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in the Soviet Union

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## EXECUTIVE SURVEY

1. The system of passports and residence control in the USSR remains basically as onerous and complex as it was when established nearly six decades years ago. Extensive criticism through glasnost', and discussion in a USSR Supreme Soviet committee have brought little substantive change. The system can still be used, as in the thirties, for purposes of political control and oppression. Despite its obvious economic and social disadvantages, intensification of nation-wide problems make its removal or liberalization unlikely.

2. Internal passports and "propiska" (the system for registering and regulating residence) have existed in the USSR since December, 1932, while the current statute dates back to August, 1974. Three other important documentary systems may be distinguished, - the work-book (trudovaya kniga), the military service card (voenny bilet), and the foreign passport, but these lie outside the scope of our investigation, and are mentioned only when relevant.

3. As a consequence of the removal of censorship, long-suppressed feelings of discontent were expressed, particularly with regard to propiska, though the passport was also criticized. The propiska system, it was said, (a) had never been properly legislated (b) had no constitutional basis, and (c) contradicted international human rights agreements to which the USSR had become a party. The system was occasionally defended by representatives of the bureaucracy.

4. The administrative linkage of passport, propiska, accommodation and employment caused or exacerbated many social problems, including: homelessness, vagabondism, recidivism, fictitious marriage, bribery, uneconomic use of housing, and unemployment. It also caused a great deal of personal inconvenience.

5. In May, 1990, as a result of public concern, the propiska problem went onto the agenda of the Committee for Constitutional Supervision of the USSR Supreme Soviet. On the 26th October the Committee's main findings were published in the form of a Conclusion.

6. The principal findings were: (a) the "registrational" functions of the system did not contradict generally accepted international norms; (b) its "regulatory" functions did, because they involved the need to obtain residence permission, and restricted the basic rights of Soviet citizens (to movement, employment and education in localities outside their place of abode); (c) the system should be changed from one of regulation to one of registration only; (d) this was currently impossible on account of employment and housing difficulties; (e) change could only take place in stages, together with the formation of labor and housing markets.

7. The Committee itself proclaimed only a few marginal changes. A few weeks before, however, in apparent anticipation of these findings, the USSR Council of Ministers decreed that all propiska regulations were to be made public, and restrictions on some relatively small categories of citizens were to be eased. It is noteworthy that other legislative changes effected under Gorbachev had been relatively minor.

8. With regard to legislative change at the all-union level, therefore, a plateau seems to have been reached, and it is unlikely that the matter will be reconsidered for some time. The current turbulence and apparent reversion to more authoritarian rule may well dissuade legislators from dismantling yet another familiar state institution.

9. Both passport and propiska have recently been bolstered by other factors. The deteriorating food situation through 1990 promoted rationing which seemed to be almost exclusively residence-based; irredentist tendencies in non-Russian areas favored the use of passports and residence documents to protect ethnic identity; and surveys of public opinion showed that although propiska was generally unpopular, it still enjoyed support among older

people and in less favored social groups. The May, 1990 law on Soviet citizenship attributed a central place to the internal passport.

10. Nevertheless, the pressures for liberalization have not disappeared. Two draft constitutions for the RSFSR published in November, 1990 embodied clauses guaranteeing freedom of movement and residence. In Lithuania, which has proceeded furthest in the legislative sphere, both the passport and propiska have been retained, together with military service; propiska, however, is to be registrational only, and labor service may be substituted for military service. Such a pattern may well be followed in other republics, should they achieve a degree of independence. The status of republican laws is still in dispute.

11. Soviet commentators may not have fully grasped at least three problems which are likely to worsen if propiska regulations are not eased. The first is the imminent wave of unemployment; residence restrictions can only inhibit the functioning of the labor market. Secondly, there is the proposed development of the private sector of the economy, which must demand greater locational freedom. Thirdly, more contact with the west (if foreign travel becomes a reality) can only increase dissatisfaction with restrictions at home. Many people already believe that procedures are simpler in other countries.

12. The maintenance of the passport and propiska system involves (according to our very approximate estimates) something in the order of sixty million bureaucratic operations a year, many quite complex and requiring extra documentation. The developments mentioned in the first part of paragraph nine above must inevitably entail a big increase in this load. Few people in the west understand the administrative problems involved in changing one's place of residence in the USSR. For the Soviet citizen, the formalities are time-consuming and irritating.

13. The administration has been shouldered since 1932 by a double bureaucracy. All housing offices have passport clerks who are responsible for registering residence, departure, and issuing various certificates. The militia also has a hierarchy of offices which have final

responsibility for the observance of regulations, and which oversee the passport desks in housing offices. Both sectors of the bureaucracy offer poorly paid and unprestigious work (except for ranking militia officers), and this may make staff more vulnerable to bribery.

14. It was not possible to arrive at any close estimates of violation or avoidance of the regulations. However, the results of a small survey suggested that in the longer term a significant proportion of the population spends some weeks or months residing illegally; the chances of getting caught are small. Although "malicious" violation of the rules may involve imprisonment, the basic fine in 1990 was relatively small (ten rubles) and unlikely to outweigh personal proclivities. The militia virtually ceased to arrest vagabonds. A large proportion of recorded violations involved such matters as loss of passport and failure to update photographs.

15. It is difficult to comment on the efficiency of the system, as this seems to vary greatly from one function to another. With the passing of widespread arrest, and subsequently "dissidence", it has hardly been needed for political control. We found, however, no evidence of dismantlement. Limiting the growth of large towns has remained a central aim of propiska. Here it has probably been effective to some extent, but the impossibility of measuring a situation of free growth (on the one hand) and total control (on the other) prevent adequate measurement of its impact. The same can be said for urban housing and employment patterns.

16. Finally, may we note that ever more information became available as our study advanced. This was, of course, highly advantageous for research, but the revelations were sometimes haphazard, and not easy to trace. We trust that no important data have been omitted, or inadequately interpreted, but crave the reader's indulgence should any such instances come to light.

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## LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

### *Legislation in the 'Thirties*

The Soviet internal passport system, as it functioned in December, 1990, was established by a decree of 27th December, 1932, and extended by numerous subsequent enactments. As might be expected, the system, at its introduction, was built on restrictive practices current in the late twenties. Stalinism was well entrenched, and the oppressive nature of the regime itself sufficient to explain the change. In any case, the civil passport, used for purposes of establishing identity, registering residence (*propiska*) and employment, quickly became an essential lever of social, economic and political control. <1>

According to the text of the 1932 decree, "passportisation" was to be effected in towns, urban settlements, district centers and Machine and Tractor Stations, within 100-kilometer radiuses around certain large towns, in frontier zones, on building sites and state farms. The remaining areas of the country, mainly rural or sparsely inhabited, were excluded from the system. Thus a majority of the population, - peasants, nomads, minority ethnic groups, etc. - had no passport. This was highly disadvantageous for them, in so far as the document was essential for residence and employment applications in all passportised, or "regime" areas. <2>

Within the latter all permanent residents over the age of sixteen were obliged to have a standard passport which was valid for three years. The only exceptions mentioned were servicemen, who were issued with military papers, and temporary visitors (from non-regime areas) who could get certificates valid for up to three months. The passport was the only document now to be used for purposes of identification. Holders had to present it for registration (within twenty four hours) at any place of sojourn, on entering state employment, or as requested by the militia and other officials. The entries in the document included:

- a) christian name, patronymic and surname;
- b) date and place of birth;
- c) nationality;
- d) social status;
- e) place of permanent residence;

f) place of employment; g) names of other persons; h) a list of documents on the basis of which the passport was issued. <3>

The link between the passport, place of residence and place of employment was therefore established at the outset.

Permanent passports cost three rubles (which represented, it would seem, around a day's work in industry) while temporary documents cost one rouble. Not having a passport (if legally required to do so), having an invalid passport, or residing without registration, were initially punishable by an administrative fine of up to 100 rubles. A second offence, or forgery, were to be regarded as violations of the criminal law.

The stringency of the system must be viewed in the framework of other growing constraints. The new Model Collective Farm statute (1935) virtually deprived the peasant of the right to leave, anyway. Obligatory military service, with the necessary registration procedures, had been reintroduced in 1928. Other controls were reimposed in the labor market. From 1928 graduates of higher educational institutions became subject to state placement for three years. After 1930 obligatory recruitment for labor became widespread in the village, leading to the so-called *orgnabor* system. A new-style labor book (with passport-like characteristics) was introduced for state workers and employees in 1938; restrictions at the work-place culminated, in 1940, in the worker losing the right to change his job without permission from the management. The same year saw the establishment of the *State Labor Reserve* schools for low-skilled workers, again with obligatory recruitment. The whole edifice was, of course, underpinned by the forced labor camps. The term that the historian Solomon Schwarz used to describe the movement in general was "the militarisation of the labor market". <4>

An official explanation for the introduction of the passport was provided in the first paragraph of the decree itself. Its declared purpose was "to obtain better statistics of the population in towns, workers' settlements and the settlements built around the newly constructed factories, and also in order to secure the deportation from these places of persons who are not connected with industry or with work in offices and schools, and who are not engaged in socially useful labor (with the exception of infirm persons and pensioners), and

also in order to cleanse these places of kulak, criminal and other anti-social elements which find a refuge there...." It is vain to search for any more detailed explanation in the censored media, but there was no doubt a good deal of truth in those propositions, if they are understood in a highly politicized sense.

Some information about the implementation of the December, 1932 decree was provided in another of 28th April, 1933. This designated twenty five towns which had extended controlled districts around them, and 100-kilometer controlled zones along the western European frontiers. It confirmed that persons living elsewhere did not get passports. Instead they were registered in village lists (*poselennye spiski*) by the rural soviets, under militia supervision. The militia was empowered to issue one-year passports to persons leaving to reside in controlled areas, after which they had to apply for documents at their new place of residence. Such registration cost one rouble. <5 >

Persons arriving in controlled areas were presumed to have documents indicating the aim of their visit, - business, holiday, convalescence, etc. If at the end of the sojourn the local militia refused to issue a regular passport, the person concerned had to leave within ten days. If the militia refused to register a new-arrival, he had to leave within twenty four hours. It is noteworthy that on the 1st July, 1934 a new article (192-a) was inserted in the RSFSR Criminal code to allow periods of up to six months' hard labor for a second infringement of passport regulations by any individuals or officials, and up to two years hard labor for a repeated offence. Loss of a passport entailed the same fines as initial infringement of the rules.

The April, 1933 decree provided a rare note on the structure of the passport bureaucracy. The militia had to organize passport departments at its oblast levels, and passport offices (*stoly*) at its town and district levels. Their structure and work programs were to be fixed by the central organs of the militia in Moscow. Therewith was also established another enduring institution of the Soviet urbs - the address bureau. Towns with a population of over ten thousand souls had separate bureaux, while in small ones the address service was provided by the passport offices. In controlled areas all employers were obliged to enter employment details into passports or temporary residence certificates. In July, 1935

the period of validity of the passport was extended to five years, except for persons liable for military service, these having the right only to a one-year passport. <6>

Another interesting change was made under the terms of a decree of 23rd October, 1937. Henceforth every Soviet citizen who applied for a passport had to submit two copies of a photograph, one for the document itself, and one for retention by the militia. <7> This meant, of course, that over some five years the authorities had the opportunity to build up a bank of photographs of virtually every adult living in a controlled area of the country. These photographs were doubtlessly available to the Department of State Security of the NKVD and must have contributed significantly to the efficacy of the purges.

We have, as noted, no official account of the functioning of the system during these years. However, as one recent authoritative text stated: "In the course of the practical implementation of the passport system a fairly full statistical enumeration (*uchet*) of the population was effected in towns and other areas... For the first time a system for enumerating population movements was established and began to function on a nation-wide scale." A fair indication of the extent of passportisation and propiska may be gained from the fact that the urban population of the USSR rose from about 26 million in 1926 to 56 million in 1939.

Ironically, cattle was brought under a passport regime in 1934, and horses in 1935, evidently with the intention of preventing illegal theft or slaughter. What happened subsequently in the animal world lies beyond the confines of our study. <8>

#### *Developments September, 1940 - July, 1974*

During these years the passport system underwent an extension of territorial coverage and some variation of severity. In September, 1940 a new statute was introduced "to strengthen the passport regime, public order and state security". The measure was probably prompted by a continuing increase in political repression, the relatively new problem of returnees from the labor camps (who were supposed to be kept out of large towns) and the need for passportisation of the recently-acquired Bessarabia and Bukovina. <9>

In the 1940 version the rules were much more detailed than hitherto, but it is hard to say which items were actually new, and which reflected practices already current, but not

traceable in published sources. Insane persons were now said not to be entitled to a passport. Holders arriving for a sojourn had to register the document with the local militia, regardless of whether the area was "regime" or not. Entries were to include, in addition to the details listed earlier, marriage and divorce, dates of starting and finishing employment, military service obligations, and details of the local militia office. Permanent (as distinct from 5-year) passports were authorized for persons holding state medals, for persons over 55 years of age, invalids and certain retired pensioners.

February, 1941 saw the publication of a decree extending the system to Soviet controlled Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The growth in population as a result of all territorial acquisitions about this time was put at 4.5 million souls. <10>

There were not, as far as we can determine, any significant changes during the remaining years of Stalin's reign. However, the regulations seem to have been rigorously enforced. Russians who remember those years mention routine militia visits to private dwellings to check the validity of passports, propiska, and the presence of unauthorized residents. It was commonplace for relatives to try and shelter returnees from the camps.

Destalinisation had a moderating effect on passportisation, though it was but little noticed by western observers. Another statute was introduced in October, 1953, a few months after Stalin's death. This document is important as it was to form the cornerstone of the system for over twenty years more. It was again more detailed than its predecessor, but so secret had administrative matters become, that it was not published until 1955, and then not fully. <11>

The items which lent it a slightly more liberal character (again bearing in mind that not all of them may have been new) can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the period of validity of the passport was lengthened from an almost universal five years to: 5 years for 16-20 year-olds, 10 years for 20-40 year-olds, and permanence thereafter. Secondly, the validity of the temporary certificate (for visitors without passports) was extended from three to six months. This of course meant less bother for the public, and some easement of the bureaucratic work load, which must have grown with urbanization. Thirdly, there was a provision allowing rural inhabitants to make visits of up to thirty days to controlled areas on

the basis of permits (*spravki*) issued by rural soviets. Such visitors still, however, needed permission for departure from home, and there was still no provision for the passportisation of rural dwellers in general.

Fourthly, the requirement to note employment details in the passport disappeared from the listing, though presentation of it was certainly required when applying for a job. Fifth, persons released from places of confinement (an important category, in view of the Khrushchev amnesties) had the right to passports, but only "on the basis of their release papers" which could impose conditions of residence. We shall return to this matter below. The charge for the passport remained nominally the same, which meant a reduction in the real cost.

As for the *propiska*, a comparison of texts reveals no change of great significance. Initial registration of the passport still had to be done on the first day, but only, it would seem, if a stay of more than three days was anticipated. Persons without passports could still reside without registration for up to five days, though they had to be entered in the house register at their place of sojourn on the first day. Unlike the 1940 version, the 1953 statute stipulated that persons who had been refused registration were required to leave the locality within three days. But it seems likely that a provision of that nature had been enforced by local militias anyway.

As time went by there were further increases in residence-associated freedoms. In 1956 workers and employees regained their right to change jobs voluntarily, and there was some easement of other work rules. *Orgnabor* lost its coercive character, and under the terms of the December, 1958 education reform the State Labor Reserves Schools were transmogrified into entirely voluntary institutions. Some forms of migration were actively encouraged through - for example - the virgin land and "new construction" campaigns. Militia inspections characteristic of earlier years became, it would seem, less frequent. But the tied status of the peasantry, military service, the obligatory placement of graduates, and a large prison camp population remained characteristic of Soviet reality.

Moreover, in the immediate post-Stalin years the passport system acquired certain new uses. It was needed to control the massive outflow of inmates from the prison camps (mostly under the terms of the 1953-55 amnesties): retain some displaced peoples (the Crimean

Tartars, etc.) in virtual exile: repress the new, incipient "dissident" movements (by keeping activists out of large towns). Also, Khrushchev's "anti-parasite" drive launched in the spring of 1961 could hardly have been conceived without it. This measure entailed seeking out unemployed persons and bringing them before formal, or even "comradely" courts which could recommend exile.

Moscow continued to have its own particularly stringent regulations (though the same may be said for other large cities on which we have little or no information). Regulations passed for the capital in April, 1958 directed the MVD and Moscow City Soviet to discover and expel people who "avoided socially useful work", whose behavior was "unworthy", and who "infringed the rules of the socialist community". <12> Separate residence statutes for Moscow were approved on the 25th June, 1964, and again on the 27th April 1972. Both sets presumably made entry to the capital more difficult, but they were probably never published. <13>

The deteriorating political atmosphere under Brezhnev meant on the whole greater stringency, as a new anti-parasite law, passed in February, 1970, indicated. Local soviets were now charged with the "systematic and rapid" revelation of parasitism, and had to nominate a full-time official to coordinate the work. An edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of June, 1973 confirmed that militiamen had the right "to enter living accommodation, as a rule during daytime, in order to check the observance of passport regulations, when reliable information on infringement had been received." Yet another set of regulations for Moscow (to jump ahead for a moment) came into force in February, 1975. These too were unpublished, but they were leaked to the west a few years subsequently. In fact they contained extraordinarily detailed rules, distinguishing no less than twenty three categories of persons who could be registered for residence. Suspected "parasites" were, it is reported, allowed three months in which to find work, before expulsion orders were issued. In August, 1985 new controls were introduced to limit the influx of workers from elsewhere. <14>

### *The 1974 Passport Statute*

The next passport statute was approved in August, 1974, and was still valid in December, 1990. Like its predecessors it was introduced without prior warning. Since its provisions form the basis of analysis below, only preliminary comment is needed at this point. It can best be described as another typical Brezhnev measure, cautious and (in most respects) highly conservative. It was brought to public notice with a delay of only four months, but some six paragraphs were kept secret. <15>

There does not seem to be any single explanation for the timing, at an official level only generalities were proffered. The announcement in Pravda (25 December, 1974) used such worn phrases as "to bring about a further perfection" of the Soviet passport system "... to consolidate civil rights, ... promote the fulfillment of citizens' duties before state and society, ... ensure a proper count of population movement, and strengthen socialist law and order". We suspect that the most relevant factor was bureaucratic, namely, the on-going, massive recodification of whole areas of Soviet law.

The statute did, however, incorporate one important change, and a number of smaller ones. The most notable innovation concerned the granting of passports to rural dwellers, including the peasantry, who had hitherto been kept outside the system. For the first time the Soviet passport was made obligatory for Soviet citizens in all parts of the country, regardless of whether residence restrictions were operative or not. The peasant was still administratively tied to his farm, and required permission to leave it; but his subservience to the local soviet in this matter was now ended. So it had taken the peasantry over four decades to catch up with the workers in this respect. Urbanization had proceeded apace, and by 1974 the population of Soviet towns had risen to about 150 million out of a total of 250: the peasantry, as a social group, was down to about 42 million. <16>

The system was slightly liberalized in other ways. Since all adults were to have passports, the need for most temporary residence certificates evaporated. A single passport was now issued, without re-registration or renewal, for life, photographs being changed at the ages of 25 and 40. The "social status" entry was considered to be obsolete in an increasingly homogeneous society, (or so subject to distortion as to be useless), and was excluded. The cost of the document was fixed at a modest two rubles. As for propiska, persons now had

three days in which to present their documents (instead of one) and those refused residence permission had seven days (instead of three) to leave the area. However, two new stringencies were introduced: the nationality entered at the age of sixteen could not be changed, and liability for alimony (child maintenance) payments could be entered if the parent missed them. This meant that any potential employer was made aware of the need for wage deductions.

The six unpublished paragraphs contained in a supplement on propiska rules placed ex-prisoners under different rules, and stated that certain cities, districts and regions "listed in decisions of the USSR government" were granted their own powers of decision in this respect. Moscow and Leningrad were to have their own rules, as before, and existing legislation was to be brought into line with the new statute under the supervision of the USSR Ministry of Justice, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB.

The 1974 regulations came into force in January, 1976 and were to be implemented over a period of six years, some 205 million documents apparently being subject to renewal. Delays were encountered mainly as a result of public reluctance to spend time on the procedures, and many exhortations were made. On the whole, however, the operation seems to have gone according to plan.

Between 1974 and the perestroika period we have been able to trace only two further modifications, both minor. In September, 1982 there was some relaxation of sanctions for minor violations of residence regulations in Moscow, Moscow oblast, Leningrad and Tashkent: the local militia were empowered to issue warnings, as well as the fines which had been stipulated earlier. In January, 1983 in Moscow and Moscow oblast, the right to issue fines was evidently restricted to the more senior passport officials. <17>

### *Some Legal Comment*

Lawyers tend to be argumentative souls, so it is all the more noteworthy that the passport regulations in the USSR should have prompted little or no commentary in any of the major legal journals. An article by S. F. Gluzman, dated the 30th March 1988, but not accepted for publication, is interesting because it places propiska in a responsible legal context. . For reasons of brevity we will adduce only the main points. <18>

In Soviet legal writing (the author stated) there is a presumption that the higher the status of a law, the more important it is socially, and vice versa. Residence provisions are covered by the USSR Civil Code, in so far as the individual is given the freedom to choose his place of residence, and no geographical limitation is imposed. <19> However, the [restrictive] statute is a government enactment, and not a Law passed by a Legislature. The Constitution does not mention passports or propiska. There is also little probability that a Law has been passed, but not published. The Law on the Council of Ministers (ie. the body which is responsible for the Code) in fact only allows it to pass decisions in accordance with a Law.

What we have in the case of the passport regulations, then, is a 'qualified silence' which leaves a yawning gap in Soviet legislation. The statute appears to contradict the Civil Code, and such practice undermines the very concept of state law.

The importance of the passport and propiska rules undoubtedly requires that they be raised to the status of a Law. Furthermore, the 1974 statute refers to detailed instructions on implementation, as set by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (a government organ), but these instructions have not been openly published. The militia can refuse to register an individual, and have this refusal confirmed by a higher office. But militia decisions cannot be appealed against in a court of law. Appeal is only possible through administrative channels.

Such refusals are thus illegal, even though they accord with the letter of the instructions issued. Law itself should cover not only published instructions, but also those marked "for official use only".

Thus by its August, 1985 decree (no. 736) "On changes and additions in the Council of Ministers decree of the 25th June, 1964 (no. 585) 'On confirming the statute on propiska and vypiska in Moscow'" the Council of Ministers stringently restricted registration in Moscow, though these same limitations were not incorporated in its general statute of 1974. Although the decrees of 1964 and 1985 were secret, they guided the activities of the militia. Gluzman mentioned, by way of example, point 27, which did indeed list categories of persons not to be registered in Moscow:

a) ex-convicts, exiles for crimes covered by numerous articles of the RSFSR Criminal Code [in fact over fifty]; b) citizens earlier convicted under various [in all, 27] articles of the

Criminal Code, if they were earlier convicted to imprisonment or exile [*ssylka or vysylka*]; c) citizens recognized as particularly dangerous recidivists ...

Thus there arises a curious legal situation: the same violations are regulated by two mutually exclusive acts emanating from the same office, one open, which is ignored, and the other secret, which is observed, and itself promulgated in violation of the decree of the Council of Ministers of the 20th March, 1959 which requires all normative law to be published. <20>

This, alas, is not the only such case (Gluzman continues). If memory does not fail, in August, 1985 the Council of Ministers passed a decree entitled "On certain limitations on the propiska of citizens in Kiev (which was not published, either). Evidently in fulfillment of this, the executive committee of the Kiev City Soviet passed its decision of the 9th September 1985 (no. 756) "On certain limitations on the registration of citizens in Kiev" and its decision of the 30th October 1986 (no. 1053) "On the fulfillment of the decision of the 9th September 1985, (no. 756). Neither of these were published in the city bulletin.

The Council of Ministers may by this means (Gluzman concluded) pass restrictive enactments covering all the towns villages of the land, while proclaiming the decree of the 28th August, 1974 to represent a broadening of the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens.

## LONG-STANDING SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The main social problems which the passport and propiska have engendered or significantly exacerbated include homelessness, criminality, unsatisfactory employment patterns, uneconomic use of housing, fictitious family relationships and bribery. A central factor in the social equation is the tight linkage between passport, propiska, living space and employment. Thus a person can normally be registered for residence only if he already has a passport, a job, and sufficient living space (which may also be job-dependent).

Under conditions of glasnost' these problems have received considerable, if sporadic attention. However, they may be better comprehended if we first summarize the passport usages common in 1990. The glasnost' revelations will be treated separately. Attempts to solve them since Gorbachev came to power are considered in the last section of the report.

### *Current Uses of the Passport*

Under the terms of article three of the 1974 statute the passport is required for certifying the holder's names, date and place of birth, nationality, and children (births and deaths). Article four requires entry of: marriage and divorce (by registry offices); military service or reserve status (by the military authorities); residence (by the militia or local village soviet); alimony obligations (for defaulters); blood group and Rh type (by medical authorities, with the consent of the holder). No other entries may be made.

Beyond this, presentation of the passport is required by many regulations of a different order, national and local. If such a document exists, it generates its own uses, human nature being what it is. Seemly officials of virtually any body may ask for it by way of insurance against error or misrepresentation; and obviously, failure to produce it when asked may raise questions about the integrity of an applicant.

Although employment details are no longer entered in it, presentation of the passport, with a residence stamp, has remained obligatory when applying for a job, and making the initial application for a labor book. The passport number is entered into labor contracts

signed with state, cooperative and private firms. The passport (with an appropriate propiska) is also essential for the important matter of putting one's name down on a housing list. <21>

The passport has to be presented by anyone applying to his local soviet for a license to engage in individual private enterprise. It is needed for an application for admission to a higher or other specialized educational institution. On the other hand it is not mentioned in the regulations covering the registration of children in a kindergarten or school, as this is normally done (for kindergartens) at the place of work, or (for schools) on the basis of a certificate from the local housing office. Only if a child is being entered for a school in another district (to take advantage of special facilities, for example) may the director ask to see a passport.

Pensions (old-age, retirement, invalid and dependency) are established and paid on the basis of passport and propiska: the passport must be presented on receipt of a special or "personal" pension, and when changing the manner of payment. It is also needed to register and receive social security benefits by mothers and children. It is required for registration at a local polyclinic (for persons without access to medical services at their place of work), and also, in some cases, at fee-paying clinics - when, for example, positive HIV or drug abuse may be suspected. Personal contact agencies also ask for them.

The passport is needed for certain financial transactions. Strangely enough, it is not requested when opening a savings account, as most saving operations in the state "sberkassy" are based on savings books and signatures. However, counter clerks have the right to ask for a passport in cases where money is being transferred, or paid through another bank, where there is doubt about identity, or when the recipient is illiterate. It is needed to obtain items posted to a box-number, to enter long-term queues for deficit capital goods (like motorcars) and for the purchase of airline tickets. It is required to get onto a housing list (again with an appropriate propiska),

But perhaps the most widespread and intensive use in recent years has been as a basis for the issue of ration cards and vouchers. The difficulties of perestroika exacerbated food supply problems, as indeed have earthquakes, the Chernobyl' disaster, ethnic dissension and

separatist tendencies. By the spring of 1989 rationing of food and consumer goods was said to be operative nearly everywhere (see page 52 below). <22>

### *Homelessness and Vagabondism*

In conditions of glasnost' much has been written on the question of homelessness in the USSR, a topic unmentionable in the media after the late twenties. The Russian generic terms for the homeless are *bezdomnye* (homeless) and *brodyagi* (wanderers). In militia jargon the people involved are now called BICHI, (the initials for "formerly respectable persons"), BOMZHI ("persons without a specific place of residence") and BOZY, or BORZY, ("persons without a specific job").

We have seen no official categorization of the homeless, but the social groups mentioned most often are old people, beggars, alcoholics, prostitutes, the mentally defective, persons deliberately unemployed, and ex-convicts (whom we shall treat separately). Formerly their sorry ranks would also have contained the so-called "parasites". Prosecution of vagabonds has, of course a long history in the USSR; constitutionally, all able-bodied citizens obliged to labor for the good of the nation. An analysis of vagabonds detained by the militia, conducted in the spring of 1988, revealed that two thirds had previous convictions, a third were aged 30-39, and some 15% were women (mostly divorced, and with children). <23>

No reliable estimates of their numbers are available, but various figures have been suggested. The economic journal EKO claimed that in 1987 some six million people "in practice had no permanent housing". The International Association for the Study of Homelessness and Unemployment quoted a figure of one and a half million. In the same year the total number of tramps probably ran into "hundreds of thousands", of whom the militia caught and warned 50,000. Half a million "parasites" were warned about their inactivity. The release of some 600,000 prisoners under the "Gorbachev" amnesties provides another indirect indication of numbers. Given the current interest in social problems, it would seem likely that more specific data will be published about these categories in the near future. <24>

Vagabonds are to be found (according to other listings) in "attics, cellars, public heating systems, cemeteries, railway stations, afforestation areas, unoccupied summer dachas,

building sites, empty houses, houses being repaired or rebuilt, public entrances, goods wagons, unguarded industrial enterprises, rubbish dumps, boiler-rooms, landing stages on rivers, childrens' play houses, deserted churches and monasteries." <25>

The appearance of old people among such unfortunates, given the extensive coverage of pension schemes, might be somewhat unexpected. It is explained in part by the registration provisions for pension payments; the fact that the minimum is very small, and a full pension requires a steady work career which some people (particularly former peasants and housewives) might not have. Common causes of distress among the elderly are therefore lack of means of support; a working career based on hostel lodging which was forfeited on retirement; inability to get into a home for the elderly (many of which, despite poor facilities, have waiting lists); the death of close family members and friends. The new pension law of May, 1990 though more supportive, is unlikely to improve the situation in the short term.

Alcoholism (a serious problem in the USSR) tends to promote infringement of propiska rules through loss of job, exclusion from hostels, or loss of other accommodation for drunken behavior, separation from a spouse, etc. The fact that alcoholic drink is so dear is also relevant, in so far as such spending may preclude occupancy of (more expensive) private accommodation. Many offenses entailing imprisonment are committed while under the influence of drink, or on account of it.

In the late 1989's many cities opened militia-controlled centers, rather like places of detention, for persons who were living in the urban limits without permission. A February, 1989 article in Komsomol'skaya Pravda provided a fairly sympathetic account of such an institution in central Moscow. There the militia offered a month's accommodation, and tried to solve the inmate's employment problems. If placement could not be effected, however, the vagrants were instructed to leave Moscow and Moscow oblast' within a further period of 24 hours, even if they had nowhere to go. The militia can issue passports, but has, of course, no authority to commandeer living space or a job. <26>

Not surprisingly, instances have been reported of erstwhile vagrants tearing up newly-issued passports, saying that without propiska, living space and a job such documents are useless. However, a massive fall was reported in the number of convictions for

"vagabondism, begging, parasitism, (*tuneyadstvo*, not working)" between 1984 and 1988. Such nefarious activities are likely to increase if unemployment spreads: but paradoxically, if the incidence of other crime increases also, the militia may have less time for vagrants, etc. <27>

Despite these problems, it would be wrong to ignore the elements of shelter which Soviet law still affords its citizens. In the capitalist world a major cause of homelessness lies in the fact that citizens may not have a constitutional right to be housed, though local authorities may provide accommodation for vulnerable souls. The Soviet citizen, by contrast, does have this constitutional right, and the housing regulations normally make eviction difficult without the provision of alternative accommodation. Propiska at a given address is popularly (if erroneously) regarded as an extra guarantee of occupancy. <28>

#### *Unavoidable Infringement of the Law*

Persons who are released from prison have particular difficulties with the propiska system. If someone goes into prison he not only surrenders his passport, but also necessarily vacates accommodation. His right to it has to be reaffirmed when he emerges. Article one, clause (i) of the propiska section of the 1974 statute states that ex-convicts and returnees from exile may move into "living space occupied by members of their families or the relatives with whom they resided before sentencing." Article two states that "other cases" should be decided under local "established procedures", providing that accommodating the returnee did not reduce the living space below locally prescribed norms. <29>

These formulations were clearly inadequate in so far as they gave no protection to released persons who had not lived with relatives, whose relatives no longer wanted them, or whose quota of living space had been taken by someone else in their absence. For long-term detainees this situation must have been common.

But they faced other problems, too. General housing regulations stipulate that [state-owned] accommodation left unoccupied for six months is normally considered to have been forfeited. Internment for longer would seem inevitably to involve forfeiture (although the branches of law are separate). Beyond this, potential employers are usually unwilling to take on and house ex-convicts: hostel wardens are reluctant to face the extra problems of

drunkenness, brawling and pilfering associated with them. A prison inspector recently charged with the task of finding jobs for female detainees prior to release received only four positive replies to a thousand enquiries. Local arrangements under which enterprises are actually obliged to hire do not work very well. <30>

Alas, as if this were not enough, four of the unpublished clauses of the 1974 statute set additional obstacles for persons interned for many serious state crimes (some of which, of course, bore a political character). Such persons were prohibited from returning to their former place of residence, or taking jobs there, until their conviction records had been annulled "through established procedures". There was no temporal limitation on this ruling, and according to one report the passports issued in such case were to have special serial numbers. For this reason prisons and camps normally discharged people with a document allowing them to apply for residence in certain localities only, at the discretion of the local militia.

The list of towns closed to ex-convicts has still, to our knowledge, not been published, but according to a recent report in the Washington Post, (28th April, 1988) more than seventy localities were involved. It is worth recalling, in this context, that in 1987 only fifty seven Soviet towns had more than half a million inhabitants. Possibly the released prisoners were excluded from all large conurbations. Residence could be authorized by the local militia if the ex-convict had lived and worked satisfactorily in an approved zone for two years. In practice, only certain categories of juveniles, mothers with under-aged children, invalids and the elderly had an unrestricted right to re-registration in the towns where they formerly resided. <31>

The militia had the power to evict any unregistered person from the given locality twice, with twenty four hours to leave on each occasion. He might have nowhere to go, but if he returned subsequently he could be imprisoned for one year solely for violation of the propiska rules. Thus a devilish mechanism of re-imprisonment came in to play. Cases have been reported of prisoners actually fearing release because propiska rules prevented them from settling in any acceptable spot. <32>

There are reports of a further distressing problem. People who harbor unregistered relatives, or try to help ex-convicts (typically elderly parents) are themselves liable to

prosecution, and ultimately imprisonment for violation of the rules. Local militias sometimes interpret regulations in a stringent manner, with the aim of reducing the threat of crime. In this way the propiska system, may be imposing intolerable psychological strain, and bring innocent individuals of another generation into the sphere of criminality.

Finally, the militia itself may sink into illegality since the pressures for registration in large towns promote bribery and corruption. To these crimes one finds, of course, only infrequent reference; it would seem that they go largely undetected and unpunished (for further comment see page 26).

### *Employment, Training and Housing Difficulties*

Another much-commented problem is that of *limitchki*, ie. workers from other localities who have been hired up to an officially authorized total, or "limit". They are mostly unskilled individuals admitted to large towns to take jobs that registered inhabitants do not find attractive. Enterprise managers who can offer some sort of accommodation use their "limit" quotas, which stem from the propiska anyway, to obviate restrictions and fill difficult vacancies, without much concern for the social consequences. The limit workers usually live in hostels, on a renewable one-year propiska, with the agreement (or connivance) of the local soviet. Sometimes they are promised a flat and permanent registration after some years of service. Such workers may in a sense be regarded as the modern equivalent of the tsarist peasant, who would leave the village to lodge and work in an urban factory without any certainty of staying.

We have seen no overall total for limit workers, but the number of people living in shared-room hostels at the beginning of 1988 was stated to be 11.5 million, of whom the majority must have been in this category. If so, they formed nearly ten per cent of all workers and employees. Instances have been reported of hard-pressed limitchiki being registered for residence at factory addresses, being forced to rent expensive private rooms, or indeed creating their own shanty towns (Tashkent and Baku). In any case, the drawbacks of crowded hostel life in the USSR need no elaboration, and the lot of the limitchik is rarely a happy one. <33>

The increasing pressures on urban facilities caused by this practice have recently provoked commercial reactions. In some localities the establishment of a migrant worker with family has actually been costed to include housing, education, health care, urban amenities, etc., and enterprise managers have been required to pay fees for each worker brought in. The rates in Kiev were 12,400 rubles, Estonia 10-16,000 rubles, Latvia 15-25,000 rubles, and Tyumen' 7,300 rubles. It is worth recalling, to improve perspective, that the average wage of workers and employees in 1988 was stated to be just over 2,600 rubles a year. No such practice has been reported for Moscow, where the "limit" system was formally (though, it would appear, not fully) abolished in 1987. It is likely that propiska fees of this order would of themselves strongly discourage "limit" practices. Beyond this we would postulate that rising unemployment amongst long-term residents and increased emphasis on profitability would also inhibit it. <34>

Another long-term, though less obvious problem has been caused by restrictions placed on the admission of able "out-of-town" candidates to higher and secondary special educational institutions and technical colleges (PTU). According to official data, in 1989 their hostels accommodated 2.5 million students, but this represented only 73% to 81% of the places needed (depending on category). The normal practice was not to admit persons without a hostel place or possibility of obtaining a propiska through family channels. This obviously reduced educational opportunities for many young people who might otherwise have found some abode. (34a)

The other side of this medal is, of course, reluctant or uneconomic occupancy of urban housing by people who would be willing to move out for long periods, but are fearful of losing propiska rights for ever. Their numbers are impossible to estimate, but must be very large indeed. Anecdotal evidence is not difficult to come by. An all-union research center was recently only able to offer one Moscow residence permit to outsiders, while the director of a major pedagogical institute was not allowed to hire any staff at all from other towns. <35>

A high proportion of Soviet pensioners, by consequence of Soviet social history, were born in the village, and many would be happy to live in uncrowded rural surroundings. On the other hand some provincials cannot take up opportunities in big cities because of lack of

housing and administrative closure. Rural and peripheral areas annually forfeit the services of thousands of trained specialists who were supposed to arrive from universities and institutes (traditionally teachers, medical personnel and agriculturalists). Retention of propiska rights might encourage a healthy mobility.

### *Fictitious Marriages*

Surprising though it might at first appear, the system has had a deleterious impact on Soviet marriage patterns in large towns. Significant numbers of people actually get married (partly or solely) to acquire residence rights. That Soviet divorce rates are high is well known (3.3 per 1000 of the population in 1988, against 9.4 marriages). Divorce may, of course, be due to numerous psychological and social factors: but many Soviet marriages appear to be contracted principally for residence purposes, and dissolved after the move. Such marriages of convenience are in common parlance called "fictitious". <36>

Precise figures are impossible to obtain. However, some indication may be gleaned from the results of our survey. Of sixty six respondents to the longer version of our questionnaire, only four said they had married fictitiously themselves; but no less than forty claimed specific knowledge of other fictitious marriages, distributed as follows:

Knowledge of:	Number of Respondents:
one case	7
two cases	14
three cases	10
four cases	3
five or more	6

Specific years were entered for no less than 114 of the nuptial unions, indicating personal memory of them. <37>

A recent housing booklet based on an analysis of 12,000 letters from readers of the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* is worthy of quotation. As noted, graduates of higher educational institutions have long been subject to state placement without particular regard for their personal wishes. Family relationships (particularly the presence of a spouse) can,

however, be used to override the normal procedures; it would normally be impossible to separate man and wife. "Every year (the booklet stated) graduates are seized by marriage fever. [Full-time graduates numbered 447,100 in 1988 - MM]. It is clear that many get married only for the sake of a permanent residence stamp in their passport. Some fast marriages are like bad plays - simply fictitious. For this reason, in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev the rate of divorce per thousand of the population is 1.7 times higher than the national average, while one third fewer children are born than in other towns". <38>

## PUBLIC OPINION AND RESPONSE

*(Data from Social Surveys)*

Any consideration of public attitudes towards passports and propiska should begin with the question of whether people believe they pose a problem or not. Of the 372 respondents who answered this question, the great majority (some 69%) indicated that such problems were very serious or serious, and 23% that they were not. Only 8% had no opinion. Clearly the matter justifies the attention it has received in the Soviet press. <39>

Both passport and propiska inevitably became more important as rationing, a residence-based practice, spread. In the changing circumstances we considered it expedient to ask whether people's attitude to passport and propiska had also changed. A majority (58%) declared that it had not; on the other hand, 8% said that rationing made them realize how useful system was, and 34% - that rationing actually caused them to think it less necessary. The latter group may well have comprised people whose access to rationed goods was restricted; but the limits of the questionnaire prevented further exploration. <40>

With regard to the over-riding question of whether passports and propiska should be abolished, our 522 respondents were distributed as follows:

	Passports(%)	Propiska(%)
Abolish immediately	24	35
Abolish gradually	24	30
Abolition needed, but impossible		12 11
<hr/>		
Total for abolition	60	76
<hr/>		
Retain	34	16
Can't say, other, no answer	6	8

It is interesting to note that while some 60% of the respondents wished to abolish the passport, 76% wanted to abolish propiska. In both cases relatively few people (6%-8%) had no opinion on the matter. <41>

The social distinctions between the "retain" and "abolish propiska" groups are also of interest. For purposes of analysis here we shall compare the retentionist group (85 respondents) with a combined group of (334) respondents who favored abolition immediately or gradually. We omit those who entered "abolition needed, but impossible", so as to obtain a sharper picture.

Among the retentionists one found rather more men, and people aged 40 and over, (60%, as opposed to 30% in the other group). The educational attainment of the retentionists was lower: 52% had secondary special or higher education, while the comparable figure for abolitionists was 82%. In terms of income 59% of the retentionists received less than 200 rubles a month (which was a little below the average wage), while in the other group only 48% were as poor. 39% of the retentionists were in unskilled, low-grade and primarily manual jobs, while the figure for abolitionists was 21%. The sample results indicate, therefore, that support for propiska was more characteristic of what might be termed the lower, or less privileged, groups in Soviet society. <42>

Rural respondents were not easy to reach, but a comparison was possible between the responses of 70 townspeople in Saratov and 34 in the village of Ust'-Kurdyum, Saratov raion. Whereas only 20 Saratovites (29%) wished to retain propiska, 19 of the villagers (56%) did so. This indicted greater conservatism in the rural locality, or a feeling, perhaps, that after so many passportless years propiska was actually a step forward. <43>

Strangely enough, in view of the articles considered earlier in this report, the percentages of (105) Moscow and Leningrad respondents who declared themselves in favor of early or eventual abolition (if circumstances permitted) were almost the same as for the sample as a whole. In view of the attractiveness of the capitals one might have expected inhabitants to be more protective of their status: the pattern of response may, however, have been affected by the fact that nearly a third worked on a "liberal" journal. Of the 66 emigres respondents all but three belonged to the abolition group, possibly a consequence of their acquaintanceship with more liberal western practice.

With regard to the positive uses of the passport, a question posed in the short questionnaire, the response was perhaps understandably poor (214 respondents made entries).

The most common answers, in percentage terms, were: <44 >

Convenient for identity	50%
Does not get in way	17%
Useful for public order	13%
Useful for fighting crime	15%

The response to a question on the positive uses of propiska was also poor, (194 respondents) but the comparable distribution in this case was:

Useful for statistics	39%
Prevents undesirable mobility	24
Prevents crime	20

Respondents to the short questionnaire were asked what documents they thought could best replace the passport were it abolished. Most people did not have a clear opinion, but the most common responses (as percentages of the 257 who answered) were: work pass - 30%; driving license (!) - 10%; trade union ticket - 7%, any of them - 44%. <45 >

We were told by our interviewers that our question on the social prestige of the propiska, a neat enough concept for sociologists, puzzled respondents, and some had never thought in those terms. Asked (in the short questionnaire) whether one's propiska could be a matter of prestige and pride, only 14% thought that it certainly could, another 21% thought it could to some extent, and 44% thought it could not. There was little difference in the pattern of response between the retentionists and abolitionists. One must, of course, bear in mind that although social variations indeed exist between urban districts in the USSR, state controls have ensured that they are (with certain exceptions) less marked than in capitalist towns. <46 >

Respondents to the shorter questionnaire were asked to name the most attractive cities in the USSR. We thought this would be a useful exercise, despite the small numbers and possible distortion through attachment to familiar localities. The cities which did best as first

choices were, predictably, Moscow (22 respondents) and Leningrad (12); less predictably Odessa (7), Vilnyus (4) and Riga (3). <47>

When asked about the existence of propiska in other lands, 53% of all respondents thought it was confined to the USSR and "socialist" countries; some 9% believed it to be common to all advanced countries; most of the remainder had not thought about it, or gave less specific replies. <48> Regarding access to maps and cartographic literature (on which censorship has only recently been relaxed) 56% thought the USSR was more restrictive than capitalist lands, whereas only 6% thought it was freer in that respect. 16% believed there was no difference, and 22% had never considered the matter. <49> In both of these respects, therefore, a majority considered Soviet practices to be less liberal than those in the west.

We made an attempt to determine what proportion of the respondents actually lived where they were currently registered. 81% of the respondents to the short questionnaire said that they did so: 4% said they were not: but 15% did not answer. This silence is not easy to interpret, in view of the fact that the questionnaire was anonymous: but one would scarcely be justified in presuming that propiska rules were invariably being broken. Some people may not have replied on account of unclear personal circumstances, others because they were doubtful about infringement anyway. <50>

Respondents to the long questionnaire were asked (in greater detail) whether they had lived without a required propiska on any occasions during their last ten years of residence in the USSR. 34 of the 66 (52%) said that they had; 28 (42%) that they had not; and 4 did not answer. <51> Further questions revealed that in 25 of the cases of illegal residence only one locality had been involved; in 8 cases - between two and four. The durations of stay had been quite considerable, the majority being of 6-14 weeks. Most of the illegal residence had been in large towns.

The practice, however, seemed to be relatively safe, because only six people suffered legal consequences, (including two warnings and an expulsion). <52> It is hazardous to generalize on a modest fund of cases; but, arithmetically, if even a few per cent of the population resided illegally every year, in the longer term a majority could do so. On a national scale enormous numbers of citizens would then be involved.

The only figure we have found for violations of propiska regulations nation-wide was published in a provincial literary journal, where "one million prosecutions a year" was quoted. We think this may well be realistic. In the first half of 1990 a single militia station in Moscow, according to our information, registered eight breaches of article 198 of the RSFSR Criminal Code ("malicious violation" of propiska rules, involving a fine of up to 50 rubles, or imprisonment), together with 119 cases of persons refusing to leave when ordered. In addition, four hundred protocols for minor violations, including loss of passport and failure to update photographs, etc., were drawn up. <53>

It is commonly held that the propiska system encourages bribery. This belief was supported by the results of the long questionnaire (though the responses were a little vaguer than we would have wished). No less than 21 respondents (32%) indicated they had given bribes; of these five went to militiamen, four to passport clerks, two to other secretarial staff, and the remainder to occupants of living space or relatives. In five cases the bribe consisted of gifts, in eight - of money; two respondents provided services, and six - a combination. Values varied from almost token sums of a few rubles to very considerable amounts indicating capital purchases; for example, three respondents entered 50 rubles, and five - between 2,000 and 4,500 rubles. It would seem that the sums reflected very different exigencies and personal circumstances. As for assessments of the occurrence of bribery among relatives and friends, 24 respondents said such cases were frequent, and 18 said they were encountered sometimes. Ten said they did not. <54>

The survey work done by Soviet researchers, as known to us at present, requires mention. In October, 1988 the newspaper *Moskovskie novosti* (no. 43, 23rd October) published a few results from a telephone survey of 550 Moscovites conducted by I. Mintusov. When asked whether they considered the system of propiska to be "socially just", 40% thought it was, and 36% that it was not. This is a vaguer question than we posed, but suggests rather more support. Dissatisfaction with propiska was highest amongst 20-30 year-olds (52%), and among people with higher education in the humanities (53%). Returning to the same survey more recently in *Literaturnaya gazeta* (21st November, 1990) the journalist L. Velikanova revealed that 63% of the respondents favored changing propiska into a system of registration (rather than authorization). 42% were against the removal of

propiska limitations in certain zones (like Moscow). The people who were dissatisfied could not, however, propose any other solution to the problem of the growth of large cities.

In May, 1990, when our own work was in progress, the Institute of Philosophy and Law in Sverdlovsk organized a survey among local residents. Some of the results were published in *Izvestiya* (26th September, 1990, by A. Gushchina and G. Maklakova), and again in the above-mentioned number of *Literaturnaya gazeta*. In this case a majority expressed itself in favor of abolition: 26% of respondents were for immediate action, and another 40% for abolition when possible. Only 14% were for retention. Abolition was supported most strongly by men aged 30-45, people with a better level of education, and those predominantly unconnected with production. Among the "conservatives" women, middle-aged people, pensioners, and people with less education, predominated.

Asked why they did not want the removal of propiska, 41% feared disorder and confusion, 44% extra difficulties with the distribution of housing, 51% a rise in the price of accommodation on the black market. The researchers attributed the urge to retain propiska to a fear of the unknown, and a liking for guarantees (known to be modest, but in effect ephemeral). People lack a proper understanding of any democratic system of registration which would not limit human rights. Change would require a period of explanatory work among the public.

According to Velikanova's presentation, 74% of the respondents thought that propiska limited freedom of residence and movement, 69% thought that it increased feelings of complete dependence on the state, 62% that it kept people under state control, and 53% that it complicated free access to goods. A third of the respondents supported it (she said) because it limited chance migration, helped in the fight against crime, and in the distribution of deficit goods. About 40% of the respondents said it gave them a feeling of protection and certainty. Over half had experienced difficulties, unpleasantness or conflict with regard to propiska procedures.

The surveys to hand posed rather different questions, and the results published in Soviet sources were incomplete. All suggest both social and regional variation. Nevertheless they appear to demonstrate a strong groundswell of support for the removal or modification of propiska as currently operative. This support is likely to be most widespread among younger

people and in the more favored strata of society. A more detailed picture would require wider and more coordinated investigation.

## FORMAL BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES

Modern man may change his place of residence in many different ways, for many different reasons . Our main concern in this report are problems facing the Soviet citizen who moves to an ordinary, urban dwelling in a new locality for an appreciable period of time. The principal residence rules are designed to cover just this type of move. However, there are many other categories of migrant, and we need to mention the more obvious, if only to improve the general perspective.

### *The Main Categories of Migrants*

People who are moving to a new address or locality for more than 45 days or permanently have to de-register from their former place of residence (through the so-called *vypiska* procedure), and complete the "propiska" procedure at their new one. Secondly, people staying less than 45 days, but more than three, do not require to deregister, and have only to "register" their presence at the temporary one, without going through the full "propiska". The 45 day-rule therefore forms a sort of bureaucratic watershed between mere registration and full propiska. (It is not easy to find mutually exclusive terms in English). This leaves a third category of people who stay less than three days, and are therefore not subject to any bureaucratic constraints.

A moment's thought reveals two flaws in this categorization. Firstly, it contains no minimum registration-free period, apart from the first three days. So what about people who come for a few days only? Strictly, they are required to register even for a fourth day. Secondly, there is the problem of those who are not sure how long they will stay, and are unable to give dates.

In terms of bureaucratic practice this problem is potentially of great importance: for the numbers of such people, and the amount of work involved in registering them, would be vast. Beyond this one can argue that all possible types of sojourn cannot be legislated for, and that the system is workable only if some are ignored.

In order to get some elucidation of what happens in practice, (presumably on the basis of unpublished regulations) we contacted two militia stations, one in Leningrad and one in Moscow, and were told by both that registration was not in fact necessary unless the stay exceeded 30 days. <55> This ruling seems to be generally known among the public. The absence of reference to it in the national regulations presumably leaves visitors with a legal obligation to register before the fourth day, while the militia retains powers to act against unregistered visitors, if necessary, after the third.

Migrants who are not moving into private accommodation may face rather different procedures, and can be categorized as follows. Firstly there are the country's 11.5 million hostel-dwellers, who obtain some sort of local authorization (from a factory, educational or other institution) allowing registration or propiska on a long-term basis, but without final de-registration elsewhere. As noted, such people are usually expected to return to their original place of residence on completing a contact or course of study. They register at their hostel, but have to complete the same documentation as an ordinary resident. <56>

Secondly, arrangements have to be made for people going to hotels, rest-homes, hospitals, etc., for relatively short stays. Such institutions usually have their own passport clerk who registers arrival on the first day, without, of course, de-registration. (Foreign tourists encounter this procedure when they submit their passport at the hotel desk). Finally, there are people who go to holiday centers or resorts on their own account, and find their own accommodation (the so-called *dikari*, or savages). Depending on local regulations, holiday-makers are required to pay a slightly higher registration fee and a holiday tax: it is, however, most difficult to determine what happens in practice. <57>

### *Main-stream registration procedures*

#### (i) De-registration (*vypiska*)

In order to de-register, the citizen normally applies at the passport desk of the housing office (*domupravlenie*, or *domuprav*) responsible for his block or individual dwelling. De-registration is dealt with only at certain hours. Initially he needs to take his passport (or the document replacing it), and papers indicating liability for military service. For

under-aged children birth certificates replace the passport. The application to leave may be made on a simple standard form, or composed by the applicant.

The passport and other documents are accepted by the passport clerk, who records the request and asks for further documentation (of which more in a moment). When this is ready she submits the papers to the local militia office (which has its own reception hours) for verification and amendment. The housing offices have no executive power in this respect. (Deaths, incidentally, have to be reported in the same way, after certification by the local registry office). <58>

The person departing has to fill in a vypiska slip (*listok ubytiya*) which is extraordinarily detailed, and requires many other documents by way of proof. Thus the slips used in Moscow in June, 1990 comprised 13 sections including:

*Surname, christian name and patronymic, (double surnames having to be entered in both forms),*

*sex, date and place of birth,*

*nationality,*

*details of current propiska,*

*details of where the citizen last arrived from,*

*the new address,*

*details of the militia office where this address is to be registered,*

*any change of name, with reasons*

*the aim of departure and proposed length of absence,*

*place of work and position or (if none) social status (pensioner, pupil dependent, etc.,)*

*before departure,*

*passport details (number, date and place of issue),*

*details of accompanying children,*

*date and signature.*

The last section of the slip is reserved for countersignature by responsible officials. The vypiska slip has to be accompanied by a statistical voucher, (*talon statisticheskogo ucheta*) which contains almost identical details, and is forwarded to the local statistical office for national purposes within a month. <59>

Curiously enough, the vypiska slip is tiny, with scarcely enough room to write on. The form-filling is obviously tedious, but most of the information required is, at least, easily available. Most people in our survey regarded the departure procedures as relatively easy, requiring generally only two to six hours. <60>

Most bothersome, however, are what may be termed tenancy release papers. These are not mentioned in the passport regulations, but are required by the housing office in order to protect its finances, as it is responsible for unpaid bills. Thus the offices we visited in Moscow all exhibited an apparently standard list of requirements comprising: *the rent book; certificates for disconnection of the radio and removal of television ariels; termination of television servicing agreements; a Moscow Energy (ie., electricity) settlement statement; telephone settlement statement, and a release form from the house technician.*

Of course, house-moving anywhere involves the settlement of accounts: but Soviet practice, as described here, could actually prevent departure. When the journalist V. Baskov discussed the matter with a senior official of the Moscow militia, the latter assured him that only the last item on the list - the need for technical examination - was valid, and then only in part. <61>

Once the militia has processed the documents and entered the departure stamps in the passport, the housing office amends its own occupancy card and issues a clearance slip from its register of tenants [*vypiska iz domovoi knigi*], thereby completing the procedure. This slip contains the following entries:

*the number of housing office and the tenant's full address:*

*the tenant's name, date of birth,*

*the place from which he arrived,*

*the aim and length of his sojourn,*

*nationality,*

*passport details,*

*liability for military service,*

*occupation,*

*the address to which he is moving.*

Tenants are still charged a modest fee of 30 kopecks for recording procedures, while there is also a small charge to cover the cost of the extract from the register of tenants or other documents (articles 28 and 33 of the 1974 statute). < 62 >

(ii) Propiska

Propiska involves even more documentation. The migrant would again begin at the housing office where he was going to live, and the documents now required (apart from the passport itself) included:

*the birth certificates of children aged under 16, (with cancellation stamps entered at the previous place of residence),*

*a completed application form for new arrivals (listok pribytiya), almost identical in content to the listok ubytiya,*

*another completed statistical voucher*

*a marriage certificate (where appropriate),*

*a document proving the existence of living space in the locality (the "Form 15" , of which more in a moment),*

*a declaration of agreement to share (from persons already occupying the living space):*

*a document proving that they are relatives,*

*a military certificate. (for persons with service obligations, showing that they have re-registered in the local military office, or voenkomat),*

*confirmation of employment or acceptance at an educational institution:*

*the clearance slip from the housing office at the former place of residence, also with a de-registration stamp,*

*and, where appropriate, a certificate of release from prison. < 63 >*

Form 15, which is issued one per family, on submission of these documents, requests the following details:

*name, date of birth, address,*

*object of arrival,*

*passport details,*

*the number of persons moving,*

*the area of the living space in square meters, number of rooms:  
details of the housing authorization order,  
the number of persons already registered there (including those temporarily absent):  
information on occupants who have no right of permanent residence,  
date and signature,  
signature of the housing manager,  
decision of the militia. < 64 >*

Form 15 has to be countersigned by housing officials before submission to the local militia, which has the right to request additional information on:

*existing prohibitions on the living space,  
on-going court proceedings with regard to it,  
the rights of any persons temporarily absent,  
any existing residents,  
any proposed evacuations connected with repairs,  
any landlord's agreement,  
the date and number of any protocol of admission to a housing cooperative,  
a cross-check on the composition of the family of the person registering,  
whether the person registering has living space elsewhere. < 65 >*

The housing office and would then be required to complete a propiska card with comparable details, we suspect for deposition at the local militia office: and also modify the occupancy card for the relevant unit of living space, including, of course, their passport data.

Obviously, a battery of items of this kind would normally take time and trouble to assemble, yielding ample opportunities for indignation. Though the difficulties of obtaining propiska vary from one town to another, all indications are that the actual procedures are standard. (Obtaining permission for movement or visits to closed zones, however, was even more complex). Of the 66 cases recorded by recent emigres, we found that in no less than 17, or about a quarter, there were specific difficulties with papers. Only two respondents said they managed to complete the propiska procedure with one visit to the housing office, the great majority requiring between four and ten:

No of visits required	No of respondents
1	2
2-3	9
4-6	23
7-10	17
11 or more	6
Indeterminate	9

The amount of time required for propiska was mostly in the range of 3-4 working hours, plus 4-20 hours of free time. The main difficulties, according to the great majority of respondents, were not so much observance of the regulations, as getting the necessary documentation in order. <66>

A problem often mentioned was the restricted reception hours at the domupravlenie. According to our observations, the passport desks of the housing offices (REU, Repair and Usage Directorates) in Moscow opened only two mornings and two afternoons a week, and every other Saturday. These hours, however, as we were told at the Pesochny Street (Sokol'niki) office, were divided between registration and de-registration. In cases of difficulty applicants could also be directed to the local militia office, which also had restricted times.

The passport clerk at Pesochny claimed that propiska could be quite quick: applicants could present their documents at one of the appointed times and expect to get them back, with militia approvals, two or three days later. Evidently, this presupposed that all the documents had been collected and were in order. According to an authoritative account provided by Iu. Kovalev, the passport clerks were obliged to submit the papers to the militia within three days.

### *The Bureaucratic Workload*

The bureaucratic workload that is involved in maintaining the passport and propiska systems is enormous. Perhaps unexpectedly, some estimate can be made of the number of operations it involves.

Let us begin with the consequences of demographic change. In 1987 (which may be taken as a convenient base year) some 205 million passports were said to be in circulation. In that year about 4.1 million youngsters reached the age of sixteen, and 2.8 million people died, which involved almost as many issues and cancellations. Passports had to be presented to record just under 2.8 million marriages, one million divorces, 5.6 million births and many thousands of alimony settlements. <67>. New photographs had to be affixed to the passports of about five million 25-year olds, and four million 45-year olds. An unknown number of passports had to be modified when surnames, street names, etc., were changed. <68>

As for other entries, about 1.5 million young men were probably called up for military service, and an equal number demobilised, all of which required the submission and retrieval of passports (together with the issue and modification of military papers). <69> Some 305,000 persons were committed to prison, and there were apparently over half a million discharges. <70> Foreign travel also involves the temporary surrender of the internal passport in exchange for a foreign one. 920,000 Soviet citizens were said to have travelled abroad for purposes of tourism alone, and in that case nearly two million passport operations were needed. Judging from age-group data (1986), up to 2.7 million persons became eligible for registration as pensioners. It must not be forgotten that corresponding modifications often had to be made in the documentation lodged with housing offices, the militia and elsewhere. <71>

In addition, we need to include a figure for losses of passports, or instances of unusability, as the document has to be taken from the home so frequently. In the first half of 1990 a militia station in Moscow (according to our information) registered 400 cases of loss, failure to enter photographs, etc. It would probably be reasonable to hypothesize a million such instances (ie., one passport in some two hundred) every year.

The total of issues, submissions and retrievals, even without propiska work, must therefore have been in the region of thirty five million for passports, to which must be added all the modifications of supplementary documents filed in offices. The issue of food vouchers and ration cards on a passport/propiska basis for a large part of the population presented

another mountainous task. All of this work was, of course, entirely uncomputerized, and involved laborious writing and filing. We never saw a single computer terminal in any of the offices visited. <72>

Turning to residence procedures, estimates are more difficult. The use of statistical vouchers means that the Central Statistical Administration has assembled an ocean of data on population movements. Unfortunately, very little of it has been published, and the all-union population census categories have so far been too general for detailed analysis. <73> A more restricted statistical publication did, however, reveal that in 1988 8.5 million people settled in Soviet towns, of whom 5.1 million came from other towns, and 3.4 million from the country: and at the same time 7.2 million people moved out, including 5.2 million to other towns, and 2 million to the country. <74> No figures were provided in this source for movement inside towns, or from one rural area to another. But urban militia and housing offices on this count alone would have had to handle up to 17 million registrations and de-registrations, including those of minors.

To these figures must be added long-term hospital admissions, curative and holiday registrations in recognized centers. In 1987 the USSR had some 3.7 million hospital beds, though many were no doubt occupied for only short periods. There were said to be half a million refugees from non-Russian republics, all of whom presumably required some kind of registration. Apart from this, there were the 52.4 million people who took lengthy holidays or "cures" in state institutions, and the unknown number who took unorganized holidays, - and registered. <75>

The overall national figure for de-registrations and registrations, permanent or temporary, even without holiday contingents, may well have surpassed 25 million (allowing 17 million for migrations, 8 million for other kinds of displacement). The figure cannot be very firm; but adding to it some thirty five million passport operations, we end up with a fair estimate of sixty million bureaucratic operations for the year, most involving one or more offices, and a good deal of supplementary documentation.

The reader may himself decide whether this is best regarded as a staggering burden, or an acceptable element in the general scheme of Soviet administrative life. All modern societies

confine their citizens bureaucratically in one way or another: here we have endeavored to winnow out the operations stemming directly from the passport and propiska system.

### *The Nature of the Bureaucracy*

Obviously, a flow of work as substantial as this requires a hefty bureaucracy. The Soviet authorities have always been secretive about the state apparatus, and to the best of our knowledge no official account of this sector has ever been published. However, the few published references, on-the-spot enquiries, and a little information from our questionnaires, provide some insight. <76>

The "passport apparatus" is divided into two distinct parts, one based in housing offices and the other in district militia stations. In the countryside, where there are no militia stations, and housing is mostly scattered or in the form of privately-owned units, propiska procedures are handled by the chairman of the village soviet or a secretary. Militia passport offices are usually located in the raion centers.

#### (i) Housing offices

Most of the information available to us concerns urban housing offices, so we will begin with these. Persons empowered to handle registration procedures in this sector have been listed as: officials of housing-use and housing amenity offices, housing managers, the chairmen of house construction agencies (ZhSK and DSK), the directors of hotels, guesthouses, rest homes and dacha complexes, the managers (*komendanty*) of houses and hostels, householders (for individual dwellings), and other persons who are responsible for dwelling houses and premises. In Moscow and Leningrad housing offices, as no doubt elsewhere, daily procedures are handled by female passport clerks, known as "pasportistki". The job is listed with its own code number (24310) in an official all-union classification. <77>

In Moscow the housing offices have seen a number of reorganizations, but since October, 1988 have been grandly named Repair and Usage Directorates (REU). <78> The number of people on the staff of any office is said to be calculated on the basis of the amount of living space in the district, plus an allowance for space in a third of buildings used for other purposes (no other details available). The staff list of a REU in the Frunze district,

which was copied for us in June, 1990, contained twenty four officials with salaries ranging from 120 to 250 rubles a month, as follows:

Post	No	Monthly Salary
Head	1	250 rubles
main engineer	1	240
engineer	2	170
engineer	1	160
economist	1	170
technician	3	160
passport clerk	1	120
deliveries clerk	9	130
bookkeeper	1	180
bookkeeper	1	140
workman (skilled)	1	190
instructor-organizer	1	150
secretary	1	120

Of interest is the fact that there was one passport clerk, who was also among the lowest-paid members of staff.

Enquiries which we made into advertisements for passport clerks appearing in a Moscow employment bulletin over ten months (1989-90) cast a little more light on the situation.

< 79 > The salaries for 38 posts advertised ranged between 80 and 160 rubles, though the great majority were offered at 110-120. Augmentation of 20-30% was possible through quarterly bonuses, and the higher rates probably included this. Even so, the total remained way below the published national average wage of 220 rubles (1988). < 80 >

The vacancies were unattractive and unfilled, we found, for months on end. Apart from being low-paid, they carried no right to living space, and lacked promotion prospects (except though the general office). Paspportistki suffered from the 1988 reorganization, in that every two housing offices (DEZ) were turned into one REU, with consequent staff reductions. The increase in the workload as a consequence of the spread of residence-based rationing procedures must also be borne in mind. A pay rise from the basic rate of 80-90 rubles, reported in 1988, was evidently not enough to offset these drawbacks. Low pay, of course, always increases the possibility of bribery.

Neither higher education, nor security clearance were needed for employment. We were told on several occasions that the jobs were open to anyone with full (10-year) general schooling; training was given over some two weeks, either by another passport clerk or (if there were none) at the local militia. The local military office could also be called upon for assistance. The jobs were said to be of most interest to women (perhaps mothers) who required some flexibility of working hours, had poor employment prospects, and lived close by. Janitors and some technical staff who did have the right to living space after five years' service might, on acquiring it, switch to passport work as an easier option.

Listings of duties for passport clerks in Moscow and the town of Kirov included:

- 1. Work with the public during reception hours (20 hours a week), comprising: propiska, vypiska; the issue of slips certifying the existence of family members and dependents (for enrollment in kindergartens, schools, etc.), certificates in connection with births, deaths, and employment; the issue of civil passports (for youngsters, retiring servicemen, and documents lost, etc.); affixing photographs; the issue of food vouchers and ration cards;*
- 2. Contact the passport office at the militia (twice a week) with regard to applications for propiska, vypiska, and the issue of passports;*
- 3. Handling military service documentation, and contact with the voenkomat (once a week) for the registration and deregistration of servicemen.*

The size of this apparatus has, as far as we are aware, never been revealed either, though it must be known in some statistical offices. The number of pasportistki in any given housing office varied (as noted) according to district, but the normal contingent was evidently between one and three. Indeed, all of the three REU we visited in Moscow had two or three workplaces, though sometimes there was only one clerk in attendance. Passport staff are also employed, of course, at hostels and large hotels. A few tentative estimates of the size of the whole contingent may be made from known national administrative units, and the relevant entries in urban telephone books.

Taking Leningrad (as possibly more typical than Moscow), we find that the bulk of the housing stock was run by 90 housing trusts; these were subdivided into 419 sectors, though many sectors, it would seem, shared registration facilities. Factories, works, trust and combines together had about 330 hostels, some occupying several blocks, while educational

institutions had another 104. In addition, there were 32 tourist hotels and an unknown number of ministerial hotel-type institutions. Dwelling houses, hostels and hotels belonging to the military and security-related agencies presumably did not figure in these totals, as their telephone numbers would be ex-directory. <81 >

It would appear that the equivalent of a full-time staff of well over a thousand would be needed to service all of these units. Since Leningrad had a population of five million in 1989, one could hypothesize well over 30,000 clerks for all the urban housing offices in the USSR. <82 >

In rural areas and isolated locations where the militia does not have an office, each village soviet must (as noted) provide propiska facilities. For decades, of course, most rural areas were "non-regime", so the amount of work was minimal: documentation was needed only for approved migrants, local passport-holders (rural workers, specialists, etc.), and recruits. The issue of passports to rural dwellers after January, 1976 (together with the granting of the right, under the terms of the 1988 Collective Farm Statute, to leave the farm) certainly involved a significant growth in the rural bureaucracy, though the continuing restrictions on residence in towns inhibited outflow. In 1988 staff evidently had to be found for 4,014 rural workers' hamlets and 42,654 village soviets, ie. up to some 47,000 offices in all.

#### (ii) The Militia

Less information is available on the passport bureaucracy in the militia, which bears responsibility for the smooth running of the system and forms its administrative backbone. The militia is, of course, part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the passport offices (unlike those in the housing sector), are hierarchically arranged, from the simple "desk" in the local militia station to the central office, or *upravlenie*, attached to the city soviet.

The three offices we visited casually in Moscow raion militia stations had two workplaces each, and large banks of drawers for alphabetically arranged residence cards. The staff were again female and dressed in civilian clothes. The offices contained a separate room for the (uniformed) chief passport officer who was available to see members of the public on request. If he could not make a decision himself he would pass the case up to a higher level.

We have no information on the recruitment of staff. The work is obviously more demanding than in a housing office, but only the chief passport officer is a ranking militiaman. A set of posts and salaries obtained in Leningrad is shown below:

Chief of a passport office - monthly basic: 105 rubles

Rank supplements:	captain	130 rubles
	senior lieutenant	120
	lieutenant	110
	junior lieutenant	100

Years of Service supplement - 20% of basic salary for every 5 years

Senior Passport Clerk	130 rubles
Passport Clerk	120

Years of Service supplement - 5% for every five years of work, and 20% after 20 years. Passport clerks have no ranking and are not subject to attestation. < 83 >

It follows from these figures, however, that passport officials, even with a militia rank, were fairly modestly paid. We have no information on the prestige (or otherwise) of this work, though it is perhaps relevant to note that the journal *Sovetskaya Militsia* (now on free sale) virtually ignores it. Morale generally in the militia is said to be very low. < 83a >

The size of the militia passport bureaucracy nationally can also, to some extent, be gauged from the entries in telephone books. Thus we find that the Directorate of Internal Affairs for Leningrad and Leningrad oblast' had both a central passport office, and a bureau for issuing passes to the frontier zones. Each of the seventy five district militia stations had its own passport desk. In fact, the stations normally publish only three telephone numbers, those for the chief, the officer on duty, and the passport desk.

The Moscow militia also had a passport desk in each of its 169 district stations. In 33 of them there were also facilities for registering foreigners ("visa and registration sections"), and we must not forget the Moscow central office for passport and visa registration, which had several scores of employees. < 84 >

It may be, however, that the network in other large towns is much less developed. Thus Kiev, with a population of 2.4 million souls, had only 12 district militia passport offices

listed in the 1985 directory. In 1972, Tashkent, with a population of 1.5 million, had nine. This may reflect a lower level of public amenity, or a different bureaucratic structure.

On the basis of such observations and the known administrative divisions one can again suggest some tentative magnitudes. There must have been about 170 central passport offices at the republic, oblast and krai levels, while most of the 2,186 towns and 665 urban districts had a number units each. In addition, passport and residence supervision had to be provided at 3,228 militia offices in rural districts. Taking into account the (apparently standard) staffing rates, it would seem likely that a minimum of 20,000 passport officials were needed for the militia system as a whole.

### *The Assessment of Efficiency*

Any review of the bureaucracy must entail assessment of the efficiency of the passport and propiska system in general. Having earlier considered the problems which the system causes or exacerbates, this is perhaps a good point at which to ask how far it succeeds in its declared aims, even if answers are hard to come by. Unlike the original 1932 Statute, the 1974 version contained no statement of them. The Pravda announcement (25th December, 1974) stated only that the system was to help the citizen enjoy his rights, fulfill his duties before the state and society, measure population movements and promote socialist law and order. Obviously, more specific objectives need to be taken in to account as well.

In the simple matter of issuing passports the bureaucracy is very effective indeed, since without this document the Soviet citizen arguably ceases to have a legal existence. To reject it would be equivalent to refusing Soviet citizenship - a rare, though not unknown, occurrence. The maintenance and updating of passports, to judge from occasional indications, is also fairly efficient, though delays in reporting losses and changing photographs may be common. However, the fact that many western states do not have internal passports at all indicates that the constitutional functions of the document may be attainable by much less ponderous means.

The running of the propiska system is another matter. The use of the statistical voucher must have ensured the collection of an ocean of data on migration, but since very little is published, and social planning procedures are rarely revealed, we cannot know to what

effect. As far as registering citizens' permanent dwelling places is concerned, the system again seems to be effective; all indications are that people generally observe procedures, if only because long-term residence is difficult without so doing. Propiska must in normal circumstances be equally efficient in ensuring the registration of young men for military service.

Having said this, there is no doubt that it is much less effective at the social margin, so to speak. Shorter-term visitors and specific social groups - rootless folk, ex-convicts, etc., - may ignore it. The severity of application must also vary, being keenest in large conurbations. In past years the system no doubt facilitated the persecution of political undesirables: though this function must have receded with perestroika, it may again become important, most topically in a drive against individual nationalists.

The role of both the passport and propiska in identifying and persecuting criminals has always been emphasized. The system may have helped control types of crime which are strongly locational (illicit distillation, brothel-keeping, etc.), or which involve settled criminals. On the other hand many criminals are mobile, have associates, and funds for bribery. Though residence is currently entered in the passport, place of employment is not. We cannot know whether the system originally caused a fall in the crime rate, or if current published rises would have been greater but for it. Despite its weaknesses, it may be of some help in the struggle against the new mafia.

A more specific question is the effectiveness of propiska in limiting the growth of large towns - a long-term policy, since urban amenities are often badly overstretched. In Moscow, for example, 50% of the housing was recently said to be in a critical condition, 43% of proposed new roads had not been built, and 50% of the sewage and water mains needed renewal (Gorodskoe khozyaistvo Moskvyy, July, 1988, pp 4-6).

Unfortunately, no satisfactory yardsticks can be devised for measuring efficiency in this respect. Migration and geographic studies, the most obvious foci, have not yielded one. The fact that urban population growth is frequently stated to have exceeded plans suggests overall failure. The problems of analysis can easily be demonstrated by taking the model of a large town "closed" by propiska regulations, together with its hinterland.

To assess the efficiency of the regulations one must ask (a) how many more people would have moved in, had there been no propiska, (b) what was the relative weight of other inhibiting factors (primarily living space, availability of jobs) (c) how many people lived illegally, without propiska, anyway (d) how far the system was distorted by managers using "limit" procedures, by bribery, etc.; (e) what impact propiska had on the pattern of commuting (f) how far official growth plans were modified to accommodate, and thus legalize, unplanned in-migration, including expansion into surrounding areas. One would then have to consider the balance of economic gains and losses, particularly in terms of labor and associated costs, and how typical the given case was. We have found no coherent, or indeed usable, statistics on such matters.

There is no doubt that propiska frequently inhibits change of residence, and without it more people would move into large towns. But this movement, again, could be counterbalanced, were easier, relaxed out-migration possible. One might reasonably conclude that without propiska overcrowding and the problems of urban living may have been worse, but that these same problems would also have performed their own inhibitive function.

On the whole it seems evident, judging by the information to hand, that the few benefits produced by the system hardly justify the substantial social and economic costs of running it.

## MODIFICATIONS DURING THE GORBACHEV PERIOD

The Gorbachev liberalization has prompted a great deal of what might be termed secondary movement in the system, though not always in one direction. Most of the movement appears to have occurred in response to specific or local pressures, and can hardly be seen as part of a coherent policy. In the tumultuous days now passing, no such policy exists. Here we shall consider the main changes which can be distinguished from the advent of perestroika to late November, 1990.

### *Legislative Consideration*

A significant consequence of perestroika in this sphere was the initiation of a discussion of propiska at the USSR Supreme Soviet level. On the 17th May, 1990 Sergei Alekseev, chairman of the Committee for Constitutional Supervision, declared that one of the four questions currently being considered was that of the constitutional status of a system which tied people to a given locality, and was, "in general", a violation of man's right to move freely. More specifically, propiska limitations contravened not only the USSR Constitution and Fundamentals of Civil Law, but also the Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the USSR was party. <85>

The matter proved difficult, and was discussed again on the 12th September. The Committee then noted that the USSR Council of Ministers had just passed a relevant decree (8th September, see below), and undertook to return to the matter in October. On the 26th of that month the Committee reported its findings in the form of a Conclusion. The registrational functions of propiska were declared not to contradict Soviet law nor recognized international norms, but its regulatory (*razreshitel'nye*) functions did, as they limited citizens' enjoyment of their basic rights of freedom of movement, choice of place of residence, work, education, and in other (unspecified) ways. These restrictions would have to be removed from Soviet law, and a transition made to a registrational system. However, the process would have to take place in stages, reflecting the development of market relationships and the creation of housing and labor markets.

The changes which the Committee authorized immediately were relatively modest. They included the annulment of propiska limitations on admissions of outsiders to establishments of higher, secondary special, and low-grade technical education, when no hostel space was available; the propiska of one spouse to the living space of another in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev; and the abolition of the seven-day departure rule for persons refused propiska by local militias. There was some relaxation of other rules for the above-mentioned cities, and for residence in frontier zones, but accurate interpretation of these points requires access to regulations so far unpublished. The Conclusion bore an air of some finality, permitting little optimism for more substantive change in the near future. <86>

### *Draft Constitutional Proposals*

The removal of propiska figured in the program of the Social Democratic Party and, more significantly, in two draft constitutions for the RSFSR. The "Constitution of the Russian Federation" proposed by the "RSFSR Constitutional Commission" would accord all citizens equal rights and freedoms, regardless of place of residence (article 2.1.3). Citizens would also have the freedom to move and choose their place of residence inside the Federation, to leave the Russian Federation and return to it. Limitation on the right of movement in specific territories could be established only by a decision of the Government of the Russian Federation, and (for individuals) by the decision or sentence of a court of law (article 22.3.5). This draft also contained detailed provisions for a transitional period: in the course of a year after the Constitution had come into force, a federal law was to be promulgated regulating the transition to a consistent realization of the right to choose one's place of residence. The transition should be completed in 18 months (article 7.1.2).

References to the propiska in the "Constitution of the RSFSR" proposed by the "Communists of Russia" group, were limited to one brief article (60). Citizens of the RSFSR "and other union republics" were to be guaranteed freedom of movement, choice of place of sojourn and residence, and also the right to leave and enter the RSFSR. There would be a single citizenship throughout the RSFSR and USSR. <87>

The Soviet passport, by contrast, has not been critically discussed at the all-union level. Indeed, its constitutional function was confirmed in article 47 of the May, 1990 USSR Law

on Soviet Citizenship, as a symbol of this happy condition. Its status has been seriously questioned only in the irredentist republics. <88>

### *Glasnost' and Relief for Ex-Convicts*

The decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of the 8th September, 1990 was said to have been promoted by "the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with a number of central ministries and offices, with the participation of union republican Councils of Ministers". There is no doubt, however, that discussion in the Committee for Constitutional Supervision significantly accelerated its appearance.

It made two important changes. Firstly it decreed (in a sharp break with the past) that propiska regulations should henceforth be in the public domain, and stipulated the publication of some thirty orders which had hitherto been secret. These included exile rules for prostitutes and clothes speculators who dealt with foreigners, participants of religious and other meetings and processions who violated public order, and persons whose conduct was undignified. Secondly, it granted released convicts the right in principle to return to their former place of residence, regardless of the offence they had committed. <89>

It remains to be seen if practice will fully accord with these precepts. A. Goncharov, Head of the Passport Section of the USSR MVD, in fact indicated in a newspaper interview that all difficulties had not really been removed. <90> The six-month forfeiture rule for vacant accommodation remained in force. Restitution of propiska was still accommodation-linked and possible only if all adult members of the family in shared dwellings agreed to accept the returnee. Persons formerly without living space could apply for help to urban soviets. But normally such an applicant could only move into accommodation which was not below local urban norms: and given the universality of waiting lists, this could rarely have been easy. (In rural areas there was no limitation regarding the amount of living space).

The decree did not cover the other problem commonly faced by released persons, namely the link between propiska and employment. Goncharov referred only to existing rules which empowered local soviets to oblige managers to employ ex-convicts, though such rules had been notoriously ineffective in the past. In cities with special regulations the local authorities

evidently retained the right to make their own arrangements for homeless returnees. Goncharov claimed that the new ruling, even as it stood, would remove difficulties for the majority of ex-convicts. That did not seem to be convincing: a TASS report of the 27th March, 1990 revealed that some half a million prisoners were released every year, of whom about a quarter had lost contact with relatives. In Moscow alone over the preceding four years sixty thousand such people had "been under passport restrictions". <91>

#### *Relaxation of Registration Rules in Moscow*

In February, 1988 TASS reported that the Moscow soviet had instructed the militia to authorize residence, in the homes of parents or family, of persons who had served one sentence for a serious crime. <92> This was a modest advance over previous stringencies. In a lengthy interview published in the youth journal *Yunost'* (April, 1989) V.V. Barkun, Deputy Head of the Moscow Main Administration for the Preservation of Public Order, provided an overall assessment of policy in the capital. He mentioned this change, but also declared that since 1974 urban registration rules had in fact become stricter. <93>

Barkun also said that the militia had made an application to the Council of Ministers to allow people to live in the capital for more than 45 days, on a temporary basis, without loss of registration rights elsewhere. This (as the *Yunost'* interviewer pointed out) might be liberal in intent, but actually doubled registration procedures. The Moscow authorities had been amongst those proposing the complete removal of restrictions on ex-convicts, and a loosening of limitations on residence in frontier zones. Goncharov mentioned a relaxation for demobbed servicemen, who under a decree of 11th January, 1990 acquired the right to registration in the capital if they lived there before. <94>

#### *Hostel Accommodation for Young Marrieds*

The problems of hostel accommodation for young married couples received much attention in the press. We have found no satisfactory statistics on this matter, but it would appear that in 1987 at least one million families were so housed. Most hostel-dwellers were mainly in the lower, marriageable age-groups, and it was said that about 11% got married annually. <95>

They faced particular problems, because the standard hostel regulations explicitly prohibited co-habitation of the sexes, and even restricted visits of married partners resident elsewhere. Also, residence by such couples meant the allocation of one room to only two people, and an unwelcome fall in occupation rates. The all-too-frequent fate of young couples was therefore loss of accommodation. In that case much of the family income (pending the eventual grant of a state-owned flat) would have to be spent on private lodgings.

A new hostel statute approved for the RSFSR on the 11th August 1988 at last formally allowed occupancy by families, and stipulated that they should be given their own rooms. Even so, hostel accommodation must have remained very unsatisfactory for married couples in the longer term. <96>

#### *Absence for Employment Purposes*

It was recognized that the residence rights of citizens whose work required long absences could be jeopardized by stringent observance of housing regulations. <97> Certain types of absence (for example, military service, illness, professional travel) could be protected on the basis of certificates issued through the local soviet. Yet it was the practice of "conservative" local authorities to insist on de-registration for persons who were not in a clearly defined category. Absent residents, and possibly dependents occupying their living space, could thus lose their propiska. Certain secondary rights - a place on a list for rehousing, the purchase of a car, use of medical facilities, - could disappear as well, especially if they also involved a minimum period of residence. Sailors, scientists, geologists, persons seconded to other jobs, and unofficially mobile individuals could thus, in certain circumstances, find themselves vulnerable.

A few noteworthy modifications were made in the spring of 1987. On the 3rd April a plenum of the USSR Supreme Court stipulated that even if a long absence necessitated de-registration, a right to living space (and registration) could in principle be retained. Local authorities were obliged to re-register returnees without hindrance, and with the retention of secondary rights. A decree of the 13th March, 1987 allowed professors and senior teachers in higher education to take jobs in distant educational establishments with retention of their basic accommodation for five years. <98>

It is perhaps in this context that one should note slight changes in the regulations for military and certain service personnel approved in 1985 and 1986. Under the terms of two decrees it became easier for long-serving and demobbed personnel to obtain provisional and short-term registration until permanent living space became available. Passport arrangements for sailors were also made a little more flexible. <99>

### *Internal Passports and Frontier Crossing*

The problems of travel abroad lie outside the scope of our study, though the very concept of freedom of such travel must interact, in the popular mind, with the irksome restrictions at home. <100> Relaxation of foreign travel has, however, marginally affected internal passport usage.

According to the statements published by KGB frontier officers in January, 1988, travel to frontier zones had already been facilitated for some officials; and the zones themselves were to be reduced in size. In 1986 agreements were reached with five countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Hungary) on simplifying border procedures. Such agreements involved the use of internal passports for frontier crossing; the issue of day passes; extending personal reasons for granting passes (including family celebrations, participation in international meetings, labor-days, etc.); increasing the number of border settlements covered and the number of crossing points. <101>

It was further reported in April, 1990, that an agreement had been reached with Iran giving Soviet citizens the right to obtain what was termed a "border passport" and an exit permit allowing them to spend up to two months with relatives in that country. Residents living no more than 45 kilometers from the border could visit the neighboring state four times a year. On the 6th May some 300,000 Romanians were said to have crossed into Moldavia over eight new crossing points. The current review of regulations on entry to and exit from the USSR may well bring further changes. <102>

### *The "Nationality" Entry in the Passport*

This is perhaps a suitable point at which to mention a possible change in passport entries. The surge of nationalism seems to have focused attention on the impossibility, under the

1974 rules, of changing the "nationality" entry once it has been made. This has been described as another unacceptable restriction of civil rights. Under the terms of the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation passports and other certificates would have no nationality entry. Non-census questionnaires, such as those completed when applying for jobs, would not include questions on nationality, party membership, residence in territories occupied during the Great Patriotic War, or other data unrelated to the individual's future activity, except as established by federal law (article 7.1.3). < 103 >

However, to judge from journalistic comment, an astonishing degree of bureaucracy would be involved in any change, since it would have to be considered not only by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, but also by the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Procuracy, and the union republican Councils of Ministers. < 104 >

#### *New Identity Cards for Rationing*

Many towns and districts of the USSR have long had restrictions on the purchase of deficit consumer goods, indeed, Soviet food shortages have been monitored in the west for several years. < 105 > The intensification of shortages in 1990 led to the introduction, in Leningrad, Moscow, Riga "and other cities", of identity cards for use in the shops. Popularly known as "visiting cards" they were issued to citizens over the age of fourteen. They bore a photograph of the holder and an official stamp, and were issued (like food vouchers earlier) by the local housing offices, on a propiska basis. The system raised its own problems, and will eventually warrant separate investigation. < 106 >

The new forms of control were the subject of much controversy in local soviets. In Leningrad, "after a long and heated debate" a joint session of the city and oblast deputies decided, on a majority vote, to introduce from the 10th January, 1990, the sale of certain goods by "visiting cards". The passport was to be used until the cards had been distributed. Restricted foods included meat and meat products, cheeses, butter, tobacco products and citrus fruit, and some 18 groups of industrial goods. Tourists from other areas would be allowed to purchase deficit goods in small quantities. In Moscow, passports had to be shown after the 28th May; more specific documentation, including visiting cards, ration cards, new vouchers [bony], and various compromises were debated. On the 14th June, 1990 the city

and oblast soviets together decreed the introduction of visiting cards from the 7th July, carrying a photograph and the inscription "Moscow", but with no personal address. Some 15 million had to be printed and distributed. <107>

The capitals will evidently serve as a model for many other towns, though we were told by an inhabitant of Saratov that rationing had not been possible there because even rationed supplies could not be ensured. Some fortnightly issues of the newspaper *Sovetskaya torgovlya* carried an on-going feature entitled "All Power to the Vouchers" with news items from various parts of the country. <108> An unpublished social survey conducted by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion in 1989 indicated, however, that despite all the difficulties, there was little public support for replacement of rationing by a free market with higher, realistic prices.

#### *Labor Books and Military Documentation*

The labor book and military registration documents lie outside our field of reference, but we need to note that little change has taken place with regard to them.

The new rules for labor books contained in the decree of the 6th September, 1973 retained the document with all its principle functions. It was still a kind of work passport, issued to workers and employees within five days of their first being hired, kept and up-dated by managements throughout the period of employment.

Some modification did, however, take place as a result of detailed instructions issued in June, 1984, August, 1985, and March, 1987. The main changes included: the removal of reference to solemn/triumphal issue of the labor book; removal of the need to enter national job-definition numbers (allowing more flexibility at the workplace); stricter rules to ensure accurate entries; better opportunities for employees to check new entries; somewhat greater protection for them in the event of bureaucratic error; and stricter provisions for safeguarding and issuing the book. Also of significance was the first introduction, under the terms of the March, 1988 Collective Farm Statute, of a Collective Farmer's Labor Book, following liberalization in that sector. The equivalence of work in the public and private sectors would seem to indicate that the same practices should be followed in cooperatives. <109>

The thrust therefore seems to have been towards administrative improvement, rather than relaxation. The labor book may sometimes be a liability (for persons whose career has been damaged by imprisonment, for example), yet it also has very positive functions - in calculating pensions, social security rights, etc. It has not, in any case, attracted nearly as much discussion as the passport and propiska.

The maintenance of an army of some five million, and long-term reservist obligations, presupposes substantial bureaucratic backing. The USSR Law on General Military Obligation of the 12th October, 1967 was virtually re-written under the terms of the Law of the 17th December, 1980, though for the majority of young men there was little substantive change. Many students in higher education did, however, lose the right to combine military training with their courses of study, and had to train before starting their studies. <110>

As a consequence of glasnost' there has been much public criticism of obligatory recruitment, and possibly in response to this a Law of the 10th April, 1989 reintroduced arrangements allowing students to proceed directly to their studies and combine the two, as previously, provided they were not expelled for other reasons. Draft arrangements have provoked massive opposition in many non-Russian republics, and further review of the call-up is possible in the RSFSR. In the autumn of 1990, however, the older rules were still on the statute-books. Developments in the Baltic states are considered in the next section. <111>

### *New Republican Legislation*

The movements for independence among the union, and certain autonomous, republics raised potent questions of passportisation and propiska. Independence is, after all, a matter of citizenship, territorial delineation, and residence. Minority peoples regard the existing Soviet instruments as distasteful limitations of political and economic freedom. However, these same instruments may be ideal for defining and protecting a new national entity. Up to the present the national movements have therefore appeared to promote well-tried Soviet administrative practices, though attuned to local needs. <112>

It has not been possible for us to elucidate the situation in all fourteen union republics and other areas that are striving for some degree of independence. Though important

information may occasionally be obtained from the republican presses, local debate and administrative practice are very difficult to follow. Here we shall record the main developments in the Baltic states (which also happen to be among the most advanced in this respect).

In the struggle for national identity the civil passport assumes immense practical and indeed emotional importance. In this context at least five policies are usually pursued. Attempts are made to define residence status on ethnic territory; limit the immigration of non-nationals; establish voting rights for nationals; redefine military obligations for young men, and (in the Caucasus and possibly elsewhere) encourage the departure of non-nationals.

Lithuania has arguably moved furthest along the path to independence from the Union. The Lithuanian authorities seem to have been the first to pass a formal law on citizenship; it was published on the 10th November, 1989 and made the Lithuanian passport the document which confirmed nationality. Permanent or previous residence became central (though not unique) conditions for acquiring citizenship (articles 1, 12-15). On the 5th April, 1990 a law was passed introducing an interim identity card until such time as "passports for citizens of the Republic of Lithuania will be prepared and Passport regulations will be affirmed".

<113> We learn from other sources that discussion in the republic also focused on the latinisation of passport documents, and the removal of the Russian patronymic.

A Passport Statute was in fact approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic on the 8th November, 1990, and was recognizably Soviet in character. It envisaged the obligatory acquisition of a civil passport at the age of sixteen, for life; the document was to contain not only the holder's names, date and place of birth, children, and signature, but also his place of residence.

On the other hand there were profound differences. The Statute was announced in advance (unlike any of the Soviet counterparts) and approved by the republican legislature. The passport blanks were to be printed in Lithuanian, English and French (ie., without Russian). The document was to be used to establish citizenship and identity; the Statute contained no separate section on propiska; there was no mention of conditions of residence, availability of living space, or local powers of refusal. Propiska therefore bore no regulatory character. The passport could also be "formulated" for travel abroad. <114>

The question of military service surfaced quickly, as young Lithuanians began to desert from the Soviet army, and the state offered them immunity when they returned home. The Provisional Fundamental Law (article 39) made [Lithuanian] national service an "honorable duty", and interim arrangements for call-up, based on place of residence, were made in the law of the 17th July, 1990. < 115 > Yet however sympathetically one observes the legislative development of Lithuania, it must be borne in mind that the future of many laws is uncertain. The same may be said, of course, of enactments in the neighboring republics.

Estonia has one of the most difficult devolutionary tasks, in so far as nearly half of the residents are immigrant Russians. By the autumn of 1990 no law on citizenship had been promulgated, but the leadership tried to move forward on other fronts. The law of the 17th November, 1989 on elections to the Estonian Supreme Soviet required voters to be citizens of Estonia and resident in Estonia, while candidates had to have lived in Estonia for at least ten years. However, no definition of Estonian, as opposed to Soviet, citizenship, was included. Voters had to be listed as such, and in contested cases the propiska stamp in the passport could serve as proof of voting rights. The nationalist cause was, however, somewhat diverse, and prompted a separate registration movement: by February, 1990 (we were told) 880,000 out of a possible total of 990,000 Estonian citizens had been registered as voters for a national congress. < 116 >

A draft law on immigration published on the 16th December, 1989 proposed the establishment of a Ministry of Migration and the introduction of three types of residence permit (*vid na zhitel'stvo*) - temporary, long-term and permanent, at a state tariff. < 117 > A proposal to introduce a separate Estonian currency (reported abroad) included the issue of special identity cards to prevent outsiders travelling to the republic to buy deficit goods. In general, residence provisions provoked a good deal of debate.

The objections to Soviet military service eventually resulted in a breakage of the link between registration for military service and propiska. Under the terms of a Law of the Estonian Republic passed on the 11th April, 1990 organizations and institutions lost the right to demand military documentation for purposes of propiska or the enjoyment of other civil rights. Alternative labor service was introduced and extended into the spring of 1991.

<118> We were told that details of young men due for enlistment were being withheld from the [Soviet controlled] military offices.

In Latvia there is has been less legislative movement, but a campaign conducted in Riga to establish new voting lists, resulted in 700,000 names and addresses being registered. Attention centered on a decree of the Latvian Council of Ministers of the 14th February, 1989 which sought to limit immigration, stipulated that enterprises were to make substantial payments (20,000 rubles) for each outside worker hired over the established "limit", and tightened propiska procedures. Some reports indicated, however, that it did not work very well. <119>

The establishment of the Baltic Council as a representative body for the three republics (12th May, 1990), the common problems of establishing national identity, disengaging from the Soviet armed forces, and distributing deficit goods must promote some uniformity of legislation. In any case, the first legal changes prompted by independence movements strongly suggest that whatever the outcome of Gorbachev's policies, some form of passportisation and registration of residence will be retained over the territory of what is now the Soviet Union.

## FOOTNOTES\*

<1> The earlier history of movement and residence control in Russia proved too bulky a topic for inclusion in this report. Origins are sometimes sought in Peter the Great's laws to ensure the fulfillment of military service obligations and taxation, though peasants' liberties had begun to disappear well before. In the middle of the 19th century regulations on movement and residence were assembled in a Statute on Passports and Runaways (1857) comprising no less than 741 articles. The system was mostly dismantled between 1894 and 1906; for their part, the Bolsheviks, after the passing of Civil War tensions, overtly proclaimed freedom of movement for Soviet citizens throughout the RSFSR. However, restrictions based on a voluntary identity card were reintroduced again in the mid-twenties. See *Svod zastavov o pasportakh i beglikh*, published in St. Petersburg, 1857; references in earlier Soviet encyclopedias, including *Entsiklopediya gosudarstva i prava*, P. Stuchok (ed), Vol III, Moscow, 1925-17, p. 250.

<2> For a translation of the text of the December, 1932 decree of the USSR Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, see M. Matthews, *Soviet Government, a Selection of Official Documents on Internal Policy*, J. Cape, 1974, pp.74-77.

<3> Passport entries: by "nationality" was meant recognized Soviet ethnic group; "social status" would have normally been understood as worker, employee, pensioner, student, dependant, etc.; the "other persons" were children under the age of sixteen.

<4> For an exhaustive account of these and other developments see Solomon M. Schwarz, *Labor in the Soviet Union*, Cresset Press, London, 1953. Estimates of earnings in the thirties (referred to in the previous paragraph) may be found in S. N. Prokopovicz, *Histoire Economique de l'URSS*, Chez Flammarion, Paris, 1952, p. 420; A. Rashin, *Sostav fabrichno-zavodskogo proletariata SSSR*, Moscow, 1930, p. 40.

<5> *Sbornik zakonov SSSR*, (hence SZ USSR) 1933, no. 28, article 168.

<6> *Ugolovny kodeks RSFSR*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 87, articles 195-196; *SZ SSSR* 1935, no. 41, article 343.

<7> *SZ SSSR* 1937 no. 70, article 328.

\* Titles of books, periodicals and articles are not italicised for technical reasons. We trust this is but a minor inconvenience.

<8> V. F. Korzan, *Pasportnaya sistema i organy vnutrennikh del*, Minsk, 1981, p. 7; *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR, Statisticheski sbornik*, (hence *Nar. khoz. SSSR*, with the relevant year) M. 1956, p. 17. *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopedia*, (1939 edition), Volume 42, p. 322.

<9> *Sobranie postanovlenii i rasporyazhenii pravitel'stva SSSR*, (hence *SP SSSR*) no. 24, 1940.

<10> *SP SSSR* 1941, no. 7, article 104; *Nar. khoz. SSSR*, M. 1956, p. 17.

<11> It was included in a volume entitled "*O soblyudenii obshchestvennogo poryadka i pravil blagoustroistva v g. Moskve*", M. 1958, p. 406.

<12> The key enactments were the Ukaz of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the 4th May, 1961, and the decree of the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court of the 12 September, 1961 (both in *Druzhinniku - sbornik zakonodatel'nykh i inykh materialov*, M. 1963, pp. 135-148); See also R. Conquest, *The Soviet Police System*, Bodley Head, London, 1968, p. 57.

<13> The first was covered by the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers dated 25th June, 1964 (no. 585), and referred to in two other unpublished texts which we have to hand, namely the decision of the Moscow City Ispolkom of the 10th February, 1975 (*Materialy Samizdata*, no. 4855) and the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of the 6th August, 1985, no. 736 (typewritten text available). The April 1972 statute is mentioned at the end of the Moscow City decision of February 1975. One may presume from the promulgation of these enactments that their aim was to tighten the rules. Otherwise, even if wide publicity was considered undesirable, they could have appeared at least in an official gazette.

<14> A similar period of grace had been granted by article 33 of the 1940 version of the statute for persons who infringed residence regulations a second time, who were unemployed or who had no regular place of residence. Bureaucratic practice dies hard. See the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers of 28th February, 1970, *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika*, no. 10, M. 1970, pp. 367-370; *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta, SSSR* No. 24, 1973, article 309. Also the sources already mentioned in footnote no. 13.

<15> *Pravda*, 25th December, 1974; *Sobranie postanovlenii pravitel'stva SSSR*, (hence *SPP SSSR*) no. 19, article 109, p. 388. A full translation, including the section on propiska rules and the unpublished clauses was made available, together with some commentary, by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the US Department of State, in the "Current Analyses" series, for limited official use, Report 319-CA, February 8, 1982, cyclostyled. See also M. Matthews, *Party, State and Citizen in the Soviet Union*, M. E. Sharpe, New York, 1989, Section 5. Somewhat ironically, the most detailed account of administrative procedures

to come to our notice was in a small handbook published in Latvia: Yu. I. Kovalev, *O sovetskom pasporte*, Riga, 1988.

<16> *Nar. khoz. SSSR* (1974), M. 1975, pp. 7, 38.

<17> Ukaz 8th September, 1982, *Vedomosti verkhovnogo soveta USSR*, 1982 no. 37, article 698; *Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov USSR*, 28th January, 1983, *Sobranie postanovlenii Soveta Ministrov SSSR*, 1983, no. 6, article 28.

<18> "On a Certain Aspect of Juridical Reality". It was submitted to the journal *Gosudarstvo i pravo*, but was not published. We made careful notes from the typescript.

<19> See *Osnovy grazhdanskogo zakonodatel'stva Soyuza SSR i Soyuznykh Respublik*, article 9, (*Sbornik zakonov SSSR v 2 tomakh*, Moscow, 1968, volume 2, p. 358) as promulgated on the 8th December, 1961.

<20> *SPP SSSR* 1959, no. 6, article 37.

<21> The labour book is normally deposited with an employer, and serves as a record of service. For background see Solomon Shwarz (op cit), and G. Sevost'yanov, *Trudovye knizhki rabochikh, sluzhashchikh i kolkhoznikov*, M. 1983, p. 8. Recent usage (1989) is reviewed in Z. S. Bogatyrenko, *Trud i zarabotnaya plata v SSSR, slovar'-spravochnik*, M. 1989, p 360. The main sources of information used here are listed in footnote 22, following.

<22> *Yuridicheski spravochnik dlya naseleniya*, A. V. Vishnyakova and others, (eds) M. 1988, p. 146; 391; *Kommentarii k zakonodatel'stvu o trude*, V. I. Terebilov and others, (eds) M. 1986, p.32; *Spravochnik profsoyuznogo rabotnika*, G. M. Sevost'yanov and others, (eds) M. 1987 492, 504, 211; V. S. Andreev, O. M. Medvedev, *Organizovanny nabor rabochikh*, M. 1988, p. 181; *Spravochnik rabotnika sberegatel'noi kassy*, P. V. Ryndin, (ed) M. 1984, pp. 12,52, 53, 59. *Sovetski zakon i grazhdanin, yuridicheski spravochnik*, B. M. Babii, (ed) Kiev, 1984, p. 426; *Spravochnik dlya postupayushchikh v srednie spetsial'nye zavedeniya SSSR*, M. 1988, V. G shipunov, (ed) p.451; *Spravochnik dlya postupayushchikh v vysshie uchebnye zavedeniya SSSR v 1985*, S. S. Gal'tsov, (ed) M. 1985, p.348; *Individual'naya trudovaya deyatelnost', sbornik normativnykh aktov*, P. I. Sedugin, (ed) M. 1989, p. 26; *Narodnoe obrazovanie v SSSR, sbornik dokumentov 1917-1973*, A. A. Abakumov and others, (eds) M. 1974, p. 120. Also notes from our Moscow visit, June, 1990.

<23> *Moskovskie novosti*, 13th March, 1988; *Radio Liberty Bulletin*, 14th March, 1988; AFP print-out No. FF012, 18th April 1988, "Tramps in the Soviet Union", by Anne Penketh (in German).

<24> See, for example, *Ekonomika i organizatsia promyshlennogo proizvodstva*, No. 2, 1987, p. 106; *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost'* No. 5, 1988, p. 5; our article in the *Sunday*

Times (colour supplement), 12th March, 1989. The reference to the International Association is in Sovetskaya kul'tura, 26th May, 1990.

<25> Ogonek, No. 8, February, 1987, p. 12; Izvestiya, 13th February, 1988; Ogonek, No. 8, 1987, p. 12; Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost', No. 4, 1987, p. 23; Moskovskie novosti, 13th March, 1988.

<26> Komsomol'skaya pravda, 7th February, 1989.

<27> Argumenty i Fakty, no. 10, (10-16 March) 1990. The figures (evidently for the USSR as a whole) rose from 53,600 in 1980 to an apparent peak of 76,800 in 1984 and then fell to 1,900 in 1988. A further fall was expected in 1989. The crime figures so far published in the national statistical handbooks contain no breakdown by passport and propiska offences.

<28> For a listing of the main provisions on eviction see M. Matthews, Patterns of Deprivation in the Soviet Union, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1989, p. 142, footnote 10.

<29> Source as in footnote 15 above. Of the ten clauses in this section the last six were designated "not for publication".

<30> Moskovskaya pravda, 18th March, 1988; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 15th June 1988, Sostialisticheskaya zakonnost', No. 5, 1988, p .7.

<31> Noted in Radio Liberty report No. PRS-0402 of 28th April, 1988; Nar. khoz. SSSR (1987), p. 349; Ogonek, No. 28, 1988. Moskovskaya pravda, 4th May 1988.

<32> Bakinski rabochi, 2nd March, 1988; Moskovskaya Pravda, 4th May, 1988.

<33> Argumenty i fakty, No. 22, 6th March, 1989; Sovetskaya kul'tura, 31st March 1987; Ogonek, No. 1987, p. 12.

<34> Sovetskaya kul'tura, 24th September 1987; Trud v SSSR, statisticheski sbornik, M. 1988, p.148; Ogonek, No 5, 1989, p. 4; Izvestiya, 13th February, 1988; Sovetskaya Estoniya 21st January, 1988; Sovetskaya Latviya, 18th February, 1989.

<34a> Narodnoe obrazovanie i kul'tura v SSSR, statisticheski sbornik, M. 1989, pp. 185, 236.

<35> For comment by V.V. Perevedentsev and B. Khorev see Moscow News, 18th May, 22nd August, 1988; Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, 3rd December, 1988; our own interviews in Moscow, January, 1989. Official data have indicated that significant numbers of specialists

are not working in appropriate posts, but the impact of residence restrictions as such was not revealed. See *Trud v SSSR, Statisticheskii sbornik*, M. 1988, pp. 121-123.

<36> *Nar. khoz. SSSR* (1988) p. 24

<37> Questionnaire data, line 2, box 25; line 7, boxes 39-46, hence [02, 25] etc.

<38> V.L. Bogdanov, V.P. Kondakov, *Order na kvartiru*, M., 1988, p. 162. *Narodnoe obrazovanie i kul'tura v SSSR*, M. 1989, p. 231: Moscow marriage and divorce figures may be found in *Moskva v tsifrakh*, 1988, M. 1988, p. 8.

<39> Our survey work may be described briefly as follows. Further details are available on request.

Two questionnaires were designed. The first, and longer one, was directed at people who had actually moved to an urban locality in the USSR after 1982; further control by social characteristics and place of residence was not possible. This questionnaire contained some 85 questions, seeking details of the move involved, registration procedures, the application of rules by local bureaucracies, difficulties and violations, time inputs, and common attitudes. Personal details judged most relevant to the topic were also requested, though preserving anonymity. Since this questionnaire involved revelation of infringements of the law, we decided that it was best applied to recent emigres and Soviet visitors to the West. It was completed by 66 respondents in the UK, USA and Israel between September, 1989 and February, 1990.

Although a great deal of useful information was collected, this questionnaire turned out to be somewhat expensive to administer. The second version (coded for manipulation in the same computer programme) was therefore limited to fifteen questions bearing on opinions and instances of illegal residence, again with some personal details and assured anonymity. Of these short questionnaires, 71 were completed by Soviet teachers and students the UK in the spring of 1990, and the remainder by 385 Soviet citizens in the USSR between June and August, 1990. The respondents in the last group comprised; 22 employees of a Moscow editorial office; 41 random respondents in other Moscow locations; 169 random passengers passing through Moscow's Paveletski Railway Station; 70 residents of Saratov; 34 residents of the village of Ust' Kurdyum (Saratov oblast'); and 50 residents of Kirov (Kirov oblast').

Clearly, the sampling was more random than we would have wished, and only in Saratov was an attempt made to match local social parameters. Communication problems in the USSR also limited the scope of the work. However, as the Russian saying goes, "Na bezryb'e i rak ryba"; and computer manipulation was used to sift out the responses of selected groups. (We were in fact offered access to a controlled all-union sample of some 3,000 respondents by a Soviet sociologist, but at relatively high rates of payment). We found no difficulty in getting help from Soviet citizens for our own modest efforts. The text of the

questionnaires was not subject to official perusal, and the interviewing (as far as we could ascertain) was done in a responsible manner.

Taking the sample as a whole, just under half (46.5%) were men; 10% were aged under 20, 23% 20-29, 47% 30-49, 10% 50-59, and 10% 60 or over. As for education, 6.9% had incomplete general schooling, 30.4% full general, or secondary special, education, 7.4% advanced manual training, and 55.3% - some form of higher education. Comparison with the national population is of doubtful value for our purposes; but if one were to compare the sample with the Soviet population of 16 years or over, the lowest age group was over-represented, and the highest under-represented (the corresponding national figures being about 6% and 14% respectively). Persons with higher education were grossly over-represented (the proportion in the adult population being only about 11%).

In terms of occupation, categorisation is more difficult. 7.5% of the total sample were unskilled manuals, 16.1 skilled manuals, 38.1% in jobs such as engineering, health, administration, research, teaching, etc., 10.7% were office or "cultural" workers, 8.6% - students, 5.1% - pensioners, and 2.2% - servicemen. As for earnings (including pensions), 12% received less than 100 roubles a month, 41% 100-200 roubles, 28% 201-300, and 16% over 300 roubles.

Against national occupation figures, therefore, the sample was heavily skewed in favour of highly skilled personnel (fitting the educational pattern just mentioned). The correspondence in terms of income was closer, the poorest group being somewhat under-represented, and the richest most over-represented. It may be, however, that these imbalances in the sample, compared to the population at large, made for more thoughtful responses.

As for residence patterns, about 91% of the respondents came from 112 towns listed as having 50,000 or more inhabitants. The main groups in the total sample resided as follows: Moscow - 17%, Leningrad - 3%; Saratov (town) - 13%, the village of Ust' Kurdyum - 7%; Kirov - 10%; 8 large towns represented by four or more respondents (Voronezh, Yaroslavl', Voroshilovgrad, Astrakhan, Lipetsk, Odessa, Minsk, Khar'kov) together provided 11%. Other towns provided no more than 1-3 respondents.

With regard to nationality, no less than 16.2% of the respondents did not enter any: of the remainder, 64.6% were Russian, 7.0% - Ukrainian, 2.3% - White Russian, 1.3% - Tartar, 1.3% - Azerbaidzhani, 1.1% - Armenian. Other nationalities were represented by one or two individuals only.

We did not know, when starting this work, that a small telephone poll had been done by journalists from the newspaper "Moskovskie novosti" in Moscow in the autumn of 1988: the results appeared in brief comment only. In May, 1990 a research institute in Sverdlovsk conducted its own local survey, but we were unaware of the preparations for it. Published results from both of these sources are adduced in the text.

<40> [08, 68] (See note # 37 above for explanation of this type of notation.)

<41> [08, 23; 08, 24]

<42> [08, 24; printout SVR.R3, "select if" response equals 1 or 2; "select if" response equals 4]

<43> [Printout as in footnote 42; figures derived from locational breakdowns, 03, 13-15; 03, 16-18]

<44> [08, 60-63]

<45> [08, 56-59]

<46> [08, 69]

<47> [08, 32-43]

<48> [08, 30]

<49> [08, 31]

<50> [08, 3; 27]

<51> [06, 45]

<52> [07, 28; 35-36]

<53> Literaturny Kirgizistan, No. 9, 1988, p. 107. Article 198 of the RSFSR Criminal Code reads as follows: "Malicious violation of the passport rules in localities where special rules have been introduced for residence and propiska, if the infringement involved residence without a passport or propiska, or if the person concerned had already been twice subject to administrative fines - is punished by deprivation of freedom for up to one year, or corrective labour for the same period, or a fine of up to fifty roubles." The information on Moscow was provided by a Soviet colleague.

<54> [05, 13-26]

<55> / See over.

<55> A telephone call was made from London on the 26th June, 1989 to militia station no. 70 (Neva district) in Leningrad; information on Moscow collected during our visit.

<56> Argumenty i fakty, no. 22, 1989. There are journalistic references to the numbers of people in hostels in Molodoi kommunist, no. 9, 1988, p. 68; See also Argumenty i fakty, no. 7, 1990, p. 3; this issue claimed that an RSFSR study of 167,000 families showed 8% of urban families and 2.3% of rural families to be living in hostels. Extrapolated to the RSFSR

as a whole, this would give a total of around two million families. According to an article in *Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva*, (No. 2, 1987, p. 106) one million families were living in hostels designed for single persons. Either there had been a sharp rise, or the statistics were inadequate.

<57> This tax - the kurortny sbor - is of local or republican status. Some recent Latvian regulations are given in Yu. I. Kovalev, *O Sovetskom pasporte*, Riga, 1988, pp. 84-90. Whereas the normal fee for propiska was 30 kopecks, the rate for recognised holiday centres was set at one rouble, to which was added a holiday tax of two roubles.

<58> Kovalev, op. cit. p. 137.

<59> Kovalev, op. cit. p. 132, (forms for Riga); also as available in Moscow in June, 1990.

<60> [04, 56-58]

<61> Details as personally observed in a number of housing offices in June, 1990; V. Baskov, *Sovetskaya kul'tura*, 28th October, 1989.

<62> Contents of the form noted in Moscow, militia station no. 17, on 10th January 1989; Ukaz of the USSR Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 29th June, 1972; Kovalev, op. cit., p. 84

<63> Kovalev, op. cit. p.48; forms as provided by a Soviet colleague (copies available on request).

<64> As displayed at Moscow militia station no. 17; Kovalev, op. cit. p. 54. A form at our disposal from the provinces shows some slight variation of content, without details about existing occupants.

<65> Kovalev p. 58. Under Soviet law persons are not in normal circumstances allowed to have more than one permanent dwelling, and space in most republics is limited to between 12 and 13.7 square metres per person. (V. N. Litovkin, *Zhilishchnoe zakonodatel'stvo, spravochnoe posobie*, M. 1988, pp. 39-40).

<66> [04, 49-54]

<67> *Nar. khoz. SSSR*, (1988), pp. 24, 256; *Nar. khoz. SSSR*, (1987), p. 343. We have no figures for the proportion of the 571,000 (1988) alimony settlements entered in passports because the fathers had defaulted on payment.

<68> *Nar. khoz. SSSR*, (1987), p. 346; G. V. Barabashev i drugie, (eds) *Kommentarii k zakonodatel'stvu o poselkovykh i sel'skikh sovetakh*, M. 1987, p. 470.

<69> The Military Balance, 1989-90, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1989. p.32. 2.7 million conscripts are estimated, excluding certain categories of special troops, mostly for two years of service.

<70> Nar, khoz. SSSR, (1988), pp. 253, 255; Radio Liberty Soviet Media News Budget no. 188 25, TASS report of 27th March, 1990. It is possible that local militia officers also impounded the passports of persons with suspended or non-custodial sentences, but the fact that the document is needed so often would necessarily limit this practice.

<71> Nar. khoz. SSSR, (1987), pp. 346, (population data); p. 683.

<72> The Soviet passport is numbered, but has no electronic reading strip. The need for computerisation has, however, been expressed (Chelovek i zakon, no. 3, June, 1990, p.22.

<73> The 1979 Census figures indicated that throughout the country some 16.3 million people had lived at their current place of abode less than two years, and had been born elsewhere. (Chislennost' i sostav naseleniya, M. 1985, p.360) This figure does not reveal the total number of passport-holding adults who moved and re-registered in one year: abode is defined only as "within or between republics", and we cannot know conclusively whether it included people who moved within the confines of a single town, village, or street.

<74> "Statisticheski press-byulleten'" no. 4, Goskomstat, Informatsionno-izdatel'ski tsentr, 1989, page 49, ff. This number (now available in the west) was also quoted by V. Perevedentsev in Rodina, No. 10, 1989, pp. 6-8. The housing data in Narodnoe khozyaistvo (1988, p. 161) on the other hand contain a category of persons (11.5 million) who "improved their living conditions" in 1987, of whom 8.0 million moved into new buildings.

<75> Nar. khoz. SSSR (1988), pp. 225, 238; Chelovek i zakon, no. 3, June, 1990, p. 19.

<76> Much of the unpublished material for this section was collected by myself or four Soviet colleagues. Although all of the information obtained was in the public domain, and legally accessible, the latter expressed a preference for anonymity.

<77> G. V. Barabashev and others, (eds) Kommentarii k zakonodatel'stvu of raionnykh sovetov narodnykh deputatov, M. 1985, p. 470: Kozlov, Yu. M., Sovetskoe administrativnoe pravo, M. 1985, p.454. Obshchesoyuznyi klassifikator - professii rabochikh, dolzhnosti sluzhashchikh i tarifnye razryady, 186016, Moscow, 1988, p. 157

<78> According to the information at our disposal, the Moscow ZhEK (Housing Use Offices) were reorganised into DEZ (Directorates for Building Use) as a consequence of order no. 112 of the 12th March, 1980 of the Main Administration for Moscow Housing (Glavmoszhilupravlenie). The DEZ were reorganised into REU on the basis of the Moscow Ispolkom decree no. 2263 of the 24th October, 1988.

<79> Occasional numbers of the series of booklets entitled: "Priglasheem na rabotu", Byulleten' vakantnykh dolzhnostei rukovoditelei, spetsialistov i sluzhashchikh ispolkoma Mosgorsoveta, glavnogo upravleniya po trudu i sotsial'nym voprosam Mosgorsipolkoma, Moskovskogo gorodskogo tsentra po trudoustroistvu, pereobucheniyu i proforientatsii naseleniya.

This was not easily found, and even the series in the Lenin Library was incomplete. The March, 1989 number of the comparable Kiev publication "Byulleten' '89 svobodnykh rabochikh mest i vakantnykh dolzhnostei na predpriyatiyakh, organizatsiyakh i uchrezhdeniyakh Kieva", (no. 3), (Upravlenie po trudu i sotsial'nym voprosam Kievskogo gorispolkoma, Kievskogo gorodskogo tsentra po trudoustroistvu, pereobucheniyu i proforientatsiya naseleniya) listed one vacancy for a passportistka, at only 75 roubles a month. The rate in Kirov was recently raised fro 80 to 100 roubles.

<80> Sotsial'noe razvitie SSSR, Statisticheski sbornik, M. 1990, p.92.

<81> Spisok abonentov LGTS, 1988, T. A. Ermakova and others, (eds), Leningrad, 1988.

<82> A similar calculation based on a few figures for Kirov gives a total of something over 20,000.

<83> Provided by a Soviet colleague in Leningrad, January, 1990. According to another source, (Moscow, July, 1990) the basic salary of the chief passport officer was 220 roubles, plus supplements for length of service and rank, which took the total up to about 300 roubles. Passport clerks (given as two per office) were said to get 170 roubles. The salary figures from the two sources could, in fact, easily fit for persons with several years of service.

<83a> See the journal "Sovetskaya militsiya". Most of the numbers for 1989, and nos 1-5, 9, 1990, were perused. The only note found on propiska was in no. 9, 1990, p. 5. With regard to morale, recruitment in 1989 was said to be 69,310 for ordinary and junior chief posts, but departures from the same categories totalled 45,757 over the same period. (No. 4, 1990, p. 52; Mark Galeotti, Police and Paramilitaries: Public Order Forces and Resources, Report on the USSR, June 8th, 1990, p. 6).

<84> Moskva 1989-90, Telefony i adresa organizatsii, uchrezhdenii, i predpriyatii, M., 1990, pp. 91-98

<85> The clauses concerned are: USSR Constitution, article 34, which grants equality of rights with regard to place of residence; article 9 of the USSR Fundamentals of Civil Law, which allows choice of place of residence in accordance with the law; the [international] Declaration of Human Rights, article 13; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 2, point 1; article 12, point 1). See also RL USSR Today, Soviet Media News and Features Digest, No. NF 354 4 of the 17th May, 1990; Moskovskie novosti, no. 35, 1988.

<86> Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 47, 1990, p. 1248, article 1004. See also Komsomol'skaya pravda, 14th September, 1990; TASS report, Radio Liberty Soviet Media News Budget, no. 617 01, 26th October 1990, cyclostyled. Gavril Popov, the non-communist chairman of the Moscow soviet, went on record saying that he categorically opposed propiska, but housing difficulties made some control in Moscow essential. (Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 8th July, 1990).

<87> Sovetskaya Rossiya, 24th November, 1990.

<88> Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 23, 1990, p. 589, article 435.

<89> Komsomol'skaya pravda, 14th September, 1990. Up to the moment of completing this report the text of the decree was not to hand, but the content seemed to be reliably expressed in this source.

<90> Argumenty i Fakty, no. 41, October, 1990, p. 7.

<91> Radio Liberty Media News Digest Budget, no. 188 25 of the 27th March, 1990.

<92> Radio Liberty Soviet reports, TASS in English, 10th February 1988;

<93> Yunost', no. 4, 1989, p.56. This would accord with our own general analysis.

<94> Temporary registration, evidently without regard to relatives or norms, had been granted (until they could be properly accommodated) by the decree of 18th March, 1985 (see SPP SSSR, no. 13, article 55, p. 234).

<95> See footnote 56 above; Chelovek i zakon, No. 2, 1989, p.58; Molodoi kommunist, No. 9, 1988, p. 68; Pravda, 29th September, 1986; Primernoie polozhenie ob obshchezhitiyakh, 30th March, 1967, SPP RSFSR, No. 5, article 39, p. 69, 1967.

<96> Primernoie polozhenie ob obshchezhitiyakh, (clause 11), SPP RSFSR, No. 17, article 95, 1988.

<97> The RSFSR Housing Code stipulated that state-owned living space was generally forfeited after a maximum absence of six months. See Zhilishchny kodeks RSFSR, 24th June, 1983, article 60; included in I. P. Prokopchenko, Zhilishchnoe i zhilishchno-stoitel'noe zakonodatel'stvo, spravochnoe posobie, M. 1986, p. 377

<98> V. N. Litovkin, op. cit. pp. 125-128. The decree referred to was issued jointly by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers.

<99> SPP SSSR, 1985, no. 13, article 55, 18th March 1985; 1986, no. 12, article 72, 26th Feb 1986. Sailors' passports became renewable for five, instead of three-year terms under the terms of the decree of the 12th November 1985 (Sobranie postanovlenii Soveta Ministrov SSSR, no. 34, article 161, page. 677, 1985).

<100> Izvestiya, 9th March, 1990; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 29th August, 1990.

<101> Izvestiya, 11th January, 1988.

<102> Radio Liberty Daily Report May 7, 1990, quoting Sel'skaya zhizn', 26th April 1990, and NCA/Paul Goble; Moskovskie novosti, 25th March 1990.

<103> Sovetskaya Rossiya 24th November, 1990.

<104> Argumenty i fakty, no. 45, 11-17 November, 1989.

<105> Rabochaya tribuna, 29th June, 1990; Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), cyclostyled, various issues. For the food supply situation during the period 1985-1988 see AR 3-89, August 1989; Argumenty i fakty, no. 40, 1990.

<106> Cases were reported of housing offices requiring residents to pay arrears on rent-books before issuing vouchers (Sovetskaya trgovlya, spetsvypusk no. 4 (18) March 1-15th, 1990); and of Muscovites offering shoppers from elsewhere the use of a passport (in the hope that the photograph would not be examined?) for 3-10 roubles (Komsoml'skaya pravda, 8th July, 1990). Issue, renewal and loss must also have presented problems.

<107> Moskovskaya pravda 17th January, 1st August, 1990; Izvestiya 26th August, 1990; Vechernii Leningrad, 9th January, 1990;

<108> Sovetskaya trgovlya, Zashchita prav potrebitelya, spetsvypuska nos. 3, 4 and 5, 1990. See also Komsomol'skaya pravda, 28th September, 1989 (Kaliningrad); Nedelya, no. 47, 1st January, 1989, on Chitinskaya oblast'; Nedelya no. 19, 1989, p. 6. The All-Union Centre report was given as a lecture, and a typescript was made available to us.

<109> Z. S. Bogatyrenko and others, (eds), Trud i zarabotnaya plata v SSSR, slovar'-spravochnik, M. 1989, pp. 359-362; V. I. Terebilov and others, (eds), Trudoustroistvo, priem, perevod i uvolnenie rabochikh i sluzhashchikh, sbornik normativnykh aktov, M. 1986, pp. 53-62. See also Instruktsii Goskomtruda SSSR i VTsSPS of the 20 June, 1984, 31th March 1987; M. Matthews, Party, State and Citizen in the Soviet Union, M. E. Sharpe, 1989, p. 249.

<110> For earlier references see Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 52, 1980, article 1121, p. 1119; provisions as of 1987 are summarized in A. Ya. Sukharev and others, (eds) Yuridicheski entsiklopedicheski slovar', M. 1987, p. 59;

<111> Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 15, article 108, page 184, 1989.

<112> In 1989 the union republics excluding the RSFSR contained about 140 million inhabitants, or 49% of the total population of the USSR. It is usually by no means easy to find out what legal changes take place in them. We made enquiries of most republican representatives in Moscow in June, 1990, but in most cases were told there was no change.

<113> Sovetskaya Litva, 10th November, 1989; "Republic of Lithuania, A Compilation of Documents, 1990", A Lithuanian Supreme Council publication, edited by Rimas Cuplinskas and Devardas Tuskenis, p. 57. (No further details printed in the volume).

<114> Ekho Litvy, 22nd November, 1990. See also the Provisional Fundamental Law of the Republic of Lithuania, Cuplinskas and Tuskenis, op. cit. p. 106. Article 13 stated that immigration to the republic was controlled by law, but the listing of rights contained no reference to freedom of choice of locality; possibly because this was taken for granted in a small state.

<115> Cuplinskas and Tuskenis, op. cit., p. 158.

<116> Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta Estonskoi SSR, no. 36, article 552, page 847, 1989, clauses 2 [1, 3], 15 [1, 2], 23 [1]; also comments by an editor at Radio Liberty. "The Independant" of the 9th August reported a Supreme Soviet decision to the effect that voters had to have two years' residence in the Republic.

<117> Sovetskaya Estonia 16th December, 1989; The Independant, 25th January, 1990; Kur'er 16th-31st August, 1989.

<118> Molodezh Estonii, 13th April, 1990.

<119> Sovetskaya Latvia, 18th February, 1989; Radio Liberty research report, 24th August, 1990, "Migration to and from Latvia", by Dzintra Bungs, cyclostyled.