Title: Restructuring the Soviet Past: The Politics of History under Gorbachev

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COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 803-06

DATE: MAY 8, 1990

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In proclaiming the arrival of a new era in social relations—the era of glasnost—the Soviet leaders had no doubt that they would be able to control the process completely, especially where history was concerned. As is apparent from numerous statements by Gorbachev, Ligachev, Vadim Medvedev, and even Aleksandr Yakovlev, they were counting on the matter being limited, as it was in the latter half of the 1950s and early 1960s, to criticism of the Stalin period. They were prepared to go slightly further, but only in rehabilitating the prominent figures of the Bolshevik Party, which, as we know, Khrushchev chose not to do. Yet even this belated act of justice, absolving N. I. Bukharin, A. I. Rykov, L. B. Kamenev, and others of the absurd accusations of treason, was initially essential to Gorbachev and his associates in order to counterpoise Stalin's "revolution from above" to the unused possibilities of NEP and Lenin's cooperative plan. However, the speculations surrounding NEP led to an unanticipated consequence. The criticism of the Soviet past came right up to the last bastion: the Lenin period. The origin of the "administrative command system" was moved back from the early 1930s; first, to 1928, and then, to 1925-1926. It was here that it became difficult to "defend" the Leninist understanding of socialism, since publications by writers and even some historians showed that this system had become deeply rooted already during Lenin's lifetime.

Another, equally important unanticipated result of opening the floodgates restraining the interest in Soviet history was the
growth in non-professional publications on history. Given the timidity, indecision, and unwillingness of the academic historians to reexamine their Stalinist views, a broad public simply turned its back on the official interpretation of Soviet history, in which the formulations changed, but the foundation remained immutable.

The key posts in academic historical scholarship were in the hands of people who had calmly weathered the Khrushchev "thaw" and had also felt completely comfortable during the nearly twenty-year period of Soviet conformism that followed. Even the election of new members and corresponding members to the USSR Academy of Sciences in historical disciplines during the years of perestroika lead to no serious change in the echelon of "power" in historical scholarship. This is readily discernable in the speeches of the new heads of the history sections and even of the new directors of historical institutes at all kinds of local and international conferences and roundtables. As a rule, official Soviet historians continued to speak "in the name" of Soviet historical scholarship, yet did not express their own points of view as scholars or individual researchers, or in the extreme case, as adherents of some direction in historical scholarship. This effort to retain a monopoly position in scholarship can only be compared to the analogous tendency in the economic agencies of the Soviet Union, who strive to maintain their monopoly in any way possible. Gorbachev's speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution in November of 1987 was of great support in this regard. However, commensurate with the deterioration in the
economic and political situation of the Soviet Union in the years of perestroika, the criticism of the Soviet past increased swiftly. In early 1988, the appearance of Mikhail Shatrov's play Dal'she, dal'she [Onward, Onward] was perceived by the liberal wing of the intelligentsia as an effort to slow the "assault" on the Lenin period, and by the conservatives, as a disgraceful shock to the foundations of the Soviet regime. By the end of that very same year, especially after the 19th All-Union Party Conference, it became virtually impossible to control the process of filling in the "blank pages" of history. This was because more than a revision of historical postulates covering the entire period of Soviet history took place. In the republics, and even in the oblast's, at the initiative of local historians and archaeologists, and in some cases, with the participation of the local authorities, what may be called a process of "opening the strata of history" began. This took place both in the literal and figurative senses. Graves of victims of the Stalinist terror were discovered in Moscow, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and in Lithuania, Vorkuta, and the Chelyabinsk Oblast'; special search parties painstakingly examined the secret burials of people who had been killed by the authorities. This struck not only at the roots of the Soviet Communist Party's policy on history, but also at its prestige and the values it represented for the 70 years of its rule. The erosion of the history taught in the schools, universities, and at lectures of the Znaniye [Knowledge] society had a direct influence on the Party's position in society. Something improbable occurred:
the history of the past began to influence the policy of perestroika, and even forcibly invade its boundaries. Embittered polemics flared up between the official historians, and, above, all, the historians of the CPSU on one hand, and individual professional historians on the other. The CPSU and the state apparatus it controls threw tremendous resources into the dissemination of its slightly renovated version of the history of the CPSU and into the creation of corresponding books and textbooks, with the goal of using the mass media to impede the spread of other versions of Soviet history. Nonetheless, the results of this effort were scanty.

Gorbachev's official policies on history actually became subject to doubts and attacks at the 19th All-Union Party Conference in the summer of 1988 on the part of agrarians—the leaders of agricultural associations and enterprises, and kolkhozniks. They demanded not only an unconditional condemnation of the policies of collectivization and of elimination of the kulaks; they also sought the restoration to the rural population and economy of the huge losses suffered as a result of the destructive policies conducted by the state over the course of a half a century. Ideologically, their positions were supported by the works of the writers Boris Mozhayev, Viktor Astaf'yev, and Vasily Belov. It became impossible to avoid an assessment of the origin and consequences of the famine in the Ukraine in 1932-1933. It turned out that for a large portion of society in the USSR, it was a genuine discovery that the most truthful description and
analysis of the famine in the Ukraine was given in British historian Robert Conquest's book *Harvest of Sorrow*. This book had been the subject of attacks in the United States by revisionist historians, and in the USSR, by the official historians. In both countries there was a "closing of the ranks." Conquest's work was translated into Russian and published in the most respected journal in the Soviet Union, *Novyy mir* [New World].

Another event unforeseen by official policy on history took place as well. The first textbook on the history of the USSR (before June of 1941) appeared that "buried" the earlier, official history which was taught to secondary school students. Nonconformist forces emerged in historical scholarship: these included Yu. N. Afanasev, L. M. Batkin, N. Lebedeva, and S. Z. Sluch. The Association of Young Historians was founded. Young historians, such as Dmitry Yurasov, arose unexpectedly; Yurasov made public certain secret data from the Archive of the Military College of the USSR Supreme Court. Research and speeches before large audiences by this cluster of historians influenced public opinion, and through it, official policies. As a result of this and also owing to purely pragmatic motives of the Soviet political leadership, there were admissions of paramount importance, completely contradicting earlier versions of Soviet history, and even versions developed under perestroika. Here we can mention the secret protocols of the Soviet-German accords of 1939.

Gorbachev's policy on history in no way foresaw that the campaign to immortalize the memory of the victims of the Stalinist
terror could transform into the widely-branched organization of the historical and educational society Memorial, whose goals and aims now go far beyond mere discussion of plans for monuments.

Now official academic historians have become activated, to the point where they agree to discuss both the errors of the October Revolution and those of Lenin himself. This is taking place against the backdrop of the collapse of the system created as a result of the October coup, and at a time when official policy on history is in decline. With the apparently unavoidable loss of the monopolistic position of the CPSU in society, policy on history is becoming less and less discernible. Assessments of the Soviet past by current or future leaders of the Soviet state will not bear the form of orders, and their value will not be great. One can anticipate the appearance of different versions of history as well.

The age of perestroika is a genuinely unique moment in the history of Russia. History created from politics toppled into the past (in the words of M. N. Pokrovskiy) has turned into politics projected into the future.
INTRODUCTION

Work on this project was conducted over a period of two years (from May 1, 1988 to April 30, 1990). It was supported primarily by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research and in part by the Harvard Russian Research Center, where the study was conducted. Further materials were collected by Dr. Nekrich in Moscow (from November 19, 1989 to February 7, 1990) at the initiative and with the support of the Russian Research Center. The work conducted in Moscow was completely justified in that it provided the opportunity for direct contact with Soviet historians and for presentation of lectures at the Historical Archive Institute, the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Public Historical Library, the Institute of World Economy and International Affairs of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Institute of General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It also afforded contact with scholars from various disciplines involved in the activity of the historical education society, Memorial. These included, among others, Academician Andrei Sakharov, V. Goldanskiy, and R. Sagdeyev. A lecture on "Restructuring the Past" presented at the Historical Archive Institute in Moscow was in part later published by the newspaper of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the State Committee on Education, Poisk [Search]. Interviews on the study of history were carried by Moscow Radio and Uchitel'skaya gazeta [Teachers Gazette], and Dr. Nekrich appeared on Moscow Central Television's program Vzglyad [Glance]. It became clear that there is tremendous interest in the
Soviet past not only among professional historians, teachers, and students, but among a significant segment of society as well, which is seeking an explanation for today's misfortunes in the history of the USSR. Each lecture presented by Dr. Nekrich drew an audience of 250-300 people.

Dr. Nekrich also met with the authors of the new tenth-grade textbook on the history of the USSR, Professors Yu. S. Borisov and Yu. A. Korablyev, as well as with M. A. Boytsov, who develops programs for the teaching of history in secondary schools. Dr. Nekrich met several times with the young and well-known historian Dmitry Yurasov, who compiled a reference file of 150,000 victims of the Stalinist terror, and on numerous occasions with historians, writers, members of the Interregional Group of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, members of the club Moskovskaya tribuna [Moscow Tribunal], and publishers.

The rapid and unpredictable development of events in the USSR beginning in the summer of 1988 made it necessary to modify plans for the study while it was underway, introducing corrections without stopping the project. The most significant and unforeseeable addition to the project was the study of the activity of the Memorial society and its branches, particularly its Yaroslavl branch (Dr. Nekrich travelled to Yaroslavl for this purpose), and branches of the society in Chelyabinsk. One of the Chelyabinsk leaders came to Moscow to meet with Dr. Nekrich. Other additions were made during the course of the study as well. For example, new evidence on crimes committed by the regime constantly
came to light: burials of those who were executed were uncovered in Moscow, Byelorussia, in the Ukraine, in Lithuania, and in the Chelyabinsk Oblast'. The study of the new discoveries revealed during the project came to an end with the official acknowledgement by the Soviet Government on April 12, 1990 of the crime committed in the Katyn Woods (near Smolensk) in April of 1940, where Polish reserve officers were shot. Executions took place in other locations as well: according to Western calculations, the overall number of victims reached 15,000 members of the Polish intelligentsia. The positions on the events taken by current Soviet leaders changed constantly: the pressure of new facts required new admissions. In many instances the issue of publishing documents relating to the investigations of the 1950s was to surface. The subject of the study turned out to be so intertwined with the political events now taking place that work on the identification of individual yet important pages of the USSR's history which had seemed hopelessly buried in closed archives continued literally until the last week of the grant.

A more precise description of the state of Soviet historical scholarship and the key issues and discussions may be found in an article which is one of the concluding parts of the project "Restructuring History."
I. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

In Moscow, not far from the Abelmanov Gate and the Moscow Meat Processing and Storage Facility, is the Kalitnikov Cemetery. "Cattle Drive"—now known as Progonnaya Street—runs along the Cemetery; this was the road that led cattle down the last stretch to the slaughterhouse, hence the name. During the Thirties, it was used for more than just cattle. At night closed metal vans would approach the Cemetery on Cattle Drive, the same vehicles used to transport animal carcasses by day. The trucks would turn onto a well-worn road leading to a deep ravine on the left side of the Cemetery; the doors were flung open and the naked corpses of men and women were cast into the ravine. Some had bullet holes in their heads, stuffed with bits of cloth, evidently to keep the blood from oozing out. The corpses were thrown so that they would land as far away as possible; the now freed hands scattered a bit of sand over the bodies, then sped off for a new consignment.

Some of the "enemies of the people" punished in Moscow prisons were "luckier": after execution their bodies were loaded into boxes and burned at night in the ovens of the Moscow crematorium. Appropriate notations were made in the victims' "case files" and the records were sent off for permanent storage. After cremation the ashes were thrown into a pit dug especially for that purpose next to the wall of the neighboring Donskoy Monastery. Now, as Moscow journalist Alexander Milchakov tells us, there is an anonymous grave in the form of a flower-bed bearing the inscription "Common Grave of Ashes Not Claimed by Relatives, 1930-1942."
has the appearance of being done honorably: the ashes unclaimed by relatives were gathered and buried. The relatives, however, received the standard notice in response to their inquiries regarding the fates of their arrested husbands, fathers, and sons: sentenced without right to correspond. Their actual fate—the death sentence—was hidden behind these words.

In 1988 Byelorussian archaeologists came upon mass graves in Kurapaty, a tract of forest near Minsk. They discovered more than 500 graves, and estimate that altogether there are more than 900. At the Kurapaty "death factory," 25—35 acres set off by a solid 28-foot fence, mass executions took place over a period of four years, from 1937—1941.3

Who were the unfortunates? Vadim Shershov, author of one of the articles on the Kurapaty tragedy, writes: "the majority of those executed were farmers, workers, petty officials, and members of the rural intelligentsia. The nature of the find testifies that the victims—many women among them—had either left their homes before they died or were clearly preparing to leave."4 They were all shot with bullets through the back of the head. There were many such death factories on the territory of the USSR.

A special commission established by the Byelorussian government concluded that the remains of no less than 30,000 Soviet citizens are buried at Kurapaty.5 A precise figure has yet to be determined. The archaeologists who opened the graves came up with a different number: they estimate that some 250,000 lost their lives there. The commission also established that the slaughter
was carried out by the NKVD. Thus far no documents relating to the mass executions in Kurapaty have come to light.

In 1989 mass graves of victims of the Stalin terror were opened at the Bykovnya Forest not far from Kiev. For many years the authorities maintained that more than 6,000 Soviet soldiers, partisans, and peaceful citizens killed during the German occupation were buried there. Surviving local inhabitants, however, contend that the graves in fact date to the pre-war period. The remains show clear traces of bullets shot through the back of the head, the method of execution preferred by the NKVD.

During the war with Germany, withdrawing Soviet troops shot political prisoners everywhere. This "liquidation" was discussed in one of the October issues of the newspaper Sovetskaya Litva [Soviet Lithuania]. The fact that this information was published is undoubtedly related to the torrent of national emotion now coursing through the Baltic republics; this does not, however, mitigate the authenticity of the account of what took place 47 years ago.

On June 24, 1941, 73 prisoners were taken from the prison at Telshyay and brutally slaughtered in the woods. Who were they? Farmers, office workers, and 18 and 19 year-old members of the Telshyay trade school who were made out to be "counter-revolutionaries" and "fascists." The execution was carried out by members of a sub-unit of the 8th Soviet Army. The retreating troops were short on bullets: they killed with bayonets, crowbars, shovels, and axes, and trampled the bodies with their feet.
The decision to execute this group of prisoners was made by a commission that included, among others, the Deputy Chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and a Red Army representative. Thus responsibility cannot be placed wholesale on the tyranny of the state security agencies. It involves all parts of the system, without exception; the main responsibility, of course, must be borne by the party in power.

Eyewitnesses of these dismal affairs still survive. One of them is Zinaida Filippova, born in 1922. She worked 50 years in a maternity home near the Abelmanov Gate. Filippova is a delegate to the soviet of Moscow's Proletarskiy District and is a decorated veteran of World War II. Her photograph is displayed on the Honor Board at the District Health Department.

Filippova lived through the war and saw much. It would seem that she of all people would be the one to reveal the secret of the Kalitnikov Cemetery, at least during the Khrushchev period following the death of Stalin. She chose to remain silent, however, as did other witnesses, people who as children and adolescents hid behind the tombstones in the cemetery and saw the apocalyptic scene of the bodies being cast into the chasm. According to her statements, Filippova kept silent even though she could still remember the sickening, sweet smell of corpses decomposing in the ravine at Kalitnikov.

Witnesses began talking only recently—and not at the behest of the authorities, but as a result of journalism and archeologists' excavations. The special commission of the
Byelorussian government found more than a hundred witnesses, people who had all held their tongues for decades, driving the thought from their minds that those executed must have families, children, and relatives who do not even know where their loved ones are buried. Have the witnesses considered the fact that their silence helped bury the memory of the terror's victims?

At the request of A. Snechkus, Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, the man who organized the execution of the prisoners near Telshyay, prepared an explanation of the events. It contains no hint of remorse for his villainy. The feeling is quite another—that of a duty well discharged.

Other organizers and perpetrators of the mass executions of innocent citizens are alive and flourishing; they too are silent, of course, and are living out their remaining days on fine pensions. Some have been named in the press, particularly those who were involved in the trials of ranking Soviet Party, military, state leaders, and cultural figures.

II. HISTORY AS POLITICS PROJECTED INTO THE FUTURE

In discussing problems of Soviet historical scholarship we should constantly be mindful of the fact that for decades all of Soviet history was divided into two main parts. The first encompasses the periods and events whose reexamination was not only allowed, but desirable; the second, the events that were not to be subject to reevaluation. This division was the principal basis for the Soviet periodization of history. From time to time this
periodization was changed in order to create a more acceptable balance between the past and the pressing needs of the CPSU. In so doing, the place and function of the professional historians was determined. The times most favorable for independent research were, as a rule, moments of acute political conflict or when the balance between political factions struggling for power was not fixed.

From the October Revolution and up to the establishment of the one-party dictatorship of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), there existed fragments of several schools of history, each with its own particular view of Russian history: there were the schools of Solovyev, Klyuchevsky, Platonov, and populist historiography, and the historical views of Plekhanov were still held by members of the revolutionary intelligentsia.

The establishment of the one-party Bolshevik system brought with it the confirmation of a new type of historiography that corresponded to the system. The school of M. N. Pokrovskiy emerged, initially receiving the support of Lenin and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). All the other historical schools were on the periphery, and their proponents—not all, to be sure—were so to speak outside the law. Some were deported, others were sent into internal exile, and yet others were arrested. Some historians were executed by the Soviet authorities: the Marxists Lukin, Vanag, and Knorin, and the philosophers Luppol, Sten, and Slepkov. The establishment of the Stalin dictatorship led to the elimination of the Pokrovskiy school as well. It was destroyed by
the efforts of Pokrovskiy's own students, some of whom were quite talented.

In 1934-1936, the need for a new interpretation of history corresponding to the political exigencies of the Stalinist state resulted in a series of Party decrees on the teaching of history, as well as the well-known commentaries of Stalin, Kirov, and Zhdanov on the draft textbook of the history of the USSR. Finally, in 1938, the Short Course on the History of the VKP(b) (All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) was published; it became the holy reference handbook on the history of the USSR. In a certain sense the basic professional responsibilities of Soviet historians became more simple: one way or another, their research was to support or confirm the interpretation of history contained in the Short Course. The basic premise of this work was that the Party is always right.

Gradually, yet not without some resistance on the part of individual historians, commentary on Party directives in the form of historical tracts became routine practice for Soviet historical scholarship from archaeology to contemporary modern history. But the Party leaders changed. Each wanted to make what contribution he could to the interpretation of the history of Russia and the USSR. Incidentally, the foundations of this history remained untouched.

The social sciences, and history, above all, were and remain—possibly to an even greater degree now, during the era of perestroika—a most important constituent part of the Soviet
regime. Established by the October Revolution, the backbone of this regime has its own "spinal cord": ideology, which in many ways determines the regime's policies. Despite numerous assurances from all sides that ideology lost its significance with the advent of perestroika, ideology in fact has undergone a transformation. It became part of the cell system of Soviet society and Soviet citizens. Within the cells of the civilian organism, it serves as a natural self-defense mechanism against the incursion of new and hostile ideas.⁹

At all times and perhaps, in all countries, history has been used as an instrument for manipulating people's consciousness. A people's moral and spiritual state has depended not least of all on the interpretation and perception of history. This is particularly true for completely ideologized states of the Nazi or Soviet type, where there is one sole ideology preserved with the entire strength of the state's power. All Soviet leaders have understood the importance of history and have constantly used it for their fully pragmatic ends. For example, by compelling its citizens to repeat millions of times that the "imperialism" of the United States is the ideological heir of Hitlerism, the Soviet leaders managed to create in the minds of Soviet citizens what we call the "image" or "archetype" of the enemy, and it is none too easy for many Soviet citizens to free themselves from this legacy of the Cold War.

One sole ideology justifies and even implies the rule of one single interpretation of the past. And although each subsequent "Fuhrer" or "Leader" [vozhd'] of the Soviet people has introduced
changes in the interpretation of Soviet history, its basic foundations have only now begun to change before our eyes, and with great difficulty, at that. Only three years ago the current Director of the Institute of Military History, then the First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, D. A. Volkogonov, wrote the following of the United States in one of his books: "Violence, fear, corruption, prostitution, racism, and senseless brutality are characteristic moral traits of the "Free World"—the world free of justice, free of humanism, and free of benevolence." This was how the United States was depicted by a man with a Doctorate in Philosophical Sciences, a professor and the author of more than 20 books and several hundred articles on historical, philosophical, and political issues, in the second year of perestroika, 1987. Here is how he described Soviet society: "The spiritual values of the Soviet man, of the Soviet warrior, are also inspired by high moral ideals." That same Volkogonov recently produced a fairly solid book on Stalin, completely in keeping with the spirit of perestroika.

Central Committee Secretary and Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev gave a completely different assessment of the condition of Soviet society in mid-1988. By rights he should be considered a theoretician of perestroika. He said, "We are only approaching the ideology of freedom and its moral code." And here we find the difference between a real evaluation of Soviet society and the one that was fabricated, yet persisted for nearly 70 years.
The views of President and General Secretary Gorbachev on the history of the USSR have been formulated in his various speeches¹³ and in his well-known book on perestroika.¹⁴ His attitude towards historical issues is perhaps most fully expressed in his article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika,"¹⁵ to which, incidentally, Pravda gave further interpretation several days after printing the article.¹⁶ Yet in his book Perestroika, published two years before the article, the Soviet leader stressed that the Soviet Union is a young state, a state without analogy in history or in the world today. This view of the USSR's history may seem to be worthy of attention to those social scientists and historians both in the USSR and in the West who claim that Soviet Russia descended directly from and continues the policies of Tsarist Russia. Yet anyone defending this point of view has lost sight of the fact that the new social order established in Russia after the October Revolution was from the very beginning calculated to spread that same system to other states, with a fully unified infrastructure. The creation of the socialist system after World War II, the basic elements of which almost completely copied the Soviet system, of course with some variations corresponding to historic traditions, was a distinct revival of the idea of world revolution that had been shattered in the early 1920s. We note here that in the socialist countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the fundamental approach to economic, political, and structural problems has been almost identical. (China, it follows, should be considered an exception.) And
everywhere we have seen the same technique of power, with all of its elements, without exception. The obvious bankruptcy of the system, above all in those of its parts that have been "socialist" for less than fifty years, shows, it seems to me, the bankruptcy of the idea of the eternal nature of this type of system and the brevity of its historical existence. It would seem that the disintegration of the outer tier of the Soviet empire testifies to the bankruptcy of the very idea of a unitary man in a unitary state. The propagation of the deceptive image of the future (here I am borrowing a metaphor from Gorbachev's November, 1989 article mentioned above) ultimately led to a profound moral catastrophe and brought the Soviet Union to the brink of an abyss. The responsibility for this cannot be placed on Tsarist Russia or the traditions of the Russian people.

Another problem, touched upon by Gorbachev on more than one occasion, is the October Revolution. Properly speaking, this is the cornerstone of Soviet history. Neither Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Ligachev, nor any other state or political figure interpreting Soviet history can avoid this subject. Moreover, there is a sort of mental link for entire generations, if not with the Revolution directly, then with notions relating to it. The conclusion at which professional Soviet historians, at least in their majority, arrive is one and the same: the Bolshevik Revolution saved Russia from ruin. In the article mentioned earlier, Gorbachev contends: "Now, in accordance with our intensifying penetration into the essence of our own history, it is becoming more and more obvious
that the October Revolution was not a mistake. This is not only because the real alternative was by no means a bourgeois democratic republic, but rather an anarchic revolt and the bloody dictatorship of a military clique, and the establishment of a reactionary, anti-people regime." This assertion only superficially corresponds to the realities of 1917. The issue is not whether a revolution, regardless of what kind it was—English or French, for that matter—was an error. The Revolution took place: first in February, followed by the coup in October. A well-organized Party seized power, at that moment not encountering organized resistance either in the capital or elsewhere in the country. Not dwelling on all of the excesses of that time, we shall note only that in April of 1917, when Lenin arrived in Petrograd, the country was, at his own admission, the freest in the world, but its government was weak and indecisive. The finale is well known: the Revolution concluded with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly—the first Russian parliament freely elected by the people—by the Bolsheviks. What turn events might have taken were it not for the October coup is a matter of conjecture. We do know what did happen, however. But whether the country would have been subsumed in peasant and worker unrest is open for speculation. There was anarchy in the first year following the Revolution, incidentally, but there was also savage dictatorship. What could have been expected from the military if the Constituent Assembly had formed a government? Attempts at a coup? Why would the military have wanted to act against the Assembly? What position would the
Bolsheviks themselves have taken? And the workers and the peasants? There are a great many questions that history cannot answer. Yet by the same token there is no basis for the contention that ruin awaited Russia save for the October Revolution.

There is much evidence that makes this contention of Gorbachev and Soviet historiography doubtful. Russia did continue to develop economically while a world war was in progress. It had economically powerful allies in France and Great Britain, and in 1917, the United States, too, appeared on the Western Front. The main contention of Soviet historiography also cannot be proved because the world war was won by a coalition one year following the Revolution.

A characteristic feature of the Soviet system is that the leader determines not only the country’s policies, but the direction of ideological development as well. It is possible that following the consolidation of power in the hands of the president and the new apparatus he created, given the waning prestige of the CPSU and the formation of a democratically-minded opposition, the General Secretary would have but a limited range of ideological problems. His concern, as may be deduced from Gorbachev's last speech on the occasion of the 120th anniversary of Lenin's birth, would have become the preservation of the Leninist ideological legacy and the interpretation of “Lenin's testament.” And all the same the leader of the Party, regardless of who he might be, would have no other alternative but to repeat, in various renditions, the definition of Soviet history Gorbachev gives in his book on
perestroika: "Soviet history is overall a history of indisputable progress, despite all the losses, setbacks and failures...we stubbornly marched on and never thought of retreating, of giving up the ground we had gained, or of questioning our socialist choice." 17

Gorbachev of course understands the significance of history as an important instrument in reforming society and the state. But for Gorbachev the head of the country, history performs a purely functional role. This is the reason why his interpretations of past events change with striking rapidity, depending each time on the constellation of forces in the political arena and the exigencies of the moment. Unlike Gorbachev, A. N. Yakovlev, without doubt the most powerful figure in the Gorbachev "team," has his own view of history. This of course is due above all to the fact that Yakovlev is a historian by education (and who, incidentally, has very few works of professional caliber to his credit). Yakovlev's historical views are far from the orthodox Soviet view, which is erroneously termed Marxist. Perhaps most appropriate here would be "Soviet," since as a rule these views are an eclectic hodgepodge of quotes from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and the decrees of the most recent CPSU congress and Central Committee plenums. Yakovlev's historical arguments are directly in line with the most urgent needs of the Party, yet he has moved far away from the "Soviet" view. His view of history, the Revolution, and historical progress are put forth most fully in his report "The Great French Revolution and the Present," prepared in conjunction
with the bicentennial of the French Revolution. Yakovlev's main idea is that the French Revolution opened a new era in the history of humanity. The principles and postulates it proclaimed are "universal and not dependent on time." The French Constitution of 1793, which never actually came into force, formulated guarantees of human rights. In contemporary declarations about human rights Yakovlev sees the realization of the ideals of two revolutions: the French and the Russian. He sees them as complimentary. Yakovlev terms the principle of actually ensuring rights and freedoms first and foremost; this principle finds its fullest expression in the ideas of, as he puts it, "the other great revolution—the October Revolution." But Yakovlev was perceptive enough to add a qualification immediately: "The October Revolution expanded the humanistic horizons of the French Revolution, but of course, does not set a limit to them." In examining the strengths and weaknesses of the French Revolution, Yakovlev seems to arrive at the thought that in any revolution, including both the French and Russian Revolutions, a boundary is attained, "beyond which the striving for a reasonable, moral organization of life actually begins to be negated by amoral means of achieving the goal."

Yakovlev notes several features common to revolutions; of course, he means the October Revolution as well, although he prefers to draw his examples from the French experience. They include the messianic spirit, in which, as Yakovlev writes, "the ascendant class lays claim to being the liberator of mankind but in
As applied to the history of the Russian Revolution this hypothesis seems disputable, insofar as it was preceded by the February Revolution, which in short order achieved the same goals as the French Revolution, namely, the destruction of the old regime. The October Revolution was a coup organized by a well prepared party, which, in the end, began to construct a new order. Very soon the interests of the classes for whose benefit the revolution was allegedly carried out were sacrificed to the idea of a unitary state; on the top of the pyramid of power was a group of leaders from the ruling party. Yakovlev says that February of 1917 "did not have time to solve the problem" of creating democratic structures, many of which had not even been proposed. It fell to the lot of the October Revolution to "create the technology of a democratic society." In fact, if the February Revolution had "not had time," it was only because it was violently interrupted by the Bolshevik coup, and it was the Bolsheviks who were not up to the task of creating the "technology of a democratic society" since the very idea of democracy was profoundly hostile to them. Yakovlev chooses to substitute for this historical fact by reasoning that it was not possible since the "bottom of society" was activated, which, according to Yakovlev's assurances, settled in power in the form of Stalinism. The Party reconciled itself to this state of affairs. Among the causes "fertilizing the soil for authoritarianism and despotism" was faith in the possibility of forcing development, and the idealization of violence. Yakovlev does not mention the most
important point, although he is of course very well aware of it: the very idea of socialist construction in Russia was faulty from the very start, just as it was faulty for the many countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America in which it was introduced. Yet it is just this that Yakovlev fails to mention: socialism has suffered worldwide defeat. It is important, however, that he understands this. The proof here may be found in his statement that "the idea of violence as the midwife of history has exhausted itself, as has the idea of dictatorship based directly on violence." In so stating Yakovlev makes a decisive break from the postulates of Marx and Lenin. Yakovlev does not think, however, that revolutions have receded into the past, because they are nothing other than "moments of truth." The new view of the historical process consists not in the opposition of revolution and evolution to one another, but in the understanding that they are intertwined. From the mouth of Yakovlev this hypothesis rings like a revival of forgotten (half-forgotten?) Biblical and Christian truths, from which he in fact draws a formulation close to that of Christian socialism: "the ultimate goal of the class struggle lies in peace and harmony."

Having stated this Yakovlev asserts that he remains on a socialist foundation and notes that the face and values of socialism were deformed by its own adherents: they substituted dogmatism and scholasticism for the scientific approach, misled themselves as to the possibilities of contemporary capitalism, and were apathetic to the "disintegration of social life." This would
be all well and good were it not for a single "but," which consists in the fact that all these errors and delusions are in fact characteristic features of the society which arose as a result of the October coup and that these traits can only be eliminated by dismantling the entire infrastructure of that society.

Here one can agree or disagree, but in fact, of most importance in the historical views of Aleksandr Yakovlev is that the world has now entered a new era and that the experience of the French and October Revolutions is no longer enough. Naturally, the "new thinking" is proposed in its stead. It seems more or less attractive as a theory, but in the light of the lessons of history, the insistent repetition by the Soviet leaders of humanistic socialism, which is still only approaching, not only creates pessimism, but a certain mistrust in the realism of the Soviet leaders themselves and of their policies. This repetition along the lines of "socialism is now firmly on its feet, has acquired impressive initial potential, has come far enough in its development that its productive forces have required new relations in society" serves only to obscure the essence of the matter. This is the origin of the wariness of many Soviet historians towards the "restructuring of the past."
III. PERESTROIKA IN HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP

We know that perestroika began with the economy. It quickly became apparent to the leadership, however, that the deplorable state of the economy is due above all to the "superstructure," the political structure in which the social sciences play their own, special role. This role consists in the creation of at least a superficial unity of the people by means of ceaseless repetition of the same ideological postulates and the fortification in social consciousness of ideas of the greatness, power, and importance of the Soviet state and its history. At the end of 1987, when it became clear to the leadership that without an ideological shake-up the economy wasn't going to budge, the social sciences became the subject of sharp criticism from Yakovlev, then CPSU Central Committee Secretary for Ideology. In particular, touching upon history, he declared, "What is needed is a full and true analysis of all the pages of our history, directed toward identifying the dialectics of the course we have travelled, in all its aspects."22 Here the Secretary for Ideology went further than the General Secretary, and proposed, in his report dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, mainly to examine the events of 1937.23 Properly speaking, this undertaking was begun in the second half of the 1950s and in the early 1960s, with the decrees of the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses and the "quiet" rehabilitation of many of those tried in the 1930s, with the exception of the key figures: Bukharin, Kamenev, and Rykov. Yet in essence this course had been legally acknowledged by the CPSU.
Lines began to be drawn among professional historians, largely according to the positions they held. All the posts were held by those who had been in the Trapeznikov entourage, the powerful (owing to the support of Brezhnev) head of the CPSU Central Committee's Department of Science and Higher Educational Institutions. These historians, many of whom Trapeznikov made full or corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, decided to "sit perestroika out." Their decades of experience had prepared them well in this regard. Typical of this period was the speech of Academician M. P. Kim at a roundtable at the journal Kommunist [Communist]: "And thus our Party's directive, that of its leadership, that history must be reconstructed is completely correct; history must be illuminated from all sides, both the positive and the negative. Not just from one side, but specifically from all sides."24 His appeal was immediately seized upon and historians produced articles in which they reduced the issue to one of minor, insignificant slip-ups and unfinished affairs.25 One can understand the irritation of Yakovlev, who did not fail to mention that "the social sciences are one of the outposts of conservatism, preserving the dying flames of dogmatism."26

The most fiery critic of the state of Soviet historical scholarship throughout all the years of perestroika has been the Rector of the Moscow State Historical Archive Institute, Yuri Afanasev, a Doctor of Historical Sciences and historian of the French Revolution. "One must have courage," he said, "not to
succumb to enticements when facing the dilemma of truth or one's career. I dare to assure you that far from everyone has chosen the former...."27 And on another occasion, he wrote, "Perhaps there is no other country in the world whose history has been as falsified as ours."28

Afanasev binds together the state of historical scholarship in the USSR and the condition of society and the state: "We have long lived in the state of a declared, monolithic, I would even say 'impermeable' unity.... From this feigned unity, phenomena, facts, processes, groups, and alliances of various orders and types have begun to spew forth...."29

In 1987 Afanasev still hoped, apparently, for a reformation of the Party; he reproached historians: "History has ceased to be an assistant of the Party in solving problems of social development and the formation of policies... Well just what is this, an unwillingness, an inability, to look truth in the eyes? Or perhaps a policy?"30 Afanasev learned many lessons during the years of perestroika in his position in the avant-garde of the democratic movement. The logic of the development of events finally leads him to an understanding that everything is due to the nature and politics of the Party. He successively becomes a People's Deputy of the USSR, heads the Interregional Group of People's Deputies and the Moscow Tribuna [Rostrum] intellectual club, becomes one of the founders of the Memorial society, and ultimately participates actively in the development of an alternative to the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress--the "Democratic
Platform." In April of 1990 Afanasev left the CPSU with the apparent intention of creating a party of the social-democratic type.31

The Historical Archive Institute is gradually becoming the foremost institution in the field of historical scholarship in the USSR, and is attracting young historians. These include, for example, Dmitry Yurasov, whose name became well known when he published secret documents of the Military College of the USSR Supreme Soviet.32

Among other of the more consistent critics of the state of Soviet historical scholarship we should also mention the historians L. Batkin33, V. A. Kozlov34, and V. D. Polikarpov.35 Here one should also mention the roundtables and the discussion "My iz Oktabrya" [We are of the October Revolution].36

Among the many roundtables at which problems in the history of Soviet society were discussed in relation to perestroika, it is perhaps worthwhile to single out the roundtable of historians of the October Revolution which took place on October 22-23, 1988. The discussion was representative. Its participants included more than 30 scholars: historians, philologists, and writers. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the discussion was the admission by all participants of the varied nature of the historical process, that is, the necessity of abandoning predeterminacy. In historical development there may be regression in any given cycle in history, evidenced in particular by the history of the Soviet Union or Cambodia. The discussion concentrated on the main positions taken
by speaker P. V. Volobuyev, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a renown scholar on the Russian Revolution. Volobuyev's main premise is that the October Revolution does not bear "historical responsibility" for Stalinism, which is one of the pivotal questions ranging far beyond the limits of the interests of professional historians alone. It seems to me that this premise is not valid, particularly his assertion that "the type of new society to be obtained, and the specific form it would assume depended on subsequent fighters, on the heirs of the October Revolution."37 For the new society was in fact created by the some people (leaders) who had assumed active roles in the Revolution. Alone collectivization, with the eradication of a significant stratum of the peasantry, was carried out not only by the "heirs," but by the old Bolshevik guard, which was later eliminated by Stalin as unwanted. The roundtable was also interesting in that the specific examples cited demonstrated the servile dependence of historians not only on the Party as a whole, but on its functionaries, such as Trapeznikov, the head of the Central Committee Science Department.38 Stalin was once again the subject of sharp criticism, yet the criticism was no more acute than it had been 17 years earlier, at the Union-wide meeting of historians. There was progress, however, and those who spoke appealed for a rejection of the defamation of Western historians as "falsifiers of history" and for an admission that Soviet historians themselves were often guilty of falsifying history.39
As before, in Soviet historical scholarship predilection is given to collective works, in which the creative methods of the authors are in fact truncated by the incursions of the editors. The aim of these editors is to fashion one sole conception. Naturally, Party historians continue to work "in dachas" (i.e., in country resorts belonging to the government and the Central Committee) as before, living exclusively on the Party bankroll, and carrying out the tasks and directives posed by its leadership.

A similar approach may be observed in the academic institutions. The Institute of the History of the USSR, for example, is preparing a six-volume edition of the history of the Russian Civil War, and the Institute of Military History is compiling a 10-volume history of World War II. Purely practical considerations are at work here. Multi-volume works, taking years to complete, make it possible for academic institutions to maintain huge staffs of researchers at government expense for an indefinitely long time, as has been the case throughout the Soviet period. One prominent Soviet historian, who will go unnamed, openly told me that for the next 20 years his institution was "covered" by the history of the Civil War. As far as the interests of the reading public were concerned, it would be much more useful and much cheaper to publish histories written by individual authors, as opposed to collectives. Reading multi-volume histories is far from accessible to everyone, whereas popular books on history are in terrific demand in the Soviet Union, and are printed in large press runs. Thus far these books have largely been
limited to books on the history of Russia in the times of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and the Decembrists.

From the mosaic of historical issues from which a picture of history can be assembled, at present the collectivization of agriculture and the Soviet-German accords of 1939 receiving clearest definition. Here it is distinctly apparent how history in the USSR serves political goals.

The state of agriculture has turned out to be so deplorable that it is no longer possible to conceal the direct link between the collectivization that disabled it and its current decline. Beginning with the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the contours of the possible organization (association, party) that would reflect and stand up for the interests of the rural population are being outlined. The All-Union Farm Workers' [krest'yanskiy] Congress is on the horizon, at which it is entirely possible that a corresponding political organization will be founded, perhaps, a farm workers' party. A historical evaluation of CPSU policies on agriculture for the entire period it has been under the control of the Soviet Union will probably be presented at this congress. Yet even now a type of consensus on this subject has taken form, a consensus of historians and politicians. Paradoxical as it may sound, the groundwork for this "consensus" was laid by Western historians, Robert Conquest, above all.40 Despite the attacks of the pro-Soviet Western historians—the "revisionists"—he has managed to defend his views on collectivization and its tragic consequences. Now even those Soviet historians such as Viktor
Danilov, who underrated collectivization's human and moral losses to society, have been forced to agree with Conquest's conclusions.

The desperate situation of agricultural workers, who were collectivized violently, has provoked more than one uprising, especially in the Northern Caucasus. According to Gorbachev, the peasant uprisings 15 years after the October Revolution were an "undisputed historic choice." (?1) In 1987 the General Secretary contended that "collectivization changed, perhaps not easily and not immediately, the entire way of life of the peasantry, making it possible for them to become a modern, civilized class of society."42

Yet this assertion far from lays the problem to rest: during collectivization there was massive destruction to the productive forces in the countryside, and the peasantry as a part of society was decimated, both physically and morally. Love for peasant labor and for the land was lost, and the centuries-old tradition of peasant labor was derailed. Writes Viktor Danilov: The view, alien to socialism, of the kolkhozes as a source of material and human resources for society and the state took root for a long time to come."43 Danilov is wrong: this view is not at all alien to socialism, in any case it was constantly propagated by the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). And in 1987 even Gorbachev himself was close to this "alien" view. In his book, the General Secretary wrote, "collectivization released considerable resources and many workers
needed in other areas of development in our society, above all in industry." Gorbachev's logic is curious; to a certain degree it reveals his approach to the history of the USSR: "Just think: how can we agree that in 1917 it was all a mistake and that all the seventy years of our life, work, effort and battles were also a complete mistake, that we were going in the 'wrong direction'? Gorbachev allows the possibility of framing the question in this way, yet declines it.

All the same we can agree that this admission marks tremendous progress on the part of the Soviet leader. Soviet historians would hardly have wagered to phrase the question so succinctly before the Party leader had expressed his opinion. And this question is far from rhetorical. It resurfaces again and again on the pages of the Soviet press, in the letters of veterans who perhaps wasted their lives in vain.

The final turn in the assessment of the history of collectivization was made in a recent resolution of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. This resolution is entitled "On the Necessity for More Extensive Study and an Objective Assessment of Certain Pages in the History of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in the 1930s, 1940s, and beginning of the 1950s." A special commission was created. The function of the commission is fairly broad and its activity will undoubtedly also touch upon the famine in the Ukraine after World War II. Partial evidence concerning the famine appears in the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev.
According to Feliks Rudich, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Director of the Institute of Party History of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, some 500 documents pertaining to the famine in the Ukraine in 1932-1933 have been discovered. In the near future these documents will be published in a collection, titled "The Famine of 1932-1933 in the Ukraine in the Eyes of Researchers and the Language of Documents." The documents bear evidence that not only Moscow, but the leadership of the Ukraine, as well, was completely aware that famine had broken out, yet continued to require that the state grain procurements be satisfied, despite the fact that all the peasant households had been swept clean. The unfortunate peasants and kolkhozniks were declared saboteurs and counterrevolutionaries, and were treated in the harshest possible way. One of the documents, signed by the Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, V. Chubar, and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), V. Kosior (both of whom were later executed at Stalin's orders), required the immediate cessation of the delivery of goods to localities that had "failed" to meet plan targets for grain deliveries to the state. The document further required that all state and cooperative trade be halted, and prohibited trade by kolkhoz workers and individuals and transportation of goods out of localities where they might already be located. The granting of credit was stopped, and existing debts were called in. Thousands of people were arrested for "kulak sabotage." Trying to save themselves from starvation, the peasants
went about the already harvested fields gathering wheat. On August 7, 1932, a law was issued providing the same punishment for this activity as for misappropriating kolkhoz or cooperative property. As has now become known, in the course of less than five months after its issuance alone, 54,646 people were convicted under this law, of which 2,110 were sentenced to be shot; the sentence was carried out in 1,000 instances. Rudich made public a ballpark figure of those who had died of starvation in the Ukraine in 1932-1933 alone: no less than 3.5 to 4 million.

Collectivization resurrected the harshest aspects of the Civil War. The entire country was racked by the brutality, which assumed the most varied forms, including moral torture. Its victims were millions of people who were not leaders, but ordinary Soviet citizens, above all, farmers. The most clear evidence can be found in the numerous written works dedicated to the countryside before and after collectivization. Siberian writer Boris Chernykh's story "Ploughmen and Sages," published in Novyy mir, caught my eye. The sketch was written in 1974-1978 based on documents from the Irkutsk Region Archive, and scrupulously details life in the Siberian countryside essentially since the 1920s. It examines the essence of the conflict in the countryside much more penetratingly than do the reputable works of professional Soviet historians. Chernykh's story is that of the gradual demise of the people who worked the land, both as individuals and as a stratum of society. Most depressing of all is Chernykh's depiction of the transformation of the peasants, who were morally independent, into the cogs of a
monstrous state machine—cogs without which the machine could not function.

The more or less normal lives of the peasants in two villages of the Tulun Volost, of which Chernykh writes, came to an end during the spring of 1929. A document illustrating this change is the minutes of the tenth meeting of the Yevgenyevka Village Soviet, dated May 22, 1929: "It was decreed that each member of the village soviet should think about who should be considered a clearly kulak household, and at the next meeting, should say who...." 48

Training the peasants to inform on one another turned out to be more difficult than had been anticipated. The deputy chief of the political department of one of the Machine Tractor Stations wrote the following in the newspaper Za kollektivizatsiyu [In Favor of Collectivization] in October of 1930: "It's annoying at times that collective farm workers sometimes do not see the enemy lurking. You think, honestly, are we the only ones who can identify kulaks?" Later, the momentum snowballed. In March of 1937 the paper reported about the head of a state farm department who "during his vacation met with friends, many of whom turned out to be Trotskyites." And more: eight men in the village of Nikitayev were arrested that same year, accused of wrecking and spying—for the Japanese! Seven of them died in the camps. The eighth survived by fortunate coincidence, and returned to his village eighteen years later. Ultimately the authorities were successful in their efforts to instill their way of thinking: the
chairman of a collective farm, a certain Shakhmatov, sent another seven people to trial, and is still proud of it today: "People must be handled with severity; they've gotten lax."

* * *

Even more new publications of episodes from the Soviet past in various journals undermined the positions of the conservatives in the Party. It became increasingly difficult to speak of "both tragic and glorious" pages of the Soviet past. The publication of materials on the mass murders in Kuropaty (Byelorussia) and at Zolotaya Gora (in the Chelyabinsk Oblast') was followed in April 1990 by an acknowledgement of responsibility for the crime committed in Katyn. The publication of original documents from the Soviet past in the monthly journal Izvestiya TsK KPSS [Proceedings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—CPSU CC] systematically batters the conservatives. A journal by the same name was published from 1919 to 1929; publication was resumed in 1989. This marks a new phase in the policy of "restructuring history." It is obvious that the leading role in the implementation of the policy on history will for the time being continue to be played by CPSU CC Secretary A. N. Yakovlev, although formally he is not responsible for ideology. This duty has for some time been carried out by V. Medvedev. However, Yakovlev headed the Politburo commission on additional study of the materials relating to the repressions of the 1930s,
1940s, and early 1950s. He prepared a report on the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty of August 23, 1939. Some degree of consensus has been achieved, or in any case, a temporary armistice has been established on the Soviet-Nazi pacts of 1939.

The Soviet position on the pacts with Nazi Germany of 1939 had remained essentially unchanged since 1948, that is to say that for more than forty years it was repeatedly reasserted and reconfirmed in official Soviet documents. In November of 1987 it was none other than Mikhail Gorbachev who reiterated it in his speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, albeit in the modernized 1959 version. This version was formulated in conjunction with the 20th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. But was it not strange to repeat it in an official document 28 years later? Individual elements of the oldest interpretation can also be found in Yakovlev's report on the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, given to the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR on December 24, 1989. The difference, however, is cardinal, since the official assertion of the existence of secret agreements with Nazi Germany on the division of foreign territories and about a joint struggle with the Nazis against the Polish resistance movement opens the eyes of millions of Soviet citizens to the real Stalinist foreign policy, which in fact only recently came to an end with the inglorious war in Afghanistan.
Let there be no mistake here: the admission of a deal between Stalin and Hitler was undoubtedly forced. On the one hand, it is known to the entire world, and the documents were published long ago; and on the other, it was no longer possible to ignore the social movement in the Baltic republics, who became victims of the deal with Hitler. The Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians demanded the admission that the annexation of their countries by the Soviet Union was illegal. But in actuality the absorption of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union was the implementation of a secret agreement with Nazi Germany, codified in the non-aggression treat of August 23, 1939. In 1987, the full texts of the accords with Germany, including the secret protocol, were published in Estonia. Conferences devoted to the events of 1939 and 1940 were held one after another. Even the official historical journals, the press, the radio, and television were compelled (after receiving permission from "above") to begin discussion of the events of 1939; at first this discussion was muted, but then it came out completely into the open. Finally, in June of 1989 an official commission was created under the Congress of People's Deputies. Named the Commission for the Political and Legal Assessment of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty of 1939, its sole purpose was to formulate a position on the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty. Yakovlev's report did not cover the second treaty, on friendship and borders, of September 28, 1939, although it is mentioned in the final version of the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies' decree on the subject.
The acknowledgement of friendship with the Nazis codified in state documents was of course the real cause for the embittered debates at the Second Congress of People's Deputies in December of 1989. Some of the Deputies demanded point-blank that any mention of the secret protocol be excluded from the decree, using the pretext that the original document had never been found. Yet the issue had been discussed at meetings of the Commission on the treaty and in the press prior to the tumultuous discussions at the Congress. The Chief of the Historical and Diplomatic Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to convince Commission members experiencing doubts to acknowledge the existence of the secret protocol at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on international politics in March of 1989. At the meeting he stated that the secret protocols were not discovered either in the Ministry's archives nor in the archives of the CPSU Central Committee, the KGB, or the Ministry of Defense. Nonetheless, "If they existed," he added, then "someone took very serious measures to destroy not only the protocols themselves, but a significant portion of any traces of these protocols."51 This statement could serve as the plot for a detective story. Who could this "who" have been? And we are to understand that not all of the traces of these protocols, but only a "significant portion" of them were destroyed; what does "significant portion" mean? Yet not so much as a word was uttered about this. This is really not all that important, however: the secret protocols were signed, and the
existing copies of the protocol do not leave so much as a shadow of a doubt.

The argumentation of those who were prepared to acknowledge the authenticity of the agreements between Germany and the Soviet Union as formulated in the secret protocols is interesting. G. A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, proposed to make at least some sort of public announcement: "In reality, someone apparently destroyed the Soviet version of the protocols. Our position will not worsen by acknowledging this situation; the main thing is that we will be regarded as honest people."52

There is a sort of nostalgia... The reasoning of the Deputy Minister is closely echoed in the conclusions drawn by Izvestiya Editor-in-Chief I. Laptev: "Finally, the time has come when we can tell the whole truth [again, the "whole truth"—author] and when in principle it is advantageous to us to tell truth, even if some of its aspects are not in our favor."53

Denying the existence of the secret protocols now, even if they were preserved only in the form of photocopies of copies, is senseless, if for no other reason than the fact that the events following the signing of the accords developed in complete correspondence with the contents of the protocols. Another question arises: Why was the attention of Soviet politicians and scholars focused predominantly on the secret protocols? Perhaps because the demands for explanation not only of the circumstances surrounding the signing of treaties with Nazi Germany and of the entire subsequent period of Soviet-Nazi friendship (until June 22,
1941) are becoming increasingly insistent? In this instance it can be predicted with complete confidence although there is nothing more unpredictable than the Soviet past, the admission of the existence of the secret protocols will bring with it an entire chain of problems involving Soviet policies towards Germany preceding, during, and after World War II.

When the possibilities for Soviet foreign policy beginning in the spring of 1939 are examined, the possibility of remaining outside of alliances and coalitions, not entering into obligations with either the French and British alliance or Germany, is excluded. Had the USSR not joined an alliance, it would be possible to view Soviet policy towards unaligned states. Thorough examination of the Commission's report reveals the contours of the old conception of the alternatives facing the USSR in 1939: the Soviet Union had to choose between England and France, on one hand, and Germany, on the other—there was no other alternative. It seems that this approach has been a characteristic feature of Soviet domestic and foreign policy in various situations throughout the Soviet period: either/or. The results are familiar enough.

The Commission stated that in and of itself the signing of the non-aggression treaty with Germany was a regular legal act, whereas the signing of the secret protocol was a violation of "Leninist norms" (it would seem that such norms are not codified in world juridical practice) and any other norms. These are just empty words. In fact the published text of the treaty on non-aggression and the secret protocol, carefully concealed for decades, were part
of a single whole. Without the secret protocol there would have been no treaty. Separating the non-aggression treaty into two individual parts is an obvious transgression against truth and common sense.

Another of the Commission's conclusions was to the effect that Stalin had hoped with the non-aggression treaty to influence England and France, but miscalculated, and that he would have been prepared to make another turn, this time away from Germany and toward the Western states. And this after signing an accord that transferred the Baltic states, part of Poland, and Bessarabia into the hands of the USSR? The basis for this assertion is the Comintern directive issued on the eve of the signing of the protocol, i.e., August 22. The purpose of this directive, as was the case with all the rest of the Comintern's activity, was to mislead the communist parties concerning the real policies of the USSR. Is it not strange that after all the other widely known facts about the activity of the Comintern it can be regarded as anything other than an instrument of Soviet foreign policy? Incidentally, Stalin would have been prepared to close down the Comintern if it had been necessary for his foreign policy machinations, which, by the way, he did in 1943, having first eliminated many functionaries and even dissolving entire communist parties, such as the Polish Communist Party.

Yakovlev's report, which was almost unanimously acknowledged as masterful, contains an assertion with which I think a historian or lawyer would find it difficult to agree. One can understand the
Commission position; it was charged with one limited task—to make a judgement on the treaty of 1939. It is impossible, however, to say that certain of the arguments contained in Yakovlev's report have methodological validity or correspond to the historical content of the era. The Commission distinctly limited the scope of its activity to the period 1937-1938, which permitted Yakovlev to state that "in the USSR's diplomatic documents from 1937-1938, no evidence testifying to Soviet intentions to come to a mutual understanding with Berlin have been found." Yet the German documents on the negotiations with Soviet representatives in Berlin in 1935-1936 are well known, and in fact it became clear only in February of 1937 that Hitler was ill-disposed toward the Soviet proposal. Thus the appeal contained in Yakovlev's report—an appeal that in principle is fundamentally correct: understanding any event is only possible "if its analysis is conducted within a specific context of historical development"—does not hold water. Moreover, the Soviet-German agreements of 1939 may be correctly understood only within the system of development of relations between the USSR and Germany over an extended period of time.

Izvestiya's publication of a list of secret protocols preserved in the Special Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the same day as the decree of the Second Congress of People's Deputies seemed to eliminate all doubts on the secret deal between the Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939. This document (on the transferral of original documents and their copies by the assistant of then Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov to another
assistant in April of 1946) enumerates all the secret and additional protocols signed with Germany in the years 1939-1941. There were other secret agreements, however, that are not mentioned in the document, apparently because they were signed between military and naval authorities of the USSR and Germany.

As before, in this specific instance, too, political expediency overcame the search for historical truth. This was particularly distinct during the conflict surrounding the declaration of the restoration of independence announced in the Lithuanian Republic (March 11, 1990). One of the main arguments the Lithuanians used in favor of the secession of Lithuania from the USSR consisted in the fact that the elections of July 14-15, 1940 were a complete falsification and therefore the decision of the National Sejm [Diet] on the entry of Lithuania into the USSR is legally invalid. And so it was in reality. However, the pro-Soviet organizations that had been created in Lithuania (such as the Lithuanian Communist Party, based on the platform of the CPSU), the overwhelming majority of whose members were non-Lithuanians, as well as other organizations, revived the Stalinist interpretation of the events in the Baltic nations, and reasserted that the declaration of the entry of Lithuania into the USSR received "the approval of wide strata of the Republic's workers." Even more important is the fact that Gorbachev's policy is based on a version of history that has been rejected by historians, not to mention the population of Lithuania. Thus there is a conflict between history and politics. The possibility of such a conflict was apparently

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not taken into account by the leadership at the time the era of glasnost was proclaimed.

In my opinion the discussion of the Commission's findings bore a remarkably symbolic character. Several Deputies, no doubt due to their allegiances, and if we can judge from the outcome of the vote, another 600-700 Deputies as well, were against an acknowledgement of the obvious fact that there was a secret agreement between Germany and the USSR on the division of Eastern Europe. This seems to underscore that the Stalinist interpretation of history—to admit only what is advantageous, and that political exigencies are more important than historical truth—still has wide support in the USSR. And it will not be easy for Soviet citizens to understand that the Soviet Union in its current borders was created as a result of agreement with two capitalist groups: in 1939-1940 it was the agreements with Nazi Germany, which determined the western Soviet frontier, and then the agreement in Yalta (in February of 1945) with the United States and Great Britain, who so to speak blessed the creation of the Soviet empire.58

This empire has begun to disintegrate. One result will be the creation of a unified Germany, and it cannot at all be ruled out that ultimately there will be a renewal of the idea of extremely close Soviet-German cooperation.

In the first phase of the "restructuring of history" the main issue was completing the rehabilitation of Party and government figures who were subject to repressions during the Stalin years. Rehabilitation had come to a halt under Khrushchev, when he was
afraid to rehabilitate Bukharin, Rykov, Kamenev, and the other main defendants of the show trials of the 1930s. Over the years the demands for their rehabilitations grew; here the voices of writers, journalists, and other media figures were most resolute. We should recall that the vast majority of those convicted at the trials were "quietly" rehabilitated. The main opponents to the rehabilitation of Bukharin and the others had long ago left the Politburo, or had been thrown out, and others had departed for the hereafter. Thus, overcoming the resistance of the remaining veterans of the Stalinist past was comparatively easy. Moreover, the influence of Western public opinion grew, and there were pragmatic calculations on the part of the new leadership to curry the sympathies, and later, the trust, of Western leaders. In February and June of 1988 the USSR Supreme Soviet reexamined the cases of Bukharin, Rykov, and others, and rehabilitated them. Those involved in the "Ryutin Affair" were also posthumously rehabilitated, seemingly one of the few cases where the accused actually had moved against the Stalin regime.

Ryutin became the key figure for the creation of a new myth about the Soviet past: that resistance was allegedly mounted against Stalin during the years when his dictatorship was being installed. Another myth was created at the same time, that of Lenin's efforts to replace Stalin while he was still alive. The political goal uniting these two myths about the Soviet past is to defend the image of the Communist Party as a force of good, the sole goal of which was the disinterested service to the people.
The only truth here is the courageous and uncompromising behavior of Martemyan Ryutin, a candidate member of the CPSU CC, who sharply criticized the Party's policies at a Central Committee plenum in 1930. He was expelled from the Party at Stalin's insistence and then arrested for a time; Ryutin was later reinstated into the Party. In 1932 he appealed to all Party members, explaining to them that the country was being pushed towards an abyss by Stalin's policy of collectivization. Ryutin was arrested again, and confined in a prison for political detainees and espionage suspects. In 1937, at Stalin's orders, he was brought to Moscow, and tried in an accelerated trial on January 10, 1937, in accordance with the law against terrorism. (This law was published on December 1, 1934, right after the assassination of Kirov.) Ryutin was sentenced to be executed, and the sentence was carried out immediately.

Ryutin is a completely justified choice as a hero of the resistance to the Stalinist regime. His individual deed was immediately depicted as a wide struggle against Stalin by members of the Communist Party.

Film dramatist Gel'man published an article in the journal Kommunist, in which he asserts that after the death of Lenin the Party was divided into two parts: one part went with Stalin, and the other defended Leninist principles and mounted resistance to Stalin's policies. This new myth, which received initial support, did not become widespread. Efforts to defend the Lenin legend came to nought. In the revival of this legend, no small
role was played by people active in the artistic world, such as the playwright Mikhail Shatrov, whose play *Dal'she, dal'she* [Onward, Onward], prompted sharp polemics among the intelligentsia. Articles criticizing policies conducted during Lenin's time and by Lenin himself snowballed. There was a breakthrough into the "holiest of holies." The defense of the Lenin period in the history of the USSR became one of the main ideological problems of the Gorbachev leadership. It is unlikely that this goal will be accomplished.

This can be seen even in the character of official Party publications. From issue to issue, *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* [Proceedings of the CPSU CC] systematically published early, unpublished documents relating to what is called the "Leninist legacy": materials on Lenin's activity in his capacity as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in the first years of Soviet power, and also documents shedding light on the relations between Lenin and Stalin in the last years of Lenin's life, which are still of great interest to historians. It should be remembered that many articles and other publications stress the cooling in the relations between the two leaders during Lenin's illness. This was caused in particular by an incident in which Stalin insulted Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya. Recently published letters of Lenin, Krupskaya, Trotsky, Stalin, and L. Kamenev in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* leave no doubt that Stalin not only had complete control over Lenin's activity during his illness in 1922 and 1923; very important to understanding the situation is that this control was
also acknowledged by the rest of the Party leadership. There are two documents written by Lenin's sister, M. I. Ul'yanova. The first is her letter of July 26, 1926 to the Presidium of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In this letter Ul'yanova asserts that "all the rumors of the opposition about V. I.'s [i.e., Lenin's] relationship to Stalin have absolutely no correspondence with reality. Their relations were and remain the most comradely." The second document is a note Ul'yanova wrote on Lenin's relationship to Stalin, the date of which has yet to be established. The document was discovered among Ul'yanova's personal papers after her death. In my view, Ul'yanova's opinion on the relations between Stalin and Lenin warrants attention. In the spring and summer of 1922, she wrote, Stalin visited Lenin more often than anyone else: "Il'ich [Lenin] received him in a friendly way, joked, laughed, and had me bring Stalin things to eat and drink, and I brought wine and so on." It was Stalin to whom Lenin turned in May of 1922 with the request to obtain poison in case he should become paralyzed. Stalin promised. Then Lenin's health improved, and the poison was never obtained. This episode by no means demonstrates that Lenin liked Stalin, but it certainly does show that he trusted him and saw in him an executor of his wishes. This same document asserts that Lenin's proposal to Trotsky to become Lenin's replacement was dictated by considerations of diplomacy alone. The assertion of Soviet historian V. Danilov that had Trotsky accepted this proposal (he
declined), matters in Russia would have taken a different turn, is unfounded. Trotsky saw through the maneuver and thus turned the offer down, although he did so under the pretext of his Jewish heritage, saying that to his mind it was incompatible with the position of leader in a country where the predominant population was Russian. The publication of these new documents yet again confirms that the question of Lenin's successor was in fact solved before the end of Lenin's life. His successor was to be Stalin, supported by the bureaucratic Party apparatus, which was strong for the time, and Party activists outside the capital. Thus the objective picture that emerges from the documents now being published seriously contradicts the efforts to separate Lenin and Stalin, and to cleanse Leninism of the "stain of Stalinism."

Another series of documents published in the same journal relate to the darker pages of the history of the CPSU about which nothing was known for decades. One series involved the internal Party opposition and the fabricated accusations against the "right-wingers," to the effect that they allegedly created an underground organization against the Party leadership, i.e., against Stalin. This organization supposedly united the adherents of Bukharin, who had already lost his position in the Party before the "discovery" of the OGPU conspiracy in 1932-1933. These documents reveal not only the technique by which the imaginary conspiracies were created, but also the nature of the sentences that were handed down, after first being confirmed by Stalin and the Politburo. The documents on the A. N. Slepkov case are also of interest in that
Bukharin, whose pupils were "members of the organization"—teachers and "Red professors" [members of the Krasnaya professura]—had not only publically renounced them, but had branded them enemies of the Party. The publication of these documents in Izvestiya TsK KPSS was accompanied by historical materials prepared by the CPSU CC Party Control Committee and the CPSU CC's Institute of Marxism–Leninism. These materials, in addition to their purely cognitive significance, also have an ideological component: the creation of a new Party myth of "honest" Party members who became victims of Stalinism, yet retained their ideological loyalty to Leninism. Thus, in fact the issue is the historical rehabilitation of the CPSU as a whole. This is the goal being sought with the rehabilitations of even such "immemorial enemies" of the Party as Trotsky. One issue of Izvestiya TsK KPSS carried biographical information on Trotsky, his family, and his descendants, pitched in a rather sympathetic tone. Publication of the works of Trotsky in various journals, and as separate publications began in the Soviet Union, naturally, of his works on Stalin first and foremost.

The results of four years of perestroika in the field of historical scholarship were summed up by chief Party ideologue Vadim Medvedev at a meeting of historians at the CPSU CC on October 3, 1989. Medvedev put forth his chronology of perestroika, from which it can be drawn that it was only in January of 1987 at a CPSU
CC plenum that the idea of the necessity of changing the political system emerged. Only gradually, according to Medvedev, did it become clear that the causes for the deplorable state of the Soviet economy should be sought not only in the years of "stagnation," but much earlier, virtually in the first years after the Revolution. The 70th anniversary of the October Revolution became the point of departure for a "rethinking" of the history of the USSR. Medvedev admitted that "historical scholarship has turned out to be unprepared for the work that needs to be done." Of particular importance is his statement that at the time of the 19th All-Union Party Conference (June-July, 1988), the understanding of the Soviet past that had been formed "was still somewhere halfway between events that happened in times long gone and new requirements." 67 Unlike Yakovlev, Medvedev is more cautious in his assessment of the state of historical scholarship, but all the same asserts an unconditional fact, that journalism and literature have determined historical scholarship in the presentation of the past. It is not scholars who are setting the tone, "it is not they who are performing the bulk of the work." He also admitted that social consciousness has been brought to a very dynamic condition.

The meeting of historians was convened, of course, because the more extensive penetration into the history of the past, or more precisely, the breakthrough into it, has done more than cast doubt on the truth of the presentation and interpretation of the USSR's history from the first days following the October Revolution. The balance of social consciousness has been shaken, as it has been
subject to a hailstorm of revelations about crimes and errors committed by the regime. It is here that a direct interdependence between historical events and policies that were conducted, and the fact that they are unconditionally and inseparably enmeshed has emerged. "The cups of the scales," Medvedev stated with alarm, "have begun to wobble, and waves of self-flagellation are splashing over the edges." Reevaluation of historical events has in fact led to a questioning of the "values of socialism" and its ideological and political basis. Medvedev and the leading administrators of historical scholarship are particularly troubled that the administrative command system, terror, and violence have been equated with the socialist order laid by Lenin and the October Revolution.

Medvedev, and other historians after him, were alarmed by the spreading criticism of the October Revolution and its results, demands for acknowledgement of Lenin's responsibility for the Stalinist system that arose after him, and also the sole responsibility of Stalin and Hitler in unleashing World War II. In the opinion of a number of historians, the basic methodological foundations of Soviet (Marxist) historical scholarship, such as the materialistic understanding of history, the teaching on social and economic formations, and on revolutions are being undermined, especially by journalists. One of the leading historians of the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary periods, P. V. Volobuyev, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, spoke of "confusion in the historical consciousness of society that is
assuming a threatening character," and demanded that historians counteract the ideological offensive both from the left and from the right. With bitterness, Volobuyev ascertained the existence of "a massive renunciation of Marxism and socialist values by former champions of socialism and figures active in the period of stagnation." He added, "this can be considered nothing short of treason." Volobuyev demanded a transition to an offensive "from positions of historical truth." The issue was put more pointedly by the Director of the CPSU CC's Institute of Marxism and Leninism, Academician G. L. Smirnov, lamenting the "destructive" force of "hostile influences," whose goal is supposedly "to justify the removal of the Party from the leadership of society." This was the final touch. The search for "blank pages" in history, initially approved by the Party leadership under the assumption that as in the past, it could mete out "historical truth" in doses, led to the breaking of the magic circle: the quest made the reexamination of the Soviet past a matter not of specific ideological agencies, but a great number of participants. These include, in addition to professional historians, writers, cultural and artistic figures, a rather wide spectrum of representatives of various professions, social circles, and official and unofficial organizations.

Other participants in the meeting also demanded "more decisiveness and more initiative regarding the extremes." The Politburo member assured them that there is a line: "The line is clear and unambiguous." In fact Medvedev was saying that when
interpreting historical events, "unacceptable views" should be rejected, but not those who espouse them, as was done in the past. The line of defense of Party historians, and, most likely, their initial positions for the upcoming ideological offensive, were pinpointed by chief Party ideologue Medvedev: these are the "principal positions of Lenin, the October Revolution, and the socialist choice." Here there can be no concessions, he concluded. Among the next tasks determined by Medvedev is activity by historians against the historical conception presented in the works of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. It can be assumed that this "target" is entirely satisfactory to many. The close connection between history and scholarship, political expediency and historical research, was reconfirmed by the Party once again. But this does not at all mean that all historians will obediently respond to the call.

The point of view elucidated by the Chairman of the Soviet Association of Young Historians, Ye. M. Kozhokin, warrants attention. Kozhokin is against an ideological war. He contends that various ideological currents can coexist. "What we need is civil peace," he stressed, "and by no means civil war." This is the main activity of the Association of Young Historians: to establish a "professional dialogue" among historians of various ideological orientations. Kozhokin has also come forth with a proposal to change radically the hierarchial division that exists in Soviet historical scholarship between historians according to their academic degrees and the positions they hold.
IV. HISTORY AND THE SCHOOLS

In 1988, history examinations in the secondary schools were cancelled. It was noted, and not without irony, that the students did not know what to answer and the teachers did not know what to ask.

Feverishly, new historical texts were begun and new programs and methodological directives were developed, the study of which could be the subject of a project in itself. The temporary scholarly collective Shkola [School] of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences developed draft programs for the historical curriculum for secondary schools. Compared to the old programs, it is now planned to introduce a tenth-grade course on "The History of World Civilizations." This subject will also be taught in the eleventh grade. Moreover, several electives will be offered in these grades: "Foundations of the Political Sciences," "The History of Philosophy," and "The History of Religion and Free Thought." These innovations constitute a serious step forward in dismantling, if you will, "Soviet centrism," in which the historical knowledge of secondary school students was subordinate to one goal: extolling the Soviet system and the inevitability of the demise of capitalist society. This is of course a major step forward in the de-ideologization of teaching in the USSR. It is difficult to say with certainty, however, whether this effort will succeed. It is essential to take account of the fundamental difference in the approach to historical issues that exists between various groups in the USSR, and the influence of patriotic, national, and other
influences. Yet the main factor here is who will be doing the teaching. Given the strength of political passions now raging in the USSR, any efforts to expand the base of the world-view of secondary school students will undoubtedly encounter numerous obstacles.

The appearance of a new textbook on the history of the USSR for tenth graders should be noted as one of the truly significant shifts in the study of history in the Soviet Union. The authors of this book, the professional historians Yu. Koralev, Yu. Borisov, and I. Fedosov, view their textbook as temporary and transitional from the old presentation of history to the new. The authors strive to strike a balanced assessment of the Soviet past. They are compelled, of course, to take stock of the situation around them. For there are numerous, and militant, representatives of the "generation of victors," who in the person of Ye. K. Ligachev, resolutely defend the "glorious and heroic past," and in the extreme case, insist that the positive in the Soviet past specifically outweigh the negative.

Yet certain progress is already evident. The past is viewed as "heroic and dramatic, radiant and monstrous." In the textbook, which covers the history from the turn of the 20th century up to the German attack on the Soviet Union in June of 1941, there is a moderate, positive presentation of events. Russia at the turn of the 20th century is characterized as a capitalist country with average development, but there is no longer any discussion of its semi-colonial status. The views have become more
sensible, and the Russian historical process is presented more objectively. Be it even in short phrases, the authors found it in themselves to put in a good word for the *zemstvo* system of local administration, the beginnings of local self-governance and civil society. But the presentation of the reforms of Stolypin, the tsarist minister who tried to implement a plan to create an independent peasantry in Russia, is quite contradictory. The authors still do not acknowledge that this was a tremendous historic step for the transformation of Russia by means of reforms, although they do concede that "the Stolypin reform was a significant step along the capitalist path."

We can elaborate: if Stolypin had had at his disposal not four years (he was assassinated by terrorists in 1911), but decades, there would be no argument as to whether the Stalin genocide of the Russian peasantry and his policy of collectivization was justified by the social and economic needs of the country, although he eliminated ten million peasants in vain. This figure is found in the textbook, as well as another: the victims of the Stalinist repressions numbered forty million.

The chief purpose of the current Soviet leadership trails like a thread through the textbook. This consists in the separation, I would even say extrication, of the Lenin period from the Stalin period. Everything that took place during Lenin's times is viewed as an expression of the humanism common to all mankind, albeit painted in class colors. It is explained to the students that chief in the dictatorship of the proletariat established by Lenin
was not at all the compulsory, but rather the educational element. It is explained that even the infamous VChK [Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counterrevolution] used its brutal methods as countermeasures against bourgeois conspiracy. There is nothing new in this standard interpretation. The textbook's authors are apparently not troubled by the fact that the foundation of the extraordinary commissions and the revolutionary tribunals parallel to the regular courts constituted the creation of instruments of mass terror. It was precisely this terror, as the authors themselves later show, that became a component part of the Soviet legal system. Following their logic, the authors approve of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, which was the first legislative meeting in Russia chosen by the will of the people. The Bolsheviks had but 24 percent of the seats, and 62 percent fell to the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, i.e., the Leninists' political opponents. Thus the Lenin quote cited by the authors is completely logical: the leader [vözhō] of the Revolution proudly tells that the first Soviet constitution, that of 1918, proclaimed in the textbook to be "the most democratic in the world," "was not invented by some sort of commission, or drawn up by lawyers...." According to this constitution ten percent of the country's population was deprived of the right to vote; these were people who used hired labor. The workers selected their representatives to the Congresses of the Soviets (the highest legislative body) at the rate of one representative per 25,000, whereas the rate for the peasantry was one per 125,000. This ought
be mentioned in conjunction with the understanding of the democratic system...

Unlike the old history textbooks, the new book is rife with the names of Soviet statesmen, scholars, engineers, and military figures eliminated by Stalin and struck from the pages of history. For the first time, Trotsky's role in the Revolution, during the Civil War, and during the post-war period has been more truthfully and objectively presented. "Trotsky," the authors write, "did much to transform the volunteer, half-partisan Red Army into a regular army.... Trotsky's almost constant presence at the front, among the troops, and his exceptional talent for oratory contributed to his popularity in the Red Army."

Stalin is depicted in the textbook as the evil genius of socialist society, who usurped power in the Party and in the country by means of intrigues and the elimination of Lenin's best comrades-at-arms (here Kamenev, Zinoviev, and, of course, Bukharin, are all mentioned). The book tells of Stalin's falsification of the results of the first two Five-Year Plans, and his complete incompetence in economic issues is stressed.

Methodologically speaking, dating the emergence of the "administrative command system" to the Lenin period is an important step forward. (Gorbachev has brought the term into everyday use; it is used to camouflage "real socialism.") The origin of the Stalinist system is moved far into the depths. This is doubtless a reaction to writers and certain historians "getting their teeth" into the ideological fortifications guarding the approaches to the
Lenin period. The origin of the administrative command system is traced to 1918, and is explained by the need to take extraordinary measures during the Civil War. The system has continued to exist since that time, and operates effectively only by means of extraordinary legislation. The appearance in a textbook of such section titles as "The Dismantling of NEP [the New Economic Policy] and the Establishment of the Regime of Personal Power," and "The Curtailing of Democracy and its Results" speak of a considerable change in the approach to the history of the Soviet period.

Yet the textbook steadfastly inculcates in the minds of the students the new myth that the Party and the people resisted Stalinism throughout all the years of Stalin's rule. This is of course a distortion of history. There was resistance, but only on the part of the peasantry during the period of collectivization. The Party had nothing to do with it. The overwhelming majority of its members, with the exception of several dozen, supported the Stalin regime, just as the Nazis supported Hitler, and the fascists, Mussolini. The new myth is intended to eliminate any reproach the younger generation might have against their fathers and grandfathers for their capitulation to evil.

Several collectives of Party historians are now involved in preparing a new history of the CPSU. What the new interpretation of the history of the bankrupt Party will be like is apparent from the publications of individual pages of history in Pravda. Three historians have assumed this occupation: G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, and V. Loginov. Loginov, a Doctor of Historical Sciences, took
part in the hearings and rehabilitations of the "enemies of the people" under Khrushchev. The other two historians belong to a younger generation. The main ideas in the publications on Party history are not particularly new: Lenin's testament on the construction of socialism was distorted after his death, Stalinism came to prevail in the Party, and then became stronger again during the Brezhnev years. At the same time there were supposedly always Leninists in the Party who worked in opposition to Stalin. However, there are in fact very few examples of this opposition. Certainly they include Martemyan Ryutin and other individual despairing Party figures, including the People's Commissar for Health Care, G. Kaminskiy. The vast majority of cases against anti-Stalinist organizations were fabricated, as the investigation of the special CPSU CC commission shows. The Party as a whole not only did not come out against the policies of, say, the elimination of the kulaks or collectivization of the countryside, but instead actively supported them, as it supported the campaign against the so-called "enemies of the people" after the assassination of Kirov in 1934. (Incidentally, no finally judgement has been made regarding this case.) The Party also supported the 1947-1949 campaign against "cosmopolitans" and the anti-semitic orgy unleashed in conjunction with the "Doctor's Plot." Although all these campaigns were officially condemned, it is impossible to deny the complicity of the great majority of CPSU members. Thus the new version of CPSU history presented in the pages of Pravda and other Party publications is quite shaky.
V. THE ANTI-SEMITIC VERSION OF THE HISTORY OF THE USSR

Starting at the end of 1989, the efforts of Pamyat' [Memory] and other anti-semitic organizations to create their own version of the history of Russia and the USSR intensified. Properly speaking these efforts were undertaken long ago. They began with the publication of historian N. N. Yakovlev's 1 Avgusta 1914 [August 1, 1914], in 1974. The author's main idea was to present the Freemasons as a secret moving force in Russian politics before the first world war, during the war, and during the February 1917 Revolution. Recently the polemics on this subject have been revived. It is true, however, that in Russia Freemasonry was widespread in political circles beginning at the end of the 18th century. But the Freemasons, although they included several members of the Provisional Government in their ranks, had no influence as an organization on politics. The concept of a conspiracy as a moving force in history is not new, but is nonetheless still quite far from reality. Revolutions and wars arise as the result of more profound factors in the lives of states and societies. However, the conspiracy theory, in particular in the history of the recent past, provides the opportunity to transfer the responsibility for the unpleasant results of a historical event onto a single "evil force." In particular, the idea of the "Freemason conspiracy" in our time gradually transformed into a repetition of Nazi-style ravings about "yid Freemasons," and later, was transformed and revived by certain of Pamyat's organizations in the form of a "Zionist conspiracy," a
"Jewish conspiracy," and an "Israeli conspiracy." The victim of this ominous union of these evil forces is, of course, the Russian people.

In researching the efforts to create an anti-semitic version of Soviet history, we also examined unpublished documents distributed in the form of handbills by Soviet anti-semites. The anti-semitic tendency is even superficially apparent in the manifesto of the National-Patriotic Front Pamyat' (the leaders of the organization located in Moscow are S. E. Vorotyntsev, A. E. Kulakov, and K. B. Sivolapov). For example, Paragraph 4 of the program demands "the exposure of the whole truth about the bestial ritual murder of the Russian Tsar." Accusing Jews of ritual murders dates back to the Middle Ages. In Russia the "Beylis Affair" is the best known; ultimately it became one of the events that undermined the prestige of the Romanov Dynasty once and for all. In this specific instance the issue is that of the murder of the Tsar and his family with a ritual purpose. The absurdity of the accusation is obvious. Paragraph 40 states: "We demand a legislative effort to combat the falsification of the history of our homeland," i.e., in other words, here Pamyat' is in favor of preserving the Stalinist version of history. The authors of the program "demand the elimination and prohibition of the use of pseudonyms"—the underlying aim here is obvious: to identify all Jews concealing their identity with pseudonyms. The program discussed even more awful things that should provoke "popular rage" against the Jews, for example, "during the time of the Zionist
genocide in our country more people were killed than in all wars waged by humanity." The senselessness of this lie would seemingly be obvious. Yet it is stubbornly being inculcated into the consciousness of the people by Soviet Russian writers and scholars. Among them is I. Shafarevich, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences. Shafarevich recently published his work Russophobia, which presents a "philosophical" foundation and justification for anti-semitism. In early March, 1990, 74 writers, members of the RSFSR Union of Writers, published a letter addressed to the Supreme Soviets of the RSFSR and the USSR, as well as to the CPSU CC, to the effect that there is a law on anti-semitism in the USSR. Here is what that law has produced: "as is known, in essence this was a LAW ON GENOCIDE OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE," all in capital letters. Since neither historians nor lawyers were aware of the existence of any Soviet law on anti-semitism, some research had to be conducted. The criminal codes of the RSFSR of 1926 and later modifications were examined. As it turns out, neither in Article 59(7), nor in the Article 74 that later replaced it, is the term "anti-semitism" even used. The articles address responsibility for propaganda or agitation "with the goal of inciting racial or national animosity and strife." In the history of Soviet Russia there was an episode at the beginning of the Civil War where bands of rioters, taking advantage of the weakening of power, burned, robbed, raped, and murdered defenseless Jewish populations in cities and rural localities. In connection with this event on July 25, 1918, at the proposal of Lenin and over
his signature, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the Struggle against Anti-Semitism and Jewish Pogroms" was issued. This law proscribed that "organizers and participants in pogroms or those conducting pogrom agitation...remain outside the law."\textsuperscript{78}

If, however, this is the "law on anti-semitism" the Russian writers are trying to interpret, than why would it be directed against the Russian people, and what would be the purpose of destroying this people? This assertion is all the more indecent in that the letter was signed among others not only by Shafarevich, Yu. Bondarev, and S. Kunyayev, which should surprise no one, but also by Valentin Rasputin, who was made a member of the President's Council three weeks after the letter appeared in print.

This effort to present Soviet history as the bloody reign of Jews destroying the Russian people is not the only one. Also to be included here are the attempts to present the history of the country and the Party as a struggle between two forces, good and evil. "Recently it finally became clear," we read in a handbill circulated in Moscow in mid-November, 1989, "that over the entire period of the history of Russia the country was controlled essentially by two parties--the CPSU and the Zionist Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet SS Zionists were long the bosses in our country, deeply underground, and carefully camouflaged as the reddest of communists and Marxist-Leninists, striving to penetrate into all the structural elements of society so as to destroy them from within."\textsuperscript{79} All this rings fantastic and far-fetched...even funny. But it is merely a most primitive extreme of the concept of
Soviet history developed on the pages of journals such as *Molodaya gvardiya* [The Young Guard] and *Nash sovremennik* [Our Contemporary], published in Moscow in huge press runs.

VI. MEMORIAL

The creation of the Memorial society is perhaps one of the most important, if unanticipated, consequences of the political leadership's decision to open the floodgates of the study of the history of the time of Stalin. However, once these gates had been unlocked, of course, it became necessary to open them wider and wider.

It all began with the collection of signatures on the streets of Soviet cities and support for an initiative to construct a monument to the victims of the Stalinist terror. The idea was endorsed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference of the CPSU (June-July 1988). The creative unions of cinematographers, architects, theater figures, artists, designers, and even *Literaturnaya gazeta* [Literary Gazette] and *Ogonek* [The Little Flame] led a broad campaign not only to collect funds for the construction of a memorial monument, but also for the founding of a volunteer historical and educational society by the same name. While the official historical institutions and institutes were still getting into the swing of things, mistrustfully and anxiously watching the new winds, small hearths of Memorial rapidly sprang into flame around the country. It was of great significance that Academician A. D. Sakharov agreed to head up the Memorial Social Council; his
moral authority began to influence the mental attitude of considerable portions of the population.

The authorities did not particularly resist the creation of Memorial, but later a protracted struggle began with the Ministry of Culture for the right to control the use of the funds in account No. 700454, created by voluntary contributions of citizens and organizations for the creation of a Memorial museum and monument. The idea was to create such museum-monuments throughout the country, for there were millions of victims of the Stalinist repressions, and there was not one oblast', region, or republic that the state terror spared. The number of victims for each oblast' was determined in Moscow. The struggle to over-fulfill this "plan" with subsequent reports to Moscow became the norm for a time, just like the reports for over-fulfillment of the industrial production plans. All these details gradually became public, and protests of Stalinists against the "defamation" of the glorious Soviet past began to stream in to press offices.

The initiators of Memorial were Candidate of Geologic Sciences Yuri Samodurov, Arseniy Roginskiy, and Nikita Okhotin. The main keeper of Memorial's archives was philologist Vyacheslav Igrunov, who later headed up an information cooperative on unofficial organizations in the USSR. Yuri Ryzhov, Rector of the Moscow Aviation Institute, and later, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Commission on Science and Education, made space available to the society.
In November of 1988 Memorial activists put together an exhibit of designs for the monument to the victims of the terror. In fact it turned into an exhibit of condemnation of the crimes committed during the Stalin years. The exposition was unveiled in the cultural facility of Moscow's Elektrolampovyy Plant. A huge map of the Gulag was displayed at the exhibit, and there was a wheelbarrow to collect contributions. More than two million visited the exhibit in one week, donating fifty thousand rubles. Five thousand copies of the censored version of the only issue of Vedimosti memoriala [Memorial Gazette] were published: the censors had removed an appeal for the return of writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn from exile from the second page. Serious disagreements had arisen during the preparation of the exhibit. Writer Anatoly Rybakov, the author of the book Deti Arbata [Children of the Arbat], which created a sensation, demanded that the exposition be limited to the Stalinist period and categorically objected to the span of the exhibit including the period beginning from the moment of the October coup on October 25, 1917 (November 7 by the new calendar).

On January 28-29, 1989, the founding conference of Memorial was held in Moscow. The official title of the organization was the All-Union Volunteer Historical Education Society. This name underscored its apolitical character. It was impossible to retain this position, however, since Gorbachev's policy of perestroika used history as its strongest argument in favor of the restructuring of society. The conference adopted the society's charter. The main goal of the society was stated as the
"establishment and publication of the full truth about the repressions in the Soviet Union, and the immortalization of the memory of the victims of the repressions." 80 Another field of the organization's activity became the rendering of legal, material, and informational support to the victims of the repressions and their families. 81 The existence of branches of Memorial in 200 cities testifies to the significance of the organization.

A year after Memorial was founded, the main directions of its activity were formally stipulated: the creation of monuments and a scientific information center, and the rendering of legal, information, material, and medical support to victims and their families. By December of 1989, 100 rubles had been dispensed to each of 300 victims. 82

History is a powerful political weapon, especially during periods when old social structures are being eliminated and new ones are being created. The "battles" that broke out as a result of Memorial's activity are graphic evidence of this. Memorial put together an exhibit in conjunction with the 50th anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin pact. In part, materials were obtained from the "Greens" in West Germany. Various items relating to the pact were displayed on 32 stands. The first problem to arise involved obtaining permission to open the exhibit in the Rusakov cultural facility (Sokol'nicheskiy District, Moscow). The organizers of the exhibit requested a period of ten days, from August 23 to September 1. Both of these dates were symbolic: August 23, 1939 was the
date of the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty, whose secret protocols included the agreement on the division of Poland. Germany attacked Poland on September 1. Only eight days were permitted for the exhibit, however. The presentation of the exhibit, with a hammer and sickle on one side, and a swastika on the other, provoked an intensely negative reaction from the Sokol'nicheskiy Regional Party Committee of the CPSU, used to express protest against this juxtaposition using the symbol of the workers. An ultimatum was delivered: either the swastika had to be removed, or the exhibit would not be permitted to open. The exhibit's organizers were compelled to capitulate, but in any case, the original form of the exhibit was photographed by the BBC. The exhibit prompted a roundtable, and films were shown. On September 1 Central Television's program Vzglyad [Glance] covered the exhibit in its truncated form. At the end of September, 1989, the exhibit was opened at the Public Historical Library. The Polish Embassy in Moscow sent materials relating to the events of September, 1939, for use in the exhibit; these included materials on Katyn.

Internal strife rapidly broke out in Memorial. Victims of the repression began to lodge claims for special treatment. In violation of the organization's charter, they created an internal association of repression victims, leading to a schism within the organization. They contended that one of the association's organizers, a certain Numerov, was associated with the Stalinists in the Party apparatus. He was also accused of using Memorial funds to establish a personal salary of 400 rubles per month. In
early December, 1989, Numerov was expelled from Memorial, but the schism was not eliminated. In December of 1989 Memorial still did not have its own space. The cool attitude toward Memorial on the part of official Party circles is also explained by the fact that Y. N. Afanasev, A. M. Admovich, and Yu. F. Karyakin were co-chairs of the organization, people the Party regarded as leftist radicals.

Currently (1990) Memorial is a unique organization; in it are interwoven the goals of restoring the truth about the Soviet past and establishing a new civil society. Of interest is their initiative to create a museum in the USSR KGB building—the "Lubyanka"—on Dzerzhinsky Square: this location is symbolic because it is the place where interrogations, torture, and killings were conducted throughout the Soviet period, beginning with Felix Dzerzhinsky's ChK [Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counterrevolution and Sabotage]. At first Memorial conducted a candlelight requiem for the victims of the terror, surrounding the KGB building with a human chain. Onward and upward. Through the Deputies connected with Memorial or those supporting its activity came a proposal to move the KGB from the Dzerzhinsky Square to another location, and create a museum to the victims of the terror on the previous location of the KGB. This proposal was then discussed on the pages of the press. Gradually it overflowed into a movement to remove the shroud concealing the activity of the VChK-OGPU-NKVD-KGB. KGB chief V. A. Kyruchkov was compelled to invite a group of USSR People's Deputies to the KGB building for a meeting. In fact there was discussion not only of opening a
Memorial museum in the KGB buildings on Dzerzhinsky Square and the adjoining streets, but also of the relations between the KGB and the public. Among these Deputies was Sergei Kovalev, a dissident who had spent many years of his life in the Gulag and who was recently chosen as a People's Deputy of the RSFSR. According to the KGB press bureau, the meeting was completely candid: "There was discussion of the repressions of the 1930s, the 1940s, and the early 1950s [i.e., the Stalin years], and about new directions in the work of state security officials."83 The Editor-in-Chief of the weekly Moskovskiy novosti [Moscow News], Ye. V. Yakovlev, noted: "there has yet been no turning point in social consciousness regarding the KGB, and locating Memorial in this building...would be of tremendous significance."84 V. V. Ivanov, a noted linguist and USSR People's Deputy, went further, proposing that the KGB building be torn down entirely on symbolic grounds, although he was prepared to discard the idea were the building to be used for other purposes. This idea will probably surface again several times; it is important that history is exerting increasing pressure on the course of events in the Soviet Union. Never before has such a close intertwining of the history of the past with immediate political decisions been observed. In this sense, the course of events has gone far beyond the limits for revealing the "truth" of the past that were planned by the political leadership. Speaking figuratively, the past has jumped on the bandwagon of perestroika and has become an essential part of it. History has broken out from under the control of politics.

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The authorities' actions are of course far from unambiguous. For example, the decree on the revocation of sentences handed down by the special courts—the "troikas" and the "special soveshchaniya [trials]" on one hand, would seem to be a step towards correcting the fifty years of injustice, but on the other, are a signal to Memorial that the functions it has taken upon itself are becoming easier, and consequently, the organization's entire activity should be come narrower. Everywhere possible republic and local authorities and CPSU organizations are emerging as guardians of the burials of the victims of Soviet power, and are organizing and conducting ceremonies in memory of the dead. In Byelorussia, for example, the First Secretary of the Central Committee placed a wreath at Kuropaty. Yet as a result of the efforts of Memorial's colleagues, the fictitious case of the "Union for the Salvation of Russia" was uncovered; as a result of this case people were executed, including the well-known Russian poet N. A. Klyuyev. The now well-known Golden Mountain burial near Chelyabinsk was discovered owing to the activity of a local branch of Memorial and the Nauka [Science] volunteer organization, formed as a cooperative. Dr. Nekrich met with one of the leaders of this organization in Moscow.

The name of the Golden Mountain burial was derived from an abandoned gold mine located between the villages of Shershni and Gradskiy Priisk, near Chelyabinsk. Here, in a fairly deserted area, executions were carried out in the 1930s, and the victims were buried in layers and covered with cinders. Fifty years later
a new district of Chelyabinsk was to be erected on this spot. It was then, when the preliminary geological surveys were conducted, that the find was located. The site was excavated by groups of archaeologists specially formed for the purpose. More than 300 skeletons, including those of women and children, and a significant number of documents and small artifacts normally carried in clothes were found. During the excavation work one group of archaeologists transformed into a field laboratory of Memorial under the Chelyabinsk City Executive Committee. The cooperation of Memorial with the local authorities, including the local administration of the KGB, made it possible to identify a portion of the victims of the executions. Films and expositions are being prepared, expedition participants give lectures on the discovered burials to the local population, and reports on the finds are being published by the local press.

VII. THE PEOPLE'S ARCHIVE

Interest in history has become so widespread that at the initiative of the Historical Archive Institute a documentation center, the People's Archive [Narodnyy arkhiy], was founded. According to the Board Chairman, Professor B. S. Iliazarov, the Archive is an independent social organization supported by funds from the Soviet-American Cultural Initiative philanthropic fund. The Archive's main aim is to collect materials about the everyday lives and concerns of average Soviet citizens. The main spheres of the Archive's activity have been set, and there is a private funds
department and a department for letters to the editors of newspapers and magazines. It seems that the latter is a first in the history of archives. If one takes into account the tremendous number of letters received by the mass media, the grandiose scale of this aim becomes obvious. It is clear that it would be impossible to cope with the huge volume of materials without using computer technology, which is in short supply, as Dr. Nekrich found during his visit to the People's Archive. A third department at the Archive is devoted to oral history and memoirs. Oral history will probably win its right to exist not only at the People's Archive--it is entirely probable that it will do the same in other archives and organizations. A special department is involved with the collection and sorting of documents from unofficial organizations. It takes no effort to imagine that in a few years this department will become a most representative depository for documents of the unofficial organizations. Students from the Moscow State Historical Archive Institute are being trained there as well, and students and teachers from the Institute hold more than one office at the Archive. In the future the Archive plans to prepare collections of documents, almanacs, and in the opinion of Professor Iliazarov, will even publish its own journal, entitled Narodnyy arkhiv [The People's Archive]. His colleagues expect to receive materials from compatriots living abroad, as well as the help of anyone interested in the Archive's work (largely, through funding and technology support).88
Studying the policy on history under Gorbachev and the restructuring of historical versions, one can only be surprised at the swiftness with which interest in the events of the past has grown among Soviet citizens. It is of course closely related to the process of forming a civil society now taking place in the USSR. However, the publication (largely non-professional) of many forgotten, half-forgotten, and entirely unknown pages of Soviet history in periodicals with utterly unheard of press runs of millions have forced the academic historians who have been in a relatively comfortably contemplative state to rouse themselves into wakefulness.

The crisis state of Soviet society has forced many to consider the reasons behind it. As a result, a huge number of people, probably millions, have found themselves drawn into disputes about Russia's historic course. However, these disputes also include explosive subjects, such as the relations between nationalities and between regions. An excellent example of the influence of history on the formation of political views and practical policies is of course the events of 1939-1941, in the course of which the Baltic states were annexed by the Soviet Union. Discussion of these events has served as a powerful stimulus for the movement to return independence to the three Baltic Soviet Republics. The official recognition of the legal and moral invalidity of the agreements with Nazi Germany on the division of Eastern Europe served as a
catalyst for actions culminating in Lithuania's formal act of restoring its independence.

An utterly unique tandem of history and politics has been emerged, in which history finds itself projected into the future.
NOTES


9. In January of 1990 at the request of the journal Novyy mir [New World], I discussed this issue with the journal's editorial staff. To my surprise I discovered that the idea of the "dissemination of ideology" into the pores not only of the social organism, but into those of each and every Soviet citizen, received the unanimous support of those present. The journal's editor-in-chief asked me to write an article on the subject, which I plan to do in the near future.


17. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika..., p. 38.


19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


27. Lecture at the Historical Archive Institute. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Yu. Afanasev, Rector of the Moscow State Historical Archive Institute. "Sotsial'naya pamyat' chelovechestva" [The Social Memory of Mankind], Nauka i zhizn' [Science and Life], 1987, No. 9, p. 57.


30. Ibid.


33. L. Batkin, "Vozobnovleniye istorii" [The Renewal of History], in the collection Inogo ne dano, p. 154.

34. V. A. Kozlov, "Istoriik i perestroyka" [The Historian and Perestroika], Voprosy istorii KPSS [Questions of CPSU History], No. 5, 1987.


36. The polemics were prompted by Afanasev's article "Proshloye i my" [The Past and Ourselves], in Kommunist, No. 14, 1986, and lasted more than a year.


38. Ibid, p. 76.


41. Viktor Danilov, "Oktyabr' i agrarnaya politika partii" [The October Revolution and the Party's Agrarian Policy], Kommunist, No. 6, November, 1987, p. 36.

42. Gorbachev, Perestroika..., p. 40.

43. Danilov, op. cit., p. 36.
44. Gorbachev, Perestroika..., p. 40.

45. Ibid., p. 42.

46. See, for example, the selection of letters "Narod i skazhet pravdu" [The People Speak the Truth] carried by Pravda on September 14, 1987.


55. Ibid.


60. First to appear was A. Vaksberg's article "Kak zhivoy k zhivym" [As Though Alive], Literaturnaya gazeta, June 20, 1988. It told of the Ryutin case. In March of 1990 the journal Izvestiya TsK KPSS published biographical material on Ryutin, in which the "Ryutin Affair" is described in some detail, based on archival material. At the same time, excerpts from Ryutin's letters to his family (and those close to him) (1932-1936) were published (pp. 150-178).
61. A. Gel'man, "Vozvrashcheniye k nравственным истокам" [The Return to Moral Sources], Kommunist, No. 9, 1988.


64. Ibid, p. 198.


67. "Istoricheskoye soznaniye obshchestva - na uroven' zadach perestroiki" [The Historical Consciousness of Society Should be Brought to the Level of the Tasks of Perestroika], Voprosy istorii [Questions of History], No. 1, 1990, p. 4.

68. Ibid, p. 5.

69. See, for example, the speech of I. D. Koval'chenko, Academician and Secretary of the Department of Historical Sciences of the Academy of Sciences. Ibid, pp. 6-7.


75. Loginov, by the way, was used several times as a debate opponent for Aleksandr Nekrich; first, in conjunction with Nekrich's interview given to the newspaper Moskovskie novosti [Moscow News] (October 8, 1989) and then, for Nekrich's appearance on Central Television, on February 4, 1990.
76. Literaturnaya Rossiya [Literary Russia], No. 9, 1990, p. 4.


80. S. Sluch. "K chemu stremitsya obshchestvo 'Memorial'?'" [What are the Goals of the Memorial Society?], manuscript, p. 1. Historian Sluch is the Chairman of the section of Memorial at the Institute of Scientific Information for the Social Sciences of the USSR Academy of Sciences.


84. Ibid.


88. Chairman of the Board of the People's Archive, Professor B. S. Iliazarov; 'Narodnyy arkhiv' [The People's Archive], manuscript.