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COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES**

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NCSEER NOTE

This is the second paper by the author to be distributed. The first, Ethnic Relations in the Baltic States, was distributed on March 24, 1994. The present paper breaks no new ground for the specialist, but may be of use as a general review to those not familiar with the earlier and recent transitions to Baltic independence.

BALTIC INDEPENDENCE, 1917-1920 AND 1988-1994: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

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Executive Summary

This paper compares the emergence of Baltic independence following the Russian Revolution in 1917-1920 with the restoration of Baltic statehood in 1988-1994, focusing on three areas of inquiry: origins, process, and issues and problems facing the newly independent states in the two eras. The author argues that key similarities and differences exist in all three areas, but the significance of the changed domestic and international context in 1988-1994 outweighs the importance of the parallels with the earlier era.

The strongest commonalities between the two periods are probably found in the realm of origins. In both cases there is a collapse of empire combined with internal Baltic readiness for independence. The most important difference between the periods in this regard is the root cause of imperial disintegration: the strains of a world war vs. severe systemic economic crisis.

Regarding the process of either achieving independence or its restoration, the following similarities are evident: the rapid shift of Baltic public opinion from supporting autonomy within a Russian-led federation to complete independence, the presence of foreign or non-native military forces, and the ambivalent attitude of the West regarding Baltic independence. In comparison with the years 1917-1920, the major differences at the end of the Soviet era included the role of historical memory of the first period of independence, a substantially greater level of intra-Baltic cooperation, a non-violent evolution of events, and the leading role played by the Baltic intelligentsia in initiating the process of change.

The major issues that the fledgling Baltic states had to grapple with in the two periods also indicate important parallels and divergences. Both in the early 1920s and early 1990s, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had to deal with severe economic problems, their politicians lacked any substantive experience with the practice of democracy, and the Balts had to contend with the major geopolitical constant in their modern history--the presence of a neighboring Russian state. The significant differences in the recent past in terms of issues to be faced are as follows: a new and massive non-Baltic presence, the result of Soviet-era immigration--especially in Latvia and Estonia; the problems of the psychological legacy of the years of Soviet rule, i.e., the "unconquered past" as the Germans have referred to the Nazi era; and on

a more positive note, a considerably more favorable international climate for developing and deepening Baltic independence, e.g., within the process of European integration.

Introduction

The restoration of Baltic independence in fall 1991 naturally raises questions of comparison with the original emergence of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian statehood in the wake of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Although the world changed greatly in the seven decades between these two transformations, a comparative analysis should illuminate the distinctive features of each era. This paper will focus on three sets of issues common to the two periods (1917-1920 and 1988-1994): (1) the origins of independence or its restoration, (2) the process through which this result was achieved, and (3) the range of issues and problems facing the fledgling states in both eras.

Origins of Independence

In terms of origins it is striking that a similar overall framework prevailed in both cases: a combination of internal readiness for independence and a favorable external situation. By 1917, each of the Baltic peoples had benefitted from several decades of experience with a culturally oriented national movement that became strongly politicized in the context of the Revolution of 1905. To be sure, because of more stringent tsarist cultural policies in the Lithuanian case, the national movement here lagged about two decades behind its northern neighbors. For example, the first native newspapers in Latvian and Estonian were established in the late 1850s, a quarter of a century before the first Lithuanian one in the early 1880s.¹ Nevertheless, cultural Russification--the attempt by the tsarist regime to promote the Russian language, an educational system with instruction only in Russian, and the Orthodox religion--proved counterproductive in all three cases, contributing to a considerably stronger sense of national identity by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. By the time of the Revolution of 1905 the Lithuanians had effectively caught up with their Baltic neighbors, as suggested by the holding of major political congresses by all three nationalities in November 1905. The key common points in the resolutions passed by these meetings included the following: (1) administrative unification of the ethnic homeland, (2) democratization in both the Russian Empire as a whole and on the local level, and (3) political and cultural autonomy.²

Probably the most significant legacy of 1905 was the political education afforded by the revolutionary experience, and when a new opportunity arose following the collapse of the tsarist regime in February 1917, all three Baltic nationalities founded a wide range of political

parties that were capable of establishing new governments. At the same time the fall of tsarist Russia and the defeat of Imperial Germany in World War I created an unprecedented international situation in which the two traditional great powers in the region were temporarily hors de combat. Germany and the new Soviet Russia were still strong enough to meddle in the Baltic region in the years 1917-1920, but neither one could fully work its will there.³

In the late 1980s, despite the impact of more than four decades of Soviet rule during which normal political life could not exist, the Baltic peoples spontaneously restored a semblance of political pluralism and led the way among union republics in challenging Moscow's rule. Thus, what has been called "civil society" was not dead, but merely dormant, and was readily revived.⁴ The origins of this striking rebirth of local initiative and grass-roots organizations in Baltic society should be sought in the legacy of the nineteenth-century national movements and especially the two decades of independence experienced by the Baltic peoples in the interwar era. In these years the Balts established a wide range of voluntary associations and cultural societies, promoting, for example, choral and orchestral music, theater, education, and temperance. In the interwar era, following the establishment of statehood, a broad range of political organizations at the grass-roots level was added to this list. Externally (in the sense of factors operating outside the Baltic region itself), the crucial element in the Gorbachev era was the growing weakness of the Soviet state and its gradual disintegration. A striking parallel in the two cases was the crisis of confidence suffered by the ruling classes in both the tsarist and Soviet empires. It can be argued that the changes that transpired took place in large part because significant portions of the established elites no longer believed in the traditional mission of the existing political system.

On the other hand, there are also significant differences that must be borne in mind when assessing the question of origins. Perhaps most important was the root factor that led to the collapse of empire in the two cases: the strains of massive war in 1917 and the severe economic crisis in 1991. More than anything else, this difference helps to explain why political revolution--in Sigmund Neumann's sense of a "sweeping, fundamental change"--occurred rapidly in the first instance while a more gradual withering away of state power took place in the second.⁵ In addition, in the Gorbachev era the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe alone were subject to upheaval while the Western countries merely remained interested bystanders.

Process

Regarding the process of either emergence or re-establishment of Baltic independence, both commonalities and divergences are evident. Viewed in broad perspective, the years 1917-1919 and 1988-1991 show a striking similarity in the shift of public opinion. In both cases a

classic radicalization of the prevailing political attitudes in society occurred, recalling, for example, a similar development in the French Revolution of 1789. In both instances Baltic public opinion moved rather quickly from the modest goal of autonomy within a Russian or Soviet federation to complete independence, and the failure of the central governments in St. Petersburg and Moscow to address the concerns of the Baltic peoples contributed significantly to this result. Neither Lenin nor Gorbachev had any workable solution for the nationalities question, and their lack of action or half-hearted attempts to deal with this issue merely fueled the desire for separation. Lenin certainly took the ethnic issue more seriously than Gorbachev, but he remained convinced that nationalism was only a temporary phenomenon and would soon lose its force.⁶

It might be objected that Bolshevism seemingly had strong support in some parts of the Baltic in 1917 (e.g., 72 percent of the vote in northern Latvia--not including Riga--and 40 percent in Estonia in the Russian Constituent Assembly elections in November 1917).⁷ In the Latvian case it should be recalled that because the military front divided this region throughout most of World War I, there was tremendous dislocation of the population, and about half of the prewar inhabitants became refugees throughout the Russian Empire. In this situation a radicalization of the population remaining in Latvia was perhaps not surprising. Furthermore, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party, allied with Lenin and Russian Bolshevism, had acquired great prestige through its role in 1905 and its work in the underground during the ensuing years of reaction. In 1917, the Latvian Social Democrats were probably more popular as a vehicle for revenge against previous tsarist repression than for their specific program.⁸

In both Latvia and Estonia in November 1917, Bolshevism was also attractive for reasons that are less evident from a contemporary perspective. It is noteworthy that at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, a few weeks before the Constituent Assembly elections, Lenin proclaimed the right of self-determination for the non-Russians of the former tsarist empire, and in contrast to the Provisional Government which vacillated on language rights for the Baltic natives, the Bolsheviks were willing to grant these much more readily.⁹ Moreover, the high figures for support of Bolshevism in the Baltic region were posted at the very start of Bolshevik rule, at a time when their revolutionary prestige was at its maximum and before they had begun to alienate various groups in society.

Given the small size of the Baltic peoples in a demographic sense and the strategic location of their homelands, it is not surprising that the presence of foreign--or non-Baltic--military forces played an important role in both periods. Because of the chaotic situation in 1917-1920, coming on the heels of Russia's participation in World War I, the course of events was much more influenced by military considerations than in the recent past. Nevertheless, in

the late 1980s and early 1990s the issue of the presence of Soviet or ex-Soviet troops has proved to be one of the most intractable problems in the relations between Moscow and the Baltic states. As the successor to the Soviet Union, Russia has been in no hurry to withdraw all its troops from the Baltic region, and as fledgling, small states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have had no means of coercion to influence Russian policy. Instead, the Baltic governments have appealed to international public opinion, generally receiving strong rhetorical support.

Moscow's strategy has been to split the Baltic states and treat each one separately. Thus, Lithuania was in effect "rewarded" for its benign domestic policy vis-a-vis its Russian population, and all ex-Soviet troops left that country in August 1993. Nevertheless, located on the land route between the heavily militarized Kaliningrad exclave and Russia proper, Lithuania faces continuing negotiations with Russia over transit rights and has had no success in encouraging demilitarization in the Kaliningrad region. Estonia and Latvia--with much larger Russian communities in their midst--have been subjected to tougher negotiations. At the end of April 1994, Latvia finally signed an agreement with Russia calling for withdrawal of all Russian troops by August 31, 1994 in exchange for allowing Russia to operate its existing radar site at Skrunda for four years and providing "social guarantees" to retired Russian military officers residing in Latvia. In contrast, Estonian-Russian talks have remained stymied, as the Estonian side has refused to accept a linkage between troop withdrawal and any guarantees for Russian military retirees.¹⁰ The major continuity from the post-World War I era is that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania must search, above all, for diplomatic and political--rather than military--support for their independence, although full NATO membership remains a publicly declared goal of all current Baltic governments.

One further common feature regarding the process in the two eras is the lukewarm attitude toward Baltic independence or promoting Baltic interests shown by the major Western powers. Although Britain gave significant military support to the Balts in 1918-1919, for example, this should be seen in the context of contribution to an anti-Bolshevik front rather than any particular interest in Baltic independence. In both periods Western leaders certainly paid lip service to the principle of self-determination, but their overriding interest was stability. The hard fact of life for small states is that large powers have little interest in their fate and tend to view them as troublesome and potentially entangling. President Bush's equivocation on the issue of recognizing the Baltic states following the failed August 1991 coup is a classic example of this attitude. More recently, in April 1994, one could cite the role of the Western countries in pressuring Latvia to accept the agreement with Russia cited above which significantly divided public opinion in Latvia.¹¹ To be sure, international awareness of the Baltic question in the recent past was incomparably greater than seventy years earlier. The

world has shrunk, and because of their leading role in challenging Gorbachev in the years 1988-1991, the Baltic peoples received unprecedented coverage in the world press. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have once again dropped out of the limelight.

With regard to differences in the process of establishing or restoring statehood, perhaps most important was the simple fact that during the era of glasnost' and perestroika, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were working to restore their independence rather than trying to establish it for the first time in the modern era. There was a strong historical memory of the pattern of events in 1917-1920 and a model to look back to. Having once been members of the League of Nations and accepted partners in the international community, the Balts appealed to international law and focused on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, especially its secret protocols assigning the Baltic states to the Soviet sphere of influence, as the strongest argument for the illegality of Soviet rule. Gorbachev and his cohorts practiced damage control on this issue, slowly retreating and making modest concessions, but there was no logic to their position. At the end of October 1992, Moscow finally admitted that the original version of the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was extant in the archives of the Soviet Communist Party.¹²

Another key difference in the recent past has been the noteworthy degree of cooperation among Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians in the movements for both autonomy and independence. For example, the Estonian and Latvian Popular Fronts and Lithuania's Sajudis collaborated closely from their beginnings in 1988, setting up formal ties in November and establishing the Baltic Assembly in May 1989. Bringing together leaders of the three popular fronts for periodic consultation, the Baltic Assembly stressed cooperation among the three movements and a strictly non-violent approach to effect change. Most dramatically, the Baltic popular fronts organized a massive human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius (some 375 miles) on the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1989 in order to protest its disastrous consequences for the Baltic peoples. By 1990, the increasingly independence-minded Baltic governments worked together more and more, most notably through the re-establishment of the Baltic Council, originally founded in 1934.¹³

In the post-Soviet era since fall 1991 Baltic cooperation at first ran into difficulties as each state sought to assert its own independence and pursued its own agenda. In view of the Baltic experience under nearly five decades of Soviet rule, such a reaction was perhaps understandable. Moreover, in the scramble for economic recovery there was a common perception that each country must fend for itself. Nevertheless, various Western and European organizations, who have tended to regard the Baltic states as a unit, encouraged them to work

together or risk the loss of certain types of external aid. Above all, as Russian foreign policy adopted a sharper tone toward the Baltic states in the course of 1993, and especially as the domestic political scene in Russia gave legitimacy to various extreme movements on the right and the left following the Duma elections in December 1993, the Baltic governments were once again motivated to seek closer ties with each other.¹⁴

On the other hand, in the confused era of 1917-1920 and with no previous experience in statehood, the Balts jealously guarded their own interests and at times even fought each other on the battlefield. Attempts at diplomatic cooperation in the interwar era foundered to a large extent on Lithuania's irredentist foreign policy with regard to the Vilnius (Vilna) issue,¹⁵ and despite their physical proximity each Baltic state had its own perspective on relations with its non-Baltic neighbors. Most strikingly, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania failed to cooperate, or even consult in a serious way, in the crisis of 1939-1940 that resulted in the eclipse of their first era of independence.¹⁶

In contrast to the years of war and revolution in 1914-1920 that resulted in massive loss of human life and population displacement in the Baltic region, the recent restoration of Baltic independence was characterized by an almost entirely non-violent process. Indeed the only people who lost their lives for political reasons were killed by Soviet repressive forces brought into the Baltic by Moscow, most notably in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991 and at a Lithuanian border crossing in July 1991. This non-violent pattern has continued in the post-Soviet years as well and is often overlooked in the context of the tragic violent conflict in various parts of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Several explanatory factors should be noted here. First, ethnic relations in the Baltic states are not based on deep-seated historical antagonisms since the great majority of the non-Balts in the region are recent immigrants during the Soviet era. Second, there is no tradition of violence in Baltic political culture, and the main model for the Baltic independence movements in the late 1980s was Solidarity in Poland. Third, the Balts recognize that violence would be counterproductive given the disparity in numbers, when neighboring Russia is included in the equation, and the need to maintain good relations with the West.¹⁷

Finally, with regard to the process of achieving independence, the singular role played by the Baltic intelligentsia in the Gorbachev era stands out as compared to a more broadly based leadership in 1917-1920. Under the Soviet system in the Baltic certain elites were coopted into the official value system (e.g., party and government officials, academicians) while others were kept artificially small (e.g., military officers). In this situation a privileged elite, but one that remained relatively autonomous from Soviet norms was the so-called creative intelligentsia, i.e., writers, critics, artists, journalists, et al. This group was

sufficiently self-assured and possessed the requisite legitimacy in society to push the process of change along in the early years of the glasnost' era.¹⁸

Post-Independence Issues

The final set of concerns to be addressed here is a comparison of the issues and problems facing the newly independent states in the wake of the Russian Revolution, on the one hand, and the collapse of Soviet power, on the other. Once again, there are important parallels and divergences. Economic instability, not to say chaos, prevailed in both instances and greatly complicated the consolidation of statehood. By 1918, for example, Estonia witnessed the use of tsarist Russian rubles, German occupation marks, Finnish marks, Duma rubles, and Kerensky money. These were later joined by Iudenich money, Soviet Russian sovznaki, and--in March 1919--Estonian marks.¹⁹ Similarly, a multiplicity of currencies flourished in the Baltic states at the end of the Soviet era and with the restoration of independence, creating the same kind of speculation and distortions in economic life as seventy years earlier. However, with Estonia taking the lead in June 1992, followed by Latvia and Lithuania in the first half of 1993, the Baltic states relatively quickly established their own currencies and gradually moved toward economic independence. Moreover, in a more interdependent world the potential for integration of the small Baltic economies into larger markets was considerably greater in the early 1990s than in the early 1920s. It can be argued that this very smallness was an advantage in the transition from a command economy. Even small amounts of capital, coupled with a relatively skilled, but inexpensive labor force, helped smooth the process of transition in the Baltic states in comparison to larger entities in the post-communist world.²⁰

Despite the passage of five decades between the eclipse of Baltic independence and its restoration, there is a striking commonality in the lack of political experience prevalent in both eras. In the first case the tsarist regime had done all it could to stunt civic growth and participation in the political process, although the Revolution of 1905 and the ensuing Duma era did afford a crucial opportunity for political education. Moreover, Baltic politicians also gained experience in municipal government in the last decades of the tsarist era.²¹ Nevertheless, Baltic leaders were neophytes in high politics in the years 1917-1920 and were forced into on-the-job training. In the Gorbachev era once again Baltic politicians had no experience with the concept of a loyal opposition or a pluralistic political system. Since a clean sweep of the old elites did not occur in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the new stage was populated by a melange of former communists ("pragmatists," who stressed their proven administrative skills) and newcomers ("idealists," who called for a clean sweep in the political arena), both inexperienced in the ways of democracy and often finding it difficult to work

together effectively. The lack of established traditions in Baltic political life made every minor confrontation between the executive and legislative branches, for example, into a potentially major crisis.²²

A geopolitical constant of Baltic history for centuries has been the presence of the "large eastern neighbor," whatever form the Russian state or empire happened to take at any given time. In 1920, Soviet Russia concluded peace treaties with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia that renounced for all time any territorial claims to the region, although Lenin and the Bolsheviks considered this a tactical move that would be undone by the coming world revolution.²³ In Stalin's view the events of 1940 in the Baltic states simply constituted a "regathering of Russian lands." If anything, the ensuing fifty years of Soviet military occupation and rule strengthened this kind of thinking among Soviet and Russian elites. Thus, perhaps the stickiest point in Baltic negotiations with the new Russian state has been over legal continuity from the past and the reluctance of the Russian side to accept the Baltic states as full-fledged partners. The Baltic side has argued that the starting point for negotiations should be Moscow's acceptance of the peace treaties of 1920 as legal and historical facts.²⁴ However, the post-Soviet Russian leadership has refused to take responsibility for the actions of the Soviet regime in the Baltic region or to recognize explicitly the illegality of the forced annexation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 1940. In recent years Moscow has increasingly used the term "near abroad" (blizhnee zarubezh'e) to refer to the former republics of the Soviet Union, including the Baltic states despite their non-membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States.²⁵ Beginning to change this mindset constitutes a major challenge for the Baltic states, especially in view of its long historical continuity.

With regard to differences in the issues facing the Baltic countries in the two eras, one can point first of all to the most important--and painful--legacy of Soviet rule: a massive Russian and other non-Baltic presence in the area, especially in Latvia and Estonia. In the early 1920s, the native population of the new Baltic states comprised over 80 percent of the total in each case. By 1989, according to postwar borders, the figures in Estonia and Latvia were down to 62 percent and 52 percent, respectively, while the proportion for Lithuania remained stable at 80 percent. Since the restoration of independence, there has been some out-migration of non-Balts from Estonia and Latvia, raising the native share in both cases by about 1.5 percentage points by early 1993 and somewhat more since then.²⁶

Perspectives on this issue vary according to the eye of the beholder, but if the Baltic states are accepted as members of the international community with the right to maintain their indigenous cultures, then it follows that the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian languages should be given a pre-eminent position in society. The governments of Latvia and Estonia are rightly

reluctant to condone the demographic changes wrought by the years of Soviet rule, especially in view of their massive scope and their illegality according to accepted norms of international law.²⁷ However, although some out-migration of Russians and other non-Balts will persist in the coming years, the fact of life for the foreseeable future is a continuing and substantial non-Baltic presence in the Baltic region. The challenge will be to find a balance between the rights of the native populations, who were brutally suppressed under Soviet rule, and those of recent immigrants, who are not personally responsible for the evils perpetrated by the Soviet regime. In any case the problem is far more complex than seventy years ago, and its solution will require all the skill and patience the Balts can muster. It is noteworthy that non-Balts are expressing growing acceptance of Baltic independence. In Estonia, for example, the proportion of Russians who felt positively about an independent Estonia doubled between 1990 and 1993 from 30 to 60 percent.²⁸

Another legacy of Soviet rule that did not exist at the beginning of the first independence era is what the Germans in the post-World War II period called the "unconquered past," referring to the Nazi era. The Soviet system not only distorted economic relations and other aspects of material life, but it also played havoc with the mental and psychological life of the population. Coming to terms with a past that encouraged or demanded unethical or inhuman behavior--be it reporting to the KGB or something worse--and distorted normal social relationships is a daunting task that simply did not have to be faced in earlier times. The tsarist regime, thankfully, had no pretensions of creating a new man or woman. The ghost of the KGB will no doubt hover over the Baltic states for years to come, but it has already claimed several prominent victims. For example, in Lithuania, Virgilijus Čepaitis, a close associate of Vytautas Landsbergis, was forced to withdraw from public life in fall 1991 after disclosure of his KGB connections, and shortly thereafter the same fate awaited Kazimiera Prunskiene, a former Prime Minister of Lithuania. Most recently, the Latvian Foreign Minister, Georgs Andrejevs, resigned from his post in June 1994 after admitting he had served as a KGB informant.²⁹

On a more positive note it can be argued that the prospects for the future of the restored Baltic states are considerably brighter than when independence first emerged seventy years ago. As noted above, the world is much smaller today, and the possibilities for international integration are incomparably greater. For all its shortcomings, the United Nations has turned out to be an improvement on the League of Nations, and there are numerous regional organizations in Europe that are providing the Baltic states key external support. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania quickly became members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as the newly formed Council of Baltic Sea States, established in March

1992. Lithuania and Estonia were accepted into the Council of Europe in May 1993, and Latvia will no doubt become a member in 1994 after it passes a citizenship law. Although the current international recession dims the outlook in the short term, the isolation that the Baltic states experienced in the post-World War I era is a thing of the past. In this sense the problems alluded to above may not be as insurmountable as they at first appear, and the viability of Baltic independence is on considerably firmer ground now than seventy years ago.

To what extent has history repeated itself? Certainly there are important similarities in the two situations, particularly in the origins of the imperial crises in Russia, but in the Gorbachev era both the local conditions and the international context were significantly different from those prevailing at the time of the Russian Revolution. Five decades of Soviet rule have left deep marks on Baltic society, but ironically, they have also brought the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians closer together than ever and broken down some of the historical barriers between them. In the final analysis the scrupulously non-violent movement for change in the Baltic states in recent years augurs well for the future and suggests that rationality can prevail in at least some parts of the post-Soviet world.

NOTES

1. The order was as follows: the Latvian Mājas Viesis [The Houseguest]-1856; the Estonian Perno Postimees [The Pärnu Courier]-1857; and the Lithuanian Auszra [The Dawn]-1883. See Toivo U. Raun, "The Latvian and Estonian National Movements, 1860-1914," Slavonic and East European Review, 64 (1986), 73; Reino Silvanto, Liettua muinoin ja nyt (Helsinki: Otava, 1920), 60.

2. J. George Longworth, The Latvian Congress of Rural Delegates in 1905 (New York, 1959), 56-57n, 103; Manfred Hellmann, "Die litauische nationale Bewegung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, 2 (1953), 93-94; Toivo U. Raun, "Estonian Social and Political Thought, 1905-February 1917," Andrew Ezergailis and Gert von Pistohlkors, eds., Die baltischen Provinzen Russlands zwischen den Revolutionen von 1905 und 1917 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1982), 63-65.

3. On 1917-1920, see Georg von Rauch, The Baltic States: The Years of Independence--Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 1917-1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

4. See, for example, Vladimir Tismaneanu. In Search of Civil Society (New York: Routledge, 1990).

5. Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1964), 2.

6. On this question, see especially Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

7. Oliver H. Radkey, The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), 33-34, 78. No elections were held in southern Latvia or in any part of Lithuania since these areas were under German military occupation.

8. Uldis Gērmanis, "The Idea of Independent Latvia and Its Development in 1917," Adolf Sprudz and Armins Rūsis, eds., Res Baltica (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1968), 30; Andrew Ezergailis, "The Causes of the Bolshevik Revolution in Latvia 1917," Ezergailis and Pistohlkors, Die baltischen Provinzen, 275-79.

9. Basil Dmytryshyn, USSR: A Concise History, 4th ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984), 79-80; Gērmanis, "Independent Latvia," 63; Toivo U. Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), 103.

10. Toivo U. Raun, "Ethnic Relations and Conflict in the Baltic States," W. Raymond Duncan and G. Paul Holman, Jr., eds., Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict: The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), 163; Helsingin Sanomat, May 28, 1994, p. B13; The Baltic Observer, May 5-11, 1994, pp. 1, 4; May 12-18, 1994, pp. 1, 4.

11. The Baltic Independent, May 6-12, 1994, pp. 1, 6.

12. New York Times, October 30, 1992, p. A7.

13. Toivo U. Raun, "The Re-Establishment of Estonian Independence," Journal of Baltic Studies, 22 (1991), 254-55; Alfred Erich Senn, Lithuania Awakening (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 77; Homeland (Tallinn), May 17, 1989, p. 1.

14. The Baltic Independent, December 24, 1993-January 6, 1994, p. 1.

15. Alfred Erich Senn, "Comparing the Circumstances of Lithuanian Independence, 1918-1922 and 1988-1992," Journal of Baltic Studies, 25 (1994), 124.
16. Edgar Anderson, "The Baltic Entente: Phantom or Reality?," V. Stanley Vardys and Romuald J. Misiunas, eds., The Baltic States in Peace and War, 1917-1945 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1978), 126-35.
17. Raun, "Ethnic Relations," 171-74.
18. Alfred Erich Senn, "Lithuania's Path to Independence," Journal of Baltic Studies, 22 (1991), 245; Juris Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," Problems of Communism, 38 (July-August 1989), 83-84; Raun, "Re-Establishment," 252.
19. Jüri Ant, Eesti 1920: Iseseisvuse esimene aasta (Tallinn: Olion, 1990), 10.
20. Toivo U. Raun, "Post-Soviet Estonia, 1991=1993," Journal of Baltic Studies, 25 (1994), 76-77, 79.
21. See Toivo U. Raun, "The Revolution of 1905 in the Baltic Provinces and Finland," Slavic Review, 43 (1984), 453-67.
22. On these points, see Raun, "Post-Soviet Estonia"; Alfred Erich Senn, "Lithuania's First Two Years of Independence," Journal of Baltic Studies, 25 (1994), 81-88; Andrejs Plakans, "The Tribulations of Independence: Latvia, 1991-1993," ibid., 63-72.
23. Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Baltic States (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970; first published, 1938), 65.
24. The peace treaties were signed with Estonia in February 1920 in Tartu, with Lithuania in July 1920 in Moscow, and with Latvia in August 1920 in Riga; von Rauch, Baltic States, 72, 74-75.
25. John Lough, "The Place of the 'Near Abroad' in Russian Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, 2, no. 11 (1993), 21-29.
26. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Baltic States, 30, 33, 36; Riina Kionka, "Migration to and from Estonia," Report on the USSR, 2, no. 37 (September 14, 1990), 20; Saulius Girnius, "Migration to and from Lithuania," ibid., 25; Dzintra Bungs, "Migration to and from Latvia," ibid., 33; Latvijas statistikas gadagrāmata 1992 (Riga: Baltika, 1993), 54; Raun, "Post-Soviet Estonia," 77.
27. The Russian share of the population of Latvia more than tripled (10.6 to 34.0 percent) between 1935 and 1989 as did the Russian proportion in Estonia (8.6 to 30.3 percent) from 1934 to 1989; Raun, "Ethnic Relations," 160.
28. Helsingin Sanomat, May 4, 1994, p. A2.
29. Senn, "Lithuania's First Two Years," 83; The Baltic Observer, June 9-15, 1994, p. 1.