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        A Political Anthropology of
        Leninist Regime Relations

AUTHOR: Ken Jowitt

CONTRACTOR: The Regents of the University of California

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Ken Jowitt

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Existing approaches to Soviet relations with other Leninist regimes and with the West can be categorized as either "monotheistic" or "polytheistic." "Monotheistic" approaches limit themselves to an appreciation of the continuously recognizable or "essential" features of Leninist regimes, to those features that persist over time and across space. In contrast, "polytheistic" approaches emphasize the settings that shape the Soviet regime's various behaviors over time and across space. "Monotheistic" approaches fail to grasp the substantial developmental changes that have occurred in Leninist ideology, political organization, and policy at the domestic, bloc, and international level. "Polytheistic" disaggregations of Soviet policy behaviors fail to say anything valuable about the unique political character of the Soviet Union, and consequently fail to establish the political meaning of those behaviors.

In place of the "monotheistic" and "polytheistic" approaches, I offer a "trinitarian" approach that places proportionate weight on the Essential, Developmental, and Organizational features that shape and inform Soviet behavior toward other Leninist regimes and toward the West. This approach reveals that, while the Soviet Union remains essentially distinct from the West, it has experienced significant Developmental and Organizational movement in the post-Stalin era. This movement has introduced flexibility in inter-regime relations and demands a reevaluation of the American and Western policy toward Communist international relations.

All Leninist regimes, including the Soviet, have neotraditional-charismatic political characters opposed to the more legal-rational features of Western liberal regimes.
The neotraditional-charismatic cast of Leninism reveals itself in the hierophanic quality accorded the October Revolution, quasi-sacral standing accorded to the Soviet Union, the heroic and "correct" status accorded the Soviet party (and all Leninist parties), the corporate-like organization of domestic life in Leninist regimes, and of inter-regime life in the international subsystem of Leninist regimes.

However, the essentially traditional-charismatic quality of the Soviet and all other Leninist regimes is subject to developmental change, i.e., to substantial institutional reformulations of the political meaning and consequences of Leninism's essential features. In Soviet history and that of other Leninist regimes one can point to at least two such developmental stages, those of Consolidation and Inclusion. Each developmental stage has a set of defining features regarding the relation between the Soviet regime and its own society, the Soviet regime and other Leninist regimes, and Soviet relations with the non-Leninist parts of the world. What distinguishes the Soviet regime more than anything during the phase of Consolidation is the explicit and intense tension between the regime and its society, the Soviet regime and its relations with other Leninist regimes, and with the non-Leninist parts of the world. The Inclusion phase of political development in the Soviet Union substantially differs from the Consolidation phase precisely in the reduction of the tension between the Party and its several environments: national, bloc, and international.

Of equal significance, the features and the political representatives of Consolidation and Inclusion not only differ from one another, they oppose one another. Thus a change from Consolidation to Inclusion at either or both the national and bloc level has always meant an intense conflict between the opposing interpreters of Leninism. The most significant international expression of this conflict was the Sino-Soviet
split between 1959 and 1979. The hostility between the Chinese and the Soviet regimes was primarily one between different institutional interpretations of the same ideology. The Soviet-Chinese clash was over the imperative/proper political identity for a Leninist regime. It was an identity-clash. Specific issues such as leadership of the bloc and bloc strategy had their own role and integrity, but took on meaning only in the context of the developmental conflict between the two Leninist regimes. The international importance of this conflict was limited as long as the Chinese regime kept it "all in the (regime) family." But, when in the mid-seventies, the Chinese adopted a national format for their conflict with the Soviets, its import fundamentally changed. What one sees in the mid- and late-1970s is the superimposition of what had previously been two separate conflict arenas: that of the Leninist regime-world and the East-West conflict.

The Chinese leadership designed foreign policy actions in the 1970s both to assert China's national individualism and position as alternative leader in the Leninist regime-world and to limit, even humiliate, the Soviet Union in the international arena. Thus, Chinese overtures to the U.S. were largely an expression and intensification of the conflict within the Leninist regime-world. The notion of a "strategic triangle" failed to capture this motivation and the effect Chinese moves had in intensifying Communist and Bloc conflicts. China's actions succeeded because of the active cooperation the Chinese regime received from the National Security Advisor of the U.S. government, Zbigniew Brzezinski. China's and Brzezinski's antipathy toward the Soviet regime and the consequent one-dimensional anti-Soviet organization of international politics created the most dangerous situation in international life since the Second World War. The Soviet Union was faced in practically every international policy setting with a Sino-American alignment,
whether it was strategic in Southeast Asia and North Asia, political in Western and (South) Eastern Europe, or symbolic in Central America and Africa. The climax of this pattern of superimposed conflicts was Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, which demonstrated their refusal to be blocked by the Chinese or the Americans.

China's developmental change from a Consolidation to an Inclusion regime in 1980 did more than anything else to defuse what was in late 1979 the most dangerous alignment and pattern of conflict the world had experienced since 1945. That the thrust of China's development is Inclusive can readily be demonstrated with even a cursory examination of the types of changes that have occurred beginning with the rejection of class struggle as the pivot of Chinese political life. More pertinent to my concerns in this piece, Inclusive regimes typically begin to define themselves more in terms of internal than external references. They begin to develop the rudiments of a national self; to individuate themselves politically. They move from an indivisible relation with an external reference, e.g., the Soviet regime, and establish their own individuality and autonomy. In the Chinese case, due to their independent mode of taking power and de facto separation from the Soviet Union since 1960, the developmental change from Consolidation to Inclusion has led to the emergence not simply of "regime individuality" but "regime individualism." China is emerging as a regime that has identified, and has the power to act on, multiple political references. This greater regime "plasticity" favors a more cross-cutting, ameliorating pattern of international conflicts. China's internal development change has been the major contribution to international peace in the last decade.

Despite these changes, the bloc organization of Soviet-American relations in the form of NATO and the Warsaw Pact remains. In an era when the members of each bloc have developed
their own political and regime individuality, when they are capable of and expect increasing policy autonomy in their foreign relations, bloc organization is increasingly dangerous. It is predicated on hierarchy and the expectation that problems affecting the bloc will sooner rather than later be handled by its superpower leader. With the increasing assertion by bloc members of their autonomous interests, bloc organization means an increase in the number of occasions for intra-bloc conflict and for inter-bloc conflict. Bloc organization is more than militarily dangerous and politically conflictual; it is also hostile to Western and congenial to Soviet political culture. Bloc organization underwrites the essential character of Leninist regimes, their affinity and preference for quasi-corporate organization. Blocs are more compatible with the Soviet Union's character and political preference than with our own. The distinctiveness of Western culture rests with the notion and reality of the individual: social and national. With its more supple national and international political, cultural, social and economic bases and ties, the West can sustain its unity more easily than the Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world. Ironically, or perversely, we continue to assume "their" unity is natural and that unlike us they do not need blocs. Presumably, Soviet geographical proximity and Leninist ideology will keep the Soviet Union and Europe together. Eastern European regimes are likely to align themselves with the Soviet Union even in the absence of blocs given their institutional and anthropological affinities. And the Soviet Union is likely to increase rather than decrease its commitment to parts of Eastern Europe. However, the way in which Soviet-European-American political-military ties are organized will directly affect the development of Soviet-East European relations in the near future. In a blocless Europe, the tendency for Eastern European regimes regularly to attempt to widen the boundaries of their regime autonomy will be
strengthened, not weakened. The apprehension of the Soviets may increase, but a pretext for intervention would be more difficult to assert. A blocless Europe would risk more conflict between East European regimes but also offer the possibility of a pattern of cross-cutting European conflicts in place of the resentment and frustration-producing consequences within each bloc today and the categoric juxtaposition of two hostile and dangerous forces in Europe.

Policy recommendations: find a mode of Western cooperation other than NATO which would be simultaneously more consistent with the political anthropology of the West and less consistent with the political anthropology of Leninism, more appreciative of the developmental changes in the Leninist world, and more sensitive to the growing risks of a bloc-organized Europe.
INTRODUCTION

Existing explanations of the Soviet Union's international relations with other Leninist regimes and the West can be grouped into two categories: "monotheistic" and "polytheistic." "Monotheistic" arguments rest on the claim that the Soviet Union's political character essentially differs from the West's. In this view the West is not at war with Soviet conduct "but with its existence: convinced that its existence and its hostility (are) the same."¹ This view allows for variations in Soviet orientation while asserting essential continuity of Soviet organization and behavior.² Those who conceive of the Soviet Union in "monotheistic" terms typically conclude that variation over time in the Soviet regime's format is less important than the persistence of those elements that provide the Soviet Union with a continuously recognizable and essentially unchanged identity, i.e., that the Soviet regime's essential political features are more important than its developmental political features.

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¹ The phrase is Edmund Burke's and is directed at the "Jacobin system." Paul Seabury "makes it his own" with a simple substitution of Soviet for Jacobin in his "Reinspecting Containment," in Aaron Wildavsky, ed., Beyond Containment (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1983), p. 43.

In contrast to the "monotheistic" interpretation of the Soviet Union as essentially alien and permanently aggressive, the "polytheistic" interpretation points to the existence of "many" Soviet Unions depending on the arena the Soviet elite acts in, the issues it confronts, the opponents it faces, the partners it aligns with, the divisions within its own elite, and the priority it sets on a given goal. For "polytheists" Soviet foreign policy and behavior are not viewed as inherently and permanently soft or hard. Instead they are viewed as the "consequences of complex, intersecting, aggregate internal and external variables, and they can be expansionist, aggressive, assertive, moderate, defensive, or deferential depending upon circumstances and personalities." Although not stated explicitly, the basic implication of the "polytheists" seems to be that developmental changes in the post-Stalin period have produced a Soviet Union essentially different from that of the Stalin era.

In place of the "monotheist" conceptions and "polytheist" descriptions of the Soviet regime's political character I propose a "trinitarian" theoretical framework to explain the Soviet Union's relations with other Leninist regimes and with the West. The "trinity" consists of the Essential, Developmental, and Organizational elements that shape the

Soviet Union's regime organization and action at any point in its political history. I will argue that the Soviet Union's political character does essentially differ from the West's—that it is not a variant but rather a "substitute," in Gerschenkronian terms, for Western liberal modernity. However, the essential or permanent features of the Soviet regime that provide it with a continuously recognizable political identity are substantially recast institutionally, i.e., organizationally, ideologically, and behaviorally in the course of the Soviet Union's political development. More exactly, developmental changes are more than attitudinal shifts. Developmental changes redefine the institutional setting within which political attitudes and ideological preferences take on political meaning and consequence. And the way in which a Leninist regime's international environments are organized will positively or negatively affect the stability and visability of that regime's developmental features.

In short, both the Soviet Union's political character and the character of its political relations with other Leninist regimes can only be understood by examining three interacting elements: those permanent features that provide Leninist regimes with a continuously recognizable identity

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As used here Organizational refers to the organization of international politics.

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(the Essential); those developmental changes that institutionally recast those essential elements ideologically, organizationally, and behaviorally (the Developmental); and the impact the organization (NOT the structure) of international politics has on the relations within and behavior of the Leninist regime world (the Organizational).

THE ESSENTIAL

"Monotheists" assert correctly that the Soviet Union's political character differs essentially from the West's. The fundamental difference in the political character of the Soviet Union and the West rests on the attitude toward the individual and individuation. Louis Hartz once observed that "...Russian development has turned its back on the Western concept of personality."6 This observation makes equal sense when applied to the Soviet Centered Leninist regime world: that group of nations ruled by Leninist parties and primarily, if not exclusively, oriented to the Soviet Union. As Modelski once commented, "the Soviet Union's status is not that of an alliance leader...it resembles more that of a head of a family or of a tribe, interested in and responsible, in a sense, for all family or tribal affairs."7 From a Western viewpoint, the essential distinctiveness and peculiarity of both the domestic and international organization of Leninist regimes lie in their traditional-charismatic features. The Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world resembles an extended traditional family made up of persons, not individuals (i.e., sovereign nation-states), led by a patriarchal figure (or central regime) whose degree of

arbitrariness and command varies but who uses substantive, not procedural criteria, for deciding when to interfere (i.e., the "Brezhnev Doctrine") in related households, that is, other Leninist regimes.

The Soviet regime's tendency to emphasize substantive criteria at the expense of such procedural norms as sovereignty speaks to more than a Soviet penchant for political interference; it signifies a particular political ontology, an understanding of regime and inter-regime organization more charismatic and traditional than modern in conception. This was reflected in its criticism of the Yugoslav Draft Program of 1958 because it had "reduced proletarian internationalism to the principles of equality and non-interference in internal affairs," and thereby failed to recognize that "under certain conditions proletarian internationalism demands the subordination of the interests of the...struggle in one country to the interests of the struggle on a worldwide scale." While it resembles the attitude of a patriarch of an extended family, the Soviet leadership's traditional-charismatic political ontology also grows out of the meaning and status it assigns to the October Revolution. Here the tradition of the Revolution is made sacred and the Soviet Union, as the scene of this sacred event, becomes the sole legitimate charismatic leader.

I propose that we should view the Soviet Union as a self-proclaimed "hierophany" as defined by Mircea Eliade in his study of the sacred and the profane. There he states that

"every sacred place implies a hierophany, an irruption of the sacred that results in detaching a territory from the surrounding cosmic milieu and making it qualitatively different." 9 For the Soviet elite, the October Revolution remains a political hierophany and the Soviet Union the corresponding politically sacred space. For the Soviets the October Revolution was THE historical event that split the world in two and gave the "whole of international life a single pivot; namely, the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet state and its natural allies." 10 But the eruption of a politically charismatic regime implies more for the Soviet leadership than simply the reorganization of international lines of conflict. To refer again to Eliade, where a sacred entity—in this instance a revolutionary regime viewed in quasi-sacral terms—appears, "we everywhere find the symbolism of the Center of the World;" 11 which is precisely the status and definition every Soviet leadership since Lenin has given the Soviet Union in relation to all other Leninist parties' regimes.


11 Eliade, p. 37.
In *Left-Wing Communism*, presented to the Second Congress of the Communist International in Moscow in July 1920, Lenin emphasized how Soviet experience "shows very definitely that certain fundamental features of our revolution have a significance that is not local...or Russian alone, but international." Lenin meant by that "the international validity or the historical inevitability of a repetition, on an international scale, of what has taken place in our country." 12 Thus began a persistent tendency to conflate the October Revolution and the Soviet regime; to identify a revolutionary 'hierophany'--the October Revolution--with a concrete 'sacred' political center--the Soviet Union. The Soviet October Revolution's significance is not exhausted by recognizing that all Soviet leaderships have seen the Soviet Union as the political center and criterion, not simply a political reference for other revolutionary socialist regimes. That significance extends to a political historical fact: Soviet organization and practice have been the substantive basis for almost all Leninist regimes at crucial points in their organization and development.

Aspaturian accurately observes that "as the original homeland of Marxism-Leninism the Soviet Union is the common inspiration and point of departure for all communist parties." It remains true that "the Soviet Union's pivotal significance in the system cannot be denied even if ambiguous and in a state of transition." 13 This pivotal significance has two components. First, all other Leninist regimes, including the

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Cuban, have modeled their internal order more rather than less on the example set by Soviet institutions. Second, as the origin(al) revolutionary hierophanic center the Soviet Union considers itself the charismatic criterion of correctness, and measures the authenticity of other Leninist, or "revolutionary" parties and regimes, by their institutional proximity to the Soviet regime, ideological fealty, and status deferral to the October Revolution myth.

This concrete, absolute identification of socialist revolution with a single origin contrasts significantly with the origins of the Western liberal world. The contrast is one between a regime world with a more modern and one with a more traditional-charismatic self-conception. The West locates its origins in the English, French and American revolutions and abstracts from those experiences a set of institutions, beliefs, and practices; the Leninist world locates its origins in a single, concrete, "sacral", revolutionary event, consistent with the dominant role the Soviet Union has played since its founding and the charismatic quality of its core institution, the Party.

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The unique feature of Cuba's relation to the Soviet Union is that it drew on the Khrushchevian Inclusion Soviet experience and not the Stalinist Consolidation experience. Louis Hartz in an ingenious comparison of nations that draw on the British experience has developed the notion of "fragments." Australia, for example, draws on the British labor fragment while the U.S. draws on the liberal middle class fragment of the total British experience. It might be fruitful to compare Leninist regimes as "fragments" of the Soviet experience. Thus Hungary would be a Khrushchevian fragment, Albania a Stalinist fragment, and Husak's Czechoslovakia a Brezhnevian one.

Cuba's creation in 1976 of a Leninist party and corresponding institutions provides a dramatic and substantive instance of political replication, one that prompted Jacques Levesque in his skilled study of Cuban-Soviet relations to make the following comment:

One of the themes that constantly recurs in the many articles published in the Soviet Union during 1976 in celebration of the first Congress of the Cuban party was the fact that the documents of the Congress confirmed the validity of the "general laws of socialist development" tried and tested by the experience of the Soviet Union. . . . The fact that the Soviet Union attached so much importance to the Congress is a good illustration of its fetishism concerning political structures. 15

If, as I am arguing, the Soviet leadership operates with a charismatic conception of the October Revolution and the "sacred" space associated with it— the Soviet Union; then for the Soviet leadership, replication of their Party-Regime and acceptance of the Soviet Union's status as revolutionary origin and center become THE ideal criteria of a "revolutionary" party or regime's authenticity. Conversely, to the degree that a "revolutionary" party or regime does not recognize the origin-quality of the October Revolution and the exemplar status of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership considers its political ontology and self-esteem under attack.

However, to argue that the Soviet Union's political self-concept differs essentially from the political self-concept of the West does not permit one to conclude that this self-conception and organization remain impervious to developmental changes in the Soviet Union's internal and external environments. To believe that, one has to ascribe to Leninist

organization, a magical power that has eluded all other historical entities. I propose to identify and examine a predictable pattern of development in the political organization and action of the Soviet regime, in all Leninist regimes, in their mutual relations, and consequently in their relations with the West.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL

In the Soviet Union's developmental history, in its relations with other Leninist regimes and with the West, one can identify two substantially different modes of political organization and action. Those modes correspond to the Consolidation and Inclusion stages of Soviet development. Both modes are essentially traditional and charismatic but vary substantially in their institutional definitions and political implications—internally and internationally. The Consolidation stage was embodied in Stalin's domestic policies and in the institution internationally of the Soviet Bloc. The Inclusion stage, which began under Khrushchev, introduced substantial changes within the Soviet polity between state and society, and in the international arena, between the Soviet Union and other Leninist regimes.

During the Stalinist-Consolidation stage, the Soviet Union was viewed by the Soviets and other Leninists as the INCARNATION of the October Revolution. This development was a response to a victorious regime's anxious political need to insulate its quasi-sacral identity from what were viewed as potentially 'contaminating' domestic and international environments. The typical response of any organization relatively secure about power and insecure about identity is to adopt a dogmatically concrete definition of its essential features: juxtapose that identity to its potentially contaminating environments, and (attempt to) distance itself from and dominate those diffusely hostile environments. Organizations in their Consolidation stage
of development typically adopt "castle profiles." Under Stalin the Soviet Union became a "Castle Regime."

The developmental imperative towards dogmatic concreteness during Consolidation manifested itself in the Soviet Union in several ways but most expressively as "socialism in one country." With that concept Stalin stably located the Revolution by dogmatically identifying it with a particular regime, the Soviet Union. "Socialism in one country" answered the anxious political and ideological need for a visible, specific revolutionary site and base. The Stalinist ideological claim that defense of the Revolution meant the defense of the Soviet Union, and the popular Party saying that "one Soviet tractor is worth ten foreign communists," signified the incarnation, not simply reification, of the October Revolution in the form of the Soviet Union. In Tucker's words, the USSR became more than an instance of a phenomenon, more than a symbol, it became the "repository of the socialist idea," the object of a cult, "the cult of the USSR." "Socialism in one country" not only "located" the Revolution by identifying it with a particular regime, it elevated that regime in an extraordinary way. From being a Marxist revolutionary anomaly, the Soviet Union became a Revolutionary Incarnation. In the eyes of the Leninists, the October Revolution transformed the "biblically last" Russia into the "biblically first" Soviet Union. The periphery of the Western world became the nucleus of a "superior" socialist one.

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The "juxtaposition imperative" is an equally integral feature of Leninist Consolidation regimes. In his political autobiography Wolfgang Leonhard notes that "...reality in the Soviet Union was completely different from the picture presented in Pravda. But somehow I dissociated these things. It was almost as if there were two separate levels, one of everyday events and experiences which I found myself often criticising: the other that of the great party line...which I still regarded as correct." 18

Leonhard was quite astute when he contrasted the quasi-sacral "correct," and therefore "essentially more real"--not idealized, Soviet reality, to that of the empirical but ordinary, and therefore somehow "less real," life that contradicted it. Stalin's castle-regime was very "Augustinian," a mix of the 'contaminating' ordinary cultural and social reality of Russian society and the politically asserted "sacral" reality of the Party and its actions. For Stalinist "Augustinians," Russia of the great Party line was sacral and as such had to be insulated from and dominant over its unreconstructed and potentially contaminating environments.

The "distance and domination imperatives" of Consolidation manifested themselves in the creation of political, ideological, and coercive "moats" between the Soviet regime and its society on the one hand and the regime and the outside world on the other. In the former setting secretiveness and a terror apparatus created both distance and domination, while internationally the so-called "iron curtain" quite graphically captured the imperative of cultural, political, and ideological "distance" from what was viewed as not simply a militarily hostile but also ideologically polluting international environment.

The Consolidation stage in the Soviet Union created a regime with three features: a dogmatically concrete identification of the Soviet regime's particular features with the general features of Leninism; a juxtaposition of the "sacral" features of regime organization with those of the "contaminating" "profane" features of the surrounding society; and a political-ideological separation of the two realms. By 1948 these three features defined the national organization of the newly created Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe and the international organization of the Soviet Bloc.

The Soviet Bloc--Stalinist Consolidation

The appearance after the War of additional regimes ruled by Leninist parties created serious political and ideological problems for the Soviet elite. The Soviet leadership had to define the ideological status of these new regimes in relation to the Soviet Union. Politically it had to decide on a mode of inter-regime organization. These were crucial issues. To incorporate Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union would risk the material interests of the Soviet regime should civil wars in Eastern Europe occur and possibly trigger a third World War. Incorporation would also challenge the material power of Soviet elite structure. But incorporation would challenge more than Soviet material interests. Soviet ideal interests would also have been jeopardized in two ways. 19

To incorporate Yugoslavia would have meant incorporating a competing charismatic leader and heroic party. In light of Stalin and the Soviet Union's absolute sacralization, the

Soviet elite must have considered such a move ideologically unacceptable, even 'sacilegious.' More generally, the Soviet leadership would have seen Eastern Europe's incorporation as a highly "contaminating" measure, particularly in light of the institutional disruption the War engendered in the Soviet Union. To incorporate several "capitalist" East European countries politically would have created a very hostile and 'polluting' 'countryside' around a militarily victorious but institutionally disrupted and ideologically indecisive Soviet 'castle.'

Stalin's solution to these material and ideal challenges was ingenious. It addressed them all. It vividly demonstrated the traditional-charismatic quality of Leninist organization. And it established the peculiarly "Augustinian" definition of Leninist regimes during their Consolidation stage.

To grasp the "essence" of Stalin's solution to the problem of inter-Leninist regime organization one must look to Durkheim who contrasted two types of society, one based on mechanical, the other on organic solidarity. Replication and segmentation are the primary features of a mechanically solidary society, one in which individuality finds no support. According to Durkheim, mechanical solidarity "can grow only in inverse ratio to personality," while the organization of such a society resembles the rings of an earthworm in its segmental replication of a central pattern.

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20 William O. McCagg, Jr. has studied the ideological and political debates within the Soviet leadership after World War II in terms that are very congruent with the perspective I employ in this piece. See his very valuable Stalin Embattled 1943-1948 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), particularly pp. 97-167.

Now consider Shoup's description of the Soviet-East European relationship after 1948. In that year the Soviets began to apply the notion of "socialism in one country" to each of the East European regimes. Shoup observes that the Stalinist "pattern of development which was to lead to a world Communist state was therefore unique. It is not integrative as much as it was reproductive." 22 The Soviet BLOC was an international political organization based on political replication of the Soviet "sacred center" and political segmentation of its constituent regime elements. The Soviet Bloc was a remarkable contemporary instance of autarchic, mutually isolated regimes linked to and through a Center whose identity was replicated in detailed fashion at the expense of each non-Soviet regime's political "personality." This mode of organization did much more than reflect Stalin's desire for absolute control. It also satisfied the Soviet belief that its particular regime organization was the correct Leninist organization; that the Soviet regime was the incarnation, not simply a representation of the October Revolution's universality. It satisfied the Soviet demand for political control of Eastern Europe minus the risk of cultural contamination that incorporation would have created. It satisfied the charismatic, heroic aspiration of each East European Leninist regime to "construct socialism;" for each East European leadership was told it could replicate Soviet achievements. And it satisfied the ideological need of East European and Asian regime leaders for definite reassurance that their political efforts to construct "socialism" would be "correct," i.e., not inadvertently result in political or social backsliding.

Under Stalin, the political organization of Leninist regimes, their relation to the Soviet regime, and the relation of the Soviet Bloc to the West emphasized concreteness of political definition, juxtaposition of the quasi-sacral Party-regime realm and the surrounding "profane" and potentially "contaminating" environment, and a corresponding tension between and separation of these two realms in both the national and international arenas.

During the Stalinist period the Soviet Union was not simply the center but the middle of the Soviet Bloc, if one appropriately includes Outer Mongolia, North Korea, China, and North Vietnam. During its "Augustinian" or consolidation stage the Soviet political universe had a politically static, dogmatic quality and one vivid expression was the Stalinist preference for geographically contiguous replica-regimes.

Dogmatic concreteness also expressed itself in the detailed replication of the Soviet political order in the most diverse cultural settings. In a clear instance of mechanically solidary international organization, "little" Stalins created replica "socialisms in each country" with replicated steel industries and collective farms. Concreteness also took the form of Soviet troops, advisors, secret police, and political personnel being physically present, powerful, and prestigious; the existence of joint-stock companies; the required teaching of Russian; and the unrequired but noticeable practice, at least in Eastern Europe, of marrying Russian wives. At times the concreteness of political definition and identification with the Soviet regime went to absurd lengths. Mao offers us a marvelous example. He reminded one audience that he "couldn't have eggs or chicken soup for three years because an article appeared in the Soviet Union which said that one shouldn't eat them." As Mao pointed out, "It didn't matter whether the article was correct or not, the Chinese listened all the same and
respectfully obeyed. In short, the Soviet Union was tops." 23 More than "tops," the Soviet Union was the source of dogmatic wisdom; powerful, authoritative, and awesome.

The second feature of Domestic, Bloc, and in this regard, Soviet-Western relations during the Consolidation stage, was the stark juxtaposition of the 'sacral' and 'profane.' Within each Leninist regime this took the form of an invidious separation of and tension between regime members and non-members. Heltai accurately describes this process: "the post-capitalist period of Eastern European history has witnessed the establishment not only of a 'new class,' but of a new micro-society--a 'master society'--above the destructured old society." 24 I should say a new "castle society" insulated from and dominating the destructured but still diffusely hostile and potentially "contaminating" old society; protected from it by a secret police "moat." Within the Bloc the same juxtaposition of "sacral" and "profane" elements played a central role in inter-regime relations. A major expression was the invidious contrast between party-to-party and state-to-state relations. A good example of this contrast occurred in connection with the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement in the mid-fifties. According to the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, Micunovic, the Soviets were unhappy with the Belgrade Declaration. They considered it a weak document "because it bears a state not a Party character." 25 During the Consolidation


stage, the Party is the concrete exclusive bearer of charisma, while the State is seen as the necessary, coercive, and "ordinary" agent suitable for dealings with non-Leninist "stranger" regimes but not other Leninist "hero" regimes. At the level of the Soviet Bloc this invidious opposition between party-to-party and state-to-state relations took the form of Leninist regime elite politically locating and identifying themselves more with the "sacrally" real Soviet party-regime than the "profanely" real countries they ruled. 26

Relations between the Soviet Bloc and the West rested on a similar juxtaposition. Zhdanov's post-war notion of two opposed camps, and the purge of the American communist Browder for thinking that at Tehran, "capitalism and socialism had begun to find the means of peaceful coexistence and collaboration in the framework of one and the same world," 27 are two sides of the same ideological coin. There could be two camps, not two parts of one world, a firm "Augustinian" distinction characteristic of the Stalinist-Consolidation stage of Leninist regime and inter-regime development. The separation of these two "worlds" or camps was assured by limited contacts, vituperative rhetoric, and limited violence, all of which created an international "moat" around the Soviet Bloc known as the "Iron Curtain." The Korean war was the quintessentially Stalinist-Consolidation undertaking. It clearly demarcated the two camps. In the short run, it also increased the loyalty and dependence of other Leninist regimes on the Soviet Center.


And in one particular instance--China--it satisfactorily "tested" Mao's ideological credentials and practically subordinated his regime to the Soviet Union for the war's duration. Separation and distance were also maintained within the Soviet Bloc. As Gomulka's former interpreter Weit noted, "the men in power in the Eastern bloc talk constantly of "internationalism" but . . . no friendly neighbour relationship of the type that has developed since the end of the war between the French and the Germans has ever linked the Poles with the Russians or the Czechs or even the people of the DDR. They have remained "stranger" to each other." This tells us a good deal about the essential and developmental character of inter-Leninist regime relations. What was true during Gomulka's reign was even more true at an earlier point.

After the Second World War the Soviet Bloc did not consist of "individual" sovereign nation-states, but of autarchic Soviet regime-replicas, distanced from their own regime-'kin' in the Bloc, and distanced from non-Leninist "stranger" regimes in the broader international community. During Stalin's Consolidation rule the organization of Leninist regime relations resembled a traditional corporate group with a dogmatic stress on group indivisibility that expressed itself politically as either complete acceptance of Soviet decisions or excommunication; and ideologically as an absolute choice between charismatic association with the Soviet Union or political degeneration into an "ordinary" (bourgeois) regime.


The Soviet-Yugoslav conflict illustrates both aspects. Santiago Carillo, the former head of the Spanish Communist Party, commenting on the Cominform's expulsion of Yugoslavia has stated, "we either had to accept or reject (it), for whoever rejected it would also have ended up by being excommunicated. During that period excommunications were still the accepted thing, and I do not believe that any party was ready to run that risk." The nature of the risk was quite explicit in the Cominform's message to the Yugoslavs: "... the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself ... outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties. ... The Yugoslav leaders evidently do not understand ... that such a nationalistic line can only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic ..." To leave the corporate group, the Soviet Bloc, was to lose one's extraordinary Leninist heroic identity because that identity was corporately indivisible, not nationally individual. To leave the quasi-sacral Bloc was to become a profane, "ordinary," isolated entity.

Khrushchev's extraordinary place in Soviet and Leninist history rests on his having challenged and replaced the Stalinist dogmatic emphasis on regime and political indivisibility with a partisan emphasis on regime individuality thereby transforming the Soviet Bloc into a Soviet Centered Leninist Regime-World. While the Korean War dramatically asserted the Stalinist Consolidation feature of Leninist organization at the national, Bloc, and international levels,


31 "Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau, June 28, 1948, Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia," in Robert V. Daniels, ed., p. 172. (The emphasis is mine.)
it also stimulated a part of the Soviet leadership to reconsider the feasibility and appropriateness of Leninism's "Augustinian" definition. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev substantially redefined Leninist organization at all three levels: national, Bloc, and international.

The "AQUINIAN" Reform

Ideological movements regularly produce two substantially different interpretations of how to define themselves politically. Historically, in Roman Catholicism one can identify two essentially but substantially different interpretations, Augustine's and Aquinas's. Khrushchev was Leninism's Aquinas. As with Aquinas, Khrushchev's innovations meant more than a shift in attitude; in both cases substantial developmental shifts in the institutional definition of the movement's ontology occurred.

Khrushchev initiated a developmental shift in the Soviet regime from Consolidation to Inclusion, a development that more than anything signaled a reduction in the political and ideological tension between the quasi-sacral party regime and the society it ruled. In the Church's case, Aquinian Inclusion was a modification to "meet a new situation . . . presented by the fact that Church and society were identical in membership." 32 Soviet Inclusion rests on a comparable recognition that Soviet society is no longer a "contaminating" force. Aquinians and Khrushchevians worry more that the social products of their respective organizations' developmental efforts might not identify themselves in terms consistent with the Church or Party's ideological self-image and political definition. 33


captures the meaning of the developmental shifts from Augustinian Consolidation to Aquinian Inclusion when he suggests "... there ought to be a real study called Anthropology corresponding to Theology. In this sense, St. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps more than he is anything else is a great anthropologist. Why? Because due to Aquinas it was "henceforth possible to look at a man either as a natural being or as a being designed for fellowship with God whereas before the former could not be conceived separately from the latter." Aquinas ameliorated the tension, diminished the alienation, and lessened the separation between Christian society and the Catholic Church. Khrushchev (and his "Khrushchevian" successors) have done much the same in the Soviet Union.

With his declaration that socialism's victory was complete and final in the Soviet Union Khrushchev removed the ideological underpinning of Stalin's dogmatic juxtaposition of a quasi-sacral regime and diffusely hostile contaminating society. "Augustinian" distrust and tension was replaced by "Aquinian" confidence that the Soviet regime could engage--not simply distance itself from--its several environments (national, Bloc, and international) without automatically being "polluted." Khrushchev initiated a less


35 Morris, p. 161. (The emphasis is mine.)

36 See Khrushchev's speech at the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU in January 1959 in Daniels, v. 2, p. 274. The addition of the term "final" was ideologically crucial. Stalin had asserted the possibility of "socialism in one country" being complete but not final. Politically this underwrote a stance of continual tension, vigilance, and terror.
tense and invidious relationship between regime and society, expressed most vividly (and controversially) in his notion "state of the whole people," a pointed assault on the Stalinist interpretation of "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Khrushchev's developmental initiatives were not designed to destroy the Soviet regime's ruling "walls." They have drained its political terror "moat." The most significant consequence of Khrushchev's developmental revisions has been the Soviet regime's greater ability and willingness to recognize intermediate political realities in contrast to Stalin's dichotomic political and ideological distinctions. Nationally, Khrushchev (unsuccessfully) attempted to create an intermediate political force of Party "citizens," the "obshchestvenniki." The members of this force were drawn from the Party, but not from its official "apparatchiki" stratum. Khrushchev was attempting to revitalize the status of party members per se. Under Stalinist Consolidation, the Party aktiv, that group of party members not holding paid official Party positions but having specific skills and available as a Party citizen pool, "dwindled and was not utilized, all business was handled by the apparatchiki." 37 In the "obshchestvenniki" Khrushchev had identified a socio-political stratum of regular party member "deacons" mid-way between the apparatchik "priests" and the non-Party "laity." His discovery and innovation reflected his faction's more empirical, less dogmatic, appraisal of the general party membership and Society; their conviction that less "distance between the Party and society was possible and necessary. 38


38 See Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization . . . ,"
Within the Bloc Khrushchev replaced the norm of indivisibility with that of regime individuality. Regime indivisibility refers to a mode of inter-regime organization in which all Leninist regimes accept the Soviet (or some other regime) interest as their own, abnegate their own political personality in favor of the Soviet's, and view that act as enhancing and guaranteeing their own revolutionary authenticity. Between 1948 and Stalin's death, the Soviet Bloc exemplified Regime Indivisibility.

Khrushchev challenged Stalin's "monotheistic" demand for an indivisible Soviet Bloc in which Soviet interests were identified as those of all Leninist regimes, and replaced it with a mode of organization that tolerated regime individuality in a Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world. Regime Individuality refers to an inter-regime organization that imperatively asserts the substantive—not simply procedural—unity of a group AND recognizes the existence of distinct interests within it. Khrushchev's notion of Bloc unity closely resembled the theologian's notion of the Trinity. Williams tells us that the term individual originally meant "inseparable" in medieval thinking; that "its main use was in the content of theological argument about the nature of the Holy Trinity. The effort was to explain how a being could be thought of as existing in his own nature yet existing by this nature as part of an indivisible whole." 39 Khrushchev's redefinition of Leninist regime relations did not allow for regime individualism, i.e., independence; it did allow for regime individuality or autonomy. It was a substantial if not an essential development. But in recognizing and tolerating the emergence of regime "personalities" within a Soviet led and centered Leninist regime world, Khrushchev was attacking and revising the Stalinist "indivisible" Bloc pattern so incisively and courageously criticized by Imre Nagy.

Writing in the midst of Bloc turmoil in the mid-fifties, Nagy assaulted the dichotomic and mechanically solidary pattern of the Stalinist Bloc. Nagy referred to the discredited anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist viewpoint, according to which the only and exclusive method for building socialism was that used by the Soviet (Union). He stressed the danger when a communist party "isolates itself from the majority of the nation," and the equal danger for international relations of preventing each Leninist regime from being guided by "its own particular circumstances" rather "than by dogmas." He called for the end of Hungary's "self-imposed seclusion, our our isolation" and pointed out that "we never examined the international situation thoroughly in the light of our own country's interests nor from the viewpoint of its effects on our country." Hungary, he claimed, was a "member not only of the socialist camp but of the great community of nations."  

Khrushchev had Nagy executed but accepted in good measure his "inclusive" critique of the dogmatically indivisible Stalinist pattern of Bloc and international relations. Khrushchev and his successors adopted a substantially different ideological and political approach to relations with other members of the Leninist regime world, that tolerated their emergence as politically distinguishable entities, a set of regime "obshchestvenniki." Gitelman has examined this development in the context of Soviet-East European relations. His argument that "East European policies which are at variance with those of the USSR are not necessarily policies directed against the USSR," and that at the same time, "it is important to bear in mind that policies which are in conformity with Soviet policy are not necessarily determined by the USSR," speaks to the Soviet tolerance for regime

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individuality, of some "diversity without deviance." 41 Gitelman studied Poland's position toward the Federal Republic of Germany and concluded that the Soviet Union "sets limits on Polish behavior . . . but did not determine the basic Polish outlook nor did it set the Polish agenda in regard to the Federal Republic. There was and is a coincidence of Polish and Soviet interests but there was no dictation of Polish policy and the various shifts it has undergone." 42

More recently one can find a clear instance of an East European policy coalition, made up of Hungary, East Germany, and Romania, opposing at least part of the Soviet leadership over the political right of East European regimes to exercise limited but real foreign policy initiatives with the West, even when their Soviet regime-world leader was unable or unwilling to do so. The Hungarian Party's semi-public defense of East Germany's active approach to West Germany in the form of articles by authoritative Hungarian Party figures, and in light of Soviet criticism of East Germany, was a significant political event. While East Germany was attempting to act autonomously on a definition of its own regime interest at a time of worsening Soviet-American relations, "the theoretical parameters of the dispute between Moscow and East Berlin . . . were staked out not in East Berlin but rather in Budapest. This in and of itself was rather remarkable, as conventional wisdom had seemed to dictate that the price that the Kadar regime paid for domestic economic reform was absolute foreign policy loyalty." 43


42 Ibid., p. 156.

Honecker's very demonstrative presence at the Romanian XIII Party Congress was another semi-public assertion of the East German position and the existence of a de facto coalition among the East Germans, Hungarians, and Romanians. Apparently, the coalition lost. Honecker's visit to West Germany was postponed. And for those whose epistemological loyalty is to the phrase, "in the final analysis," that undoubtedly demonstrates essential continuity in the Soviet Union's domination of Eastern Europe. But it does more than that. The episode revealed several things: the ability of relatively weak members of the Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world semi-publicly to differ with and oppose a Soviet policy position; the centrality of regime foreign policy autonomy or "individuality" as an issue in Soviet-East European relations, and the possibility that shifting policy coalitions are a regular feature of that regime-world. All these features differ substantially from those of the Stalinist Soviet Bloc. In that setting, conflicts were not semi-publicly articulated; no ideological allowance was made for inter-regime policy conflicts within the context of overall loyalty to the Soviet regime; and neither the ideological nor organizational conditions existed that would permit such a coalition to come into existence. There seems to be a politically relevant content in the conceptual distinction between (Stalinist) regime indivisibility and (Khrushchevian) regime individuality; between the developmental stages of Leninist Consolidation and Inclusion.

Evidence for regime "individuality" in a Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world extends beyond the existence of semi-public shifting policy coalitions. One can also locate more stable pairs of Leninist regimes with a positive or negative affinity for one another. Positive affinity regime pairs include North Korea and Romania, and Cuba and Vietnam. Negative "pairs" include Cuba and Yugoslavia. I call these regime relations "stable affinity pairs" because they reflect more than a coincidence of interest over a specific issue.
Relations between regime affinity pairs rest on a more diffuse and intense sense of mutual recognition or antipathy. Cuba and Vietnam mutually identify as small ex-colonial countries who, assaulted by the same superpower, responded as revolutionary "heroes." Romania and North Korea's positive regime affinity rests in part on their exposed position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union but more on their pariah history as low status communist parties and regimes first in the Comintern, then during and after the Second World War. The negative affinity between Cuba and Yugoslavia reflects their competition for status and influence within the "third world," their opposing notions of the relationship that entity should have with the Soviet Union, and Cuba's resentment over Yugoslavia's alleged support of the Batista regime. In studying these negative affinity regime pairs it is important to note the source of antipathy and conflict specific to their history as Leninist parties and regimes. For example, while Bulgaria and Yugoslavia do have crucial historical disagreements over Macedonia, the intensity of their current conflict also draws on the status conflict resulting from Bulgaria's Comintern preeminence being displaced by Tito's partisan-guerrilla preeminence. North Korea and Vietnam are another example of Leninist regimes with status conflicts. North Korea displaced Vietnam as the heroic front line in the early 50's and was in turn displaced by Vietnam in the 60's and remains so in light of Vietnam's successful reunification. And Romania and Hungary's historical clash over Transylvania may well be intensified by the role anti-communist Romania played in overthrowing the Bela Kun regime and communist Romania played in replacing the Nagy regime.

44 The relatively rapid defeat of the North Korean army by American forces and the superseding of the North Korean military role by the Chinese quickly removed any sustained heroic role for the North Korean party.

45 See Castro's bitter comments on Yugoslav support of Batista in Granma, August 25, 1968.
In addition to semi-public shifting issue coalitions within the Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world, and the more stable but restricted regime affinity pairs just discussed, one can identify two stable and broad Leninist regime coalitions. China, Romania, Yugoslavia, North Korea, and the non-ruling parties of Italy and Spain form one. The Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cuba, Outer Mongolia, and the remaining East European regimes form the other.* They differ on three issues. The first coalition refuses to accept, ideologically, a fundamental distinction between those who are members of the Warsaw Pact/CMEA and those who are not. The thrust of this refusal is to deny the Soviet Union the ability to segment the components of the Leninist regime-world and thereby monopolize the position of potential mediator between its various segments. The two coalitions also disagree on the relations of the "unaligned" movement to the Soviet Union, and the relative importance of the North-South dimension in international politics.

The Soviet Union's invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 prove that the Soviet Union does not ideologically tolerate Regime Individualism, and will politically destroy it when it can. Regime Individualism refers to a mode of international organization in which unity is defined procedurally rather than substantively, i.e., in a way that emphasizes national sovereignty over proletarian internationalism. The concept of individualism locates a single unit "without immediate reference . . . to the group of which one is a member." 46 Regime individualism is a modern challenge to Leninism's essentially traditional

*Albania "escapes" these categories.

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Williams, loc. cit.
and charismatic political ontology. However, while the Soviet regime remains intolerant of regime individualism, the existence of semi-public and issue specific coalitions, politically persistent positive and negative regime affinity pairs, and broadly based issue coalitions points to Soviet toleration of regime individuality; to a developmental change from a Soviet Bloc to a Soviet-Centered Leninist regime-world.

Khrushchev's Inclusive changes also affected Soviet relations with the non-Leninist world. All these changes had a central thrust—they reduced the perceived and organized tension between what had been identified and juxtaposed as "sacral" and "profane" realms. The reduction in tension permitted (and continues to permit) the ideological identification and political acceptance of intermediate political entities and realities. No clearer instance of Khrushchev's "Aquinnian" quality exists than his political recognition of the "third world." To return to the Middle Ages, the Aquinian revision of Augustine coincided with a more developed notion of Purgatory, an intermediate theological reality between Heaven and Hell. Under Khrushchev, the "third world" was no longer seen in Stalinist terms as either part of the "socialist" camp or as part of the "capitalist" camp; rather it was assigned a purgatory-like status. Countries in this category are now "given" a certain autonomy for an indeterminate period of time before they eventually reach socialist "heaven." Along with his anti-Stalinist recognition of the "third world" as a distinguishable, substantial, political entity, Khrushchev also recast the meaning of 'peaceful coexistence.' For Western "monotheists" this term's existence prior to Khrushchev is evidence of essential continuity.

42 For the elaboration of the notion of Purgatory in the 13th and 14th centuries, see Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
However, an ideological term's political meaning is mediated by its institutional environments. Khrushchev's recognition that nuclear war had created one world with two parts: his political engagement of the West (including the Cuban episode); his recognition of the political autonomy of the "third world;" his toleration of regime individuality in a Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world; his declaration of socialism's "complete and final" victory in the Soviet Union; and his reorganization of the Soviet Party's police and leadership features constituted a substantial developmental redefinition and reorganization of the Soviet Union's institutional formats and political relations with its societal, Bloc, and international environments.

Khrushchev never challenged the special relationship between the Soviet regime and the October Revolution; he did broaden and partially demystify it. He never challenged the conception of the Soviet regime-world as qualitatively different and superior to the West; he did revise the Soviet Union's perception of and political relations with the Western and non-European parts of the world. Like Aquinas he maintained his organization's essential ontology and changed its political epistemology. And like Aquinas he did not go unopposed.

The "AUGUSTINIAN" Opposition--The Sino-Soviet Conflict

Molotov opposed Khrushchev's Inclusive reforms within the Soviet regime and Mao opposed them within the Leninist regime-world. The Sino-Soviet conflict was one between regimes with opposing developmental-institutional interpretations of Leninism. It was not primarily a clash between

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nations with "ancient enmities." Nor was it primarily due to "the determination of Mao . . . that China should become a superpower and the determination of the Soviet leadership to prevent it." 49 These elements, like the contrasting levels of economic development in China and the Soviet Union, had their place: important and secondary. The Sino-Soviet conflict was primarily a clash between opposing beliefs about, and institutional definitions of, the proper and imperative political identity for a Leninist regime. Fortunately, we have an extraordinary set of sophisticated polemical documents by the Soviets and Chinese that strongly support this interpretation.

According to the Chinese their differences with the Soviets began with Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech at the Soviet XXth Congress in 1956. 50 It was not Khrushchev's attack on Stalin per se but rather Khrushchev's rejection of class struggle as the central tenet of Party rule that became the pivot of a widening issue-filled dispute. The Chinese argued that "in completely negating Stalin, . . . Khrushchev in effect negated the dictatorship of the proletariat and the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism which Stalin defended and developed." 51 The Khrushchevian notions of "state of the whole people," and "peaceful coexistence" 52 meant that the Soviet Union "was failing to draw a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves." 53 Repeatedly, the Chinese


51 Ibid., p. 391.

52 The Chinese had no doubt that these revisions were more than "attitudinal" or tactical shifts in Soviet regime format and policy.

attacked the Soviet regime's Inclusive measures with "Augustinian" warnings about political and ideological contamination from diffusely hostile national and international forces. If Augustine emphasized discipline, Maoists emphasized vigilance. The Chinese stressed that "in socialist society, the overthrown bourgeoisie and other reactionary classes remain strong . . . unreconciled to their defeat . . . working to undermine socialism . . . sneaking into governmental organs . . . constantly breeding political degenerates, and linked in a thousand and one ways with the international bourgeoisie." 54 For the Maoists, Consolidation remained the imperative. In good "Augustinian" fashion they continued to view the "political order as a kind of intermediate plane where the two antithetical symbolisms--civitas terrena and civitas dei--intersected."

Specific contentious issues did exist and not as mere reflections of the underlying Chinese-Soviet clash over the appropriate institutional definition of Leninism. Arguments about the relative importance of nuclear or guerrilla war were arguments about the major locus of international political uncertainty and had direct implications as to who should lead the Leninist regime-world. When the Chinese argued that "the third world is the storm center and the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the . . . struggles . . . of these areas," they were laying claim to the leadership of the international Leninist movement. They were doing so on the basis of their guerrilla war competence and "third world" location. Not surprisingly the Soviets rejected this and offered nuclear competition with the West as the primary locus of international uncertainty, thereby assuring themselves continued leadership of the Leninist regime and party world.

The Chinese impugned and challenged Soviet leadership with repeated criticisms of Khruschev's "insistence on establishing a kind of feudal patriarchal domination over the international communist movement and turning the relations between brother Parties into those between Patriarchal father and his sons." But like the Chinese criticism of the Soviet tendency to offer Soviet Party Congress Programs as authoritative programs for all Leninist regimes the challenge was not in the first instance a power challenge. Rather power was necessary to check the "contaminating" spread of Khrushchevian ideological, political, and policy positions in the Leninist world. And leadership of the Leninist regime-world was necessary for the authority to establish the "correct" political identity for all members of that world.

In the 1960s an intensely conflictual pattern of inter-regime relations emerged within the Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world. The pivot of this conflict was the Sino-Soviet clash over the imperative and appropriate institutional definition of Leninism; over two substantially different and opposed developmental interpretations of Leninism. Had this conflict remained within the international subsystem of Leninist regimes

55 "The Leaders of the CPSU are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (7)," in Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, p. 163. The remarkable thing about the Chinese characterization of the Soviet position is its accuracy as a political anthropological reading of the Soviet attitude, one that was and remains quasi-patriarchal and familial. The Chinese emphasis on "brother parties" expresses a preference for a Leninist regime "war-band" of equal heroic units. This preference comes out very clearly in the Chinese designation of the socialist camp as a whole as the unit of charismatic worth and in their demand for consultation within the camp prior to any programmatic decisions. But both regimes express a clear if differently organized preference for a traditional-charismatic mode of inter-regime organization in the Leninist world.

it would have been of real but limited significance. It did not remain there. By the late 1970s, specifically 1978-1979, the Sino-Soviet developmental conflict within the Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world was superimposed on the global conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States producing the most dangerous situation since the Second World War.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL--AMERICAN-SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

The notion of a "strategic triangle" in the seventies fundamentally FAILS to capture the simultaneous and overlapping intensification of Chinese-Soviet and Soviet-American hostile relations. The pivotal international political actor in this period was the Hua Guofeng regime in China. The most dangerous relationship: that fostered by Zbigniew Brzezinski of the Carter administration with the Chinese. The most threatening event: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which can only be understood in light of China's simultaneous presence and role in TWO conflict realms: that of the Leninist regime-world and the East-West conflict. The most dramatic--and positive--change in the international order has been China's internal developmental change since 1980 from a Consolidation to an Inclusion Leninist regime. With this developmental shift, an international order has been created in which the notion of a "strategic triangle" makes more conceptual and political sense because (at least) the Soviet and Chinese regimes orient themselves, internationally, primarily to issues that are not immediately cast as questions of political and ideological identity.

Polycentrism

In adopting a more national idiom and arena to present its developmental challenge to the Soviet Union, China was not dropping some epiphenomenal ideological mask in favor of a more 'real' national conflict. China was choosing an arena and a unit of conflict--the nation state--that joined what had been
two separate realms of conflict. 1979 was an incomparably more dangerous year in international politics than 1969. In 1969 the Soviet Union and China were in violent conflict on their border but the conflict was separated from the larger pattern of Soviet-American hostility. By 1979 the two realms of conflict were joined in a manner that superimposed one on the other thereby adding to the intensity and scope of each. In entering the broader realm of international politics while maintaining their dogmatic developmental opposition and antipathy towards the Soviet Union, the Chinese attempted to co-opt the United States in its intra-"familial" conflict with the Soviets. And in Zbigniew Brzezinski the Chinese found a person whose intense ideological antipathy towards the Soviet Union and influence in the American government coincided remarkably and contributed decisively to a highly dangerous pattern of superimposed American-Soviet-Chinese national and ideological conflicts.

One possible interpretation of Brzezinski's active and forceful pursuit of alignment with the Hua regime is that he did not understand how superimposition greatly intensifies conflicts and correspondingly heightens the risks associated with them. Perhaps he did not recognize that the Sino-Soviet conflict and Sino-American cooperation could not be seen exclusively in "global strategic terms;" that the Soviet Union would view such an alignment not only as a strategic challenge but also as an insidious boundary blurring and threatening alliance between a regime "stranger," the United States, and a "degenerate" regime-"kin," the Chinese. To Cyrus Vance's great credit he always sensed this "anthropologically" dangerous dimension and consistently attempted to limit the Chinese-American relation. 57

Examining Brzezinski's conception of the Chinese-American alignment against the Soviet Union, one is struck by its mechanical quality. This was clear in such statements as, "Perhaps if the Soviets worry a little more (sic) about our policy toward China we will have less cause to worry about our relations with the Soviets." 58

In part one can explain Brzezinski's approach by his own observation that the "Sino-Soviet relationship was being forged in the course of a single decade by two U.S. officials who were of immigrant birth and who approached this task with relatively little knowledge of or special sentiment for China but with larger strategic concerns in mind." 59 As for Brzezinski's repeated reference to "global strategic" concerns, in almost every instance it translated as a Chinese-like collapsing of all issues into a contest with the Soviet Union, and a desire not merely to oppose or defeat but also to humiliate the Soviet regime. So when China invaded Vietnam, Brzezinski believed "... it revealed some limits to Soviet power by demonstrating that an ally of the Soviet Union (Vietnam) could be molested with relative impunity. Soviet reaction throughout was confined to threats and bluster." 60 This held true only until the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

Brzezinski's belief that the Chinese regarded him as someone "whose strategic perspectives to some extent they shared" is an accurate, but stingy observation. To a shared strategic perspective, the Chinese and Brzezinski added a common, if differently formulated, obsession with and antipathy towards the Soviet Union. And these elements infused the Sino-American relation and Soviet response with an intensity

59 Ibid., p. 209.
60 Ibid., p. 414 (The emphasis is mine.)
and scope that cumulated rather than disaggregated the specific issues between the United States and the Soviet Union: and that directly engaged rather than distanced the essential ideological opposition between the two global powers. The consistency of Brzezinski's one-dimensional strategy with China's was evident in his confusion over and annoyance with Vance's differentiated attempt to establish relations with Vietnam at the same time the United States was getting closer to China. According to Brzezinski, "Before the new (Chinese) relationship could be consummated, we had to deal with a policy diversion (sic). For reasons which I could never quite understand from a policy standpoint but perhaps may be better explained by the psychologically searing impact of the Vietnamese war tragedy, both Vance, and even more, Holbrooke seemed determined at this time to initiate a diplomatic relationship with Vietnam." 61 The Vance-Holbrooke position actually made good policy and political sense. It would have increased American autonomy and leverage in our relations with a China that had nowhere else to go internationally except toward the United States. It would also have contributed to a more differentiated, cross-cutting pattern of American relations with Leninist regimes in contrast to the one-dimensional superimposed international pattern assiduously, successfully and dangerously pursued by the Hua regime and Brzezinski.

By 1978-1979 China had emerged as the common element in a whole series of increasingly related international conflicts; succeeded in good measure in superimposing two previously discrete realms of conflict: within the Leninist regime-world and between the Soviet Union and the United States; and thus created a global danger of very serious proportions.

Two Years of "Living Dangerously"

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was the culmination of a two-year global pattern of intensified and superimposed Sino-American and Soviet-American hostility. Viewed from the Carter-Brzezinski side, the common conflictual element in international life was Soviet imperialism in the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America. Viewed from the Brezhnev side, the common element was Chinese hostility within the Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world and alignment with the United States. The Soviets were more accurate.

Needless to say, each of the international events of 1978-1979 had its individual significance. The Pahlavi regime's destruction in Iran, the Sandinista's rise to power in Nicaragua, the development of the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan, Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, and the Soviet-American SALT relations have their own history and import. However, at another level, these events were related. China's "boundary" position and politically pivotal role stand out as the common, overlapping, and politically dangerous elements in most of these settings. China's military, symbolic, and political actions were designed to cumulate discrete regional conflicts and make them integral components of a superimposed Sino-Soviet/American-Soviet hostility.

China responded to Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea by symbolically identifying Vietnam with Cuba as a Soviet "proxy," attempting to get ASEAN to align itself with the PRC, and associating the United States with its invasion of Vietnam through a careful sequencing of Deng's visit to the U.S. and subsequent attack of Vietnam. In connection with the "Soviet brigade in Cuba" episode, an article in the New York Times by James Reston interpreted President Carter's speeches to mean "If the Soviet Union will not respect 'our interests and
concerns' in the Western hemisphere, we will not respect their 'sensibilities' in Eastern Europe and elsewhere." 62 At approximately the same time, the announcement was made that the American Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, would visit - China. Then, in October, Hua Guofeng traveled to WESTERN Europe where he pointedly assailed Soviet "sensibilities" by emphasizing the "artificial" division of the two Germanies. 63 Hua's visit coincided with American military maneuvers at Guantanamo. There is here an overlapping set of crises unified by explicit efforts on the Hua regime's part to collapse them along one anti-Soviet dimension: an effort purposely supported by the Brzezinski wing of the Carter administration. 64


64 The steps taken by ex-National Security Advisor Brzezinski to integrate Chinese and American policy included arranging "on my own authority . . . for the Chinese to obtain a NATO briefing on the global strategic problem thereby initiating a tacit security relationship with them," " holding regular consultative meetings with the acting head of the Chinese Liaison Mission . . . , " trying to "counter the image of the Carter Administration as being soft vis-a-vis the Soviet Union," "telling the Japanese to go along with the 'hegemony clause' in the Sino-Japanese accord," intensifying "the frequency and scope of my personal consultations with the head of the Chinese Liaison Mission and (using) each occasion to provide more and more detailed briefings regarding our foreign policy initiatives," and mentioning to Carter at the time of Deng's visit "not to convey to the Chinese any excessive U.S. alarm over possible Chinese actions (towards Vietnam)." See Brzezinski, pp. 203, 211, 218, 226, 409.
This developing and intensifying pattern of superimposed American-Soviet-Chinese hostility culminated with the Afghani crisis in late 1979. By the end of that year the regime of Hafizullah Amin was neither stable nor reliable from the Soviet point of view. Soviet "strategic" concerns led, in October, to an attempted coup against Amin. It failed. By November 1979, according to one observer, the Soviets were worried that "Amin would turn to the United States, China, and Pakistan in order to counter Soviet pressures, checkmate insurgency, and consolidate his own power." 65 Hyman notes that "Soviet policy makers appear to have been apprehensive by the end of 1979 not only about the imminent collapse of the Kabul regime, but even about Amin's pro-Moscow loyalties; the Soviet media were to make much of Amin's overtures to the Afghan opposition, to China, and to the USA. 66

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 may appear to be an overdetermined event related to Soviet uncertainty about American intentions regarding Iran, especially in light of talk in the United States about a Rapid Deployment Force; the instability and unreliability of the Amin regime beginning with events in Herat in March 1979; the possible repercussions of developments in Iran and Afghanistan on Soviet Central Asia; the deterioration in Soviet-American relations following the "discovery" of a Soviet brigade in Cuba; 67 and the consequent difficulties with the U.S. over SALT. It would be surprising if these events did not "add up" for the Soviets. However, their invasion of Afghanistan rested on something more integral and less "arithmetical;" on what the Soviets perceived


as an attempted and potentially successful Sino-American encirclement. America, China, and Japan aligned in Asia, the possibility of American and Chinese aid to the Amin regime in Afghanistan, Chinese support of the American position in Iran, Chinese and American diplomatic gestures towards Romania and Yugoslavia (by Hua in the fall of 1978 and by Vance in the fall of 1979), China's demonstrative support for NATO, and Sino-American hostility towards Cuba and Vietnam made the Soviet fear of STRATEGIC encirclement plausible.

But Afghanistan had more than strategic significance for the Soviets in the winter of 1979. The possibility of a second Chinese attack on Vietnam and possible appearance of a Maoist-like regime in Afghanistan added distinct features to the Soviet perception of international developments and the intensity of their reaction. While not pro-Chinese in its foreign policy, Amin's Khalq regime definitely resembled the ultra-leftist China of the mid-sixties. Like other contemporary movements of rage, e.g., Sendero Luminoso in Peru, \(^{68}\) and the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea, \(^{69}\) the Khalq, or "children of history," were messianic—in fact more Fanonist than Leninist. By the winter of 1979 the Soviets were faced with a revolutionary but suspect regime in Afghanistan resembling one they both feared and detested—the "Maoist" regime in China; and with the possibility that the Khalq leader might tactically align his regime with China and the United States, thereby combining and blurring acts of military and political-ideological encirclement.

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\(^{69}\) On the Khmer Rouge, see Michael Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982 (Boston: South End Press, 1984).
The Soviets responded to the superimposed threats of strategic and ideological encirclement by invading Afghanistan. The invasion was directed at TWO audiences, one in the Leninist regime-world and one in the West. In the former, the Soviet invasion was probably intended as a clear warning to China NOT to invade Vietnam again. As such it was far removed from Brzezinski's conclusion that the Soviets were only capable of bluster. 70 The Soviet invasion was a dramatic, visible, and impressing action; an action designed to inhibit the Chinese and reassure other members of the Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world, in particular the Vietnamese, the Cubans, and the Outer Mongolians. To the West the message was clear. The Soviet Union considered the deepening and broadening alignments of China and the United States a "clear and present danger" and was reacting with a degree of desperation.

Developmental Change in China

Had the Solidarity movement appeared in Poland in 1979 and not 1980; had Cuba in 1979 been the Cuba of 1966, or had there NOT been a substantial developmental change in China in 1980, the Afghani crisis could have been the catalyst for a period of escalating military violence between the United States and the Soviet Union. But China did change, radically, from a Leninist Consolidation to a Leninist Inclusion regime. Even a cursory examination of the institutional changes in China beginning in 1980 establishes the Inclusive quality of the developmental change there. Hsin-Chi Kuan's suggestion that "the Chinese Constitution of 1982 comes very close to the Inclusion type," 71 may be said to apply to the entire "constitution" of Deng Xiaoping's regime. Deng's elevation

70 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 414.
of empirical reality, i.e., his emphasis on "learning from facts," is a typically Inclusive (or "Aquinian") rejection of a dogmatic regime epistemology, one that under Mao saw the Cultural Revolution's "sacral reality" as more genuine than any empirical statement of social and economic problems. Similarly, the move from a dogmatically concrete definition of leadership--the Maoist cult of personality--to a broader more oligarchic notion is also typically Inclusive. But more than anything it is the rejection of Class Struggle as the ideological pivot of Chinese political life that marks Deng's regime as Inclusive.

In every instance of a Leninist regime moving from its Consolidation to Inclusion stage the primary object of ideological attack has been the notion of class struggle. The statement in the Czechoslovak Party's Action Program that "The Party resolutely condemns attempts to oppose the various classes, strata, and groups of the socialist society to each other and will eliminate everything that creates tension among them." 72 sounds very much like the position taken at the Third Plenary Session of the XIth Central Committee by the Chinese party, one that "firmly discarded the slogan, 'Take Class struggle as the key link,' something that Deng leadership considered 'unsuitable in a socialist society,' where the focus of work should be socialist modernization." 73 In the authoritative "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of


China," the assault on class struggle, and more generally on the dogmatic consolidation stage of Leninism, is central and relentless. 74 Paltiel is undoubtedly correct in designating the Third Plenum of the XIth Central Committee in China as the political equivalent of the XXth Party Congress in the Soviet Union. 75 The "most important political development in 1980 was the rise of Deng Xiaoping to a position of clear dominance within the collective leadership." 76 Deng's growing and Hua's diminishing power, Deng's domestic agenda, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused a substantial developmental shift within China with direct implications for its role in the Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world and in East-West relations. In December 1979 the Chinese stopped referring to the Soviet Union as a "revisionist" power. And in February 1980 the Vietnamese, who several months earlier had been nearly hysterical in their fear of a second Chinese "lesson," were saying "maybe the Chinese are preparing for it, but their modernization is not finished." The Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister, Phan Hien, went on to suggest that "a resumption of Sino-Vietnamese fighting in the near future seemed unlikely." 77


Finally, in May 1980 when Deputy Premier Geng Biao visited Washington, he "used the term 'friendship,' carefully avoiding the word 'alliance' . . ." And the American Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Richard Holbrooke, " . . . declared in a passage that particularly pleased the Chinese that the strategic triangle 'was no longer an adequate conceptual framework' as Sino-American ties were 'not a simple function of our relations with the Soviet Union.'" 78 More than any single international event, China's internal developmental shift from Consolidation to Inclusion reduced the global tension and danger surrounding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

At the peak of the American-Soviet-Chinese conflict in early 1980, China did not simply disengage; rather, it began to redefine the developmental features of its Leninist regime. Rejecting the Consolidation imperative of regime indivisibility within the Leninist regime-world and the Khrushchevian alternative of regime individuality, China, like Yugoslavia, has adopted a position of regime individualism. In the post-1980 period the Chinese regime has established itself as a regime with unevenly weighted but multiple political reference points and memberships, e.g., Leninist, Asian, "third world," and Chinese; and as a regime that orders its multiple references according to its own internal priorities. China has apparently rejected both the Soviet Union and itself as the Center for an indivisible Leninist regime and party-world. It has also rejected membership in the post-Stalinist Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world as incompatible with the imperative of politically defining itself "without immediate reference . . . to the group of which (it) is a member." 79

79 Raymond Williams on the concept of the individual in The Long Revolution, p. 73.
striking expression of regime individuation in China is Hu Yaobang's address to the Party's Twelfth National Congress. Hu claimed "Socialist China belongs to the third world," thereby assaulting the absolute and exclusive quality of membership in a Leninist regime-world. Hu distinguished China's international position relative to Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union by pointedly criticizing each of them, while not isolating China, in Albanian-indivisible style, from any one of them. Most symbolically, Hu looked inward to China's history of the last one hundred years as his and the regime's most significant referent.

As a developmental stage within the boundaries of Leninism's continuous feature, Inclusion has a "protestant" thrust. Inclusive Leninist regimes begin to locate and act on internal social and historical references. As with the emergence of a psychological self, Inclusion regimes begin to establish a political identity distinct from any specific external (e.g., regime) referent. China's definition of its political self in terms of multiple references ordered by internal priorities has established its ability to take different positions on different international issues with different partners. The Chinese regime's greater "plasticity," its Inclusive ability to relate specific political issues indirectly to its regime identity rather than having that identity be an immediate and pervasive issue in all realms and encounters, favors a pattern of cross-cutting, partial, and shifting international cleavages more than a pattern of politically cumulating and superimposed cleavages. Continuing its central role in international life, the Chinese regime has radically reversed the nature of its impact. In the late seventies the crisis in international relations rested on the superimposition of developmental conflicts within the Leninist regime-world and East-West conflicts. Regime development within China has greatly ameliorated the intensity of that crisis. However, it could not and has not eliminated the
remaining and single most threatening feature of Soviet-American hostility; namely, its organization in the form of two opposing political security Blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

**Soviet Bloc, Soviet Empire, or Soviet Centered Leninist Regime-World**

One can postulate that the Stalinist Soviet Bloc no longer exists as an adequate concept or as a political reality. Soviet influence and power now extend beyond the Hanoi-Prague axis and its political relations with other Leninist regimes are no longer "indivisible." The task is to create a concept that does justice to the current pattern of relations among Leninist regimes.

I propose the concept of a Centered Regime World. This concept recognizes and emphasizes the central, pivotal place a specific political, military, ideological, and economic power occupies in relation to a clearly, if not absolutely, delineated set of regimes that SUPPORT the positions, DEPEND on the resources, and ADOPT the institutional facade of the Central regime. The extent of support, dependence, and adoption will vary within the regime-world, and that variation may be substantial and in certain respects essential. The concept of a Centered Regime World avoids a too rigid "monotheistic" notion of Soviet (or Roman) control and power, and a too flacid "polytheistic" denial of the Soviet regime's pivotal role as referent and/or ruler.

"Moscow Centre"

What substantiates or refutes a particular regime's claim to be the center of a regime-world is whether or not it is the only regime to control a major political uncertainty in all parts of that "world."
During the Stalinist Consolidation stage, Leninist regimes had no control over any major uncertainty affecting the Soviet regime. Their dependence on, support of, and adoption of Soviet features was practically absolute. The substantial difference in the present Inclusion stage of Leninist regime relations is that members of the Soviet Centered regime-world DO control particular political uncertainties—some resource the Soviet Union views as significant in sustaining its political status, ideological self-conception, and/or military position—in their relations with the Soviet Union. Cuba controls a major Soviet ideological uncertainty; namely, the Soviet Union's conception of itself as a revolutionary international force. Cuban leverage varies with circumstance, but its international "activism" has been a real source of status and influence in its relations with the Soviet regime. Vietnam enjoys a comparable status, due to its revolutionary heroism during the war with the U.S. Now as the Soviet's major political ally in Southeast Asia it continues to control a limited but real strategic Soviet uncertainty. To some degree Romania, North Korea, and Yugoslavia control an important Soviet political uncertainty in their role as access points to the "third world," but the "third world" role of the more rebellious North Korean and Romanian regimes, and independent Yugoslav regime, remains politically relevant to the Soviets. The East German, Hungarian, Polish, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and Outer Mongolian regimes are the base for a Soviet-centered effort at multinational integration, and thereby exercise some influence over a major Soviet ideological uncertainty. And the non-ruling West European Italian, French, and Spanish communist parties help ground the Soviet claim that the Soviet Union stands at the "center" of three worlds: the "socialist," "third," and working class movements in the capitalist world. Each sector of the Leninist regime (and Party) world now controls a limited, specific, but significant uncertainty affecting the Soviet Union, be it ideological, political, or strategic.
However, only the Soviet regime controls a major uncertainty facing each of the other members of the regime-world. Only the Soviet Union can protect Cuba against the United States and Vietnam and Outer Mongolia against China. Only the Soviet Union can provide the economic and consumer resources the East European regimes require, and military protection for their regimes both externally and internally. And only the Soviet Union is recognized by "third world" regimes opposing the U.S. as a credible military counter and economic supplier. The Soviet Union now occupies the Central position of ideological origin, military protector, and economic storehouse. It remains the common and central referent for a diverse but bounded set of regimes that exercise varying degrees of autonomy in their relations with it. Some, such as the Chinese and Yugoslav, are independent national regimes whose orientation to the Soviet Union rests primarily on institutional affinities. Others, such as Cuba and Vietnam, are allies whose orientation rests on institutional affinities, material dependence on military and economic resources, and an ideological "appreciation" of the Soviet regime as ideological origin and political guarantor of a neotraditional corporate regime-world. Such regimes as the Afghani and Ethiopian are Soviet subject: regimes whose immediate survival depends on accepting direct Soviet control in critical regime areas. While those of Nicaragua, Angola, South Yemen, Mozambique, Benin, and Congo-Brazzaville can be regarded as either candidates or 'flirts': regimes whose survival needs are pressing and wish to make a claim of some sort on the Soviet Union as protector and/or storehouse. But the greater number of Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world members are European-East European—and their relations with the Soviet Union are a dangerous amalgam of Bloc organization and regime "individuality."
The Eastern Part of Europe

The lore about Eastern Europe is that the Soviets consider it an integral part of their political order. The strategic dimension of the Soviet-East European relationship remains and there is an important political sense in which "Eastern Europe (is) a living example of socialist internationalism and new international relations, indeed the most mature and sophisticated organizational effort on behalf of international communism to date." 80 But the Soviet attachment to Eastern Europe has other, equally, perhaps even more, important and certainly less appreciated bases.

To begin with, the social-political transformation of Eastern Europe is the revolutionary accomplishment of this generation of Soviet leaders. The Soviet "generation of '38" made its revolutionary "bones" with the military conquest and political transformation of Eastern Europe. These experiences and achievements are to the Brezhnev generation what 1917-1921 was to the Bolsheviks, and the period of industrialization, collectivization, and the Second World War to the Stalinist leadership--proof of its revolutionary heroism and internationalism. Eastern Europe isn't simply territorial "booty;" it is an integral and concrete expression of a political generation's revolutionary credentials and achievements, its revolutionary "patrimony." That explains Brezhnev's blunt assertion to the Czechoslovak leadership in the late sixties that the Soviet Union would never give up Eastern Europe. 81

One might ask, "Won't a new Soviet leadership generation, one that did not conquer and transform Eastern Europe, one with a position of global, not simply regional, power, identify less with the area?" The probable answer: no. The reason: East Europe is European. The Soviet leadership has always been intensely ambivalent about the Soviet Union's peripheral European status. The idea of "socialism in one country," was a response to the "anomalous" appearance of revolutionary socialism in "backward" Russia, but it never completely removed the ideological unease and cultural ambivalence Soviet leaders felt towards the area and development they "usurped": revolution in Western Europe. From the very beginning prominent WEST European revolutionaries rejected Lenin's conclusion that the Russian Revolution was a development with universal application. No one did so more bluntly than the Dutch communist Gorter in reply to Lenin's Left-Wing Communism. After congratulating Lenin on his tactics, "which . . . were brilliant for Russia," Gorter asked, "But what does that prove for West Europe? In my opinion, nothing, or very little .... How can a tactic be the same for East and West Europe?" 82 Today the same partially invidious and completely accurate charge is made by Western Eurocommunists. In 1978, the French communist Elleinstein could say, "My point is precisely that, for a developed and sophisticated Western society such as the French, the Bolshevik Revolution and Soviet society cannot serve as models." 83 Such statements as this, and more so, the Italian Communist Party's charge that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have reached a point in their development where the "phase . . . that began with the October Revolution has exhausted its driving force . . . the advance of socialism in the present


phase depends increasingly on the ideas and the democratic and the socialist conquests in developed capitalist countries, particularly in Western Europe," 84 threaten the Soviet regime with ideological and political marginality. Support by East European regimes, the dependence of East European regimes, and the adoption by East European regimes of Soviet institutional features remains a vital component of the Soviet leadership's conception of itself as a European political and ideological, not simply military and economic force. I suspect that its European status had become even more salient to the Soviet elite as its influence and power increases but remains limited to the non-European world, e.g., Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Vietnam. The Soviet emphasis on the eastern part of Europe may well intensify in response to a Soviet apprehension that the growth of its international power which began with non-European Outer Mongolia, may end with non-European Afghanistan. In retrospect the Soviets may view their withdrawal from a part of European Austria as the greatest political, ideological, and status error they ever made. This line of reasoning suggests that the Soviet evaluation of Eastern Europe will remain exceptionally high and its commitment to the area equally strong. However, the kind of relationship that will emerge between the Leninist regime in the Soviet Union and those in Eastern Europe still remains an issue.

The American-Centered Liberal World and the Soviet-Centered Leninist Regime-World

The developmental change from Consolidation to Inclusion within and among Leninist regimes means that any reversion to a pattern of regime indivisibility with a Soviet center authoritatively equating its interests with those of other Leninist regimes is highly improbable. Even so, political relations

84 "Resolution of the Executive Committee of the PCI," December 29, 1981 in The Italian Communists, Foreign Bulletin of the PCI (Rome), October-December 1981, pp. 138-139. (The emphasis is mine.)
between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe depend on the interaction between changes in developmental stage and the political organization of Soviet-American relations. In the post-war period those relations have been BLOC relations.

"Many people in Europe see the division of the Continent into two military blocs as dangerous and oppressive: it contains the seeds of nuclear catastrophe, obstructs political change in both parts of the Continent, and casts a blight over the whole of European culture and civilization." 85 As a form of political-military organization, blocs have definite biases. Members are expected by the bloc leader to define themselves primarily in terms of one membership, membership in the bloc; one referent, the leader of the respective bloc; and one identity, the ideology that formally distinguishes the members of one bloc from another. 86 Bloc organization of Europe calls essentially for a hierarchical and compartmentalized relationship between two quasi-corporate political and military entities and favors a stereotypical assignment of political identity and national choice. Blocs seriously restrict the ability of their members to order their potentially alternative identities (e.g., as small powers, European, Latin, highly industrialized . . .) according to individual national priorities and circumstances. Bloc organization favors absolute encounters over political identity in place of limited encounters over political issues.

At a time when so many are mesmerized by the term "structural," it is imperative to recognize that deliberate political organization in the form of political-military blocs

is the immediate context and stimulus for Soviet-American conflict. The level and nature of Soviet-American hostility is explained more by their essentially different political and ideological "personalities" than by structural features of the international system. Equally important, a bipolar international structure allows for a bounded by real variety of ways in which to organize political and military relations with one's allies and opponents. And it is those (different) mediating organizational forms that "quicken" structural relations with (different) political meanings and consequences.

During the Cold War each bloc had an absolutist quality: members regularly deferred to a recognized leader, criticism tended to be "private," not public, major initiatives were usually the leader's prerogative, and "individual" national interests were generally subordinated to the interests of a bloc whose metaphysical quality was conveyed by emotive and ritualized references to "the socialist camp" and "the free world." Since Stalin's death, one finds a similar pattern of change in each bloc, in the form of greater regime individuality." The pattern includes more public or semi-public criticism of American policy in Central America, and East-German-Hungarian criticism of the Chernenko regime's stance towards contact with the West Europeans; foreign policy initiatives by bloc members, e.g., West German's Ostpolitik, and Romania's "third world" policies; less willingness to accept a presumed identity of interests with the bloc leader, e.g., the different response in the U.S. and West Europe to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Hungarian defense of a specific role for small nations in the Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world; and at least a symbolic upgrading of member participation in
in each bloc's deliberations. These changes have substantially demystified each bloc and its leader and speak to the assertion of more nationally individuated regime-selves within each bloc. But they do not amount to an essential change in the basic pattern of Soviet-American relations or in the relations between the two global powers and their respective European allies. This persistence of bloc organization as the dominant mode of Soviet-American and East-West European relations is militarily dangerous for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, for the West, it is also politically mistaken and culturally inappropriate. Individualism distinguishes the West culturally and historically. From at least the time of Luther's individuation of Christian conscience, to the English revolution's elevation of citizen-saints, and the French and American assertion of social and national individualism, the individual has been the pivot of Western civilization. Corporate-like bloc organization is incompatible with that ethos, history, and identity. The grand irony of contemporary Soviet-American relations in Europe is that the West, and particularly the United States, invests its political, military, and ideological energy in maintaining a form of organization so congruent with and supportive of the political anthropology of Leninist regimes.

Yet it is the Soviet Union and not the United States which regularly calls for the end of Blocs. Even before the Warsaw Pact was signed, "the Soviet Union offered to forego the creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization if NATO would disband itself. Since 1955 the Pact has called many times for the dissolution of the two military alliances...." 88


88 Holloway, p. 36
For most observers the Soviet offer is not much of a puzzle. Holloway's explanation is plausible and typical. He notes the existence of "a network of bilateral treaties and status of forces agreements that would make it possible to maintain many of the existing military arrangements in Eastern Europe even if the Pact were formally dissolved." 89 Conclusion: "Abolition of the blocs would probably have less effect on the Pact than it would on NATO, unless the infrastructure of bilateral relationships in Eastern Europe were dissolved at the same time." 90 This explanation restricts our focus to military matters, however, when there may be other reasons behind the Soviet call to end Blocs.

In the Soviet political ontology, the West is made up of nation(al) egoists who, in the absence of American controlled political and military organization, i.e., NATO, would economically nationally conflict with one another. In the West itself, one finds a number of commentators who hold a related view. These "political Augustinians" fear that without a high degree of ideological and military tension between the West and the Soviet Union, the West will degenerate into a disparate set of nations unwilling to defend their common cultural distinctiveness. The "Augustinians" combine rage towards the Soviet Union with condescension toward those in the West, particularly in the United States, who fail to accept their argument, i.e., who may be well meaning but "naive."

I have deliberately distinguished the American Centered Liberal world from the Soviet Centered Leninist REGIME-world. Western nations differ essentially from Leninist regimes both in their internal definition and international relations.

89 Idem.
90 Idem.
In itself that is hardly a profound observation, but its implications for the types of political relations that are both possible and desirable among Western nations is rarely, if ever, argued. Western regimes have political legitimacy. Practically, that means Western governments can regularly assume the voluntary provision of private resources for public ends. These resources are both material and affective. One can recognize class cleavage in Great Britain, the successful evasion of taxes in Italy, or the racial issue in the United States and still make a plausible case for the political integration of Western nations, i.e., the existence of a common political membership in the form of an institutionally viable definition of citizenship that complements and compensates for the distinction between governmental officials and non-officials. The implication is clear: Western regimes are more politically stable and viable, less torn between a national and supranational identity, and less categorically rigid in the assignment of political membership than Leninist regimes. Liberal political organization provides Western nations with a cultural and political depth and flexibility unavailable to Leninist regimes with their one-dimensional, absolute, and jealous designation of the Party as THE unit of membership (not simply identification). The same contrast holds at the international level. As an international community, the West locates its ideological self in the plural and relativizing framework of three revolutions, not as in the case of the Leninist regime-world in the absolute framework of THE Soviet October Revolution. Nationally and inter-nationally, the Liberal world can not only survive, but indeed thrive outside the framework of Bloc organization.

If the Soviets mistakenly view the West as a potentially centrifugal political entity, the West mistakenly sees Leninist regimes as naturally cohesive. The reality and intensity of the Sino-Soviet conflict was denied for so long because of the
Western conception, not perception, of Leninism and the Soviet Union's place in the Leninist world. Oddly enough Western students of Leninism tended to agree with the Soviet position that there was no substantive basis for fundamental conflicts between Leninist regimes. Bukharin's argument that "Logically: there is no clash of real interests between proletarian states whatsoever. . . . Genetically: the very process of struggle waged by the Proletarian states for their existence will knit them together in a still closer bond," remains the traditional/charismatic position of the Soviet leadership and until very recently was paralleled by the Western belief that Leninist totalitarian regimes would always be monolithically united under Soviet domination. The empirical evidence in the form of the Soviet-Chinese, Chinese-Vietnamese, Soviet-Romanian, Hungarian-Romanian, Yugoslav-Bulgarian, and Albanian-Yugoslav regime conflicts strongly suggests that Bukharin, Western Sovietologists, and the current Soviet leadership were and are wrong. There is a good theoretical explanation why, one related to Brzezinski and Huntington's insightful observation that "the Soviet system is better suited for dealing with enemies and the American more effective in coping with friends." 

In many ways the Korean War was the peak of Leninist regime unity, as the Leninist regime war-band united corporately and indivisibly around the central Soviet patriarch-hero in a conflict with the "imperialist" enemy. The Soviet "alliance system" deals better with enemies than friends not because it is ideological but because it is a neotraditional-charismatic entity whose internal political tolerance extends only as far as regime individuality. In traditional-charismatic fashion the Soviet Union sees regime individualism or sovereignty a la China and Yugoslavia as contributing to the disorganization,

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chaos, degeneration, and defeat of its regime-world. In light of the greater survival risks currently associated with war and the development from a Soviet Bloc to a Soviet Centered Leninist regime-world, bloc organization functions as a substitute for war-created indivisibility. The neo-traditional Soviet regime-world has both a greater need and affinity for the corporate and hierarchial biases of bloc organization. Traditional groups typically define themselves in opposition to "strangers" and bloc organization offers a very valuable means for the Soviet regime to sustain a clear delineation between the imperialist "stranger," and to maintain neopatriarchal control of most of its regime "kin."
In short, bloc organization coincides with the neotraditional features of Leninist organization and helps check the centrifugal movement of Leninist regimes whose international solidarity is more "mechanical" than "organic." 93 This is not to say that in the absence of blocs, East European regimes would have no basis for or preference for alignment with the Soviet Union. They would. But a non-bloc organization of American-West European, Soviet-East European relations would complicate inter-regime matters "there" more than "here."
The elimination of Blocs would favor an international political universe in which regime-world affinities would replace regime-world exclusivity; a political universe where issues, not conflicting ideological identities, were the immediate focus; and a political universe where real ideological moats and potential military conflicts were ameliorated by a flexible variety of lowered political drawbridges.

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93 Durkheim, pp. 181-183.