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**TITLE: YOUNG OTTOMANS AND JADIDISTS: THE CONTINUITY
OF DEBATES IN TURKEY, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA**

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Summary¹

This Report reviews the discourse of Muslim Turkic intellectuals of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Turkey on issues of sovereignty and identity, and its evolution and continuity from origins in the Russian and Ottoman empires to the present debates. Dealing as they do with the role of the intellectuals, the role of the state, "national identity", Islam, relations with Russia, the West and with the Middle Eastern countries; and politicized as they are; those debates, and their politicizing role in the communities will be intensified by the events in Chechnya.

The authors argue that the ongoing discourse became part of a political tradition through which Muslim Turkic intellectuals tried to exert their own interpretations of the process of change in an attempt to control the process. They tie the longevity of the discourse to the historical conditions from which it emerged, and to the inaccessibility of its goals, which continued to politicize the Muslim Turkic communities in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East.

It is the first of four anticipated reports on the subject.

¹ Edited and composed by the staff of the National Council.

YOUNG OTTOMANS AND JADIDISTS: PAST DISCOURSE AND THE CONTINUITY OF DEBATES IN TURKEY, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

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During the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries the Muslim Turkic intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire, the Caucasus and Central Asia debated the need to reform institutions and ways to strengthen their communities to meet the challenge of Western power and the expansion of capitalism. Since the independence of the Muslim Republics of the Soviet Union, debates voiced in the past by Muslim Turkic intellectuals have again come to the forefront of political discourse in Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia. This political discourse reveals complex views on the past and the future of Muslim Turkic societies, and exhibits continuing dominance of issues ranging from Islam and secularization, popular versus state sovereignty, formulation of national identity and the impact of integration into the capitalist system.

This discourse developed and has persisted despite geopolitical boundaries, cultural differences and distinct historical experiences. Surveying the period from the late nineteenth into the twentieth century, in this paper we explore some of the substantive issues, such as the debate on Islam and society, that first linked the Young Ottomans and Jadidists, and permeate the contemporary debates of intellectuals in Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Instead of undertaking an exhaustive or conclusive analysis of all articulations of the political discourse, which is beyond the scope of a single paper, our aim is to introduce some of the intellectual bridges to suggest areas for further study of the continuity of debate between past and present and from Turkey, to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

In this essay, we use the term "Muslim Turkic intellectuals" to refer to intellectuals of the Crimea, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. These intellectuals share a common Islamic heritage and have tended to correspond in Turkic languages. Even though many of them have questioned Islam as a basis of social institutions and the state, and some have written in other languages, such as Russian and French, we argue that religious and linguistic ties have allowed them to communicate and allow us to look at their historically specific experiences along with overlapping or divergent concerns in their discourse.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, Muslim Turkic intellectuals have struggled to answer two interlocking questions: who are the intellectuals, and what is their historical role in the

transformation of society?¹ The urgency of these questions heightened as Muslim Turkic intellectuals saw themselves facing the challenge of the growing influence of the West and expansion of capitalism changing their communities. In this context, some of the emerging proposals aimed at strengthening the communities by breaching borders and overcoming gaps in historical experiences through proposals of unity and identity based on religious and ethnic solidarity within the context of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. Other proposals, such as put forth by some Jadidists, advocated assimilation and co-existence within the Russian Empire, while others including some Young Ottomans and Young Turks explored nationalism and democracy as models of sovereignty and state. Overall, this ongoing discourse became part of a political tradition through which Muslim Turkic intellectuals tried to exert their own interpretation of a process of change in an attempt to control cultural models. The longevity of this complex discourse stemmed not only from the historical conditions in which it developed; its present articulation reveals that the inaccessibility of its goals has insured the continued politicization of the Muslim Turkic communities in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East.²

Traditionally, Muslim Turkic intellectuals have been studied within the context of separate disciplines, especially in the United States, which correspond to geopolitical boundaries, regardless of the overlapping issues in their discourse. Thus, the Young Ottomans as well as Turkish nationalists and their ideas have been explored by scholars predominantly from the perspective of the Middle East. In contrast, studies of the intellectuals of the Caucasus and Central Asia, such as the Jadidists and other reformers of the Russian Empire, and Muslim political activists of the Soviet Union, tend to view them from the perspective of Russian and Soviet history. Even though there is a rich literature on intellectuals of Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia, there are few studies which explicitly examine the cross cultural and historical connections between them.³ Yet, the historical and comparative study of the political discourse will illuminate not only the construction of multi-faceted reality by the intellectuals, but also allow us to examine cultural and other variables which have influenced past as well as present political debate.

Thus, the disciplinary categorization can be challenged by concentrating on the discourse of intellectuals which created bridges, in order to search for the roots and components and the process of the development of a Muslim Turkic intellectual response to the challenge of the West and the expansion of capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁴ This approach is not pan-Turkist or Turanist in its methodology or focus; it examines intellectuals, and separate and divergent schools of thought, reflecting the influence of distinct and often antithetical ideologies. By combining a study of schools of thought along with the major

representatives that led the intellectual debates during their careers and continued to influence subsequent, even the present generations, the aim is to understand the past, present and future possibilities of the political discourse.⁵ Thus, the study of discourse places the debates of the Muslim Turkic intellectuals on politics, economics and society within the context of the political and economic strains and the cultural conditions and social relations in which the discourse developed. In this paper, we explore the roots of this discourse in the connections between the ideas that emerged out of the Ottoman Tanzimat, and Jadidist proposals of the Muslim intellectuals of the Russian Empire, to explore the bridges and their relevance to present debates.

The Young Ottomans: Politicization of Intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire

The reforms of the nineteenth century Tanzimat (reorganization) emerged out of the growing awareness of Western hegemony and the relative weakness of the central government both of which challenged the Ottoman Empire politically and economically. In this period, growing military pressure from Russia was matched by increasing economic pressure from Western Europe as the Empire confronted fragmentation brought by separatist movements, including the Greek Revolution of 1820-1828, insurrections in the Balkans, and the growing power of Muhammad Ali in Egypt. During the Tanzimat period, the integration of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist system was facilitated through accommodation of the terms of the 1838 Commercial Convention redefining the Empire as a free trade zone.⁶

The Tanzimat, as means to reorganize the Empire's internal economic and political structures, including its tax system, emerged from the intellectuals' beliefs that the restoration of old institutions which had given strength to the Empire in the past was no longer sufficient to meet the needs of changing circumstances. Tanzimat, as a reform movement, reflected the changing ideas of power and progress in the minds of the administrators of the Empire.⁷ The sense of advancement that had earlier stemmed from the expansion of territories gradually left its place to the exertion of control by a stronger central government in the shrinking empire. Even though fiscal concerns were evident, detailed economic considerations for the future were not dominant in the equation.

The reforms of the Tanzimat, designed and enacted by palace administrators, were aimed at modernization of the Empire and centralization of power. As the autocracy was strengthened, a group of intellectuals known as the Young Ottomans (Yeni Osmanlilar), emerged as its critics. Opposing what they saw as the slow pace of change, they began to debate political ideas regarding patriotism, homeland and nationalism, and called for adoption of representative institutions.⁸

Even though there were disagreements over methods, the Young Ottoman intellectuals and the Tanzimat reformers shared similar goals: to modernize and protect the Empire. For example, to spread literacy and secular education, in 1845 Ottoman administrators launched a plan to simplify Ottoman Turkish by excluding Arabic and Persian words and by altering the Arabic script, a reform which the Young Ottomans supported.⁹ Reforms in language and education, along with use of the printing press, helped to spread the debates concerning the Tanzimat. From their exile in France and England, the leading advocates of the Young Ottoman movement, including Ibrahim Sinasi (1824-1871), Ziya Pasha (1825-1880), Ali Suavi (1839-1879) and Namik Kemal (1840-1888), publicized their ideas through literature, and especially through newspapers such as Tasvir-i Efkar (Narrative of Ideas) and Hurriyet (Liberty).¹⁰ The Young Ottomans were among the first to contrast the institutions of the East and West and to offer a critique of the merits of each for the Empire and Ottoman society. In fact, they introduced the concept of Ottoman society to argue about a collective future for the distinct communities of the Empire. Also, they were among the first Eastern intellectuals to argue that Islam, but in a progressive form, was needed to fill the vacuum left by the replacement of traditional institutions by the Westernizing Tanzimat reforms.¹¹

The Russian Empire and the Roots of Jadidist Thought: Accommodation or Resistance?

As the Ottoman Empire contracted and centralized, the Russian Empire expanded. The expansion of the Russian Empire into the Muslim lands of the Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia beginning in the 1780's, ended the military struggle between the Ottoman Empire, the Qajars of Iran and the local feudal leaders for control of the region.¹² For the Russian Empire, the Crimea and the Caucasus were sources of agricultural commodities, raw materials and small scale manufactured goods.¹³

Economic domination, brought by increased production of cash crops and raw materials through labor intensive methods, and political control exerted through the Russian colonial administration, along with the imperial mission of spreading Christianity, perpetuated the reaction among the Muslim population even long after the invasion. At one level the reaction led by the Muslim elite, such as in the Sheikh Shamil uprisings in the Caucasus, was manifested as resistance and rejection of the terms of co-existence with the Russians.¹⁴ At another level the reaction came as a search for peaceful means of co-existence, advocating accommodation and assimilation. It was led by Muslim intellectuals educated in Russian colonial schools, which were established to recruit the children of the Muslim aristocracy.

Muslim intellectuals educated in Russian colonial schools were the first advocates of Usul-i Jadid (the New Method) as a means of reforming Muslim society as well as creating a

base to reconcile differences between the Muslim population and the Russians. Advocates of Jadidism aimed at reforming education and simplifying language, and advocated the emancipation of women, development of civic society and the establishment of cooperation among the Turkic Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire and with the Russian government and people.¹⁵ Thus, the Jadidist response to Russian colonialism was an attempt to claim control of the cultural models and social relations by introducing reforms.

In the Caucasus, Abbaskulu Aga Bakuhanli (1794-1846) exemplifies an early Jadidist response to Russian colonialism.¹⁶ As the son of Muslim aristocrats who cooperated with the Russians by taking charge of Kuba following the Russian invasion in 1806, Abbaskulu Aga was allowed to join the colonial army and became a member of the Caucasian Russian Army, commanded by General Yermelov in 1820. He expanded his knowledge of Persian and Arabic as well as traditional Islamic subjects to include Russian and contemporary debates introduced by the Decembrists and Polish intellectuals who were serving in the Russian army in the Caucasus.¹⁷ As an army officer, he fought for and represented the Russian Empire in the 1826-1828 Russian-Iranian war and the 1828-1829 Russian-Ottoman war and was present at the settlement conferences. Retiring from the Russian army, he returned to Kuba to establish "Gulistan," a literary society formed to discuss classical Muslim and Sufi poetry, and he became a community leader and a devout Muslim. In 1846 Abbaskulu Aga went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, stopping in Istanbul to present his panegyric poetry to the Ottoman Sultan Abdulmecid.¹⁸

The complexity of Abbaskulu Aga's multi-faceted allegiances, to Russia, to the Muslim world, and to the Ottoman Empire, is exhibited through his proposals for the future of the Muslim community in the Caucasus. In his writings he advocated replacing the medrese with a Russian school system to teach both Islam and Western methods in science and technology to the new Muslim generations. In his book, written for children, Nasihatname [Book of Advice], he was one of the first intellectuals of the Caucasus to argue the importance of the native language in education, yet he wrote his books on history and poetry in Persian and Arabic.¹⁹ Abbaskulu Aga believed that in the future the Muslim community would emerge as a powerful force in the Caucasus by combining the superiority of Western methods and Islamic teachings.

Abbaskulu Aga Bakuhanli's views about coexistence with Russian colonial rule and what he saw as its constructive influence on the Muslim community, were shared by others including Mehmet Ali Mirza Kazembey (1802-1870). Kazembey argued that the Westernization of Eastern culture could be facilitated by Muslim intellectuals, and that it could best be accomplished by educating the next generation of intellectuals in a Turkic language common to all of the Turkic population of the Russian Empire.²⁰ Thus both Bakuhanli and Kazembey

advocated education as a means to reform the Muslim community in the Russian Empire. Yet, at the time, their agenda overlapped with Russian colonial goals. Workers with skills and technological know-how were needed for the growing extractive economy, and establishment of a common Turkic language would have provided an accommodating base for Russian colonial interference with the culture and society.

Mirza Sefi Vazih (1794-1852), as an activist, combined diverse ideas and debates regarding education of the Muslims of the Russian Empire to establish what can be described as the first Usul-i Jadid (the new method) school in the eastern Caucasus. Vazih influenced the next generation of Jadidists with his call for secular, mass education for all Muslims, and his student Mirza Fath Ali Akhuzade (1812-1878) advanced Vazih's argument. For Akhuzade, what he saw as the backwardness of the Islamic East resulted from unprogressive, religious education.²¹

The roots of Jadidist thought reflected the influence of the debates of the Young Ottomans, as well as the Russian Slavophiles and Westernizers.²² Each of these groups attempted to assess the future of their communities and the impact of the growing power of the West and the expansion of capitalism. In this attempt, the Young Ottomans and the early Jadidists concentrated on education as a tool to create and shape their communities. This project involved intellectuals' construction of communal identity in order to exert control over cultural models. Thus, education was important because it not only defined the place of intellectuals in a changing society, but also was meant to establish the terms of coexistence with different communities, and ultimately it was aimed at recreating their community in an image to which they aspired: glorious, superior, and strong.

Negotiation with Islam was integral to this agenda. Even though the early generation of Jadidists exhibited the influence of the Tanzimat reforms and the Young Ottomans, especially regarding the adoption of Western technology, language reform and the improvement of education, they vastly differed in their views on religion as an institution and as part of everyday life. The Young Ottomans advocated a reformed, progressive Islam, compatible with modernization, and saw religion as a vehicle to restore the power of Muslims and the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, the Jadidists advocated the reduction of the influence of religion, for the peaceful coexistence of the Muslims of Russia with the Russian Christians. In their analysis of power, religion was a barrier to assimilation that had to be transformed or displaced in order to reach peaceful terms of coexistence with the "other" in the colonial system. Yet a debate emerged around the discourse on religion. While some Jadidists, such as Mirza Fath Ali Akhuzade and Hasan Melikzade Zardabi, rejected informal religion as obscurantist, and endeavored to change the institutional influence of formal religion, others like Hajji Seyyid

Azim Shirvani and Ismail Bey Gasprinski saw religion as a source of power and advocated unification of Muslims, as well as Turkic unity in the Russian Empire.

Within this discourse, besides education and Islam, debates centered around language, literature and history. History was especially important because through reconstruction of the past, intellectuals proposed agendas for the future. Intellectuals identified history with their own interests, but in the Russian Empire, for some, their interests reflected those of the Russian colonial administration. For example, Kazembey wrote a history of the Crimea and eastern Caucasus, concentrating on Sheikh Shamil, to explain the roots of religious activism and conflict. His contemporary, Abbaskulu Aga authored a history of Shirvan and Daghestan to present as a tribute to the Russian Tsar. In a letter, Abbaskulu Aga recognized that writing the history of the region was a responsibility he felt he should fulfill for future Muslim Turkic generations.²³ In Central Asia, Jadidists such as Mahmud Khoja Behbudiy (1874-1919) and later Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970) advocated the writing of a new history of the area they called Turkistan, to construct a common past for the Muslim peoples of the region.²⁴

For the Young Ottomans and Jadidists, the reformist agenda was not only a redefinition of the place of intellectuals in a changing society, and an intellectual struggle over political and cultural models and historicity, but it was effort to realign the political system to preserve and strengthen the community. Among Jadidists, the debates on assimilation into the Russian system stemmed from the desire to coexist, as well as to preserve the existing culture by controlling the merging of Russian and Islamic education. But, some Kazakh Jadidists saw the blending of Russian and Islamic teaching as a threat to Kazakh culture.²⁵ The debate on religion and education set the boundaries of conflict among intellectuals and eventually led to antagonism between the intellectuals and the people, in both the Ottoman and Russian Empires.

Alternative Articulations of Jadidist Thought

Starting from the 1860s Russian colonial policies shifted to reflect emphasis on central administration and Russification of the colonial lands. For example, in 1865, with the retirement of the first Viceroy of the Caucasus, Mikhail S. Vorontsov, the integrative policies began to shift,²⁶ reducing the political power of the Muslims as well as limiting their participation in the regional economy, which was developing to accommodate external markets, and was being rapidly integrated into the capitalist system through oil at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.²⁷

While industrialization and colonial urbanization challenged existing arrangements in the Caucasus, migration of Russian peasants into Central Asia became threatening to Kazakh nomads. A new generation of Kazakh Jadidists, including Abubakir Kerderi (1858-1903),

opposed the Russian policies of trying to end Kazakh nomadism, and advocated Kazakh unity against the Russians. For Abubakir Kerderi, Jadidist schools should function both to educate Kazakhs in their own culture and to train them to compete with Russians in the new economic system. In Central Asia, this argument set the parameters of the debate, and established terms of coexistence between the Kazakh and migrant Russian communities different from what existed in the Caucasus. Also, contrary to most Tatar or Azerbaijani Jadidists, some Kazakh intellectuals focused only on their own region, for instance Ali Khan Bukeikhanov (1869-1932) who advocated the unification of the Kazakh people to avoid destruction of their culture by the Tsarist policies of Russian expansionism.²⁸

While the Kazakh discussion concentrated on the controls imposed on the community from the outside, Jadidists in the Caucasus looked at pressures within the community which ran counter to Jadidist proposals for unification and advancement. Jadidists of the Caucasus, such as Mirza Fath Ali Akhuzade, targeted the ulema, seeing them as representatives of the backwardness and superstition of Islam. In his plays he satirized various aspects of everyday experience in Azerbaijani society, to criticize the expression of antagonism between people rather than the social order imposed by colonialism.²⁹ Along with early Jadidist and Tanzimat reformers of the Ottoman Empire, Akhuzade advocated the simplification of the Arabic alphabet for Turkic languages of the Caucasus, and later proposed to change the alphabet to a Latin script.³⁰ His contemporary Hajji Seyyid Azim Shirvani also favored Turkic language reform, but to spread Islamic teaching among Turkic people to revitalize the political potential of Islam in the Russian Empire.

Thus, intellectuals of the Caucasus, regardless of their assessment of Islam, tried to build a community and establish a common identity through education. For example, Hasan Melikzade Zardabi (1837-1907) promoted the establishment of a "milli mektep" (national school) which would create and foster a cadre of "milli ziyalilar" (national intellectuals), to unite the community around a common culture. With this assertion of education as a tool to preserve the culture, Zardabi arrived at a crossroads with Kazakh intellectuals. To achieve his goals, Zardabi became the publisher of the first Turkic language newspaper in the Russian Empire, *Akinci*.³¹ Through his newspaper he advocated unity among the Turks, as well as freedom in every aspect of an individual's life. He tied freedom to civilization and advancement thus arguing that freedom, rather than Westernization or assimilation into the Russian Empire, was a necessity for the advancement of the Muslim community in the Caucasus.³² Furthermore Zardabi, along with Hanife Hanim Abayova, his wife, established a Girls' school in Baku, symbolizing the argument that women's equality was not to be realized as a result of advancement, but was a prior necessity for advancement of the community.³³

Zardabi's efforts in publishing provided the impetus for an avalanche of publications. Ismail Bey Gasprinski's paper Tercuman (The Interpreter), published in Bahcesaray in the Crimea, became the "unofficial voice of Muslims" of the Russian Empire after 1883.³⁴ In his writing, Ismail Bey Gasprinski (1851-1914) combined the arguments that ran through Jadidism regarding the reform of political and social institutions, with pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, calling for the unity of the Turkic and Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire.³⁵ By advocating pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, he proposed new boundaries of an "imagined community" within the Russian Empire,³⁶ and he designated the means to establish it through unification of language, ideology and effort, as popularized in a slogan "Dilde, Fikirde, Iste Birlik" (Unity in Language, Thought and Effort). Through this trilogy he began to formulate a structure that could accommodate nationalism.³⁷ Integral to this trilogy was secular education as a way to synthesize the traditional knowledge of the past and Islamic teachings with Western knowledge and methods, in accordance with Jadidist goals, to generate the revival of the Muslim community of the Russian Empire.³⁸

Ismail Bey Gasprinski, as a synthesizer of many different ideas, influenced and was influenced by intellectuals of both the Russian Empire and the Middle East. His knowledge of the pan-Slavic movement came from his friendship with Ivan Katkov,³⁹ while his newspaper, Tercuman, was named after Sinasi's Tercuman-i Ahval, published in the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁰ Gasprinski's ideas on pan-Islamism showed the influence of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who traveled extensively throughout the Ottoman Empire and Arab lands, Iran, the Russian Empire and Europe spreading a message of the unity of all Muslims to fight Western domination.⁴¹

Both Gasprinski and Zardabi influenced their contemporaries and later generations by introducing different perspectives into the reformist discourse. Islam as a political and social force began to emerge as a key problematic among intellectuals, its representation ranging from being the source of power to being an obstacle to advancement and the cause of powerlessness. Religion was progressively becoming not only integral to politics between the Muslim and Christian communities, but also central to politics within the Muslim Turkic community. In this context, interpretations of Islamic unity varied, reflecting not only sectarian differences, but also cultural and regional ties. For most Muslim intellectuals of the Russian Empire, pan-Islamism meant reform of the Muslim way of life, to strengthen the Muslim community rather than establishing an antagonistic Muslim unity against Russia. But in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan and his administration saw pan-Islamism as an answer to the Western challenge and as an ideology to restore the dominance of Ottoman imperial power.

The Politics of Unification and Division in the Ottoman Empire and the Young Turks

During the period of the late nineteenth century the integration of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist system accelerated. Due to commercial treaties which until 1911 restricted import duties, the increasing trade did not generate much needed revenues for the Empire. Overall, centralization of the government enhanced control over resources, but ongoing fiscal weakness curtailed the effectiveness of administrative reform plans in economic affairs. The main economic growth was in agriculture, reflecting both administrative initiatives and increasing demand for cash crops on the world market. According to the perceptions of Ottomans, all of these changes cumulatively gave an increasing advantage to foreigners and non-Muslims in economic affairs.⁴²

The reign of Sultan Abdulhamit II (1876-1909) began with the promulgation of the constitution of 1876, promising equality for all citizens of the Ottoman Empire regardless of ethnic origin, religion or wealth. Although abrogated by Abdulhamit II a year later, the 1876 constitution represented a culmination of the Tanzimat reforms and the debates of the Young Ottomans, as well as the influence of Western thought and experience as interpreted by administrators, politicians and intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire. Following the Tanzimat and the failure of the constitution, demands for change continued to be raised by a new generation of intellectuals, known as the Young Turks. The period of Abdulhamit's rule was marked by crises within the empire and in foreign affairs, ranging from Armenian efforts to establish their independence, the Greco-Turkish War, Bulgarian annexation of eastern Rumelia and problems in Albania, to war with Russia, French occupation of Tunisia and British occupation of Egypt. At the same time, the decline of the Empire was accompanied on the one hand by growing intellectual activity, including the opening of public libraries and greater circulation of printed materials, and on the other hand by increasing government censorship and oppression.⁴³

Abdulhamit II responded to the crisis of the Empire in part by promoting pan-Islamism as an imperial ideology. His administration saw pan-Islamism as a way to defend the Empire and the rule of the Sultan by uniting Muslims against dissolution of the Empire and Western encroachment.⁴⁴ Even though doubtful of the ability of pan-Islamism to unite Muslims, Ottoman intellectuals like Prince Sabahattin (1878-1948) did not dismiss its potential as a political force in the Empire, but interpreted the palace's support of pan-Islamism as an effort to mobilize reactionary forces against Europe.⁴⁵ Other Young Turk intellectuals such as Ahmet Riza (1859-1930) shared Prince Sabahattin's assessment of pan-Islamism as addressing desires for unity and solidarity among Muslims.⁴⁶ Overall, the Ottoman administration's attempt to introduce pan-Islamism as an ideology sharpened the debate concerning religion, its

potential as a political force, its compatibility with the modern world, and thus its impact on the future of Ottoman society.

As part of a broader agenda, the Young Turks first proposed pan-Turkism as an alternative to Abdulhamit's proposal of pan-Islamism, as a way to create a base for unity and solidarity on a different political plateau.⁴⁷ This argument was adopted as policy at the 1909 Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress in Salonika. Even though the Young Turks saw Pan-Turkism, advocating the unity of all Turks, as an instrument for what they saw as "modern nationalism," they did not dismiss the potential of pan-Islamism as a political tool. Actually, in the years immediately preceding World War I the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress, using logic comparable to Abdulhamit's, began to advocate pan-Islamism, not only because it united their followers, but also because it allowed them to claim leadership and legitimacy in the Muslim world. Besides pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, the Committee promoted "modernization" and "Ottomanism," which allowed continuation of the discourse that emerged out of the Tanzimat regarding reform and the integration of Western knowledge and technology, as well as the co-existence of Muslims and minorities in the Empire. This diverse and complex agenda was formulated for its political potential, and it reflected the influences of both Young Ottomans and Jadidists of the Russian Empire, some of whom became active members of the Committee of Union and Progress after 1908.⁴⁸

Once pan-Islamism had become part of the official discourse during the reign of Abdulhamit, it dominated both the administration's and the opposition's approach to foreign and domestic relations. In domestic affairs the implementation of pan-Islamic policies followed the abandonment of some of the Tanzimat reforms after 1876. For example, contrary to language and education reforms of the Tanzimat, the Ottoman administration began to promote Muslim schools, the teaching of Arabic, observance of religious holidays, and the construction and maintenance of religious shrines, while raising the salary of the Ulema and increasing state control over religious activities. In foreign affairs, pan-Islamism was meant to unify the East under Abdulhamit's leadership to challenge the West, but some Muslims of the Empire, such as the Arabs, were moving away in search of their own identity. Furthermore, the Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia saw pan-Islamism as a force to unite the Muslims of the Russian Empire, rather than unify them under Ottoman control. Even though as a foreign policy initiative pan-Islamism failed, pan-Turkism later became influential in setting formal relations between the Young Turk government and the Caucasus and Central Asia in the period before World War I. Besides the policy efforts, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism began to dominate the discourse, especially as paradigms to define identity and the confrontation between East and West. While debates varied regarding methods and theoretical

interpretations, both Jadidist and Young Ottoman discourse were integrated and reshaped within this framework.

The Turkish Republic and Continuing Discourse

Historical circumstances not only facilitated the coalescence of ideas, but also brought intellectuals together in the early twentieth century. Some intellectuals put forth their vision for the future of the Muslim community in a series of pan-Islamic conferences in the Russian Empire beginning in 1905,⁴⁹ and their debates about unity, freedom, equality and protection of religious rights were carried by intellectuals who chose to migrate from the collapsing Russian Empire to the newly formed Turkish Republic. Among those who migrated was Azerbaijani nationalist Huseynzade Ali Turan (1864-1942), who became a symbol of anti-Russian thought with his synthesis of Jadidism, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. By arguing against both Russian and Iranian cultural and political influence in the Caucasus, he advocated an amalgamation of what he called Ottoman-European civilization. In his model, the social order based on equality could only be established by Turks and maintained by Turks in the land of "Turan." With his slogan "Turklestirmek, Islamlastirmek, Avrupalastirmek," (Turkify, Islamicize, Europeanize), Huseynzade created a powerful impact both in Russia and in the Ottoman Empire. These three words not only became the political assertion of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan, they later became the symbol of Turkism as advocated by Ziya Gokalp: "Turklesmek, Islamlasmak, Muasirlasmak" (Turkify, Islamicize, Modernize). Other emigre intellectuals included Yusuf Akcura, Ahmed Zeki Validi Togan, and Ahmed Agaoglu, all of whom played prominent roles in Turkish politics and education. Also, Mehmet Emin Resulzade (1884-1955), who was President of the Azerbaijani Republic and leader of the Musavat Party, migrated first to Turkey, then to Berlin with Mirza Bala to continue their political efforts against Soviet domination.⁵⁰

The creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the Kemalist reform program carried out during the Presidency of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1923-1938) reflected the influence of the past debates in the establishment of the constitutional, secular republic. Integration of the emigre intellectuals into Turkish politics and the continuing influence of the program of the Committee of Union and Progress in Republican policies, led to the perpetuation of the debates which emerged out of the experience of the nineteenth century.⁵¹

Through the Kemalist reforms, many of the goals of the Tanzimat, and the Young Ottoman agenda were realized. Kemalism concentrated power in the central government to reform political institutions and develop a national economy free of foreign domination. As an ideology, it aimed to modernize Turkey by moving Turkish society closer to the West.⁵² The

Kemalist agenda was formalized into six areas, republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, reformism and statism, which reflected the discussions of the Young Ottomans regarding the formation of the state and its relation to society. Furthermore, the actual content of the Kemalist reforms, such as alphabet reform, changes in the legal codes, and women's suffrage echoed the past debates regarding the reshaping of Ottoman society.

In terms of religion, the Kemalist reformers followed the path of the Young Turks, who advocated reducing the power of the Sheikh ul-Islam, restricting the jurisdiction of religious courts, secularizing waqfs, and extending the authority of the Ministry of Education over religious matters. The Kemalists chose to continue Young Turk policies by adopting state control of the religious institutions, rather than establishing a separation of religion and state in the context of secularization.⁵³ In order to legitimate their refusal to negotiate with Islam, Kemalist reformers presented religion as obscurantist and reactionary. In this sense, their approach was more in accord with the Jadidists than with the Tanzimat reformers or the Young Ottomans. Just as some Jadidists had integrated pan-Islamism into their formulations, the supporters of the Kemalist reforms reconsidered their position on state control over religion as Turkey moved from single-party politics to multi-party politics in the post-World War II period.

Pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism were not part of the Turkish Republic's official ideology as it was spelled out during Ataturk's presidency, yet they entered into foreign and domestic policies. Pan-Islamist ideas influenced foreign policy towards the Muslim countries of the Middle East and Asia, such as reflected in secular Turkey's sporadic representation at World Muslim Conferences during the interwar period.⁵⁴ Pan-Turkist ideas were integrated into domestic policies through the stress on Turkish nationalism, and surfaced in official interpretations of Turkish history, language reforms, literature, and educational policies. While pan-Turkist appeals for the unity of all Turkic peoples were officially discouraged, pan-Turkist intellectuals still played prominent roles in the government, universities and politics.

World War II was a test of the longevity of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, as pan-Turkist groups revived their political activities in Turkey and Europe in an effort to gain support for their cause. Even though by the end of the war all pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic hopes for the independence of the Crimea, Caucasus and Central Asia had proved elusive, the intellectuals' activism raised international awareness of the Muslim population of the Soviet Union as a major source of possible opposition to Soviet rule in the Cold War. Also, during World War II and the Cold War years in Turkey, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism continued to define ideologies against Soviet as well as Western encroachment.

Turkey and The New Republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia

The collapse of the Soviet Union has provided grounds for the renewal of ideas and debates of the past, emerging with the establishment of connections between the new republics and the Middle East since the mid-1980s. Tremendous changes being experienced are spurring debates in the new republics and in the Middle Eastern countries, stimulating intellectuals, politicians and businessmen to search for alternative scenarios for the future. The range of these alternative scenarios demonstrates the anxiety over economic and political stability within the region.

Economic stability is tied to interrelated conditions in a rapidly changing market for investment and trade, especially in oil and gas, and the increasing need for capital, technology and expertise, as well as problems of unemployment and inflation in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Political stability depends on the outcome of domestic and regional conflicts ranging from political opposition to ethnic struggles and hostilities with neighboring states, which add to the complexity of the transformation that the new republics are undergoing. Yet, from the beginning, the discourse which emerged out of this transformation reflected continuity with the past and the bridges between Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia. For example, in December, 1989, the Azerbaijani Popular Front's official newspaper, *Turkun Sesi* (Voice of the Turk) published a famous poem from the Ottoman poet Teyfik Fikret (1870-1915), as an editorial:

Millet yoludur, Hak yoludur tuttugumuz yol.
Ey hak yasa! Ey sevgili Millet yasa, var ol!
(The road we are on is the road of the nation,
the road of God, Oh! Sovereign, Oh! Dear Nation,
live long and exist forever).

The legacy in the present discourse, of Muslim Turkic thought in the Caucasus and Central Asia, reflects the continuing dominance of the unresolved issues and intellectuals' search for their role in changing circumstances. In this context, recasting the "old issues" allows the intellectuals to claim the legitimacy of an established system of thought. This has led intellectuals to debate issues regarding co-existence with the Russians within the framework of Jadidist discourse. The early opposition to Russian minorities and demands for their repatriation, which were part of nationality politics as the new republics gained their independence, is now giving way to discussions regarding integration. This policy can be the outcome of a careful calculation of the need to retain trained personnel to facilitate the demands of changing economic conditions, yet this decision adds to the already heavy financial responsibility of high unemployment resulting from the closing of state enterprises that had

employed emigre Russians. For example, recently President Asker Akayev of Kyrgyzstan initiated a new policy to make Kyrgyzstan more hospitable to Russian emigres, and the Russian press has interpreted this policy decision as an effort to foster closer ties with Russia.⁵⁵ Actually, close ties to Russia are continuing on both economic and political fronts. In Uzbekistan, as well as in the other new republics, over 70% of trade is still with the Russian Republic.⁵⁶

The second issue which is being discussed within the Jadidist framework is language and alphabet reform. When the new republics declared independence, one of the first attempts at reform targetted changing the alphabet and restricting the use of Russian. This discussion led to an "alphabet war." While the republics tried to change from the Cyrillic script to a Latin or Arabic script, Turkey attempted to influence their decisions by sending thousands of typewriters, as Saudi Arabia and Iran distributed Qurans.⁵⁷ Now it appears that restrictions on the use of Russian are progressively being decreased, leaving the bureaucracy in the new republics functioning mostly in Russian.⁵⁸

These reconsiderations of national policies is leading intellectuals to reassess the power arrangements, especially after Geidar Aliev's return to power in Azerbaijan, which has solidified the stronghold of former high ranking Communist Party officials as presidents of the new republics.⁵⁹ Under these power arrangements, intellectual discourse is fragmenting. As Russian soldiers recently entered Azerbaijan for a "peace keeping mission," Azerbaijani intellectuals split among themselves over whether this was necessary for the security of Azerbaijan, or another invasion of the Caucasus by Russian forces. Along with Azerbaijan, other republics, such as Uzbekistan are entering into military agreements with Russia for strategic defense, which allow for the continued presence of Russian troops in the new republics.⁶⁰

When the new republics became independent, definite possibilities for cultural, political and economic alliances between the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East emerged. While the Middle Eastern countries try to legitimize their increasing interest through references to common religious, cultural and historical experiences, their efforts reflect frantic attempts to build new economic linkages and a desire to control the entrance of the new republics into the world market. From the beginning, Turkey, the only sovereign Turkish state throughout the twentieth century, postured as a model for the new republics and was recognized in that mold. For example, after Turkey recognized Kyrgyzstan, Asker Akayev, in an emotional speech, likened Turkey to the Northern Star, to be looked up to for guidance.⁶¹ President Islam Kerimov of Uzbekistan announced that "we will pursue the path of Turkey, there is no other way."⁶² Turkey reinforced this position by leading in the recognition of the independence of

the new republics, and by representing their interests in the West,⁶¹ as a "big brother to the Soviet Turks."⁶⁴

In this context, Turkey has also signed individual treaties with the republics, modeled on the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Azerbaijan, first signed in 1991, and renewed in 1992 and recently in 1994.⁶⁵ With these treaties Turkey is attempting to extend economic influence as well as develop and reinforce cultural ties. For example, Turkish universities have begun to admit students from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Yet, Turkey's closer ties are much criticized by some leftist and rightist intellectuals in Turkey, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Some, such as the Kazakh writer Olzhas Suleimanov, argue that Turkish foreign policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia resembles the Ottoman Empire's efforts to create unity in order to impose its leadership on the region.⁶⁶ While this assessment reflects reservations about pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist models that influence the intellectuals of Central Asia and the Caucasus, in reality Turkey faces economic and political difficulties, with an inflation rate over 70%, budget deficits, foreign debt, unemployment and the struggle with the Kurds.

Turkic economic and cultural unity and the tendency to look at Turkey as a secular democratic model and a "big brother" is expressed on the official level in different Republics, but Islam as an ideology and as an expression of the cultural memory and communal identity of the people remains the most powerful political expression against the existing power arrangements. Its political power comes from being an alternative first to Russian, then Soviet and now autocratic political structures. The promise of Islam remains uncertain, but it frames alternative futures, either as a secular religion which fosters coexistence between the Muslims and Christians in the post-Soviet period, or as a defining ideology securing the power of Muslims in the post-Soviet republics. The recent success of the Refah Party in Turkey is a strong indication that Islam remains a political force. In this complex equation, the debate of the intellectuals regarding identity, sovereignty and the state as well as Islam and relations with Russia and the West is again merging in Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia. While the alternative scenarios reflect ambivalence about the future, the discourse bridging Asia Minor, the Caucasus and Central Asia for more than a century continues.

NOTES

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1. Martin Malia in an essay on Russian intellectuals argues that these two questions led the intelligentsia to arrive at "an exalted sense of difference from and superiority to the barbarous world around it." This alone created cohesion, subsequently leading to a sense of being a distinct "class" in Russian society, even though the members of the intelligentsia came from various backgrounds, supported various principles and functioned within various institutions. Martin Malia, "What is the Intelligentsia?," Daedalus (Summer, 1960). Did the Muslim Turkic intellectuals constitute a distinct class in this sense? In the context of social theory, Karl Mannheim argues that intellectuals are a classless aggregation, which can easily become an extension of "existing classes and parties." Karl Mannheim, Essays on Society and Culture, (New York, 1956), p. 104. In contrast to Mannheim, Alvin Gouldner argues "intellectuals are rapidly constituting themselves as a new class, capable of contending for political power corresponding to their already formidable economic and cultural position." Stanley Aranowitz "On Intellectuals," from Bruce Robbins, ed., Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics, Academics (Minneapolis, 1990), p. 41, in reference to Alvin Gouldner's Future of the Intellectuals (New York, 1978). The important point here is that while Gouldner talks about intellectuals' perceptions of themselves, Mannheim is interested in the question of how they are perceived. When it comes to Muslim Turkic intellectuals, these key questions, together, help define who the intellectuals are, and the definition alters according to specific historical circumstances. The educated strata in the Ottoman and Russian Empires, regardless of whether they received a secular or Islamic education saw themselves as intellectuals, and claimed control of political models. In the nineteenth as well as twentieth century, until now, education has been a key variable dominating claims to legitimacy. But more and more, position within the stratification system as well as affiliation with social movements are emerging as important criteria to define intellectuals, whether they are "full-time" intellectuals such as writers or scholars or "part-time" intellectuals such as bureaucrats or technocrats. Over all, due to historical circumstances, for the most part Muslim Turkic intellectuals tried to negotiate their legitimacy between hegemony and counter-hegemony, without formulating well articulated class beliefs. For discussion regarding class rooting of intellectuals and hegemony, see Antonio Gramsci, An Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916-1935, ed. by David Forgacs (New York, 1988).

2. Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin, 1982), pp. 1-17.

3. Works which do examine the connections between intellectuals across borders tend to concentrate on supra-nationalist movements. See Jacob Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam (Oxford, 1990), and Pan-Turkism in Turkey (London, 1981); Serge Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Charles Hostler, The Turks of Central Asia (Westport, 1993); Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era (Leiden, 1992).

4. Albert Hourani, "How Should We Write the History of the Middle East?," JMES 23 (1991): 125-136. See also Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964); Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, 1962); Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London, 1964); Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914 (Chicago, 1980).

5. With this emphasis, this method of inquiry carries the influence of Albert Hourani's seminal work Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1983).

6. Caglar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development (London, 1987), pp. 29-32.

7. Serif Mardin, "The Mind of the Turkish Reformer, 1700-1900," Western Humanities Review XIV (1960).

8. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 58-69, 71, 80, 130; Berkes, Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 208-218.
9. Shaw and Shaw, pp. 129-130.
10. Shaw and Shaw, pp. 128-131; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1968), pp. 136-150.
11. Shaw and Shaw, pp. 131-132; Berkes, pp. 218-222.
12. Muriel Atkin, Russia and Iran, 1780-1828 (Minneapolis, 1980).
13. For example, in the Caucasus, the concentration was on tobacco, cotton, silk and viniculture, and by the end of the nineteenth century, Azerbaijan emerged as a major supplier of oil, surpassing the entire U.S. output in 1901. Emil Agayev, Baku (Moscow, 1987); I. A. Guseinov, et al. eds., Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, 3 vols. (Baku, 1959-1963); Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 17-20; Audrey Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity Under Russian Rule (Stanford, 1992).
14. A. Caferoglu, Azeri Edebiyatında İstiklal Mücadelesi (Istanbul, 1932), p. 28; Mustafa Zihni Hizaloglu, Seyh Sami (Ankara, 1958); and Suleyman Tekiner, "Azerbaycan Sovyet Edebiyatında Mukavemet Hareketinin Milli Karakteri," Dergi 9 (1963): 34-47.
15. For Jadidism, see Edward Lazzarini, "Beyond Renewal: The Jadid Response to Pressure for Change in the Modern Age," in Jo-Ann Gross (ed), Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change (Durham, 1992), pp. 151-166, and "Gadidism at the Turn of the Century: A View from Within," Cahiers du Monde Russ et Sovietique XVI (1975): 245-277; Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks (Stanford, 1990); Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs (Stanford, 1987); Azade Ayse Rorlich, The Volga Tatars (Stanford, 1986); Alan Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford, 1978); Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks.
16. Ibrahim Yuksel, Azerbaycan'da Fikir Hayati ve Basın (Istanbul, 1991), pp. 22-27; Abdulvahap Yurtsever, "Abbaskulu Aga Bakuhanli," Azerbaycan (journal), May, 1953; A. Caferoglu, Azerbaycan (Istanbul, 1940), pp. 124-125; Altstadt, Azerbaijani Turks, pp. 54-55.
17. Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism, trans. by H. Andrews-Rusiecka. (Stanford, 1979).
18. Yuksel, p. 25.
19. Yuksel, pp. 25-26.
20. Kazembey was a member of the Muslim aristocracy and become a lecturer in Turkish and Persian at Kazan University and the University of St. Petersburg. In contrast to those who were part of the colonial administration and advocated accomodating terms of coexistence with the Russians, Kasim Bey "Zakir" (1774-1857), also a member of the Muslim aristocracy, fought against colonial rule, and wrote poetry and satire targetting Russian colonial administrators and what he saw as coopted Muslim aristocrats alike. For Kazembey and Zakir, see Yuksel, pp. 27-39; Abdulvahap Yurtsever, "Kasim Bey Zakir," Azerbaycan (journal), (1952); Kerim Oder, Azerbaycan (Istanbul, 1982), p. 125.
21. Yuksel, pp. 36-38.
22. For more on the Slavophiles and Westernizers, see Walicki, History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism, and Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York, 1974).
23. Yuksel, Azerbaycan'da Fikir Hayati ve Basın.
24. Allworth, pp. 125-126.

25. Olcott, pp. 105-111.

26. Swietochowski, pp. 13-14.

27. Baku, center of oil extraction and production, emerged as an administrative, commercial and industrial city. Audrey Altstadt-Mirhadi, "Baku: Transformation of a Muslim Town," in M. F. Hamm, ed., The City in Late Imperial Russia (Bloomington, 1986), pp. 283-316. The Nobels and the Rothschilds, centered in Baku, challenged the stronghold of John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company on the world oil market. On the origins of the Azerbaijani oil industry, see Daniel Yergin, The Prize (New York, 1991); Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made (New York, 1975); Robert Tolf, The Russian Rockefellers: The Saga of the Nobel Family and the Russian Oil Industry (Stanford, 1976); John McKay, "Baku Oil and Transcaucasian Pipelines, 1883-1891: A Study in Tsarist Economic Policy," Slavic Review 43 (1984): 604-623. The multinational interest in Baku oil either pushed the local bidders, including some small Russian producers, off the market as the land prices rose, or reduced their share drastically. In 1870 eighty eight per cent of the wells were owned by Muslims which accounted for half of the total output in Baku, but after land concessions in 1872, Muslim ownership of the wells dropped to thirteen per cent, and was concentrated in the hands of a few families. Swietochowski, p. 22; Hoover Institution Library, W.E. Post Papers.

28. Olcott, pp. 108-115; and see Martha Brill Olcott, "The Emergence of National Identity in Kazakhstan," Canadian Journal of History 8 (1981): 283-300, and "Central Asia: The Reformers Challenge a Traditional Society," in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society, pp. 253-280. See also Sirin Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union (London, 1983), pp. 290-292; Suleyman Tekiner, "Azerbaycan ve Kazakistan Sovyet Cumhuriyetlerinin 50. Yilligi," Dergi 16 (1970): 3-17; and Qazaq Sovet Enciklopedevasi (Almati, 1972-1978).

29. For Akhundzade see Yuksel, Azerbaycan'da Fikir Hayati ve Basin; A. Caferoglu, "Merza Fethali Ahundzade Hakkinda bir Vesika," AYB, (1934); Mirza Bala, "Mirza Fath Ali Ahundzade," Azerbaycan, (1953); Hafez Farman Farmayan, "The Forces of Modernization in Nineteenth Century Iran: A Historical Survey," in Wm. Polk and R. Chambers, eds., The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: the Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1968); Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan; Altstadt, Azerbaijani Turks.

30. Swietochowski, p. 26. Through this effort Akhundzade aimed to reduce the influence of the Persianized Turkic literary language of the region, even while he wrote poetry in Persian.

31. Swietochowski, p. 28; Yuksel, pp. 51-64.

32. Yuksel, p. 64.

33. Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, "The 'Ali Bayramov' Club, the Journal *Şarq* and the Socialization of Azeri Women, 1920-1930," Central Asian Survey 5 (1986): 221-239.

34. Swietochowski, p. 31.

35. Edward J. Lazzarini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinski and Muslim Modernism in Russia," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, (1973), and "Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View from Within," Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique XVI (1975); Alan Fischer, Crimæan Tatars, (Stanford, 1973); Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan; Rorlich, Volga Tatars; Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey and Politics of Pan-Islamism.

36. Benedict Anderson defines nation as "an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." In this context, while the community is political its roots are cultural, based on reconstruction of language, history, boundaries, sovereignty and identity. According to Anderson, the imagined communities differ not by the genuineness of the reconstruction of the cultural models but "by the style in which they are imagined." Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 1983), p. 6.

37. As Ernest Gellner argues, "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness, it invents nations where they do not exist." For Gellner, in this context nationalism is primarily a political principle and a theory of political legitimacy. Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London, 1964), p. 169; and Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (New York, 1983).
38. Lazzerini, "Gadidism at the Turn of the Century."
39. Katkov was a leading advocate of Pan-Slavism, which united notions of political unification of all Slavs with the concept of Slavic superiority and a Slavic mission. Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology, 2nd ed. (New York, 1960).
40. Serge Zenkovsky, Rusya'da Pan-Turkizm ve Muslumanlik (Istanbul, 1983), p. 27.
41. Al-Afgani influenced other Jadidists, such as Abdulnasir al-Kursavi (1783-1814) and Huseyn Feizkhanov (1826-1865) as well as the Young Turks, Ottoman administrators and Abdulhamit II, along with Arab thinkers and Indian Muslims. Lazzerini, "Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century;" Landau, Politics of Pan-Islam; Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkizm and Islam in Russia; Sylvia Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley, 1962), pp. 6-15.
42. Issawi, Economic History of Turkey, pp. 1-10; Sevket Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisi ve Dunya Kapitalizmi, 1820-1913 (Ankara, 1984); Zafer Toprak, Turkiye'de "Milli Iktisat," 1908-1918 (Ankara, 1982); Keyder, State and Class in Turkey.
43. Shaw and Shaw, pp. 172-272.
44. Landau, Politics of Pan-Islam, pp. 9-72.
45. Landau, Politics of Pan-Islam, pp. 28-29. Prince Sabahattin, the nephew of Abdulhamit II, travelled to Paris in 1899, where he joined the Young Turk intellectuals. Besides his important role as a critic of Young Turk politics, Prince Sabahattin helped spread French influence in Turkish social thought. Prince Sabahattin posed an important question framing a major problem for generations of Turkish intellectuals in his book Turkiye Nasil Kurtarilabilir? For Prince Sabahattin's assessment of Ottoman society and his ideas about social theory, see Ali Erkul, "Prens Sabahattin," in Emre Kongar, ed. Turk Toplum Bilimcileri (Istanbul, 1982), pp. 83-150.
46. Landau, Politics of Pan-Islam, p. 29. Ahmet Riza led the Committee of Union and Progress in Paris and continued to represent a major faction of the Committee after returning to the Ottoman Empire. According to his memoirs, the Committee was first to be called Ittihat-i Islam [Islamic Unification]. See Serif Mardin, Jon Turklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908 (Istanbul, 1983).
47. For more on the Young Turks, see Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (Oxford, 1969); Sina Aksin, Jon Turkler ve Ittihat ve Terakki (Istanbul, 1987); E. E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks (Princeton, 1957); Erik Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor (Leiden, 1984).
48. Landau, Politics of Pan-Islam, pp. 86-90; Landau, Pan-Turkizm in Turkey.
49. On the Muslim conferences, see Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled (New York, 1986).
50. Yuksel, Azerbaycan'da Fikir Hayati ve Basın; Nadir Devlet, Rus Turklerinin Milli Mucadele Tarihi, 1905-1917 (Ankara, 1985); Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan; Altstadt, Azerbaijani Turks; Olcott, The Kazakhs; Rortlich, Volga Tatars.
51. Paul Dumont, "Origins of Kemalist Ideology," in Jacob Landau, ed. Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey (Boulder, 1984), pp. 25-44; Zürcher, Unionist Factor.
52. For Kemalism, see Dogan Avcioğlu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni: Dun, Bugun, Yarın (Ankara, 1971); Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun, eds. Ataturk: Founder of a Modern State (London, 1981); Jacob Landau, ed. Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey (Boulder, 1984); Suna Kili, Ataturk Devrimi: Bir Cagdaslasma Modeli (Ankara, 1981).
53. Dumont, pp. 36-38.

54. Landau, Politics of Pan-Islam, pp. 234-247.
55. The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, March 23, 1994, pp. 26-27.
56. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, January 19, 1994, pp. 23-24.
57. Washington Post, November 24, 1991; New York Times, February 22, 1992.
58. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, February 23, 1994, p. 24.
59. For the "Aliev network," see John Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR, (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 191-222.
60. Cumhuriyet, March 3, 1994.
61. From the Turkish press of January, 1992.
62. Tercuman December 31, 1991.
63. Cumhuriyet, January 23, 1992.
64. According to the Russian news Agency, President Kerimov of Uzbekistan said "Turkey is the big brother to the Soviet Turks." January, 1992.
65. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, March 16, 1994, pp. 31-32.
66. Olzhas Suleimanov, "Independence is not Enough," Meeting Report, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, vol. IX, no. 1.

