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TITLE: TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE:
THE END OF A PEASANT SOCIETY

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Executive Summary

The Transformation of the Soviet Countryside
The End of a Peasant Society

Cynthia S. Kaplan

The pervasive influence of rural society in the Soviet Union has created an anomaly—an industrial state whose citizens' attitudes reflect a more traditional agrarian era. The predominance of such social values is now declining as a result of Soviet economic and social policies of the last twenty years. The transformation of the Soviet countryside means not only the end of a peasant society in rural areas, but also heralds the end of that society as it was transplanted to the city by rural migrants who comprise the majority of urban residents.

As Soviet society develops, the attitudes and desires of its citizens are changing as well as their ability to articulate them. Soviet citizens are discovering a new, broader frame of reference by which to assess their social and economic needs. The end of a peasant society means the emergence of Soviet citizens as more active participants and claimants on the political system. Political leaders who seek increased labor productivity through material incentives can ill afford to ignore or simply repress such rising expectations.

In the past, rural discontent was not publicly articulated. This apathy was associated with conditions of poverty. For those rural residents who were discontented or ambitious, particularly the young, migration to cities served as the major means of upward mobility in a countryside lacking in opportunity. This pattern is
a common feature of peasant societies. As a result of migration, those least contented and perhaps most able to voice dissatisfaction became city dwellers. Such migrants, influenced by the rural poverty which they had left, were unlikely to develop rising expectations in their new urban environment. Their presence in cities was likely to suppress increasing demands frequently associated with an urban, industrial work force.

Recent social change in the countryside and cities has begun to alter this scenario. The effects of economic and social development in the countryside, the changing demographic structure of the Soviet population, and the decreasing opportunities for upward mobility in urban areas contribute to a new set of attitudes among Soviet citizens. These attitudinal changes shape the options which Soviet leaders confront as they seek to affect citizen behavior. Soviet citizens can no longer be acted upon by the party and state with impunity. The Soviet Union is approaching a point at which its citizens must either be incorporated or coopted by the political system.

This study analyzes the consequences of post-1965 economic and social policies by examining the Soviet population's well-being or sense of satisfaction in an attempt to connect objective indicators with social attitudes. How residents evaluate objective changes that affect their lives provides both an important reflection of changing attitudes and, indirectly, an indication of levels of satisfaction.

Due to development of sociological surveys in the USSR
Western scholars are now able to at least partially assess changes in the attitudes found among Soviet citizens. While relatively rudimentary work appeared at the beginning of the 1960s, by the 1970s the sociological centers in Novosibirsk, Moscow, and Tallin were regularly surveying the attitudes of Soviet youth, potential and actual rural migrants, and expanding upon the tradition of time budget studies by seeking to understand people's desires for different types of leisure activities. By the 1980s, the accumulated body of survey work allows for longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis. This extraordinarily rich and varied source of information contained in published monographs, often under the imprint of individual institutes under the Academy of Sciences printed in limited numbers, and dissertations can now be utilized allowing Western social scientists to explore the subjective world of Soviet citizens for the first time.

The linkage between economic change, social status, and attitudes provides a key to understanding the political consequences of development in the Soviet Union. The most important factors found to account for a general sense of well-being in US research were housing, jobs, family life, neighborhoods, spare-time activities, and national government. Among youth, the evaluation of jobs was most highly correlated with their degree of satisfaction. The single most important condition associated with well-being is the nature of the social structure. These relationships are all explored in the Soviet context.
The job and social structure of the Soviet countryside has changed since the introduction of the post-1965 policies. According to national data, educational levels, skills, income, and the standard of living have all improved. These changes are correlated with emerging attitudes. With increased job opportunities in the countryside, a higher proportion of rural residents are remaining in rural areas than in the past. These better educated rural residents are increasingly aware of the outside world. Thus, in spite of improved material conditions, they are sensitive to the relative deprivation which affects their lives. Their realization of this is a consequence of breaking down the isolation of rural society due to increased geographical mobility and the spread of television. Material changes in themselves do not determine the social and political consequences of development. How material changes are perceived and the attitudes which emerge shape political consequences. Attitudes provide a critical link between social status and behavior, including autonomous political participation. The most influential intervening factor affecting the impact of social structure on attitudes is education. This is because respondents' overall degree of satisfaction and the nature of what gives them satisfaction varies by their level of education. Variance in attitudes is also correlated with the nature of a respondents' work and age. Changes in the rural job structure and the increase in education among rural residents is closely tied to the changing distribution of social groups within the total working population.
of the USSR. Our hypothesis is that rising expectations are developing among new social groups which are better educated than in the past, thereby leading to an increased degree of efficacy promoting political participation.

Three indicators were selected as illustrative of attitudinal change: reasons cited for desiring to migrate from the countryside to the city; the professional orientation of youth as a reflection of their changing values; and respondents' assessment of leisure time activities. These dependent variables provide an indication of satisfaction with present conditions and reflect changing expectations. The major independent variables examined include respondents' evaluations of their jobs, educational opportunities, and standard of living (including housing and income). Social origin and educational levels of respondents serve as intervening variables. The content of the selected variables differs widely in the Soviet Union and within the rural sector itself due to regional diversity and the multi-ethnic nature of the state.

Migration

During the 1960s the most frequently cited reason for desiring to migrate was low salaries. By the end of the 1970s, the nature of employment, working conditions, and the standard of living were the dominant factors motivating migration among 23 to 30 year olds. The detailed study of the countryside by T.I. Zaslavskaya and her colleagues in Novosibirsk argues for the
critical impact of the level of development of the socio-economic infrastructure. As expected, the reasons for migration tend to cluster fairly consistently by the population's age, level of education, and occupation. However, the degree of dissatisfaction associated with these reasons varies according to the level of development of the infrastructure. This is not merely a function of socio-economic policies. Demographic structure and the nature of the economy strongly influence the development of regional infrastructure. Nonetheless, what we find is a relationship of potential significance: the rural population, which will increasingly have some post-secondary vocational education and occupy middle and lower level jobs, will, as it reaches its middle and late twenties, evaluate its surroundings based on its standard of living. It is true, of course, that youth (19-23 year olds) tend to focus most on the nature of their employment and that this has improved, particularly for males. This combined with a changing demographic structure has led to a decline in migration. The ultimate result of these changes will be a somewhat more stable rural population which places increasing importance on its quality of life. Given intra-rural migration and step migration (in which rural residents tend to move sequentially to settlements of larger sizes), a slow homogenization of values throughout Soviet society will occur. This is also a result of increased mobility and the impact of the mass media, especially television, on the countryside.

The decline in migration and the retention of more people
with higher levels of education point to an increase in the pool of rural residents with a strong potential for rising expectations. Given the relative improvement in rural conditions and the potential increasing demands, the rate at which economic and social policies succeed is the key to individual satisfaction. The rural sector of the population will no longer find satisfaction by changing its status through migration to cities. Indeed, even those who move find themselves critical of the urban lifestyle and the quality of life in overcrowded cities with declining opportunities for upward mobility.

Professional Orientation of Youth and Prestige Hierarchies

Research on the professional orientation of youth and prestige hierarchies allows us to examine changing attitudes in the context of generational differences. Based on surveys from Novosibirsk we know that the importance of education to a profession's prestige has increased in rural areas. Job preferences associated with the respondent's sex has somewhat abated and the high prestige attributed to industrial jobs by rural youth has declined, while that given to rural jobs has improved. These findings reflect the impact of new rural occupations and a backlash towards urban society as contact has increased. Differences evident in longitudinal studies of secondary school graduates show the impact of education and economic development.
Leisure Time

How people use time provides an indicator of the structure of society and social preferences. It is a complex indicator of these factors mediated by a number of intervening factors which influence and/or structure the choices made by the population. Our inability to differentiate clearly between structural and normative components makes it difficult to demonstrate value change, but this does not invalidate time budgets and, more specifically, the use of leisure time from serving as a major means by which to examine social change. Perhaps, the use of leisure time should be viewed as a reflection of structural change as well as personal economic and cultural choices. Time budgets provide an important, albeit imperfect, indicator of social change and, as such, a mechanism by which to assess rural change in the Soviet Union.

Both the use of free time and the degree of satisfaction derived from leisure time activities are closely related to the educational attainment of rural residents. The higher the level of education, the more the desire for cultural opportunities. For most of the rural population, however, the spread of secondary education with lower migration rates has led to a more critical attitude toward one's standard of living. Overall, there exists a strong desire for more free time.

Education is clearly related to rural residents' degree of satisfaction with their leisure time activities. During the 1970s in the non-Black Earth Zone, a less prosperous area of the Soviet
Union, dissatisfaction with how leisure time had been spent in the three to five preceding years was directly related to levels of education. Not only did 92 percent of the respondents with higher education feel that their use of leisure time had deteriorated during this period, but most importantly, those with specialized technical training were also dissatisfied (32.7 to 50.8 percent).

What types of preliminary conclusions can be drawn about social change from our indicators?

- Increased secondary education and a more highly differentiated occupational structure in the countryside are leading to the disappearance of an uneducated and unskilled peasantry which was associated with passivity. Rural mass society, especially the young, now possesses the skills to participate.

- Demands for an improved quality of life are associated with those who hold skilled jobs, especially in regions where the economic infrastructure has improved. Those totally dissatisfied with their jobs migrate, but those who remain in the countryside now evidence increased demands.

- Increased demands are associated with regions which have enjoyed at least an "average" level of economic development. This means that we may be approaching a situation of rising expectations--due both to improved conditions and a new standard of comparison resulting from the end of rural isolation.
Changes in the Soviet countryside also have important implications for the urban sector.

- Migration has stabilized. No longer is it necessary for rural residents with secondary and post-secondary education to migrate in order to find employment.

- Previous migrants were satisfied with changing their status through moving to the city, since upward mobility in the countryside was impossible. Today these migrants will be more demanding at a time when urban social mobility is declining. This will contribute to increased urban demands.

New attitudes and increased demands throughout Soviet society are associated with new, incipient social groups based on education and occupation.

What Does Social Change Mean for Political Life?

New social groups espousing economic demands now possess skills necessary for political leadership. These are the potential leaders of voluntary associations. This is a broader stratum than the intelligentsia. What is even more important is that these new groups may be able to organize a more highly educated mass public which no longer exhibits the passivity associated with a peasant culture. The link between these two groups would be extraordinarily important, since the intelligentsia in the USSR has been isolated from the masses.
Such new groups may focus on local issues such as the economic difficulties of daily life as opposed to the intelligentsia's concern for more intangible political liberties.

New groups focusing on low level politics, making demands to effect policies, would confront the Soviet political elite with a dilemma. The economic tasks facing the Soviet Union require increased initiative from middle level management and increased worker productivity, i.e., active participation. This now requires material incentives. If the political elite ignores new demands, it risks the withdrawal or opposition of new groups. This would result in high economic costs during the transition from industrial to post-industrial society. Economic complexity can no longer tolerate a highly centralized system with low levels of participation and initiative.

If new social groups are not to be ignored, the Soviet Union confronts the dilemma of how either to incorporate groups and allow them influence or to coopt them. It is not at all clear what the political/economic preferences of these groups will be. Nor is it clear how or whether the Soviet system will permit groups to participate. It is, however, evident that this is on the current political agenda.

The issue of political change is not simply a matter of political rights, often associated with glasnost', but more fundamentally, how a society which is rapidly changing and beginning to make new demands can be incorporated into a heretofore centralized political system. Social change has given
rise to new groups which are beginning to make demands on the state. The emergence of new social groups and the possibility of voluntary associations and spontaneous group formation is a crucial event in the evolution of the Soviet political system.
The pervasive influence of rural society in the Soviet Union has created an anomaly—an industrial state whose citizens' attitudes reflect a more traditional agrarian era. The predominance of such social values is now declining as a result of Soviet economic and social policies of the last twenty years. The transformation of the Soviet countryside not only means the end of a peasant society in rural areas, but also heralds the end of that society as it was transplanted to the city by rural migrants who comprise the majority of urban residents.

The relationship between economic, social, and political factors in the Soviet Union constitutes an anomaly of development. Western social science theory focuses on the impact of economic development on society and how economic and social change influence the nature of the political system. The critical issue from this perspective is which class or social group dominates the political system when the mass public is incorporated into the polity or, alternatively, is denied meaningful political participation. Typically, entrepreneurial classes, workers, and peasants have participated through intermediary structures such as parties, trade unions, and professional associations. The timing of their incorporation into the political system is viewed as critical to their future political roles and, ultimately, the structure of the political system.

Theories of development have ignored the post-revolutionary
Soviet era. The Soviet political system is viewed as though it were unique. Such a conclusion is unwarranted. Yet, centrally directed economic development with its preference for industry over agriculture and the consumer sector has created an industrial and military giant in which until recently a majority of citizens lived in the countryside and worked in agriculture. In this society, rural residents were de facto and, at times, de jure second class citizens. Economic equality for the mass public existed at the lowest common denominator. Soviet economic and social policies thwarted societal development.

The absence of complex social differentiation in the USSR does not deny the progress which the Soviet regime has achieved since World War II in providing the necessities of life for its citizens, a fact which has made the Soviet system appealing for many developing nations. Yet, Soviet leaders cannot be sanguine about this relative success as they confront the tasks of entering a post-industrial age with a population whose standard of living reflects an early period of industrialization. Most importantly, Soviet citizens are developing a new frame of reference by which to assess their social and economic needs. As Soviet society becomes more complex the attitudes and desires of its citizens are changing as well as their ability to articulate them. The end of a peasant society means the emergence of Soviet citizens as active participants in and claimants on the political system. Political leaders who seek increased labor productivity through material incentives can ill afford to ignore or simply repress such rising
The Importance of Social Change

The 1965 March Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union marked the reversal of the Soviet Union's traditional preference for industry over agriculture and the consumer sector. Consequently, the regime sought to devote economic resources to raising the standard of living for urban and rural residents. The traditionally isolated countryside was now to share in the fruits of Soviet society.

Social change is associated with increasing material demands. This does not mean that rural residents were previously satisfied. Nonetheless, if rural discontent existed, it was not publicly articulated. Such apathy tends to be associated with conditions of poverty. We may also infer that for many Soviet citizens, particularly rural residents who had lived through collectivization and World War II, the relative improvement in conditions along with the absence of an external frame of comparison (urban life), contributed to a sense if not of satisfaction, than at least of complacency. For those rural residents who were more ambitious, particularly the young, migration to cities served as the major means of upward mobility in a countryside lacking in opportunity. This pattern is a common feature of peasant societies. As a result of migration, those least contented and perhaps most able to voice dissatisfaction became city dwellers. Such migrants, influenced by the rural
poverty which they had left, were unlikely to develop rising expectations in their new urban environment. Their presence in cities was likely to suppress rising demands frequently associated with an urban, industrial work force.

Recent social change in the countryside and cities has begun to alter this scenario. The effects of economic and social development in the countryside, the changing demographic structure of the Soviet population, and the declining opportunities for upward mobility in urban areas influence Soviet citizens' attitudes. These attitudinal changes shape the options which Soviet leaders confront as they seek to affect citizen behavior. Soviet citizens can no longer be acted upon by the party and state with impunity. The Soviet Union is approaching a point at which its citizens must either be incorporated or coopted by the political system.

The Study of Social Change

The study of Soviet society by Western social scientists has focused primarily on the examination of material indicators of change. This study examines not only the material consequences of the post-1965 economic and social policies, but the Soviet population's sense of well-being and satisfaction, in an attempt to connect objective indicators with social attitudes.

Due to development of sociological surveys in the USSR, Western scholars are now able to at least partially assess changes in the attitudes found among Soviet citizens. While relatively
rudimentary work appeared at the beginning of the 1960s, by the 1970s the sociological centers in Novosibirsk, Moscow, and Tallin were regularly surveying the attitudes of Soviet youth, potential and actual rural migrants, and expanding upon the tradition of time budget studies by seeking to understand people's desires for different types of leisure activities. By the 1980s, the accumulated body of survey work allows for longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis. This extraordinarily rich and varied source of information contained in published monographs (often under the imprint of individual institutes under the Academy of Sciences printed in limited numbers) and dissertations can now be utilized by Western social scientists to explore the subjective world of Soviet citizens for the first time.

Of course, most Soviet surveys do not ask questions about satisfaction per se, rather, they tend to concentrate on attitudes towards specific factors affecting an individual's quality of life. Nonetheless, how residents evaluate objective changes that affect their lives provides both an important reflection of changing attitudes and, indirectly, an indication of the degree of citizen satisfaction. The linkage between economic change, social status, and attitudes provides a key to understanding the political consequences of development in the Soviet Union.

In studies of general well-being conducted in the United States, satisfaction was found to be quite stable over time despite changing objective conditions. One explanation for this was that expectations declined. Soviet evidence suggests that
the relationship between satisfaction and expectations may be somewhat different in the Soviet Union. In part this relationship poses a more complex problem for Soviet society today than did social change during the 1970s in the United States. Although subcultures exist in both countries, the United States had relatively few sectors isolated from national norms, while the Soviet Union represents an almost classic case of a country with a national center and an isolated rural periphery. 

New attitudes such as those expected to emerge as Soviet society evolves can be studied from a number of perspectives. Frank Andrews and Stephen Withey in their study Social Indicators of Well-Being suggest that "One possibility is to explore the components of perceived well-being. Alternatives are to identify and measure the factors that influence perceptions of well-being, or to investigate the social and psychological effects produced by differences in perceived well-being." This study draws on the first two approaches. As Andrews and Withey suggest, two sets of social indicators should be considered, "one indicating how people themselves evaluate various aspects of their lives; and the other indicating the external or environmental conditions relevant to each of those aspects." The Andrews and Withey study identifies a set of variables which corresponds closely to those of central concern to Soviet scholars.

Perhaps the most important aspect of studies such as that by Andrews and Withey is the relationship which they establish between so-called objective and subjective factors to a general
state of well-being. They find this distinction to be artificial. Their study showed that attitudes towards specific objective factors could account for approximately the same degree of variance in the general sense of well-being as the subjective, value criteria. This suggests a broader significance for the frequently narrower findings of Soviet research. The most important factors found to account for a general sense of well-being in US research were housing, jobs, family life, neighborhoods, spare-time activities, and national government. Among youth, the evaluation of jobs was most highly correlated with their degree of satisfaction. Overall, the factors which most account for a general sense of well-being are:

"(1) the character of one's daily life—how much fun, enjoyment, and interest it has; (2) the extent to which one's physical needs are met, and the related matter of financial security; (3) the nature of oneself, including the extent to which one is developing and broadening oneself, and how one adapts to changes; and (4) how one is treated by other people." 9

The single most important condition associated with well-being is the nature of the social structure.

Social Change: The Soviet Case

In the Soviet Union recent structural shifts in society, high rates of upward mobility during the 1950s and 1960s, and the relative isolation of rural society until the 1970s make structural issues extraordinarily important. 9 During the 1970s the service sector expanded, the number of industrial workers declined, and the number of agricultural workers (especially
kolkhozniki) stabilized. Social mobility declined throughout the USSR. According to the Soviet sociologist F.R. Filippov, during the 1970s and 1980s social mobility was only half that of the 1950s and 1960s. This contributed to a mismatch between those who had and/or desired higher education, and available employment. These changes in Soviet society are likely to have significant consequences on the degree of satisfaction found among different segments of society.

Objective Change in the Countryside

As a result of the post-1965 social and economic policies the occupational and social structure of Soviet rural society has changed. In 1960 the majority of rural residents were peasants, approximately 56 percent; by 1980 kolkhoz peasants constituted only 34.5 percent of all rural residents who were employed, while workers and employees reached 65.5 percent. Although much agricultural work is still done by unskilled labor on the kolkhoz, increasingly agricultural jobs require specialized skills and education, while at the same time more industrial jobs are now located in the countryside. In short, whether measured by skills and education, the nature of work (physical or mental), or income, the rural social structure has become more complex. However, the diversification of the rural job market has not been uniform. Both industrial employment and the distribution of jobs requiring specialized education or skills vary by area with wealthier regions witnessing the greatest change.
Occupational Structure

Since the introduction of the 1965 rural economic policies, a clear shift among the types of agricultural enterprises has occurred. The number of agro-industrial complexes, inter-kolkhoz/sovkhoz enterprises, and sovkhozy has increased while the number of kolkhozy has declined (see Chart 1, p. 9a). These changes have led to the diversification of jobs available in rural areas (see Table 1, p. 9b).

The greater diversity in the types of jobs and the skills which these jobs require is evidenced by the professional structure of the rural population and the level of education and training of rural residents (see Chart 2, p. 9c, and Chart 3, p. 9d). Many new jobs located in the countryside are non-agricultural, often in food processing or other types of light industry. Even primarily agricultural jobs at kolkhozy and sovkhozy increasingly require skilled labor.

The introduction of new jobs has had a differential impact on men and women. Many of these new positions are categorized as more suitable for males. Although women may now find that "feminine" jobs have higher salaries, the nature of the work and skills required often are at odds with their desire for higher and specialized education. Such "feminine" jobs tend to enjoy lower prestige. One possible exception to the problem, however, is the movement of women into the service sector (see Chart 4, p. 9e, and Chart 5, p. 9f).
Chart 1

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL WORKERS BY TYPE OF WORK (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agro-industrial Complex</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Service &amp;</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social &amp; Cultural Personnel</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Personnel</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Personnel</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Workers</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 2

Professional Structure of Kolkhozniki

Chart 3

Professional Structure of Sovkhozniki

Source: G.A. Slesarev, F.R. Filippov, and P. Erenburg, Formirovanie sotsial'noi
Chart 4
Social Structure USSR

Chart 5

Urban - Rural Social Structure

Working Class | Kolkhoz Peasant | Intelligentsia | White Collar

Standard of Living

Rural policies have sought to raise the standard of living and improve the overall social welfare of residents in the countryside. These efforts have meant devoting resources to housing, consumer goods and services, and social welfare benefits for the rural population. Both the urban and rural sectors have received increased levels of state social subvention, but despite the existence of the greater absolute need in the countryside, urban benefits continue to increase at a faster rate than those in the rural sector. Nonetheless, rural economic gains have been real.

One of the most important aspects of rural policies was the introduction of guaranteed salaries at collective farms and the increase of state and collective farm workers' incomes. An important goal of income policy was overcoming the gap between agricultural and industrial workers (see Chart 6, p. 10a). However, the absolute differences in average monthly salary between industrial workers and kolkhozniki continued to increase.

Although the availability of consumer goods and services has increased in rural areas, their quality and assortment remain problematic. The absence of desirable products to purchase in the countryside has led to an increase in rural savings. One consumer good of potentially great importance for attitudinal change has spread dramatically—the television. Despite the relative improvement in the overall rural standard of living, the
Chart 6

Average Monthly Salary

continued absence of central heating, sewage, and water continues to detract from the attractiveness of rural life (see Table 2, p. 11a).23

Clearly the job and social structure of the Soviet countryside has changed since the introduction of the post-1965 policies. According to national data, educational levels, skills, income, and the standard of living have all improved. Although it remains somewhat controversial, Soviet scholars no longer insist that subjective factors -- attitudes and values -- are direct reflections of structural change. Given the wide variation in conditions, it is particularly important to have some sense of the objective conditions in particular oblasts before analyzing survey data from these regions.

By way of example we have selected data from the Non-Black Earth Zone and Rostov Oblast with some additional information drawn from Novosibirsk Oblast and other areas where survey research has been conducted. The Non-Black Earth Zone has a somewhat older population than the USSR as a whole -- there are many small settlements, and young males outnumber young females. The area suffers from a long-term labor deficit. In addition, in the Non-Black Earth Zone the extent of development of a given area's infrastructure tends to be dependent on that area's proximity to a large industrial city. On the whole, the Non-Black Earth Zone's infrastructure remains underdeveloped and agricultural production tends to be low.24

Although agricultural and social conditions in the Non-Black
# TABLE 2

**OWNERSHIP OF DURABLE GOODS BY RURAL RESIDENTS /IN THE RSFSR/**

(per 100 families)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Televisions</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerators/Freezers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing Machines</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Narodnoe khoziaistvo RSFSR v 1985 g. Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1986, p. 265.
Earth Zone tend to be poorer than those found in most other areas of the RSFSR, salaries and the qualifications of agricultural personnel have risen since 1965. From 1965 to 1970 qualified personnel, so-called mechanizers, at kolkhozy and sovkhozy in the Non-Black Earth Zone increased 10 percent and by 1980 -- 34 percent.\textsuperscript{25} Table 3 (see p. 12a), presents data on the changing occupational structure found at sovkhozy in the Non-Black Earth Zone. It should, however, be noted that the number of qualified personnel varies significantly between oblasts such as Pskov and Novgorod, and Leningrad -- a difference related to the presence of a major industrial city.\textsuperscript{26} Sovkhoz and kolkhoz total income is likely to be lower in more isolated areas where marketing opportunities are more limited due to transportation difficulties and relatively poor agricultural conditions.

In contrast to the Non-Black Earth Zone, Rostov Oblast is a relatively productive agricultural area. The standard of living in the oblast is fairly high, which helps to maintain a balanced demographic structure by age and sex.\textsuperscript{27} Counter to national tendencies, the number of kolkhozy and sovkhozy in Rostov Oblast actually rose between 1966 and 1976.\textsuperscript{28} The number of specialists with higher and secondary education in agriculture also increased, as is evident in Table 4, (see p. 12b). The number of specialists at kolkhozy and sovkhozy in Rostov Oblast increased almost 1.5 times from 1965 to 1980. From 1960 to 1969, the number of unskilled agricultural laborers declined in Rostov Oblast by 12.8 percent (RSFSR - 15.9 percent).\textsuperscript{29} At the same time, the number of
TABLE 3

JOB STRUCTURE AT SOVKHOZY IN THE NON-BLACK EARTH ZONE (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineers, technicians, &amp; White Collar Employees</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigaders</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanizers</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Labor</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Workers</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers at Local Industrial Enterprises</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4

SPECIALISTS IN AGRICULTURE WITH HIGHER AND SPECIALIZED SECONDARY EDUCATION (thousands)
ROSTOV OBLAST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized Secondary</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

those classified as mechanizers increased by 5 percent and service personnel in kolkhoz production increased by 5.9 percent. More recent data show that the number of rural residents with special preparation grew from 29 percent to 54 percent between 1971 and 1981. Monthly income also has increased since 1965, as is shown in Table 5 (see p. 13a).

The available evidence indicates that conditions in the Soviet countryside have improved since the adoption of the new agricultural and social welfare policies. Thus, although the degree of economic change remains to be precisely established, the general trend is clear -- investment, job structure, and, for the most part, the standard of living have improved. Although rural incomes and the standard of living remain poor in many regions, for the most part, the rural population has more discretionary income and a standard of living which exceeds the level of mere necessities.

Education

Material changes in themselves do not reveal the social and political consequences of development. The most influential intervening factor affecting the impact of social structure on attitudes is education. Education may also have a direct effect on attitudes. The desire for specialized and higher education, often cited as a reason for rural migration, must be separated from its attitudinal component. Education's effect on attitudes can be analyzed on the basis of the changing attitudes expressed
TABLE 5
SOVKHOZ and KOLKHOZ MONTHLY INCOME*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sovkhoz</th>
<th>Kolkhoz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>77.58</td>
<td>183.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>100.33</td>
<td>282.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>124.25</td>
<td>300.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>138.5</td>
<td>346.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>169.2</td>
<td>397.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data for kolkhoz income reflects income from private plots. Kolkhoz monthly average salary in Rostov was only 61 rubles in 1965. A.F. Tarasov et al, eds., Problemy sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia sela. Rostov on the Don: Rostov State Pedagogical Institute, 1971, p. 44.

by students at different grade levels and in longitudinal studies of students before and after they enter post-secondary education. In particular, education helps shape respondents' evaluation of their environment—their standard of living, the nature of work, and cultural conditions. Respondents' overall degree of satisfaction and the nature of what gives them satisfaction varies by the level of education. Variance in attitudes is also correlated with the nature of a respondents' work and age.

Rural residents, including kolkhozniki, have increasingly completed secondary school and specialized training courses. Efforts to improve rural education have been undertaken as part of general educational reform. In particular, policy makers hope to expand educational opportunities in the countryside by building more vocational schools located in rural areas, improving the quality of rural education, and waiving entrance examinations for rural youths at agricultural institutions of higher education. Such policies address the relatively poor quality of rural education and represent an attempt to encourage more rural youth to enter programs related to agriculture. As a result of the increased pool of secondary graduates in the USSR, competition for places in institutions of higher education has increased. Current policy promotes specialized secondary and additional vocational training in order to meet a rising demand for skilled labor and to avoid the underemployment of those with higher qualifications. These programs are consistent with the emerging labor market and greater realism in the educational aspiration of youth. The
The general level of education among rural residents has risen dramatically, a trend which began in the late 1950s (see Table 6, p. 15a, and Table 7, p. 15b).

Changes in the rural job structure and the increase in education among rural residents is closely tied to the changing distribution of social groups within the total working population of the USSR (Chart 5, p. 9f). Shifts in the distribution of social groups, although influenced by the reclassification of kolkhozy into sovkhozy, more significantly reflect inter-generational mobility of rural youth. Although education remains a major mechanism for upward mobility, those with kolkhoz peasant backgrounds are less likely to enter higher education than those from the working class or intelligentsia. If they do pursue education beyond the secondary level, youth from kolkhoz peasant backgrounds are most likely to enter vocational programs. In the past the primary source of social mobility was through migration: one moved to a city and became a worker. Although migration has declined, a change in social status is still often connected with non-agricultural employment.

The level of education among rural and urban youth began to increase under Khrushchev. The gap between the proportion of urban and rural students pursuing secondary education has narrowed. "The average years of schooling for a member of the [industrial] work force increased by about 50% between 1959 and 1979, rising from approximately 6 years in 1959 to 7.5 in 1970, and to 'more than' 9 in 1979." The educational level of the
TABLE 6

RSFSR: Education of the Agricultural Labor Force  
1970 and 1979 (per 1000)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher, Incomplete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher &amp; Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete Secondary</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes only those involved in physical labor.

**TABLE 7***

**EDUCATION OF THE RURAL POPULATION IN THE RSFSR (per 1000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher, Incomplete Secondary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sluzhashchie</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhozniki</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher &amp; Specialized Secondary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sluzhashchie</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhozniki</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inc.S. Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sluzhashchie</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhozniki</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:**  *Vestnik statistiki*, (1981), no. 2, p. 64.

* These data vary somewhat from those found in *Vestnik statistiki*, no. 4, 1981, p. 69 for agricultural workers.
rural work force has also increased. The number of agricultural laborers with secondary education nearly quadrupled from 1970 to 1979 and those with incomplete secondary education increased by approximately 33 percent. (It must, of course, be acknowledged, that the number of agricultural workers with secondary education—the saturation rate—is much lower than that found among industrial workers.) As a result of the spread of secondary education in both the countryside and the cities, the proportion of secondary school graduates able to enter institutions of higher education has declined. The competition for entry into institutions of higher education was expected to grow, but recent data suggest that there has been a decline in the aspirations of both urban and rural youth. For the most part, this has resulted in a greater number of both urban and rural youth entering vocational institutions. Although the decline in demand for VUZ education represents a realistic adjustment of youth aspirations, the effect of vocational education on our independent variables supports a possible rise in expectations. The single most important factor affecting the attitudes of rural residents has been the spread of secondary education to the countryside.

The Subjective Component of Change: Attitudes

Objective indicators of economic development have long been examined in the Western literature. What has been absent is the theory and evidence which relates objective factors to behavior having political consequences. In the past, rural residents'
individual mobility, that is horizontal mobility reflecting urban migration, substituted for political participation. This pattern has declined not only at an absolute level due to demographic changes, but also relatively, within the pool of potential migrants. Opportunities for individual mobility in the countryside increased due to the diversification of available jobs. Today's rural residents enjoy new social statuses derived from new occupations and lifestyles. Rural residents' higher level of education and improved quality of life provide the basis for new social groups in Soviet society. Such changes in social status are usually associated with new subjective attitudes. Attitudes provide a critical link between social status and behavior, including autonomous political participation.

A variety of attitudes can coexist at any given level of economic development. Our focus is low level politics, that is, attitudes towards local conditions--salaries, housing, leisure activities, and cultural opportunities. Consequently, we must examine micro-level evidence. Recalling Andrews and Withey's study, we focus on subjective attitudes towards local conditions as a means of establishing satisfaction. The degree of satisfaction, in turn, is viewed as a indicator of potential rising expectations. Our hypothesis is that rising expectations are developing among new social groups which have greater education, thereby leading to an increased degree of political efficacy promoting participation.

Three indicators were selected as illustrative of attitudinal
change: reasons cited for desiring to migrate from the countryside to the city; the professional orientation of youth as a reflection of their changing values; and respondents' assessment of leisure time activities. Although these dependent variables are not substitutes for global well-being, they provide an indication of satisfaction with present conditions and reflect changing expectations. The major independent variables examined include respondents' evaluations of their jobs, educational opportunities, and standard of living (including housing and income). Social origin and educational levels of respondents serve as intervening variables.

Migration

Rural residents' desire to migrate reflects their attitudes towards urban and rural life. Among the reasons most frequently cited by potential migrants is dissatisfaction with factors which constitute the independent variables found in studies of well-being: attitudes towards jobs and salaries and educational and leisure time opportunities. Information from the pre-1970 period will be considered indicative of attitudes before the new rural policies took effect and will be compared to that found at the end of the 1970s. Given the importance of social structure and the status of individuals, regional diversity due to different levels of economic development and the nature of the local economy must be taken into account as an important mediating condition. Such differences are evident in regional data from Novosibirsk, the
Black Earth Zone, and the Non-Black Earth Zone. Social mobility and the major mechanism for it in the countryside, urban migration, also varies by region. Our concern here is with the correspondence between the independent variables and the reasons cited for migration. Factors associated with the social structure, such as the increasing level of education found among rural residents, influence their evaluation of the conditions in which they live and work. This in turn shapes their preferences towards urban or rural life and their decisions to migrate.

In exploring the issue of migration, we devote special attention to youth, as an indicator of possible generational change. Youth constitute the largest pool of migrants. As understood by most Soviet sociologists, youth includes adolescents and young adults under the age of 30. This cohort, however, should be understood to have at least two components. Those under 23 years of age who are usually single and are continuing their education, serving in the armed forces, or adapting to work life. Those over 23 years of age are often married and beginning to raise families. Obviously, these differences affect the probability that an individual will migrate as well as the reasons for migration.

According to a survey conducted at the end of the 1970s among youth in villages of Leningrad, Smolensk, and Pskov Oblasts (the Non-Black Earth Zone), the most frequently cited reason for moving to the city was a desire to continue study (52.9 percent). Other important reasons cited included 32.6 percent who noted an
absence of interesting professions in the countryside, 36.6 percent--insufficient cultural services, 33 percent--unsatisfactory living conditions, 32.5 percent said that the countryside is boring and uninteresting, 30.9 percent noted the absence of days off in the summer and lengthy work days, 28.4 percent--insufficient salary, and 17.6 percent cited insufficient mechanization of kolkhoz work. Ten years earlier, the most frequently cited reason for migration was low pay. These findings are consistent with those of V.I. Staroverov in his 1968-1969 study of Starorussk Raion, Novgorod Oblast. Staroverov points out, however, that passport restrictions and other official regulations may have prevented migrants from saying that they simply wanted to live in the city. Rural residents indicate an increasing preference for rural life, but frequently decide to migrate because of working conditions and the nature of rural jobs, the lack of services and cultural opportunities, and the absence of professional opportunities.

The reasons for wishing to migrate are correlated with the general level of prosperity of a region and the level of development of an area's infrastructure. Survey data from Rostov Oblast, a fairly prosperous agricultural area, is illustrative. During the 1960s Rostov youth in their last two years of secondary school most frequently cited the absence of professional opportunities and a desire for further education for wishing to migrate. The nature of agricultural work was also frequently noted as a reason for migration. The major motives given by
youth in 1969 for leaving the countryside was dissatisfaction with dead-end jobs (44 percent), the nature of the workday and the seasonal nature of work (28 percent), and the low level of mechanization of agricultural work (19 percent). Among those actually migrating in 1968, 21.7 percent cited unsatisfactory cultural and living conditions, 19 percent a desire to continue their education, 17 percent the unsatisfactory nature of work, and only 11 percent poor pay. By the end of the 1970s the reasons given for migration had not substantially changed in Rostov Oblast. Among the general rural population surveyed, the most frequently cited reason for migration was unsatisfactory labor conditions (28.9 percent). Unsatisfactory cultural services were cited by 22.1 percent, a desire for education by 18.3 percent, low pay by only 8.8 percent, family reasons by 8.5 percent, with other reasons constituting 14.3 percent.

The reasons cited by youth (16-30 year olds) differed from the sample as a whole. The city was seen by 66 percent as providing better cultural opportunities, transportation, and medical care. The remaining portion of the sample cited "city lifestyle" as their primary reason for wishing to migrate. Income appears to have played a relatively minor role in motivating rural Rostov residents to migrate. According to the work done by V.N. Chapek, most migrants saw no difference between urban and rural pay, although data show that salaries in urban areas exceeded rural salaries by 7 percent.

Novosibirsk oblast has a relatively high rate of rural
migration, yet as in other regions, most rural youth would prefer to remain in the countryside.\textsuperscript{53} In 1966 a majority of rural youth in Novosibirsk Oblast, 58.5 percent, preferred rural to urban life, and 75.7 percent preferred life in a rural settlement to that in a city.\textsuperscript{54} Over 65 percent of rural youth in Siberia were satisfied with their work.\textsuperscript{55} Among those who did prefer life in the city, the reasons varied. Culture was cited by 21.8 percent of all rural respondents and 39.6 percent of rural youth, and approximately 14 percent of both groups cited better working conditions; the third most frequently cited advantage of urban life (9.2\%) was interesting work for youth and more free time for the rural population as a whole.\textsuperscript{56} The distribution of the respective attitudes is peculiar to Novosibirsk, but the reasons cited are typical of other regions.

As noted above, the most frequently cited reason for migration in the pre-1965 period for the country as a whole was low salaries.\textsuperscript{57} The importance ascribed to salaries is inversely related to the respondent's level of education. According to surveys, those rural youth having only primary education tend to grant greater importance to salary levels than do those with either incomplete or completed secondary education. However, the results from surveys conducted in Novosibirsk may well reflect the predominantly industrial nature of the oblast's economy and the concentrated settlement pattern of the population.

Data from Novosibirsk in 1967 confirm the strong relationship between education and migration. An increase in education led to
an increased probability of migration. Although only 11 percent of those with primary education and 40 percent with secondary or specialized secondary education migrated, 60 to 80 percent of rural secondary school graduates migrated. Among those youth who completed institutions of higher education (VUZy), 48.6 percent decided to migrate while approximately 31 percent of those who had completed professional-technical schools and tekhnikumy did so. This may be partly reflecting a shift in the importance attributed to factors which define the quality of rural life due to the influence of education as well as the difficulty in finding appropriate jobs. However, as conditions improved and educational levels increased during the 1970s, the number of those wishing to migrate declined in Novosibirsk Oblast.

R. Ryvkina's detailed analysis of data from Novosibirsk elucidates the pattern of migration found there. The nature and conditions of work and the standard of living along with "personal reasons" constituted the major reasons cited for wishing to migrate. Curiously, there appears to have been a partial backlash against some of the characteristics associated with an urban lifestyle as the countryside itself took on more urban characteristics, i.e., the "pull" of the city appears to have declined. The largest pool of migrants came not from the smallest villages, but from middle-size communities with average levels of socio-economic development. This pattern echoes that found in Arutiunian's study of Kalinin Oblast: middle level specialists were the most likely group to migrate. However, in Novosibirsk
the reasons for migration are more closely tied to the standard of living than in other European areas of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the poorest settlements with the least educated work force did not have the largest number of potential migrants. This suggests that absolute levels of poverty do not give rise to dissatisfaction leading to potential action; rather, youth areas which had begun to develop and have a skilled and somewhat more educated work force constitute the major source of potential migrants, a situation which is typically associated with rising expectations.

Of course, the largest pool of potential migrants comes from those in their late teens and early twenties. Their reasons for wanting to migrate differ from those of the rest of the rural population. Younger respondents' answers are more likely to reflect the "pull" of the city as opposed to the "push" of the countryside. Few rural residents over 30 years of age actually cited a desire to live in the city. Dissatisfaction with the conditions and nature of work were the most frequently cited motives for migrating: 27.1 percent for youth and 24.8 percent for rural residents over 30 years of age. In response to the question, "What type of work is considered most important by youth and which would you pick?" the most numerous response (64.9%) was based on interesting conditions of work and its connection with technology. The second-place answer concerned the social prestige of work and salary level (15.6%). Attitudes toward work, it will be recalled, were the most significant indicator of well-
being among youth in Western studies.

Youths also cited a desire to continue their education (27 percent) as a reason for migrating more frequently than older rural residents (14.8 percent). The desire for higher and specialized education includes those who simply wanted further education and those who preferred particular occupations which required further education. The location of higher and specialized secondary institutions has been directly related to the likelihood of migration. The last decade has witnessed efforts to locate more schools in rural areas.

In her dissertation, L. P. Liashenko focused on the relationship between attitudes toward work and migration. Slightly over 23 percent of young rural respondents wished to migrate. However, only those who were "completely dissatisfied" with their work stand out in their wish to migrate (43.8%). All others who indicated that they were fully satisfied, satisfied since another type of work did not exist, were not completely satisfied, or were unable to answer, ranged in their desire to migrate from 19.4 to 28.3 percent. Dissatisfaction with work is positively related to a desire to migrate, but does not constitute a sufficient basis for actual migration. Among rural youth who have no desire to migrate, 71.9 percent are completely satisfied with their work while 51.9 percent of those desiring to migrate are completely satisfied with their work. Once again the major difference is found among those who are entirely dissatisfied with their work. Among those rural youth who desired to migrate, over
30 percent were totally dissatisfied with their work; only 12 percent of those who chose to remain in the countryside were dissatisfied.\textsuperscript{69}

The relationship between age and the reasons cited for migration in Novosibirsk confirms that found in survey work carried out in Krasnodar Krai, and Kalinin, Leningrad, Pskov, Novgorod, and Rostov Oblasts.\textsuperscript{70} As respondents grew older, their standard of living gained importance as a factor motivating migration while education and culture declined in importance. According to Arutunian's study, these differences became most apparent in the post-22 year old group, just as the respondents began to assume family responsibilities. Relative differences in the frequencies reflect the prosperity of a given oblast; for example, respondents in Krasnodar Krai are less likely to desire to migrate.\textsuperscript{71}

The material on migration suggests some of the important effects of the transformation of the countryside. T. I. Zaslavskaiia and her colleagues in Novosibirsk in their detailed study of the countryside present a strong case for the critical impact of the level of development of the socio-economic infrastructure on migration.\textsuperscript{72} The reasons for migration tend to cluster fairly consistently by the population's age, level of education, and occupation. The degree of dissatisfaction associated with these reasons varies according to the infrastructure of the region. Of course, this is not merely a function of socio-economic policies. Demographic structure and
the nature of the economy strongly influence the development of regional infrastructure. Nonetheless, what we find is a relationship of potential significance: the rural population, which has increasing educational levels including some post-secondary vocational education and occupies middle and lower level jobs, will, as it reaches its middle and late twenties, evaluate its surroundings based on its standard of living. Youth tend to focus most on the nature of their employment and this has improved, particularly for males. Greater occupational choice combined with a changing demographic structure has led to a decline in migration. The ultimate result of the above changes will be a somewhat more stable rural population which places increasing importance on its quality of life. Given intra-rural migration and step migration (in which rural residents tend to move sequentially to settlements of larger sizes), a slow homogenization of values throughout Soviet society is likely to occur. This is also a result of increased mobility and the impact of the mass media, especially television, on the countryside.

An unanticipated consequence of the above trend is an increase in the pool of rural residents who have a strong potential for rising expectations. The rate at which economic and social policies succeed is the key to rural residents' satisfaction. Increasingly, rural dissatisfaction will not be dissipated through high rates of urban migration. Indeed, even those who move find themselves critical of the urban lifestyle and the quality of life in overcrowded cities with limited
opportunities for upward mobility. A somewhat surprising tendency has been found among rural migrants in the 1980s—a desire to return to the countryside. Migration is often circular. What is most often is cited as rural migration is actually the net change in population. Increasingly, migrants to cities have a generally positive view of the rural environment and a negative one of the city. Their desire to return to the countryside is tempered, however, by rural living conditions and their ability to find suitable work. Although not specifically noted in this context, the need of rural migrants for higher qualifications and the greater difficulty they encounter in finding appropriate urban employment may also contribute to this trend. At this point what we confront is a merging of expectations for a higher standard of living and lifestyle in both the urban and rural environments. This may be connected with relatively high rates of demand arising in the urban setting and a new set of expectations in the countryside. Thus, our original thesis that changing economic and social conditions will be associated with new attitudes and values appears promising. What these changes will mean for citizen-regime relations and the formation of a new national culture in the Soviet Union remains to be explored.

Professional Orientation

The choice of profession is influenced by objective opportunities and subjective preferences. The reasons why particular professions are desirable provide evidence of changing
values. These values and attitudes testify to change among rural residents and the narrowing of an urban-rural gap.

Differences in the prestige of agricultural and industrial occupations indirectly reflect attitudes towards the countryside and the city and the characteristics with which each sector is associated.

In the 1960s professions not requiring higher education were ranked at a middle level of desirability by youth in Novosibirsk Oblast. Agricultural professions and those in the service sector, whether or not they required higher education, consistently ranked at the bottom of the prestige hierarchy among Novosibirsk youth. On the whole, the prestige of agricultural professions was lower than that of industrial occupations.

Professional prestige was assessed differently by urban youth (city of Novosibirsk) and rural youth (Novosibirsk Oblast). Rural youth held agricultural professions in greater esteem than did their urban counterparts, but still did not grant them high prestige relative to other professions. This was particularly true for agricultural work not requiring specialized education or training. Many rural youth actually held agricultural professions in less esteem than did their parents, an indication of intergenerational change.

Jobs requiring higher education at VUZy (institutions of higher education) tended to be accorded high prestige in all surveys. According to data from Sverdlovsk, but typical of other areas, rural youth continued to be concentrated in medical...
and pedagogical institutions. Medical and teaching jobs were perceived as providing a means out of the countryside. This is reflected by the lack of desire among these students to assume jobs in rural areas.\textsuperscript{78}

Indeed, the desirability of particular jobs varied with the level of urbanization of respondents' residences. For example, the prestige of agricultural professions in Novosibirsk Oblast declined among respondents according to the degree of urbanization of their residence.\textsuperscript{79} Youths from the countryside and small cities held mass industrial jobs in greater esteem than did residents of large cities.\textsuperscript{80} The effect of settlement size is an important source of regional variation. For example, in the Non-Black Earth Zone most kolkhozniki live in small settlements. The effect of the size of settlements is balanced, however, by the distance of the settlement from large cities and the presence of good transportation.\textsuperscript{81}

Rural youth consistently gave lower rankings to scientific professions than did their urban counterparts, but they gave significantly higher ratings to agricultural professions, especially those connected with mechanization. Agricultural professions were ranked higher than industrial jobs by rural youth.\textsuperscript{82} V.N. Shubkin notes that the rankings of occupations by rural youth have shown considerable variation related to the degree of rural isolation. Over time, these rankings have drawn closer to those of their urban counterparts.
The great degree to which rural residents are isolated (a weak network of roads, fewer television sets, radio receivers, newspapers, journals, and books per village resident in comparison with urban residents) causes a great shift in the amplitude of average evaluations in rural locations. Thus, the great regional and ethnic variation in the Soviet Union makes a single prestige hierarchy unlikely until standards of living, life chances, and values grow more homogenous.

The prestige hierarchy found among rural youth has changed since the 1960s. Based on data from surveys of 17 year old graduates of rural secondary schools in 1963 and 1973, the relative prestige of scientific and industrial professions has increased among rural youth in Novosibirsk Oblast. Professional prestige hierarchies also differ according to the gender of the respondent. Both females and males during the 1960s preferred positions in which their gender dominated, such as teaching, the health professions, and service sector jobs for women and industrial, construction, and transport jobs for males. This is no longer so true. So-called female professions have declined in prestige. Some of these changes may be due to the inclusion of a greater proportion of rural youth in the samples, a result of the spread of secondary education in the countryside. This is because those who preferred industrial jobs in 1963 had not completed secondary education and thus were not included in the earlier sample.

Not only does the prestige of professions differ between urban and rural youth, but the factors which influence their professional orientation also differ. These differences reflect
the more isolated nature of rural life. In particular, rural students are more heavily influenced by their parents than are their urban counterparts. The choices of urban youth are most influenced by the mass media, while rural youth are also strongly affected by their early introduction to agricultural work. This accounts, according to Soviet researchers, for rural youths' attitudes toward physical and cerebral labor. However, during the 9th and 10th classes—the final years of a complete secondary education—rural students' attitudes come to resemble those of their urban counterparts more carefully. Once again, we are reminded of the importance of education as a homogenizing factor.

It is worth considering in greater detail the relation between parental preferences and the professional choices of rural youth as an indicator of generational change. Most rural parents prefer that their children choose non-agricultural jobs. It is not surprising that parents who hold white collar jobs prefer that their children also pursue higher or specialized secondary education and choose non-agricultural professions. What must be somewhat alarming for Soviet planners, however, is the strong preference among kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers for their children to pursue non-agricultural jobs. Parental preference for non-agricultural jobs does not, however, reflect a preference for urban over rural life. Thus, a conflict between a preference for a rural lifestyle and jobs which were unavailable in the countryside confronted rural youth until the diversification of the rural occupational structure.
In spite of parental preferences, most youth who chose agricultural jobs had parents who worked at sovkhozy and kolkhozy. The majority of those who became field and livestock workers did so due to a perceived lack of choice, which is not surprising given a general belief that agricultural jobs do not require much knowledge. Most individuals choosing agricultural professions had either relatively limited education, at most completing the 8th class, or had relatively less education than their cohorts at institutions of specialized education.

To summarize, the development of the economic and social infrastructure has influenced the preferences of youth, especially in the countryside. According to the early survey data of Arutiunian, the desirability of agricultural professions increases in more prosperous areas. This is due not only to an increase in salaries (most important in the poor, Non-Black Earth Zone) but also to an improvement in the standard of living. The greater diversity of jobs in the rural sector means that new choices are available for rural youth. They need not choose between simply accepting unskilled jobs or pursuing higher education with the expectation that they must migrate to the city. The greater array of jobs and the increase in agricultural jobs requiring technical knowledge have undoubtedly made the option of choosing to remain in rural areas more probable. Indeed, a high percentage of the rural intelligentsia is drawn from the children of kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers. All of this is consistent with the effects of increasing general levels of education among rural youth. Youth
with less than secondary education had tended to drift into jobs without consciously choosing a profession. Thus, before the end of the 1960s a high percentage of rural youth desired higher education, but, seeing no alternative, settled for going directly to work. As the job structure developed, the desire for education slowly adjusted to the increase in vocational opportunities. This adjustment also appears to have occurred among urban youth.

The more technical nature of agricultural employment has contributed to the increased prestige of agricultural jobs among rural youth. Although the professional aspirations of rural youth overall have grown to more closely resemble those of their urban counterparts, rural youth grant a somewhat higher status to skilled agricultural professions. Whether such changes lead to greater satisfaction depends on the nature of employment and standard of living found in the particular region. The more developed the rural infrastructure, the more likely that the rural population will remain in the countryside, although intra-sectoral mobility may increase.\footnote{91}

Leisure Time

How people use time provides an indicator of social structure and preferences. It is a complex indicator of these factors mediated by a number of intervening factors which influence and/or structure the choices made by the population. Our inability to differentiate clearly between structural and normative components makes it difficult to demonstrate value change, but this does not
prevent time budgets and, more specifically, studies on the use of leisure time from serving as a major means by which to examine social change. Perhaps, the use of leisure time should be viewed as a reflection of structural change as well as individual economic and cultural choices.

Value of Leisure Time

Let us first consider, however, evidence concerning the value allotted to free time (leisure time) in the countryside. In traditional peasant societies time is not highly valued. There is some evidence that this has begun to change in the Soviet countryside as economic conditions have improved. The trade-off for the rural actor is clearly between time and money. This is a complicated equation since the utility of money in rural areas is not easy to assess. It is, of course, a product of the demand and supply of goods. The Soviet economy is based on the allocation of scarce goods. The supply of such goods was traditionally skewed toward the urban sector. Rural residents had to have access to transportation, which was itself a deficit good, in order to obtain a wide selection of desirable products. Until recently money in the rural economy purchased necessities. This is what promoted work on the private plot as a means through which rural residents could become part of the monetary economy. After such needs are met or alternative sources of money are provided, the time devoted to the private plot should decline, unless demand increases. Here we confront the real constraining factor after
minimal needs are met—the availability and desirability of objects for which rural residents need money and a change in their demand structure.

Salaries and social welfare benefits dramatically increased beginning in the middle of the 1960s. This raised the marginal utility of additional income derived from the private plot. Rural savings since the mid-1960s have grown at a faster rate than urban savings. Based on the number of retail outlets and the quality of goods sold, this appears to have limited the utility of working on the private plot. It is probably this scenario which structures the time-work tradeoff in the USSR, as opposed to the saturation of consumer demand, a fact not lost on Soviet planners who attempt to use remunerative means to increase labor productivity.

The increased importance of leisure time, however, reflects more than a purely economic decision. In part, this may reflect a new frame of reference for the rural population. As rural incomes increased in the countryside, the conditions of work have grown in importance. In particular, this is related to the length of the work day, the availability of a day off, and vacations. As previously noted, dissatisfaction with the conditions of work is now a leading cause of migration. Data from the 1970s suggest that youth prefer leisure time to additional income. Although not totally clear, the degree of dissatisfaction with the amount of leisure time in the countryside seems fairly extensive. A study of sovkhozy in the non-Black Earth Zone (Leningrad Oblast) found that sovkhoz workers were dissatisfied with the amount
leisure time available. This was particularly true among youth. In Rostov Oblast 71.5% of the rural population in the early 1970s (1973-74), noted the inadequacy of free time.

Nonetheless, increased free time itself does not necessarily lead to greater satisfaction. Rural youth frequently complain about the lack of options for the use of free time. It is not clear that the efforts to build more clubs and improve libraries, so often called for by Soviet planners and researchers, will lead to greater satisfaction. Indeed, the greater availability of improved facilities does not necessarily lead to greater usage. In part, this dissatisfaction may arise from expectations derived from a new frame of reference--urban and international.

The desire for goods themselves reflects aspirations for an improved standard of living and a desire to adopt a lifestyle more closely resembling that found in the city. Here we need to examine the impact of factors which have broken the isolation which characterized rural society--the mass media, improved transportation, and, most importantly, education. The impact of these factors varies by generation and cultural/ethnic values.

Another aspect of leisure time is the actual use made of it. The confining condition, of course, is the availability of venues in which to spend leisure time. These are traditionally limited in the countryside. Admittedly, the lack of facilities makes the assessment of choice as a function of value preference difficult. Nonetheless, if we our able to ascertain the structure of the desired uses of time rather than the actual use of time, then we
Changes in the Use of Time

The use of time reflects changing preferences which appear
directly related to the rural occupational structure and the
sexual segregation of occupations in the countryside. The
traditional division of labor between males and females appears to
have continued. Some of the patterns found among women from 1963
to 1973 seem related to an absolute increase in non-working time.
Women appear to use this additional time primarily for household
and child care tasks. Although the amount of free time among
rural women as compared to males has increased, men have used
their additional free time to watch television and listen to the
radio. Thus, increases in free time connected to lifestyle and
occupations result in differential usage. It would appear that
increased television viewing reduces rural isolation, but that the
sexual division of labor, like that in cities, perpetuates more
traditional roles. Some differences in the use of leisure time
reflect family size, the absolute amount of time available, and
the availability of labor saving devices.

Both the use of free time and the degree of satisfaction
derived from leisure time activities are closely related to the
educational attainment of rural residents. The higher the level
of education, the greater the desire for cultural opportunities.
For most of the rural population, however, the spread of secondary
education with lower migration rates has led to a more critical attitude toward one's standard of living. Overall, there exists a strong desire for more free time.\textsuperscript{96}

Education is clearly related to rural residents' degree of satisfaction with their leisure time activities. In the non-Black Earth Zone during the 1970s, dissatisfaction with how leisure time was spent was directly related to respondents' level of education. Not only did 92 percent of the respondents with higher education feel that their use of leisure time had deteriorated during the last 3-5 years, but more importantly, those with specialized technical training were also dissatisfied (32.7 to 50.8 percent).\textsuperscript{97}

In comparing the use of leisure time in rural and urban areas, the differences appear to have declined. Perhaps, the fact that until now the majority of urban dwellers were born in the countryside has affected their preference structure.\textsuperscript{98} In general, the decline in rural isolation represented by the spread of television and higher frequency of travel is evidenced by the decline in urban and rural differences in leisure time activities. Dramatic changes in time usage may await second generation urbanites. Overall, the amount of time available in rural areas has increased and rural preferences have grown more similar to those found in urban areas. Increasingly, urban and rural residents will employ a single frame of reference.
Conclusion

What types of preliminary conclusions can be drawn about social change from our indicators?

- Increased secondary education and a more highly differentiated occupational structure in the countryside are leading to the disappearance of an uneducated and unskilled peasantry which was associated with passivity. Rural mass society, especially the young, now possesses the skills to participate.

- Demands for an improved quality of life are associated with those who hold skilled jobs, especially in regions where the economic infrastructure has improved. Those totally dissatisfied with their jobs migrate, but those who remain in the countryside now evidence increased demands.

- Increased demands are associated with regions which have enjoyed at least an "average" level of economic development. Given patterns of economic development in the USSR during the last two decades, Soviet citizens may be approaching a situation of rising expectations due both to improved conditions and a new standard of comparison, i.e., the result of the end of rural isolation.

- Changes in the Soviet countryside have important implications for the urban sector.

- Migration has stabilized. No longer is it necessary for rural residents with secondary and post-secondary education to migrate in order to find employment.

- Previous migrants were satisfied with changing their status by
moving to the city, since upward mobility in the countryside was impossible. Today these migrants will be more demanding at a time when urban social mobility is declining. This will contribute to increased urban demands.

- New attitudes and increased demands are associated with new, incipient social groups based on education and occupation.

**What Does Social Change Mean For Political Life?**

New social groups espousing economic demands now possess skills necessary for political leadership. These are the potential leaders of voluntary associations. This is a broader stratum than the intelligentsia. What is even more important is that this new group may be able to organize a more highly educated mass public which no longer exhibits the passivity associated with a peasant culture. The link between these two groups would be extraordinarily important, since the intelligentsia in the USSR has been isolated from the masses. Such new groups may focus on local issues, such as economic difficulties of daily life as opposed to the intelligentsia's concern for more intangible political liberties.

New groups focusing on low level politics - making demands to affect policies - would confront the Soviet political elite with a dilemma. The economic tasks facing the Soviet Union require increased initiative from middle level management and increased worker productivity, i.e., active participation. This now requires material incentives. If the political elite ignores new
demands, it risks the withdrawal or opposition of new groups. This would result in high economic costs during the transition from industrial to post-industrial society. Economic complexity can no longer tolerate a highly centralized system with low levels of participation and initiative.

If new social groups are not to be ignored, the Soviet Union confronts the dilemma of how either to incorporate groups and allow them influence or to coopt them. It is not at all clear what the political/economic preferences of these groups will be. Nor is it clear how or whether the Soviet system will permit groups to participate. It is, however, evident that this is on the current political agenda. The issue of political change is not simply a matter of political rights, often associated with glasnost', but more fundamentally, how a society which is rapidly changing and beginning to make new demands can be incorporated into a heretofore centralized political system. Social change provides the basis for new groups which are beginning to make demands on the state. The emergence of new social groups and the possibility of voluntary associations and spontaneous group formation will be crucial in the evolution of the Soviet political system.


3. Huntington and Nelson, No Easy Choices.


5. This refers to urban-rural differences, not the multi-ethnic nature of the Soviet state.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 136.


11. Ibid.


23. V. I. Staroverov, ed., Sotsial'nyi oblik srednerusskoi derevni (Moscow: 1S1 AN SSSR, 1982), pp. 74, 75.


27. Zaslavskaia and Muchina, Sotsial'no-demograficheskoe razvitie, p. 308.


32. Considerable diversity exists, particularly in Central Asia, which is not included in this study.


34. See Biulleten' MViSSO SSSR, (June 1982), no. 6, pp. 5-11 and (May 1983), no. 7, pp. 1-7.


37. F.R. Filippov, "Vseobshchee srednee obrazovanie kak faktor sotsial'nogo sblizhenia goroda i derevni," Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, no. 3 (1976), p. 71. Also see, F.R. Filippov, "Deti v strane razvitogo sotsializma," Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia,


42. This trend confirms that noted by Huntington and Nelson, No Easy Choices, pp. 51, 52.

43. Huntington and Nelson, No Easy Choices, p. 81.


45. Ibid., p. 38.


47. Ibid., p. 126.


49. Ibid., p. 46.


51. Ibid., p. 38.

52. Ibid., p. 44.


55. Ibid., p. 10.

56. Ibid, p. 68. Table 13.


59. Liashenko, dissertation, p. 73.

60. For a sophisticated examination of the standard of living in Novosibirsk Oblast from 1967 through 1977 showing the improved conditions and their impact on the values and behavior of the population see R.V. Ryvkina, *Obraz zhizni sel'skogo naseleniia* (Novosibirsk: Izd-vo Nauka Sibirskoe otdelenie, 1979).


63. Ibid., p. 320.

64. Ryvkina, dissertation, p. 320.

### POTENTIAL MIGRANTS BY AGE GROUP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>to 18</th>
<th>19-24</th>
<th>25-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-54 (59)</th>
<th>Older than 55 (60)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65. Ibid., p. 12.
66. Liashenko, dissertation, p. 69, Table 14. Note that 21.9 percent of youth and 31.7 percent of the rural population over 30 years of age could not cite a reason why they wished to migrate.

67. See, for example, Tarasov, Professional'naia orientatsiia and Titma and Saar, Molodoe pokolenie.

68. Liashenko, dissertation, p. 72. Table 15. Those who were undecided ranged from a low of 7.4 percent among those fully satisfied with their work to a high of 13.0 percent among those not very satisfied.

69. Ibid., p. 72, Table 16.

70. See Arutiunian, Sotsial'naia struktura; Semkalov, Tolmachev, and Filippov, Sel'skie kadry nechernozem'ia; G.V. Ignatov, Opyt' sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo izucheniiia professional'noi orientatsii sel'skoi molodezhi (Rostov on the Don: Rostov Pedagogical Institute, 1974); and Chapek, Migratsiia i stabilizatsiia.

71. Arutiunian, Sotsial'naia struktura, p. 164, Table 83.

72. Among the major authors of these numerous works are T.I. Zaslavskaiia, R.V. Ryvkina, I.B. Muchinka, L.A. Khakhulinna, I.M. Belen'kaia, R.I. Shniper, V.I. Fedossev, and others associated with IEiOPP in Novosibirsk.


75. G.M. Kochetov, "Professionalnye plany molodezhi i ikh realizatsiia (Opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia problem vybora professii vypuskikami srednikh shkol Novosibirskoi oblasti)," (Candidate dissertation, Novosibirsk State University, 1968,) pp. 85-86. Kochetov and Liashenko use data from the same surveys carried out in 1967 and 1968. These sources were supplemented by data from surveys carried out in 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1965.

76. Liashenko, dissertation, p. 87, Table 20. 54 percent of graduates of rural secondary schools in Novosibirsk Oblast in the sample ranked tractor drivers and mechanizers lower than did their parents, 53 percent agronomists, 51 percent livestock workers, 47 percent field workers. The percentage of the graduates agreeing with their parents ranged from 29 to 35 percent and among those ranking agricultural professions higher than their parents the
range varied from 16 percent for tractor drivers and mechanizers and 18 percent for livestock and field workers and agronomists to 27 percent for low level mechanization workers.


80. Shubkin and Cherednichenko, *Molodezh*', p. 52, Table 7: Evaluation of the prestige of a series of professions of physical and mental work. (This table presents data for 1963 broken down by sex and type of residence.)


88. Among parents in Moscow Oblast, 69 percent wanted their children to have higher education, 65% in Orel, and 40% in Krasnodar Krai and Kalinin Oblast. Arutunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura*, pp. 238-39.

89. Tarasov, *Professional'naia orientatsiia*, p. 44. This work is based on surveys conducted in 1966/67 in the Amur, Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov oblasts.

90. Tarasov, *Professional'naia orientatsiia*. 
91. This applies in a relative sense since the gross level of migration reflects shifts in the demographic structure of the population, i.e., the decline in the number of youth due to the world wars.


94. Patrushev, Biudzhet vremeni, p. 203.

95. In 1963 rural men had 1.7 times more time than rural women. In 1973, the difference dropped to 1.2 times. Ibid., p. 160. The data are for Rostov Oblast.

96. Staroverov, Sotsial'nyi oblik, p. 71.

97. Voronstov, dissertation, pp. 93, 94.
