Dynamics of the Soviet Illicit Drug Market

by Rensselaer Lee

Dr. Rensselaer Lee is President of Global Advisory Services, Alexandria, Virginia. A shortened version of this paper was presented at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies on 17 January 1991.
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DYNAMICS
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SOVIET ILLICIT DRUG MARKET

Prepared by
Rensselaer Lee
Global Advisory Services
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Size and Characteristics of the Soviet Illicit Drug Market

Although not subject to an outright ban, discussions on drug abuse and drug trafficking were officially discouraged in the USSR until quite recently. With few exceptions, Soviet scholars did not pursue systematic studies of the narcotics phenomenon, and the media were almost silent on the subject. A survey by the author of books and monographs available in libraries, bookstores, and other institutions in Moscow demonstrated that more than 80 percent of the materials published on narcotics in the USSR have appeared between 1985 and 1990. Of course, drug abuse is not an invention of glasnost. For instance, approximately 25,000 registered cases of addiction to narcotics and to various toxic substances were recorded in 1965. By 1975, that number had climbed to about 33,000, and in 1989, the total came close to 73,000.

However, only the advent of the Gorbachev regime vaulted the subject into national prominence. One reason for that development—aside from the relaxing of ideological controls—is that the magnitude of the problem apparently has increased significantly in the past decade, especially since the mid-1980s. For example, the combined total of drug addicts and toxic addicts on the Ministry of Health's register increased a phenomenal 77 percent between 1985 and 1989. To be sure, glasnost itself may have encouraged Soviet public health and law enforcement officials to compile more complete statistics on non-medical drug use. However, virtually all Soviet observers—officials, scholars, medical doctors, and journalists—agree that the upward trend in drug addiction is not a statistical artifact and that narcotics are far more widely available today than in the 1960s and 1970s.

Soviet public health and internal affairs organizations have identified approximately 130,000 Soviet citizens who engage regularly or occasionally in the nonmedical use of narcotics. Approximately half of these registered users are classified as addicts and are receiving medical treatment. Yet, Ministry of Interior (MVD) sources contend that the official statistics represent just the tip of the iceberg—that in reality 1.5 million Soviet citizens use drugs or have tried them. However, a recent multiregional survey in the USSR suggests that 1.5 million people in the
The 14-17 age category have used drugs at least once; extrapolating to the general population, as many as 15 million Soviets have tried some narcotic substance at least once in their lifetimes.

The typical Soviet drug user is a 30-year-old male blue-collar worker who lives in a major city such as the capital of a union republic, oblast, or autonomous republic. Compared to women, roughly six times as many men consume drugs in the USSR; in contrast, in the United States, the ratio of male to female drug users is less than 1.5 to 1. In addition, some survey evidence indicates that Soviet drug users come from families whose incomes are above average by Soviet standards, perhaps echoing drug abuse patterns in the United States two to three decades ago.

Drug consumption rates differ greatly by region. For example, according to Ministry of Health statistics, the rate of addiction in Soviet Central Asia—where opium cultivation and consumption are deeply ingrained in the local culture—is 60 percent higher than in the Russian Republic and 165 percent higher than in the Baltic Republics. In 1989, in Turkmenia, the rate of 103 addicts per 100,000 citizens was almost 5 times the national average of 22 addicts per 100,000 people. Moreover, the pattern of substance abuse varies substantially throughout the USSR. People in the northern European sections of the country are far more likely to consume amphetamines and toxic substances not classified as narcotics (such as glue, gasoline, weed killer, acetone) than are citizens in the southern regions and the Soviet Far East, where plant-based drugs are more readily available.

Importantly, the Soviet Union is a narcotics-producing as well as a narcotics-consuming nation. Indeed, the country is virtually self-sufficient in narcotics, as it is in so many other commodities. One MVD source in Moscow reports that 98 percent or more of the drugs consumed in the USSR are produced domestically. Imports of drugs such as cocaine and heroin are increasing but still constitute a negligible proportion of the market. The Soviet Union itself possesses an immense base of raw materials for producing narcotics: millions of hectares of largely wild hemp, including as many as 4 million hectares in Kazakhstan, and extensive poppy fields in Central Asia, Azerbaidzhan, the Ukraine, and southern European Russia. By all indications, the Soviet Union has the potential to become a significant exporter of drugs, but currently the USSR’s main role in the international narcotics market is that of a transit country. As many as 20 to 30 tons of illegal drugs pass through Soviet territory each year en route to customers in the West. Most of these drugs are shipped by
narcotics mafias operating in the Golden Crescent or Golden Triangle countries.

Marijuana and hashish are by far the principal drugs of choice in the USSR (hashish is used much more widely in the Soviet Union than in the United States). Other popular drugs include (1) opium, (2) morphine, (3) koknar, an evil brew concocted by grinding up the stems of poppies that contain opium, and (4) ephedrone, an amphetamine extracted from ephedrine, a readily available prescription drug. Some recent findings bolster the contention that a growing underground drug market is flourishing. Users and addicts traditionally have acquired drugs outside of normal market channels by collecting or manufacturing drugs themselves, stealing narcotics, or procuring them from friends. Users today are more likely to buy drugs from street dealers; nonetheless, the Soviet illicit drug market is less capitalistic than its counterparts in the West—drugs frequently are acquired rather than purchased.

The level of expenditures by Soviet consumers to support their habits remains essentially unknown. Official estimates of the annual retail value of the Soviet narcotics trade range from 3 billion rubles to 14 billion rubles; MVD projections fall at the low end of that scale, while projections by the Committee of State Security (the KGB) sit at the high end. The methodology for deriving these estimates is not clear. The variance apparently mirrors widely differing assumptions about drug users’ expenditures to support their habits. The MVD’s estimate is almost certainly much too low, even when the noncapitalistic features of the Soviet narcotics market are taken into account. Based on the MVD’s calculation of 1.5 million addicts and users, a minimum credible market-value figure would be 7 to 8 billion rubles, roughly midway between the KGB and the MVD market estimates.

Market Dynamics

At first glance, the Soviet drug problem apparently is a nonproblem, at least by U.S. standards. A few obvious comparisons can be drawn. The officially acknowledged 1.5 million Soviet drug users represent an infinitesimal part of the total Soviet population, less than 1 percent. In contrast, according to the National Institute for Drug Abuse, in the United States in 1990, 27 million Americans (11 percent of the population) used some illicit drug at least once a year. Similarly, the Soviet drug market of 3 to 14 billion rubles (0.3 to 1.6 percent of the Soviet gross national product) is relatively unimpressive compared to the $100-billion market in
the United States, where illicit drug sales constitute 2.3 percent of the
gross national product.

The extent of drug trafficking in the USSR thus is still extremely
modest, but such problems nonetheless are generating significant anxiety
for Soviet law enforcement and public health officials. Several factors
explain this state of Soviet affairs.

First, the use of drugs in the Soviet Union is increasing rapidly.
Between 1985 and 1989, the number of registered drug addicts in the
USSR jumped 66 percent, from 38,585 to 64,210. President
Gorbachev's ill-conceived anti-alcohol campaign from 1985 to 1987 may
well have driven many young people to use drugs. In some parts of the
country, the rise in drug consumption was especially swift—for example,
approximately 100 percent in the Ukraine and nearly 250 percent in
Byelorussia. (In contrast, use of the most widely consumed drugs in the
United States, marijuana and cocaine, has actually declined since the
mid-1980s.) Moreover, the growth in drug addiction is fueling a crime
wave. Addicts reportedly commit as much as 30 to 40 percent
of residential burglaries and 80 to 90 percent of pickpocket thefts. Such
estimates are hardly surprising In the RSFSR, the average price of a
kilogram of hashish (1,750 rubles), or even a gram of opium (300
rubles), exceeds the average monthly income earned by workers in
Soviet industry (235 rubles).

Second, glasnost and perestroika have furnished fertile soil for the
growth of organized crime in general and of narcotics trafficking in
particular. As social and political controls break down and the Union
crumbles, the power and influence of the criminal world is
concomitantly amplified. Organized interregional narcotics mafias are
emerging to serve the expanding Soviet drug market. Such
organizations are becoming larger, more internally specialized, better
equipped, and in general more sophisticated in distributing their
products. Even more troublesome, these trafficking organizations, like
the rest of the criminal underworld, have succeeded in developing
external ties with police, government officials, and even communist
party cadres at the district level and in higher government echelons. To
be sure, the drug traffic in the Soviet Union has not penetrated the
society and the political system to the same degree as in many other
parts of the world. Still, the Soviet leadership has reason to be
apprehensive when surveying the expansion of the Soviet market for
narcotics and the increasing sophistication of the criminal organizational
response to this market.
The Government Response

At least ten different Soviet government organizations and various political and voluntary groups (such as the Komsomol, "Znanie," and the Russian Orthodox Church) are involved in both the supply and demand sides of the Soviet fight against drugs. Yet, four USSR organizations—the MVD, the KGB, the State Customs Administration, and the Ministry of Health—bear most of the drug-fighting burden. The MVD is the lead drug enforcement agency in the Soviet Union and is responsible for investigating criminal organizations that deal in narcotics, eradicating illicit crops, seizing drug shipments, and arresting drug criminals. However, the KGB also investigates criminal enterprises that traffic in drugs, especially larger organizations that transcend union republic boundaries or that have apparent ties with trafficking groups abroad. In addition, cases of drug-related corruption (such as bribing officials and buying votes) fall within the KGB's sphere of responsibility. KGB and MVD responsibilities thus overlap to a large extent, because drug trafficking is now defined as a security threat in the USSR, just as it is in the United States. The role of Soviet Customs, as one might suspect, is detecting and seizing illicit drugs that cross Soviet frontiers. However, the KGB and the MVD handle criminal investigations that are precipitated by drug seizures. The Ministry of Health has various responsibilities, including maintaining statistics on drug abuse, treating addicts, conducting research on the sources or preconditions of addiction, and organizing education and prevention activities.

In general, Soviet anti-drug programs have produced poor results. The Soviets, who for years have deluded themselves that drug addiction was a problem peculiar to capitalist societies, lack both the experience and the resources to cope with the problem. The MVD currently assigns only 900 employees to the Soviet war against drugs. Demand-reduction activities—primarily anti-narcotics propaganda—are sporadic and loosely organized. Despite several highly touted campaigns to eradicate illicit crops in Soviet Central Asia, opium production apparently is increasing rapidly in that region to serve the growing market in the European section of the USSR. According to one unofficial MVD estimate, opium production in Central Asia rose 400 percent between mid-1989 and mid-1990. Soviet drug trafficking is becoming more organized and more interregional, and, of course, more and more Soviets consequently are coming under the influence of drugs.
Future Trends

What about the future? One can expect that Soviet drug abuse and drug trafficking will worsen in years to come. Westernization, internal economic reform, and Moscow's weakening hold over the union republics will all play a role in that process. One important economic factor is the movement toward increased convertibility of the ruble. By the mid-1990s, full convertibility may well be a reality in the USSR. If traffickers can sell drugs to Soviet customers in exchange for dollars or francs or marks, then traffickers undoubtedly will intensify their efforts to penetrate the Soviet market.

A second factor is the privatization of economic activity in the USSR. Some of the nearly 200,000 cooperatives now operating apparently have served as convenient legal covers for laundering drug money. Sometime in 1991, cooperatives and Soviet-foreign joint ventures will be able to freely exchange rubles for foreign currency in specially designated currency houses. This new development doubtless will be welcomed enthusiastically by drug mafias in the Soviet Union and abroad, particularly because Soviet bank regulators are inexperienced with private sector banking in general and with money laundering in particular. The monetary reform of early 1991 exemplifies the ineptitude of Soviet financial authorities; a January decree called for withdrawing all 50- and 100-ruble notes from circulation and forcing the exchange of these notes under highly restrictive conditions. Such requirements inconvenienced ordinary Soviet citizens but probably caused little anguish to the drug mafias. Some undocumented cash holdings of cooperatives were seized; however, cooperatives' bank accounts were not, in theory, affected by the decree (although some accounts may have been frozen as a result of criminal investigations). Furthermore, drug dealers and other organized criminal groups routinely and quickly convert rubles in their possession into property, gold, or hard currency. There are indications that the criminal underworld received advanced warning about the decree via an information leak which revealed that the authorities had ordered one of the state's money-printing factories to start printing new large-denomination ruble notes.

A third factor is the rapid expansion of trade, travel, and economic ties with Western countries and with Far Eastern countries, which will widen the drug pipeline. Moreover, the international pipeline will be a channel for transferring Western mafia expertise—such as refining
technology, distribution methods, and concealment techniques—to the Soviet criminal world.

The fourth factor is the weakening of central power (or the actual breakup of the USSR into separate Eurasian nations), which will enormously complicate the enforcement of drug laws. For example, in the reconfigured Soviet Union, the projected allocation of functions to Moscow, the union republics, and ethnic minority groups (such as Tatars, Buryats, and the like) in the major union republics is unclear. Organized crime and drug trafficking clearly are interregional by nature and require law enforcement strategies with the same reach.

International Linkages to Drug Control

The USSR is confronting a growing narcotics threat but lacks the experience and the resources to cope with that threat. Consequently, the Soviet Union has made a strategic decision to seek anti-narcotics assistance from the West. From the U.S. perspective, improving anti-drug cooperation with the USSR would be advantageous for several reasons. First, the USSR almost certainly will become an important actor in the international drug trade in the 1990s, both as a consuming and an exporting nation. Already, many tons of narcotics each year are transported through the USSR. Moreover, the Soviet Union's gigantic base of raw materials makes it a potentially prominent world supplier of opiates and hashish. Developments in the Soviet illicit drug trade obviously bear watching. Furthermore, expanded U.S.-Soviet cooperation against drug use and trafficking would furnish an invaluable window into the momentous social and political changes now occurring in the USSR—especially if anti-drug collaborative arrangements could be implemented at the union republic as well as the all-union level. In addition, operational cooperation against trafficking organizations could significantly enhance U.S. access to institutions that lie at the core of the Soviet power structure, for example, the MVD, the KGB, and the military.

The specific provisions of an expanded U.S.-Soviet partnership to combat narcotics need to be negotiated. However, an important first step would be establishing a full-time narcotics representative—either from the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters or from the Drug Enforcement Administration—to be stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. A second step would be broadening current U.S.-Soviet official anti-drug contacts (which include DEA-run training
seminars and joint research projects in the medical field) to encompass MVD and public health officials in the individual union republics. A third step would be supporting, perhaps by a combination of public and private funds, certain institutions suggested by the Soviets themselves, for example, funding a data bank on organized crime (as long as the United States would definitely have access to the data) and creating regional centers for anti-narcotics propaganda—that is, for educating the Soviet populace about the dangers of drug use. Overall, responding adequately to various Soviet requests for anti-drug aid would require a substantially expanded U.S. official and quasi-official presence in Soviet territories. The benefit of such a presence, particularly now, cannot be overstated.

Of course, risks do accompany U.S.-Soviet cooperation on the narcotics front, most notably the political risks of appearing to strengthen organizations that constitute part of the repressive apparatus of the Soviet state. Clear ground rules must be established for U.S. anti-narcotics assistance programs. On the law enforcement side, such programs should target the MVD's Administration for Combatting the Illegal Narcotics Trade and the Customs Administration. (The United States certainly should not furnish assistance to the Black Berets, the Soviet military, or the KGB.) Moreover, the technical and the organizational components of such programs should be as drug-specific as possible. However, if such rules can be established—and there is every reason to believe that they can—collaborating with the Soviets on drug control can advance a variety of important U.S. diplomatic, political, and intelligence objectives.

ENDNOTES

INTRODUCTION

International narcotics trafficking during the 1980s has profoundly affected the economies, social life, and political institutions of many developed and developing countries. For example, drug trafficking organizations, especially the multinational cocaine syndicates, have penetrated the economies and power structures of many Latin American countries. The violence, crime, and public health problems associated with drugs exact a major toll in the United States. Western Europe apparently is now on the verge of an explosive increase in cocaine use, similar to the one that struck the United States at the beginning of the 1980s.

The Soviet bloc countries have suffered fewer adverse effects from drug abuse than Western countries, but the Soviets are not immune. For example, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the USSR report growing rates of substance abuse. In the Soviet Union, the drastic changes associated with perestroika—the breakdown of communist controls, the crumbling of the Soviet empire, and a rapidly worsening economy—have created a fertile field for organized crime, including narcotics trafficking. Although the Soviet Union is not yet in the midst of a drug epidemic, clear indications suggest that the market for morphine, heroin, hashish, and other illicit substances is expanding in the USSR. The increasing number of Soviet economic and financial ties with the West undoubtedly will accentuate this trend: As one MVD official noted, "If ruble convertibility is achieved, a tremendous flood of drugs could pour toward us." Moreover, such contacts will surely accelerate the flow of Western narco-expertise—especially in the manufacture and supply of illicit drugs—to Soviet criminal networks. Consequently, the USSR could well assume the role of a major player in the international narcotics traffic in the 1990s, as both a consuming and an exporting nation.

Such a development would embody several important implications. First, to the extent that Soviet domestic production is concentrated in the southern Islamic republics, narcotics trafficking would aggravate centrifugal trends in the USSR. Second, the emergence of a serious drug abuse and drug trafficking problem in the Soviet Union would furnish additional ammunition for opponents of perestroika. The Gorbachev regime's supposed tolerance of organized crime already constitutes a rallying point for neo-Stalinists and other Soviet conservatives. Third, if, as seems likely, individual Soviet republics begin exporting opiates and hashish in the 1990s, narcotics trafficking could become a relatively significant issue in U.S.-Soviet relations.
Consequently, relations conceivably could suffer; alternatively, combatting drugs could be recast as a significant focus of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

The following report evaluates the dimensions and dynamics of the Soviet illicit drug trade, analyzing trends in the Soviet drug market, the roles and capabilities of various Soviet bureaucratic actors in battling the drug trade, and future prospects for narcotics control in the USSR. A concluding section of the report outlines the opportunities for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the narcotics field.

Profile of Soviet Drug Users

According to an August 1990 report from the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the number of Soviet citizens "who have tried drugs or use them" totaled "around 1.5 million." These figures represent an extrapolation of the 130,000 addicts and users in a register maintained by the MVD; that is, the actual number of Soviets who consume narcotics apparently is about 11 times the number represented in official statistics. The MVD register includes the 64,000-odd people classified as addicts (narkomany) by the Ministry of Health (see Table 1) and an equivalent number of casual, occasional, or even one-time users (potrebiteli). Unlike potrebiteli, narkomany are categorized as chronically ill. By extrapolation, about half of the estimated 1.5 million narcotics users are addicts—people who require medical treatment for their affliction.

The Soviets also identify a class of substance addiction called "toxicomania." As Duke University researcher Kimberly Neuhauser observes, toxicomania "straddles the world of substance abuse between drug and alcohol addiction in Soviet terminology." Toxic addicts (toksikomany) ingest, by sniffing or swallowing, compounds that are not classified as narcotics but that produce a high—for example, glue, acetone, gasoline, and weed killer. As of 1989, roughly 9,000 such addicts appeared on the Ministry of Health register (see Table 1). On an all-union scale, narkomany outnumber toksikomany by seven to one. Using the methods of extrapolation described above, the total number of toxic addicts can be estimated at more than 200,000.

The MVD's extrapolations apparently reflect the assumptions of a prominent Georgian researcher, Anzor Gabiani, who heads the Caucasian branch of the MVD's All-Union Research Institute. Gabiani concluded after 18 years of survey research in Georgia that hidden users numbered 10 to 12 for every user known to the authorities. This estimate constitutes an upper-boundary limit. For example, Vyacheslav Pankin, the former head of the
### TABLE 1
NUMBER OF DRUG ADDICTS AND TOXIC ADDICTS ON MINISTRY OF HEALTH REGISTER 1984-1989, BY UNION REPUBLIC

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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>4,601</td>
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<td>(411)</td>
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### TABLE 1 CONTINUED

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<td>1,307</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>1,116</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
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<td>TURKMENIA</td>
<td>5,191</td>
<td>5,297</td>
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<td>(11)</td>
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<td>(43)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
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<td>TADZHIKISTAN</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(88)</td>
<td>(116)</td>
<td>(118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UZBEKISTAN</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>2,273</td>
<td>2,272</td>
<td>3,741</td>
<td>4,367</td>
<td>4,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(87)</td>
<td>(104)</td>
<td>(184)</td>
<td>(334)</td>
<td>(476)</td>
<td>(515)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures in parentheses are toxic addicts.

Source: All-Union Research Center on Medical-Biological Problems of Narcology: Ministry of Health, September 1990.
MVD's Criminal Investigation Division and now vice minister of the RSFSR MVD, estimates that the ratio of latent to discovered users was only 5 to 1. A researcher at the All-Union Research Institute on Medical Biological Problems of Narcology (hereafter the Narcology Institute) suggests a figure of 7 to 1.5 Yet, even a ratio of 10 to 1 or 11 to 1 may be too conservative, as recent research by Gabiani himself attests. For instance, in a multiregional survey of 5,801 secondary school students conducted by Gabiani in 1988-1989, 597 respondents, or 10.2 percent, admitted that they had taken drugs. Gabiani estimated that the categories surveyed—which included students in professional-technical schools (PTU) and in the top four grades of the general middle schools—included 15.2 million people nationwide. By extrapolation, the number of drug users only in these categories, which cover roughly schoolchildren between the ages of 14 and 17, could be calculated at more than 1.5 million, and the total number of Soviets who have taken drugs at least once in their lives may total more than 15 million.6 Clearly, the 130,000 registered users and addicts represent the tip of a very large iceberg whose dimensions cannot be calculated with any degree of certainty. For purposes of this report, however, the current MVD figure of 1.5 million people engaged in non-medical drug use will be employed as an approximation of the actual Soviet narcotics-consuming population.

Who are the Soviet drug users? Recent survey data draw the following statistical portrait. The average drug user is male, less than 30 years of age, a blue-collar worker (in industry, construction, or transport), and fairly well educated. In 1988-1989, Gabiani conducted the most authoritative survey to date (unfortunately, still unpublished) under MVD auspices in the cities of Moscow and Tashkent; the Latvian SSR, Stavropol, and Primorsky krais (RSFSR); Gorky and Novosibirsk oblasts (RSFSR); and Lvov oblast (Ukraine). This multiregional study, which comprised 2,998 narkomany (addicts) and potrebiteli (users), apparently is the first of its kind—previous studies focused on specific cities or regions.

According to Gabiani, 67.2 percent of the 2,998 respondents were younger than 30 years of age, and 40.1 percent were younger than 25. Moreover, nearly one-quarter (23.5 percent) of the respondents began using drugs before they reached the age of 16, and nearly three-quarters (73.1 percent) began before they were 19. (Other Soviet survey data suggest that some people start using drugs at as young an age as 9 or 11.) Males predominated over females in the survey, 85.8 percent to 13.3 percent. (In contrast, in the United States, drug survey data indicate that male users—both frequent and occasional—outnumber female users by ratios of less than 1.5 to 1.) About one-third of the sample (33.5 percent) resided in prominent cities (Moscow and the capitals of Union republics and autonomous republics); about one-half (50.7 percent)
lived in krai or oblast capitals; and only 1.3 percent were rural residents. (Of course, such results raise the question of whether the sample suffers from a built-in urban bias, and Gabiani does not explain how the sample was selected.) The survey's results by occupation showed that of the employed respondents, 20.5 percent were workers, 10 percent were professionals (engineering and technical personnel), and less than 1 percent (0.7 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively) were collective farmers or active-duty military personnel. The majority of respondents, 66.9 percent, worked in industry, construction, or transport. In Gabiani's view, the educational level of the sample was unexpectedly high: Roughly three-quarters of the respondents (75.8 percent) had finished secondary school, attended a higher educational institution (VUZ), or been graduated from a VUZ. About one-tenth (9.2 percent) had at least attended a VUZ; in Moscow and Tashkent, the comparable percentages were higher, 15.8 percent and 11.3 percent, respectively.7

Gabiani's results can be compared with the results of a survey (also unpublished) conducted in 1988 in Kazakhstan by Boris Levin, the president of the Department of Social Problems of Alcoholism and Drug Addiction, attached to the Institute of Sociology of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Levin's sample included 428 prisoners convicted of one or another infraction of the narcotics laws. In contrast, Gabiani's sample comprised people who work or study, who do both, or who do neither (that is, parasites); Gabiani's sample apparently did not encompass prisoners. Yet, the results of Levin's survey are surprisingly similar: 97.2 percent of the respondents were male; 75.9 percent were less than 30 years of age; 46.7 percent were younger than 25; and 34.3 percent started using drugs before the age of 16 (this figure is significantly higher than the comparable Gabiani figure of 23.5 percent). Workers accounted for 71.5 percent of the sample, and most respondents (70.8 percent) had at least completed secondary school.8

What kinds of illicit drugs are most popular in the Soviet Union? Both national and regional sources suggest that products of the hemp plant—hashish and marijuana—constitute the main drugs of choice. (Hashish, a sticky, resinous substance, is five times stronger than its less concentrated cousin.) According to the Gabiani study, the three most commonly used drugs nationally are hashish-marijuana (a combined category), koknar (an evil brew made by grinding the stems of poppies and steeping them), and opium. Levin's work in Kazakhstan documented similar preferences, identifying marijuana and hashish (in that order) as the most popular drugs. However, a Gabiani survey of 1,620 addicts and users in Georgia in 1984-1985 concluded that morphine was the second most widely used drug, after the hemp category (see Table 2).
TABLE 2

MOST WIDELY USED DRUGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Respondents</td>
<td>Percent of Respondents</td>
<td>Percent of Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashish/Marijuana</td>
<td>Marijuana</td>
<td>Hashish/Marijuana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koknor</td>
<td>Hashish</td>
<td>Morphine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>Koknar</td>
<td>Opium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chifir</td>
<td>Omnopen</td>
<td>Codeine tablets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codeine Tablets</td>
<td>Promedol</td>
<td>Noksirin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promedol</td>
<td>Morphine</td>
<td>Promedol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ephedrine</td>
<td>Khimka</td>
<td>Omnopon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphine</td>
<td>Codeine</td>
<td>Pure Codeine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omnopon</td>
<td>Ephedrine</td>
<td>Cocaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noksirin</td>
<td>Noksirin</td>
<td>Heroin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codeine Powder</td>
<td>Barbormil</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>Rodelorm</td>
<td>No info.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efir</td>
<td>Codeine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of these surveys highlight the differences between Soviet and Western patterns of drug abuse. Although hashish and marijuana are the principal Soviet drugs of choice, opium derivatives collectively are more widespread than hemp derivatives. According to Gabiani's studies, opiates are used 2.3 to 2.5 times as frequently as hemp-based drugs. In Kazakhstan, the respondents in Levin's study preferred opiates over marijuana and hashish by about a 7 to 5 ratio. By most indications, the Soviet drug culture is more opium-centered than that in the West (or at least in the United States). Other differences are clear as well: Hashish is widely consumed in the USSR but not in the United States. Heroin is infrequently used; according to a source in the Narcology Institute, the drug accounts for only 1 percent of the value of the narcotics turnover in the USSR. A 1990 study by the National Institute of Drug Abuse documented that cocaine is used once a month or more by 1.6 million Americans; however, that drug is relatively rare in the USSR, although apparently more common than heroin. In addition, home-brewed drugs such as koknar and khimka (a more refined version of koknar that is injected rather than ingested) seemingly account for a significant share of the Soviet drug market. In contrast, in the West, refined narcotics are widely available, so users have less incentive to manufacture their own drugs.

Drug consumption in the USSR varies significantly by region. For example, according to the Ministry of Health's register, the rate of narcotics addiction in Soviet Central Asia (excluding Kazakhstan)—where opium cultivation and consumption are deeply ingrained in the local culture—averages 28.9 per 100,000, or 61 percent higher than the rate in the RSFSR (17.9 per 100,000) and 167 percent higher than the rate in the Baltic countries (10.8 per 100,000). Turkmenia harbors proportionately more drug addicts than any other union republic, averaging 103.3 per 100,000. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the Ukraine ranks in second place, at 38.4 per 100,000: this Ukrainian prominence is associated with the large numbers of oil-bearing (maslichnye) poppies that grow in the republic.

Moreover, the pattern of substance abuse (both narcotic and toxic) varies substantially across the USSR. The availability of raw materials apparently constitutes the main factor in these differences. For example, as the data from Gabiani's multiregional survey and from the Narcology Institute demonstrate, people in the northern European parts of the USSR are far more likely to consume amphetamines and toxic substances not classified as narcotics than are people in the southern regions and the Soviet Far East, where plant-based drugs are more readily available. The variations in consumption patterns are evident from the data displayed in Tables 3 and 4. Note, for example, the data in the tables on (1) the comparison of drug use in Gorky to that in Tashkent or
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Hashish - Marijuana</th>
<th>Opium</th>
<th>Koknar</th>
<th>Ephedrone (An Amphetamine)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primorskii Krai</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavropol Krai</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorki Oblast</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow City</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>7 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>4.4 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Countries</td>
<td>2.0 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Central Asia</td>
<td>12.5 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>18 : 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: All-Union Research Institute of the Medical-Biological Problems of Narcology, September 1990.
in Primorskii krai and (2) the low ratio of narcotics addiction to toxic substances addiction in the Baltic countries compared to the same ratio for the Ukraine or Central Asia.

**THE DRUG MARKET**

The Soviet Union can be categorized as both a narcotics-producing and a narcotics-consuming nation. Indeed, the country is virtually self-sufficient in narcotics. According to the Drug Enforcement Division of the MVD's Main Administration of Criminal Investigations (MACI), 98 percent or more of the drugs consumed in the USSR (by value) are of domestic origin. Imports of heroin and cocaine from the West are increasing, and some drugs (opium and hashish) are smuggled into the USSR, primarily from Afghanistan. (Smuggling rings operating along the Soviet-Afghan border exchange gold and jewelry for narcotics and sometimes for weapons.) However, imports still represent a negligible share of the Soviet market, although the USSR's increasing economic integration with the West could alter this equation considerably. As one MACI official in Moscow, Valentin Roshchin, explained, "If ruble convertibility is achieved, a tremendous flood of drugs could pour toward us." The USSR is not a significant exporter of illicit drugs, either—however, Soviet officials report, "The geographical scale of contraband drugs and the transit of drugs across our territory are expanding." The USSR's involvement in international drug trafficking is virtually predetermined by its size and geographical location. Drug cargoes from Southwest Asia (the Golden Crescent) and Southeast Asia (the Golden Triangle) travel across Soviet territory by air, rail, and truck en route to Western Europe and North America.

The Soviet Union itself apparently possesses a gigantic base of raw materials necessary for the production of narcotics: Millions of hectares of mostly wild hemp reportedly are growing in the USSR, including as many as 4 million hectares in Kazakhstan alone and another 1.5 million hectares in the Soviet Far East. (In an interview with the author in August 1990, Anzor Gabiani predicted that the Soviet Union would some day flood the world with hashish.) In addition, significant quantities of opium poppies are cultivated in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, and in Azerbaidzhan, and the oil-bearing poppy thrives in Southern Russia and the Ukraine. Drug crops that do not grow wild are grown in private plots in sovhozy or kolkozy or on unpopulated state lands, for example, in mountain gorges or on irrigated lands in desert areas.
All private cultivation of hemp and poppies is currently illegal in the USSR, and growing opium and certain high-potency strains of cannabis is classified as a crime punishable by jail terms. Growing oil-bearing poppies or cannabis with lower concentrations of tetrahydracannabinol (THC) is punishable administratively by fines as high as 100 rubles. (Administrative fines for illegal cultivation of poppies and hemp were imposed on 48,960 Soviet citizens in 1989.) As Table 5 shows, the Soviet government still maintains hemp plantations totaling about 63,000 hectares in 1989 and until 1987 cultivated significant extensions of oil-bearing poppies. (Of course, hemp is needed for producing rope fiber, and poppies are used in preparing medicines, certain foods, and paints and lacquers.) In 1987, however, the government—specifically, the State Agricultural-Industrial Committee (Gosagroprom) and the Ministry of Medical and Microbiological Industry—decided to abandon the poppy-growing business. Protecting the fields against poppy-hunting addicts and drug dealers proved to be an administrative nightmare. As one account noted:

Hundreds of members of the Central Investigation Division, district police reporters, investigators, members of the Department for Controlling Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation, and specially trained dog handlers with guard dogs have had to take to the fields...

Much of the time, the fields were simply unguarded; in other cases, the poppy hunters bribed the guards to look the other way.

Sophisticated production facilities for processing narcotics are still relatively rare in the USSR. Most manufactured drugs are in fact homemade, usually concocted in the user's own kitchen. However, as one MVD spokesman noted in August 1990:

The appearance of synthetic drugs in illegal circulation is increasingly being recorded. And this means that underground laboratories using industrial equipment and chemical reagents are operating in the country.

Such operations have been discovered in Leningrad, Moscow, Riga, Perm, Rostov, Tomsk, Vladivostok, and other Soviet cities. Most of these illegal laboratories produce amphetamines; a few, however, manufacture plant-based drugs such as morphine and heroin. MVD sources interviewed in Moscow believe that expanded contacts with the West will create new opportunities for transferring narcotics-manufacturing technology to the USSR. Currently, chemists from local scientific-research institutes or university students operate
TABLE 5

STATE CULTIVATION OF
HEMP AND OIL-BEARING POPPIES
(in thousands of hectares)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Hemp</th>
<th>Oil Poppy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>122.85</td>
<td>35.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>132.22</td>
<td>43.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>113.19</td>
<td>38.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>101.83</td>
<td>39.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>115.91</td>
<td>37.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>114.61</td>
<td>35.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>107.16</td>
<td>31.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>25.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>80.24</td>
<td>8.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>71.84</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>62.57</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

most of the illegal facilities. In the case of a narcotics laboratory detected in Moscow in 1985:

Students of the chemistry faculty of one of the Vuzy in the capital decided to test their theoretical knowledge in practice. They borrowed equipment from a well-supplied laboratory in the Vuzy, bought the other material that they needed, and set up a base of scientific experimentation in a private apartment. Some specialists later remarked that the equipment and the uniqueness of the technology [dedicated to this illegal operation] would be the envy of many a scientific-research institute.16

How does the Soviet user population procure illegal narcotics? The evidence suggests that the Soviet narcotics market is highly imperfect by capitalist standards. As the survey data in Table 6 indicate, users often acquire their supplies of narcotics from friends, associates, or relatives; harvest hemp or poppies on their own; or manufacture drugs themselves. Some users obtain medicinal drugs (especially opiates such as morphine and codeine) through contacts in pharmacies, hospitals, and medical storehouses. Money does not necessarily change hands in a drug transaction—if it does, the user may pay only a nominal sum (a fraction of the black market price) for a particular illicit substance.

In contrast to the surveys, the seizure data furnished by the RSFSR MVD (MACI) assigns relatively low weight to personal channels for the allocation of narcotics, but that calculation is hardly surprising. Such channels are more difficult for the MVD to monitor than market transactions, which often occur in specific neighborhoods, or the process of self-manufacturing, which frequently produces obtrusive odors and other characteristic signatures. However, the role of market mechanisms and relatively impersonal buyer-seller relationships cannot be overlooked—both the surveys and the MVD data offer undeniable evidence that a narcotics business as such exists in the USSR. As Boris and Mikhail Levin note in their study, "Narkomania y Narkomany":

Self-supply and the black market coexist and complement one another; often the same people will obtain drugs both through their own effort and from dealers.17

Official estimates of the 1990 retail value of the Soviet criminal narcotics trade ranged from 3 billion rubles to 14 billion rubles. MVD projections fall at the low end of the scale, but estimates from the Committee of State Security (KGB) appear at the high end. (In mid-1989, the MVD calculated the market's size at only 300-400 million rubles.)18 The derivation of these
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gabiani (Multi-Regional Survey, 1988-1989)¹</th>
<th>Gabiani (Georgia, 1984-1985)²</th>
<th>The Levins (Kazakhstan, 1988)³</th>
<th>RSFSR MVD⁴</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) from friends and comrades</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>1) from comrades and friends</td>
<td>92.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) from known dealers</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>2) go to places where opium or cannabis are grown</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) from unknown dealers</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>3) buy drugs of which</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a) from friends</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) from known dealers</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c) from unknown people</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) from workers in pharmacies and other medical institutions</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4) self-manufacture</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4) obtain from</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) self-manufacture from various medical drugs</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>5) from workers in pharmacies and other medical institutions</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>from medical or pharmaceuti-</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cal workers with whom ac-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>quainted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>6) collect opium, cannabis</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>6) self-manufacture</td>
<td>14.4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6) theft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) illegal or stolen prescription</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7) other or unknown</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) other</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

1. Percentage of 2998 respondents
2. Percentage of 1620 respondents
3. Percentage of 428 respondents
4. Origins of drugs seized, percent

Sources: Gabiani. "Narkotism v Zerkalye Sotsislogii." p. 21
Gabiani. Narkotism, Vchera i Sevodnia. p. 152
Levin and Levin. "Narkomania y Narkomany" pp. 163-166
Criminal Investigation Division. MVD RSFSR.
estimates is uncertain, but the difference between them reflects widely-varying assumptions about drug users' expenditures to support their habits. Using the MVD's figures, the 1.5 million addicts and users would spend an average of 166 rubles per month; the KGB's estimate assumes an average monthly expenditure of 778 rubles. An outlay of 166 rubles per month seems on the low side, even considering that users do not necessarily procure drugs on the black market, where the prices recorded in Table 7 are well beyond the reach of the average citizen.

Reconciling these estimates is challenging. In the previously cited multiregional survey, Anzor Gabiani asked the 2,998 respondents what they thought a chronic addict would spend on drugs and what they themselves paid for drugs. The average responses were, respectively, 656 rubles and 218 rubles. As Gabiani notes, "indirect indicators" suggest that the respondents' figures constitute a guess and perhaps a deliberate underestimation. Almost half of the sample (44 percent) used drugs at least once a day and probably could be categorized as addicts. Moreover, roughly 29 percent of the sample represented opium users (864 respondents), and 11 percent (324 respondents) were morphine users. Gabiani calculated that an opium addict's average monthly expenditures would be 1,500 rubles, assuming a dose of 0.25 grams a day at 200 rubles per gram (the black market price). Other survey data support the contention that a morphine addict would spend 4,500 rubles a month. Granted, some of the opiate users in the sample may not be addicts, and some of the opium or morphine that they consume may not be procured at black market prices. However, assuming for the sake of argument that consumers pay an average of half of the black market price for opiates and that half use drugs an average of once a month (instead of once a day), the average monthly expenditure would total 657 rubles—almost identical to Gabiani's 656-ruble figure for the chronic addict. The lower figure of 218 rubles may approximate the non-addict user's monthly expenditures on drugs. If these two figures respectively represent the monthly outlays of addicts and non-addicts, the value of the yearly turnover of drugs in the USSR would total at least 7.5 billion to 8.0 billion rubles, more than double the MVD's estimate.

MARKET DYNAMICS

At first glance, the Soviet drug problem seemingly is a big non-problem, at least by U.S. standards. A few obvious comparisons can be drawn: The official estimate of 1.5 million Soviet addicts and users represents an infinitesimal segment of the total Soviet population, about 0.5 percent. In contrast, according to the National Institute for Drug Abuse (NIDA), in the United States, roughly 10 million Americans use marijuana and 1.6 million
# TABLE 7

**BLACK MARKET PRICES FOR NARCOTICS IN THE RSFSR, mid-1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morphine</td>
<td>one gram</td>
<td>500 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>one gram</td>
<td>500 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codeine</td>
<td>one gram</td>
<td>500 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>one gram</td>
<td>100 - 500 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koknar</td>
<td>glass (200 grams)</td>
<td>120 - 150 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashish</td>
<td>one kilogram</td>
<td>1500 - 3000 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promedol</td>
<td>0.25 grams</td>
<td>100 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methadone</td>
<td>one gram</td>
<td>300 - 600 rubles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average USSR industrial monthly wage (1988) - 235 rubles

**Sources:** RSFSR MVD Main Administration of Criminal Investigation; *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR* v 1988g., p. 81.
consume cocaine on a current basis (that is, at least once a month) and 27 million consume some illicit drug occasionally (that is, at least once a year). Occasional marijuana users, who number 20.5 million, account for 8.3 percent of the total U.S. population, and the 6.2 million occasional cocaine users account for 2.5 percent.

Similarly, the Soviet illicit drug market of 3 billion to 14 billion rubles—or $1 billion to $5 billion (U.S.) at current official exchange rates—is unimpressive compared to the estimated $100-billion market in the United States. Retail sales of narcotics represent about 2.3 percent of the 1988 U.S. GNP and between 0.3 and 1.6 percent of the 1988 Soviet GNP, according to Goskomstat calculations (866 billion rubles). If the Soviet drug market is computed at 7.5 billion rubles, it accounts for less than 1 percent of the Soviet GNP.

Furthermore, drug-related offenses (those involving illegal manufacturing, trafficking, or possession of narcotics) represent a negligible percentage of all arrests in the USSR—an estimated 1.2 percent in 1989. In contrast, in the United States in 1989, the proportion of drug arrests was 9.4 percent, according to FBI statistics; in 1988, more than one million people were arrested in the United States for violations of the drug laws, compared to about 26,000 in the USSR. In the United States, a high percentage of the prison population is incarcerated for drug law violations—about 10 percent of the 800,000 inmates in state prisons and local jails and more than 33 percent of the 440,000 inmates in federal prisons.

The extent of drug trafficking and drug abuse in the USSR thus is extremely modest by U.S. standards, but such problems nonetheless are generating significant anxiety among Soviet law enforcement and public health officials. Several factors explain this state of Soviet affairs.

First, the use of drugs in the Soviet Union is increasing rapidly. Between 1984 and 1989, the number of drug addicts in the USSR rose more than 80 percent, and the number of toxic addicts more than tripled (see Table 1, pages 3-4). One possible cause was Gorbachev's ill-conceived anti-alcohol campaign in 1985-1987: This campaign was designed to reduce violent crime (alcohol figures in about 70 percent of the murders committed in the USSR) and to regain lost productivity in the workforce but apparently drove many young people to consume drugs. In some parts of the country, the growth in drug use was especially rapid—for example, about 175 percent in the Ukraine, 325 percent in Latvia, and 350 percent in Moldavia. During the 1980s, combined substance abuse—drug and toxic addiction as a proportion of the total Soviet population—surged more than 85 percent (see Table 8). The increase was
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenia</td>
<td>182.9</td>
<td>152.3</td>
<td>104.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizia</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
- All-Union Research Institute on Medical-Biological Problems of Narcology, Ministry of Health. September 1990.
- Author's calculations.
especially rapid in the Slavic republics and Moldavia (136 percent) and in the Baltics (182 percent). In addition, as Table 9 indicates, the number of newly diagnosed addicts in the Ministry of Health's narcotics register rose as a proportion of the Soviet population between 1980 and 1989 and between 1985 and 1989. (However, from the Soviet perspective, some small comfort is taken from the apparent reduction in the rate of new addiction in three Union republics—the Ukraine, Georgia, and Turkmenistan—between 1985 and 1989.) In contrast, in the United States, drug abuse has declined markedly since the mid-1980s. According to NIDA, in 1990, some 13 million Americans used some illicit drug at least once a month, compared to 23 million in 1985—a 43-percent drop.

Moreover, some evidence—albeit data from only one union republic—suggests that the profile of drug users is changing. A comparison of two surveys conducted by Anzor Gabiani in Georgia in between 1967 and 1974 and between 1984 and 1985 shows that users are becoming better educated, wealthier (or at least not as poor), and more frequently women (see Table 10). All of these trends are obviously cause for concern.

Second, the Soviets view the expansion of drug abuse and drug trafficking as stark symbols of the disintegration of their society. This perception reflects the close link in all societies between drugs and crime. On the other hand, drug addicts commit various crimes—such as burglary and prostitution—to earn money to support their habits. As noted in Table 7 (page 18), the average Russian worker's monthly wage might not be sufficient to cover the cost of a single gram of opium. An MVD briefing in Moscow in February 1990 reported an alarming statistic: "One convicted drug addict in every three has taken part in thefts and robberies." The MVD also disclosed that addicts commit "up to 30-40 percent of burglaries and 80-90 percent of pickpocket thefts" and that "up to 70-80 percent of property crimes in Central Asia, the Far East, and the Northern Caucasus are committed to get money for drugs."23 Clearly, the abuse of narcotics—although not yet of epidemic proportions—is already an important stimulus to criminal behavior in the USSR. On the other hand, glasnost and perestroika have furnished fertile soil for the growth of organized crime in general and of narcotics trafficking in particular. As social and political controls break down and the Union crumbles, the power and influence of the criminal world is concomitantly amplified. Relatively large narcotics trafficking organizations, comprising 20 to 30 or more members, are emerging and are exhibiting signs of internal specialization.24 In a recent Pravda interview, a Moscow MVD official described this process of organizational growth. Pravda asked the official, "How does the drug mafia differ from ordinary sellers of marijuana and hashish?" The official replied:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Republic</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussia</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenia</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizia</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 10

THE CHANGING PATTERN
OF DRUG USE IN GEORGIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Survey 1967-1974 (percent of sample)</th>
<th>Survey 1984-1985 (percent of sample)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 30</td>
<td>70.39</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher, incomplete</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>higher, or complete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or higher$^1$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^1$ More than 240 rubles per family per month, 1967-1974; more than 300 rubles per family per month, 1984-1985.


Anzor Gabiani. Narkotism Vchera i Sevodnya. Part II. Tbilisi: Sabchota Sakartvelo. 1988, chapter II.
First, there were occasional deals, one on one. Second, a person involved in drugs combined within himself both the manufacturer and the buyer and even the seller. That was three or four years ago. Everything is different now. All the elements characteristic of the drug mafia are inherent in the drug delivery and sales organization: demarcation of roles, profound secrecy, and also the use of hiding places, passwords, and the hiring of guards.25

According to MVD officials and researchers interviewed by the author in Moscow and Tbilisi, modern Soviet drug mafias conduct fairly sophisticated operations. The larger syndicates have successfully differentiated themselves from the rest of the criminal underworld; that is, they operate independently from other mafia-type groups. Furthermore, such syndicates possess their own leaders, middlemen, couriers, manufacturers, distributors, security guards, paid informants, treasurers, money launderers, and muscle men. The trafficking organizations are well-equipped with transportation, weapons, and communication equipment—in fact, their equipment may well outstrip that of the Soviet police who pursue them. Furthermore, many of these criminal syndicates operate over wide geographic territories: As RSFSR MACI officials noted in a document prepared at the author's request:

[Drug trafficking] acquires increasingly clear-cut organizational focus with the differentiation of specialized roles in manufacturing, procurement, and marketing. Narcotics manufactured in Leningrad, Perm, and Tomsk turn up in Murmansk, Vorkuta, and Krasnoyarsk. The connection of narco-groups, operating in the North Caucasus establish themselves in the Urals and the Volga regions. Groupings that engage in contraband in the Far East extend their operations to Siberia.26

The increasing maturity of Soviet narco-mafias is also evident in their external ties. As a top-ranking Soviet MVD official observed, "For a criminal society to become a mafia, there has to be corruption—the secret society must have representatives of the state apparatus who are in the service of the criminals."27 Such representatives shield criminals from punishment or warn them about impending raids or crackdowns. MVD authorities contend that the drug syndicates have successfully cultivated ties with police, government officials, prosecutors, and even Communist party cadres at the district (raion) level and higher government echelons. Drug-related corruption is rampant in Central Asia, especially, according to the author's MVD sources, in the two Asian republics of Turkmenia and Uzbekistan. (Of course, the cultivation of drug crops is traditional in Central Asia—and the relative poverty of the
region, the clan-like structure of the society, and certain elements of Islamic culture all contribute to the phenomenon.) However, serious cases of corruption also plague the European section of the USSR. According to one MVD source, in 1987, one of the few heroin laboratories discovered in the USSR was detected in Riga, the capital of Latvia. The ensuing investigation disclosed a network of official protection that extended to party and MVD organs at the union republic level.

Drug trafficking organizations are not a new phenomenon in the USSR. Gabiani's research in Georgia in the 1960s and 1970s pointed to the existence of internally specialized organizations that operated over a broad geographical area (see Figure 1). However, the demands of a growing internal market for drugs have prompted the evolution of organizations that are almost certainly larger and more sophisticated than those identified by Gabiani. Moreover, the capacity of such organizations to corrupt parts of the power structure—even if still limited mainly to low-ranking officials—seemingly connotes a relatively new development. Gabiani's earlier research did not even discuss the issue of corruption, although, admittedly, such a discourse may have been more or less proscribed in the Brezhnev era.

Clearly, the problem of organized drug crime in the USSR must be kept in perspective: By world standards, it is still at an early stage of growth. Drug-related corruption has not invaded the top levels of the political or military elite, as it has in Colombia, Bolivia, Panama, and other Latin American countries. Unlike their South American counterparts, Soviet narco-mafias do not maintain large paramilitary armies, create their own political movements, issue communiques to the press, conduct negotiations with governments, and otherwise challenge the authority of the state. The Soviets like to emphasize that the USSR is not Colombia—at least, not yet. However, the trends in the Soviet drug market and the organizational response of Soviet drug criminals constitute reason enough for Soviet apprehension.

Finally, Soviet officials express concern about the possibly rising incidence of non-medical drug use in the Soviet military, especially in the army. The author has seen no surveys that would indicate the percentage of Soviet soldiers on active duty who use drugs or the likelihood that this percentage is in fact increasing. However, as a commentator for Sovetskii Patriot reported, "The army is a scale model of the society. If drug addiction is a social problem, a juvenile problem, in the society, the army cannot be a decontaminated zone." Draft boards supposedly screen out young people who are registered addicts or users. As noted above, however, the register maintained by public health and internal affairs organs encompasses only a fraction of the drug-consuming population. New recruits bring their drug
"Prime Source" has obtained the morphine illegally from a chemical pharmaceutical factory in Chimkent, Kazakhstan.

habits with them; as the commentator cited above remarked, "A social defect
does not disappear as soon as the recruit puts on a uniform."28

In addition, some percentage of the addict-user population was first
exposed to drugs during military service. According to a sociological survey
of 3,000 people in 20 Vuzy in three regions—Moscow, Kiev, and Krasnodar
krai—26.9 percent of students who consumed illicit substances started using
them in the army.29 Many soldiers acquired a craving for hashish and opium
while serving in Afghanistan, in Soviet Central Asia, and in other areas where
drug cultivation and production are rampant. As a lecturer in the MVD
Higher Militia School declared:

Whenever military subunits live alongside the population of
countries (in the continent of Asia, as a rule), when drug addiction is
deeply rooted as a way of life, this naturally leads to contacts
between servicemen and local residents and the adoption of antisocial
habits, traditions, and rules of behavior.30

Because of the above trends—the rise in drug use and drug-related crime,
the growth of Soviet narco-mafias, and the possible contamination of the
armed forces—the narcotics issue has amassed explosive political potential in
the USSR. In general, the increasing prominence of the issue is bad news for
glasnost and perestroika. In political terms, the illicit drug trade represents an
embarrassment for Soviet liberal reformers, providing ammunition for neo-
Stalinists seeking to reverse the course of reform. The image of the USSR as
a drug-ridden rather than merely an alcohol-addicted society inevitably will
strengthen the conservatives' case against democratization and Westernization.
Consequently, Western observers must pay close attention to developments in
the Soviet drug market and the Soviet reaction to such developments.

**FOCUS ON CENTRAL ASIA**

Central Asia probably ranks as the most important raw-material base for
the Soviet illegal drug market. Most opium poppies are grown in the region,
although oil-bearing (maslichny) poppies are cultivated in the European parts
of the USSR. The Central Asian region, especially the republic of Kazakhstan,
also constitutes an important supplier of Indian hemp, whose buds are used to
prepare hashish, one of the most widely used drugs in the USSR.

Drug consumption is traditional in Central Asia, where opium, for
example, is employed to treat stomach ailments, is used to tranquilize unruly
children, and commonly is passed out at family celebrations such as weddings.
Not surprisingly, addiction rates in Central Asia are higher than the national average. Turkmenia, Tadzhakistan, Kirghizia, and Uzbekistan (hereafter referred to as the four republics) reported a combined drug and toxic addiction rate in 1989 of 30.8 people per 100,000, compared to 25.6 for the USSR, 22.1 for the RSFSR, 16.1 for the Baltics, and 15.1 for the Trans-Caucasus republics. Nonetheless, overall addiction rates in the region were relatively stable during the 1980s. In Kirghizia, the number of drug addicts actually declined 11 percent from 1985 to 1989, and in Turkmenia, the number declined 31 percent (see Table 1, pages 3-4, and Table 8, page 20). However, addiction rates have risen dramatically in the European USSR.

MVD officials believe that Central Asian trafficking syndicates are encouraging the expansion of drug-crop cultivation to satisfy the rising demand for narcotics in other parts of the country. Much of this new production is located in remote mountainous regions on plots that are carefully camouflaged and in some cases protected by armed guards. Although the author has not seen any data on cultivation trends since the mid-1980s, in the first 9 months of this year alone, opium poppy and hemp fields reportedly expanded ninefold in Uzbekistan. An MVD official interviewed in Moscow in September 1990 stated that opium cultivation in Soviet Central Asia had risen fourfold between mid-1989 and mid-1990. Some of the demand for opiates in the European region is being satisfied by oil-bearing poppies grown in southern Russia and the Ukraine. Central Asian producers and traffickers, however, undoubtedly are capturing a considerable share of this rapidly expanding market.

Law enforcement officials interviewed in Moscow believe that the drug trade represents an important economic sector in some localities in Central Asia—especially in areas where drug crops are grown and in the supplying zones along the Turkmen-Uzbek-Afghan border. In fact, traffickers occasionally purchase opium and hashish on the Afghan side of the border in exchange for gold and valuables. Officials also refer to Central Asian narcomafias, organized criminal networks that specialize in selling drugs. The larger networks—which may comprise producers, couriers, armed guards, hitmen, liaisons, dealers, informants, and money launderers—are capable of moving drugs from Central Asian base areas into most major cities of the USSR. The leaders of these organizations reputedly are fabulously wealthy and have forged protective ties with party, Soviet, and MVD officials at the raion level and more rarely at the oblast level. Traffickers apparently have not yet bought into the political system in the Central Asian republics to the extent that Latin American traffickers have infiltrated the Colombian and Bolivian government systems. Nonetheless, their influence is likely to develop
in tandem with the growth of the USSR’s illicit drug market and with the decline of Moscow’s ability to affect events in the Central Asian region.

Drugs could well assume the status of a serious issue in relations between the USSR and the Central Asian republics. The relative poverty of the region is one central factor: The four republics in 1988 accounted for 12 percent of the total USSR population but only 6 percent of the total national income. Drugs thus might represent an attractive export for these republics—a development that may well be especially prohibitive if, as the price of greater national independence, Soviet Central Asia loses some of the 8 billion rubles in subsidies that now flow from Moscow to the region. A second factor, of course, is Central Asia's political and psychological distance from Moscow, which is reinforced both by geography and by the prevailing clan and Islamic traditions in the region. Clan loyalties and other personalistic ties cut across formal authority arrangements and limit the reach of Soviet-style political controls. Moreover, as Gregory Gleason, Boris Rumer, and others have observed, the clan-tribal pattern of power facilitates the partial coalescence of mafia-type organizations with the official power structure. Given these political and economic realities, Soviet efforts to control drugs in Central Asia are not likely to be very successful. For example, according to MVD sources in Moscow, the various Soviet operations "Mak" (a crop-eradication campaign) of the past 5 years have received at best perfunctory cooperation from local governments and populations.

Admittedly, the Central Asian republics as a group exhibit less eagerness to detach themselves from Moscow’s rule than other republics (the Baltics, Moldavia, and Georgia, for instance). Yet, vigorous Soviet efforts to suppress narcotics production and to dismantle local mafias could inflame Islamic chauvinism and generate further tension between the European and Asiatic parts of the USSR; Central Asia could become to European Russia what Latin America is to the United States.

**Fighting Drugs, Soviet Style**

**Overview**

The manufacture, acquisition, theft, possession, use, transport, and sale of drugs or toxic substances are against the law in the Soviet Union. In addition, the private cultivation of all forms of cannabis, opium, and oil-bearing poppies also is illegal. Certain first-time violations of the drug laws are penalized administratively by levying fines; such crimes include manufacture and possession without intent to sell, non-medical drug use, and cultivation of
oil-bearing poppies and low-potency strains of marijuana. (All of these offenses are punishable by fines of as much as 100 rubles or by a period of corrective labor.) Repeat offenses, however, carry the possibility of criminal sentences—that is, jail terms. Stealing or trafficking in illicit substances and cultivating certain drug crops (such as opium and Indian hemp) are considered criminal offenses under Soviet law.

Chronic addicts and even regular drug users who are not addicts can under certain circumstances (for example, refusal to submit to medical observation or therapy) be institutionalized in MVD-administered "work-treatment" or, for minors, "education-treatment" centers. According to the law, compulsory treatment of addicts is suggested under the following conditions: a petition by a labor collective, social organization, or state organ; certification by competent medical authorities; and a decision by the local court. However, the legal niceties of compulsory institutionalization frequently are not observed. This procedure is less than humane and manifests the Soviet propensity to solve social problems by making them disappear. Few addicts are ever cured in these treatment centers (the recidivism rate in the addict population as a whole reportedly hovers at 90 percent), and some of them do not survive the experience.

Soviet authorities do attempt to enforce the narcotics laws. According to the MVD, in 1989, some 90,000 people were brought to justice for violation of these laws—that is, they received criminal or administrative penalties. A total of 28,471 crimes (presumably resulting in arrests) were recorded "in the sphere of narco-business." Reportedly, 48,960 people were fined or sentenced to corrective labor for illegal cultivation of hemp and oil-bearing poppies. In the late 1980s, some 25 to 30 tons of drugs were confiscated annually, and 2 to 3 tons of that total represented drugs in transit through the USSR to customers in the West. Starting in 1986, the Soviets have conducted yearly crop eradication campaigns—Operations "Mak" (poppy)—in hemp and opium growing regions in Central Asia. Such campaigns reputedly have entailed the participation of local militia units, members of state and collective farms, the Soviet military, and even the KGB. According to a source at the Narcology Institute, some 250,000 hectares of drug crops were eliminated in 1989; nearly all of that acreage, except for 1,000 hectares, was hemp, predominantly wild hemp. (The procedures for eradicating such crops seemingly relied on a combination of aerial spraying, manual applications, and the use of tractors.) This 250,000-hectare figure is surely inflated—consider, for example, that the entire coca crop in South America covers an area of 200,000 to 250,000 hectares—yet, even if the eradication figure is discounted by 90 percent, the Soviets still would have destroyed more drugs (in hectares) than the Latin American governments did in 1989.
Still, Soviet anti-drug crusades cannot be termed successful. The 25 to 30 tons of drugs seized represent only 10 to 15 percent (by MVD estimates) of the total volume of drugs circulating in or transiting the USSR. The 250,000 hectares of marijuana reportedly razed in 1989 constitute only 5 percent of the total number of hectares reportedly growing in Kazakhstan and the Soviet Far East alone. Peasants who cultivate drug crops have adapted to the various Operations Mak by moving their plots of opium or Indian hemp to "deep abandoned gorges far from human eyes" and, in some cases, to sites inaccessible to helicopters and aircraft. Eradication campaigns, which consume farm labor needed for harvesting or tending crops, are greeted with hostility by local populations. Such animosity is compounded by the importance of the drug crops as a source of livelihood for many Central Asian peasants. Soviet anti-drug programs also suffer from a dearth of critical equipment (such as helicopters, aircraft, and herbicides), shoestring budgets, manpower shortages, and poor coordination and turf disputes among the Soviet agencies charged with law enforcement. In general, the prospects that the Soviets will be able to contain their rapidly growing drug problem seem remote; moreover, no conceivable amount of Western anti-drug assistance (which the Soviets are now desperately seeking) is likely to affect materially the scope and status of drug abuse and drug trafficking in the USSR.

How is the Soviet anti-narcotics drive organized? Who are the main bureaucratic actors, and what are their responsibilities? The four Soviet organizations most deeply involved in combatting drugs are the MVD, the KGB, the Customs Administration, and the Ministry of Health. Other bodies that play a role in this process include the Procuracy, the Ministries of Culture and Foreign Affairs, the State Committee for Public Education, the Komsomol, the Gosagroprom, state and collective farms, and various voluntary associations. These organizations and their functions are described below.

MVD

The MVD is the lead enforcement agency in the Soviet war on drugs and is responsible for making arrests, organizing drug raids and eradication campaigns, and investigating trafficking organizations. Within the MVD, a specialized drug enforcement division, the Administration on Illegal Narcotics Trade (ACINT), is roughly comparable to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and is subordinate to the MVD's Main Administration of Criminal Investigations (MACI). The head of ACINT, Aleksandr Nikolovich Sergeyev, told the author in August 1990 that his group had been upgraded from a division (otdyel) to an administration (upravlyenie) that
summer. ACINT divisions (otdyely) and sections (otdyelyenia) are attached to MVD Criminal Investigation organs in union republics, krais, and oblasts.

ACINT is currently trying to establish a number of interregional departments (otdyely), ostensibly to achieve better overall coordination of the Soviet anti-drug effort (see Table 11). Clearly, however, these organizations would serve a political purpose, combatting local corruption and separatist tendencies in the union republics and strengthening Moscow's control over the republic MVDs. According to an MVD official interviewed in September 1990, the interregional scheme is making very slow progress; it exists "mainly on paper," he said.

Overall, 900 people in the MVD system reportedly are dedicated to drug law enforcement. The figure apparently subsumes both ACINT personnel and narcotics units attached to local police forces. MVD officials in Moscow could not give the author figures on the funds that the MVD expends each year on anti-narcotics activities, but the general consensus is that such actions are pitifully underfunded. The MVD's entire budget, which must cover the cost of all of its police functions in the USSR, reputedly is only $11 billion, and the funds allocated to drug control undoubtedly represent only a small fraction of that figure. In comparison, the U.S. federal budget for domestic drug law enforcement and for prosecution of drug criminals totaled $4.2 billion in FY 1991, or about 25 billion rubles at the internal tourist rate of exchange.

The MVD does not simply exercise direct enforcement responsibilities. For instance, the MVD maintains an All-Union Scientific Research Institute that has regional subdivisions. (The author met the heads of the Baltic and Caucasian subdivisions, respectively Andrei Vilks and Anzor Gabiani, during a visit to the Soviet Union in August-September 1990. These institutes analyze problems of social deviance—drugs, alcohol, prostitution, and the like—as well as structural and organizational aspects of the Soviet criminal underworld. In addition, as noted above, the MVD supports a network of treatment centers for addicts and maintains a register of addicts and users. Moreover, the MVD and several other Soviet groups are actively involved in education and prevention work. As an article in Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost' observed:

Law enforcement officials often write articles and appear on television, on the radio, at general and vocational schools, and at working collectives to promote the understanding of the problem and to inform the public about it.
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MVD officials increasingly emphasize that the ministry’s most important mission is fighting organized crime. The MVD has lobbied strenuously for legislative changes that would make criminal investigations easier. One change long sought by the MVD is a law that would allow the introduction of surreptitiously gathered evidence (wiretaps, recordings, films, and so on) in criminal cases. Such evidence was long banned from the courtroom. In October 1990, however, a law was passed permitting law enforcement agencies—subject to prior permission from a prosecutor or a court—to videotape criminal suspects and to tap their telephone conversations.42

MVD officials also support legislation that would require drug dealers to identify their sources and accomplices as a condition for escaping criminal punishment. (Of course, such plea bargaining is a common practice in the West.) In addition, the drug enforcement community widely holds the view that non-medical drug use should be completely decriminalized (currently, repeat offenders are subject to criminal penalties).43 Comparable to U.S. law enforcement agencies, the MVD has come to realize that prosecuting drug users is unproductive. This conclusion naturally is not surprising: The MVD would rather devote scarce resources to targeting the syndicates that produce and sell the drugs and bringing the leaders of these syndicates to justice.

KGB

Soviet premier Nikolai Ryzhkhov noted in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in June 1989:

Bearing in mind the burgeoning manifestations of organized crime in our country, the USSR KGB must, in our view, fully involve itself in solving this problem, which is extremely dangerous for our society.44

The KGB today actively investigates cases of contraband, currency speculation, corruption, and drug trafficking. The KGB’s crime-fighting role overlaps that of the MVD in important respects. According to KGB spokesmen, however, the Committee’s role is critical for three main reasons. First, MVD agents, "however actively they perform their tasks," cannot cope with the growing problem of organized crime and corruption. The KGB has both the experience and the "necessary operative technical capabilities" to supplement the MVD’s efforts. "People come to us and we cannot exactly brush them off," explained a deputy head of the KGB, Victor Gruskho, in a recent Pravda interview.45 Second, the ties between mafia-type organizations and the political system threaten the “foundation of constitutional government” and hence represent a direct responsibility of the KGB. Consequently, the
KGB's concerns center not only on traditional corruption--organized crime's penetration of the administrative-economic apparatus and the military--but also on the attempts by mafia-type formations to politicize themselves by influencing the outcomes of local elections. "They are unifying their efforts to support candidates for people's deputies in local organs of power," said Gruskho. The third official justification for the KGB's expanded role in controlling crime addresses the increasing number of links between Soviet criminal organizations and the outside world. The KGB describes criminal groups as profiting from the supply of drugs and other contraband and from the transformation of rubles generated in the shadow economy into convertible funds. Moreover, in the KGB's view, smuggling, drug trafficking, and currency violations are associated with foreign espionage and subversion. As KGB Chairman Kryuchkov explained, such "negative phenomena" are "exploited by foreign special services and anti-Soviet organizations for aims detrimental to the Soviet Union." Controlling such phenomena thus falls within the scope of the KGB's traditional security mission.

These theoretical considerations help to define the KGB's role in combatting narcotics. The components of this mandate can be described on several levels. First, in cooperation with the MVD and the Customs Administration, the KGB investigates all cases of drug smuggling across Soviet frontiers. When Customs discovers a narcotics shipment, the Customs authorities immediately inform local KGB units. The KGB then tries to identify the domestic and international dimensions of the trafficking network. Second, the KGB investigates important cases of interregional drug trafficking; here the Committee's main interest is uncovering large trafficking networks that operate across union republic boundaries. In connection with these interregional responsibilities, the KGB also maintains observers--"controllers," as one knowledgeable Soviet researcher put it--in the eradication campaigns (Operations "Mak") that the Soviets conduct in the Central Asian republics. Third, the KGB investigates cases of drug-related corruption. "Why are we Chekists especially worried about the narcotics business?" asks a KGB colonel serving in Turkmenia. One reason, he reports, "[is that] the narcotics mafia, so to speak, has been tied to smuggling, currency speculation, and murders." Another reason is that militia workers in various raions in Chardzhou oblast "are closely tied to the narcotics mafia" and that there are "instances of ties with dealers by workers in the Chardzhou party apparatus." A third reason is that the republic and (Chardzhou) oblast MVD leaders condone lower-level corruption and continue to work with the people involved.
The KGB and the MVD apparently cooperate and share information on organized crime, but the author's impression is that bureaucratically the two organizations are rivals if not enemies. First, their mandates are similar: Both are charged with investigating large criminal organizations, including narco-mafias. Consequently, both are competing for a larger share of the same anti-crime budget. Interestingly, both organizations are trying to expand their contacts with the West: The KGB seeks cooperation with Western countries in fighting drug trafficking, contraband, and terrorism. The MVD has entered into exchanges with the United States and other countries to obtain technology and an understanding of techniques for investigating trafficking organizations and eradicating drug crops. Second, the KGB apparently acquired a mandate to fight organized crime because of the MVD's ineptitude and internal corruption. Aside from conducting its own investigations, the KGB also apparently is supervising the MVD's anti-drug activities—perhaps to prevent militia formations from being coopted by local narco-mafias.

**State Customs Administration**

Like the MVD, the Customs Administration is on the cutting edge of the Soviet war against drugs. According to an August 1990 Izvestia article, since 1985, Customs has intercepted more than 1,000 drug smuggling cargoes at the Soviet border. According to another Izvestia article published in November, in the past 4 years, Soviet authorities have seized 10 tons of drugs moving across their western territories to destinations in the West. If such seizures represent 10 to 15 percent of the total transshipment volume, each year traffickers may be moving 20 to 30 tons of narcotic substances through the Soviet Union. Most of the drugs travel by train, hidden in the estimated 150,000 containers that pass through the USSR each year.51

Sometimes the Soviet Customs cooperates with Western law enforcement agencies, intentionally allowing transit cargoes containing drugs to travel across Soviet territory. These so-called monitored deliveries enable Customs officials to arrest the recipients of the cargo at points of entry in Europe or North America; subsequent interrogation of the recipients can expose other members of the international trafficking gang. However, the fish do not always take the bait, as indicated by the following account from the chief of the Latvian Customs.

Thus, for example, when our customs officials detained the first large consignment of drugs in freight addressed from Afghanistan to the Netherlands (over a ton of hashish was discovered in a load of raisins), a decision was made jointly with the Main Administration State Customs Control to establish contact with the corresponding
Dutch services, and organize cooperation with them. The representatives of the Dutch police visited Riga. They presented an official request from their government to hand the freight shipment containing the drugs over to their country. It was sent to Rotterdam, and from there the container was forwarded to Antwerp, Belgium, at the request of the recipient. The corresponding services of this country waited for the recipients in vain—they never did appear for the freight.

The USSR now has bilateral customs agreements with Italy, the FRG, France, the United States, England, and Canada. The agreements provide for the exchange of information on criminal organizations and smuggling techniques and for the controlled delivery operations described above. In the case of the Soviet-U.S. agreement, Soviet Customs officials are being trained by DEA-run services in Moscow. In addition, the Soviets were recently invited to watch a joint DEA-Customs seizure of a drug-laden ship on the high seas not far from Miami.

Ministry of Health

The Ministry of Health (MOH) holds the main responsibility for diagnosing, treating, and rehabilitating those who are chronically ill from substance addiction. The Ministry maintains its own registry of drug addicts and toxic addicts; all of those registered are undergoing courses of detoxification for their afflictions. MOH also supervises about 30 narcology hospitals in the USSR and a network of dispensaries and clinics at the union republic and oblast levels.

In addition, MOH and its republic affiliates control a number of research institutes—for example, the Moscow State Medical Institute (under the RSFSR Ministry of Health) and the All-Union Research Center on the Medical and Biological Problems of Narcology. The Narcology Institute manages an active program of international exchanges that includes the United States, Italy, and India, among other countries. The Institute and the U.S. National Institute of Drug Abuse operate a joint research program that includes, among other projects, an ongoing study of biological predispositions for drug abuse (that is, genetic determinants of drug use).

MOH also shares responsibility with other Soviet institutions such as the MVD, the Komsomol, and the mass media for preventative education, or anti-narcotics propaganda. By most accounts, these agencies are not doing their job well. Part of the problem is a shortage of resources (usual for Soviet anti-drug programs); however, narcotics experts in the USSR widely believe
that publicizing the dangers of drug abuse simply will induce more young people to try drugs and hence will produce more addicts. Different surveys have demonstrated that between 60 and 80 percent of addicts and users start taking drugs primarily because of curiosity. Obviously, though, an anti-narcotics campaign is not necessary to turn people on to drugs. For instance, between 1980 and 1985, when relatively few public discussions about drugs were heard in the USSR, newly diagnosed addicts as a percentage of the Soviet population more than doubled. In any event, the reformist currents of the mid- and late 1980s already have exposed an increasing percentage of Soviet youth to Western lifestyles, including the Western drug culture; so, in a sense, the narcotics cat is already out of the bag.

**Other Organizations**

Comparable to the United States, in the Soviet Union, responsibility for fighting drug abuse and drug trafficking is widely dispersed. Various organizations other than the MVD, the KGB, MOH, and Customs are charged with law enforcement or demand-reduction functions. The Procuracy, for example, prosecutes drug cases and also exercises general supervision over the execution of drug laws. Procuracy offices at different territorial levels unite and coordinate the work of the MVD, MOH, and other organizations. For example, prosecutors sometimes organize interagency conferences to analyze shortcomings in the fight against drugs. They also conduct independent investigations on a range of topics, such as links between drug abuse and crime, poppy cultivation on collective farms, compulsory treatment of drug addicts, the state of education and prevention work, and profiles of arrests for violations of drug laws. (A common complaint by prosecutors is that too many people are brought before the court on possession charges, while distributors and dealers "have been able to remain in the shadows."

The Soviet military also participates in drug law enforcement, although primarily in a support capacity. The army and the air force furnish combat helicopters and military pilots to support the MVD's poppy eradication campaign in Central Asia. Local MVD units have few helicopters at their disposal, and those they do have apparently are not equipped for combat. A rationale for the military's involvement is that opium plantations often are protected by armed local residents who have been hired by organized criminal groups "in exchange for high compensation" (which enables a guard to earn as much as 100 rubles a day, according to one Soviet account). In addition, the military--like the KGB, the MVD, and Customs--has an institutional interest in combatting drug smuggling—an interest that has involved the military to some degree in crime fighting. "We do not have a specific mission of working with narcotics," observed a military counterintelligence officer in a
recent Krasnaya Zvesda interview, but drug smuggling channels "can also be used for hostile purposes." Moreover, said the officer, when the investigation of a specific case begins, "the chain extends to the dealers, the wholesalers, that is, to organized crime."\textsuperscript{55}

Other Soviet organizations play supplementary roles in the anti-drug campaign. The State Committee for Public Education and the Ministry of Culture are supposed to engage in demand-reduction activities, but their tasks are not yet clearly defined. The Komsomol is charged with alerting Soviet youth to the dangers of substance abuse and with reeducating those young people who have started taking drugs. In some cases, specialized Komsomol shock troops (druzhniki) have been organized for this task. The kolkhozy and sovkhozy are responsible for identifying and destroying cultivations of hemp and poppies on their lands; however, as one Izvestia article notes, illegal cultivation usually is discovered by oblast or republic government bodies or by MVD units, not by "specialists and leaders of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy."\textsuperscript{56} The State Agro-Industrial Committee (Gosagroprom) has taken measures to restrict state source areas of hemp and to eliminate poppy cultivation entirely. Gosagroprom also contributes funds to law enforcement agencies to buy equipment for crop eradication and in addition is managing a research program to develop varieties of hemp with a low narcotics content. The Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology—specifically, the Department of Social Problems of Alcoholism and Drug Addiction, headed by Boris Levin—directs survey research on trends and patterns of narcotics addiction in the USSR. This Department and Anzor Gabiani's Caucasian Research Institute in Georgia are the two most important Soviet organizations conducting sociological research on drugs. Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a not unimportant role in Soviet drug control by negotiating framework agreements for anti-drug cooperation with interested foreign countries. By September 1990, the USSR had concluded such agreements with Britain, Canada, Italy, the FRG, France, and the United States and was negotiating agreements with Japan, China, Pakistan, Holland, Sweden, and Spain.

In addition, various voluntary or quasi-voluntary organizations have been established to combat drug abuse—for example, the Society for Saving Children and Juveniles from Drugs, the Narkologiya Association, and the Russian Fund for the Struggle Against Drug Addiction. The latter organization, which aims at "saving the citizens of Russia from narcotics addiction," was in fact created by an official in the RSFSR MVD, Vladimir Kapustin. Among the organizations participating in the Fund are members of the drug control establishment—the RSFSR, the MVD, the RSFSR MOH, and the USSR Customs Administration—as well as representatives of the media.
(Znanie and TASS) and the Moscow Patriarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Narkologiya Association, registered under the Moscow City Soviet, comprises state public health and MVD officials and Russian Orthodox priests. Quite obviously, the Soviet authorities are beginning to see the Church as an important potential ally in the struggle against drug addiction.57

**FUTURE PERSPECTIVES**

By all indications, the Soviets believe that the drug problem is likely to worsen over time. Several factors would seem to dictate such a conclusion if not a gloomier deduction.

First, Gorbachev's highest economic-reform priority is increasing the convertibility of the ruble, and a gradual movement toward convertibility is already evident. Although the ruble currently cannot be easily converted into hard currency, the reform timetable calls for simpler conversion techniques inside the USSR. If international drug traffickers can sell drugs to Soviet customers in exchange for dollars, francs, or marks, the traffickers will have a much greater incentive to penetrate the Soviet market. Soviet officials are absolutely terrified that foreign mafias might introduce massive quantities of relatively cheap drugs such as crack into the USSR.

Second, economic activity is being privatized in the USSR. For example, the formation of cooperatives in the mid-1980s--quasi-private groups of workers or employees in industry, trade, and services whose members theoretically all have a share in the profits of the enterprise. MVD officials believe that some of the nearly 200,000 cooperatives now operating have served as a convenient legal cover for laundering drug money. According to an ACINT official interviewed in Moscow in September 1990, one-third of the drug dealers apprehended by Moscow police in the past year were cooperative members.58 In 1991, cooperatives and Soviet-foreign joint ventures will be able to exchange rubles freely for foreign currency in specially designated currency houses (birzhi). This new development undoubtedly will be welcomed enthusiastically by drug mafias in the Soviet Union and abroad.

Soviet financial authorities currently hold no coherent concept for controlling money laundering. A case in point is the Soviet decree of January 23, 1991, which withdrew all 50- and 100-ruble notes from circulation and forced the exchange of these notes under highly restrictive conditions. The decree was designed in part to confiscate the undocumented cash holdings of cooperatives. However, the cooperatives' bank accounts were not touched by the decree. Furthermore, drug dealers and other organized criminals
routinely and promptly convert rubles in their possession into property, gold, or hard currency. The real victims of the January decree were working citizens and pensioners, who could freely exchange their high-denomination notes for smaller legal bills only up to limits of 1,000 rubles and 200 rubles, respectively. In effect, the forced exchange constituted a confiscatory measure, aimed as much at sopping up ruble "overhang" (and consequently at containing inflation) as at combatting drug dealers and other criminal elements.

Third, the rapid expansion of trade, travel, and economic ties with countries in the West and the Far East will enlarge the drug pipeline, or, as one RSFSR MVD official put it, "broaden the basis of penetration of narcotics from abroad." In addition, the international pipeline will act as a channel for the transfer of Western mafia expertise to the Soviet criminal underworld. Soviet authorities cite examples of narcotics laboratories in Leningrad, Riga, and elsewhere that have adopted Western manufacturing technology; whether the transfer relied on direct hands-on instruction or another mechanism is unclear. MVD officials contend that representatives of Western criminal syndicates might station themselves in various parts of the USSR as partners in Soviet-foreign joint ventures, such as a textile factory in Uzbekistan. Such mafia plants consequently would be positioned to train Soviet mafias in advanced techniques for manufacturing, smuggling, and distributing drugs and for corrupting or neutralizing law enforcement officials.

Fourth, the collapse of central power and the breakup of the USSR into separate nations that populate the Eurasian land mass will enormously complicate the enforcement of drug laws. For example, in the reconfigured Soviet Union, it is not clear which functions will be allocated to Moscow, which will belong to the Union republics, and which will be the responsibility of ethnic minority groups (such as the Tatars, Buryats, Yakuts, and the like) in the major union republics. Ideally, perhaps the republics would run their own economic and political affairs and would choose their own leaders, but certain functions—such as defense, foreign affairs, the banking system, the customs authority, and the struggle against organized crime—would be directed largely if not entirely from Moscow. But such divvying of responsibilities may not work out quite so neatly. As former MVD head Vladimir Bakatin recently remarked, "Moscow can no longer rule the police from the Baltic to the Pacific." (These kinds of statements got Bakatin into trouble with the conservative Soyuz faction in the Soviet parliament. Soyuz accused the minister of fostering national separatism and called for his ouster. Bakatin was dismissed from his job in early December 1990.) However, organized crime and drug trafficking are by nature interregional and require interregional law enforcement strategies. In addition, the indifference or
hostility of local populations to drug control—and the pervasive drug-related corruption—are arguments for strong control by central authorities. But a Muscovite solution may not work, especially in Central Asia, where the largely Islamic population is inclined to view narcotics control campaigns as an instrument of "Russification." Moreover, if the disintegration of the Union results in the elimination of the 8 billion rubles in subsidies that Central Asian republics now receive each year from Moscow, the republics may try to compensate for part of the difference by peddling hashish and opium. (According to one unofficial MVD estimate, opium poppy cultivation in Soviet Central Asia increased four-fold from mid-1989 to mid-1990.61) Soviet police chiefs now talk hopefully about a Soviet "Interpol" that would link the ministries of internal affairs of the newly independent union republics. Whether an effective system of cooperation will ever evolve is difficult to predict, of course, but the author personally is not very optimistic.

Fifth, the Soviets, who for years deluded themselves that drug addiction was essentially a problem peculiar to capitalist societies, lack both the experience and the resources to deal effectively with the phenomenon. As already noted, the MVD currently allocates only 900 employees to the Soviet war against drugs. Education and prevention programs (so-called anti-narcotics propaganda) are almost non-existent. The Soviets desperately want help from the West—such as training, equipment, remote sensors, herbicides, ideas for new drug legislation, and so on—and are collaborating in various anti-drug projects with several Western countries, including the United States. However, a massive infusion of Western or U.S. assistance at the levels required to effect a significant increase in Soviet drug-fighting capabilities seems most unlikely. U.S. drug enforcement funds are committed to those countries that are already producing and exporting large quantities of narcotics to the West, especially the Andean cocaine-producing countries. So far, the USSR's main role in international narcotics markets is that of a transit country for drugs moving westward from the Golden Crescent or Golden Triangle countries. This transit function, however, is not insignificant. As many as 30 tons of drugs a year may cross Soviet territory en route to the West. In addition, because of its gigantic raw material base, the USSR has the potential to become a significant exporter of hashish and opiates in the 1990s.

**U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION**

The author's overall impression after a visit to the USSR and an analysis of Soviet documentary materials is that the Soviets cannot cope with their growing narcotics threat and that they desperately crave large infusions of anti-drug assistance from the West, especially from the United States.
Aside from a dearth of money and personnel, the MVD also suffers from shortages of equipment—weapons, helicopters, fuel, communications, and the like—and has very little real experience in dealing with the drug problem.

In response to this situation, the Soviets have sought to expand formal cooperation with foreign law enforcement and public health agencies. The Soviets have signed framework agreements for anti-drug collaboration with six countries and are negotiating agreements with six other countries. The USSR participates in the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, and, as of September 1990, they have joined Interpol. The then-Soviet Interior Minister, Vadim Bakatin, explained the significance of the latter step in an October 1990 interview.

Crime knows no borders. It would have been unwise in the new political conditions to stay outside the established structure of international police. There is another side of the story of our entry into Interpol. This organization has accumulated rich experience of international struggle against crime. It has its systems of analysis and recommendations, for instance, of how to fight drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, or money laundering. Interpol is an information storage that will be now available to us.62

Cooperation with the United States is developing on various fronts. As noted previously, the Narcology Institute and NIDA are conducting a study of the biological predeterminants of drug abuse. The Narcology Institute would like to work jointly with NIDA and other U.S. agencies in formulating better methods of profilaktika—education and prevention work. The U.S. DEA is now routinely training Soviet MVD and Customs officials in police procedures for detecting illicit drug shipments and for identifying the members of drug trafficking groups. The DEA and the Soviets have obviously forged a good relationship (DEA enjoys a degree of admiration and esteem in the USSR that contrasts starkly with its image in Latin America and in Asia). Last July-August, cooperation reached new heights when the newly formed MVD Administration for combatting the illegal narcotics trade treated several DEA agents to a helicopter tour of the Chu Valley in Kazakhstan, one of the Soviet Union's largest growing zones. MVD officials are eager to see a permanent DEA presence attached to the Embassy in Moscow and are wondering why the U.S. State Department has not yet given the green light for such representation.

The Soviet wish list—what they hope to get from the West and the United States in the drug control sphere—is lengthy. For example, they want effective and environmentally safe herbicides or biological control
mechanisms that can be used to destroy illegal drug crops. They desire Western advice on ways of improving their criminal legal codes against drugs—which are insufficiently comprehensive, sometimes internally contradictory, and in general inadequate to the task of fighting organized narcotics syndicates. (Concepts such as conspiracy to commit a crime, plea bargaining, and witness protection programs are not yet well established in Soviet jurisprudence.) They covet remote sensing technology that would enable them to detect drug crops from the air. They want to draw on U.S. experience in tracking the flow of illegal drug money. They crave foreign assistance to develop, test, and patent drugs that seem to show promise in treating drug addicts.

A Latvian MVD official wants the United States to fund, equip, and participate in centers for anti-narcotics propaganda in various union republics. A Consultation-Information Center (see Appendix 2) would "disseminate information about the struggle against drug addiction, youth crime, and other criminal activities" in capitalist countries. The Center would collect and analyze sociological and criminal information and data on deviant behavior in Latvia and also would employ Western techniques for conducting anti-narcotics propaganda projects in that republic. (The Soviets' faith in the efficacy of our education and prevention programs is remarkable.) A leading Soviet researcher on the sociology of drug abuse even proposed creating a joint American-Soviet computerized information center that would collect and analyze all data about narcotics abuse and trafficking in the USSR (see Appendix 3). The system—to which the United States presumably would have access—would develop profiles of Soviet drug users, analyze trends in the Soviet drug market, and assemble a more comprehensive picture of Soviet criminal organizations that deal in narcotics. Obviously, if established, such a center would give the United States an invaluable window for viewing both the workings of organized crime and the criminal justice system in the USSR.

Certainly, the obvious question that springs to mind is: Should we help the Soviet Union attack its drug problem? What is in it for us? In my view, the answer to this question is a qualified "yes." Four main factors justify this position.

First, a well-designed narcotics assistance program would broaden our access to the Soviet system, expand U.S. contacts with Soviet government agencies, and establish a larger U.S. official or quasi-official presence in the territory of the USSR (at least, that is the thrust of some of the Soviet proposals). The United States probably could formulate a working relationship with most of the ten or so ministries or state committees that are actively involved in different aspects of the fight against narcotics.
Furthermore, this relationship could develop on both the all-union and union-republic levels. Significantly, the author's MVD contacts in the union-republic systems are promoting the idea of subnational (U.S.-RSFSR, U.S.-Georgian, U.S.-Latvian, and so on) cooperation against drugs. The two most important drug crime-fighting organizations, the MVD and the KGB, are also at the heart of the Soviet internal control structure. Proximity to these organizations conceivably could produce significant new insights into the momentous political and social changes now occurring in the USSR. Of course, such a collaboration carries attendant risks—the Soviets probably will want high-technology crime-fighting aids and state-of-the-art photographic and electronic sensors, and, in general, will attempt to exploit the relationship for their own intelligence objectives. Obviously, the relationship will have to be structured carefully to maximize benefits to the U.S. intelligence community vis-a-vis those accruing to the Soviets.

Second, by virtue of its size, geographical location, and potential for cultivating drug crops, the USSR obviously could become a significant exporter of narcotics by the end of the century. (At a minimum, the USSR might evolve into an ancillary production base for narco-mafias based in the Golden Crescent countries.) Hashish would be the predominant export, but opiates from poppies grown in Central Asia, Southern Siberia, or the Soviet Far East could also find their way into Western markets, especially in Japan and on the West Coast of the United States. The United States consequently should monitor developments in the Soviet drug trade, even if U.S. narcotics assistance programs can accomplish little in controlling the traffic.

Third, the U.S.-Soviet cooperation against drugs may produce some direct reciprocal benefits, especially in the health field. For example, the Soviets claim to have amassed significant expertise in the diagnosis and treatment of addicts. (Their system of compulsory treatment of addicts, repellant though it is, may have generated some useful data.) They claim to have trial-produced a crude pharmaceutical product (polufabrikat) that can directly counteract the neuro-chemical changes associated with drug addiction. They also say that they have developed techniques to detect traces of drugs in the human body (from changes in the body's immune system) 2 to 3 months after ingestion. Expansion of scientific-technical contacts between U.S. and Soviet public health institutions certainly would provide opportunities to assess the validity and significance of such claims.

Fourth, even if furnishing training and technical assistance to the Soviets does not contribute significantly to solving their drug problem—witness the difficulties encountered by the DEA and the State Department in their drive against South American coca farmers and cocaine mafias—such support will
help broaden and strengthen the underpinnings of the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship. The author envisions that the good will arising from cooperation on the drug front might improve the U.S.-Soviet dialogue in other and potentially more important areas, such as arms control negotiations, trade and investment, environmental protection, and combatting international terrorism. If new bridges to the USSR are to be built, collaboration against the international drug menace seems to be a good starting point.

To be sure, risks do attend U.S.-Soviet cooperation on the narcotics front—most notably the political risks of appearing to strengthen components of the repressive apparatus of the Soviet state. Clear ground rules must govern U.S. narcotics assistance programs. First, they should be targeted at the MVD's Administration for Combatting the Illegal Narcotics Trade and at the Customs Administration's law enforcement side. (The United States certainly should not furnish assistance to the Black Berets, the Soviet military, or the KGB.) Second, the technical and organizational components of such programs should be as drug-specific as possible. If such rules can be established, however—and the author believes that they can be—collaborating with the Soviets on drug control can serve a variety of important U.S. diplomatic, political, and intelligence objectives.
FOOTNOTES


5. Interviews. Staff of All-Union Medical Biological Problems of Narcology, Moscow. August 1990.


10. See footnote 1.

11. See footnote 2.

12. See footnote 1. Roshchin furnished these figures to the author in September in an interview in Moscow.


15. See footnote 2.


18. See footnote 2.


25. See footnote 1.


For a different view, see: Yurii Lushchai. "Organizovannaya Prestupnost': Stepeni Organizovannosti." Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost'. No. 6, 1989, pp. 45-47. This author believes that corruption is not a hallmark of organized crime.


30. Ibid.


34. See footnote 13.

35. See footnote 2.


36. Interviews. Staff of Narcology Institute, Moscow. August 1990.


46. Ibid.


53. See footnote 41.


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APPENDIX 1

Regarding the Joint Latvian-American Consultation-Information Center (KITS)


1.1 The Consultation-Information Center will be created in a constituent meeting of the members of the center, will function on the basis of the provisions stated herein, according to the laws of the Latvian Republic, and according to the orders and instructions of the Directorate of the center.

1.2 On the Latvian side, the founding institution of the Consultation-Information Center will be the Association for business cooperation: "Scientific-Technical Progress."

1.3 KITS is an independent juridical entity, has its own budget, is financially self-supporting (in local currency and hard currency), has a bank account, fulfills the tasks assigned to it, and enjoys the rights associated with these responsibilities.

1.4 KITS has its own stationery printed with the title and emblem of the center.

1.5 The Consultation-Information Center will be located in Riga, Latvia.

2. The Subject and Aims of the Center

2.1 Disseminating the experience of the struggle with drug addiction, youth crime, and other violations of the law occurring in developed capitalist centers, especially in the United States.

2.2 Assisting the organization of the publication and dissemination in Latvia of Western anti-narcotics and anti-alcohol teaching materials: video films, slides, posters, textbooks and other school aids, etc.
2.3 Creating unified information funds of sociological and criminological information regarding problems of drug- and toxic-addiction, alcoholism, youth crime, prostitution, and other forms of deviant behavior.

2.4 Realizing the collection, accumulation, and analysis of sociological and criminological information on various forms of deviant behavior.

2.5 Providing scientific and scientific-practical consultation to private individuals, institutions, and organizations on questions of prevention of drug- and toxic-addiction and of the struggle against crime and other forms of deviant behavior.

2.6 Ensuring the development and training of scientifically qualified cadres in the sphere of law enforcement activity.

3. **Organization of the Activity of the Center**

3.1 The director exercises overall leadership of the center and is elected at the united (founding) meeting and at meetings specially convened by the founding members.

3.2 The organizers-founders name executive directors to carry out specific tasks.

3.3 The Consultation-Information Center includes the following structures:

- directors and executive directors
- information-analytical services
- consultation-lecture series
- auxiliary services

Andrei Vilks
September 1990
*Translated from the Russian (RWL)*
APPENDIX 2

On the Expediency of Creating a
Joint American-Soviet Computerized Information System NNN
(Narcomania, Narcobusiness, Narcomafia)

With the aim of limiting the growth of drug use, the sowing and cultivation of drug crops (opium, oil-bearing poppies, hemp, etc.); the illegal manufacture, acquisition, storage, transport, and sending of drugs with intent to sell them and the smuggling of narcotics; and, in addition, with the aim of controlling narco-business and narco-mafias in both countries, first of all on the territory of the USSR, it is expedient to set up in the region of the Caucasus and Central Asia a computerized information center capable of resolving the following tasks.

1. The computerized registration and monitoring of all drug addicts and drug users.

2. The computerized registration and control of all individuals and groups—both identified and suspected—engaged in criminal activities of illegal sowing and cultivation of narcotics-containing plants as well as those of the manufacture, acquisition, storage, transport, and sending (including the smuggling across national boundaries) of narcotics-containing substances.

3. Description of the conditions, dynamics, and structure of drug addiction, the basic social and social-psychological characteristics of individuals using narcotics or of individuals convicted of the illegal manufacture, acquisition, storage, transport, or sending of narcotics substances.

4. Description and computerized analysis of the basic characteristics of the black market in illegal drugs, of drug trafficking, and of narco-mafias (both Soviet and American).
5. Prediction of the future development of drug addiction in the USSR and the USA.

6. Prediction of the probability that Soviet narco-businesses will cooperate with international narco-businesses.

7. Elaboration of strategy and tactics for combatting drug trafficking and drug mafias in the entire world.

Anzor Gabiani
August 23, 1990
Translated from the Russian (RWL)