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NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE: THE FUTURE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE
IN AFRICA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

SOVIET POLICY

1. With pressing domestic economic needs and the explicitly stated policy of Gorbachev which gives these needs first priority, the Soviet Union does not have the resources to pursue a policy of active expansion in the Third World.

   a. Soviet experts now expect that "socialism" will be unsuccessful in developing countries in the foreseeable future. Developing countries will remain within the Western economic sphere.

   b. Africa in particular is considered far too backward for socialist development (see Part II).

2. The Gorbachev government has rejected the expansionist policy of the late 1970s, when the Soviet Union sought to create a tier of allied "socialist oriented" Third World countries by offers of military support and assistance in state-building. In Africa (and elsewhere) this policy proved costly and unworkable. Gains to the

*For policy suggestions, please see pages 117-122.
and propaganda; put money into military technology rather than increasing the size of forces or interventionary capabilities (the navy in particular). Interventions are thus highly unlikely unless potential gains to the Soviet Union would be immense. Only South Africa has that potentiality.

4. African leaders and governments of the 1980s are far less inclined to look to Soviet support:
   a. it is now well known that the Soviets and their allies offer no effective help in economic development. Of the four truly "socialist oriented" African countries one (Congo) has developed a EurAfrican economy like its Francophone neighbors; the others (Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique) are economic disaster zones. The West is the only source of funds, markets, and food imports.
   b. the Soviet economy is considered a failure. Africans are pursuing development by whatever means seem useful, and the Soviet model is not one to emulate.

5. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union has upheld existing commitments to Angola, Ethiopia, and the southern African liberation movements. The MPLA and the Ethiopian leaders are apparently secure in power. Ethiopia is Africa's first communist state.

6. By avoiding new involvements while maintaining consistency, the Soviet Union has recouped prestige lost by the interventions
promises have been scaled back, and fulfilled.

7. The Soviet Union now pursues general African friendship. It echoes African positions on African issues. (The exception is the staunch refusal to be classified as a developed country obligated to provide economic aid.) Soviet propaganda promotes anti-Americanism by amplifying the concerns of Africans — South Africa, debt repayments, western military threats. However, African skepticism about the United States has its source in American policy, not in Soviet propaganda. U. S. "Constructive engagement" with South Africa, and also aid to UNITA in Angola, are the critical issues.

IMPORTANT COUNTRIES

Africa is actually three zones of varying importance to the Soviet Union. The first, the Mediterranean littoral and the Horn and the Indian Ocean islands, lies just beyond the Middle East and the Gulf and thus matters somewhat to Soviet security. The second, southern Africa, presents an opportunity for major political and economic gains at American expense (see Part III). The third, Tropical Africa, which lies between, is the world region of least interest and importance to the Soviet Union.
South Africa (See Part III)

The Soviets do not control the African National Congress (ANC), nor can they alter the course of events in South Africa. They are bystanders waiting to reap the political harvest of revolution. The ANC has close ties to the South African Communist Party, particularly in the operations of its military organization, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (spear of the nation). The ANC regards the Soviet Union as a constant friend, and the United States government as an enemy, for entirely understandable reasons. No viable majority alternative to the ANC exists: the ANC has the loyalty of South African black activist politicians and youth, who are self-consciously militant and revolutionary. In power, the ANC (or any majority government) will be compelled to divert wealth rapidly from whites and from corporations to blacks and to workers. If the U.S. and the West then reacts against this transfer of wealth and the radical policies toward business and whites associated with it, an ANC government may turn to Soviet friends for protection and guidance. This then raises the distinct possibility of a Soviet-linked southern African region controlling strategic minerals and a key piece of world geography. Only at the very last stage, however, will the Soviets have any significant influence on the process.

The West can prevent disaster to its long term interests by promoting majority rule, and accepting and helping it even in the face of provocation when a majority government is established.
The critical period, as with all revolutions, will be immediately after a majority government takes power, when disorganization and promises of quick change tempt drastic solutions and a search for foreign enemies.

Ethiopia, and Sudan (See Part IV)

Under Mengistu Haile Mariam, Ethiopia has become a communist country. The Workers Party of Ethiopia, formally inaugurated in September 1984, is a ruling communist party. The political system is modeled on that of the Soviet Union. The reality of politics and power remains personal and factional, however. The Party is rudimentary and the shift of power from army to party has not yet occurred. Mengistu seems to be a communist (or Stalinist) ideologue who talks of full collectivization of the Ethiopian peasantry within the next decade.

The Soviets have not fully embraced Ethiopia’s national communism. They are aware that Mengistu could fall in a coup, that his goals are unrealistic, and that Ethiopia needs economic aid which only the West can provide. Ethiopian loan repayments to the Soviet Union are a constant issue not discussed in public. Soviets are not popular in Ethiopia. Nevertheless Soviet military support of Mengistu continues and 4,000 Cubans remain in Ethiopia as a palace guard against a possible coup. The Dahlak Islands base does contribute to Soviet military reach.

Ethiopia is an insecure national communist regime, which may or may not follow Soviet wishes and which may or may not receive
Soviet support. Andropov, then Gorbachev, extended a commitment to protect the regime against Eritrean and Tigrean rebels and the Somalis, but that commitment does not extend to intervention against an anti-Mengistu coup within Ethiopia. The Soviets wish for stability and gradual consolidation. Local wars, rebellions, and over-hasty Ethiopian radical measures are not in the Soviet interest.

In northeast Africa support to any regime or faction, be it in Addis Ababa, Eritrea, Khartoum, the southern Sudan, or Mogadishu, will alienate that group's enemies. No outside power can control or resolve these conflicts. "Good-neighborliness" is official Soviet-Ethiopian policy, and evidence (Chad, southern Sudan) shows that the Soviets wish to avoid more local involvements.

Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe

Protecting the MPLA from UNITA, the South Africans, and the Americans was essential to Soviet (and Cuban) prestige and credibility. That was accomplished in 1984-86, with the military reinforcement of Angola decided by Andropov and reemphasized, as a "commitment", by Gorbachev. The Soviets will now accept a political solution that leaves the MPLA in power and lessens Soviet commitment and responsibility. Cuba may have internal reasons for keeping its fading military-revolutionary exploits alive, but the Soviets no longer share them.

Soviet long term policy is to build and establish cordial relations with the entire group of southern African states, while
waiting for South Africa's revolution. In 1983 the Soviets decided not to reinforce Mozambique with troops (Cuban presumably) or economic aid. While Mozambique is a Soviet "failure" in the 1970s terms of creating new clients, contact and good relations continue. The friendship treaty of 1977 remains in force and Mozambique's Nkomati agreement with South Africa is an obvious failure because it did not end the RENAMO (MNR) insurgency paid for by South Africa.

In Angola and Mozambique, the Soviets will cooperate with the U.S. and others to achieve a political solution just so long as the existing government stays in power. (The same is true in Afghanistan and Kampuchea -- most Soviet policies are world-wide in application.) Soviet policy promotes Western trade and investment in Angola; since the Soviet bloc cannot finance anyone else's development, better the Western dollars go to Soviet friends than to others.

Zimbabwe has been patiently courted by the Soviets from hostility (1980) to friendship (1985, when Mugabe met Gorbachev in Moscow). Counter-insurgency in Mozambique has been internationalized, with Zimbabwean and Tanzanian, not Soviet or Cuban, soldiers. The Soviets will continue moderate arms supply, and propaganda and diplomatic aid, to all the Frontline States, while watching South Africa and waiting.
Other "Progressive" African Countries (See Part II)

Congo (once considered "socialist oriented"), Madagascar, Tanzania, and Benin still maintain good relations with the Soviet Union but show every sign of increased economic integration with the West. Soviet theory as well as practice says that these and other African countries will remain part of the Western world economy. They have no strategic purpose worth any serious cost in money, attention, or alienation of Europe or the United States. The 1970s hope of converting Africa to "socialist orientation" is an expensive fantasy. Soviet policy therefore pursues relations between the CPSU and the ruling party, some military aid, and as much diplomatic cooperation as possible, and stops there. No Soviet pressure now exists toward Soviet client status. Madagascar's President Ratsiraka, for example, signed a friendship declaration in Moscow in 1986; it includes none of the clauses about military aid or crisis consultation (and potential Soviet intervention) of the 1970s Friendship Treaties with Angola (1976), Mozambique (1977), Ethiopia (1978), and Congo (1980).

African leaders who are secure in power welcome Soviet friendship but gain little benefit from a Soviet alliance. Insecure leaders like Ratsiraka must balance security and economic development needs. The Soviets are no longer willing to extend security guarantees, hence have little to offer. No African country not now a Soviet client seems to want to become one. Economic development in cooperation with the Western world economy is now the only serious option.
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PART I: AFRICAN POLICY OF THE GORBACHEV GOVERNMENT

Since Brezhnev's death the main objectives of Soviet policy in Africa have been to persevere in Angola and Ethiopia and to restore credibility and prestige. In the last several years the Soviets have reinforced Angola and Ethiopia; have refused new involvement in local quarrels; and have continued support to the South African ANC and Namibian SWAPO. Soviet refusal to provide economic aid hurts, but the Soviets would rather be unpopular (on this count) than promise what they can't deliver. The Soviets were badly stung by the widespread African (and world) perception that they were only a late, crude model of white man's big power imperialism, with nothing to offer but guns. Now they claim to be consistent friends of the Organization of African Unity; of mediation and peace; of all African countries. This is in contrast to the 'evil empire' of Washington which upholds South Africa, increases military pressure in the Indian Ocean and northeast Africa, is responsible for African poverty, and doesn't care what Africans want or think. In the last five years, the Soviet effort to restore prestige and pin the imperialist onus on the United States has been quite successful.

The key institution directing Soviet policy in Africa is the International Department of the Central Committee Secretariat. The International Department directs Soviet liaison with non-ruling parties and liberation movements, and also political ties (cadre training, ideological schools, propaganda
coordination) with leaders and parties in countries of "existing socialism" such as Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. These duties devolve from the Comintern, of which it is the successor. Another is the Main Political Administration (MPA) of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Party organization which oversees political loyalty, education, and morale. In Africa, the MPA has taken responsibility for guidance of the armies of allied countries, and for advising the Politburo on the feasibility of intervention or counterinsurgency. This follows Soviet emphasis in Africa on the loyalty and morale of the army, not military technology or external defense. Both the International Department and the MPA have new leadership. First Deputy Minister of Defense General V.I. Petrov, long active in directing Soviet military ventures in the Third World (Ethiopia, Afghanistan) is now probably in charge of these MPA activities. The appointment of Anatoly Dobrynin as Secretary for the International Department, to replace aged conservative Boris Ponomarev, has great importance. Ponomarev was a thoroughgoing Leninist and the architect of the expansionist policies of the 1970s. Dobrynin's concerns are Western and globalist (see below). Ponomarev's deputy for "socialist oriented" countries and African affairs, R.A. Ul'yanovsky, also recently retired. His replacement will be critical for African policy, given Dobrynin's own concentration elsewhere. South Africa and the ANC, and also Ethiopia, will probably be the questions of greatest importance.
THE 27th CONGRESS AND CURRENT POLICY

Gorbachev's 27th Congress report -- the statement of overall policy priorities and directions -- has clear implications for Africa:

Low level of attention and concern

In the 27th Congress report the Third World received little attention and Africa least of all. East-West issues and arms control dominated the foreign policy sections. Gorbachev called for reconciliation with "socialist" China and reiterated that the Soviets would leave Afghanistan only if the government was securely in power. Apart from issues which span the Asian borders of the USSR, Third World specifics got just one sentence: a mention of "the Middle East, Central America, and Southern Africa" as crises needing attention. The level of attention to Africa in the Party Congress reports was highest in 1976, when Brezhnev heralded the Angolan victory at length as evidence that detente would accelerate, not impede, "the changing correlation of forces" worldwide. The 1981 report said less. In Soviet journals such as World Marxist Review (Problems of Peace and Socialism) focus shifted in the early 1980s from Africa to Latin America, and since has shifted to Europe and Asia.  

Lack of public attention does not necessarily mean lack of Soviet interest. Counterinsurgency and consolidation of communism in Ethiopia and Angola (as in Afghanistan) are best pursued
outside the limelight. Toward South Africa, too, the Soviets wish
to continue their involvement without publicity.

**Soviet progress first: no new poor clients and no aid**

Gorbachev explicitly told the 27th Congress that Soviet
resources belong at (or close to) home. Since the early 1980s
economists at the Institute for the Economy of the World Socialist
System (IEMSS) and others opposed wasting money on Third World
adventures when it was needed to keep the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe afloat. In the single most important sentence of the
report Gorbachev put Soviet development first, and squarely
considered the fact that Soviet world power depends on its
economic base:

> In short, comrades, acceleration of the country's
economic development is the key to all our prob-
lems; immediate and long term, economic and social,
political and ideological, domestic and foreign.

Gorbachev also acknowledged that Soviet standing in the Third
World would depend on its own economic performance:

> We are watched by the huge heterogenous world
of developing nations. It is looking for its
choice, and what this choice will be depends
to a large extent on socialism's successes.

African clients requiring money or hard goods need not apply.
Even the truly "socialist-oriented" will pay. Only Angola and
Ethiopia are commitments, and Angola pays from its oil revenues.
The economic obligations of the New International Economic Order
are only for the West. In these economic conditions the only new
adventures with appeal in Moscow are those promising high
military-security gains at low cost and low risk, or truly major changes in the world correlation of forces, but still at low risk. In Africa, only invitations from strategically placed mini-states (Cape Verde, Mauritius) or sustenance to a regionally dominant ANC majority government in South Africa meet these criteria. Thorough going revolution in Nigeria -- unlikely -- would also qualify.

Continue existing commitments: no backing down

Soviet prestige and credibility are tied to the preservation of the MPLA and Socialist Ethiopia. These are the only true Soviet allies (or "clients") in Africa. Both are treated as partners in "existing socialism" and as candidate members of the world "Socialist Community," although neither has CMEA membership which is the hallmark of acceptance. In both countries Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans are engaged in building communist institutions: the ruling Party, internal security police, media and propaganda apparatus, political control within the armed forces, economic planning. The frequent Moscow visits of national leaders continue: Mengistu (November 1985 and April 1987), Dos Santos (May 1986) and also Mozambique's late Samora Machel (April 1986). The commitment to protection symbolized by the Cuban troop presence in Angola and also Ethiopia divide these two from all other African countries. Mozambique is a borderline case (see Part III), and Libya an entirely different sort of relationship (see Part IV).
Anti-Americanism

Gorbachev has made numerous statements which exacerbate U.S.-Soviet hostility on African issues. For example, in his speech for Dos Santos: "The U.S. Administration has again showed itself to the world in the unseemly role of the strangler of the freedom and independence of the peoples." The debt problem is part of "neocolonialist enslavement" which is "economic terrorism" (Pravda, 7 May 1986). Or in his speech for Machel: "Look how blatantly the U.S. imperialists are interfering in the affairs of Nicaragua, Angola, Libya, and some other countries, look at the cynical cruelty with which they act" (Pravda, 1 April 1986). Or in his welcome for Algeria's Chadli Benjedid, mention of "the imperial bandit face of neocolonialist policy." This sort of talk is hardly conciliatory, and the Soviets would be well advised to break the habit of speaking in different tones in different fora. The U.S. decisions on arms to UNITA, the Afghans and the Nicaraguan Contras; invasion of Grenada; attacks on Libya; and military buildup in the Middle East have hardened Gorbachev's hostility and confirmed the Soviet view of U.S. "imperialism," much as Soviet expansion and intervention in the late 1970s confirmed anti-Soviet views in the United States.

Diplomatic initiative: world security conference

The new Soviet motif connects peace and disarmament with Third World poverty and debt. In the 27th Congress speech
Gorbachev claimed that U.S. military spending was paid for by Third World debtors. In the May 1986 welcome speech for Angola's Dos Santos Gorbachev said:

Current confrontation and the arms race are putting an unbearable burden on their [the developing countries'] shoulders. Imperialism is seeking to sustain its truly appalling military spending at their expense. Parasitizing on the peoples, it is bleeding them white, while shedding crocodile tears over the economic difficulties of its victims. (Pravda, 7 May 1986)

The Soviet remedy is a world conference on economic and military security. Its presumed task would be to persuade the U.S. to reduce military spending and put the savings into transfer payments (Frantz Fanon called them "reparations") to the developing countries. A side benefit would be reduction of U.S. capability to intervene. The Soviet Union is absolved from all responsibility for either poverty or the arms race. Both can be ended by a simple humane policy of Washington that any reasonable person can support -- missiles into debt forgiveness.

In 1986 Gorbachev tried this out on visitors Machel, Dos Santos, Chadli Benjedid, and Libya's Abdul Jalloud, with predictable results: Dos Santos and Jalloud were enthusiastic; Machel was favorable; the Algerians will study it. While the approach is transparently one-sided and propagandistic, it appeals greatly to Africans who want more money and less Western military presence, and it succeeds in shifting all attention and blame to the United States, which is its purpose.

New international Party Secretary Dobrynin has sounded the
global security theme in a different key. In a May 1986 speech to
Soviet scientists Dobrynin stressed interconnectedness of all
international issues: nuclear weapons and "the interdependence of
survival;" "indivisibility of national and international
security;" need for "scrupulous research into the specifically
national and regional forms of development;" an "integral
comprehensive model of international economic security;" study of
"global level" problems of "environmental destruction, finding
alternative energy sources, combating economic backwardness and
hunger, and exploring space and the world oceans." Dobrynin also
called for attention to "the humanitarian sphere." He ended with
a striking note:

The new mode of thinking by no means implies
renouncing the class analysis of problems of
war and peace. But it implies combining our
ideals, as Marx put it, combining real human-
ism with the democratic, peaceful aspirations
of all social strata acting in defense of human
interests, to save civilization.6

From the Communist Party's top international official, this
statement is remarkable. It invokes Marx but not Lenin. It extols
"humanism," which has the same suspect connotation to Leninists as
it does to Christian fundamentalists and other true believers. It
explicitly tells Soviet analysts to soft-pedal "class analysis,"
meaning hard core us-versus-them thinking. It reflects the
globalist thought prevalent in the West in the 1970s. Perhaps
Dobrynin's version of globalism will moderate Soviet political
rhetoric, and perhaps Washington will listen.
TIMES CHANGE: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY

To learn from reality is a Leninist principle. Long term goals are constant, but ways to get there are not. The captain "on Lenin's course" (the title used for Brezhnev's collected speeches) will constantly be tacking, trimming sail, avoiding rocks and reefs, and now and then fetching aground in need of repair. Soviets are less likely than Americans to adopt a "strategic plan" and then follow it rigidly. Americans think like engineers, seeking "systems" with technical solutions to problems. Soviets think like negotiators and psychologists, using threats and promises. In the 1980s, and often before, the United States relies on military technology while the Soviets rely on diplomacy.

Africa, with its changes of government, insecure regimes, and anti-Western hostilities, offers many possibilities for Soviet expansion of influence. Making influence stick in a disorganized, poor, and culturally alien setting is quite another matter. This is what the Soviets have learned in Africa in the last ten years, and they have adjusted their policy accordingly.

Objectives

Soviet purposes, with varying emphasis by time and place, have remained constant:

- to expand communism; gain more allies and recruits
- to gain access to needed military facilities
- to promote beneficial trade
- to establish "anti-imperialist," meaning anti-American,
attitudes which are useful for the future and in the world ideological struggle - to gain acceptance of Soviet policies and promote Soviet prestige.

Of these, the 1970s emphasized the first two ("the changing correlation of forces" based on Soviet "might"). The 1980s emphasize anti-Americanism and a united front with African countries. Soviet economic needs are becoming a driving force of Soviet foreign policy, but that has little application now in Africa.

There are local variations. Building communism is the goal in Ethiopia and Angola, and in Ethiopia military facilities remain important. The long term value of South Africa goes far beyond stirring up hostility against the United States.

The Soviets have always learned in Africa. The lesson of Khrushchev's failed adventure on behalf of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo (now Zaire) in 1960 was the African equivalent of the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet power was insufficient to protect Soviet friends. This was relearned in the 1966 Ghana coup against Kwame Nkrumah. China, then Egypt after Nasser, also Guinea and Mali told another lesson: military and economic aid to a friendly government calling itself "socialist" does not prevent backsliding or defection. As in Cuba, involvement had to be inside, within the system. Thus when the African opportunities of the mid-1970s came by, the Soviets, working closely with their Cuban and East
German allies, were ready to try a new strategy of communist nation-building, which they applied to a new category of "socialist oriented" countries.

Expansion and socialist orientation

The meaning and significance of the "socialist orientation" policy is still imperfectly understood. The Soviets wished to create an entire tier of loosely allied communist states in the rear of "imperialism" in Africa, in South Yemen and Afghanistan, in southeast Asia and the Caribbean. The geopolitical strategy was to break once and for all the American-led encirclement of "socialism". The entire policy was based on overconfident assumptions about "the changing correlation of forces" and Soviet "might" and American decline. A bandwagon of Third World countries would follow Cuba and Vietnam and now Angola into the Soviet orbit. 1975 was the key year: North Vietnamese conquest of the South; the first formal Congress of the Cuban Communist Party which completed the Cuban path to communism; the Helsinki agreements which finally established the Soviet position in Europe; the Cuban-Soviet intervention in Angola. Cuba was admitted to CMEA also in 1975 -- the first non-contiguous member. (Mongolia was admitted in 1962, so CMEA already included one non-European country.) CMEA membership marks the transition from potential communism ("socialist orientation") to a presumably irreversible "socialist path." Soviet military commitments remained cautious and contiguous, however. Vietnam received only
a non-binding Friendship Treaty like those of Angola or Ethiopia or Afghanistan or South Yemen. Cuba has no public Soviet state treaty with military implications at all.

Detente was expected to help expansion. Western interference with Soviet influence in the new tier of "socialist oriented" countries could be branded a violation of detente. The Clark Amendment blocking U.S. intervention in Angola was the precedent the Soviets expected to see elsewhere.

Opportunities to establish influence would come via local wars, as in Angola or Ethiopia, or from coups as in South Yemen or Afghanistan. What came after was the key. Arms transfers and military officer training were peripheral. The Soviets learned in Egypt, later in Somalia, that the professional military is nationalist and inclined to oust Soviet influence. The real effort was to create, from a willing but unsophisticated leadership, institutions of internal control on the Soviet Leninist model -- a vanguard party, the secret police, the propaganda organs and control of information, and the apparatus for control of the military. These institutions, created and advised by Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans, would make the local leadership communist, link it to the Soviet bloc, and keep it in power.

These efforts followed a single pattern, with local variations. First, create a "vanguard party" on the Soviet model, established within the army and bureaucracy and within workplaces. Link it to the CPSU with a party-to-party agreement which provides
Soviet training for party officials and extensive contacts and visits. To prevent coups, train loyal political officers ("commissars", now zampolits in the USSR) at special party-military schools: these are established in Angola and Ethiopia. Train an effective security police: the East Germans specialize in police work in Libya, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen. Gain influence within the internal media by a clause in the party-to-party agreement which mandates coordination of information and prohibits unfavorable publicity. Thus by agreement Soviet bloc censors can eliminate unfavorable information within the African country. (In Madagascar, for example, Soviet and East German officials with backing from President Ratsiraka could pencil out whatever they didn't like in the national media.)

The "socialist orientation" policy was mistakenly called "ideological" by Western analysts. The intent was entirely practical -- instruction in Soviet style political control for a local leadership increasingly dependent on the Soviet bloc for external and internal protection. Socialist orientation proved very difficult in African conditions of ethnic rivalries, rudimentary social organization and primitive communications, and acute economic needs. The Soviets did not reject the idea of building vanguard nations, but they did decide that more of them in Africa weren't worth the cost and effort and uncertainty of result. Among the "socialist oriented", Congo and Mozambique decided to dilute their Soviet connection, and the Soviets did not
press their influence. The Angolan and Ethiopian leaders decided to press on toward communism and the Soviets have fulfilled their role.

The 1980s

World conditions changed dramatically in 1979-80. The entire Soviet bloc was in economic straits. Expansion produced some virulent counter-actions: China invaded Vietnam, the Americans were rearming, and after the invasion of Afghanistan detente was dead. Islamic countries deplored the Afghan adventure, and Africans tolerant of Soviet aid to liberation in Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia saw Soviet intervention in Ethiopia as typical great power imperialism. Poland was in revolt, Iran had the wrong revolution, and the Afghan mujahiddin refused not to fight. By 1980s the Soviets were supporting five or six counterinsurgency wars (Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Eritrea). Moscow desperately needed a respite and a curb on the increasing costs of empire, and Soviet policy needed some friends beyond the few very poor and war-torn corners of the earth which had welcomed Soviet involvement. Hence the general shift from military-based expansion to diplomacy, nonintervention, and broad-based Soviet friendship for all, particular those resisting the resurgence of American military power.

After the illusions of the 1970s, International Department chief Ponomarev (now retired) summed up the experience of the 1980s in the Third World:
It is no secret that in recent years the attitude to existing socialism and its international role have been the subject of discussion in the communist movement. Some urgency was given to these discussions by difficulties that arose in the course of socialist construction for a number of countries, the belated tackling of pressing problems, and some negative phenomena. All this was eagerly used by the class adversary, who intensified pressure on the socialist countries and did not shrink from shameless intervention in their internal affairs.

It has now been proved in fact that the socialist-oriented countries have opted for a correct, promising road. But they too have innumerable problems, some of which have no analog in either the past or the present.

Inter-state conflicts (for instance the war between Iran and Iraq) and separatist movements have become a painful phenomenon. They are giving imperialism a convenient pretext for encouraging reactionary forces and regimes, and for kindling internecine strife permitting it to maintain in many regions huge armed forces ready for action against progressive nations. 8

Ponomarev concludes this sorry litany by urging "special attention to a number of fundamental questions" concerning the developing nations. One should compare the optimistic article written by Ponomarev for Kommunist in January 1979, called "Existing Socialism and its International Significance," in which he called the new group of "socialist oriented" countries "the historical vanguard" of all developing nations. 9
PART II: TROPICAL AFRICA

Tropical Africa is what lies between the southern Africa crisis zone and the Maghreb, Sudan, and the Horn. The region has neither military importance in Soviet strategy nor much potential as an "anti-imperialist" cause. Political turmoil offers opportunity for intervention and influence, but to what end? The Soviets are realists: expenditures of money, attention, and political capital must produce commensurate results.

AFRICAN REALITIES

By the 1980s the Soviets had discovered real, existing Africa, which is not the Africa that the International Department expected to graft easily onto "existing socialism." Experts in the Africa Institute and the Foreign Ministry probably guessed that Africa would not be easily transformed, proclamations of fidelity to Marxism-Leninism by ruling juntas or no. But, as in other governments, it takes a while to educate the top decision-makers. Specifically, in the 1980s the Soviets discovered:

- ethnic politics which use ideology as a cover;
- societies, whatever their leaders' rhetoric, of a few rulers, a parasitic "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (often socialist in sentiment -- after all, the state pays their salaries and gives them power); and masses of traditional-
minded hungry and goods-starved peasants;
- strong Pan-Africanist sentiment among the educated;
resistance to joining one European white imperialist against
another, except temporarily for tangible advantage;
- local conflicts with long-standing historical roots that
have nothing to do with great power conflicts or pretensions
to world leadership.

Soviet analysis of Africa is now realistic and is much the
same as that of Western experts and African scholars.

Social structure

African societies are amorphous and "backward" (in Russian,
отсталый), dominated by "pre-capitalist" peasants who resist
socialist economic organization.

The economic, social, and cultural level of
development in African countries is extremely
low. That is why implanting in people's minds
the goals of socialist orientation is a very
complex task. 10

The peasants are народники who reject the leadership of a
conscious, centralized party vanguard for vague notions of local
communal peasant authority. 11 The Soviets have no use for leaders
such as Nyerere of Tanzania or Kaunda of Zambia who espouse
communists declared:

Some reactionary African ideologists supported
by imperialist circles utilize the doctrine of
"African socialism" to divert the African peoples
from the road to revolution . . . and to isolate
them from . . . the world socialist movement. 12
Soviets also recognize the huge gap between leaders isolated in the capital and prone to such finery as fancy cars and seaside villas -- the people called WaBenzi, or "people-of-the-Mercedes-Benz" in East Africa -- and the masses. One of the first tasks of a vanguard party is to bridge this gap. Easier said than done. Current articles on Angola or Ethiopia doggedly recount problems and difficulties. \(^\text{13}\)

The orientation and direction of any African country depends on the views, even whims, of a few leaders. The peasant majority is unconscious and inert. The urban workers are a small privileged "labor aristocracy," and officials are a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie." No class basis for socialism exists. In these circumstances, the dictator or the junta may "play the roles of future classes" \(^\text{14}\) and lead their country in a progressive, pro-Soviet direction. Or not. Most likely, without a great deal of attention and support, they won't be progressive for very long. In its perception that the top leaders make all the difference, this Soviet analysis is entirely realistic and un-Marxist.

**Economic dependence**

Soviet writers now say that African economies cannot be self-reliant and will remain part of Western capitalism for the foreseeable future. Soviet policy encourages even its closest dependencies (Angola, Ethiopia) to seek Western trade and capital, because there is no Soviet alternative. The 1970s optimistic model, drawing on Lenin and Russia's own revolutionary experience,
held that if political power was secure, all else was possible. The first task (as in Soviet Russia 1917-28) was to consolidate the political machine. Then the apparat could transform society and economy, drawing on Western technology and credits to do it.\textsuperscript{15} The Soviets are now increasingly pessimistic that socialism can be built in these economic conditions. Western economic connections are too powerful (see, for example, Congo, below). This is actually a Menshevik position: Africa must experience capitalism, pulling the peasants out of traditional "pre-capitalist" patterns, before "socialism" can be attempted.

**Military coups and African armies**

Articles of the early 1980s proposed a neat and accurate analysis of the African military and its coups.\textsuperscript{16} These appeared shortly after the Liberian coup of April 1980 and the two Ghanaian coups led by Jerry Rawlings in June 1979 and December 1981. The army holds the key to power among competing factions in African capitals. The army itself can be divided into top commanders, generally loyal, who may use the army to prevent radical change; mid-rank officers, the majors and colonels, who may be radicalized and who lead coups; and lower-rank officers and soldiers who are potentially mobilizable and mutinous (as in Liberia). The chain of command may break between the loyalist top commanders and a military uprising from below. Or it may break between the rulers in power and the army as a whole.

Military governments often are radical at first, then
backslide into more conservative nationalism. The army cannot have a “class” ideology, and the policies of military governments depend on the personal views of the leaders. (Soviet writers perhaps have Colonel Qadhafy in mind.) The only way to ensure "progressive" or "socialist" development is to transfer authority from the army to a vanguard party. The Party may be led by those who led the coup (as in Ethiopia), but only a Party can incorporate Leninist ideology and methods of rule.

This is nothing new. Soviets have been relearning that military leaders are bad bets: the first lesson came from Chiang Kai-shek, in China, in 1926-27. The 1970s emphasis on the necessity of a vanguard party was conservative and traditional. The 1980s are pessimistic about parties, but equally skeptical of military governments.

Ethnic conflict and solidarity

Two late-1970s events registered the importance of ethnic and religious loyalties in Africa. The first was the failure to bridge Somali and Eritrean conflicts with Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978. Fidel Castro’s personal mediation at a meeting in Aden of the Somalis, Eritreans, and Ethiopians failed to win agreement to a federation under Soviet auspices (the Somalis walked out). The Somalis, Eritreans and Sudanese subsequently adopted a Saudi-Egyptian-American orientation. That the Soviets had trained the entire Somali officer corps, and that the Cubans had trained Eritrean political cadres, meant nothing. Apart from its
hypocrisy (the Soviets armed the Somalis exactly for an anti-
Ethiopian national war). Major-General Mozolev's description of
the Somali defection is painful:

The Somali army, after the revolutionary coup of
21 October 1969, defended the interests of the
working people. But in 1978 the leadership set
the country and the armed forces on the path of
expansionist and nationalist policy, unleashing
as aggressive war against democratic Ethiopia.
In this way the Somali army under the influence of
bourgeois-nationalist top commanders from a re-
volutionary force became reactionary.17

Since, Soviet articles cite the Horn as an example of unfortunate
ethnic conflict abetted and used (but not caused) by
"imperialism."18

The second was the Zimbabwe election of 1980. The Shona
majority voted Mugabe and ZANU; the Ndebele minority voted Nkomo
and ZAPU. Soviet military aid to ZAPU during the war of
liberation made no difference. In a "socialist oriented" country
the army is justified in suppressing anyone and everyone opposed
to the government.19 But suppression of ethnic rebellions, as in
Ethiopia, does not change the consciousness of the people.

SOVIET CONNECTIONS WITH AFRICA

Vanguard parties

Except for South Africa, a developed country, the class base
for a communist party does not exist and formation of parties is
premature. African communists are to encourage "the national-
Table 1 - AFRICAN VANGUARD PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Membership Details</th>
<th>Population %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Has over 30,000 members, some 1,300 party cells, most members are officials. Membership is 0.3% of the population.</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Has about 35,000 members; 0.3% of the population.</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Workers Party of Ethiopia claims 30,000 members, mostly officials, about 0.1% of the population.</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>PCT</td>
<td>Has about 7,000 members, about 0.4% of the population.</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


democratic revolution" -- anti-Western nationalism -- and work inside national parties and governments. The only traditional communist party in tropical Africa is the PIT (Parti de l'Independence et du Travail) of Senegal. The PIT went underground in 1960 and became legal again in 1981. Its leader, Seydou Sissoko, died in Moscow in 1986. Like the Sudan CP, it has some acceptance but few votes. Communist parties in Madagascar (the AKFM) and the French possession of Reunion are, like the PIT, 1940s children of the French CP.

The 1970s policy was to take radical pro-Soviet leaderships and help them create Soviet-style "vanguard parties" which would eventually be accepted as ruling communist parties. MPLA, FRELIMO, and the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) qualified. Ten years after the revolution, the Workers Party of Ethiopia was formed. These signed agreements with the CPSU for training and exchanges.
and were treated as part of "existing socialism" in international communist meetings. Party training institutes were established.

Expansion of party membership beyond the top elite and the bureaucracy is difficult. Vanguard parties remain small, concentrated in the capital, and top-heavy with officials. Even the elites have little concern for ideology or "internationalism." Soviet sources acknowledge these problems and reiterate the need to make contact with the people and the countryside. Listen to Angola's President Dos Santos writing in the CPSU official journal Kommunist:

The majority of Party organs . . . in the localities . . . are not capable of fulfilling their leading role.

The number of party officials is excessively high compared to the number of members.

The experience of other countries shows that socialism prevails only when socialist production relations are supreme in the countryside as well as the city. 21

For all the recent skepticism, neither Soviets nor Africans have proposed any substitute for the vanguard party.

Arms and influence

The Soviets have two kinds of policy toward the African military. In countries aligned with the Soviet Union, involvement within the host country army is part of communist state-building. This includes political-military and ideological training as well as professional training and weapons supply. Much of it is done by Cubans in Angola, Mozambique, and Congo; Soviets are more
prominent in Ethiopia and Madagascar. In other countries, the Soviets transfer arms and offer some professional training.

The pattern of arms transfers is consistent and focused, on Ethiopia, southern Africa (including Tanzania and Zambia), and the ex-Portuguese colonies throughout Africa. Ethiopia and Angola are far and away the leading recipients. The data below do not include the sophisticated weapons sent to Angola and Ethiopia since 1983. From an African perspective countries which depend on Soviet arms supply include Congo, Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. Mozambique, note, has a proportion of Soviet arms more like Zambia's and Tanzania's than Angola's.

Neither Soviets nor African recipients expect much to result from these connections. Promoting arms transfers to gain influence with military officers who would then mount pro-Soviet coups has not been a serious Soviet strategy since Khrushchev. The arms are real enough, and so are the coups, but new clients do not result. Guinea's 1984 coup did not put that country into the Soviet camp, and Guinea-Bissau has been backsliding since its coup of 1980. Congo, Mozambique, and Madagascar have loosened Soviet connections.
Table 2
SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS, 1978-82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Czech, Romania</th>
<th>% of total to country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eq. Guinea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,840</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>96.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>93.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
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<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid.
In some countries, a wish to have some Eastern connections to balance overwhelmingly Western commerce leads them to buy Soviet arms. Arms are the only goods on the African needs list which the Soviets can efficiently provide.

Soviet training of military officers may induce the same anti-Soviet reactions developed by other sojourners. One outstanding Somali general, whose upbringing began in the Kenyan army and included a stint at the British Royal Military College, recounted his experience at the elite Frunze military academy in Moscow. He was instructed alone for a year -- a class of one -- because Soviet policy forbade mixing Africans from different countries and he was the only Somali. All the Africans joked about this after class. African military men remain professional and nationalist. The Soviets trained the entire Somali officer corps before 1978, but that induced no obesiance to Soviet policy when it contradicted Somali interests. The Ethiopian army is apparently resisting politicization.

Hearts and minds, friends and enemies

Africans are people of the word more than of the cash register. Attitudes matter. Since 1980 the Soviets have mounted a propaganda campaign to establish the USSR as the friend of all Africa and the USA as the uncaring dangerous enemy. The effort has been largely successful. Soviet focus is on the evil, threatening Americans. The Soviet Union recedes into the background as a benign, distant friend.
The propaganda themes are obvious and effective. First South Africa: the U.S. is the ally and patron of apartheid. Africans generally believe this. Friends believe it in sorrow and hope that United States will soon understand how much damage "constructive engagement" has done. The Soviet role in southern Africa is mentioned only as Soviet votes and aid backing positions of the OAU or the Frontline States or the ANC and SWAPO. The desired perception is Africa against the United States. In refusing to abandon Angola to the ravages of South Africa, UNITA "bandits," and the CIA, the Soviets are consistent and reliable friends seeking no gain for themselves.

The second theme paints the Reagan Administration as a wild and threatening militarist, in Grenada, Lebanon, Nicaragua, and Angola. U.S. attacks on Libya (1984 and 1986) confirm years of Soviet fulminations against the Bright Star exercises, the Central Command, and the Reagan Doctrine of aid to insurgencies against Soviet allies. Since 1980 the Soviets have not drawn attention to their own military activities, and no longer tout Soviet "might" or "the changing correlation of forces." Leadership change has helped this very rapid shift of image, from strength to peaceableness.

This works in Africa. Americans generally fail to understand that Africans instinctively see the West, not Russia, as the dangerous attacker. Consider Suez (1956), Algeria and the Portuguese colonial wars, the Congo interventions (1960 and 1964), the two Shaba interventions (1977 and 1978), the failed attempts
by strange adventurers in Guinea and Benin, the South African raids on the Seychelles (1983) and Cabinda, now the bombing of Libya. The Soviets have no such history. They have arrived only on African invitation.

Africans find the pompous bureaucratic style imported from Moscow distasteful. The ugly Russian does exist, bossing Malagasy soldiers unloading wooden crates from Ilyushin transports; browbeating Mauritian customs officials; telling 'primitive African' jokes in Western homes in Dar es Salaam. Also, Russians are considered less efficient than Westerners or Chinese in development projects. But this does not make Russians dangerous. Far more dangerous is the CIA, which stalks Africa like a hunter after prey.

The third Soviet propaganda theme has been staunch support of the Organization of African Unity, contrasted with alleged American attempts to divide it. The Soviets were hurt by their 1970s policy of trying to divide Africa into two camps of socialist and capitalist orientation; of taking sides in African quarrels; of seeking African clients tied to the Soviet Union. Now the Soviets acknowledge pan-African sentiment, uphold all OAU positions and mediation efforts (for example, in Chad), offer friendship to all African countries, denounce no one except South Africa. On no political issue important to Africans is the Soviet position now at odds with African opinion. The Soviet-African united front is fragile, but for now it exists.
Trade and Aid

The Soviet Union is not an important economic force in Africa. To no African country, in any export product, is the Soviet market important. Even Angola and Ethiopia conduct more than 80% of their trade with the West. The Soviet attitude toward aid, including famine relief, is that since the West is to blame, the West should pay. Otherwise even the "socialist-oriented" should be self-reliant.

Tightfisted Soviet economic policy has not changed in the The position (spring 1986) is that:

The reasons for the extremely difficult economic condition of the least developed nations lie in their colonial past, their unequal position in the system of the world capitalist economy, and in the present neo-colonial policy of the imperialist powers. That is why the socialist countries view the [UNCTAD] Conference's recommendations on questions concerning the granting of financial and other aid to the least developed states as addressed above all to the industrial capitalist powers. The Soviet Union cannot agree in principle with the idea that the socialist countries should equally share with the industrial capitalist states the demand [for aid].

The Soviets also claim that their aid and trade arrangements are equal and do not depend on world price fluctuations which the LDCs cannot control. Soviet projects are built for a fixed repayment in products, and Soviets do not extract cash from the LDCs:

In their relations with the socialist countries the developing nations do not have such a crippling reverse flow of financial resources. This circumstance alone makes senseless the demand for equal efforts on the part of the socialist countries. (ibid)

The West now takes out of Africa far more than it puts in, and
uses the profits of this exploitation to finance its armaments. This is the traditional, and strongest, Leninist argument.

The key question in Soviet-African economic arrangements is who gets what. Recipients of Soviet arms may pay if they can. Repayment terms are not public. Soviet industrial and mining projects in tropical Africa include:

- in Ethiopia, the refinery at Assab, begun in the 1950s, and a tractor factory;
- in Nigeria, an oil pipeline and a metallurgical complex;
- prospecting and some mining in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique.
- A coal mining project in Mozambique, managed by Eastern Europeans, was discontinued in 1983;
- fisheries agreements with several countries, in which Soviet ships take the catch directly home for processing;
- a road in Madagascar.

Soviet projects are not negligible, but they bear no comparison to EEC and World Bank funding of infrastructure or Western financial subsidies and food aid.

The trade data show serious Soviet economic involvement only with allied countries (and Nigeria). Since 1980, when world policy shifted from expansion to consolidation of "gains of socialism", Soviet and East European aid has gone to CMEA members Cuba and Vietnam, with a trickle to Laos, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. An official British source estimated that in 1976-82 65% of all Soviet bloc aid went to Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam; for 1982 the proportion was 72%. In 1982 aid to non-communist LDCs was negative -- the Soviets took out more than

31
they put in. In 1982 Nicaragua received 18% of aid to non-communist LDCs, and aid to Africa declined proportionately. Soviet terms, at 2.5%-3% interest, one year grace, and twelve years repayment were slightly harsher than most Western aid.

The trade data for 1979-84 are consistent. Tropical Africa is unimportant in Soviet trade: about 8 rubles of every thousand are in African trade. Even excluding arms sales, Egypt and the Maghreb are twice as important. The "socialist oriented" countries, primarily Angola and Ethiopia, now account for half the trade turnover. The proportion of Soviet trade with the rest of Africa has declined in the 1980s, although it has grown slightly in absolute level.
Table 4

SOVIET TRADE WITH COUNTRIES OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

(million rubles)

In order of 1981 trade turnover.

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*Socialist orientation countries

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<tr>
<td>Benin*</td>
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*Socialist orientation countries

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<td>1,049.3</td>
<td>1,058.6</td>
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<td>as % of all Soviet trade</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
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<td>Trade with countries of socialist orientation as % of Soviet trade with sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>444.2</td>
<td>517.6</td>
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<td>40.7%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ratio of Soviet exports to imports:</td>
<td>All sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialist orientation countries</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
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Russians, too, eat chocolate and drink coffee. Hence the imports from, and unfavorable balance with, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Cameroun. From Guinea, the Soviets now take aluminum from the bauxite smelter they built in the 1960s. This, plus a tiny amount from Nigeria, is about 80% of imports. Soviet exports of any significance go to just four countries: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Angola, and Mozambique (in 1984 order). In 1981-83 Nigeria was the number one trading partner; that has changed with Nigerian austerity due to falling oil revenues. From Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique the Soviets import very little. The key element, then, is the repayment terms, which are not known. Angola may repay in hard currency. Ethiopia has nothing with which to repay, and apparently keeps renegotiating its Soviet debt.

POVERTY AND INFLUENCE; SIX CASES

Recent Soviet reluctance toward unproductive adventures has been matched by growing African disinterest. The change in African perspective drastically limits Soviet influence.

As Africans realize, you can't eat ideology. The African fascination with socialism, be it communist "scientific socialism" or the "African socialism" based on peasant cooperatives which the Soviets denounce, has waned.

African leaders now accept that:

- peasant prosperity must precede grandiose industrial development.
- the large number of government bureaucrats (the
"bureaucratic bourgeoisie") do little but consume salaries paid by impoverished peasants. Rampant corruption makes the drain worse.

- the West, particularly Europe, is the only source of food, export markets, and long term finance.

- state-managed economies which set low food prices and control trade have been a failure.

- socialism has not brought prosperity to the Soviet Union either.

- the Soviet Union cannot help Africa because the Soviet Union is poor.

The fact of Soviet poverty is brought home literally, by Africans educated in the USSR. Unlike Soviet citizens, African diplomats and African students in the Soviet Union can go to Western Europe and return. The contrast is overwhelming, and is well understood back home.

That Soviet socialism doesn't produce food or consumer goods is its weakest point. Soviet political and military behavior is less threatening than the West. Human rights are more of an issue in Africa than most Americans believe -- in fact, abuse of power by tinpot dictators is fast becoming a very hot issue -- but the Soviets are not singled out as rights abusers. South Africa is. Western unemployment and racism are seen to match Soviet failings. What really hurts the Soviets is their poverty. Africans need money and food, which they now know Soviet socialism lacks.

Nigeria

The Soviet Union regards Nigeria as a major regional power, worthy of cultivation like other capitalist regional powers such
as India, Brazil, or Mexico. Nigeria is the only country in tropical Africa in which the Soviets maintain significant industrial aid projects (pipelines, steel). Relations have been friendly since the Soviets provided military aid during the Biafran war of 1967-70, and these friendly relations continue in spite of successive Nigerian governments and coups. Nigeria was the largest African trading partner of the USSR in 1981-83, now exceeded by Ethiopia. No evidence points to Soviet efforts to meddle in internal affairs in Nigeria. Rather, the Soviets wish to gain a long-term diplomatic foothold as part of their 1980s policy of general friendship with all Africa. Nigeria's dominance within West Africa, its role as oil supplier to the United States, and also Nigeria's leading role in pan-African diplomacy (the Nigerians have long backed the MPLA in Angola) make connections welcome. Because of its importance, Nigeria is perhaps the one country of tropical Africa where the Soviets might be tempted to make a commitment to a revolutionary regime if invited to do so, in spite of cost. Such an evolution of Nigerian politics seems highly unlikely.

Ghana

The Jerry Rawlings military dictatorship is intensely anti-American. (The U.S. was accused of plots in 1983 and 1986.) Peoples Defence Committees rule neighborhoods and villages and militia march in Accra streets. The rhetoric is socialist. Yet by early 1986 the Ghanaian left was accusing Rawlings of selling
out to capitalism because Ghana signed an agreement with the IMF to help rescue its destitute economy. With an IMF loan and some investment from Europe, the economy has revived. Ghana perhaps best illustrates the combination of Soviet disinterest and African economic need which prevents Soviet involvement in even highly favorable political circumstances. In March 1986 Ghana signed a cultural agreement with Moscow for radio and television and publishing, for "study tours and workshops." The Soviets in Ghana and elsewhere will concentrate on propaganda and anti-Americanism while leaving the economy to the West.

Congo

Congo adopted "socialist orientation" before the term was invented by declaring itself a "peoples republic" in 1969. Cubans, Soviets, and Chinese had been active in Brazzaville since 1964. Brazzaville then was the coordination point for aid to the unsuccessful Lumumbist rebellion in eastern Zaire; in 1975-76 it was the entrepot for Cuban-Soviet aid to the MPLA. In the 1960s and 1970s Congo had a half dozen coups among competing army, militia and youth organizations and leaders. All contenders claimed to be Marxist-Leninist! When the country settled down under Denis Sassou-Nguesso (1978- ) and the Congolese Labor Party (PCT, or Parti Congolais du Travail) the Soviets went forward with economic and Party agreements and a Friendship Treaty (1980). The Party agreement, like others of its kind, provided for cadre training and political-military officer training and coordination
of propaganda. The Friendship treaty included a clause (Article 10) which allows intervention by mutual consent if the regime is threatened. (Soviet Friendship treaties with Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen are almost identical.) This made Congo a fully "socialist-oriented" country like Angola, Ethiopia, or Mozambique, presumably on its way to eventual socialism and the Soviet camp.

Congo, however, is rich by African standards. Its offshore oil, next to Angola's Cabinda fields, is under French management (Elf Aquitaine), now joined by AGIP (Italian) and Getty. Congo has export timber and a small population. Per capita income is third highest in tropical Africa. The Congolese never left the franc zone or the IMF, were original participants in the Lome conventions linking European trade to Africa, and in general never changed either their French cultural affiliations or their Euro-African economic ones. In the 1980s, prosperity and the absence of a military threat from Zaire (a problem in the 1960s; France now mediates between what were then the two Congos) has made Congo much like other Francophone African countries in politics and economy, in spite of formal Soviet connections.

Uganda

The new leader of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, started his political career in 1970 as a thoroughgoing Leninist. Sixteen years later Museveni entered Kampala with his National Resistance Army which fought the marauding troops first of Amin, then of
Obote. He announced an end to the killing (some half million Ugandans in the south had been killed by the northern soldiers under Amin and Obote in 1970-86). He brought moderates from the conservative Baganda into his military government, and encouraged peasant smallholder production. A decade and a half of experience, Libyan aid to Idi Amin, the economic failure of ujamaa peasant socialism in neighboring Tanzania, and living with Ugandan villagers terrorized by government soldiers had their effect.

Museveni's government will be authoritarian and nonaligned, but Uganda needs fewer guns and more food. Chaos in Uganda did not produce Soviet influence but rather the opposite.

Madagascar

The Ratsiraka military government, from 1974, followed the socialist economic pattern of low food and cash crop prices paid to farmers, restriction of imports, and state-controlled trade. By 1983 the economy was kept afloat only by French subsidies. Outlying areas, including the north near the superb harbor of Diego Suarez, were close to rebellion. Under Ratsiraka, Madagascar's Soviet bloc connections included arms deliveries, East German training of the security police, and an information agreement which allowed Soviet and East German censorship of unfavorable information. Malagasy intellectuals remarked that the Chinese built a road on time while the Russians were years behind schedule. The brusque Soviet style, reflecting behavior back home, made "comrade Popov" thoroughly resented and the butt of
jokes by the highly sophisticated Malagasy elite.) In 1984, a turn toward Europe and the U.S. occurred. Clearly, the missing element in Soviet presence and influence was the most important one -- effective economic advice and aid. For this reason, economic not political, Madagascar like Congo is not a Soviet client, and the harbor at Diego Suarez is not a Soviet base.

Guinea

According to the instability and arms transfers hypothesis of Soviet expansion, Guinea should now be a Soviet ally. Soviet-trained military officers seized power in April 1984 after the death of long-time dictator Sekou Toure. Toure had already accustomed Guineans to repression and arbitrary rule. The economy was socialist, state-managed, and included a Soviet-built bauxite mining complex. Toure had been cool toward the Soviets, as he built his cult of personality complete with parades in a white convertible, a practice which he urged on his new friend Samuel K. Doe of Liberia.

The first acts of the Guinean military council were to announce an end to arbitrary police power and to free political prisoners. Since the coup Guinea has loosened some of the less rational extensions of state socialism, and shows no sign of a Soviet alliance. The point, perhaps clearer in this case than in any other, is that African leaders, military or civilian (and often the distinction is blurred, as with guerrilla chief Museveni) realize that too much state socialism, too much dictatorship, too much arbitrary rule simply does not work. It does not grow food, and it does not
make the leaders popular. Guinean colonels led by Moussa Traore are well aware of what their country needs and of what they must do to be successful. Neither a Soviet alliance, nor an imitation of Soviet economy or government, fits those needs.

THE FRENCH CONNECTION

France, not the United States, is the most important Western power in Africa. France manages Western economic aid to many African countries. France maintains military forces for African interventions (used recently in Chad) and is tropical Africa's largest source of weapons. While Soviet propaganda and diplomacy in Africa are directed against the United States, good relations with France are a Soviet international objective. France has influence in Angola and Mozambique. In Guinea, Mali, Congo, Madagascar, Benin, and other places of Soviet presence the French are more influential than the Soviets. The Soviets cannot afford to alienate France and Germany, so they must tread lightly in Africa. French policy has been to firm up cultural and economic connections while not worrying overmuch about Soviet political influence or arms shipments. Soviet anti-American propaganda is of little concern; Gaullists rather welcome it. French policy has succeeded in Congo, Madagascar, Guinea, Mali, and Benin -- all countries of Soviet influence and presence but now tending toward the West. United States policy might learn from successful French experience.
PART III: SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa carries considerable emotional freight. Partisans of black majority rule see discussion of Soviet activities as an immoral evasion of the real issue, which is justice for black South Africans. People concerned about Soviet policy are suspect as closet supporters of the South African white government, which presents itself as the only alternative to Red Southern Africa. Conversely, some conservatives dislike hearing that the Soviet Union is not the cause of trouble, that its power is very limited, and that the United States should consider its national interests without being provoked by South Africans waving red flags.27

The United States has a great deal to lose, and potentially much to gain, in southern Africa. Morality and psychology cannot be ignored. Focus on minerals and naval bases and geopolitical strategy which ignores "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind" misses an essential ingredient of effective policy. Unblinking realism about the political forces in southern Africa, and their goals and interests, is required.

Arguments over southern Africa are about means, not ends. Supporters of apartheid (who blame trouble in South Africa on "outside agitators" in the style of American white supremacists of an earlier day) and those on the left who wish ill to the United States are few on either side. For everyone else the question is
how to achieve black rights (as blacks themselves see them: someone else's definition of the rights they are entitled to won't work); end the violence (including wars in Angola and Mozambique); provide physical security to the white population; maintain a South African economy integrated with Europe and the United States; and exclude Soviet military use of southern Africa. These U.S. interests have a different emphasis from the agenda of African governments, but the two are compatible.

Soviet policy counts on polarization to produce a stark choice between continued white domination and a "socialist oriented" ANC government of South Africa, along the lines of the MPLA or the Sandinistas. The essential interest of the United States is to prevent that polarization. Southern Africa is important enough that an active U.S. policy toward positive change is essential.

SOVIET POLICY

While Soviet objectives have been scaled back and strategies changed in many parts of the world, policy in southern Africa has been constant since 1975. Toward South Africa, it has been constant since 16 December 1961, when the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party joined forces to establish the Umkhonto we Sizwe, and begin armed struggle. After 1979 the Soviets became skeptical about socialism in Africa and disenchanted with "socialist oriented" clients. But South Africa is different: a developed rich industrial country with a proletariat and a
Three characteristics -- a popular cause, the freedom of action that comes from not having a security stake, and the promise of long term economic gain -- make southern Africa different from any other region of interest to Soviet policy. In southern Africa the Soviets have been (in the eyes of most) on the side of goodness and progress. They have established a reputation for following, not bullying, their African allies (MPLA, FRELIMO, ANC, SWAPO). Excluded from liberated Zimbabwe, they accepted a serious setback, behaved correctly, and regained lost ground at American expense. Soviet credibility has been established in Angola, although Angola and Mozambique have starkly illuminated the Soviet inability to aid development. Mozambique revealed Soviet economic and also military weakness. Mozambique also demonstrates the persistence, in spite of weakness, of Soviet diplomatic and communist party ties.

In the long run, South Africa and Namibia and Angola are resource-rich countries which should more than pay for themselves. In the long run the ally and patron of southern Africa should gain wealth, not lose it.

Southern Africa is not important to Soviet military security. A worldwide network of naval bases may have been Admiral Gorshkov's dream, but Soviet behavior indicates that naval facilities south of the Horn of Africa have been unimportant as a motivation for policy. President Ratsiraka of Madagascar denied use of Diego Suarez, and Samora Machel denied use of Beira and Maputo in spite of the 1977 Friendship Treaty. Exactly because southern Africa is
outside Soviet security needs, the Soviets are able to pursue a sophisticated, flexible, long term policy which relies on diplomacy and avoids strongarm behavior.

In the early 1980s, after Zimbabwe's liberation had gone awry and the Soviets were clearly unable to do anything about African poverty and destitution, Soviet policy was in trouble. Since, it has recovered. The Soviets reinforced Angola and held fast to their position (no deal on withdrawal of Cuban troops!) while cutting their losses in Mozambique. In the important country, South Africa, the Soviet bet on the die-hard character of the National Party government has proved more accurate than American hopes that nice people in Pretoria would reform with a little nudge from their friends.

Southern Africa is in the midst of revolutionary change. The outcome of that change is uncertain, in Angola and Mozambique and Zimbabwe as well as Namibia and South Africa. Moscow does not control change, but Soviet interests may gain greatly from it.

Limited Soviet power in southern Africa...

If power is the ability to get someone else to do what they would not do otherwise, the Soviets have very little power in southern Africa. The Soviets cannot command or control any other actor in the region -- even the Angolans march to an African beat. They cannot offer incentives or rewards beyond what they now provide: continued military support to MPLA; some arms and training for SWAPO and the ANC; diplomatic and propaganda backing.
They have no development aid to spare (abundantly clear from treatment of Mozambique and also Angola) and will refuse further military commitments, for example against the Mozambique insurgency. The Soviets have no useful threats, either: they cannot withdraw backing from MPLA without damaging credibility beyond repair. Nor can the Soviets credibly change their policy of training and arms and propaganda support for the ANC and SWAPO. Why should they? Soviet capability for large scale military intervention does not exist: the Soviets could move one airborne division, about 8,000 men, quickly, if they used their entire air transport fleet and refueled in Ethiopia or South Yemen. The South Africans could defeat them in any short conventional war.

... means consistent policy.

The present Soviet posture bears little cost, little risk, and the possibility of great gains. It adds to Soviet prestige. The Soviets would lose much by withdrawing from southern Africa. Conversely they have neither ability nor incentive to play a greater or different role. Events are moving correctly, toward a South African revolution dominated by the ANC. Soviet policy will thus be constant, even immobile.

Regional objectives

To avoid cost, risk, or confrontation in southern Africa is a primary objective. The Soviets will encourage confrontation of Africans against the United States, which is useful.
Positive objectives are:

1. Secure the political base in Angola. Keep the MPLA in power. Discredit UNITA, and use UNITA to discredit the United States.


3. Become indispensable to the ANC by training and supplying the Umkhonto we Sizwe. Help communists (declared or undeclared) gain leadership within the ANC. Continue to provide technical and financial assistance to ANC propaganda (radio, publications). Become a trusted source of diplomatic and political advice to the ANC. All these apply also to SWAPO.

4. Associate the Soviet position with international law and UN and the OAU. Rely on Cuba and East Germany. Avoid the stigma of any Soviet initiative not requested by the OAU or the Frontline States. Keep a low profile as Africa's consistent friend.

5. Particularly through forums such as the UN, OAU, and Non-Aligned Movement, establish among Africans the perception that the United States is ignorant and uncaring, the patron of apartheid, the real source of warfare and economic dislocation which only seems to emanate from Pretoria.

6. Wait for the revolution in South Africa to ripen. Work through the SACP and in the ANC to polarize South Africa and radicalize the black communities. (The ANC and others need little encouragement.) Discredit or eliminate all "moderate" alternatives. Provoke police retaliation and government terrorism and repression. Drag out the process.

The maximum Soviet objective in southern Africa has always been a "socialist oriented" South Africa, closely allied with the USSR. Revolutionary South Africa would remain at the center of an integrated southern African economic unit (which now exists in spite of political tensions and warfare). Such an outcome would alter world economic power and affect naval strategies (as did, for example, Soviet bases in Cuba). It would also be a dramatic
reversal of current trends and conventional wisdom which tout the decline of Soviet world influence.

This result is more probable now than five years ago, as a result of mistaken United States policies and the actions of the South African government. As one intelligent Soviet source said:

The Reagan administration of the beginning of the 1980s, in a new effort to subordinate Africa to the global policy of the USA, fairly quickly achieved the liquidation of that reserve of trust which Washington tried to create with the help of liberal maneuverings under Carter, thus laying the groundwork for subsequent crisis in American-African relations, similar to the crisis of the 1970s, but potentially deeper.²⁸

**Multinational focus**

Most Western analysts miss the multinational focus of Soviet thinking, in many regions. The Soviets have a distinct model of international organization. This model ties countries bilaterally to a common central country which controls the entire group. The region may have multilateral institutions as well, but these too are subordinate to the control of the Center. This is the model for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was proclaimed as the model for "the Indochina countries" after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978. In the Caribbean, Cuba took the lead in links to Grenada and Nicaragua and the rebellion in El Salvador. Ethiopia-South Yemen-Libya signed a 1981 treaty toward another such group: the Soviets have as much difficulty as anyone else establishing permanent Middle Eastern alignments. The regional center-periphery model comes originally from the Soviet Union itself: multinational republics grouped around a central Russian core. In the 1970s,
simultaneous with other "Leninist" revivals such as "proletarian internationalism" (each communist country contributes to the multilateral efforts to support revolutions and fight wars) the Soviets promoted new regional alliances of "socialist oriented" Third World countries.

Southern Africa's economy and geography almost force regional association based on the South African center. The active Soviet policy of 1975-80 anticipated a linked group of "socialist oriented" frontline states facing white South Africa: Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and possibly Zambia. The anti-Soviet policy of Zimbabwe (now modified), the civil war in Angola, and South African military dominance and intervention scuttled that idea. The fallback position has been to hold on in Angola, push anti-Americanism, establish broad-based friendship with all the Frontline States, continue to train and advise the ANC and SWAPO, and wait for revolutionary developments in South Africa. Also, the Soviets would continue low key arms transfers to the frontline states -- direct military challenge to the South Africans is not part of the plan. Arms transfers maintain credibility and keep a diplomatic foot in the door against overwhelming Western economic and cultural influence.

Arms transfers

Soviet doctrine has always maintained that countries must make their own revolutions: communist "internationalists" (to use the current Soviet term) give weapons, training, sanctuary, diplomatic
and propaganda assistance, and military advisers. This policy dates from China in the 1920s -- General Blucher trained the Kuomintang Army -- and Spain in the 1930s, when the "international brigades" provided volunteers. Invasion across borders to install revolutions has never been part of Soviet doctrine -- unless a civil war is already in progress and some sort of invitation to intervene can be engineered. Afghanistan, like Hungary in 1956, bent the doctrine, but did not break it. At the time of the Lancaster House conference on Zimbabwe in 1979 the Soviets apparently considered formation of a Zimbabwean liberation government based inside Rhodesia which could then call on intervention by Cuban troops.

In 1978-82 the Soviet Union became the major arms supplier of all southern African countries except Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. In that period, southern Africa took 37% of Soviet arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia took 47%; the rest of the continent got a scattered 16%. Approximately $2 billion of arms transfers to Angola in 1984-86 increased the southern African proportion.

Zimbabwe is the interesting case. Zimbabwean troops now protect FRELIMO against the MNR guerrillas -- reciprocating ZANU's debt for Mozambican sanctuary and support during the liberation war. While Zimbabwe buys arms from China, Italy, and Britain, the 5th brigade of Zimbabwe's army was trained by North Korea after liberation. That 5th brigade was accused of rough reprisals in 1981-83 in Matabeleland, the southwestern region loyal to Joshua
Nkomo and the minority ZAPU party.

**SADC**

While Soviet policy thinks regionally, regional development is organized by the West. The Soviet Union does not contribute to the Southern African Development Consultative Conference, the Western consortium which puts up money for expensive regional transportation projects in the Frontline States. Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are the main beneficiaries. In February 1987 AID Administrator McPherson promised $175-$200 million annually from the United States.\(^{29}\)

**SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTION AND SOVIET PROSPECTS**

In South Africa the ANC, including communist and Soviet influence, has become the alternative to white supremacy and apartheid. Also, South African blacks now see the United States as an enemy and the ally of the white system, while the Soviet Union is a friend. U.S. policy must deal with these facts.

Angola and Mozambique and Namibia have become side-shows in spite of the continuing warfare there. The future of the entire region depends on the South African outcome. A revolutionary ANC government will quickly end UNITA and MNR military activities and radicalize the region. A stable moderate government accepted by blacks could also bring peace. This outcome now seems very
unlikely, however. Consider:

1. the probability of loss of power by the National Party government;
2. the probability of the ANC assuming power if (1) occurs.
3. the probability of some variant of "socialist orientation" if (2) occurs.

These probabilities, which the Soviets cannot control, will determine the future of Soviet influence.

The Botha government cannot hold on forever. The revolution underway in South Africa since 1984 probably will not continue quickly to its completion -- black rights and majority rule. The movement to the right of the Botha government, and the strikes in the mines, sharpen the contradictions and exacerbate the slow-motion revolution. Whether police can recapture control of the townships is problematic. Pre-1984 normalcy seems impossible. The alternatives are totalitarian white rule and an attempt at serious reform.

No attempt at serious reform will stabilize the country or satisfy demands, unless it culminates in majority rule. Majority rule means the ANC. No viable alternative to the ANC now exists. Alternatives cannot be created from outside.

Under an ANC government, chances of anti-Western and "socialist" policies are high, for economic as well as political reasons. The United States must be well prepared, highly skilled, and thick-skinned, to prevent repetition of the Chinese or Cuban pattern, in which a revolutionary government is pulled or pushed into a Soviet alliance.
The ANC has spent a quarter century underground and in exile. It has a roster of martyrs killed by the regime from the commando teams of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (spear of the nation) and from the townships. It has received real help only from the Soviet Union among European powers. The ANC has become anti-American for entirely obvious reasons. An ANC government will fear Western, mainly American, plots and intrigues. No one should expect the ANC to be much different in political coloration from the MPLA or the Sandinistas.

South African blacks identify the USA as an enemy and the Soviets as a friend. Wall Street Journal reporter Joe Davidson, living underground in a poor township near Port Elizabeth, reports a young Mabuto ('army') gang member saying "[President Reagan] is the enemy to us. I feel he is helping the South African regime to crush us." Another report quotes an activist at Craddock, in the Eastern Cape:

We were very happy to see our ministers walking under that [Soviet] flag, which has never been associated with the oppression of blacks in South Africa. We are... not inspired by the Soviet Union... [the government] are the surrogates of Yankee imperialism which is responsible for our misery and subjection.

The ANC and the Umkhonto we Sizwe

Like most revolutionary movements opposing well organized governments, the ANC is fragmented. Known leaders in exile or in jail, Oliver Tambo or Nelson Mandela, may not be able to assert authority over the radical young underground organizers in the black townships. The military Umkhonto we Sizwe(also called MK)
may operate independently under its own leadership. Public figures inside South Africa, like Winnie Mandela or Allan Boesak, must avoid formal ANC affiliation because the organization is banned and membership in it a crime.

Until it was banned in 1960 following the passbook demonstrations and the police shootings at Sharpeville, the ANC was a peaceable mass party in the classic African style -- in fact the oldest of such organizations, founded in 1912. Forced underground, ANC leaders took two decisions with far reaching implications: to join forces with the South African Communist Party, banned since 1950, and to begin armed struggle. Anatoly Gromyko claimed in a 1979 book that the SACP actually founded the Umkhonto we Sizwe. Moses Mabhida, General Secretary of the SACP (died March 1986 in Maputo, age 63), wrote in Kommunist in 1981 that the SACP only participated in the decision. Certainly, communists within the ANC pushed armed struggle as hard as they could. Joe Slovo, who succeeded Mabhida, was "in Umkhonto's leading echelon from its formation, and has remained there ever since, perhaps its foremost theoretician on matters of military-political tactics and strategy." From the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union and East Germany began to develop contact through Europe and Tanzania, particularly Zanzibar where the East Germans were influential. The East Germans provided funds to publish Sechaba (drum), the ANC journal. (While East German activity in Africa became noticed only in the 1970s, it began in the mid-1960s.)

Until 1976 the Soviet Union had little influence. English-
speaking liberation leaders (the Portuguese colonies were different) hoped for Western aid and peaceful change, and were ignored. Chinese influence was strong in Tanzania and Zambia and with FRELIMO (Mozambique) and ZANU (Rhodesia). Circumstances changed with the Angola intervention and the Soweto rebellion of 1976. The spontaneous uprising of youth and school-children in Soweto, easily repressed, showed that black youth were revolutionary. Thousands fled and some undertook ANC military training in Soviet bloc camps now established in Angola. More recently, camps have moved to Ethiopia, which also provides a home for ANC Radio Freedom outside the range of the South African air force. Details of Soviet, East German, and Cuban help to the Umkhonto we Sizwe are not available, but the effects are easily traced in the steady gradual increase of sabotage and terrorism within South Africa from the late 1970s.

The Umkhonto's first internal operatives were caught and imprisoned or killed, in the 1960s: a "low ebb." In the 1970s a "Luthuli detachment" of the MK fought with ZAPU in Rhodesia -- part of the 1970s Soviet effort at "proletarian internationalism" designed to weave southern African liberation movements into a single network. "The late 1970s were a period of armed propaganda" with raids on South African energy facilities and police stations: "these actions served to popularize the ANC, and Umkhonto we Sizwe captured the minds of young people." 36

As the attacks by infiltration teams began, so did the South African policy of raids on neighboring countries harboring the
guerrillas -- Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, and the repeated incursions into southern Angola. (Zimbabwe never permitted ANC operations.) South African-Israeli contacts grew, and the Israelis perhaps advised on cross-border attacks and raids on guerrilla hideouts, in which they have a quarter-century of experience. To mobilize white support and to draw in the United States, the South African government claimed that the ANC had become an extension of world communism controlled by Cubans and Soviets.

The ANC and its policy of guerrilla action would be much the same if the Soviet Union did not exist or if it took no interest. The Soviets did not create the South African problem. Nor does their society or ideology (except the justification of violence and anti-Americanism) now inspire anyone in southern Africa. The Soviets have made ANC guerilla operations more effective and provide a friendly propaganda voice. They are the natural ally, but not leader or boss.

No serious alternative to ANC rule exists except a white-led government. The ANC has the loyalty of black youth and activists (many of the township rebels are school-children) -- its anthems and flags are everywhere. The ANC may tolerate the church leaders, but Bishop Tutu and Reverend Boesak and others like them cannot lead or govern apart from or in opposition to the ANC. The United Democratic Front (UDF), a coalition of student and union and other organizations, is an ANC ally, not an alternative. The Soviets praise the UDF because it is not a rival of the ANC: Africa Institute head Anatoly Gromyko writes that the UDF which includes
"around 700 various organizations" "broadened the social base of the opponents of apartheid." 37

The ANC has two rivals. One is the Zulu national movement Inkatha. Six million Zulus are 25% of the black population of South Africa and 20% of the total. Most ANC leaders are Xhosa and other non-Zulu, although Zulus are certainly represented in the ANC. In Soviet terms, the Zulus are a nation, and Inkatha a "reactionary" national movement of the sort that communists always oppose. Zulus and whites together are over a third of the population. If the ANC does come to power, the position of the Zulu nation will be an issue perhaps as difficult as the status of whites.

The other rival is the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (also banned in 1960) and other groups successor to Steve Biko's black consciousness movement. The PAC had Chinese support in the 1960s. It is not powerful now. The PAC gets harsh criticism from the Soviets because it is anti-white and therefore anti-Soviet and anti-Russian. 38 More than anything else (except serious reform) the Soviets fear a wave of black racialist sentiment which will exclude them and which will make pro-Soviet ANC cadres suspect as agents of new white masters. Soviets stress that whites must be judged by what they do. The ANC is good because it wants "equal rights for all citizens" not "a dictatorship of Africans." 39 New General Secretary Joe Slovo and other SACP leaders are white. Nonracialism as doctrine and policy is essential to Soviet and SACP influence.
Soviet Objectives

Soviet strategy promotes four simultaneous interlinked processes and tries to make each of them irreversible:

1. weaken the authority of the South African state. Means range from worldwide propaganda to internal sabotage which damages credibility.

2. establish the ANC as the only legitimate representative of the majority. Keep the revolution nonracial and discredit black nationalism.

3. within the ANC, radicalize the leadership and promote communists and friends of the Soviet Union.

4. consolidate the general perception that the USA is the enemy and the Soviet Union the friend.

All these results—the proximate goals of Soviet policy—were for the most part achieved by 1986.

Wooing the South African whites

A most interesting article called "Cracks in the Monolith" appeared in April 1986 in Azja i Afrika Segodnia (Asia and Africa Today), which has English and French editions for African circulation. The point of the article was that South African whites may be good guys fighting for revolution. Good whites mentioned are, first, communists: Joe Slovo, Brian Bunting (editor of The African Communist), Ruth First (assassinated "by agents of the regime"). Then liberals such as author Nadine Gordimer. Finally, young citizens such as Wendy Orr, a doctor who protested police brutality in Port Elizabeth. On the other side, Soviet journalists play up the far right Afrikaner Resistance Movement and alleged extra-legal death squads. (Bishop Tutu was claimed to be
on the death list.) Soviets note the possibility of a military coup "of the fascist type" led by military officers commanded by Defense Minister Magnus Malan. They note the tension between businessmen and Afrikaners -- called "Boers" (bury). Boers are "the white tribe" rooted in southern Africa. They have nowhere to go -- and they are free to choose which side of the revolution they are on.

SACP writers acknowledge that white workers backed apartheid because it made them affluent. Now, the onset of revolution creates inflation, blocks investment, and will lower living standards, so the allegiance of the white workers should change.

SACP and Soviet writers recognize the importance of big business and distinguish the "fascist" Afrikaner government from the English-speaking "bourgeois" business community, which wants profits with or without apartheid. The meeting of Kevin Reilly of Anglo-American Corporation with Oliver Tambo of the ANC at Mfune, Zambia, in September 1985 confirms the legitimacy of the ANC. Harry Oppenheimer is favorably mentioned. The business community wants a "normal" bourgeois regime run by the white business elite. These pragmatic businessmen have a place in a liberated (and socialist) South Africa, just as they have a place in Angola or for that matter in trade with the Soviet Union.

The revolutionary upsurge: spontaneity and discipline

The recent ANC strategy of making the townships ungovernable worked in 1985 and 1986. Killings of black policemen and informers
removed the intimidation and information on which police control of the black population depended. The townships may be contained by the police and army, but no longer does the regime rule within them. Control may be reestablished by totalitarian methods: extralegal arrest and torture to eliminate local organizers behind an information blackout. To keep up the military pressure, the next ANC strategy may be land-mines and terrorist attacks in rural areas.

Who is in charge of the uprising? The third element of the ANC, after the above-ground politicians and the Umkhonto we Sizwe, are the organizers in the townships. The key facts are those of organization and communication: do the leaders of the "comrades" or "children" communicate with each other, or with the outside? Are disciplined ANC cells now operating, or are matters helter-skelter and uncoordinated? This is critical. Certainly the young organizers of the "comrades" will expect recognition of their power if and when black rule comes. They will certainly be radical -- drumhead trials followed by public burning to death of informers tends to radicalize the perpetrators. They may also be uncontrollable and hostile to Soviet advice. They may, in fact, reject the ANC's nominal leaders.

Direct Soviet or East German links with the underground are probably negligible. Soviet thinking is generally fearful of uncontrolled local radicals. Soviets have opposed left radicalism in Angola (the Organization of Angolan Communists and the Nito Alves group which claimed to represent the real people of the
bairros against the elite Marxists of the MPLA Politburo) and Ethiopia (the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party and the Me'ison). Such left radicals -- the Kronstadt rebels, the Workers' Opposition, and the Democratic Centralists within the communist party-- almost overthrew Lenin and the Central Committee in 1921. Soviets favor discipline, top-down authority, organization, and keeping the masses in their place. Collapse of authority and the outbreak of democracy before a disciplined and controlled Leninist organization has become the only opposition can be a disaster. (In the Philippines it ruined communist plans.) Spontaneous victory leads to confusion and possible miscarriage of the revolution, which may go running madly off in all directions.

Soviet objectives are best served by:

- protracted turmoil, leading to
- increasing repression by the white government, which
- discredits legal black politicians and all willing to negotiate,
- which makes warfare led by the ANC the only option for youngsters, workers, and the 2 million unemployed in the homelands, and
- within the ANC the need for secrecy and discipline leads to control by the best trained, most ruthless, "Leninist" elements.

This takes some time. South African resistance traditions of mass civil disobedience, of volunteer aid and individual action, of religious concern mitigate against the authority of a Leninist vanguard. A motley coalition of church, labor, tribal and ANC leaders sharing power with liberal whites might collapse -- but it might not. Far safer to have the hardening continue. Repression
stifles non-communists like Steve Biko or Bishop Tutu (they are useful only as martyrs). The longer the repression goes on, the more likely that the democratic goals of the ANC -- one man one vote in a unitary nonracial society -- will become "socialist" ones of economic takeover and rigid internal control with strong Soviet connections.

The South African Communist Party and control of the ANC

SACP General Secretary Moses Mabhida wrote in the CPSU journal Kommunist in 1981 that "communists are rising to leading posts in various sectors of the national liberation movement."

Mabhida himself was a member of the ANC executive committee and a Vice President of the South African Congress of Trade Unions.

In the Umkhonto we Sizwe communists "are among the commanders."

How many of the ANC top leadership are formal members of the SACP has become a burning question of little significance. Thomas Karis in Foreign Affairs correctly describes ANC contacts and support as "eclectic". He notes the Moscow appearances and generous praise of the Soviet Union and denunciations of the United States by ANC leaders. He mentions growing sentiment in South Africa which is anti-capitalist, pro-socialist, anti-American. However he takes the inability of the ANC exile leadership to keep up with the radicalism of the internal rebellion as a rejection of communist aims. Here he makes the common mistake of assuming that communists (including Soviets) want revolution now. They don't. ANC reluctance to commit to spontaneous uprising strengthens, not
weakens, the circumstantial case for ANC-SACP unanimity.

Counting communists in the upper echelons of the ANC misses the point. Formal communist membership doesn't matter. What matters is the pro-Soviet character of the ANC top leadership. Cuba is the model. Soviet policy in Africa opposes the formation of communist parties and instructs pro-Soviet activists to work within "revolutionary-democratic" national parties. The way to make regimes communist is to co-opt pro-Soviet leaders. Party cadre training, military aid, economic planning, and secret police collaboration aim to ensure permanent connections once Africans opt for a Soviet alliance. National movements like FRELIMO or the Sandinistas can be adopted wholesale as part of "existing socialism", or party cards can be issued later, as in Ethiopia. A pre-existing separate communist party just complicates matters.

The SACP

The South African Communist Party was founded by white workers, many of Eastern European Jewish background, in 1921. The SACP was always English-speaking and never included many Afrikaners. It was accepted into the Comintern in 1926. Communist ties to the ANC date from the 1920s. (The ANC is older, founded in 1912.) In 1928 the sixth Comintern Congress dictated the policy of national separation thought appropriate to solve the black problem (a black republic in the American south was also on the Comintern agenda). Thus ironically the SACP advocated separate development two decades before apartheid became national policy. The 1928 orders from
Moscow lost the now integrated and majority black SACP much of its membership. George Padmore, in charge of black affairs for the Comintern in the 1930s, described various communist attempts to gain control of black movements, which failed.\textsuperscript{47} The main enemy of the SACP was always the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, which under Strijdom and Malan courted fascism and favored German victory in World War II.\textsuperscript{48} In power, the Afrikaner Nationalists quickly passed the Suppression of Communism Act (1950) which outlawed the SACP and incidentally defined most anti-apartheid agitation as "communism."

Since 1961 the SACP has worked within the ANC; SACP members join the ANC and are a faction within it. The model dates from the 1920s in China, when Chinese communists joined the Kuomintang. In China communists learned a main lesson of united fronts -- gain control of the military force lest it be turned against you.

In 1978, in new conditions of presumed Soviet "might" and revolutionary gains, African communists (probably with Soviet participation) met to evolve strategy. The 1978 document is consistent with the 1962 party programme, which is still in force. The theses on South Africa can be summarized as:

1. South African communists will work within the "national democratic" ANC and seek leadership roles within it.
2. Armed struggle will be the main revolutionary activity.
3. Workers, particularly miners, and labor unions will be the special focus of organizing. "The South African working class, which is increasingly concentrated at large mining, industrial, and manufacturing enterprises, is the leading-force . . . in the liberation struggle."
4. South African conditions are "colonialism of a special type" in a developed, industrialized country. In these special conditions, the "national liberation" phase (against colonialism) can merge directly into a socialist revolution. Big business dominance "plus the fact that the South African working class has its own communist party can create the objective material prerequisites for a speedy transition to socialism." 49

The last is crucial. Elsewhere in Africa, in the view of contemporary Soviet scholars, the "material prerequisites" for socialism are decades if not centuries away. But South Africa's communist revolution requires only the seizure of power by the ANC leading without interruption to the "socialist" phase. Radicalization of the "national democratic" revolution, the South African October, may occur without a second coup d'état.

All these points are echoed in 1986 Soviet and SACP writings. What has changed is the internal situation. 1970s tactics of "armed propaganda" and sabotage teams need updating to take advantage of internal rebellion.

In the April 1986 issue of The African Communist Quadro Cabesa calls absence of internal political-military infrastructure "a deficiency on our part" and argues that immediate insurrection is premature: "ours therefore is a protracted peoples war -- towards the ultimate build-up into an insurrectionary overthrow of the South African state." 50 In the present "equilibrium" neither the government nor the revolution can defeat the other. The new element which will tilt the balance is organized guerrilla activity by "a full time professional army of political cadres." In early 1987 the SACP Central Committee announced that only "possibilities" for coordinated action were in place, and that the Umkhonto we
Sizwe (MK) must change its character from small units to the cadre of a large, coordinated guerilla network. Immediate tasks are: first, to organize "people's committees" to take authority in the townships. This has "urgent strategic importance." Second, to continue acts of violence in both urban and rural areas. Ports, mines ("especially gold"), and foreign technology and capital are singled out as "weak links" liable to "systematic disruption." The "peoples army" will teach use of weapons and guerrilla tactics and will multiply "militia, hit squads, mobile guerrillas units, etc." Cabesa wants to expand urban guerrilla warfare to rural areas, "forcing [the government] to scatter his forces throughout the country." Rural areas turned into "no-go areas" (small liberated zones) would allow "setting up small mobile bases to cater for the political and military training of cadres."

All this is ordinary revolutionary doctrine. The important fact is that the essential political-military infrastructure is not yet in place.

Preconditions for waging a successful insurrection . . . are the intensification of the process of training and arming the masses, of building . . . a strong revolutionary army. Only under conditions of absolute economic, social and political crisis, on a national scale, of chaos and confusion in the ranks of the enemy and his army . . . armed insurrection becomes a logical and final step. Like Trotsky writing about 1917, Cabesa considers defection of black soldiers and police, which has not yet occurred, necessary for successful insurrection.

The SACP (and the Soviets) see two dangers. One is what Yusuf Dadoo called "feverish reformist prescriptions" to create a black
bourgeoisie with a real stake in the system. The other is premature spontaneous insurrection. The kind of reforms which would matter include revocation of the pass laws, common citizenship and abolition of the homelands, ending of restrictions on who may live where, credit and contracts for black entrepreneurs, a jobs program for the millions of unemployed in the townships and homelands, and political power sharing. The government will not seriously contemplate anything so drastic. Creating two million jobs would mean expelling all foreign contract workers (workers from "independent" homelands are also considered "foreign") and would be very costly.

Such reforms might accelerate, not prevent, rule by the ANC in coalition with other activists. But they might also prevent the "absolute crisis" and "chaos and confusion" which might give control to hard Leninist revolutionaries.

South Africa is not Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, a radical socialist liberation movement which came to power by protracted guerrilla warfare against a white regime, with Soviet backing, rejected Soviet influence and turned to the West. Can this happen in South Africa? Under what conditions would it happen?

The Zimbabwe experience is not a good analogy. Zimbabwe had two tribally based liberation movements, ZANU and ZAPU, in uneasy alliance. The Soviets armed ZAPU, the minority and eventual loser at the polls. ZANU's ties and traditions, never broken, were
Chinese, not Soviet. ZANU-Soviet connections were late and few, and friction was always present. The Soviets and Cubans did give arms and propaganda assistance to ZANU via Mozambique, but not much. No communist party existed within ZANU or in Rhodesia. Zimbabwean leaders never decisively rejected British or American influence; Britain led sanctions against Rhodesia, via the UN, from 1965. Rhodesia was legally a British colony. Mediated independence was always the preferred solution.

None of these political circumstances apply to South Africa and the ANC. Similarities with Zimbabwe are the Anglo-American cultural orientation and experience of black leaders, and the compelling need to continue white participation and investment in the economy. While white supremacy was certainly Rhodesian policy, race relations were not so systematically entrenched as in South Africa. Nor was there any Rhodesian equivalent of the Afrikaners.

To make the South African situation more like Rhodesia at the time of independence, the United States would impose economic sanctions, declare the South African regime illegal, and work with the ANC to arrange an externally controlled conference to draw up terms for a transfer of power. This is not realistic for South Africa. The Zimbabwe analogy doesn’t work. Further, the frictions which have developed in U.S.-Zimbabwe relations since independence are likely to be worse in South Africa.

Possible consequences of black majority rule

The leadership and complexion of any majority rule government
are unpredictable. Factions in and around the ANC will compete for power. Local leaders from the townships are an unknown quantity: probably they will not be inclined to listen to pragmatic economic arguments.

Any majority government will have to provide jobs and redistribute wealth from whites to blacks. The money can come only from nationalization of industry and mining or from drastic taxes on white incomes. Any majority government will be driven toward retribution against collaborators, and will fear plots against it by rival factions helped by whites and foreigners. These political imperatives would create conflict with the United States even without previous hostility.

If United States behavior remains true to form, it will start with accommodation, then react sharply against some radical and hostile policy -- nationalization, insulting remarks, agreements with the Soviet Union, violence against American citizens or others. Washington will cut off aid and pursue economic sanctions. The recipient of this American punishment then may discover benefits in greater Soviet friendship, particularly if anti-American attitudes were present all along. Past cases include Cuba, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe. South Africa under the ANC may follow the pattern. The growth of Soviet influence in "newly-free" South Africa will be limited by only one external constraint -- United States and European reaction. Cost is not a problem. Even if South African production and exports decline, the rise in prices for Soviet gold, chromium, and other minerals should
compensate for whatever aid or subsidy the Soviets offer. Eventually, collaboration on gold and mineral prices should boost both Soviet and South African income. (The Soviets now collaborate with the world diamond cartel managed by DeBeers, and make no effort to undercut the price for gold; their interest is the highest price.)

Soviet involvement will not alarm other Africans if it is gradual and low key. Since 1978 the Soviets have an excellent record on African issues. They vote the African line at the UN and make a point of backing the OAU (against purported American efforts to disrupt and divide it). They have not attempted to throw military weight around beyond upholding commitments in Angola and Ethiopia. They have never forced policy on a southern African ally. In Mozambique they accepted, perhaps counseled, the Nkomati agreement with South Africa. The Soviets waited patiently to overcome Zimbabwe's rejection, and received Prime Minister Mugabe cordially in Moscow in November 1985. The MPLA owes its survival to Soviet and Cuban military support, even as it draws its income from oil sales to the United States.

There is no external base for insurgency against a Soviet-allied South African regime. Unlike those of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, or Kampuchea, neighbors of liberated South Africa will be jubilantly friendly. They will appreciate the end of insurgencies and economic pressures brought by white South Africa against them. The neighbors will be inclined to join South Africa in a regional economic partnership and alliance.
The Soviets will have every reason to continue a close relationship with an ANC government. Soviet practice favors gradual escalation of links: a cultural agreement followed by a technical cooperation and trade agreement followed by a party agreement. The party agreement covers cadre training and internal propaganda, and allows establishment of a party ideological institute staffed by Soviets and East Germans and others. (Party agreements now exist with Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua.) Soviets and allies train army political officers, to ensure loyalty and party control of the army; party-military schools now operate under Soviet guidance in Angola and Ethiopia. Reorganization and loyalty of the army will be a critical issue in South Africa, as it was in Zimbabwe.

Party and military connections would only continue existing Soviet-ANC relationships. Party ties would continue to be handled by the International Department, and military ones through the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces. At the state-to-state level, Soviets and East Germans (who do this in Mozambique and Ethiopia) could be involved in economic planning. To the extent that white expertise was withdrawn and mining and industry nationalized, Soviet bloc experts could help. In South Africa, unlike more primitive peasant economies elsewhere, Soviet and East European industrial expertise and technology would be appropriate.

A formal state Friendship treaty, with clauses allowing military aid and, if mutually agreed, Soviet intervention in crisis
situations, will wait until Western alternatives have been reduced to invasion or acceptance of a Soviet-allied South Africa. No Soviet Friendship treaties have been signed since 1981. Nicaragua does not have one -- it would be too provocative.

Soviet initiatives will be calibrated to South African requests and international reaction. They will include no commitments. The Soviets will encourage regional cooperation. When and if the United States reacts to Soviet contacts and influence, a naval visit or some other demonstration may be arranged to provoke retaliation by the United States. Deteriorating U.S.-South African relations should speed Soviet ties, and lead to nationalization of U.S. (but not necessarily European) investments, particularly in mining.

Soviet use of naval and air facilities in South Africa would be a reasonable request if the ANC were to gain power, given past Soviet aid to the ANC. Opposition from other African countries and pressures for a demilitarized southern Africa (which Mozambique promotes and the Soviets now ostensibly support) would get in the way. The ideal Soviet outcome would be discussions about use of naval and air facilities (not a "base," of course) which provoked American threats which then impelled a collective southern African request for Soviet protection against "imperialism."

Mineral sales to the West will not be interrupted, nor investment discouraged as long as it is controlled. South Africa would duplicate, on a larger scale, the policies of Angola. The Soviets want their friends and allies to be part of, and if
possible profit from, the Western-based world economy. Put otherwise, the West should finance the transition to socialism in South Africa too. As a developed country which can pay its way, South Africa could eventually be admitted to CMEA, joining Cuba and Vietnam and Mongolia among the non-European members. Or all the southern African countries might be admitted together. (The Indochina pattern is that only Vietnam is a CMEA member; Laos and Cambodia are not.) Certainly an economic bloc centered on South Africa is the only rational economic arrangement for the region. Eventually Socialist South Africa could become the hegemon of a southern African federation linked to Soviet military and political protection.

If the ANC does gain power, such an outcome depends on decisions and events which other Africans and the United States and the Europeans may influence. The pan-African consensus and solidarity which most American statesmen have dismissed as insubstantial may turn out to be the effective barrier to Soviet influence in southern Africa. Majority rule in South Africa will test the skill and tough-mindedness of United States diplomacy. The United States has a poor record over the past forty years in dealing with overtly anti-American governments. Hostility has been allowed to overpower rationality. (The twenty year confrontation with communist China is the most obvious case.) Africans, including the ANC, appear more hostile than they actually are. Washington needs to cultivate cool responses and a sense of long term American interest.
Problems within South Africa after establishment of black majority rule -- assuming events move that far -- make all predictions chancy. A liberation government will have at least seven major issues:

- status of whites;
- status and treatment of the Asians;
- control and direction of investment and exports, particularly mining;
- employment for the millions underemployed in the homelands;
- organization and control of the army and police;
- Africanization of the Afrikaner-dominated bureaucracy;
- Zulu separatism and cohesion as a national minority.

The permutations are too varied to analyze. Soviet counsel will be to keep white expertise, gradually extend state control of the economy, insist on strict control of the army and police, co-opt the liberals, and break up Inkatha -- controlled transition, not helter-skelter economic and social dislocation.

What African friends have been trying to tell us

African diplomats, politicians, and intellectuals have been trying to tell Washington that these consequences are quite likely. The years of "constructive engagement" convinced many Africans that Washington is not capable of understanding what may happen. No African can defend "constructive engagement": all friends can do is warn. And, they say, please don't come back later and ask us to oppose socialism or Soviet influence in black-ruled South Africa. That will only mark us as puppets of
those-who-loved-apartheid. I have heard variations of this in or from Liberia, Sudan, Senegal, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, not to mention from black and white South Africans.

Africans do not want a South African version of Ethiopia or Vietnam dominating southern Africa. Nor do they want a twenty-year sputtering bloody rebellion and race war, which is entirely possible. Therefore African friends of the West continue to plead for strong American and European leadership to manage the transition from apartheid to some reasonably liberal variant of majority rule.

The European factor

The ideal African situation for the Soviets is one which splits the Europeans from the "imperialist" Americans, and induces Soviet-European cooperation against the United States, reinforcing both European detente and anti-Americanism. Southern Africa has some intriguing possibilities. The Europeans gave up on the Contact Group for Namibia. They recognize the MPLA and do not aid UNITA. The ANC gets much of its aid from Western Europe. "Constructive engagement" drew little overt European support. The European policy of investment and trade regardless of politics opposes the American policy of using trade to enforce Western political orientation.

South Africa really matters to the British and West German economies. Nationalization of (only) United States interests, or
discrimination in trade (strategic minerals) against the United States could provoke the Americans while leaving Europe caught between its economic interests and its American alliance. A "reasonable" Soviet Union would offer to share economic influence in South Africa with Europeans but not the United States, and thus move Europe toward Soviet-European economic partnership and political neutrality.

NAMIBIA

Namibia is on hold waiting for the South African revolution. SWAPO Politburo member Malima writes in World Marxist Review that SWAPO expects a long and arduous struggle. The Soviets have not emphasized Namibia since the South African uprising began in August 1984. Proximate Soviet objectives in Namibia were to demonstrate solidarity with the Africans and the UN and the OAU, to consolidate influence with SWAPO, to keep Cubans in Angola and resist the Angola-Namibia linkage, and to discredit the United States as an effective good faith mediator. All these objectives have been achieved.

The transfer of power in Namibia must wait for further developments in South Africa and Angola. If South African resources are absorbed by internal security, perhaps UNITA can be defeated and the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN, SWAPO's guerrilla force) strengthened. If liberal reform government emerges in South Africa (unlikely), Namibian independence will be
up for negotiation. As usual, the liberal solution is worst for the Soviets: a liberal government in Pretoria could induce SWAPO to join it or to repudiate its Soviet connections. An ANC victory by armed struggle would put SWAPO in power—perhaps.

In circumstances other than white rule, should Namibia be independent? With scarcely more than a million people, Namibia is not a viable country. The demand for Namibian independence was part of the African liberation strategy of one place at a time decided by Nyerere and Kaunda and the liberation movement leaders at Lusaka in 1969. The ANC may want to keep Namibia in their South Africa. This may become a serious intra-African issue if, as is likely, SWAPO insists on independence.

The Soviet model would be an "autonomous Namibian republic" in some sort of South African Union. (Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana would be Republics too.) Do the Soviets care about access to Walvis Bay? Not until revival of the Soviet economy allows a much larger naval budget.

Both Germanies have been involved in what was once German Southwest Africa. East Germans train PLAN. West Germans invest. Some German settlers still remain. Anatoly Gromyko's 1979 book mentions reactionary German colonists and accuses West Germany of using Namibian uranium (and South Africa) to build a German nuclear bomb.55
Angola: A Soviet Commitment

Angola is the key to all Soviet influence in the region. A decade of Cuban and Soviet commitment was upheld in 1983, Andropov's year, with the decision to reinforce Angola while avoiding counterinsurgency in Mozambique.

Soviet and Cuban influence in Angola seems well assured. $2 billion in military and economic aid has been sent since 1984. The 30,000 Cuban soldiers protect the MPLA, and the Cubans and Angolans are now launching offensives against UNITA after the reverses of 1983 and 1984. The shops on Luanda's waterfront may be closed, and one half of Angola's oil earnings may go to Moscow and Havana to pay for the war, but no signs exist that the MPLA has any intention of loosening its Soviet or Cuban alliance. Ten years of work with the MPLA party organization and the army have not created popular support, but the regime is apparently secure against coups and factions.

Repeal of the Clark amendment in July 1985 followed by announcement of U.S. aid to UNITA (most Africans believe the United States has been funding and supplying UNITA all along, using the South Africans as proxies) ended chances of a deal on Cuban withdrawal. Soviet reinforcement of Angola, including helicopters, provoked the U.S. decision. The result is to Soviet advantage. At its July 1985 meeting the entire OAU went on record: U.S. supply to UNITA would be "a hostile act against the OAU." In that event Angola could "take any appropriate action it may deem necessary," which means that the Cubans now fight in Angola with OAU approval.
The Soviet objective of lining up OAU-Angola-Cuba-USSR against USA-South Africa-UNITA was certainly achieved.

As the war continues Soviet-Angolan relations improve in spite of destitution and food shortage. When Dos Santos came to Moscow in May 1986 Gorbachev called him "comrade" and sanctified the Soviet role as a "commitment" under the 1976 Friendship Treaty. (These treaties are highly flexible: the one with Mozambique, not to mention the one with Iraq, contains identical wording but no commitment exists.) Gorbachev cited "complete mutual understanding" and "the fruitful, progressive development of Soviet-Angolan relations in every respect, at state, party, and other [?] levels." The Angolan delegation included several economic officials, but according to the communique they only "discussed in detail questions of bilateral economic and trade cooperation." With oil prices down and a four month backlog at the Luanda port the Angolan economy barely survives. But Western business deals will induce no change of political orientation. Angola is on the Cuban path, not yet "socialist" but heading rapidly in that direction. Making socialism and a Soviet alliance irreversible in Angola is another Soviet objective now within reach.

Success of the MPLA in managing the country is another matter entirely. In Kommunist in March 1985 Eduardo Dos Santos wrote with remarkable candor about MPLA's problems. After ten years in power MPLA has only 35,000 members. Most are officials or army officers. MPLA has almost no roots in the villages where 90% of
the people live. As Dos Santos says:

The experience of other countries shows that socialism wins only when socialist economic relations prevail in both city and countryside. . . . I consider the strengthening of party activity in the villages an obvious present necessity. 59

Party branches are weak and disorganized. More members and more cells are needed. Tribalism is a problem, and understanding of Marxism-Leninism rudimentary. Without "discipline" the party has no effect on society.

Dos Santos also mentions the proliferation of workers on the government payroll and the little they do, the flight of peasants back to individual plots, the inadequacy of "the central directing organs." The gap between bureaucrats and peasants is wider than ever: plans are not fulfilled. This litany of familiar African problems means that the Soviet connection works only in military and security matters. War has entrenched Soviet influence. What the leadership might do if peace erupts is an open question.

MOZAMBIQUE: CONTINUED SOVIET OPTION?

This destitute country has now become the stock example of Soviet "failure" in Africa. Lack of protection against South African raids and against the growing insurgency of the Resistencia National Mocambiquana (RENAMO, or MNR) mocked the overblown 1970s Soviet claim to protect friends anywhere in the world and undercut the credibility of the Friendship Treaties.

In 1982 the MNR stepped up guerrilla attacks and many
provinces were on the verge of famine. In April 1982 a military agreement with Portugal was signed. In May Machel went to Moscow, and in June General Yepishev, head of the Main Political Administration, came to Mozambique. Yepishev was the planner of military-political interventions: for example, he visited Afghanistan in 1979. His task was to assess the morale and capabilities of local armies, in this case the Mozambicans. In Afghanistan, Yepishev was followed by ground forces head Pavlovsky. In Mozambique the top leadership apparently decided against intervention, and no second visit to plan details of intervention occurred. In November Machel attended Brezhnev's funeral and talked with Defense Minister Ustinov and Marshal Ogarkov. The South African foreign minister warned that if Cuban troops arrived South Africa might invade. Machel began in 1983 to talk with South Africa, leading to the Nkomati agreement of March 1984 which was supposed to bring peace but did not. Machel fulfilled his agreement to stop Umkhonto we Sizwe commandos from using Mozambican territory, although ANC and SACP politicians continued to visit Maputo. (Moses Mabhida died there in 1986.) The South Africans did not fulfill their promise to leash the MNR, which now operates in all provinces of Mozambique and continues to ruin the economy.

Soviet unwillingness to provide aid was noted by other Africans. Rejection of Mozambique's 1980 application to join CMEA and be levelled up to a decent economic standard led to rapprochement with the West: a military cooperation agreement with
Portugal (1982), acceptance of the "Berlin clause" against East Germany and toward aid from the Federal Republic, membership in the Lomé conventions and the IMF, renewed trade relations with formerly China. The 4th FRELIMO party congress (1983) put emphasis on private farming and reversed the policy of heavy subsidies to state farms. (In Ethiopia and Angola too state farms, promoted by Soviet and East German development planners, have done little more than soak up money.) The 1984 investment code allows wholly owned private companies and permits them to take profits home in hard currency.61

Soviet 1970s hopes for Mozambique -- to create an economically viable recruit for the new Third World network of candidate communist countries -- obviously failed. Soviet prestige took a beating.

This is not the end of the story, however. Soviet influence lingers to take advantage of FRELIMO's disillusion with the West -- continued MNR attacks and the sporadic refusals of the United States Congress to authorize aid. The Soviets remain the source of weapons, including MI24 helicopters for counterinsurgency sent in 1985 which sit inoperable for lack of fuel. The FRELIMO-CPSU agreement continues, and in March 1986 Gorbachev said that "contacts between the CPSU and FRELIMO have a special place" in Soviet - Mozambican relations. Like Mengistu and Dos Santos, Machel went each year to Moscow. (Just as East European party heads visit annually, the Soviets through 1986 included an annual state visit to Moscow as part of "socialist orientation".)
In the three years since Nkomati, Mozambique has not been helped by the West. That the RENAMO insurgency did not end was a breach of faith by South Africa and the United States. If "constructive engagement" meant anything, it should have meant enough U.S. influence in Pretoria to get South Africa to honor the agreement. FRELIMO's soldiers are now confined to the towns. The rains of 1985 and 1986 relieved drought but rural areas remain detached and impoverished: Mozambique is still (with Ethiopia and Sudan) on the UN emergency food aid list. The currency is almost worthless (stores accept dollars and rand for potatoes and cooking oil). The Nkomati policy is no longer defensible. Machel's death in a plane crash (summer 1986) increases uncertainty.

The Soviets show no sign of wanting a greater commitment to such a poor and indefensible country. During Machel's April 1986 visit Gorbachev promised nothing, but hinted at a deal:

The Soviet Union has been doing and will continue to do what it can to render Mozambique assistance in economic and cultural development, in training national personnel and in strengthening its defenses. Of course, we have large untapped reserves in a number of areas. We should join forces and make an effort to put them to use as soon as possible. We think such an approach businesslike and correct.

A "businesslike" Soviet policy that does "what it can" certainly means no serious aid. But the "untapped reserves" available if Mozambique will "join forces" are very curious. Mineral rights? What Soviet offer did Mozambique refuse?

The communique of the April 1986 visit "expressed satisfaction" (a cool statement; compare "complete mutual understanding" with Angola) and mentioned "close cooperation in
different fields, especially in strengthening the defense capability of people's Mozambique."63 The Soviets can make Machel's successor Chissano an offer of military help he can't refuse, now that the Western option has failed to produce security.

Machel died in a plane crash in South African territory in October 1986; the plane's crew were Soviets. FRELIMO proved stable: elections continued, Chissano took party leadership and has continued the policy of economic opening to the West and negotiation with Pretoria. The United States has proposed additional aid to Mozambique as part of its revised southern African policy.

For the time being, it is the Zimbabwe army that occupies key towns and the railway line to Beira in FRELIMO's defense. This reciprocates Mozambican sanctuary and support for ZANU during the Rhodesian war, when Rhodesian aircraft bombed Mozambique. (The MNR was originally formed by the Rhodesians as counterpressure to end sanctuary for ZANU; the South Africans took over MNR for exactly the same purpose in relation to the ANC.)

ZIMBABWE: WASHINGTON'S LOSS?

Robert Mugabe's government is angry over "constructive engagement" and its lack of positive results, including the Nkomati fiasco which now requires Zimbabwean soldiers to fight in Mozambique. Information Minister and ZANU Politburo member Nathan Shamuyarira now writes in a Soviet publication that "the British
and Americans promised us aid, but they never delivered."

Zimbabwe has begun to develop Soviet connections. A cultural agreement, a usual first step, was signed during Mugabe's first Moscow visit in November 1985. Soviet patience with an African government that spurned and insulted it serves as a lesson to the United States: Soviet patience works. (Soviet hostage policy is another example of the ability to absorb insults. Soviet officers have been held by UNITA, South Africa, and RENAMO. Publicity is avoided, no threats are made, and diplomacy brings them home.) Zimbabwe shows how the southern African situation produces Soviet gains with almost no Soviet influence or activity.

LESOTHO

The overthrow of Chief Leabua Jonathan's unpopular dictatorship was a blow to Soviet influence in Southern Africa. The Communist-Party of Lesotho, one of the three formal communist parties in Africa, was urging Lesotho as a base for ANC raids. Soviet contacts were growing although Soviet presence and protection were forestalled by the threat of South African intervention - one more result of South African military dominance.

SUMMARY

Achievement of Soviet objectives in southern Africa depends on the outcome in South Africa. This in turn depends on the South
African government, the ANC and other opposition groups, the United States, European governments, other African nations, and only incidentally on anything the Soviets may do.

Three possibilities exist. A majority rule government which came to power by protracted armed struggle may accept long term substantial Soviet influence and involvement. This would extend throughout all southern Africa, and includes the possibility of minerals cartels and naval bases. The extent of Soviet influence will depend on how the United States copes with a radical regime in South Africa, and on internal events in that very complicated country.

South Africa ruled by a coalition government which satisfied black majority needs and demands and ended turmoil, and which maintained Western economic orientation, would make significant Soviet influence or presence unlikely in the long run. If the UNITA insurgency ends, which it would because any reform government in South Africa would cut off UNITA's support, Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola will diminish. With pragmatic economic policies, Angola would in a few years become one of the more prosperous one-party states, with EEC links, like near neighbor Congo. South Africa under continued Afrikaner Nationalist rule will mean more of what we have seen since 1984, with violence perhaps receding for a time, then cresting higher. At some point the wave will break. The longer it takes, the more likely the first outcome eventually is.
PART IV: NORTHEAST AFRICA: LIBYA, SUDAN, ETHIOPIA

Draw a line across the African map from Kano, Northern Nigeria to Berbera, Somalia. Across this line lie a series of traditional conflicts based on Islamic/non-Islamic and Arab/African divisions. The whole region is complicated by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism which has affected politics in Nigeria, in Sudan, and on the Horn.

Ethnic, national, and factional alliances shift and interconnect, and neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can neatly sort out a set of friends. Unlike southern Africa, no issue in this region is an "anti-imperialist" cause. Intervention or alliance creates local enemies. The Soviets learned this in 1977-78 when their Ethiopian gains lost them Somalia, Eritrea, and general support in the Arab-Islamic world. (Iraq, then called a Soviet "client," went right on helping the Eritreans.) Between 1969 and 1979, the international leanings of Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia were exactly reversed! What stayed constant were local divisions: Amharic Ethiopian conflict with Somalia and Eritrea; Sudanese-Egyptian cooperation against Libya (now modified); southern Sudanese conflict with Khartoum and ties to Ethiopia.

Soviet policy now pursues three goals: to defend Ethiopia and make it Africa's first communist country, to stay clear of other commitments, and to mobilize Africans against American military power, in the region. The Soviets did not adopt Chad's civil war,
nor will they adopt Sudan's: why alienate half the OAU and incur costs and commitments for no discernible gain? Naval presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean is a security matter (hence facilities at Aden and the Ethiopian Dahlak Islands) but presence in interior Africa definitely is not.

Soviet regional policy is caught in some tangles. Support of Libya was always distant partly so as not to alienate Egypt, which remains the regional prize. Sudan's new government mends fences in Moscow while it provides sanctuary for the Eritreans and fights southern insurgents trained by Cubans in Ethiopia. Libya now enjoys good relations with Sudan, and its 1981 Friendship Treaty with Ethiopia and South Yemen seems a dead letter.

LIBYAN ACTIVITIES AND SOVIET INTERESTS

Libyan meddling in Africa and the Indian Ocean seems to have no relation to Soviet national interests. In the 1970s and early 1980s Libya bought Soviet arms, some $5.8 billion in 1978-82, and thus recycled petrodollars into Soviet accounts. Qadhafy's provocations of the Americans, and American retaliation, also make useful propaganda so long as Soviets can stay out of games of chicken with the Sixth Fleet. In Africa, however, close association with Libya hurts the Soviet reputation. In the early 1980s Libya tried to buy influence in Liberia, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mauritius, and throughout West Africa. Libyan soldiers were present when the Tanzanian army deposed Idi Amin in 1979. Khartoum
was bombed several times by Libyan aircraft. Libya's 1973 occupation of Chad's Aouzou strip\textsuperscript{65} violated the sacrosanct OAU principle of no territorial changes, and Libyan imperialism in Chad was blatant. Hence the Libyans, rich and arrogant Arabs intent on mischief, alienated important African leaders such as Nyerere of Tanzania and the Nigerians.\textsuperscript{66}

For their part the Soviets rightly consider Qadhafy a loose cannon who violates their conservative style of control and careful planning. Qadhafy's Green Book Islamic socialism (rejected by the Moslem Brotherhood and other fundamentalists) and his quirky administrative and diplomatic organization have nothing in common with Leninism. The Soviets never considered Libya "socialist-oriented", and Qadhafy never invited Soviet and East German tutelage within party and army. Libyan leaders are called by their military titles, never "comrade"; relations are not "fraternal." The East Germans help with internal security, and Qadhafy's escape from various plots may have something to do with East bloc intelligence protection. But the Soviets were unwilling, in 1983, to sign a Friendship Treaty with its implicit promise of military protection. An "agreement in principle"\textsuperscript{67} to conclude a treaty was never fulfilled: Qadhafy's October 1985 Moscow visit produced only a statement about "political consultations." Abdul Jalloud's May 1986 visit, after the U.S. attack on Libya and reported Libyan offers of a naval base to the Soviets, produced no change in Soviet policy. The communique reported only "support for the Libyan revolution" and "that the Soviet Union was prepared to help Libya
in strengthening its defense capability." Gorbachev called the U.S. attack "criminal aggression" -- but action was nil. When the Soviets issue a serious warning, the tone is different, as in "hands off Socialist Vietnam" to the invading Chinese in 1979. "Criminal aggression," a judgment from afar, is commonplace rhetoric.

CHAD: REASONS FOR NONINTERVENTION

The Soviets never got involved in Chad, and the reasons are instructive because they apply elsewhere in Africa.

First, the anti-Western side was unreliable. Soviet statements referred to the opposition GUNT (Gouvernement de l'Unite Transitionelle) sponsored by Libya as "progressive" but not socialist: its leader, Goukouni Oueddei, was in fact a northern traditional leader. Hissene Habre, in Njamena with French and U.S. aid, is a Paris-educated intellectual, formerly part of Goukouni's rebellion. In spring 1987 Goukuoni and his soldiers quit, and Chad's soldiers routed the Libyans at Faya Largeau.

Chad is a Libyan-French proxy war. The Soviets need good relations with France which help in important European matters such as arms control and East-West trade. Chad forced the Soviets to take sides between France and Libya, which was unwelcome, and it inspired successful French activism in Africa, which was equally unwelcome. During the 1983-84 fighting and French intervention in Chad, when the U.S. also sent arms, Pravda denounced French
"imperialism" and repeated Libyan lies about Libya's noninvolvement. It also accused the Mitterand government of being a pawn of Washington. (Whenever Europeans act together with the United States in Africa, the Soviets call them puppets to wound their pride and split the West.) Mostly, the Soviets tried to avoid the Chad issue; Chad was never mentioned in the long lists of issues crammed into Soviet-African communiques.

Relations with Nigeria also matter. Long term cultivation of Nigeria, as a major regional power, has continued since the Biafran war of 1967-70. The Nigerians sent peacekeeping forces to Chad in 1981, encouraged mediation, and strongly oppose Libyan subversion and imperialism across the Sahara, which they will contain by force if necessary.

African countries generally were deeply divided on the Chad issue. Some, more pro-Libyan, saw it as a civil war and wanted even-handed mediation. Others wanted Libya out. The issue split the OAU and cost Qadhafy his OAU chairmanship in 1986. The Soviets, following their policy of backing for the OAU generally, refused to take sides and encouraged Mengistu of Ethiopia, who became Chairman, to pursue mediation.

Finally, Chad has no strategic or economic importance.

SUDAN

Sudan is a strategic country: it borders ten others and the Red Sea. It is also one of the world's poorest countries. The
rains finally came in 1985, and then the locusts in 1986. In 1985 six million people were affected by famine. Sudan remains on the list of countries needing emergency food (with Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia) in spite of a record harvest of 4.6 million tons and a grain surplus in 1985. In the rebel-held countryside of the south, a million people may be hungry. In February 1986 food convoys from Kenya were stopped by the rebels. Government unconcern and inefficiency also contributes; in summer 1985 U.S. food aid (called "Reagan" in Sudan) sat at Port Said while the railways carried commercial and religious supplies.

Sudan has five million refugees. Some three million are in rebel held areas. 75% are from Ethiopia and Eritrea; others from Uganda and Chad. Sudan cannot meet interest on its $9 billion debt; the IMF cut all further credit in February 1986. Government efforts to control imports and black market currency trading fail, as anyone who has visited the market in Khartoum will well understand. The Soviet Union can not and will not give serious economic help to Sudan. For this reason a serious Soviet connection is not useful.

The changes since the army coup which toppled General Nimeiry in April 1985 -- anti-American agitation, the March 1986 agreement with Libya, some warming of relations with Ethiopia and the Soviet Union -- are driven by the internal politics of Islamic fundamentalism. Nimeiry had made himself highly unpopular. For instance, he built a monument to himself at the site of the Ansar Mosque at Omdurman, the shrine of Islamic nationalism in Sudan. The country
was in desperate economic straits. Nimieri tried to forestall renewed rebellion in the African, non-Moslem provinces of the south by administrative reorganization and political deals setting some provincial leaders against others. Nevertheless by early 1984 the rebels, successors to the An'nyanya rebellion of 1959-72, controlled much of the south. Southern leaders sought control of oil revenues and an end to resettlement of people to accommodate the Jonglei canal project. Egyptian and American connections were too close for some nationalist army officers, who resented Sudan's participation in Bright Star exercises while Libyan planes occasionally bombed Khartoum.

Nimeiry tried to save his position by a coalition with one of the two Islamic movements, the Moslem Brotherhood. The Brotherhood's price for joining the government, in September 1983, was nationwide sharia (Islamic law), which inflamed the smoldering rebellion in the south. At the same time Nimiery imprisoned the popular leader of the rival Ansar, Sadiq el-Mahdi. By early 1984 Nimeiry had almost no support left.

The elections of April 1986, after a year of military rule under General Siwardahad (or Siwar el-Dahab) brought to power Sadiq el-Mahdi and his Umma (Islamic unity) party, political front for the Ansar. Sadiq is charismatic, British-educated, an orator, and an administrator. He is descended from the Mahdi who led the Islamic resistance to the British in the 1880s and who founded Ansar. Sadiq is now Prime Minister. The National Islamic Front, party of the Brotherhood, got 20% of the vote. The Sudan Communist
Party, one the traditional communist parties of the Arab world, emerged from underground to contest the elections. The Sudan CP was important in the 1950s and 1960s. It was suppressed after communist-led plots against Nimieri (1970 and 1972) with Libyan connivance failed. In 1986 the communists are no longer important. The party won very few votes and only a few seats in parliament. Islamic resurgence has left communists in the dust. The Soviets take little interest in the Sudan CP (and in African or Arab communist parties generally) and show no sign of devoting prestige or resources to it.

Changes in Sudan's foreign relations are of some, but not much, benefit to the Soviets. Sudan's absence from the Bright Star exercises helps disrupt U.S. military planning in the Middle East, and preventing U.S. military dominance in the Middle East is very important. The dramatic change was Sudan's decision to mend fences with Libya and to drop the special arrangement with Egypt. In July 1985 Libya held out a promise to end supply to the southern rebellion. On 14 March 1986, in Tripoli, Sudan Defense Minister Mohamed signed a military cooperation agreement with Libya. Libya promised military aid and training -- use of the Tupolevs recently bombing Khartoum to bomb the Southerners! In the personal politics of the Arab world, Nimieri and Qadhafy were bitter enemies, and the warming of Libyan-Sudan relations was mostly due to a change of leaders and personalities. On 31 March 1986 Sudan dissolved the 1982 10-year integration agreement with Egypt. Egypt said relations remain "normal and good." Such changes are common;
agreements for integration among Arab states come and go quite regularly. Libya may now cooperate with Sudan against the southern insurgency aided from Soviet client Ethiopia. All this makes perfectly good sense if one realizes that in this region the real divisions are Islamic-Christian or Arab-African, not East-West, and that the superpowers get drawn in on the principle "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

Also in March 1986 Prime Minister Sadiq told a Khartoum rally that Sudan "decided to put all its resources at the disposal of the Libyan people in the face of savage U.S. aggression." In April, a U.S. diplomat was shot in Khartoum, and another anti-American rally held. Former Vice President Omer Muhamed el-Tayeeb, once head of their secret police, was convicted of treason for his part in the airlift of Ethiopian Jews to Israel and incidentally for cooperation with the CIA. A Sudan military mission visited Moscow in March 1986 and Prime Minister Sadiq visited in August. Gorbachev did not meet Sadiq, and no special arrangements were announced. Diplomatic relations have been restored with Ethiopia also.

None of this is pro-Soviet or "left" behavior. All of it is Islamic nationalism, led by the army and the Ansar, to assert Sudan's independence of Egypt, move out of a U.S. orbit, and try to cope with the burning issue of the southern rebellion.

In the south, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army led by John Garang (an alumnus of Grinnell College and Iowa State) controls the countryside. The SPLA (or SPLM, for Movement) is based on the
Dinka people. It has tribal rivals, but none in support of sharia law and Arab rule from Khartoum. Garang's forces, perhaps 15,000, have training camps and a radio station in Ethiopia. Garang claims his goal is a united Sudan ruled by socialist principles. Nevertheless his movement is the direct successor to the An'nyanya separatist rebellion of 1959-72. SPLM rhetoric about unity and socialism may have more to do with keeping Cuban and Ethiopian backing than with real policy choice. The SPLM was invited to join the April 1986 elections. It refused, and no elections were held in half the southern districts. Garang's conditions for a cease fire are an end to sharia law, no military ties with Egypt or Libya, and a new constitution. Sadiq el-Mahdi and the army, on a wave of Islamic sentiment, cannot meet these conditions. In 1986 at Port Sudan a mob led by Moslem Brothers burned a Christian church. Nuba Christians retaliated. High feelings reflected in such incidents block reconciliation.

The Soviet Union provides some indirect support to the rebellion via Ethiopia. Public support would alienate the Arab countries: one more demonstration of Russia's fickle friendship for Arab causes. Also, while SPLM claims not to be secessionist, they are seen that way, and the Soviets have been careful to wrap themselves in the cloak of national territorial integrity in Ethiopia next door. Soviet purposes would be best served support by a Sudanese cutoff of supply and sanctuary to the Eritreans, in return for a cutoff of Ethiopia aid to the Southerners. But the Sudanese can't end the Islamic Eritrean movement any more than the
Soviets or Ethiopians can change the local roots of southern Sudanese dissent.

Soviet analysis, realistic as usual, says that Nimiery fell because he had become a personal tyrant supported only by privileged bureaucrats. His effort to co-opt "the Islamic wave" didn't work. That the successor military government let communists and others out of jail is good, but "the democratically inclined army" is not ready to "achieve a transfer of power directly into the hands of [communist] representatives of the people's movement." Sadiq and Umma are passed off as "conservative" and "representing a privileged minority."75

These comments by George Mirsky, leading Soviet analyst of Arab military coups, are essentially correct. Mirsky also carefully hints a thwarted conspiracy. He says that unspecified Radical Free Officers in the army "see Garang's movement as a central element of the process of revolutionary transformation which for the time being awaits further development as a result of the preventative coup of the generals." Mirsky quotes the Cuban paper Granma: the Free Officers are "an organic part of the Sudan national liberation movement including Garang."76 However a Sudan takeover by Soviet- or Cuban-connected military radicals may wait a very long time.
ETHIOPIA: AFRICA'S FIRST COMMUNIST COUNTRY

In September 1979, on the fifth anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution, Alexei Kosygin dedicated Lenin Square opposite Africa Hall in Addis Ababa. On the tenth anniversary, in September 1984, Politburo member Grigorii Romanov helped inaugurate the Workers Party of Ethiopia -- a ruling communist party. The Ethiopian leaders seemed committed to becoming communist, even at severe economic and social cost. Ethiopian Social Affairs Minister and Politburo member Berhanu Bayih said the government would collectivize the entire peasantry -- some 38 million people and 90% of the population. Or as Chairman Mengistu said in 1981:

there are some who have forgotten that the sole basis for our revolutionary struggle was the ideology and politics which we follow . . . who tend to neglect political and ideological issues, taking the priority we have given to economic reconstruction as a reason.

National communism is not necessarily Soviet-led or even Soviet-linked. Tito and Mao were communists too. Like Vietnam, Ethiopia is an ally but not a satellite. Ethiopia's culture is distinct and the country has successfully resisted foreign domination for thousands of years. Soviet influence depends on the Ethiopian leaders. Paul Henze concluded in 1983:

Ethiopia itself is an open question. Its revolution is far from consolidated. Basic political questions are as unsolved as they were in 1975. Mengistu's capacity to maintain himself in power remains to be demonstrated. Ethiopian nationalism has been strengthened by the defeat of the Somalis and the Eritrean rebels, but this very nationalism may prove to be a serious problem for the Russians. They are going to have to continue providing not only economic aid but increasing quantities of economic aid. The full price for Ethiopia is far from being paid.
The Workers Party of Ethiopia

After five years of dallying by COPWE, the Commission to Organize the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was inaugurated in September 1984. The WPE structure is an almost exact copy of the Soviet communist party: General Secretary, Politburo, Central Committee, central Secretariat, Party Congress, Central Control Commission. Branches are to be formed in workplaces and army units throughout the country. Mengistu plans to establish party schools beyond the central party school now operating in Addis Ababa.

The formalities can be misleading. The former ruling junta, the Standing Committee of the Provisional Military Advisory Council (PMAC), transformed itself into the Politburo. The PMAC was not abolished, but continues in tandem with the WPE. Mengistu is WPE General Secretary and PMAC Chairman. (Soviet sources always list the WPE first, but use both titles.) Most of the first 11 full and 6 candidate members of the WPE Politburo were also PMAC standing committee members. Regional administrators also have been left in place. As in most Soviet-model systems, the key institution may be the central Secretariat of the WPE. At the November 1985 Soviet-Ethiopian summit meeting in Moscow the head of the WPE secretariat International Department, Ashagre Yigletu, was listed ahead of Foreign Minister Goshe Wolde.

The crucial power issue is the relation of party and army. The army must fight in Eritrea and Tigre and may be used to force peasants into collectives. Most of the soldiers are themselves
peasants with little or no education. Army leadership is likely to be more cautious than the top leaders and party officials. (A large body of Soviet literature documents the tendency of African national armies to "backslide" from radical "revolutionary democracy" toward more conservative and anti-Soviet nationalism. Egypt, Somalia, and Sudan are cited with other countries. In Ethiopia, a newly created political branch, modeled on the Soviet Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces, is responsible for ideology and loyalty. At the inaugural WPE Congress General Mesfin Gebre Kal, himself a central committee member, took an oath of loyalty on behalf of the army. Defense Minister and Politburo member Lt. General Tesfaye Gebre Kidian mentioned recent creation of the first party cells in the armed forces.79

Soviet or other foreign advisers cannot monitor, let alone control, the content of ideological instruction in Amharic. Few recruits have the education to understand political ideas. For many, Amharic is a second language. The universal draft promulgated in 1983 will increase the number and depress the educational level of recruits, making political education yet more difficult.

The economy is managed by a Central Planning Supreme Council created in 1978. Soviet and East German advisers have pushed centralization, and collective farms. The economic bureaucracy, growing rapidly, apparently is staffed largely by economic ideologues out of touch with local and peasant realities. This is both a communist problem, and a more general African one:
bureaucracies of school and university graduates imposing unrealistic sorts of "socialism" on peasants have existed in Guinea, Tanzania, and other countries.

Like other African "vanguard parties," the WPE is a small, elite organization. In September 1985 the Ethiopian party had only 900 "cells" and perhaps 15,000 total membership, although 30,000 are claimed. This represents about one of every thousand adult Ethiopians. In 1981 COPWE, the party forerunner, had a membership which was 95% "teachers, officials, members of the army and other sectors of society" while workers were 2.9% and peasants 1.2%. In 1982 the percentage of workers (a flexible classification: bureaucrats may be included) reportedly reached 21.7% and peasants 3.3%; the intelligentsia was now (only!) 75%. Pravda notes efforts to increase peasant and worker membership.

WPE ties to the people are obviously very weak. The army, not the party, is the only real transmission belt connecting rulers and ruled. Ethiopia remains a military regime with a new party label; the task for Mengistu and the Soviets is to maintain control of the army while developing Party institutions. Cadre training, preparation of the future Ethiopian elite, is important. In 1984, Romanov mentioned 3,000 Ethiopians training in the USSR. Others are in East Germany. This seems a small number given Ethiopia's 35 million people and its importance in Soviet policy.

The Soviet interpretation of Ethiopia

In spite of the communist enthusiasm of Ethiopia's top
leadership, Soviet spokesmen are cautious. Politburo member Romanov deliberately introduced skepticism and uncertainty about Ethiopia's prospects in his speech to the founding Congress:

A distinguishing feature of Comrade Mengistu's report is the combination of revolutionary aspiration for the future and the consideration of the real situation... The WPE talks honestly and openly about difficulties and unresolved problems. It rightly stresses that much effort and time are still needed to extricate the country from the clutches of a backwardness inherited from the past...

Moreover, the Soviets are wary of the Ethiopian leadership:

success in building socialism can only be achieved by a party that does not lose its bearings, or backslide... There is no doubt that under party leadership Ethiopia's movement forward along the chosen path will be even more assured and purposeful.

The party itself is not Marxist-Leninist (communist) but is "a party guided by the ideals of Marxism-Leninism." In relations with the Soviet Union, "on the whole, the potential and reserves of mutual cooperation are considerable and its prospects are good." In Soviet language, a "potential" which is "good" "on the whole" means that serious problems exist.

Mengistu went to Moscow in November 1985 as Gorbachev's guest at the Soviet anniversary celebrations. Pravda (7 November) called it a visit "of very great importance." Mengistu met at length with Nikolai Ryzhkov on economic questions, presumably the Ethiopian problem in repaying its Soviet debt, and other matters of Soviet and CMEA economic aid. The details of the Ethiopian debt are not known, but like other Soviet allies Ethiopia is expected to pay, and has difficulty doing so. Coffee exports to the West are the
only major source of hard currency earnings, and prices have been low. Soviet aid during the famine of 1984 and 1985 was highly touted by the Ethiopians, but it consisted only of trucks (probably sent for military purposes) and of air transport. The real aid came from the United States and Europe. The economic talks in Moscow resulted in no new agreements. As usual, speeches and communiques praised the importance of Party-to-Party ties and the Soviet-Ethiopian Friendship Treaty -- and mentioned only "the desire to further deepen their economic ties" (Izvestia, 12 November 1985).

Mengistu announced "preparations to proclaim The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia"; that is, taking a communist state name. He reaffirmed the classical Leninist formula of building "organs of people's power" -- the Party and secret police and political cells within the army-- before undertaking economic change. Mengistu acknowledged "bitter ideological struggle" within the Ethiopian elite and said that "the decisive transitional period of the Ethiopian revolution" is now at hand (Pravda, 3 November 1985). This has an ominous ring, reminiscent of the Stalin purges.

Gorbachev congratulated the Ethiopians for surviving the famine and for moving peasants to "new areas that are most favorable in which to live and work" (Pravda, 3 November). The Soviet leader thus endorsed Ethiopia's resettlement and deportation schemes.

Mengistu's Moscow trip came just after President Reagan's speech at the United Nations which mentioned Ethiopia (with
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, and Nicaragua) as a pro-Soviet regime to be fought. In this context, Mengistu let fly some virulent anti-American rhetoric. Gorbachev accused the United States of taking "societal revenge" against Soviet-linked countries. ("Revenge" alludes to policies of Nazi Germany, and is a strong word in Soviet language.) He compared "provocative military maneuvers" of Washington against reiterated Soviet proposals for an African nuclear-free zone and an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (presumably to exclude U.S. carrier forces and SLBMs from as much of the area as possible). Sounding another Soviet theme, Gorbachev contrasted presumed Soviet and Ethiopian support for the Organization of African Unity (of which Ethiopia was Chairman in 1984-85) with "the imperialist policy of dividing African states."83

The Soviet-Ethiopian communique claimed "complete identity of views" on all world issues. This is stronger language, and indicates a closer relation, than the May 1986 communique with Angola, and much closer than 1986 communiques with Mozambique, Libya, and Algeria.

Marx against the peasant -- again

Party and peasant, city and countryside, food production and land tenure are a key issue in Ethiopia as in all twentieth century revolutions. Lenin knew that the revolution would be secure only when the peasants were under control. Stalin broke the resistance of the peasants by force, deporting several million to the camps.
The Ethiopian leaders seem utterly Stalinist: "We believe 100% collectivization will work and is the only way to develop the rural areas of our country." \(^8\)

Ethiopian peasants traditionally live in scattered farmsteads, and must be relocated to consolidated villages. The 1984 development plan anticipated half the peasantry collectivized by 1995. In 1984, no more than 2% of the land was in cooperatives; the rest was individually controlled. \(^8\) The land reform of 1975 redistributed large estates to the peasants and created Peasant Associations. We know little about what goes on in the Ethiopian countryside, but do know that peasant smallholders are notoriously resistant to losing their land. In 1978–83 East German advisers in the Land Tenure Ministry argued to make former large estates in the south into state farms. These then took up more resources than they produced, including most of the fertilizer. Prices paid to peasants have been low and controlled, which kept food production down. \(^8\) These common mistakes made the famine of 1983–85 worse. While most African countries move toward a free market for peasant crops, Ethiopian policy is in reverse.

In 1983–85 the regions hardest hit by famine were Eritrea and Tigre, where most of the countryside is in rebel hands. Tigre was expected to produce only 30% of its food needs in 1985–86. The 1985 harvest of 5.5 million tons was 12% below normal, and in 1986 Ethiopia needed to import 1.08 million tons of food for 6 million hungry people. In summer and fall 1985 food shipped to Ethiopia piled up on the docks, and the Ethiopian army refused to use
military trucks for food distribution in the north.

The government apparently used famine to bring rebellious Eritrean and Tigrean and Oromo peasants into camps and remove them to the south. Those unwilling became refugees dumped on impoverished neighbors Somalia and Sudan. Driving rebel populations into neighboring countries, while resettling the remainder in distant areas, is one Soviet-model solution to ethnic turmoil. Compare Afghans, the Meskito of Nicaragua, Kampucheans, the Hmong of Laos. Perhaps as many as 600,000 Ethiopian peasants were "resettled" in 1985. Families were separated. The French Medecins sans Frontieres claimed 100,000 people may have died during "resettlement." 87 Stalin's "resettlements" of nationalities come quickly to mind. In Oromo areas livestock have been confiscated to drive peasants into collective, controlled villages. Some flee to Somalia, which now has some 850,000 refugees, to escape collectivization.

Whether collectivization can be extended to 30 million people is doubtful. Ethiopia's primitive countryside has neither tractors nor roads to support an equivalent of the Soviet Machine Tractor Stations of the 1930s. The party has no members in the villages. The army of peasant soldiers will be the point of contact between peasants and the government. Hence political education and control of the army are crucial.

Minister Bayih says that because collectivization is "voluntary" there can be "no resistance" to it. 88

Soviet sources are silent about Ethiopian peasants, and
rebellions, except to denounce "imperialism's attempts to politicize and ideologize the hunger problem . . . using it against the forces of social and national liberation." Ethiopia is now treated like Afghanistan; the Soviets avoid saying much about their side.

The national question and the rebellions

Since 1978, the Ethiopian government has said it will resolve the nationalities issue along Soviet lines, by allowing some autonomy and cultural independence. This can happen only after all territory is conquered and resistance ends. Rebellions are caused by the United States:

Because of the strategic location of Ethiopia reaction and international imperialism are actively opposing the revolution there and using nationalism as a means of their subversive policy. Separatist organizations . . . draw generous aid in return for their waving of the flag of nationalism and serve as a tool to carry out the strategic designs of imperialism and reaction.

Of the several rebellions, the Ogaden has been cleared and the people driven into Somalia. The Western Somali Liberation Front exists but makes little trouble for the Ethiopian army. The Oromo areas are also largely quiet. The Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (originally Marxist and Cuban-trained) and the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front remain strong and troublesome. EPLF and TPLF have sanctuary and a supply route from Sudan; perhaps as many as 500,000 refugees fled to Sudan in 1984 and 1985. Food for Tigre enters via Sudan. EPLF and TPLF are distinct; disputes
between them interrupted supply.

The national conflict in Ethiopia is not entirely a Christian-Moslem one. Eritreans and Oromos and Somalis are Moslem, but Tigreans, whose language is spoken throughout the north, are Christian. Tigreans resent the continued dominance of Shoan Amharas in positions of power, which has intensified under the revolution. The TPLF aims to free Ethiopia from "Soviet lackeys" who represent only the narrow ethnic interests of the Shoans.

Before the famine, the Ethiopian army had made little progress against the Eritreans, and the Tigreans were growing stronger. In 1983 Ethiopia introduced compulsory military service for all men ages 18-30, with reserve obligations to age 50. Ethiopian offensives in 1983 and 1984 failed to clear the province. In March 1984 Eritreans claimed they routed "thousands of Ethiopian troops" in a counterattack. Soviet model counterinsurgency relies on staying power rather than quick victory, but the strength of the insurgency must have been worrisome. In 1985, contacts between Somalia, the EPLF, and the TPLF were announced. The Sudan government reported Ethiopian troops seeking asylum. 1985 Ethiopian summer and fall offensives also failed to win: the EPLF claimed 5,000 government casualties at Barentu in August 1985.

Nevertheless about half of the Cuban troops serving in Ethiopia since the 1978 Ogaden war were withdrawn in early 1984. Cost may be one reason. It is usual Soviet practice to require the hosts to pay for Socialist Community troops quartered in the country, and the Cubans reportedly cost some $5 million a year.92
Another is that more Cubans were needed in Angola, and Cuba may have wished to keep the total size of its African expeditionary forces constant, to limit dissent at home. The remaining 5,000 Cuban soldiers may serve as a special protective force for the PMAC/Politburo leaders. They can hold an airport as a bridgehead if the Soviet Union decides to intervene against a coup -- maintaining "socialist orientation" as in Afghanistan. (The Soviet troops in Cuba may serve the same function.) The usual Soviet rule is that Soviet or other communist soldiers may fight foreign attackers but not internal insurgents. Once a country becomes part of "socialism," however, intervention is justified (as in Hungary or Czechoslovakia). The rule was broken in Afghanistan, but so far has been upheld in Ethiopia; in 1977-78 Cubans fought the Somalis, external invaders, but not the Eritreans. Whether Ethiopia would be worth Soviet intervention depends on circumstances. In 1987, given Gorbachev's announced priority of domestic reform and the experience of Afghanistan -- and also the skepticism of the Soviet experts about the benefits of building socialism in faraway backward countries -- intervention against the Ethiopian army would not be undertaken. Soviet influence, and the communist future of Ethiopia, now depends on politics within the party and the army.

**Ethiopia: regional influence**

Ethiopia now hosts dissident politicians and provides guerrilla sanctuary for two neighboring countries, Somalia and Sudan. It has also become a location for South African ANC
training camps and the ANC radio -- out of reach of the South African military. Mengistu's comparison to Vietnam is apt: Ethiopia is a multiethnic empire with pretensions to regional dominance and continental influence. Socialist Ethiopia inherits the country's symbolic role as mentor of free Africa, and inherits also the headquarters of the OAU and the UN Economic Commission for Africa. Pan-African influences touch the Ethiopian leadership, and the revolution is watched by a crowd of international bureaucrats.

The official Soviet-Ethiopian position is that Ethiopia seeks "good-neighborliness" with all nearby countries.\textsuperscript{93} The condition for neighborly relations is an end to supply to the Tigreans and Eritreans and Somali renunciation of claims to the Ogaden. Ethiopian support for the southern Sudan rebellion and the Somali dissidents is negotiable. (This follows the Afghanistan pattern: use counter-threats as bargaining chips to end rebellion.) For now, Ethiopia and the Soviets take the high moral ground of territorial integrity and offers of detente as they pursue military reconquest of the borderlands.

SOMALIA

The increasingly unpopular dictatorship of Siyaad Barre remains Soviet and socialist in form but anti-Soviet in content. Not only is reconquest of the Ogaden out of the question, but the Ethiopians are able to invade at will. Forays by the Ethiopian army across the border, at points where the Somali north, formerly...
British Somaliland, might be cut from the formerly Italian south, are undertaken on occasion to make the point. In present circumstances the Soviets, whose help would be necessary, show no interest in an Ethiopian conquest of Somalia. Such a venture would multiply Ethiopia's economic and counterinsurgency problems, and would totally undercut Soviet claims to be a non-expansionist, disinterested friend of Africa and the OAU.

Addis Ababa hosts two Somali dissident groups, the more radical Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia and the more conservative Somali National Movement. Few educated Somalis, at home or in exile, are active supporters of the regime. Some military officers and others educated in the Soviet Union retain nostalgia for the good old days of the Soviet alliance, but this has nothing to do with ideology. Somalis naturally prefer their 1970s role as a strong and growing regional force, with Soviet arms, to their present unimportance.
V. CONCLUSION

Soviet influence in Africa, while limited by domestic weakness and cultural distance, is more secure today than in the early 1980s. Two poles of influence and presence, in Ethiopia and Angola, have been defended successfully. The South African issue has enabled the Soviets to win respect and acceptance as a friend of Africa while "constructive engagement" has hardened the African view that the United States is ignorant and uncaring. Since 1979, the Soviets have been out of the game of military intervention to prop up or establish friendly regimes. Since then, they have been cultivating long term influence by support of general African causes while avoiding new commitments.

Since the mid-1970s, as African economies slipped inexorably into destitution, concerns of African leaders necessarily turned from politics to rural development. The great discovery of the past decade has been that 'you can't eat ideology,' particularly socialist ideology which ignores peasants, depresses crop prices, and substitutes controls and bureaucrats for production. (You can't eat corrupt capitalism either: Zaire and Nigeria have as many problems as Tanzania or Guinea, and many of them are the same.) The Soviet Union is not important to Africa's economies. Even if it lasts, the current improvement in Soviet production will not produce for a generation the surplus over domestic needs that an active policy of significant aid to Africa would require. As long as the West (Europe, mostly) remains the only source of funds
and markets, Soviet involvements are useful only for military or security reasons. A Soviet connection may be attractive to insecure leaders who fear overthrow. External security, the defense of borders against hostile neighbors, is not often an issue. Secessionist, regional, and border wars exist along the northern African fault line from Western Sahara to the Horn (in 1987, Chad and Libya, for example). But the assistance desired in Africa is generally to control one's own population, bureaucracy, opposition factions, and above all the army. In the 1975-80 period this is what the Soviets promised: join us, and we will arm you and protect you in power and teach you to transform your country. For the last six or seven years this has not been Soviet policy because protection of more and more poor clients proved expensive, militarily costly, diplomatically counterproductive, and lacking benefits equal to costs or risks.

Southern Africa is the last of the "anti-imperialist" struggles where the Soviets are the natural ally of liberation and revolution. Elsewhere, Soviet policy inevitably is caught up in local and factional struggles where taking sides makes as many enemies as friends. Consider Chad, Sudan, or the Horn. So far, the Soviets have not discovered a successful policy other than nonintervention. The question is whether they will relegate "Leninist" objectives of expansion to the historical ashcan.

Apart from southern Africa -- a most promising opportunity for Soviet gains -- Soviet influence and presence is likely to remain low because the Soviets will not spare the resources for
intervention in chancy African circumstances and do not wish to inherit the ensuing commitments. Sub-Saharan Africa has very little importance to Soviet security. Activism in Africa is a Soviet luxury, and this is no time for luxuries. The prospect for the next decade, until the 1996 29th Party Congress, is low-cost, low-risk, consistent, credible, prestige-building, uncommitted Soviet policy, to build Soviet-African friendship to long term advantage. South African revolution could change that. The opportunity to become protector and patron of all southern Africa, with the great economic and strategic and political implications of such an expansion of the Soviet sphere, could lead to other unpredictable results.

A longer world historical view helps to understand Soviet-African relations. For seven decades the Soviets have tried to find ways to profit from the confused and often violent process of Asian and African resurgence against Western domination. Soviet strategy has always had two stages: first, to aid liberation and in the process weaken the West; second, to recruit the "newly-free countries" as Soviet allies and eventual partners in world communism. As all dialecticians know, there are only two sides, capitalism and socialism: to quote Lenin, there is "no third way." What has happened, over seven decades, is that country after country, region after region, has thrown off Western control, sometimes using Soviet aid to do so -- and then has failed to follow through into the Soviet camp. Countries have gone their own national-cultural self-interested way, be it Chinese, Islamic,
African socialist, or whatever. Lenin was wrong: once liberated, the dialectic ceases to operate. Soviets know this. They no longer try to explain away the recent histories of China, India, Egypt, or Iran. The issue now, at the outset of the Gorbachev era, is whether the Soviets can throw off archaic objectives and habits; acknowledge a world which is national and plural, not dialectic, and which is highly resistant to anybody's imperialism; acknowledge their own role as a nation and not the self-appointed leader of the world's future; and integrate themselves into whatever post-capitalist world order we are evolving.
SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICY

SOUTH AFRICA

The great danger to U.S. interests is deepening polarization in South Africa, with the U.S. isolated as the only patron of apartheid. Success requires a policy which really desires transition to majority rule, not delay on behalf of the South African government. Reformed policy may allow the United States to repeat its Middle East success of the 1970s, as a country able to talk to everyone with some degree of credibility. In the present climate of economic pragmatism, South Africa is the only issue which seriously sets Africa against the U.S. Reformed policy toward South Africa will undercut potential Soviet influence and will improve U.S. relations everywhere in Africa.

1. Announce that the U.S. will assist in a transition to majority democratic rule.

2. Make contacts with all groups, prominently including the ANC, including also white groups.

3. Continue to advocate non-violent transition to democratic majority rule, but with as much emphasis on transition as non-violent. Maintain that human rights apply to everyone -- including whites after a change of power.

4. Start non-military aid and training for ANC exile youth, also for all other groups. Expand existing programs.

5. Continue contacts with the Botha government. Push lifting of censorship and drastic expansion of the franchise. Also an end to segregation in housing -- dismantling of the restrictions on who may live where, which is apartheid at its most basic.

6. Work out contingency plans with Britain, other European countries, and Canada for absorption of 2-3 million white refugees, and also Asian and black refugees.
7. Develop a Western plan for economic transition in South Africa. This plan must allow:

- redistribution of wealth and services to blacks
- continued Western access to resources
- jobs for Afrikaner whites now employed in army, police, and state bureaucracy. One third of all Afrikaners now depend on the government payroll. These will be the first jobs demanded by blacks. Control of army and police will be critical. Afrikaner bureaucrats may join the die-hard element willing to shed blood for white rule and subject to retaliation after.

8. Lift U.S. diplomacy out of its Pretoria ghetto to a position of mediation and mobility:

- call for a Transition to Majority Rule Conference. Invite the Europeans; the Soviet Union; the South African government, the ANC, other South African black leaders; and the Frontline States. The conference would not be held but the proposal would demonstrate a new American perspective.
- make South Africa a subject of overt and public U.S. concern.

These measures would increase visibility and publicity about South Africa, which would add to the pressure for reform more than sanctions or other punishments.

The other reasonable policy is disengagement -- continue commerce as usual, let the political chips fall where they may, and cope with whatever happens. If the United States stays out of politics and will do business with whoever is in power, little threat exists to minerals supply. No outside country will control events in South Africa, so why not just wait and see what happens? This European or Japanese, approach should be seriously considered. Surprisingly, Soviets along with Africans may prefer U.S.
involvement and a controlled transition to crisis and unpredictable consequences.

ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, ZIMBABWE

United States Policy should benefit from renewed talks with Angola and proposed aid to SADCC and Mozambique. Basic guidelines are:

1. Encourage European and United States investment in Southern Africa.

2. Bolster FRELIMO against RENAMO/MNR. RENAMO is a South African mercenary force bent on destruction, not an alternative government. Mozambique is nonaligned, not part of a Soviet camp. The fall 1986 elections, interrupted but not stopped by Samora Machel's death, demonstrate legitimacy of the FRELIMO government. U.S. military counterinsurgency training for the Mozambican army should be considered. This would electrify southern Africa (including the Botha government) and challenge anti-American attitudes entrenched during the 1981-86 "constructive engagement" period.

3. Quietly stop talking about Cuban soldiers in Angola. Continue to urge a political solution with France and Brazil as guarantors. Include amnesty for UNITA and U.S. recognition of the Angola government, but without reparations.* Accept Angolan guarantees that no permanent foreign military bases or combat presence will be established - Cubans not specifically mentioned.

This policy respects pan-African tradition and African resistance to Cold War intervention in Africa. The Soviets and the MPLA, who pay, have an economic incentive to send the Cuban expeditionary force home. If peace and economic development break out in southern Africa, Angola is unlikely to remain strongly aligned with the Soviet Union.

(*Angola and the Soviets, with continuing reference to the cost of war, have been building the case for reparations; the same case is made for Mozambique and Nicaragua. Our side wins, and the West repays

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us our military costs for winning. In Angola the estimate is now $5 billion.)

4. Drop prestige issues and rebuild contact with Zimbabwe.

5. Leave Namibia alone. Namibia's future depends on South Africa's.

ETHIOPIA, SUDAN, AND THE HORN

Ethiopia is a national communist state, like Yugoslavia, China, or Vietnam. Ethiopian communism ruins the economy and is unmindful of human rights. But like Yugoslavia or China, Ethiopia need not repudiate communism to change its internal policies or its Soviet alignment.

The Soviet alignment depends on Ethiopia's need for military aid and Soviet willingness to provide it. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe provide no substantial aid or markets, and demand debt repayments. Since Soviet military facilities in Ethiopia seem only a minor irritant to U.S. interests, little reason exists for the U.S. to exert great effort or incur high political or military costs to get them out.

U.S. policy should promote trade and investment to encourage evolution like that of Yugoslavia, China, or Congo. Student and technical assistance training for Ethiopians in the U.S. would build on earlier U.S. contacts and take advantage of Ethiopian distaste for the Soviet style.

Sudan's change to a more popular government should be an improvement, even if Sudan relies less on the United States. Extension of the U.S. military-logistic net into southern Sudan...
does not seem worth the political costs of meddling in Khartoum's complicated factional politics. The worst outcome would be an exaggerated replay of the last years of the Nimeiry dictatorship: U.S. support for an unpopular dictator opposed by much of the Sudan army as well as the Southerners. Soviet or communist influence in Sudan is not an issue: the political trend is Islam, not Marxism.

An invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia or Ethiopian-aided Somalis is unlikely. The Soviets would not provide the money and guns to back it, and Ethiopia could not sustain it without Soviet aid. A coup in Mogadishu is far more likely. Gradual U.S. disengagement from the Siyaad Barre dictatorship and some contact with the democratic exile opposition may be wise.

TROPICAL AFRICA

Present Soviet policy has no strategy, and no desire, to create more African client states. Trends are favorable to Western economic ties, democracy, and greater political stability. Thus U.S. policy can

1. encourage economic development led by Europeans, particularly France.

2. avoid U.S. internal involvement or intervention, limit military aid.

3. recognize and deal with existing governments or their coup replacements (e.g. Nigeria, Cameroun, Guinea).

4. tilt toward promotion of human rights and democracy which is becoming a popular cause in Africa.

5. continue bilateral food aid and technical assistance.
6. stress that the West offers development and urge the Soviets to provide more non-military aid (which they won't).

In short, if current policy works, don't fix it.
NOTES

PART I


2. Among indicators of lack of attention to Africa, a survey article in _Mirovaia Ekonomiia i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia_ ("Tekushchie problemy mirovoi politiki," January 1986) listed "regional conflicts" last among "pressing problems," and mentioned only South Africa after Nicaragua and the Middle East. The most recent articles on Africa in the two military-political journals, _Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil_ and _Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal_, appeared in 1983. The new editor of _Azia i Afrika Segodnia_, Grigorii Kim, is an Asian specialist.

3. See Charles Wolf et al., _The Costs of the Soviet Empire_, RAND, 1983; also Thomas J. Zamostny in _The Washington Quarterly_, Spring 1984. Most costs are incurred in Eastern Europe and Cuba and Vietnam, but as military plus other foreign policy costs have grown to perhaps 20% of GNP the marginal cost of any new venture looks large. For the change in opinions of Soviet experts see Jerry Hough, _The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options_, Brookings, 1986, particularly chapter 4 and chapter 6.


5. "There is an irrefutable causal connection between the trillion-sized debt of these countries and the more than trillion-sized growth of military expenditures in the past ten years. The 200-odd billion dollars that are being annually pumped out of the developing countries and the practically equal size of the U.S. military budget in recent years are no coincidence." Gorbachev Report to the XVII Congress, loc. cit., p. 23.


9. Ponomarev in Kommunist, no. 2, January 1979, pp.29-30. A state Friendship treaty with the USSR and a vanguard party formally committed to Marxism-Leninism were the distinguishing features of "socialist orientation."

PART II


11. The narodniks, eventually organized in the Socialist Revolutionary Party, were the most formidable pre-revolutionary rivals of the Russian Marxists. Lenin denounced the narodniks from the 1890s onward, but the result was not settled until Bolshevik bayonets dispersed the elected Constituent Assembly of January 1918, in which the SRs held a majority on the strength of the peasant vote. In Africa, such ideas as Julius Nyerere's ujamaa, which literally means family-ness but which Nyerere translates as "socialism" are the narodnik deviation.


13. In his 1979 Kommunist article Ponomarev said that closing the party-people gap was necessary for success of "socialist orientation." In March 1986, also in Kommunist, Angolan President Dos Santos published a stinging self-criticism of the MPLA's failure to reach the peasants: "Avangardnaia rol' partii na nyneshnem etape Angol'skoj revoliutsii," Kommunist, no. 5, March 1985, pp. 88-98.

14. I. Andreyev, The Non-Capitalist Way, Moscow, 1977, p.53. "In many liberated countries with unformed classes some intermediate groups and sections play the social roles of future classes, acting as the temporary substitute in the political and ideological superstructure. The choice of capitalist or socialist orientation largely depends on the social groups that hold the key positions in the state apparatus."

15. Soviet encouragement of African allies to trade with the West follows the Soviet Union's own history. The first Soviet acts of detente in the 1920s were trade agreements with Britain, France, and Germany. Starvation was mitigated by American grain shipped by Herbert Hoover's ARA. Western advanced technology, and contract personnel to install it, was welcomed through the 1930s.

17. Mozolev, "Rol' armii . . ." 

18. Soviet Ethiopianists would know that Somali-Ethiopian clashes had deep roots. In the sixteenth century Ahmed Granj (the left-handed) invaded the Christian Amharic highlands and was beaten back when aid organized by Portuguese Jesuits reached the Ethiopians from Christian Europe. The Jesuits were thrown out by nationalist Ethiopians before 1600. This has a contemporary ring.

19. Soviet General Samoilenko wrote in an unpublished paper (Uppsala, 1978) that "The internal function of armies of countries of socialist orientation is to oppress organized and non-organized resistance of those social forces which are interested in preserving pre-capitalist socio-economic structures or in the development of capitalist relations." Major-General Mozolev, "Rol' armii v razvivaiushchikh stranakh," p. 62, has an almost identical formulation.


PART III

27. The Soviet Union and South Africa share a common interest — both want the United States to become the ally of Pretoria, which is exactly what the United States must not do. See Singleton, "The Shared Tactical Goals of South Africa and the Soviet Union," CSIS Africa Notes, No. 12, April 1983.


33. Tension between external exile and internal underground leaders is common to most revolutionary or liberation movements. The Algerian FLN was split between exiles and the internal guerrilla commanders. Lenin returned to Russia in April 1917 to preserve his leadership over those already on the scene.

34. Anatoly Gromyko, Konflikt na Iuge Afriki, Moscow, 1979, p. 214.


37. Anatoly Gromyko, "Pokonchit' s Rasizmom i Kolonializmom!", Azia i Afrika Segodnia, No. 3, March, 1986, p.7. TASS correspondent Sergei Kulik in Azia i Afrika Segodnia, January 1986, p. 33 writes that "around 700 political parties and social organizations of all races and ethnic groups in South Africa have joined the UDF."


41. ibid., p. 27.


44. See The African Communist, number 106, third quarter 1986, for a short biographies of Mabhida and new General Secretary Joe Slovo. Number 107, fourth quarter 1986 began a series by Jack Simons, "Builders of the Communist Party." Traditionally in the SACP, the Chairman is the public figure, while the General Secretary is the administrator.


46. Under the title "ANC will Never Forego the Alliance with the SACP" The African Communist (no. 107, fourth quarter 1986, pp.29-36) published ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo's speech at the 65th anniversary of the SACP, in London on July 30, 1986. Nzo defined the ANC as a united front. He called the ANC "a committed detachment of the international anti-imperialist movement." He warned against efforts of the Reagan Administration "to transform the nature of our movement or to define its objectives, "presumably a reference to efforts to get the ANC to shed the SACP. He included China with the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba as countries which "stand with us."

47. The last chapter of Padmore's book Pan-Africanism or Communism (London, 1955) treats South Africa. Padmore was a West Indian. Like other black intellectuals he broke with the Party and became an advocate of black nationalism and pan-Africanism, ending his career as adviser to Kwame Nkrumah.


54. Philemon Malima, "Bitter Battles Lie Ahead," *World Marxist Review*, October 1986, pp. 111-113. "We have no further illusions: ahead of us is a hard and grim struggle that will require much effort and sacrifice from SWAPO fighters."

55. Gromyko, *Konflikt na Iuge Afriki*, 1979, p. 182: "The basic interest of the militarist circles [of West Germany] concerns the uranium deposits of southern Africa."


63. Pravda, 3 April 1986

64. Nathan Shamuyarira in *World Marxist Review*, January 1987, p. 96. That the Zimbabwean Information Minister appears in this communist party journal is significant.
PART IV

65. The Aouzou strip was originally disputed between France and Italy. French, now Chadian, claims seem to have the better argument. The Aouzou strip may have minerals. Qadafy reportedly offered former Chadian President Tombalbaye a bribe of 32 million CFA frans in 1972. Summer 1987 Chad-Libyan fighting across the Aouzou has become a classic border war.

66. For example, 28 African countries walked out of a March 1986 Organization of African Trade Union Unity meeting in Accra. OATUU is a Libyan-funded front, in cooperation with Ghana, where Libya has provided subsidies since 1982. The protestors, charging corruption and mismanagement, included Angola, Congo, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe with conservative Senegal and Zaire. Africa Research Bulletin, 15 March 1986, p. 7964.

67. The "agreement in principle" is in the text of the Soviet-Libyan communique of April 1983.

68. Pravda, 31 May 1986.

69. According to Pravda, 19 July 1984, the French Defense Minister "repeated the false and spurious thesis put forward by the American administration of some 'Libyan threat' to Chad" while "Libya is observing neutrality."

70. The May 1986 Soviet-Libyan communique includes U.S. attacks, the PLO, southern Africa, Nicaragua, the arms race and SDI, "world economic security" -- and no mention of Chad.

71. The Sudan CP election platform is found in Information Bulletin: Documents of the Communist and Workers Parties, June 1986, pp. 28-29. See also ibid., April 1986, pp. 38-39 for a pre-election statement. Both documents fudge on the key issues of sharia law and southern autonomy.


76. ibid., p. 28.


79. Krasnaia Zvezda, 12 September 1984. According to General Tesfaye, "servicemen who are party members are beacons whom the rest strive to emulate."

80. Pravda, 4 September 1984 and Problems of Communism, March-April 1985, p. 92. The authorities in Addis Ababa probably do not have an accurate count of party membership.


82. Romanov's speech in Pravda, 9 September 1984.


86. See Cohen, "Agrarian reform." Peasant Associations must sell much of their crop to the state Agricultural Marketing Corporation at fixed prices. AMC also buys the entire state farm output.


88. Ibid., 31 March 1986, p. 8113.


A ship carrying food for famine victims set out for Ethiopia from Australia. It was demanded that the food be distributed according to the wishes of the supplier. Ethiopia replied that it would be happy to receive assistance, but if the country's sovereignty and unity were made a condition for that assistance Ethiopia did not need it. Of course it is hard to turn down food aid when people are going hungry. But firmness must be shown. (p. 59)
90. See Berhanu Bayih in *World Marxist Review*, April 1978, p. 62. To reconquer the borderlands first and grant some self-rule later was also Bolshevik policy in 1918-21.

