TITLE: CHURCH, STATE AND DEMOCRACY: SERVING AMERICAN INTERESTS THROUGH COORDINATED VOLUNTARISM IN AID TO RUSSIA, BELARUS AND UKRAINE

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SUMMARY

The author, an Orthodox priest and an American academic, has been active for years in private, church-funded humanitarian aid in Russia and Ukraine. He concludes: it is more cost effective, socially productive, and democratically nurturing to assist, in incremental and monitored grants, already existing volunteer organizations than it is to entrust large American-administered block grants through local authorities. It is also possible to coordinate public and private efforts.

There are hundreds of religious and private American organizations already active in aid and development in Russia and Ukraine. Among the groups they assist, the Orthodox are the most politically influential. Russians now place their trust in two central institutions: the Orthodox Church and the military. American analysis has focused upon the latter and virtually ignored the former. Due to his entrenchment in both conservative and liberal camps, the Patriarch of Moscow has become a power broker in Russia after Yeltsin’s dissolution of Parliament.

The Church is vulnerable to influence from the "mystic nationalism" of the right; yet it also contains forces compatible with democracy and free markets. Throughout Russia, there are a host of small, volunteer-staffed organizations serving human needs. Churches, rather than secular institutions, now motivate and mobilize volunteers. Existing organizations active in Russia, like the IOCC (International Orthodox Christian Charities; Baltimore, MD), can locate, fund, and mobilize such organizations to cooperate with others.

Russians and Ukrainians themselves plead for one thing above all: organizational help. With a "five step plan to self help," the U.S. can coordinate various religious and secular groups, meeting the same human or economic needs, in a single district. The five steps are: 1) SEEK already active, indigenously directed groups with a record; 2) TRAIN its personnel in organizational skills; 3) ALLY the group with similarly focused groups in the same district; 4) REACT together against corruption and common problems; and 5) SELECT, through a "rolling review" the most successful groups for continued, incremental funding.
Ukraine, with unique internal religious tensions, needs some modifications upon the plan. Yet the plan's coordinating possibilities, and its implicit ability to unite religious and secular groups with a similar focus, make it constructive there as well.

Russian and Ukrainian volunteers give Americans their own advice: we must not operate according to our old assumptions. The new Slavic nations of the old USSR are rapidly desecularizing states in which religious institutions are powerful, but not monolithic. Progressive elements in those institutions must be enlisted as allies in building democracy, promoting free markets, and meeting human needs. The primary key to success is coordination among existing efforts both in Russia and in the U.S.A.

There are two appendices to this report, written to accompany it: I) a report by Ken Ackerman, "Assessment of the Management Structure and Health Services in Russian Hospitals;" and, II) a report by John Vass, "Voluntary Social Organizations of St. Petersburg, Russia." The first analyzes patterns of administration and is intended to assist in the formation of management structures for the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid through Russian and Ukrainian hospitals. The second offers a catalogue of volunteer organizations already underway without foreign assistance in that city, with an analysis of budgets, scope, and leadership. It may serve as a guide for funding groups with a proven record of local effectiveness.
CHURCH, STATE, AND DEMOCRACY: SERVING AMERICAN INTERESTS THROUGH COORDINATED VOLUNTARISM IN AID TO RUSSIA, BELARUS AND UKRAINE.

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I. Introduction

This Report is the culmination of an earlier report, distributed by the Council on May 27, 1993, on the social effects of humanitarian assistance in Russia. It is meant to supplement and amplify that earlier report. It also includes two important appendices, completed under my direction in the summer of 1993, after work in Ukraine and Russia.

Appendix I is a report, by Ken Ackerman of the Henry Ford Health System in Detroit, titled "Assessment of the Management Structure and Health Care Services in Russian Hospitals." It is hoped that this detailed analysis of comparative patterns of administration can assist the formation of management structures for the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid through Russian and Ukrainian hospitals. Mr. Ackerman, whose specialty in hospital administration is evident in the report he has written, also provides his vita at the end of his report. He is available for advice and consultation; he is also available for employment on any projects related to medical aid to Russia.

Appendix II, is a report, by John Vass of the University of Scranton, Pennsylvania, entitled "Social Organizations of St. Petersburg, Russia." Vass offers a detailed catalogue of volunteer organizations already underway without foreign assistance in that city, with an analysis of budgets, scope, and leadership. It is hoped that this may serve as a guide for funding groups with an already proven record of local effectiveness. Mr. Vass, who has five years' experience in the St. Petersburg area where he was a student at the Theological Academy, is also available for consultation regarding the material in his report. He can carry out short-term assignments in Russia which will allow him to continue his work and commitment in the area of Russian relief and development.
A. Thesis. This study, like its preceding report in June, advances a single thesis. The experience of private humanitarian initiatives in Russia has demonstrated one principle of funding in the post-Soviet environment: it is more cost effective, socially productive, and democratically nurturing to assist, in incremental and monitored programs, already existing volunteer organizations than it is to entrust large, block-grant sums to local authorities. In the unstable, rapidly shifting political environment following President Yeltsin’s dissolution of Parliament, this principle is especially important in promoting local stability and discouraging the patterns of patronage, appropriated by anti-democratic forces, to which Russian society is currently vulnerable.

B. Author. I am both a scholar in a secular college (Franklin and Marshall, in Lancaster, Pennsylvania) and a priest of the Eastern Orthodox faith, currently serving in a Ukrainian Orthodox jurisdiction under the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. I have struggled to preserve my objectivity in these reports, even when it interferes with the preferred perception of my own co-religionists. There is a paradox, however, implicit in presenting a portrait of humanitarian efforts in Russia and Ukraine. Americans who cherish the separation of Church and State cherish an avoidance of entanglements between the two. This fear extends to the realm of analysis.

Thus a studiously secular, "a-religious" perception of the current Russian and Ukrainian situation may appear to be more acceptable in portraying the post-Soviet reality. The fact is, however, that the post-Soviet reality is highly critical of that very secularism and its world view. An accurate analysis then, must take into account all the complexities of religious awareness in the former USSR (complexities of which most American scholars are largely unaware). Such an analysis is apt to be the more reflective of the situation there, even if it may cause a degree of disjunction for the country in which it is intended. It is true, then, that I share the religious awareness of the majority of Russian and Ukrainian Christians. It is also true that I take seriously in this report the civic duties of an American scholar. As a priest and an academic in America, I am used to deploying my activity in the charged space between these two polarities.
II. Christian Organizations at Work in Russia and Ukraine

There is now a Directory of Western Christian Organizations working in East Central Europe and former USSR (East/West Christian Organizations, ed. Sharon Linzey, M. Holt Ruffin and Mark R. Elliott; Berry Publishing Services, Evanston IL, 1993). It contains information regarding nearly 500 Christian organizations alone which now have a presence in Russia. Though many Americans have an impression that such groups constitute a bloc of "foreign missionaries," many of these organizations in fact concentrate on humanitarian efforts. Many of them also combine humanitarian efforts with religious information or instruction, most often of a general Biblical nature. Some of them seek, in fact, the endorsement or sponsorship of the previously existing religious organizations in Russia or Ukraine: members of the All-Union Council of Baptists and Evangelicals, Roman Catholic, Ukrainian Catholic, or Orthodox communities. These organizations, combined, have constituted an "advance wave" of western assistance to the former USSR, anticipating by years any legislative approval of American aid to Russia, and giving a foretaste of its effects. The combined amounts of aid distributed by these groups, some of them supplemented by grants through agencies, is difficult to discern, but it is considerable. In its effects, we can anticipate the problems to be faced by any large-scale federal effort to assist Russia, Belarus, and/or Ukraine.

A. Transplanted organizations and "anti-missionary" legislation in Russia.
Those communities with a "growth agenda" involving the foundation or transplantation of faith communities into Russia or Ukraine are a minority of those active in the former USSR. Communities like the Mormons (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints), Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Unification Church, in general re-create on Russian soil the organizational patterns which serve them in the west and elsewhere. Their humanitarian efforts, which are often considerable, are ancillary to and under the jurisdiction of these organizational patterns. Much of the popular antipathy to "foreign missionaries," reflected in the efforts of the Russian Parliament to render foreign missionary activity subject to Russian control, is directed in fact toward these highly visible groups in the Russian religious landscape. (The Orthodox hierarchy, when it levels criticism against Catholic and Evangelical missionary activity which it perceives as in competition with itself, "borrows" even in its rhetoric from a Russian xenophobia directed against these communities from abroad: the Orthodox portray
Catholics and Evangélicals as "foreign," when in fact they serve established local communities with local patterns of organization.) The legislation against foreign missionaries, as yet unadopted due in large part to pressure from the west, would frustrate in effect the religious and humanitarian efforts of foreign relief organizations unapproved by local, Russian religious communities.

B. The three "native Christian" blocs of influence. Any American administration or pluralist organization would like to avoid the complexities of this issue. In fact, however, that is very difficult to do. The three large religious groups in Russia with native, local patterns of organization, political influence, and distribution of aid are the "Evangelical/Baptist" bloc; the "Roman/Ukrainian Catholic" bloc; and the Orthodox communities. Each of them has an enviable advantage in reaching and affecting local populations: organization, volunteers, commitment and trust. Each of them has also a unique set of problems which can foreshadow the immense social effects of an American initiative toward aid and development in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

C. The Russian "Baptists" and "Evangélicals." The "Evangelical and Baptist" communities in Russia, first of all, contain even within their name an implicit misunderstanding. There are not, as we know them in America, "Baptists" and "Evangelicals" in Russia. That is, these communities are not extensions or even organizational reflections of the like-named groups in the U.S. As religious groups officially "registered" by previous Communist authorities, they are an amalgam of former native sects and transplanted Protestants (German Mennonites, for example) which in effect "federated" in order to survive under tight Communist restraints. There were also "unregistered" groups, who for reasons of conscience failed to amalgamate; they are a much looser and less defined body of people, often rural. Earlier efforts to assist some previously unregistered groups, like the so-called Russian "Pentecostals" or Mennonites, were often focused on emigration to the west. These emigration programs in the Christian community have waned of late (though in the Jewish community they still constitute a main humanitarian focus).

Much Protestant Evangélical and Baptist humanitarian activity in Russia consists of locating local, long-established communities across Russia and Ukraine, establishing rapport with them, and training them to accept and distribute American contributions. To banish or restrict foreign missionaries would either inhibit the aid reaching these populations through American Protestants, or it would subject such groups to regulation by a government subject
to the pressures of a "majority" religious body; that is to say, the Orthodox Church under the established Patriarchate of Moscow. The current Patriarch, Alexei II, has been an apologist for these restrictions.

The Patriarch of Moscow has co-existed with the All-Union Council of Baptists and Evangelicals under the common restrictions placed upon all religious bodies by the Communist Party. He has also supported international ecumenical efforts, and he has expressed vocal support and appreciation for western humanitarian assistance. He has, however, been alarmed by the spread of local millennialist and spiritualist cults in the atmosphere of massive economic unrest in Russia; and he has expressed alarm at the success of Protestant Biblically-centered communities in attracting worshippers who are nominally or formerly Orthodox. Any Russian legislation restricting foreign missionary activity would have the effect of limiting humanitarian assistance through the established channels of local, Russian Protestant communities.

Any judgement of humanitarian initiatives in Russia must be based on its effects. The Mennonites, for example, with the experience of the Mennonite Central Committee and its successful record of efficient, rapid local development, must be judged by their humanitarian effectiveness, not by their doctrine or acceptability to the Patriarch of Moscow. One natural issue of concern to contributors, however, is the object of their aid. If the local organization of Russian religious communities reaches a community otherwise unreached, and if it does not grossly discriminate among the needy by ideological criteria, then its money has been spent according to principles acceptable to a civil American agenda.

Assistance which reaches others through the aegis of Protestant communities in Russia may, indeed, reach Protestants first, by virtue of their proximity to the agencies of distribution. If, however, the aid is distributed within local communities without regard to creed or nationality, then it meets humanitarian and American, democratic criteria. The groups whose primary focus is upon proselytization, and who do not have a counterpart among Russians or Ukrainians themselves, do in fact confine their help, by the admission of those approached by Russians for assistance, to their own adherents. Among those groups labeled "Baptist" and "Evangelical," however, I have found no consistent evidence of such discrimination.

The availability of American funds provides a problem here. Among the hundreds of Christian organizations active in Russia, the vast majority are Protestant: these are the people
numerous enough, and motivated enough, to raise funds in the U.S. Naturally, however, Orthodox agencies have less money to give and hence reach fewer among their own much larger population.

D. The Catholic agencies in Russia. Catholic/Orthodox relations in Russia are charged with acute ethnic as well as religious tensions. When the Orthodox majority complains of "proselytization" by Protestants, they speak of efforts directed toward individual people. The complaints of "proselytization" by Catholics, however, carry in Russia the clear implication of efforts to win over the allegiance of entire populations from Moscow to Rome. The history of those fears is too complex to relate here. Let it suffice to say simply that in Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania -- on the western edges of what Russian Orthodox regard as their domain -- whole populations within the Orthodox Church have in the past shifted their ultimate episcopal allegiance to the Pope of Rome. These "Eastern Catholics" or "Ukrainian Catholics" are not to be confused with the Roman Catholics more widely known in the west. The Eastern Catholics look, outwardly, like the Orthodox: they dress like them, worship like them, subject themselves to the same rule of ritual and custom. They are, however, loyal to the see of Rome.

In the former USSR, these Eastern Catholic communities were cruelly suppressed, with the acquiescence of the Orthodox bishops. Thus they "reverted back" to their Orthodox form as their leaders were executed or imprisoned. Ironically, since they were acquired by Russia after World War II and were not subject to the most virulent of the atheist campaigns, these communities provided the Orthodox with a renewable supply of pious believers, seminarians, and revenues. With the erosion of Communism under Gorbachev, many of these communities responded to their surviving leaders returned from exile. "Ukrainian Catholicism" emerged from hiding and has grown in the past four years. It has become a voice for Ukrainian nationalism and resistance to the authority of their former Orthodox leaders, whom they labeled puppets of Communist control.

Issues relating to Catholicism in Russia, then, strike chords of acute sensitivity in Moscow. Challenged on the right by a rapidly strengthening wing of the Church, fiercely nationalist in its sympathies, the Patriarch of Moscow resists an ecclesiastical defection of Ukraine which reflects the already accomplished political one. (Russian Orthodoxy in the former USSR can be a *de facto* ecclesiastical survival of a political domain lost in the collapse of the USSR.) Russian nationalists yet retain, in the ecclesiastical sovereignty of
Moscow, much of what they lost in the secession of the former Republics. Indeed, the Patriarch himself is Estonian-born: Alexei II embodies in his very person the continued aspiration of many Russians to claims over the former territory of "greater Russia."

In this atmosphere, Catholicism takes on the character of an alien force. Nor can this "Catholicism" be understood in its American context. The Roman Catholics, with only a peripheral connection to the Ukrainian Catholics who loudly seceded from Moscow, are a tiny minority in Russia. They constitute a conservative, very Latinate order emanating from Poland and Lithuania. In the old USSR, a few scattered Roman Catholic parishes in Russia and eastern Ukraine served displaced populations of ethnic Poles, Catholic Belarusians, and Lithuanians. These parishes were in a state of "arrested development": isolated from the larger Catholic world, and cut off from a younger clergy, they still served their liturgies in Latin and were confined to their ethnic groups. With the collapse of the USSR, however, substantial numbers of transplanted Catholics as deep into Russia as eastern Siberia founded parishes, asked for, and received Catholic assistance. The Vatican appointed clergy and bishops to serve them.

The Orthodox responded angrily to these moves toward a Roman Catholic presence in Russia. As a direct result, the humanitarian efforts of Catholics in Russia, which are not limited to Catholic populations, also received criticism. Conservative Orthodox, in fact, charged that Catholics sought through these efforts to re-create the mass defections to Catholicism which occurred centuries before in Ukraine and Belarus.

The Orthodox have won concessions from Rome. Orthodox resist, on ecclesiastical and canonical grounds, the creation of "parallel sees [centers of episcopal authority]" by Rome on Russian soil. The Vatican has responded with efforts to recognize the pre-eminence of Russian sees as the "native Church," with an apology for its own bishoprics as mere efforts to serve Catholic populations far removed from their point of origin.

In any case, the humanitarian assistance delivered to Russians through Catholic agencies is affected by this atmosphere of suspicion. Any restriction or regulation of foreign missionaries, as the Patriarchate of Moscow well realizes, would affect these efforts by Catholics. While it is unlikely that the Moscow Patriarchate would stand in the way of humanitarian assistance offered by Catholics (National Catholic Relief has been effective in delivering large quantities of aid by transport to all parties), such legislation would
dramatically increase the leverage of the Orthodox in assuming a kind of patronage over such assistance.

E. **The Orthodox communities and their internal problems.** The Orthodox Church has a crucial importance in current Russian politics. To discount its influence, under the assumption that Russia will correspond to American assumptions about the separation of Church and State, is to risk a profoundly flawed analysis of any problem even remotely connected to the growing number of Orthodox believers. To underestimate its power could be fatal in the American attempts to encourage democratic structures in Russia. Many often-cited surveys of Russian opinion assert that Russians in these times of profound instability retain their primary faith in two institutions, the Orthodox Church and the Russian military. American analysis thus far has been exclusively focused, with all its resources, upon the military half of this key to the Russian imagination. A failure now to grasp the ecclesiastical element in the Russian dilemma could be fatal to American, democratic interests in this region of the world.

The **Russian Orthodox Church, for all its influence, is not a monolith within.** It incorporates within itself a right wing faction so fascist in inclination as to be extremely dangerous to American interests. It also includes some hierarchy and members of the intelligentsia who are thorough democrats and apologists for a profound separation between Church and State. Yet the Church cannot escape its political role.

In the latter days of the Soviet era, the Church won approval to build for itself an administrative center at Danilovsky Monastery in Moscow. At the time, this concession was designed to render the church more effective as a diplomatic tool. Now, however, the monastery serves as a symbol of the renewed power of the Patriarchate. The Church acted as a negotiator between the competing parties in the standoff between Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament; and one might mistakenly assume that the failure of the negotiations indicated the powerlessness of the Church. In fact, however, the Church now retains -- and contains within itself -- the elements of both parties, still engaged in a standoff in the midst of the Russian national consciousness.

The Orthodox conservatives, nationalist and anti-democratic, suspicious of America as the "Jewish-Masonic" amalgam (which zealots among them believe is symbolically represented in its flag), press resolutely to the right; the liberals, intellectual and ecumenical, democratic according to the "Christian-democratic" models in west Europe yet profoundly
more conservative than they in worldview, constitute the left in this relative equation. It is apparent, then, that the whole structure is much more conservative and even, by some instincts, less "democratic" than any western parallel. Yet this is Russia, and this is the structure which wields an influence in the nation we wish to coax toward democracy.

**Leader of the Church.** Patriarch Alexei II is himself a survivor, a veteran of long association with Communist authorities. In interviews with me in 1990, when the author was a visiting scholar at the Theological Academy in St. Petersburg, where he retained his office, and a cleric in the diocese where he served, the Patriarch was even then sensitive to charges that he had been a collaborationist with the Communist regime. "I negotiated with the regime," he said. "I did not collaborate. The concessions I won were, by the very nature of the negotiations, ones which I could not divulge. But they allowed the Church to function and in some ways even improve its mission in one of the most hostile environments the Church has ever known." He enjoys prestige in Russia as a prelate of dignity who has not much suffered from attempts to undermine his credibility as a former collaborator.

His public statements and sermons are directed toward nonbelievers as well as believers, incorporating both into a national culture which the Church claims as its own. This strategy has been extremely successful: even atheist philosophers in Russia now defer to the Church as an embodiment of the national conscience. Alexei has, then, harnessed and to some degree controlled the renascent Russian nationalism and placed it at the service of the Church. Everywhere in Russia the Church reclaims ruined churches, assigns priests to formerly "priestless" areas, baptizes the newly committed and the marginally interested alike.

This has been, however, a dangerous success, and one which demands constant controls. He faces from the right those who would re-create the Church-state alliance which characterized czarist Russia. Indeed, the cult of Nicholas and Alexandra as "royal martyrs," the renewed interest in pre-revolutionary Russia and its aristocracy, and the widespread distress at the loss of Russian control over its former republics have all increased the visibility of the Orthodox Church as that institution through which the past lives in the present. I have no figures to cite, but my continued experience among young Russian priests and believers leads me to identify a strong new conservative strain in this wing of the church, ideologically hostile to pluralist and democratic assumptions and accepting of an autocracy, as long as it served Orthodoxy or shaped an alliance with the church. There is also a more moderate wing of the church, democratic in its sympathies; but these are people
who command more control over the church's educational institutions than over the popular imagination.

Many of those most committed to a conservative "ultra-Orthodox" and "mystic nationalist" vision have joined a schism, a "Free Orthodoxy" or "Synodal Orthodoxy" which is served from the west by a parallel movement which long served as a religious bastion against the Communists.

Most Russians identify the intellectual center of this movement as in the U.S., at Holy Trinity Monastery in Jordanville, New York, a monastery of the fiercely anti-Communist "Russian Church in Exile." This church "in exile" has now come back to its home to challenge even the Patriarch. The grounds of its separation are charges of the tainted nature of the Patriarchate, due to its collaborationist record under Communist rule, and also the "ecumenical," West-serving nature of its politics and public statements.

From 1989, when the present Patriarch first made overtures to these Orthodox challengers from the right, he sought to accommodate them through a commitment to a conservative agenda. Internally, then, the Orthodox Church has to be constantly aware of the threatened schism from the right. In symbolism and imagination, if not always in actual policy, the Orthodox Church has been critical of the west and its institutions.

In recent weeks, even days, the Patriarchate has enlisted the local militia in his campaign against these conservatives: they have been driven out of local churches in several places across Russia, and replaced with official priests of the Moscow Patriarchate. Though the number of such churches is a small fraction of the whole, the Patriarch is clearly troubled by them.

F. Humanitarian assistance and the Orthodox connection. The issue of humanitarian assistance delivered directly to the Orthodox communities, then, is of crucial importance in this very politicized situation. The hundreds of Christian and sectarian organizations active in Russia, for both religious and humanitarian reasons, have won the antipathy of many Orthodox Russians, in particular those believers whom the Communists placed at the lower end of the scale of economic advantages. Scourged by inflation, powerless to gain access to new sources of wealth which they perceive as controlled by former apparatchiks, and influenced by new numbers of conservative, nationalist clergy, many Russian Orthodox perceive themselves as excluded from the humanitarian conscience of the west. All these foreign dollars, they claim, go to assist others, and not themselves.
American government money, if it is to be had, goes to the former bosses. And private money goes to Protestants, Catholics, Jews -- anybody but themselves. This is, at least, their popular lore.

The lore is to some degree borne out by the distribution of donated financial resources. The agents, if not the sole receivers, are largely those non-Orthodox church organizations with some connection to funds abroad. The Orthodox patriarch, then, to preserve his credibility and serve the interests of his community, has sought to have some claim to foreign assistance of his own. He wins it, in part from others in the west who, in small amounts and in individual projects, assist Orthodox parishes or seminaries or charities. But the organization which has primary symbolic influence, and hence great political potential in Russia, is the International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC), with its American headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland. (711 W. 40th St., Suite 356; Baltimore MD 21211; tel (410) 243-9820; Fax (410) 243-9824).

The IOCC is funded by contributions and grants. Its budget, some $15 million, of which half is focused upon Russia, is small in comparison to the totaled amounts of aid distributed through others; but its visibility is very high indeed. Its director, Alex Rondos, a professional relief administrator, successfully struggles to keep its activities focused upon meeting humanitarian needs and expanding social services through native, volunteer initiatives.

Though the bulk of IOCC’s funding is raised by non-Russian Orthodox Christians (primarily Greek Americans) and secular grants, the most visible agents of its distribution in Russia are Americans of the O.C.A. (Orthodox Church in America). This is a jurisdiction of Orthodoxy headquartered in Syosset, Long Island, which received its canonical validity from the Patriarch of Moscow in 1970. It is tied, then, to Moscow as its "Mother Church" and has acted as the Patriarch’s host and apologist on his visits to the U.S.

The IOCC has negotiated, with much success, an internal struggle. On the one hand, it seeks to use the vast and stable Orthodox organization, through both diocesan channels and voluntary groups, as a network of distribution. At the same time it seeks not to serve an ecclesiastical "patronage system" which would allow the Patriarch to control and politically utilize its funds. Internal to the IOCC, there have been tensions between those at home who raise and adjudicate the funds according to strictly professional criteria, and those Russians in
the Patriarchate and Americans in the O.C.A. who wish to serve the Patriarch’s specific agenda.

The means to that end -- utilizing the Orthodox network to reach the people most directly, while avoiding ecclesial and political controls -- lies in the aim to find and empower local volunteer organizations which have already, without foreign funds, met specific human needs. The Orthodox laity are best able to find the most effective volunteer organizations, and they are also those most capable of resisting efforts from Church or State to control and administer those funds from above. Lay activists sometimes must fight clerical control over funds intended for lay needs rather than clerical patronage. These laypeople claim that Russian Americans, who identify more strongly with the institution of the Church than the welfare of the country, unwittingly assist and promote such patterns of clerical patronage.

There are problems of distribution to the former republics, where native centers of distribution are needed. The Ukrainians, for example, many of whom now dispute Moscow’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Ukraine, have received no funds as yet through IOCC, though they constitute a plurality of “Orthodox in the former USSR.” This report will deal with Ukraine in a later section (VI).

The Orthodox role in resistance to foreign missionaries and in the distribution of humanitarian assistance is thus a very complex one. The issue also has profound implications for American policy. The Moscow Patriarchate, that body which is in administrative control over the Church in which the Russians now place substantial public trust, would like to be in a position of control and patronage (or the appearance of patronage) over as many funds as possible. In an inflation ravaged, capital starved economy, with dangerous levels of public distress and much political instability, it is clear that those who can harness aid in their own interests gain great power. With a state policy against foreign missionaries, at the behest of the Orthodox Church, the Church in effect would make clients of all foreigners who sought, through private means, to alleviate the suffering of Russians. Protestants and Catholics could be subject to Orthodox controls over their own charity as well as their own religious activity. Americans, who supply through private channels much of that aid, must understandably resist such controls. At the same time, it would also be in the clear American interest to win Russian good will (and support for progressive elements in the Church) by using Orthodox channels to fund and distribute productive, “progressive” aid through indigenous sources.
III. Political Implications of Church-Related Aid in Russia

President Yeltsin and any successor who seeks western cooperation quite clearly is, at least in part, a client of the west. Aid and development, as well as humanitarian assistance in the short run, is what he needs to make his own position more stable. Yet he must also avoid as much as possible the appearance of such patronage. One way to do so is to enlist the aid of as nativist and nationalist an organization as the Russian Orthodox Church. Though western commentators have focused upon Yeltsin's indebtedness to his own military, it is also true that an even stronger alliance with the Orthodox Church is in his own best interest. Even a short year ago, in the summer of 1992, my sources in the Patriarchate indicated that some "democrats" in the Church were restive at the Patriarch's attempts to ingratiate himself to Yeltsin. Since then, indications are that the cards have turned. Yeltsin now needs to ingratiate himself to the Patriarch. And serious democrats, especially in Orthodox ranks, are no less restive.

A. Yeltsin and the "Orthodox problem." Since the U.S. Government has chosen to ally itself with Yeltsin as its own best choice for promoting a free economy and democratic interests, it is useful to study the implications of any alliance between Yeltsin and Patriarch Alexei II. First of all, the Patriarch faces strong pressure from the right. The Patriarch has enlisted the local authorities and militia in suppressing the schism coming from that wing, but he must also appease the "mystic nationalism" among his own loyalists in the process of avoiding further pressures toward schism. That means that the Orthodox Church, with scant experience of real pluralism, could lean toward authoritarianism. If Yeltsin's democratic agenda seems too secularist, too "chaotic" in its ideological openness, he cannot count on the Church for support and indeed will find within it a source of resistance.

Humanitarian assistance through Orthodox sources, then, provides a problem for those serving American interests. The Orthodox powers seem to embody within themselves an implicitly anti-democratic, despotic catalyst within the Russian imagination. (Indeed, Orthodox Christians, when they call upon the bishop for his blessing, address him in Greek as despota.) There would seem to be no reward in working through or even tolerating Orthodox sources in order to achieve a desirable civic end.
This approach to the problem might fit well within the American worldview, but it would never correspond to the Russian realities. Attention to Orthodoxy, precisely because it can be so politically dangerous, is a crucial factor in achieving any tangible end.

**B. Political influence of Protestants and Catholics.** As my earlier report indicated, the hundreds of private organizations in Russia which work through Russian Protestants do not, in large numbers, have a profound political effect. The religious sects from which these believers derive have a long history of political alienation and minimal involvement. Though they may indeed be enterprising, they do not in fact have a history or a present interest in political activity. The Catholics in Russia, on the other hand, whether of the Ukrainian or Roman variety, have a history of vigorous political involvement. Yet their own interests, at present, are focused upon their own limited communities within Russia (Vatican policy) or the national integrity of Ukraine (Ukrainian Catholic sentiment). They are not, by definition, ready to plunge into Russian politics.

**C. The inevitability of an Orthodox role in politics.** Unlike both other "blocs," the Orthodox have already become a primary factor in the Russian political arena. If one is not blind to the imaginative and symbolic influence of faith systems on politics (and in places like Iran and the Balkans we have learned the price of such blindness), the analyst must at least deal with the Orthodox reality. Agencies which seek to promote and develop Russian democracy and a freer market, and at the same time take existing institutions into account, must allow for an "Orthodox connection" in some assisted groups (and indeed for a "Protestant" or "Catholic" or "Jewish" or "Muslim" connection in others). The strategy is to work through such groups, even politically dangerous ones, without endorsing or assisting their internal agenda. The alternative, working in a purely secular model, is one with its own host of difficulties.

**D. Problems in a purely secular approach to Russian aid and development.** One might argue, given our own system and the complexities of the Russian religious landscape, that the only solution is to work through a purely secular, political model. Indeed, one might conceive of a cadre of secular "democrats," on the American model, sent to administer aid and direct it through the Russian economy, both shaping Russian democracy and serving American interests simultaneously in the process.

Lest such a model seem purely utopian, we must admit that through American universities and granting agencies, we have already set free such a cadre in Russia, collecting
data and shaping public perception of what transpires there. It is also likely that this cadre
will in effect control the bulk of what assistance we deliver to the Russian economy. The
trouble with such a model does not lie in our own conceptualization, but rather in the
Russian mind. The fact is, the Russians will refuse to correspond to our own western
models of how they should behave.

Russians do not, at present, trust government. It is our own democratic instinct,
however, to work through existing government agencies. Corruption, as anyone who works
in East Europe now knows all too well, is a condition of existence. Aid given through
secular sources, especially through government sources, will simply enrich those closest to it.
It will not, as the Russians well know, reach those for whom it is intended.

Corruption, of course, exists in church circles as well as secular ones. Private
agencies which raise funds are reluctant, understandably, to be forthright about patterns of
abuse of those funds. Information about the precise nature of such corruption in Russia and
Ukraine is hard to come by in virtually all organizations active in those countries. I can
speak only of Orthodox experiences; and I can testify that the patterns, though hardly to be
dismissed, are not of a shocking kind.

E. The models of corruption. There are three common patterns of corruption:
extortion, patronage, and outright appropriation.

Extortion. Shipments of goods, particularly donated clothing and goods, are
sometimes subject to a "mafia tax," exacted by local thugs, who demand a kind of payment
in goods for such materials as vans, trucks, clothes, and medical materials. The "tax" is
extortion demanded of churches as well as agencies; the incidents I have encountered have
involved amounts small by standards one might expect: the equivalent of $100, paid in
rubles, for the privilege of accepting the gift of a van to an agency without harassment. The
people from whom the extortion is exacted are Russians, never the foreign donors or workers
themselves. And in general the embarrassment is so great in the explaining, and the
extortion so relatively small in comparison to the gift, that the extortion is paid out of the
funds or materials donated without reporting the fact to the donors. Thus, almost inevitably,
foreign philanthropy helps to sustain the thugs who prey upon those in need.

Patronage. Churches who receive foreign goods tend to be large ones which attract
foreign notice: Nikolskii Sobor, the beautiful cathedral of St. Nicholas in St. Petersburg, is
just one such example. Parishioners of some such places have complained (as have deacons

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and other minor clergy who serve there as well) that foreign shipments of clothing and
goods, once arrived at the parish, experience a "visit by rank." The archpriest rector, his
assistants, and other parish dignitaries receive "first choice," the second rank the second, an
so on. The most needy, it is asserted by various sources in the same parish, receive their
their "share" last. Yet such patterns of hierarchy are common in Russian culture, and the
shipments are so visible that it is easy to discern that most of the needy do, in fact, receive
something of which they are in need.

**Outright appropriation.** With government donated and government received blocks
of assistance, however, the possibilities for corruption are so vast, and the checks against it
so weak, that huge amounts of money and material can in fact enrich those with first access
to it. In privately donated assistance, the patterns of organization tend to precede the
assistance: aid has an immediate institutional "object." In large, public grants of assistance,
however, it is often the case that the organization follows the aid, in direct response to it.
Such organization can, in Russia’s and Ukraine’s current climate, spring up at the very smell
of dollars and approach the fictitious. Small extortions may be exacted from those who
receive goods from private donors; in large public grants, huge donations can reach people
whom Americans in fact endow as *de facto* founders of the private economy. Were such
budding entrepreneurs selected on the basis of talent it would be one thing. But to leave
their selection to the scraps of a system we hope to replace is not a way to ensure the
survival of a new order. Most significantly, such mismanaged and misappropriated aid by
public officials is a sure way to win the enduring hostility of those people whom we wish to
win over.

**F. "Secular" missionaries.** Should we wish on the other hand to avoid vast
transfers of public assistance, one government to another, and replace it with a monitored
program of studiously "secular" assistance, we would also be vulnerable to problems of
another kind. In seeking to transfer "democracy," we also wish to export its manifestations.
Americans often interpret those manifestations in a way specific to their own culture. We
wish to export, for example, our own models of pluralism. The wording of some
foundations who invite Russian applicants already mimics the "equal opportunity" formulae
of American affirmative action. American feminists are likely to perceive the growth of
democracy as concomitant with the growth of feminism, in its American manifestations, even
if those manifestations do not meet with the approval of Russians of both genders in their
own culture. Russians have often testified to me that their sensibilities are routinely trampled in these well-meaning exchanges. And so they are, as surely and as inevitably as any Russian encounter with the Salvation Army or an earnest young missionary from the Latter Day Saints. Virtually all of us come armed with agendas; and because our agendas are secular rather than religious does not mean they are any less alien or unwelcome to those we intend to assist.

G. The dangers of an anti-American backlash. Thus assistance programs in Russia are doomed if they bear too evident an American stamp. Even though some may first receive them as evidence of a decidedly non-Soviet fashionability (or as the price for aid and material badly needed), most Russians will eventually react against them as evidence of foreign meddling. The process has already begun in the reaction to the cheaper, more tawdry manifestations of the "free market," and the result has been a strengthening of the forces of reaction. Among respected intellectuals and wizened grandmothers alike, there is a decided shift away from things American. The way to clear a path to democracy, then, is not by painting it with red, white, and blue.

IV The Middle Path: Helping Russia through Russian Hands by Integrating Private and Publicly Funded Aid and Development

There is a middle way, a path of moderation which can achieve the maximum good with a minimum risk. Neither secular nor private sources wish to assist the needy, or to promote development and democracy, through endorsing and endowing organizations whose ideology they do not share. To directly and almost unconditionally fund the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia, or any Orthodox church in any former republic, would not only strain good ethics but also common sense. As an Orthodox priest myself, I would assert that the Orthodox Church cannot be trusted to political empowerment in Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus. Yet the fact is that churches and religious societies in these countries have engendered a great many spontaneous, effective human aid efforts, long before foreign help has been available to them. We are not speaking here about plans to build in what seems a near hopeless task of reconstruction: we are describing people who have already worked at the task, without help, and who inspire others to join them.
A. The internal workings of successful organizations. The way to take part in this effort is to study the way in which these actual organizations work. The report of John Vass, appended to this one, lists a number of such organizations. I have, in my own work in Russia and Ukraine, encountered a host of other such groups. They are not "church organizations," as we would imagine them in the west, directed by and organized through ecclesiastical auspices. Quite to the contrary, these are organizations which began with a person, who had an idea, and who then went to the Church in order to endorse the idea rather than direct it.

Individual initiatives, embodied in organizations with a direct or peripheral church involvement, were undertaken by such people as Dr. G. Gniezdinsky and D. Ostrovsky. The results have been organizations which have achieved great social good with minimal funding.

Dr. Gniezdinsky, reading of western hospices for the dying, founded his own clinic in St. Petersburg in the Chernaia Rechka region. With very little assistance, and with painfully gained cooperation from local authorities, he has launched a successful hospice in which I have worked as a priest and which treats hundreds of patients each year. Facing tremendous demand for services, yet limited geographically to patients from one region of the city, he is now shaping a plan for such hospices in every district of the St. Petersburg. He has inspired imitators in Moscow and other Russian cities.

D. Ostrovsky, a recovered heroin addict, once imprisoned and a victim when he was a convict of the cruel "behaviorist" therapy of the Soviet era, could find no successful program of rehabilitation. He launched his own, on "supportive" models he discerned himself in spiritual literature. Rehabilitating himself, he then "paired" recovering addicts with support partners, for periods of intensive personal involvement interspersed with retreats at a rural center. With almost no help from abroad, and in the midst of all the crushing burdens of life in the current hyperinflation, Mr. Ostrovsky has built his own retreat center in the Pskov-Pochaev region near the Estonian border. His students, and graduates of his program, work on the streets of Moscow and other Russian cities. In ten years he has reached several hundreds of patients on his own, developed a methodology and trained its implementors, through them affected thousands of those seeking help with a 30-50% remission rate. His organization, "Revival," looks to the Church for guidance and inspiration, but is in no way directed by it.
In the current climate of the former USSR, those who head organizations which have been generated by or in order to seek western aid exist with a profound dependency upon foreign resources. Indeed, visiting or working at their offices, as I worked with those who were launching a Home for the Infirm sponsored by the Theological Academy in St. Petersburg, one quickly realizes that western aid is the first priority, and the needs of those whom it is to serve follow after. In any of the voluntary organizations, however, the work is underway before funding begins. Those who discover and fund the activity multiply the effectiveness of the assistance.

One prominent source of such assistance has been the manifold and diverse exchanges between Russian, Ukrainian and American physicians and health organizations. Mr. Ackerman's report on patterns of administration (Appendix I) outlines some problems in adjustment and coordination among these structures.

In the examples of private initiative, I have thus far spoken only of the dying, the sick, and of hardened addicts -- people, perhaps, in whom the religiously or humanistically motivated might invest attention, but hardly those who can serve the interests of a new economy and a new democracy. Yet efforts which are focused precisely on the economy and private enterprise can spring from individuals motivated by a desire to tap neglected talent.

One example of this kind of American/Russian alliance is the Seachrist/Vasiliev partnership. I placed in contact an American businessman, William Seachrist (Prodex, Inc., in the Cleveland area), and a young Russian entrepreneur, Igor Vasiliev. Mr. Vasiliev had located a number of craftsmen skilled in fine decorative metalwork, of a kind which adorned many Russian icons before the Revolution. With Mr. Seachrist's investment, Vasiliev founded a shop and business allowing these craftsmen to produce fine metalwork for reproductions. Vasiliev has also refurbished his own clothing shop, designing durable and cheap clothes for Russian children on the ruble economy. Mr. Seachrist envisioned this program, and another which he is planning for a joint venture in peat, with a purely educative mission in mind: find the talent, train it, and let it go. There have been no meetings with ministers, directors, or middlemen. He sought to go straight to the center in his search.

B. The primary need. There is one request, which I have received consistently in the over three years of work, travel, and research which underlies this report, from various sources. From a doctor who has given his life to ease the passing of those forgotten dying
amidst the needy, from former addict therapists and priests and youth workers and young entrepreneurs, I have heard one refrain: "Train us in organization. We know what we need and where to apply it. We know our own society. We are ashamed of the ruin around us, but we have simply inherited bumbling, inefficient modes of self-organization. We need hands-on, pragmatic organizers to help us create the structures which we can then take over and administer ourselves. This is one thing you Americans do so well. Show us how!"

C. Addressing the need: "The Pentangle: A Five-Point Program of Self Help.

With that plea in mind, I have spent much of my time in the past two years going over the administrative needs and problems of volunteer organizations in Russia and Ukraine. In conjunction with my Russian and Ukrainian friends, and after listening to relief experts like Alex Rondos of IOCC, I have designed a five-point "pentangle" program specifically designed for the Russian and Ukrainian environment in these times. The pentangle, in medieval times, signified the five "points" of individual virtue by which a person could strive toward a perfection in independence. I believe that those who wish to foster independence and self-help in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, can apply the following five principles. They can use them to target and empower those most likely to have the greatest effect in giving their own people the gifts of tolerance, economic self-sustenance, and hope.

The five principles apply five words (Seek, Train, Ally, React, Select) which form the acronym S.T.A.R.S., to embody the "pentangle" principle. The principle is specifically designed to select from among the many volunteer organizations and private initiatives, both religious and secular, those which are most successful. The principle will also bring together these successful organizational units in administrative cooperation, promoting both efficiency and democratic principles. This mode of operation will also guard against the possibility of either church or local authorities appropriating large amounts of economic assistance in order to build a patronage system, a system which could work against the very democratic values our aid and assistance seeks to instill. Let us follow each principle in sequence:

Seek: Through existing American organizations which now have experience in Russia, funding agencies whether public or private can locate private, volunteer and
lay-directed organizations. These organizations should be already founded, with a proven record, and native in leadership.

**Train:** To avoid the existing patronage network, and to help generate a new network based upon democratic, cooperative principles, the funding agencies should seek to wean this organization from administrative dependency upon local ministries or ecclesiastical direction. Though clergy or local authorities may offer a support role, they should not in any way direct the activities of the group. Instead, the group should be "tutored" periodically by an organizer assigned to a local district. The organizer should be a person practically trained, in business or social services, rather than a theoretical economist or political theorist.

**Ally.** In order, then, to foster the kind of intercommunication and practical networking which is so sadly lacking in former Soviet nations, one can make these grants-in-aid contingent upon forming cooperative committees in the same district, where under the district organizational specialist they can be taught to share common problems and arrive at common solutions. Needs in transport, supply, exchange of materials and allocation could be arranged within these local committees; and internal patterns of barter and exchange could be free to arise.

**React.** As the structures of extortion begin to operate upon these local organizations, and as they become the prey of authorities who desire a part of the action, the cooperative committees could form strategies of reaction. These, to be honest, would differ with each region and each circumstance: police cannot always be trusted, or may themselves be the agents of extortion. At any rate, the organizer who works within the district or the on-site advisers hold the best leverage: their own dollars. At their most effective if also the most radical, westerners can cut off all aid to those districts which allow their efforts to be pillaged.

**Select.** Using an incremental plan of gradually increasing allotments, beginning with quite modest amounts (most of these native organizations will have been working with very little), the local committees can begin a system of accountability. Outside reviewers can review the quarterly reports of funded organizations and efforts, to discern those who have been most successful. Remember that these are people unused to competition; they can only gradually absorb and internalize the message that success breeds success. Those most successful can be endowed further, with an eye to reaching the maximum population and then achieving independence. Those with a poor record can be dropped.
D. Linking different organizations funded through various sources. Participants in and then graduates of this five-point "pentangle" program (STARS) can link with other STARS members through the network of organizers. STARS units could be arranged by activity (as in those targeted to stimulate private enterprise) or by social service (medical STARS, units, youth-directed STARS units, family services STARS units). The targeted organizations could be completely "pluralist," in that they might derive from any organization affiliated with any religious, ethnic, or accepted political group. They would be free to seek inspiration and motivation from any of those sources. Yet at the same time, they could be brought into pragmatically motivated cooperation with other units.

Coordinated in this way, foreign assistance might blend both private and public sources in the U.S. and at the same time target native, Russian population groups on their own social and ethical terms. U.S. Agencies could fund through grants any variety of private charitable initiatives, as long as they were focused upon a specific social end. The STARS organizers could then combine like groups within the same districts of Russia or Ukraine into the local cooperative framework.

Thus Orthodox or secular or Evangelical-funded groups addressing the problem, say, of neglected children or young families could be combined together in a cooperative framework. Many Russians and Ukrainians have found only within their churches and spiritual traditions the motivation and inspiration to voluntarily address social problems, or to organize in the anticipation of freer markets. This STARS system would not break those motivating allegiances, but it would at the same time combine problem solving with long-term demonstrations of democratic cooperation in action.

E. Organization of Volunteer Groups in Russia and Belarus. Russia and Belarus follow, through most of their regions, the problems and patterns which I have outlined thus far in this report. I would say that the deeper into rural areas one penetrates, the fewer voluntary organizations one finds. In the far north or deep into central Russia, where I have traced the effects of private aid or followed activist Russian volunteers, the rich array of voluntary efforts dissipates. In a single motivated citizen, or in a young priest assigned to a rural region, one can find "catalysts" of social organization. These individuals tend themselves to delegate a number of interested followers to pursue different social needs, thereby in effect anticipating the "committee network" which lies at the heart of the STARS
pattern. Yet the needs are so great, and the time and resources of these few individuals so limited, that they are exhausted by needs.

The task in regions far from Moscow is to SEEK (step one) and find the one individual, and let him or her serve as chief advisor to the organizers who should form the core of any American effort. With small grants, much can be done; and indeed people in the outlying regions tend perforce to be more resourceful, more independent than their counterparts in cities. These individuals have already, through cajoling and barter, worked out crude links by transport, one of the chief problems which now plague the rural regions.

It is far better to work within those local structures, following them and improving them, than it is to impose from above an entire new system of aid and transport. These new schemes will rapidly face the same shortages which paralyzed the old system. It is best to go to those who have already worked their way through the old difficulties, and found "holes" within the system, than it is to create new structures with the same old authorities.

V. Ukraine and its Special Circumstances

A. Internal religious discord in Ukraine. In Russia and Belarus, there is enough unity within Orthodox ranks and enough vestiges of mutual cooperation in most districts to make this STAR system work. Like an overlying transparency in an organizational chart, the district networking can link together and interconnect organizations who have already been funded independently, through different sources. In Ukraine, however, there has been so much discord and infighting among native religious groups that a special variation of this procedure is called for.

The four "intra-Orthodox" parties in Ukraine. In a long report to NCEER in 1991, I documented the religious infighting among Orthodox and Eastern Catholic groups in Russia and Ukraine. I also tried to outline the political impact of such divisions. Though the divisions may seem extremely complex, it is necessary to distinguish among these groups in order to make sense of this tragic morass. Currently, there are four religious divisions in Ukraine among those who were, only a few years ago, regarded by the world as "Russian Orthodox":

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a. Ukrainian Catholics. In West Ukraine, and to some degree east of Kiev, there are now many "Ukrainian Catholics," those people Orthodox in ritual and form, but now linked once more to Rome in ecclesiastical discipline. Their leader, regarded as a "Patriarch" by his followers but not yet proclaimed so by Rome, is a cardinal archbishop with his residence in Lviv. These are a people who receive significant aid and support from the large Ukrainian Catholic community in the U.S. and Canada. With their links abroad and their numbers, they have significant political influence in west Ukraine.

b. Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox. Among the Orthodox remaining, one group separated from Moscow in 1989 and sought to re-create the ancient "Church of Kiev," independent from both Moscow and Rome, which preceded Russian and Roman religious domination of Kiev in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This "Autocephalous" ("self-heading") church elected a Patriarch in 1991, Mstislav I who was an exile residing in S. Bounbrook, New Jersey. Patriarch Mstislav died earlier this year. This Church then elevated a successor, on October 14 of this year, to act as "Patriarch" of this church.

c. The Orthodox in Communion with Moscow. Those who remained loyal to Moscow at first kept their links to the Russian Patriarch unchanged. Then, when defections from the Russian Patriarch grew, the Synod of Russian Bishops sanctioned a semi-autonomous "Ukrainian Church." This Church, still called "Muscovite" even by its followers, retains the loyalty of most Russophone Ukrainians. (Whereas "Ukrainian Orthodox" and "Ukrainian Catholic" parishes celebrate the liturgy and other services in modern Ukrainians, those linked with Moscow use the traditional Old Church Slavonic, preferred by ecclesiastical conservatives.) The Synod of Russian bishops also ousted from his see in Kiev one of their own supporters, the unpopular and suspectedly corrupt Metropolitan (a bishop of high regional rank) Philaret.

d. The "Kievan" Orthodox Church. Metropolitan Philaret, immediately after he was ousted by the Russian bishops, separated himself from Moscow and pronounced himself a nationalist. He "repented" of his former denunciations of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and sought to link himself with their Patriarch Mstislav. Philaret is linked closely with President Kravchuk of Ukraine, and well funded with personal accounts in the national bank (as reported to me by workers in his own Consistory this summer). He linked his church very closely with the central government. Patriarch Mstislav formally denounced him and refused to join with his jurisdiction. Thus yet another schism was created, the
so-called Kievan Orthodox Church. This church, with its headquarters in Kiev, retains close links with the government, which seeks its official recognition by other Orthodox churches abroad. On October 21, they too elevated their own "Patriarch."

B. Some international implications of Ukrainian church politics. Both the Autocephalous and the Kievan Orthodox Churches (b and d above) are denounced by Moscow. Both churches seek formal ("canonical") recognition by other international Orthodox bishops. The avenue to this recognition is a united Ukrainian front appealing to the Patriarch of Constantinople (Istanbul) in Turkey, who has ancient historic links to Kiev as its "Mother Church," and who also has symbolic precedence in the company of all Orthodox Churches.

This desire for recognition by the chief Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul, avidly pressed by the Ukrainian government, creates a potentially significant diplomatic connection between Turkey and Ukraine. The Patriarch in Constantinople, with but symbolic authority and a tiny enclave in an Islamic nation, is held in suit to the Turkish government; Ukraine, with its own tensions with Russia, has reasons to strengthen its ties with Turkey as it seeks a link with the Patriarch of Constantinople.

President Kravchuk has sent several letters to the Patriarch in Constantinople through church delegations, and he has made a number of diplomatic overtures to Turkey in the same recent period.

The Patriarch of Moscow avidly resists such a connection between Ukraine and Constantinople. He has gone so far as to convey veiled personal threats to two bishops of that jurisdiction, when they visited Moscow and declared an intention to visit Ukraine. He has pressured the Patriarch of Constantinople not to recognize any independent church movement in Ukraine. The Patriarch of Constantinople has thus far offered no overt encouragement, though it is clear that he could be served very well by a link with the many Orthodox in Ukraine who prefer his ecclesiastical authority to that of Moscow.

C. Efforts at reconciliation. The Government of Ukraine is perceived to be more stable than that in Moscow. It has in recent days been clumsy in its too hasty, too transparent attempts to serve national unity through interfering in Church politics, lending its authority to Philaret and serving his interests in lending local militia to suppress his opponents. Ecclesiastical disarray continues in Ukraine; yet many people return to a church affiliation even as their churches grow more bitterly estranged from each other. There are
overtures toward canonical unity in Ukraine. The Ukrainian bishop Vsevolod, resident in New York and serving under the Patriarch of Constantinople, has kept channels open among the competing Ukrainian jurisdictions. An "Oxford/Kiev Church Study Group" even brings theologians together to discuss matters of common concern to Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholics; and several prominent Ukrainian Catholic figures have visited Turkey in search of some breakthrough toward Ukrainian church unity. But the Patriarch of Moscow (with his own pressures from the right at home, and with ecclesiastical if not political precedence in Ukraine) resists efforts toward reconciliation.

D. Ukrainian echoes in the Balkans. Thus Church politics has international implications. As the Balkans grow more and more troublesome and dangerous, and as NATO's link of Turkey with Greece grows more and more tenuous, Ukraine and Turkey have a common axis of interests. Should Russia grow more unstable internally, and should the "mystic nationalists" hold sway, Russian ecclesiastical precedence in Ukraine will become a political issue. Although figures are hard to estimate, the Ukrainian press generally assumes that the Ukrainian Catholics constitute about 10%-15% of the churchgoing population. Of the remainder, the Orthodox in communion with Moscow compete evenly with the more nationalist jurisdictions. Among them all, however, there is an embittered atmosphere which erupts occasionally in violence. Though the violence is sporadic and more a matter of scandal than of civil concern, the discord absorbs energy otherwise spent in deeds of charity.

E. Humanitarian assistance in Ukraine. Most likely because of the religious discord in Ukraine, much of the humanitarian aid to that country has centered upon hospitals and the medical response to the Chernobyl disaster. Religious efforts on the Catholic and Protestant front serve their own communities. Orthodox volunteer organizations, of the kind documented in Russia, do indeed exist, but my own fieldwork in Kiev and Lviv found even these charitable organizations bound up in sectarian disputes. There is a "paralysis" of charity: many people are willing to work, and they deplore the fact that people are not working together. Yet they cannot overcome their disputes even long enough to organize themselves to receive aid.

On behalf of IOCC (International Orthodox Christian Charities) I have succeeded in the Kiev region in bringing together a number of people, registered in an outlying suburb, as a "League." It was registered in my presence in June of 1993. It is hoped that through this
League, which includes people from all the varying jurisdictions bound in common civil and charitable causes, the IOCC can work through a funded organizer to begin an operation in Ukraine. As yet, there has been no funding. Almost no "volunteer based" humanitarian aid reaches these communities in Ukraine: even those Orthodox in communion with Moscow complain bitterly that Moscow sends them nothing.

Hospital aid, separated from such complex jurisdictional disputes, is much less problematic. Thus those interested in Ukrainian relief can at least help the sick, if not the nominally healthy. Funded by Ukrainians abroad, most of this hospital aid is not administratively centered, and it tends to manifest itself in numerous inter-hospital exchanges and institution-to-institution or person-to-person contacts.

There is some business effort and business-generated instruction going on in Ukraine as well, but this too is not well coordinated. Americans who go to Ukraine complain that the people they receive in business-related training sessions or seminars are "boss selected," "safe" apparatchiks from state industry: they cannot "get at" the entrepreneurs. The Ukrainians who go to such training programs complain that the Americans are well meaning, but that they simply do not comprehend the restrictions still implicit in their economy.

F. Avoiding religious tensions in aid and development programs. In Ukraine, virtually all non-Protestant religious communities are highly politicized. Their internal disputes, however, are irrelevant to American national interests with one exception: they can exacerbate tensions with Russia. For funding agencies, the religious landscape is a mine field; yet at the same time vast human needs go neglected. The task and agenda in Ukraine, then, should be set by the needs themselves. Rather than working through the disputing parties, humanitarian concerns can work through those interested in meeting human needs.

The coordinating STAR pattern, integrating private volunteer organizations with public efforts, can indeed work as well in Ukraine as in Russia. In Russia, however, volunteer organizations are more likely to be staffed by well-meaning nonpartisans. "Orthodox" sounding groups will host charitable non-Orthodox activists who are simply motivated by humanitarian concerns and who have a vague affinity for the spiritual traditions which their society so long silenced. In Ukraine, however, many volunteer organizations tend to be fiercely partisan. President Kravchuk is seeking to harness the Orthodox Church under the "Kievan Orthodox" model in order to bring it into harmony with government causes, as well as to quell inter-Orthodox rivalries. His attempts, however, are
controversial; and any U.S. funded efforts would do well to avoid strengthening one party or another.

In implementing the "five point plan," then, Ukraine has its own set of problems. Working through existing voluntary organizations requires more caution and even more direction than it does in Russia. Careful coordination, and an emphasis upon the cooperative, committee structure in addressing common concrete problems, can help to harness energies and focus them in a more useful direction. Above all, local organizations must realize that their continued funding depends absolutely upon their ability to coordinate their efforts in meeting common ends.

VI. Correction of Nonproductive Approaches to the Problem of Aid

In order, then, to serve American interests in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and at the same time combat the regressive forces of "mystic nationalism" and xenophobia in those countries, Americans must set aside some assumptions which have guided their behavior in the past.

Through the same sources in all three countries from which I drew the "five point program," I asked about past mistakes in the American mode of operation in the Slavic countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. From my work and interviews with a host of active volunteer organizations in Russia and Ukraine, I drew up the following eight suggestions. Volunteers in Russia and Ukraine provided this advice to those public and private organizations who wish to do work there:

1. Americans must not impose their own secular assumptions upon a rapidly de-secularizing society. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine are rejecting a Soviet past which promoted a militant, repressive secularism. Americans may have problems with their recovery of a religiously colored nationalism. They may even regard Slavic religious institutions as obstructing the democratic models which America hopes to foster. Yet to ignore these religious traditions, or to be perceived as working against them, is to lose ground in promoting long term American interests in the area of the former U.S.S.R.
Americans must work within and through any indigenous, stable structures in this unstable society in order to achieve any success. Religious institutions are the most stable, and also the most successful in inspiring others to work toward prosperity and public welfare.

2. **Americans must not regard Russian or Ukrainian religious structures as a monolith.** Many academic and government analysts, unfamiliar with Eastern European religious traditions, view them in analogy with the west. The Patriarch of Moscow is not analogous to the Pope of Rome or the Cardinal Archbishop of New York. The models of authority are traditional and patriarchal, but not at all orderly or in concord. The Orthodox Church includes a vigorous right wing, but also progressive, democratic and intellectual laity, priests, and hierarchs. Serving American interests means not only working around the right wing, but also assisting the progressive elements in any movement whose ideology is more in concord with our own civil democratic models. To do this skillfully means that the U.S., with skillfully applied economic initiatives, can easily tip the balance away from the right wing and toward the progressive wing in the Orthodox Church. And Orthodoxy is that religious community most politically influential in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

3. **The U.S. can most effectively and efficiently channel funds, for civil ends, through small, voluntary religious and private institutions which precede the granting of aid.** Indeed, the funding of USAID through IOCC (to the amount thus far of only $400,000) has been an effective way of promoting both indigenization and cooperation in the non-profit voluntary sector. (Recent glitches between competing American agencies threaten some of these efforts.) Those organizations made up of Russians are ones which best understand their society; initiatives directed by Americans alone are the most prone to fail in achieving democratic ends. The idea is to motivate Russians or Belarussians or Ukrainians to work on their own behalf. Foreign leadership, even when directed by experts in the field, merely prolongs patterns of dependency and also contributes to eventual resentment.

4. **Americans, used to a pragmatic, "results" oriented assessment of investment, must realize that process is in itself a part of the desired**
outcome of our aid efforts. Americans like to count "food distributed" or "cooperative enterprises founded" as the ultimate criteria for success or failure of a program. In East Europe, however, the lumbering, inefficient and rapidly collapsing means of achieving any end are in themselves the basic problem. Thus the founding of cooperative structures, the promotion of new methods of organization and management, are in their own way the best measures of the U.S.'s initial success. It is natural, given the internal disorder of their sickened society, that first results will be slow to measure. The instruments of measurement, then, must be focused at first upon the administrative structures which begin to take shape. As these are founded, and as cooperation is encouraged among all working parties, later results will be more efficient and more certain.

5. **Coordination of these efforts is best achieved through on-site "group management," rather than through negotiations among agencies at home.**

The assigned "organizers" are crucial figures in coordination of various projects through various private agencies. Russians themselves plead for organizational help, and realize that one of their biggest problems is coordinating effort. U.S. funding agencies can address that problem most efficiently, through the assignment of organizers in various districts simply to promote connection and coordination among the various funded projects in that region.

*Coordination even among American government agencies is no less important.* In today's climate Russians and Ukrainians, once they have western contacts, quite naturally regard them as a marketable resource. They can, in effect, "hoard" their contacts and build closed patronage systems through them. This tendency, of course, militates against struggles to build an open society. A demand for practical coordination, focusing upon the task at hand, can frustrate this tendency. The funding, for all parties, must be contingent upon such organizational cooperation.

6. **Practical organizational skills are more important for facilitators than theoretical expertise.** In the past 16 years I have seen Americans of various kinds at work in Russia and Ukraine. In the explosion of western aid and assistance to Russia in the past three years, there has been a tendency in the secular arena to draw from the theoretically trained analysts and experts who concerned themselves with the USSR during the Cold War.
Gorbachev himself made overtures to these experts in a series of highly visible conferences which reflected his policies; and once Yeltsin acceded to power some very prestigious American universities lent their staffs and names to reform initiatives. Private and/or religious organizations, on the other hand, sent personnel directly to the communities they wished to effect. With confusion as to how to proceed, and sometimes with scant language skills to begin, these people plunged into the arena and did what other people were beginning to plan how to do. What is more, the "second echelon" of these humanitarian efforts is now beginning in an effort to organize local populations to enter a free market economy.

The point is this: private groups can more easily enter the current Russian reality. Large planning efforts, involving theoretical experts, are perceived to be parallel to the old Soviet structures (with which, quite frankly, many Americans were more comfortable). Russia, to survive, must achieve some centralization of its authority; yet Moscow is growing more and more irrelevant to the outlying regions. The answer to Russian and Ukrainian economic and social health lies in the local communities. What they need most are people with practical organizing skills to assist new, already functioning but floundering organizations to cooperate with each other. In other words, we need to assist Russians now to build their economic and social structures toward a common center, rather than impose from a common center some order upon the whole body.

The experience of private organizations indicates that a host of small, locally applied efforts with relatively modest budgets are more successful in the new Russian environment than the large, expert-advised and centralized funds or foundations. The problem of virtually every organization in Moscow is getting the money out. Those Americans with contacts in Moscow are in fact among the least capable to achieve that miracle of distribution. Eager, English-fluent Muscovites, the inheritance of the old order, lie in wait to monopolize whatever Americans bestow upon them. American efforts can use the existing private channels to begin their aid programs directly to the regions where Americans have already built contacts. They need not rely upon those with credentials relating to Russia in itself; rather, they can rely upon those credentials they possess in business, police work, social work or education.

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7. Carefully screen regulations which donating agencies place upon the use of donated material, and allow for sufficient freedom to adapt. There are a host of wasteful horrors, due to regulations placed upon the use of materials by American donors or local authorities, which I have myself witnessed in the course of my work. Cancer patients were unable to digest the canned meat, donated to them by American agencies. Yet regulations prohibited distributing any of it to employees or volunteers, many of whose children needed protein. The cans collect dust and await the passage of their expiration dates.

8. Corruption within the old order is now the norm rather than the exception; through our choice of those whom to assist, we build a new order. The corruption covered in this report has been of two primary kinds. In the model which I have myself observed, thugs or minor public officials directly prey upon those to whom goods or funds are distributed. In the second model, "those in the middle" appropriate funds or goods for themselves. Aid and development grants offered through those already active in Russia will encounter the first variety; aid and development grants offered through central agencies in Moscow will encounter the second. In the first model, those recipients who are organized cooperatively can use their own devices to resist the criminals in their own midst: for this reason, some police and law enforcement components should be a part of any extensive district program. In the second model, controls are much more difficult to institute.

VII Conclusion: Hope Could Be Our Best Export

Hope is the best gift we can offer those in East Europe. Optimism of any kind has been a casualty of the old order's collapse. The most cursory contact with Russian or Ukrainian young people will reveal how little faith they place in the existing government and social structures, and how little expectation they have that any alternatives can work.
For this reason, we should treat with respect what reserves we can muster of high American expectations.

1. American young people, fresh out of college with proven organizing and leadership potential, are a tremendous resource not so much for what they can do (they can do less, in fact, than any Russians they might assist in coordinating), but for what they can inspire.

2. Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians speak with some bemusement of American enthusiasm, but they are also quite vulnerable to it. The quiet assurance of experienced Americans, and also the resolute cheer of American youth, often act as a catalyst for their own best efforts. Quite simply, they have lost faith in themselves. An aid program which gives them back even a measure of that lost faith will be a successful one.

It is difficult to measure with any precision the presence of that crucial confidence, but it is all too easy to see its absence on the current Russian scene. Facing the tremendous social and economic needs that loom, like huge black holes, over the Russian landscape, those who spend money there can easily be affected by a sense of futility. After many years' experience in Russia and Ukraine, with constant efforts to penetrate deep into the country, avoid notoriety, and avoid a "Moscow's eye" perception of Russia, I retain a sense of commitment and hope. I think that in attitude, and to a more limited degree in wealth and organizational expertise, we can offer Russia, Belarus and Ukraine what they need to form stable economies generally friendly to American interests. All we need to do is proceed with wisdom and an honest awareness of the people whom we seek to assist.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
AND HEALTH CARE SERVICES OF RUSSIAN HOSPITALS

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SUMMARY

This report was developed as a result of a two-week visit to St. Petersburg, Russia, spent interviewing physicians and hospital administrators and gathering data at, and observing the operation of, the following organizations: Djanelidze Research Institute Of Emergency Care (an 850-bed hospital that consists of 200 salaried physicians and 40-to-50 research personnel, and annual patient admissions of over 23,000); the First Medical Institute of St. Petersburg (a 2,000-bed medical institute that includes 12 clinics, a teaching hospital, and a medical school); and Children's Hospital #21.

Russian hospitals are currently struggling to respond to the breakdown of central authority, as well as rapidly adapt to evolving market economies. There is reason for concern as hospital management teams are now being faced with the seemingly insurmountable challenge of taking on more responsibilities and performing functions they have never been forced to perform before (i.e. operational analysis, planning, budgeting, etc.). Due to the extremely dynamic and complex field of health care, one only wonders how this adjustment will be successfully accomplished by such management teams -- which are typically quite lean and are almost entirely comprised of physicians who continue to perform clinical functions approximately 40% of the time, as well.

In addition, the severe lack of pharmaceuticals, supplies, and up-to-date technology continues to place the health status of approximately 150 million Russian citizens in jeopardy. A significant increase in the number of AIDS cases has already occurred due to the lack of available disposable equipment and adequate sterilization capabilities. This shortage of available technology has also threatened the continuation of many potentially valuable studies/projects that are currently being performed by Russian physicians and/or researchers.

While many recommendations for aid to Russian hospitals can be offered, a significant amount of these would most likely be extremely costly and their benefit would be questionable. Because of the collaborative efforts that are currently taking place between a variety hospitals and health care organizations in the United States, it would seem only natural that the most effective help would be achieved through the development and support of international hospital partnerships. These partnerships, some of which are already being
developed, could potentially successfully address a whole host of challenges that currently face the Russian health care system. However, it must be kept in mind that many American health care organizations are beginning to struggle as a result of a more restrictive reimbursement environment, an increasingly complex and chronically ill patient population, and the ongoing threat of major health care reform (which could cause many American health care organizations to scramble to restructure themselves in order to continue to successfully compete in the future). Therefore, the financing of these partnerships would have to come from other sources than merely the health care organizations that are involved in the partnerships. Currently, the strain on the Russian health care system is significant. Without immediate assistance, the health care status of millions of Russians is at stake.
INTRODUCTION

This paper was developed as a result of a recent trip to St. Petersburg, Russia, where the author spent approximately two weeks interviewing physicians and hospital administrators, gathering data, and observing the operations at several of St. Petersburg’s most prestigious health care organizations. These organizations included the following: Djanelidze Research Institute of Emergency Care (an 850-bed hospital that consists of 200 salaried physicians and 40-to-50 research personnel, and annual patient admissions of over 23,000); the First Medical Institute of St. Petersburg (a 2,000-bed medical institute that includes 12 clinics, a teaching hospital, and a medical school); and Children’s Hospital #21.

While it was virtually impossible to ignore the physical condition of these terribly worn facilities, the intent of this visit was to perform an assessment of the current management structure of these organizations. Therefore, this assessment includes the following: an overview of the management structure that currently exists in a typical Russian hospital; a thorough critique of this particular management structure; and finally, recommendations on how these management teams can be strengthened in order to ensure that Russian hospitals, not only remain viable, but begin to significantly improve operationally by becoming more efficient, effective, and productive. This will undoubtedly enable Russian hospitals to better meet the ever-changing needs of the patients they serve.

This paper also explores the current condition of the various health care services that exists within these hospitals. Specifically, these services include the following: medicines/drugs; equipment; and supplies. A list of needs is presented in this section, as well as suggestions for potentially improving the quality and increasing the quantity of these particular services in Russian hospitals.

Finally, this paper explores one particularly interesting project that is currently being performed by a Russian surgeon. This project is a reflection of the tremendous potential that exists within the field of Russian medicine. However, it is also understood that this potential may never be realized without the proper equipment and support systems.
MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIAN HOSPITALS

The field of health care is quite dynamic. This constant change has led many to believe that health care is one of the most complex social systems in existence today. Furthermore, it is a common belief that the hospital is one of the most challenging organizations to effectively administer. While these beliefs are debatable, it is a known fact that, due to the sheer complexity of the health care field, it is vitally important for these organizations to have strong management teams in place. The most effective management teams have the ability to not only ensure that their hospital is operating most efficiently and effectively on a daily basis, but they are also capable of successfully positioning the organization appropriately for the future. This combination of effective management of daily operations and strategic planning for the future is invaluable to the success of hospitals in today’s dynamic health care environment.

Management Structure:

The management team in a typical Russian hospital is dominated by doctors. This team is led by a Director, or Chief Doctor, who operates a relatively small management team. This supporting cast consists of the following: Hospital/Polyclinic Deputies; Chief Nurse; and Financial Advisor.

The Director generally spends approximately 60% of his/her time on management duties, while continuing to perform clinical duties the remaining 40% of the time. According to Michael V. Grinev, M.D., Director of Djanelidze Research Institute of Emergency Care, and Vladimir Miniaev, F.M.D., Professor in the First Medical Institute of St. Petersburg, the Directors of these hospitals are ultimately responsible for the following: the overall operations of the clinics and departments within the organization; the operations of the centralized laboratory; the ordering of supplies, pharmaceuticals, equipment, and disposables; and the operations of Housekeeping, Nutritional Services and other support services.

While total control of the overall expenditure is retained by the Director, the Deputies are responsible for the management of certain areas that have been specifically designated to them (e.g. Pediatric Polyclinic, OB/GYN Polyclinic, etc.). According to Drs. Grinev and Miniaev, these Deputies are especially helpful in assisting with the ordering of the supplies, equipment, pharmaceuticals, and disposables in the various clinics. In addition, it is fair to
state that the typical Russian hospital is primarily run by the Director, who, in turn, seeks input from the Deputies.

Within this general framework, however, it is recognized that the Chief Nurse also provides valuable input into the management of the various departments. Finally, a Financial Advisor often exists as a part of the management team, as well. This person's role simply consists of tracking the organization's expenditures.

It should be added that there is no Board of Directors in the Western European or American sense. Typically, the closest thing to any sort of governing body in each individual organization is the presence of a committee of hospital employees that serves in an advisory capacity for the Director.

Areas of Concern:

It must be noted that health care is just as complex in Russia as it is in America. Thus, the value of a strong management team in a Russian hospital is as vitally important. Historically, however, this was not necessarily the case. For example, the USSR Ministry of Health (in Moscow) always accepted full responsibility for the health activities of the 15 Union Republics by directing the appropriate services through the Republic Ministries of Health to the various Regional (Oblasti) and District (Rayon) Health Departments. Therefore, resources, priorities, and overall direction were set by the USSR Health Ministry together with norms and standards to which the Republics would plan facilities and services within the allocated budget. This system led to the creation of a heavily centralized and bureaucratic management system as well as rigid normative planning in the Russian health care system. As a result, no incentives were created to encourage the recruitment and development of strong management teams within Russian hospitals.

Many dramatic changes have taken place in Russia recently, which has caused great distress within the health care community. For example, as early as 1987, the USSR Ministry of Health began to assess the many deficiencies that existed within their own department. One conclusion that resulted from this assessment was that the deterioration in public health care has been aggravated by the management, planning, and financial systems employed by the USSR Ministry. In addition, this has been exacerbated by a lack of autonomy for managers (Directors) at the regional and local level. This assessment has been
influential. For example, while the Russian health care system at one time was riddled with heavily centralized, bureaucratic management systems and rigid normative planning, it is now believed that this system must rely on effective management and planning of the health care resources at the local level.

While this new "freedom," that is apparently being granted to the management teams of the various Russian hospitals, may be considered appealing to many who have felt frustrated by the previous heavily centralized, rigid system, there is also reason for considerable concern. For example, there is a significant lack of experience evident in the areas of planning, budgeting, and, most importantly, critical analysis. This is mainly because, until recently, decisions were only made at a high level. Even the Directors of the hospitals were expected only to administrate -- they were not rewarded for any planning or critical assessment of policy implications. Thus, these areas were typically ignored by the hospitals' management staffs.

Also, as was previously mentioned, the management teams within the Russian hospitals are primarily made up of physicians. Furthermore, these physician-managers still continue to perform clinical functions in addition to handling the various administrative responsibilities. It is interesting to note that numerous studies have been completed in recent years examining the cultural differences between physicians and administrators and the reasons for these differences. These studies indicate that, whereas administrators emphasize strategic planning (in order to produce a road map of how an organization can achieve a particular goal), communications skills (to effectively articulate the organization's vision and strategy to the other employees), and team building (in order to "move" the entire organization in the desired direction); physicians tend to direct their concerns more toward achieving and maintaining clinical competence, adherence to bylaws relating to accreditation and other regulatory requirements, advising the appropriate individuals on new technology and other practice needs, and maintaining some sort of personal autonomy. In sum, traditional physician understanding of effective leadership is far more clinically focused than institutionally focused. While the two outlooks on effective leadership are understandable, given the vastly different educational curriculums that administrators and physicians encounter while still preparing to enter their respective professions, the lack of team building
skills (and, hence, the physicians’ reliance upon independent thinking) can be quite problematic when seen in the larger context of organizational behavior.

Thus, clearly the emphasis upon individual, autonomous decision-making is at odds with an organizational culture of group decision and teamwork. Furthermore, even Vladimir Krasnorogov, M.D., a surgeon at Djanelidze Research Institute of Emergency Care, stated that health care management is a special art that physicians simply are not trained to do in medical school -- they, instead, are trained to provide the best medical care possible to the patient. It must be emphasized that the conclusions that should be deduced from this section are not that physicians cannot handle administrative responsibilities, and therefore they should not be performing any of the administrative functions whatsoever. As a matter of fact, some of the greatest health care administrators have indeed been physicians. Instead, what needs to be recognized here is the fact that physicians, because of their educational background and lack of management training, often need to attend management training courses. In addition, because of the demands of administration, it is often the case that the physician-administrator will be forced to significantly cut back or, even more likely, entirely give up his/her clinical functions in order to remain in an administrative capacity.

Finally, due to the drastic change that is taking place in Russia, there is also a feeling that low morale may become a serious problem. For example, the people working in Russian hospitals are not accustomed to having the kind of responsibilities and power that they now have. Because, previously, Soviet hospitals were government run and, thus, the staffs never had the ability to make decisions, a lack of confidence has left these hospital employees feeling like they cannot do anything. This sense of hopelessness, if not appropriately addressed, may very well jeopardize the future of many Russian hospitals.

Recommendations:

There is a belief that the operations of Russian hospitals will continue to deteriorate despite the efforts of the respective management teams, who are desperately struggling to respond to the breakdown of central authority. Considering the lack of experience that these teams possess in the areas of planning and operational analysis, this may certainly prove to be true. However, it should be kept in mind that significant change is often accompanied by difficult times...in the beginning. While things may initially get worse before they get better,
effective change eventually often leads to a situation that is vastly improved. Therefore, Russian hospital management simply needs to learn their new and greatly expanded roles and responsibilities. Undoubtedly, this will take an unlimited amount of patience and persistence. However, with some valuable assistance through international partnerships and projects, the progression along this seemingly endless learning curve may be significantly expedited. The following are some recommendations that may, in fact, aid in the development of Russian hospital management teams.

First, there is evidence that international hospital partnerships have been established in recent years. These programs should continue to be enthusiastically developed and supported. The focus of these partnerships would likely be on successfully addressing administrative imperatives that will positively affect the efficiency of Russian hospitals.

An example of such a partnership has been initiated between Geisinger Medical Center (a 577-bed, tertiary, regional referral, teaching hospital with 500 salaried physicians and 21,000 admissions per year, located in Danville, PA) and Djanelidze Research Institute of Emergency Care in St. Petersburg. It is Dr. Grinev’s belief that a restructuring of his hospital, utilizing Western management methods, may prove to be the key to the future viability of the Djanelidze Research Institute of Emergency Care. Dr. Grinev is acutely aware that before he can invest a large amount of technology and advanced medical supplies into his hospital, he must first put in place an organizational structure to manage these resources. Therefore, Djanelidze Research Institute of Emergency Care initially sought Geisinger Medical Center’s assistance in: (1) Assessing the Institute’s current organizational structure and operational functionality; (2) Evaluating the Institute’s role in St. Petersburg’s regional health care system; (3) Conducting a strategic planning retreat with the executive staff and developing an ongoing, self-sustaining process for planning, goal setting, and action-plan development and implementation; (4) Conducting a needs assessment and making recommendations for restructuring the Institute that is congruent with the strategic plan and increases the Institute’s organizational effectiveness in the areas of organizational structure and design, leadership, human resources development, financial management, decision making, and technology acquisition, maintenance, and management; (5) Developing a management curriculum to train physician administrators similar to executive programs found
in the United States; and (6) Developing a health administration program at a university in St. Petersburg which would provide accelerated instruction for physician-administrators and lay administrators in addition to the traditional baccalaureate and master degree curriculum.

Unfortunately, due to a lack of necessary grant funding to successfully support this partnership, many of these requests have been temporarily put on hold. However a "Geisinger-Djanelidze Program" currently exists in an effort to improve the management of the Djanelidze Institute through a series of demonstration projects and professional organizations. It is hoped that this program will serve as a model which would encourage other hospitals in the United States to adopt sister institutions in Russia and other Eastern European countries. It may also serve as a model for other hospitals within the city of St. Petersburg. Regardless, it will provide a stimulus and an example to the members of the staff of the Djanelidze Institute so that they might benefit from formal management training courses. Ultimately, this program could very well increase institutional pride as a result of the development of management skills and a new sense of professionalism.

Another initiative that should be further developed and thoroughly supported is the establishment of educational programs that will train Russian physicians to be effective administrators. Although this concept was briefly touched upon previously while discussing the original specifics of the Geisinger-Djanelidze partnership, it deserves special recognition because the impact of such a program could prove to be significant.

It has been stated that the country that has probably best taken to Western concepts of health care delivery is Poland, which has been the beneficiary of Project HOPE (a program that was designed during the Eisenhower administration for training health care workers overseas). Today, the University of Alabama at Birmingham's School of Health Related Professions is deeply involved in the project and has begun a program to train willing Poles the basics of health care administration. The UAB program enrolled 25 Polish administrators in its first full class, which began in September, 1991. The course teaches the fundamental aspects of administration such as operations, materials and personnel management, information systems, quality assurance, etc.

According to Dr. Miniaev, The First Medical Institute of St. Petersburg is in the planning stages of developing an educational program to train health care managers, as well.
This curriculum will consist of general management courses such as: accounting; economics; finance; marketing; statistics; and strategic planning. The curriculum will consist of health care-specific courses, as well (i.e. overview of various types of health care organizations, governance within the health care organization, etc.). Initially, The First Medical Institute of St. Petersburg is considering targeting a group of approximately 15-to-20 students from within the medical school to enroll in the health care management curriculum, as well. Dr. Miniaev stated that he believes that a manager is really a "specialist" also, in the sense that managers complete a special educational training program and possess a special knowledge and talent. Therefore, professors within The First Medical Institute of St. Petersburg are attempting to look for students that may have these special talents.

Programs such as these take a significant amount of time to develop to the point where they can operate on their own. Therefore, in the interim, much help is required from experienced administrators and qualified educators. As a matter of fact, Howard Howser, a professor and director of international studies at UAB's School of Health Related Professions firmly believes that getting American hospital management leaders into the program is crucial to the success of a project such as this. These leaders have the ability to bring a sense of reality to the classroom and, hence, avoid the pitfalls that accompany a complete reliance on theory.

Unfortunately, the initiatives that have been described in this section may require a significant amount of time, money, and other valuable resources in order to attract the attention of other American health care executives, physicians, researchers, professors, and/or qualified teachers. Nevertheless, these programs represent an ambitious step in the right direction, and, for this very reason, they should continue to be supported and encouraged in every way.

HEALTH CARE SERVICES IN RUSSIAN HOSPITALS

It is no secret that the quantity and quality of the health care services (i.e. pharmaceuticals, equipment, and supplies) in Russia are far inferior to the health care services in American hospitals. This is understandable when you consider that in Russia only 2% of the gross national product is spent on health care, while in the United States approximately 14% of the gross national product is spent on health care. Whatever the
reason for this huge disparity, it does not take a keen eye to notice that the current conditions in Russian hospitals are simply deplorable.

The lack of adequate supplies of medications, dressing supplies, needles, and syringes in addition to significantly outdated technology within these hospitals is virtually impossible to overlook. As a matter of fact, it has been stated that the lack of disposable equipment is a particularly frightening problem right now for the Russian health care workers because they are often forced to reuse these items without adequately sterilizing them. The unfortunate outcome has been an increase in the amount of reported AIDS cases.

The problems of severe shortages of these supplies in Russian hospitals has been further exacerbated by the inability to equitably distribute these products to the needy hospitals throughout the country. Distribution is frequently at a standstill because of the problems with the transportation system in Russia.

With that said, it is quite interesting to note that the Russian physicians are well-trained and qualified. Studies indicate that their clinical knowledge is more than adequate. Nevertheless, they are severely limited in their ability to perform the necessary procedures due to the lack of adequate health care supplies.

Needs:

It is important to keep in mind that Russians are extremely proud people. They have survived world wars, revolutions, and harsh living conditions for generations. Therefore, they were reluctant, to say the least, to submit a list of needs for their hospitals. As a matter of fact, only Djanelidze Research Institute of Emergency Care successfully provided a summary of necessary items -- and even that list was brief in length. Regardless, the following represents a list of supplies that are needed at Djanelidze Research Institute of Emergency Care:

Endoscopic Equipment/Supplies. -- This was considered to be the most important item on the list. Because endoscopic procedures are non-invasive, there is a strong feeling that the use of this equipment could positively impact the quality of patient care provided, while at the same time, significantly reduce the length of patient stay in the hospital. Also, the scopes should be accompanied by the appropriate equipment for compatibility purposes. Finally,
it was believed that Johnson & Johnson endoscopic devices are of the highest quality.

Antibiotics of the Fourth Generation (particularly Cephalosporin). -- It should be noted here that Children's Hospital #21 expressed a need for this antibiotic, as well.

Corticosteriods that can be injected.

Parental Nutrition (particularly Amino Acids and Albumin).

Plastic bags for blood collection.

Prophylactic antibiotics.

Equipment sterilization technology.

Any other available technology.

Recommendations:

A continued development of international hospital partnerships may positively impact the dire conditions under which the physicians are forced to provide quality health care in Russia. While referring again to the Geisinger-Djandelidze partnership, it is evident that this relationship attempts to address this issue, as well. For example, Geisinger has made attempts, albeit with limited success, to seek additional financing for this particular project. In doing so, Geisinger has approached U.S. companies who wish to establish a market in St. Petersburg. Examples of such companies include Abbott Laboratories, Baxter, Johnson & Johnson, and Merck & Co.. In the meantime, Geisinger is considering a variety of options such as: (1) Sending complete volumes of pertinent American medical journals that are currently in scarce supply in St. Petersburg. Donations of journals would be solicited from Geisinger physicians and shipped to Russia via Geisinger Medical Center mail services; (2) Sending fully depreciated, usable medical equipment to the Djanelidze Research Institute of Emergency Care; and (3) Coordinating an effort to solicit humanitarian aid in the form of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals for the Institute. This will require seeking donations from U.S. medical supply companies. Therefore, by establishing permanent sources of shipments of pharmaceuticals, equipment, and other supplies, these partnerships could positively impact the Russian hospitals in this area, as well.
UPDATE SCIENTIFIC ELECTRONIC MEDICAL EXPERT (USE ME)

As was previously mentioned, it is believed that the typical Russian physician is a well-trained, highly qualified professional in the field of medicine. It is merely the lack of pharmaceuticals, supplies, and up-to-date equipment/technology that obstructs the provision of high quality health care. An example of this is evident when considering a number of the studies that are currently being attempted by various Russian physicians, but are in jeopardy of not being completed due to a lack of available resources and/or money.

One such study is currently being performed by Dr. Krasnorogov at Djaneliidze Research Institute of Emergency Care. This study, known as "USE ME" (Update Scientific Electronic Medical Expert), is an attempt to define critical pathways (or clinical protocols) for the treatment of "surgical abdominal emergencies."

It is no secret that timely diagnostic evaluation and early effective treatment of acute surgical diseases and injuries of abdominal organs are extremely complex problems relative to surgical emergencies. Statistics show that, between 1980 and 1990, over 2 million Russian patients annually suffered different forms of "acute abdomen" and were admitted for surgical procedures. Unfortunately, this figure continues to increase each year. These statistics are primarily due to industrial accidents, transportation accidents and the growing incidence of crime.

The authors of this project indicate that the surgeons who are currently practicing in smaller hospitals in rural communities throughout Russia are not as highly qualified to treat these types of cases. Also, communication with those physicians who are better equipped to handle abdominal trauma cases is often a problem due to the unsatisfactory transportation and telephone systems in addition to the lack of computer networks. Therefore, the mortality rates of this patient population tends to be quite high -- anywhere from 32%-80% depending on the severity of the patient and the treatment conditions.

The authors, thus, hypothesize that USE ME: "Surgical Abdominal Emergencies" will provide essential informational support to practitioners by assisting with the decision making processes encountered when diagnosing and treating these complex cases. Specifically, USE ME: "Surgical Abdominal Emergencies" will include:

Computerized medical records.
Database of 20,000-to-30,000 cases of different surgical abdominal emergencies.

Expert system (diagnosis, individualized algorithm of treatment, prognosis of critical conditions, quality and cost effectiveness of treatment, etc.).

Electronic manual in surgical abdominal emergencies.

Programs for continuing medical education.

LEARN to USE ME program.

In addition, the authors believe that USE ME: "Surgical Abdominal Emergencies" will prove to be useful in other countries, as well.

The research team consists of highly educated experts from some of St. Petersburg's most prestigious scientific and medical institutions. These experts primarily practice in the areas of abdominal emergencies, mathematics, and programming.

Unfortunately, however, this team has been proceeding with this project since October, 1992 without any financial support. The authors are currently searching for investors, sponsors, or partners in order to enable continued development of the project.

This particular project is on the cutting edge of modern medicine. Even American physicians are currently attempting to define critical pathways such as the one described here. Unfortunately, however, without the aid of an outside source, the potential of this study will never be realized.

CONCLUSION

This paper reveals the fact that the dissolution of the Soviet Union has placed a significant strain on the health care delivery system in Russia. Hospitals, along with a wide variety of other organizations within the country of Russia, must receive help from various outside sources in order to develop the capacity to respond to the breakdown of central authority, as well as quickly adapt to evolving market economies. Due to the tremendous potential for rapid deterioration of the health status of almost 150 million people, the urgency with which this adjustment must be made cannot be overemphasized.
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OBJECTIVE
Obtain an entry level administrator's position in a large, complex health care organization with outstanding leadership and a strong commitment to quality.

EDUCATION
Master of Health Administration
Duke University
May, 1991
Durham, NC

Bachelor of Arts in English
Franklin and Marshall College
May, 1988
Lancaster, PA

EXPERIENCE
Henry Ford Health System
Senior Administrative Fellow
Detroit, MI
1992-1993

• Developed an appreciation of operational aspects of a vertically integrated regional health system.
  -- Monthly hospital performance report of all hospitals within Henry Ford Health System.
  -- Development of regionally structured system model.
  -- Ensured staff awareness of general issues (e.g. emergency procedures, safety, patient rights, quality assessment, and infection control) at outpatient facilities in preparation for JCAHO.
  -- Analysis of Henry Ford Hospital operations diagnostic performed by Deloitte and Touche.
  -- Summary of all committees that exist within the Parent Operating Group of Henry Ford Health System.
  -- Analysis of Henry Ford Hospital Transplant Programs.
  -- Analysis of Henry Ford Hospital Neonatal Services.
  -- Summary of customers' expectations at Henry Ford Medical Center, Woodhaven, based on 1992 Access Survey.
  -- Assisted with development of Point-of-Service insurance product.

• Enhanced leadership and management skills.
  -- Learned and utilized the principles of Total Quality Management.
  -- Assisted in the planning and development of a breast and cervical cancer screening program for low income women in Wayne County.
  -- Company Leader for Metro Detroit American Heart Walk.
  -- Assisted in budget preparation for Henry Ford Rehabilitation Programs.

• Developed an understanding of importance of community affairs.
  -- Participated in numerous community activities.

• Developed an understanding of numerous internal and external factors which affect administrators' ability to successfully manage.
  -- Attended hospital, medical group, corporate management, and governance meetings.
SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF

ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

by

JOHN F. VASS

JUNE 1-19, 1993
During the period of June 1 - 19, 1993 I conducted a series of interviews with various leaders of eighteen social, charitable groups and agencies working primarily in the secular circles of society. My talks with each of the groups, held mostly in the offices of "Nevskii Angel," were at least one hour in length. During these meetings, I inquired of each group's history, purpose, clientele, short and long term goals, needs and problems. Though each agency is unique, all of them share a variety of similar problems and needs: lack of funding and of contacts with social organizations in the U.S. Granted, most of the agencies I researched are small and very modestly serve people in need. None of them, however, are looking for an easy "hand-out". Rather, they are zealously striving for a real beginning toward self-sufficiency -- a sense of independence. So, as you read the descriptions of these groups' short and long term plans, please do not forget that during the last four to five years, they have accomplished a great deal in a society that was forced to ignore social problems for over seventy years. Their commendable efforts to provide aid to as many people as possible and as independently as possible must not go unassisted.
**Interview with Vladimir Al'fredovich Lyk'ianov, president / chairman of the Society. Boris IAkov'l'ich Zvonkin, director of Charitable Sector / Inter-Societal Relations**

Originally known as the "Society of Charity", this charitable collective society was the first official group in the then U.S.S.R., dating back to the autumn of 1987. Presently, known as "Nevskii Angel" this organization operates on two fundamental levels: 1) coordinating information, seminars and incoming aid for over 200 independent non-profit social-charitable organizations; and 2) distributing aid directly to 250,000 people (e.g. retired persons, families with many children, handicapped children, and cancer patients to name a few). Approximately 63% of their funding comes from the organization "Diakonia" based in Hamburg, Germany, while the remaining 37% comes from proceeds raised by charitable concerts, art exhibits and fund raisers, and donations from local organizations. Since their work reaches many people and several organizations, their expenses run quite high. The average monthly expenses reach up to 6 million rubles; for the month of May the figure topped 7 million rubles, which included the purchase of a computer.

**Staff:** leadership - 1 president plus an executive council of 11 persons (workers and volunteers); each of the two levels of operations (mentioned above) includes 6-8 directors of the various programs -- each of these directors form their own advisory committees of volunteers. All of these directors are members of the executive council. In total, 51 persons receive a salary averaging about 20,000 - 25,000 rubles per month, and 109 volunteers work in programs of both levels of operations.

**Goals:** --to continue and expand their college-level, 9-month course for social workers, designed to train leaders and volunteers of charitable organizations (students undergo this training free of charge) -- to open a publishing house where "Nevskii Angel" and its member-organizations can publish pamphlets and newspapers -- open legal consulting services for its member organizations -- to start the practice of writing grant proposals for special programs.

**Recommendations:** The success of my research is due in part to the friendly assistance offered by Boris I.A. Zvonkin who arranged the meetings and visits I had with the leaders of several organizations. "Nevskii Angel" holds a wealth of information on approx. 200 various charitable groups; a close working relationship could be established to reach its member organizations on both an individual and group level (sending aid and conducting seminars). However, it appears that "Nevskii Angel" has no set system by which to distribute aid (aid not specifically addressed to a particular group) to member organizations. Though on this level of operations, "Nevskii Angel" coordinates only seminars and informational assistance for the groups. Yet any material aid that can be directed to some of the member organizations seems to be distributed arbitrarily. This sector of operations has great potential in helping especially the smaller grass-roots groups. Therefore, expansion in this area should be encouraged, but only with the help of United Way International, whose
distribution methods can serve as models, thereby avoiding problems of arbitrary distribution and/or conflict of interests—since this organization is involved with distributing aid while seeking aid for its own specific programs.

Overall, the infrastructure of "Nevskii Angel" is well organized and its leadership struck me as being creatively innovative in their striving to become self-sufficient as an agency, while helping other organizations and people in need reach a reasonable level of independence. Funding especially earmarked for the future publishing house (printing press) and for the expansion of the 9-month course in social work (including consultative assistance) would be money well spent, positively effecting several individual organizations. In fact, any type of aid going to this agency should be sent for a specific program, helping them transfer to a grant/funding system of financing their programs and facilities. United Way International has extensive relations with "Nevskii Angel" and thus should be consulted on other ways of assisting this organization.
Interview with Marina Grigor'evna Shipulina, director Anna Samuilovna Zvonkina, asst. director

In existence since April of 1989, the St. Petersburg Diabetic Society dedicates its energies to organize and bring aid to well over 9,000 people suffering from diabetes. There are, however, approximately 100,000 diabetics all together in St. Petersburg. By distributing insulin and blood analysis sticks, conducting educational self-help seminars and publishing a bimonthly magazine, the workers and volunteers of the society strive to help diabetics, especially children, adapt and return to an active lifestyle. The society is funded in part by the local municipal government, proceeds from the magazine, local sponsors and nominal dues. Though all their insulin is donated by Denmark, Finland and the International Diabetic Society or purchased at lower prices, the society has difficulty in providing a steady supply of insulin for its members.

Staff: leadership -3; volunteers -150. The each of the leadership staff receives a salary of 10,000 rubles per month. The leadership staff makes all decisions. Small committees are created occasionally on an ad hoc basis; they simply help and advise the leadership staff.

Goals: a.) to continue and expand their summer camp - second year in the running. Eighty children between the ages of 7-15 (however, in the society, there are approx. 600 children in this age group) attend camp to learn how to properly regulate their insulin intake on their own and how to maintain a healthy and safe diet. b.) to continue an expand their Sanitarium, located in Petrodvorets, for parents and children -- up to 70 participants will receive free medical examination and consultation on insulin therapy. c.) expand counseling services offered by psychologists (on a volunteer basis) from the University of St. Petersburg. d.) to organize and build a Center for Diabetics, through which all the above mentioned programs will be centered - counseling, dietary and insulin training, medical treatments and informational bank. e.) to expand their newly opened "Diabetic Store," where all diabetes-related products are sold at reduced prices to members of the society.

Problems: --no office/hall space, presently using facilities offered by local clinics which soon will ask for rent -- no steady source of funding -- no steady source of insulin, especially since no insulin is produced in Russia.

Needs: --means of transportation - mini bus / truck -- technical assistance (computers) to create information bank, publish magazine and informational brochures -- more international contacts which will help in providing a steady supply of insulin.

Recommendations: I was impressed by this group's plans and potential of achieving self-sufficiency. Of course the short term needs must be addressed, namely a steady supply of insulin, glucometers (blood and urine analysis), literature on proper dietary practices even food items for diabetics. Contacts with "Lilly" company will help this group toward
independence and ultimately a working relationship with pharmaceutical companies and organizations like the International Diabetic Society. Technical assistance will be a tremendous boost for them - to create an organized info-bank and to publish literature.
**Interview with Zinaida Sergeevna Evfimovskaia director/founder of the orphanage.**

After adopting three girls and seeing the problems they encountered in school and society, Zinaida S. Evfimovskaia started a family cooperative in hopes of teaching the girls skills and lifting their self-confidence, enabling them to re-enter society. From this humble beginning, Ms. Evfimovskaia started the Orphanage "Efimiia" back in January of 1989. Presently, the orphanage houses up to 33 girls, mostly teenagers, as well as 5 young mothers with their children, six in total. At the orphanage, girls receive food and shelter, learn skills like sewing and embroidery, and are provided with psychological counseling helping them overcome physical and sexual abuse. The orphanage also provides special classes similar to our GED courses, since most of the girls have problems adapting in the social situation of the regular school system. Last year 22 girls received their high school equivalency diploma. The facility also houses several sewing and embroidery machines, on which the girls craft many things like dolls and lace items. These are then sold in local stores; and the proceeds go to support the orphanage. For all the work and cooperation the girls offer, the orphanage pays them a reasonable stipend, with the purpose of raising their levels of self-esteem and self-worth.

**Needs:** --many of the sewing machines are old and need repair -- recently the orphanage obtained an entire 4-story building, 7-8 rooms per floor, (present address) which is need of remodeling -- funds to speed up the remodeling and to attract more teachers and psychologists so to house and counsel the growing number of girls coming to the orphanage -- contacts with orphanages in the U.S. -- more markets to sell their crafts, which are high in quality.

**Goals:** --foremost to finish the remodeling project -- to expand counseling services -- to enlarge the teaching staff -- to offer more living space for young single mothers and their babies -- to include more courses on parenting.

**Recommendations:** I was extremely impressed by Ms. Evfimova's dedication to provide a safe and healthy shelter for these abused girls. She is full of drive and determination to achieve the goals of the orphanage as quickly and independently as possible. Her small staff of workers and professionals participate in an efficient infrastructure. Presently, of course, they are in need of funding to complete the remodeling and to obtain better quality sewing machines in order to bring in some kind of income. Any monies used in addressing their goals would be well spent in helping the orphanage strive toward a greater sense of independence. All their ideas are aimed at achieving self-sufficiency; they just need financial help to put them on their feet.
Interview with Alice Ivanovna Busova, director Galina Grigor’evna Vereshak
Katherine Nikolaevna Andrusova

Originally a part of the Society of Families with Many Children of Peterhof, the group "Alicia," in May of 1992, decided to break away and independently serve the needs of just handicapped children. Parents of handicapped children themselves, the leaders of "Alicia" are dedicated to helping families with handicapped children meet their material and emotional needs. Over the past year "Alicia" has distributed aid (food, clothing, medicines) coming from CARE, which works exclusively through local governments, to approximately 150 families. Assistance has come also through the concerted efforts of the Charitable Committee of the Cathedral of Sts. Peter and Paul Russian Orthodox Church of Peterhof. This committee coordinates and distributes aid to 7-10 different social charitable organizations of Peterhof. Because of the group’s young age, "Alicia" has been giving out only short-term assistance in the form of food and clothing parcels coming from the U.S. and Germany.

Staff: leadership -4. These individuals are volunteers working with the group only on a part-time basis.

Goals: --to build a Center of Rehabilitation for Handicapped Children where patients will undergo therapeutic rehabilitation and learn special crafts’ and educational skills. Ultimately so children can attend a regular school and live a fairly active lifestyle (doctors and specialists have already shown interest in this project) -- to operate a pharmacy where the society will buy and sell medicines at reduced prices for its members -- to open a specialized medical equipment store, selling at reduced prices, equipment and therapeutic items for handicapped persons.

Needs: -- (short term) medicines: insulin, glucometers, vitamins, antibiotics: equipment: leg braces, supportive shoes -- (long term) need funds to buy/rent buildings to begin realizing their goals (so far they have no room even to store food parcels); need building for their Center -- need contacts with similar organizations in the West to learn how to properly organize staff and volunteers.

Recommendations: "Alicia" is in its earliest stages of development; its leadership is in great need of consultations on how to organize and expand operations. Contacts with Easter Seals and similar organizations would be extremely helpful in organizing and in building relations with pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies. Consultative assistance should accompany even short term assistance. Once a working infrastructure is in place, the long term goals must be addressed so that the organization can expand. With a good infrastructure this organization has the potential to become somewhat independent. Funding will get them started, again, only after consulting with agencies like Easter Seals & United Way.
Interview with Viacheslav Dimitrievich Ozerov.

Founded in June of 1990, the Association of Parents of Blind Children was originally organized by fifty parents of blind children. At first their goals were centered around the material and emotional support of children and their parents, helping them return to an active lifestyle in society. Presently, the Association serves approximately 170 families in St. Petersburg. The types of aid distributed by the Association have been mostly informational in the form of literature and technical training. Every three months, the Assoc. sponsors seminars/workshops where parents and children (1) become acquainted with others in the organization and; (2) learn of new medicines and how to seek aid from the government and local schools. From Sept. 1992 to June 1993 four seminars were conducted; 30 - 100 persons participated in each. Most of the assistance received has been from the Russian Orthodox Church in Exile (USA and Germany). In 1991, the School for the Blind in cooperation with the Association established a Music Dept. where 90 children participate. The Association has active relations with: the Russia's Children's Fund; Nevskii Angel; Society of the Blind; and the City Association of the Unified Society of Parents of Handicapped Children. These relations are strictly for the sharing of information and cooperation with seminars.

Staff: -- leadership -3; volunteers -12. No salaries to anyone. Committees are created on an ad hoc basis to deal with specific problems. Leadership makes all decisions.

Goals: -- during the period of 1993-1997, in cooperation with the School-Internat N1, creation of an Organizational, Methodological and Practical Center for Blind Children to prepare them to live an independent lifestyle -- to supply the means and methods for rehabilitation of parents and children -- to provide professional help and training to children from the first notice of visual impairment until achieving an independent lifestyle. The entire process would encompass consultations, medical attention, psychological support, professional training (reading braille, use of instruments, etc.) and complete schooling.

Problems: -- their main difficulties arise from having to work with the school's bureaucratic infrastructure which noticeably hinders progress. Because of lack of funds and sponsors, the Association is forced to operate in conjunction with the school.

Needs: -- approx. 100,000 rubles / month to operate school -- sponsors to help achieve goals -- computer equipment with braille keyboards --- braille textbooks -- audio equipment.

Recommendations: -- establish relations with similar organizations in U.S. to help build infrastructures -- address immediate needs until the organization can achieve a greater sense of independence -- long term goals seem good, provide material, consultative and educational means for their realization.
Interview with Stanislav P. Samsonov, president and Leonid K. Gutkin Karlovis, vice-president.

Organized in 1989 with the help of the "Russian-German Exchange" from Hamburg and finally registered in January of 1991, "Asscol" is an association of volunteers and professionals dedicated to helping rehabilitate persons recovering from tumor and intestinal operations as well as organ transplants. Approximately 80% of the 1,000 patients they serve are elderly. The program of treatment and rehabilitation consists of the material, educational, psychological and medicinal support offered by specialists who, on at least a monthly basis, visit the patients at home or meet with them at the hospital. Funding is received from the city government of St. Petersburg, the "Russian-German Exchange" and the "Society of Samaritans" (latter two based in Hamburg, Germany).

Staff: leadership -2; co-workers -10. Salaries are paid to the Secretary, Accountant/Controller, and President. Salaries are paid only when funds are available. Nothing was paid to personnel over the last three months.

Goals: --to organize members into support groups -- to expand rehabilitative services to cover 20,000 -- to organize the production of medical and therapeutic equipment -- to open special institute for the training of physical therapists -- to frequently conduct seminars on use of new technology and prostheses, for doctors and specialists -- to open specialized pharmacy.

Problems: --organizational, forced to work within the constraints of the governmental infrastructures of the local hospitals: no money to expand out of the hospital system: cannot transfer to a committee/council system of rule: the leadership of two decides on program. provided the hospital system agrees to cooperate -- lack of equipment (medical and therapeutic) and medicines.

Needs: --money to expand out of hospital system -- therefore, need money for the production of equipment (approx. $250,000 for the construction of a medical equipment factory) -- medicines -- special dietary items needed for persons recovering from some form of intestinal surgery -- qualified personnel for physical therapy and psychological counseling -- more contacts with similar organizations in the West.

Recommendations: Address short-term needs such as supplying medicines, dietary items, prostheses and equipment needed for physical therapy. Help conduct seminars on physical therapy and new technologies in cooperation with American hospitals. Build relations between "Asscol" and pharmaceutical companies. Any direct money should not be sent until "Asscol" is able to gain independence from the governmental infrastructures of the hospital system. Provide incentives to companies interested in the construction of the medical equipment factory so the group can expand out of the governmental infrastructure.
"Legacy", founded in December of 1991, is a very good example of a classic "grass-roots" self-help group. It was started by some parents of handicapped children for the sake of helping parents and children who have physical and mental handicaps and those children suffering from cancer. Presently, 50 families of handicapped children and 77 children suffering from cancer receive various types of aid. Monetary assistance (eg. money to send children to summer camp) food and clothing items are distributed according to need, yet because of sporadic aid shipments, some families have not received any help. Every day up to seven children come to the address above to receive minor physical therapy in the swimming pool and sauna. Also, parents have organized themselves within the association in order to teach the children crafts like embroidery, sewing, etc.

**Staff:** Leadership -2; volunteers -5. No salaries to anyone. A few times a year, the leadership and volunteers meet with all the parents to discuss and decide upon problem solving and future plans. All major projects and goals are decided by these general meetings. Parents participate in informal committees on various projects. This is encouraged by all. Maintains relations with similar groups from Moscow and Tallinn, but strictly informational.

**Goals:** --to help children learn new skills and gain confidence so to return to regular school and an active lifestyle -- provide a comprehensive day care for handicapped children for the child's physical and mental therapy and to allow the parents to work -- to expand their day care facility in the city -- to build a sanitarium / camp / day care Center in Zelenogorsk -- to supply medicine and equipment for their members.

**Problems:** --financially incapable to even meet their minimal goals and expectations - - have no contacts with similar organizations from the West -- not enough facilities to handle the demand for their services -- difficulty in attaining land for Center in Zelenogorsk (no $) - - can't supply material assistance to all in need -- aid coming from "Heart-to-Heart" (USA) and from Germany (via "Nevskii Angel") is sporadic.

**Needs:** --money to buy land and build Center in Zelenogorsk -- expansion of day care facilities in city -- special buses for handicapped children -- proper equipment and instruments for physical therapy -- toys -- tools and equipments for embroidery / sewing.

**Recommendations:** Their plans are workable, but they need financial backing in order to begin. Help open consultative relations with Easter Seals as their infrastructure is forming; and help establish contacts with pharmaceutical companies and hospitals. Means to realize daily goals must be made available until the Center is built and running. Western
hospitals could donate slightly used equipment for physical therapy to help maintain and expand the association's therapeutic programs.
Interview with Irene G. Shakirova, leader of club.

This group of families having many children, registered since 1989, originally began as simply a social club for moral support. However, as life became more difficult, the families grouped together for the sake of soliciting and distributing aid to all families with many children, in the Smolensk area of St. Petersburg. Aid, in the form of food parcels, coming from CARE via the municipal regional government, has been distributed over the last 2-3 years to approximately 500 families having three or more children. This organization also holds seminars and self-help meetings where parents learn how to run efficiently and effectively a household during these economic difficulties, as well as learn special crafts (eg. cooking, sewing, embroidery). The club, then in turn, gathers these craft items, sending them to be sold. The proceeds go to the families and the club. Since May of 1993, a special fund was created for children, from participating families, wishing to attend art/music colleges. A concert was given recently to begin the fund. This autumn, five students will attend music college thanks to the money raised for this special fund.

Staff: leadership -8, each in charge of special projects; volunteers -35. No salaries paid to anyone. [[This club is part of another association known as "3+". This association is a collection of organizations of families with many children from throughout the city. In total, fourteen regional organizations (like the club of relatives of the Smolensk region) make up the association "3+". The leadership of "3+" which consists of the presidents of the member clubs, meets regularly, only for the sharing of information. No aid or monies go through "3+"; it is simply for the sake of organization. ]] The Club of Relatives meets with its families on a regular basis to decide on programming ideas and to attract more members to become involved.

Goals: --to obtain the funding to buy medicines and vitamins and then sell them to their member families at a much cheaper price -- to provide free medical examinations for the children and their families -- to supply the means for their children to regularly attend summer camp -- to continue parenting and crafts lessons on a more sophisticated level.

Problems: --not enough money to realize goals -- not enough storage space to hold the parcels coming from organizations like CARE -- not enough room in the club to regularly meet with all their families -- no means of transporting the shipments of aid addressed to the club.

Needs: --local sponsors to provide some kind of steady assistance -- direct contacts with social organizations in addition to CARE; present contacts with CARE are only via the local municipal government which hinders the selection and distribution process -- money to purchase a bus and truck -- means to find markets for the craft items that their families make.


**Recommendations:** It is important that some direct contacts be made with social organizations of the U.S. Accountability should not be a problem; the leadership of this organization is committed to proper upkeep of records. The overall structure allows for a healthy relationship between the leadership and families and much potential.
**Interview with Natalia Vladimirovna Zakharova, president of the society {home phone (812) 272-72-74}**

--- Member of city-wide Association "3+" (see earlier sheet on "Club of Relatives")

This society, started in December of 1990, was organized for the sake of collecting information about needy people in their region. Over the last two and a half years, the organization has grown to serve over 200 families with three or more children.

**Staff:** leadership -5; volunteers -15. No salaries. As a member of "3+", "Vega" has the same infrastructure as fellow member organizations. Entire staff meets once a month. All the families of "Vega" meet once a year to discuss programs.

**Goals:** same basic goals as "Club of Relatives" and other members of "3+".

Also: --striving to obtain land to farm in hopes of raising enough food-stuffs to be sold at minimal prices to member families -- expand arts/skills/parenting classes.

**Needs:** --means of transportation (bus/truck) -- more space for a meeting hall and for storage -- medicines to help their children suffering from asthma and allergies -- need to find sponsor for steady income (eg. to rent present hall = 20,000 rubles per month).

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**Recommendations:** The organization "3+" seems to be a weakly constructed alliance, despite the fact that many of the member organizations experience the same difficulties, have similar needs and share information on their families, programs and records. The purpose of this association is admirable and offers the potential for bringing aid to all the member families in the city. Their individual searching for direct contacts should not go unrewarded. The effectiveness of not only each member group, but also the collective association would be enhanced greatly, if some kind of incentives where given to allow a more parallel flow of information and funds/assistance. For example, it would be much more efficient to purchase seven or eight buses and or trucks for the entire association, than it would to buy buses/trucks for each of the fourteen member groups, since they all need forms of transportation. Then each member group could use the vehicles for a small user fee, which could go into a collective fund for the upkeep of the vehicles. Also, seminars and class work could be held on the association-wide level. The Association "3+" has the potential and theoretical structure allowing it to be a widely effective and efficient social organization, if it could transform to something more than just an information bank.
**Interview with Marina Anatol’evna Viazovaia, leader.**

--Member of the Association "3+" (see earlier sheets on Club of Relatives & Society "Vega").

Dating back to January of 1989, the Center for Families with Many Children in the Primorskii Region serves a growing number of families. In the Primorskii region of St. Petersburg there are approximately 3,000 families with three or more children, yet this organization can serve only about 1,500 families who are in need. One characteristic that separates this group from the other members of "3+" is the group’s practice of sending 700 children to summer camp - 350 children each month (no charge to the parents). The total cost of running the camp for two months exceeds 120,000 rubles. While at camp the children, in addition to their many recreational and educational activities, help grow vegetables for the organization, which distributes the foodstuffs to its member families.

**Staff:** Two levels  
I. Board of Directors = 7, which makes most decisions.  
II. Territorial Circles = 13 circle directors -- in each territorial circle there is a committee of 3-4 persons to advise and gather information for the circle director.

The General Council (7 + 13) meets once every month to discuss programming ideas.

**Problems & Needs:** very similar to other member organizations of "3+".

**Recommendations:** Funding for the renting of a meeting hall and computer and technical assistance should be a high priority. This group like others in "3+" is very well organized, while keeping very close and healthy relations with the families they serve. Any assistance that this member and other members of "3+" receive, would bring much help to several families and ultimately would enable all those involved with "3+" to achieve a greater sense of independence.
**Interview with Valerii Sokolov, president.**

Dating back to December of 1990, the organization "Nochlezhka" diligently strives to help and protect the human and legal rights of homeless people of St. Petersburg. Serving approx. 11,500 homeless people, "Nochlezhka" runs a network of services including night shelters, soup kitchens (feeding over 250 people daily), a job center, workshops, centers for medical attention, psychological help and legal aid, housing for homeless children and a newspaper. Funding is received from a variety of private sponsors (Russian, German and other foreign sponsors) thanks to their working relationship with the "Russian-German Exchange." These programs are quite expensive to run, eg. 1,300 German marks are needed to keep the soup kitchen in operation. Already this year, the organization has received approx. five million rubles in donations from their many sponsors.

**Staff:** Three levels: a.) **president** who independently makes many of the major decisions; b.) **board of directors** consisting of five individuals who frequently advise and direct the president concerning goals of the several programs and financial matters; c.) **general assembly** consisting of about 40-50 persons (from all walks of life), meets twice a year to advise and decide upon many programming ideas. Each of the six programs has a director and committee of workers and volunteers who advise the directors. The directors then in turn answer to the president and board of directors. The president, board of directors and program directors all receive salaries.

**Needs:** --information on how non-profit, social agencies work in the U.S. with the homeless -- build contacts with similar organizations in U.S. -- more international attention on the protection and defense of human rights of the homeless -- contacts with private organizations which can be financial sponsors.

**Recommendations:** The organizational and financial strength of this group is very impressive. It is apparent that much consultation with European social agencies was sought as this organization grew. "Nochlezhka" has relations with several other local social charities, but strictly on an informational basis. Because of this group's dedication to defending the human rights of their homeless, the potential is great that eventually it will attract international attention. The leaders of "Nochlezhka" strive not just to feed and give shelter to the homeless, but more importantly work towards bringing each person a sense of independence which is legally impossible without obtaining official residence status in the city ("propiska"). Once official residency is granted, the person can then legally work. Overall, an effective apparatus seems to be in place; it just needs a steady flow of funding for it to work properly and consistently. Hence, any funding that could be sent to this organization must be accompanied by real contacts with similar organizations in the U.S. "Nochlezhka" has a real potential to expand quickly only if it receives helpful consultations and supportive relations from similar agencies in the U.S.
**Interview with Galina A. Stoupko president of club "Rosinka" Evgenyi Vasilievich Pogozhev president of the Frunzenskii Society of Invalids.**

The Club of Invalids "Rosinka" (member group of the Society of Invalids of the Frunzenskii Region of St. Petersburg) dates back to December of 1991. Approximately 70 handicapped (physically and mentally) children and adults receive aid from the club, enabling them to live as much of an active life as possible. The club offers daily schedule of events and therapies (eg. physical exercises, arts/crafts, music lessons, etc.) conducted by professional teachers and specialists. Most of their funding comes from a local factory "Avtomotorno".

**Staff:** leadership -1; paid workers/teachers -15. Average salary = 10,000 rubles per month. Leadership makes all decisions; no committees. Workers/teachers only consult the president.

**Goals:** --to expand the facilities, by updating therapeutic equipment and inviting more specialists to work with a larger case load, serving all handicapped children in the city. Expand special classes on crafts' skills (sewing, embroidery, etc.); put final products on sale.

**Needs:** --mini-bus for handicapped persons -- equipment for therapy -- leg braces and other similar supports -- special education tools for mentally retarded children -- more space for operating the club -- sewing/embroidery machinery and materials -- toys for therapy -- vitamins/medicines.

Frunzenskii Society of Invalids primarily gives out humanitarian aid (food, medicines, clothing, etc.) coming from the West. Approximately 3,000 persons are registered members of the society. **Main problems:** no money to rent adequate housing for the society -- no means of special transportation for the severely handicapped -- difficulty in membership organization.

**Goals:** --create computer informational bank on membership, therapies and specialists -- expand crafts' program -- vastly expand the number of workers, specialists and volunteers, enabling the society to serve all 30,000 handicapped persons in the city.

**Needs:** same as above, plus: literature on how to properly organize volunteers in an private non-profit organization -- specially sensitive typewriters -- computers for informational bank -- musical instruments for therapies.

**Recommendations:** Despite the small number of staff, these groups are very well organized and effective in the programs they are able to implement. Help establish contacts with Easter Seals and other similar agencies!! This will help them expand their base of
operations and update them on the latest equipment and therapies. Short term needs/problems, however, must be addressed before any expansion is possible. Special minibuses, therapeutic and musical instruments, leg braces, shoes and medicines are in great need. This group, though in its early stages, offers much potential. Its leadership, also handicapped, certainly does not lack motivation. Working with this group will be quite rewarding.
**Interview with Hegumen Benjamin /Novik, vice-rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and the Chairman of the Ecumenical Committee of St. Petersburg.**

Founded in the autumn of 1990, the Ecumenical Committee of St. Petersburg began as a result of the political and economic difficulties of Russia. The committee encompasses the Russian Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic Church, Finnish Lutheran Church, German Lutheran Church, Baptist Church and Pentecostal Church. Members of the committee strive to frequently distribute aid, while building up their structures of social programming inside each of the churches. Handicapped people, former prisoners, single mothers, retired persons and needy families with many children are the main groups receiving aid from members of the committee. The general goal of the committee and its members is not catechetical, but simply to address the social needs of the people who come to them for help. A large portion of aid comes from "Finn-Church Aid" located in Helsinki, Finland. The committee receives money in various currencies, converts them into rubles, and then assigns 50% to the Russian Orthodox membership and 50% to the remaining member churches according to the size of each of the member churches.

The Russian Orthodox Church in St. Petersburg uses its share of the aid to buy food products for the teachers and workers of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and for approximately 1,000 parishioners who come to the chapel at the academy and to anyone else who comes in off the street asking for assistance.

Because of the size and limited capabilities of the Ecumenical Council, it holds no realistic relations with other groups, other than its own church members. Additionally, because of the limited amount of financing coming from Finn-Church Aid, the council is forced to address only the short term problems (eg. providing parcels of food items and sometimes clothing) of those whom they serve. All those who work for this committee do so on strictly a voluntary basis.

**Recommendations:** There should be some consultations with "Finn-Church Aid," located in Helsinki, Finland, before any kind of assistance is sent. Contacts also should be established with organizations like United Way for the sake of instructing the council how to build an effective and efficient infrastructure as the council expands. Though the council is religious (inter-denominational) by name, its purpose is secular, thus deserving aid from secular and governmental sources.
Interview with Inna Rikhartovna Izotova, leader of the Orphanage "Blue Harrow".

This organization, the Teenager Institute, consists of a collection of the following agencies: Orphanage "Blue Harrow"; Sanitarium "Pushkin"; Social Services; and Psychological Services. The collective was organized by its present director Andre Dimitrievich Artimchiuk in Sept. 1992. The orphanage "Blue Harrow" dates back to 1989. Both the orphanage and Teenager Institute were established to help homeless children find adoptive parents, so these "high at risk" children can return to school and learn how to live in a healthy family setting. The orphanage has room for 18 children, yet presently houses 23 providing complete care and schooling. Two teachers work a full 24-hour shift every three days. Each child has a one-to-one relation with a social worker who comes to the orphanage daily to offer counseling. Overall, the orphanage has helped over 300 children either find homes or return to their parents. The social workers provide maintenance care for these children and their families at the orphanage or in their homes. Also, material help (food, clothing) is extended to all 300 children/families according to need.

Staff: Orphanage = Leadership -1; Professional -8 teachers, 1 doctor, 2 social workers, 4 other // Institute = Leadership -7. **The infrastructure has two levels: Committee of leadership of the Institute (makes most decisions); Collective Committee consisting of orphanage/institute directors and professional workers of the orphanage. Each orphanage director has his/her committee made up of professionals and parents. Collective Committee’s relation to the Leadership is strictly advisory.

Goals: --to provide shelter and psychological counseling for homeless children not from just St. Petersburg but from surrounding areas and cities -- to establish a more permanent summer camp -- to attain land surrounding the camp in order to build a farm, where the children may learn how to work agriculturally, which will enable the orphanage to become self sufficient and sell the extra food stuffs.

Problems: --serious need of financing (two months have passed without any salaries for employed staff), need sponsors -- difficulty with obtaining means of transportation.

Needs: --6,000 German marks to run summer camp (not including salaries) -- 10,000 German marks for salaries from the last two months and for the following two -- large bus and truck -- sponsor to help with land purchase.

Recommendations: Infrastructure seems to be advantageous for active cooperation on all levels -- they are in need of money, but financial bailout would be short term -- help with land purchase and expansion of summer camp -- means and encouragement to offer skills and technical-vocational training in addition to their schooling program -- need to find other means of attaining financial independence (starting a farm is a good idea, but it’s mostly seasonal -- help obtain contacts with American orphanages.
**Interview with Petr Andreevich Oleinik, director-founder.**

Founded in the Autumn of 1990 and registered in March of 1992, "Allergic" originally was started by parents wishing to help their children overcome their severe cases of allergies. The purpose of the organization is to help parents and children determine the type of allergies from which they suffer, obtain effective medicines and educate how to avoid further allergic reactions. Presently, "Allergic" has over 3,000 children in their registry, and hopes to expand its coverage to include a total of 10,000 young people. The agency has distributed (by prescription only) medicines coming from the U.S., Germany, Denmark and France. Most of the monies needed to operate and obtain some medicines come from the city government of St. Petersburg. Close working relations with several local hospitals, polyclinics and the government Committee on Health are useful in reaching out to many people.

**Staff:** Leadership -5; Volunteers -40-50. No salaries to anyone. All decisions and problems are solved by the leadership staff (Presidential form). Contacts with the volunteers are strictly informational / advisory.

**Goals:**

a.) -- to continue summer camp this year (3rd year) for approximately 175 young people in the Crimea. Over 15 million rubles are needed to run the camp. Money has been promised by the Mayor of St. Petersburg. Plans are in the works to expand the camp in hopes of serving up to 60 people per week. 

b.) -- to build an "Allergy Center" by the end of 1993. This will be a clinic where specialists will diagnose and treat allergy sufferers. This project is being funded by "Pediatric Assistance International, Inc." through contacts with Eugene K. Poplavskii. The American office of "PAI" is located at the concord Center, Suite 150, CVI, 455E. Eisenhower Parkway, Ann Arbor, MI. 48108 tel. (313) 662-8832. 

c.) -- to open specialized pharmacy for allergy sufferers. Last year the Mayor of the city gave 450,000 rubles for them to purchase medicines. Other long term plans include the establishing of a research center via contacts with pharmaceutical companies like Johnson & Johnson and Lilly.

**Problems:**

--organizational, no computers; -- monies come in only for special purposes; -- no local sponsors; -- not enough contact with Western companies and organizations.

**Needs:**

-- computers for patient registry; -- medicines; -- establish contacts with Western companies; -- office space and storage facilities, all drugs that are donated to this group are stored in the apartment of Petr A. Oleinik, until they can be distributed.

**Recommendations:**

-- need to broaden the power base of this organization, a great deal of responsibility is in hands of just five people; --- inquire at the "PAI" to see how aid can be used for the Allergic Center; -- provide incentives to pharmaceutical companies to
help with providing short term aid and assistance with the specialized pharmacy; any direct aid for the time being should be in the form of technical assistance - computers.
Organized in 1992, this unregistered group was started by G. Veshezerova who suddenly found herself a widow with no income and children to support. With the help of only three volunteers, she set out to help organize adoptive families and those families where the children have no parents, but are being raised by the grandparents. The purpose of the group is to provide emotional and material support to these families, approximately 452 in number. Of these families, 250 are in extreme need. Over the past year, the volunteers have distributed several food parcels, clothing and vitamins coming from the U.S., Sweden and Italy. Such aid from the West was not a result of direct contacts but cooperation with "Nevskii Angel" and the local regional government. This organization also has cooperative relations with groups like "Families of Invalids", "Parents' Bridge", "Children's Fund - HELO" and the Christian Evangelical Lutheran Society. These relations, however, are strictly informational.

**Interview with Galina Veshezerova, coordinator of the group.**

Staff: Leadership -3; volunteers -according to need. The leadership staff works only part-time and receives no salary.

Goals: --to create an informational bank on adoptive and guardian families in the Kirovskii region and eventually the entire city -- to build a Center where psychologists, therapists and medical doctors could provide complete care for these families and their "at risk" children.

Problems: --no money -- no organization -- no working place (they work out of their apartments) -- no direct contacts with agencies from the West -- no local sponsors -- no means or understanding of soliciting aid.

Needs: --money to rent a place of operations -- in short, means to address the above mentioned problems -- money to build their Center.

Recommendations: This group has basically little, if no structure because it exists in the very early stages of development. Few people/agencies know of this organization; it receives very little aid, yet several needy people come to its volunteers for help. A closer relationship with United Way International and Nevskii Angel must be encouraged, for the sake of building a sound infrastructure and creating efficient methods of information gathering and distribution of aid. Short term problems like obtaining a place of operations and building an informational bank must be addressed soon. Even before the group may receive the means to address their immediate needs, the volunteers should be encouraged to register their organization with the city government.
Interview with Irina Petrovna ZHil'tsova, general director.

"Antirak", founded and registered in August of 1991 by professionals and cancer patients, is an association dedicated to help cancer patients find effective treatment and overcome the difficulties of radiation and chemical therapies in order to return to an active lifestyle and to develop an awareness for early detection. Working with the cancer hospitals of the city, "Antirak" serves approximately 620 adults and 52 children. Any kind of aid received from the West (food, clothing, money), is distributed evenly to all registered participants/patients. Infrequent aid / donations are received from "Phillips" and local companies like "Co-op Otechestvennikov" and the "Russian Commercial Bank." Several letters have been sent to various organizations in Europe and Churches in the U.S. without any response. "Antirak" has little, if no working relations with Nevskii Angel. "Antirak" has no relations with any other similar organizations.

Staff: Leadership -4; volunteers -25. Salaries are paid to only the general director and the accountant/controller (approx. 20,000 rubles/month). All decisions and programs are decided by a Council, made up by the leadership staff (president, two vice-presidents and the general director), doctors, professionals and patients, all totaling 17 members. This council meets at least once a month.

Goals: --to build a Rehabilitation Center where they can provide medical care, psychological counseling, therapy (including use of prostheses) and education on preventative medicine -- to establish a specialized pharmacy where medicines and prostheses will be available to patient/members free of charge -- to establish an information bank and educational center for rehabilitation.

Problems: --organization, no financial means to expand their infrastructure or base of operations to help more people -- no local sponsors -- no relations with other charitable organizations, either local or foreign.

Needs: --financing to build the Rehabilitative Center for Cancer Patients -- computers and technical assistance in organizing their list of patients/participants -- help with translating literature, on cancer treatments and rehabilitation, coming from the U.S. -- help with establishing working relationships with similar organizations and hospitals in the U.S.

Recommendations: Technical assistance (computers) would be extremely helpful for them with their expansion. Contacts with agencies like the American Cancer Society and specialized hospitals would provide the most productive, immediate results. This group did not strike me as one looking for "hand-outs." They are professionally minded and self-motivated. Of course, some financial assistance is needed in the short-term in order to begin work on the Rehabilitative Center, which has the potential for self-sufficiency provided there are active relations with similar agencies, hospitals and pharmaceutical firms in the U.S.