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TITLE: Gorbachev's "New Thinking" in Soviet
Foreign-Security Policy, and the Military:
Recent Trends and Implications

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The emergence of the “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy is posing challenging questions to the West. Does it represent a fundamental departure in Soviet foreign policy, or is it merely a tactical ploy to camouflage its unchanged goal of expansionism? Should we interpret Gorbachev’s arms control initiatives as a manifestation of the new thinking or should we view them as having resulted from the cold calculations of political and strategic correlation of forces? Will it significantly change the traditional approach to foreign policy that was characterized by the primacy of the military factor? Answers to these questions will have significant practical implications on what our policy should be toward the new Soviet foreign policy initiatives.

This article is an attempt to examine the significance of the new thinking and its implications in actual Soviet foreign-military policy. Specifically, it is divided into four parts: (1) characteristics of the new thinking, (2) significance of the new thinking and its implications, (3) the new thinking and Soviet military doctrine, and (4) the military’s attitude toward the new thinking.

1. The New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Policy

(1) Key Concepts of the New Thinking

In a nutshell the new thinking can be reduced to the two interrelated, but separate concepts: interdependence and mutual security. The concept of interdependence has resulted from the increasing awareness that the contemporary world is characterized by interdependence that transcends national barriers and the social systems. Interdependence is increasing not only in science and technology, and information and communications, but also in economic
and political spheres. Interdependence is not only integrating certain areas of human activities beyond national barriers, but also it has created "global problems" that transcend the differences of the social systems, and that are threatening the existence of civilization itself. "Interdependence" and "global problems" indicate that in the contemporary world there have emerged areas of human activities, to which the traditional Marxist-Leninist principles can be no longer applicable. A new approach is required to secure further development of science and technology and further integration of economic activities, and at the same time to solve global problems.

The concept of "mutual security" has a different origin. It was born out of the acutely felt sense of urgency of the threat of nuclear war, and the realization that in the nuclear age security cannot be attained unilaterally even for such superpowers as the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, security can only be mutual.

Although they have different origins, the two concepts are interrelated in the sense that in the nuclear age interdependence takes the form of "interdependence of survival." In the situation, where nuclear weapons threaten the survival of mankind itself, the concepts of national and international security have become indivisible. Thus, the problem of nuclear weapons has become recognized as one of the most important global problems.

(2) Background of the New Thinking

The new thinking is not really new. Its key concepts had appeared already during the detente period under Brezhnev, although they remained basically outside the orthodoxy accepted by the
leadership. According to Charles Glickham, Gorbachev used the term, "new political thinking," for the first time in his comprehensive arms control proposal in January 1986. It is at the 27th Party Congress, however, where Gorbachev indicated that the new thinking had more comprehensive applications to the basic framework of Soviet foreign policy. Nevertheless, its significance was made obscure by a stark contrast between the first part of his political speech that dealt with the ideological sphere and the "operational" aspect of the foreign policy section. In the first part, Gorbachev's speech was studded with the traditional Marxist-Leninist verbiage; his reference to interdependence and global problems was obscured in the traditional bipolar vision of conflict between capitalist and socialist systems. But in sharp contrast, all the elements in the new thinking were introduced in the foreign policy section of his speech.

It soon became clear that Gorbachev's sympathy rested with the new thinking, as various commentaries began to appear and Gorbachev himself began speaking more openly in support of the new thinking. The first important article that indicated the importance of the new thinking was Anatolii Dobrynin's article in Kommunist in June, 1986, which supported what Gorbachev said about the new thinking in his political report to the 27th Party Congress. Since Dobrynin is a secretary of the Central Committee and head of its International Department, his endorsement of the new thinking indicated that the new thinking was being accepted at least partly by those who were engaged in policy formulation rather than being discussed as academic subjects divorced from reality, or remaining a harebrained scheme of the general secretary. The expression of "the new political thinking" also found its way in a diplomatic document in the form of
the Dehli Declaration in November 1986, which was signed by Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi. 8

Nevertheless, as Glickham explained in his article, which appeared in September, 1986, there were some grounds to believe that the new thinking did not gain full citizenship as the basis of Soviet foreign policy. Such concepts as mutual security, interdependence, and global problems cannot be ideologically acceptable for the purest theologians of Marxism-Leninism. The most difficult problem was within the sphere of the security policy. The concept of mutual security was developed, but there seemed to exist an ideological resistance to acknowledge the problem of nuclear rivalry as one of the global problems along with such problems as ecology and natural resources. Gorbachev’s political report to the 27th Party Congress for instance excluded the nuclear issue from the global issue. 4 National security seemed to touch the raw nerves of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, which appeared to resist the proliferation of such non-Marxist concepts as global problems into its sanctum sanctorium.

(3) Gorbachev’s Speech at the Moscow Forum

Gorbachev’s speech at the Moscow Peace Forum in February, 1987, represented a new stage in the evolution of the new thinking. There are striking similarities between Gorbachev’s political report to the 27th Party Congress and his Moscow Forum speech. But in three important respects he went farther than his other previous statements. 9

First, in the Moscow Forum speech he discussed the question of security in the nuclear age in the context of global problems, thus removing a major obstacle that was blocking the new thinking from acquiring full legitimacy. Gorbachev stated: “Our world is united
not only by the internationalization of economic life and by powerful information and communications media but also in facing the common danger of nuclear death, ecological catastrophe and global explosion of the contradictions between its poor and wealthy regions." Second, Clausewitz's axiom that had been the pillar of the Marxist-Leninist approach to war was rejected. Gorbachev declared that the axiom that "world war" is an extension of politics by violent means became no longer applicable in the nuclear age. The question, however, remained whether this axiom was no longer applicable to all wars or world war only.

Third, in his discussion on regional conflicts Gorbachev maintained that regional conflicts should not be viewed through the geostrategic vision of East-West conflict, thus indicating a new departure from the traditional approach to the Third World conflict that was interpreted in the context of the zero-sum game.

(4) Primakov's Pravda article

Soviet ideology is somewhat akin to Catholic doctrine. Dogmas enunciated by the general secretary and the Party Congresses often become clearer in commentaries written by their trusted theologians. Evgenii Primakov, Director of the Institute of International Economy and International Relations, reputed to be a close advisor to Gorbachev, is one of such theologians. His article, published in Pravda on July 10, 1987, is an important article that provides an authoritative interpretation on the new thinking, accentuating its significance and elaborating on what remained previously ambiguous.10

Primakov emphasizes that the new thinking is not a reformulation of previous principles, but that it represents a totally new way of approaching the new reality of international situations. He defends
the previous Soviet policy that stressed the readiness to wage a nuclear war by unleashing a crushing retaliatory blow at imperialists as a necessary evil at the time when the Soviet military power was inferior to its adversary. But the Soviet Union has now acquired sufficient military power, and the quantity as well as the quality of weapons of mass destruction have reached such an extent that the survival of mankind has become an urgent question. Such a situation requires a new philosophy different from the old approach.

He also underscores the importance of Gorbachev’s speech at the 27th Party Congress as an attempt to reject the previously held distorted view that saw the competition of the world between capitalism and socialism without interdependence. Here, he not only clearly includes the nuclear issue in his list of global problems, but also identifies it as the most serious one of all. Another point made by Primakov is the “organic” connection between domestic reform and the new thinking. He argues that the new concepts that emerged in the new thinking were an outgrowth of larger, more fundamental changes that are taking place in the domestic front.

Finally, on Soviet policy toward the Third World he pushes the argument developed by Gorbachev a little farther. Social change has to happen in the Third World, but such social transformation has to be carried out according to the objective social contradictions of each country. Thus, export of revolution from outside is an anathema in the nuclear age, although he hastens to add that stability of the international situation also excludes imposition of the social status-quo from outside, that is, an export of counterrevolution.

(5) Gorbachev Steps Up His Rhetoric

In the fall of 1987 Gorbachev has stepped up his rhetoric in
support of the new thinking. It can be seen first in his message to the United Nations in mid-September, which signaled the Soviet willingness to use the United Nations as a vehicle to solve international conflicts.\(^{11}\) Towards the end of September, in his conversation with the French delegation, he stated that in the present condition, where the threat of nuclear war is real, "Clausewitz's formula that war is an extension of politics by different means is no longer applicable."\(^{12}\)

The publication of his book, *Perestroika and the New Thinking*, in the middle of October represented another important step taken by Gorbachev in the radical direction. In the chapter dealing with the new thinking, he identifies "nuclear weapons, ecology, scientific-technical revolution, and information" as factors that connect the world together. He argues that differences on social choice, ideological and religious convictions, and the way of life must be overcome "for the sake of all-human values," thus making his preference clear in the choice between all-human values and class values.\(^{13}\) As for Clausewitz's formula, he totally rejects it as follows: "Clausewitz's classical formula has become hopelessly obsolete. It belongs to libraries. To place all-human, moral-ethical norms in the foundation of international politics and to humanize inter-state relations has for the first time in history become a vital requirement."\(^{14}\) As if to anticipate conservative criticisms, he hints that military-industrial complex may not be an unchangeable attribute of capitalism.\(^{15}\)

More important is Gorbachev's speech on the occasion to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. This speech, delivered in the midst of the Yeltsin affair, the first serious political crisis under Gorbachev, is a good indication to
measure the nature of the internal debate that might be taking place within the leadership with regard to the new thinking.

The primary attention in the West has been focused on the historical part of his speech. The general conclusion is that Gorbachev did not go far enough to insist on a thorough reexamination of the past, although he began to move in the right direction. His hesitation to radically revise the party's official view on the sensitive issues of the past has been attributed to the strength of the conservative opposition, which came to surface in the Yeltsin affair. Too much attention is focused, however, on the historical part of this speech. In my view, the most important part of this speech was in the last part that dealt with foreign policy.

The possibility that Gorbachev was responding to conservative criticisms can be surmised by some peculiarities in this part of the speech. The usual upbeat, high-sounding ideals extolling the virtue of the new thinking is absent, and the speech is characterized by a tone of defensiveness. The major part of his speech is devoted to the relationship between the nature of imperialism and the new thinking. In defending the new thinking, he had to make some concessions by resurrecting the old themes of the revolutionary nature of the working class and of the need to maintain the defense capability "to the level that would exclude military superiority of imperialism over socialism, as long as the danger of war exists, and as long as the social reprisal is the pivotal strategy of military programs of the West."16

At the same time, however, the speech is Gorbachev's counteroffensive as well. Since Gorbachev and his supporters had thus far avoided confronting the crucial question of the relationship between the new thinking and the fundamental nature of imperialism,
it is natural that his critics attacked him on this vulnerable point.
Responding to his criticisms, however, he caught the bull by the
horns. He basically raises three questions. First, given the nature
of imperialism, is it possible, at the new level of interdependence
and wholeness of the world, to influence the nature of imperialism in
such a way as to prevent its most dangerous aspects? Second, can
capitalism exist without militarism? Third, can capitalism survive
without neo-colonialism? A detailed analysis cannot be given here,
but it suffices to state that Gorbachev gives an affirmative answer
to all questions.17

Significance of his speech becomes immediately apparent, if it
is compared with the first part of his political report to the 27th
Party Congress. At the 27th Party Congress, the major theme was the
irreconcilable nature of competition between socialism and
capitalism. The nature of imperialism was said to bring aggressive,
adventuralistic policy that stemmed from the existence of the
military-industrial complex, the monopoly capitalist's pursuit for
profit, and fear by the bourgeoisie of social change.18 The
difference between this assessment and Gorbachev's speech on the 70th
anniversary of the October Revolution is striking. It may be said
that the new thinking has completed its final process by challenging
the very basis of the traditional approach to the contemporary world.
Thus, the nature of imperialism has become the focal point between
the new thinking and traditional Marxist-Leninism.

II. Significance of the New Thinking in Soviet Foreign Policy
(1) Fundamental Change in Ideology

How should we interpret the new thinking? There are skeptics
who dismiss it as nothing but propaganda or cosmetic change without
much substance in the actual implementation of Soviet foreign policy. I have analyzed these arguments in detail elsewhere, and I will concentrate here rather on why we are better advised to take the new thinking seriously.¹⁰

We should begin with reaffirming the role of ideology. Despite the fact that the role of ideology as a guide for actual policy has declined in recent years, the Marxist-Leninist ideology continues to give the Soviet elite a general framework in which to view their society and the outside world.¹⁷ To that extent, ideology is taken very seriously in the Soviet Union, and even for propaganda purposes for foreign consumption the leadership does not dare change its basic postulates without preparing to accept far-reaching domestic political consequences. This is the reason why the Marxist-Leninist ideology has clung, with amazing, often quixotic tenacity, to the obsolete, but self-contained abstract logical consistency that has little relevance to the real world. This does not mean that Marxism-Leninism has not changed. Seventy-years' Soviet history is, in a way, the history in which the sacred letters of Marxism-Leninism have been chipped away by reality. The importance of ideology also explains why important changes in policies began in the past with highly esoteric theoretical debates that seemed to have no relevance to actual policies. One must understand the following paradox in the socialist states which adopt the Marxist ideology as its official religion: the relationship between the upper structure and the basis is turned completely on its head. We cannot dismiss what they say as propaganda; on the contrary, by analysing what they say, we can discern important signs of change in Soviet policy.

The new thinking represents a departure from the traditional way of approaching the world. As Primakov states and Gorbachev's October
Revolution speech clearly affirms, the new thinking rejects the traditional bipolar vision that views the world through the competition between capitalism and socialism. Instead, it emphasizes the interdependent nature of the contemporary world that transcends the differences in the social systems. This is a new philosophy fundamentally different from peaceful coexistence under Khrushchev and détente under Brezhnev, which saw the world basically as an arena where the two irreconcilable systems competed with each other. The new thinking presupposes the existence of the world community that exists beyond the two systems. It also means the acceptance of capitalism as a system whose interests are not necessarily incompatible with those of socialism, but with whom socialism has to ensure its survival and to build its future progress together. It also rejects the zero-sum vision through which to view the Third World conflicts.

The question is whether the new thinking will solidly take roots as the framework of Soviet foreign policy. Marxist-Leninist ideologues have good reasons to worry, because ultimately the new thinking will lead to the destruction of the central core of Marxism based on the conflictual model of society, class analysis, and historical inevitability from capitalism to socialism. Thus, we would be naive to think that the internal debate on the new thinking was solved once and for all by Gorbachev’s October Revolution speech.

(2) Reorganizations and Personnel Change

Another reason why I think the new thinking represents more than propaganda is that both at the level of the Foreign Ministry as well as at the International Department of the Central Committee drastic organizational changes are taking place. Moreover, those who support
the new thinking are advancing rapidly in the Foreign Ministry and in
the International Department. The new thinking, therefore, does not
remain in the realm of thoughts, but it is acquiring its own
organizational basis.

The reorganizations of the Foreign Ministry and the
International Department are important at least in three respects.
First, a far-reaching reorganization of the Foreign Ministry was
carried out. Second, academics and foreign policy experts outside
the government have been more closely brought in the decision-making
process. For instance, a new advisory organization consisting of
academics and foreign policy experts was established directly under
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Third, a new section dealing with
arms control has been established both in the Foreign Ministry and in
the International Department, thus consolidating the locus of arms
control policy more solidly into the party. The pattern of
personnel changes also clearly indicates that those who are
instrumental in putting forward ideas for the new thinking are in
ascendancy.

It does not mean, however, that implementation of the new
thinking in actual foreign policy is a foregone conclusion. In this
respect, it is interesting to note that Dobrynin himself indicates
that the formulation and implementation of new thinking is a
difficult task and that there arise "bitter clashes, acute
discussions, and painful divergences." Such clashes might be
already taking place. As the fundamental debate on the nature of
imperialism is becoming the issue, the conflict will likely be
sharpened in the future.

(3) Domestic Roots of the New Thinking

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As Primakov says, the new thinking is also “organically” connected with the domestic reform. The connection between domestic reform and foreign policy, however, should not be narrowly confined to the problem of tactics designed only to build an international environment suited for domestic reform. The new thinking has deeper roots related to a broader intellectual ferment that can be properly called a revolution in consciousness.26

Behind this revolution in consciousness there is an almost unanimous recognition of the crisis of socialism—the painful awareness that their system has reached a blind alley and that it has lost all its economic, social, political, and spiritual vitality. The need for economic reform was first recognized, but soon it became apparent that economic reform narrowly focused on economy alone would not be possible; hence, there emerged perestroika, glasnost’, and democratization. There was a universal recognition that the Stalinist system had outlived its historical usefulness, and that society could restore its vitality only by overhauling the Stalinist legacy. Once the Stalinist fetters were removed by glasnost’, all ideas that had smoldered under Brezhnev, mostly suppressed by the orthodoxy, and confined in their own narrow specialties cut off from other similar ideas in other fields, were suddenly coalesced into a single intellectual movement. But this movement is remarkable precisely because it does not pretend to present the only correct point of view to replace the old, but it allows diversity of opinions and possibilities of genuine debate. A fundamental reexamination of foreign policy is only a part of this broader intellectual ferment, and the development of the new thinking has closely paralleled the radical development of the process of perestroika.

There are basically three factors that connect the domestic
reform directly with foreign policy. Most importantly, foreign policy is integrally related with economic reform, which is decisively moving in the direction to accept and facilitate interdependence. Second, in the process of mapping out strategies for economic reform under the condition of glasnost', it has become inevitable that the question on rational allocation of resources between military and civilian sectors of economy is raised. This is bound to lead to the debate of national security. Third, the impact of the Chernobyl incident on the consciousness of the nuclear issue cannot be dismissed. Chernobyl served as a catalyst to alert the impending catastrophe caused by nuclear power when it gets out of human control. The nuclear issue has no longer become the exclusive prerogative left only for the political and military leadership.

(4) Criticism of Brezhnev's Foreign Policy

The last, and the most important reason why the new thinking should be taken seriously is that it represents a fundamental criticism of Brezhnev's foreign policy. Brezhnev's detente policy was based on the mistaken assumption that the correlation of forces in international relations was moving inexorably in favor of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the growth of Soviet military power that finally succeeded in attaining strategic parity with the United States was recognized as one of the most important factors in the changing correlation of forces. In fact, Brezhnev's policy can be said to have elevated the military factor to the primary means of Soviet foreign policy, partly because military power was an undeniable accomplishment that the Soviet state could be proud of, and partly because there was no other foreign policy instruments available to them. Another consequence of this appraisal of the
correlation of forces was that the Soviet leadership came to believe that it could pursue its activist foreign policy in the Third World without affecting U.S.-Soviet relations.

Until recently, Soviet commentators never acknowledged their own mistake in the failures of detente, conveniently shifting all the blame on the American side. The new thinking indicates that for the first time the Soviet leadership and the foreign policy elites are engaging in a thorough self-criticism of their own detente policy.

It should be noted that in the general background of the new thinking there is a recognition that the correlation of forces is no longer moving in favor of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the Soviet Union is on the defensive, and challenged by the U.S. rapid modernization of military power and activist foreign policy hostile to the Soviet Union. In the Third World, despite its expansionism in the 1970s, it finds itself isolated and limited in influence. There is a sense of crisis that if this situation is allowed to continue, the Soviet Union will lose its international prestige and ultimately its status as a superpower. We must recognize that this urgent sense of crisis lay at the heart of Gorbachev's reforms and the new thinking.

The new thinking is a fundamental criticism of the Brezhnevite notion of detente. It thus contains some important elements, which, if allowed to develop, might effect a significant departure from traditional Soviet foreign policy. First, the exclusive reliance on the military factor as the primary foreign policy instrument is criticized. Both Gorbachev and Dobrynin emphasize the importance of a multi-faceted foreign policy approach, including the military, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. Second, the need for a qualitatively higher level of flexibility in foreign policy and a
readiness to move towards reasonable compromises is emphasized. Third, there seems to be a recognition that the Soviet Union cannot pursue an activist foreign policy in the Third World without affecting the relations between the superpowers, which occupy the central place in Soviet foreign policy. Fourth, by emphasizing "interdependence," the Soviet Union is expressing a greater willingness than hitherto shown to participate in international cooperative activities and organizations. Finally, there is a significant change in their notion of national security. There is a recognition that the unilateral military buildup in the Brezhnev period did not buy the commensurate guarantee of national security; on the contrary it brought the Soviet Union closer to the danger of nuclear confrontation. This last point is important enough to be examined in more detail.

III. The New Thinking and Soviet Military Policy

(1) Key Concepts of the New Thinking in Military Policy

On the basis of official pronouncements and commentaries written by various foreign policy advisors, the following concepts can be singled out as key concepts of the new thinking with regard to military policy.30

*Mutual security*: In the nuclear age security can only be mutual in bilateral relations, in the global scale, it can only be universal and comprehensive.

*No victory in nuclear war*: There will be no victory in nuclear war. It will be suicidal to start a nuclear war.

*Impossibility of achieving military superiority*: It is impossible to achieve military superiority in the strategic relations between USSR and US and between East and West.
Insufficiency of military-technical means: National security cannot be attained by military-technical means alone. The increasingly important role should be played by the political means through which to attain arms control and disarmament.

Rejection of deterrence: Deterrence cannot provide the basis for solid peace. It perpetuates the arms race and increases the chance of military confrontations.

Rejection of parity: Parity can no longer guarantee peace. The level of nuclear weapons of both sides must be lowered, and eventually they must be completely eliminated.

Strategic stability: The transition from the present stage to the non-nuclear world must be guided by the principle of strategic stability.

Reasonable sufficiency: The level of military strength and force planning should be based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency rather than on parity.

Defensive military doctrine: Both sides should adopt defensive strategy in formulating operational strategy.

Glasnost' in the military sphere: Excessive secrecy in the military sphere will contribute to mistrust. Glasnost' should be applied to the military sphere.

Rejection of military means to solve international conflicts: In the nuclear age any local conflicts have the possibility of escalating to a major superpower confrontation. Thus, all conflicts should be solved through peaceful means.

Rejection of Clausewitz's formula: The axiom that war is an extention of politics by violent means is no longer applicable in the nuclear age.

(2) Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine
Although this is not the place to describe Soviet military doctrine in detail,\textsuperscript{11} in order to understand the significance of the new thinking, we must put it in the context of the basic outline of its evolution.

It is possible to view the evolution of Soviet military doctrine as a history in which the Soviet leadership has struggled with the problem of how to integrate nuclear weapons into the operational system of foreign-military policy, while maintaining the ideologically consistent system of Marxism-Leninism. In the operational system of foreign-military policy, nuclear weapons have undergone various stages of evaluations. Stalin underestimated the value of nuclear weapons, as this evaluation reflected the decisive inferiority of the Soviet Union in strategic relations with the United States. Under Khrushchev a complete turnaround called a "nuclear revolution" in military doctrine took place, and nuclear weapons were elevated to the most decisive element for the purpose of deterring imperialists' attack on the Soviet Union. Under Brezhnev nuclear weapons were the decisive factor that propelled the Soviet Union into the superpower status.

As nuclear weapons became integrated into Soviet foreign-military policy, however, the leadership had to face basic contradictions between the fundamental postulates of Marxism-Leninism and the implications of the nuclear-inclusive operational system of foreign-military policy. Specifically, nuclear weapons touched the following raw nerves of Marxism-Leninism: (1) Is war inevitable, even in the nuclear age, as long as imperialism exists? (2) If the transition from capitalism to socialism is an inevitable historical process, will socialism win in a nuclear war?\textsuperscript{32} And (3) even in a nuclear age, is war an extension of politics by violent means?
The first Marxist-Leninist dogma to be thrown out of the window was the inevitability of war. As soon as Stalin was dead, Malenkov declared that in a nuclear age war became no longer inevitable. But it was Khrushchev who had the rejection of the inevitability of war accepted at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. Nevertheless, the two other dogmas remained in effect. Khrushchev stated that the reason why war became no longer inevitable was because the Soviet Union came to possess nuclear weapons, and that even the imperialists became sober-minded enough to realize that their attack on the Soviet Union would be the end of capitalism. Had this been meant to be mutual suicide, Khrushchev's military doctrine would have been close to mutual assured destruction. But in two respects it was different from MAD. First, true to the Marxism-Leninism postulate of the historical inevitability of the transition from capitalism to socialism, Khrushchev hastened to state that if imperialists decided to wage war against the Soviet Union and its allies, the Soviet Union would emerge victorious even after a nuclear devastation, while imperialism would perish. The belief in victory in nuclear war was, thus, one of the cornerstones of Khrushchev's military doctrine. Second, it was believed that the best way to deter a nuclear attack by imperialists would be for the Soviet Union to possess superior military power that was capable of dealing a crushing blow against its enemy. The intention to seek military superiority was, therefore, the second cornerstone of Khrushchev's military doctrine.

In the late 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s, a significant reappraisal of the military doctrine took place. In 1972, the Soviet Union concluded SALT I with the United States. It meant, first of all, that the Soviet Union accepted the concept of mutual vulnerability inherent in the ABM Treaty. Secondly, "parity
and equal security" was accepted as the foundation on which to create the framework of strategic relations with the West. From 1977 on, Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders openly declared that the Soviet Union would not seek military superiority, and that the parity that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact Treaty nations was the guarantee for world peace. At least from 1981, Brezhnev began to state that "only a mad man who decides to commit suicide can start a nuclear war," thus, implying the rejection of victory in nuclear war.33

It is, therefore, possible to say that in the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s, there was an important shift in Soviet military doctrine. Its direction was moving away from the previous doctrine that centered around the concept of victory in nuclear war and military superiority toward a doctrine that basically accepted mutual deterrence as the foundation of its military doctrine. Brezhnev's arms control policy, however, seemed to contradict with this direction in an important respect; the Soviet Union never agreed to reduce its most destabilizing big missiles, particularly its SS-18s, even if their concessions would have greatly contributed to strategic stability. This attitude led many in the West to conclude that despite what Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders repeatedly stated, they actually never abandoned their old doctrine centered on nuclear-warfighting strategy intended to acquire first strike capability.34

It is also important to note that the military, notably represented by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, resisted accepting the political leadership's notion that there would be no victory in nuclear war. Either for ideological reasons or for the necessity of boosting the morale of the soldiers, Ogarkov either clearly insisted
on the need of attempting to prepare for victory even in nuclear war, or at least refused to endorse the notion that there would be no victory in nuclear war.35 This conflict may have been also connected with the serious struggle between the military and the party leadership as to how to allocate scarce national resources.36

There was a common thread that ran from Khrushchev to Brezhnev. The Soviet Union in both periods basically viewed the world in terms of the conflict of the two irreconcilable systems, in which imperialists were determined to destroy socialism. The logical conclusion derived from this was that there was no choice but for the Soviet Union to rely primarily on military means, particularly on nuclear weapons, to deter the imperialists' aggression. Although Brezhnev's military doctrine moved in the direction to accept mutual deterrence, it contained in itself the inevitable logic to further the spiral of the arms race, and ultimately contradicted with strategic stability.

(3) Change in the Analytical Framework

Until the end of the Brezhnev era the Soviet approach to national security was guided by the principle of "absolute security," which meant that the Soviet Union would not feel secure until its adversaries became completely insecure. The adoption of "mutual security" thus represents a new departure from this tradition. The important point, however, is to recognize that this change has resulted from a fundamental change in the basic analytical framework with which they view the world.

Behind the concept of "mutual security," there is an acutely felt sense of the danger of nuclear war. "Mutual security" is derived from the reality of "mutual insecurity," the reality that
mankind as a whole, whether one lives under capitalism or under socialism, is in danger of extinction from the threat of nuclear war. A number of important factors coalesced to bring this sense of crisis to the forefront of foreign-military policy. First, there was a military challenge from the U.S, which was virtually nullifying the strategic gains made in the 1970s. This challenge forced the Soviet Union to reexamine seriously what responses would be best suited to insure national security. They must have concluded from this examination that responding to the U.S. challenge with reciprocal arms buildup and emulative military programs would not increase their security; on the contrary, this would reduce the security of both sides, since the new arms race will inevitably lead to qualitatively different strategic instability, thus bringing the world closer to the brink of nuclear war.37

Coincidentally, the Chernobyl' nuclear accident must have had a profound effect on the nuclear issue.
"presumption of infallibility" was rejected. This led to their admission that the past Soviet military policy, while defensible in the objective reality at the respective time, also contributed to the momentum of the arms race.39 Particularly, criticism was directed at the past attempt to seek security by exclusively relying on military-technical means.

"Mutual security," however, is based on a more fundamental change in an approach to international relations than a recognition of the danger of nuclear war. "Mutual security" presupposes that one's national security depends on the understanding and good intention of the other side. The reason why Soviet security policy in the past relied exclusively on military-technical means can be explained by their understanding of the nature of imperialism. As long as imperialism by its own nature conceals within itself a momentum of militarism with which to attempt to crush socialism, it is inevitable to conclude that only military strength can guarantee Soviet security, and that the interests of the two systems are in a fundamental sense mutually exclusive in the sphere of security. The new thinking is a rejection of this view. It takes the position that nuclear war threatens socialism and capitalism alike, and to that extent the fate of both systems are bound together by the danger of mutual extinction. Neither side can remove this danger unilaterally by military-technical means alone, while unilateral attempts are bound to contribute to this danger even more. In such a reality, risking one's security at the understanding and intention of the other side is not a matter of choice, but necessity.40 In his speech at the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, Gorbachev clearly formulates the new approach to imperialism: in the new stage of interdependence of the world, the most dangerous aspects of
imperialism can be suppressed and imperialism can exist without militarism. When the world was threatened by fascism, the Soviet Union and the U.S. were united in the grand alliance against the common enemy; there is no reason why such an alliance cannot be formed to combat the common threat of nuclear war. The idea of the “world community” that exists above the different social systems may well be one of the most important notions of the new thinking.

The rejection of Clausewitz's axiom that war is an extension of politics by violent means can be understood in this context. This thesis was previously recognized as the foundation of Marxist-Leninist approach to war. For instance Ogarkov cites this formula as the basis of the Soviet approach to war in his pamphlet, History Teaches Vigilance, published in 1985. Criticism of this thesis appeared already in 1986 in Aleksandr Bovin's article. But it was in Gorbachev's speech at the Moscow Forum that the general secretary rejected this thesis for the first time. Although Gorbachev used the expression that this axiom became no longer applicable to "world war," he later removed this qualification and states that "war" in general could not be an extension of politics any longer in the nuclear age. This is tantamount to removing the question of war and peace from an area where the Marxist-Leninist class analysis could be no longer applied. The process of dismemberment of the Marxist-Leninist approach to war that began with the rejection of the inevitability of war has been completed.

(4) The New Thinking and Mutual Deterrence

The new thinking has two elements that are contradictory with each other. The first element is to accept mutual deterrence by strengthening strategic stability. The second is the rejection of
deterrence itself.

While in the Brezhnev era arms control remained only a supplementary function to buttress the military means of acquiring national security, Gorbachev's new thinking elevates arms control to a central place in his security policy. Gorbachev's arms control initiatives indicate that the Soviet Union was decisively moving in the direction of accepting the concept of mutual deterrence as the basis of strategic relations with the U.S. and the West. Unlike Brezhnev, Gorbachev's guiding principle in pursuing arms control seems to be strategic stability. This is shown by his willingness to reduce drastically its big missiles Brezhnev had jealously guarded even at the expense of strategic stability, as well as by his numerous concessions on INF negotiations. It seems that their primary concern is directed to assure the survivability of the second-strike deterrent capability. The attempt to increase survivability of their new missiles--SS-24 and SS-25--in the mobile mode may be a part of this overall objective. In the strategic and theater warfighting strategy they are moving in the direction emphasizing conventional option, while nuclear weapons are losing operational significance, relegated more and more to the deterrent role.45

Gorbachev's arms control initiatives are not the only evidence to demonstrate that the Soviet Union is moving in the direction to accept mutual deterrence through strengthening strategic stability. Another important concept is reasonable sufficiently. This concept resulted from the critical examination of Brezhnev's policy that maintained that parity would be the guarantee of peace. According to the new thinking, parity is no longer the guarantee for peace, since in the name of parity the level of the nuclear arsenal of both sides keeps going up without any upper limit. The adoption of the concept
of reasonable sufficiency will break the vicious cycle of the arms race. Previously, the party's commitment to the armed forces was guaranteed in the promise to provide "everything necessary to defend" the Soviet homeland. At the 27th Party Congress, however, both Gorbachev's political report and the resolution used the expression that "arms forces are maintained at the level sufficient to insure peaceful labor and peaceful life of Soviet people." In the new edition of the party program, it is declared that the armed forces are maintained "at the level that excludes strategic superiority by the forces of imperialism." This change is important, since it may mean that Soviet military doctrine might be moving in the direction to accept the concept of "sufficiency" inherent in mutual deterrence.

Furthermore, there might be a possibility that the Soviet leadership is revising the notion of "parity and equal security"--the notion that lay at the foundation of Brezhnev's military doctrine. The problem of this concept consists of its inherent logical contradiction. If the Soviet Union insists on equal security, parity cannot be realized either at the global level or at the regional level, because pursuance of equal security--the notion that the Soviet Union has to possess military power equal to the aggregate military power of all its opponents--will inevitably lead to Soviet superiority. Glickham notes that Gorbachev avoids the phrase, "equal security."

Another important concept that has developed under the new thinking is that of defensive military doctrine. Previously, it was maintained that although Soviet military doctrine was defensive in nature, "to create conditions for seizing the strategic initiative to begin offensive" was considered to be the best means to assure effective defense. The new thinking, however, is beginning to
explore the possibility of rewriting Soviet military doctrine in such a way to incorporate the policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons, the adoption of defensive strategy by removing offensive actions, and the implementation of reasonable sufficiency into force planning.\textsuperscript{51} The document on military doctrine adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Berlin in May, 1987, was the first step in this direction, although what such defensive doctrine really means in the force posture, strategy, and arms control policy is unclear at this point.\textsuperscript{52} This document, incidentally, proposes exchange of information between NATO and WTO, comparing their respective strategies. This, too, is meant to increase strategic stability by removing fears and mistrust that exist between the two military alliances.

Another means to increase strategic stability that has been proposed under the new thinking is to extend glasnost' to the military sphere, which was hitherto protected in impenetrable secrecy. The Soviets have made concessions on verification allowing inspectors to inspect military installations deep in their territory, concessions unthinkable only a few years ago. Moreover, they have opened up a nuclear test site, the controversial Krasnoyarsk radar site, and a chemical weapon factory to Western observers. Glasnost' has been extended to military expenditures as well. Deputy-Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii admitted for the first time that the military outlay for R & D was not included in the military expenditure in the Soviet budget.\textsuperscript{53} This admission was followed by Chief of the General Staff Sergei Akhromeev's statement that the official military expenditure in the budget did not include military R & D or weapons procurement.\textsuperscript{54} Gorbachev promised in his message to the United Nations in September that the Soviet Union would publish
its real military expenditures in such a way as to be able to compare with those in the West. 55

The new concepts and new trends described above indicate that Soviet military doctrine under Gorbachev is moving in the direction of accepting mutual deterrence by strengthening strategic stability.

(5) Rejection of Deterrence

The new thinking, adopted by Gorbachev, however, contains not only the acceptance of mutual deterrence, but also, contradictorily, its repudiation. The clearest formulation of this position is given in Gorbachev's speech at the Moscow Forum, in which he gives four reasons why deterrence should be rejected. First, deterrence is ammoral, because it is based on the balance of terror, which takes the world as a hostage. He states: "In the nuclear age no one, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States, has the right to pronounce a death sentence on mankind... Neither are we judges, nor billions of people criminals who have to be punished." Second, as long as nuclear weapons exist, mankind will always be threatened by the possibility of a nuclear war that might occur because of the inability of man to control these weapons. The nature of the nuclear weapon is such that there will be less chance to "train them to follow obedient behaviors." In Gorbachev's words, "proliferation, increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapon systems, the greater scale of delivery systems, and the constant risk of technical error, human error or malice are all accidental factors on which the survival of mankind depends."

Third, he rejected deterrence, because the policy of deterrence is based on intimidation. In his opinion, deterrence has the inner logic that, when threats become a political means, they must be taken
seriously by the other side, and that in order for threats to be taken seriously, they must always be backed up by definite actions. Thus, "the policy of deterrence, if examined in historical context, has not reduced the risk of military conflict. In fact it has increased that risk." Fourth, on philosophical ground he rejects the notion that man is violent by nature and that war is but a manifestation of human instinct, because if this notion were to be accepted, one would have to accept its logical consequence that "ever more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction will continue to be developed."

Hence, his goal is not merely to accomplish complete elimination of nuclear weapons, but also to abolish war itself. "We believe that it is possible to build such a world," he declared, "and we shall do everything to ensure the accomplishment of what is perhaps the most ambitious social goal ever."

(6) Gorbachev’s True Intention

How are we to reconcile the contradiction in Gorbachev’s stand on military doctrine? There are basically four hypotheses to explain the contradiction. First, his real intention is to achieve military superiority by demilitarization, and the new thinking is nothing but propaganda to serve this purpose. Second, Gorbachev’s renunciation of deterrence is real, and he accepts mutual deterrence only as a transitional stage to achieve his final goal of the non-nuclear world. Third, his goal is to achieve mutual deterrence, but either for propaganda purpose to gain the support of the public opinion in the West or for the best tactics to reach an arms control agreement with the U.S., he renounces deterrence without really meaning it. Fourth, Gorbachev believes in both, accepting contradictory opinions.
and choosing the most expedient alternative to fit the circumstances. I have elsewhere explained at length these four hypotheses and their implications.\textsuperscript{57} It suffices to say here that although all four hypotheses have certain merits, the second hypothesis looks more like a good candidate for Gorbachev's true intention.

For one thing, Gorbachev's aversion to deterrence is persistent. He succeeded in including the rejection of deterrence in the document on military doctrine of the WTO in May. He repeated his attack on deterrence in his interview with the French delegation in September as well as in his speech on the anniversary of the October Revolution. This persistence is striking in view of the increasing irritations expressed by the military on this point. But he is realistic enough to see that his goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be achieved immediately. Mutual deterrence through maintenance of strategic stability seems to be the best instrument in the transitional stage to reduce the level of the nuclear arsenal of both sides. Rejection of deterrence also underscores Gorbachev's determination to break the vicious cycle of the spiral of the arms race, for he believes that as long as deterrence persists, it will inevitably lead to the spiral of the arms race.

VI. The New Thinking and the Military
(1) Potential Sources of the Military's Dissatisfaction

The new thinking is in a way an assault on the military. It is an attack on the traditional privilege given to the military in allocation of resources. As civilian advisors and commentators are beginning to voice their opinions on national security issues, the monopoly once enjoyed by the military related to military-technical affairs has eroded. Clausewitz's formula on the nature of war that
the military held to be central to the Marxist-Leninist approach to war is rejected with a stroke of pen. Civilians and even foreigners are becoming intrusive in their long coveted sanctuary once held in strictest secrecy. Foreign observers are inspecting a nuclear test site, a chemical weapon factory, and a radar site. This situation will become even worse once the verification clause on the INF agreement is implemented. There is now strong pressure to extend *glasnost* to military expenditures, a tendency that will inevitably lead to tougher competition in the battle for resource allocations.

In terms of the relative weight of the military in decision making, the defense minister remained only a candidate member of the Politburo in comparison with the KGB chief, who enjoys full membership. When Defense Minister Sokolov was unceremoniously sacked for the unprecedented lax discipline allowing a West German youth to have violated the vital Soviet airspace and landed his Cessna plane on the Red Square, General Yazov was selected as successor over several senior officers waiting for their turn for promotion. Most importantly, the new thinking has downgraded the role of the military factor in foreign policy, which inevitably leads to a declining role of the military in the decision-making process and in society in general. Seweryn Bialer once remarked that one must make a distinction between the military factor in Soviet policy and the military sector in Soviet decision-making process. While the military sector has always subordinated itself to the authority of the party in the decision-making process, the military factor has always dominated the nature of Soviet policy throughout Soviet history. If so, the emergence of the new thinking indicates that for the first time in Soviet history the military factor is relegated to the secondary position.
Despite this impressive list of potential conflicts, Western analyses on the relationship between Gorbachev and the military overwhelmingly portray the harmony rather than the conflict. Dale Herspring for instance states: "Though Gorbachev lacks Brezhnev's strong attachment to the military, he does not appear to be particularly anti-military." Nevertheless, it is difficult to subscribe to this opinion. Some signs of opposition to the new thinking can actually be gleaned through the lines of articles written by military officers. Although no military officers openly criticize the new thinking, subtle nuances of differences emerge in their writings on such issues as deterrence, Clausewitz's formula, and reasonable sufficiency.

(2) Deterrence

In Gorbachev's mind there may not be a contradiction between his belief against deterrence and the necessity of seeking mutual deterrence in the real world. But in terms of practical policy this contradiction raises a difficult question, because the rejection of deterrence itself may undermine the efficacy of mutual deterrence.

This question became a central issue of the debate between Ales' Adamovich, a Belorussian writer, and Colonel-General Volkogonov, deputy chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. What sparked the debate was Adamovich's article in Moskovskie novosti' (March 8, 1987), in which he recounted his interview with a commander of an SSBN. In a hypothetical case where the Soviet Union received a first nuclear strike, would the commander push the button to release a retaliatory second strike? Adamovich's categorical answer was to refuse the button. He states:
No, we don’t want to participate in the murder of mankind, either in the first or second, or any kind of strike, because we are for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; we are ready to part with the nuclear “might” with relief; we do not rejoice at all at these cancerous pseudobiceps; we do not hold on to the status of a nuclear power...

In nuclear war there cannot be a victor. This is the absolute truth of our time—the very foundation of all real politics.61

It should be pointed out that Adamovich's argument is much in common with what Gorbachev has been advocating in the name of the new thinking.

Volkogonov sharply attacked Adamovich's argument on two occasions, first at the conference of the Writers' Union and then in his Krasnaia zvezda article. He begins by qualifying the significance of the new thinking. In his opinion, the new political thinking is not a new world view, but it is merely “a new facet that enriches our understanding of commanding imperatives (objective requirements) of the nuclear age.” He insists that the new thinking is not contradictory with Leninist teaching.62 Thus, Volkogonov resurrects the Leninist orthodoxy in the name of the new thinking, thereby skillfully disposing the true meaning of the new thinking.

Then he goes on to argue that realities of nuclear war exist, but that there are some who see these realities only through “the prism of apocalypse.”63 Volkogonov accepts that to start a nuclear war has become suicidal in contemporary reality, but by no means has it become impossible, as long as imperialists insist on irrational, criminal, adventurist policy, believing that they could achieve
decisive strategic superiority against socialism. Adamovich claims that to have the bomb would be no less shameful today than Auschwitz. This is to ignore the political context in which the problem of war and peace is posed in the contemporary world. Socialism stands for peace, while imperialism seeks war. Ignoring this dialectic, Adamovich falls into the mistake of moral relativism, where he argues that in order to achieve peace both sides must get rid of "illusory ideas." This means that the possibility of maintaining peace is predicated by the rejection of their own ideals and spiritual value. Unacceptability of such an approach is obvious. The nuclear world is at present the threatening imperative of the contemporary existence, in which the Soviet Union could not create a non-nuclear world with unilateral efforts. The world view of the two systems will continue to be different.

Imperatives of the nuclear age are powerful, imposing their imprint on the correlation of forces, contemporary strategy, priorities of resources, and perspective for the future. One cannot ignore the militaristic nature of U.S. policy. The U.S. nuclear strategy, military program, pronouncements of leaders responsible for military policy all indicate that it intends to wage and survive nuclear war. Soviet military doctrine is on the contrary completely defensive, aiming at the prevention of war as its goal. In fact, Soviet defensive capability is the only guarantee for peace. Volkogonov states:

For us the phenomenon of nuclear competition is what is especially imposed on us as an answer to threatening challenges... For the other side, nuclear deterrence is the conceptual, strategic objective. Therefore, it is hardly
correct, as many authors do, to view this process without
discrimination. It has indeed dual characters: for the one
side, it is imposed, and for the other it is purposeful
(tselopolagaiushchii)....

In other words, deterrence advocated by the West should be denounced,
but deterrence pursued by the Soviet Union is the only guarantee of
peace. Thus, Volkogonov denounces both the rejection of deterrence
and the acceptance of mutual deterrence, which amounts to the total
attack on Gorbachev's position.

By condemning the second strike, according to Volkogonov,
Adamovich leads readers to a logical conclusion that it is not
necessary to prepare for the second strike. This view is not
original; it is widely held by "nuclear pacifists," who believe that
the use of nuclear weapons even for self-defense or retaliation is
amoral. Such view is dangerous, because it questions the efficacy of
Soviet soldiers to fulfill their military duty. He attacks such
pacifism as "vegetarian pacifism."

Every day thousands of Soviet soldiers take up the duty at the
missile complexes. They are directly joined to the task of
strategic, or I might call, fateful significance. We all hope
and believe that no one from them would have to execute commands
to fire at real targets. But to prepare for it (Volkogonov's
italics) as the highest expression of his military duty and as a
duty of a citizen continues to remain as a threatening,
deterring factor. And as long as no political mechanism to
prevent war is established, only one indisputable truth exists
for the Soviet military men in the form of axiom: the higher our
military preparedness is, the less likelihood it is of our potential aggressor deciding on a nuclear adventure."

This is the most classical formulation of deterrence one could think of. It is a mirror image, one might add, of the American advocates of deterrence. It is based on the bipolar vision, the total mistrust of the other side, and the belief in unilateral means of security. In this sense, Volkogonov's view is in total opposition to the new thinking. It is important to note that Volkogonov's argument is shared by other military authors. Comparing Volkogonov's argument with the key concepts of the new thinking supported by Gorbachev, it is difficult to support Herspring's opinion: "The doctrinal trend observed under Gorbachev... has long been visible within the Soviet military establishment. Gorbachev is following the military's lead in this area."

(2) Clausewitz's Formula

In his speech at the Moscow Forum, Gorbachev first rejected Clausewitz's formula. In the context of the speech it was obvious that he intended to extend the rejection of Clausewitz's formula to all wars, not merely to "world war" involving both superpowers. Whether the rejection of Clausewitz's formula is applied only to world war or to all wars is not a dogmatic hairsplitting difference, but it has profound practical significance on the approach to war, the role of the military factor in foreign policy, and the role of the military in society.

Marshal S. I. Sokolov, then Defense Minister, published an article in Pravda on May 9, 1987. In what turned out to be his last article before his dismissal, he stated: "World war (italics by
Hasegawa) in the nuclear-cosmic era has outlived itself, and ceased to be a means to achieve political aims. It should be noted that Sokolov did not mention anything about Clausewitz’s formula, whereby he presumably intended to disassociate this disclaimer with the frontal attack on Clausewitz’s axiom. If this disclaimer were limited to world war, then what became impossible would be confined only to world war that might involve both superpowers. But there are other wars that do not necessarily develop into world war. Sokolov implies that Clausewitz’s axiom is still applicable to these wars.

A similar attempt can be found also in Volkogonov’s article. He explains that “in the contemporary epoch, nuclear war cannot be a reasonable, rational means of politics, if one refers to its functional aspect.” Volkogonov concedes that nuclear war is no longer a realistic means to pursue political objectives, but by qualifying that this applies only to its operational aspect, he reaffirms that nuclear war continues to have a meaning other than in its operational meaning. What he means by this is already clear from the discussion above on deterrence. He takes the deterrent role of nuclear weapons seriously; he believes that more seriously the Soviet Union prepares for nuclear war, the more likely it would be able to prevent it. Furthermore, Volkogonov, like Sokolov, also refuses to associate the rejection of operational utility of nuclear war with Clausewitz’s axiom. His reference to Gorbachev’s Moscow forum speech without mentioning his rejection of Clausewitz’s formula, which was the most notable part of this speech, underscores his intention to ignore Gorbachev’s innovation.

While Gorbachev himself stepped up his tone by applying the rejection of Clausewitz’s formula to all wars, it is important to note that no military men have so far openly endorsed Gorbachev’s
opinion. Thus, it might be possible to surmise that the rejection of Clausewitz’s axiom is far from being accepted in the military.

(3) Reasonable Sufficiency versus Parity

The concept of reasonable sufficiency [razumnaia dostatochnost’] is, like many other Soviet strategic concepts, American in its intellectual origin. The concept of sufficiency was first formulated in 1956 by Secretary of the Air Force Donald W. Quarles in his article, “How Much Is Enough.” Its central notion was that once sufficient level of nuclear deterrence was achieved, additional increase to match the other side’s buildup would be meaningless. Thus, reasonable sufficiency is fundamentally in contradiction with parity and equality.

In his last article Sokolov defends that Soviet military preparedness will be maintained “at the level that will guarantee the successful prevention of aggression.” Proclaiming that the Soviet Union will neither let the U.S. achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, nor will it tolerate “any attempt to upset the existing military equality,” he cites Gorbachev’s statement at the 27th Party Congress that “the Soviet Union will not aspire/more security, nor will it go for less.” Although Sokolov does not use the word, parity, it is possible to conclude that this article supports more or less the principle of parity rather than reasonable sufficiency.

Volkogonov is also presumed to oppose the concept of reasonable sufficiency. In the first place, his long article does not mention anything about this concept. Instead, his central focus is parity. To Volkogonov, real possibility for peace was created precisely because the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity with the U.S. Although he also advocates that survival of mankind is possible only
on the basis of compromises and mutual concessions, he immediately qualifies this by adding that "only the actual recognition of the principle of equal security gives the chances for the possibility of agreement." Finally, he concludes: "military-strategic parity is not spiritual parity. We placed, and are placing indisputable priority in this."  

After May, 1987, it appears that the concept of reasonable sufficiency has become the most important dispute between those who support the new thinking and at least some in the military who feel dissatisfied with the new thinking. Colonel P. Skorodenko discusses the relationship between military parity and reasonable sufficiency. He at first defends the concept of reasonable sufficiency defined as "such minimal quantitative and qualitative level of military potential of a state as to guarantee reliably its security and not to create real military threat to other countries." Although he admits that military-strategic parity itself does not guarantee peace, he nonetheless defines reasonable sufficiency in terms of parity. In Skorodenko's opinion, the limit of sufficiency "under the conditions of parity" can be determined in three ways: first, by maintaining the present level, second, by reducing the level of military force through stages without offsetting the balance, and third by increasing the limit of sufficiency as responsive measures for acquisition of military potential of the other side." The Soviet Union would prefer the second option, Skorodenko argues, but ultimately the level of sufficiency will be determined by the other side, since it will not allow imperialists to achieve military superiority over socialism. It can be said that Skorodenko's article is an attempt to emasculate the concept of reasonable sufficiency by substituting parity for it.
Rear-Admiral G. Kostev's formulation of the problem is even sharper. He argues that the level of reasonable sufficiency is determined first by the requirement to prevent unpunished nuclear attack "even in the most unfavorable conditions," and second by currently existing military-strategic parity, which remains to be a decisive factor in preventing war. Earlier Soviet military doctrine took the position that once imperialists began a war, it would inevitably lead to nuclear war, where the major means of war would be nuclear missiles. This situation has changed, in Kostev's opinion. The U.S. and NATO are actively making preparations for a protracted war under the strategy of flexible response with the use of not only nuclear, but also conventional weapons. From this it follows, Kostev argues, that "it is necessary for our country to engage in comprehensive preparations for military defense with the use of not only nuclear, but also conventional, highly effective weapons."

Kostev concludes:

Today war is a reality of our time and the integral part of policy of violence by reactionary imperialist circles. The army and navy, which exist to carry out military struggle, perform their duty with weapons. Therefore, it is exceptionally important to support military-strategic parity by strengthening the Soviet armed forces, weakening all attempts by imperialism to disrupt the balance of force."

Thus, Kostev comes out much stronger than Skorodenko in insisting the need to maintain parity by even unilateral military program. It should be noted that one can find a striking similarity between Kostev's argument and the argument once advocated by Ogarkov.
A similar view, less strident, nonetheless supporting the thrust of argument made by Skorodenko and Kostev, is presented by General E. Ivanovskii, Commander of Ground Forces and deputy minister of defense. Relying on an article written by U. S. Secretary of Army G. Marsh, Ivanovskii discusses in detail the malevolent U.S. military intentions. U.S. strategy continues to be based on deterrence (ustrashenie) through threat of punishment of assured destruction. It also aims to take decisive measures to force the Soviet Union out from any part of the world, while it openly advocates intervention in revolutionary and national liberation movements. Marsh's views are tantamount to putting spokes in the wheels of mechanism of Soviet-U.S. relations, particularly in arms control. Ivanovskii concludes that the Soviet Union will be forced to "maintain its armed forces in such a composition and at such a level that will be able to repulse any aggression from outside." It is important to note that this article was published only a few weeks before the summit meeting, and in the midst of the Yeltsin affair.

(4) Military and Political Opposition to Gorbachev

All these military authors publicly state that they support the concepts of the new thinking, but, as it is clear from the above analysis, what they actually intend to do is to undermine what the new thinking represents. The list of military authors I examined is by no means comprehensive, but it is sufficient to show that there exist dissatisfactions and frustrations among at least some in the military with the new thinking. This is not to suggest that the military as a whole is united in opposition to the new thinking. There are undoubtedly some who enthusiastically support the new thinking for a variety of reasons. But it is also true, as I have
shown, that the new thinking, which poses a difficult dilemma to the professional military men, aggravates their frustrations.

One common thread that runs through these military authors is their fundamental distrust of intentions of the imperialist world. Spending their whole life studying the other side's military doctrine, strategy, force planning, and procurement patterns, it is difficult for them to subscribe to the opinion that the nature of imperialism has become benign to the extent that their own security can be tied with that of imperialists. It is in this fundamental point on the nature of imperialism that at least some military men and the advocates of the new thinking are diametrically opposed. If history offers some guide for the future, it would be unlikely that the military will form an opposition as a bloc to the political leadership, but it is quite likely that the military will play an important role in the outcome of the power struggle that will inevitably be waged in the future.

V. Conclusion

The new thinking is not merely a tactical retreat of Soviet foreign policy; it basically stems from the new approach to international relations quite different from the traditional Marxist-Leninist approach. It is also integrally connected with the ongoing revolution in consciousness. The general direction in which the new thinking is attempting to bring Soviet foreign policy--whether it is interdependence or mutual security--is not averse to the interest of the West in the long run, although its implementation in specific issues is likely to be a difficult process.

We have to bear in mind, however, that the new thinking is by no means a solid basis on which current Soviet foreign policy is
anchored. In fact, it is still fragile. It seems to me that various concepts of the new thinking that have arisen from the practical necessity of changing the previous course are now coming to their logical conclusion, the most difficult ideological wall that is standing before them. This is the question of how to define the nature of imperialism. It seems that what had been discussed until now was merely preliminary skirmishes; the real test of the new thinking is about to begin where the battleline is clearly drawn.

The ultimate fate of the new thinking will be determined by the outcome of this decisive battle. We have no way of predicting how this conflict will turn out. We can be sure, however, that the battle on the new thinking will be closely connected with the struggle on domestic reforms. It is also possible that its outcome will be to some extent influenced by our response to the new Soviet foreign policy initiatives.

Western response to Soviet foreign policy under the new thinking should be guided only by the principle of upholding and enhancing our own interests. Our own interests themselves, however, will be ultimately influenced by the outcome of this conflict in the Soviet Union. To this extent, the new thinking expresses one universal truth of the contemporary world: interdependence and mutual security.

The most important documents on the new thinking are the following:

M. S. Gorbachev, "Politicheskii doklad Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS XXVII s"ezda kommunisticheskoj partii Sovetskogo Soiuza," Kommunist, No. 4 (March, 1986), pp. 8, 17; M. S. Gorbachev, "Za bez"iadernyi mir, za gumanizm mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii," Izvestiia, February 17, 1987 (English translation of this speech, see Mikhail Gorbachev, For the Sake of Preserving Human Civilisation (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987)); M. S. Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlja nashei strany i dlja vsego mira (Moscow, 1987).

For the ideological background of the new thinking, see Shenfield, The Nuclear Predicament.

Glickham, pp. 7-10.

5 Gorbachev, “Politicheskii doklad,” pp. 53-57.
7 “Deliiskaia deklaratsiia o printsipakh svobodnogo ot iadernogo oruzhiia i nenasil’stvennogo mira,” Izvestiia, November 28, 1986.
8 Glickham, pp. 8-9.
9 See Gorbachev’s Moscow Forum Speech, “Za bez”iadernyi mir,” Izvestiia, February 17, 1987. Since the danger of nuclear war is not specifically identified as a global problem, there still remained a theoretical possibility that security and global problems are still separately treated. But this doubt was to be removed completely.
12 Izvestiia, October 1, 1987.
13 Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie, p. 141.
14 Ibid., p. 144.
15 Ibid.
16 M. S. Gorbachev, “Oktyabr’ i perestroika: revoliutsiia prodolzhaetsia,” Izvestiia, November 3, 1987, p. 5; for English translation of this speech, see Mikhail Gorbachev, October and Perestroika: the Revolution Continues (Moscow, Novosti, 1987).
17 Gorbachev, “Oktyabr’ i perestroika,” p. 4.
18 Gorbachev, “Politicheskii doklad Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS XVII s”ezda,” p.


82 This information was revealed recently to the author by someone involved in this advisory body.

83 Glickham, p. 11.


85 Dobrynin, p. 25; Glickham, p. 6.

86 Primakov, “Novaia filosofiaa.”

87 Ibid.

88 Haruki Wada, in his recent reportage, makes the point that Soviet intellectuals, who make analogy between the Great Reforms in the 1860s and perestroika, liken Chernobyl' to the defeat of the Crimean War. See Haruki Wada, Watashino mita peresutoroika (Perestroika Seen Through my Eyes) (Tokyo: Iwanami shinsho, 1987).


90 The following documents are crucial in understanding the key concepts of the new thinking toward the security policy: Gorbachev’s Proposal to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons by the Year 2000 (January 16, 1986); Gorbachev’s Political Report and the Resolution at the 27th Party Congress (February 1986); the Dehli Declaration (November 1986); Gorbachev’s speech at the Moscow Forum (February 1987);
Document on Military Doctrine adopted by the Warsaw Pact Organization (May 1987); Gorbachev's message to the United Nations (September 1987); Gorbachev's book, Perestroika and the New Thinking (October 1987); and Gorbachev's speech at the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution (November, 1987).


This question is fully examined by Shenfield, chapter 3.


We do not have to subscribe to the opinion, widely circulated in the West, that Soviet concessions have resulted only from their painful realization that their economic and technological backwardness would make it impossible for them to compete with the robust U.S. military program; in other words, that only our strength and resolve have induced their concessions. Recent studies by American specialists indicate that the Soviet Union is quite capable of matching the U.S. SDI challenge with both offsetting and emulative

For the evolution of Soviet view on strategic defense, see an excellent study by Bruce Parrott, _The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense_ (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987).

38 Gorbachev's message to the United Nations refers to the influence of Chernobyl' on their view on nuclear weapons. See Gorbachev, "Reshimost' i garantii." Also see note 28 above.

39 Primakov, "Novaia filosofiiia." Also see Shenfield, p. 52.

40 For discussion on universal peace and the class analysis, see Shenfield, pp. 40-47.

41 Gorbachev, "Oktiabr' i perestroika," p. 5. For the ideological debate on the nature of imperialism, see Shenfield, chapter 7.


44 See above pp. 6-7.

45 Glickham, p.


47 Glickham, p. 8.


49 Glickham, p. 8.

50 "Strategicheskaia oborona," _Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar'_. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), p. 710. Also see Meyer, "Soviet Views on

Primagov, "Novaia filosofiia."

O voennoi doktrine gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo
Dogovora," Krasnia zvezda, May 30, 1987; A. Kokoshin, V. Larionov,
"Kurskaia bitva v svete sovremennoi oboronitel’noi doktriny," MEMO.

"Vybor v pol’zu razoružheniiia i razvitiiia," Izvestiiia, August 27,
1987.

"Excerpts of Interview with Soviet Armed Forces Chief of Staff,

Gorbachev, "Reshimost’ i garantii."

Gorbachev, "Za bez’iadernyi mir."

Hasegawa, "The New Thinking and Gorbachev’s Foreign-Military

Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal

For example, George G. Weickhardt, "The Soviet Military-Industrial
Complex and Economic Reform," Soviet Economy, 2, No. 3 (July-
September 1986): 193-220; Mary C. FitzGerald, "The Strategic
Revolution behind Soviet Arms Control," Arms Control Today, 17, No. 5
(July 1987): 16-19; George E. Weickhardt, "The Military Consensus
behind Soviet Arms Control," Arms Control Today, 17, No. 7
(September, 1987): 20-24; Dale R. Herspring, "On Perestroika:
Gorbachev, Yaxov, and the Military," Problems of Communism, July-


Literaturnaia gazeta, May 6, 1987, p. 7. Adamovich’s original
article was published in Moskovskie novosti, March 8, 1987.

D. Volkogonov, "Imperativy iadernogo veka," Krasnia zvezda, May

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For instance, P. Skorodenko, "Voennyi paritet i printsip razumnoi dostatochnosti," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 10 (May), 1987, pp. 15, 21.


See above, pp. 6-7, 24.


Volkogonov, "Imperativy iadernogo veka."

Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 33. Quarles stated as follows: "The buildup of atomic power in the hands of the two opposed alliances of nations makes total war an unthinkable catastrophe for both sides. Neither side can hope by a mere margin of superiority in airplanes or other means of delivery of atomic weapons to escape the catastrophe of such a war. Beyond a certain point, this prospect is not the result of relative strength of the two opposed forces. It is the absolute power in the hands of each, and...the substantial invulnerability of this power to interdiction."

Sokolov, "Pobeda vo imia mira."

Volkogonov, "Imperativy iadernogo veka."

Skorodenko, "Voennyi paritet," p. 15.

Ibid., p. 17.

Ibid., p. 19. A similar view is expressed by Lieutenant-General V. Serebriannikov, "Sootnoshenie politicheskikh i voennykh sredstv v zashchite sotsializma," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 18 (September), 1987, p. 15.

G. Kostev, "Nasha voennaia doktrina v svete novogo politicheskogo
myshleniia," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 17 (September), 1987, pp. 13-14.


It is interesting to note that Ivanovskii uses the term ustrashenie here for deterrence. Deterrence is translated into Russian either ustrashenie or sderzhivanie. Ustrashenie has the meaning of intimidation, and thus more negative connotation. In recent years, sderzhivanie is more often used for neutral meaning of deterrence.


For instance, see General Yazov's article in Pravda, July 26, 1987.