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Can Gorbachev's radical reforms succeed? It is striking to note how different the discussion of this topic would have been only 7-10 years ago. At that time, most academic discussion was dominated by skepticism of radical or reactionary images of the future. The emphasis was rather on the ways in which Soviet leaders might "muddle through," rationalize the command economy, or foster "moderate reform." [Ruble 1981; Bialer 1980; Colton 1984; Breslauer 1978]. The prevailing assumption (which I shared) was that the Soviet, or at least the Russian, population was exceptionally passive and patient, that the regime needed only to deliver incremental improvements in the standard of living to maintain political peace, and that moderate reforms would make that possible. We also overwhelmingly assumed that, should a reformist leadership come to power and seek to anticipate or preempt crisis, it would push for economic reform, but not far-reaching political liberalization, much less democratization.

These assumptions and projections were based upon a relatively undifferentiated image of the Soviet population's political aspirations, and a view of the political establishment that posited little likelihood of high polarization between conservatives and reformists. We accepted the Stephen Cohen [1985] argument that these tendencies existed, but assumed that a technocratic synthesis of the two would dominate the middle ranges of the political spectrum, making moderate reform politically feasible and the most
attractive alternative. Then too, we tended to underestimate the depth of antagonism and the bravery among ethnic minorities.

The SIP studies, which have only begun to appear in the last three to four years [Millar 1987], implicitly warned us that our images were out-of-date. They presented hard data that demonstrated a real generation gap on matters of both economic and political reform. Those data told us to employ a more differentiated image of both society and polity, and alerted us to the existence of an extensive social base for reform—as well as to a set of social strata that did not have a large stake in reform.

It would be too harsh to claim that Gorbachev has proven us wrong. We do not know what would have happened had a moderate reformer come to power instead of Gorbachev—for example, if Andropov had lived on, in good health, for ten years. Even in the absence of a lengthy tenure for Andropov, there was nothing inevitable about Gorbachev's coming to power. And there was nothing inevitable about his political radicalization during 1986-88. It was Gorbachev who, for good political reasons that I cannot explore in this paper, unleashed social forces with his glasnost and perestroika campaigns. He encouraged radicalization and people took him up on it, then facing him with a snowball effect that he could not control. Since people everywhere often "rebel" only when they perceive it to be a feasible, not just desirable, alternative, it is quite possible that, had a moderate reformer come to power, we would not be witnessing the extent of social turmoil we find today in the USSR. The antagonisms and alienation would have been there, but people might have been less likely to act upon them.
Be that as it may, Gorbachev and we face a new reality. The genie is out of the bottle, and it can only be put back in at great cost. Hence, today we debate grander choices. Now that the level of autonomous social and political mobilization is so great, it is at least questionable whether "muddling through" could ever again be a viable alternative to a breakthrough to the left or to the right.

Before we discuss whether Gorbachev's reforms can succeed, let us be clear as to what we mean by reform. I do not mean a multi-party liberal democracy and a free-market economy, though these are scenarios that must be considered when we discuss alternative futures (see below). Rather, I mean a process of democratization of political relationships, liberalization of expression, and partial marketization of the economy. Reform means a process of maintaining a secular momentum in each of these directions. Conservatism means an effort to slow, stop, or reverse that momentum. Reaction is an effort to turn back the clock to a more authoritarian, centralized, and coercive regime than existed even under Brezhnev. It seems obvious that neither we nor Gorbachev know how far a Soviet leader will have to go, or will be allowed to go, in order to create a more viable political and economic order.

Which raises the question of what constitutes "success." This is also a murky issue that is best dealt with without over-specification. Politically, it means that new mechanisms and processes of conflict-management have been created and at least moderately institutionalized that increase the accountability of officials to their constituencies. Economically, it means that structural reforms, after a difficult transition, during which the situation is likely to worsen, survive backlash.
temptations and generate sustained improvements in both growth and consumption. In this respect, comparative referents are useful. China and Hungary would be the examples of economic success, though inflation rates and foreign indebtedness raise questions about how to emulate them while avoiding these outcomes, while Poland and Yugoslavia would represent the outcomes to avoid.

One could, of course, make this easier on the forecaster by adopting more modest definitions of success. (Surely Gorbachev will be tempted to adjust downward the definition of success to maintain the legitimacy of his leadership, should the process of reform stall for long, but that is another matter.) Political success could be defined as the avoidance of systemic breakdown and civil war. Economic success could be defined as the avoidance of economic unraveling. This is a set of definitions that Poland's leader, General Jaruzelski, might embrace. But such a minimalist definition is not very useful for a discussion of the prospects for reform in the USSR. The minimalist definition really refers to a different debate: the prospects for stability.

This paper will first present a list of obstacles to the success of Gorbachev's program of political and economic liberalization. It will then turn to factors that could facilitate realization of that program. Then it will discuss alternative scenarios for the near-term future, and the assumptions about both process and the factual situation in the USSR today that undergird each of these scenarios.
Obstacles to Reform

Pessimistic prognoses for the success of reform have much to recommend them. They are based upon images of Soviet society and polity that are plausible, though (as we shall see) incomplete. Let me outline those obstacles and images in random order, with no pretensions to assigning relative weights to them.

(1) BUREAUCRATIC ENTRENCHMENT AND CORRUPTION: Deeply entrenched party and economic bureaucracies, stretching over a huge land mass, and widely corrupted by the largesse of the Brezhnev era, constitute a formidable obstacle to reform. Both political accountability and a genuinely free market would undermine the political autonomy and status of bureaucrats and apparatchiki who have much to lose from such a change. Not only would it threaten their career prospects, their rights to control political and economic relationships in their domain, and their self-conception. It would also threaten their socio-economic privileges, on which they, their families, and their friends have come to depend, either (in some cases) for a decent standard of living or (in other cases) for a luxurious standard of living.

Thus, bureaucratic resistance to the idea of political democratization, anti-system public expression, and economic marketization is likely to be widespread, though it might take passive forms in light of the risk associated with being dubbed "anti-perestroika." What's more, this resistance will be difficult to break. Bureaucratization per se is not the main problem. It is bureaucratic entrenchment and corruption that is so
difficult to bust. One need only think of Soviet public administration as
-dominated by corrupt political machines to envisage the problem. Tammany
Hall, the Chicago machine, Huey Long's Louisiana—all required autonomous
public movements, drawing upon the coercive resources and political muscle
of other levels of government, to break their power. Or consider the
difficulty of forcing the de-segregation of the University of Alabama under
George Wallace's governorship. John Kennedy had to send the federal
marshals, amidst nationwide publicity and autonomous political mobilization
by blacks and whites. How many federal marshals can Gorbachev muster to
break local political machines throughout that vast country? And what is
his strategy for preventing bureaucratic reentrenchment by successors?

(2) INSTITUTIONAL PASSIONS FOR DISCIPLINE AND ORDER: The military
and the KGB may have their own reasons for believing that reform is
necessary for improving the performance of the economy. But they are also
institutions that are not comfortable with the implications and side-effects
of political democratization or consumer sovereignty. Military leaders have
long enjoyed privileged access to scarce resources, both during decisions
over investment priorities and during the subsequent struggle to fulfill the
plan. Any move toward consumer sovereignty, as an adjunct to economic
reform, would threaten that access. The KGB, in turn, must fear an
environment of openness toward the outside world (and foreign spies), as
well as manifestations of disorder at home. In part this stems from an
ethos that the KGB shares with the military (and with most militaries in the
world): a passion for discipline and order. In part, though, it stems from
the profoundly unsettling ambiguity facing KGB officials as they try to
distinguish political from non-political crime, anti-state from within-system behavior, and illegitimate police behavior from legitimate during this period of glasnost, "learning democracy," and transition to a "legal state." Interestingly, a KGB official, speaking at the 19th Party Conference, called for legal clarification of the KGB's functions so as to reduce ambiguity as to institutional mission. In a liberalizing and destabilized political milieux, some cops are eager to bash heads; others are afraid of being accused of "police brutality"; both are ambivalent or hostile toward the process that made the new milieux possible.

(3) WIDESPREAD SOCIAL DEMORALIZATION: One legacy of the Brezhnev era was the demoralization that spread among wide strata of the population. Among the working masses, both urban and rural, this expressed itself in an epidemic of alcoholism. Among the professional classes, this expressed itself in a loss of faith in the reformability of the system, a loss of optimism about the future, and a sense of anomie. Young people became cynical and self-regarding, placing rock 'n' roll and jeans over public causes and work satisfaction in their hierarchies of values.

(4) BUDGETARY STRINGENCY: Both economic and political reform are threatened by budgetary stringency. Reforming certain sectors of the economy requires simultaneously liberating them of excessive central controls and pumping them with resources. The legacy of taut plans and an unreliable supply system is that liberalization without pumping creates contradictions that will undermine performance in the reformed sectors. Regional supply depots that are well-stocked, and prepared to engage in
wholesale trade of inputs, for example, will be required. Moreover, reform is a process that engenders deprivation of certain social groups more than others. If the "losers" are not to mobilize their own political resources to undermine reform, they must be pacified with side-payments, such as subsidies. That is not so easy without budgetary slack—though the latter can be created by certain reform measures, such as lifting subsidies on basic commodities. Then too, political reform unleashes social and political forces, as in the ethnic minority areas, or in the Russian Republic as an anti-ethnic minority backlash, whose grievances simply may not be capable of being met without engendering political instability. Under those conditions, economic side-payments as a way of making political deprivation tolerable will require budgetary slack.

(5) LEGACY OF THE WELFARE STATE: Ten years ago, I suggested [Breslauer 1978] that the Soviet Union under Brezhnev had evolved into an authoritarian welfare-state. True, this was not an authoritarian regime that allowed as much autonomous political expression or organization as most. And it was not an affluent welfare-state, on the order of a Sweden, that assured both a safety net and a fairly good standard of living for almost all citizens. But it was authoritarian rather than totalitarian in its approach to citizen mobilization (missing the terroristic despotism of 20th century totalitarian regimes), and was committed to providing minimal cradle-to-grave social security for the population. The welfare state provided subsidization of prices on basic commodities, heavily subsidized rent for state apartments, job security in one's place of current employment, and a relatively egalitarian wage structure (though not
privilege structure). My claim was not that these were the only important features of the system; rather, I argued that these were defining features of an aspect of state-society relations that would have important, possibly decisive, implications for the reformability of the system.

With respect to the welfare-state legacy, that prognosis has certainly been borne out by the reform efforts under Gorbachev. At a time when major reorganizations of personnel, political institutions, accountability relationships, and economic exchange relationships have been pushed through, the regime has been most wary of attacking the welfare-state. Price reform, which would surely engender inflation and a reduction or elimination of many subsidies, has been postponed until 1991. Job security, though formally attacked by job-elimination schemes, still finds protection in the name of preventing "unemployment." It remains to be seen to what extent job security is currently being threatened by the reforms. Distrust of the inequalitarian features of private and cooperative enterprise is one major social constraint on loosening the laws restrictive of the scope and character of such enterprise. My argument is not that the welfare-state legacy will necessarily throttle reform. It is rather that fear of mass reaction to addressing that legacy, and reversing tacit entitlements, is a major constraint on reform.

(6) A XENOPHOBIC AND AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL CULTURE: At both the mass and the elite levels, xenophobia is a strong feature of both Russian and Soviet political culture. This is often underappreciated in discussions of reform obstacles. Russian and Soviet uniqueness and autonomy (samobytnost') have been coupled to a siege mentality, a manichean
worldview, a missionary urge, and a severe distrust of foreigners. In its most extreme form, this has facilitated regime-initiated pogroms. In its less extreme forms, it has facilitated regime efforts to justify a repressive authoritarian regime. Xenophobic perspectives, combined with the objective economic and social conditions of the 1980s, mean that, in the Soviet Union today, a social base for fascism may exist that is as large or larger than the social base for reformism. Short of that, they justify maintaining tight political controls over society and economy in a threatening international context.

In addition to being xenophobic, both Russian and Soviet political cultures have been authoritarian: paternalistic and regimented, instilling in people a belief that the only alternative to order is anarchy, and that they need a strong boss to ensure social cohesion. These anti-liberal features have been further reinforced by a culture that never extolled the notion of individual rights, individualism, or contracts, and that embraced substantive, rather than procedural, definitions of justice (i.e. "who wins" is more important than "fair play"). To the extent that radical reforms move the system toward rule of law, contracts, commercialism, procedural definitions of justice, individual political empowerment, and so on, they will have to overcome or circumvent the biases of the mass political culture.

(7) GLOBAL OVEREXTENSION: Worldwide Soviet foreign policy commitments are a continuing drain, not only on Soviet resources, but also on the attention-span of Soviet leaders, who must concentrate on steering the unpredictable reform process at home. Soviet foreign policy commitments
contribute to budgetary stringency; an arms race, of course, would further strain the budget and limit the disposable surplus available for redistribution to the benefit of reform. What's more, global overextension increases the probability that crises will suddenly undermine stability in the East-West relationship, and reinforce the political strength of xenophobic forces at home. Finally, overextension in Eastern Europe can generate crises that, if they do not undermine political stability within the USSR itself, can discredit the cause of reformism in the USSR by allowing the same process to get out of hand within Eastern Europe.

(8) ETHNIC TENSIONS: In certain respects, ethnic assertiveness can push reform along, by raising inordinately the perceived cost and risk associated with cracking down. I suspect, for example, that even Chebrikov or Ligachev would not relish the prospect of trying to disperse half-a-million Estonians, Armenians, or Azerbaidjanis. But we should also bear in mind that the most politically important ethnic minorities have not yet been heard from: the Ukrainians and the Central Asians. Should instability take place in those locales, it could have the effect of discrediting perestroika by undermining arguments that the process can be kept within bounds. What's more, we have not yet heard from the Russian-chauvinist "National Bolsheviks," whose reactions against minority assertiveness in conditions of political instability could rapidly escalate interethnic violence (ponder, for example, what might happen if, next time, the Azerbaidjanis slaughter Russians instead of Armenians). More generally, inter-ethnic conflicts have already demonstrated to the leadership that it cannot control the pace of change, or the scheduling of issues to which attention has to be paid.
Gorbachev has tried to control the sequencing of issues, and has failed. Since reform is a process that touches upon almost every area of political and economic life, ethnic assertiveness confounds the effort to deal with the politically least intractable problems first.

(9) COMPLEXITY OF THE TASK: The task of reforming any authoritarian system, and especially a Leninist system, is intellectually daunting. Neither Soviet nor Western theory can tell Soviet leaders just what mix of market and plan even to aim for in order to effect a workable mix of growth, consumption, national security, and social equity. Neither Soviet nor Western theory can tell them whether a socialist democracy (a la Roy Medvedev [1975]) can be stabilized without yielding inexorable pressures for a multi-party system. DeTocqueville can advise Soviet leaders that there is no more dangerous time for an authoritarian regime than when it begins to reform itself and discovers the need to backtrack as released social forces go "too far." Some theorists of the history of democracy in Western Europe can advise the Kremlin that a "civic political culture" is required, based on individualism and commercialism, in order to support a market economy and a democratic polity. But these bits of advice can hardly guide Soviet leaders through the liberalization process, much less legitimize the notion that there are alternatives short of capitalist liberal democracy that would prove viable.

(10) CONTRADICTIONS OF TRANSITION: Closely related to these points is the observation that Soviet leaders lack, not only a theory about the prospectively viable end-state to shoot for, but also a theory about
strategies for getting there. Contradictions abounds during the early stages of reform, as we can see in contemporary China, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. In the USSR we already see how the Soviet underworld is shaking down the weak and vulnerable cooperative sector, and how party and state bureaucrats are demanding substantial bribes to give licenses and supplies to that sector, all of which additionally raises the cost of doing business, increases prices on the cooperative markets, and alienates citizens repelled by those prices. These contradictions of transition can be exploited by anti-reformists to discredit the process of reform. Those against reform will gain additional ideological and political ammunition from the Soviet historical tradition of the past sixty years, which has delivered a message that has been consistently anti-market in content.

Other contradictions abound, making it difficult to chart, much less manage, a transition. Glasnost, for example, has mobilized people faster than institutions have been created to regulate political conflict. The destruction of even the pretense of ideological belief has created a moral-ideological vacuum conducive to social disorder and elite loss of morale or will to crack down---as in the recent "occupation" of the city of Kazan' by youth gangs. These are the conditions under which xenophobic forces, or Russian-chauvinist "National Bolsheviks," come to the fore with simple solutions. Should these kinds of riots and rebellions spread within the RSFSR and the Ukraine, a coalition of party, military, and KGB officials, along with National Bolshevik intelligentsia, could demand such simple solutions [Yanov 1987]. On a less apocalyptic, but equally serious, note, perestroika and glasnost have apparently caused a "revolution of rising aspirations" by Soviet consumers who, on a widespread scale, appear to have
shifted their base of comparison for the evaluation of current conditions from the Soviet past to the West European and American present. Yet economic reform is a process during which things get worse for the average consumer before they get better. The contradiction is palpable, and provides fertile ground for passive resistance and deepening alienation.

In the midst of these and other contradictions, Soviet leaders find themselves lacking a political strategy or theory of transformation. It is not enough to say that the success of reform will take a long time, or "will be a matter of generations." That statement might be politically useful for present purposes, but it is based on the tenuous assumption that gains will cumulate rather than unravel. What critical early thrusts are required to achieve a decisive breakthrough against the obstacles to reform? Through what process can the above contradictions be overcome or attenuated in order to facilitate cumulation of gains? How does one go about combining market and plan, democratization and limits, in ways that will not delegitimize the idea of reform? We do not know. Nor, probably, does Gorbachev.

Having thoroughly depressed the reader hopeful of success for Gorbachev and his program, let me now reverse field. I will not deny that any of the above points is correct as stated. Rather, I will argue that many of the points ignore offsetting factors that push for the success of reform. Were I forced to bet my life's savings on the success of reform, I would demand odds in my favor. But that said, let me now argue why a very respectable case can be made that successful reform is not a utopian undertaking, either intellectually or politically.
Factors Facilitating Reform

A number of factors push for, or facilitate, continued expansion of the restructuring process—both in the economy and the polity. Again, let me outline these without assigning relative weights.

(1) A NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE: This includes the "new middle class," skilled blue-collar strata, and, from a generational standpoint, the "yuppies." Jerry Hough [1988], Martin Walker [1986], Blair Ruble [1987], and Peter Hauslohner [1987] have all emphasized the fact that, collectively, these strata number in the tens of millions, many of whom are eager to employ their skills and initiative in a context that will promise a pay-off (either public or private). This stratum has expanded tremendously in size during the past twenty-five years, and was not available to Khrushchev in such numbers as a social base for his reforms. But they grew up while Brezhnev slept, and now provide the best hope for mobilization on behalf of economic and political liberalization.

True, these are the strata that were demoralized, or turned cynical, under Brezhnev. But it does not necessarily follow that they are irretrievable. Gorbachev has clearly targeted them as the people he hopes to activate on behalf of entrepreneurialism and political initiative, and has been attempting, through glasnost', the laws on cooperatives, and other means to create for them an environment in which independent political and economic initiative will prove rewarding. It would be presumptuous for us to declare categorically that this cannot be done. The scope of the "second economy" under Brezhnev belies the notion that either a commercial spirit or
the work ethic have been destroyed in the USSR. And Paul Gregory's findings from emigre interviewing [Gregory 1988] support the proposition that low labor exertion under Brezhnev was more often a product of the incentive structure than of alcoholism or sloth. Many of these people may not be willing as yet to stick their necks out to fight for perestroika. But many of them might well be willing to fight to prevent the process from being halted or rolled back. Thus, at a minimum, this social base could perform a "blocking" function against far-reaching backlashes. At maximum, they could provide the entrepreneurial spirit required for perestroika to succeed.

Even at the mass levels, the process of moving toward reform, and the glasnost' campaign's elevation of popular consciousness, can erode the passive, authoritarian mentality of the traditional political culture. Without doubt, we have seen this in the Baltic and the Caucasus, where both the lower and the middle classes have combined to exploit new opportunities for political empowerment. And as Bill Keller [1988] reports regarding the situation in Moscow: "Perhaps most striking is the general reduction in the level of fear, as ordinary citizens begin to say in the press and on the streets what they once said only around their kitchen tables. Even though Mr. Gorbachev has not yet delivered on his promise of new laws to safeguard individual rights of expression, people have begun to accept those rights as their own."

(2) ELITE AND SPECIALIST LEARNING: Brezhnev's longevity contributed to the eventual reform process by thoroughly discrediting conservatism, which is now treated as synonymous with stagnation (zastoi). As a result, within the upper reaches of the political establishment, there
is a widespread sense of there being no alternative to reform. The idea of reform, then, has been legitimized, even though battles may rage over how far the process should be allowed to go—that is, over the scope and costs of reform. Moreover, thirty years of experimentation with more modest reform efforts, both in the USSR and in Eastern Europe (and now China) have given Soviet social scientists, and their political sponsors, a deeper understanding of the nature of systemic interdependencies, of the limits on the capacity of the unreformed system to perform, of the inevitability of corruption and stagnation in the absence of far-reaching reform, and of the potential consequences for Soviet international competitiveness of failure to reform the system. On these scores as well, Khrushchev did not have the benefit of such a mood and mentality, a point that should be borne in mind by those who point to Khrushchev's fate as a major reason Gorbachev cannot succeed.

(3) PSYCHOLOGICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS: While it is true that some strands of the ideological tradition provide powerful supports for conservatism and for an aversion to markets (be they political or economic), it is also true that other strands of the ideological tradition provide compelling force for reform. Both psychologically and ideologically, Soviet elite political culture displays an aversion to stagnation, and a need for a sense of progress, drama, optimism, and a mission. This helps to foster, and then to legitimize, transformative leadership. Khrushchev tried to stimulate such missionary drama, following the stagnation of late-Stalinism, with his anti-Stalin campaign and his campaign to construct full communism. The former proved to be too negative, and the latter too incredible.
Brezhnev hardly sought to create a sense of drama, but he did seek to diffuse notions of Soviet patriotism and great power nationalism as integrating values for the union. Judging from present-day events, that proved to be insufficient to maintain cohesion once controls were loosened, and was wholly inadequate for inspiring people during the 1970s. The New Right in the USSR today proposes Russian chauvinism or "National Bolshevism" which, to this point, has been treated by the politicians as too dangerous and counterproductive. Indeed, that may be the greatest constraint on a Russian-chauvinist right wing reaction: widespread belief within the upper reaches of the party-state that such a course would be counter-productive in a volatile multi-ethnic state, and that the adoption of a pogrom mentality could turn, as it did under Stalin, against the official class as well.

That leaves perestroika or some variant of "socialist democracy" to provide a core task and future vision. At the moment, the other competitors lack legitimacy, lending strength to the Gorbachevian claim that "there is no alternative." What's more, socialist democracy or market socialism would not have to be legitimized from scratch. As Stephen Cohen has argued with great eloquence [Cohen 1985], the ideological heritage is substantively dualistic. Lenin's last writings and the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s can be cited as precedents to justify both political and economic marketization. That is not to say that the strands within the ideological heritage are equally weighted in Lenin's work. What the outside observer believes about this academic debate, or what the actual weights were, is less important in political life than the fact that both strands are available for purposes of political justification.
A NON-MONOLITHIC PARTY-STATE: Were the "entrenched and corrupted bureaucracy" united in its definition of where its interests lie, the task of perestroika might be an impossible one. Fortunately for Gorbachev (who himself is a product of the party apparatus), there are heterogeneous dispositions and interests within the party-state. There are reformists as well as conservatives, technocrats as well as traditional mobilizers, cosmopolitans as well as parochials, ascetics as well as "aristocratizers," regionalists as well as centralists, anti-corruption fighters as well as the corrupted. Indeed, in many officials, several of these orientations probably coexist, sometimes in ways that are mutually reinforcing (e.g. reformist + cosmopolitan + anti-corruption), sometimes in ways that are conflictual. What's more, generalizations about the distribution of these "types," while based on scanty data, nonetheless have to distinguish between the interests of the central leadership in Moscow and the regional leaderships. The relative autonomy of the central leadership from its political base, and the all-union perspective its job requires, combine to make for a greater proclivity for transformative thrusts at the top than in the middle of the party-state. All of which provides Gorbachev with the opportunity to alter recruitment patterns and build coalitions within the apparatus as he seeks to promote personnel who share his orientations. None of this is accounted for when we think solely in terms of entrenched bureaucrats defending their "interests."

And there is another point. The experience of both China and Hungary reveals that, in the course of reform, the middle-level apparat can develop a financial and commercial stake in reform, even among those whose orientations are antithetical to reform. This stake may result from shaking
down the private sector; or it may stem from party officials themselves becoming entrepreneurs. This may bode ill for the eventual legitimation with other publics of the outcome of reform; and it may engender contradictions that affect the performance level of the reformed system (the rule of law would be important to preventing a mafia-like shake-down economy). But if the issue is the probability of enactment and implementation of reform, then the appearance of an apparat stake in a reformed economy would bode well.

(5) A MANIPULABLE POLITICAL ORDER: Two, apparently contradictory features of the Soviet political order also facilitate the task of reform. First, the advantages of centralization make it easier for Gorbachev to transform the bureaucracy from above, by mobilizing supporters through the patron-client machinery on which much of his raw power is based. Second, the nominally legislative arenas of the system (the Soviets and the party committees [as opposed to executive bureaus]), though subordinated to the executive structures for seventy years, are available for resuscitation as an alternative arena of political accountability— as, indeed, Gorbachev is currently pushing hard to do. This also provides Gorbachev an alternative arena within which to mobilize political leverage against the bureaucrats. Such resuscitation can also easily be justified with reference to the formal ideology of the regime, which has always maintained the fiction that the executive bureaus are chosen by and accountable to the legislative arenas. Thus, a transformative leader in the Soviet context does not have to invent and sell an ideological justification; he needs only to argue that the regime must live up to its claims. That does not ensure success; but it
certainly makes things easier than they would otherwise be.

(6) INTERNATIONAL IMPULSES: Throughout both Russian and Soviet history, there has existed a strong relationship between modernization strategies and perceived international security imperatives. To cite but one example of recent memory, Stalin justified the tempos of industrialization in 1931 by arguing that the alternative would be to be crushed by foreign predators. Similarly, Gorbachev justifies perestroika in part in precisely these terms. He cites the economic and military security implications of technological backwardness, and holds out the prospect of the USSR slipping to second-class power status in the absence of reform. This may explain, incidentally, why Gorbachev chose to reform the urban-industrial sector before reforming the agricultural sector. He may have believed that only an argument based on fears about national security, rather than fears of consumer dissatisfaction, could legitimize as far-reaching a reform as he was proposing.

There are other international impulses that stem less from perceived security requirements than from ideological forces. Soviet elite political culture has viewed the USSR as the natural ideological hegemon within the world communist movement. It has also viewed the USSR as the leading ideological competitor of the West in proving to all audiences the higher worth of the socialist social system. Although Soviet leaders' belief in these propositions may have been diluted during the past twenty years, they remain sensitive to the threat of ideological humiliation. To the extent that successful reform in Hungary and China allows these countries to make major progress in the direction of more affluent societies, and to the
extent that the export capacity of manufactured goods, technological levels, and consumer affluence of capitalist NICs come to exceed those of the USSR, severe ideological embarrassment is eventually likely to be the Soviet response, facilitating the efforts of Soviet reformists to legitimize their case. Indeed, under those circumstances, I would expect many "party ideologues" to be in the forefront of such an effort.

(7) THE 'PULL' OF WESTERNIZATION: This is still another international impulse, but it deserves separate attention, for two reasons. It is an impulse that derives from the international environment itself, as an attraction, rather than from the leadership's definitions of security or ideological identity. It is also an impulse that is a potential offset to the xenophobic strains discussed above as an obstacle to reform. There has long since been a Westernizing pull at both the elite and societal levels. Stalin enforced insulation bordering on isolation against it. Since Stalin, and especially since the early-1970s, Soviet elite and society have been increasingly penetrated by Western ideas, information, science, cultural fads, standards of comparison regarding economic well-being, and so on. The tension---with xenophobic proclivities and conservative concerns for political control---created by this penetration was palpable during the Brezhnev era.

Part of Gorbachev's reform program is a conscious effort to break through this tension and to allow a flood of penetration. Efforts at integration into the international economic order entail joint ventures that will soon allow majority ownership of Soviet projects by foreign capitalists (no small ideological concession!). A tremendous expansion of both exchange
programs and allowable tourism to the West has taken place. Jamming of Radio Liberty, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, BBC, and Israeli Radio has ceased. Rock 'n' roll has been allowed to come above-ground, to become a model for youth (as witness the stadiums in which concerts take place and the fact that leading Western rock groups appear on Soviet television). Soviet scientists are rapidly becoming more fully integrated into the international scientific community. The list could be extended.

The attraction of foreign travel, ideas, fads, forms, science, and goods for wide strata of both society and the elite is undeniable. It will continue to compete vigorously for predominance with xenophobic tendencies. To the extent that this is a generational phenomenon—and the evidence suggests it is—generational change will strengthen the Westernizing biases markedly. To the extent that reforming the Soviet system requires Soviet integration into the international political, scientific, and economic orders, the process of reform will strengthen the hand of Westernizers. To be sure, there will be many times when ambivalence will strike Soviet leaders. After all, they are not single-motive political actors. Thus, Premier Ryzhkov was asked why the USSR does not borrow heavily on foreign financial markets to finance the import of large quantities of consumer goods for the Soviet population. He replied: "we will not leave that debt to our grandchildren!" This is a reasonable case of ambivalence, of "approach-avoidance" behavior. It simply means that Soviet leaders will face hard choices among conflicting priorities. But the pull of Westernization will likely grow stronger as time goes on, due to generational change and to the synergistic interaction of reform and expressed demands for it. What's more, some of the effects of
Westernization may prove irreversible, or reversible only at a price the leadership will not be willing to pay.

(8) ETHNIC TENSIONS AND DEMANDS: It may seem strange to see ethnic tensions listed as a factor facilitating reform. It is common among analysts to point out—correctly, I believe—that the multi-ethnic state structure is a major constraint on political reform, for Moscow very much fears augmenting centrifugal forces among the ethnic minorities. However, this cuts both ways. Glasnost' has already unleashed many ethnic forces (though not yet the most important ones—the Ukrainians), creating a situation in which ethnic demands push for maintaining and raising the momentum of perestroika, while the level of ethnic mobilization raises prohibitively the cost of enforcing a return to the old way of maintaining order. Furthermore, it is precisely in such ethnic minorities as the Balts and the Caucasians that the spirit of commercialism, entrepreneurialism, and political self-expression is most fully developed, making them a valuable laboratory and showcase for reform. In these respects, a reformist leader may need a certain level of ethnic assertiveness as a means of both legitimizing new directions and delegitimizing old ones.

(9) THE NATURE OF TRANSITIONS: Transitions are always messy. Democratization and marketization are rarely effected smoothly, by design from above. In the absence of real disruptions, both economic and political, a genuine transition to new ordering principles is not likely to take place. To be sure, elites must have some sense of direction—what they want to approach, and what they want to avoid. But beyond that, an
unpredictable interaction takes place between elite initiatives and released social forces. A focus on the contradictions inherent in the present situation, therefore, alerts us to the difficulties of transition, but not necessarily to its ultimate fate. Political strategies evolve as elites learn and policies are adjusted. Even optimists about the fate of reform would be wise to anticipate that perestroika will not proceed in unilinear fashion. It will likely proceed in fits and starts, but it will keep coming back, because there is no viable alternative, because social forces of the younger generations will keep pushing for it, and because there is an objective need, both at home and abroad, that will only grow.

What's more, the elite learning that has taken place in recent years makes it difficult for conservatives to point to transitional dilemmas in order to delegitimize the very idea of reform. One would anticipate, therefore, that the Soviet Union during the next twenty years, with or without Gorbachev, will experience a rolling reform, rather than the previous pattern of a "treadmill of reforms" [Schroeder 1979]. The referent for rolling reform in a communist system would be Hungary during the past twenty-five years. The defining characteristic of a rolling reform is that frustration of half-measures leads, not to a backlash against reform per se (the previous pattern), but rather to a radicalization of the reform proposals enacted.

(10) THE NATURE OF TRANSFORMATIVE LEADERSHIP: In a similar vein, we run the danger of evaluating the utility of current policies and programs only in terms of their short-run consequences for the performance of the economy or the democratic accountability of officials. How many times have
we heard it said that the joint ventures law is inadequate, that multiple-candidacy elections have not broken the apparatus' control of the nomination process, or that cooperatives are relatively few in number and are hemmed in by licensing and supply restraints? These observations are quite correct, but they miss a point. Transformative leadership is not only a matter of attaining tangible short-term results. It is also a process of transforming biases. Indeed, that is probably the most important function a transformative leader can perform. In that light, it is more important that Gorbachev first concentrate on legitimizing new ideas, such as foreign capitalists owning equity in Soviet firms, or multiple-candidate, secret-ballot elections, or a mixed economy. He can worry later about making the amendments required to ensure effective performance of the new laws. Indeed, were a leader to try to gain the optimal legislation simultaneously with the effort to legitimize the new idea, he would likely fail on both scores. When we consider how many sacred cows Gorbachev has delegitimized in but three-and-a-half years, and how many new practices he has legitimized, the "results" of his leadership appear breathtaking, not meager. And the prospective effectiveness of his leadership appears all the greater for having laid the proper foundation of political and social legitimacy.

Nor should we be misled by manifestations of political conflict within the establishment over the desirability and feasibility of reformist policies. Conflict is a necessary ally of the transformative leader. He needs to invite challenges and dissensus in order to clarify to all audiences the choices and the stakes [Burns 1980; Tichy and Devanna 1986; Wildavsky 1987]. This has the effect of raising the consciousness of
audiences, of involving people psychologically in a choice process. From this standpoint, the most important consequence of the 19th Party Conference in June 1988 was not its failure to deliver the purge mechanism that Gorbachev might have been seeking. The main, and perhaps most important, consequence was psychological: it was a national catharsis to see leaders on television debating critical choices, and to witness Gorbachev confidently directing the proceedings. This is the kind of transformative leadership that "excites the previously bored and apathetic" [Burns 1980: 137], and encourages them to take up the opportunities for empowerment they are being offered.

We should also not be misled by simple counts of the number of officials whose orientation is for or against perestroika. Transformative leadership does not require a majority of officials to be active fighters for transformation. Rather, it requires a critical mass of dedicated followers placed in strategic positions in key organizations [Burns 1980; Tichy and Devanna 1986]. Their presence has the effect of neutralizing people whose orientations are antithetical, but whose sense of political survival dictates bandwagoning rather than oppositional behavior.

Then too, successful transformative leadership creates relatively irreversible faits accomplis. When Gorbachev activates social forces through his glasnost' campaigns, when he ends the jamming of foreign radios, or when he brings foreign companies into the USSR on joint ventures, he creates new situations that are difficult to reverse. He raises the cost of turning back. In Leninist terms, he latches onto certain "key links" that will raise public consciousness, delegitimize past practices, and create national commitments. Thus, we must realize that some policy changes are
more important than others in terms of their reverberating impact and ease of being reversed. The transformative leader tries to maximize changes of these sorts. Gorbachev is certainly acting as if he realizes this.

(11) TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: We can also draw some encouraging lessons from the literature on democratization in Western Europe [the following is based on Rustow 1970]. One lesson is that there are many roads to, and forms of, democracy. Another is that democratization generally emerges through phases, and that the first phase requires at least a generation to take hold. A third is that democracy emerges from a preparatory stage of protracted, deep conflict and struggle between radical and conservative forces. Fourth, in the course of that struggle, circumstances often force or lure non-democrats into democratic forms of behavior, which they later rationalize by adopting democratic beliefs or values. Fifth, democracy was rarely historically the primary goal; it was sought as a means to some other end (usually, as Bryce pointed out, to "the wish to be rid of tangible evils"). The parallels with the USSR are obvious, including the wish to be rid of technological backwardness for the sake of national and regime security.

None of this means that the Soviet Union will necessarily follow the path, or reach the end-point, achieved by Western Europe. But it does lend perspective to the tortured process through which that country is current going, and alert us to the probability of some unexpected, and apparently paradoxical, outcomes.

In a similar vein, Peter Hauslohner [1988: 8] has recently examined the large and growing literature on transitions to democracy in the Third World.
He points out that recent cases of 'begun transitions' to democracy elsewhere in the world indicate that sometimes a ruling elite will initiate a process over which it then loses control. Incumbent leaders may institute partial political reforms from above, in pursuit of their own, self-serving purposes, which become the cause or pretext of actions by other institutions and groups in society—actions which, if they come to threaten the existing political order, are liable to force their rulers to choose between additional changes not originally contemplated, or a strategic, and possibly more dangerous retreat.

Thus, new situations may present hard-choice alternatives in which yesterday's intolerable option becomes today's least bad option. For example, tolerating Estonian acts of defiance may prove preferable to routing 300,000 Estonians from a public square—even to conservatives. Perhaps only the right-wing extremists—the pogromshchiki—would be willing to pay the price. Likewise, tens of thousands of informal groups have mushroomed across the country, spearheaded primarily by young people; it would require drastic action to return to the status quo ante. Young people today have taken advantage of glasnost' on a very large scale, and represent a range of moods and ideologies that, while mutually incompatible, on the whole share an aversion to returning to a Brezhnevite regime.
Similarly, a diversity of incompatible Russian nationalist ideologies and organizations has come above ground under Gorbachev, sharing only their common allegiance to glasnost' [Hammer 1988]. An attempt to reverse glasnost', then, could face the leadership with a situation in which the price of tolerating public expression is perceived as lower than the price of cracking down. Thus, a leadership's calculation of its interests may evolve in unpredictable ways, laying the basis for both new patterns of behavior and rationalization that makes a virtue of necessity.

This perspective lends support to my suggestion that we envisage the possibility of a "rolling reform." However, we should also note that democratization in the Third World has thus far followed a much more tortured and inconclusive path than in Western Europe. The typical pattern in much of the Third World has been for "begun transitions to democracy" to be aborted by military coups, with democracy rarely becoming institutionalized as a stable outcome. The question is whether the Soviet Union is more likely to follow the Third World route, or the route of such West European countries as England, France, Sweden, and Spain. This question ties us into some of the major debates in the literature today regarding the nature of the Soviet system. It is worth outlining these debates, as a step toward specifying assumptions that underpin alternative scenarios for the future.
Neo-Traditional Versus Modernizing Images of the Soviet System

With the welcome demise of the "totalitarian" versus "pluralist" debate about the nature of the Soviet system under Brezhnev, discussion now centers on somewhat different, and more realistic, alternatives: "neo-traditional" versus "modernizing." The leading advocate of the modernizing conception has been Jerry Hough [1988, but see also his earlier work], who argues that rational-technical and rational-legal premises in decision-making, and in the orientations of officials, have been getting stronger for decades. In the absence of a generational shift, they might not have become dominant over traditional approaches. But the generational shift that is taking place, at both the societal and establishment levels, is making, and will make, a decisive difference for the future direction of the regime. The result will be a more relaxed authoritarian regime, or a fairly restrictive democratic regime, and a significantly marketized economic system that is more fully integrated into the world economy.

The most elaborate argument against this perspective is made by Kenneth Jowitt [1983], who proposes a "neo-traditional" image of the Brezhnevite political order. From this perspective, not rational-technical and rational-legal, but neo-traditional premises and orientations have been gaining strength during the past twenty years. The evidence for this claim is the vast corruption of party and state officialdom. Jowitt traces this corruption not to Lord Acton ("power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely") but to features more distinctive to the political order. He argues that the elitism intrinsic to Leninism, based on party officials' self-proclaimed higher insight into historical necessity, provides a basis
for aristocratization. Such a process is held in check by the combination of a "social combat task" (e.g. collectivization) and terror. But in the post-Stalin era, when each of these has been largely eliminated, party officials become corrupted, demanding "tribute" and other concrete demonstration of deference and recognition of their higher worth. The result of spreading corruption, nepotism, and the like is that rational-technical and rational-legal orientations come to be embedded in a political cultural and political institutional context that is determinant of what is possible. Put differently, modern orientations are embedded in, and therefore decisively subordinated to, neo-traditional orientations.

Not surprisingly, Hough and Jowitt typically employ differing comparative referents in their work. For the most part, Hough compares the Soviet Union with the United States and the industrialized democracies of West Europe. Jowitt compares the Soviet Union with Third World authoritarian regimes and with the history of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor is it a coincidence that they reach different conclusions about the factors that are likely to prove determinantal or decisive for future Soviet development. Treating the USSR as an embryonic modern system, Hough envisages rational-technical premises subordinating neo-traditional (indeed, his work hardly ever discusses corruption). Treating the USSR as neo-traditional, Jowitt envisages the continued subordination of rational-technical urges (the existence and importance of which he forcefully acknowledges) to Leninist political culture and institutions, despite generational change. He posits that the USSR, like Third World states, will bounce between efforts to modernize and inevitable backlashes that will put the modernizing elements back in their place. Neither marketization nor
democratization, from this perspective, can go very far.

Alexander Yanov [1987] is another theorist and observer of the contemporary Soviet scene who articulates a distinctive perspective on the nature of the system. His image of Soviet state and society is closer to Jowitt's than to Hough's. He views the system as "pre-modern" and Russian. He is impressed by the fierce continuity throughout Russian and Soviet history, such that efforts at democratization or Westernization have regularly been squelched by extremist backlashes and totalitarian restorations. He believes that in the current situation of polarization within both the society and the establishment, the Russian New Right stands a very good chance of coming to power, liquidating all opposition, and restoring a regime of terror. His analogue is neither the United States nor the Third World. It is Weimar Germany.

However, Yanov is more optimistic (but not much more optimistic) than Jowitt about the possibility of an alternative winning out. In contrast to Jowitt, he discerns reformist forces in the "aristocratizing elite" (central officials) and the "new managers" that could combine with social forces (skilled workers; new middle class; critical intelligentsia) to create a marketized system within which the managerial elite would have institutionalized power within the establishment and legal guarantees against party interference in their daily work. Because Yanov is so impressed by the power of traditional forces, he considers the liberalizing alternative to be very much the long shot---in which respect he resembles Jowitt in his estimation of the current relative weight of forces within the establishment. But Yanov believes that the international environment could be the decisive determinant of the success of the reformist alternative,
despite the domestic odds. A benevolent international environment, that sought to integrate the Soviet economy into the international economic order, and that was willing to invest in a reformed Soviet economy, could tip the scales.

What emerges from a review of these three major perspectives is the conclusion that the more differentiated one's image of interests within the establishment and society, the more optimistic one is about the prospects for successful reform. Jowitt is the least optimistic, in part because he adheres to a relatively undifferentiated image of establishment interests. He treats the party apparatus as relatively monolithic with respect to orientations, with the exception of a split between the ascetics and the corrupted (from which he derives the prediction of an alternation between periods of entrenchment of corruption and campaigns against corruption, but not democratization or marketization). Yanov employs a more differentiated image of interests within the party-state, and therefore sees the seeds, or coalitional bases, for successful reform. Hough sees the party-state as comprised of multiple, conflicting interests, with the modern types predominant within the younger generation that is coming to power in both state and society. He is therefore most optimistic about the prospects for reform.

These scholars also differ regarding the nature of Leninism as an ideology. Jowitt embraces a novel view of Leninism as "charismatic impersonalism," a slightly less monolithic view of the ideology than is depicted by essentialist theorists of "Bolshevism," but one that is considerably more monolithic than is argued by Stephen Cohen and Jerry Hough, for whom the dualistic heritage is important. (Yanov does not
discuss the nature of Leninism.) For Jowitt, the ideological tradition can justify heroic projects, party interventionism, and anti-corruption campaigns as ways of breaking through stagnation. But it cannot justify a breakout that seeks to institutionalize the rule of law, market coordination, or public opposition to the leading role of the party. For Hough, the ideological tradition is more diversified and less constraining of choice. It can therefore justify (indeed, demands) overcoming stagnation by whatever measures are required, including market coordination, the rule of law, and a more public political process.

One's conception of the relationship between ideology and organization is another determinant of one's view of the scope for future change. Jowitt's more monolithic image of both the ideological heritage and the political establishment leads him to spell out a structural theory of Soviet politics that sees high complementarity between elite political culture and current political institutions. The result is that he embraces a tightly-bounded cyclical view of the future. Yanov believes that both the ideology and the organization are more internally diverse, and is closer to Hough regarding the scope of that diversity. However, he is closer to Jowitt regarding the relative weights among the diverse elements, treating the conservative and reactionary elements as far out-weighting the reformist. Yet, because of his cyclical view of Russian history, and because of the pressures emanating from the reactionary and reformist wings within the establishment (both of which Jowitt downplays), Yanov embraces a cyclical perspective that is very different from Jowitt's. To Jowitt, the future will swing between a militarized Brezhnevism and anti-corruption campaigns a la Andropov. To Yanov, the future will swing between reactionary
restorations (a la Stalin) and variants of Brezhnevism, unless there is a reformist "breakout."

Hough's view, and the view of all those who are optimistic about the success of Gorbachev's reform, is that the future will follow an evolutionary, not a cyclical, course toward a reformed Soviet Union. The reason for this conclusion can be traced to Hough's image of the relationship between ideology and organization. Because both of them are highly diverse internally, and because generational change is decisively altering the balance of orientations within the political establishment, Hough embraces, not a structural theory, but a learning theory of Soviet political evolution. Interests are treated as highly subjective and variable over time and circumstances. To Jowitt and Yanov, though to varying degrees between the two, interests are largely objective and constant.

Still another difference among the authors concerns their conceptions of leadership autonomy within the political establishment. Hough's vision of a reformed future hinges on the leadership enacting and enforcing policy changes that will foster marketization, liberalization, and rule of law. To bring this about, he must assume that the leadership is not "captured" by constituencies. He must assume sufficient leadership autonomy to ensure both enactment and reasonably faithful implementation of reformist policies. That is why Hough has, for several years now, been emphasizing the centrality of the patron-client system, and the large scope of Gorbachev's power consolidation. In contrast, Jowitt and Yanov treat leadership autonomy as relatively low, viewing the leaders as highly constrained by the requirement of accountability to elite constituencies.
Another difference among observers concerns their view of the relationship between the international environment and the prospects for Soviet reform. Yanov treats the international environment as potentially decisive. This is logical. He sees forces for reform within the Soviet establishment, but does not view them as strong enough in the absence of international assistance. Hough views the international environment as contributory, but not necessarily decisive. Since the forces for reform within the establishment are already powerful, they can emerge victorious even without external assistance. However, a proper leadership strategy would assist the reform process by putting an end to Soviet protectionism and forcing Soviet managers to compete on world markets, thereby generating external pressures for Soviet internal entrepreneurialism. Jowitt's model, in turn, is largely self-contained. The condition of the international environment is not treated as a variable capable of affecting the course of structural change. To the extent that Jowitt treats the international environment in his other work, he emphasizes Soviet leaders' urge for avoiding dependency and their self-image as leaders of the world communist movement. But he views each of these as reinforcing conservatism, which squares with his image of Leninist ideology and organization.

To some extent, the differences among these scholars are products of their respective theories or philosophies of history. Jowitt and Yanov are mightily impressed by the power of identity concerns in pre-modern systems, and therefore view the party apparatus (in Yanov's case, the regional party apparatus in particular) as an obstacle to reform as obdurate and resilient as a medieval aristocracy. Hough, in contrast, downplays issues of identity and privilege, and treats the party apparatus as an institution that can
change its traditional orientations as a result of generational change and learning. To the extent that we are dealing with deductions from a theory of history, or from a somewhat arbitrarily embraced analogue, the differences among these authors cannot be resolved through empirical research.

All three scholars I have analyzed employ conceptual apparatuses that capture an important dimension of the truth. We can test their respective predictions as time goes on. Indeed, I suspect that in-depth analysis of the administrations of Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev would reveal that Jowitt and Yanov can do a better job of explaining the Chernenko backlash, Hough can better explain the emergence and radicalization of Gorbachev, while only a mixture of all three models can explain Andropov. No scholar has a monopoly on the answer to the question: "which are weightier: the rational-legal and rational-technical forces or the neo-traditional forces in Soviet politics and society?" Nor can answers about the future weights among these forces be derived by deduction from a persuasive theory of history.

Rather, the better approach would be an agnostic one. The forces currently arrayed against marketization, democratization, and rule of law are formidable. But so are the forces and factors arrayed in behalf of such a reformist course, or against continuing in the old way. We would do better to spend our time retrospectively drawing lessons from the course of events about our assumptions regarding the distribution of interests, orientations, and behavioral tendencies within both state and society. If we think of the Soviet future as an indeterminate clash among conflicting tendencies, we may learn a great deal about the nature and reformability of
the Soviet system from closely observing that clash.

**Alternative Futures**

Yet there is something unsatisfying about this conclusion. Can we do any better by at least laying out alternative regime-types or outcomes, and inquiring into the conditions that might lead to one or the other eventuality? I think we can.

Ten years ago I published a monograph, *Five Images of the Soviet Future: A Critical Review and Synthesis*. In that work, I examined the assumptions underlying five images, and several more sub-images, of the future, as reflected in the Sovietological literature of the mid-1970s. I have already alluded to several of those images in this article. But let me now specify the full range of images discussed in that monograph, and add several more. Table 1 outlines six images, and six sub-images, of the future, the ordering principles and integrating values of each regime-type (excluding instability variants), and the images of diversity within state, society, and ideology that inform predictions of given regime-types as outcomes.

In my earlier monograph, I characterized the regime under Brezhnev as an authoritarian welfare-state, in which efficiency was sacrificed to social security and political power considerations. This is the kind of regime that Gorbachev inherited. What alternatives to such a regime exist? One anti-reformist outcome would be a Russite-fundamentalist reaction—essentially a return to Stalinism, based on mobilizing the chauvinists and

*Page 54*
programshchiki against the Jews, other ethnic minorities and the liberal intelligentsia. Another alternative is, of course, chronic or acute instability, analogous to the condition in which Poland currently finds itself. Reformist alternatives, as specified in my monograph, come in two varieties. One is socialist democracy/market socialism, the specific features of which entail rule of law, political accountability to empowered mass constituencies, substantial marketization of the economy, and parliamentary control over macro-distributive and equity concerns. (Because of its implausibility as an image of the Soviet future, I did not discuss an image of liberal democracy and capitalist economy, though I do include it in Table 1 of the present article.)

Another variant of a reformed system I called elitist liberalism. I used this concept to characterize Yanov's preferred outcome: a Magna Carta for the Soviet managerial elite, in which the "new managers" would be accorded guarantees of direct political representation in the Central Committee and immunity against party intervention in their economic decisions. Yanov's was an image of a largely marketized economy, large scope for entrepreneurialism, and legal restrictions on the "leading role of the party." But it was not an image of mass democracy, a multi-party system, or social egalitarianism. Indeed, Yanov saw little likelihood of a Dubcek alternative emerging in the USSR.

When writing in 1977, I was skeptical of the probability that any of these radical or reactionary alternatives to "welfare-state authoritarianism" (hereafter, often referred to as WSA) could come into being. My conclusions were that the level of polarization within both state and society was insufficient to generate momentum to break out of welfare-
statism or authoritarianism. Until 1986/87, that conclusion held firm. Since then, Gorbachev's radicalization, and especially his glasnost' campaigns, have created such political turbulence that more far-reaching alternatives must be upgraded in probability. (I will indicate below, however, that some variant of WSA may still prove to be predictively most accurate.)

If one assumes that "the glasnost genie is out of the bottle," one is not likely to see WSA (i.e. a reversion to some form of Brezhnevism) as a likely future. However, by the same reasoning, one is also not likely to see much chance for elitist liberalism stabilizing itself. Elitist liberalism assumes that mass mobilization continues to be controlled and manipulated from above to a decisive degree, and that the extent of democratization goes no farther than expanding the contours of, and relationships within, the elite. Given the proliferation of informal organizations, the diversity of expression in the media, the growing openness to external sources of information and ideas, the move toward, and legitimation of, multiple-candidate elections, secret ballots, and limited tenure, and the level of mass mobilization in the Baltic and Caucasus regions, it is difficult to image a reformist alternative stabilizing itself that did not contain a substantial dose of mass democracy.

Just how far that might go in a democratizing direction is, of course, an open question. If the outcome is reformist, then we are likely to see some combination of elitism and accountability, public politics and limits on disruption, that would confound pure categorization as either elitist liberalism or socialist democracy. In short, we would be likely to witness an unprecedented amalgam, one that might "guarantee the leading role of the
Communist party along with the popular right to independent organizations" (Kowalik, as paraphrased in Brus [1985: 54]). If coupled with guaranteed property rights, and a legal structure with some independence from party dictate, the amalgam could resemble that which remained relatively stable in Mexico for many decades. Only those acting on faith would predict confidently the victory of socialist or liberal democracy (the latter entails a multi-party system and very few limits on autonomous political organization).

In like manner, only those acting on faith would confidently predict either a fundamentalist restoration or a revolution. However, we must admit that the probability of each has risen in recent years. For the level of social and political polarization has risen greatly as a result of Gorbachev’s policies and largesse. And active polarization at the societal level, coupled to a split in the elite and elite loss of will or desire to crack down, can be the sufficient conditions for rebellion. The same polarization can also be the catalyst for a right-wing reaction to social turbulence. The spectre of both these alternatives hangs over the entire perestroika effort.

In thinking about the future, and in testing our assumptions about the system against the future course of events, it will be very important to treat these "outcomes" as possible way-stations rather than necessarily as end-states. For example, instability (i.e. unmanageable social turbulence) could be a brief prelude to either a right-wing reaction, a reversion to welfare-state authoritarianism, or a process of democratization. The tensions of elitist liberalism could result in either a limited backlash (WSA, for example) or a push for socialist democracy. Or they could result
in instability. In like manner, the tensions inherent in trying to restore a Brezhnevite regime could also trigger instability or a right-wing reaction.

Notice that I am here treating instability as a catalyst, rather than an outcome. In the industrial world, anarchy and total systemic disintegration are very rare occurrences. For the Soviet regime to lose its ability to regain control over widespread popular rebellion, or for the Soviet economy to unravel, would require an extraordinary confluence of circumstances that are somewhat unimaginable in a world of nuclear weapons. Hence, while we should factor into our analyses an instability scenario, we should also treat the instability as a catalyst for regime re-formation (to the right or the left), rather than as a continuing outcome.

However, in the early years of the Brezhnev regime, a number of perceptive Western scholars [Brzezinski 1966; Lowenthal 1976] predicted the political and economic bankruptcy of the Brezhnev regime's organizing principles, and further predicted that stagnation, crisis, and instability would result. Both Brzezinski and Lowenthal, though, treated instability as an outcome, seeing little chance that the regime would be able to break out of its partocratic confines, even in response to continuing crises. Lowenthal in particular posited that stagnation and continuing crisis would be the pattern for the future. The assumption was that factors blocking reform would remain stronger than factors compelling or facilitating reform.

Once we go beyond this 2-3 step projection, the mind begins to boggle. It is not really necessary to go much further, however, for at that point we are engaged more in guesswork than in brainstorming. The important point to bear in mind is that we must avoid assumptions of premature closure. That
is, we must not assume that a given turn of events is necessarily the concluding act of the drama, on the basis of which we must determine which image of the future or perspective on the nature of the Soviet system was "correct."

Having acknowledged that far-reaching change is now more likely than it appeared ten years ago, let me elaborate somewhat on alternative forms that "welfare-state authoritarianism" might take. What variants might emerge in a regime that sought to deal with evolving challenges (societal, political, and economic) without abandoning either the authoritarian or the centrally-planned character, of the political and economic systems, and without challenging the welfare "contract" that kept the working masses pacified (albeit alcoholic). Toward this end, I have drawn up a chart that is displayed in Table 2*

The gist of this chart is that a liberal version would seek to accommodate new socio-political forces, and shore up the viability of the system in the face of new challenges, by selectively loosening up on constraints. Certain sectors of the economy (small-scale services and consumer outlets, certain areas of agriculture, for examples) would be partially marketized or decentralized: they would go from a command economy to a loosely regulated economy. Elements of this approach are already visible in Gorbachev's laws on cooperatives and in his proposal to allow 50-year leases of state land and property. The military budget might be reduced significantly to meet new needs. Greater autonomy would be accorded the ethnic minority republics---and to some republics more than others. Wider realms of social life would be effectively depoliticized, and greater opportunities for both specialist and mass "input" would be developed. The

*Page 55.
level of political institutionalization would be raised, through mandatory retirement ages or limited tenure of office. These are but examples of selectivity in each of the major realms of policy. What distinguishes this liberal variant of WSA from elitist liberalism is that it would exclude: marketization of the heavy industrial sectors; a Magna Carta for the managerial elite; an independent judiciary to enforce such a Magna Carta; and threats to subsidized pricing or the full employment constraint.

Would such a regime prove viable? Would it actually improve performance? That is an open question. Economists differ among themselves as to whether such partial reform of the economy would "work." Some economists argue that the interdependencies among sectors of the command economy are so great and tightly coupled that only full-system reform can improve performance on a sustained basis [Nove 1983; Brus 1985]. If these economists are correct, then we should treat this "outcome" as a way-station, to be succeeded by something else when the contradictions and lack of progress become manifest. Or we could treat it as a prescription for long-term stagnation---assuming that the elites are unwilling to break out of WSA to overcome stagnation.

What's more, one could argue that the level of autonomous political mobilization in the USSR in 1988 has already exceeded levels consistent with this vision. The very selectivity required by this variant could not be sustained or enforced, given the social forces that have already been activated, and the ordering principles that have been explicitly delegitimized.

This raises the question, not of whether such a regime would prove viable, but of whether such a regime is likely to come into being. Here an
evolutionary perspective becomes relevant. The current level of social protest in the USSR may portend still greater protest in the future—or it may portend the opposite. The Balts and Caucasians, after all, are relatively few in number. The level of protest and autonomous political organization in Russia, the Ukraine, and Central Asia, is much lower, though it is much higher than under Brezhnev. We shall see whether the larger areas "blow"; we shall also see whether the levels of protest in the smaller areas have "peaked," and will diminish as new policies are adopted to give people a stake in the political process. If control is maintained, we may find that the resultant of the conflict between forces pushing for and against reform will be a squeeze toward a liberal version of welfare-state authoritarianism, rather than a breakthrough to the left or the right. Whether that variant would prove viable at all, or for long, is another matter.

A conservative version of welfare-state authoritarianism is descriptive of the direction in which Brezhnevism went in the course of the 1970s. Such a regime seeks to compensate for the inefficiencies of the command economy, and the declining legitimacy of the political order, by tightening up. Party mobilization is the hallmark of administrative control. Priority for military and heavy-industrial policies is characteristic of budgetary priorities. A Great Russian "tilt" is the solution to ethnic tensions. Censorship is tightly maintained, and persecution of dissidents is actively pursued. A political boss prevents reformist forces from enacting legislation that would break through these constraints. Social policy, of course, remains respectful of the commitment to mass pacification through provision of social and physical security.
The third variant of WSA is what I shall call "militarized." In this image, the forces of order (military and KGB) seek to contain pressures for glasnost and democratization, while attempting to raise efficiency in the civilian economy through the introduction of military methods and personnel into the factories. Perhaps unfairly, this image is sometimes associated with the direction that Andropov might have led the Soviet Union had he remained healthy. The image is also one that present-day conservatives in the Soviet political establishment might find appealing as they search for a crystallized and defensible alternative to reformism.

It seems likely that neither the conservative nor the militarized variant of WSA would substantially improve the performance of the economy or the polity for very long. Thus, it would likely be a way-station on the road to some other alternative. Is it likely to come about anyway? Quite possibly, if the result of a "squeeze" between reformist and conservative forces and tendencies is a victory for the hardliners seeking to "hold the line." It would require stuffing more genies back in the bottle than would the liberal variant. Doing so might require substantial coercion, in response to which levels of polarization could rise markedly, and either a Russite-fundamentalist reaction, or instability, could result.

If we assume that any variant of welfare-state authoritarianism (including combinations of these three variants) will fail to improve systemic performance, and if we further assume that the forces of conservatism are so strong as to prevent a breakout from the basic Brezhnevite constraints, then we might entertain a vision proposed by T.G. Ash [1988: 56]: "Ottomanization." Ash's definition is worth quoting at length:
I mean by this, in a very loose analogy to the decline of the Ottoman Empire, a long, slow process of imperial decline in the course of which one would see an unplanned, piecemeal, and discontinuous emancipation, both of the constituent states from the imperial center and of societies from states. This would occur not by planned reform from the imperial center, in the context of sustained growth and comprehensive modernization, but mainly by uncoordinated independent action, whether individual, collective, or national, by pressure from below or from outside, in an overall context of growing relative backwardness in relation to much of the developed world, and specifically to Western Europe. In a phrase, 'Ottomanization' means emancipation in decay. ...This metaphor therefore invites us not to think of revolution as the end of reform, or of reform as the definitive alternative to revolution, but rather of both as part of a very long-term historical process—whose final outcome is, to be sure, almost impossible to conceive, since most previous empires ended in wars, but this empire has nuclear weapons.

Ash applies this concept to the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. He is more skeptical of its current applicability to the Soviet internal scene, more specifically to Moscow's relations with the ethnic minority republics.
"Not yet," he writes. But, as stated above, this is a perfectly defensible predictive scenario for Soviet internal development, should a regime of welfare-state authoritarianism be maintained and prove unviable. Part of the virtue of Ash's concept is that it is inherently evolutionary, descriptive of a process, rather than an outcome. Another virtue is that it posits, not the crushing, but rather the relative emancipation and encapsulation [the terms is Jowitt's 1983] of modernizing forces in society, allowing them limited expression, autonomy, and even ritualized protest, but not allowing them to define the character of the system. Ottomanization, then, is a fairly vivid image of the fate of a stable neo-traditional regime.

And yet, let us not lose sight of the reasons that reform could succeed, and that the constraints of welfare-state authoritarianism could be broken, in favor of a breakthrough toward some amalgam of elitist liberalism and socialist democracy. The reader who has become depressed by the Ottomanization scenario might re-read the section that discusses factors pushing for reform, and ask whether, in light of those factors, the political authorities in the USSR could preside for very long over such an ostrich-regime, and whether they would be able to actually encapsulate modernizing forces in order to contain demands for rule of law, marketization, and political democratization.

If we chart the alternative futures I have been discussing on a left-right continuum, we find that everything to the left of a liberal variant of WSA (and possibly including this variant) assumes the great or growing strength of those factors facilitating reform. Likewise, everything to the right of the liberal variant of WSA assumes the great or growing strength of
those obstacles to reform outlined earlier. (Note, however, that I have placed "liberal democracy" to the left of "socialist democracy" in Table 1. That would be indefensible in a larger comparative perspective, but is defensible in a chart that scales the extent of reform of the Soviet system required by a given variant—to the left or to the right.)

Let me conclude by delimiting the claims I am making for this article. First, I am highly skeptical of flat-footed predictions that Gorbachev's reforms will or will not succeed. I prefer to deal in possibilities and probabilities, or in conditional generalizations, rather than in specific predictions or scientific laws. (As Tocqueville wrote: "Happy are those who can tie together in their thoughts the past, the present and the future! No Frenchman of our time has this happiness..." [Gross 1988].)

Secondly, I treat the international environment as a variable that can potentially facilitate or frustrate the reform process. However, I have not undertaken any of the following three tasks in this article: 1) to specify the Soviet foreign policy consequences of the reform process; 2) to examine how alternative US foreign policies might impact on that process; or 3) to address what the US ought to do in its policies toward Moscow. Those would be useful projects, but they must build upon the conclusions reached in this paper.


Table 1

IMAGES OF THE SOVIET FUTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Left</th>
<th>Political Right</th>
<th>W.S.A. Variants</th>
<th>Instability Variants*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>Socialist Democracy</td>
<td>Elitist Liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordering Principles:</td>
<td>One-party pluralism</td>
<td>One-party inclusionary</td>
<td>One-party exclusionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Multi-party</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>Constrained free-market</td>
<td>Selectiv. market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Indep. legal order</td>
<td>Indep. legal order</td>
<td>Legal guarantees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Integrating Political Values:</td>
<td>Participatory market socialism; growth &amp; efficiency</td>
<td>Social Security and patriotism; order; leading role of party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictors:</td>
<td>Diversity within Party-State</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity within Society</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity within Pol./Culture</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As this article does not delve into the forms instability might take, or the factors that might bring different types of instability to pass, I have not filled in the chart for these columns. For fuller discussion, see my Five Images of the Soviet Future: A Critical Review and Synthesis (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1978). Moreover, placement of "instability" on the "political right" of this spectrum is arbitrary, and is not a product of a sub-conscious preference for order.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Realm</th>
<th>Liberal Variant</th>
<th>Conservative Variant</th>
<th>Militarized Variant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Coorden.</td>
<td>Computerization + Selective Marketization</td>
<td>Computerization + Selective Intervention and Mobilization</td>
<td>Computerization + Militarization of Civilian Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Priorities</td>
<td>Selective Budgetary Reallocation</td>
<td>Military/Heavy Industrial Priority</td>
<td>Military/Heavy Industrial Priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality Policy</td>
<td>Selective Political and Cultural Liberalization</td>
<td>Great Russian &quot;tilt&quot;; police action against dissent</td>
<td>Great Russian chauvinist &quot;tilt&quot;; campaigns against corruption and &quot;nationalism&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Articulation and Aggregation</td>
<td>Expanded input; tolerance of private pursuits and eccentricity; new formats for political expression</td>
<td>Tight censorship; narrow input; low tolerance of eccentricity; traditional channels for input only.</td>
<td>Pageantry and regimentation; broad definition of deviance; very low tolerance of eccentricity; militarized channels for input.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Policy</td>
<td>Limited cutbacks in social security</td>
<td>No cutbacks in social security</td>
<td>Limited cutbacks in social security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Political Institutionalism</td>
<td>Limited terms; mandatory retirement age</td>
<td>&quot;trust in cadres&quot;; circular flow of power.</td>
<td>Purges; circular flow of power; strong boss; possibly high military involvement in leadership roles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>