet collectivization and the economic strategy adopted around 1930, and finally, in a more cautious
manner, by 1985 there was some reexamination of the political system from the 1930s. In each debate different weightings were proposed for Stalin's rule. On selected themes some were apparently more negative than positive, even if the conclusiveness of the verdict rendered in 1981 on Mao's pros and cons made it difficult to reverse the overall verdict on Stalin.

In the middle of 1983, informal discussions on Khrushchev were bringing forward sharply varied judgments. A few apparently dared to propose that the balance lay roughly 60:40 in Khrushchev's favor, cognizant of the analogy between Deng and Khrushchev and wondering how Deng's reform course could be welcomed in China without, on the whole, approving Khrushchev's break from the model of Stalin's time. There were also a few among the most orthodox who, I understand, advocated a miniscule weight (even 0:100) for Khrushchev's achievements and, in the process, registered discontent with Deng's reforms. It was, safest, naturally to follow the well-travelled path, weighing Khrushchev's shortcomings somewhat heavier than his accomplishments or, if one were adventurous, perhaps making the two 50:50. Those who followed the established path could show that they were resisting any substantial tampering with the socialist political system and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Deng himself had criticized Khrushchev mostly for his methods--inconsistency, haste, extremism, etc.--not for his interest in reform. The spiritual pollution campaign, however, interrupted the informal reexamination of Khrushchev, which had failed to make its way into print.

The appeal to Lenin's authority in the 1980s in one important respect resembles the appeal in the 1960s and much of the 1970s: Lenin was the great leader who first grasped what socialism requires, but he died prematurely before he could firmly establish the policies and the theory that would make crystal clear to others what must be done. This is the seedbed for later
mistakes in the Soviet Union. In Mao's times, these were mistakes such as neglecting class struggle which were attributed to Khrushchev's revisionism. Under Deng, Lenin's untimely death is linked to the later emergence of Stalin's rigid centralized economic model and bureaucratization, which in turn led to the excessive rejection of fundamental socialist principles in the Khrushchev era. Either way, the problems of later socialism are never traced to Lenin's own policies, only to his shortened experience with the problems of building socialism that gave him inadequate opportunity to resolve the range of problems that would eventually be faced. The two Lenins in Chinese sources of different periods may scarcely resemble each other; yet each serves to legitimize the approved socialist worldview. Under Mao's shadow, there was but modest room even for Lenin to stand, while Deng has placed Lenin far higher on the most honored pedestal. Lenin is, perhaps, the strongest ideological bond between China and the Soviet Union. In China as in the Soviet Union, he is an unassailable figure in the history of Marxism. The apparently easy decision in 1978-79 not to drop Leninism, keeping the label of Marxism-Leninism rather than Marxism for China's ideology has had far-reaching consequences for writings on the Soviet Union. It limits the scope of reform-oriented criticisms. This common bond with Moscow is well understood in Beijing. People are known to refer to Lenin as the great god (da sheng or da pusa) as opposed to Mao who has become a small god (xiao sheng or xiao pusa).

Lenin means different things to orthodox and reform advocates. To the former he was deeply concerned about maintaining control. While approving the NEP, and the introduction of capitalist elements, he insisted on controlling the arteries—economic, political, and military—of the system. At any time, it would be possible to clamp a tourniquet on the flows of capitalism
into the system without serious damage to the vital organs. This is apparently Chen Yun’s reasoning as well as Lenin’s. To the reformers Lenin was a battler against bureaucracy and a man who came to appreciate the need for substantial market forces.¹² This may be Deng Xiaoping’s reasoning.

The first three Soviet leaders represent the entire spectrum of socialist options in the post-Mao era. On the left is Stalin. On the right is Khrushchev. In the middle is Lenin. Only part of this spectrum may be advocated openly in the mid-1980s. The orthodox group does not stand fully behind Stalin; it positions itself intermediate between Stalin and Lenin’s economic policy—with some criticisms of the former but never the latter. The reform group takes an intermediate position between Khrushchev and Lenin’s economic policy, stressing Lenin’s anti-bureaucratic viewpoint and trying somehow to introduce Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin, in the hope, one suspects, of indirectly attacking Mao as well. Although Chinese might surmise that Deng’s economic reforms have in many cases surpassed Khrushchev’s, Deng’s speech has been much more careful and he has chose to position himself on non-economic matters largely in the center of a well-delineated socialist spectrum. Deng concentrates on China’s economic reforms, agreeing to allow the orthodox position on politics and ideology and on interpretations of the first three Soviet leaders to maintain a central position.

Certain fixed ideas establish the framework for writings about the Soviet Union. They are not subject to direct assault except by Deng Xiaoping or a collective decision of the top leadership; yet there is room for maneuver. Whereas the overall evaluation of Stalin is an unchangeable 70:30, the concrete contents of pros and cons are changeable. Authors may demonstrate their compliance with the standard formula at the beginning or end of their
presentation, then reveal their true leanings by the precise weight they give to one side in contrast to the empty words used for the other.

Should Chinese probe deeper into evaluations of various socialist countries and leaders? That was a question that was apparently raised in 1983 simultaneous with the discussion of Khrushchev. Some proposed that the four cardinal principles should be the standard for judgment. Others pointed out, however, that the inclusion of Mao Zedong Thought in one of the four principles creates an impossible standard for other countries. Some urged that a country's foreign policy be included as a standard. The debate failed to set theoretical guidelines before it halted with the spiritual pollution campaign. Statements by Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang to leaders of non-ruling communist parties proposed instead a "live and let live" view. "You don't criticize us and we won't criticize you."13

Broadly speaking, there were three alternatives for Chinese views of Soviet society: 1) to attack from the left; 2) to attack from the right; or 3) to accept the Soviet system as socialist. The first which emphasizes the need for class struggle and continuous revolution, was the Maoist approach and had been discredited by its unsubstantiated application for a period of fifteen or more years. Given China's reform program from 1978, this approach was inconceivable. The second is the Western approach to Soviet society and to socialism in general. Its stress on democracy and human rights threatens the communist party's hold on power. The fact that China's aged leadership at the end of the 1970s and through most, if not all, of the 1980s is comprised primarily of veterans of the revolutionary movement and high officials of the 1950s means that it has a huge stake in justifying earlier policies and sustaining communist control. How could these leaders adopt a capitalist worldview? In order to make the system work better, China moved to the right;
yet officials did not talk in terms of left and right nor did they apply these terms to the Soviet Union. It was sufficient to look for justifications in the original ideas of Marx and Lenin or in other reform periods (such as the NEP) in the history of socialism to legitimize reforms without indicating that China was embracing capitalist critiques of socialism. In the area of foreign policy, the Soviet Union could continue to be attacked from the standpoint of national interest without any longer mentioning that hegemonism was rooted in deviations from socialism found in domestic policies. China chose the alternative of recognizing the Soviet Union as socialist and confining its criticisms largely to foreign policy and to the need for reforms to reinvigorate the Soviet economy.

Leadership and Chinese Perceptions

To what extent has Deng Xiaoping played a direct role in Soviet matters? Every indication is that just as Mao reserved Soviet relations as his own bailiwick, Deng remains the final arbiter of Soviet affairs. When the journal, Wenyi baijia, went public in the winter of 1979-80 with the conclusion that Chinese regard the Soviet Union as socialist, and about the same time a vice-president of Beijing University made a similar comment in public, Deng, one is told, took a direct role in criticizing these transgressions. On Soviet foreign policy, Deng has consistently taken the leading role. In late 1980 or early 1981 he is alleged to have led in shifting China's reaction to the Solidarity movement in Poland from condemnation of the Polish government and the Soviet role to a more neutral position. In early 1982 when a delegation from the Central Liaison Bureau led by Liu Xiao, a former ambassador to Moscow, returned from the Soviet Union, Deng was apparently influenced by their report in his decision to lead China into negotiations. Wang Youping, another former ambassador to Moscow and a
likely member of the powerful Central Consulting Committee of which Deng is the chairman, has influence too. Yet, Deng has also been the architect of an open door policy to capitalist countries and a chief critic of Soviet military expansion. He has carefully balanced reform and orthodox forces in the Chinese leadership, now leaning to one side and then to the other.

Within China, ties with Washington and Moscow have been discussed as tactical or strategic. The United States continues to be labeled imperialist, ruling out a close association. Some officials have argued beyond that, that relations with the United States should be tactical in nature, for short-term advantage only. Others, however, favor the term strategic to suggest the anticipated long-term character of Sino-American ties. Deng sided with the latter group, recognizing this relationship as strategic.

One point of view is that Deng's judgment has been decisive; if he were to leave the leadership scene, ties with the United States would stand in peril of being downgraded to the tactical category. Another view is that the reform forces have gained strength and Sino-American, Sino-Western, and Sino-Japanese ties are already deeply enough rooted to survive Deng's departure. Perhaps, a more widely held view is that Deng has stood in the way of those in the leadership who are favorably disposed to Moscow, that he has strongly opposed Soviet hegemonism and fears that a Sino-Soviet rapprochement could get out of control and lead to "leaning to one side" again. It is a door Deng worries about opening. Even in 1979 that sort of worry may have been a factor in Deng's annoyance that the reevaluation of the Soviet Union as revisionist had occurred prematurely.

Deng is the most powerful leader of China; yet he is part of a collective leadership in which serve other veteran leaders with considerable prestige and independence. Deng's primary attention has centered on domestic economic
reforms and the opening to capitalist countries. The orthodox group has remained in the background on these matters, while Deng has arranged for the promotion of other reformers such as Zhao Ziyang to take charge of these policies. The power hierarchy dealing with the Soviet Union appears to be different. Veteran party and heavy industry leaders have a more prominent role. Second to Deng appears to be Chen Yun, whose high office and vast experience entitle him to an important say on both the economics and politics of the Soviet Union. On economic relations as well as scientific and cultural exchanges the most important figures in handling negotiations are Li Peng and Yao Yilin. Being Zhou Enlai's stepson, Li is identified with Deng Xiaoping and China's economic reforms. Yao is closer to Chen Yun. Together they make a strong case for expanded Soviet economic ties to reequip China's aging industrial plants and to build up the centrally managed heavy industrial sector. These views have been a driving force on the Chinese side toward "normalization" and may have been most openly reflected in December 1984 when Arkkipov visited China. As China's urban reforms ran into difficulty in 1985, anticipated Soviet aid for reequipping the centralized sector may have seemed particularly attractive. In foreign policy the most prominent figure is Chen Qichen, who is in charge of the biannual negotiations. Some Chinese refer to Chen as "the Chinese Kapitsa." Similar to the Soviet deputy foreign minister who has long been responsible for Chinese relations, Chen has important responsibilities for bilateral relations. Moreover, he is rumored to be a likely candidate for foreign minister, just as Li Peng is rumored to be a likely successor to Zhao Ziyang. On military matters, Yang Cangkun who like Li Peng studied in Moscow, is second to Deng.

In the Soviet Union the central figures associated with China--Rakhmanin, Tikhvinsky, Kapitsa--have dual roles in policy-making and academic research.
They have published extensively. In China there is a clearer dividing line between officials and intellectuals. The intellectuals have long been excluded from policy making, and the officials until recently could make little claim to academic learning. Intellectuals have tended to avoid giving concrete opinions. They have become accustomed to talking in abstractions that often only give a hint of their real concerns. Through philosophical discussions, Chinese specialists--on Marxism, on the Soviet Union, and in other social science fields--manage to participate in the debate about political and ideological reforms. The very term political economy used to identify the main field in the social sciences conveys the close connection between economics and politics. In socialist countries, as Chinese are aware, one cannot strip politics and philosophy from economic principles. They are conscious of the interrelations between economic reforms and political and ideological reforms.

Three countries in the Chinese worldview

The Chinese worldview is primarily concerned with three foreign countries and three dimensions of social change and types of societies. The three countries are the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan. The Soviet Union is the focus for the most open debate--the debate which China's leaders see as most relevant to their immediate economic reforms. It concerns the dimension of the old model of socialism versus reform-oriented socialism.

Although Hungary (and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia) play a part in this debate, it is seen as small, very different from China in its background conditions, and not a source of much that China can learn. The debate about the Soviet Union, which this book examines, is the most accessible and the least sensitive of the three great debates that interest Chinese intellectuals.
The United States is the focus of the debate on socialism versus capitalism. The stakes for China on this dimension are much higher and the tolerance of leaders for diverse viewpoints is correspondingly much lower. The debate about the United States must therefore be less visible to the public, more focused on issues that seem to be peripheral, and more abstract. The term "ziyouhua" (literally "making freer") is a code for the American model.

Japan represents Chinese concern for the continuum: tradition versus borrowing from the outside. Japanese are thought to have borrowed heavily from foreign countries, yet preserved their own traditions. They have succeeded in modernizing rapidly without succumbing to many of the spiritual problems seen in the United States and elsewhere. Reformers ask, why can't China worry less about foreign influences and borrow more extensively, following the Japanese precedent? Traditionalists eager to preserve China's own value system and lifestyle look to Japan and to other East Asian countries including Singapore, cognizant of their Confucian traditions. To simplify matters, we can surmise that young people are attracted to the debate over Japan as well as to that over the United States, while older persons and political figures have been concerned with the debate over the Soviet Union.

From the Soviet Union and other socialist countries (primarily Eastern Europe), China expects to learn much of relevance for reforming socialism. This is the continuum that Chinese leaders want their people to be thinking about most. From the United States and the Western, capitalist countries, China is learning about modern science and technology, and seeking to obtain the economic benefits of an international division of labor. From Japan and other East Asian countries, China seeks guidance on how to maintain traditions while borrowing extensively from the West. As shown in Table 7.1, China's
place in the world is defined in relation to these three countries and along the three dimensions that they have come to represent.
Table 7.1
Debates Shaping the Chinese Worldview

<table>
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<tr>
<th>The Socialist Reform Dimension</th>
<th>The Type of Society Dimension</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reform</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>The old Stalin model</td>
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<tr>
<th>The East Asian Dimension</th>
<th>China's Place in the World</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Borrowing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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The Two Legs of Socialism

Chinese studies of the Soviet Union suggest the view that socialism has two legs in its domestic policy. One leg consists of economic policies. The other is a combination of political and ideological policies. The former is the primary problem in the Soviet Union as it has been in China. The latter is not so serious. The orthodox position is that China has not broken very sharply from early practices—the Soviet socialist model—and does not need a sharp break. The orthodox group frowns on discussions that would call for reform in this second sphere. The reform group wonders if China really wants to go beyond the Soviet economic model if it can afford to keep the Stalin ideological and political model for intellectual life. By now the economic model is different from those of Stalin's time and subsequent Soviet approaches; for reformers the Soviet economy has become less interesting. Yet, ideological and political reform topics have, if anything, greater appeal.

The discrepancy between the two legs is striking. Some Chinese ask, "How can we walk on two legs if the economic leg has grown long (chang tui) and the political and ideological leg remains short (duan tui)? How can China keep its balance?" Over a quarter century earlier Mao had first talked of "walking on two legs" in order to achieve balanced economic development. Now the issue had resurfaced with non-economic concerns. Another way of expressing the problem was also gaining popularity. Chinese summarize their leaders' policies as, "Jingji yao kaifang, sixiang yao tongji, zhengzhi yao wending." (We must open our economy, unify our thought, stabilize our politics.) In other words, the economy should be reformed, but thought must be controlled to prevent deviations and politics should also not be touched. Alternatively, Chinese talk about the economic test being against the left (fanzi) and the
ideological test against the right (fanyou). This is the leadership's basic model and the basis for publications on the Soviet Union.

TURNING POINTS IN CHINESE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET UNION

Between 1977 and 1985 there were discernable changes in Chinese views of: 1) Soviet history; 2) current conditions in the Soviet Union; and 3) contemporary Soviet foreign policy. On the whole, opinions of the Soviet Union were improving; yet paradoxically almost everything that is subject to strong criticism in 1985 occurred after this period of increasingly favorable views was in progress. Views of the Soviet Union became more complex, as they were differentiated to weigh pros and cons on many specialized topics.

Soviet history. Conferences and review articles have been concerned with many of the milestones of Soviet socialism: the transition from War Communism to the NEP, the political struggles of the 1920s including those between Stalin and Bukharin, the all-out collectivization and emergence of the Stalin economic model, the significance of the "thaw literature" in the 1950s and 1960s, and the economic reforms of the post-Stalin era. Other topics are treated more indirectly, yet can also be analyzed, such as the overall assessment of Stalin's leadership, the evaluation of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program, and the question of Brezhnev's legacy for Soviet socialism. We can summarize the general consensus in China on these matters and compare it to both recent Soviet and recent Western views.

The abandonment and, some would say, the repudiation of War Communism stands out as one of the most important developments in the history of Soviet socialism, according to Chinese writers. Lenin's theoretical reevaluation of socialism at that time (late Lenin) also represents the single greatest contribution to the theory of the construction of socialism. In official Chinese eyes, Westerners and Soviets since the time of Stalin both err in
dismissing the NEP too lightly as an aberration or a temporary retreat to capitalism when it has longstanding significance as a foundation for establishing socialism in an economically backward country. War Communism symbolizes a coercive program without adequate material incentives, while the NEP appears as a parallel to China's economic program in the 1980s: wide scope for market forces, household management of agricultural resources, foreign investment, and reliance on experts.16 The wisdom of Lenin and the experience of Soviet history are used to justify current Chinese policies.

Less openly and with more limitations, Chinese publications have examined the struggles in the 1920s between Stalin and his opponents, especially Bukharin but also Trotsky. The suggestion that Stalin acted improperly in his struggle against Trotsky was easily rejected. The proposal that Bukharin was treated unjustly and also was the true successor to Lenin, seeking to preserve the NEP model and to maintain peasant support, was more tempting.17 Nevertheless, despite reform-oriented translations and writings on Bukharin, the official position remains that there should be no "reversal of verdicts." The issue was left in a state of limbo with little direct analysis or refutation of the pro-Bukharin ideas, but also little acceptance of them in the overall evaluations. Criticisms of Stalin center on his later years, not his actions in the 1920s.

How do official Chinese views treat Stalin's collectivization, high-speed, forced industrialization, socialist realism, and purges? They acknowledge excesses and errors in timing, but criticize none of these policies in principle. Collectivization draws the most criticism in published Chinese sources.18 Although sooner or later it would have been necessary, it was not carried out properly. Excuses are made for many of the Soviet mistakes. The first socialist country lacked experience and had no prior
example from which to benefit. Enemies of the people could not be placated
and had to be dealt with through collectivization and purges. Foreign
imperialist enemies were becoming increasingly menacing and Stalin was right
to adopt stringent measures to prepare his country for the war that was to
come. Set phrases are employed to close off discussion of Stalin's serious
errors. Chinese fail to explain what is meant by the "widening of the purges"
beyond that which was necessary. When they draw attention only to the unjust
treatment of loyal communists, it seems as if the punishments meted out to
anyone who was not in that category are not being questioned. Brief mention
of the excessively rosy coloring in post-WWII Soviet literature also does not
lead to any analysis of what went wrong and how the principles of socialist
realism might bear some responsibility. Chinese criticisms of the Stalin
period are limited rather than fundamental. Soviet choices were not ideal
because of circumstances, not because of systemic errors. Literary conditions
worsened and the Soviet economic model became less suitable after WWII. In
other words, things had been fine earlier; the problem was a failure to
reform. Chinese criticisms follow the Soviet example of referring vaguely to
Stalin's "cult of personality." Although they go beyond Soviet writings (at
least of post-Khrushchev times) in criticizing some aspects of the Stalin era,
such as collectivization, the overall rubric and specific criticisms are
similar and the ratio of 70:30 in pros and cons is probably not much lower
than the implied ratio in Soviet publications. Chinese specifically reject
Western writings on the Stalin era as too negative and motivated by
anti-communism.

There is also close affinity between Chinese and Soviet treatments of the
Khrushchev era and the "thaw literature" that starkly contrasts with Western
writings. While the West praises Solzhenitsyn and others who have pointed out
serious shortcomings in the Soviet system, Chinese regard them as anti-socialist. This disapproval is accompanied by positive comments about the literary policies of the Brezhnev period and the crackdown against the earlier erroneous tendencies of the "thaw literature." Both Chinese and Soviets recall Khrushchev's blundering inconsistencies and hasty decisions while, for most purposes, making him a non-person whose name must not be mentioned. He receives almost no credit for turning the Soviet Union sharply away from Stalin's practices and for condemning those practices. While in the West, Khrushchev may be considered the best of Soviet leaders for giving a humane face to socialism, in China as in the Soviet Union he is treated as the worst of Soviet leaders.

The sharpest turnabout in Chinese thinking about Soviet history since the Mao era concerns the domestic policies of Brezhnev's time. Whereas as recently as 1977 these were harshly condemned, in the 1980s they are treated sympathetically, if critically. Some of the criticisms are exactly the opposite of what was earlier written: excessive egalitarianism rather than vast and unjust inequalities, timidity of reform due to rigid adherence to principles of the Stalin era rather than repudiation of Stalin's model. Chinese criticisms are no longer sweeping condemnations; they recognize the continued superior functioning of the old system in comparison to American capitalism during much of the Brezhnev era and suggest that if reforms had been more comprehensive the system would have been able to prevent the economic slowdown and other problems of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The problems faced by the Soviet Union are not treated as trivial; yet they are mainly discussed in the context of management shortcomings that can be resolved through reforms of the economic system with modest adjustments in the theory of socialism and in political institutions. One finds no echo of the
severe Western attacks on the stultifying atmosphere and political corruption of Soviet life. As Brezhnev's successors, especially Andropov and Gorbachev, have been criticizing the inadequacy of earlier reforms, Soviet and Chinese opinions on the Brezhnev period have been converging.

Along with Soviet domestic policy, the history of Soviet foreign policy draws Moscow and Beijing together. The exception is pre-1917 tsarist policy, especially toward China. Soviets have concentrated on justifying the treaties Russia signed with China over a few centuries and other Russian activities in China. Although Chinese articles and books against Russian imperialism sharply declined in the first years of the 1980s, there has been no effort to revise the harsh condemnations of what is regarded as one of the worst of the imperialist powers. Soviet foreign policy under Lenin and Stalin is another matter. If Stalin is depicted as making mistakes concerning the Chinese revolution which meant that the Chinese under Mao independently worked out a successful revolutionary strategy, he is still viewed as a friend of China and as the defender of socialism in a world of hostile countries. Chinese sources largely praise Soviet foreign policy to the late 1950s and in recent years have become less critical of policies in the 1960s such as the sending of troops into Czechoslovakia. Criticism now focuses on Soviet policy in the Third World, primarily during the post-Vietnam war era. It is contemporary Soviet foreign policy of the past decade that bothers China, not the policies of earlier decades.

This perspective on Soviet history combines the pro-Lenin, largely pro-Stalin, and anti-Khrushchev thinking of Mao with the pro-NEP and pro-post-Stalin reform thinking of Deng. In late 1979 when the label "revisionist" was dropped from discussions of the Soviet Union, this overall perspective on Soviet history quickly took shape. Criticisms of the Soviet Union from a
leftist viewpoint quickly disappeared. Over the next years attempts to move
closer to a Western perspective critical of the Soviet Union from the right
were deflected. By early 1982 the general outlines of the new consensus were
in place.

Current conditions in the Soviet Union. In recent years success or
failure for the Soviet Union has been judged largely according to the standard
of the economic growth rate. As the figures declined or remained very low for
several years, the Chinese were switching from the negative explanation that
the problem was in the Soviet system—its switch from socialism to
revisionism—to constructive criticism concerning the need for reform.
Already in 1981 and 1982 Chinese specialists were attentive to reform policies
in the Soviet Union, suggesting that they are part of the same process in
which China is engaged and hold some promise for alleviating Soviet economic
problems. 24

Andropov's early speeches and policies quickly heightened Chinese
interest in Soviet reform prospects. From 1983 more optimistic predictions
were appearing about the likelihood of substantial economic reforms, which
would succeed in raising the Soviet growth rate. Andropov received a
favorable press in China. Not only did his economic policies and experiments
such as brigade contracts win praise; his revisions of Soviet ideology excited
Chinese to react enthusiastically. Andropov is credited with many important
revisions, most importantly moving the Soviet Union back to an earlier stage
of socialism and opening the way to borrowing from other socialist
countries. 25 It is true that Chinese articles continue to point to serious
obstacles to reform and are reluctant to give a timetable in the 1980s or
beyond for completion of the basic set of reforms needed to break out of the
current difficult situation. Nonetheless, they have also been quick over the
last few years to credit the Soviet economy with even small successes; while praising Soviet prospects in the long run. The Chinese position remains more wary than the Soviet one to proclaim success around the corner (after Brezhnev's death Soviet caution approached the Chinese position), while it is more optimistic than the many American doubters who do not think that Soviet leaders are prepared for the necessary drastic overhaul of the social system to set the economy on a new, successful track.

While on economic reforms there is still considerable distance between the Soviet and Chinese positions, Chinese assessments of Soviet social conditions and academic debates suggest greater agreement. Many articles on education, sociology, city planning, and other areas convey a desire to learn from the Soviet experience. Not only is the Soviet Union a model because of its more advanced modernization, it is also a model because it is socialist. Chinese use the term "socialist spiritual civilization" along with "socialist material civilization" as one of the two goals that guide the country. This is directly opposed to capitalist civilization, which is described as corrupting and selfish. The Soviet Union is not devoid of spiritual problems, such as alcoholism and divorce, Chinese sources note, but, on the whole, it is treated favorably for its non-economic characteristics. By 1985 Chinese newspapers and journals were also reporting enthusiastically about the warmth of Soviet hospitality to visiting Chinese delegations. All thought that the Soviet people were racist or that the leaders harbored strong resentments against China had apparently been cast aside. Lenin and Stalin had built a socialist spiritual civilization and recent Soviet leaders kept adding to it through high-level educational programs, political stability, and the development of the natural and social sciences. Western specialists often find serious faults in the Soviet superstructure of government, academics, and
the arts. Chinese are reluctant to echo these criticisms and when they do tend to narrow the message, e.g. from denunciations of academic freedom to criticisms of the slow rate of application of science and technology to the economy.

**Contemporary Soviet foreign policy.** Only in this sphere are Chinese and Soviet worldviews fundamentally opposed. When the Chinese remark that despite considerable progress from 1983 to 1985 in improving Sino-Soviet relations three obstacles remain, the message is that foreign policy alone stands in the way of major gains that are vaguely referred to as "normalization."\(^{29}\) Chinese articles are not as vitriolic as earlier in the decade. The scope of criticism has narrowed. Nevertheless, the Soviet presence at Cam Ran Bay and the Vietnamese military involvement in Kampuchea as well as the Afghan situation and Soviet military buildups on China's northern border are still strongly condemned.

To say that foreign policy is the number one barrier to "normal" relations is not to say that Chinese thinking about Soviet foreign policy has not changed significantly in the seven years following the Third Plenum of 1978. It was slower to change than were views on domestic policy. The Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 and the reverberations in 1980 of Soviet troops marching into Afghanistan delayed a new view of Soviet foreign policy, but by 1982 it was emerging. The notion that an anti-Soviet alliance must be encouraged with insinuations that the United States is too soft on its superpower ally, was the first to go. Increasingly Chinese called for an independent foreign policy. Even so, they were clearly leaning to the American side for two or three years. Chinese stressed that Moscow is the more dangerous of the two superpowers. It is on the offensive, while Washington in the post-Vietnam era stays on the defensive. Yet, China's
criticisms were becoming less one-sided. In Chinese eyes the Soviet goal was a military impact on Europe, not on China. Under Reagan, Washington was seizing the offensive in much of the Third World and in the arms race, while mired in Afghanistan, Moscow was becoming more defensive. The list of Chinese disagreements with U.S. foreign policy in the Third World was mounting, while the Soviet list became rather short: apart from the three obstacles, Soviet behavior in Africa was the prime concern. 30

By the end of 1983 a strong case for equidistance in Chinese foreign policy was being mounted in official circles within Beijing. Huan Xiang and other Western-oriented officials tried to ward it off with arguments that the Soviet Union remained the greater enemy. 31 Chernenko did not help matters in the first eight months of 1984, when Moscow adopted a tougher position toward China and the Chinese responded with renewed criticisms of Soviet foreign policy on a wide scale. Nonetheless, after the breakthrough at the foreign ministers' meeting in New York in September, Beijing moved close to a position of equidistance. Moscow and Washington are both hegemonists and dangerous to China, both superpowers and threats to world peace. The latter is also imperialist. America's Taiwan policy is regarded as no less serious than the Soviet Vietnam policy. Reagan's invasion of Grenada is portrayed as a parallel to the Soviet role in Afghanistan. Each superpower has regions of the world where it is the main aggressor. And each in its military presence and alliances in Asia poses a threat to China. 32

Separately for history, contemporary domestic policy, and contemporary foreign policy, we can detect improving images of the Soviet Union from 1978 to 1985. Between 1977 and 1979 occurred an abrupt change of course with the downfall of the radical viewpoint which attacked the Soviet Union from the left. From late 1979 to 1981 occurred another shift as Soviet domestic
policies and Soviet history were interpreted more favorably. Gradual improvements continued to occur: by 1985 most official images were favorable although there were sufficient exceptions to prevent great optimism about a sudden rebound in the Soviet economy or breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations.

EXPLANATIONS FOR CHANGING OFFICIAL VIEWS

What happened during this seven-year period to account for China's improving impressions of the Soviet Union? To some extent, these impressions reflect actual conditions in the Soviet Union, above all the rise of Andropov and then Gorbachev, who are perceived as reform leaders whose domestic policies more closely resemble China's economic reforms. Another factor is the improving Soviet commentaries on China. Brezhnev's assertion that China is socialist helped establish a new, bilateral atmosphere. Later private Soviet interest in and implied approval of some of China's reforms may have partially compensated for the absence of favorable press commentary in the Soviet Union. Intermittent progress in the negotiations that began in the fall of 1982 also gave momentum to more positive perceptions. The United States and Japan may also have contributed to China's partial turn toward the Soviet Union, particularly through America's Taiwan policies and the failure to meet China's expectations for foreign investment and open markets.

Although all of these factors are pertinent, there is little doubt that what has mattered most is China's own domestic considerations. China's leadership regards the country as socialist. It has sought to foster an environment of political stability and social control along with heightened economic development and individual labor motivation. Changing images of the domestic side of the Soviet Union have been seen as a means to these ends.

China's communist leaders have needed the Soviet Union to legitimize their social system and even their reform program. The history of socialism
in China provides little to support Deng Xiaoping's programs. Soviet history is much richer in appropriate examples such as Lenin's NEP, Stalin's expansion of the educational system and emphasis on technology, and even Brezhnev's support for the sociological (ideological) concept, "the socialist way of life." According to Chinese comparisons of socialist countries, China is not floundering in some limbo of unparalleled reforms; it is taking a middle path between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union along the common course of socialist reforms away from the outdated Stalin model.

At least five purposes are served by Chinese publications on Soviet society. First, Soviet history, especially high rates of economic growth, demonstrates the superiority of socialism to capitalism. Second, Soviet history provides models to legitimate controversial reform programs in the People's Republic. Third, the Soviet Union is an example of a more modernized socialist country from which China can learn. Fourth, studies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reassure the Chinese people that they are engaged in a common process of changeover and reform within the socialist world. Fifth, the example of the Soviet Union, particularly its superstructure in the arts, social sciences, government, etc., is a counterweight to excessive fascination with capitalist countries and their potential corrupting influence.

Chinese imply in the literature on Soviet society a future of Soviet and Chinese socialism standing together victorious over the capitalist countries of the world. The superiority of socialism will be revealed in a superior material civilization made possible by rapid economic growth and a superior spiritual civilization, which is part of the inevitable contrast between socialism and capitalism. Chinese leaders want to show the superiority of socialism because they are veterans of the communist movement--most having served this cause for half a century or longer. They want to maintain their
own power and the power of their networks of friends and associates. Many have noted with alarm the widespread admiration among the Chinese people of capitalist material life, music and literature, and even political principles. Positive impressions of the Soviet Union are an attempt to balance the one-sided fascination with the capitalist world.

To counter the enthusiasm with the West and capitalist East Asia, Chinese officials and certain academics have taken a selective approach toward praise and blame. They laud Western science and technology, seek to borrow extensively from Western education, and call for an open door for trade and foreign investment. Yet, they criticize spiritual pollution in the capitalist world, point to Soviet successes, and seek to explain why socialist countries are behind in some areas.

While the course of China's economic reforms from 1978 to 1985 was, with short-term exceptions, a unilinear expansion in the role of the market and personal incentives, the course of political and ideological policies was almost cyclical. China's leaders would relax controls and then crack down or seek to set limits to debates. Renewed controls appeared in March 1979 (Deng's speech on the four cardinal principles), October 1979 (Li Xiannian's speech on socialist leaders), December 1980 and much of 1981 (the attacks on Bai Hua), October 1983 (the spiritual pollution campaign), and March 1985 (Deng's speech on the pernicious effects of capitalism brought by the urban reform).

Deng Xiaoping is China's foremost leader and his speeches have initiated each major cycle of control as well as each major economic reform. Others in the leadership, however, are more often identified with the insistence on social control and the opposition to reforms of the political and ideological systems. It is primarily the old guard in the collective leadership, not
Zhao Ziyang or Hu Yaobang, who have maintained the pressure to distance China from the capitalist countries and to silence domestic critics of the political and ideological systems.

Orthodox vs. Reform Views

Debates on the Soviet Union and on Marxist ideology are the most open forums for following the clash of thinking in China over the nature of socialism. Those who seek to make far-reaching reforms in socialism turn back to early Marx, late Lenin, and Bukharin for a revised set of ideological precepts. They take advantage of each turn in the ideological cycle from control toward freedom to try to take a step forward in shifting the terms of debate. Early in 1979 they sought through theoretical discussions to move China back to a not fully socialist stage of development or to redefine socialism to emphasize freedom and democracy. In the 1980s they have drawn different lessons from Soviet history than have the voices of orthodoxy. They are also more critical of contemporary Soviet society.

The reformers who write about Soviet history challenge the excuses that are often presented for major policy errors. Their view of War Communism is not that it was a necessary response to the emergency of civil war, but that ideology had led Soviet leaders astray. On this topic reformers had some success because Lenin had come to the same conclusion for the final year or so of radical policies before the abrupt shift to the NEP. The reform view of the political struggles of the 1920s is less visible, but in comparison to the Soviet Union Bukharin became a subject of open discussion. Above all, reformers dispute the explanation that Stalin acted correctly in collectivization, the purges, and other major policy initiatives that expanded political control in the 1930s. A conference on collectivization in 1983 provided an opportunity for the reexamination of Stalin’s economic policies.
but other more sensitive policies of the Stalin era (and the term Stalinism) remain essentially off-limits.

Perhaps the most open expression of a reform position, apart from the numerous writings on humanism and alienation, occurs in criticisms of the Soviet economy in the 1980s. On this popular topic, it is possible to take a pessimistic position, demanding more thorough reforms, some of which extend into the political and ideological spheres. Some critics manage to communicate the viewpoint that to motivate the people in a socialist system requires less control from above and new forms of voluntary participation from below. The themes of meritocracy (based on expertise rather than politics), material incentives, and democratic participation figure prominently in reform thinking about Soviet socialism.

This research on Chinese views of the Soviet Union reveals persistent, sharp differences between reform and orthodox positions. These differences are not as easy to attribute to particular organizations and individuals as are Soviet differences of opinion on China. There are several reasons for this problem of identification. First, Chinese sources normally reveal less information about the differing viewpoint of individual authors. There are almost no footnotes or historiographical observations which place a particular study in a broader context. Review articles that summarize conference debates only mention that a few people hold one view, many hold another view, etc. No names are identified. Second, individual authors do not often write lengthy analyses. There are few interpretive books on the Soviet Union (indeed no book-length study by a single author), and most articles are short. Finally, Soviet studies in China are much more decentralized than are Chinese studies in the Soviet Union. There are no counterparts to officials such as Rakhmanin, Tikhvinsky, and Kapitsa or administrators such as Sladkovsky whose
own writings directly guide the work of most academics. China's officials who have a major role in Soviet policy do not write about that country, as far as bibliographies indicate, and senior advisors such as Wang Youping and Wu Xiuquan with longstanding ties to the Soviet Union are only identifiable through an occasional speech transmitted to a Hong Kong journal or a volume of memoirs. Although Liu Keming and later Xu Kui have been the directors of the leading institute for Soviet studies, the Institute of Soviet and Eastern European Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, neither has published many articles or ones that could serve to guide the field.

Certain factors obfuscate the division between orthodox and reform below the level of the top leadership. Frequent changes in Chinese views of the Soviet Union keep shifting the terms of debate. Cyclical factors such as the rise and fall of the spiritual pollution campaign create temporary pressures to adopt a point of view that may not persist. Furthermore, personal networks continue to operate in China, causing the individual's viewpoint to be subordinated to the views of someone higher in the hierarchy. All of these problems complicate the identification of groups of reform and orthodox advocates.

Despite these complexities, we can generalize about the general balance between reform and orthodoxy. On the whole, the orthodox position has prevailed in Soviet studies. It has done so because it is supported by most of the top leadership. Deng Xiaoping, apparently out of concern for political stability and as a consequence of the agreement reached from 1979 to 1981 in the handling of Mao Zedong's role in Chinese history, has accepted a largely positive assessment of Stalin and a negative one of Khrushchev. The Chinese leaders agreed on Lenin's very positive place in the history of socialism. These evaluations are the foundation for the official Chinese viewpoint on
Soviet history. Chen Yun and other Chinese leaders concerned with central control of the economy have helped boost the image of the contemporary Soviet Union. Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu, and other leaders eager to preserve ideological orthodoxy have created an atmosphere favorable to a positive image of the Soviet superstructure. The orthodox side has had formidable support from above.

On the reform side, there is support from both above and below. Above all, Deng Xiaoping's concern that political and ideological factors interfere with economic reform has been a vital force for a reform-oriented worldview. The general course of economic reforms from 1978 and the increasing opening to the West and Japan bore a momentum of their own. Moreover, the inherent contradictions in Chinese views of the Soviet Union, such as the praise for the NEP and the simultaneous praise for Stalin or criticism of Khrushchev despite the approval given to the post-Stalin economic reforms, open the door to reform interpretations. As seen in the remarkable demonstration of public opinion at the Fourth Writers' Congress in response to Hu Qili's call for "freedom of expression" and Zhou Yang's telegram (after he had been criticized a year earlier in the spiritual pollution campaign for reform-oriented ideas expressed at the conference commemorating the centenary of Marx's death), Chinese intellectuals are struggling to reduce controls over them by officials. The Soviet Union symbolizes such controls and criticisms of the Soviet political system, even if necessarily obliquely, are a way of placing this issue on the agenda in China.

The reform viewpoint is welcomed by many in the younger generation--researchers, returnees from study abroad, students, etc. Positive thinking about the Soviet model of socialism worries them because it suggests that the outcome of China's reform process will only bring a Soviet-style of socialism.
Young intellectuals and many youths fascinated with Western materialism and youth culture are also worried about China's open door being partially shut.

Another factor making it difficult for Chinese official thinking to embrace the Soviet system tightly is the tendency even among some orthodox thinkers to associate that system, to some degree, with both Maoist radical controls and hegemonistic foreign policy. Given these barriers and the absence of "normalization" in Sino-Soviet relations, the Chinese are hesitant to assemble the pieces of their new view of the Soviet Union together. There is no overview of Chinese thinking, no attempt to summarize just how positive the new outlook has become. Many of the most positive as well as the most negative impressions have been somewhat concealed through the neibu system. Chinese officials have not wanted the world and maybe not even their own people to grasp the general implications of their emerging understanding of the Soviet Union. This reluctance to generalize has also made it difficult in the preceding chapters to proceed from piecemeal interpretations to general conclusions.

IMPROVING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

In retrospect, what was the Sino-Soviet dispute about? Once the dispute gained momentum, so many themes were dragged into it that one has difficulty distinguishing what counted from what did not. Was it a dispute over boundaries? After all, the Sino-Soviet border is the longest in world history and it was established from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries through treaties the Chinese have characterized as unequal. Yet, in the 1980s the Chinese insist that they have only been interested in minor adjustments such as of islands where the course of the main river has shifted. Once negotiations began they dropped the problem of boundaries without placing it on the agenda. Was it a dispute over ideology? In the first stages of the
split, the chief combatants were Mao and Khrushchev, two leaders deeply concerned about ideology and directly opposed in their attitudes about de-Stalinization. Yet, Brezhnev turned away from de-Stalinization without any effect on Sino-Soviet relations. The victory of Deng's pragmatism led quickly to abandonment of the term "revisionism" for the Soviet Union, while the shift to a reform course under Andropov and later Gorbachev caused Soviet specialists on China to discard the idea that China is led by "Maoism" or "Maoism without Mao."

Looking back to the 1950s, the Chinese continue publicly to blame the Soviets for the split. What is left from their earlier rationale is the idea that Moscow sought to control China. Mostly it was China's foreign policy that Moscow was bent on controlling. Moscow's developing relationships with Washington and India were restricting Beijing's freedom to maneuver—especially on the Taiwan issue which Beijing has always considered a domestic matter. The Soviets were restricting Chinese actions in East Asia. Soviet control also extended to what Chinese could publish about Stalin.

In the 1980s the Chinese insisted that they would maintain an independent foreign policy and at home would reform their system according to the ideal of socialism with Chinese characteristics. These matters were stumbling blocks to better relations only insofar as the Soviets kept seeking reassurances that China's foreign policy was independent and not in collusion with the imperialists.

The problems that remained difficult to resolve from 1982 were no longer direct manifestations of Soviet control, but of Soviet intimidation and interference along China's borders. All of the problems dated from the post-Mao era, when, as the Chinese describe it, the Soviets went on the offensive while America pulled back for a time to a more defensive posture.
Soviet "hegemonism" in Vietnam and Afghanistan are the transgressions that disturb the Chinese most.

Without putting it in writing, Chinese leaders seem to be communicating that everything that happened before 1978 is no longer on their agenda with the Soviet Union. They do not try to justify their past pronouncements or to hold the Soviets accountable for anything done or said. For instance, Chinese pay little heed to prior criticisms directed against their country's policies by Soviet specialists and officials. Even recent criticisms Chinese make no effort to refute in print. It is as if they acknowledge that for long Chinese themselves have been guilty of false accusations; so it would be wrong to hold the Soviets accountable for responding in kind to such provocations.

What more promising scenario could have been devised for preserving the wide divide between China and the Soviet Union than the situation in the Soviet Union from 1978 into 1982! In foreign policy, Moscow aided Vietnam's march into Kampuchea, set up its southern fleet in Vietnam's Cam Ran Bay, occupied Afghanistan, and carried out a huge build-up of powerful missiles along the Chinese frontier that could reach targets over a wide range of that country. The result was that almost all of the barriers to "normalized" relations that the Chinese identified after 1982 had been nonexistent only four years earlier. In domestic affairs, the Soviet economy went from bad to worse. In agriculture one severe shortfall followed another, while in industry the rate of growth slowed sharply without any sign that intractable problems were being solved.

Meanwhile, the aged Brezhnev leadership group failed to deliver on promised reforms and kept stifling the younger generation's hopes for change. Finally, in Soviet studies of China the tone remained hostile; some of the most threatening denunciations, such as Victor Louis' call published in
English for the minority peoples from Manchuria to Tibet to rise up against the Chinese government and secede, were published in 1979 and later. It was still common to hear the stock phrase "Maoism without Mao," in depreciation of China's reforms in the middle of 1982.

How little Moscow did until 1982 to win over the Chinese! The orthodox group in Moscow reigned supreme in the handling of Chinese affairs even if reform voices were growing bolder in publications on China that addressed—obliquely, to be sure—many fundamental issues of socialism. Yet, the Soviet leadership still claimed to be beckoning the Chinese into negotiations, and Chinese officials may have found even the occasional overtures for better relations, e.g. a well-wishing telegram to mark an occasion, a signal that relations could improve.

What Moscow could offer both informally and merely by its very existence may have compensated for its lack of other blandishments. Informal contacts such as the Foreign Ministry official Kapitsa's comments in annual meetings in Beijing beginning in 1980 were undoubtedly encouraging: Moscow was eager for better relations with a fellow socialist country. When Brezhnev made this view official in a series of short passages inserted into his speeches in 1982 and in authoritative articles in Pravda, it became clear that Moscow was bestowing a degree of legitimacy on China as a member of the socialist world. Above all, what the Soviet Union was willing to provide was an end to China's outcaste status and a working relationship with optimistic expectations.

The immediate gains—as limited as they appear— that the Soviet leadership promised China met many of the needs of China's communist leadership. They needed the Soviet Union—Yugoslavia and Romania alone were insufficient—to reassert a socialist worldview in which the October
Revolution is the turning point of history, and the remainder of the twentieth century is characterized by a fierce struggle between socialism and capitalism with the former gaining and eventually emerging victorious everywhere. Having repudiated Mao's radical version of socialist self-reliance and continuous revolution, they probably decided that the image of Chinese socialism standing alone would be hard-pressed to sustain their ideological and political needs at home. Somehow Chinese socialism had to be integrated into the inexorable march of world socialism in this century.

China's leaders needed to modernize the foundation they had established in the 1950s—not only the industrial foundation of Soviet-assisted factories, but more importantly the organizational and ideological foundations of management within a planned economy and education of socialist citizens. The Soviet Union and its allies provided experiences from which to borrow and with which to legitimize Chinese reforms.

In foreign affairs, renewed and improving ties with Moscow gave China increased leverage with the capitalist countries and at the same time helped stabilize the military environment in East Asia for China's concentrated attention on economic development. In the arts and education, these ties and the image of Soviet developments created a counterweight to the dangers of "spiritual pollution" from the West. In economics, the Soviet Union reemerged as a source of substantial assistance to China's heavy industry and as a promising trading partner.

All of these gains from "normalization" do not add up to a case for close Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese leaders and even more the Chinese people do not view Moscow as being in a position, even if it were sufficiently reliable and magnanimous, to meet China's principal needs. Moscow can help with China's economic program, but the Soviet weakness in modern science and
technology and in world-class quality are obvious drawbacks. The Soviet Union is mired in its own serious economic difficulties and is not viewed as a long-term solution to China's economic problems. Chinese are benefiting so much from educational exchanges and sending students abroad to the West and Japan that they are also not tempted to place many of their eggs in the Soviet educational basket. Furthermore, as long as the Soviet military presence is formidable in Cam Ran Bay, Afghanistan, and the northern border areas, China is likely to keep some military counterweight via ties to the United States. These are the chief limitations on the Sino-Soviet rapprochement. They indicate that a quadrilateral relationship roughly along the lines existing in 1985 will continue to be perceived in East Asia, in which the principal actors are China, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States. Yet, there is much opportunity for flux and the main tendency in the 1980s of improved Sino-Soviet ties is still in progress.

The period 1978-1985 saw two contrasting trends in China: a consistent reform course for the economy and a rollercoaster of inconsistent policies affecting politics and ideology. The leadership agreed, on the whole, about economic reform and opening to the outside world, but remained deeply divided on politics and ideology. Publications on the Soviet Union, because bilateral relations were in flux and the Soviet Union represented the most important dimension of public or semi-public debate that Chinese leaders would tolerate, emerged in this period as perhaps the most lively forum for understanding the evolving Chinese worldview and the struggle between orthodoxy and reform to shift that worldview away from its current compromise position.

Our review of the Chinese debate over the Soviet Union presents one additional set of evidence that in the second half of the twentieth century the principal non-military and non-economic factor affecting the world balance
of power has been China's initiatives brought about primarily out of concern for: 1) domestic policy changes affecting economics, politics, and ideology inside China; and 2) foreign policy along China's borders in Asia. Chinese leaders took the initiative on three occasions: in the late 1950s and early 1960s when they broke with Moscow; in the early 1970s when they joined with Washington against Moscow; and then in the first half of the 1980s when they moved close to a position of equidistance between Washington and Moscow. In each case, there were both domestic and regional concerns that prompted Chinese leaders to act. Moreover, the Chinese have preferred to leave the impression that the other side in negotiations is the more earnest suitor. By examining the debates within China, we gain a new appreciation for how carefully China's specialists weigh the alternatives and how energetically they vie in support of rival viewpoints as they seek to redirect China domestically and within the world.

Chinese studies of internal conditions in the Soviet Union are written by specialists on that country, yet they are widely perceived as a response to and a commentary on domestic developments in China itself. To an important degree, they are written with consideration of their impact on the struggle between orthodoxy and reform inside China. Chinese publications on Soviet foreign policy are often the work of international affairs experts and more directly reflect the state of Sino-Soviet relations and the general state of China's foreign relations. Different groups in China have responsibility for these two types of publications. The first group is more orthodox than the second and is less concerned with the development of China's relations with capitalist countries. Turning points in the two types of writings, as each has become less pessimistic over the period 1978-85, have not necessarily coincided. Views of the Soviet domestic scene have improved faster than those
of foreign policy, but in both cases Andropov's leadership created new opportunities. His reform initiatives made it possible for the forces of orthodoxy in China to find new parallels between the two socialist countries and his moves toward closer Sino-Soviet relations led to reassessments of Soviet foreign policy. In neither area did the brief Andropov era resolve all of the serious differences that divided the two countries. Chinese continued to be negative about Soviet military policy in Asia and doubtful about the Soviet commitment to major domestic reforms, but the tone of their writings on the Soviet Union became much less gloomy.

In Chinese writings on the Soviet Union one finds the same six turning points that are treated by other schools of sovietology: 1) the switch from War Communism to the NEP; 2) the revolution from above, including collectivization; 3) Stalin's purges and his growing "cult of the personality; 4) de-Stalinization represented by the Twentieth Party Congress; 5) Brezhnev's stabilization and tightening of control from the mid-sixties; and 6) the Andropov-Gorbachev reform process of the 1980s. Writings on economics, literature, and politics all refer to many of these milestones in the history of the Soviet Union, evaluating them and sometimes drawing lessons for Chinese socialism. Intense debates have developed over each of these turning points; often both orthodox and reform views can be discerned. While differences of opinion are present, one finds in Chinese publications for most, if not all, of these key periods in the history of Soviet socialism a widely popularized consensus. By 1984 a clear understanding of the history of the Soviet system was emerging in China.

This consensus, which represents the official worldview, is positive about Soviet history, largely in agreement with the official Soviet perspective on Soviet history, and rather optimistic about the Soviet future.
In the Andropov-Gorbachev era, there has been convergence between official Chinese and Soviet views of Soviet history, of Soviet reform needs, and of the nature of socialism. Both sides agree on the high priority of economic reform, while downplaying the need for political and ideological reform of a fundamental nature. Both agree on Lenin's greatness, on Stalin's overall successes despite serious mistakes, on Khrushchev's mishandling of the shift away from Stalin's model, and on the inadequacy of reform programs under Brezhnev. Since Brezhnev's death, the Chinese have found reason to see Soviet reforms in a more serious light and the Soviets have looked more favorably on Chinese reforms. On domestic matters a remarkable resemblance can be found in their views of Soviet history—all the more so since less than a decade earlier neither Chinese nor Soviet publications accepted many of the reform-oriented views that comprise this consensus.

While the similarities are striking, the differences should not be overlooked. As of late 1985 Soviet officials had not publicly acknowledged the wisdom of China's reform programs and Chinese publications were not expressing optimism that Soviet reforms over the next several years would adequately address the serious problems facing that country. Neither side was publicizing the growing consensus in the two worldviews. A continued barrier existed, preventing either side from expressing high optimism about the other's development and also blocking comparisons between the two countries. Given the widespread appreciation in both countries of strong similarities between the two, the absence of any comparisons—historic or contemporary—was conclusive testimony to the existence of a firm barrier.

Two interpretations of the nature of this barrier to comparative scholarship and positive mutual assessments readily come to mind. The first is that both Beijing and Moscow follow the practice of allowing foreign
relations to determine evaluations of each other. They refuse to move ahead to praise and genuine optimism until their foreign affairs problems are clearly resolved. The second interpretation is that each side is awaiting the outcome of Gorbachev's consolidation of power. The signal awaited by China may be the decision by Soviet leaders to praise China's reforms and to comment directly about learning from the Chinese experience. The Gorbachev leadership may delay in doing so until it puts its own reform agenda in order, but it also may hesitate because it is dissatisfied with continued Chinese criticisms of Soviet foreign policy in Asia. The challenge remained in 1985 for the Soviet leadership to launch a fundamental reform program and to recognize an independent China within the socialist camp. The challenge was not new. What was new after Gorbachev's accession to power and the appointment of many new members of the top Soviet leadership and after the warming relations between the two countries in 1984-85 was how likely it seemed that Sino-Soviet "normalization" and party-to-party relations could now be achieved on this basis.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY

American policy makers have to make many decisions concerning strategic, economic, and scientific and cultural exchanges with the People's Republic of China. These decisions should be based on the best possible information about the domestic and foreign policy inclinations and debates in the PRC. It follows that specialists should learn what they can about views in the PRC that help shape the most important policies. Perhaps no issue is of greater significance than the relations the PRC forges with the Soviet Union. Academic specialists can examine published sources that help explain those relations and that may provide a basis for predicting future relations.
The purpose of academic exchanges is to learn from each other and from the sources not available in one's own country. Chinese researchers and students (not a few in international affairs fields) come to the United States and make use of our sources and academic consultations. They energetically strive to understand American foreign policy, including perceptions of the Soviet Union and relations with that country. It is only fair that Americans have similar opportunities in China. America's progress in gathering technological information should be accompanied by a serious effort to gather policy-related information.

It should be in the interest of all nations to exchange such information openly. This would reduce misinformation and lessen the possibility of serious misunderstandings. Chinese officials have a penchant for secrecy that obstructs this quest for accurate information. They distribute hundreds of journals for internal circulation (neibu). They warn academic specialists against speaking openly with foreigners about the Soviet Union and other presumably sensitive subjects. Collectively and individually, Americans interested in improved information should strive to break down these barriers. Some success has already been achieved, as witnessed by my acceptance into China to study the sensitive subject of the Soviet Union and by the full schedule of meetings arranged on my behalf. Nevertheless, when it is necessary to obtain neibu sources without the knowledge of one's hosts (including many of the authors of the very publications involved), something is amiss. When few of the most valuable journals can be found in any American university library, research is seriously handicapped. A major effort is called for to improve academic exchanges with the PRC so that Americans gain access to the essential sources on Chinese foreign relations and perceptions of the world.
The following five goals represent a preliminary proposal for the information that should be sought on behalf of American and other researchers:

1) bibliographies, including China's National Periodical Index (Quanguo baokan suoyin) and specialized monthly bibliographies by field--in the Soviet field Jinri Sulian dongou offers a monthly bibliography;

2) the entry into China of specialists whose purpose is to write a report on the state of publications in particular fields;

3) a requirement by funding agencies that American organizations which host Chinese researchers in relevant fields for purposes of information exchanges become informed about the publications of their visitors;

4) regular access to neibu publications for Americans working in Chinese libraries;

5) neibu journals for American libraries, including a nationwide index of the small number of issues that have already been obtained.

In addition to gathering more and better information, Americans should make increased use of available information. One possibility is to compile periodically a collection of articles on mutual perceptions of major countries such as Soviet views of Japan and Chinese views of the United States. Another is to expand cooperative efforts with scholars in other countries to study problems of mutual perceptions jointly. It would be most desirable if Chinese scholars worked together with Americans on the subject of Chinese perceptions of the Soviet Union or perhaps American perceptions of the Soviet Union. Similar cooperation could be suggested to Soviet specialists. In each case, the goal would be to maximize a full and open exchange of information. Peer review groups are essential to assess the degree of success in obtaining genuine information from such exchanges.
FOOTNOTES


4. This was the consistent message in my interviews with Soviet experts in Beijing and Shanghai in the winter of 1984-85, and I could not find a favorable view of Khrushchev in published sources.


9. This was reported to me in several interviews, but I have not found a published reference.


17. Zhongguo shehuikexueyuan Maliezhuyi Mao Zedong sixiang yanjiusuo, ed.,


20. This was a view often expressed in my interviews and is reflected in Zhou Xincheng and Li Jun, "Shiying woguo jiakuai chengshi tizhi gaige de shuyao jinyibu kaizhan Sulian, dongou guo jia jingji tizhi gaige de yanjiu gongzuo," *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi neican*, No. 11, 1984, 15-19.


32. Wu Yikang, "Qian tan shijie jingji de duojihua gushi-jian ping weilai shi 'Taipingyang shidai' de tifa-," Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi neican, No. 4, 1984, 12-17.

33. Sulian he dongou guojia nongye jingji tizhi de gaige (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1982), 11-14.


35. Jin Hui, "Shilun zhengzhi tizhi he jingji tizhi de guanxi yi jiantan


