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## STATE-BUILDING AND NATIONALISM IN CROATIA, 1990-1996

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper examines the impact of nationalist and extreme right ideology on the process of regime transition in Croatia. A significant portion of the ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, HDZ) as well as the radical right parties have appropriated the ideas and the symbols of the extremist strand of the Croatian national movement. The predominant role of this ideology in shaping the state-building process from 1990 to 1995 will have a significant effect on Croatian political developments in the future.

Several groups and political parties adhere to a state-building program based on extreme nationalism. First, there are several *pravasi* (rightist) parties that take their inspiration from Ante Starcevic, founder of the first Croatian Party of Rights (*Hrvatska stranka prava*, HSP). Starcevic advocated the establishment of a Great Croatian state and espoused an integral Croatian nationalism with a markedly anti-Serb tone. The main *pravasi* party today, also called the HSP, was formed in 1990 by Dobroslav Paraga. The HSP has become increasingly fractured since Ante Djapic replaced Paraga as head of the party in 1993, and increasingly co-opted by the HDZ. Consequently, there appears to be room on the right for a new political party. Several former HSP sympathizers and splinter groups announced their intention to form a new *pravasi* party in May 1996.

The second and more influential group to adopt an ultranationalist state-building agenda is within the HDZ. The HDZ has retained its initial character as a conglomerate party or a movement, unlike many other East European conglomerate parties which have gradually begun to resemble their West European counterparts. The ruling party contains a wide range of views within its ranks, including a powerful extremist wing. This faction increased in strength after several moderate leaders left the HDZ in 1994 to form their own political party. The HDZ's relatively disappointing performance in the October 1995 parliamentary elections further radicalized the hard-liners. (Despite Croatia's recent military victories, the HDZ received approximately the same percentage of the vote as in previous elections while its share of the urban vote continued to drop). Tudjman's key role in the Dayton Accord and his acceptance by the West appear to have increased his own extremist proclivities and the position of the extremist group within the HDZ.

HSP sympathizers and extremists within the HDZ embrace a state-building ideology which consists of six main elements:

(1) insistence upon the historical continuity of the Croatian state and the state-building "accomplishments" of the Ustasha movement and the Independent State of Croatia from 1941-1945. The regime's symbolic appropriation of the wartime fascist state and its emphasis on

Ustasha themes in public discourse have strengthened the extreme right and helped move extremist positions into the political mainstream in Croatia.

(2) achieving independence through military means. Ultranationalist emphasis on armed conflict has caused them to pay close attention to military matters and to seek control over the Croatian military. The activities of the HSP's paramilitary force, the Croatian Defense Force (*Hrvatske obrambene snage*, HOS) were a crucial component in its initial political success. Although HOS has been neutralized as a political and military factor, there have been accusations of an attempted *pravasi* "putsch" within the army. Nevertheless, the military appears to be under the firm control of the Defense Minister Gojko Susak, a powerful HDZ extremist.

(3) establishing a strong authoritarian or semi-authoritarian state. While most extremists pledge their support for democracy they routinely operate in ways that undermine it. Extremists within the HDZ and President Tudjman himself display a hostility toward the opposition that ranges from denunciation of political opponents as "enemies of the Croatian state" to harassment of opposition leaders and parties, to outright physical intimidation and possibly assassination of political opponents. Extremists outside the HDZ, with the notable exception of Dobroslav Paraga's new party, HSP-1861, have generally supported these repressive measures.

(4) Territorial expansion into Croatia's "historical, natural and ethnic borders." In its minimal variant, this expansionism involves a Croatia reconstructed within the borders of the Croatian Banovina of 1939. Its maximum variant involves extending Croatian control not only over all of Bosnia-Herzegovina but over significant portions of Serbia including Srijem, Backa and Sandzak and the Bay of Kotor in Montenegro. The main question concerning Croatia's borders involves the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on this issue ultranationalists have not agreed. HSP sympathizers (including those in the HSP splinter parties) insist that Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain united and that Croatia should strengthen its alliance with the Bosnian Muslims. Extremists with the HDZ, particularly from the "Herzegovinian lobby," hold a less "positive" view of the Bosnian Muslims and a reluctance to include them in the Croatian state. They support the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the creation of an ethnically pure Herceg Bosna.

(5) the struggle with "natural enemies" for survival. Proponents of this ideology view Serbs as "natural enemies" and they believe that educational materials should clearly reflect this view. They oppose negotiating with Serbs about cultural or political autonomy and are determined to prevent large numbers of Serb refugees, who left in August 1995, from returning to Croatia. Moreover, their public vilification of Serbs has created a hostile environment for Serb participation in Croatian political life.

(6) conservative social and isolationist foreign policies based on anti-liberal and anti-western views. Ultranationalists reject liberal emphasis on individual rights and benefits, advocating

policies instead that promote the welfare of the nation and fulfill its state-building needs. This emphasis is evident in the area of family policy which is viewed primarily in terms of “demographic renewal.” Ultrationalists’ position on the economy have varied depending on whether they are in or out of the ruling party. While extremist members of the HDZ have supported significant state ownership and intervention in the economy, other ultrationalists have championed the rights of the “little guy” and similar populist themes.

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from examining the impact of this nationalist ideology on political developments in Croatia. First, the political doctrine adopted by HSP sympathizers and a substantial portion of the HDZ (including president Tudjman) subordinates democratization to state-building concerns. Their primary concern has been to “nationalize” the state and to secure its borders. Secondly, the need for a strong state has been used to justify the authoritarian practices of the ruling party. Political opponents who do not agree with this ideology are accused of betraying the Croatian state. Third, although the HDZ claims to be a Christian Democratic Party, its powerful extremist wing is closer in its views to the ultrationalist HSP. Both groups’ conception of the polity is profoundly anti-liberal. Fourth, despite the HSP’s poor electoral performance, it continues to have an influential voice in public discourse precisely because its views are close to those of the ruling party. Finally, extremists differ substantially in their approach toward the Bosnian Muslims and relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. *Pravasi* sympathizers continue to oppose what they perceive as HDZ attempts to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina and incorporate Herzegovina within Croatia.

In conclusion, there are three policy implications that can be drawn from the material presented in this paper. First, the authoritarian practices of the HDZ must be understood not as tactical errors but as strategic aims. The United States and other democracies must apply pressure when they can to force Tudjman and the HDZ to respect democratic norms and institutions. Secondly, policy makers should be aware of the deep division between the HDZ and other extremists concerning policy toward Bosnia. The US may be able to use hostility toward Tudjman’s Bosnia policy among all segments of the opposition, including the far right, to encourage Tudjman to support the Muslim-Croat federation delineated by the Dayton Accord. Finally, it is important to focus on the long term processes of state-building and democratic consolidation in Croatia as well as the short term exigencies of war and peace. The way in which these processes unfold in the next few years is critical not only to the character of Croatian domestic politics but to the enduring stability of the entire region. The US should attempt to oppose the nationalist state-building ideology of the ruling HDZ and other extremist groups in order to promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.



**STATE-BUILDING AND NATIONALISM  
IN CROATIA, 1990-1996<sup>1</sup>**

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**Introduction**

Since the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia in 1991, much attention has been paid to the politics of extreme nationalism and their affect on the disintegration of the Yugoslav socialist state. Scholars, journalists and policy makers have provided exhaustive accounts of the various factors leading to Yugoslavia's violent demise. Nevertheless there has been little systematic analysis of the role of ultranationalism and the extreme right in constructing the Yugoslav successor states--a process that is closely linked with but not confined to the war. This paper examines the impact of nationalist and extreme right ideologies on the process of state-building in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>2</sup> It focuses on Croatia because of the countries centrally involved in the fighting, the process of state-building has developed most extensively there. In Croatia, as in some other countries in the former Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe, new political elites have been less interested in the rights of parliament and free speech than in securing borders and the privileges of "their" national group within the state. In this situation, ultranationalist ideologies have found a powerful voice. The predominant role of nationalism in shaping the transition from state socialism will have significant effects on Croatian political developments for decades to come.

Creating a new basis of legitimacy is essential to constructing a new state, and Croatia's new leaders have drawn primarily upon extreme nationalist and radical right ideologies to garner support for their goals. In 1990 Croatia held its first multi-party elections in which the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, HDZ)--a center-right party committed to Croatian independence--emerged victorious. The ruling party was determined to achieve its state-building aims, despite the fighting that soon erupted first in Croatia and then in Bosnia. HDZ leaders faced several tasks in building an independent state: creating an army, securing state borders, establishing a new institutional framework and propagating a new normative order. This last goal was particularly important in the chaotic and rapidly changing circumstances of the first few years of Croatia's existence: the collapse of state socialism in 1990, the attempt to carve out maximum autonomy for Croatia within the Yugoslav state, the declaration of independence and finally the outbreak of war in Croatia in 1991. A new normative order was essential both to legitimize the actions of the new regime and to mobilize the population for the important tasks of state-building, including military conflict with a better armed and organized Serb army and para-military formations. By creating a "new definition of reality" Croatia's leaders attempted to give the population a framework for understanding rapid



social and political change and to direct mass actions in regime-approved ways. Ultrnationalist and extreme right ideologies provided much of the content of this new normative order, with profound political consequences.

There are several reasons why nationalist, rather than liberal democratic, ideas predominated in Croatia. First, the HDZ's emphasis on state-building over all other political concerns ensured that ultrnationalist ideology, with its almost exclusive focus on creating an independent (Great Croatian) state, would quickly come to the fore in public discussions. This ideology, based on a Croatian national ideology of state rights, had a well articulated state-building agenda and an acknowledged place in Croatian history. In a situation in which the old political actors and normative order were deligitimized and new ideologies and political parties were not well established, this traditional voice of the Croatian right provided the framework both for public discourse and for regime actions. Popular receptivity to this nationalist ideology was heightened, undoubtedly, by the war and the loss of state control over one third of Croatia's territory. Furthermore, though the HDZ attempted to carve out a "middle road" as a center-right Christian democratic party, it coopted the message and even the organizations of the extreme right in Croatia. This appropriation of many symbolic and ideological elements of traditional Croatian ultrnationalism in creating a new legitimizing "myth" or "narrative" of the state has adversely affected the development of democracy in Croatia.

This paper will provide an overview of nationalist and extreme right ideology in Croatia as a starting point for investigating its impact on the construction of the new state. It begins by examining the current context of ultrnationalism, comparing extremist ideology in Croatia with its European counterparts. After exploring the historical roots of ultrnationalist ideology in Croatia, it describes the current organizations and political parties espousing these views. The main part of the article analyzes the ideological tenets of Croatian ultrnationalism, paying particular attention to its state-building aims. The article concludes by exploring the political consequences of this ideology, assessing the prospects for democratic transformation in Croatia and the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of regional conflict after the Dayton Accord.

### **Ideological Context of the Extreme Right**

The difficulty of classifying ultrnationalist and extreme right movements and ideologies has been the subject of much discussion and has prompted long terminological disputes. This problem is also evident in the newly emerging study of these groups and ideas in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> While recognizing the vital importance of clarifying concepts and developing classification schemes of the extreme right and ultrnationalism, such a task is outside the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the discussion that follows will attempt to place the ideology of ultrnationalism in Croatia within a larger framework, distinguishing it in

important ways both from historic Fascism and from current right extremism in Western Europe.

The politics of identity is a phrase that can be aptly used to describe political life in much of Eastern Europe today. Rapidly changing social and economic conditions coupled with the loss of legitimacy and authority by the previous regimes have resulted in a crisis of political legitimacy and identity.<sup>4</sup> While political life in the industrial democracies of Western Europe and the United States centers primarily around instrumental and economic questions (questions “about how much?”), in Eastern Europe since 1989 politics has revolved largely around questions concerning the basic shape and character of the political community (questions such as “who belongs?” and “to what kind of state?”); in this setting the expressive and symbolic aspects of politics are emphasized.<sup>5</sup>

This preoccupation with the most basic questions of political identity is both cause and effect of the potency of extreme nationalism and the rise of the extreme right in Eastern Europe. Socialism has been discredited and it has proved difficult to achieve a liberal political consensus in parts of Eastern Europe. In these circumstances, extreme nationalism has proved particularly conducive to solving the crisis of political identity.<sup>6</sup> It does this through a profoundly anti-liberal perspective which places the source of an individual’s value and meaning within the context of the national community. As this view was expressed by Ivan Veki, a leader of the extreme right in Croatia: “The most immoral act is to be free of an obligation to the community.”<sup>7</sup> As students of historic Fascism have frequently pointed out, extreme nationalism, centered on the idea of an organic community based on nation, race, blood or soil, provides a link from the individual to the larger political community or state.

According to extreme right ideology, the strengthening of the nation, which is seen to be in a constant struggle for survival with other nations, is the main object of political life. In order to survive, however, a nation needs its own state, or at the very least to be able to put the resources of the state to work for its particular national purposes.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, an essential part of ultranationalist ideology is the ‘sacralization’ of the state, the belief that, as an expression or reflection of one’s own nation, it is the highest political end.<sup>9</sup> Historical Fascism sometimes displayed a more universal, revolutionary perspective, or at least a dedication to expanding the Fascist state’s dominion over the widest possible territory. Current neo-fascism and ultranationalism have eschewed this expansionist perspective in favor of what might be called the doctrine of ‘fascism in one country’, and their main preoccupation has been to achieve the ‘pure’ nation-state based on national exclusivity.

If the foremost goal of ultranationalists is to create or maintain a state which offers full membership to only one nation, the practical implications of this goal have differed in the recent contexts of Western and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, where nation-states are more fully

established, extreme nationalism is often directed against outsiders - immigrants who migrated to these countries in large numbers in previous decades. Ultrationalists and neo-fascists seek to keep the nation-state free from “contamination” by these “outsiders”.<sup>10</sup> In Eastern Europe, where state and nation have seldom corresponded, the problem since 1989 has been one of creating such states, either by redrawing borders to include co-nationals excluded from the state, or by denying full rights to minorities residing within the state. The forcible removal of other nations has also been used, as attested by the “ethnic cleansing” employed in the former Yugoslavia. Geo-politically, the creation of nation-states often means a struggle “for survival” against neighboring states and their sponsors which are viewed as encroaching upon the legitimate state aims of the nation in question. In other words, while the extreme right in Western Europe is primarily concerned with closing borders, in Eastern Europe it is often concerned with redrawing them. In both halves of Europe, however, racist and hostile propaganda toward national groups perceived as threats or competitors are essential tools in the struggle to achieve these goals.

Although creating a sense of collective identity through the nation-state is of foremost importance in extreme right ideology, certain domestic political and economic arrangements are also part of its program. Unlike traditional Fascism, which rejected parliamentary democracy as corrupting and weakening the nation, ultrationalism and the extreme right in the current European context often seek to work within this system. Consequently, they have affirmed their support for a multi-party system and the most important procedural aspects of democracy such as contested elections, the rights of free association and a free press. Nevertheless, while these groups nominally accept the democratic framework, they often act in ways that undermine it, for example resorting to violence to achieve their goals, or branding as national traitors those who do not share their views. While they may seek particular institutional reforms that will further their political aims (such as proportional representation), extreme right groups in Eastern Europe do not see strengthening or maintaining democracy as a main priority .

In terms of the economy, traditional Fascist ideology emphasized a third way between capitalism and communism, usually through a corporatist system of linkages between labor and capital. Ultrationalism and the extreme right have generally looked more favorably upon capitalism, though in its more benign form of the full welfare state. In Western Europe this has meant a determination by right-wing extremists to prevent those who are not “real” Germans or Frenchmen from enjoying the economic benefits of the welfare state. In Eastern Europe, ultra-rightists have tended to support a gradual transition to a market economy with significant state intervention in the economy in the foreseeable future.<sup>11</sup> This position has in some cases brought them into an alliance with former communists, many of whom have simply switched their allegiance from communist to extreme right parties. While the reasons for this alliance are

more complex than their similar positions on the economy, the 'red-brown' condominium is, in any case, an intriguing feature of the extreme right in Eastern Europe today.

### **The Roots of Ultrationalism in Croatia**

While ultrationalism in Croatia shares the general ideological components outlined above, its specific features are derived from national ideologies developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The most vocal and influential voice of ultrationalism and the extreme right in Croatia today comes from the *pravasi* (rightists); those individuals and groups who claim to follow the aims of Ante Starcevic and his Croatian Party of Rights (*Hrvatska stranka prava*, HSP) created in 1861. While these groups have appropriated some essential elements of Starcevic's national ideology, they have seldom agreed on how to interpret and apply them in the current circumstances of war and reconstruction in Croatia. Some *pravasi* have explicitly argued for a more flexible approach to understanding Starcevic; all *pravasi* have been forced to modify their ideology in response to changing political circumstances, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, there is fundamental ideological unity among the numerous parties and groups espousing *pravasi* ideals. Moreover, many of these beliefs are shared by a significant portion of the extremist wing of the ruling HDZ.

Croats formulated their national ideologies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to the geographic distribution of their national population and the political circumstances in which they found themselves. They faced the problem of creating a sense of national community from their disparate regions and dialects and of carving out political autonomy, if not independence, from Austro-Hungarian rule. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Triune Kingdom was composed of the diverse regions of Dalmatia, Slavonia and Croatia proper (the area around Zagreb that was usually termed inner Croatia or Banska Hrvatska). Croatia's marked regional flavor was expressed in a variety of dialects: the kajkavian dialect spoken in the Zagreb region, the akavian in parts of the Croatian Littoral and Dalmatia, and the tokavian dialect everywhere else. Croats faced an additional challenge from the large number of Serbs residing within the historical territory of Croatia in the crescent shaped area along the borders with Serbia and Bosnia formerly known as the Military Frontier (*Vojna krajina*, known as the Krajina region today). Administratively autonomous until the late nineteenth century, this largely Serb-populated area of Croatia was used by the Habsburgs to create a military buffer against the Ottoman Empire. In the nineteenth century, Serbs in the Military Frontier became increasingly receptive to the emerging Serbian national ideology which sought to reunite them with a Serbian state. The challenge to national unification and independence posed by the Serbian population within Croatia became a major preoccupation of the Croat national movement.<sup>12</sup>

Although there was a strong strand of Yugoslav national ideology among Croats--a desire to unite with other South Slavs in a unified state--there also developed a national ideology which sought to establish an independent Great Croatian state. Ante Starcevic was the first Croatian political leader to articulate such a political goal, although other political parties, such as the Croat Peasant Party [*Hrvatska seljacka stranka*, HSS], subsequently adopted political programs based primarily on achieving Croatian national aims. A one-time enthusiast of the Illyrian (pro-Yugoslav) Movement, Starcevic became increasingly disillusioned with the Serbs' lack of interest in South Slav unity and the Croats' lack of progress in uniting Croatian lands into a viable political unit. After 1848, this son of a military frontiersman took up political cudgels to fight for an independent Croatian state. Carrying the idea of "Croatian state right" to its extreme, he contemplated a greater Croatia, including Bosnia, and refused to recognize the existence of any other South Slav nations besides the Bulgarians. Well aware of the difficulty posed by the large number of Serbs residing in historically Croatian territory, Starcevic attempted to deny the historical validity of the existence of the Serb nation in Croatia, describing Serbs as "beggars" and "slaves."<sup>13</sup> Together with Eugen Kvaternik, he established the HSP which espoused an integral Croat nationalism with a markedly anti-Serb tone.<sup>14</sup> Although some of Starcevic's followers adopted a more conciliatory stance toward Serbs in the years after his death in 1903, others joined the Pure Party of Rights (*Cista stranka prava*, CSP) formed by Josip Frank in 1895, which continued to endorse as its main position an implacable hatred of Serbs.<sup>15</sup> The HSP and its various splinter groups, the main representatives of the extreme right in Croatia today, consider themselves the direct successors of Starcevic's creation.

The most radical of the *pravasi* groups to emerge in the twentieth century was the Ustasha-Croat Revolutionary Organization. [*Ustasha-Hrvatska revolucionarna organizacija*] which was formed in 1932 by Ante Paveli, a former leader of the HSP. The Ustasha pledged to use all means, including terrorism, to fight for an independent Croatian state, encompassing Bosnia and Hercegovina, which would grant political rights only to Croats. In the 1930s, Paveli established a network of camps in Italy and Hungary in which to oversee the political indoctrination and military training of his national revolutionaries. The Ustasha gained support among the peasantry, particularly in the poor and nationally mixed regions of western Hercegovina, Lika, Kordun, Banija, and Dalmatinska Zagora.<sup>16</sup> Ustasha supporters, along with their fellow travelers, the *frankovci*, also established a stronghold at the University of Zagreb, where they became the largest student group in 1940.<sup>17</sup>

As the Second World War approached and Axis influence over Yugoslavia increased, Fascist political forces grew in strength. The outbreak of war in 1941 brought a fully Fascist regime to power in the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna drzava Hrvatska*, NDH), under the control of the Ustashas and backed by Germany and Italy.<sup>18</sup> Although it is difficult to

measure the extent of support for the Ustasha regime, many Croats were undoubtedly sympathetic to Paveli's demands for an independent Croatian state. (Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac was certainly not alone when he proclaimed the new state "the hand of God in action.")<sup>19</sup> The Ustashes quickly promulgated racial laws against Jews, Serbs and Gypsies (Serbs were required to wear an armband with a P for *Pravoslavac*, meaning Orthodox) and launched a campaign of terror against Serbs.<sup>20</sup> A civil war ensued, with the Ustashes fighting the Chetniks (the traditional name given to Serbian fighters against the Turks and the main Serbian resistance group during the Second World War), and the communist-led Partisans fighting them both. It left an indelible mark upon the political map of Croatia (and Yugoslavia as a whole). Ultranationalist groups in Croatia today both define and justify their state-building ideology largely in relation to the Ustasha regime and the civil war of 1941-1945.

### **Organizational Forms of Extreme Nationalism**

Before examining the ideological components of ultranationalism in Croatia, it is necessary to provide a brief introduction to the organizations and individuals espousing these views. There are three organizational forms that characterize the extreme right in Croatia. The first are the so-called *pravasi* political parties such as the HSP with explicitly ultranationalist programs and agendas. As the HSP has become increasingly fractured, several newer ultranationalist parties have emerged which espouse *pravasi* ideals. The second organizational home of ultranationalism is in the ruling party, the HDZ. This party contains a wide range of political orientations within its ranks, including a powerful ultranationalist wing. Finally, ultranationalist goals are promoted by individuals and organizations using the electronic and print media.

The largest and most influential of the extreme right parties, the HSP, was formed in February 1990 by the young dissident Dobroslav Paraga and a group of associates living in Croatia and abroad. Declaring itself to be a direct continuation of the HSP formed in the nineteenth century by Ante Starevi, the party pledged to fight for Croatian independence and sovereignty. The HSP quickly attempted to fold into its party those organizations and individuals like the Ustasha Youth that began to display neo-fascist tendencies.<sup>21</sup> The HSP did not run in the elections of 1990, probably due to its lack of organization and its unclear status as a legitimate player. Nevertheless, it quickly became a sharp critic of the Tudjman government, denouncing its negotiations with Belgrade over the future shape of Yugoslav federalism as an attempt to "sell out" Croatian interests. The party also opposed the promulgation of the 1990 Croatian constitution and spearheaded a drive to gather signatures for a petition to the United Nations calling for Croatian independence. The HSP organized demonstrations, like the one in Zagreb in December 1990, which drew thousands of people in

spite of the fact that it was banned.<sup>22</sup> Its membership, estimated at 18,000 at the end of 1990, grew to approximately 100,000 by the fall of 1991.<sup>23</sup>

As a result of his party's initial success, HSP leader Paraga became a main spokesman for ultranationalist views during the period from the first multi-party elections in 1990 to the second round of elections in 1992 and 1993. A former law and seminary student, Paraga spent most of the 1980s as a dissident to the communist regime. First imprisoned in 1980 for passing out a petition calling for the freeing of all political prisoners in Yugoslavia, Paraga subsequently brought charges against the state for cruel and inhumane treatment in the notorious communist prison, Goli Otok. His frequent testimony to the US Congress and to western leaders about political repression in Yugoslavia further solidified his reputation as a champion of human rights. Ironically, Paraga used this reputation to lend respectability to his right-wing group and cause.<sup>24</sup> An intelligent-looking, articulate man, he also had a predilection for creating tough-looking images (such as giving interviews behind a desk with rocket launchers perched on top), images which enhanced his popularity during the war in Croatia in 1991. Nevertheless, he proved unable to project an appeal beyond his party's own followers or generate wider electoral support, receiving only 5% of the presidential vote in 1992.

In 1993, a fierce factional struggle erupted in the party and Ante Djapic replaced Paraga as leader of the HSP. Paraga blamed HDZ infiltration for the putsch and launched a series of unsuccessful legal actions to have Djapic removed. Previously a close associate of Paraga, Djapic had joined the HSP after becoming disillusioned with HDZ waffling on the question of independence in 1990. Now, however, Djapic proved very willing to cooperate with the HDZ and the orientation of the HSP changed markedly. During the opposition boycott of parliament in 1994, the HSP quickly broke ranks and returned to parliament with the HDZ. This action prompted opposition leaders to denounce Djapic as "the extended hand of the HDZ." Despite his congeniality and a gift for explaining his party's positions in rational and moderate terms, Djapic also did not possess the personal appeal that would enable him to project his party's support beyond the HSP's core electorate, and in the parliamentary election of 1995 the HSP received only 5.1% of the vote.<sup>25</sup> This poor showing, and the perception of Djapic as a tool of the ruling party led to another round of factional fighting within the HSP that ended in the expulsion of a significant portion of the (anti-Djapic) HSP leadership in February 1996.

Factional struggle within the HSP and its weak electoral performance have resulted in the formation of a number of ultranationalist parties which place themselves under the general *pravasi* label. The Croatian Democratic Party of Rights (*Hrvatska demokratska stanka prava*, HDSP) was formed by Kresimir Pavelic and several other HSP members in 1992 out of opposition to Paraga's endorsement of the NDH and his formation of the para-military organization, the Croatian Defense Force (*Hrvatske obrambene snage*, HOS).<sup>26</sup> A lawyer from

the Dalmatian coast near Rijeka, Pavelic was active in the Croatian spring of 1971 and faced repeated court proceedings during subsequent years. His party, which had approximately 3,500 members in 1994, most of them from Zagreb, adopted a program which Pavelic described as a combination of Starcevic's state-building program and Radic's program of peaceful agitation.<sup>27</sup>

The National Democratic League (*Nacionalna demokratska liga*, NDL) was formed shortly thereafter by Ivan Vekic and Bosiljko Misetic to promote an ultranationalist state-building agenda.<sup>28</sup> Misetic, who shared a law firm with former prime minister Valentice and frequently moved in moderate circles of the HDZ, had little else in common with this group. An intense, emotional man, Misetic's law office was frequently filled with young men in military uniform before he rejoined the government as deputy prime minister in the fall of 1994.<sup>29</sup> Although his party had minimal membership and influence, Misetic played a visible role both in and out of the government. A third party of *pravasi*, the Croatian Pure Party of Rights (*Hrvatska cista stranka prava*, HCSP) was formed by Ivan Gabelica in 1993. The HCSP pledged to fight for an 'integral Croatia' and for 'the truth [to] be told about the NDH'.<sup>30</sup> In 1994, after Djapic assumed the leadership of the HSP, the HCSP formed an alliance with the main rightist party. Cooperation between the two parties broke down, however, in the spring of 1996.<sup>31</sup> The HCSP, the NDL and the HDSP cooperated with each other periodically, for example as members of the Statebuilding Block in 1994, but they were unable to achieve their frequently stated goal of unifying all *pravasi* into one political party or organization. Finally, a fourth party of *pravasi*, the Independent Party of Rights (*Nezavisna stranka prava*, NSP) was formed in 1994 in Varazdin after the split between Djapic and Paraga in the HSP. Headed by local businessman Zvonimir Kramaric, the NSP pledged to continue the struggle to establish a Croatian state within its "historical and ethnic borders."<sup>32</sup>

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1995, Paraga attempted to affect his political comeback by forming a new party, the HSP-1861. Although Paraga retained the name HSP and thereby continued to stake his claim to the leadership of *pravasi* ideals in Croatian politics, the new party platform had a very different emphasis. Paraga had always stressed his democratic convictions; indeed he had campaigned tirelessly against the alleged human rights and legal abuses of the Tudjman regime. However, the new HSP-1861 reflected a far greater concern for human rights than the state rights and national rights Paraga had championed three years earlier. The HSP-1861 pledged to fight corruption, crime and nepotism, and to work for free elections and human rights. Paraga reversed his earlier position on getting rid of the "occupying" UNPROFOR, admitting that Croatia could not afford to play David to Serbia's Goliath. Paraga also repudiated his previous support for the NDH, charging that the Tudjman regime had failed to create a feeling of security or equality among Serbs or to provide a legal or political framework for protecting their rights.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, he claimed that other rightists were



mistaken in basing their anti-Serb positions on Starcevic's beliefs. Starcevic had not defined Croats in an ethnic sense, Paraga insisted, but rather in a spiritual, political sense.<sup>34</sup> Djapic appeared to be at least partially correct when he charged that Paraga had "set himself very much apart from the Ustasha movement."<sup>35</sup>

In addition to these domestic political parties, there are two ultranationalist parties that serve the expatriate Croat community: the Croatian Republican Party (*Hrvatska republikanska stranka*, HRS) and the Croatian Statebuilding Movement (*Hrvatski drzavotvorni pokret*, HDP). The HRS represents the ultranationalist right wing in Latin America while the HDP represents the right-wing in North America, Europe and Australia.<sup>36</sup> The HRS and the HDP do not appear to have any political ambitions in Croatia, although they took part in the '92 and '95 elections. The insignificance of their political influence can be seen by the fact that they received less than .3% of the vote.<sup>37</sup> Their main political goal is to maintain contact between Croatia and the exile community and to exert pressure on public policy whenever possible. Although they have supported the unification of all Starcevic parties of the right, they also insist on maintaining their independence.

The second major organizational form of ultranationalism in Croatia is represented by extremists within the HDZ. The HDZ has retained its initial character as a conglomerate party or movement--unlike many other East European conglomerate parties that have gradually begun to resemble their west European counterparts--which embraces large portions of the populace with various political views. Dismissed as a fringe party when it was formed by Tudjman in 1989 with the goal of achieving Croatian independence, it quickly became the major player in Croatian political life, winning the elections of '90, '92, '93 and '95. Its relatively undefined political program has contributed to the development of factions within the party and the occasional outbreak of hostilities among them.

There are two main groups of extremists within the HDZ both of which base their power primarily upon regional identification.<sup>38</sup> The first group, including people like Vladimir Seks and Branimir Glavas, maintains a regional base of support which it uses to consolidate its position within the party. Since Tudjman relies on Glavas, for example, to maintain HDZ support in the crucial Slavonian city of Osijek, he has tolerated a degree of political independence by Glavas that would probably have caused problems for an HDZ leader differently placed. The second group of politicians, such as Vice Vukojevic and Gojko Susak, represents the political emigration in the regime and is closely connected to the HDZ leadership in Hercegovina. Tudjman has ostensibly delegated a fair amount of responsibility to Defense Minister Susak because of his key role in maintaining contacts with the emigration. These contacts have been essential for guaranteeing the flow of money from abroad into HDZ coffers and also the supply of arms during the embargo. This "Hercegovinian lobby" has strengthened

its position within the party by using regional identity as a basis for establishing networks of power, influence and favors. Younger HDZ extremists such as Ivic Pasalic have gained influence through these means. Although the party has not stabilized enough to allow for bureaucratic manipulation as a means to accrue power, extremists have used tactics like periodic "anti-corruption" campaigns to neutralize opponents within the party and bolster their own political popularity.

A continual question among observers of the Croatian political scene is the extent to which Tudjman shares the views of the extreme nationalist wing within the HDZ. As the HDZ has become more centralized, Tudjman has increased his already considerable hold over the ruling party and its policies. The Croatian president's sympathy toward the extremist wing is indisputable, especially when it comes to authoritarianism on the domestic front. He appears convinced of the "historic mission" of his party and himself in bringing independence to Croatia and is unwilling to contemplate a significant role for the opposition. Moreover, he remains profoundly suspicious of "universal" ideologies, including liberalism, extolling instead the specific virtues of "Croatness" and the Croatian national movement. His belief that all aspects of the transition from state socialism, including democratization and the move toward a market economy, must be subordinated to the state-building cause have made him sympathetic to traditional right radical positions.

The final form of ultranationalist activities in Croatia involves individuals and groups who are not officially registered as political parties. These groups seek to propagate their extremist message through the largely government-controlled print and electronic media. The prominence of various ultranationalist publicists and essayists in these mediums has prompted Croatian political scientist Nenad Zakosek to speak of "essay right radicalism" in Croatia.<sup>39</sup> The aim and effect of these editorialists is to redefine the parameters of public discussion to allow for more extremist and ultranationalist views. Hrvoje Sobic, who is head of the Croatian Party (*Hrvatska stranka*, HS) and delegate to the parliament's upper house, has been essential in this effort, and he appears to enjoy Tudjman's full support. Although no significant daily or weekly serves as mouthpiece for nationalist extremism, smaller neo-fascist and ultranationalist papers such as *Hrvatski vjesnik* (circulation approximately 2,000) carry advertisements from firms with close contacts with the HDZ and can be bought easily in major cities throughout the country.

One prolific essayist and prominent extremist activist is Mladen Schwartz, leader of the New Croatian Right (*Nova Hrvatska prava*, NHP). Schwartz was a member of the HSP and editor of its journal *Hrvatsko pravo*, until he formed his new group in 1994. A Croatian Jew, Schwartz spent his childhood and youth in Belgrade until he emigrated to Germany in 1973. According to the description of one fellow HSP member, this experience "helped him to become acquainted with our enemy-neighbor across the Drina so that he can well say today that

talking to them is of no use.”<sup>40</sup> In 1990 Swartz returned to Zagreb where he engaged in polemics with other members of the Jewish community, warning Jews that they must be loyal citizens of Croatia “or else...”<sup>41</sup> Schwartz parted ways with Paraga in 1994 because of his excessive emphasis on human rights as opposed to “national rights and human obligations”.<sup>42</sup> He pledged to use his group to fight against “the aggression of liberalism,” to advocate a strong national state, strict legislature, capital punishment and to oppose abortion. Although his organization has few members and little influence, Schwartz frequently promotes his views through the electronic and particularly print media.

A second radical right organization that, like the NHP, is openly associated with fascism is the Croatian Liberation Movement (*Hrvatski oslobodilacki pokret*, HOP), headed by Ante Pavelic’s son-in-law, Srecko Psenicnik. Psenicnik was a secretary in the Croatian Embassy in Rome during the NDH. He was brought to the US after the war and from there deported to Argentina where he became a translator to Peron. For the past several decades, he has been editor of a newspaper for Ustasha supporters abroad, the *Nezavisna drzava hrvatska*. According to Psenicnik, the *poglavnik* instructed him to return the publication of *Nezavisna drzava hrvatska* to Croatia, which he did after the HDZ came to power in 1990. His movement appears to represent largely the views of an extremist segment of the Croatian emigration, some of whom have returned to Croatia. HOP has begun to play a more active role in Croatian domestic politics, especially in recent attempts to unify the various *pravasi* splinter parties and organizations. In this respect, it resembles another ultranationalist organization, the Croatian Defense Order (*Hrvatski obrambeni red*, HOR), led by Branimir Petener, whose main purpose is to promote unity among all individuals and groups supporting a Croatian state building agenda. Psenicnik argues that the NDH can serve as a valuable model today, noting, for example, that social policy in the NDH, “which respected workers,” offers a valuable alternative to the corruption of the present regime.<sup>43</sup> Although expressing satisfaction with current state-building achievements, he calls upon future generations to fight for a Great Croatia encompassing the same borders as the NDH.

In April 1996, HOP, HOR and several other *pravasi* parties and organizations, attended a meeting in Zagreb in which they set up the framework for establishing a new rightist political block. Additional participants included recently expelled members of Djapic’s HSP, the NSP, the HDP, the HCSP and the Independent Croatian Volunteers (*Nezavisni dragovoljci hrvatski*, NDH) a veterans organization led by Zvonimir Trusic. With Djapic continuing to cooperate closely with the HDZ and Paraga moving closer to the liberal opposition, there appears to be room on the right for a new *pravasi* organization or party. The participants in the meeting discussed the Dayton Agreement, relations with Muslims and the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and pledged to work for “the future and progress of the Croatian people with

special emphasis on social policy.” They also announced that an all-*pravasi* meeting would be held in May with the aim of forming a new political party.

### **The Ideology of Extreme Nationalism**

As this brief survey of ultranationalist groups and parties indicates, their main goal is to create a strong and independent Croatian state. Ultranationalist ideology, which has provided the basis for the new normative order in Croatia, specifies the means for achieving this state, its institutional framework and important policy features. It consists of six main elements: (1) insistence upon the historical continuity of the Croatian state and the state-building “accomplishments” of the the interwar Ustasha fascist movement and the NDH, (2) achieving Croatian independence through military means (3) the establishment of a strong, semi-authoritarian or authoritarian state, (4) territorial expansion into Croatia’s “historical, natural and ethnic borders,” (5) the struggle with “natural enemies” for survival and (6) conservative social and isolationist foreign policies based anti-liberal and anti-western views.

The political reference point for Croatian ultranationalism and its state-building agenda is the NDH. Ultranationalists insist upon a political rehabilitation of the NDH, which was condemned harshly by the communist regime, and an acknowledgement of its contributions to the Croatian state-building enterprise. Praising the NDH represents a symbolic reappropriation of the Croatian past which, they believe, was “distorted” and manipulated by the communist regime. To a few ultranationalists such as Schwartz and Psenicnik, the NDH provides a political blue print for the current state of Croatia. To many ultranationalists, whose families were connected to the Ustasha regime and may have lost their lives as a result, reevaluating the role of the NDH provides an opportunity for retribution and rehabilitation. To all ultranationalists, the existence of the NDH provides an important link with (and proof of) “the thousand year old legal continuity of the Croatian state.”

*Pravasi* parties and organizations have openly advertised their parties’ connection to the NDH and to Ante Pavelic, a former member of the HSP. Indeed, most *pravasi* have emphasized the continuity between their current goals and those promoted by the Ustasha before and during the Second World War. The HSP, when it was founded in 1990, initially defined its program largely in relation to the NDH. HSP supporters, particularly during the height of the military conflict with Serbs, openly endorsed the Ustasha regime, often wearing a U on their caps and donning the black shirts of the Ustasha paramilitary forces. HSP leader Dobroslav Paraga insisted repeatedly that there was nothing fascist about the Ustasha regime.<sup>44</sup> According to him, the NDH represented the wishes of the majority of the population for independence from the Serbs and was the legal embodiment of the continuity of the medieval Croatian state. Although he condemned the “few” racial laws that were promulgated by the

Ustashas, he denied there was systematic racial or national persecution by the state: "I would never say that Serbs were persecuted (in the NDH) simply because they were Serbs."<sup>45</sup> Moreover, Paraga and the HSP indicated their willingness to adopt some repressive Ustasha policies such as the creation of an autocephalous Croatian Orthodox Church.<sup>46</sup> Paraga began to tone down his rhetoric on the Ustasha state, however, as the wave of enthusiasm for Ustasha iconography and symbolism that swept Croatia after the outbreak of war in 1991 subsided, and in 1995 he renounced his association with the NDH altogether.

The majority of HSP leaders such as Ante Djapic have continued to use Ustasha symbols and to excuse the violence of the Ustasha state.<sup>47</sup> Velimir Bunjanec, a prominent young extremist and HOP member, recently suggested that acknowledging the NDH and "the historical deeds of the *poglavnik*" should be required of any groups or individuals wishing to join a new all-*pravasi* organization.<sup>48</sup> Nevertheless, not all rightists have interpreted the NDH in the same way, though most such as Bunjanec and Psenicnik are apologists for the regime. Many *pravasi* argue that the NDH has been falsely represented, and they have painted a picture of it that diverges widely from established historical accounts. These ultranationalists claim, for example, that the fascist aspects of the NDH were forced upon the Ustashas by the Axis powers, that Croatia did more to protect its Jews than any other country in Europe and, most importantly, that the number of Serbs killed by the Ustasha regime was grossly exaggerated.

An example of this historical revisionism can be found in ultranationalist discussions of Jasenovac, an Ustasha prison camp where thousands of Serbs (and others) were killed. Jasenovac is the most important symbol of a Croatian history ultranationalists claim was falsified by Serbs, and they are determined to expose the "lies" about it propagated during the communist period. As the HSP election program of 1992 put it, Jasenovac is: "the biggest symbol of the enduring discrimination against dead and living Croats...Jasenovac is the monument of the Great Serbian myth about the genocide [committed by] Croats. It was raised at the place of a wartime prison camp in which several hundred people of various nationalities (among which the largest number were Croats) were killed..."<sup>49</sup>

While some extremists in the HDZ enthusiastically embrace the rehabilitation of the NDH, its legacy is more problematic for Tudjman, and he remains deeply ambivalent toward it. On the one hand, Tudjman knows that a close association with the NDH causes difficulties for Croatia's image abroad. On the other hand, he does not want to dismiss altogether the state building "achievements" of the Ustashas, especially since Croatia has had little other experience of "complete" independence during its "centuries-long" existence as an independent state. Moreover, reconciliation with the NDH is essential for what Tudjman sees as his main historical task, uniting the "various strands of Croatness," both Partisan and Ustasha, within the HDZ.

The ambivalence of the HDZ toward the Ustasha movement has resulted, according to Nenad Zakosek, in a political discourse characterized by manifest and latent meanings.<sup>50</sup> While the regime manifestly supports the anti-fascist forces (communist-led partisan movement) in the civil war of 1941-1995, it latently approves of the Ustasha regime. The NDH is not openly endorsed by the regime, as it is by most *pravasi* groups, but the HDZ has avoided a clear denunciation of the totalitarian and genocidal aspects of the NDH. Moreover, it has appropriated important symbolic aspects of the wartime state, from the red and white checkered state insignia, to the name of the Croatian currency (kuna), to the dedication of streets and squares after Ustasha officials. Tudjman has nominated at least two former Ustasha officials to government posts-- Ivo Rojnic, former Ustasha commander in Dubrovnik, as ambassador to Argentina and Vinko Nikolic, who was an official in the Ustasha Ministry of Education, to a seat in parliament.

Although HDZ leaders claim they want to reconcile the two sides of the civil war in Croatia from 1941 to 1945, they have often denigrated and even vilified the anti-fascist movement in Croatia. Some observers and veterans organizations have charged that while lip service is paid to the partisan movement in Croatia, an atmosphere has been created in which the victims of fascism are spoken of so contemptuously it is clear they are regarded as enemies. Indeed, it has been estimated that during the years the HDZ has been in power, 3,000 monuments to the national liberation movement have been taken down in Croatia, 500 in Dalmatia alone.<sup>51</sup> As Zakosek has noted:

“This entire ideological process of appropriating the extreme right tradition is carried out under the label of ‘national reconciliation,’ which is undoubtedly a legitimate endeavor. However, the point is not to finish the unfinished civil war on the basis of liberal-democratic ideas and institutions (as was, for instance, the case in Spain after Franco), but rather to integrate original Croatian anti-fascism into the tradition and discursive universe of Croatian nationalism. Since this does not include a clear judgment about the totalitarian legacy of Croatian right radicalism, reconciliation is in reality reduced to relativization and even giving up of the Croatian anti-fascist tradition.”<sup>52</sup>

An example of the HDZ’s willingness to associate itself symbolically with the Ustasha movement and the NDH is Tudjman’s suggestion that Jasenovac be transformed from a monument “to the victims of fascism” into a memorial for the victims of the war. (Tudjman himself first ran afoul of the communist authorities in Croatia in the mid-sixties when he argued that the official number of Serbs killed in Jasenovac was too high, and that communist authorities had deliberately falsified them. The punishment that followed with his removal as head of the Institute for the History of the Workers Movement in Croatia began his transformation from Partisan general and historian to avowed nationalist and opponent of the

state socialist regime.) While this move may have pleased many extremists (and even some more moderate Croats whose family members were associated with the Ustasha regime), it aroused the intense opposition of many Croats who objected to the “relativization” of wartime guilt it appeared to endorse. In February 1996, a prominent editor and Tudjman opponent Slavko Goldstein threatened to bring a law suit against the HDZ-led government if it carried out proposed plans to rededicate the monument. Although the HDZ has not moved forward with any plans concerning the monument, it has failed to restore the museum building and grounds which were heavily damaged in the fighting in this area.

Despite the HDZ’s refusal to denounce unequivocally the NDH, Tudjman has attempted to maintain some distance from it. This distance is necessary, he believes, to avoid censure from Croatia’s allies abroad. For example, Tudjman has pressured émigré groups abroad to change their Ustasha names and has denounced Ustasha organizations like HOP for “harming the Croatian cause.”<sup>53</sup> At the third general convention of the HDZ in October 1995, he removed prominent extremist and NDH enthusiast, Tomislav Mercep from the HDZ executive committee (*sredisnji odbor*), charging that if he (Tudjman) “had problems with Croatia’s image in the world, it’s because of people like Mercep. Because still today our biggest mistake,” Tudjman continued, “has been that we are allegedly a continuation of Pavelic’s NDH--that we let into our ranks people who do what the Ustasha did.”<sup>54</sup>

Although popular infatuation with Ustasha iconography has subsided in the past few years, heated discussion and disagreement about the NDH continues. Some activists such as Ivo Banac have repeatedly called for Ustasha symbols and organizations to be banned. Tudjman argues that historians must establish the final answers about the character of the wartime regime, though in the current highly charged atmosphere that seems unlikely. The HDZ’s preoccupation with state-building means that the NDH will continue to occupy an important place in the ruling party’s attempt to create a new normative order. In any case, the regime’s symbolic appropriation of the NDH and its latent emphasis on Ustasha themes in public discourse have strengthened the voice of the right and have helped move extremist positions into the political mainstream in Croatia.

The second feature of extreme nationalist ideology is an emphasis on military means for achieving Croatian independence. While ultranationalists share with much of the Croat population a desire for an independent state, they differ in their emphasis on securing it militarily. The “complete” independence of the Croatian state can only be achieved through fighting, not by negotiating, they insist. For example, HSP leader Ante Djapic has threatened to “withdraw from politics if even one square meter of Croatian territory is returned by peaceful means.”<sup>55</sup> Extremists advocate waging war against the enemy (in this case Serbs) to achieve Croatian independence for two reasons. First, they believe that fighting against the

enemy for one's nation is spiritually fulfilling. Bosiljko Miletic, for example, argues that war is beneficial for individuals and nations. According to Miletic, "a man feels good when he defends his family, his property, his nation."<sup>56</sup> A second reason for achieving Croatian independence militarily is that Serbs cannot be trusted to negotiate in good faith. The only way Croats will prevail against the implacable hostility and opposition of Serbia (and Serbs in Croatia) is by fighting. Therefore, ultranationalists advocate the "militarization" of the country in order to prepare the citizenry to fulfill Croatia's historical and geopolitical destiny of becoming an independent state.<sup>57</sup> Djapic and other ultranationalists have called for the "Israelization" of the country to prepare for the "final showdown".<sup>58</sup>

Ultrationalists' emphasis on armed conflict has caused them to pay close attention to military matters. The HSP formed its own paramilitary force in 1991, HOS, which quickly gained a reputation as ruthless and effective fighters. Other ultranationalist groups such as the HDP are alleged to have close supporters in the military and even to have planned a coup within the army and ministry of defense. Although HDP leader Nikola Stedul was never publicly accused, the regime launched an operation in 1995 to remove Stedul's "infiltrators" within the Croatian Army.<sup>59</sup> In any case, the army appears to be firmly under the control of the extremist wing of the HDZ. In recent months Defense Minister Gojko Susak has purged the top ranks of the officers' corps of former members of the Yugoslav People's Army in an attempt to further consolidate his position.<sup>60</sup>

The third component of ultranationalist ideology concerns the political institutions and practices of the Croatian state. The state envisioned by the ultranationalists is an authoritarian one in which, "all other rights are put at the service of the state."<sup>61</sup> It is a centralized polity with a strong military, a muzzled press and a silent opposition. Some extreme right leaders such as Mladen Schwartz denounce parliamentary democracy altogether, describing it as a "luxury" Croatia cannot afford.<sup>62</sup> The alternative Schwartz has in mind is a dictatorship that "can save us the trouble of parliamentarianism." If Tudjman would be willing to endorse the policies of the NDH and be more firm in his dealings with the Serbs, Schwartz would be pleased to support him as dictator of the country.<sup>63</sup> Like some other members of the extreme right, such as Hrvoje Susic, who have propagated a cult of leadership around Tudjman, Schwartz has more recently begun to laud Tudjman as the only "true statesman" in a world without charismatic leaders.<sup>64</sup> Susic typically goes farther in his panegyric, describing Tudjman as "the father of the homeland who is believed, who is relied upon and trusted, whose work is expected and listened to so that one may know what to do."<sup>65</sup>

While some ultranationalists reject liberal institutions, most extremists from the *pravasi* parties and the HDZ pledge their support for parliamentary democracy, a position more typical of current ultranationalist parties. However, they routinely operate in ways that undermine



democratic institutions. This has been particularly true of the HDZ which has the mechanisms of repression at its disposal. Extremists within the HDZ and President Tudjman himself display a hostility toward the opposition that ranges from denunciations of political opponents as “enemies of the Croat people,” to harassment of opposition leaders and parties to outright physical intimidation and possibly assassination of political opponents.<sup>66</sup> The common practice of maligning political opponents for allegedly “betraying” the Croatian cause has created an inhospitable atmosphere for the democratic exchange of views. According to liberal leader Drazen Budisa, it has also been an effective tool in silencing the opposition.<sup>67</sup>

HDZ extremists have also been hostile toward the opposition press. Tudjman has charged that opposition journalists are “separated from their nation” and using their freedom “irresponsibly.” The repression of the press by Tudjman’s government is well known--the take over of *Slobodna Dalmacija*, *Vjesnik* and *Danas* and the harassment of independent weeklies such as *Feral tribune* through illegal taxation and *Globus* through libel suits.<sup>68</sup> The government has used these tactics more recently against the opposition regional press, including the well respected *Novi list*. During the elections of 1995, opposition parties were denied equal access to the government-controlled press and television, violating one of the basic conditions of free and fair elections. The HDZ dominated parliament recently passed an anti-libel law that stipulates stiffer punishment for slander against state leaders.

The extremist wing of the HDZ and Tudjman have taken other steps that call into question the liberal underpinnings of the state. Tudjman’s efforts to strengthen his own position at the cost of democratic institutions have increased, particularly after the elections in October 1995. He has refused to ratify the opposition’s choice for mayor of Zagreb, describing his reluctance to hand over the capital (or his capital one suspects he is thinking) to “enemies of state policy.” Moreover, he has attempted to personalize the institutions of authority such as the presidency, often equating himself with the survival of the Croatian state. As Susic expressed it at the HDZ convention in October 1995: “Without Franjo Tudjman there would be no HDZ and without the HDZ there would be no Croatia.”<sup>69</sup> There is evidence that if Tudjman had received the two thirds majority in the last elections necessary to amend the constitution, he intended to introduce a Ban system in Croatia that would have augmented his powers considerably.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, Tudjman and the extremist wing of the HDZ have fundamentally reinterpreted the liberal notion of citizenship rights, basing the right to vote for public officials upon ethnic rather than residence criteria. Although other countries such as Spain have allowed their expatriates to vote in domestic elections, the HDZ has significantly extended this practice by creating a separate list of twelve seats in the lower house of parliament for the diaspora vote. This move virtually ensures the HDZ twelve more seats in parliament and calls into question the independence of the Bosnian state.<sup>71</sup> Finally, the HDZ remains

implacably opposed to regional autonomy within Croatia, harassing the regional parties, particularly in Istria and Dalmatia, and denouncing them for their alleged intentions of resurrecting a Yugoslav state.

The *pravasi* parties have done little to protest the authoritarian inclinations of Tudjman and the extremist segment of the HDZ. While many *pravasi* leaders are personally opposed to Tudjman, describing him as “bad for the Croatian nation,” they generally support his repressive political practices.<sup>72</sup> HSP leader Ante Djapic and other rightists describe the press as “anti-Croat” and “unpatriotic” and call for its restriction.<sup>73</sup> They also oppose regional autonomy and support the HDZ’s effort to centralize the state. The notable exception is Dobroslav Paraga and his HSP-1861. Paraga expressed his approval of regional parties and denounced the practice of allowing the diaspora to vote in Croatian elections.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, the HSP--1861 leader has dedicated his new party to “opposing the criminality, corruption and nepotism of the HDZ mafia which has brought the country to a state worse than before 1990.”<sup>75</sup>

The fourth ideological component of ultranationalism in Croatia is territorial expansion. All ultranationalist groups want to establish a Croatian state within its “historical, natural and ethnic borders.” In its minimal variant, this expansionism involves a Croatia reconstructed within the borders of the Croatian Banovina of 1939. Its maximum variant involves extending Croatian control not only over all of Bosnia-Herzegovina but over significant portions of Serbia including Srijem, Backa and Sandzak and the Bay of Kotor in Montenegro. For the *pravasi* the Drina River represents the border between eastern and western civilization, a border which the Serbs must not be allowed to cross; the HSP slogan in the 1992 elections was “Croatia to the Drina.” Mladen Schwarz maintains that the borders of Croatia should be drawn according to “an imaginary line connecting Subotica, Zemun, Sandzak, the Drina, Boka Kotorska [that] forms the eastern border and that is final....The Drina is the only real Croatian border.”<sup>76</sup> Most importantly, building the Croatian state must result in the “total” destruction of the Serbian one, until “nothing is left of Serbia except Belgrade and its surroundings.”<sup>77</sup> According to Ante Djapic, Great Croatia should result in “a Serbia of the greater part of the Belgrade pashadom.”<sup>78</sup> When justifying the borders of the Croatian state, ultranationalists usually speak of the historic mission of Croats in defending European Christendom from the oriental despotism of the east. They share an intense hostility toward Yugoslavism, which they see as a “cancer” on the body politic, and harbor deep suspicions of what they fear is the support of foreign powers for a resurrection of such a state.<sup>79</sup>

The crux of the question concerning Croatia’s borders involves the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on this question ultranationalists have not agreed. There are two main approaches toward the Bosnian Muslims and relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The first view, held by ultranationalists outside the HDZ, is that Bosnia-Herzegovina should

remain united and that Croatia should strengthen its alliance with the Bosnian Muslims. This view is based upon the traditional *pravasi* view of Bosnians as being Croats of the Muslim (and even Orthodox) faith who should be returned to the fold. The Ustahas also believed Bosnia to be populated by the “purest Croats” and expected (wrongly) to encounter no major problems in administering this area. These *pravasi* insist, as Paraga did at the beginning of the conflict in Croatia, that Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia are “the same soil, the same blood, the same nation” and that they must be united in a common state.<sup>80</sup> Whatever differences currently exist between Croats and Muslims they view as artificial, largely Serbian and communist creations, which “will not last.”<sup>81</sup> Nevertheless, while *pravasi* have maintained that the structure of the new state (federal or not) should be decided by plebiscite, they have also emphasized that this state would be ‘for only one people living in Croatia, the Croats.’<sup>82</sup>

The second position among ultranationalists toward Bosnia-Hercegovina is held by Tudjman and extremists within the HDZ, particularly from the “Hercegovinian lobby”. This group has frequently displayed a less “positive” view of the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina and a reluctance to include them in the Croatian state.<sup>83</sup> The historical reference point for them has been less the NDH than the *Banovina* Croatia, whose borders encompassed Hercegovina but excluded most of the rest of Bosnia. From the outset, Tudjman displayed a preference for this arrangement, engaging in a series of secret talks with Slobodan Milosevic to work out the details of such a division.<sup>84</sup> HDZ ultranationalists such as Goko Susak also supported the partition of Bosnia and the creation of an ethnically pure Herceg Bosna<sup>85</sup> They promoted the conflict between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1993 in order to achieve this goal. Tudjman agreed to the Croat-Muslim federation introduced by Washington Framework Agreement in March of 1994 and called a halt to hostilities between Croat and Muslims in Bosnia. Although the Croatian president initially did little to bolster the Agreement, he has increased his support for it more recently because it is a lynchpin of the Dayton Accord and a key to his good relations with the Americans. Nevertheless, so far he has been unwilling to subordinate what he views as a crucial state building goal--the virtual incorporation of Hercegovina into Croatia--to the demands of Muslims for more central control over this area.

*Pravasi* opposition to the HDZ’s Bosnia policy increased after conflict erupted between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia in 1993. They were convinced that attempts by HDZ extremists to partition Bosnia had offered the Serbs a foothold across the Drina and had alienated Croat’s traditional ally against its natural enemy.<sup>86</sup> Moreover, partition completely repudiated traditional *pravasi* claims to the whole of Bosnia and their perception of Muslims as ethnically Croat. Paraga and HSP sympathizers campaigned fiercely against Tudjman’s Bosnian policy in 1993 while Paraga tried unsuccessfully to keep intact his HOS forces in Bosnia, with their numerous Muslim members.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, *pravasi* found themselves on the same side of this issue

as the liberal opposition, though the two sides did not perceive the national character of Muslims in the same way. Like the liberal opposition, HSP followers welcomed the cessation of hostilities that followed the Washington Agreement and called upon Tudjman to rebuild bridges with the Muslims by “resuming the common fight against the Serb enemy.”<sup>88</sup>

In the two years since the Washington Agreement, *pravasi* nationalists have displayed a measure of flexibility in their understanding of the “new realities” of the situation in Bosnia. A recent policy statement by several *pravasi* leaders reiterated their opposition to any division of Bosnia, calling for a “united, whole and decentralized Bosnia composed of three constituent peoples.” Only when the regime has moved away from its support for partition, they argue, will the “life of Croats in other republics...be better and the possibility of another conflict with the Muslims [be] removed.” Although the *pravasi* continue to assert that Muslims are “historically Croat” they do not deny their right to act “according to their feelings of nationality” since “it is difficult to talk about brotherhood after the recent bloodletting.”<sup>89</sup> They also adopt a more conciliatory stance toward the Dayton Accord. HSP sympathizers were initially were opposed to the Accord, arguing that it did not sufficiently guard the unity of Bosnia and allowed Serbia the possibility of extending its influence across the Drina River. Now they stress that the Dayton Accord can be interpreted in many ways, and that it should be used to guard the unity of Bosnia-Hercegovina and to “punish Serbian aggressors.” They warn, however, that if Serbia’s move across the Drina is “legalized” or Izetbegovic accepts partition, they will turn to other options. In the event of renewed hostilities between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, ultranationalists will continue to speak loudly against what they view as HDZ promotion of this conflict.

The fifth ideological component of Croatian ultranationalism is the struggle for survival against “natural enemies,” in this case the Serbs.<sup>90</sup> Ultranationalists view Serbs and Serbian expansionism as the causes of all Croatia’s misfortunes, the obstacles to all attempts to create an independent state of Croatia. From the onset of tensions between Serbs and Croats in Croatia in 1990, ultranationalists insisted that there was no real Serbian problem in Croatia and that Serbs had nothing to fear in the independent Croatian state. As Ante Djapic put it, there never was a Serbian question in Croatia, “only Great Serbia’s policy for eradicating the Croatian state and people.”<sup>91</sup> In 1990-1991, they opposed discussions with Serbs about cultural or political autonomy and their harsh rhetoric undoubtedly heightened Serb-Croat tensions during this crucial period in Croatia.

For extreme nationalists, opposition to Serbs is not simply a political but a spiritual or moral question. In the natural order of the world as they see it, nations must struggle for survival with their natural enemies. Therefore, individuals must be taught who their enemy is

from a very young age so that they can dedicate themselves to resisting it. According to Bosiljko Miletic:

In the spiritual renewal the child from birth, that is, before he learns to read and write, should be taught who his enemy is. And his enemy in this region is the Serb. This does not mean that one should develop in him a resistance to the point where he would kill tomorrow, but from the very beginning, just as he learns to read, to speak, to behave properly, he should be taught that all evil committed against the Croatian individual and the Croatian people in this region has been done by Serbs.<sup>92</sup>

This vilification of Serbs has often assumed racial dimensions. For example, HDZ extremists such as Sime Djodan have made disparaging remarks about Serbian physiognomy in parliament. In another case, HDZ member Anton Vrdoljak, head of HRT (Croatian Radio Television), accused opposition leader Drazen Budisa of having a Serb in his family tree and of possessing “Byzantine” (read Serbian) blood.<sup>93</sup> Such remarks have contributed greatly to creating an atmosphere in which individuals are judged according to and national criteria.

Ultrationalists perception of Serbs as the “natural enemy” and author of all evil has led them to argue for the restriction of Serbs’ political rights and participation in Croatia. Although HSP party statutes state that there should be no discrimination against individuals on the basis of national identity, in practice the HSP has acted otherwise toward Serbs.<sup>94</sup> For example, a HSP spokesperson concurred when pressed by a member of the Italian Social Movement (a neo-fascist group) on the merits of Croats giving themselves “at least a little more rights than members of other nations in Croatia...Why isn’t it all right, “ the HSP member asked “that a nation in its own country feels a little more privileged than another [nation]? Because if that isn’t the case, how can that nation in general feel as if it is at home?”<sup>95</sup> Or in the words of HSP leader Ante Djapic, Serbs should “either bow down or get out of the way.”<sup>96</sup>

HSP and other ultranationalist leaders consistently have opposed any negotiations with Serbs in the Krajina area, rejected their participation in parliament, called for the abolition of the Serbian Orthodox church in Croatia and, after August 1995, worked to prevent the return of Serb refugees to their homes in Croatia. When the regime engaged in negotiations with the Serb leaders in Croatia before the military campaigns in 1995, Djapic argued that there could never be a negotiated settlement between Serbs and Croats. “The Croat leadership is again laboring under a historical delusion,” he said, “and we have fallen victim to that delusion twice already. They believe in an understanding between Croats and Serbs. That is impossible.”<sup>97</sup> After the mass exodus of Serbs from Croatia in August 1995, ultranationalists worked against their return. Since the majority of Serb families in Croatia had someone involved in the conflict, he argued, it was unthinkable that they should live next to their Croat neighbors anymore. Rather, Croat refugees and a portion of the diaspora should be settled in areas of Croatia once inhabited by Serbs.<sup>98</sup> Tudjman displayed a similar satisfaction at the “solution” to the Serb

question after the mass exodus of Serbs in August 1995. When he took his “freedom train” ride from Zagreb to Split through Krajina on August 26, he said that the Serbs “had disappeared ignominiously, as if they had never populated this land. We urged them to stay, but they didn’t listen to us and, well, bon voyage.”<sup>99</sup> Despite strenuous objections by the HSP, the Croatian government repealed a law stipulating a three month period during which refugees could reclaim their property. Nevertheless, little progress has been made toward creating conditions for these refugees to return.

The final ideological element of ultranationalism in Croatia is an anti-liberal, anti-western perspective, and this perspective has had a significant impact upon the formulation of public policy. Although ultranationalists emphasize Croatia’s role as the bulwark of Christian and European civilization against the east, they also display a profound suspicion of and hostility toward the west. The liberalism to which the west gave birth, they argue, has failed to speak to the spiritual nature of man, his need to understand himself in the context of a particular community or nation. Instead of the universal ideologies, including liberalism, spawned by the west, only the particularity of the nation gives meaning to the life of the individual. The specificity of the Croat nation and its unique mission provide individual Croats with a sense of their true and satisfying place in the world.<sup>100</sup> Ultranationalists reject the liberal emphasis on individual rights and benefits, instead advocating social and economic policies that promote the welfare of the nation and its state building goals.

This anti-liberal emphasis is most evident in the area of family policy which is understood primarily in terms of “demographic renewal.” Like the extreme right elsewhere in Europe, ultranationalists in Croatia advocate a conservative social order based upon a patriarchal structure within the family, the “ideal of family and nation.”<sup>101</sup> According to them, the family is the best place to foster the “moral cleanliness and willingness to sacrifice” necessary to the survival and growth of the nation. They believe that the “sick individualism” of the west has created social “deviations” such as homosexuality which they strenuously oppose.<sup>102</sup> Western Europe and particularly the United States have fallen prey to this sickness and are therefore unfit to offer advice to Croatia about its own social policies.

Family policy in Croatia has been closely linked with the attempt to increase the Croat population. Tudjman cited this goal in his speech to the parliament in 1990 when he outlined the ten major tasks of his regime.<sup>103</sup> Subsequently, as part of its state-building agenda the government has enacted legislation designed to encourage women to have more children. The incorporation of demographic renewal into its state-building program has also led to a strong move to ban abortion in order to ensure a higher rate of population growth. Ultranationalists have emphasized that legalized abortion is “both national genocide as well as national suicide.”<sup>104</sup> While the moral issues concerning abortion are thorny indeed, the call for

banning abortion in the service of state and nation building goals is far removed from liberal rights-based arguments (whether the mother's, father's or unborn child's) predominant in western democracies. This clear emphasis on national obligation as opposed to individual rights reflects the ultranationalists rejection of the liberal political basis of the state.

In contrast to demographic and family policy, about which ultranationalists both inside and outside the HDZ agree, economic policy has been the source of disagreement and a basis of political competition between these two groups. Both groups nominally endorse the move toward a market economy, though practically they subordinate economic to state-building concerns. However, while members of the HDZ have supported significant state ownership and involvement in the economy, the *pravasi* groups have typically championed the rights of "the little guy" and other populist themes. Numerous cases of dubious economic practices by well placed HDZ leaders and their personal enrichment has made the ruling party vulnerable to charges of corruption from the opposition including the extreme right. Although the *pravasi* parties were initially uninterested in economic themes, they have become more willing to discuss this topic. The HSP under Paraga developed an increasingly sophisticated analysis and critique of the government's economic policy after the 1992 parliamentary elections. Other *pravasi* leaders such as Ivan Gabelica have more recently begun to emphasize anti-corruption, anti-enrichment themes.<sup>105</sup> Nevertheless, when asked to describe his party's economic policies before the '95 elections, Djapic answered that it was best to leave these matters to those (HDZ) members of the government "who have access to the correct information."<sup>106</sup> Economic policies continue to be a relatively undeveloped part of the HSP program.

Finally, in the area of foreign policy, ultranationalist ideology has led to support for isolationism. Ultranationalists view with intense suspicion what they perceive as attempts by the west, especially the United States, to foist its values on the Croatian nation and its interference in Croats' state-building efforts.<sup>107</sup> In practical terms, this isolationism has resulted in a perception of UNPROFOR as an "occupying presence" in Croatia and a call for its removal. It has also led to a continuing suspicion of possible western attempts to resurrect a Yugoslav state or confederation in the Balkans. Croats have consistently expressed strong approval for integration with Europe, making widespread popular support for isolationism unlikely (though for a portion of the electorate integration may also represent a means of maintaining a crucial distinction from the "non-European" Serbs). Moreover, while Tudjman is sympathetic to some ultranationalist aims, he is cognizant of the need to maintain good relations with the allies and has resisted the isolationist elements of ultranationalist ideology.

## Conclusion

The current cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and preparations for the upcoming elections there have turned attention toward the issues involved in consolidating the Yugoslav successor states. In the recent political transformation of Eastern Europe, state-building efforts have often been aimed primarily at “nationalizing” the state and strengthening the cultural, political and economic position of the dominant ethnic group. This has also been the case in Croatia where political leaders have adopted a state-building strategy fundamentally at odds with the process of democratization. Their strategy has been based in large part on traditional Croatian ultranationalism, and legitimized through appropriating the symbols of the extremist strand of the Croat national movement.

An examination of the role of ultranationalist ideology in the state-building process in Croatia suggests some important conclusions. First, this ideology, which is based upon the fundamentally anti-liberal notion of the primacy of national (community) over individual rights, has been used to justify the authoritarian political practices of the regime and its inattention to consolidating democratic institutions. Moreover, it promotes an intrusive state to achieve such essential state-building aims as demographic renewal. The central role of ultranationalist ideology also explains why extremist political parties have shaped political discourse disproportionately to their electoral strength. Although the HSP has become increasingly weakened and fractured, *pravasi* political parties and leaders continue to have an important influence on the policy making process. Moreover, the extremist segment of the HDZ, which holds similar views, appears to be gaining strength within the ruling party. Despite strenuous resistance from the liberal opposition, this group is likely to continue consolidating its position in Croatian political life and promoting its views as part of the political mainstream.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that the doctrines of traditional right extremism have been modified to fit changing political circumstances in Croatia. Moreover, ultranationalists within the HDZ and outside it have not always agreed, particularly on the best policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. While HDZ extremists continue to support *thede facto* partition of Bosnia and the complete integration of Herzegovina within Croatia, HSP groups insist on a unified Bosnian state, and they have been prepared to make concessions to Muslim national sentiments in pursuit of this goal. Their recent flexibility should facilitate their cooperation with the liberal opposition against Tudjman on this issue. Many observers in Croatia are convinced of the likelihood of renewed conflict between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia. In that case, the divergent ideological views of HDZ extremists and other ultranationalist groups may be of great political significance.



## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The research for this paper has been made possible by a grant from the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. I would like to thank the Institute for Contemporary History in Zagreb for its support for my research. Thanks also to my colleagues, Ivan Grdesic and Nenad Zakosek, from the Department of Political Science at the University of Zagreb.
- <sup>2</sup> This paper uses the terms extreme right, neofascism and ultranationalism interchangeably. This usage is not meant to suggest that there are not important distinctions among them. Nor is it meant to suggest that all varieties of the extreme right are based upon ultranationalist ideology. Nevertheless, their frequently common emphasis on the politics of extreme nationalism is the focus of this work.
- <sup>3</sup> For example, a recent paper on the current extreme right in Russia identified nine main ideological groupings on the right, each of which has several sub-groupings within it. Peter Reddaway and Catherine Dale, 'The Significance of Nationalism and Communism in Contemporary Russian Politics,' Paper presented at the annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Hawaii, November 1993.
- <sup>4</sup> G. Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, July 1991, pp. 285-313.
- <sup>5</sup> G. Schopflin, "Obstacles to Liberalism in Post-Communist Polities," *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 5, Winter 1991, pp. 189-94.
- <sup>6</sup> There has been much dispute about whether Fascism and neo-fascism can be said to possess a coherent ideology. Rober Vivarelli, for example, argues that fascism "was not an intellectual movement with anything comparable to a doctrine." Robert Eatwell and others such as Roger Griffin have argued convincingly for a definition of fascism that places a coherent ideology at its centre. Thus for Griffin, "fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism." Eatwell offers a definition of fascism based on its "spectral-synthetic" ideology which sees the essence of fascism as a series of syntheses around four main themes: natural history, geopolitics, political economy and leadership, activism, party, and propaganda. In any case, it is clear that while fascism does have a discernible ideology, it is one characterised by flexibility, which may be due, as Juan Linz suggests, to its latecomer status and the associated problem of defining its political space. See R. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, Pinter Press, London, 1991; R. Eatwell, "Toward a New Model of Generic Fascism," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol 4, No. 2, 1992, pp. 161-94; and R. Vivarelli, "Interpretations of the Origins of Fascism," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 63, March 1991, pp. 29-43. J. Linz, "Some Notes toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," in W. Laqueur, *Fascism, A Reader's Guide*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976, pp. 3-121.
- <sup>7</sup> Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-EEU-93-159, 30 March 1993, pp. 41-42; in *Danas*, 26 February 1993, pp. 20-21.
- <sup>8</sup> John Breuilly and others have pointed out that nationalism makes 'eminent sense' in the situations produced by the modern state, which declares itself the legitimate dispenser of political and economic goods. As the state expands its functions and capabilities, power over the state apparatus become the crucial goal of national movements. See J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1982.
- <sup>9</sup> E. Gentile, "Fascism as Political Religion," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 2-3, 1990, pp. 229-51.
- <sup>10</sup> P. Hockenos, *Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, Routledge, London, 1993.
- <sup>11</sup> In Russia, neo-fascist groups have tended to be more opposed to capitalism, arguing that it is foreign in spirit. Groups like Russian Unity, therefore, advocated a third way between capitalism and communism. For a treatment of this question see W. Laqueur, *Black Hundred, The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia*, Harper Collins Publishers, 1993, pp. 119-82.
- <sup>12</sup> For a discussion in English of the Croatian national movement see I. Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia, Origins, History, Politics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1984; and A. Djilas, *The Contested Country, Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1991.
- <sup>13</sup> For a discussion of Ante Starevisee Mario S. Spalatin, 'The Croatian Nationalism of Ante Starevi, 1845-1871', *Journal of Croatian Studies*, Vol. 15, 1975, pp. 19-146; and G. G. Gilbert, 'Pravatvo and the Croatian National Issue', *East European Quarterly*, No. 1, 1978, pp. 57-68.

- <sup>14</sup> Although the HSP advocated the establishment of an independent state, it more immediately supported a trialist solution within the framework of the Habsburg Empire.
- <sup>15</sup> While proclaiming Starevi as their leader, the *frankovci* in fact reversed his policy of opposition to the Habsburgs and began to look to Vienna for protection from Hungary. They also renounced Starevi's aim of creating an independent Croatian state outside the monarchy.
- <sup>16</sup> For a social profile of Ustasha support see B. Krizman, *Ante Pavelic i ustase*, Globus, Zagreb, 1978, pp. 564-74.
- <sup>17</sup> For a discussion of the relationship between the *frankovci* and the Ustashas see Djilas, *The Contested Country*, cit., pp. 108-9.
- <sup>18</sup> For a description of this regime see B. Krizman, *Ustase i Treci Reich*, Globus, Zagreb, 1983; and Djilas, *The Contested Country*, cit., pp. 103-27.
- <sup>19</sup> S. Nesovian and B. Petranovi, *AVNOJ i revolucij*, Belgrade, 1983, p. 18.
- <sup>20</sup> The actual number of Serbs who were killed has been the subject of acrimonious dispute among Serb and Croat scholars and publicists. For a recent discussion of this question in English see N. Pasic, 'In Search of the True Number of War Victims in Yugoslavia in the Second World War,' *Serbian Studies*, No. 1, 1989, pp. 92-120.
- <sup>21</sup> M. uli, cit., *Danas*, 5 March 1991, pp. 7-9.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>23</sup> Paraga estimated his party's membership at 100,000 in the fall of 1991. R. Moseley, "Croatian Extremist Spoiling for Wider War," *Chicago Tribune*, 7 October 1991, p. 8.
- <sup>24</sup> In his testimony to Congress in May 1993, Paraga insisted that the HSP was an anti-fascist party fighting against the "fascist" Tudjman regime. In his testimony Paraga stated: 'Nothing could be more damaging to the future of Croatia and the region as a whole than totalitarian philosophies of government such as ethnic purity and one-party rule.' *Congressional Record*, No. 76, 26 May 1993.
- <sup>25</sup> There have been charges that the HDZ violated the electoral law in order to permit the HSP to reach the 5% threshold. Ballots that were invalidly marked (totaling 82,666 or 3.31% of ballots) were removed from the total vote count thereby increasing the percentage of HSP votes. Although the court upheld this practice, six political parties (including the HSP-1861) have filed suit against the government of Croatia with the UN Commission for Human Rights in Geneva in order to have this practice declared invalid.
- <sup>26</sup> Author's interview with Kresimir Pavelic, 11 July 1994.
- <sup>27</sup> Author's interview with Kresimir Pavelic, 11 July 1994.
- <sup>28</sup> Vekic withdrew from active politics in 1992 after the car accident of his son and left the running of party affairs to Misetic.
- <sup>29</sup> Misetic was also minister of justice in the national unity government.
- <sup>30</sup> FBIS-EEU-92-241, 15 December 1992, p. 44.
- <sup>31</sup> Ivan Gabelica, "Hrvatska vlada usprotivila se mome prijedlogu da se 15 svibnja proglassi za dan Hrvatskih narodnih zrtava u Bleiburgu!" *Globus*, 23 February 1996, p. 15.
- <sup>32</sup> *Novi list*, 23 October 1995, p. 6; interview with Zvonimir Kramaric.
- <sup>33</sup> *Novi list*, 18 February 1995, pp. 5-6; interview with Dobroslav Paraga.
- <sup>34</sup> *Novi list*, 23 October 1995, p. 6; interview with Dobroslav Paraga.
- <sup>35</sup> *Hrvatski obzor*, 31 July 1995, pp. 26-27; interview with Ante Djapic.
- <sup>36</sup> For a discussion of these groups see Nenad Zakosek, "In Gefährlicher Nähe der Macht," *Ost-West Gegeninformationen*, no. 2/94 (May), pp. 8-11.
- <sup>37</sup> The HRS received .29% of the vote and the HDP .26% of the vote in 1992.
- <sup>38</sup> Nenad Zakosek, "In Gefährlicher Nähe der Macht," *Ost-West Gegeninformationen*, no. 2/94 (May), pp. 8-11.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>40</sup> Zvonimir Horvat, "Kamo ides, Hrvatska?" *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 19-20, (July-August, 1993) p. 42.
- <sup>41</sup> Schwartz denounced liberal publicist Slavko Goldstein as "the biggest anti-semitic of all" and charged that he should go live in Israel or Serbia if he didn't like what was going on in Croatia. See *ibid.*
- <sup>42</sup> FBIS-EEU, 15 September 1994, interview with Schwartz; *Nedjeljna Dalmacija*, 2 September 1994, pp. 13-14.
- <sup>43</sup> *Nezavisna drzava Hrvatska*, 4 April 1996, pp. 8-9, interview with Srecko Psenicnik.
- <sup>44</sup> *Danas*, 5 March 1991, p. 8; interview with Dobroslav Paraga.
- <sup>45</sup> FBIS-EEU-92-103, 28 May 1992, pp. 57-62; interview in *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 9 May, 1992, pp. 10-11.
- <sup>46</sup> M. uli, "Tko zaziva ustastvo?" *Danas*, 5 March 1991, pp. 7-9.

- <sup>47</sup> When I spoke to Ante Djapic about this subject he insisted that Ustasha reprisals against Serbs were provoked by the Serbian (Partisan) uprising against the legitimate Croatian state in the summer of 1941. According to Djapic, many of these Serbs were killed by Chetniks and Partisans dressed up as Ustashas. Author's interview with Ante Djapic, 13 July 1994.
- <sup>48</sup> Velimir Bujanec, "Odgovor Kresimiru Pavelicu," *Nezavisna drzavna Hrvatska*, no. 4 (418), April 1996, p.15.
- <sup>49</sup> *Izborna deklaracija Hrvatske stranke prava*, 1992, p.3.
- <sup>50</sup> Nenad Zakosek, "Extremism as Normality, Discursive Patterns of Right Radicalism in Contemporary Croatia," Unpublished Manuscript.
- <sup>51</sup> *Vreme News Digest*, 15 January 1996.
- <sup>52</sup> Nenad Zakosek, "Extremism as Normality, Discursive Patterns of Right Radicalism in Contemporary Croatia," Unpublished Manuscript, p.7.
- <sup>53</sup> *Nezavisna drzava Hrvatska*, no. 4 (418), April 1996, p. 9; interview with Psenicnik.
- <sup>54</sup> Nikola Jelic, Andjelko Erceg, Jelena Lovric, "Tudjman se odrekao Mercepa," *Novi list*, 16 October 1995, pp.5-6.
- <sup>55</sup> *Glas Slavonije*, 18 August 1995, pp.10-11; interview with Ante Djapic
- <sup>56</sup> Author's interview with Bosiljko Misetic, 12 July 1994.
- <sup>57</sup> FBIS-EEU; interview with Mladen Schwartz, *Nedjeljna Dalmacija*, 2 September 1994, p, 13-14.
- <sup>58</sup> FBIS-EEU-94-189, 29 September 1994; in *Vjesnik*, 6 September 1994; interview with Ante Djapic.
- <sup>59</sup> Jasna Babic, "Hrvatska izvjestajna sluzba pod vodstvom dr. Miroslava Tudjmana sastavila je tajno izvjesce o tome kako oporba, sindikati, strane agenture i mediji pokusavaju srusiti HDZ I dr. Franju Tudjmana s vlasti i restaurirati komunizam," *National*, 12 April 1996, pp.3-5.
- <sup>60</sup> For a discussion of recent purges in the military see: *Globus*, 19 January 1996, pp.4-6; *Globus*, 23 February 1996, p.7; *Globus* 26 April 1996, pp.3-4.
- <sup>61</sup> Author's interview with Bosiljko Misetic, 12 July 1994.
- <sup>62</sup> FBIS-EEU, 15 September 1994; interview with Mladen Schwartz, *Nedjeljna Dalmacija*, 2 September 1994, pp. 13-14. Schwartz stated: "Democracy has its positive characteristics, I would be mad to deny that. However, there are limitations to democracy and that is why we must look for alternatives. I think that in this day and age, democracy will not benefit the Croatian nation and I am prepared to present arguments in support of that."
- <sup>63</sup> Zvonimir Horvat, "Kamo ides, Hrvatska?" *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 19-20, (July-August, 1993) p 42.
- <sup>64</sup> Mladen Schwartz, "Politricari s kraja desetljeća podsjećaju na karikaturu: stoga je u pravu Maja Freundlich kada tvrdi da je Franjo Tudjman jedini pravi drzavnik u svijetu," *ST*, 10 April 1996, p.10.
- <sup>65</sup> FBIS-EEU-95-098, 22 May 1995; Tanjug in English, 21 May 1995.
- <sup>66</sup> For example, HSP and opposition leaders charged the HDZ with complicity when police shot HSP vice president Ante Paradzik at a check point outside Zagreb.
- <sup>67</sup> For a recent discussion of alleged HDZ repression of the largest opposition party, the Croatian Social Liberal Party (*Hrvatska socijalna liberalna stranka*, HSLS) see *Globus*, February 23 1996, pp. 13-15; interview with Drazen Budisa.
- <sup>68</sup> For a recent overview in English of Tudjman's policy toward the press see: Patrick Moore, "War as the Centerpiece in Bosnia and Croatia," *Transition*, vol.1 #18, pp.30-32.
- <sup>69</sup> Nikola Jelic, Edita Vlahovic, "Tudjman: najbitnija zadaca vracanje istocne Slavonije," *Novi list*, 15 October 1995, p.3.
- <sup>70</sup> FBIS-EEU-95-192, 4 October 1995; in *Globus*, 29 September 1995, pp.6-7.
- <sup>71</sup> For a critical discussion of this system of voting see: "Bosanski Hrvati--diaspora ili konstitutivni narod?", *Novi list*, 23 October 1995, p.7.
- <sup>72</sup> *Novi list*, 22 February 1996, p.25; interview with Ivan Kranjcina.
- <sup>73</sup> FBIS-EEU-92-103, 28 May 1992, pp. 57-62; interview in *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 9 May 1992, pp. 10-11.
- <sup>74</sup> *Novi list*, 23 October 1995, pp.6-7; interview with Dobroslav Paraga.
- <sup>75</sup> *Novi list*, 20 July 1995, p.4; interview with Dobroslav Paraga.
- <sup>76</sup> FBIS-EEU, 15 September 1994; in *Nedjeljna Dalmacija*, 2 September 1994, pp.13-14; interview with Mladen Schwartz.
- <sup>77</sup> FBIS-EEU-92-149, 3 August 1992, pp. 26-27.
- <sup>78</sup> *Glas Slavonija*, 19 August 1995, pp.10-11; interview with Ante Djapic.
- <sup>79</sup> Dobroslav Paraga and Ante Paradzik, *Borba za Hrvatsku drzavnu nezavisnost*, Zagreb, 1991, p. 164.

- <sup>80</sup> FBIS-EEU-92-103, 28 May 1992, pp. 57-62; interview with Dobroslav Paraga in *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 9 May 1992, pp. 10-11.
- <sup>81</sup> *Novi list*, 23 October 1995, pp.8-9; interview with Zvonimir Kramaric.
- <sup>82</sup> FBIS-EEU-92-149, 3 August 1992, pp. 26-27.
- <sup>83</sup> Tudjman claims that it is Croatia's "duty to integrate Bosnian Muslims into European civilization." FBIS-EEU-95-87, 27 September 1995; Paris TV Network.
- <sup>84</sup> These talks are discussed in several recent books on the former Yugoslavia. For the most detailed coverage see Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy, Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1995.
- <sup>85</sup> Susak was alleged to have said that swallowing the Croat-Muslim Federation was "like swallowing a large frog." *Vreme News Digest*, 15 January 1996.
- <sup>86</sup> Author's interview with Dobroslav Paraga, 15 July 1994.
- <sup>87</sup> According to Paraga, by the summer of 1994 there were only about 1,000 to 1,500 HOS fighters left in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Author's interview with Dobroslav Paraga, 15 July 1994.
- <sup>88</sup> Branka Juras, "Nova stranka prava ulazi u Sabor zahvaljujuci mandatu Ivana Gabelice," *Panorama*, 3 April 1996, pp.8-9.
- <sup>89</sup> Nevertheless, the limited extent to which they are prepared to see these symbols as designating a separate nationality is revealed by the fact that they use the term Bosnjak (referring to Bosnian Muslims) as they would other names designating parts of Croatia such as Dalmation, Slavonia or Hercegovina.
- <sup>90</sup> Although ultranationalists sometimes display anti-semitic opinions, anti-semitism is not a pronounced element of ultranationalism in Croatia.
- <sup>91</sup> *Novi list*, 22 October 1995, pp. 12-13; interview with Ante Djapic.
- <sup>92</sup> FBIS-EEU, 30 August 1995, in *Arkzin*, June 6 1995, p.6.
- <sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>94</sup> For example see: *Temeljna nacela i statut, Hrvatska stranka prava*, 24 February 1991, p.6.
- <sup>95</sup> "Neofasisti izemđu Zagreba i Beograda," *Hrvatsko pravo*, #19-20 (July-August 1993) p.35.
- <sup>96</sup> *Glas Slavonije*, 19 August 1995, pp.10-11; interview with Ante Djapic.
- <sup>97</sup> FBIS-EEU, 9 October 1994; in *Vjesnik*, 16 September 1994, pp.6-7.
- <sup>98</sup> *Novi list*, 22 October 1995, pp. 12-13; interview with Ante Djapic.
- <sup>99</sup> *Transition*, 3 November 1995, vol.1, no.2, p.8; from AFP, Aug. 26, 1995.
- <sup>100</sup> Author's interview with Bosiljko Misetic, 12 July 1994. This view has also been expressed by Franjo Tudjman in various writings and speeches. For example see: Franjo Tudjman, *S vjerom u samostalnu Hrvatsku*, Zagreb, Narodne Novine, 1995.
- <sup>101</sup> B. Basic, "Sabor ujedinjenja 10. travnja," *Novi list*, 23 February 1996, p.7.
- <sup>102</sup> *Ibid.* Also author's interview with Bosiljko Misetic, 12 July 1994 .
- <sup>103</sup> Franjo Tudjman, "Ocuvanje punog suvereniteta Hrvatskog naroda i gradjanskih prava svih drzavljenia Republike Hrvatske," in *S vjerom u samostalnu Hrvatsku*, Zagreb, Narodne Novine, 1995, pp.79-90.
- <sup>104</sup> FBIS-EEU, 15 September 1994; in *Nedjeljna Dalmacija*, 2 September 1994, pp.13-14, interview with Mladen Schwartz.
- <sup>105</sup> *Hrvatski obzor*, 25 September 1995, pp.14-16; interview with Ivan Gabelica.
- <sup>106</sup> *Novi list*, 22 October 1995, pp.12-13; interview with Ante Djapic.
- <sup>107</sup> Author's interview with Bosiljko Misetic, 12 July 1994.