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Orthodoxy today is Russia's numerically largest confession and has for more than a millennium remained one and indivisible with the culture of all the Eastern Slavs (Byelorussians and Ukrainians included). But, the Russian Orthodox Church, that credo's most expressive and representative institution, faces a crisis of faith and institutional organization unparalleled in its history.

The causes of that crisis are just as complex as are the strategies and tactics which the Church has adopted during the past five years to restore its ascendancy over believers and reestablish its credibility as a social force at home and abroad. In many ways, this challenge mirrors that of the Russian state and society.

In this respect, the Church also finds itself no less rent by internal divisions.

Four major ecclesial factions have emerged. Identified here as Ultra-nationalists, Ecumenists, Institutionalists and Pastoralists, each is examined separately and in relationship to one another.

The perspective is largely from within the church universe proper, while at the same time church ties to political and social changes occurring inside post-Communist Russia are kept in sight.

Data for this account are based on scores of personal interviews with clergymen, scholars, journalists and lay persons conducted in the Spring of 1995 and 1996 in nine cities of European Russia and, for the first time in such an inquiry, on a close reading of the Orthodox and specialized religious press in Russia and abroad.

Orthodoxy today is Russia's numerically largest confession and has for more than a millennium remained one and indivisible with the culture of all the Eastern Slavs (Byelorussians and Ukrainians included). But, the Russian Orthodox Church, that credo's most expressive and representative institution, faces a crisis of faith and institutional organization unparalleled in its history.¹

The crisis, of course, did not come about overnight. Rather, it has been forged during nearly eight decades of state-supported de-christianization. It has been further aggravated by the post-communist onslaught of consumerist-driven secularization (that rivals any in advanced capitalist economies). Lastly, under the new "democratic" order and the sudden opening of a "free market" in religious goods, it has been exacerbated by wide-spread conversions to other faiths and sects from among not only agnostics and atheists, but also hundreds of thousands of nominal Orthodox.²
With this cyclonic uprooting of transcendent belief from contemporary society, a process that in Western Europe took place over centuries instead of decades, and in the aftermath of Orthodoxy's manifest reduction, begun under Communist rule, as a living credo and decisive social actor, no effort has been spared to restore the faith to its historic ascendancy.

Indeed, church leaders have commanded this undertaking with considerable skill and can boast of several remarkable achievements. But, they have been unable to secure within the church either a consensus of ideas about the Church's present course or an uncontested field of manoeuvre for themselves. From among the rank and file of the clergy, differences over innumerable issues keep coming to the fore and clashes between factions are continually erupting. Whenever these conflicts have touched on critical political and economic issues of the day, as they are often wont to do, they have been brought swiftly to the public's attention and have just as swiftly come under the scrutiny of the press and experts alike.

Largely for its xenophobic, anti-Semitic and nationalist stand, an Ultra-nationalist wing of the clergy has dominated the headlines. It alone has largely given shape to the currently dominant view of the Russian Church as a proponent, ally or pawn of broader conservative and nationalist forces. In contrast, other internal church currents go largely unnoticed or have gotten short-shrift. Moreover, "in-house" debates, especially those which on the surface seem to deal strictly with "religious matters," go for the most part unreported -- in the erroneous belief that quarrels over doctrine and practise have little relationship or bearing on society as a whole.

Nothing, of course, could be farther from the current reality of the Russian Orthodox Church. Its chief marks are complexity and conflict -- with regard to both the diversity of opinion within the institution and the various societal and world forces with which the Church is now obliged to dialogue if its very survival and revival are to be secured. Even its strictly religious discourse (often in a kind of code -- albeit a sacred code, but a code nonetheless) is not devoid of political implications, whether for members of the ecclesiastical institution and the faithful, or quite often for society as a whole.

In the following pages, both the reality of the church and its discourse will be examined from within the religious universe itself by describing and analyzing, for the first time as a cohesive whole, the four main tendencies that make up the Russian Orthodox Church today. What emerges from this overview -- based on extensive interviews conducted in 1995 and 1996 and a close reading of the usually neglected religious and specifically Orthodox press in Russia and abroad -- is a far more nuanced picture of the Church, one that has not only endured for the past millennium, but is engaged in a Herculean enterprise to assure itself of a major role in the next.
The Ultra-Nationalists:

At least three factions, and possibly a fourth-in-the-making, are today clearly discernible within the church, each proposing a rather distinct route "to reverse God's misfortunes in Russia."

As was noted, the extreme rightist, ultra-nationalist contingent has received the lion's share of press and scholarly notoriety. In a sense, that is merited, since so many of its positions run contrary to the best values of a pluralistic world. Consequently, its defense of the restoration of Russian state control over Belarus and Ukraine in some new, post-Soviet re-creation of a one-time tsarist pan-Slavism; its hostility to certain ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Jews and Roman Catholics; its interpretation of nationality as synonymous with the profession of Orthodoxy; and several other untenable positions -- that are, of course, not entirely without resonance within the church and society at large -- have also been given wide publicity at home and abroad. 5

But the death in November 1995 of its ostensible leader and noted anti-Semite, Archbishop Ioann, Metropolitan of Saint Petersburg and Ladoga, and his replacement by a decisively more moderate, urbane, and, in intra-religious affairs, highly experienced prelate was a critical turning point. In effect, that change irreversibly deprived the faction of its one-time legitimacy within the hierarchy, which from today's vantage point appears unquestionably to have been much more apparent than real. 6

It lost further credibility during the 1996 presidential election campaign. In flagrant opposition to the public stand against "a return to the past" by His Holiness, Alexei II, Patriarch of Moscow and All the Russians, and Russian Orthodoxy's supreme ecclesiastical authority, one Moscow cleric enthusiastically took to stumping for the Communist Party candidate. Echoing a broadly-based anxiety over the loss of Russia's prestige and the annihilation of its traditional culture, this parish priest and head of the "Public Committee For the Moral Revival of the Motherland" went so far as to avow that the party's return to power was worthy of Orthodox believers' votes and the sole antidote to the nation's further political and economic decline. 7

But, preempted as they were by the Patriarch's obvious support for incumbent Boris Yeltsin and, on the whole, by his moderated partisanship on most other issues, the ultra-nationalists can no longer play their political cards in the public arena as openly as before. In contrast, that is not the case with respect to the current, heated, "in-church" dispute over Orthodoxy's ties to Christians in the West (particularly to Roman Catholic and Protestant centers of ecumenism in France, Germany, Switzerland and Italy). Here, their frequent denunciations of ecumenism as nothing short of a betrayal of Orthodoxy not only find frequent popular resonance, but have also helped widen the gap between moderate Orthodox and especially Roman Catholics over each other's already differing understanding of the term. 8 Even so, it should be noted, a virulent December 1995 attack, renewed in March 1996, by the ultra-nationalists against their "neo-Westernizing," ecumenist confreres in-the-cloth, met with a less than cool reception from the Moscow Patriarchate. 9
The Ecumenists:

So too, not surprisingly, did these liberal advocates of ecumenism who, like the ultra-nationalists, make up a small minority of the Orthodox clergy and laity. In fact, one of their numbers, removed in January 1996 from an important post within the Patriarchate, may have even been unfairly sacrificed by the hierarchy -- some say, out of fear of schism -- to rightist clerical pressures. But, precisely because of the liberals’ links abroad, their access to and control over media, and above all, their roots in Moscow and Saint Petersburg parishes that are made up of believers drawn from the professions and university circles -- no less an important constituency of the "New Russia" than that of the biznesmeny -- these advocates of internal church reform cannot be so readily dismissed out of hand by church authorities.

Admittedly, their leverage within the institution and among the populace at large leaves much to be desired. Until now, they have also lacked a really coherent and systematic platform for changing Russian Orthodoxy. While not wanting in inspiration for such an enterprise, a programmatic approach remains to be spelt out. In one other important respect, they are also handicapped: considering the hierarchical nature of the institution, they can count on not a single bishop who would publicly carry their message to both the inner circles and the closed synods in which church policy is hammered out.

Moreover, within their ranks, they are weakened by a factionalism of their own. A few, for example, continue to insist that current high church officials, alleged to be complicit and compromised with the defeated regime, must own up to their past, renounce their present posts, and do public reparation for their disgraceful silence in the face of the unprecedented martyrdom of more than 200,000 believers, cleric and lay, at the hands of the Communists. Whether because of the accusers’ alleged stridency or because Alexei II had very early partially diffused the issue by a personal public admission of "responsibility for all that happened," this stand now seems to sustain frankly narrower and narrower appeal.

Consequently, the greater number of the ecumenists (for want of a better term to describe them despite its vitriolic pejorative connotation among the rightists) would prefer simply to get on -- even piece-meal, as is now the pace -- with making the Church a more open and contemporary institution. They embrace the search by Western Christians for mutual understanding among denominations and the eventual return to Christian unity, they call for an end to anti-Semitism, advocate the use of the Russian language over Church Slavonic in public worship, and champion a greater role for the laity in the running of church affairs.

Their bottom line, perhaps, is the summoning of a nation-wide church council, something conceived of as just as path breaking as Roman Catholicism’s Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (1962-1965). Proposals for such within Orthodoxy at the beginning of the century were short-
circuited by the Bolshevik Revolution. At the moment, no ground swell to convene any appears at all in the making, while the long-standing Slavophile suspicion among many Orthodox of "things Western" still puts the proponents of radical change at a distinct disadvantage among the great majority of their confreres.

The Institutionalists:

That majority comprises the third and most powerful faction within the Church. It draws overwhelmingly on a large and hierarchically organized ecclesiastical establishment that was greatly expanded after 1991 despite many political and financial obstacles. By late 1995, the church could boast of: a 144-strong episcopacy presiding over 119 dioceses; a secular clergy of better than 12,841 married priests and 1,400 deacons (a 1994 figure) who were charged with the care of 17,000 parishes; several thousand candidates for the priesthood studying in two major theological academies, six other major seminaries (both with four year programs of study) and eighteen (minor) inter-diocesan seminaries (many of these open to women who mostly study choir music and direction, but also theology); an unspecified number of celibate monks (solely from among whose ranks future bishops may be consecrated) and nuns (in sisterhoods now under reorganization), occupying better than 350 monasteries and convents; a growing number of lay intellectuals organized around several educational and research institutes of competence (generally financed by Swiss and German foundations); and -- not at all to be discounted -- a network of moral and financial supporters in Orthodox and other Christian communities around the world.

Under the sometimes temporizing policies, the often conciliatory leadership, and, in the final analysis, the largely intact personal authority of Alexei II, cadres specifically drawn from the ranks of the Patriarchate command the center stage of the Russian Orthodox Church.

These cadres are, in a word, the institutionalists. They have their counterparts (in nearly equal numbers) in the Roman Catholic Church of Brazil or, for that matter, in almost any other similar corporative body found in most other populous, continent-sized nations of disparate interests. Similarly, it is they who are the indispensable agents to fashion and carry out policies, perceive inadequacies and their remedies; in the end they constitute the key actors who weave hierarchy and faithful into a single cloth.

Coordinating their efforts is a hierarchical authority, a rather large bureaucracy, and a system of rules and procedures. It would be instructive to examine this complex briefly.

The Church's supreme governing body is the Episcopal Council (Archiereyskiy Sobor), an assembly of archbishops and bishops, including those from the Baltics, Belarus, Ukraine and several overseas churches (zarubezhniye eparxhii) still under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. The most recent council took place in Moscow in late 1994, the penultimate in 1988 (the millennial
anniversary of the founding of Christianity among the Slavs), while the forthcoming will be held in 1997.

Between those gatherings, decisions are constitutionally taken at periodic meetings by the Holy Synod (Svyashcheniy Sinod), the single most powerful interim policy-making committee of the church. Presided over by the Patriarch, it consists of five other Metropolitans, i.e., archbishops of major sees (including one from Minsk, Belarus and another from Kiev, Ukraine). Only this select company can elect future patriarchs who, more often than not, are chosen from within its own ranks. No aspect of church governance can proceed without the Synod’s approval. At its disposal is both a series of permanent departments (otdely), provisional commissions, and special committees, all authorized by and responsible to the Episcopal Council; for the execution of policies, the Synod relies on a permanent central secretariat with a staff of clerics and lay persons of various professional skills.

Intra-Orthodox Division & External Religious Threat

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990, however, no small part of the Synod’s energies has had to be dedicated to keeping the moral hegemony and ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate intact. This proved a particular responsibility of the Department for External Church Relations (DECR). Founded in 1946 (the first modification in church structure permitted after the Bolshevik Revolution), and thought by many to rank second only to the office of the Patriarch itself, the DECR has acted in recent years as much on such internal as well as external matters of importance. But, in this particular effort which has involved the entire Patriarchate, complete success has been elusive, strife the order of the day. Two specific challenges to the Russian Church’s integrity predominate and will likely continue to do so for some time to come: intra-Orthodox division and the advance of foreign missionaries.

With respect to the former, the many-sided fractionalization of Orthodoxy in Ukraine which followed swiftly upon national independence in 1990, but too complex a story to recount here, proved the first severe blow. Not only did the Moscow Patriarchate lose a once substantial stream of steady revenues and a third of its manpower and future priests, but also a sizable number of dioceses whose presiding bishops joined up with other Orthodox Christian communions. Even the Patriarchate’s continuing hold over 6,564 parishes in Ukraine is today nearly equaled by the 5,620 which belong to the Greek Catholic and to the two other Orthodox churches which favor a Kievan patriarchate entirely independent of Moscow (and for which there is considerable popular and governmental support). With respect to clergy, the approximately 4,000 priests loyal to Moscow are no match for the more than 14,000 clerics among Greek Catholics alone, an imbalance that helps fuel the fires of continuing attrition between Moscow and the Vatican.
Almost as debilitating to its prestige has been the nearly five year-old dispute with Archbishop Bartholomew, Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, the "primus inter pares" of world Orthodoxy and, by tradition and canon law, alone empowered to grant full autocephaly (self-government) to newly formed national churches.

At issue has been the status of the Orthodox Church of Estonia. In early 1996, differences became embittered when the Third Rome most adamantly warned the Second Rome against reconfirming the Estonian church’s pre-war autonomy (forcibly ended in 1940 by incorporation into the Moscow Patriarchate immediately on the heels of the Soviet invasion and occupation of the Baltics). Then, on 23 February 1996, after Constantinople acted without any longer heeding Moscow’s admonitions, Alexei II took the unprecedented step of omitting the name of Patriarch Bartholomew from the prayers of the liturgy (the mass) for the living. For the first time in the better than thousand year history of Slavic Christianity, Moscow and Constantinople ceased to be in full communion.22

The ensuing "split" -- initially called "provisional" by Alexei II, but bordering on out and out schism -- has been put on the back burner, but is long from becoming fully resolved soon.23 The political implications for the Russian Orthodox Church are all too clear: to the degree that Constantinople succeeds in re-instating or granting autonomy to “national” churches in the newly independent republics of the former USSR, the once unchallenged hegemony of the Moscow Patriarchate over some of these former constituencies runs the risk of being greatly diminished in the post-Communist era.24

That prospect, moreover, is threatened not only by the Estonian case at hand, but also by strong nationalist church movements in Ukraine and Moldova (and even in "diaspora" communities beyond the former USSR). Some speculate that the Estonian dispute is merely a metaphor for an impending crisis with Ukraine, in so many respects far more crucial to the Moscow Patriarchate’s power and prestige, and so a rupture to be feared and avoided. For the moment, however, the current disagreement’s devastating impact on world Orthodoxy, long in search of a practical intercommunion that transcends the multiplicity of nationalities, languages and cultures peculiar to its diverse sister-churches, is still being felt.25

With respect to foreign missionaries who, seemingly limitless in numbers and resources and thanks to the 1990 Law of Religion guaranteeing liberty of conscience and religious organization, now freely traverse the length and breadth of the nine time zones of Russia, it is as if the thousand year-old monopoly over Slavic Christianity, enjoyed almost exclusively by Orthodoxy, had now come to an end.26 As a result, the Patriarchate’s steady criticism of Catholics and Protestants, coupled with outright denunciations of “arriviste” Pentecostals, “odd-fitting” Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses, and up-start New Age "pseudo-religions" (the term used by the Russian church) has become ever more vocal.
The task of keeping both main-line and minor confessions at bay has fallen on many individuals and departments within the Patriarchate. Several have been engaged in lobbying the Russian Duma over the last three and a half years to revise the 1990 Law of Religion to the disadvantage of outside credos. Still others are being assigned in ever larger numbers to "missionary" work among Orthodox believers considered most vulnerable to foreign evangelists. To no small extent, the Patriarchate's implacable stand against the onslaught of "proselytizers" is thought by some to have seriously set back the historic, mostly positive past record of inter-confessional cooperation and will surely test its future.

But, it cannot be repeated often enough: this over-arching crisis of the place of Orthodoxy in the hearts of the faithful as well as in the community of world religions is surely the greatest the Russian church has faced in the last decade. Moreover, it does no harm to reiterate that this church crisis parallels almost step by step the larger one within Russian society, as the latter attempts not only to create a new compact at home, but also recover its status as a great power abroad.

Symbolic Responses

Within this all-encompassing, deeply-felt and multi-faceted challenge, the response of the church's institutionalists -- with whom this discussion began and to which it now returns -- has been multi-faceted and far-ranging. It cannot fully be done justice just yet. But, several of its significant directions, rarely alluded to elsewhere, are worth mentioning here.

Foremost, in my opinion, has been the symbolic response. In less than a decade, institutionalists have labored hard and successfully to place the church simultaneously within and above the world of politics, and "re-secure," if you will, the public space long denied it under communism. Its most visible manifestation has been the return of ecclesiastical properties, above all churches and temples, to their original owners, by an overwhelming majority the Russian Orthodox Church. Rescued from their condemnation by the Soviet regime as one-time museums, workshops, warehouses, movie theatres, "culture palaces," discotechs, and the like, these once neglected properties are, moreover, everywhere resuming their original purpose as places of worship. Often veiled in towering scaffolding and topped by onion shaped cupolas freshly leafed in shimmering gold, they once again enliven the landscape of every day life.

They stand, too, for the restoration of the Russian Orthodox Church's presence in society. No small measure of this achievement must be attributed not only to the leadership of the reigning Patriarch, but also to his frankly favorable public persona. According to repeated polls, Alexei II is considered among the most trustworthy figures in contemporary Russian society. That image has been further strengthened by his ready offers to broker the peace in situations of conflict, to be the voice of voiceless Russian minorities in the "near abroad" (the now independent republics of the former Soviet Union where one-time Russian settlers are thought of as pariahs), to intercede before
public authorities on behalf of migrants and the homeless, the aged and infirm. Along with Sergei Kovalev, the now ailing human rights champion, Alexei II, though untitled, is highly regarded today as one of Russia’s foremost ombudsmen. That, in part, explains why everything from the Patriarch’s Christmas pronouncements and Easter messages to the Holy Day liturgies over which he presides are all given their due in the press and transmitted on television. Meanwhile, banners that were once stretched across the main thoroughfares of big cities by civic authorities to hail communist holidays now commemorate church feasts instead. Literally, all this has served to help ritualize and legitimize the abiding presence — if not the transcendence — of the religious amidst the mundane.

The mundane too is being sacralized! In ever increasing numbers and manner, the church has been appropriating the once civic celebrations of communist prowess and, under its patronage, is restoring them to the Russian people in tribute to their sacrifices and honor. For example, the Dyen Pobedy, the annual May 9th anniversary of the end of World War II, or the "Great Patriotic War" as it was called during the Soviet era, is now commemorated in molebens (or Te Deums, in Western Christian parlance) in churches throughout the country.

Near the famous battlefield of Kursk, where the Soviets defeated the Nazis in the greatest tank battle of all times and had secured, a full year before the Normandy invasion, the Allies’ victory over Fascism, there now rises not just a new church. But, with its interior walls lined from ground to ceiling with marble plaques, like ex-votos, engraved with the names of all who fell in battle, it is also fast becoming a new center of Orthodox pilgrimage. Together, this sanctuary and each newly arriving pilgrim have wrought here in this southern part of Russia on the border with Ukraine an instant "tradition" of pilgrimage where none had before existed.

In a similar vein, a famous religious sculptor has been commissioned to erect monuments from one corner of Russia to another. His imagery frankly weds faith to nation, or as in the tableaus of his famous bell-tower outside of Belgorod. St. George, the Dragon Slayer, one of Orthodoxy’s most venerated saints, to Marshall Georgi Zhukov, one of Russia’s greatest military heros. But, nowhere, of course, is the triumph of belief over negation, of today’s renewal over the entire Stalinist past, more vividly and visibly proclaimed than in the albeit highly controversial rebuilding — achieved nonetheless in record time, thanks to the direct political intervention and financial subsidies of the Mayor of Moscow and federal authorities — of Christ the Savior Cathedral.

Organizational Responses

More suggestive than exhaustive, this symbolic response has had its counterpoint in ecclesiastical organization — and reorganization. Here, structures and relationships have been altered, strengthened, and re-invented — sometimes overnight, as the need has arisen — to secure a firmer footing for the church in society. In this respect, the remarkably swift refashioning of the
Church's ties to the state, to government at all levels, and to political parties has been a full time undertaking, ably documented for almost a decade by the secular and religious press.\(^{39}\)

However, this broad political terrain may be the most explosive on which the church must now tread, one for which there is no immediate precedent in the nominally pluralistic society that has emerged since 1991. Moreover, it is a vast canvas that is most likely the ultimate responsibility of the Patriarch himself and one that is also said to have required a major deployment of other scarce church personnel and resources from their original specializations. For this and other reasons, the subject merits far deeper study than it has received to date in the daily press or than can be accorded it here.\(^{40}\) But, it is at least alluded to whenever possible, however incompletely, in the course of this essay.

Equally crucial, but even more difficult to document, has been the necessary re-financing of the religious enterprise. Cut off abruptly in 1991 from state funding that under Soviet rule exacted the dearest price, and deprived by Ukrainian independence of substantial financial contributions (as was noted earlier),\(^{41}\) the Patriarchate and its bishops have had to look elsewhere for revenues. This search borders on the comical and (for outsiders) the unaccustomed. One bishop has launched a joint-venture with an American company to bottle and market Russian mineral water (appropriately, Holy Springs brand), its proceeds partly helping to sustain the Moscow Patriarchate.\(^{42}\) The existence of other wholly church-sponsored businesses (artisan workshops for the repair of churches, icons and religious artifacts; candle-making factories), church-owned banks and even internationally-backed investment and mutual funds has also been reported.\(^{43}\) What specific role the collective generosity of parishioners, financially strapped as wages plummet, prices skyrocket and a third of the population is reduced to poverty, plays, is difficult to discern.

To be sure, resources are as tight as their origins, and expenditures are sometimes controversial. Recent contributions of prominent private Moscow banks and businesses, especially for the rebuilding of Christ the Savior Cathedral, have raised no few eyebrows.\(^{44}\) Meanwhile, the offer of a Roman Catholic foundation in Germany to pay an annual salary of $1,000 for ten years to 6,000 Orthodox priests and their families, allegedly impoverished by the run-away inflation of the early nineties, has raised the ire of several Orthodox churchmen as out and out "soul poaching."\(^{45}\) On the whole, however, something more than occasional news stories and innuendo is necessary if the interplay between finances and institution-building is to be charted with care.

To that end, a government official recently opened a window on the extent of state funding, noting that the Church and its several organizations have in fact received considerable sums from various public sources. Federal ministries, for example, pay for the upkeep of religious monuments; the return of churches by the state has been generally cost-free; and lastly, tax benefits, customs privileges and subsidies from local and regional governments have been substantial.\(^{46}\) In Moscow, the mayor designated hundreds of billions of rubles to several Orthodox, Catholic and Moslem
groups in the 1994-1995 fiscal year alone. Elsewhere, local priests have called on their city councils, now for a subsidy or tax relief, now for an outright contribution of cash or goods in kind.

With respect to Orthodox believers, organizational links are also being forged by the hierarchy to the several more critical sectors, but perhaps far more slowly than in the political arena. Bratstvos (religious confraternities of lay persons) have all too often shown themselves to be too independent, overly politicized (by ultra-rightists, for the most part) and sometimes too rebellious toward clerical oversight. As a result, few of the estimated one hundred and fifty in the country (as of December 1995) have been juridically incorporated into the church. The Orthodox youth movement (for which there is an office within the Patriarchate) is apparently in a similar state of disarray. But, like several new centers of religious training and education as well as religious publication enterprises, it too has received enthusiastic support and accompanying budget lines to make up for the dire shortcomings incurred during Soviet rule in each of these domains.

The Four New Departments

Four other domains provide further insight into the breadth of concerns and priorities with which the Patriarchate approaches the remaking of the institutional church and of its links to the broader social order. Each now enjoys the corresponding status of a "department" within the Patriarchate, signifying the Holy Synod's appointment of a bishop to preside over its administration and program.

That "for religious education and catechetics" was created in 1991, less than a year after the "enthronement" of Alexei II as Patriarch. The first new department since 1946, it is dedicated to the religious formation of youth, religion teachers and catecheticists. Such an objective is nothing short of overwhelming in as much most nominal believers have had virtually no instruction whatsoever in Orthodoxy, and of the millions who re-embraced the faith during the "religious boom" years in a return resembling mass conversion, "not a tenth of these neophytes," according to one expert observer, "have become regular churchgoers." At the same time, preparing the clerical and lay cadres who could conduct such an enterprise simply cannot be accomplished overnight. Indeed, the same observer puts little store in the competence of most seminary teaching staffs or in the calibre of the several thousand seminarians trained by them over the past decade.

But, as if that were not enough, even more complex questions, primarily political, abound. Crucial are: how can the Church introduce courses and textbooks on religion into the public schools?; how can public education be "influenced" by the church?; or whether, could or should erect a parallel system of "orthodox" primary and secondary institutions of comparable quality and at costs accessible to parents? It is fairly certain that the resources, cadres and a necessarily amenable government attitude to such an enterprise, are as yet unavailable on the scale desired or required.
For example, during the July 1996 Duma negotiations over restrictions on religious confessions, the Patriarchate's hope to get the authorization to teach "doctrines of the historical religious and moral traditions of the peoples of the Russian Federation" in both state and private schools by "official representatives of religious organizations" was flatly rejected. But, the eventual achievement of religious education in the public schools remains, nonetheless, an express goal of clergy and laity. That is especially true at the local level where access by Orthodox churchmen to sympathetic public officials is said to be commonplace, but also, given the communist past of most of the office-holders, highly problematic for the Church.

A second domain, handled by a new department and also created in 1991, is that of "charitable activities and social services," the two avenues through which religious institutions of all faiths in most nations have traditionally served the interests of society. During the communist period, the governance of hospitals and orphanages, like schools and universities, belonged exclusively to the state. "Soup kitchens," old-age homes, home- and child-care services and emergency humanitarian aid were considered unnecessary in a society that had allegedly wiped out the root causes of poverty (but definitely not the ubiquitous babushkas, or grandmothers, who throughout the Soviet era in fact filled the void).

The Church’s resumption of activities in these areas corresponds both to its fundamental teachings on the cardinal works of mercy (feed the hungry, heal the sick, bury the dead) and to the autarchic subsidiary role, most frequently financed with state funds, historically played by religious institutions. In many cities, local parishes, sometimes with foreign assistance, have already assumed the responsibility for running various social services from a children’s hospital in Moscow to an orphanage for girl drug addicts in Maloyaroslavets. At the federal level, an agreement signed in the spring of 1996 by the Patriarchate and the Ministry of Health foresees a wide-ranging plan of cooperation to establish medical stations in local parishes, erect shelters for the elderly in monasteries, and enroll church assistance in combating alcoholism and drug addiction.

Moreover, the presence in Russia of international charitable agencies, such as the American-based International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC) and the Polish-based Eastern Europe Office of the World Council of Churches for aid to the Orthodox of Central and East Europe, may prove at this juncture doubly beneficial. For one, the prestige and hand of the Patriarchate, serving as the intermediary for foreign aid to fellow Christians in need, cannot help but be strengthened; for another, donations from abroad may help sustain some of the Patriarchate’s own, directly-sponsored local social welfare projects. For the moment, however, the actual allocation of funds from the general church budget to social welfare projects remains small.

A third domain encompasses the military and law enforcement in the new Russian Federation. In November 1995, the establishment of a department for "communication with the armed forces and law enforcement agencies" was formalized after eighteen months of prior close cooperation.
new accord will make possible the recommencement of the spiritual mission of the church not only in military barracks and officers’ quarters, but also in security agencies (from local police precincts to perhaps even the Ministry for Internal Security) and the prisons.

Of course, the rapprochement between the church and the armed forces is by far the more critical (even though the rising crime rate has turned overcrowded penitentiaries into spiritual and moral hells). At stake is not merely the re-establishment of military chaplaincies. At a time when the armed forces were actually engaged in a war in Chechnya and are on military alert in other border areas, when Russian Navy units in the Crimea stand poised against Tartar irredentism and Ukrainian nationalism, and when the Russian services, the Army in particular, are faced with charges of internal corruption, a 60% reduction in overall size, wide-spread draft-dodging, civilian pacifism, an anti-draft movement and an overall decline in the numbers, health and educational levels of recruits, the Church is being called on to help restore morale as well as morality.

In October 1995, in a speech for which the former Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev, heartfully thanked the Patriarch, Alexei II had "called upon draftees to 'serve the Motherland' and 'protect and defend it from external and internal enemies as true Orthodox warriors.'" According to ITAR-Tass, the speech faithfully "reflect[ed] the Russian military’s [concerns over expected] difficulties with the fall [1995] draft." Nor is the Navy without interests of its own. At the initiative of naval commanders stationed at Russian bases in Antarctica, the Patriarch consecrated "a cross of adoration and icons" which in January 1996 were to be installed there. Then, to mark the 300th anniversary of the Russian Navy, a twenty-seven foot high, eight-sided Orthodox cross, blessed by the Patriarch in Moscow, was to be installed at Cape Bellinghausen in memory of forty-nine Russian seamen who died there.

It can be now be proclaimed, as Alexei II had also explicitly declared, that the "artificial wall ... that had been erected to separate the Church from the Army over the past few decades, had at last been pulled down." Indeed, cooperation with the armed forces has proven remarkably successful, especially in the academies for commissioned officers and in certain military districts, as in the Far Eastern provinces and in the Urals; "a number of commanding generals [have voluntarily] called upon the Church 'to march more resolutely towards the restitution of the military Chaplaincy.'"

Several areas, however, can still stand improvement. Indeed, the bishop in charge of the department has voiced complaint "over delays [by the military] in the restitution of places of worship" at military installations and the lack of a "more rigorous attitude" among the high command towards the exemption of seminarians and priests from military service. But as General Grachev exclaimed, the military’s cooperation with the Church was a matter of "natural necessity."

To be sure, the likelihood that priests (as well as clerics from other confessions) would one day soon take charge of the moral guidance of the Russian soldier was now contingent only on the
availability of chaplains (but, hardly easy to increase from one year to the next), rather than on a deliberate policy of exclusion by the state or its soldiery. But in this mutual strengthening of the corporate power of the church and the military, Russia would appear to be heading toward a model of societal hierarchy more reminiscent of Latin America during the Cold War, rather than toward a practise of institutional separation followed in Western Europe.

The last domain for which the Patriarchate has created a new department, also in 1995, embraces the church’s “mission to the Orthodox.” The term “mission” enjoins Christians to “go and preach” the Gospel “to all nations.” Indeed, the Russian Orthodox Church had long done just that and now, after the fall of communism, is once again free to revere in public its saints, martyrs and preachers who carried the faith to the farthest ends of Russia, and in the last century, even to Alaska and the California coast.

But the mission department is specifically charged not with preaching to the potential believer in distant lands, but to the Orthodox and nominal Orthodox who have become targeted by foreign missionaries on the church’s own turf. Referred to as “canonical territory” in ecclesiastical law and suggesting a kind of jurisdictional monopoly over a geographical space, this principle unilaterally declares the lands historically converted by Slavic Orthodox to be ipso facto off-limits to other Christians. For, to “convert” the Orthodox, the argument goes, is to deny their original baptism. But, in so far as that baptism is sacramentally valid, were another Christian confession to readminister it, i.e., to repeat it, that act would be tantamount to a sacrilege.

“Canonical territory,” however, is not universally accepted, least of all by other confessions and, moreover, it flies in the face of the right of free choice and religious liberty, constitutionally guaranteed Russian citizens by the 1990 Law of Religion. Hence, what would appear to be a realm of labors and activities proper to religious institutions, i.e. missionary work, also turns out to present deep philosophical differences and the potential for permanent political conflict.

At the moment, the new department is in the throes of elaborating its own rationale and priorities, establishing supportive committees and training institutes, scurrying for funds and publicizing its goals within and beyond church circles. This enterprise as well as an account of its leaders are the subject of a forthcoming essay, the first on this significant development, and so are best left for a fuller discussion there.

But, a word of summation about the four new departments of the Patriarchate is in order. Considered together, they speak to the concerted, five-year effort by the church’s highest authorities to redefine the entire gamut of its constituent parts, delineate and then encompass them in a wide-ranging set of hierarchically defined institutional priorities.

At the same time, these objectives -- if they are to be realized -- must necessarily interface, as indeed they do, with all the critical sectors of the political and civil order in which the fulfillment of this current "religious project" is inextricably inter-twined, if not significantly dependent. Therefore,
the heads of these departments, like the Patriarch, the members of the Synod and several other prominent prelates, should be seen as they see themselves: Orthodoxy's maximum religious guides and its prime political leaders.

In both capacities, they are the ones who assume the direct and ultimate responsibility for making political and civil society conform, in so far as it is possible in a pluralistic world, to the Church's institutional agenda and the exigencies of the faith, as that faith is varyingly interpreted. As leaders encamped in the realms of religion, politics and society, the lines of battle are often ill-defined and constantly shifting.

Not unexpectedly then these "true Orthodox warriors," like the recruits to whom the Patriarch addressed these words, are just as much called upon to "serve the Motherland" and "protect and defend it from external and internal enemies," as they are called to serve, protect and defend the "one, holy, universal and apostolic Church." As such, their public deeds inevitably will never escape, and rightly so, the scrutiny and judgment of believers and citizens alike.

The Pastoralists:

For want of a better term, the pastoralists are those clerics, laymen and women who, it might be said, are engaged at the grass roots, who in some significant way break from the past, and who without much to-do speak to the future. They can be found in each of the three factions just discussed, but tend to eschew politics both within and beyond the church. They see themselves as pastors.

As an emerging cadre their principal ties to one another are in no way systematically forged; rather, they lie in the labors each undertakes, the generation from which they hail, and the anonymity in which many have largely remained until now. The following remarks can merely suggest some of the dimensions that seem to characterize these still inchoate, sometimes overlapping, sets of pastoralists from whom significant changes may be expected. At this stage, three such sets are in the making: seminary reformers, new bishops, and the clerics of priestly families and devout communities.

Dimitri Pospielovsky, a historian at the University of West Ontario, keen and authoritative observer of contemporary Orthodoxy, a Russian-Ukrainian by birth, and a member of the Orthodox Church, has especially called attention to today's outstanding reformers of seminary life. They have arisen precisely at the moment in which the standards of the contemporary clergy, if Pospielovsky is correct, have reached their nadir. Bishops exercise "an arbitrary episcopal despotism," instructors of theology trained since 1988 in the two most advanced eight-year programs of study of the Patriarchate "were failures as teachers," and the clergy on the whole is wanting in sound "education and balance."
"The most interesting and promising seminarians," practically all of whom are adult converts with secular degrees, continues Pospielovsky, end up after two years of study to find their enthusiasm for the faith and community service "replaced by a sense of being encircled by enemies," by the anti-intellectualism of their narrow-minded monastic mentors, and by a "desire to isolate themselves from the sinful world around them..." 68

But despite these manifold problems, Pospielovsky places his hope for the faith and the Church squarely on seminary reforms. In fact, several of these experiments and their advocates in Moscow and in the provinces merit his special interest.69 At the provincial minor seminary in Kursk, headed by Bishop Ioann of Belgorod and Stariy Oskol who was subsequently named director of the Patriarchal Department of Mission, he encountered:70

open student discussion at lectures [while] questions [were] asked or disagreements expressed directly and orally in the classroom. In other seminaries, students generally do not dare openly challenge the lecturer... or even get up and ask questions.

A similar atmosphere defying rote learning was also found -- "despite a lack of space, the want of good libraries, the shortage of qualified teachers and money" -- in the regional schools of Kostroma, Smolensk, and Stavropol.

Perhaps the most radically successful theological program is that of Moscow's Higher Orthodox-Christian School of the Brotherhood of the Meeting of the Vladimir Icon of the Mother of God, run by Fr. Georgi Kotchetkov who has suffered excessively from the attacks of the ultra-rightist clerical faction and at times from those of the Patriarchate itself. His school can draw on some of the best national and foreign lay and clerical theologians, imposes a rigorous spiritual preparation of students in the adjoining parish, also in the care of Fr. Kotchetkov, and has already "produced dozens of competent theologians ready for ordination," but which the Patriarchate refuses to ordain despite the urgent need, preferring instead "hundreds of others" having "no [or inadequate] theological education." 71

Other successful experiments have been conducted by the ecumenist-minded pastor of Saints Cosmas and Damian, the "parish of the Moscow intellectuals," Fr. Aleksandr Borisov, himself a disciple of the late Fr. Alexandr Men', the reformer-preacher, theologian and pastor, whose 1990 murder by still unknown assailants remains unsolved.72 Like Fr. Kotchetkov's efforts, Fr. Borisov's too persist in the penumbra of ecclesiastical toleration.

But their importance should not be underestimated: in ecclesiastical institutions where the Word is the instrument of both salvation and combat, the more competent and persuasive theologian-intellectuals are, the far better chance they stand to be able to prevail in the middle-run even against "the gates of hell." In the more practical sense, the graduates of "reformed" seminaries will doubtlessly prove the decisive cadre as the Russian Orthodox Church continues to bid for
respectability in diverse international fora of theology, and in the innumerable intra-Orthodox and inter-confessional congresses of world Christianity.

What of the new bishops, this second set of pastoralists? They are a direct consequence of the hierarchy's rapid expansion in the post-Soviet era. New dioceses are being created at break-neck speed, rising from a total of 67 in 1988 to 144 in 1995. Of these 32 were established or re-established between 1989 and 1994, and 45 in the two year period of 1994-1995 alone! With the likelihood of doubling the existing number of dioceses in the coming five years, fresh cadres will be needed to fill new sees. At least another 21 established sees, occupied by bishops sixty-five years of age and older (8 of them over seventy) will likely be vacated in the next decade or sooner through resignation, illness, or death.

Youth, in contrast, is the chief characteristic of nearly a third of the current bishops: ten of a hundred prelates sampled are forty years old or younger, and 16 to 18 between the ages of forty-one and forty five. This age cohort is likely to be the direct beneficiary of the future doubling of the episcopacy. But youth, of course, is no guarantee per se of ecclesiastical renovation. In fact, regardless of age, the sole certainty about almost all the appointments made after 1990 -- amounting to 70 of the 100 bishops surveyed! -- is that they have tended to strengthen the moderate policies of Patriarch Alexei_II who assumed office in that year and whose power of appointment is, if not exclusive, at least decisive.

That said, this new generation of younger prelates is likely to be of two minds. As a generation freer of the constraints of state power and, in certain instances, shaped by prior active dissidence against state repression, they may prove to be genuine religious innovators, possibly even key agents of future church-wide reform. At the same time, however, they can be expected to uphold the Patriarchate's policies on any number of issues, particularly that of securing Orthodoxy's de facto ascendance over and against other confessions.

Two young prelates are worth mentioning in so far as they illustrate this argument. Since 1993, Ioann (Popov), 36 years old, has held the rank of Bishop of Belgorod and Stariy Oskol, a diocese situated near the southern Russian border, less than an afternoon train ride to Kharkov, eastern Ukraine's heavily Russian ethnic capital. He was also the former director of the Kursk minor seminary, one of the four outside Moscow that, according to Pospielovsky, distinguished itself by actively promoting dialogue, debate, and scholarship, instead of intellectual supineness, moral cowardice and rote learning.

Raised in Irkutsk, a tsarist outpost for the exiled Decembrist rebels of 1825 and situated on the Trans-Siberian railway in Central Siberia, Bishop Ioann was influenced by the religious content of Dostoyevsky's writings and by the intellectuals who gathered around the journal, Literary Irkutsk, for which he himself later wrote; Its editor is reputed among the first "to speak about many religious
problems of the time. In that atmosphere of belief's confrontation with disbelief, Ioann was called to the faith and his vocation.

Named in 1995 the first director of the newly-established Patriarchal Department of Mission, he has assumed the responsibility, assigned the highest priority by the hierarchy, of taking the faith to the unchurched and defending them against the "false claims" of foreign missionaries. But, the potential of this office also for stimulating truly collaborative relations with other faiths should not be underestimated, nor the chance it may afford to translate the often empty praise of church officials or the now polemical anathemas of urban intellectuals towards ecumenism into practical programs leading to genuinely popular exchanges.76

Bishop Sergey (Sokolov) of Novosibirsk, 44, was appointed to his post in December 1995. A former archimandrite (abbot) and inspector of one of Moscow's religious academies, he holds degrees in both music and religious education and is currently a doctoral candidate in theology.77 A man of learning and culture, Bishop Sergey takes charge of one of Siberia's most strategic cities, one that is not only home to Russia's great scientific research center, (Akademogorsk, Academic City), but also a monument to the Soviet state's pursuit of militant atheism. Here scores of churches once stood at the start of the twentieth-century, but today only the Orthodox Ascension Cathedral remains.

Bishop Sergey's mission, however, is not limited to the already formidable task of erecting new churches, cementing ties to local officials, and cultivating Orthodoxy's links to the city's remaining intellectuals.78 Rather, his is the challenge to reaffirm the faith in this once historic center of Orthodoxy that today has become transformed into one of Russia's prime areas of de facto religious pluralism. For whatever the city's past symbolizes for the Russian Church, it is also for Buddhists, Moslems, Old Believers, Protestants and Roman Catholics a living experiment in religious liberty and the heartland that each credo calls home.79

So too, apparently, do many of the so-called "sects," from Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh-Day Adventists to Hari Krishnas and Scientology. One Orthodox response to these outsiders was to establish a "telephone hot line" as part of psychological services made available to teen-agers by a local center in which clergymen take an active part. Its program resembles others under diocesan auspices in Moscow and St. Petersburg and largely aimed at "de-programming" young converts to "pseudo-religions," as Orthodox refer to the Moonies (Unification Church), and similar sects.80

Novosibirsk is also the seat of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration for Siberia, one of two for all of Russia (the other is in Moscow) set up in 1991 and presided over by bishops born and raised in the former Soviet Union. It is the hub of a pastoral effort to the farthest ends of Siberia striving to care for hundreds of thousands of Latin Catholics, descendants for the most part of one-time Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian and Ukrainian deportees to the Gulag, but now almost all culturally and linguistically Russian. 81
It has been sometimes said that the Roman Catholic presence in Novosibirsk is as deeply resented as that of the sects. The litany of suspicions sounds truly alarmist: that its new Cathedral, built with German-Catholic funds, its daily Russian-language masses, and its cadres of well-educated priests who hail from dozens of nations and each month travel thousands of miles from one tiny snow-bound community to another, really aim to "proselytize" the Orthodox; and that its Jesuit cultural center, Center I-igo, which regularly provides the university with two visiting professors of philosophy each semester and publishes a serious scholarly journal on faith and society, seeks to win converts from among intellectuals.

If that were so, the question arises whether the appointment of such a learned prelate as Bishop Sergey was not made to take on Catholics as well as the sects. No evidence to that effect exists. Moreover, should a confrontation between Orthodox and Catholics be contemplated throughout Siberia, that would require the alteration of current policy and could only be implemented with the full consent of the Moscow Patriarchate. For the foreseeable future, that is nowhere in the cards.82

To the contrary, everywhere in Siberia, instances of fraternity, independently of credo, abound. In the archipelago of camps, prisons and outposts designed to oppress, humiliate and dehumanize men and women guilty only of their love for liberty, historic enemies, like Russians and Ukrainians, Poles and Lithuanians, not only lived side-by-side, but came to each other's aid and, when gathered as believers, often prayed together. Their pastors, moreover, clandestinely and in silence cared for souls, not denominations. They administered first the "sacraments" of faith, hope and charity, and, only then, whenever discretion and sensibility permitted, baptism, the Eucharist, and the anointing of the sick and dying.

Such lessons of human dignity and solidarity are not forgotten, oft remembered, and are still held aloft in many a published account of the Gulag as the highest tribute to a common brotherhood. Perhaps today they are unattainable or even justifiably no longer necessary to emulate, as each believer freely turns again to the faith of his or her desire or birth. But, there is no reason such lessons cannot continue to inspire acts of friendship, tolerance and mutual respect. They are worthy of being recounted to future generations; nor are they lost on the heirs to this, perhaps Siberia's greatest legacy, and on those leaders, such as Bishop Sergey, who comes to reap and reinvest the Gospel's storied "talents" of past generations.

To speak of Bishop Sergey, in this sense, is also to invoke the third and last group of pastoralists. They are perhaps the most elusive of characterization. They are, for one, the lay persons (miryane) and clerics who have acted spontaneously on the commandment to love their neighbor and acted out a corresponding personal vocation of service. Independently of official church initiatives, they responded promptly after the dissolution of the former USSR to the needs of orphans and children, the sick and the aged. In doing so, they helped found, staff and operate innumerable agencies and facilities. True, some have been the beneficiaries of international charitable
foundations. Cynics contend that others have benefited improperly. But that charge greatly exaggerates such instances and irresponsibly dishonors the countless deeds of unsung heroism.

Among frankly selfless miryane, youths from the large urban centers with a university education tend to be the most numerous. But, as is illustrated by the particular case of Bishop Sergey (Sokolov) -- and his two brothers, who are also priests -- many of the clerics so engaged hail in a long line of descent from priestly families. Among current seminarians, as Pospielovsky notes, the sons of priests make up a significant number (between 40% and 50%) just as they did during the last two centuries. By now, however, these percentages have likely decreased. Since many of such publicly Orthodox priestly families resided in Western Ukraine (the former Austro-Hungarian imperial province of Galicia), which had been incorporated into the Moscow Patriarchate only in 1946, and so were not subjected to as long a period of state persecution, they may have reverted after independence to the once banned Orthodox and Greek Catholic communities, now once again thriving, from which they originally sprang.

Nonetheless, Orthodox priestly families loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate not only survive in Ukraine, even in Galicia, but -- as the Sokolov brothers prove -- in Russia proper too. The criticism that sons of priests are less educated and hail from rural areas is as a rule of thumb undeniable. But, in two important respects these priests are unlike their confreres from large towns and cities. For one, they are rooted in the local community itself, are known to and enjoy the respect of their neighbors. For another, they and their wives and their children seem forever engaged in the needs of their local community or parish. (In this sense, they resemble Lutheran pastors in the American Mid-West and Canada or Methodist ministers in the South West; they literally operate a local, family-run, social welfare office). In both these respects, moreover, such clerics comply with the ideal of the Orthodox married priesthood. The increase in vocations among sons of priests could not then be more auspicious and in some locales might even prove an effective intermediate solution to some of the spiritual needs of Orthodoxy.

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As this overview has shown, the unprecedented crisis of faith and institutional organization confronting Russian Orthodoxy has profoundly divided the Church. Put in question are not only the root causes of the crisis but also its requisite solutions. In turn, these internal divisions closely parallel and mirror those within the Russian polity and society themselves.

If taken as a corporate body, however, the Church enjoys a distinct advantage. At a moment when the country struggles to restore a measure of balance and equity at home and recover its lost power and prestige abroad, the Church -- despite all its blemishes and past transgressions -- is the single societal institution that provides an unbroken continuity between past and present.
It thus reminds Russians that it alone antedates the nation and lies at the very origins of the people’s culture and traditions. With this powerful appeal to, and imprint upon, the real and mythic history of Russia, it enjoys a unique prestige and legitimacy. Eager to share in them, the state, government at all levels, political parties, and other vested social and economic interests of the "new Russia" have avidly courted the Church.

Nor has the Church turned a deaf ear. Thus far, its rewards have been numerous and handsome, as if it were the de jure state church and official religion of the nation. More than the army, sullied by corruption, it again basks in a measure of popular acclamation as the ultimate depository of the people’s past and future.

Of course, the Church runs risks in consorting with the world. For one, its own autonomy could be again threatened, perhaps even more gravely than under Soviet rule. For another, internal factions might take the route of schism. For still another, an expedient alliance with the state in opposition to "foreign" faiths could lose it the sympathy of those sectors of Russian society and of the world community which champion a pluralistic order, precisely so that religion may know no temporal master.

Within the Church itself, the risk runs more deeply. In shoring up its relationship to the secular order, it may have too thoroughly neglected the spiritual True, it has everywhere striven to demonstrate the efficacy and power of faith, the transcendence of the divine, the permanence of the church. On the symbolic level, it has acted prodigiously. But might it have done all this by "over-invoking" a past that speaks less to contemporary, secular Russians than to their believing great-grandfathers?

What message, then, has the Russian Orthodox Church, above all its institutionalists, elaborated for modern men and women, and can it effectively transmit it? Such questions are indeed being raised. The answers to them could be far more pertinent and decisive to the Church’s revival and survival than any short-term agreement reached with worldly leaders of the moment.
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1. With regard to this crisis, see the sharply critical view of the noted historian and keen observer of the contemporary church, himself an Orthodox, Dimitry Pospielovsky, "Impressions of the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church: Its Problems and its Theological Education," Religion, State and Society, 23:3 (1995), 249-262. He believes that "the tragedy for the Church is that it has proved incapable of filling the spiritual vacuum in society, of quenching the thirst for spiritual sustenance among the population in general..." 257.


Electoral surveys conducted in December 1995 and March 1996 by Tatyana Varzanova of the Sociology Research Center of Moscow University found that only 42% of those surveyed identified themselves as Orthodox; 53% do not go to church (compared to 38% in Soviet times), while only 2.2% go to church once a week; 5.9% once a month; see "Analysis: Does there exist a Religious Electorate," Metaphrasis, 37 (22-28 April 1996), hereafter cited as Mf.

[Author's Note: Metaphrasis is an on-line "religious information service." Launched in April 1995, its aim is, according to its Moscow editors, to provide "complete and regular information about the many-faceted and complex religious life in Russia, the CIS and the Baltic states. Special attention shall be paid to relations between the state and religious organizations." It is ecumenical in scope, but Orthodox in inspiration. It is available by subscription via mf@glas.apc.org].

The noted Russian sociologist of religion, Sergey B. Filatov, addressed himself to the likely numbers of actually practicing Orthodox believers; he estimates them to range anywhere from 50 to 100 persons in each of the approximately 1,000 existing Orthodox parishes; cited in Patrick Henry, "Church Backing, More Symbol Than Votes," The Moscow Times (15 May 1996), 1-2. It should be noted, however, that his figures fall far short of otherwise also usually low estimates. Moreover, his 1,000 parishes are 700 fewer than the official church count).

2. For an overview, see Alessandra Stanley, "From Repression to Respect, Russian Church in Comeback," The New York Times (03 October 1994).


4. The identifications assigned to the four tendencies discussed -- Ultra-nationalists, Ecumenists, Institutionalists and Pastoralists -- owe a debt of gratitude to a pioneering 1965 study of the Catholic Church in Latin America by the late Ivan Vallier.

5. The articles are numerous; for the sake of example, see James Rupert, "Religious faiths collide in Russia," Washington Post (25 July 1993) and "Nationalist right tries to mobilize Russia's Orthodox," Washington Post (25 August 1993).

6. For a biographical sketch of the new Metropolitan of Saint Petersburg and Ladoga, Vladimir, formerly the Archbishop of Rostov-on-Don and a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Second Vatican Council, see "Neuer Metropolit für St. Petersburg," Glaube in der Zweiter Welt, usually rendered and hereafter cited as G2W, 2 (February, 1996), 11-12. For his consecration speech in which he provides autobiographical detail, see "Metropolitan Vladimir of St. Petersburg and Ladoga Taking Office," Mf, 23 (15-21 January 1996).

7. The exact text of the Patriarch's repudiation of the Communist Party's presidential candidate is found in "What we experienced should not come back," says Patriarch Alexy II," Mf, 42 (May-June 1996), Supplement. In his press conference held in Syktivkar, Georgia on 08 May 1996, the Patriarch further noted that in the event of a communist victory, citizens "may witness once again the desecration of Orthodoxy's sacred things...People should not allow this to happen."
The pro-communist, nationalist cleric in question is Archpriest Alexander Shargunov, Chair of the Public Committee For the Moral Revival of the Motherland which issued a document on 22 May 1996 laying the blame for all the ills of Russia on the Yeltsin government; see "A Group of Moscow Priests Sign a Joint Address with Gennady Zyganov," *Mf*, 42 (May-June 1996), Supplement; in the same issue, see also the reaction from the liberal wing of the clergy, "Another Attempt at 'Red-White Synthesis'."

8. Regarding differing interpretations of ecumenism, one Roman Catholic priest in Russia believes they are rooted in conflicting views about "proselytism."

"From my own experience," he wrote in July 1996, "I would feel it necessary to say that the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches seem to understand this word in different although similar ways. ... While Catholics deny charges of proselytism (understanding it as a Catholic way -[as] forced or pressured or enticed conversions), there are many of our priests and religious who are in fact quite proselytistic in attitude and/or action (in this instance, understanding the word as the Orthodox understand it -i.e., as either encouraging actively or passively ethnic Russians [a majority of whom it seems has been baptized as Orthodox] to join another religious denomination. I think that the [theologically accepted, but possibly incorrect] Catholic position that a baptized Orthodox can become a Catholic is already perceived [by the Orthodox] as proselytistic and as signifying a Catholic attitude of "anti-sobornost." [Author's note: "sobornost" is a difficult word to translate, but it's closest meaning for the above context is "in consultation" or an opinion arrived at "in council." Hence, an "anti-sobornost" attitude is one that is not reached in common or as a result of consensus.


The Patriarch's outright warning to both factions of the right-left division among the clergy and his dismissal of its importance as a mere conflict among those who entered the church from among the ranks of "secular intellectuals" and whose struggle had no relevance to "the Church body of many millions" is found in "Seven Paschal Topics of the Patriarch," *Mf*, 36 (12-18 April 1996).

10. An appeal by the Holy Synod to cease further "aggravating existing divisions" within the church is found in "Decision of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church of March 21, 1996," *Mf*, 42 (May-June), Supplement.

11. In an interview with Dimitri Pospielovsky, Patriarch Alexei II was reported to have said that "if the Church were to get involved in the polemics between right and left, the split would penetrate the Church and cause another schism..." in "Impressions of the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church: Its Problems and its Theological Education." *Religion, State and Society*, 23:3 (1995), 249-262, esp., 256.

On the dismissal, see "Archpriest Ioann Sviridov and Priest Georgy Chistyakov Deprived of Office," *Mf*, 23 (15-21 January 1996); *Mf* gives this account: "Hegumen Ioann [Ekonomtsev, Director of the Patriarchate's Department for Religious Education and Catechetics] said Archpriest Ioann's [being relieved] of his post is linked to 'the great amount of work [he has] as the editor-in-chief of the Christian Church Public Broadcasting Channel.' [On] January 18, Archpriest Ioann Sviridov told Metaphrasis that he saw the main cause of his removal in 'the growing influence of the right wing in the Church,' which found its expression in the address of a group of Moscow priests to Patriarch Alexy II. [Their] statement voices preoccupation 'over overt collaboration of certain clerics and laity of the ROC with those Catholic structures which engage in proselytizing in the territory of Russia.' In the opinion of Archpriest Ioann Sviridov, Hegumen Ioann had to make some compromise and dismiss from his department the official whose activities [had] brought on in the Church circles 'quite a mixed reaction.' Father Ioann Sviridov said that the entire department could [have been] liquidated if Hegumen Ioann had not agreed to dismiss him."

12. Perhaps the closest to a programmatic approach to change is found in the book of Fr. Aleksandr Boriso, Pastor of the liberal Moscow parish Church of Saints Cosmas and Damian. *Pobelishchye Niniye: Razmuzhlyeniya o Russkoi Pravoslanoi Tserkvi*, published in 1993 or 1994; its title is "Fields Ready to Harvest: Reflections about the Russian Orthodox Church." His book was widely attacked by rightist factions, but unlike one or two other colleagues, he was never suspended.

Fr. Borisov is a "disciple" of the late, murdered priest, pastor and preacher, Fr. Alexandr Men's whose influence on the ecumenical wing of the church cannot be underestimated. His own writings are extensive, but despite his importance, there is no extensive bibliography about him; a good starting point is the excellent study by Michael Meerson, "The Life and Work of Father Alexander Men,' " Seeking God: The Recovery of Religious Identity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, ed. by Stephen K. Batalden (DeKalb, MI: No. Illinois University Press, 1993) and the forthcoming English translation of a French biography by Yves Hamant, tentatively entitled "Alexander Men--Witness To Our Time."
13. The most insistent voice for public admission of past complicities is Fr. Glen Yakunin, since defrocked, allegedly for taking part in politics as an elected member of the Duma, a deed contrary to eccelesiastical regulations; see Gleb Yakunin, "First Open Letter to Patriarch Alexei II," and Philip Walters, "The Defrocking of Fr. Gleb Yakunin," both in Religion, State and Society, 22:3 (1994), respectively, 311-316 and 309-310. For a fuller discussion of Fr. Yakunin's historic role as a dissident, see the indispensable, now classic, study by Jane Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church - A Contemporary History (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), Part 2.

Regarding the annihilation of Orthodox believers, Dimitri Pospielovsky, The Russian Orthodox Church under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982 (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1982), 2 Vols. estimated that 80% to 85% of the Orthodox clergy active prior to 1917 had disappeared by 1939.

That estimate is confirmed in the "Official Report" of the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Political Prisoners, headed by Alexandr Yakolev, which was issued on 27 November 1995 in Moscow. entitled "Repressivnaya Politika RKP(B)-VKP(B)-KPSS po Otmosheniyu k Religii i Tserkvi (nume'o), Pp.32. It is summarized in "Moscou: un rapport officiel sur les persécutions religieuses en URSS," Service Orthdoxe de Presse, hereinafter cited as SOP, 204 (January, 1996), 14-15; and as "Facts and Figures of Communist Persecution," The Tablet (London), (23-30 December 1995), 22.

A documentary account of the Orthodox Church's sometimes none too flattering acquiescence in state policy under communism is Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov' v Sovyetskoye Vremya (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "PROPILEI," 1995), 2 Vols.

14. The Patriarch's admission of responsibility took place in 1991 - more than two years before documents from the KGB incriminated him as a close collaborator of the security agencies of the former USSR; see G. Alimov and G. Charodeyev, "Patriarch Alexei II: I accept Responsibility for All that Happened," Religion, State and Society, 20:2 (1992); this is a translation of the interview he had given to Isvestiya, 137 (10 June 1991), 2.

15. Apparently, the 1988 Episcopal Council nominally adopted some of the pre-Bolshevik proposals for church reform, but the most important of these, the proper running of ecclesiastical courts has been totally neglected, according to Dimitry Pospielovsky, "Impressions of the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church: Its Problems and its Theological Education," Religion, State and Society, 23:3 (1995), 249-262, esp., 252.


Out of the total number of ecclesiastical units, there are 11 bishops, 181 priests, 194 parishes and 5 monasteries that are located in 28 countries in Western Europe, North and South America and Hungary and are considered by the Moscow Patriarchate as "the diaspora" of the Russian Orthodox Church; see "Summary of the Report of Metropolitan Kiril to the Solemn Act Celebrating 50 Years of the Department of External Church Relation [DECR]," Mf, 44 (23), (7-13 June 1996), hereinafter cited as Summary Report of DECR.

For a view of St. Tikhon's Academy, a university level theological institute with 186 professors and nearly 1600 students, nearly 450 of whom are full time, see "Solemn Act of St. Tikhon Theological Institute Held in Lomonosov University," Mf, 16 (16-22 November 1995).

Among key Russian Orthodox organizations abroad are St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary in Crestwood, New York, St. Serge Theological Institute in Paris; the International Orthodox Christian Charities in Baltimore, Maryland, and various departments of the World Council of Churches in Geneva.


17.. For the sake of comparison, the Catholic Church in Brazil has about 350 bishops -- a number which he Russian Orthodox Church is likely to reach in the next five years as many new dioceses are created and the few old ones are resuscitated, especially in Siberia, but even in European Russia where foreign missionaries are ubiquitous; half of Brazil's 12,000 priests are, however, are foreigners); there are also about 30,000 nuns and countless scores of thousands of lay catechists, organized locally and nationally. The population of Brazil, comparable to Russia's, now numbers approximately
150 million inhabitants, 80% of whom are nominal Catholics, and of which some 0.3% to 0.6% attend Sunday mass (a statistic also comparable to Russian Orthodox Sunday attendance).

18. For a discussion of the Moscow Patriarchate’s relationship to Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, see notes 23 and 24 below.


21. “Statistics - Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is the Largest Confession in Ukraine,” Mf, 31 (8-14 March 1996). With regard to clergy, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has 14,018 priests, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has only 4,904, according to “Congress of Russian Organizations in Ukraine Calls Upon Hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church Not to Grant Autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church,” Mf, 32, Part II (15-21 March 1996).

On the improvement of Orthodox-Roman Catholic relations, expressed in mid-summer 1996 by Archbishop Tadeusz Konradsewicz, the Apostolic Administrator for European Russia, and the likelihood of an eventual meeting between the Patriarch of Moscow and the Pope of Rome at which the latter will return “a genuine Kazan icon of the Mother of God,” one of the most venerated Orthodox effigies of Mary, see “Relations between Catholics and Orthodox in Russia Become Better,” Mf, 46 (21-27 June 1996).


23. Lawrence A. Uzzell, “Estonian Orthodox Church Breaks Away from Moscow,” Keston News Service (23 February 1996); an on-line subscription service available at the following e-mail address: keston_institute@cin.co.uk [no final period at the end of “uk”].

On the negotiations to resolve their differences, see “Metropolitan Cyril [Kiril] Regretting the Jurisdictional Fractioning of Estonia,” Mf, 40 (10-16 May 1996) and the remaining articles grouped under the rubric, “Estonia.”


25. An outcry against internal Orthodox divisions based on nationality, ethnicity, language, culture and ideology can be found in the writings of the current Rector of St. Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary in Crestwood, New York, Archpriest John Hopko; see his “The narrow way of Orthodoxy: A Message from Orthodoxy in America to Eastern Europe,” Christian Century (15 March 1995), 296-299.

Despite close theological and liturgical communion among the various “national churches,” cooperation on the practical level and efforts to convene a world convention of all Orthodox confessions continue to meet with difficulties; see Marlise Simons, “At a Crossroads, Rifts Pull at Orthodox Churches,” The New York Times (05 November 1995), 3.

26. Of course, Orthodoxy’s exclusivity was earlier broken by the Greek Catholic union with Rome (the “Unia” in Orthodox terms), then by the Old Believers’ schism and recently by other minor, but persisting ruptures, unleashed during Soviet rule.

27. For a summary of the Patriarchate’s efforts at lobbying the Duma to change the new law on religion and through it restrict the rights of foreign missionaries, see Patrick Henry, “Russian Church Seeks Curb on Other Faiths,” The Moscow Times (30 April 1996), 5; Ralph Della Cava, “The Roman Catholic Church in Russia, 1991-1996, The Latin Rite: A Five-

29. Cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the World Council of Churches has grown less frequent and taken a back seat to internal Russian church problems, as acknowledged in "Summary Report of DECR," Mf, 44 (23), (7-13 June 1996).

30. While there is still no dispassionate account of this process, a useful starting point is Dimitry Pospielovsky, "Impressions of the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church: Its Problems and its Theological Education," Religion, State and Society, 23:3 (1995), 249-262.


32. According to "Personalia," Mf, 28 (February 21-28, 1996): "Alexy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia is in the list of 100 political leaders for 1995, made up by Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Vox Populists public opinion poll. He comes as 27 in the popularity list with 4.08 points against 4.81 in the previous year. The newspaper writes that most 1993-1994 politicians have a lower rating now. The list cites only two persons who influence Russian politics in a spiritual manner, without being formally present in it - the Patriarch and A.Solzhenitsyn. ... No other spiritual leaders are seen in the list."

33. I refer to the Church of Saints Peter and Paul; I am grateful to Fr. Vsevolod Chaplin of the Department for External Church Relations for the opportunity to visit this church in his company and to its Rector for his most cordial reception.

34. The revival of the tradition of pilgrimage both to key monasteries within Russia and to Mount Athos and the Holy Land has been gaining momentum; on the place of pilgrimage in the Russian Church, see Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk to Church (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 143-147.

35. The sculptor in question is Vyacheslav Klykov, and one of his most celebrated works is the bell tower near the battlefield of Kursk; each of its four sides, towering some four or five stories high, depict scenes from religious and popular history, symbolically uniting the two. One of the sides links St. George, the Dragon Slayer, among the most venerated saints of the Slavs, in the highest panel, to Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the greatest military hero of World War II, in the lowest panel.

36. Symptomatic of the controversy over the rebuilding of Christ the Saviour is found in the following article by the son of the late, Fr. Aleksandr Men', a reform-minded Orthodox cleric and spiritual leader of the liberal wing of the clergy who was murdered in 1990; see Mikhail Men', "Kakoy Xram Nam Nuzhen?" Reprinted in Novoye Russkoye Slovo (13 January 1995).

For further data on the "symbolic" level, it should be noted that the Public Trusteeship Council, jointly chaired by the Patriarch and the Mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, approved the removal of the monument to Friedrich Engels from the vicinity of Christ the Saviour, "but it declined to rename the Kropotkinskaya Metro Station as Christ the Saviour Cathedral station, recommending [sic; instead?] to adopt the name of Immaculate Conception Gate, and to rename 'Lenin Library' the 'Rumyantsev Museum;'." cited in Mf, 35 (11-17 April 1996).

37. Space does not permit, for example, an account of the recent canonization of clerics who were martyred by the Communists, the return of historic icons from state museums to their churches of origin, and the dispatch of holy relics from city to city for public veneration, nor a discussion of the significance of these acts.

38. In the following discussion, I have followed intermittently and found invaluable the published documents of Episcopal Council, ASRPTs, 66-75; the Report of the Patriarch was especially helpful.

Among other topics covered in the "Reports and Documents" of the Council are: Church and Society; Liturgical Language; Church and Education; Church and Politics; Unity of the Russian Church; Re-thinking Ecumenism; Relations
with the Roman Catholics; Relations with Non-Chalcedonian Churches; Western preachers in Russia; Pseudo-Christianity, Neo-Pagan and Occult influences; Church Finances and Budget.

39.. For the church's view of reconstruction, see Item 8 of the Patriarch's Report to the 1994 Episcopal Council, entitled "Church, government, and society in Russia, other countries of the CIS and the Baltics."

Key sources besides The Moscow Times are the Swiss-based G2W (Glaube in der Zweiten Welt), the French-based Service Orthodoxe de Presse (SOP), the extinct, Milan-based Lettera da Mosca, the Paris-based Russkaya Mysl, and the official publication of the Moscow Patriarchate, Bulletin of Moscow Patriarch, and such important semi-official sources as the journal Bogovestnik and the on-line news service, Metaphrasis.

40.. There is to date no critical study of the process by which the Russian Orthodox Church has developed ties to the political sector.

But, to that purpose, at least one notable shift in the Patriarchate's Department of External Church Relations, perhaps second in importance only to the office of the Patriarch itself, has been made public. At a festivity commemorating the 50th anniversary of its founding (04 April 1946), its current chair, Metropolitan Kiril of Smolensk and Kaliningrad noted that now that the church is diminishing its participation in international (ecumenical) organizations, the "DECR engages mainly in relations with the state and public organizations in Russia and other countries. 'Russian Orthodoxy,' he said, 'has no tested model for church-state cooperation and this is our major problem;'" as cited in Mf, 41 (16-30 May 1996).

41. See Anthony Ugolnik, "Burdened with History - Soviet Churches & The Search for Authenticity," Commonweal (21 December 1990), 751-756; for a more recent view, see Sergey Syrovatsky, Deputy Chairman, Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods of Ukraine, "Interview: Greek Catholics and Orthodox - Tension Stays," Mf, 35 (11-17 April 1996).


43. See Alessandra Stanley, "From Repression to Respect, Russian Church in Comeback," The New York Times (03 October 1994).


45. Not all Orthodox churchmen have refused this and other forms of Catholic and Protestant aid from the West. For the rationale of the Catholic funding agency supporting Orthodox clergymen with salaries, see the monthly bulletin, entitled Mirror, of the world-wide charity, Aid to the Church in Need (Kirche in Not), whose headquarters is situated in Königstein-am-Taunus, Germany.

46. Genrikh Mikhailov, Executive Secretary, Commission for Religious Associations of the Russian Federation, "Religious Situation in Russia and Some Problems of Relations Between State and Church." Mf, 33 (22-28 March 1996).


48. See "Orthodox Church Restored in a Village, Sponsored by Saratov Vice-Mayor," Mf, 19 (17-23 December 1995); also "Novosibirsk Region Head of Administration Providing 25 Million Rubles For Orthodox Church Construction," Mf, 36 (12-18 April 1996); and Larry E. Uzzell, "Volga Orthodox Struggle To Build," Keston News Service, Part 3: Issue 6 (12 July 1996); .

49.. A balanced overview of the bratstvos is found in Sergey Vasilyev, "Fates of Orthodox Brotherhoods," Mf, 20 (24-30 December 1995)

50.. "Status of All-Church Orthodox Youth Movement (AROYM) 'Should Be Brought into Conformity with the Canonical Rules,'" Mf, 19 (17-23 December 1995).

51. For a discussion of some of these facilities, see the Patriarch's Report in ASRPTs, 27-33; and the appendices in Pravoslavnaya Moskva - Spravochnik Devstvuvushchikh Monastyrev i Khramov (Moskva-Klin: Izdatel'stvo Bratstva Syatiotyva Tikhona, 1995), 149-172.

53. See the Patriarch’s Report in ASRPTs, 27-30. For his ambition to place Orthodox laymen into the Duma to influence legislation on education and other subjects, see “Religious Education in Russia Discussed by the 4th International Christmas Lectures,” Mf, 24 (22-28 January, 1996); the lectures were held on 21 January 1996 at the Parliamentary Center in Moscow.


55. The place of the church in education was among the topics of a seminar for priests held in early 1996 and sponsored by the St. Tikhon Theological Institute of Moscow; see “Another Priests’ Seminar Held in Moscow,” Mf, 34 (29 March-04 April 1996).

56. “Moscow Patriarchate and Ministry of Health Sign Cooperation Agreement,” Mf, 31 (8-14 March 1996); the agreement was signed on 12 March 1996.

57. Interview with IOCC representatives in Baltimore, Maryland and Moscow in June 1995 and May 1996; interviews in Geneva at the World Council of Churches in March 1996; also see Samaritan, 1 (1995), the magazine of the WCC Eastern Europe Office (which is located in Byalistok, Poland, a center of Polish Orthodoxy).

58. In April 1995, under the auspices of the Patriarchate, The Unity Fund of Orthodox Peoples was created. It is comprised of Orthodox hierarchs and clergy, politicians and public figures, bankers, artists, and scholars to help promote cooperation between the Patriarchate and public and private associations and persons in Russia and abroad. Its main objectives include the publication of religious literature, financial assistance to dioceses and monasteries, and the granting of college fellowships; see “Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia Speaking to Unity Fund of Orthodox Peoples,” Mf, 34 (29 March-04 April 1996).

59. Less than 2% of general church funds are allocated to social welfare projects, but this figure does not include sums spent by local parishes or dioceses, according to the Patriarchate’s budget contained in ASRPTs, 38-39.


61. Considerable work by parish priests in neighboring penitentiaries is becoming widespread.

62. “Military Conscripts a Poor Lot.” OMRI-L (13 November 1995): On 11 October 1995, General Aleksandr Galkin noted that suicide rates of conscripts “are less healthy, more prone to suicide, less educated, and more likely to be criminals than was the case three years ago.”


64. “Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia Consecrating Cross of Adoration to be Installed in Antarctica,” Mf, 23 (15-21 January 1996).


69. They are simply listed here: the St. Tikhon Theological Institute in Moscow; the Alexander Men’ Orthodox Open University and the Orthodox University under the direct patronage of the Patriarchal Department for Education and Catechetics, both in Moscow; two similar Orthodox universities in Volgorod and a town in the Caucasus; and several minor (two-year) seminaries in the provinces, see Pospielovsky, “Impressions...,” 253-259.
70. Pospielovsky, "Impressions..." 259.

71. Pospielovsky, "Impressions..." 255.


73. See ASRPTs, 13.

74. Based on the dates of birth of 100 bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate (excluding the autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church) listed in Pravoslavnyi Tserkovnyi Kalendar' 1996 (Moscow, 1995), in the section, entitled "Eparkhii i arkhierei Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi," 103-112.

75. Those over sixty-five years of age number 21, while the bulk of the episcopate between the ages of forty-six and sixty-four totals 51 to 53 prelates; the slight discrepancy of two is caused by uncertain correlation between date of birth, date of consecration, and date of appointment to an episcopal see.

76. On Ioann, see "Personalia». Mf, No. 28 (21-27 February 1996).


78. "Novosibirsk Region Head of Administration Providing 25 Million Rubles for Orthodox Church Construction," Mf, 36 (12-18 April 1996): at the beginning of the 20th century "there were 10 churches in the in [the Zdvinsky district]," all of which were "demolished by the Soviet regime."

79. "Buddhist Sangha of Russia Adopting New Rules and Names," Mf, 33 (22 - March 1996); some of the most active communities are located in Ulan Ude, Elista, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Chita, and Gorno-Altaisk. "Festal Divine Service Held in Intercession Old Believers' Cathedral in Moscow," Mf, 38 (1 - 7 May 1996), the Old Believer Bishop of Novosibirsk and All Siberia, Siluan, was one of the officiants at a ceremony marking the 1905 restoration of Old Believer rights to celebrate the liturgy.

80. "Orthodox Service of Psychological Assistance for Teenagers Set Up in Novosibirsk," Mf, 33 (22-28 March 1996): "The Orthodox service to help teenagers has been organized at the Novosibirsk psychological center, 'Teenager Confidence Telephone,' by Alexander of Neva Church priests who will be answering calls twice a week. Center Director, Svetlana Vandrepova, said other confessions may join the service, such as Moslems."


82. What is clearly a concern of the Patriarchate is "the responsibility [of] ROC clerics for missionary work among compatriots 'under the conditions of expansion of totalitarian sects of pagan and occult nature.'" from "HH [His Holiness] Patriarch Alexey_II Speaks on the State of ROC [the Russian Orthodox Church] to Moscow Diocese Hierarchical Meeting," Mf, 21 (1-7 January 1996). For a fuller discussion, see Ralph Della Cava, "On Mission to the Orthodox," manuscript (forthcoming 1996).

83. Pospielovsky, "Impressions..." 258-259.
