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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Soviet militsiia (ordinary police) conforms neither to western nor totalitarian police models. The ordinary Soviet police are not free of political functions as are the typical police of western democratic societies. Neither is the Soviet militsiia, as the simplistic totalitarian model would indicate, an omnipresent police force that effectively maintains domestic order and controls crime. Rather the militsiia is an imperfect instrument of social control striving to maintain Party power and suppress political, social and economic deviance.

The Soviet militsiia represents a curious amalgam of the characteristics of traditional police forces and those of modern nation states. In 18th and 19th century France and Prussia the police were unspecialized: they were authorized to use force, but simultaneously served as general instruments of social control. Although the contemporary Soviet militsiia is specialized, a characteristic of modern day policing, its range of functions is in many ways more reminiscent of the 18th and 19th century model than that of industrialized democracies. The present day militsiia, like the French and Prussian forces of previous centuries, also enforces sanitary regulations, ensures food supplies and certifies building plans for highways.¹

The militsiia retains features of 18th and 19th century policing because the USSR shares many of the characteristics of the traditional police states of previous centuries. Although
political and economic power is retained by a political party rather than a hereditary nobility, the consequences for policing are similar. Broad regulatory functions must be granted to an armed police because voluntary compliance can not be ensured in a complex non-democratic society. Policing can not be privatized because the Party's monopoly over the means of production and economic policy must be safeguarded.

Consequently, in the USSR, unlike in western democratic societies, policing remains a state monopoly performed by a specialized militsiia, with far-reaching responsibilities and ready access to force and criminal sanctions. In the Soviet Union, all policing is in the hands of the centralized militsiia and KGB (secret police), in guard services, or in volunteer and auxiliary groups supervised by the Party or the State. Over the past seventy years, the Soviet militsiia has evolved from a militarized body emphasizing the maintenance of political order to a sophisticated police force needed to monitor a complex urbanized society.

The Soviet militsiia has had three stages of development. In all three periods it has performed its primary social, economic, and political control functions. The enforcement focus and the nature of the militsiia has changed with the maturation of the state: important structural, personnel and policy changes have accompanied the shift in militsiia focus.

The first period from 1917-53 marks the birth of the Soviet militsiia under Lenin and its development under Stalin. The political concerns of the state were paramount as the Bolsheviks
fought off internal opposition and the Soviets faced the German onslaught during World War II. The state was militarized and so was the police. The militiia and the secret police were merged in the nearly omnipotent NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs). Social control was subordinate to other police functions as the protection of citizens was not the state's priority. Political and economic control of the USSR were the primary objectives of the Soviet police under Lenin and Stalin.

During the second period, from 1953-1963, the militiia was de-Stalinized. Under Khrushchev, de-politicization occurred as the militiia was separated institutionally from the secret police. The maintenance of social rather than political order received priority as the militiia tried to meet the demands of a complex industrialized society. Khrushchev popularized the regular police by enlisting millions of volunteers (druzhinniki) to assist in street patrols. More educated individuals were recruited for full-time service and were trained to be responsive to the citizenry.

The period from 1963 to 1982, the Brezhnev years, marks the beginning of the mature Soviet police. The present emphasis of the militiia is the maintenance of social and economic order. Political control has receded in importance but the political functions of the Soviet militiia still far exceed those of western democratic societies. However, the mature Soviet police is also highly corrupt, thus undermining its ability to maintain order. Brezhnev's successors have attempted to combat the consequences of long-term one party rule by purging 161,000 Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel between 1983 and 1985.3
Cadre change continued under Gorbachev as 10,000 corrupt militsija personnel were dismissed and 155,000 new recruits added. The extent of personnel changes orchestrated by Gorbachev and his followers has proved unsettling to conservative elements of the Party.

It is as yet unclear whether there will be a diminution or elimination of the political functions of the militsija in the post-Brezhnev period. As always the nature of policing is tied to the vicissitudes of power in the Politburo. Gorbachev is clearly making changes in the style of policing, but it is not yet certain whether he will be able to alter the substance of policing. Reduced corruption and increased respect for the law among members of the ordinary police are Gorbachev's priorities, yet no apparent change has yet been made in the functions of the militsija. Changes will have to be made in the responsibilities of the ordinary police, however, if the democratization sought by Gorbachev is to continue. As the riots in Kazakhstan, the rallies of the Crimean Tatars in Moscow, and the mass disturbances in Nagorno-Karabagh indicate, one of the major tests of the political tolerance of the new regime will be the approach of the militsija to demonstrations and political unrest. The dispersion of demonstrators in Azerbaijan and Armenia and the detention of the Glasnost' editors indicate that the ordinary police are still involved in limiting the level of political expression in Soviet society. It is likely that the militsija will retain an important political role under Gorbachev as it has in all periods in Soviet history.
In some respects the current Soviet police resembles its counterparts in western democratic societies; militsiia personnel perform social as well as crime control functions. In the USSR, the police do not spend their time chasing stray dogs and cats, but they do try to settle family disputes. Furthermore, they perform such other disparate social functions as combating alcoholism and the spread of venereal disease, in addition to maintaining control over problem youth. Like their western counterparts, members of the Soviet militsiia help detect, investigate and prevent crime.

The militsiia's current political and economic functions, however, set it apart from most western police forces. Among its important political functions are: monitoring of the public at elections to detect anti-Soviet comments, the licensing and control of printing presses, searches and confinement of dissidents, and the dispersion and arrest of peaceful demonstrators. Most of these are considered inappropriate activities for ordinary police in democratic societies.

The socialization of the means of production and the centrally planned economy require the policing of individual economic activity. While certain western societies with extensive welfare systems and highly socialized economies grant their police forces extensive economic responsibilities, few share as much concentrated economic enforcement responsibility as the Soviet militsiia. The Soviet militsiia maintains a special division to detect and combat the theft of socialist property (OBKhSS). It also controls the passport and registration system helping to
ensure the appropriate distribution of manpower. It enforces campaigns to control the feeding of bread to animals, and seeks to impede the production of homebrew that deprives the state of needed revenues.

These diverse social, economic and political responsibilities are assigned to different branches of the militsiia. As in most of the world's police forces, over-lapping authority and the imprecise division of responsibilities inhibit the execution of the militsiia's responsibilities. Furthermore, jurisdictional conflicts with other law enforcement agencies such as the KGB and the procuracy sometimes impede the maintenance of social and economic order.

Law enforcement is directed towards maintenance of order rather than protection of individual rights. The premium placed on order rather than legal formalities means that jurisdictional distinctions are often blurred as the need of the state to maintain control takes precedence over legislative mandate.

The Soviet police and investigatory organs have changed dramatically in the post-Stalinist period. The changes are a reflection both of the new national leadership as well as a fundamental transformation in the relationship between the militsiia and the Party. Under Stalin, the power of the state was equated with the power of the NKVD. At times the Party seemed almost subordinate to the police apparatus as millions of Party members were liquidated through the activities of the police organs. The militsiia and political police were subordinate only to Stalin as successive heads of the NKVD were themselves
eliminated through the purges that they had so carefully engineered.

Since Stalin's death the police have been reined in. The centralized militsiia is now responsible to the Party as well as to the Party General Secretary. Unlike their counterparts of the 1920's and 1940's, they are remote from the military. The relationship between the police and the state, however, remains different from that in democratic societies. Control and supervision is maintained by a single party and the militsiia's responsibility is to the Communist Party rather than to the local citizenry. Although citizen input into law enforcement is minimal, regional differences in police practice reflect cultural differences, and variations in Party organizations affect law enforcement.

The post-Stalinist police and investigatory organs have become more sophisticated. Gone are the mass terrorizing techniques of the Stalinist period. The regular police are no longer "the meat grinders" of the Stalinist years, but trained professionals in the modern techniques of criminal investigation. The militsiia, while no longer a source of terror to the population, still wields tremendous power because its personnel are enforcers of the will of the Party.

Party emphasis on socialist order results in the marshalling of the militia effort to root out ordinary, economic, and political crime. The national agenda of the Party becomes the marching orders of the local militsiia. As politicians in the United States declare war on crime or drugs, so too do Party
officials launch campaigns against deviant and illicit conduct. Carefully orchestrated campaigns against alcoholism, bribery, hooliganism and theft from enterprises are executed via secret directives to law enforcement personnel and result in increased arrests by the local militsija and the procuracy.7

The militsija's responsibility to the local Party organization helps ensure that the local police maintain some credibility with the local populace. In the post-Stalinist period, the Party does not rule as much by force. Consequently, a balance must be struck between maintenance of local supervision and direction at the national level.

Despite the encompassing authority of the centrally controlled militsija, there is flexibility in their daily operations. Although every shot fired by a militsija officer must be reported to Moscow,8 significant discretion is accorded to the militiaman on the beat and even to the OBKhSS (the division of the militsija concerned with the theft of socialist property) inspector who has discovered a shortfall in inventory. Discretion is not the only means of introducing flexibility into tightly controlled police operations. Militsija power is further diminished by pervasive corruption at all police ranks. The only police agency largely unsullied by corruption is the KGB, which is charged with maintaining political order, a task which makes its personnel less subject to financial temptations.9 Discretion, corruption and reduced legislative authority ensure that Soviet policing agencies are not now the omnipotent agencies of the Stalin period.
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The Bolshevik leadership moved quickly in 1917 to abolish the hated Tsarist police. Although few pre-revolutionary police personnel were permitted to serve the new Soviet state, the legacy of the Tsarist police remained in the style of policing adopted by the new Bolshevik leadership. The sudden name change from politsiya to the new workers' and peasants' militsiya did not alter the fundamental relationship between the police and the state that existed both before and after the revolution. Police intrusion into politics prevailed under the Tsars and continued under the Bolsheviks.

"Criminal insecurity does not impel police into politics; only political insecurity does." As the tsars and landowning nobility had feared the serfs and foreign powers, the new Bolshevik leaders feared White opposition and foreign intervention. The political role of the ordinary police (militsiya) was affirmed immediately after the Bolshevik takeover. "The legacy of police control was confirmed rather than expunged by the Bolshevik revolution and the civil war that followed." From the first days after the revolution, the newly constituted militsiya worked alongside the army and the Cheka (the secret police), to which it was subordinate, to wrest and ensure control for the newly victorious Bolsheviks.

The mandate granted the newly constituted militsiya was not merely political. The first declaration on the workers' and peasants' militsiya issued in 1917 granted this law enforcement
agency most of the sweeping social and economic responsibilities now associated with it. Some of these, such as its taxing and duty responsibility,\textsuperscript{13} were subsequently withdrawn from the militsiia as the poorly staffed and trained body was hard pressed to perform even a limited number of tasks. In Moscow and the western Slavic regions where the Bolsheviks managed to secure and maintain control without great internal strife, the militsiia was able to perform such traditional police tasks as catching criminals and detaining drunks.\textsuperscript{14} In many parts of the country, however, where the Soviets faced strong opposition from the Whites and the Basmachi (the Central Asian resistance), members of the militsiia were engaged in civil war. Soviet chroniclers of the period admitted that the militsiia was militarized and was no less brutal than the regular army in combatting opposition.\textsuperscript{15}

The militsiia was also at the forefront of the Soviet state's economic policy. By 1921 the militsiia was required to escort grain shipments. Further orders involved them in the requisitioning of grain, taking necessary measures against peasants and redistributing food to starving urban residents.\textsuperscript{16} Given this experience, it is hardly surprising that the militsiia was recruited in the late 1920's to aid in the collectivization drive. The ignominious role of the army and the Cheka in the subjugation of the peasantry and the elimination of the kulaks has been carefully chronicled,\textsuperscript{17} but the militsiia's part in this effort has remained unacknowledged.

The Smolensk archives reveal that the ordinary police was
involved in the collectivization drive in the first half of the 1930's. They were so overworked in their pursuit of the independent peasantry and so poorly provided for that members of the militsiia, according to minutes of an NKVD meeting, were literally falling asleep wherever they landed.18

Following the end of the civil war and the suppression of Central Asian opposition, the militsiia turned to other pressing problems of internal order. The collectivization drive had resulted in a mass exodus from rural to urban areas. Attempting to stem this tide, the Soviet authorities introduced an internal passport and registration system in 1932.19 Although previous population controls had existed in the form of a labor book, this new legislation marked an expansion of police authority. The passport system became one of the strongest control measures of the state and the militsiia as millions of residents of cities, work settlements, state farms and construction sites were registered by the local police.

The militsiia aided the Cheka in the purges, but their main responsibility in the 1930's was the maintenance of social order. Offenses such as banditry, embezzlement, kolkhoz disorder, harvesting crimes, and abuses of power by officials in addition to the usual array of criminal activity, remained among the primary responsibilities of the militsiia until World War II.20

Years of revolution and internal strife created large numbers of homeless youth and so-called "declasse" individuals who had no place in the new society. Bands of bezprizorniki (homeless youth)
and armed marauders became primary foci of militsiia efforts. All means necessary, no matter how brutal, were used by the militsiia against the population to realize the society's objective of social order.

The advent of war placed new pressures on the NKVD. The annexation of large new territories brought in many new individuals not cowed by years of Stalinist repression. The security branch of the NKVD, while busy molding twenty-three million people in the newly acquired territories into compliant Soviet subjects, necessarily thrust many political functions on the already burdened militsiia. The militsiia assumed responsibility for deserters, resisters, marauders, "panickers," and "rumor mongers" (particularly in border areas), as well as for evacuations and security on transport.

The political and social order functions of the militsiia supplemented their usual responsibility for general crime prevention. Wartime conditions exacerbated speculation and theft of socialist property. Consequently, the already harsh techniques of the militsiia were intensified to seek rapid disclosure of crimes and the speedy trials of perpetrators. The minimal standards of justice for ordinary offenders were further abridged during World War II.

The dislocations of the wartime years provided the militsiia with an additional responsibility, bezprizorniki. While the militsiia had enjoyed success in controlling their behavior in the 1930's, homeless youth again became a major militsiia burden,
particularly in areas crippled by large civilian losses. Militsiia resources were severely strained to accomplish these diversified responsibilities since the NKVD was heavily recruited into the wartime efforts needed to bolster the army units demoralized by leadership losses from the purges.

The politicization of the militsiia continued into the post-war period. The massive domestic and foreign demands placed on the police apparatus generated more work than the security police alone could perform. Consequently, the militsiia could not confine its activities to the control of ordinary crime; its services were enlisted to reestablish internal political order and to supervise the establishment and training of police forces in the Soviet bloc. 25

The police enjoyed extraordinary power until Stalin's death, but such power made the removal of the leaders of Stalin's police apparatus a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of a new political authority. Although the post-Stalin transition was achieved with limited bloodshed, former police personnel were among its most visible victims. 26 While Stalin's police leaders perished in the de-Stalinization drive, the influence of their administration endured. The development of the law enforcement apparatus during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods can only be understood as a reaction to the abuses of the Stalin years.

Khrushchev, as Stalin's successor, was faced with two formidable tasks—reconstruction of the law enforcement apparatus and subordination of the police to the Party apparatus. Every
effort was made to ensure that the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) which supervised the militsiia did not become a separate kingdom as it had under Stalin's henchman, Beria. Legislation was enacted to improve the militsiia and formalize its position.\textsuperscript{27} This helped reverse the dramatic decline in militsiia authority that was affecting the maintenance of social order.

The 1953 separation of the KGB from the MVD, or the security from the ordinary police, was an important step in the de-Stalinization process. By isolating political control from ordinary crime control activity, an important step was made in reducing the terror instilled by the law enforcement apparatus and in professionalizing the militsiia. A militsiia was developed which had greater support among the population.

The character of the ordinary police was changed slowly by recruits replacing retirees. Changes in militsiia activity resulted from a policy and training decision to emphasize criminalistics and sophisticated detection methods over brute force.

In the 1950's the militsiia turned away from its political functions, focusing instead on social and economic regulation. New laws were introduced to enhance the state agricultural sector at the expense of private domestic activity. These laws became the marching orders of the militsiia as the newspapers featured reports of arrests of shippers of fruits and vegetables from private plots in the Caucasian republics and of women who fed bread to animals.\textsuperscript{28}
Military jurisdiction in economic cases was clearly delimited by legal statute, but military authority was augmented by its new responsibility to deal with "anti-social individuals" whose source of income was not clear. Parasites, described by the media as vagrants, beggars and general no-goods who subsisted on hand-outs from family, friends and the general public, became the focus of much military work. 29

Under Khrushchev, the citizenry was mobilized to aid in law enforcement. 30 While some scholars have suggested that mass mobilization is associated with totalitarian societies, Khrushchev's efforts to popularize the military recalled those of the early revolutionaries who envisioned the withering away of the state. The recruitment of millions of druzhinniki (citizen auxiliary police) encountered numerous problems 31 but the entry of numerous private citizens into the law enforcement arena helped reduce many of the grossest abuses of the Stalinist era.

The morale of the law enforcement apparatus suffered much during Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and popularization drive. Brezhnev upgraded the quality and image of the police. In the mid-1960s, new and more qualified personnel were recruited to improve the qualifications of those already on the force. New equipment for military operations was purchased and the Party apparatus made more effective policing a priority. Increased professionalism and power 32 were the hallmarks of the Brezhnev military.

The rising police star of the 1960s and 1970s eventually
proved counterproductive to Brezhnev's own interests. The increasing corruption that accompanied augmented power discredited the militsiia and led to the diminution of Brezhnev's influence as members of his family figured prominently in the corruption scandals surrounding the militsiia. Andropov, the KGB chief with a reputation for integrity, rather than a Brezhnev protege, assumed the post of Party Secretary after Brezhnev's death. Once again the militsiia assumed an important role in national politics.

Andropov's platform of law and discipline had important implications for the militsiia. A major anti-corruption campaign affected the entire justice system, including the regular police. Brezhnev's law enforcement leadership personnel was removed, (some rumored to have committed suicide) and trained law enforcement professionals replaced them. Although Andropov's tenure was brief, his efforts to clean up the law enforcement apparatus only slowed under Chernenko to accelerate again with Gorbachev's assumption of power.

The militsiia, a taboo topic for many decades, became a prime subject of glasnost as the mass media was used to publicize the trials of former MVD personnel and enhance respect for the law enforcement apparatus. The vigorous anti-alcohol campaign launched in 1985 gave the militsiia major direction and press conferences given to Soviet journalists publicized their efforts to combat all forms of social and economic deviance. An enlarged, invigorated militsiia capable of ensuring order as well as
democratization are prime Gorbachev objectives.

STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP OF THE MILITSIIA

The first decade of Soviet rule was marked by a serious struggle for survival. But, despite the confusion of the internal situation, much attention was paid in the initial years of Soviet rule to the establishment of the security police that would eliminate opposition as well as the regular police that would regulate Soviet society. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the first normative act issued by the Soviet government founded the militsiia.

The fourth day after the revolution, the establishment of the raboche-krestiianskaia militsiia was announced throughout the USSR by telegram.35 The NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] resolution indicated that the normal police or militsiia was under the general supervision of the NKVD but was attached to the local Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. The militsiia "was at the disposal of the local Chekas (special organ of police repression) in so far as it was essential to the discharge of their responsibilities."36

The structure of the militsiia was also determined shortly after the revolution. At a conference in mid-1918, at which Lenin was a keynote speaker, a resolution was adopted establishing the militsiia on all territories of the RSFSR including cities and rural areas.37 The militsiia, initially under the control of the
local Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, was placed under the overall direction of the NKVD of the RSFSR in 1918. That same year legislation created the уголовный розыск (criminal investigative branch of the милиция) and the river police (речная милиция) to ensure order and the safe transport of goods. By 1920 five specialized types of милиция existed: urban and district, river, criminal investigative as well as the industrial and railway. These bodies were funded both by the NKVD and local budgets. Another specialized body, the departmental guard (ведомственная милиция) was founded in 1924 and was supported by the contracts from the organizations it protected. In 1925 the NKVD consolidated the diverse responsibilities assigned to the милиция.

Organs of the милиция were subordinate to two bodies—the corresponding Soviet Executive Committee and the superior милиция administration. Control and direction was, however, in the hands of the internal affairs organs rather than in local government.

When Stalin assumed power two distinct organizations performed the police function. However, during his early years in office significant changes were made in the structure of law enforcement that would greatly augment the authority of the милиция while simultaneously reducing the external controls over their operations. In the late 1920s, the ordinary and political police functions were divided: ordinary criminal offenses, as previously discussed, were under the jurisdiction of the NKVD
while political crime was the responsibility of the OGPU (Unified State Political Administration).

"By 1931 the Militiia in the USSR were organized in Chief Administrations under the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics, with local militia organs, were still in dual subordination." In 1932, the NKVD was placed under the OGPU, consolidating the two police functions for the first time. Authority over the militsija was then placed in the OGPU's Chief Administration of the Worker and Peasant Militia. Further change ensued in 1934 as the OGPU was absorbed into an expanded NKVD where all police functions were concentrated. A planned split in 1941 of the NKVD into political and crime control functions did not occur because of the outbreak of war but finally did occur in 1943. This division lasted for a decade after which the bodies were reunited briefly following Stalin's death.

The political turmoil following Stalin's death and the execution of Beria resulted in further shake-ups in the police apparatus. The nature of the security police was decided early in the post-Stalin period but the regular police has had many transformations. In 1954, the political police or KGB (Committee for State Security) was established with jurisdiction over the security police and border guards. Until 1960, the militsija was under the jurisdiction of a union-republic MVD. "In that year the union-republic ministry was dissolved and replaced by republic ministries of internal affairs." Khrushchev's commitment to anti-Stalinism made him restrain both police organs, but at the
end of his rule he helped upgrade the status of the *militsiia*. In 1962 the dreaded name of Ministry of Internal Affairs, associated with the excesses of Stalin, was eliminated and, at all levels, the ministries renamed as Ministries for Defense of Public Order.

Khrushchev's structural changes were undone by Brezhnev by the late 1960s. The *militsiia* was recentralized in the MVD and the onerous name of the Stalin police authority was reinstated. Local control was reduced. But Khrushchev's supreme contribution to de-Stalinization remained, control of the *militsiia* apparatus remained under the Party, rather than under one powerful individual.

In the post-Stalin period the *militsiia* is subordinate to both the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and local units of government. This dual subordination of the *militsiia* is intended to provide greater checks on law enforcement, thereby avoiding some of the excesses that characterized both the ordinary and the political police during the Stalinist years. In practice, the *militsiia* is controlled by the MVD but local government commissions do keep a watchful eye on law enforcement personnel. The local Party organization is supposed to provide a check on the activities of the MVD, but, as numerous recent newspaper accounts reveal, the Party has been a very unwilling and inefficient watchdog.

The *militsiia* is not a monolithic organization. Rather, it is divided into city, regional, and oblast administrations that report to the Party organizations at the appropriate level. The
military is organizationally removed from the KGB or secret police; only its authorizing legislation requires that the ordinary police cooperate with the KGB.

Each police administrative unit is divided into numerous separate divisions which have distinct responsibilities and activities. In a typical city, each unit of 150-200 personnel may have as many as 20 different sub-units. The urban sub-units of the military are considered filials and are under the direction of a senior military officer. The senior military administrator has at a minimum two assistants. They are the deputy chief for operations and the deputy chief for political affairs who is responsible for relations with the Party apparatus and the KGB. Subordinate to the deputy chief for operations are numerous police divisions responsible for crime and social control within the community. The personnel employed by these branches work solely for the division to which they are assigned; there is no rotation of assignments. Individuals, if they move, move vertically rather than horizontally.

The principal organizational division of local (raion) police units are: criminal investigation (ugolovnyi rozysk), the division for the protection of socialist property (OBKhSS) and the division for maintaining community order which employs the skills of the ordinary militiaman. It is the latter division which mans the local military precincts, staffs the patrol division and manages the children's room responsible for preventing and controlling juvenile delinquency. The passport division, while
located in the local militsiia stations, is not completely subordinate to the militsiia organization because it maintains close ties with the KGB. The traffic division or GAI (state highway inspectorate), affiliated with the local police organization, enjoys a certain autonomy.

Administrative and political divisions complement these operational units at the city level. These units oversee personnel matters and internal affairs, political education of the militsiia force and propaganda among the citizenry. (see Table 1) At the oblast, and republic levels, militsiia administrative units have additional responsibilities. Militsiia units at the higher levels handle more serious offenses, investigate Party members and the conduct of militia personnel and have more contact with the procuracy and the KGB. Crime statistics are registered at the first special division of the republic militsiia.\(^5\)

**Police Personnel**

Since Gorbachev assumed power, 155,000 individuals have been added to the ranks of the MVD and over 10,000 have been dismissed, many of them going to trial. Unlike in the past, individuals are not recruited straight out of the army: instead, replacements are found in work collectives. There, individuals with proven work records and positive moral attributes are directed to the militsiia. Following the recent exposes in the press on the corruption and shortcomings of the militsiia, young men are called on to improve the caliber of law enforcement personnel. Yet, even with this new recruitment approach, MVD officials are not
confident that they can reverse the nature of the Soviet militiamen who all too often are those who can do nothing else in society. During most of the seventy years since the revolution, the militsiia has consistently been drawn from the lower levels of Soviet society, a policy consistent with the Tsarist period. The present policy thus marks a sharp break not only with Soviet practice but also with the Tsarist legacy.

Size

The post-Stalinist militsiia is a large body that has been reduced slightly since Brezhnev's death as Gorbachev attempts to invigorate the regular police. Further cuts are planned consistent with the general reduction of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus. The reduced manpower provides a challenge to the militsiia facing growing problems of social order, drug addiction, alcohol abuse, and juvenile delinquency.54

Glasnost' has revealed much about the nature of the militsiia, even its size, long a taboo topic. The Moscow militsiia has approximately 56,000 personnel to police the city of eight million.55 This is considerably larger than the figure of approximately 32,000 individuals who police New York City, a metropolis of comparable size. Moscow must require more militsiia per capita than other Soviet communities because of its large transient population, the number of embassies and official buildings, as well as the greater degree of order that must be maintained in the capital. If Moscow has 7 militsiia personnel per 1,000 citizens, extrapolated on a nationwide basis the USSR would
have a maximum of 1,925,000 (using a national population figure of 275 million) in the MVD assigned to policing. This figure is probably somewhat higher than the actual national figure, but suggests a force of significant proportions.

The number of full-time employees is not the prime determinant of the militsiia's capabilities. The USSR lacks the private police that have become so prevalent in western societies; however, large numbers of individuals supplement the militsiia. The extensive guard services (approximately 1.3 million individuals), the large number of informants, as well as the 13 million auxiliary police (Druzhinniki) permit extensive law enforcement. Apart from the visible militsiia, a secret, unacknowledged spetsmilitsiia (special police) performs the law enforcement function in closed cities, regions and research facilities whose legal cases are handled by the special courts. These voluntary and official organizations complement the strong ingrained social controls within the community.

**Recruitment, Training and Pay**

Very different recruitment patterns exist for the militsiia than for the druzhinniki. Although druzhinniki are more frequently male, a significant number of women are drawn into the auxiliary police force. This is not true of ordinary militia work where female participation is limited to only a few areas: work with juveniles, traffic control, investigations and office paper work.

The educational differences and social background of the line
personnel and trained officers are quite different. Many of the officers in the militsija are assigned positions upon completion of law school through the system of raspredelenie (job assignment) which places full-time graduates. Militiamen have social and educational backgrounds similar to factory workers. Important in the selection process are their kharakteristika (their personnel ratings for performance and personal reliability), provided either by their army unit or former work collective. In non-Slavic areas, an effort is often made to ensure that the majority of militsija personnel are Russian, but recruitment is difficult as militsija prestige is low and many parents do not want their children to join.

Recruitment into the militia is often followed by a thorough training program. A large network of police educational institutions exists throughout the USSR. They range from militia schools, through militia institutes that grant the equivalent of a college degree, on up to the Academy of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) in Moscow. Depending on the region in which the individual lives, the recruit is sent to a specialized militia training school or to an MVD school. The training consists of fundamental legal education, investigative and criminalistics techniques, and athletic training in addition to Party subjects. Preparation of police officers involves much practical training. Significant differences exist between the theoretical work of the training institutions and the reality of militia work. As one former MVD instructor ironically commented, "We teach them one
thing, at work they do another."

The frank discussions in the aftermath of the Sumgait, Azerbaijani disturbances reveal local Moslem militia personnel totally insensitive to the needs of the Armenian population before the disturbances. When the Azerbaijani rampage began against the Armenians, the militia personnel permitted the abuse and slaughter of Armenians. This flagrant neglect of duty was not tolerated, and leading law enforcement personnel were dismissed.

Existing educational programs differentiate the contemporary police from their pre-Stalinist predecessors. In the 1940s, there were milfsiia division heads who could not read, their illiteracy so complete that they would hold written documents upside down. At present, 90 percent of ordinary and lower level supervisory personnel nationwide have a secondary education, while 84% of officers have higher or specialized secondary educations. With higher general educational levels and more thorough training, the milfsiia has become more competent. Tremendous regional variations still exist, however, with superior performance levels in the Baltics and more illegalities and incompetence present in the Asian republics.

Often milfsiia recruits are from rural areas, a background similar to that of many police personnel throughout the world. Employment in the milfsiia is particularly desirable for rural males because it provides an internal passport, and a means of escaping years of hardship on a collective farm. The combined enticements of urban life and a passport are often enough to
attract young men who would not otherwise work for the low salaries paid ordinary militia personnel.\textsuperscript{60}

At present, the starting police man (militsioner) earns 165 rubles a month (approx. $250); slightly below the approximately 175 rubles a month that an industrial worker could earn. Every two years his salary is augmented by five rubles and at 15 years service he earns 215 rubles monthly.\textsuperscript{61} In 1987, a district inspector (uchastkovyi inspektor) who is at the lower end of the middle officer corps earned approximately 300 rubles ($480) monthly. The leading MVD official in a major city would earn between 350 and 400 rubles monthly.\textsuperscript{62}

The official compensation available to militia personnel is only part of the picture. There is significant legal and illicit compensation as well. The higher ranks of the militsiia have access to special stores that stock desirable and hard to obtain food and consumer goods; ordinary police personnel have occasional access to such facilities. But, more valuable than these state supplied privileges are the favors offered by private citizens trying to ingratiate themselves with militia personnel.

\textbf{Promotion}

The militsiia is a hierarchical organization with military ranks. These ranks are divided into line personnel (ordinary militiamen and internal service), lowest officer ranks (sergeants and the starshina of the police), middle officers (lieutenant and captain), senior officers (major through colonel) and the highest
ranks, major general and above. Promotion in militia and investigatory work is not based on examination; educational training, Party reliability and job performance determine advancement. The rules for promotion are governed by a series of unpublished regulations with a minimum period required at each rank before promotion. Without membership in the Party, advancement is curtailed; while many line personnel are not Party members, half of all officers belong to the Party.

Employment and promotion at the lowest ranks are determined by the local supervisory personnel. Starting with the middle officer—the position of lieutenant—rank is decided at the level of the USSR MVD. At the higher levels, selection falls under the nomenklatura system, the system of Party appointments.

Despite the low prestige, morale and difficult work conditions, personnel retention is not a problem because transfer out of law enforcement is difficult. Only recently have increasing numbers been expelled from the militsiia and investigatory organs for corruption and misconduct. Yet Soviet militiamen, like their western counterparts, can take early retirement. A militiawoman may retire at 45 while a male militsioner can do the same at 50. Higher retirement ages are set for officers. The differential retirement ages appear to acknowledge the increasingly sedentary nature of militia work at higher bureaucratic levels.

The fact that militsiia service is a lifetime commitment has important implications for the nature of Soviet law enforcement. It means that individuals within the militsiia develop a common
morale and mindset. As individuals work together for years, they develop their own styles of operation, and identify with their work and subculture. The process of socialization into the militsiia is a gradual one, as individuals make the transition from being outsiders to the system, to those who are necessarily distanced from the population by their responsibility to enforce the law. Those not seeking large illicit incomes find the adjustment to the pervasive corruption difficult to accept.

Soviet authorities both address and enforce the isolation experienced by their police personnel. Police in many societies socialize amongst themselves voluntarily. In the United States, police have organized police athletic leagues as well as numerous other social service organizations. In the USSR, these social activities are provided and encouraged by the state; there are militia sports teams, choirs, dance groups and orchestras. But as the Soviet workplace is the focal point of individual's lives, militia personnel also receive their vacations through their work and may be fortunate enough to receive an apartment in a housing complex constructed for MVD personnel. While Soviet militia personnel may distrust their colleagues, they spend not only their working hours but much of their recreation time with other policing professionals.

**Police Image and Perception**

The Soviet mass media has traditionally glorified the militsiia, yet the propaganda has had little effect. Both Soviet
and western survey research have consistently shown that the militsija is held in low esteem; a result, Soviet researchers suggest, of the personal experience of individual citizens as well as a legacy of the Stalinist past.

Citizen dissatisfaction is not confined to the problem of corruption. Survey research within and outside the USSR reveals that citizens find the militsija slow to respond, curt, slovenly and inefficient. The disregard for the militsija does not extend to all Soviet institutions, rather, the militsija is seen as particularly incompetent.

Glasnost' has changed the approach of the mass media. Television, radio, and the press, the primary vehicles for molding public opinion, now regularly reveal the corruption, inefficiency and legal violations of militsija personnel. Soviet citizens now have authoritative sources that substantiate their disregard for the militia with hard evidence. The public response to the outpouring of articles on the abuses and structural problems of the justice system has been enormous. Militsija reform is now a topic of prime concern to Soviet citizens.

The media campaign on the militsija is as critical to Gorbachev's democratization effort as the law enforcement apparatus is central to the maintenance of order. But a militia that is known and seen as abusing its position and the rights of its fellow citizens is a major obstruction to the new rule of law envisaged by Gorbachev. If law enforcement is to acquire a positive image, it can no longer be perceived as the authoritarian
force of the Stalin years, nor yet as the corrupt institution of
the Brezhnev period. Instead, the militsiia needs a new image
that is based on a different reality. A change in the nature and
operations of the militsiia must occur in order for public
perception to change.

FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS OF THE MILITSIIA

The ubiquitous nature of law enforcement in Soviet society
permits the militsiia to operate in many more areas than is the
case in most western industrialized societies. The close
interaction of the militsiia with the community, government and
Party means that there is a blending of social control. This
complex meshing of the law enforcement apparatus in Soviet society
sometimes makes it difficult to discern where militsiia control
begins and ends.

The militsiia has responsibility in many different spheres.
It is expected to maintain order in the community, control
traffic, supervise the passport and registration system, control
deviance and crime and assist in the maintenance of political
control. All these functional areas do not command equal
attention from the militsiia, but distinct responsibilities are
entrusted to different branches to ensure that one area is not
ignored in favor of another.

The concentration of law enforcement activity in the
hierarchical centralized MVD, procuracy, and KGB permits increased
control. The division of the policing and investigatory functions among so many different organizations is often counterproductive though: significant rivalries exist that sometimes hamper operations. However, the fundamental commitment to the maintenance of "socialist order" normally results in cooperation rather than destructive competition. The KGB and the procuracy are held in esteem and fear while the militsiia is clearly less respected.

Citizens, however, have the most contact with the militsiia because it is visible and highly localized. Although the militsiia exists in every community, there is great variation in its operations. The militsioner on the beat does not rigidly enforce the law, as he is accorded considerable discretion. This discretion permits adjustment to the particular needs of a community, but on the other hand it facilitates differential treatment of citizens. Individuals of higher social status and a dominant nationality are often treated better than those of lower social status or minority groups.

The following sections focus on the major functional areas of militsiia activity and the impact they have on the Soviet population and daily life.

Militsiia and the Maintenance of Social Order

Maintenance of social order in the community and governmental organizations is interpreted broadly in the USSR. It is not restricted merely to preservation of the peace and prevention of
crime. Rather, social order, as envisioned by the Soviet authorities, requires the regulation of daily life and citizen adherence to state and Party objectives. The state of family relations, the residence of individuals, and order in the streets are all the concern of governmental authorities. Consequently, the social order branch of the Soviet militsiia has jurisdiction over all these aspects of an individual's existence. To realize this broad mandate, the militia and guard units that police the community and governmental organizations are granted extensive powers.

The public order branch of the militia is present in every community, urban or rural, through its patrols and militia posts. Highly visible, the militiaman on patrol and the uchastkovyi inspektor enforce law and order; it is to them Soviet citizens must turn in times of trouble. Relying on both administrative and criminal law and closely supervised by local Party organizations and governmental units, local militia personnel have extensive rights. They can apply coercive measures to prevent or stop violations of the law, detain citizens, and examine the identification papers of all possible violators of public order.

The patrol and post services operate at the most immediate level in the community. Cities are divided into a large number of uchastki (a small geographical unit of several blocks) that are patrolled by individuals assigned to a police post. All the major responsibilities assigned the militia are executed in each small area policed by the local inspector. Protection of property and
of social order, problem juveniles, and the settlement of family disputes, as well as legal education of community members are all his responsibility.

The daily activities of the militsioner under the inspector's jurisdiction are often reminiscent of their counterparts in other industrialized nations. On foot, in radio patrol cars, and on motorcycles they patrol their beat at all hours of the day and night. Maintaining close contact with their local precinct, militsiya men can easily be located and directed wherever their services are needed.

Supervision of the druzhini is a major responsibility of each local militia post. Presently over 13 million individuals nationally work as militia auxiliaries and are divided into 282,000 separate units. Together with the militsiya they frequent places such as movie houses, bus stations and stores. The druzhini also help man the 50,000 social order points that exist nationwide in residential communities.73

Members of the public order division in Stalin's time would preserve order at any cost, often severely abusing the rights and bodies of citizens in the process. While militsiya brutality still exists, the contemporary militiaman often provides service to the community. The Soviet police assist as well as coerce.

The militsiya also serves the state by maintaining security while enforcing regulations. While the preservation of political order is the function of the KGB, militia members in the licensing division and employees of guard units assure the security of
private homes and restricted governmental organizations. Militsiia personnel maintain surveillance over the permits and passes that grant access to closed state facilities and ensure the safe transport of confidential government shipments. Jurisdiction in entirely closed cities and top secret installations is, however, outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary militia, entrusted instead to the secret spetsmilitsiia (special militia).

The Soviet militsiia operates with little autonomy. Militia and guard units, in enforcing the extensive administrative and criminal laws at their disposal, are in constant contact with the Party, Komosomol and government organizations that direct their activities. They receive input from the community in the form of citizen patrols (druzhiny), social order points and councils at the workplace. Citizen participation is, however, often coerced as the poor name of the militia and the population's desire to maintain a private existence away from state control makes many unwilling to assist police operations.

The responsibilities of the public order division are not confined solely to the community and to governmental organizations. As the following sections indicate, control extends to the roads and highways and into the private lives of both the ordinary citizen and the deviant.

Militsiia and Traffic Control

The GAI (State Automotive Inspection) is an integral part of the social order division of the militsiia. Its jurisdiction is
broad as it combines the responsibilities assigned to the ordinary police, highway patrolmen, and the department of transportation of American communities. As a specialized branch of the militsiia, it oversees the education of the population on the need for safety as well as regulating and planning transport. Moreover, it assumes a major enforcement role in Soviet society, dispensing millions of administrative fines and participating in large numbers of investigations of traffic offenses.

The USSR is a country with few experienced, but many intoxicated drivers travelling on poorly maintained roads. There are relatively few privately owned cars—most vehicles belong either to the military or to government-run enterprises. Most of the time of GAI personnel is, therefore, spent monitoring drivers in the state's employ and regulating government property. This poses particular problems. Many of the cars and drivers are serving Party members who have more clout than the lowly GAI officer. Consequently, they are often powerless to enforce regulations. The same problem also exists for GAI patrolmen when members of the nomenklatura are driving their own vehicles.

Much of the commercial traffic regulated by GAI serves the state military and economic objectives. The premium placed in the USSR on state defenses and plan fulfillment means that GAI personnel are under pressure to ensure that trucks make required deliveries. Consequently, GAI personnel are often forced to certify trucks as safe when they are not fit to travel, and allow unfit drivers to remain on the roads.
Demoralization of GAI forces results. This, combined with the possibility for large bribes, has made the personnel of the transport branch of the militiia among the most corrupt in Soviet policing. The former GAI chief, in power for fifteen years, was removed by Andropov, but elimination of corruption in the auto inspection administration will require more than the reshuffling of personnel as the very structure of Soviet life and the economy creates the existing problems.

The extensive powers granted other branches of the militia designated to enforce social order help ensure a higher degree of community order than is found in most western industrialized societies. But the special problems confronting GAI personnel have created a situation that is an embarrassment to Soviet authorities. Glasnost has heightened awareness of the GAI's problems suggesting a major revamping and house cleaning of its operations.

The Militsiia and the Passport System

For the past five decades the passport and registration systems have served as fundamental means of social, political, and economic control in the USSR. Administration of the passport and registration systems are among the most important responsibilities assigned to the militsiia.74

The kingpin in this system of control is the internal passport issued to all urban Soviet citizens, members of state farms and work settlements over the age of sixteen. It indicates the name, age, address, and nationality, as well as the work
history, marital status and the place of residence of its holder. Individuals may legally reside only at the address indicated on their passport where they are registered with the militsiia (their propiska). The internal passport must be carried at all times to permit ready identification of the citizenry. Foreigners travelling within the USSR who lack an internal passport must register with the militsiia upon arrival and at every stop on their itinerary.

The passport system authorizes the militsiia to know more about the private lives and movements of individual citizens than is considered desirable in most western industrialized societies. The passport branch of the militsiia is informed of an individual's birth and maintains knowledge of his existence to the time of his death. Furthermore, the passport branch of the militia can limit individuals' choices by failing to grant a residence permit for a desired move, by failing to authorize couples residence permits in the same community and by penalizing migrant laborers (shabashniki) who contract with collective farms.

The passport system helps the authorities regulate the distribution of the labor force and control the daily existence of most citizens. The careful monitoring and record keeping of the passport division helps rapidly locate Soviet citizens and facilitates economic planning. Statistical data supplied by the passport division is used to plan trade, consumer industries and the construction of educational, cultural and medical facilities. Furthermore, the information it collects is
invaluable in the monitoring of the population. Its files are used by the military, the KGB and the operational branches of the militia.

The political, social and economic importance of the passport division's activities means that enforcement of this fundamental control mechanism of the Soviet state is not entrusted to the ordinary militia employee. Instead, politically reliable individuals are specially selected at militia schools for service in the passport branch. Those chosen for service represent the elite of the militia corps, their profile resembles that of rank and file KGB employees.

Despite the caliber of personnel selected for service in the passport division, responsibility for enforcement of the passport laws is shared with other government agencies. The personnel permanently assigned to the passport division often remain aloof from the rest of the militia, working instead with the procuracy, armed forces, Party organs, units of local government and the KGB to ensure observance of the passport and registration regulations. This cooperation is important as passport personnel can more easily solicit information than their counterparts in the security organs.

While many western societies have passport and registration systems, the Soviet system goes farther in determining an individual's mobility, place of residence and identifying his criminal record. The power granted to the militsiia to oversee these diverse responsibilities affecting daily life provides the
regular police extensive contact with the citizenry and far-reaching influence over the population's existence.

The Militsiia and the Deviant

The militsiia is responsible for maintaining order in the streets, preventing crime and controlling and regulating the behavior of deviants. At times they function as social workers with sticks, using their punitive authority to cajole and force the deviant to abide by and conform to the norms of society. The prophylactic functions of the militsiia extend to problem youth, alcoholics, parasites, drug addicts, prostitutes and released offenders. In some militia divisions these responsibilities are assigned to special prophylactic units while in others these functions are divided among personnel with more general assignments.

The militsiia performs an educational as well as a coercive role with problem youths. Militia efforts with juveniles are centered in the children's room (Detskaia komnata) which is attached to the local militia post.\textsuperscript{78} For the population at large, one militsiia personnel is assigned to every 20,000 youth.\textsuperscript{79} The head of the children's room, while maintaining a forceful presence among the youth in her district, also runs an outreach program involving community members in delinquency prevention. The children's room maintains strong links with the bureau of labor placement, run by local units of city government, that try to find employment for their difficult charges.
The most difficult youth in the community are registered in militia files and are closely monitored by the staff of the children's room. Potential delinquents and their families are visited by militia staff. Juveniles returning from youth labor camps are subject to even closer scrutiny.

The militsija also keeps track of all identified alcoholics in their community, often in a centralized file, in addition to monitoring the locations where drunks congregate. Visible drunks are sometimes delivered to the local sobering-up station administered by the militsija. Individuals can be confined there until sober or may be subject to a month's confinement as an administrative penalty. In Moscow for the first 9 months of 1987, 240,000 individuals were detained on public drunkenness charges by the militsija. Drunks are all too frequently subject to militia abuse.

Parasites and vagrants require much attention from militsija authorities as many of those who do not or refuse to work are former or potential offenders. The militsija maintains detailed files of those deliberately unemployed. Approximately 500,000 parasites and beggars were on police lists nationwide in the mid-1980's. Of these, approximately 90,000 were criminally charged. The militsija reports great difficulty in dealing with these groups, for the parasites are evasive and "administrators of enterprises and institutions are unwilling to give employment to loafers exposed by us and sent to their collectives."

The increasing problem of drug addiction, particularly since
the war in Afghanistan, has provided the militiia with another enforcement problem. Soviet sources suggest that lack of previous experience limits militia effectiveness in combatting drug use and trafficking and newspapers report militiia travails in rooting out drug production and stopping its transport. The lucrative drug trade has contributed to militia corruption and letters to the editor complain of militia reluctance to move against addicts.

The militiia fights just as unsuccessfully against prostitution. Local precincts maintain files on the prostitutes within their community. Although prostitution is not a criminal offense, the women are subject to an administrative fine of 100 rubles for practicing their trade. The militia closely monitors the activities of prostitutes whether they operate in streets, out of apartments or serve a higher class clientele in hotels. Those that serve foreigners are under the jurisdiction of the KGB. Despite this intense surveillance, prostitution survives because women find it profitable to pay both administrative fines and bribes to the militiia. More intense policing effort is focused on brothels, and these are sometimes broken up, but often they continue to operate either under the patronage of local Party officials or as a result of significant payments to the militiia.

In the USSR the regulation of the so-called "victimless crimes" such as prostitution and drug addiction has the same corrupting effect on the militia as in western societies. The militiia fails to "reform" these deviants but the enforcement of these laws exacerbates the problems of militia corruption.
The militsiia supervises the conduct of individuals sentenced by the court to community based sanctions. Individuals entrusted to the collective, those performing corrective labor at their enterprise, and others working at their regular jobs while on reduced wages all fall under militia jurisdiction. Furthermore, the local militia has responsibility for released offenders who are placed under nadzor (surveillance) after release from prison or labor camp. Militia personnel, especially when an offender has committed another crime, are faulted for inadequate supervision. Strict controls are to be maintained over released offenders and triple violations of stated infractions result in return to the labor camp system.

The Militsiia and the Control of Crime

The crime control function is one of the most central of militsiia responsibilities. Although all branches of the militsiia contribute to the effort to prevent and detect crime, primary responsibility is assigned to the criminal investigative branch (UR—ugolovnyi rozysk) and the branch that investigates thefts of socialist property (OBKhSS). A complex system of informants, safe houses, and plants in the investigation cell (Nasetka) help disclose crime. In a society where citizens are not granted much autonomy, individuals can not easily refuse to cooperate with the militsiia. Consequently, the militsiia, perpetuating a prerevolutionary tradition, can rely more on informers than in western democratic societies.
The criminal investigative division deals with the full range of criminal offenses. Its responsibilities range from trapping pickpockets to breaking up organized gangs of criminal offenders. The criminal investigative division responds to reports of crimes, to information provided by informants, and conducts raids of parks and other public places that are known to be frequented by criminals. Assisting the militia in their apprehension of criminals is the fact that there are no curbs on their ability to stop, question or search citizens.88

The OBKhSS deals with a narrower range of crimes--theft from state enterprises, bribery and other forms of corruption. It conducts inventories of warehouses, reviews files, stops trucks on the highways and even sets up individuals suspected of accepting bribes.

The criminal investigative function is also shared with the KGB. Its long-standing responsibility for investigating political offenses has been supplemented since Khrushchev's time by authority in cases of large scale economic crime and those involving foreigners. Although KGB investigations are conducted quite separately from those handled by the MVD, members of the militsiia are sometimes recruited by the KGB to assist in the searches and interrogations of suspected criminals.

Members of the UR and OBKhSS militsiia divisions, like their counterparts in other branches of the militia, carry arms at all times. While those in the OBKhSS are rarely vulnerable, as their contingent of criminals does not typically resort to violence,
members of the criminal investigative division are threatened and several dozen are killed annually in the USSR. 89

Party scrutiny of law enforcement means that careful attention is paid to the criteria of militia performance. As militia units have been evaluated by the proportion of reported crimes cleared by arrest, Soviet militia personnel, like many of their western counterparts, fail to record an offense when the probability of locating the perpetrator is low. For example, the chance for a citizen to get a case of pickpocketing registered as a crime has been less than 50%, and until Gorbachev the solution rate for all categories of criminal conduct was allegedly 95%. 90

The calls under glasnost' for more realistic measures of militia performance have had a noticeable impact on the recording and disclosure rates of criminal conduct. Disclosure rates for homicide, bribery and personal theft have declined to 90% since the change in Party policy under Gorbachev, while those for house theft are at an even lower 70-75%. 91

The Party emphasis on clearing crimes has had a deleterious effect on the treatment of witnesses and suspects. Abuse of individuals rights and even torture have been used to extract confessions. 92 Individuals have also been forced to accept responsibility for crimes they did not commit in order to improve the militsiia clearance by arrest rate. The inability of Soviet defense attorneys to participate in a case during the preliminary investigation exacerbates this problem.

During much of the Soviet period, the majority of criminal
investigations were conducted by the procuracy, but the militsija has increased its share since Brezhnev's time. At present, the militsija handles 75% of all criminal investigations and a typical investigator handles 55 to 65 cases annually to completion. The caseload is heavy and militsija investigators spend much of their time on the extensive required paper work. Investigators use a great variety of techniques including criminalistics, the frequently employed psychological approach of ochnaia stayka (one on one confrontation of the defendant and accuser) as well as traditional sleuth work.

Many investigators coming out of correspondence courses are poorly prepared and unable to conduct investigations properly. Procurators review the cases prepared by the militsija investigators helping to catch some of the more flagrant violations of the law. Yet flawed cases are all too often sent to the courts and are sometimes sent back to the militsija for reinvestigation.

Soviet critics of the justice system believe that the current investigative process is deeply flawed, as the same militsija unit that runs undercover work is also responsible for the investigations. They feel that until these functions are separated administratively, individual rights will be abused as the presumption of innocence does not operate. The isolation of the militsija investigative function is one of the objectives of the planned criminal justice reforms.

The extensive powers granted to the militsija to investigate crime, and the limited rights provided the defendant, have led to
extensive corruption, particularly among personnel of the UR and OBKhSS. Gorbachev has taken a strong stand against this corruption but it is unclear, despite well publicized prosecutions of militsiia personnel, whether he will be able to eliminate the endemic bribery and pay-offs.

THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITSIIA

The extensive political responsibilities of the militsiia in controlling religious believers, nationalist groups and human rights activities negate the popular image of the ordinary police as a group of flatfoots who direct traffic and clear drunks off the street. In the post-Stalin period the militsiia has played an important role in demonstrating the limits of permissible political conduct. The militsiia has the daily drudgery of manning embassies and consulates to restrict the access of Soviet citizens to foreign governments. The proximity of the militsiia to the population has made it possible for them to participate in political surveillance and control when supplemental personnel are needed. They are thus involved in sniffing out political disaffection at election polling stations and maintaining order at staged mass demonstrations. They are not, however, trusted to deal directly with political discontent or misconduct; instead they must report all politically suspicious cases to the KGB.
Illustrative of cooperation with the KGB are the activities of the militsiia personnel assigned to guard foreign embassies. These guards dressed in regular police uniforms are assigned to control the entry of all personnel into the offices and residential complexes of foreign governments. They are organized into divisions that are assigned solely to one particular foreign embassy. As all Soviet citizens are not granted access to foreign embassies, the militsiia performs an important political function by deterring them from entering these foreign missions using whatever means necessary. Diplomats occasionally have to deal directly with the militsiia to protest the beating up of Soviet citizens who have unsuccessfully attempted to enter their country's embassy. The militsiia is not alone in maintaining this political control; troublemakers are often turned over to the KGB.

A samizdat document of a religious believer vividly brings to life the political role and attitudes of this branch of the militsiia.

I came to the Canadian embassy. When I approached... the militsioner who was standing there ran to me and started shouting all kinds of curses. ...Then with all his strength he began to hit me around the head. An open wound developed. I cried "Why do you beat me?" He screamed back, "I will kill you, you vile creature..." Then another shouted "Beat him so he loses consciousness."

When the author of this document returned to his home town the links between the embassy based militsiia and the KGB were all too clear. He was summoned to his local KGB and questioned.
The Militsiia and Dissenters

The KGB has primary responsibility for control of political and religious dissenters, but the last fifteen years worth of samizdat materials are filled with references to militsiia control of different dissenting religious and ethnic groups. Using administrative law, and to a lesser degree criminal law, as well as psychiatric hospitals, the militsiia clearly communicated to political and religious activists the possible consequences of their activities. The militsiia helped conduct searches of dissidents' apartments, took human rights activists into confinement during American presidential visits, and used force to break up unauthorized religious services. While members of the KGB might tail individuals or call them in for interrogation, it was members of the militsiia who demonstrated the limits of dissent.

Administrative law provides ample flexibility in controlling nonconformists: individuals can be incarcerated for 15 days by the militsiia on charges of petty hooliganism, priests can be fined for conducting unauthorized services. However, the methods used by the militsiia to combat "undesireable" religious conduct are much more varied.

Soviet law permits the performance of religious services and rites but prohibits services outside of established places of worship or the teaching of religion. Religious customs and traditions that transcend these prohibitions often incur militsiia action. For example, militsiia workers have turned away worshippers...
headed to pilgrimage sites; those who managed to reach their destination encountered militia personnel who beat up some of the pilgrims. Similar treatment is also used against religious processions in Lithuania and Slavic republics. In the 1980s quarantines were announced in communities on the day of a planned Catholic procession; the militia blocked the road and the organizers were taken into detention and subsequently tried. 102

Religious ceremonies such as funerals and weddings may evoke even more dramatic reactions from the militia. For example, militia personnel have asked wedding parties to disperse by means of a bulldozer, and in one Ukrainian community the village was cordoned off to prevent the guests' attendance. 103

More violent means are used to disrupt outdoor religious services. A united meeting of Young Baptists was broken up by tractors that started to clear the forest during the prayers. Militia personnel and druzhinniki provoked a fight and despite the absence of believers' resistance, some were hauled off to the militia station in police cars while others were dragged by the hair, beaten with sticks and threatened with firearms. 104 This is not an isolated incident, as the samizdat literature is filled with cases of militia harassment of Baptist and Pentecostal worshipers, 105 occasionally even leading to their deaths, 106 as well as those of Georgian believers in Azerbaijan. 107 Militia personnel also return escaping Baptist children to the childrens' homes where they have been placed after their parents have been deprived of their parental rights. 108
The militsiia has helped confine a religious figure to a psychiatric hospital, and members of the militsiia take obstinate individuals, those seeking justice at their workplace and nonconformists for unnecessary diagnosis and "treatment". Secret instructions governing the confinement of individuals to psychiatric hospitals were approved in 1972 by the procuracy and MVD, and only under Gorbachev have new regulations been issued that attempt to limit psychiatric abuse, confining only those with mental problems to psychiatric care.

The militsiia helps control religious and political dissenters, but the resources available to the KGB are clearly superior. It has access to better equipment, such as computers, and is able to recruit more competent personnel for its staff. The militsiia is clearly at a disadvantage in performing its political functions, yet it uses a variety of techniques in controlling behavior, ranging from confrontation to personal and electronic surveillance. Soviet militsiia personnel can intimidate political activists by questioning them concerning their passports and registration; they can threaten unemployed individuals with the force of the parasite laws; and they can harass verbally, or by means of guard dogs, Jews who apply to emigrate from the USSR. Such actions are not initiated by the militsiia itself but are performed at the behest of the secret police.

The militsiia also uses another legal tool at its disposal to maintain regular surveillance. While the KGB often uses electronic equipment to aid its efforts, such resources are rarely available
to members of the ordinary police especially in secondary cities and remote communities. Instead the militsiia has the tool of administrative surveillance or nadzor. Individuals released from confinement after serving sentences for political offenses or other categories of criminal behavior can be placed under militsiia surveillance, requiring them to report regularly to the ordinary police, stay at home between fixed hours, and to ask militsiia permission prior to travel outside their community. Multiple violations of the surveillance rules lead to renewed incarceration. Nadzor is used to maintain control over released dissidents, as well as to limit the political activities of such groups as the Crimean Tatars.

One dissident released following eight years of confinement in a labor camp reported as follows on his administrative surveillance in the Russian town of Tarusa, a frequent place of settlement of former political prisoners:

Surveillance is exile of an especially difficult variety, the only difference is that the court sentences you to exile for a definite period while surveillance is determined by the guarding militsioner using his judgment year after year.

Confined to tiny Tarusa, forced to register weekly with the militsiia, and forced to participate in educational conversations with the local militsiia staff he pronounced, "I am now being punished with surveillance for my thoughts."

The isolation of former political prisoners has made administrative surveillance one of the most effective militsiia tools for preventing renewed political activism. It has limited the
organization of dissident and nationalist groups.

Lacking the sophisticated equipment or the quality of personnel available to the KGB, their means of limiting politically unacceptable behavior are those of harassment, physical presence and, on occasion, brute force. The means used by the militsiia to help ensure political conformity differ by region of the country. In more visible regions of the country such as Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, the techniques of the militsiia are generally more subtle. In more remote parts of the country, those expressing non-conforming religious or political views or seeking to advance their group's ethnic interests, may find themselves subject to more abuse.

Militsiia and Planned Demonstrations

The political functions of the militsiia are not performed solely by special personnel such as those assigned to embassies. They are also entrusted to ordinary militsiia divisions which maintain public order at mass gatherings and political demonstrations. Oversight of this responsibility is assigned to special supervisory personnel at militsiia headquarters. The maintenance of public order at these events is too important to be left exclusively to the ordinary police, however; working with Party, KGB, state and social organizations, the militsiia, along with large numbers of druzhinniki (Citizen auxiliary police) plan for months to ensure that there are no political embarrassments at such events.
Despite advance planning, embarrassing incidents do occur and even public riots have been reported. One former police officer recalled the case of a drunken demonstrator at a May Day parade who collapsed with a portrait of Lenin. While the man might have escaped severe punishment under less visible circumstances, the importance attached to public ceremonies meant that the man could not be merely fined by the militsiia for disturbing public order. Following established procedures, the responsible militsiia official reported the case to the KGB and the man was subsequently handed over to the secret police for prosecution on political charges.

**Militsiia and Protests**

The militsiia also handles those who assemble at unscheduled meetings and demonstrations. The general image of the contemporary USSR is one in which political control is so consolidated that spontaneous gatherings or protests rarely occur. The occasional demonstration on Red Square or Pushkin Square in Moscow is treated in the western press as an anomaly, yet the truth of the matter is that in the post-Stalin period unofficial gatherings to protest political, national or cultural questions have become increasingly frequent. Although not a daily occurrence, such protests occur with sufficient frequency that militsiia training must include the handling of large public meetings.

Significant fluctuations in policy have been observed in different periods of the post-Stalinist period, a reflection both of the level of oppositional political activity as well as the
philosophy of the Party leadership. Militsiia treatment of political demonstrators was milder under Khrushchev than under Brezhnev. In the Brezhnev period there was a differentiated approach to unplanned mass actions by the population. The approach taken "depended on the site of the action, on its character, and on the general direction of Soviet domestic and foreign policy at the moment of a given action." Throughout the Brezhnev years there was a consistent reluctance to introduce troops but a general impatience with actions that were not under governmental control.

A sharp change in policy was noted in the initial Gorbachev era as there seemed to be an increasing tolerance of demonstrators. But the feeling by more conservative elements of the Party leadership that this liberalization had gone too far led to a shift in policy following the removal of Yeltsin as Moscow Party Secretary. The extensive militsiia and military presence used to suppress the Nagorno-Karabagh demonstrations provides evidence of this changed stance.

Despite the recent hardening of the militsiia approach, it is evident that the ordinary police in the Gorbachev era have been handling demonstrators with increased sophistication. Yet, as the mistreatment of Jewish demonstrators and protesters against the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan indicates, the militsiia has not entirely abandoned the physical force that was so commonly used in previous decades against those who challenged the political authority of the state.
Throughout the post-Stalinist period the militsiia has assumed a much more active role in the control and suppression of demonstrations than in dealing with labor strikes. While the militsiia is frequently called in to deal with unplanned protests, it is much less frequently used in handling worker unrest. Before the militsiia is called in to deal with a strike, managers of the particular enterprise try to settle the dispute. If this fails, Party and local authorities may be called in. Even though the KGB appears to be notified concerning any conflict, militsiia and KGB personnel are not actively used until negotiations fail. Special troops are only summoned if the militia's attempts to settle the labor conflict fail. 127

The militsiia, in its limited number of cases of involvement in labor unrest, has used a variety of techniques. The militsiia has entered factory premises to calm a crowd, or has taken recalcitrant workers off to the local precinct and applied physical force. 128 If there is prior knowledge of a planned worker protest, volunteer militia may be mobilized by the militsiia to assist in patrols to assure calm around the enterprise. 129 The militsiia's role may appear more active than is actually the case, because KGB agents may be those questioning the protesters at the militia station rather than militsiia personnel. 130

The militsiia role, while minimal in settling labor disputes, has been significant in the handling of over four hundred cases of collective protest between 1956 and 1983, reported in samizdat, the western or Soviet press, or in eyewitness accounts published by
emigres. They reveal significant changes in the number of participants when the focus of the demonstrations has been human rights and nationality questions. (See Tables II and III, p. 50).

The years of extreme political repression left a very passive population. Consequently, in the first post-Stalin decade there were a mere 32, generally small, demonstrations reported, most of which were concerned with nationalist, political and cultural matters. In this period, the militiia, often assisted by troops, dispersed about half of the demonstrations, often using force. Despite this, the number of demonstrations and mass meetings grew dramatically in the following decade; between 1965 and 1974 the number of demonstrations increased fivefold. Proportionately more of these were concerned with human rights questions and many more involved hundreds if not thousands of individuals. In very few of these gatherings or protests did the ordinary police assume an active role. In certain cases, impediments were set up for the demonstrators or personal reprisals taken later against individual leaders.

By the final years of the Brezhnev period, the number of planned protests had increased, but skillful militiia techniques reduced their size. Many more demonstrations involved tens rather than hundreds of demonstrators as many potential participants were prevented from joining. Increased intelligence on planned protests, and enhanced coordination between the KGB and the militiia permitted concerted militia action to deter demonstrators through threats and sanctions. For example, before scheduled Jewish
Table II  **Chronological Distribution of Demonstrations by Number of Participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>1953-64</th>
<th>1965-74</th>
<th>1975-83</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A few people</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tens</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100s</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000s</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000s</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Participants Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table III  **Breakdown of Motives of Demonstrations (1953-83)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Number of Meetings and Demonstrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fascist</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

demonstrations on the anniversary of the shooting at Babi Yar, arriving Muscovites were detained at the Kiev train station and airport and were subject to administrative arrest by the local militsiia. Other participants were put on a train and accompanied back to Moscow by the militsiia. Similar actions were taken in the late 1970's and early 1980's by the militsiia in other parts of the country, in an effort to prevent other Jewish commemorative efforts. Not only were Jews deterred, but calculated militsiia efforts were used to prevent human rights activists from joining demonstrations on December 10th (Human Rights Day). Militsiia personnel went to activists' homes, warning them not to leave their houses on that day, streets were cordoned off to prevent access to the demonstration site, and volunteer militia were mobilized in large numbers to prevent assemblage. With the development of the post-Stalin leadership, the militsiia was learning how to de-fuse rather than confront political conflicts.

During the Brezhnev period the militsiia was not as successful at de-fusing large scale demonstrations in areas where national tensions were high. For example in April, 1965, a nationalist demonstration of 100,000 youths and students occurred in Yerevan. The protest, motivated by nationalistic sentiment, was dispersed with firehoses, and volunteer militia beat up the demonstrators. Possibly the most famous riot of the Brezhnev period occurred in Uzbekistan in the late 1960s after a soccer match. Despite careful advance planning by the militsiia and local Party authorities,
nothing could prevent the large-scale riots after the match, when Russian-Uzbek hostility came to the fore. The disturbances spread beyond the sports arena, and the militsiia, along with the other agents of social control, were not able to contain the conflict. Troops were called in and many lives were lost. Hundreds of individuals were prosecuted and many Party and law enforcement personnel were purged for their failure to forestall the riots.135

Militsiia personnel help control large scale disorders, but their actions may result in strikes or violence. In the early 1960s, in two separate cities, a killing at the local militsiia station resulted in worker protests. In Aleksandrov workers struck at the plant of the dead worker and there, as in similarly motivated protests in Murom, militia buildings were destroyed. Such violence directed at the militsiia was dispersed by special troops and led to arrests and death sentences.136 Such actions were not confined to the Khrushchev years: in Dneprodzerzhinsk in 1972, militsiia enforcement of the anti-alcohol laws against a wedding party resulted in the destruction of a branch building of the militsiia and of a city Party committee building. The militsiia shot at the crowd, killing at least ten and wounding many more.137

Militsiia failure to maintain order, as in the Uzbek and the anti-militia protests, is unusual. In the late 1970s and early 1980s more than two hundred meetings and demonstrations were held concerned with nationalist and human rights questions, yet none remained uncontrolled. Either the presence of the militsiia and other social control agents was sufficient to contain the protest,
or else members of the militsiia were able to disperse those assembled without recourse to extraordinary force. Beatings and skirmishes did, however, occur in some of the more acrimonious demonstrations, and in several cases individuals were arrested and later tried for such offenses as hooliganism. 138

While the forceful techniques of the militsiia were successful in controlling the actual demonstrations, their strong-arm techniques occasionally had resonance beyond local dispersal of protesters, as was the case in the treatment of non-conformist artists in Moscow in the mid-1970s. In September 1975, 24 artists decided to show their art in a vacant lot in southwestern Moscow. The western press and a small coterie of intellectuals were advised of the exhibit. The exhibit lasted only briefly. Bulldozers appeared, on the pretext of preparing the area for landscaping. Members of the militsiia rushed at the artists, beat them up, twisted their arms and stamped on the works of art. The New York Times correspondent lost his front tooth and five of the artists attacked were arrested by the militsiia for hooliganism. 139

The militsiia had accomplished its objective—it had closed down the art exhibit—but not without arousing an international sensation. Militsiia techniques proved counterproductive, and two weeks later a mass exhibit was held in Izmailovo park with 65 artists and 15,000 visitors. The militsiia let this later exhibit of much politically motivated art proceed without disruption. 140

The visibility of the militsiia's strong arm in dealing with political nonconformists had further political implications, as the
Moscow Party Second Secretary was removed and sent into diplomatic exile as the Soviet ambassador to North Vietnam.

The art exhibit that sparked this confrontation demonstrated the forces of political and cultural protest that first surfaced in the early Brezhnev period and proliferated in the 1970s. The liberalization of Soviet society that followed Stalin's death evoked nationalist, religious and cultural expression. None of these movements ever involved large numbers of people, though the Baptist and Pentecostal churches had over half a million followers. Activists emerged from such national groups as the Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians and Lithuanians as well as the well-publicized Jewish emigration movement. At the same time a significant human rights movement developed, which, starting in the mid-1960's after the arrest of Sinyavsky and Daniel, began to make its presence felt in various public fora.

Gorbachev's efforts to encourage free expression led to different militsiia tactics. In the initial stages, ordinary police often did not seek to disperse the demonstrators. In fact, before Yeltsin's ouster in late 1987, militsiia personnel were under specific instructions to address demonstrators courteously. This greater tolerance did not lessen the number of demonstrators; instead, protests often escalated on succeeding days as a consequence of militsiia tolerance. At this stage, members of the militsiia often changed from observers to activists, scattering diffusing or even attacking the demonstrators.

The protests in Azerbaijan and Armenia placed great political
demands on the local militsija. A MVD official who oversees the Armenian militsija, rather than the local head of the KGB, appeared on local television warning citizens to stay off the streets. But the militsija and druzhinniki performance was far from satisfactory; they needed buttressing by large numbers of militarized units.143

The militsija role in reacting to these protesters highlights one of the major dilemmas of the Gorbachev era--how to liberalize while still maintaining control. If glasnost' is to proceed, political controls within Soviet society need to be diminished. The role of the KGB must be reduced, and the tactics of the militsija in handling political and religious activity must be changed. The party apparatus and the KGB must perceive the militsija as a professional body to maintain order and not an organization that will perform the less savory tasks of political control. The political nature of the militsija is not, however, dependent on its own internal structure but on the vicissitudes of power in the political hierarchy and the extent of coercion and control assigned to the security police.

The Militsija and Political Vendettas

Political control is usually achieved by organized militsija divisions. Often these militsija actions are performed to promote a larger societal goal such as the control of religion, political dissent or nationalist sentiment. The militsija can, however, be used to protect leading officials and promote their personal
political interests. Two recent cases indicate that KGB and Party awareness of the political utility of the militsiia means that militia personnel can be used to harass whistleblowers and collect information on political opponents. These efforts are often successful, but as the cases below indicate, such use of the militsiia can also backfire.

In a publicized case that led to the dismissal of a Ukrainian province KGB chief and the Voroshilovgrad First Secretary, local Party and KGB officials, with the help of the militsiia, collaborated to rid themselves of an investigative journalist for Soviet Miner who had been studying violation of safety standards in local mines. He was arrested after being "trailed by a 'capture group' that had come from the Voroshilovgrad militsiia." The KGB and local Party officials, so accustomed to having the militsiia do its dirty work, sidestepped the police general in charge of the province's internal affairs operations and went to a lieutenant colonel of the militsiia to organize the operation. Pravda reported the vigorous militsiia interrogation of the honest journalist, but only an obscure Soviet publication announced the journalist's death several months later after failing to recover from the shock of his investigation.

The militsiia executes the political agenda of Party leaders on the national as well as the local level. The revelations of Yeltsin's conduct while Moscow Party secretary and Politburo member, reveal the practical political uses of uchastkovye inspektory (neighborhood police inspectors). According to the
Moscow Party gorkom plenum following Yeltsin's ouster,

Even neighborhood police inspectors were given the right to follow us. What was said about us was: See if those sons of bitches are getting up to anything. Boris Nikolaevich, a person at your level cannot say things like that merely for the sake of playing up to an audience.118

Clearly the Moscow city Party officials were not annoyed at his remarks, but at the idea that the local militia inspector would be charged with shadowing them to collect dirt that might compromise their positions. This most immediate threat was more than the Party bureaucrats could tolerate.

The militsia can be freely used for political functions when they are serving the larger political objectives of the state; yet when they are pursuing the personal vendettas or protecting the interests of a highly placed individual, the official may suffer for his abuse of militsia authority.

CORRUPTION AND OTHER MAJOR PROBLEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

The major problems of Soviet law enforcement can be summarized as follows: 1) accepting bribes from ordinary criminals to overlook their crimes or reduce charges, 2) failing to register hard-to-solve crimes to improve militsia performance evaluations, 3) Party influence on the investigative process to overlook crimes committed or prosecuting individuals who annoy local party or governmental officials, 4) framing innocent individuals, 5) conducting searches without warrants, abusing the rights of citizens and torturing suspects.149 These problems, though by no means unique to the
Soviet system, are particularly characteristic of a legal system closely linked to a single centralized political party that has little sense of responsibility to the local community.

Bribe giving to militsiia personnel ranges from the routine three ruble pay-off that is given to ward off a traffic ticket or appease an officer of the GAI, to sums in the hundreds of thousands of rubles proffered to investigators of particularly large embezzlement cases. Illegal payments to militsiia personnel have been routine for many years. Starting with Andropov and continuing under Gorbachev, 171,000 law enforcement personnel have been expelled from the MVD alone. Additional dismissals occurred within the procuracy among investigatorial and other personnel. In mid-1987, 10,000 individuals were expelled from the MVD, many of these prosecuted, and in the first half of 1987, 900 personnel were dismissed in Kazakhstan alone for misconduct. 150

Party oversight of militsiia operations led to the previously discussed practice of failing to register offenses without known perpetrators. Yet Party interference in the legal process can be even more direct. Party members can intervene to halt an investigation of a favored individual or to initiate one against an innovator who has threatened Party officials. 151

Prosecution of individuals for non-existent crimes or those perpetrated by others has also been reported in the Soviet press. In one widely publicized case, an Odessan OBKhSS chief was wrongly investigated and prosecuted for failing to give false testimony against Party officials. 152 Human rights activists report being
framed on charges of resisting the militia or attempting to kill a
militiaman during an apartment search.\textsuperscript{153} Milititsia officials,
needling to clear serious crimes perpetrated by unknown offenders or
relatives of well placed Party members, sometimes railroad criminal
investigations.\textsuperscript{154}

While legally prohibited from conducting searches of
apartments without a procurator's permission, militsiia personnel
conduct unauthorized searches under various pretexts. While
revelations of this militia misconduct were previously confined to
samizdat sources,\textsuperscript{155} recent Soviet periodicals reveal these and
other violations of criminal procedure.

In the Stalin years, suspects and witnesses were routinely
abused by militia personnel. During the post-Stalin period,
occasional reports have surfaced of individuals expelled from the
militsiia for abusing individual rights. Since Gorbachev, these
accounts have become more explicit with specific personnel cited
for explicit torture\textsuperscript{156}, and former investigators tried for
rape.\textsuperscript{157} Such exposes are intended to reveal both to the MVD and
the public that such behavior will no longer be considered
acceptable.

CONCLUSION

The Ministry of Internal Affairs responsible for law
enforcement is a massive institution. Between the security guards
and the militsiia approximately three million individuals police
Soviet society. Assisting the millions of law enforcement personnel in their mandate to maintain social, economic and political control is an extensive body of administrative and criminal law. Unrestricted by the controls that operate in a democratic society, where community members have significant input into law enforcement and curbs are placed on police authority, the militsija is subordinate only to the Party. With such an extensive law enforcement apparatus, possessing sweeping authority, one might conclude that the USSR, even in the post-Stalin period, has evolved into the ultimate police state.

Such a conclusion belies Soviet reality. The corrupt, inefficient and underfunded militia is an imperfect instrument of social control. Soviet authorities since the revolution have been unwilling to commit the resources necessary to recruit, maintain and equip a first class ordinary police force. Members of the militsija have often been those who could do nothing else; peasant men and women recruited into the militia enticed by permission to reside in a city, where they were poorly compensated for their demanding work, and scorned for their incompetence by those whom they policed. Demoralized, isolated from the population, yet with significant power, they were prone to the corruption that almost universally affects law enforcement personnel. Soviet authorities have acquired a militsija feared but not respected by the Soviet populace. Reform and reconstruction of the law enforcement apparatus thus remains one of the primary objectives of perestroika.
The inefficiency and corruption of the *militsiia* have made the extensive law enforcement apparatus tolerable to the population. Although the *militsiia* is feared, many know that there are ways to get around its authority. If Gorbachev is able to revamp the law enforcement apparatus, will it become an effective but pervasive institution that will impede the democratization of society? Changes in the law enforcement apparatus require a careful juggling act, as increases in professionalism and integrity are balanced with the direction of *militsiia* authority.

As Gorbachev loosens the reins on his society and permits more open expression, he cannot but unleash various groups pressing for greater rights or increased autonomy. Evidence of this already exists, for in the past year there have been demonstrations in Moscow for increased Jewish emigration and for the return of Crimean Tatars to their homeland. These protests have not been confined to Moscow. Major demonstrations have occurred in the Baltic republics and large-scale riots were reported in Alma Ata following the ouster of the long term Kazakhstan leader, Kunayev. The most recent protests in Azerbaijan and Armenia highlight the disruptive potential of ethnic conflict.

Although he has the post of General Secretary, Gorbachev is not in total control. Ligachev, who is number two in the Politburo, possesses much power and enjoys support from the more conservative elements of the Party apparatus. He supports Gorbachev's efforts to restructure the Soviet economy but does not share Gorbachev's enthusiasm for loosening the reins within Soviet society. Since the
ouster of Yeltsin and the ascendancy of more traditional elements of the Party leadership, there has been a noticeable change in the handling of demonstrators by the militsiia.

Following Yeltin's ouster, the militia reacted more immediately to demonstrators. A week after Yeltsin's removal, several hundred armed militsiia men blocked Latvians from protesting Soviet rule and as a western commentator said,

> The heavy presence of uniformed militiamen, plain-clothesmen and civil vigilantes in Riga streets, coupled with the shrill campaign by Soviet authorities warning against the protests, signaled a sharp official turn against open demonstrations and another sign of a conservative backlash against... Gorbachev's policy of glasnost'...

Harsher militsiia tactics were noted in November 1987, in Moscow, as well as in the Baltics, as militia personnel broke up meetings and arrested members of some unofficial political clubs. More physical force was noted in subsequent months in the handling of other groups of protesters.

The instructions given to militsiia personnel to respect demonstrators at a Leningrad rally concerned with the destruction of a historic building are indications of the kind of changes that must be made if Soviet leaders seek to change the nature of militsiia-community relations. The subsequent rescinding of such instructions to militia members at later demonstrations highlights the present challenge of liberalizing while maintaining a high degree of social order.

Much can be made of the challenges facing Soviet policing. Yet the USSR is not alone in facing serious problems in maintaining a
respected and honest law enforcement presence. By certain conventional measures of policing, the Soviet law enforcement apparatus has proved effective. Crime rates are lower than in many western societies, better order is maintained in the streets and the community, and the USSR has avoided the extent of youth problems associated with many industrialized societies. These accomplishments in a diverse, heterogeneous society can be at least partially attributed to the impact of the pervasive law enforcement apparatus. The Soviet leadership has promised its citizenry a higher degree of order than that which prevails in western industrialized societies and it has delivered on its promise.

The cost of this feat has been a militiaman on nearly every corner, a range of responsibilities unknown to most modern western police forces, and a degree of intrusion into the lives of private citizens that would not be tolerable in most democratic societies. The Soviet Union has chosen a different model of policing, an extensive, centralized, police force totally controlled by the government. It remains to be seen whether the present effort to democratize while still maintaining social stability is compatible with the traditional Soviet militsiia.

The transformation of the militsiia into a police force concerned solely with the maintenance of social and economic order is difficult, as there is presently a legacy of seventy years of auxiliary political activity, and the militsiia's legislative mandate to aid the KGB is still in place. It is unlikely that the Soviets will achieve the objective that the Bolsheviks had prior to
the revolution—the creation of a non-political ordinary police. Gorbachev's present debates with Ligachev over what can be taught about the past affects the present. Until the Soviet authorities come to grips with the past political excesses of both the secret and the ordinary police, they will not be able to change the contemporary institutions. The future political role of the militsiia remains one of the major challenges to Gorbachev in his efforts to democratize yet control Soviet society.
Endnotes

1. David H. Bayley, *Patterns of Policing A Comparative International Analysis* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1985, p. 12 discusses the differences between specialized and unspecialized police and the historical background to this distinction.

2. In the past years some residents of major cities have been able to contract privately for protection services but these services are provided by state employees such as the vnevedomstvennaia okhrana.


8. Interview with a Soviet MVD official in 1984.


12. Ibid., p.205.

13. Eropkin, p.44.


18. Smolensk archives, microfilm, WPK 93.


23. Ibid., p.18.

24. Ibid., p.19.

25. Hingley, p.204.


27. 1962 militsiia statute


30. Ibid., pp. 291-298.


38. Ibid., p.31.


40. Ibid., p.20.

41. Ibid., p.31.

42. Ibid., p.44.

43. Conquest, p.31.

44. Ibid., p.16.


46. Ibid., p.453.

48. The MVD also has responsibility for the prison and labor camp system, the vnutreenaia voiska, the fire troops and the guard units (vedomstvennaia and vne-vedomstvennaia okhrana).

49. A Soviet legal scholar told me that as a member of an oversight committee associated with the ispolkom, members of the militsiia were interviewed to detect problems of corruption or other factors that might affect appropriate law enforcement.


53. Classified analysis of the crime reports are provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs which collects material not only from the militsiia but from the GAI and the fire patrol. See Papers on Soviet Law vol.3.


58. I want to thank Zvi Gitelman for making the raw results of his Israeli and German survey data, from which this conclusion is obtained, available to me.


60. Dzhulagoniia, p.14, states that individuals not interested in policing joined to obtain a registration permit in Moscow. Yeltsin ended limitchiki (individuals granted temporary permits) in the Moscow militsiia.
61. Ibid.


64. Imashev, p.16.

65. Kozlov et.al, p.194.


68. Petrov et.al, p.75.

69. Bahry and Silver.


72. Ibid., p.95.

73. Fedorchuk 29 Aug 1984


77. Members of the militsiia often summon individuals desired by the KGB to the local precinct and then they are questioned there by KGB personnel, often disguised as militia men.

79. Figure provided by an informed source in the MVD.


81. Ibid., p.40.

82. T.M. Kafarov and Ch. T. Musaev, Bor'ba s posiyagatel'stvom na obshchestvennyi poriadko Baku: Elm, 1983, p.178.


85. Zori Balaian, "Otkliuchenien tormozov," Literaturanaia Gazeta 3 December 1986, p.13 suggests that this was not a known problem in the 1960's. One leading justice figure informed me that there were 25,000 registered drug addicts in Leningrad in the 1960's indicating that it never was an unknown problem.


89. Interview with Soviet militia official.


91. 1987 interview with Soviet law enforcement official.

92. Likhanov, pp. 30-31 provides a most graphic illustration of militia abuse.


96. Indicative of this is that when I visited in Moscow and was staying at the American embassy, my passport registration documents stated that I was registered with the branch of the militsiia assigned to the American embassy.


98. See for example Arkhiv Samizdata, No.3845, 5/80.

99. See the samizdat literature such as Arkhiv Samizdata 19/82 No.4637 and 13/86 No.5644 and more recently the discussion of the subject in the Soviet press see A. Novikov, S. Razin and N. Mishin, "Assignment in Response to a Disturbing Letter: A Closed Subject: For Many Years Now Psychiatric Science and Practice Have Been Shut Off From Glasnost' Behind a High and Impenetrable Wall. Meanwhile Crimes Have Been Committed Behind that Wall," FBIS 20 November 1987, pp.45-51.

100. Arkhiv Samizdata, No. 1609, No.14/74; No. 1845, No. 7/75.

101. See for example Arkhiv Samizdata Nos. 3109a and 3109b, 3/78.


105. See Arkhiv Samizdata,30/72, No.1117, 41/72 No.1167, 47/73 No. 1370, 25/80 No. 4007.

106. See for example Arkhiv Samizdata 36/74, No. 1817, p.3.

107. Arkhiv Samizdata, 20/81, No.4308.


111. Arkhiv Samizdata, 19/82 No. 4637, 21/82 No.4650, 13/86 No. 5644.

112. Arkhiv Samizdata 21/77, No. 2954.

114. *Arkiv Samizdata* No. 1817, p.5 36/74.


117. For a discussion of its use against Aleksandr Ginsburg see *Arkiv Samizdata* No.1728, 31/74.

118. See *Arkiv Samizdata* No.4096, 36/80.


120. Ibid.


124. Ibid.


128. Ibid., p. 258.

129. Ibid., p.275.

130. Ibid., p.277.

132. Ibid., pp.361-362.

133. Ibid., pp.366-367.

134. Alexeeva and Chalidze, volume 1, p.144.


138. Alexeeva and Chalidze.


140. *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 34, pp.34-35; personally attended the art exhibit.


142. Ibid., pp.249-258.


146. Ibid., p.3 cites the case of a women who wrote about report-padding to Moscow and was hounded by the party agencies and the militsiia and hints at other similar cases.


149. Many of these have been cited by Peter B. Maggs in Changes in the Criminal Law System Under Gorbachev Draft of a Report for the U.S. Department of State, 1987.


155. See for example Arkhiv Samizdata No.2437 18/76; No.2797 4/77;and No.4993 29/83.

156. Likhanov, pp.30-31.


