TITLE: POST-YUGOSLAV REALITIES: STATE AND ETHNICITY

AUTHOR: IVO BANAC, Yale University

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE VIII PROGRAM

1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
PROJECT INFORMATION:

CONTRACTOR: Yale University

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Ivo Banac

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 807-31

DATE: October 3, 1996

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

Individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded by Council Contract. The Council and the U.S. Government have the right to duplicate written reports and other materials submitted under Council Contract and to distribute such copies within the Council and U.S. Government for their own use, and to draw upon such reports and materials for their own studies; but the Council and U.S. Government do not have the right to distribute, or make such reports and materials available, outside the Council or U.S. Government without the written consent of the authors, except as may be required under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. 552, or other applicable law.

1 The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author(s).
## CONTENTS

### Executive Summary

Executive Summary .................................................. 1

### History, the Dissolution

History, the Dissolution ........................................ 1

- The Kosovo Phase ............................................. 5
- The Milosevic Phase ......................................... 5
- The Northwestern Phase .................................... 6
- The "Timber Revolution Phase" ......................... 7
- The Bogus Negotiations Phase ......................... 8
- The Confrontation Phase ................................ 9
- The Phase of War Against Croatia .................. 9
- The Phase of War Against Bosnia-Hercegovina .. 10
- Glosses on the Dissolution of Yugoslavia ......... 13

### The Politics of National Homogeneity

The Politics of National Homogeneity ....................... 14

- Serbian Conduct ............................................. 14
- Croatian Conduct ........................................... 16
- Bosniak Conduct ............................................ 18

### Regional Prospects

Regional Prospects ............................................... 20

- Serbia and Serbia’s Parastates ......................... 20
- Montenegro ................................................... 22
- Croatia ......................................................... 23
- Bosnia-Hercegovina ...................................... 24
- Maxcedonia and its Neighbors ...................... 25
- Slovenia ......................................................... 26

### Conclusion

Conclusion .......................................................... 26
POST-YUGOSLAV REALITIES: STATE AND ETHNICITY

IVO BANAC
Yale University

Executive Summary

Principal Findings:

The inability to establish legitimate patterns of statehood that would be accepted as equitable by all the component lands and national groups was the most important internal problem of the former Yugoslavia before its breakup in 1991 and remains the most important internal problem of all of Yugoslavia’s successor states with the exception of Slovenia. The reasons for this should not be sought in reputed “ancient ethnic hatreds,” “clashes of civilization,” or other deterministic schemes, but in the concrete policies of main political actors. All of them (but not at once or to the same degree) have accepted the proposition that stability means nationally homogeneous states. Serbia’s president Milosevic applied this proposition first with repression in Kosovo and later (1991-92) with armed aggression against Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The proposition was then taken on by Croatia’s president Tudjman and applied both in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serb-controlled parts of Croatia (Krajina) in 1992-95. It is currently being forced on the Bosniak Muslim leadership of president Izetbegovic in a combination of external pressures (aspects of international agreements on Bosnia-Hercegovina) and internal concessions to Bosniak nationalism.

The politics of national homogeneity are the underlying pattern of the war. This means that “ethnic cleansing” and the construction of nationally homogeneous states was not the consequence, but the aim of the war. Since the multinational and multiconfessional Bosnia-Hercegovina could not easily be dismembered to fit the logic of national homogenizers, the war for the establishment of nationally homogeneous states was turned into a war for the division of Bosnia. Despite an entirely new ethnic reality that has emerged on the ground of former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1996, the new increasingly homogeneous national states or parastates are not more stable than the former Yugoslavia. The policy conclusion that follows is not to attempt to reconstitute Yugoslavia, which would be politically futile, but to reduce the tension between statehood and ethnicity in the internationally-recognized successor states of Yugoslavia. This practically means the following:

(1) American and allied policy must work very hard to promote the return of all refugees to their domiciles of origin. This includes not only the Serbs of Croatia and the Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats of Bosnia-Hercegovina, but also displaced Croats, Hungarians, and Kosovar Albanians of Yugoslavia. The return of the refugees is the only practical way to undo “ethnic
cleansing. As a result, the return of the refugees delegitimizes ethnic statehood and promotes civic statehood.

(2) The pursuit of those responsible for "ethnic cleansing" is a prerequisite for reconciliation and healing. As a consequence, the Hague tribunal ought to be aided and financed for as long as it takes to hunt down the war criminals and those who permitted their misdeeds.

(3) Bosnia-Hercegovina must be mainstaned as a multinational, multiconfessional, and united state. Hence, all elements of the Dayton agreements that can be interpreted as license to partition must be kept in check and reinterpreted to promote the cohesion of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

(4) All federal units of the former Yugoslavia ought to be treated equally. This means that Kosovo, too, has a claim to independence, but it can be effected only on the de-ethnicised basis, with proper guarantees to all component nationalities.

(5) The promotion of democracy through the support of free press, independent institutions, and unbiased scholarship is the best way to encourage de-ethnicised public climate. The investment in these areas is always less expensive than the results. In addition, all successor states of Yugoslavia must be held to a very high standard of human rights and civic conduct. No temporary diplomatic benefits ought to interfere.
Post-Yugoslav Realities: State and Ethnicity

The successor states of Yugoslavia have experienced a breathing spell in the aftermath of the Dayton agreements. But the suspension of war does not imply a lasting peace. No compelling solution has been found to the main problem of former Yugoslavia -- the inability to establish legitimate patterns of statehood that would be accepted as equitable by all the component lands and national groups. Nor are there any indications of a developing regional security structure. Hence the great prospect of new clashes and -- should the overall East European situation worsen -- of new Balkan wars.

History: There have been a number of simplistic explanations for the Yugoslav meltdown. The icebox explanation views the Communist phase of East European history as essentially free of national conflict. The Communists froze the political scene and hence temporarily froze the virulent pre-Communist nationalisms. Revived by the thaw of pluralism, the old nationalisms picked up where the Communists interrupted them. This explanation suspends fifty years of Communist engagement with the various types of national ideologies, but, more important, it ignores some very serious crises in the nationality relations of the Communist era -- in Yugoslavia practically the whole period after 1962-63, especially 1968 (Kosovo), 1971 (Croatia), 1981 (Kosovo), and 1987 and thereafter (Serbia). In fact, all of the old nationality disputes were continued in new forms within the Yugoslav Communist movement, which became increasingly "nationalized" after the mid-1960s.

Various deterministic explanations (articulated or otherwise) that are dependent on the idea of violent Balkans, inhabited by never forgetting haters (R. Kaplan) are equally unconvincing, as is the recent tautological argument (M. Glenny) that sees violence when empires crumble and crumbling empires when there is violence. In fact, the Balkan region has been relatively free of national and religious conflict over the centuries, certainly in comparison to many parts of Western Europe. Nor have South Slavic nationalisms structurally
been different from or more violent than any other European nationalism of a corresponding historical period. The deterministic argument has promoted inaction by the international community and is therefore co-responsible for the outcome of the conflict without being able to explain its origins.

The real reasons for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Serbia’s most recent expansionist effort -- and that is the proper way of fixing the parameters of the Yugoslav drama at the beginning of armed clashes in 1991 -- must be sought in Yugoslavia’s history (that is, since 1918) and in the national ideologies of its principal national groups -- Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniak Muslims, etc.

Royalist Yugoslavia (1918-1941) was no more inevitable than its dissolution. It was the product of opportunity and timing (the collapse of multinational monarchies of Eastern Europe in the First World War) and several contradictory initiatives. For Serbia, independent since 1878, Yugoslavia was a convenient way of uniting all its outlaying co-nationals in a single state (Great Serbianism). Under centralist management, with the reins of political power in the hands of the Serbs, their army, dynasty, and state institutions, it really hardly mattered whether the country was called Great Serbia or Yugoslavia.

Two ideological impulses discouraged the affirmation of evident national, historical, and regional individualities in royalist Yugoslavia. For the Great Serbs any affirmation of non-Serb individualities represented a concession and a deprivation. Better to leave matters undefined and hold on to political hegemony. To the Yugoslavist unitarists, the hapless builders of a new, integral, Yugoslav supranation, all individualities (although the Serb individuality certainly less so) represented an obstacle to pure integration. Better to hold on to centralism, however Serb dominated, than to yield to "tribalist separatists."

Consequently, the opposition to the contradictory -- but ever centralistic -- system built by the Great Serbs and the Yugoslavist unitarists had to take the form of "separatism." The Croats and Slovenes entered Yugoslavia because they saw it as a guarantee of their territorial integrity, which was threatened in 1918 by Italian irredentism, but they did not count
on the denigration of their individualities within a centralist system. Their political parties, whether autonomist, federalist, or outrightly separatist, dealt less with the issue of democracy or overall liberties. The exception was the Croat Peasant Party, which, under Stjepan Radić and Vladko Maček, on at least two occasions (after 1927 with Svetozar Pribićević, the leader of the Serb minority in Croatia; and in the mid-1930s with the Serbian opposition) sought to expand the phalanx of nationality opposition.

The Croat opposition was the strongest obstacle to Serbian supremacy not only because the Croats were the most numerous non-Serb nationality. Croatia was the center of Yugoslavia’s industry and banking. Moreover, it was the logical flagship to which a flotilla of smaller movements (Macedonian, Montenegrin, Albanian) could be attached. In 1939, after a bitter and ruthless struggle, in which Croat leaders were assassinated (Radić) or imprisoned (most notably Radić and Maček), and masses of people exposed to police terror, Belgrade conceded to a deal with Croatia. This agreement (Sporazum) established an autonomous Banate of Croatia, which planted the seeds of federalism, but also inaugurated less pleasant territorial divisions (portions of autonomous Croatia were taken from Bosnia-Hercegovina, the rest of this province being left to direct Belgrade rule). The 1939 Sporazum unwittingly demonstrated the limitations of centralistic Yugoslavism and opened the road to alternative solutions.

For all that, the Sporazum was given little time to serve as a cornerstone for future Yugoslav rearrangements. Within twenty months Yugoslavia was attacked by the Axis powers and dismembered among Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italy’s puppet Albania. Serbia was governed militarily by the Germans on the model of Vichy France. Unannexed parts of Croatia and Dalmatia, together with the whole of Bosnia-Hercegovina, were occupied in the guise of a newly-established Independent State of Croatia -- an Italo-German condominium ruled by the Ustašas, a Croat fascist movement. They initiated ruthless repression and massacres of Serb population, killing over 100,000. The royal government in exile was discredited by its support of Serb royalist Chetniks, who in turn started massacring Croat and Muslim population.
The atrocities weakened the already dim prospects of Yugoslavism. In fact, the Yugoslav state probably would not have been restored after the war had it not been for the Yugoslav program of the Communist Party (KPJ). Precisely because the Communists represented the only radical negation to the Axis system, but also because they had no obligation to the prewar system that persecuted them, they succeeded in gathering all those who did not believe in the postponement of the struggle against the occupiers and the viability of royalist Yugoslavia. As professional revolutionaries, bound by a cadre party directed by a great power, they could advance a program of insurrection based on the vision of a more equitable Yugoslav state, without Great Serbian hegemony, Ustaša slaughter, and social cleavages. This was indeed accomplished, but at the cost of Communist dictatorship. Nor was the Soviet-style federation of the initial postwar years a vast improvement over prewar centralism. Only the rhetoric was federalized. The essence of Communist power in the immediate postwar period was centralism. This was changed only slightly after Stalin's row with Tito in 1948, the systemic evolution of the Yugoslav Communist system being a lot slower than the emancipation of the Yugoslav state from under Soviet tutelage.

The discussion of national grievances was tabooed under Tito. When Tito, after 1962, decided that his Soviet-based federal system was in danger of being devoured by creeping Serbian supremacy, which was predictably revived by party centralism, he opted for institutional innovations that would "federalize the federation." that is, breathe some genuine federalist substance into rhetorical formulas. This was a consequence of popular pressure. In Slovenia, Kosovo, and Croatia the party leaderships had become responsive to calls for greater local control over all aspects of public life, especially economic, for the decrease of repression, and the decriminalization of all sorts of signs and symbols of national identities. Tito first purged the party of reformists leaders, recentralized the party, and then proceeded to decentralize the state by promulgating a new constitution.

The Constitution of 1974, hence, was a contradictory charter. It devolved great authority to Yugoslavia's six republics and two autonomous provinces within Serbia (Kosovo...
and Vojvodina), making all eight federal units only slightly asymmetrical "factors of the federation," moreover guaranteeing their sovereignty and equality in perpetuity. But it had one structural weakness. It was predicated on the rule of the centralist Communist party, which would oblige all of Yugoslavia's Communists to stick to Tito's brand of federalism. As soon as Tito died, in 1980, Serbian Communists started a campaign against Tito's constitution. The dissolution of Yugoslavia commenced at that point and was exacerbated in increasingly violent phases:

1. **The Kosovo phase (1981-1989):** Serbian Communists found their pretext for the dismantling of the 1974 Constitution in the Kosovar Albanian riots of March 1981. The Kosovo party leadership of Mahmut Bakali was purged, but the debate over the position of Kosovo in Serbia was artificially whipped up and kept open. The Belgrade press systematically exaggerated the supposed outrages of the province's Albanian majority against the Serbs in order to abolish the Kosovo's autonomous status. The term "ethnic cleansing" was first introduced as an accusation against Albanian intentions. In the meanwhile, The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts promulgated a text titled Memorandum in which the leadership of Yugoslavia under Tito, as well as the principal Communist figures of Slovenia and Croatia, too, were accused of long-standing anti-Serbian tendencies, notably of attempts to divide the Serb nation and its culture. The high point of this phase was the virtual military occupation of Kosovo.

2. **The Milošević phase (1987-1989):** The principal figure in Serbian reaction to Titoist federalism was Slobodan Milošević, a rising party apparatchik without any deviationist blemishes. After he purged the relative moderates within the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) and assumed the uncontested leadership of the Serbian party organization (September 1987) he started pursuing an unrealistic Serbian nationalist project of keeping Albanians permanently subjugated in Kosovo. But this was hardly new in the ranks of the SKS. Milošević's real innovation was in turning the SKS into the party of Serbian nationalism. He awakened the old Serbian nationalist myths and dreams of establishing a Great Serbia which
would include most of Yugoslavia. He put the party-state of Serbia in the service of Serbian national homogenization.

The high point of Milošević's "anti-bureaucratic revolution" was the overthrow of the already pliant party leaderships of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, which he accomplished by 1989. He simultaneously abolished the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, assumed their functions in the federation, and made Montenegro his political dependency. With four votes in Yugoslavia's federal presidency in his pocket, he was able to neutralize the influence of the four remaining republics -- Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Slovenia. At the Gazimestan rally on St. Vitus's Day (28 June 1989) Milošević announced his intention of restructuring Yugoslavia, by armed might if necessary. His challenge was not met by the federal government of the reformist premier Ante Marković or by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). This period is also noted for the growth of both systemic and extra-systemic opposition to Milošević within Slovenia and Croatia (the Ljubljana trial of Janez Janša and of other JNA critics; the beginning of organized oppositional activities in Slovenia and Croatia).

(3) The northwestern phase (June 1989 - August 1990): The Communist leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia, as well as their comrades in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia, repeatedly demonstrated their weakness in resisting Serbia's demolition of the Yugoslav federal system. Nevertheless, as a result of communism's collapse throughout Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989, these leaderships started demonstrating some resistance to Milošević and, more important, opened the political arena to more determined groups. The oppositional political parties were legalized during this period, including the oppositional bloc DEMOS in Slovenia, the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, and the Muslim-dominated Party of Democratic Action (SDA) in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

At the same time, the final round of Communist republican congresses (November-December 1989) demonstrated to what extent the party was split by republic lines. The federal party was split at its final congress in January 1990, as the Slovenian and Croatian delegations
walked out. As a result, all federal institutions started crumbling. Moreover, the multiparty elections in Slovenia and Croatia (April-May 1990) ended Communist rule in these republics and brought the nationalist opposition to power (DEMOS, Tudjman’s HDZ). The new democratically-elected leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia sought to gain time for internal consolidation, but also presented a common front against Milošević’s Serbia.

(4) The “timber revolution” phase (August 1990 - January 1991): Milošević’s response was to instrumentalize the Serbs of Croatia against the Tudjman administration. Tudjman played into Milošević’s hands by encouraging revanchism against the Serb nomenklatura, which was overrepresented and even dominant in some areas of public life (security police) in Croatia. But national discrimination could not be limited to some -- and necessarily spilled over to embrace most Serbs. The focal point of Serb resistance was Knin, in northern Dalmatia, where the Serbs started blocking highways with timber roadblocks (hence the term, the “timber revolution”), expelling Croat officials and establishing their own “autonomous” territory, known as Krajina (lit. Frontier). This effort was masterminded by the Serbian security apparatus and protected by the local units of the JNA, which was entering into a tactical alliance with the Milošević leadership. Tudjman sought to offset the pressure by proposing (with the Slovenes) a new confederal constitution for Yugoslavia. This was in turn rejected by Milošević. The period came to a tense conclusion with the multiparty elections in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia (won by the anti-Communist nationalist parties), as well as in Serbia and Montenegro (won by the Communist-successor parties of Milošević and Momir Bulatović), and the Slovenian plebiscite for independence (showing the overwhelming support for Slovenia’s separate course). At the same time the JNA promulgated its neo-Communist platform.

Gloss on the JNA: Though predominantly Serb in the composition of its officer corps, the JNA was until the summer of 1991 more of a Communist than a Serbian institution. Even after the turnabout in Eastern Europe, the army commanders saw themselves as the defenders of socialism. They theorized that the countries that experienced revolution (USSR,
Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, Cuba) were less vulnerable to "imperialist subversion," and, hence, had a good chance of maintaining the old system if only they colluded. The JNA brass entered into contacts with the Soviet army and other hardliners in the area. Then Milošević won the generals to the proposition that their enemies were the capitalist restorationists in Slovenia and Croatia, against whom they could march together. When the JNA joined the battle, it lost all credibility as a federal institution. Milošević misused its muscle and deprived it of its aura, thereby scoring a double win for Serbian supremacy.

(5) The bogus negotiations phase (January 1991 - June 1991): This was the period of JNA’s military pressure on Croatia (characterized by the army’s full emancipation from any civilian control) and the highly publicized (but totally ineffective) whirlwind negotiations between the six republic presidents. The agreement on the peaceful dissolution of Yugoslavia or a loose confederal solution was impossible because Milošević refused to recognize the sovereignty of the federal republics, which he reinterpreted as purely administrative districts, although never when Serbia’s prerogatives were in question. He declared that Serbia will recognize the sovereignty of the other republics only if they agree on the redrawing of Yugoslavia’s internal borders, that is, by giving up those districts in which the "formed local majorities.

At the height of the bogus negotiations Milošević was challenged by oppositional demonstrations in Belgrade (March events), which he crushed by the swift use of willing JNA units. Immediately thereafter, as if to shore up Milošević, Tudjman met with the Serbian leader at Karadjordjevo, the army retreat in Vojvodina, where the two apparently agreed on the terms of Serb-Croat settlement, which would include the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the exchange of population. Since the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina could not be accomplished in peacetime, there are indications that the two considered the terms of their subsequent engagement. In that sense one can speculate on the framework of a negotiated war, designed to promote the establishment of nationally homogeneous states.

After the meeting, the best of enemies proceeded to spar within the Yugoslav arena. At the beginning of May Croat police units clashed with the Serb paramilitaries in eastern
Slavonia, beginning the slow drift to war in Croatia. During the same month, Serbia attempted to prevent the inauguration of Stipe Mesić, the Croatian member of the federal presidency, who was supposed to assume the chairmanship of this increasingly toothless institution, delaying his seating by several weeks. The international community, which hitherto ignored the Yugoslav developments, got busy in rescuing the Mesić presidency. At the end of the month Croatia carried out a referendum on independence, which was won overwhelmingly by the pro-independence option.

(6) The confrontation phase (June 1991 - August 1991): In June Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed independence. The JNA tried to shortcircuit these developments by a strategic move against Slovenia for the securing of Yugoslavia's border with Italy, Austria, and Hungary. This move failed, as the JNA initiative was sabotaged by non-Serb servicemen and officers. Slovenian defenders were also highly successful. In the process the JNA changed from a Titoist institution into an appendage of Serbian policy. By August the JNA units started occupying Croatia's northwest (Baranja) and their withdrawal from Slovenia increased the JNA's offensive potential in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. At the same time, there was a considerable growth of various militias, committed to deepening the escalating conflict. The period was also characterized by the internationalization of the conflict, as various European and international agencies, as well as individual governments, attempted to mediate among the parties.

(7) The phase of war against Croatia (September 1991 - January 1992): By September, Slovenia's independence was no longer in doubt, the conflict having been turned into a bloody war of conquest ("liberation" in Serbian parlance) of all Croatian areas with a significant Serb presence. The sloppy and brutish manner of the JNA should be noted. Tito's army was by this time de-Titoized and de-Croatianized. This quiet process was really a vast revolution, especially if the role of Partisan Croatia is kept in mind in the early history of the JNA. The JNA entered into consensual relations with various irregular Serbian units that were connected with the Milošević-sponsored Serb "autonomous regions" of Croatia (Krajina) and
Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as with the extremist private armies of Serbian provenance (notably the renewed Chetnik units of Vojislav Šešelj).

The changes in the JNA’s character, as well as the presence of the "irregulars" and undisciplined reservists in the JNA’s war machine, explains the brutality of attacks in Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci, Petrinja, Karlovac, Zadar, and Dubrovnik, as well as the balance sheet of some 10,000 dead and 500,000 "ethnically cleansed" Croat and other non-Serb refugees. In the process, all federal institutions collapsed (federal presidency, federal government), the federal premier Ante Marković having fled Belgrade by way of Hungary to his native Croatia. The period is also notable for the total collapse of Yugoslavism as a viable ideology.

The international community was drawn into the Croatian war in the fall of 1991. The Vance plan, creating the UN protected zones in Croatia, patroled by the UN forces (UNPROFOR), merely took cognizance of the fact that the Serbs controlled a third of Croatia’s territory, but brought about a (frequently violated) cease fire and permitted the international recognition of Croatia (as well as Slovenia) in January 1992 by the European Community, Canada, the Russian Federation, and many other states.

(8) The phase of war against Bosnia-Hercegovina (February 1992 - December 1995): The withdrawal of the JNA units from Croatia seriously upset the balance of power in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where the precarious coalition of three nationalist parties (Izetbegović’s SDA, the Bosnian section of Croatia’s ruling HDZ, and Radovan Karadžić’s Serb Democratic Party /SDS/) was in power since 1990. Bosnia was faced with a choice. Remain in the Serbian-dominated rump Yugoslavia, with all the prospects of permanent inequality similar to the status of Kosovo, or opt for independence and the probability of military confrontation with Serbia on the model of what preceded in Croatia. Urged by the foreign governments to clarify Bosnia’s position, President Izetbegović opted for a referendum on independence (1 March 1991), in which the Muslim and Croat coalition brought about a pro-independence majority. Serbs, with exceptions, boycotted the referendum and vowed war. There ensued the
beginning of SDS insurgency aided by the JNA (Gen. Ratko Mladić was moved from Knin to command the Bosnian Serb army).

On 7 April 1992, the Europeans and Americans recognized the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina (US also belatedly recognized Slovenia and Croatia). Recognition coincided with an all-out attack by the Serbs along the Drina frontier, and (from their strongholds in Banja Luka) to Kupres and the gates of Brod (south of the Sava River), whereby the Serbs tried to connect their Bosnian territorial acquisitions with the Krajina area in Croatia. Serb attacks were accompanied by unprecedented atrocities, “ethnic cleansing,” and construction of concentration camps (Omarska, Manjača), all meant to promote Muslim and Croat flight to parts of central Bosnia or outside the republic. Although Sarajevo, too, was initially targeted for division, the hastily assembled units of defenders managed to preserve the city, which was tightly encircled and shelled by the Serbs.

Diplomatic attempts to end the war floundered in a series of cantonization or ethnoterritorial schemes (Vance-Owen plan, Owen-Stoltenberg plan, Contact Group plan), which were passively resisted by the Bosnian government. The revival of Croat-Serb diplomatic contacts was even more dangerous to Bosnia’s integrity, as Tudjman’s negotiations with Milošević and Yugoslavia’s new “federal” president Dobrica Ćosić, one of the architects of “humane transfer” schemes, reaffirmed the spirit of the Karadjordjevo meeting. In the meanwhile, in the fall of 1992, the Croatian army went on a counteroffensive on the Dubrovnik front. The JNA units withdrew with minimal resistance from Croatia’s southernmost territory and also yielded territory in Dubrovnik’s Hercegovinian hinterland (Stolac). The Croats then started paralleling Serb separatist institutions in Bosnia-Hercegovina. They parried Karadžić’s SDS party-parastate Serb Republic (Republika srpska) and Mladić’s Serb army with their own HDZ party-parastate Herceg-Bosna and the Croat paramilitary force Croat Defense Council (HVO). In localities where the HVO was entrenched (western Hercegovina, parts of eastern Hercegovina, enclaves of central Bosnia), the Croats started provoking fights with the Muslims, which the Bosnian Army met with increasingly successful counterattacks.
By 1993 free Bosnia was reduced to Muslim enclaves in central Bosnia. Croatia and its Bosnian clients (not just Croats, but also Fikret Abdić's Muslims of the Cazin parastate in northwestern Bosnia) were blocking Bosnia's weapon supply and aiding Serb strangulation of Sarajevo. After the intensification of combat, US diplomacy intervened (Washington Agreements of March 1994) and forced the Bosnian Croats to accede to a federation agreement with the Bosniaks (as the Bosnian Muslims now called themselves). This ended the increasingly costly Croat-Bosniak war, but did not promote Croat-Bosniak cohesion. In fact, mutual "ethnic cleansing" proceeded even after the Washington Agreements. Nevertheless, by the end of 1994, the Serbs were on the defensive and Milošević increasingly hard pressed by the sanctions that were enforced since the summer of 1992. Although he and Tudjman retained their majorities in their respective parliaments and won presidential elections, Milošević's isolation left its toll and promoted the old tactician's new gambits. In the process, Milošević began cutting his losses in regard to his clients in the Krajina and the Serb Republic, particularly after the massacres of Bosniaks in the UN protected zones of Srebrenica and Žepa. The fall of these enclaves in July 1995 left the whole eastern Bosnia (with the exception of Goražde) "ethnically cleansed" of Bosniaks.

In May 1995, the Croatian army attacked the Serb forces in occupied western Slavonia and quickly regained this territory for Croatia (Operation Lightning Flash). There ensued many atrocities and massive flight of Serb refugees to the Serb portions of Bosnia and Serbia proper. During the summer the Croatian army and the HVO units kept pushing the Serbs from the Bosnian hinterland of Knin. On 5 August 1995 Croatia initiated Operation Storm and quickly defeated the Krajina army, prompting the exodus of some 200,000 Serbs, who peacefully left for Bosnia and Serbia. In the meanwhile, the Croatian and Bosnian armies lifted the siege of Bihać (northwestern Bosnia) and proceeded to rout the Serbs in Drvar and Mrkonjić-Grad (Operation Maestral). Bosnian army, in addition, dislodged Abdić's Muslims from their Cazin enclave. These battles, too, were accompanied by the removal of Serbs and the resettlement of Croats from the Banja Luka area to the Knin and Drvar districts.
In the new strategic situation, characterized by the retreat of the Serbs and the establishment of "ethnically clean" entities, US initiatives for a peace accord became more realistic. The result was the flawed Dayton Agreement of December 1995. Despite the maintenance of Bosnia's outer shell and a nod to the principle of return of all refugees, which would undo the work of "ethnic cleansers," the agreement effectively recognized the partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina and reduced its constitutional government to the status of a warring party. After the coming of the NATO-based IFOR, Bosnia-Hercegovina has been in a state of suspended warfare. Mutual recognitions between Bosnia and rump Yugoslavia have been effected, as has, most recently the mutual recognition of Croatia and rump Yugoslavia. But the "ethnically clean" parastates remain and with them the diminished chance for a return to status quo ante.

(9) Glosses on the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1991-1995): Outside our framework, but within the overall story, remain the issues of international entanglements and their consequences for the non-frontline successor states of Yugoslavia, as well as for their neighbors.

Serbia's cause was frequently aided by Russia and Greece, and more distantly by some of the other Eastern Orthodox states, as well as India and China. At key points some of the West European powers (Britain, France, Spain) also found understanding for Serbia, or better, sought to prevent its collapse. Bosnia's cause was championed by the West in general, but especially by the United States. Turkey, Iran, and the other Muslim countries (including some distant ones, like Pakistan and Malaysia) had their own reasons for strong support of Bosnia. Croatia was initially aided by Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the Holy See, but this support evaporated with the growing evidence of Tudjman's abuses and Croatia's disastrous role in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Since 1994 Croatia has been a client of the United States, but it has also benefited from good relations with Turkey and Iran. This does not quite make for a proxy war, but certain patterns cannot be overlooked.

One of the important cleavages that run through the Balkans concerns Macedonia or, more exactly, that portion of Ottoman Macedonia that Serbia acquired after the Balkan wars (1912-13) and which became a federal republic of Yugoslavia in 1944. Serbia unaccountably
failed to assert itself militarily in this volatile area in 1991, perhaps because it had bigger
fishes to fry elsewhere. As a result, Macedonia's independence was obstructed most especially
by Greece, which imposed humiliating terms on the new state (revision of its flag and name)
and thereby prompted an alignment in which Turkey, Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent Albania
came solidly on the side of Macedonia. The government of Kiro Gligorov has been successful
in parrying Greek pressures, but the Macedonian situation bears watching (see below) not only
because of its international implications.

The Politics of National Homogeneity: The account provided above seems tortuous only at
first glance. There is an underlying pattern that can be followed in the account. In a nutshell,
"ethnic cleansing" and the construction of nationally homogenous states was not the con-
sequence, but the aim of the war. This proposition might not have been obvious to all parties
in the encounter at the beginning of the war, but it became their common stock in the course
of the war. The leaders of Serb, Croat, and Bosniak national communities, with variations,
evidently believe that national homogeneity, that is, statehood without minorities, constitutes
political stability and offers the only genuine chance for peace. In order to illustrate this it is
necessary to investigate the behavior of the national leaderships:

Serbian conduct: As in all other matters, Milošević led the way. Although taciturn in
public statements, he was explicit in defense of national homogenization as early as January
1989 in the following statement at the Twentieth session of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia Central Committee: "I ... ask the critics of homogenization, why are they dis-
turbed by the homogenization of peoples and human beings in general if it is carried out on the
basis of just, humane, and progressive ideas, in one's own interests, and is of no harm to
others? Is this not the meaning, the aim, to which humanity has always aspired? Surely the
sense of the human community is not to be unhomogenous, divided, even when its aspirations
are progressive and humane?" (Slobodan Milošević, Godine raspleta. Belgrade, 1989, p. 334).

But had Milošević not been so forthcoming in reconciling the Communist notions of
unity with national homogenization, his political behavior would have told the story. It was
Milošević who turned the propaganda machinery of Serbian party-state through his appointees (Živorad Minović, editor-in-chief of the daily Politika; Dušan Mitević, general director of Belgrade TV) into vehicles of nationalist ideologization. Serbian press and electronic media promoted national stereotypes, systematically dehumanized Kosovo Albanians, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, insinuated notions of Serb historical victimization, and aggrandized the role of Serbia and its historical mission in the Balkans. The Serbian media created the preconditions for an ethnically pure Great Serbia that could be accomplished only by war.

Another instrument of national homogenization and war were the paramilitaries, which Milošević permitted and encouraged, and which were given logistical support by Serbia’s security apparatus. Such notorious units as the Chetniks of Vojislav Šešelj, the White Eagles of the Serbian Renaissance Movement, the Tigers of Željko Ražnatović-Arkan were responsible for carefully orchestrated massacres, “strategic rape,” and the introduction of terrorist regimes in various Croatian and Bosnian localities that were meant to spread panic and intimidation and move entire national groups to exile. Their work was then followed by the "regular" armies of Serb parastates -- Krajina and Republika srpska.

But even where paramilitaries were not directly involved, where peace prevailed throughout the war, as in Banja Luka, the largest Bosnian city under Serb control, "ethnic cleansing" was practiced from the beginning. The usual pattern was to create symbolic delegitimation of non-Serb communities (systematic destruction of mosques or Catholic churches), followed by the recruitment of the non-Serbs into units for forcible labor, followed by arrests and removal into concentration camps (Prijedor), ending with the expulsion of survivors.

The goal of Serbian policy, which was originally shared by Milošević’s ex-Communists and groups far to their right, was the establishment of an ethnically cleansed Great Serbia, which would include most of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, certainly its inner rim. When this goal became untenable Milošević shifted to a more realistic policy of holding to the lands conceded to the Serbs by the international community. That meant the abandon-
ment of dependencies in Croatia and a certain cooling to the most extreme pretensions of Karadžić. When the Croat offensives commenced in 1995, Serbia offered no military help to Milan Martić's Krajina parastate. Milošević's generals only prepared an orderly retreat. In fact, the exodus of Serbs from Croatia also aided the cause of Serbia's homogenization, by however backhanded means. The inflow of Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia was interpreted as the strengthening of Serbian national juices in a setting destabilized by Albanian, Muslim, Hungarian, and other minorities.

Croatian conduct: It must always be borne in mind that the political establishment of Serbia was not changed in the course of communism's systemic demise in Eastern Europe. The policy of national homogenization and war permitted the change of ideological garb for Serbia's old Communist establishment. Moreover, Milošević kept parts of the Yugoslavia's federal apparatus (JNA) under his control. The Croat leadership of Tudjman had a far more difficult task of pursuing a transitional course, establishing a new political elite (albeit aided by significant sections of the old Communist apparatus), and fending off Milošević's pressures. Hence, it is seemingly puzzling that Tudjman never strayed from a course of unbridled national discrimination and limited defense.

To put it another way, Croatia's best option was to counter Serbian expansionist nationalism with a policy of civic nationhood, enlisting the Serbs of Croatia into a common front against Serbia, which could have included the other republics (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia) and Serbia's minorities. That would have meant discouragement of narrow Croat nationalism, with its limiting symbols and historical references, some of which were offensive to the Serbs. Admittedly, had such policy been pursued it would not have stayed Milošević's hand. But it could have slowed it. Instead, Tudjman's behavior was anything but restrained. He did nothing to prevent the mass expulsion of Serbs from important positions in public administration and the other areas of public trust. In fact, some of his minions encouraged radical "lustration" of Serbs.

As for defense, when the war started, Tudjman pursued a self-limiting war, which conceded much to Serbian ambitions. This is less evident in the Croatian phase of the war,
although many questions can be raised about why the arms meant for the defense of Vukovar and Dubrovnik frequently ended in western Hercegovina, among Tudjman's hard core supporters. But, it is perfectly obvious in the Bosnian war. HVO and the Croatian army, without which the HVO would not have been possible, yielded key strategic areas to the Serbs. Without their cooperation the Serb corridor in Bosnian Posavina would have been cut off in 1992-93, leading to the encirclement of "Western Serbia" (Krajina and northwestern Bosnia). Nor would the Bosnian Croats voluntarily withdrawn had from Jajce and many other towns adjacent to the Serb strongholds to the southwest of Banja Luka.

The logic of Tudjman's behavior, too, must be sought in the belief that national homogenization and the establishment of "ethnically pure" states constitutes stability. Tudjman's book Nacionalno pitanje u suvremenoj Europi (The National Question in Contemporary Europe), published by an émigré press in 1982 (a poorly translated English version appeared in 1981), contains many sections that support this proposition. In the book Tudjman approvingly cites the population exchanges between Turkey and Greece after 1923, whereby "Turkey gained the preconditions for its development as a national state" (p. 25). He promotes the idea of "reasonable territorial division and joint coexistence" between the Cypriot Greeks and Turks, cautioning that "historical experiences, unfortunately, hardly provide examples in which reasonable considerations and solutions won over the narrowly selfish interests -- not just material interests, but even suicidal hegemonist impulses and revanchist incentives" (p. 118).

As for Bosnia-Hercegovina, Tudjman's views on the "federal status" of this republic within Yugoslavia were consistently negative. For him, federal Bosnia-Hercegovina "was more often a source of new divisions between the Serb and Croat population than their bridge" (p. 152). For Tudjman, Bosnian Muslims were Croats. Their option for an alternative identity could only benefit the Serbs and hence advance the hour of Bosnia's "reasonable territorial division." Agreement with Milošević at Karadjordjevo in March 1991 was the final step in that direction.
Tudjman's Bosnian strategy was division by construction of separate territorial-political units in the overwhelmingly Croat areas of western Hercegovina. This Hercegovinian option included the building of the parastate of Herceg-Bosna, the establishment of the HVO paramilitary force, and the stirring up of hostilities against the Muslims. The course of the latter endeavor closely paralleled the lessons learned from Milošević's nationalist mobilization. Croatian official press and the state-controlled electronic media incited hatred against the Muslims. Their work was followed by "ethnic cleansing" in the Croat-controlled parts of Bosnia, again on the Serb model. The concentration camps at Čapljina and Dretelj and the destruction of Islamic antiquities in many localities, most dramatically in Stolac, were aspects of this policy.

Another aspect was the voluntary withdrawal of Croats from central Bosnia and Sarajevo. Croat officials encouraged the exodus of Croats from these areas, often in conflict with the Catholic church, which opposed the moves that would have deprived it of its flock. The point was to strengthen the Croat areas of western Hercegovina and the depopulated parts of Croatia (Istria, Dalmatian islands). After the Serb exodus from Krajina and parts of western Bosnia in 1995, efforts were made to resettle Bosnian Croat refugees on the lands left vacant by the Serbs. In short, the official Croat response to Serbian challenges, pressures and, ultimately, military aggression, was on the whole "ethnic."

Bosniak conduct: Official Croatia adopted Milošević's concepts against its own long-term interests. Nevertheless, some have argued that Croatia is somewhat stabler now than in 1991. No such argument can obtain in Bosnia's case, certainly as far as the Bosniak community is concerned. The history of its concessions to the logic of national homogeneity is, therefore, in part a story of growing desperation. It is also a story of nationalist mobilization and of "modern" nationalist subversion of Islam.

Alija Izetbegović's Islamic Declaration (1970) was not a program for the Islamization of Bosnia, but it was a program for the "Islamization of Muslims." Tragically, the latter was accomplished by the war that Izetbegović sought to avoid, but which also had the effect of
destroying Bosnia-Hercegovina. Izetbegović’s Declaration recognizes that Islam is not only a religion, that the “very principle of Islamic order [is] the unity of religion and politics.” The treatise affirms the contradiction between Islam and non-Islamic systems. Moreover, “Islamic order can be realized only in countries in which the Muslims represent the majority of population. Without this majority, Islamic order is reduced to state power alone (because the other element — Islamic society — is missing) and can turn itself into violence. Non-Islamic minorities within the confines of an Islamic state, provided they are loyal, enjoy religious liberties and all protection. Muslim minorities within the confines of non-Islamic [state] communities, provided their religious liberties, normal life, and development are guaranteed, are loyal to — and are obliged to carry out all obligations to — that community, except those that harm Islam and Muslims.”

Written under communism and in the Yugoslav state, where Muslims were a minority and whose religious liberties were frequently violated, this was certainly a challenge to Tito’s order. Applied to ex-Yugoslav Bosnia-Hercegovina, in which Muslims (as a religious category) were a minority, this program had controversial connotations, which were readily seized, in turn, by Milošević’s and Tudjman’s propagandists, but it does not imply an establishment of a nationally homogeneous Bosnian Muslim state, which would have been impossible in 1992 anyway. Since 1992, however, Serb and Croat national homogenizations reordered Bosnia-Hercegovina by armed force and “ethnic cleansing.” This was inevitable precisely because multinational and multiconfessional Bosnia in every respect was at odds with the logic of national homogenizers. The war for the establishment of nationally homogeneous states was turned into a war for the division of Bosnia.

Bosnian Muslim reaction to this horrific challenge was initially disbelief, then panic, and finally a turning inward. The aim of a united and integral multinational Bosnia-Hercegovina was never abandoned, but the content of that aim was increasingly compromised, frequently under pressure of the international community, which obstructed Bosnia’s armament and self-defense. Bosnian Muslims were aware of the negative implications of Muslim nomen-
clature in their national identity. After their failure in parrying international incredulity on the non-religious implications of their name, they opted for the term "Bosniak," the archaic common name for all inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina. This opened them to charges that they were trying to assimilate Bosnian Serbs and Croats. As their mosques were being blown up, their women raped, and their people most unhumanely removed from many of their ancestral sites, their response was to seek shelter in Islam. This opened them to accusations that they were accepting fundamentalism. Inured to all hostile charges, they started flaunting Islam in Bosnian state institutions, particularly in the army. Under pressure of their refugees that were flooding the cities like Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, and eastern Mostar, they looked the other way as loyal Croats and Serbs were becoming new victims of discrimination.

The familiar logic of national homogeneity made strong inroads among the Bosniaks. The question remains whether the leadership of Izetbegović's SDA wants to revive multinational Bosnia -- even in the long run, or whether it is convinced that the Serb and Croat efforts to build nationally homogeneous states from parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina (among other pieces of available territory) requires the acceptance of a mini-Bosniak "entity" as a substitute for increasingly unreal Bosnia-Hercegovina. The first option requires a long-term strategy that must simultaneously appeal to Bosnian Serbs and Croats and risk the revival of warfare against the Bosnian parastates controlled and assisted by Belgrade and Zagreb. The second option implies the slow strangulation of Bosniak community. Both are tragic and, more important, both will lead to more warfare.

Regional Prospects: Despite the politics of national homogeneity, the breakup of Yugoslavia did not establish more legitimate patterns of statehood in the successor states. If anything, the discrepancy between statehood and ethnicity, which was the source of Yugoslavia's ills, was continued in every tidbit of the broken state, just as in Andersen's tale of the broken mirror that distorted beauty and goodness and exaggerated ugliness:

Serbia and Serbia's Parastates: Despite Serbia's military advantage throughout the war, Milošević's goal of Great Serbia was not realized, nor has Serbia improved her position.
On the contrary, Serbia is now much poorer and totally exhausted. Her economy, despite the
lifting of sanctions, must work hard to reach the prewar levels of production. Nor has she sta-
bilized the internal nationality conflicts, notably the Kosovo issue. Serbia's parastate in Croatia
has been eliminated. Its Bosnian parastate (Republika srpska) is in tatters. Not only has it not
prevailed in the war against the legitimate government of Bosnia-Hercegovina, it is saddled
with the least productive Bosnian areas. Some of the misshapen parts of Republika srpska,
such as the Banja Luka district, will naturally gravitate to Croatia should a semblance of
normality be restored. Therefore, the question that Milošević must answer is fundamental: was
it all worth it? What was gained by Serbia's belligerence since 1987?

Because of general disillusionment and the crisis of Great Serbian ideology,
Milošević's tactical inventiveness has generated new ideological constructs. His new "leftist"
visage has been spurred by his conjugal ideologist, Mira Marković-Milošević, whose new
party, United Yugoslav Left (JUL), has been making inroads among the hapless minorities in
Vojvodina and the Sandžak. Milošević, too, has increasingly turned to his ruling party's leftist
origins, celebrating its Partisan heritage and promoting a form of pseudo-Yugoslavism. His
peace vestments have not prevented him from intensifying police terror in Kosovo, but they
put him at distance with the discredited Great Serbian extremists like Radovan Karadžić. The
motor force of war has opted for the currently more lucrative role of a peacemaker.

The success of Milošević's backpedaling in Great Serbianism can also be appreciated
in terms of the slack that has been taken up by the Serbian opposition. The problem of Serbian
opposition is that it has always been more extreme in nationalism than Milošević himself;
Zoran Đinđić and Vojislav Koštunica are now aligned with Karadžić, as is the influential --
and quite fanatical -- Serbian Orthodox church. This means that their democratic verbiage
against the "Bolshevik Milošević" falls on deaf ears among Serbia's minorities (one third of
rump Yugoslavia's population), among potential allies in the West, and indeed among many
Serbs. So, despite everything, Serbia is stuck with Milošević. Until Serbia undergoes a serious
self-examination and rejects the history of expansionism and hegemonism, it will remain in
this "no exit" position.
The problem of Kosovo, however, will not go away. Milošević is currently toying with a very dangerous "ethnic" scheme of Kosovo’s partition. The president of the Serbian Academy Aleksandar Despić has aired this idea, whereby the province would be divided between Serbs and Albanians and the appropriate transfers of population carried out. The partition scheme comes in tandem with a concession by Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Albanian national movement in Kosovo, who recently agreed to end the six-year Albanian boycott of state schools. Milošević’s problem is that he has brutally ended Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. To restore it now would constitute another volte-face that requires additional explanations about the costs of his policies.

Kosovo’s, on the whole, has taken advantage of Milošević’s problems and its own determination not to truck with him. A parallel Albanian society now exists in Kosovo, with nearly all institutions that can be found in official society (schools, hospitals, cultural enterprises), but ironically better run and better financed. In addition, Kosovo, unlike Serbia, has a vibrant private sector. Since it is unlikely that the Kosovar Albanians will ever become willing citizens of a non-ethnic Yugoslavia, it is probable that their extraordinary political patience will ultimately pay off not just in the restoration of autonomy, but in Kosovo’s independence as well.

Montenegro: Although ignored by most observers, Montenegro has undergone marked evolution during the war years. The trauma of Montenegro’s participation in the cowardly war against Croatia (the Dubrovnik front) and Bosnia-Hercegovina (the Hercegovinian front) and the shabby treatment that the republic has received from Milošević’s Serbia have deepened pro-independence sentiment. Montenegrin nationalism has never been stronger and it is seeking symbolic separation from everything Serbian. (Montenegrin nationalist publications are often printed in Roman script and new letters have been introduced for peculiarly Montenegrin phonemes.) The Serbian Orthodox church, admittedly never strong in Montenegro, has been isolated with the introduction of canonically unrecognized Serbian Orthodox church.
Milošević’s Montenegrin dependents, Momir Bulatović and Milo Đukanović, have been backpedaling in Great Serbianism, too. In fact, contrary to the situation in Serbia, where the opposition tries to catch up with Milošević, Bulatović and Đukanović have been racing to catch up with the opposition, which is determined to loosen the bonds with Serbia. On 22 August, the two principal Montenegrin oppositional parties, Slavko Perović’s Liberal Alliance and Novak Kilibarda’s National Party, have created an electoral alliance titled National Concord. The alliance was immediately joined by the most Montenegrin of Montenegro’s several going or ex-Communist parties, the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro, and will probably be joined by Montenegro’s Albanian and Bosniak parties. The curiosity of the National Concord is that it binds the pro-independence anti-Serbian Liberals with Kilibarda’s pro-Serb party. This increases the chance of the opposition’s electoral victory in November 1996 and, with it, the likelihood of rump-Yugoslavia’s further dissolution.

Croatia: After the recovery of Croatia’s occupied territories in 1995, the advancing restoration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with rump Yugoslavia, Tudjman’s fortunes would seem assured. That is not so. Croatia, too, is facing postwar blues, its economy nearly shuttered by deindustrialization, which was not caused by war but by Tudjman’s policies. In addition, in an attempt to create a new and loyal elite, Tudjman has authorized the transfer of most profitable state firms to his minions, who are the beneficiaries of a "privatization" scheme that would delight any grafter. Public resentment against the creation of this "newest class" has been significant, particularly in the context of an overpriced national currency that has opened the gates to an influx of imports, inordinately high prices, and high unemployment.

In this unstable situation Tudjman has been trying to shore himself with the control of the media (total control of the TV, most other electronic media, and four out of five dailies) and with repression. The Zagreb municipal elections that took place in October 1995 have not yet been recognized by Tudjman’s HDZ, which, contrary to established practice, refuses to seat the mayor chosen by the oppositional bloc that controls the city council. Viola-
tions of human rights have been rampant, particularly against the minorities. After the restoration of Krajina, the area has been crisscrossed by pillagers who loot and destroy the vacant Serb homes and farms, frequently killing the elderly Serbs who did not join the Serb exodus. Looters would not have been as successful had the state organs made any serious attempt to stop them. In fact, there is growing evidence that the army and police units themselves have participated in looting and murder.

Anti-Serbianism without the Serbs is meant to maintain the wartime levels of nationalist mobilization. This is also an aspect of Croat cultural wars waged by HDZ’s lumpenintelligentsia against growing voices of reason that challenge self-imposed nationalist isolation. Unfortunately, these voices, well represented by independent intellectuals, various NGO’s like the Helsinki Committee, the alternative press (daily Novi List in Rijeka, Split’s sometimes satirical weekly Feral Tribune, intellectual biweekly Vijenac, etc.), and muckraking tabloids (Nacional, Globus, etc.), have not been joined by the oppositional parties that are slow, opportunistic, and unwilling to wage a determined battle against both Tudjman and his isolationist nationalism. Likewise, the Catholic church has not shown any serious willingness to criticize Tudjman and the public comments of its prelates and spokesmen on the alarming situation in the former Krajina have been inadequate and frequently dissembling.

Hence, Croatia’s political pulse, too, can be felt to represent a case of a “no exit” situation. The fact that Croatia is closer and more open to the West than Serbia suggests that her case might not be chronic and offers a greater chance for the success of the opposition. Nevertheless, a great deal will have to be done before Croatia’s usually individualistic scene snaps out of Tudjman’s mold. Much will depend on Western criticisms, which have been muted or absent because Croatia has been a strategic asset against Milošević.

Bosnia-Hercegovina: Everything that was noted in Croatia can be found in non-Serb Bosnia, or, in official parlance, the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The HDZ’s policies in the still active parastate of Herceg-Bosna have been purely “ethnic” and inimical to Bosnian integrity. The most recent row over elections in Mostar, where the HDZ sought to negate the electoral
results, bear that out. Nevertheless, since some 25,000 Croats failed to vote in the Mostar elections, their absenteeism suggests growing resentment against the HDZ, whose "success" can be measured by the fact that some 450,000 Croats, or three fifths of Bosnian Croats, have left Bosnia-Hercegovina in the course of the war.

Bosniak response to the war has been noted. Muslim isolationism has promoted all sorts of particularist programs, including the shaping of a separate Bosniak linguistic norm and rewritings of history. The Islamic element in this enterprise has been prominent. Although Bosniak exclusivism nurses a very serious wound, its consequences are no better than those of "nationalisms without objects," as in Croatia. The realization of Bosniak ethnicity through statehood can only mean the end of Bosnia-Hercegovina. That is why any sign of electoral success by the non-ethnic parties in the September 1996 elections will be so important. In fact, Izetbegović’s SDA holds captive a string of parallel parties, which though nominally non-ethnic (Haris Silajdžić’s Movement for Bosnia-Hercegovina, Rasim Kadić’s Liberals), have prevented the consolidation of the non-ethnic opposition gathered around the United Opposition (Združena opozicija) of ex-Communists, Croat Peasant Party, Bosnian Republicans, Muslim Bosniak Organization, and others. This hinders the non-ethnic showing. More important, no matter what the electoral results, the future of Bosnia will depend on the continuance of IFOR presence. Without it, the revival of warfare — and new attempts to make the map of Bosnia more "logical" — cannot be ruled out.

Macedonia and its Neighbors: Macedonia’s president Kiro Gligorov has tried to build a non-ethnic Macedonia. That is the meaning of of the star of Vergina in Macedonia’s flag, which, Gligorov thought, could appeal not just to Slavic Macedonians, but also to a third of Macedonia’s population that is Albanian. Greece and to a lesser extent Serbia, who do not wish a successful Macedonia, have spoiled Gligorov’s intentions. So have various domestic nationalist groups, both Great Macedonian and Albanian, some of them no doubt in pay of various neighboring countries. Bulgaria created no obstacles for Gligorov’s policies, but stands to gain most, should he fail. This is because failure will meant partition. Any disturbances
among the Albanians of Kosovo will inevitably destabilize Macedonia and advance the hour of secession of Macedonia's predominantly Albanian eastern territories. Such a development would bring on the possibility of intervention by Greece, Serbia, or Bulgaria, to which Turkey, too, could not be indifferent. That is why the stability of Macedonia is so important. In fact, its importance is even greater in terms of international consequences than for local reasons. Here, too, Western pressures, particularly on Greece, have not been adequate. Symbolic US military presence is also insufficient.

**Slovenia:** Alone among the successor states of Yugoslavia, Slovenia has developed successfully, its Western orientation and political model being aided by Slovenia's national homogeneity. Despite this advantage, Slovenia's leaders have not advanced anything that might correspond to the goal of non-ethnic statehood. Every effort was made to harass numerically insignificant Croat minorities in border hubs and deprive remnants of extra-Slovenian federal officials and their families of their status and citizenship in Slovenia. For all that, Slovenia remains uninvolved in ex-Yugoslav entanglements. Viable for as long as the EU is, Slovenia stands a chance of early entrance into NATO, its territory not having been a part of the Warsaw Pact before 1989.

**Conclusion:** The degrees of illegitimacy in post-Yugoslav statehood and the inability of the new states to address the question of minorities in a successful way demonstrate the great potential of new conflicts in the Balkans. "Ethnic cleansing" can be read to mean a simpler ethnic map, but it does not promote non-ethnic nationhood. Just as Greece and Turkey, albeit partners in the same military alliance, have not yet found a path to constructive engagement, the successor states of Yugoslavia are not likely to show an early success in this area. The battle, ultimately, will not be won in the Balkans, but in Western Europe. If it becomes possible to be French and simultaneously Muslim and black, then it might become possible to be Macedonian and simultaneously Muslim and Albanian-speaking.