FINAL REPORT TO
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE: "THE SOVIET DATA BANK: CAREER PATTERNS IN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY, 1917-1941"

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PREFACE

This Report describes work performed on the Soviet Data Bank Project under National Council Contract No. 800-11. The essential product of this work is the Data Bank itself -- a computer database of biographical information on nearly 28,000 Soviet officials, designed to facilitate many kinds of analysis concerning the Soviet bureaucracy. Copies of the database and related documentation are available from the investigators for use by other interested scholars, and this fact has been publicized through appropriate professional channels such as the AAASS newsletter. (For ordering information, see flyer reproduced at Appendix 4.)

As an example of the types of substantive results that can be obtained through analysis of information in the Data Bank, a paper on "The Soviet Bureaucracy in 1935: A Socio-Political Profile" is attached to this report (Appendix 5).

National Council for Soviet
and East European Research
Executive Summary

The now completed first phase of the Soviet Data Bank Project was aimed at producing a biographical database on Soviet officials from the 1917-1941 period. Incorporating a diversity of sources not hitherto widely available, the database is the first large-scale public and scholarly attempt to provide electronic access to this material. The bank includes Soviet and western published sources, Vsia Moskva (the Moscow city directory), and the private files of Soviet specialists. It provides both "lookup" of individuals as well as facility for advanced statistical analysis. All planned tasks have been completed, and the present version of the database contains data on 27,982 individuals.

Early research findings from the data relate to the origins of officials, social content of the "Old Bolsheviks", and the impact of the Great Purges (1936-39) on Soviet officialdom. Thus, the evidence suggests a purge centering on the upper elite and governed more by particular status relations on the eve of the purge than by long-term personal or political experiences.

Current and future uses of the database by Chase and Getty will involve application of statistical modelling techniques to the bureaucracy and the expansion of the database to the end of the Stalin era.
Activities Undertaken

[Note: This contract funded the final year of a three-year effort. The following report necessarily refers to the entire project.]

The purpose of the now-completed first phase of the Soviet Data Bank Project was to produce a biographical database on Soviet officials from the 1917-1941 period. Until its completion, there has been no single resource providing electronic access to biographical data from rare and privately-held sources as well as from traditional published collections. The bank was to include Soviet and western published sources, Vsia Moskva (the Moscow city directory), and the private files of Soviet specialists. It was to provide both "lookup" of individual officials and facility for statistical analysis.

This National Council contract funded the third year of the three-year project. According to the proposal, activities scheduled for this year were (1) to complete verification and testing of previously coded and entered data, (2) to produce a version of the Soviet Data Bank, (3) to undertake preliminary analysis of the 1917-1941 bureaucracy, and (4) to annotate the codebook and documentation for new users. All of these tasks have been completed.

Specifically, verification has involved the following procedures: verifying data against the source, refining and consolidation of the codebook, evaluation of records from conflicting sources, consolidating records based on position description and dates coded. Annotation of documentation has included preparation of a user-friendly codebook from the master codes, documentation of the
electronic data and code files on the tape, describing the variables in each data file, and elaboration of any special coding conventions employed. Preliminary analysis has taken the form of several scholarly papers, one published article, and plans for a book-length monograph.

Results Achieved

Planned tasks [Plan of Work section 4.1 of original proposal] have all been completed on time. The Soviet Data Bank now exists on a data base management system at the University of California, Riverside and the University of Pittsburgh. It contains all records coded and entered, and allows instant retrieval, updating, and addition. Because data base management software is proprietary, we are unable to supply a "turnkey" database, but the data and code files which make up the bank are provided in standard format on the accompanying magnetic tape. (Because of the probability of future additions and updates, the Soviet Data Bank, as it exists on this date, is referred to as Version 1.0). This tape is being provided to the National Council and to the ISPSR clearinghouse in Michigan.

The bank is the most comprehensive effort of its kind to date. Some heretofore unused or unknown sources have been completely coded in machine-readable form. We believe that the Soviet Data Bank is notable for its extremely low error rate and the general "cleanliness" of the data. While coding and punching error rates around 5% are acceptable in this kind of work, we believe ours to be below 1% as a result of the tedious but ultimately beneficial cleaning and checking operations.
We encountered only one significant problem. Personal files from Prof. Kendall Bailes were secured, coded, and processed. But in the course of work, we discovered a number of incompatibilities between this data and our format. Different variable definitions and levels of data aggregation were inconsistent with the parameters established for the bank. Accordingly, Prof. Bailes data has been deleted. We feel, however, that the lost data is in large part replicated in coding from several dozen other sources, and does not represent a serious lack.

Entered data includes a total of 76,388 cases (data records). The records are distributed in subfiles as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUB FILE NAME</th>
<th>RECORDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>1387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>1227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KINSHIP</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>3782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREREVACT</td>
<td>3917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRISON</td>
<td>1335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARREST</td>
<td>1182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTSTAZH</td>
<td>2176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data on vital statistics: dates of birth, death, social origins, etc.)

(Data on place, type, and amount of education)

(Cross-reference file identifying known kin relations among subjects)

(Data non-political occupations)

(Data on pre-1917 political activities)

(Data on pre-1917 incidences of imprisonment)

(Data on pre-1917 incidences of arrest)

(Data on membership in political parties)
REVACTS
(Data on 1917 revolutionary activities) 2485

EXPULSION
(Data on incidences of expulsion from the Bolshevik party) 548

OPPOSITION
(Data on incidences of membership in oppositional or dissident groups) 308

OFFICE
(Data on incidences of state or party officeholding during the 1917-1941 period) 55017

MILITARY
(Data on military officeholding during the period) 2972

TOTAL 76388

Original estimated funding costs for the three-year project were calculated to be $245,965. Total funding received has totalled $244,512. Thus, the project's tasks have been completed on time and slightly under budget. The Soviet Data Bank's funding history is given in the Appendix.

Even before the completion and release of the data bank, several scholars have used the data through requests to Getty and Chase:
1. Graeme Gill (University of Sydney, Australia), data on obkom
Chase and Getty have begun preliminary analysis of the data. So far, one published article and three conference papers have been produced. One of the papers has dramatically revised the field's conception of purge rates and criteria in the Stalin period. (See appendix 5 below). These early findings necessarily represent "work in progress" and the complexity of the preliminary conclusions would be difficult to explain in a short space. A sample (and perhaps unsatisfactorily terse) potpourri of these early observations would at least indicate the nature of this research, and would include the following propositions:

(1) The Old Bolsheviks of the prewar Soviet elite were provincial in their origins; a majority came from widely dispersed villages and towns of Imperial Russia. (2) In terms of age structure, national origin, province of birth, and social origins, these Soviet officials were broadly representative of the milieux from which they sprang. (3) The shorthand category "Old Bolshevik" poorly describes a group which was in fact extremely heterogeneous in its educational levels, age, social origins, and occupation. Thus, there was no typical "Old Bolshevik". (4) Surprising data on incidence of the Great Purges has
suggested that statistically, "Old Bolsheviks" were not at appreciably higher risk than others to be purged; partstazh, social origins, education level, or prerevolutionary political experience had no correlation with purge fate. The only statistically significant factors in influencing one's "purge status" were former oppositional membership (low correlation), age (younger officials were actually at higher risk), party membership (members were much more likely to be purged than non-members), and bureaucratic rank in 1936 (higher ranking officials were much more exposed). Thus, educational levels were negatively related to rank, while party stazh and one's revolutionary past were positively correlated with rank; but neither education, partstazh, nor political past were statistically related to one's purge fate. Indeed, youth was more strongly associated with being purged than any of the above factors. [See Chase and Getty, "Soviet Bureaucratic Elite ...", Appendix 5 below]. These interesting suggestions require further large-scale study of various groups. The enclosed Figure 1 illustrates this relationship and suggests the types of advanced statistical modeling to be used in future research.

Accessibility

In addition to final checking and recoding, project staff have taken steps to begin dissemination. First, in the late fall of 1986, a complete copy of the Soviet Data Bank was deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Science Research in Ann Arbor Michigan. Second, project staff mounted an on-line demonstration of the Soviet Data bank at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in New Orleans,
Multiple Classification Results of Purge Variables

1917 Rev. Activities
Education
Party Status

1935 Rank
Oppositionist
Age
Party Member

Notes: $\beta =$ beta score from multiple classification analysis. Betas are relative scores which measure the comparative effect of each of the four independent variables on "Purged in 1930s".
November 20 - 24, 1986. This is the principal meeting for scholars of Russian and Soviet history and provided maximum exposure of the bank and its capabilities. User-friendly documentation on the data bank has been provided to ICPSR, observers at the AAASS meeting, and others who have requested it. Third, selected journals and newsletters have been sent notices of the bank and its availability.

Plans for Future Efforts

We are now planning two projects. First, during the present year we will be researching and writing a book-length monograph providing a statistical analysis of the 1917-1941 Stalinist Bureaucracy.

Second, we are seeking renewed extramural funding for the second planned phase of the Soviet Data Bank: incorporating the Soviet bureaucracy in the 1941-1964 period. As with the first phase, this effort will involve coding both rare and traditional printed sources along with the privately held files of noted researchers. To date, an international group of historians and scholars have agreed to join the Soviet Data Bank effort by contributing their personal research files—many of which contain unique material drawn from Soviet archives. In addition to the already incorporated files of Professors Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ronald G. Suny, and Arch Getty, the following scholars have agreed to participate:

1. Dr. Blair Ruble (Social Science Research Council): several hundred biographical records on Leningrad party and state officials from 1941.
2. Professor Timothy Colton (Government Dept., University of
Toronto): 1,400 biography records on military personnel from beginning of World War II.

3. Professor Barbara Chotiner (Political Science, University of Alabama): around 1,000 records on Ministers and on agricultural personnel below Deputy Minister level.

4. Professor Mary McAuley (Government Dept., Oxford University): several hundred records on Leningrad officials from both pre- and postwar period.

5. Professor David Granick (Economics Dept., University of Wisconsin): comprehensive files on Soviet factory managers.

6. Professor David Lane (Sociology Dept., University of Birmingham, England): Early biographical data on Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.

This combination of contributors is particularly fortuitous for the project. Ruble's and McAuley's data will fill a gap on Leningrad officials; the Vsia Moskva sources used in the first phase of the project were heavily weighted toward Moscow. Colton is a leading expert on the postwar Soviet military, and Granick's research on economic administrators is well-known.

In general, the quality, quantity, and potential of the data in the Soviet Data Bank has exceeded our original expectations. We are delighted with the outcome and feel that it will make a contribution as a research tool in the field.

J. Arch Getty, P.I.

William J. Chase, P.I.
Appendix 1: Project Staff

University of California, Riverside Team

Personnel:  P.I.: J. Arch Getty
            Computer Consultant: Charles Wetherell
            Senior Research Assistant: Thomas Baldwin
            Junior Research Assistant: Vicki Dyer

University of Pittsburgh Team

Personnel:  P.I.: William Chase
            Senior Research Assistant: Robert Beattie
            Junior Research Assistants: Elroy Worner (since 12/31/84)
            Robert Supansic
            Anna Melnikov (until 4/1/85)
            Carmine Storella
            Elroy Worner
Appendix 2: Preliminary Research Results

Papers:

Article:
Appendix 3: Soviet Data Bank Funding History

1. NEH 1983-84 $81,462
2. National Council for Soviet and East European Research 1983-84 $20,000
3. Fund for the Eighties 1984-85 $33,382
4. NEH match of $3 above 1984-85 $33,382
5. National Council for SEER 1985-86 $76,288

Total $244,514
THE SOVIET DATA BANK

The Soviet Data Bank is a machine-readable data archive of biographical and office-holding information on Soviet officials who held a bureaucratic position at any time during the 1917-1941 period. This version (Version 1.0) contains 76,388 data records on some 28,000 individuals. Chronologically, these records span the period from the late nineteenth century to the post-Stalin period. The data are stored in numeric form, but can be readily converted to text thereby making the Soviet Data Bank very easy to use for a variety of purposes. Because it can be used for simple informational retrieval and for statistical analysis, the Soviet Data Bank is a unique research tool and valuable instructional resource.

The data are stored in one of thirteen data files (or data sets): ARREST, BIOGRAPHY, EDUCATION, EXPULSION, KINSHIP, MILITARY EXPERIENCE, OCCUPATION, OFFICE-HOLDING, OPPOSITIONAL MEMBERSHIP, PARTY BACKGROUND, PREREVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, PRISON EXPERIENCE, 1917 REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. Information on an individual can exist in any or all data files and is linked by that person's identification number. Each individual can have as many data records in any or all data files as are necessary to reconstruct his/her biography.

The information contained in the Soviet Data Bank comes from a variety of Soviet and western publications, Vse Moskva (the personnel directory of state, party and trade-union officials housed in Moscow), and the personal research files of Professors Sheila Fitzpatrick, G. Ronald Suny, and J. Arch Getty.

The Soviet Data Bank can be operated on any data base management system (DBMS). Institutions or individuals who purchase it will receive a User Manual and a magnetic tape containing all of the files necessary to operate the data bank. Because of software proprietary restrictions that forbid the dissemination of a "ready" data bank, the magnetic tape contains ASCII files. The User Manual identifies and defines all of the data files and variables and provides the columnar locations of each variable. Consult your computer center about converting the ASCII files to your DBMS system.

Inquiries about the Soviet Data Bank should be directed to either of the co-directors:

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(412) 648-7487

Prof. J. Arch Getty
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University of California
Riverside, CA 92521
(714) 787-5113

Orders should be directed to Professor Getty.
Appendix 5

The Soviet Bureaucracy in 1935: A Socio-Political Profile *

by

William Chase and J. Arch Getty

One of the most significant and unfortunate gaps in Western historiography of the Soviet Union during the 1930s is in the area of bureaucratic history. Thanks to the pioneering work of Merle Fainsod, Western scholars understand the structure of the party and state bureaucracies and the functions which many agencies performed. Although recent works have raised serious questions about how those bureaucracies did or did not function and political conflicts within those bureaucracies, our knowledge of bureaucratic structures remains sound.1 But as the debate over the political behavior within the bureaucracy(ies) deepens, new questions have arisen.

Among the most important, but unfortunately least asked questions are: what types of people staffed the bureaucracy?; from what social backgrounds did they come?; how much and what types of education did they have?; how many were Communist Party members and, of those, how many were "Old Bolsheviks" and how many were the "new men"?; what were their revolutionary credentials and formative political experiences? In short, what were the social and political characteristics of those who ran the USSR in the 1930s?

Although these questions may seem simple, finding satisfactory answers to them is very difficult. Yet being able to answer them is essential if we are to understand the Soviet bureaucracy not merely as a structure (or set of structures), but as an institution staffed by human beings. Understanding the social and political composition of the Soviet bureaucracy can provide us with insight into how these institutions functioned and why they functioned as they did. But if one were to search for answers to these very basic questions in the western literature, the results with few exceptions would be very disappointing. Nor would one find much solace in a Soviet secondary literature which is replete with statistics on certain groups of party members, but much less on the socio-political composition of the bureaucracy.2

One of the consequences of this historiographic gap is that, consciously or unconsciously, we have accepted the implicit assumption of the totalitarian model: the structure of the bureaucracy in the 1930s is more important than those who staffed it. Although few today give much credence to the totalitarian model, our inability to answer the questions

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posed above means that we have simply sought new models to define and describe the bureaucracy. The task of historians is to provide the evidence on which models are based. Unfortunately, we historians have abdicated our role for too long.

This paper’s modest purpose is to provide a partial socio-political profile of the USSR’s bureaucrats in the mid-1930s. For analytical purposes, we chose to examine the composition of the Soviet bureaucracy in 1935. We chose this year for two reasons: 1) the chaotic First Five-Year Plan had ended and some order and stability existed within the bureaucracy’s ranks; 2) the chaos and mass bureaucratic turnover occasioned by the Ezhovshchina had not begun. The analytical method employed here is prosopography, or collective biography based on rigorous social science methodologies. In conducting this research, we made no assumptions that biographical past, social origins or any other factors were determinants of behavior or predictors of later activities. Rather this research was undertaken to begin to answer the questions posed above in the hopes that it might provide insight into the composition and possibly the behavior of the Soviet bureaucracy in the mid-1930s.

The data for this analysis came from the Soviet Data Bank, a project under the authors’ direction which contains biographical and officeholding information on Soviet state and party officials in the pre-World War II period. Because the Soviet Data Bank is not yet complete and therefore may contain unknown and immeasurable biases, the findings presented here are of necessity tentative and preliminary.

The Selection Set

Our selection consists of 283 officials who worked in the Soviet state and/or Communist Party bureaucracies in 1935. The criteria by which the 283 were chosen were two: they had to have held a bureaucratic position in 1935, and biographical data on them had to be in the data bank. Hence those chosen do not represent a random sample. To overcome this deficiency and bias, we weighted the selection. (See Appendix 6 for a discussion of the weighting procedures.)

The officials chosen ranged from Politburo members to sub-department administrative personnel in the state apparatus. Of the 283, 83 were chairmen of agencies (i.e.
commissariats, state committees, trade unions, trusts), 98 were members of all-union or republic-level party Central Committees, 100 were members or candidate members of presidiums or collegiums within agencies, 95 were chairmen of departments or commissions within agencies, 12 were leading military officials, 7 were procurators, 12 were diplomatic personnel, 15 were chairmen of sub-departments within agencies, and 55 were lower-level personnel in departments or sub-departments.

Clearly, many people held more than one position simultaneously. In 1935, one-fifth of the sample held four or more positions, 10% held three positions, another 20% held two positions and the remaining 50% held only one position. Almost three-quarters (72.3%) of the offices held were in the national (USSR) bureaucracy, another 17.3% were in republic-level bureaucracies, and one in eleven (8.9%) were in city-level or lower bureaucracies. For analytical purposes, we divided the selection’s members into three major agency groups based on their specialization in 1935: state (includes the military), economic (includes trade union and transport), and party. Of the 283, almost half (46.3%) specialized in work within the state sector, one-third (33.9%) within the economic sector, and one-fifth (20.1%) within the party sector. Of the total sample, about 90% (88.5%) were Communist Party members and two-thirds (65.6%) of them were “Old Bolsheviks”, having joined the party before 1917.

The 1935 Bureaucracy: A Social Profile

Before presenting a detailed social profile of our selection, we should ask whether the 1935 bureaucracy was representative or unrepresentative of Soviet society at large. In terms of gender, it was certainly not representative—only 3.5% were females. However, the age structure of the selection was quite representative of the population at risk (as measured by age) to hold bureaucratic positions. The mean year of birth was normally distributed around 1886, and the mean age in 1935 was fifty years (49.7) old. (See Table 1) The “old man” of the group was A. P. Karpinskii, who was born in 1847; the “baby” was G. M. Popov, who was born in 1906.

An examination of the selection’s province of birth reveals that the 1935 bureaucracy was generally representative of the nation’s 1939 ethnic composition. Slightly more than half (52.2%) were born in provinces within the RSFSR’s 1939 borders, another 17% were
born in the Ukraine. These figures are comparable to the proportions of Russians (58%) and Ukrainians (16.4%) in 1939. Within the Slavic lands, provinces of birth were widely dispersed geographically. The only significant concentrations worthy of note were those of Moscow (5.7%) and St. Petersburg (5.7%) gubernii which together comprised one-ninth of the total. People born in Georgia were over-represented; 9.4% of the selection were Georgians compared with only 1.3% nationwide in 1939. But with the exception of the latter group, the provinces of birth of our group are more or less representative of the late imperial and 1939 population distribution.\textsuperscript{7}

Although the selection's members had been born in widely dispersed provinces, a minority of them (40%) were born in villages. A comparable proportion (42.4%) were born in cities; the remaining 17.5% came from provincial towns. (See Table 2) Undoubtedly, a disproportionately high percentage (59.9%) came from urban environments. Given the party's pronounced urban bias and weltanschauung, this is not surprising. But it provides another criteria by which the group was unrepresentative of their society, be it of late imperial times or the mid-1930s.

But these same figures can be viewed from a different perspective. Precisely because of the party’s urban bias, it is surprising that almost 60% (57.5%) of the sample came from provincial towns and villages. Viewed in this way, it is fair to describe the sample as a group of provincials. The juxtaposition of these perspectives is not merely an exercise to prove that statistics can be manipulated to support different viewpoints, but rather to suggest that quick and facile conclusions have their pitfalls. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than by examining the sample’s social origins.

Although one’s birth environment provides some idea of the milieu in which one was raised, it is not a predictor of one’s social origins. As Table 3 indicates, one-third (32.7%) of the group came from peasant families, one-fifth (22.6%) came from working class families, and slightly less than one-fifth (18.5%) were born into families of professionals or intelligeny.\textsuperscript{8} Comparative analysis of social origins and birth environment provides insight into the changing and complex nature of late imperial society. Of those born in villages, almost one-third (30.6%) were the children of industrial workers. Put another way, more than half (51.7%) of the children of industrial workers were born in villages. Equally
striking is the fact that 15.4% of those with peasant parents were urban-born. By contrast, three-quarters of those with professionals or intelligency for parents were urban-born. (See Table 4)

Although birth environment is no predictor of social origins, social origin is a better predictor of one's future occupation. (See Table 5) For this paper, we classified the selection on the basis of the last occupation before the revolution. Almost two-thirds (62.1%) of the children of workers became workers themselves. But very few (13.8%) of the children of peasants remained in agricultural occupations and none were landowning peasants themselves. In fact, half (48.3%) of the children of peasants became workers. To social and labor historians of the pre-revolutionary period, the blurred distinction between town and country or between worker and peasant is a given. But to those who study Soviet government and politics in the 1930s, these findings should serve as a warning not to ignore the complexities of late imperial society in which future Soviet leaders passed their formative years. Precisely what the impact of pre-revolutionary experiences had on Soviet leaders is an area of research which begs exploration.

The only other social group in the sample deserving of mention here are the children of parents who worked in "white collar" jobs. Slightly more than one-quarter of our group fell into this category; about one-fifth (18.5%) were from the families of professionals or intelligency. Three-quarters of them were urban-born and 70% followed in their parent's footsteps. In contrast, virtually none (2%) of the children of workers and peasants became professionals or intelligency.

The evidence clearly indicates that those who governed the USSR in 1935 were the social products of the rapid and tumultuous changes which accompanied pre-revolutionary Russian industrialization. Most Soviet leaders in 1935 were not the children of or themselves professionals or intelligency, but rather were toilers from the bottom of imperial Russian society both by social origins and occupation. In fact, at the time of the revolution, almost 60% were workers or soldiers—two of the social groups which most directly suffered from the hardships of industrial life and the horrors of war: Nor were the 1935 leaders the products of any imperial-period upward social mobility. Their mobility was limited to movement into and within the working class and is better described as being lateral rather than upward.
Some people may take issue with our description of the movement from peasant to worker as lateral mobility. We do not wish to rekindle an old debate, but rather to offer some new evidence and a perspective. Those people in our selection whose parents were making the transition from peasant to proletariat, that is the village-born children of workers and the urban-born children of peasants, had the lowest educational levels of the offspring of any other social group, lower even than the village-born children of peasants and the urban-born children of workers.

There may be several reasons why this is so. It may well be that village-born children of workers were denied educational opportunities because the need for labor in the absence of one's father precluded school. Or it may be that the periodic movement between town and country made it impossible for them to attend school regularly. There may be other reasons. But more interesting to ponder is what effect the denial of educational opportunities had on those youth who experienced first-hand the realities and hardships of both peasant and proletarian life and who were deprived of the expanding educational opportunities of which their rural and urban peers availed themselves. One is tempted to suggest that their variegated social experiences created in them heightened expectations, frustrations and anger. But until more research into the educational and social costs of the movement from peasant to proletarian is conducted, we must content ourselves with private speculations.

As a group, however, members of the selection were more educated than the population of both the late imperial period and the 1930s. One-half had completed university studies and almost one-third had finished secondary school. Only 10% had no formal education as of 1935. Of those with some education, 80% had received it before the revolution. Although the number of people in the selection who received Soviet educations is small (N=18) and therefore necessitates the presentation of preliminary conclusions only, the data deserve mention.

Of those who completed or had some university education before the revolution (N=74), one-half studied law or medicine and 6.5% studied economics. No other faculty of study attracted significant numbers of people. More than one-third (37%) of this group studied in one of the two capitals. Twelve people studied at Moscow University, but the only
notable cluster of people there simultaneously consisted of three people: N. A. Bukharin, N. E. Khrisfanov and N. A. Izgaryshev were there between 1907 and 1910. Of the six who studied at St. Petersburg University, four (G. L. Piatikov, N. N. Kristinskii, G. I. Lomov, and S. Z. Eliava) were all there in 1907. The only other identifiable cluster of people who attended school together consisted of O. I. Shmidt, A. I. Vyshinskii, and V. P. Zatonskii who attended Kiev University in 1912 and 1913. The remainder of those educated in pre-revolutionary times attended institutions which were widely dispersed geographically. We can note again that our group of provincial-born officials were educated in the provinces.

Those who completed their education in the Soviet period had a dramatically different educational profile. Virtually all received their education in Soviet-era institutions—the Higher Military Academy, the Institute of Red Professors, the Industrial Academy in Moscow, the Communist Academy in Moscow, the Artem Communist Academy and higher technical institutes. Not surprisingly, this group eschewed law and medicine opting instead to study Marxism-Leninism, history, military subjects, machine-building and agriculture.

If the data accurately reflect the trends within the bureaucracy, the upper levels of the 1935 bureaucracy, especially the economic agencies, had not yet been permeated by the Soviet-educated economic and technical specialists who flocked to the classrooms in the aftermath of the 1928 Shakhty trial and the concomitant rapid expansion of educational opportunities. In 1935, those educated before the revolution dominated the country's bureaucratic elite. In fact, one in nine (11%) of those in our sample are non-party, pre-revolutionary educated intelligentsia, or to use the parlance of the period "bourgeois specialists." Surprising as this may seem in the aftermath of the Shakhty trial and the Cultural Revolution, more surprising is the fact that the vast majority of these "bourgeois specialists" survived the Ezhovshchina.

Two other groups had markedly different educational profiles: "Old Bolsheviks" who joined the party before 1917, and the "new Bolsheviks" who joined during or after that year. Amazingly, "Old Bolsheviks" as a group were less educated (by a quantitative factor of 10%) than their new comrades. Given Soviet educational opportunities and priorities, it is not surprising that newer party members who completed their education after 1917 had more formal education. Nonetheless, this remained largely a pre-revolutionary educated leadership which "Old Bolsheviks" dominated.
Let us conclude this social profile of the 1935 bureaucracy by returning to the issue of how representative it was of the society which it governed. In some respects, it was very representative; in others, much less so. Males vastly outnumbered females, and the levels of education completed were much higher than those of either late imperial society or that of the 1930s. A disproportionately large number of people came from major cities and the families of professionals and intelligentsia. On the other hand, the age structure of the bureaucracy was comparable to that of the population at risk to hold office, most were not urbanites but provincials whose provinces of birth represented a cross-section of the nation, and most were the children of peasants and workers. If we assume (and it seems fair to do so) that during the 1930s no country's bureaucracy's social profile mirrored that of its society, then we can state that the Soviet bureaucracy was as socially representative of the country it governed as that of any other country. And although this is not the appropriate place to do so, there is much evidence to suggest that the 1935 Soviet bureaucracy was socially more representative of its society than, for example, that of Great Britain or France.

The 1935 Bureaucracy: A Political Profile

Predictably, the vast majority (88.5%) of our selection were Communist Party members. Of those, two-thirds (65.6%) were "Old Bolsheviks", 16.2% joined during 1917, and the remaining 18.2% joined after 1917. Within the 1935 bureaucratic leadership, "Old Bolsheviks" outnumbered the "new Bolsheviks" by two to one. But within the party, the proportion of "Old Bolsheviks" was much smaller and had been shrinking steadily since 1924. Although precise figures on parstazh for 1935 are lacking, we know that the year before only 22.6% of the voting delegates to the 17th Party Congress were "Old Bolsheviks"; they accounted for less than 10% of the entire party. The "Old Bolsheviks" minority status in the party stands in stark contrast to their majority status within the bureaucratic elite and underscores their dominance of the organs of political power.

For those who joined the party before 1917, a clearly discernible pattern exists. As Table 7 indicates, the two pre-revolutionary periods that witnessed the greatest influx of new members—1903-1905 (13.7%) and 1912-1916 (15%)—coincided with periods of intense social conflict and radical political upsurges. The largest cohort of party members in our group were those who joined in 1917. Clearly, the party's ability to attract new
members in the years before it became the governing party was dependent on the shifting political climate.

More than one-third of selection joined the party in either St. Petersburg/Petrograd/Leningrad (18.4%) or in Moscow (17.3%). The remaining members joined the party in widely scattered provinces. Because the two capitals housed the largest and most politically active party committees, were the country's largest industrial centers, and, in the case of Petrograd in 1917, contained large numbers of troops, they were natural magnets for revolutionaries and one expects them to have seen the enrollment of disproportionately large numbers of new members. Nonetheless, two-thirds of our selection joined the party in other locales. Taken together with the above evidence on province of birth and place of education, there seems to be little doubt that provincials dominated the 1935 bureaucracy.

Of our selection's party members, one in eight (13.4%) had belonged to another political party before joining the Bolsheviks. One-third (31.6%) of that group of 38 had been Mensheviks; one-half had been members of other Social Democratic parties. Another 15.8% had belonged to parties (mostly Social Democratic ones) in foreign countries, the Baltic lands or Poland. More than half (57.2%) of those who had belonged to a previous political party joined the Bolsheviks during or after 1917.

Because the data on our selection's pre-revolutionary activities are somewhat incomplete, we shall confine our comments to a few observations. Based on the available data, more than half (53.4%) engaged in notable pre-revolutionary political activities. The median number of activities was three, but the range was wide: one-quarter had one activity, one-half had three or fewer, and 18% had ten or more. One of the most active members of our selection during the pre-1917 period was F. I. Goloshchekin, who spent the years 1903-1906 in the St. Petersburg area where he engaged in a variety of party committee activities in the capital, Kronstadt and Sestroretsk. During the 1905 revolution, he devoted much of his energy to agitprop work among the soldiers and sailors. Between 1906 and 1909, Goloshchekin was in and out of prison. Then in 1909 he went into exile and served on the editorial board of Proletarii in France. He returned to Russia late that year, this time going to Moscow where he resumed his underground party work. Goloshchekin's
skills won him election to the party’s Central Committee at the 1912 Prague Conference. From then until WWI, his new stature and responsibilities cast him in the role of itinerant revolutionary who moved frequently between the two capitals and the Urals.

As Goloshchekin’s activities suggest, “party committee work” was the most frequent of the pre-1917 political activities. Excluding such work, the most common activity was newspaper work which comprised almost half (46.1%) of all activities. We are familiar with the importance which the Bolsheviks and Lenin in particular placed on party newspapers. But here we have evidence of precisely how important newspaper work was in the political lives of underground revolutionaries. More than one-quarter (27.8%) of the activities centered on organizing workers, another Bolshevik priority. Trailing far behind these two activities were organizing students (9.7%, mostly during 1903-05) and soldiers (7.2%) during the Russo-Japanese War and WWI. Analysis of where these activities were conducted reveals that almost one-third (31.9%) occurred in the two capitals and that the remainder were widely scattered across the provinces.

Because the vast majority of our selection’s pre-revolutionary political activities were illegal and underground, they ran a great risk of running afoul of the Okhrana. Forty percent (39.3%) of our selection had been arrested by the tsarist police. Of those, 43.6% has one arrest record; three-quarters had three or fewer arrests. (The median number of arrests was two.) A few people (5.7%) had been arrested ten or more times. Some people passed virtually all of the pre-revolutionary twentieth century in prison or internal exile. Such was the fate of A. P. Smirnov, who, save for 1905-06 and WWI, spent the rest of the period under one form or another of police detention. For A. I. Rykov, the only continuous time after 1900 when he was not incarcerated or in exile was 1902-05.

One-half of those with prison records had been arrested in St Petersburg or Moscow; the other half in widely scattered provinces. The figures re-confirm the importance of the two capitals as revolutionary centers. But we should be careful not to over-inflate the importance of these figures which may be as much an indictment of the ineffectiveness of the provincial police as they are an indicator of the capitals’ preeminence. For those unfortunate enough to have been arrested, half found themselves exiled and one-third imprisoned. The rest were either released under surveillance, deported or conscripted.
Half of those exiled were sent to Siberia and one-fifth to the far northern regions of European Russia. Some like Kalinin were luckier.

At the time of his first arrest in St. Petersburg in 1899, Kalinin worked as a lathe-operator at the Putilov Works. After spending ten months in jail there, he was exiled to Tbilisi where he secured a job as a lathe-operator and immediately joined the Tbilisi RSDRP organization. Within five months, he was arrested and exiled to Revel' where he resumed his former occupation and revolutionary activities. In 1903, he was arrested again and spent six months in St. Petersburg's Krësty prison. Then in its infinite wisdom, the Okhrana released Kalinin and exiled him to, of all places, Revel' where, to no one's surprise, he resumed his underground activities. Such tales give one pause to wonder about the judgment which some Okhrana officials possessed.

When the 1917 revolution erupted, our selection was literally spread all over the globe—from eastern Siberia to the United States—and involved in a spectrum of political activities and occupations. (See Table 9.) Despite this diaspora, most of the group immediately began to participate in revolutionary activities. Almost two-thirds (63.3%) participated in political activities in 1917 and two-thirds of them began doing so in March 1917. But as Table 10 indicates, 15% did not engage in revolutionary activities until the eve of the Bolshevik seizure of power.

As was the case with pre-revolutionary activities, the number of 1917 political activities varied widely. (See Table 11) The median number of such activities was three, but this figure masks somewhat the distribution. Sixty percent of the selection had three or fewer activities (excluding participation at congresses or conferences), but 4.5% had ten or more activities. N. V. Krylenko had eighteen separate activities. He devoted most of his energy in 1917 to revolutionary work among the troops, first in the Ukraine where he was the chairman of a divisional soldiers' committee and later in Petrograd where he worked as an organizer among the troops, was an organizer and delegate to the All-Russian Congress of Bolshevik Frontline and Rear Military Organizations, a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee and a regular contributor to Soldatskaia Pravda. He was also a delegate to the first two Congresses of Soviets.
During 1917 as before, the most common political activity was party committee work, but the relative importance of such work declined significantly. Only one-quarter of the activities were so described. The next most frequent activity consisted of being a deputy of or working in a Soviet (22.6%). Military Revolutionary Committee and Red Guard membership accounted for one-sixth (16.2%) of all activities. Taken together the latter three activities accounted for almost 40% (38.8%) of all 1917 political activities. Newspaper work, so prominent an activity before 1917, dwindled to a meager 7.7% of that year's activities. Nor did union or factory committee activities (6.7%) occupy much of the group's energies. Once again, an analysis of where the activities occurred showed that half of all the selection's 1917 activities took place in the provinces.

This division of revolutionary activities provides another insight into the political profile of those who governed the USSR in 1935. Several recent works have enriched our understanding of 1917 by demonstrating that the Bolshevik revolution was not simply a coup d'état, but rather a logical extension of political developments in 1917. Several have convincingly argued that the dramatic increase in Bolshevik popularity in that year resulted from a confluence of worsening economic, political and social conditions and active grassroots Bolshevik political agitation and organization, particularly in factory committees and other local worker organizations.

Based on our preliminary findings, it appears that those who staffed the bureaucracy in 1935 were not actively engaged in the latter grassroots activities. Rather they concentrated their energies on those institutions which expressed and legitimized grassroots demands—-the Soviets and political parties. Given that upwards of one-fifth of the group's 1917 activities consisted of participation in various congresses and conferences and that many were prominent members of their party committees and Soviets, it appears that we can refine our earlier characterization of the 1935 bureaucracy as one dominated by "Old Bolsheviks". Not only were the "Old Bolsheviks" the governing elite in 1935, they were also members of the revolutionary elite in 1917.

More than a decade ago, Marc Ferro argued that to understand the early Soviet bureaucracy one had to examine the origins, structures and demands of the emerging revolutionary bureaucracy in 1917. Although our findings are preliminary, the evidence
suggests that not only is Ferro correct, but also that those who dominated the state and party bureaucracies in 1917 continued to do so until the Ezhovshchina, despite the continuous and rapid turnover within these bureaucracies and the assumed political transfers and purges associated with Stalin's ascension to power. The political cohort which rode the revolutionary wave to victory in 1917, regardless of their subsequent horizontal and vertical movements within the bureaucracy, continued to dominate it in the mid-1930s.

Some Observations on 1935 Officeholding

Let us return briefly to our selection's bureaucratic activities in 1935. This paper's purpose is not to analyze the bureaucracy or why those who staffed it did so, but rather to present a socio-political profile of Soviet bureaucrats in 1935. While not concerned with ascertaining whether there were political or bureaucratic determinants of why the 1935 bureaucrats held the offices which they did, we were curious as to whether or not one's biographical profile had any bearing on where one worked. Toward this end, we divided the selection into three bureaucratic agency groups based on their area of specialization in 1935. The three groups were state (includes military), party, and economic (includes transport and trade unions).

Analysis revealed that age, social origins, parttazh, and pre-revolutionary and 1917 revolutionary activities had nothing to do with one's bureaucratic specialization in 1935. When one was educated did. Those in party agencies were most likely to have been educated after 1917, whereas no one who worked in economic agencies had been Soviet-educated. When we analyzed the educational levels of those in the three agency groups, we found that, although party agencies had more Soviet-educated personnel (and such people were likely to have had higher educational levels than those educated before the revolution), only one-quarter (26.6%) of those in party agencies had completed higher education and almost one-fifth (17.4%) had no formal education. By comparison, about 60% of the personnel in both the state (58.3%) and economic (58.2%) agency groups had attended or completed universities. Although most people in economic agencies in 1935 had higher educations, one in eleven (8.8%) had no formal education. Clearly, amount of education was not a determining factor in who worked in party and economic agencies.
Despite their relative educational deficiencies, party people held the most number of offices per person (mean = 3.5). In fact, they held more than twice as many as those in economics (mean = 1.8) and almost twice as many as those in state agencies (mean = 2.0). (The overall mean = 2.3) Although "Old" and "new" Bolsheviks held about the same number of offices per person, whether or not one participated in 1917 revolutionary activities affected significantly how many offices they held in 1935. The average number of offices held by 1917 activists was 2.5 compared to 1.8 for those who had not participated in the revolution.

Participation in the revolution also significantly affected one's 1935 rank. Those active in 1917 had slightly higher ranks than those who were not. The amount of education also affected one's rank. Surprisingly, educational level was negatively correlated with rank, that is those with less education were more likely to have had higher ranks.22 Although educational level and revolutionary activities were the only significant factors directly affecting rank in 1935, there was no correlation between them. (See Figure 1.)

Although these findings are of necessity preliminary, they do suggest possible avenues for future research. Given that educational levels were negatively correlated with rank, one obvious question is whether or not there were significant and discernible political factors which explain why those who staffed the bureaucracy's upper ranks worked where they did. For example, to what extent did practical experience or personal connections determine who worked where? How extensive were personal networks? Only future analysis will help to refine and answer such questions.

The Fate of the 1935 Bureaucrats

No study of the Soviet bureaucracy in the mid-1930s would be complete without a discussion of its members' fates during the Ezhovshchina. Because this is a study of the bureaucracy on the eve of that horrible event, the topic is especially relevant. Of those in our selection whose cause of death is known (N=213), more than half (56.%) died during the Ezhovshchina; only one-fifth (18%) outlived Stalin. (See Table 12)

One interpretation of the Ezhovshchina holds that Stalin used the NKVD to eliminate several clearly identifiable groups: "Old Bolsheviks", especially those who were the heroes
of the pre-revolutionary party and of 1917; former oppositionists; Stalin's political rivals; and those who knew too much about the General Secretary's past. Although 64% of our selection's "Old Bolsheviks" died as a result of the Ezhovshchina, "Old Bolshevik" status was not a statistically significant determinant of why people were purged. Nor did one's pre-revolutionary and 1917 political activities or stature, social origins, or the timing and quantity of education have any bearing on whether or not they fell victim to the Great Purge.

Only four factors proved to be statistically significant characteristics of purge victims. (See Table 13) Former oppositional membership was one. Of the thirty-six people within the selection who had belonged to an oppositional group, 85.7% perished during the Ezhovshchina, whereas only 52.2% of non-oppositionists shared their comrades' tragic fate. (That 11.4% of the selection had oppositional backgrounds and yet retained powerful positions a year after Kirov's assassination seems high in light of the long-standing argument that the assassination sparked a "heresy hunt" for oppositionists that culminated in the Ezhovshchina. This fact alone should make us pause and ponder the validity of that aspect of the traditional view.) Those with higher ranks, that is the top echelon of the bureaucracy, were also more likely to be purged. Party membership also proved to be significant. More than 60% (61%) of the selection's party members died during the Ezhovshchina as opposed to only one-fifth (22%) of non-party people. Finally, age was a significant factor, but not in the way which one might expect. Younger people were at greater risk of being purged. The mean age of the victims was 48 years as opposed to a mean age of 52 years of the survivors.

So those at greatest risk to be purged were former oppositionists, high-ranking officials, party members, and younger officials. It is important to stress that these were the significant aggregate characteristics of victims of the Ezhovshchina, but they were not connected in the same people. That is, the NKVD did not decide that these four criteria were those by which they selected their victims. But those who possessed one or more of the characteristics were at greater risk to be arrested.

Our data are not yet complete enough to establish causality. These four are relative characteristics, but we can not say that they caused one to be arrested. More research on
larger samples and the use of more sophisticated statistical tests will be required before causality can be determined. Preliminary though they are, the findings do not support the common assumption that the Ezhovshchina was aimed at the "Old Bolsheviks", the heroes of the pre-revolutionary movement or of 1917, the older generation or the remnants of the ancien regime's intelligentsia. The only verifiable aspect of the standard view which seems to hold true is that former oppositionists were likely to die during the Ezhovshchina. From these data, it is impossible to state that the Ezhovshchina was "aimed" at any identifiable social or political group other than former oppositionists.

Figure 1 expresses the statistically significant relationships among the only variables related to one's fate in the purges of the 1930s. Of the four variables known to affect purge status, age was the strongest, followed by 1935 rank and party membership, with oppositional membership a distant fourth. One's revolutionary past, educational level, partstazh influenced one's rank, but none of these three (or any other variable) had a significant effect on purge status. These relationships suggest two conclusions.

First, it seems that one's fate in the purges was determined by factors rooted in the 1930s rather than the past. The model suggests that categorizations based on one's background (education, underground or revolutionary activity, "Old Bolshevik" status, social origins, etc.) did not determine one's fate during the Ezhovshchina. Rather ones' rank, party status, and---apparently---age in the 1930s seemed to be crucial. One's contemporary position or immediate situation in the mid-thirties was more important than one's past. Second, the $R^2$ figure indicates that this model explains almost half of the determination of purge fate. While this figure suggests a statistically respectable explanatory model, more work needs to be done to fully clarify the situation. Personal links and networks, as well as one's exact location in the bureaucracy on the eve of the Great Purges, seem promising factors for future investigation using the recently developed and more sophisticated techniques of path analysis and linear models.

Conclusions

This paper's purpose was to present a socio-political profile of the 1935 bureaucracy, something which is essential to any investigation of that apparatus but which has yet to be done systematically. In some respects, these bureaucrats were representative of the
people whom they governed; in others, they were less so. However, those who staff bureaucracies are rarely chosen on the basis of whether or not they are representative of their fellow citizens, but according to other, often political, criteria. The 1935 bureaucracy was one in which high rank was not a function of age or education or social origin or any other biographical factor. Rather high rank was a function of partstazh and revolutionary service. In short, "Old Bolsheviks" dominated the 1935 bureaucracy. These remained the proven and trusted officials who, by virtue of their powerful positions and ability to select personnel, were able to perpetuate their political cohort. That "Old Bolsheviks" so clearly dominated the 1935 bureaucracy in spite of their decidedly minority status within the party and the presence of vast numbers of recently and better educated personnel suggests that, in the bureaucracy as in the factories, "Old Bolsheviks" used their power to hold at bay a new and better educated generation of younger rivals.28 None of those in leading positions in economic agencies were Soviet-educated. In the bureaucracy as in the factories, that generation, despite being better educated and more numerous, had not yet penetrated the bureaucracy's commanding heights. Eager though they may have been to do so, they were forced to wait in the wings.

In light of this, it is tempting to hypothesize that the Ezhovshchina was at least in part an effort to advance and reward those with proletarian backgrounds, more education, fewer political credentials and more recent partstazh—the "new men".29 However, our data do not support such a view. Were this to have been the case, we would expect to find statistically significant correlations between death during the Ezhovshchina and "Old Bolshevism", education, and revolutionary credentials. No such correlations exist. This is not to say that future research based on larger samples and more variegated sources will not yield evidence to support this hypothesis. But at a minimum, this analysis casts doubt on that hypothesis and demonstrates the importance of testing hypotheses and assumptions.

We have all become accustomed to using terms such as "Old Bolshevik" and "the proletariat" as shorthand to describe political and social groups and to characterize their behaviors and fates. While we all suspect that such terms are stereotypes which oversimplify complex social formations, we have continued to use them. Implicit in our thoughts about "Old Bolsheviks", for example, is a view of a homogeneous community of bespectacled intelligentsiya who were professional revolutionaries.
Yet our data show (as we have written elsewhere) that "Old Bolsheviks" in fact included a number of heterogeneous social groups. Those who joined the Bolsheviks before 1917 had widely diverse social origins, educational levels, occupations, and ages. Half of them were the children of workers or peasants, but more were the children of peasants than of workers. At least 40% of the "Old Bolsheviks" at the time of the revolution were industrial workers; none were peasants. Only a third were the children of intelligentsia, professionals, state servants and employees. One in five "Old Bolsheviks" never went beyond primary school and fewer than one-third completed higher education. Indeed, as a group, they were less educated than those who joined the party after the revolution and, based on their provinces of birth, where they were educated, and where they engaged in political activities, it is fair to describe them more as a group of provincials than cosmopolitans. In 1917, the ages of our "Old Bolsheviks" ranged from 19 to 52 years. Clearly, there was no typical "Old Bolshevik".

While invalidating the the stereotypic "Old Bolshevik", our data also allow us to refine generalizations about the social origins of party members. For example, to assume that Bolsheviks of working class origin shared common social backgrounds is misleading. Some were urban-born; others were village-born. But these hereditary proletarians were not the only workers within the Bolshevik's ranks. First-generation workers, most of whom came from the peasantry, also joined the party. Which 'generation' of workers dominated the ranks of proletarians who joined the Bolsheviks before 1917 is a question which continues to fascinate western historians of the late imperial period. For some the influx of members of the hereditary proletariat in the party is of greatest significance, while others stress the importance of first-generation workers. The findings presented here suggest that both views have merit and are not mutually exclusive.

If we are to advance our understanding of Bolshevism and the social milieu from which Bolsheviks came, we must combine political and social history in new ways. Historians of Bolshevism could profit by the findings and methods of students of pre-1917 Russian society. So too can students of the prewar Soviet bureaucracy benefit from this growing body of historical literature. We believe that social science methodologies can help historians to untangle the complexities of Soviet social and political history. We hope that the application of statistical and quantitative methods applied to collective biography represents a fruitful approach to unravelling problems in certain areas of research.
Footnotes


2 In the case of party statistics, the obvious exception to this is: T. H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917–1967. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Even in the Soviet literature, data on the composition of the party between 1933 and 1939 is very rare because the party stopped releasing such data.


Western historians of the Soviet period rarely use prosopography as an investigative method. However, a study of the Social Democratic movement before 1917 does. See David Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism: A Social and Historical Study of Russian Social Democracy, 1898-1907*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968. Given that this paper and Lane's study examine very different groups, no attempt will be made to correlate the findings.

The proportion of women in the sample is not only small vis-a-vis Soviet society, but also vis-a-vis the Communist Party which dominated the bureaucracy. In July 1932, 16.5% of the party's members were females. "O rabote partiinykh organizatsii sredi zhenshhin", *Bolshevik*, 1 (January 1951), 11. However, the proportion of voting delegates at the 17th Party Congress in 1934 who were females was even smaller than the all-party statistic—7.2 percent. *XVII s'ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b) 27 ianvaria-10 fevralia 1934g.: stenograficheski otchet*. Moscow, 1934, 149.


An examination of the selection's known ethnic composition yields rather different results. Although Slavs accounted for more than three-quarters of the USSR's 1939 population, within our selection they accounted for only slightly more than half (54.4%). Russians were particularly under-represented, comprising only 41% of the selection but 58% of the 1939 population. Baltic peoples, Jews, and people from the Caucasus were
over-represented within the selection. In 1939, less than 1% of the Soviet population were Balts, but within the selection they accounted for 15.1 percent; Latvians accounted for 10% of the selection. Jews, who accounted for about 2% of the 1939 population, also accounted for 10% of the selection. People’s from the Caucasus—Armenians, Azerbaidzhanis, and Georgians—comprised 12% of the selection, a proportion three times larger than that in the national population. The figures for Georgians were 6% and 1.3% respectively.

Because the number of those whose nationality we knew for certain is small (N=66), we caution the reader not to over-estimate the significance of this unrepresentative ethnic composition. The reason for the small sample size is that we only recorded nationality when we knew it to be true and not based on the place of birth. Given the considerable geographic mobility of people, especially Slavs, during the late imperial period and the mixture of different nationalities in certain areas (e.g. the mixture of Ukrainians, Poles, Russian, Belorussians and Jews in the western Ukraine or Belorussia), we chose to err on the side of caution.

As of July 1932, the “social position” of Communist Party members was: workers — 65.2%; peasants — 26.9%; employees and others — 7.9 percent. Rigby, 325. Based on this data, one might be tempted to label our sample as unrepresentative, but it is important to keep several factors in mind. First, our’s is a sample of the 1935 bureaucracy, not of the party. Second, from the 1924 Lenin levy, the proportion of workers in the party rose sharply. Finally, the 1933 chistka resulted in the expulsion of disproportionately high numbers of workers and peasants. For a discussion of the post-1924 social composition of the party, see Rigby, 88–235 passim. On the 1933 chistka, see Getty, Origins, chapter 2.

For an example of a family which owned land in a village and the head of which worked in a Moscow factory, a situation which meant that the children periodically travelled between the village and city, see: E. O. Kabo, *Ocherki rabochego byta*. Moscow, 1928, 103-107.

For a discussion of the educational levels of the population at large, see: Nicholas DeWitt, *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR*. Washington: National Science Foundation, 1961; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934*. Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Our selection was also more educated than the party leadership at the time. According to Ezhov's report to the 17th Congress, 31% of the delegates to that convocation had finished secondary school and only 10% had completed their higher education. *XVII s"ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b)*, 303.


According to Ezhov's report to the 1934 Party Congress, 10% of the party's members had joined the party during or before 1920. *XVII s"ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b)*, 303.


The following sample members had belonged to a political party before joining the Bolsheviks: A. M. Anikst, V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, S. I. Aralov, G. I. Broido, A. I. Egorov, M. S. Epshtein, A. G. Goikhbarg, N. P. Gorbunov, K. K. Iurenev, M. I. Kalmanovich, S. I. Kaplun,

16 On the inefficiency of the provincial police, see Neil Weissmann, "Regular Police in Tsarist Russia, 1900–1914", Paper presented to the Third Annual Conference of the National Seminar on Russian Social History in the Twentieth Century, University of Pennsylvania, January 1983.

17 For a comparison of these activities with those of the Moscow Bolshevik cadres in 1917, see William Chase and J. Arch Getty, "The Moscow Bolshevik Cadres of 1917: A Prosopographic Analysis," Russian History/Histoire Russe, 5, 1 (1978), 103–105.

18 Because virtually all congresses and conferences, organized by either political parties, trade unions, factory committees or the Provisional Government, were held in one of the two capitals, the proportion of activities which occurred in Moscow and Petrograd is somewhat inflated.


21 See footnote 3.

22 Spearman's $r = -0.3899$, which is statistically significant at the .05 level.

For examples of this view, see: ibid, 51-133 passim; Fainsod, Smolensk, 35-92, especially 57.

That higher ranking people were at greater risk to die during the Ezhovshchina should not be surprising in light of Khrushchev’s claim that 70% of the Central Committee members elected in 1934 were purged. N. S. Khrushchev, The Secret Speech Delivered to the Closed Session of the 20th Congress of the CPSU (Introduction by Zhores and Roy Medvedev) London, 1956, 33. Khrushchev’s figures may be slightly high. According to Getty, 62.5% of that Central Committee’s members were purged. J. Arch Getty, "The Great Purges Reconsidered: The Soviet Communist Party, 1933–1939" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College, 1979), 503.

It is important to note that age is an independent variable. No statistical relationship existed between age and partstazh or between age and rank. And given that oppositionists were generally older, obviously oppositional membership was not a function of age.

Oppositional membership explains so little because only 11% of the selection were former oppositions.


Fitzpatrick, "Stalin."

Chase and Getty, "Moscow Bolshevik Cadres".

For example, see: Haimson; Victoria E. Bonnell, The Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900–1914. Berkeley: University of California, 1983.
"The Soviet Bureaucracy in 1935"

(Tables and Appendices)

William Chase

Arch Getty
Table 1

Age in 1935 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
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mean age = 49.7
Table 2

Birth Environment (%)

\[ n = 101 \]

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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3
Social Origins (Father's Class) (%)

\[ n = 140 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisan</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Service/Mil.</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noble</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meshchanin</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4
Father's Class by Birth Environment (%)

n = 76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Class</th>
<th>Rural-born</th>
<th>Urban-born</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Intel.</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5  
Father's Class by Subject's Occupation (%)  
n = 76  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Class</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Prof./Intel.</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sons of Workers</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of Peasants</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of Prof./Int.</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Subject's occupation was calculated on the basis of the last known occupation before the 1917 revolutions. Thus, for many, the last occupation occurred during World War I.
Table 6

Highest Educational Level Completed [7]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Forma l</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Completed</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Completed</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Completed</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgrad. Completed</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 124
Table 8

Number of Pre-revolutionary Political Activities

\[ n = 151 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Political Activities</th>
<th>% of Bolsheviks with pol. activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13+</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

mean number of activities = 3.0
median number of activities = 2.0
Table 9

*Occupation as of February, 1917 (§)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof./Intel.</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 92
Table 10

Month Began 1917 Revolutionary Activity (%)  

n = 146  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Activity (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-November</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11

Number of Revolutionary Political Activities

\[ n = 151 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of 1917 Activities</th>
<th>% of Bolsheviks with revolutionary acts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12+</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean number of activities = 3.7
Median number of activities = 3.0
Table 12

Cause of Death (%)

\[ n = 209 \]

\begin{tabular}{ | l | c | }
\hline
Died in Prison & 51.2 \\
Natural & 39.9 \\
Executed & 4.9 \\
Suicide & 2.6 \\
World War II & 1.5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
Table 13

Characteristics of Those Purged in 1930s (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Purged</th>
<th>Not Purged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (%)</strong></td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=283)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Age in 1935</strong></td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=283)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oppositionists</strong></td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Oppositionists</strong></td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=181)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Members</strong></td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=180)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Party Members</strong></td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Correlation statistically significant at .05 level.
Multiple Classification Results of Purge Variables

Notes: $b =$ beta score from multiple classification analysis. Betas are relative scores which measure the comparative effect of each of the four independent variables on "Purged in 1930s".
The group of 283 Soviet leaders under study here was drawn from the Soviet Data Bank, a project under the direction of the authors which is aimed at assembling, verifying, and disseminating a machine-readable data bank of biographical information on the Soviet state and party leadership from the pre-World War II period. The data bank contains information from a wide variety of published and unpublished sources (see below) and is the largest collection of biographical data now in use by non-governmental scholars. It is scheduled for completion sometime in 1986.

The present group consists of those party and state officials from all levels and agencies who are known to have held office in 1935 and for whom the bank currently contains reasonably complete and verified biographies. It is therefore not, strictly speaking, a "random sample" since inclusion in the group is based on such factors as availability of a complete biography and the current levels of verification and inclusion in the data bank. On the other hand, a group of 283 senior leaders does represent a reasonable section of the top and middle levels of the 1935 bureaucracy.

Because high-ranking persons were more likely to have biographies written about them (then or now), our target group is "biased" toward the higher ranks of the 1935 bureaucracy; middle and lower levels are thus underrepresented in a statistical sense. To correct for this sampling bias, we have weighted the group by rank so that our
calculations better reflect the aggregate characteristics of the bureaucracy as a whole. We assume that in terms of rank, the Soviet bureaucracy (like all others) is roughly pyramid-shaped with relatively few representatives at the apex and a great many more nearer the low-ranking base of the structure. The apex of the pyramid is heavily represented by members of our basic group of 283 officials, the base much less so. Hence, in accordance with accepted sociological techniques, we conservatively weighted the group such that middle and lower ranking officials were given somewhat higher weight in statistical calculations. Correcting in this way allows us to make observations, generalizations, and conclusions which apply to the middle (and to some extent lower) as well as upper levels of the Soviet bureaucracy in 1935.

In this and other calculations, it is difficult to determine precise rank given the plethora of job titles at various levels; ranking is one of the major problems in the "hard" social sciences. To calculate an official's rank for analytical purposes, we used a two-judge procedure with a subtractive factor. That is, the two authors assigned each of the several hundred stated ranks into one of 18 hierarchical categories. Then, points were subtracted from each rank category, according to the level of the position, to arrive at the final rank. Thus, although their stated job titles were the same, a Central Committee secretary in a national republic had a lower rank than one at USSR level; a party secretary at raion level ranked lower than one at oblast level; the editor of a provincial newspaper ranked lower than the editor of Pravda.
Finally, a technical note on statistics. In assessing the relationship between two factors, or variables, we used a variety of tests: crosstabulation, Kolomogorov-Smirnov Test, Kruskal-Wallis Test, and one and two-way analyses of variance. We chose .05 as our criterion threshold for statistical significance.