TITLE: History, Politics and Memory: The Holocaust and Its Contemporary Consequences in the Former USSR

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Abstract

Although about one-third of all Jews killed in the holocaust were Soviet citizens as of 1940, we know less about the holocaust in the USSR than in most other countries. This is because for political and ideological reasons Soviet historians either ignored the murder of Soviet Jews or submerged it in the story of fascist occupation. In March 1990 a workshop brought together scholars of the holocaust who have worked on the USSR and they presented papers on several aspects of the subject. The project also uses a survey of Soviet immigrants to ascertain Soviet Jewish perceptions of the holocaust's consequences.

An important goal of the project is to ascertain whether and how the holocaust influences Jewish attitudes and behavior in the USSR today and what impact it has had on relations between Jews and other nationalities. Our researchers find that, especially in the Baltic, but also in Ukraine, local peoples terrorized and murdered Jews even before the Nazis arrived or after they invaded but before they began mass murders. This issue was suppressed in the Soviet Union until now and clearly colors Jews' views of their neighbors and their prospects in independent states emerging from the disintegrating USSR. During the period of glasnost, however, there was reason to believe that the issue of Jewish-Gentile relations during the war would be re-examined. However, as of this writing there has been little reassessment, and what there is has been largely a defense of the local peoples' behavior toward Jews. This reinforces Jewish fears that the successor states to the USSR might not be concerned with the protection of Jewish rights and will deny complicity in the holocaust. Thus, the holocaust and its treatment play a role in the post-1989 emigration of over 400,000 Soviet Jews.

A second contemporary consequence of the holocaust was the alienation of Soviet Jews from the regime and the rise in Jewish national consciousness due to the holocaust itself and official Soviet refusal to acknowledge it. The psychological, demographic
and political consequences of the holocaust explain much contemporary Jewish behavior and relations between Jews and other ex-Soviet nationalities. New opportunities for both research and freer expression in the former USSR have enabled foreign and local scholars to obtain vast amounts of information on the holocaust in the USSR but thus far the issue of collaboration has not been confronted. It may influence negatively Jewish and even Western attitudes to some of the successor states.

The project will culminate in the publication of an anthology on the holocaust in the USSR. It will consist of scholarly essays, including some presented at the 1990 workshop, and documents illustrating the points made by the essays.
The Holocaust in the USSR

Although nearly a third of all victims of the Holocaust were Soviet citizens, no comprehensive study of that aspect of the Holocaust exists. The term "holocaust" itself was largely unknown in the USSR until a few years ago. It is significant that Jews now call it "genotsid," "kholokaust" or "kholokast," while the latter two terms are generally completely unknown to non-Jews in the former Soviet Union. The very term had to be imported from outside. Small wonder that we know more about the Holocaust in Greece or Holland, which had far smaller Jewish communities, than we do about what happened in the USSR. Moreover, the Holocaust in the USSR has had important contemporary consequences which have also been either not remarked upon at all, or insufficiently analyzed. In part, this is due to the Soviet tendency to either ignore or downplay the Holocaust, as well as to the inaccessibility until recently of materials in the Soviet Union. Another reason the subject is not much discussed even in the newly independent states is that it raises awkward questions about the attitude of the local populations to their Jewish neighbors during the war and casts a shadow on local nationalisms, now so much in evidence.

Glasnost' opened slightly the pages of Soviet newspapers and journals to the subject. The holdings of Soviet archives and libraries were opened to some foreign specialists who are now microfilming much of the material for future analysis. At the same time, personal and collective memories of the Holocaust seem to have been influencing the behavior of large numbers of Soviet Jews who fear another outbreak of anti-Jewish violence and who are emigrating from their native countries in unprecedented numbers. To be sure, deteriorating economies, the presence of
family and friends abroad, and the perception that emigration could be halted are other spurs to the mass movement, but the heightened consciousness of the holocaust created by recent writings and public activities seems to be playing a role as well. Moreover, the holocaust is explicitly on the agenda of the changing relations between Jews and other, especially European, non-Russian nationalities. It remains an unsettled issue not only in the former USSR but for many Jews outside the successor states as well as for emigre communities of Baltic peoples, Ukrainians, and, to a lesser extent, Moldavians/Romanians.

This project was undertaken in order to bring together and make accessible to a wide audience the facts that together constitute the broad outlines of the holocaust in the USSR and to draw out the present day consequences of both the holocaust itself and its treatment for Soviet Jews and their relationships with other nationalities. To this end, I did research on Soviet historiography and on the perception of the holocaust and its treatment by Soviet Jews, as measured by interviews with recent emigres in the Detroit area. I also convened a workshop in London, England in March 1990 which brought together a small group of scholars from the United States, Germany, Israel and the Soviet Union. The aim of the workshop was to explore different aspects of the subject and see whether it is now possible to essay a comprehensive treatment of the subject. I have come to the conclusion that because so much new research is going on, and there is a realistic expectation that it will continue and even expand in the near future, it is too early to attempt a comprehensive treatment. At the same time, the vacuum that exists can be partially filled by some tentative treatments of aspects of the subject. The workshop did not, in my judgment, achieve that aim, though it provided some materials toward that end. In order to attain it, I have gathered other materials, articles and documents, which will be included in an anthology on the holocaust in the USSR. At this point, some stylistic editing, mainly of translated works, remains to be done. Three publishers, Macmillan (England), M.E. Sharpe, and Indiana University Press
have expressed interest in publishing the anthology. I plan to submit it to a publisher in April 1993.

The Consequences of the Holocaust in the USSR

There is considerable disagreement over the number of Soviet Jewish citizens murdered by the Nazis and their collaborators—estimates range from 820,000 to 2.1 million. This is but one manifestation of the status of the subject in Soviet research and writing and the inaccessibility of Soviet records until recently. Perhaps the most careful estimate is by Yitzhak Arad, recently retired director of the Yad Vashem Institute in Jerusalem. He concludes that about 2.75-2.9 million Jews came under German occupation and as many as 90 per cent or more were killed. About 120,000 Soviet Jews died in combat and 80,000 were killed as prisoners of war.¹ Whatever the correct figure, the long-term consequences of the murder of such a large number of people have been profound. They may be grouped under three interrelated rubrics: demographic, political and psychological.

The long-range demographic consequences of such a massive loss of life included those shared by the Soviet population as a whole—an abnormally high number of females, depressed fertility, large numbers of unmarried women, a "missing generation" or even two. But there are also some consequences unique to the Jews. For example, because the Jewish rural population was pretty much concentrated in a few locales in Ukraine, Belorussia and Crimea, it was an easy target for the Nazi death squads who swooped down on Jewish and partly Jewish collective farms and made short shrift of their inhabitants. Daniel Romanovsky's essay points out that Jewish peasants were especially reluctant to flee to the interior because they would be abandoning their livestock and land. In 1939 there were about 100,000 Jewish collective farmers, but by the end of the 1950s there were probably no more than 40,000, none of them in specifically Jewish farms.

Moreover, the surviving rural population and those who lived in small towns moved to the larger cities at a more rapid pace
than other nationalities. Jewish urban migration was motivated not only by the usual stimuli—desire for better cultural facilities and a higher standard of living—but also by fear of isolation as Jews in an environment that was generally perceived as far more hostile than it had been before the war. Just as surviving Polish Jews feared to return to their shtetlakh and huddled together for safety in the larger cities of southern and Western Poland, so, too, did Soviet Jews move to republic capitals and to Moscow and Leningrad.

A second demographic consequence of the war years was that considerable numbers of "Zapadniki," Jews who had been Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian and Romanian citizens before 1939-40, succeeded in leaving the Soviet Union, legally and otherwise, generally moving on to Palestine (Israel), Western Europe, Australia, South Africa and North America. This lowered the proportion of Yiddish and Hebrew speaking, less assimilated Jews in the Soviet population but also strengthened somewhat the familial and other ties between Soviet Jews and co-ethnics abroad.

There were three important political consequences of the holocaust. First, the illusion held by many Soviet Jews in the decade preceding the war that they were being not only acculturated but assimilated into the larger society was shattered by the ease with which they were identified as Jews by both the Nazis and local populations. Moreover, the "proletarian internationalism" in which many had sincerely believed melted away, as many Soviet citizens, including friends and neighbors of Jews, either remained indifferent to their fate or actively aided the killers. Many Jews seem to have concluded—often reluctantly and bitterly—that it was impossible to shuck off one's Jewish identity.

Second, grass roots and governmental antisemitism, both of which were assumed by many to have disappeared or shrunk into insignificance by the 1930s, made themselves quite manifest in the 1940s. Not only in occupied territory but also in the ranks of the Soviet military Jews were chagrined to find that they were
objects of derision and worse. The government's failure during the war to even once condemn explicitly Nazi murder of Jews paled in comparison to the "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign of the late 1940s, the destruction of the remnants of Jewish culture, and the "doctors plot" of 1953. Societal and governmental antisemitism in these years cooled the ardor which many Jews had for both the system and the country. The beginnings of mass Jewish alienation from both the Soviet system and Soviet society can be found in the war experience and how it was treated by officialdom and the population. Although about 200,000 Jews had been killed in combat, as prisoners of war or as partisans, it was comonly bruited about that "the Jews fought the war in Tashkent," i.e., they enjoyed a comfortable life in evacuation. This accusation seems to have hurt Soviet Jews deeply, for there is a great deal of interest on the part of the older and middle aged generations in demonstrating the heroism and combat records of Jews.

Finally, relations between Jews, on one hand, and Balts, Ukrainians and Moldavians, on the other, have been deeply influenced for half a century by the events of 1940-1945. "Rukh," the Ukrainian national movement, and "Sajudis," its Lithuanian counterpart, have addressed the issue of the behavior of members of their respective nationalities toward Jews during the war. They are aware that there is a perception widespread among Jews, both inside and outside the USSR, that large numbers of Ukrainians and Lithuanians killed Jews together with the Nazis or even on their own, and that many "punitive" groups working for the Nazis, as well as concentration camp guards, were of those nationalities. As some of the papers at our workshop made clear, spontaneous pogroms against Jews were carried out in Lithuania and elsewhere even before the Nazis took control. In turn, Baltic people, Ukrainians and others in lands occupied by the Red Army in 1939-1940 argue that many Jews greeted the Red Army enthusiastically and were all too happy to participate in ending the short lived independence which the Baltic republics had enjoyed.
In independent Ukraine and Lithuania, and to a lesser extent in other successor states, despite initial gestures by Rukh and Sajudis, the sensitive question of the attitude of local populations toward Jews during the war has not been fully confronted. On one hand, on the fiftieth anniversary of the massacre at Babi Yar (September 1991), the Ukrainian government mounted impressive public ceremonies and invited many foreign guests to the commemorations. The population of Kiev was exposed to photographs, books, public ceremonies and other events which brought to light a tragedy which, in the Soviet period, had been described as that of "peaceful Soviet citizens." Now it is portrayed as a largely Jewish tragedy. On the other hand, assiduous searching has failed to turn up scholarly or even popular articles or books on the holocaust in Ukraine, with only the one exception included in the forthcoming anthology. True, the press in Ukraine has discussed the topic, but in no great depth.

In Lithuania, the government summarily pardoned thousands of those convicted by the Soviets as war criminals. This unselective, wholesale pardon aroused great resentment among Jews in Lithuania and abroad. After widespread protests, the Lithuanian government agreed to establish a commission, composed of Lithuanian, Israeli and other foreign scholars, to review the case. The commission is apparently only now being activated, over two years after its formation was announced.

Soviet myths and dogmas of "friendship of the peoples" did not permit such issues to be ventilated, and so they festered for decades. They also condition relations between Jews and these nationalities outside the USSR. Through the 1980s one issue which agitated these communities was whether they could cooperate in the struggle for ethnic and religious rights in the Soviet Union, or whether their relations were forever poisoned by the events of the 1940s.

Today Jews inside and outside the former Soviet Union regard the emergent successor states with ambivalence. On one hand, they appreciate national assertion and can empathize with those who
claim that their cultures and religions were suppressed by Soviet and Russian dictatorship. On the other hand, they worry that if given their head these peoples and states might treat the Jewish minority even worse than it was under a strong, centralized Soviet regime, and they point to ample historical precedent. Several of the non-Russian national movements and government spokesmen have been at pains to renounce antisemitism, confront the behavior of some members of their groups during World War Two, and give moral and concrete support to Jewish groups trying to revive their culture and religion. Russian nationalism, on the other hand, is perceived today by many Jews as the main danger, since the more radical elements in the Russian national movement have returned to age-old antisemitic themes, blaming Jews for the ills of Russia and sometimes issuing barely veiled threats against them. In the complex relationships between Jews, Russians and other nationalities the legacy of the holocaust plays a significant role.

The psychological legacy of the holocaust includes a lingering distrust of the populations among whom Jews live; a feeling of insult and injury at the official Soviet suppression of the holocaust, a seminal event in modern Jewish history; and a feeling of vulnerability, especially in times of social, political and economic instability. I was very much struck by a conversation in 1990 with a young Lithuanian supporter of her country's independence. Reflecting on the diminishing presence of Jews in the capital, Vilnius, where before the war they were forty percent of the population, she remarked: "It is sad not to hear the sounds of Yiddish and Hebrew here anymore. All my Jewish friends are leaving. But I understand them. They don't trust us. They remember what we did to them in 1941, though we don't want to remember. The saddest thing is—they are probably right."

Despite repeated assurances in Ukraine, the Baltic and Moldavia that the rights of all nationalities will be scrupulously respected, at least part of the Jewish population—and not necessarily those who actually lived through the period of the
holocaust—remains wary of their neighbors, largely because it is common knowledge among Jews that some among an earlier generation of neighbors turned against them at a critical time, and that generation has not confronted its own behavior in the half century since.

The Soviet suppression of the holocaust had an effect opposite to that which was intended. Undoubtedly, one reason for glossing over it was to avoid arousing Jewish consciousness, which might lead to all kinds of undesirable conclusions. Instead, since almost every Jew learned about it in the family, as interviews with emigres in Detroit make clear, official silence on the matter raised the natural question, "why don't they talk about it?" Over three quarters of those interviewed in Detroit said that the Soviet treatment of the holocaust led them to conclude, or affirmed an earlier perception, that the regime was antisemitic. Since most European Soviet Jews were largely ignorant of their religion, culture and history already by the 1950s, and so had only an official Jewish identity with little positive content or consequences, taking away the one profoundly Jewish experience of which they had immediate knowledge and which all of them shared was an especially damaging psychic blow.

In 1989 and 1990 rumors spread in the USSR that there would be pogroms against Jews. These rumors were spread throughout the country and beyond it. Though there was no concrete evidence to support them, they were so widely bruited about and given such credibility that even Soviet newspapers found it necessary to try and dispel them. Without any civil rights or defense organizations, such as exist among Western Jews, with no effective political representation and having no faith in a constitutional-legal order that would protect against pogroms, Soviet Jews were more vulnerable than Jews in the West. But they were also closer to the holocaust and more apt to believe that it could happen again. What may be seen as hysteria or hypersensitivity in the West seemed to many Soviet Jews to be realism. This remains true in some of the successor states. In short, the holocaust is a
more immediate reality for Soviet Jews and current events are inescapably perceived in light of the events of 1941-45.

Recent Developments

Glasnost' and perestroika allowed greater discussion and exploration of hitherto forbidden subjects. One subject given greater public attention is the holocaust. This was manifested on two levels: popular and academic. On the popular level, beginning in about 1989, public commemorations of the holocaust, once actively discouraged by the police, became quite commonplace in both larger cities and small towns. In Leningrad (St. Petersburg), for example, attempts to meet in the Jewish cemetery and publicly mark the day established in Israel to commemorate the holocaust were frustrated by the officials as late as in 1987. In subsequent years the ceremonies were not interfered with and the number of participants grew rapidly. Similar meetings took place in Moscow, at Babi Yar in Kiev, Minsk and elsewhere, and many of the meetings were reported in the press.

These commemorations seem to have several purposes. They are designed primarily to honor the memory of people, many of whom were very close to those at the gatherings. They are also a public statement that history which had been repressed is being restored to its rightful place. In a larger sense these gatherings are a quasi-religious and communal experience around the one thing that all Soviet Jews shared, irrespective of age, sex, education, social status or politics, that is, their fate. To most Soviet Jews traditional prayer and ceremonial occasions were unknown. Even today, when there has been a tremendous growth in Jewish knowledge and observance, holocaust memorial gatherings are far more meaningful to most participants than traditional holidays or fast days.

The gatherings are occasions for expressing multiple solidarities. The participants express solidarity with each other as a beleagured people now as well as then. The gatherings also manifest solidarity across generations, despite the political and
cultural gaps which otherwise exist. Solidarity is also expressed across boundaries since participants are aware that the holocaust is an experience with which Jews in Israel and the West also identify.

New conditions have given rise to a sudden burgeoning of a Jewish press. In 1991 there were about forty Jewish newspapers and periodicals in the Baltic, Ukraine and Russia, though the number may have declined as a result of shortages in money and paper as well as the emigration of much of the readership. A sampling of this press reveals that nearly every issue has at least one article on the holocaust. Clearly, this subject is of great interest to readers in many cities and there is not one Jewish publication which ignores it.

Even the most "establishment" of the publications, the monthly Sovietish haimland, publishing from 1961 to 1991 (it has changed its name to Di idishe gass), which always carried materials relating to the holocaust for its small Yiddish reading audience, increased the amount of factual material published about the holocaust. It published descriptions of memorial meetings in several cities, as well as letters from readers asking that more information be made available and that the Black Book documenting the holocaust in the USSR, prepared for publication by Ilya Ehrenburg and Vassily Grossman in 1946, be published finally in a Soviet edition. Three issues (May-July 1990) carried the first extensive chronicle of what happened to Jews in the USSR in 1941-1945, including their role in combat. Seventy-seven double-columned pages were devoted to the articles, introduced as "but one of the first steps on the road to deeper and broader work in this field." An article by the late Shaul Borovoy on the annihilation of Odessa's Jews was published in July 1990. It was said to be the first work published in the USSR on the holocaust which was based completely on Soviet archival materials.

This kind of publication bridges the popular and the academic or scholarly. Similarly, the interviewing of holocaust survi-
vors is of interest both to general and to scholarly publics. In Odessa a group of professional historians and cultural activists is videotaping accounts by survivors of some of the camps of Transnistria. Amateur historians are making parallel efforts in other cities. In Moscow and St. Petersburg the Jewish cultural associations have sub-sections whose task it is to research the holocaust. In light of all the other tasks before a community which has had no communal life and organizations since at least 1948, it is highly significant that researching and understanding the holocaust should be given such prominence.

The holocaust has also been salient in the political arena. As the non-Russian republics moved toward sovereignty and independence, they were very careful to specify that all nationalities should enjoy equal rights and cultural opportunities within them. Mykhailo Horyn, chairman of the secretariat of the Ukrainian Rukh movement, rejected "All proponents of integral nationalism, all those who believe in the idea of 'Ukraine for Ukrainians'" and asserted that "We are forming ethnic communities which represent a spectrum of independent communities within an independent and democratic Ukraine. It is only such a Ukraine that we foresee, and only such a Ukraine that we want to build." 7

In the Baltic, however, some see the national movements as curtailing the rights and freedom of expression of the Slavic populations, in part through the new citizenship laws. Be that as it may, the Baltic movements and states have explicitly supported Jewish cultural expression. And yet, the shadow of the holocaust hangs over Baltic-Jewish relations, as expressed in the Yiddish newspaper published in Vilnius. "The greatest problem which all Jews in the diaspora face cannot go unmentioned. The declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic 'On the Genocide Against the Jews During the Hitlerite Occupation' was received with satisfaction and it should be a buffer against antisemitic manifestations. But...it pains us to see the callousness of officials who prevent the commemoration of the memory of the
victims of genocide. They avoid designating the sites of mass murder as places where Jews were sent to their eternal rest."8

The author went on to say quite pointedly that "In our republic people avoid speaking openly and writing about events in Lithuania in the years 1941-1944; people try to cut out this period of history as if there hadn't been mass slaughter of Jews, no ghettos, no self-sacrifice by noble people who saved Jews, as if there had not been a total extermination of a nation. So how, asks a Jew, is our period different from Stalin's or Brezhnev's? ...These thoughts and feelings have dominated the mass emigration."9 Thus, a direct connection is made between the holocaust of half a century ago and the mass emigration of Jews today. Clearly, the holocaust remains a political issue affecting relations between Jews and other nationalities.

**Developments in Research**

There are no professionally trained historians of the holocaust in the Soviet Union. However, there are professional historians whose training has been in other fields who are now taking an interest in the holocaust. One such historian is Professor G. Kumanev of the Institute of History in Moscow who participated in our London workshop. Since 1990 several groups have come to Israel each year for intensive training at Yad Vashem and the Hebrew University in how to research the holocaust. One of the pioneers of amateur research, Daniel Romanovsky, also participated in the London workshop. Others from the Soviet Union who were invited could not attend. More numerous are amateurs who collect testimony from survivors or do library and archival work.

An exciting development is the decision by Soviet and now Russian authorities to grant access to archives to researchers from both the United States Holocaust Memorial Commission and Yad Vashem, the main holocaust research center in Israel. Teams of researchers from both institutions have been working together in the former USSR for about three years and have concentrated on
microfilming materials in archives in several cities, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Odessa, Riga, Minsk and others. Since information is lacking especially on the pre-1939 Soviet territories, this is the area in which the researchers are concentrating. The films are being taken to Israel and the United States.

Another potentially rich source is the complete archive of Ilya Ehrenburg which was brought to Israel and is now at Yad Vashem. That archive, containing testimonies collected in the mid- and late 1940s, has been catalogued and examined by Israeli specialists. Information about the holocaust is also being disseminated more widely among Russian-language readers outside the USSR. In 1990, the head of Yad Vashem, Yitzhak Arad, himself a former Soviet partisan, published a paperback book in Russian titled *Kholokast*, a collection of essays on aspects of the holocaust in the USSR. A year later he edited a Russian-language documentary collection on the holocaust in the USSR.  

Workshop Report

In order to try and bring together some of the research on the holocaust in the USSR, I convened a workshop in London with the aid of the NCSEER grant and cooperation from the Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies of University College London (UCL). Among the commentators and observers were Professor John Armstrong (Wisconsin), who has done research on Ukraine in World War Two; Dr. David Bankier (Hebrew University) who specializes in Nazi propaganda and the holocaust; Professor Roman Szporluk (University of Michigan, now at Harvard) who has done research on ethnic relations in Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia; and two UCL students with interests in the holocaust.

Workshop participants were: Dr. Yitzhak Arad, Yad Vashem; Dr. Dov Levin, Yad Vashem; Dr. Shmuel Spector, Yad Vashem; Mr. Michael MacQueen, Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Department of Justice; Dr. Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Germany; Professor Zvi Gitelman, University of Michigan; Mr. Daniel Romanovsky, Yad Vashem; and Professor G.A Kumaniev, Institute of the History of
the USSR, Soviet Academy of Sciences, Moscow. It was logistically very difficult to secure the participation of Professor Kumanev, but since this was the first time that a Soviet scholar had participated in a conference on the holocaust, we felt that our efforts were worthwhile.

In compliance with the NCSEER contract, which calls for a "conference report," what follows are Executive Summaries of the workshop papers. I have added a few remarks drawn from the workshop discussion as well as my own evaluation of each paper in regard to suitability for publication in its present form.

Yitzhak Arad, "The Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR"

This paper addresses two questions: what are the potential sources of knowledge of the holocaust to be found in Soviet archives, and what was the scope of the holocaust on Soviet territory. We know of Soviet archival holdings with a great deal of material on the holocaust but only now are these being made available to foreign and even Soviet historians. The greatest dearth of information pertains to what happened within the pre-1939 Soviet borders. There has been very little published on the lives of the 70 million Soviet citizens under occupation, and even less on the Jews. [Professor Armstrong noted that in 1956-58 he had read 70 Soviet dissertations on the occupation, and in none were Jews ever mentioned at all]. Soviet archives now "targeted for research" are: 1) documentation by Soviet special commissions to investigate Nazi German war crimes; 2) records of war crimes trials held in the USSR; 3) captured Nazi documents; 4) testimonies of survivors.

The paper describes the organization and activities of the Einsatzgruppen and the three periods of "extermination activities." Einsatzgruppe A, operating in the Baltic, killed more Jews in less time than any other group. This is explained in part by the fact that "the degree of collaboration in the Baltic states was much greater than in Byelorussia or even the Ukraine. In the
Baltic states, most of the Jews were killed by local police and other volunteer units, some of them under German command." [This explains why today the issue of war criminals and local collaboration with the Nazis is so sensitive and why it colors Jewish-Baltic relations in and outside those states--ZG]. It is difficult to estimate the number of Nazi victims. Probably 10-12 percent of the over two million Jews in the annexed territories succeeded in escaping the invaders, while another 2-3 percent had been deported to the Soviet interior in 1939-41. About 2.75-2.9 million Jews remained under German occupation, and about half succeeded in fleeing. Another 20-30,000 survived as partisans or in hiding, but 120,000 Jews died in the armed forces and another 80,000 Jewish prisoners of war were killed. Most Jews were killed by the end of 1942. After June 1943 all ghettos were liquidated, except in Romanian-occupied Transnistria. Some 80,000 non-Soviet Jews from Central Europe were deported to and killed in the Soviet Union.

Contrary to the general impression, "The German army [as opposed to special killing squads] was directly involved in the murder of Jews in the occupied Soviet Union to a greater extent than in any other country...."

The attitude of local populations toward the killings was mostly one of indifference. That objectively assisted the Germans since in order to survive Jews would have needed the food, shelter and false papers that the population would have had to provide. The number of active collaborators was smaller than of the indifferent but larger than that of active rescuers of Jews. The paper suggests reasons for this and also points out that the Soviet government and Party never called for assistance to Jews, perhaps because all civilians in occupied areas, including Jews, were seen "almost as traitors."

Evaluation: This is a sound, comprehensive paper that has been fleshed out since the workshop and can serve as one of two introductory chapters in the anthology, the other being my overview of Soviet Jewish history before the holocaust. There are
some obvious implications here for the contemporary period and I will draw them out in an introduction to the paper. Arad is a former Soviet partisan, recently retired head of Yad Vashem, author of a fine study of the Vilna ghetto, and has worked in Soviet archives. For these reasons it is important to have him as an author.


The subject has hardly been touched upon in the Soviet Union for several reasons. The occupied territories had multiethnic populations and the Fascist genocide was directed against many peoples. Secondly, until very recently, any author focussing on Jews "could easily have been accused of some kind of nationalism or Zionism." However, the time has come to fill in the blank spots in Soviet historiography.

Basing himself on published documents and some archival materials, Kumanev attempts an overview of the subject. He describes Nazi policies and their implementation; the ghettos in Ukraine, especially Lvov; the mass murder at Babi Yar (Kiev); and similar actions in the Baltic and Belorussia. The fate of Jewish POWs has been unjustly neglected. One Wehrmacht report says that "It was a completely natural thing for every officer and soldier of the Wehrmacht that they shot every Jew [who was captured]."

The Soviets have never tried to establish the number of Jews murdered. There are many untapped resources in the USSR that could yield considerable information. There is a project called "Pamyat'" (Memory) which aims to list the names of all Soviet citizens who died in the war. This work will probably fill over 400 volumes.

Evaluation: This essay is somewhat superficial, going over what is familiar ground for Western readers, but acknowledging the shortcomings of Soviet scholarship and trying to explain them. Some of them are inadvertently brought out in the paper which is written, still, in the style of the "period of stagnation."
Kumanov seems to imply that the most important task is to fix the exact number and names of the victims. Nothing is said about collaboration and its consequences, about attitudes of Soviet citizens, or about evacuation policy. These omissions speak for themselves. In my judgment the paper should stand as is because it accurately reflects the problematics of Soviet attitudes and scholarship, while also acknowledging them.

The paper was written in Russian and I have supervised and edited the translation by Diahanna Lynch.

Shmuel Spector, "The Holocaust of Ukrainian Jews"

The holocaust in Ukraine was marked by considerable Ukrainian participation. There were only 1,400 men in the two Einsatzgruppen sent to Ukraine, so auxiliary Ukrainian units and Wehrmacht troops were used to kill Jews there. "In many places, Ukrainians themselves organized anti-Jewish pogroms in which many thousands of Jews were brutally murdered and their property stolen. The Germans welcomed the pogroms as 'laudable activities against the Jews, that the Ukrainian population understood within the first hours after the Bolshevik retreat.'"

The Nazis, and Hitler especially, identified Jews with Bolshevism and therefore the Wehrmacht was reminded that one aim of the war was to eliminate the "Jewish-Bolshevist intelligentsia," then expanded to include all Jewish state employees, which, in Soviet conditions, meant just about all Jews. The mass murder of Soviet Jews "was the first stage in the 'Final Solution.'"

The Germans complained of a "problem," namely, that the German army relied on local skilled labor and Jews were very prominent as craftsmen and skilled workers and their murder hindered the German war effort.

There were Ukrainian pogroms against Jews, the biggest in Lvov where thousands were murdered. These were encouraged by the Germans who also reported receiving "basketfuls" of denunciations of Jews by local inhabitants in Kiev and elsewhere. German
policy was differentiated. In West Ukraine, where ghettos were established, Jews stayed alive longer (until 1942/43) than in the east. Judenraten (Jewish councils) were set up and were responsible for the conduct of the Jews as well as for registering them for work, collecting taxes and requisitioning goods. Only about five per cent of the Jews in West Ukraine managed to flee. From the central and eastern areas of Ukraine some two-thirds of the Jewish population was rescued by flight or Soviet evacuation. All told, about 1.5 million Jews were killed in the enlarged Ukraine (including Bessarabia, Bukovina, East Galicia). About a million Ukrainian Jews were saved by flight or evacuation.

Evaluation: The paper is clear and well constructed but it is only an outline of a very complex subject. More needs to be written about regional differences, Ukrainian-German relations and their implications for Jews, and, of course, Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Recently, several books on Ukrainian-Jewish relations have been published and these need to be considered. I have added an article by M.I. Koval who treats the subject from a post-Soviet Ukrainian point of view, and it is summarized below. I have also included articles and documents, from both Ukrainian and Jewish points of view, about Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the war. The different views of the complex case of Archbishop Sheptitskii illustrate the complexity and sensitivity of the issues and why the subject is being handled in very gingerly fashion by Jews and Ukrainians in independent Ukraine. There is no doubt that the issue will influence Jewish-Ukrainian relations and mutual perceptions for many years to come. How it is resolved will say much about the place of Jews in Ukraine's future and how they will perceive it. It may also tell us something about Ukraine's policy toward her national minorities, since there are contentious historical issues in Polish-Ukrainian and Russian-Ukrainian relations as well.

The Soviet regime prevented research into and discussion of the holocaust in Ukraine. Now it is possible to open this tragic page of history. Only an insignificant minority of Ukrainians assisted in the murder of Jews. Most were "neutral," but many assisted the Jews. The attitude of the OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists- Ukrainian Insurgent Army) toward the holocaust is a complex issue and needs to be explored. Ukrainians have been unfairly criticized for not saving more Jews.

Ukrainian and Soviet historians were hostage to "officially imposed false conceptions and ideological stereotypes and were unable to pay attention to one of the most 'delicate' topics in the historiography of World War Two." Now, however, Ukrainian historians can free themselves from the "swamp of dogmatism" and study the genocide of Ukraine's Jews. All Ukrainians experienced the terrors of the occupation, though Slavs were killed mainly on political grounds whereas Jews were killed simply because they were Jews.

The Nazi propaganda machine was enormous and constantly preached antisemitism. This was reinforced by "intimidation" of the Ukrainian population. "In several cases Nazi casuistry attained its goal. The residents of Stanislav, Ternopol and some other towns were instigated to pogroms." But the involvement of Ukrainian police in pogroms and executions "should not be identified with the attitude of the Ukrainian population as a whole. The police constituted no more than one per cent of the local population and it was despised and criticized by the people." Ukrainians were appalled by the murder of Jews, partly because they feared it foreshadowed their own fate. "In general, the attitude of the Ukrainians toward the holocaust seems to have been the following: the insignificant minority supported anti-Jewish actions, the overwhelming majority took a neutral stand. At the same time, many people managed to overcome prejudices and
propaganda pressures opposing pogromists and torturers, helping the victims." "Hundreds" of Ukrainians helped Jews, but the Communist underground does not appear to have done so, probably because it had orders "from above" not to assist Jews. By contrast, the Uniate church, led by Archbishop Andrej Sheptitskii, defended the Jews. In Lviv, 2,000 Jews were saved by the local population. Peasants and partisans saved Jews, and Jewish partisan units were formed. "But as a whole this subject needs a thorough investigation."

The attitude of the OUN-UPA to Jews, a "difficult question," can now be explored "with due objectivity." While "in its first years" the OUN supported "the Nazi program for the Jews," under the influence of the atrocities and guided by Sheptitskii, it recognized "the right of minorities, including the Jews, to live in Ukraine." This came in 1943. "Unfortunately, by this time there were no Jews left in Western Ukraine."

The "Ukrainian resistance" [groups unspecified] made assistance to Jews part of its daily activity. It is not fair to compare the larger number of West Europeans who assisted Jews with the Ukrainians because the latter experienced much greater terror. "Conceding that...this movement [to assist Jews] was not as widespread as we would have liked it to have been, it ought to be noted that Ukrainians themselves were subject to Nazi terror." After the war, Soviet authorities, including Beria and Khrushchev, were indifferent to the fate of the surviving Jews.

Jews and Ukrainians have lived together for centuries, and their relations have had "their ups and downs." But even during the war they preserved their relations.

Evaluation: This is the only article I could find in a post-Soviet scholarly publication on the subject of the holocaust in the USSR. It focuses on the issue of Ukrainian-Jewish relations, but blames German propaganda and Soviet policy for anti-Jewish actions on the part of the local population or for their failure to rescue more Jews. It defends the OUN-UPA by referring to a very late and not very explicit seeming change of policy. Koval
writes of Lviv residents saving 2,000 Jews but does not mention the "Petliura Days," July 25-27, 1941, in which, according to Jewish sources, over 2,000 Jewish residents of Lviv were killed by Ukrainian nationalists, encouraged by the Germans. Thus, the article is not a comprehensive and objective treatment of the issue, and its evidentiary base is weak. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy for raising the subject and calling for further investigation, as well as for the fact that it is such a rare treatment of the issue in post-Soviet literature. The paper was translated from Ukrainian by Leonid Livak and edited by me.

Dov Levin, "The Holocaust in the Baltic States"

The rapidity of German occupation determined Jews' chances for survival in the Baltic states. In Lithuania, occupied within three to four days, only six per cent of the Jewish population survived, whereas 60 per cent survived in Estonia where the occupation took over two months. What made the situation in the Baltic particularly tragic was that "A large number of Jews...particularly those residing in small towns, were murdered by former neighbors, classmates, customers and the like. Moreover, many of these incidents occurred before the German army entered...." The great majority of Baltic Jews were killed within the first six months of the occupation. Jews were shipped to Baltic ghettos and concentration camps from other countries.

Three obstacles to Jewish partisan activity were that so many had been killed so early in the occupation; the hostility of the local population; partisan units were Communist-dominated and controlled from Moscow, and this put off many Jews.

At the end of the war, the Jewish population of the Baltics was only five per cent of what it had been, and many of the survivors had migrated from other areas of the USSR.

Evaluation: This is quite sketchy. Dov Levin has written extensively on this subject, mostly in Hebrew. I have located a better article by Levin on the subject and will substitute it for the
present one in the published anthology. It also has the advantage of dealing with the consequences of the events in wartime for contemporary Jewish–Lithuanian relations. The article is "On the Relations between the Baltic Peoples and Their Jewish Neighbors Before, During and After World War II," in Remembering for the Future, Theme I (Pergamon, 1988) [This is a pre-print of papers presented at a conference held at Oxford University, July 1988]


Michael MacQueen, "Nazi Policy Toward the Jews in the Reichskommissariat Ostland, June–December 1941: From White Terror to Holocaust in Lithuania"

The thesis of this paper is summed up as follows: "The Holocaust in Lithuania was as much the product of pressures from below (i.e., low level SS and SD commanders, commanders of collaborationist units, local vigilante squads, persons of responsibility in the Nazi and indigenous civil administrations) as it was of the decrees issuing from the Nazi hierarchy; further, it was the development of these forces in and in conjunction with the specific ethno-political context of Lithuania that made possible the full development of the Holocaust."
In the first three months of the Nazi occupation there was more of a "white terror" (anti-Jewish riots) than a planned and systematic extermination campaign. Only when the Germans recognized "the destructiveness of their Baltic collaborators" did they shift to systematic extermination since they saw that local attitudes and behavior made this feasible.

Contrary to popular perceptions, Jews did not benefit from the Soviet occupation of 1940. Nevertheless, they were held responsible for it and 5,000 Jews were killed, mostly in Kaunas, before the Nazis even came in.

Before 1941 Jews were blamed for the Soviet takeover in 1940, though they "had nothing to do with it." Jews made up about 20 per cent of those deported from Lithuania by the Soviets. Yet, when the Germans invaded, "the Jews were singled out for the wrath of the conqueror and collaborator." From June 22 until mid-August 1941 there were random pogroms against the Jews and highly selective killings by the Germans. Lithuanians and Baltic Germans who had fled to Germany when the Soviets invaded Lithuania returned with the German invaders and spearheaded pogroms against the Jews, about 5,000 of whom were killed. When German military administration was consolidated, the pogroms came to a halt. It may be that the Germans feared anarchy or that the Lithuanians' actions were "too gruesome for the German military commandant to tolerate." The German SS may have trained a cadre of Lithuanians to spearhead the pogroms.

A third stage was inaugurated in August 1941, that of systematic murder of Jews. By the end of the year, over 130,000 Jews had been killed. Close analysis of the Einsatzgruppen leads to the conclusion that this "'achievement' has to [be] considered largely as a 'triumph' of managing the Lithuanian auxiliary forces (some 8,000 by end 1941), without whom this deadly work would not have been remotely possible." Lithuanian collaborators were later used for similar purposes in Belorussia and in the Polish death camp, Maidanek. It may be that the experience of seeing so many Jews killed so brutally and quickly by local
elements contributed to the decision adopted at Wannsee in January 1942 to launch the "final solution"—to annihilate totally the Jews of Europe.

Evaluation: This is a very important, even shocking, paper. It is well documented, with a clear and striking thesis, and well presented. If the thesis is correct, it explains much of contemporary Jewish-Baltic relations and the current mass emigration in the context of Lithuanian independence. Since 1990, the Jewish population of Lithuania has declined by half (from 12,000 to about 6,000; it was 150,000 before the war, excluding Vilnius oblast').

Mr. MacQueen has uncovered much new material in the course of his professional work which has taken him to Lithuanian archives several times. He is revising his paper for publication and hopes to obtain clearance to include some of the material which he has discovered since the workshop. He should deliver a revised version by April 1993.

Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, "Inventing the Holocaust for Latvia: New Research Directions"

The paper mainly sets an extensive research agenda for better understanding of Nazi policies and their consequences in the Baltic, especially in Latvia. Wilhelm reviews a good deal of the German literature, especially on the occupation in Latvia, and points out untapped sources of information, such as soldiers' letters, and records of the intelligence agencies of neutral and German-allied states. How much was known by people in Ukraine about events in the Baltic and vice versa? What were the attitudes and motivations of Latvians who served in the German administration?

In Latvia Jews were killed sporadically and under pseudo-legal pretexts as soon as the German occupation began, in large part by Latvians. In small, isolated towns whole populations were wiped out, but in larger cities Latvians and Germans proceeded with some caution. Germans did not protest Latvian massacres of
Jews until August 1941, and then their protests were ineffective until German control was fully established. Then there was an escalation to mass murder, but there was no "grand design" implemented as originally planned. As a result of their experience in World War One, the Germans concluded that the value placed on life in Eastern Europe was much less than in Western Europe and therefore local populations would react accordingly to mass killings of Jews and others.

Latvian collaborators, unlike some in Austria and Poland, were not motivated by a desire to improve the local economy, but by conventional antisemitism. The role of some Jews in the Soviet administration of 1940-41 "gave them only an alibi for their pogroms. They cried revenge, but meant the property of the Jews...." The Arajs Commandos, Latvian killers of Jews, were not troubled by Nazi racial doctrines and forced sexual relations upon Jewish women until the Nazis stopped the practice. Latvian churches were silent or "neutral."

There may have been a Nazi fifth column planted in Latvia before the war which may have spurred Latvian actions against Jews, many of which were considered excessive by the Germans. Evaluation: This essay had to be extensively edited and now provides a good survey of the German-language literature and poses many important questions for further research. It complements MacQueen's essay nicely and implicitly raises the question of how deeply contemporary Latvian-Jewish relations are affected by the wartime experience. A colleague of MacQueen's, Dr. Richard Waite, helped Wilhelm rewrite the essay and has made it suitable for publication.

Daniel Romanovsky, "Soviet Jews under the Nazi Occupation (Based on Data on North-Eastern Byelorussia and Northern Russia)"

On the basis of 120 oral interviews conducted by the author in East Belorussia in 1984-1987, half of them with non-Jewish witnesses, he explores the reasons more Jews did not flee. There was a lack of transportation, they were unfamiliar with the
countryside, Soviet law prohibited leaving one's workplace, there were strong moral and social pressures to stay and help produce for the front. Local officials were also afraid to urge evacuation lest they be charged with "lack of faith in the Red Army." Subjective factors impeding evacuation included ignorance of the true state of military affairs, images of the Germans as fair and cultured, and an attachment to modest possessions which people had acquired only at the end of the 1930s when the standard of living had risen somewhat. Some believed that Soviet fortifications were sufficient to repel the invaders. Once the invasion came, Soviet evacuation policy did not include Jews in the categories of people identified as being in the greatest danger.

German propaganda described the war as "liberation from Bolshevism," portrayed as a Jewish plot. Jews were associated, in the eyes of many, with the party, NKVD, and collectivization. But the main reason people did not help Jews was fear of punishment. Still, Russians and Belorussians who would not help Jews would help escaped POWs since they were "our boys" and Jews were not. Moreover, the experience of fighting the Whites, "kulaks," and "enemies of the people" inured Soviet citizens to the idea of fellow citizens being killed. "In the Russian popular mind the notion of intrinsic value of human life was absent. For an average Russian, there was nothing extraordinary about the act of murder." As a woman put it who saw especially cruel executions of Jews in Sebezhe, "How were the Jews shot? Well, what's there to tell. They were shot and that's all."

The paper describes in vivid detail the ghettos, murders of entire town populations, and how Jewish goods were taken over by others. Jews in ghettos felt the world had turned against them. This so demoralized them that few attempted to flee. Jews were placed in ghettos in this region not so much to use them for forced labor but to facilitate their mass murder. This was usually done in two stages. First, the young and strong were killed, and then the elderly, children and women, already demoralized, would be shot. Jewish passivity was reinforced by the
absence of a partisan movement in 1941-42; lack of support from the population; reluctance to flee and leave families behind; and, Romanovsky asserts, the fact that historic persecutions had accustomed Jews "to the thought of violent death....The Jews of the Soviet Union were ill-served by their traditional attitude toward death."

Looting of Jewish property began even before Jews were killed. To this day there remains a strong—and fantastic—impression among the local population regarding huge quantities of gold taken from the Jews. "The Jewish gold continues to disturb the minds of some inhabitants of Eastern Belorussia even to this day."

**Evaluation:** This is an example of the amateur history being done now in the former USSR and provides a good complement to the "official" writing of Kumanov. The paper is firmly anchored in the Soviet realities of the 1930s and 1940s and recreates the atmosphere of the period, touching also on the lasting imprint the holocaust made on Jews and non-Jews who lived through it. The portrayals are vivid and reflect a view from the grass roots not found in most of the other papers. This is an unusual and needed perspective. Some heavy editing was required and was done by John Squier and myself.

**Mordechai Altshuler, "The Impact of the Holocaust on Jewish National Consciousness in the USSR.**

Data from three unpublished research projects among Soviet emigres indicate that the holocaust played a more decisive role in raising Jewish consciousness and identity than did the establishment of the State of Israel, the Six Day War of 1967 or the Yom Kippur war (1973). This is true also for those who were born after 1945. Knowledge of the holocaust was acquired mainly within the family and it was personalized. Immediately after the war, some Soviet literature and music dealt with the holocaust but the theme was abandoned by 1950, to the consternation of many Jews.
Recent novels and other works dealing with the holocaust are read eagerly by Soviet Jews and well known among them.

**Evaluation:** Thus far, I have only an outline of the essay. Its thesis fits very well with the findings from my study in Detroit. I anticipate a well documented and valuable contribution to our understanding of the contemporary and behavioral relevance of the holocaust. However, I have been waiting for the essay for several years. I saw the author in December 1992 and he promised me the paper "within a week" but I have yet to receive it.

Zvi Gitelman, "Politics and the Soviet Historiography of the Holocaust"

The holocaust has been ignored or downplayed in Soviet writings, except in Yiddish, and this paper examines why this is so. Contrary to assertions by some Western analysts, there is considerable variation in Soviet treatments of the holocaust. The variations seem idiosyncratic, indicating that there was no rigid "Party line" on the matter. Soviet Yiddish writing emphasizes aid to Jews by fellow Soviet citizens and the leading roles played by Communists in anti-Nazi resistance. Collaboration by Soviet people, Jewish military heroism and antisemitism among Soviet people are themes assiduously avoided by Soviet authors.

The way the holocaust has been treated aroused Jewish resentment and has raised ethnic consciousness. The holocaust remains a major item on the agenda of relations between Jews and other peoples of the former USSR. It influences Jewish attitudes to both Soviet society and the system. Expectations that the downfall of the Communist regime would lead to a full and frank discussion of the holocaust in the Soviet Union have not been met. The reluctance to confront the issues of Jewish-Gentile relations and collaboration carries over from the Soviet period, albeit the motivations are different.

The paper begins with a 22 page survey of Soviet Jewish history before the holocaust. For the anthology this will be made into a separate, introductory chapter. The rest of the paper,
some 42 pages, shows that Jews and Gentiles had very different perspectives on the Soviet annexation of the Western territories in 1939-40. Many Jews saw the Soviets as liberators from Nazi or local oppression, whereas the Baltic peoples, Ukrainians and Romanians/Moldavians regarded the Soviets as invaders who were depriving them of recently won independence. These different perceptions, and longer standing prejudices, led some people to murder Jews once the Soviets retreated. This remains an issue in Jewish-Gentile relations in the areas discussed.

Soviet historiography treated the holocaust not as sui generis, but as a logical consequence of fascism, itself the ultimate stage of capitalism. However, while most publications in Ukraine ignored the murder of Jews, some works in Estonia, Belorussia and Lithuania discussed the special Jewish fate. One of the most popular works on World War Two discussed Jewish suffering but assiduously avoided mentioning Jewish resistance and participation in the war effort. Thus, there was less uniformity in Soviet writings than assumed by some Western authors. I cannot explain the diversity of approaches in Soviet writings.

The general tendency to ignore the holocaust may have stemmed from simple antisemitism, or a desire not to arouse sensitive issues such as collaboration and Jewish-Gentile relations (which would damage the myths of "friendship of the peoples" and the unity of Soviet peoples in the struggle against the invaders). It may also have been motivated by a desire to avoid rousing Jewish national consciousness.

Comment: An early version of this paper was published in 1990. More information on Soviet historiography before glasnost' and new materials which have been published in the last two years are taken account of in a revised treatment.

The Detroit Study

In an attempt to understand Soviet Jewish perceptions of the holocaust and their influence on Jewish attitudes and behavior in the USSR, I collected 382 interviews with 1989-91 immigrants to
the Detroit area. They come from all parts of the European USSR, and include both sexes, people of different ages, educational levels and occupations. Of the respondents, 117 came from Russia; 143 from Ukraine; 41 from Belorussia; 42 from Azerbaijan and Central Asia; and 36 from the Baltic and Moldavia. This is very close to the national profile of Soviet immigrants to the United States. Fifty-two of the respondents were born before 1921; 138 between 1921 and 1940; 148 between 1941 and 1960; and 41 between 1960 and 1977. Joanna Berger of the Detroit Jewish Community Center's English language program for immigrants was extraordinarily helpful in making the survey possible.

Interestingly, only 57 per cent know that 5-7 million Jews died in the holocaust (the rest gave wrong figures or could not answer at all—the latter making up 35% of the sample!) Two thirds could not accurately estimate how many Jews died in the USSR, not surprising in light of the lack of research and of Soviet information on the subject. Of the 182 respondents alive in 1941-45, only 18 lived in Ukraine and Belorussia, that is, under occupation. So 90 per cent survived outside the occupation, including 20 who lived outside the USSR altogether. Fifty were in the armed services, including eight women. I estimate that about 80 were age-eligible, including 30 women. This means that all age-eligible men served in the military. One hundred sixty-two had fathers in the military and 11 had mothers in the service. Ninety-one had siblings in the military, and 217 had an aunt or uncle serving. Of the over 500 people mentioned as serving in the military, 79 were captains or higher (colonel was the highest rank mentioned). About 170 relatives, not including cousins, died in combat. One-third of those born in 1897-1920 had a sibling die in combat; of those born in 1921-1940, 40 per cent had an uncle or aunt die in combat. Of those relatives not in the military, 38 parents, 48 siblings and 187 aunts and uncles died during the war. Thus, it is very clear that practically every family had close relatives serving in the military—many of them casualties—or who were victims of the war. This is why, despite official
suppression, every Jew in the USSR heard about the consequences of the war for the Jews. Ninety-four per cent of our respondents say that when they lived in the USSR they were aware that the Nazis had singled the Jews out for annihilation. Most became aware of this in childhood, 24 per cent as adults, but only 7 per cent in school, reflecting the absence of the subject in Soviet curricula. Those from Central Asia and Azerbaijan, however, are less likely to have learned about the holocaust at home. They were also more likely to view Soviet treatment of the subject as fair and comprehensive.

Over 70 per cent say the holocaust was discussed at home; 58 per cent learned about it from relatives and friends, but only 10 per cent learned about it from schoolbooks, and only 38 per cent learned about it from other Soviet books, though three-quarters say they learned "a little" about it from Soviet books. This confirms my impression that many Soviet books mention the subject but do not discuss it in any detail.

Of 255 who could name a book published in the USSR dealing with the holocaust (one-third could NOT name such a publication), a third mentioned Anatoly Kuznetsov's Babi Yar, and 38 per cent Anatoly Rybakov's Heavy Sand. Over 80 per cent assert that non-Jews were aware of the Jews' fate. Eighteen per cent say most non-Jews approved it; 31 per cent say some approved while others condemned the persecutions; 30 per cent say most were indifferent; and 11 per cent say most non-Jews sympathized with Jews. Only two per cent say non-Jews saved Jews. Thus, their perceptions are rather mixed and do not indicate wholesale condemnation, nor massive appreciation, of the role of non-Jews in the holocaust. However, nearly 80 per cent say the holocaust influenced their own views of the place of Jews in the USSR when they lived there. Over two-thirds said their knowledge of the holocaust led them to the conclusion that they should emigrate (31%), that it could happen again (11%), that the USSR "is antisemitic" (26%). Respondents were asked: "Some members of some Soviet nationalities collaborated with the Germans in the killing of
Jews during the war. Which nationalities would you say did so more than others?" Of 532 responses (multiple responses were permitted), 285 (54%) were "Ukrainians." Nineteen per cent mentioned Russians and only 12 per cent mentioned Balts. Clearly, there is a strong negative perception of Ukrainians here, though a surprisingly benign perception of Lithuanians and Latvians. The implications for Jewish-Ukrainian relations are obvious.

Agenda for the Future

The objectives of the original research plan have been largely accomplished. My objective now is to publish a book.

The outline for the book is as follows:

1) Gitelman, The Historical Background of Soviet Jewry
2) Arad, overview of the holocaust
3) Gitelman, Politics and the Soviet Historiography of the Holocaust
4) McQueen, chapter on Lithuania
5) Wilhelm, chapter on Latvia
6) Spector, chapter on Ukraine (Jewish view)
7) Koval, chapter on Ukraine (Ukrainian view)
8) Kumanev, chapter on Soviet historiography
9) Romanovsky, chapter on view from below
10) Litvak, Polish-Jewish refugees in the USSR

Additional Articles

12) S. Redlich, "Metropolitan Andrej Sheptyts'kyi, Ukrainians and Jews During and After the Holocaust," Remembering for the Future Theme I (Pergamon, 1988)
13) Dov Levin, "The Response of the Jews of Eastern Poland to the Invasion of the Red Army in September 1939 (as described by Jewish Witnesses), Gal-Ed, 11 (Tel Aviv, 1989).


Documents
6) Yitzhak Arad, Kholokast (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990)
Notes

1. Yitzhak Arad, *Kholokast* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990) pp. 61-62. Arad arrives at his figures by calculating that there were 1,850,000 Jews in the territories annexed by the Soviets in 1939-40 who were joined by about 200,000 refugees from Nazi-occupied Poland. Only 10-12 per cent of them managed to flee to the Soviet interior, and 2-3 per cent were deported as political or class enemies by the Soviets. There were 3,020,000 Jews in the old Soviet borders who declared themselves as such in the 1939 census. Thus, there was a total of about 4.8 million Jews in the expanded USSR. Arad thinks that a million to 1.1 million Jews were evacuated by the Soviets. About 2.1 million Jews lived in areas occupied by the Nazis and nearly all of them were killed.

2. See, for example, "Neuzhto nie slykhali?" Komsomolskaya pravda, August 22, 1989; "Chi bude pogrom?" Zoriia (Dnepropetrovsk), April 18, 1989; B. Kirillov, "Razmyslenie po povodu polzut slukhi," Kurskaya pravda, July 2, 1989.


5. Nikolai Motovilov, "Yidn in PSSR un di milkhome fun 1941-45," Sovietish haimland Nos. 5, 6, 7, 1990. This work is said to be based on a through survey of five Soviet newspapers, not including the Yiddish daily of the war years, six documentary collections, and other sources.


9. Ibid.