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Executive Summary

The following represents our final report to the NCSEER for the project entitled "The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet: Its Early Development" (contract #808-15). A number of previous papers and reports have detailed findings from this project concerning decision making and voting behavior in the Russian parliament. Under the project’s auspices, we have also conducted four surveys of candidates and parliamentarians. A preliminary report on findings from the survey of candidates running for the Duma in the 1993 election was presented at the State Department on January 28, 1994. The present paper analyzes for the first time the results of all four of these surveys. Following this executive summary of major conclusions, we analyze our results in the light of our theoretical concerns. Appendix I describes the details of the four surveys from which we draw our data. Appendix II reviews the basic empirical findings from the surveys. We are presenting a somewhat different version of this paper at the 1996 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

1. Our surveys confirm that on major policy issues, sharp differences of opinion divide Russian politicians. This is visible in wide differences on issues such as whether to denounce the Belovezh treaties, land and enterprise privatization, Russia’s relationship to NATO, whom to support in the Bosnian conflict, and openness to Western economic influences. On this left-right dimension, we find a consistent polarization of political camps. The political landscape is strongly organized around the left-right dimension, which is related closely both to market/socialist economic differences and to pro-Western vs. nationalist orientations. The divergence over basic economic values (market reform vs. state socialism) defines many differences among parties. But some questions are divisive within parties; on other issues, parties sharing the same basic ideological tendency differ.

2. On some issues, respondents express nearly unanimous agreement in all our surveys regardless of their ideological position. Among these are the desirability of maintaining the integrity of the Russian state, the value of treating all subjects of the federation equally, protectionism for native industry, the desirability of integration of the CIS, and blame for both the federal and Chechen authorities for the war in Chechnia.

3. The left-right division is associated with some divergence of views over the basic constitutional distribution of power. The state/socialist/ left camp would generally give parliament more power and the president less. Economic reformers are more favorable to presidential power. But this dimension divides both camps. Among the opposition, LDPR members are consistently more sympathetic to the executive power principle, and among reformers, Yabloko and others are more favorable to increasing parliamentary power.
4. The communists fear the loss of political rights in an environment where democrats are willing to behave undemocratically. This gives them an added interest in protections for minority rights. Hence their responses to our civil liberties questions are poorly correlated with their responses on the economic reform dimension. Communists consistently express reluctance to justify state restrictions on political rights, e.g., over the question of banning anti-constitutional groups, or restricting civil liberties in order to fight crime.

5. The communist party (CPRF) emerges as different from other parties not only in its ideological stance and in the relative homogeneity of its adherents' outlooks, but also in its organizational cohesiveness. It offered political and material support to its candidates earlier and more extensively than did other parties. It is likely that since many politicians of other parties find it helpful to associate with a party both during the campaign and in parliament, the model of communist party discipline exerts an influence on the formation of Russia's political party system through the process of emulation as members of other parties base their behavior upon that of the communists to obtain similar benefits from concerted action.

6. Our guiding question has been: How can politicians who are deeply divided on the basic directions of national policy in the post-communist period agree on a set of democratic institutional arrangements which neither side controls? The answer, we believe, is that in a limited sub-set of questions—those concerning the way to organize parliament—deputies have found a way to harmonize their interests by securing their ability to influence policy, further their careers, and enhance reelection prospects through parties. A party-oriented process where many procedural matters are mediated by party leaders rather than by the will of a dominant coalition has resulted, and appears to enjoy substantial support from across the full spectrum of political camps. We can offer some explanation of this finding, based on the sequence of events.

7. The party-dominated but non-majoritarian process in parliament probably enjoys the degree of support that it does because the parties are the most readily available means for deputies of opposing ideological persuasion to keep tabs on one another, and check the power of rivals, in a context where they cannot be sure that they would have stable or secure dominance if institutions were more majoritarian (communists fear that Yeltsin might suppress them or parliament if they grew too strong, democrats fear that they might lose out if parliament were majoritarian and they do not win an electoral majority). Thus the two sides make reciprocal concessions in policy-making in order to gain advantages that are useful in other arenas, including elections and career making.

8. Our paper lays out three alternative explanations of the central agenda-setting institution of the Russian Duma and outlines their relationship to contending theoretical approaches that are current in the scholarly literature on how legislative institutions are...
chosen. These center on spatial models of policy preferences, career- and status-seeking by legislators, and the drive for reelection. Evidence consistent with each explanation is found, although none can fully account for important features of the Duma. A direct test of predictions of a spatial perspective against predictions of a reelection perspective demonstrates the viability of both explanations. Theoretical progress in this field is not likely to take the form of a unified or integrated theory but, at least for the time being, is more likely to take the form of more fully elaborating alternative perspectives and testing their implications directly against each other.
Theories of Legislative Institutions and the Organization of the Russian Duma

Thomas F. Remington and Steven S. Smith

Theory about the development of legislative or parliamentary institutions is in its infancy. This condition is not unique to parliamentary institutions, of course. Theories developed in the study of comparative politics offer some guidance. For example, some treatments of the process of democratization give attention to the role of parliamentary bodies. The prospect of gaining representation in a multi-member parliament gives contending factions and parties some confidence that democratic institutions will not be too harmful to their interests and some hope that they will be sufficiently successful to gain majority status from time to time. But the internal rules and structures of the parliament are not addressed by these theories. Similarly, theories about the consequences of electoral laws offer predictions about the number of parties elected to parliaments but remain silent on subject of how those parties interact or structure the legislative process within parliament. Thus, the theories of comparative politics that help us characterize the political environments of parliaments must be complemented by theories about the internal dynamics of institutional arrangements to have a complete accounting of institutional change.

The operating rules and structures of legislative assemblies allocate members’ rights to influence decision making and employ the body’s resources. Explaining their adoption is of considerable interest for both practical and theoretical reasons. Although in principle a majority of members of a legislature can adopt, amend or replace the rules governing their work, subject to limitations in a national constitution, in practice some operating rules outlive the conditions under which they were adopted. The rule permitting filibustering in the U.S. Senate has proven durable given the difficulty of collecting enough votes to change it, for example; such a rule in turn affects the nature of policy, and its effects may cumulate over time. The adoption and amendment of legislative rules of procedure and organization pose theoretical questions as well, since they provide evidence about the way institutions are chosen and allow us to test competing theories of institutional evolution in a setting where institutional choice forms an element of strategic action on the part of a finite set of members, equal in legal rights, and conscious of the political consequences of their actions.

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1The research presented here was supported by funding from the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, whose support is gratefully acknowledged. The authors, however, bear sole responsibility for the information and interpretations reported. We would also like to express our appreciation to Moshe Haspel for research assistance. Details of the surveys discussed here are provided in the appendix.
The Problem

In this paper, we are concerned with the organization of the Russian State Duma, the lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly as created by the 1993 Constitution. The particular aspect we address is the allocation of steering or agenda-setting rights, which include the ability to assign legislative issues to particular committee jurisdictions, formulate and propose the daily and longer-term agendas to the chamber, resolve disputes arising from the interpretation of the Standing Rules, and negotiate compromise agreements on controversial legislative issues. In the State Duma these powers are wielded by the Council of the Duma. What makes the Council particularly interesting as an object for study is the fact that it represents party factions (and those deputy groups that have qualified for registration with similar rights to those of party factions by virtue of meeting a membership size threshold) on a parity rather than proportional basis. Thus, in contrast to a similar body such as the Bureau of the French National Assembly, which in a similarly mixed parliamentary-presidential constitutional setting nonetheless operates under a clearly majoritarian rule, the Russian parliament’s steering body is composed in such a way as to allow small party factions and those in the minority an equal share of power in governing the chamber to those factions which are larger and those which are in the majority.

The Council of the Duma is seen by deputies as a sharp departure from previous practice. Russia has had two principal legislative systems since the wave of democratizing reforms launched in the late 1980s. In the 1990-1993 “transitional” period, a two-tiered adaptation of the traditional communist model of Supreme Soviet system was in place. The larger parent body, the Congress of People’s Deputies, met several times each year, while the working body, the Supreme Soviet, was a full-time bicameral legislature. These institutions featured a slightly modified presidium as their principal steering organ. The 1990-1993 parliament was abruptly suppressed by President Yeltsin in September 1993, when Yeltsin issued decrees dissolving parliament, annulling the deputies’ mandates, and mandating new elections to a new parliament in December 1993. Moreover, by decree he enacted a new electoral system for these elections. Finally, he mandated a referendum on a new constitution, drafted under his direction, to be held simultaneously with the new parliamentary elections. The constitutional landscape we are examining, therefore, is the product of these decrees, and was given retroactive legal force by the referendum held in December 1993. It is the immediate successor of a constitutional framework which was effectively a modified version of older Soviet-era arrangements.

The alternatives with which politicians in 1993 and 1994 were most familiar were those which had existed in the USSR and Russian Republic-level Congress/Supreme Soviet assemblies. These alternatives had in fact been the subject of intense discussion for at least three years, as working groups comprising deputies and experts had developed proposals for a new constitution, new electoral laws, and new models of legislative organization. Steering arrangements were among the central points of debate. One crucial question was whether the new parliament should preserve the Soviet-era institution of presidium, or should replace it with another structure; how much power a chairman should have; and how much power should be granted to political
party factions. Politicians of opposing camps had made a good deal of progress in agreeing on a new legislative model. Therefore, as extra-constitutional as Yeltsin's actions were when he ultimately suppressed the Russian Congress/Supreme Soviet system, the details of the new parliamentary organization with which he proposed to replace it had been the subject of extensive national deliberation for at least two years.

The parliamentary steering organ with which politicians were familiar from direct experience was the presidium. Under Soviet law since the Stalin period, the presidium was a full-time working organ empowered to enact any decisions falling under the jurisdiction of its parent Supreme Soviet in those periods when the Supreme Soviet was not in session (Minagawa 1985). The communist-era Supreme Soviet, of course, was hardly ever in session, so that the presidium, through the decades from the 1930s to the 1980s, had become itself a small parliament. It exercised its power through a large and cohesive staff which in turn was closely tied to and firmly controlled by the staff of the Communist Party Central Committee. Consequently, the Presidium translated into legislative acts decisions which the communist party determined should take the form of law (as opposed to party resolutions and other politically binding acts). The presidium was charged with preparing the agenda of the Supreme Soviet for its periodic if brief sessions. Moreover, the Soviet state--under the Stalinist constitutional framework, which survived with minor modifications until the late 1980s--assigned the presidium the status of a collective head of state. Its chairman, whose title was chairman of the Supreme Soviet, was the equivalent of a head of state, with ceremonial powers similar to those of a British monarch or German state president.

The presidium model survived into the reform era. Between 1989 and 1991 the Soviet state under Gorbachev operated under a modified version of the Stalin model, and from 1990-1993 the Russian Republic, which constitutionally was a constituent member of the Soviet federation until that federal union dissolved in 1991, operated under an almost identical version of the same modified system. This system retained the presidium as a steering body for both the Congress of People's Deputies which was elected in direct national territorial district races and for the Supreme Soviet, which was the working parliament elected by the deputies of the Congress from among its own membership. It is important to understand that presidium was composed of committee chairs. As in the past, it was presided over by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, who was elected to this position from among the membership of the Congress. Together with several deputy chairs, he exercised the powers inherited from the older system: chairing the meetings of the presidium, managing the central staff, overseeing the budget and material resources of the parliament, and chairing plenary sessions of the legislature. The chairman also had a privileged role in shaping the presidium's collective decisions with respect to the parliament's agenda, the assignment of pieces of draft legislation to committees, the nomination of deputies to committee leadership posts, and the management of legislative processes.

Both the 1989-91 USSR-level legislative system and its Russian republican equivalent that existed between 1990 and 1993 were highly centralized in the way these powers were exercised. USSR deputies frequently complained that Chairman Gorbachev (1989-90) and Chairman Luk'ianov (1990-91) manipulated the parliament
for their own political purposes using the power of the presidium and the chairmanship to do so; exactly the same complaints were voiced about Boris Yeltsin (1990-91) and Ruslan Khasbulatov (1991-93) during their respective tenures as chairs of the Russian republic Supreme Soviet. To a large extent, the complaints corresponded to ideological divisions: communist opponents of Yeltsin opposed his use of the powers of the chairmanship and presidium in the Russian Supreme Soviet to achieve radical reform objectives. Liberal democrats opposed Khasbulatov’s use of the same powers to promote the agenda of the communists and nationalists.

The new Council of the Duma, featuring a sharing of power among parliamentary parties, represents a sharp break with the traditional Soviet presidium. To a certain extent, the power-sharing Council is offset by majoritarianism in other areas: the majority-elected chairman, majoritarian rules in floor voting, the distribution of committee chairmanships in proportion to the parties’ shares of members, and the open rule on agenda and amendment rights on the floor. But the powers of the Council of the Duma are sufficiently great as to raise the question of why the Duma is not fully majoritarian but has adopted more egalitarian and consensual arrangements for its steering body. The puzzle is heightened by the fact that the Duma chose to preserve this institutional structure even after the 1995 parliamentary elections brought the communists and their

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2Both the 1994 and 1996 Dumas found a proportional solution to the distribution problem of allocating leadership positions in the chamber. This they did by adjusting the number of committees until a consensus solution was found, and by assigning weights to the different levels of these positions. The Duma chairmanship was the most valued position, deputy chairmanships next in attractiveness, then committee chairmanships, then deputy committee chairmanships. Each faction was assigned a number of “chips” or voting rights with which it bid on these positions: the chips were distributed according to the shares of seats each faction possessed. Over a weekend in January 1994, the leaders of the factions met and worked out a package deal which proved to be Pareto-optimal. Each faction acquired a share of the benefits of leadership that was roughly proportional to its strength in the Duma. Once the deputies had agreed to elect Ivan Rybkin (a moderate from the agrarian faction) to the chairmanship of the Duma, a grand package distributing the remaining leadership posts was then offered to the deputies on the floor as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. The 1996 Duma devised a similar proportional solution. First the chairman was elected, then the deputy chamber chairmanships were allocated on a parity basis to the factions. Then, as a package agreement, the committee chairmanships were distributed to the seven party factions and registered groups in rough proportion to their strength on the floor, while deputy committee chairmanships were distributed in such a way that the four party factions took roughly equal shares—one each for most committees—while the non-party factions took equal but smaller shares—roughly one each on 6 to 8 committees. Members who were outside party factions and registered groups were thus left outside the distribution of leadership positions entirely, while members of party factions were in a somewhat stronger position than members of registered groups. Finally, proportionality in the allocation of committee chairmanships rewarded the larger factions.
allies into a position where they command almost a clear majority of votes. Although it was, by some accounts, in their power to force through an alteration in steering arrangements that would have resulted in a more advantageous majoritarian framework, they refrained from changing the rules.

It is the adoption and stabilization of non-majoritarian steering institutions that provide the puzzle to which we address this paper. But first we seek to frame alternative arguments from the theoretical literature about institutional choice and development that might offer explanatory leverage on the problem. The flood of thinking about institutional development in recent years requires more than a superficial review of existing arguments and so we provide an extended discussion of some of the theoretical arguments that shape our analysis. We then examine evidence from surveys that we have conducted of candidates running for parliament and of members of the Duma over the last three years. The surveys allow us to combine our knowledge of what transpired in the Duma during the 1993-1996 period with evidence of the participants’ views of parliamentary institutions in order to provide a more complete account of the institutional choices that were made.

**Explaining Central Features of the Russian Duma**

Our goal is to explain the choice of central features of the new Duma—the Council of the Duma and the package deal for allocating leadership and committee positions within the Duma—at two crucial points in the short history of the Duma, the organization of the first modern Duma after the 1993 elections and the organization of the second Duma after the 1995 elections. Three explanations of this choice parallel important theoretical perspectives that we have outlined.

A common redistributive, demand-oriented, spatial perspective emphasizes variation in the distribution of policy preferences among the players as a driving force in institutional change.\(^3\) In this case, the distribution of preferences among deputies of the Duma would shape the decision-making process molded in the initial rules and any modifications to them that occurred after the 1995 elections. Given a sufficiently cohesive majority, we would expect the members to choose a majoritarian governing system that restricted the rights of minority factions or parties to crucial levers of power and resources, and established a strong central leader who, on behalf of the majority, directed the activities of the committees and staff. In the absence of a cohesive, policy-based majority, deputies would be unwilling to create a strongly centralized or majoritarian decision-making process that could be used against them. The governing structure might limit the power of a central leader, ensure ample rights for minorities to influence the legislative agenda, and distribute resources such as committee chairmanships and staffing widely. The absence of a highly centralized decision-

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\(^3\)The best examples in the congressional literature is the work by David Brady and his colleagues. See Brady (1988), Brady, Brody, and Epstein (1989), and Cooper and Brady (1981).
making process and the adoption of a party-based power-sharing arrangement in the Council of the Duma suggests that the Duma lacked a cohesive majority bloc after the 1993 and 1995 elections.

A second explanation focuses on members’ common interest in deriving material, career and other benefits from parliamentary status. This perspective incorporates a supply-side view of deputies’ circumstances. Whatever their policy positions, deputies in the new Duma may have shared certain goals at the early stages in the institution’s development. One such goal, the control over patronage and other perquisites of office, has long been important to Soviet-era and now post-reform legislators. Deputies would create institutional arrangements that maximized their overall welfare, judged in terms of the perks of office. The question for the deputies was how to provide those perks efficiently—a supply problem. Supply involved two elements: gaining resources and distributing resources among deputies. The first element depended on reestablishing a stable parliamentary structure and on the good will of the presidential administration, which could intervene to prevent the provision of staff funding, apartments, cars, and other perks. The second element meant that a heavy bias in the provision of perks in favor of a dominant parliamentary faction, if one existed, was not possible, given the recent experience with such a heavily biased arrangement in the transitional parliament. Some arrangement that would produce a “fair” distribution of perks would be required. The power-sharing system reflected in the Council of the Duma and package deal may be such an arrangement.

A third explanation, also taking a supply-side perspective, rests on the assumption that legislators’ seek reelection but is complicated by the presence of both party-list (PL) and single-member-district (SMD) deputies in the Duma. We can construct separate sets of preferences for PL and SMD deputies. The electoral fate of PL deputies is dependent on the support of central party leaders and on their parties’ reputations, so party leaders will be in a position to gain a central role in policy making and deputies will support strong party leaders who help to solve the coordination problems associated with maintaining or enhancing their parties’ reputations. The electoral fate of SMD deputies has little relationship to party, particularly in a system with underdeveloped local parties, so they seek to create an institution that allows them to pursue the activities outlined by Mayhew. Such a system would have weak parties, decentralized policy making, self selection in committee assignments, and freedom to pursue issues of concern to local constituencies. Meeting the electoral requirements of both PL and SMD deputies would require some hybrid system, the details of which are not easily predicted. Among other things, the details may turn on which group of deputies, PL or SMD, was advantaged by virtue of early organization and the timing of key decisions. This is the possibility we explore below.

In the sections that follow, we elaborate on each of these explanations and explore confirming and disconfirming evidence for each account. As evidence bearing on the reasons that the Duma chose the particular structure of leadership that it did in 1994 and 1996, we examine responses to a series of surveys that we administered to candidates running for the Duma in 1993 and 1995 and members of the elected Duma in
These surveys allow us to match respondent views on policy issues with their positions on various aspects of parliamentary organization. We are then able to explore variations in these patterns by ideological tendency, partisan affiliation, and electoral category. The dependent variable is the nature of respondent attitudes about three closely related aspects of parliamentary institutions: the degree to which the right to direct legislative processes and resources should be centralized; the desirability of granting political parties precedence in ordering parliamentary processes over other structural elements, such as individual members, committees, and the chamber’s leaders; and the degree to which a partisan majority should be able to govern parliament.

The Spatial Perspective

The spatial model posits that (1) deputies seek Duma passage of their preferred policies, (2) deputies seek institutional arrangements that enhance the prospects of passage of their preferred policies, and (3) the adopted institutional arrangements reflect the balance of power in the alignment of policy preferences. Proposition (1) is treated as an assumption; (2) and (3) are testable propositions, with (3) representing the core prediction of the spatial perspective examined here.

Complicating tests of a spatial account are multidimensionality and the role of party. When policy preferences are organized in a single dimension, a majority coalition is a possible and outcomes are dictated by the median voter. Explaining institutional choices is then a matter of identifying the policy and institutional preferences of the median voter. If two or more dimensions structure the policy space, no single majority exists and we must complicate the account by explaining the path by which a particular majority emerged to dictate the choice of institutional arrangements.

In spatial accounts, policy preferences are exogenous (and fixed) and are not considered to be influenced by party activity within the parliament. To the extent that party is recognized, it is treated as a function of, even as a by-product of, the activities of like-minded legislators. This perspective may seem strained in a party-list system where control over the placement of individuals on the party list gives party leaders a source of leverage over deputies seeking future party-list designation. But the spatial perspective provides that deputies, once in office, view parties and their leaders as tools for pursuing their policy preferences, wherever those preferences originate. The place of party interests is subsidiary to legislators’ policy interests, then, and is determined by the distribution of preferences within and across parties.

When parties are clearly differentiated but internally cohesive with respect to policy and institutional preferences, we expect deputies to work through their parties as they pursue their objectives. Thus, with differentiated and cohesive parties, we expect policy-based differences over institutional arrangements to be translated into party differences over institutional arrangements. A cohesive majority party or bloc of parties

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4Details of the surveys are provided in the Appendix.
would seek more centralized, party-oriented, and majoritarian arrangements, while members of smaller or less cohesive parties would prefer rules that protect the parliamentary rights of individuals and minorities.

We cannot pretend to offer a definitive test of these expectations at this early stage in the history of the Duma. But we can explore their fit using data from the four surveys we conducted between 1993 and 1996, two among candidates running for parliament, and two among the elected members. In order to do so, it is necessary to begin with a brief excursus into recent Russian political history.

Policy and Institutional Preferences Among the Candidates of 1993

We explore the relationship between policy preferences and attitudes about the presidium and its successor institutions using our surveys. We begin with a 1993 survey of parliamentary candidates, whose views were questioned before the new Duma was organized. These responses could not have been influenced by knowledge of the institutional arrangements chosen in the coming months. Then we turn to the 1994 deputies survey to measure attitudes of the players present in the Duma when the Council of the Duma arrangement was adopted in the first Duma. The 1995 candidate survey and the 1996 deputy survey allow us to measure changes in the alignment of policy and institutional preferences just before and after the formation of the second Duma.

To measure respondents' general attitudes about the old presidium arrangement, we posed two questions about the presidium model to our sample of parliamentary candidates: Did the respondent consider that it had been excessive, as much as proper, or insufficient, and did the respondent think that the new Federal Assembly needed a presidium. We measure ideological tendency in two ways.

One was to use the self-description that respondents themselves chose through their responses to the item, "Which of the political tendencies listed below is closest personally to you?" Respondents in some cases checked two and even three categories, but the great majority placed themselves in one of five principal ideological classes. These categories are self-defined, however, and, in the fluid context of Russian party politics, do not always lend themselves to a standard interpretation that accurately captures the respondents' views on major ideological questions.

The second approach was to examine the respondents' views on a battery of questions related to major national policy issues. These items included the desirability of accelerating land and enterprise privatization, adopting more laissez-faire or welfare policies for the state, encouraging Western investment, cutting military spending, adopting a more pro-Western foreign policy, tightening the CIS, emphasizing personal
rights over social order, and the like. In 1993, and in the other three surveys, a principal components analysis of respondents’ policy views revealed a single dominant dimension, on which questions related to support for market and property rights institutions demonstrated the highest loadings. The distribution appears to be anchored at one end by the reform/pro-market/right-wing position and at the other by the statist/leftist position.

Furthermore, the party affiliations of the candidates structured policy views to a considerable degree. Candidates running on the lists of Russia’s Choice, Yabloko, and PRES, the reform-oriented parties, were positioned well on one side of the left-right spectrum; communists, agrarians, Liberal-Democrats (Zhirinovsky’s party), and others occupied the opposite end. In fact, as the box plot in Figure 1 shows, there is virtually no overlap in the scores of the candidates of these two groups of parties. However, there is a great deal of overlap in left-right scores within each bloc. From a spatial perspective, party affiliation is of no practical significance to like-minded deputies, so we would not expect party differences to account for deputies’ preferences for institutional arrangements relevant to their policy goals.

We found that responses to the questions about the presidium divided sharply by ideological tendency and party, just as the spatial model predicts. Tables 1 and 2 show

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5Our surveys reveal that on major policy issues, such as whether to denounce the Belovezh treaties dissolving the USSR, land and enterprise privatization, the desired relationship to NATO, and openness to Western economic influences, sharp differences divide Russian politicians. These issues yield a strong left-right dimension, on which we observe a consistent polarization of political camps. The political landscape is strongly organized around this left-right dimension, which is related closely both to differences over pro- and anti-market economic orientations, and to pro-Western vs. nationalist foreign policy orientations. On some issues, politicians hold nearly unanimous opinions; among these are the desirability of preserving the integrity of the Russian state, the equality of regions, protectionism toward native industry, and blame for both sides for the Chechen conflict. However, the left-right division is associated with some divergence of views over basic constitutional principles. Generally the reform-oriented camp is more willing to delegate power to the president and the left seeks more parliamentary control over president and government.

6In the 1993 candidate survey, the 1994 deputy survey, and 1995 candidate survey, only one dimension exceeded an eigenvalue of 1.0. In each case, the dimension accounted for a little more than 50 percent of the variance. In the 1996 deputy survey, two dimensions had eigenvalues of greater than 1.0, with the first dimension accounting for 39 percent of the variance and the second accounting for 15 percent of the variance.

7It is worth noting that single-member district candidates showed a high variation in their policy views. They were not asked about their party affiliations because many of them ran without or with multiple party endorsements.
that candidates on the political right were far more likely than candidates on the left to disapprove of the way the old presidium was used. And candidates on the right were much more likely than those on the left to oppose adopting the presidium model in the new parliament. Moreover, as Tables 3 and 4 indicate, parties differed greatly in their central tendencies on questions about the presidium. As expected, parties similarly situated on the policy spectrum show similar balances of views on the presidium. The one exception appears to be DPR candidates, but we cannot put much confidence in these numbers with such small subsample sizes. Overall, we find some support for proposition (2) and see that preferences about policy and the presidium were organized by the party blocs.

[Tables 1-4]

Not all institutional arrangements are related to policy preferences, of course. And some preferences for institutional arrangements would depend on the eventual balance of forces in the Duma, something which candidates could not know before the election results were published. So, for example, candidates held quite mixed views about whether a party or coalition receiving a majority of seats in the new Duma should be able to name the chairman of the chamber, control the hiring of staff, name the chairs of committees, or set the content and order of the legislative proceedings (data not shown). And the respondents who supported majority control had policy scores that were not statistically different from those who opposed majority control on any of these aspects of Duma organization.

Of the party groups, only Communists took a cohesive stand on whether a majority party or bloc should have the right to control parliament--and they opposed it. On the issue of agenda control--whether a partisan majority should be able to determine the content and order of decision-making--among all respondents, one third were in favor, while 43 percent were not. In contrast, 85 percent of Communist candidate respondents were opposed to this principle. In fact, on all four items about majoritarian arrangements, 80-90 percent of the communists opposed giving a partisan majority rights over the chamber. Why? The communists--whose previous party organization had been banned and whose leaders had been jailed--had reasons to be quite pessimistic about the parliamentary election outcomes and therefore may have been more skeptical than other parties about the implications of majoritarian arrangements for the new Duma.

Policy and Institutional Preferences Among Deputies in 1994

It almost goes without saying that the distribution of preferences among elected deputies is what determines the choice of institutional arrangements. But by the time that we could interview them in the last month of 1994, many of the choices about institutional arrangements had been made, so the deputies' responses reflected nearly a year's worth of experience with the adopted institutional arrangements. In addition to a set of questions about policy issues, we asked respondents to comment on the power of the Council of the Duma, the influence of the Chairman of the Duma, and whether chairs of committees ought to have the right to vote in the Council of the Duma.
As for the candidates of 1993, the deputies of 1994 were aligned on a dominant dimension—in this case as the only factor with an eigenvalue exceeding 1.0 and accounting for more than 55 percent of the variance in a principal components analysis. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, the factions are fairly cohesive. The large, party-based factions—Russia’s Choice and Yabloko on the right, and the Agrarians, LDP, and Communists on the left—overlap little in their members’ policy preferences. The faction in the middle, the New Regional Policy group, was composed almost entirely of SMD deputies, as was the December 12 faction.

Deputies’ views of the power of the Council and its chairman, as well as of voting rights on the Council, were at best very weakly related to their policy scores. Deputies expressed general satisfaction with the influence of the Council and its chairman. A plurality of 47 percent considered the Council’s power to be about right and over three-fourths of the respondents considered the chairman’s power to be about right. Deputies favoring a stronger or weaker Council or chairman were not disproportionately left or right on the policy spectrum (data not shown).

Similar results obtain on the question of voting rights for committee chairs on the Council of the Duma. This has been a contentious matter. The system of equal faction representation on the Council, while denying committee chairs a vote, undercuts majority rule. Voting rights for committee chairs would enhance the influence of large factions because chairmanships were distributed in proportion to the factions’ shares of seats. We asked deputies whether they believed that committee chairs should have a full vote in the Council. Responses were only very weakly related to policy position. Communists and agrarians were slightly more likely to support adding committee chairs than were Russia’s Choice and Yabloko, which overwhelmingly preferred the present arrangement. This is perhaps reasonable in view of the larger than average size of factions on the left. But, on the whole, policy views did not produce markedly different attitudes about voting rights for chairs.

These findings for the deputies of the 1994-1995 Duma are puzzling in light of how strongly policy views structured attitudes about the Council’s predecessor institution, the presidium, among candidates for the Duma in 1993. In some way, the new Council satisfied deputies who once differed widely in attitudes about previous institutions and still differed widely in policy views.

The Council in 1994

The spatial model holds that under conditions such as those that obtain here—agents’ preferences are ordered transitively over a single policy dimension—the median voter determines the outcome of a given vote. In the case of the Duma, the model would predict that the deputies convening in January 1994 would elect as chairman someone slightly to the left of center, since that was the location of the median point in the
distribution of members along the left-right dimension. Indeed, the election of Ivan Rybkin—a member of the agrarian faction with a reputation of a moderate--fits this model well. Similarly, the model would also suggest that the median deputy on the dominant left-right dimension would choose the institutional arrangements closest to his or her policy interests. And yet a party-based, power-sharing arrangement was developed that does not seem to clearly advantage any deputy, party, or bloc. Is there a way to account for this result within the framework of the simple spatial model?

Perhaps we have mischaracterized the dimensionality of the policy space. Perhaps our survey instruments or analytical technique failed to tap or appropriately weight additional dimensions. As we have noted elsewhere, the differences between groups within the left and right blocs are smaller than differences between the two blocs. But if two or more dimensions were relevant to the deputies, then no single median deputy existed and no stable solution to the problem of replacing the presidium could be explained without additional theoretical apparatus. And we find what seems to be a remarkably stable and widely approved solution, one that survived the next election. In any event, analysis of roll-call voting patterns in the 1994-1995 Duma confirms the domination of a single dimension (Remington and Smith, 1995).

Another possibility is that deputies’ tolerance for variation from their ideal points was quite limited, which may have prevented a median deputy from coalescing with distant deputies to control the Duma. This possibility gains credibility once we take into account the enormous policy distances that probably are perceived by the players in transitional Russia. Deputies to the left or the right of the median deputy may not have viewed a compromise with the median deputy as an acceptable outcome. Even the presence of a unidimensional alignment of preferences would not guarantee that a majority would emerge and that its actions would be dictated by the median deputy.

The absence of a feasible majority may have led deputies to settle on a mutually acceptable power-sharing arrangement. By itself, the spatial account does not have a prediction for this eventuality. Perhaps deputies wanted to create a viable Duma so they could pursue their policy goals over the long run, in which case they needed some agenda-setting institution. But this cannot explain the cooperation of reform-oriented deputies who might have preferred a weak or chaotic Duma and left policy making to the president.

Whatever the dimensionality, the character of deputies’ preferences, or the basis for sharing power broadly, the spatial model does not easily account for the role of party in the Council of the Duma. There is no obvious reason why the median deputy would adopt a system of equal representation of parties on the Council. To the contrary, the

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8The deputies themselves conducted a series of straw polls to ascertain the levels of support for several candidates, and determined that neither a representative of the reform wing nor a hard-line leftist could win a majority. After Rybkin obtained the most votes in the straw poll, the members voted on his candidacy formally. He was elected by one vote.
median deputy would oppose such an arrangement if the median faction’s preferences were different from her own. Because factions can and do form and reform, it would have been very difficult to predict the policy position of the median faction.

We are left with the tentative conclusion that a spatial perspective cannot explain key features of the Council of the Duma chosen at the start of the 1994-1995 Duma. The absence of a feasible majority may have forced compromise on the composition of the Council, but the particular form of the Council is not easily explained in spatial terms.

The Council in 1996

General satisfaction with the Council may help us explain its continuation after the 1995 elections, but the election outcome might lead us to predict some other arrangement. In fact, the widely held view that forces in opposition to Yeltsin gained control of the Duma might lead us to expect that a strongly majoritarian process would have been imposed by the new majority. The spatial perspective appears to offer some useful guidance here.

The dominance of the left-right dimension had diminished some by 1996. In our 1996 survey of deputies, and using the same policy questions employed in the 1994 survey, the first dimension explained only 39 percent of the variance and was accompanied by another statistically significant dimension that accounted for 15 percent of the variance, as well as a two other dimensions that accounted for better than 10 percent of the variance each. These dimensions, associated with issues such as Chechnia, presidential power, relations with CIS states, and so on, divided forces on the left. Thus, while there may have been a new majority on the longstanding left-right dimension, the increased importance of other dimensions would have made it difficult for a majority to form around some new arrangement of the Council.

The Perquisites Perspective

A second model assumes that parliamentary status is an instrument to other goals desired by most members, such as prestige, material status, and career opportunities. We have ample reason to believe that control over the material perquisites that parliament has at its disposal was a powerful source of leverage wielded by past parliamentary chairs in Russia, given the scarcity of many of these advantages otherwise. Among them are the opportunity to acquire an apartment and residence permit in Moscow; use of car and driver; office space and equipment; staff; right to free travel; absolute legal immunity from all violations of the law; the chance to be included in delegations travelling abroad; use of the medical and recreational facilities possessed by parliament; VIP
treatment in public facilities; a diplomatic passport; and the right of access to the mass media. Even by the standards of Western parliaments, these are generous benefits. In the context of a society where privilege has been scarce and politically-allocated, they are a powerful incentive to become and remain a member of parliament.

In addition, many members are motivated by career ambitions for which parliament is a highly desirable spring-board (observation of European parliaments and previous Soviet and Russian parliamentary experience suggests that this goal is indeed present for many). Members seek committee assignments and committee leadership positions enabling them to gain expertise and influence in particular areas of policy-making. They give press conferences, hold hearings, and make televised speeches on the floor which allow them to advertise their positions. In these activities they can be helped or obstructed by the parliamentary leadership. In turn, their visibility improves their chances of being appointed to positions in the government or presidential administration.

Parliament is thus the source of a number of symbolic, material and career-related goods for its members, but their access to them is insecure. Both external and internal forces can interdict their supply. Externally, members face the threat of parliamentary dissolution at the hands of the president. As Yeltsin's actions in 1993 demonstrated, the balance of power between the presidency and parliament is tilted toward the president. Yeltsin's 1993 constitution, although establishing the principle of separation of powers, affirmed the asymmetrical political realities. The president can dissolve parliament, but parliament may not remove the president except through impeachment; the president can both veto legislation and issue edicts with the status of law; and the president controls the physical and material resources enjoyed by parliament. The events of 1993 proved that the president has the political power to deny these resources to parliament and annul the deputies' mandates. Deputies who value deputy status, we assume, would be reluctant to provoke the president to act in such a way again. Moreover, the president need not necessarily violate the constitution to dissolve

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9By Soviet tradition, which continues to exist, the VIP lounge at airports, train stations, and the like is called the "deputies' hall," in recognition of the privileges that elected soviet deputies were accorded. In the old regime, virtually all notables were deputies to some soviet or other, and thus this was an easy way to recognize and provide privileges to members of the political class.

10The presidential administration's chancery (upravliaiushchii delami) controls the budget of parliament, and manages the physical facilities of parliament, including its buildings, car pools, housing and recreational facilities, and the like. It is worth noting that parliament has made little concerted effort to remove these functions from the presidential administration.
parliament: under any of several conditions prescribed by the constitution, he can dissolve the Duma and call new elections.11

Second, a runaway chairman of the Duma could jeopardize the provision of material and other benefits to any particular member by using the allocation of perquisites strategically. A chairman might manipulate control over these goods either for his own political purposes, to build up a personal political empire, or at the behest of a particular faction in parliament. Moreover, whether by incompetence or design, such a chairman could readily lead parliament into a collision with the president, resulting in parliament’s dissolution and the holding of new elections. This may be too high a price for many deputies to pay simply to achieve their preferred policy outcomes, even if they otherwise support the chairman on policy grounds. Nor is such a sequence of events a remote possibility. Many deputies of varying political persuasions have blamed Ruslan Khasbulatov for deliberating manipulating the powers of the chairmanship to create a personal base of support in 1992-93. Khasbulatov forced several reform-minded members from their positions as committee chairs, denied recognition in floor proceedings to deputies he wished to punish, and rewarded those who supported his leadership with Moscow apartments, committee leadership jobs, and membership in delegations traveling abroad. Eventually, of course, he helped to steer parliament toward the uprising of October 1993 which was suppressed with considerable bloodshed. We would expect, therefore, that members who valued parliamentary status for the material, prestige, and career benefits it provides, and who wished to preserve parliament’s existence, would oppose delegating excessive power to any political leader who might jeopardize those benefits, even if the leader was acting on behalf of the policy interests of a majority.

The problem is analogous to the game recently modeled by John Huber (1996). Huber observed that members of a governing majority incur both electoral risks and possible loss of government patronage benefits if they defect from the prime minister on a vote of confidence over a policy dispute. Members of a dissenting faction in the prime minister’s coalition may therefore be willing to accept a policy outcome that falls well short of their preferred position so as to avoid parliamentary dissolution. In a purely parliamentary system, the prime minister controls the agenda, and hence the choice of proposals on which the members vote; thus he can force the members of the majority coalition to choose between supporting him or facing dissolution. In the Russian case, a strong chairman of the Duma has substantial power to guarantee outcomes, and the

11The president faces certain political and constitutional limitations on his ability to dissolve parliament. Constitutionally, he may not do so within one year of the election of a new Duma, nor within six months of the end of his own term, or when he has declared a state of emergency. Politically, he may be inhibited from dissolution by the prospect of obtaining an even more unfavorable balance of forces in the election. Members face a similar political risk, however, if they take actions that result in dissolution and new elections: no member can be certain of winning reelection. We postulate, therefore, that members incur a cost if collectively they act so as to bring about dissolution.
 president chooses how to respond. Members thus face a collective action problem: each prefers to keep the flow of status-related benefits secure but no one member is willing or able to bear the cost of preventing the chairman from behaving autocratically, arbitrarily, or provocatively.

Note that this problem exists even if the chairman is initially the elected agent of a majority party or bloc. A partisan majority might certainly wish to keep a lion’s share of parliament’s budget, staff, car pool, office space, dachas, and the like for itself: since there is a fixed quantity of many of these benefits, the more that any one group can limit other groups’ access to them, the more it can keep for itself. But imagine that a party or bloc wins a majority in the Duma and elects one of its members to the chairmanship under rules which favor a majority’s power over the perks. The chairman would then gain control over the pool of valued benefits at parliament’s disposal. There is then little to prevent an ambitious, self-interested chairman from using these to construct a base of power independent of his own party. Even expulsion from the party, under Duma rules, would not deprive him of the chairmanship. In view of the considerable leverage he could use to construct a personal following, his party might be unable to dislodge him from the chairmanship. Such a chairman could then steer parliament toward outcomes contrary to the wishes of the party majority, even to the extent of provoking dissolution. Thus even if a party gained a majority of seats, a chairman elected from that party could still escape control by that party’s own leadership, and use that power in such a way as to injure his own party’s interests in preserving the benefits of parliamentary membership. The party, as principal, would then face the challenge of checking its ostensible agent.

Again, this eventuality is far from hypothetical: Khasbulatov diverged very far from his original political camp as he drifted from the reform wing to the communist-nationalist wing; Rybkin gravitated well away from his original communist-agrarian support base and toward President Yeltsin’s camp. Under the past rules of parliamentary organization, a chairman had substantial freedom to cultivate his own base of support, something which a purely spatial model does not readily explain. On the more modest plane of committee chairmanships, a similar principal-agent problem arises. A number of committee chairs in 1994-95 grew politically independent of their political factions, and several left their factions but held on to their committee positions, having built up their own personal bases of power through their committees.

In this model, then, individual members value deputy status but need a low-cost means of ensuring that the supply of those benefits is secure. The president can disrupt the supply of these perks by dissolving parliament and forcing its members to face the risks of a new election campaign. A strong chairman can acquire control over their allocation and distribute them unequally, either as agent of a party majority, or to build a personal political empire. How, then, can members ensure continuing and secure access

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12See Myagkov and Kiewiet (1996) for an application of an agenda-setting model to the CPD, which finds that Khasbulatov did not always have the power to set policy proposals in such a way as to guarantee his most preferred outcomes.
to the "golden eggs?" The benefits themselves are private, but prevention of their
disruption is a collective good, and is therefore apt to be undersupplied unless an agent
takes on the costly responsibility for monitoring and checking the behavior of the
chairman and staff—which in turn raises the dilemma of monitoring that agent's behavior,
and so on. Even the parties themselves face the dilemma of controlling their own
representatives in leadership positions.

Majoritarian rules therefore do not resolve the problem of providing a secure flow
of parliamentary perquisites. If the members of a particular majority bloc could be certain
that a chairman would act as their faithful agent in dispensing the perks of parliament, it
could restrict the flow of such benefits efficiently to themselves. But as we have seen,
no party or bloc can be certain that a Duma chairman will behave in accordance with
their interests. Consequently, we would expect that most members of the Duma would
be reluctant ex ante to set up institutions that gave a partisan majority the power to
control the allocation of these benefits. They would instead prefer an allocative
institution that restricted enjoyment of these privileges to the smallest number of
members consistent with dispersed and efficient control over their allocation. A system
of partisan mutual control satisfies these requirements.

So far we have concentrated on the demand side of this model: members share a
common interest in enjoying the benefits of parliamentary status, but face a coordination
problem in providing an assured supply. In principle a number of solutions might be
devised, but in Russia the solution found came about as a result of the particular
sequence of events: constitutional crisis, parliamentary dissolution and new elections
under a party-oriented electoral law, consultations in Moscow among party leaders on
the new rules and the distribution of power in the new parliament, and finally the
convening of the new parliament. The political parties that cleared the five percent
electoral threshold to winning party list seats met after the election but before the new
members convened in Moscow, and coordinated on a party-oriented but non-
majoritarian institutional framework in which a new "Council of the Duma" was to
exercise many of the political powers wielded in the past by the Chairman and Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet. The Council of the Duma would meet before each daily session
of the full Duma and agree on an agenda to propose for debate, motions to amend, and
approval on the floor. It would make the principal steering decisions for the chamber
concerning legislative procedures and housekeeping matters, as well as setting policy for
relations with the government and president. It would be chaired by the Chairman of
the State Duma, who was to be elected by the full membership of the Duma, but the
members of the Council would have substantially independent bases of power. Finally,
purely administrative, resource-allocating tasks were assigned to a new Organizational
Committee of the Duma, which would operate under the supervision of the Council of
the Duma and of the full membership. The political, administrative, and allocative powers
of the old chairman and presidium were thus deconcentrated, but the final seat of
executive power within the chamber was vested in the Council of the Duma.

The institutional framework they devised allowed the party factions to take the
largest share of parliamentary privileges for their members, while dispersing control over
the allocation process in such a way as to ensure that no majority could gain exclusive
rights over them. The governing body they created gave each organized faction equal representation in the steering body of the Duma (thus ensuring that no faction had a majority) but set the threshold to inclusion rather high.

In the first week of the Duma's initial session in January 1994, deputies adopted a "tâtonnement" procedure to find the equilibrium level at which members would support restricting membership in the Council of the Duma. The specific rule to be chosen was the threshold size for membership in a non-party group that would be required for a group to register and thereby win the benefits of faction status, which included the right of representation in the Council of the Duma, the chance to bid on and receive committee chairmanships; rights of privileged recognition on the floor, the right to acquire office space and other material perquisites at the Duma's expense, and so on. Consistent with a perquisites-centered perspectives, SMD deputies proposed a very low threshold (15), while party-list deputies proposed a very high threshold (50). Successive alternative proposals were made and voted on (45, 20, 40, 25) and so on, until a compromise level of 35 won majority support. This is a rather high level--France's National Assembly, for instance, with 577 members, requires only 25 to form a registered group--and it filtered out all but one of the non-party groups that formed in the 1994 Duma.

The 1996 Duma retained the 35-member threshold rule. Under this rule, three groups have gained faction status that did not enter parliament via the party list route. Two of them—the agrarians and the People's Power groups—correspond to electoral associations which ran party lists in the election but failed to clear the 5% threshold for gaining list seats; a number of their leading members did, however, win district seats. Both fell just short of the 35-member threshold for registration. The communists then seconded them a sufficient number of members to enable them to register. Both lean toward the left, anti-market end of the ideological spectrum. By facilitating the registration of these two groups, the communists therefore obtained two allies on the Council of the Duma. Russia's Regions is the third group made up of SMD members which gained registration. Unlike the agrarians and People's Power, it had no external party organization, and had not run a list in the election. While it has a generally liberal ideological bent (its mean factor score is -.71) its internal heterogeneity is high (its standard deviation is .86). Commentators in the Duma sometimes say of it that it formed, not for any policy-oriented reason, but purely instrumentally—to gain the perks that flow from faction status and particularly the right to bid for committee chairmanships.

A party-oriented Duma appears to be an efficient means to share out the benefits of deputy status among the narrowest circle of members possible consistent with winning majority support for the rule, while through mutual control denying any one party from gaining a dangerous monopoly over those benefits. Each deputy who is member of a party faction or registered deputy group obtains a small but guaranteed share of the privileges of membership but gives up the chance to obtain a larger but much riskier slice.

We do not have direct evidence from our surveys with which to test this model against other explanations for the particular shape that the Duma's central features
assumed, but we can test it indirectly by examining member behavior at a point when
the deputies were forced to choose between voting for their most-preferred policy
outcome and preserving the flow of perks.\textsuperscript{13} This moment occurred in June-July 1995 in
connection with a drive by an alliance of communists and Yabloko members to deny the
government confidence. Remember that under the constitution, if twice within three
months the Duma passes a motion of no confidence in the government, or fails to give a
majority to a motion of confidence, the president chooses either to dissolve the
government or to dissolve the parliament and call new elections. On June 21, 1995, after
a Chechen terrorist hostage-taking incident, a motion expressing no confidence in the
government was voted on and approved by 241 to 72, with 20 members abstaining.
This action made it possible that if the same outcome occurred a second time within
three months, the president might dissolve parliament and call new elections. (The
alternative outcome, in the event of a second successful no confidence vote, was for the
president to dissolve the government instead. The president, however, immediately
declared that he would keep the government and dissolve the parliament.)

The government then unexpectedly forced the Duma’s hand the day after the
June 21 vote by demanding that the Duma vote on a motion of confidence in the
government. This manoeuvre invoked a different constitutional mechanism. If the
confidence motion were to fail, the president could immediately choose whether to
dismiss the government or dissolve the Duma. The passage of a motion of no
certainty two times and the failure of a motion of confidence once thus had similar
constitutional repercussions. The government used this rule to put the deputies over a
barrel: now not parliament but the government could choose the timing of the likely
dissolution of parliament. Both deputies and government understood that to assemble a
majority to express confidence in the government would be nearly impossible: by
forcing the issue, the government was blackmailing the members into choosing between
their majority-preferred policy outcome, and their instinct for political self-preservation.

The government’s dare panicked many deputies. They had expected to be able
to hold the threat of a second no confidence vote over the government’s head for three
months, and did not wish to be forced to vote on a motion of confidence, knowing that
it could never pass, but that when it failed, the president would dissolve parliament early
and call early elections. The deputies would then be forced to conduct their election
campaigns without the benefit of the privileges they enjoyed as deputies, such as free
transportation to and from and within their districts. They were also uncertain how their
anti-government stance would sit with the voters. Opinion surveys were starting to
show that the Russian public by a large majority approved the prime minister had
handled the hostage crisis. Deputies feared that they would lose electoral support for
their action. Nonetheless, the Duma agreed to schedule a confidence vote for July 1. At
the same time, negotiations between parliament, government and president began
immediately to find a way out of the impasse.

\textsuperscript{13}Some of the account that follows is based upon personal observation and
interviews with members at the time of this incident.
Eventually Chairman Rybkin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed on a procedural solution, backed up by some personnel changes in the government that removed a few figures who were particularly objectionable to some liberal members of the Duma. They agreed that the Duma would first vote on a motion of no confidence on July 1. If it failed, the government would withdraw its request for a vote of confidence. Because, like a vote of confidence or a vote on a draft law, passage of a motion of no-confidence requires a high threshold (a majority of all deputies, voting or not), everyone concerned understood that it would be far easier to engineer the defeat of the no-confidence motion than it would be to ensure passage of a vote of confidence. The constitutional effect, however, was the same: both government and parliament would survive to fight another day. On July 1, the Duma voted on the no-confidence motion. The motion failed, receiving 193 votes in favor, 116 against, and 48 abstentions. The government then duly withdrew the motion of confidence and the crisis was resolved.

Had the deputies’ policy preferences changed? It is possible that the removal of four officials blamed for the hostage incident may have altered the median deputy’s position on the confidence issue, in accordance with the spatial model. But it is at least as likely that these changes simply gave a few dozen deputies a pretext to switch their votes in order to avert the risk of the government’s defeat and the loss of their parliamentary status.

The Reelection Perspective

A final perspective is that deputies designed institutional arrangements to meet their electoral goals. The electoral model posits that (1) deputies seek to get reelected, (2) deputies seek institutional arrangements that enhance the prospects of reelection, and (3) institutional arrangements are designed to meet electoral needs. Whether institutions are designed to meet the electoral needs of all or just some legislators depends on whether reelection is a positive- or zero-sum game for legislators.

As we noted, the Russian case is particularly interesting because of the presence of an equal number of PL and SMD deputies. The electoral fate of PL deputies is dependent on the support of central party leaders and on their parties’ national reputations, while the electoral fate of SMD deputies has a weaker relationship to party and is more dependent on the deputies’ personal reputations in local districts. For expectations about the institutional implications of these two sets of deputies, we simply borrow from the extensive literature on the subject. PL deputies should favor a system that is generally party-oriented and gives more power to central party leaders, who are needed to maintain and enhance party reputations and who have the leverage with PL deputies to gain compliant behavior. PL deputies see reelection at least partially as a zero-sum game among the parties. SMD deputies prefer freedom to associate with parties as they wish, freedom from the binding constraints of strong parties, and freedom to pursue issues of concern to local constituencies in a more decentralized decision-making process. They are more likely to see reelection as a positive-sum game.
The questions are, Do deputies’ attitudes about key features of the Council of the Duma reflect their different electoral needs? And do the key features of the Council reflect some predictable aggregation of the institutional preferences of deputies with such varied electoral needs? We already can note that the party-based composition of the Council seems to represent the influence of PL deputies and their leaders. So the second question can be reoriented: Why did the interests of PL deputies supercede the interests of SMD deputies in the organization of the Council of the Duma?

The answer to the first question appears to be yes. Table 5 reviews differences between PL and SMD candidates and deputies in 1993 and 1994 on a number of questions about their views of institutional arrangements in the Duma. SMD candidates were more likely than PL candidates to view the influence of the old presidium as excessive and much less eager to have a presidium reestablished in the new Duma. Contrary to our expectations, SMD candidates were a bit more supportive than PL candidates of the idea that a majority party or bloc would control chairmanships and staff—although the most important point may be that most candidates of both types were not anxious about reestablishing a majoritarian institution. By the time we interviewed incumbent deputies in late 1994, even this difference ran in the expected direction. By late 1994, SMD deputies were as accepting as PL deputies of the influence of the Council or the Duma chairman than PL deputies, they were far more critical of the role of parties and their leaders, but the SMD deputies were much more opposed to rule by majority parties or blocs and more supportive of giving committee chairs a formal voice on the Council. And these differences between PL and SMD candidates and deputies continued into the next 1995 campaign and 1996 Duma. Thus, for the candidates seeking a seat in the 1994-1995 Duma and for the elected deputies of that Duma, attitudes about key features of the Council of the Duma reflect their different electoral needs.

[Table 5]

The PL-bias of the system needs explanation but must first be understood in greater detail. To gain faction status in the Duma, a group must either have won representation in the Duma on the basis of party-list voting or register at least 35 deputies under its name. This threshold was set just low enough to win a majority’s consent and high enough to ensure that only a few organized factions can enjoy the benefits of official faction status. Parity representation in the Council of the Duma keeps all factions satisfied while proportionalism in the distribution of committee chairmanships ensures that a stronger faction is not greatly disadvantaged by the non-majoritarian character of Council membership. Members of strong parties, regardless of electoral category, would be predicted to support these arrangements. Members of weaker parties (those failing to cross the five percent threshold) and members of non-party factions (registered groups) would be less supportive because they face certain disadvantages under the system: before the election, their candidates cannot be sure that they will win a place in the governing body, while after the election their members face the danger that they will fail to retain 35 members and so will lose their registered status. Finally, deputies outside any party faction or registered group are at the gravest disadvantage under this system, so might be even expected to oppose it: they do not
have any chance of bidding on leadership posts, they lack a voice on the Council of the Duma, they lack privileged floor rights and other perks of faction status. On the other hand, they still enjoy the public good that follows from the Duma’s non-majoritarian structure, to wit, the party-provided hurdles to the rise of a despotic chairman.

The question about the PL-bias of the adopted system may have three related answers, one that requires more detail about the electoral system, one that notes the special advantages enjoyed by PL deputies, and one that requires that we account for the sequence of events leading to the adoption of the Duma’s rules in 1994. First, more than the PL deputies may be interested in a party-oriented system. Some of the SMD deputies also ran on a party list and may want to run on a party list in the future, giving them incentive to adhere to be responsive to party demands and needs. Second, PL deputies are organized and have chosen leaders before a new Duma convenes, giving them an edge over SMD deputies who do not meet until the Duma convenes. And third, the party leaders began devising parliamentary rules and organization in December, 1993, even before the official election results were published, giving party leaders an opportunity to present a well-developed plan for the organization of the new parliament before SMD deputies had a chance to consider it and perhaps organize to oppose it. Thus, electoral motivations combined with the collective action and the sequence of events to advantage a PL-biased approach.

A Multivariate Perspective

We have noted that each of our three theoretical perspectives seems to fit particular elements of the early history of Russian Duma. The spatial perspective correctly predicts that politicians whose political positions were well served under the old presidium-governed parliament favor retention of this system while their political opponents do not. With respect to critical choices about institutional arrangements made by the new Duma, however, and retained in the succeeding Duma, the spatial model offers little useful guidance. Although we could not look for confirming or disconfirming evidence for the perquisites perspective with our survey data, we noted that it fit the observed facts reasonably well, including the non-majoritarian and party-oriented nature of the Council of the Duma’s composition and the deputies’ revealed preferences in averting parliamentary dissolution. We found evidence broadly consistent with the reelection perspective, which predicts differences in institutional preferences between PL and SMD candidates and deputies.

In our view, these findings support the argument that it is premature to choose among the theories of parliamentary institutions or to hope for rapid integration of the theories. It is tempting to say that a complete model of the emergence and evolution of legislative institutions would presumably need to account for different aspects of central organizational features in different ways: some clearly relate to the zero-sum conflict over policy choices among members of opposing political camps, but others are best explained as an effort to coordinate the supply of desired goods. Our concern is that such a model would become a generic cost-benefit model with no directly operational form.
At this stage in the development of the field, progress is most likely to be made by further specifying alternative models and testing them against each other wherever the data permit it. In this case, we are able to estimate the influence of variables derived from the policy and reelection perspectives in a single equation. For the spatial perspective, the survey respondents' policy positions have been identified through dimensional analysis. For the reelection perspective, the survey respondents' mode of election is readily identified. We can therefore examine the relative importance of policy positions and mode of election for the respondents' views of on the procedural and organizational issues reviewed in Table 5. We have transformed all of the variables addressed in Table 5 into dichotomous variables (as implied in the table) and estimated logistic regression equations for them using the respondents’ policy dimension scores and mode of election as covariates.

As Table 6 shows, on many organizational issues, deputies on the left and the right have rather similar distributions of views, while for most issues, electoral category accounts for a good deal of the variation in deputies’s outlooks, even when ideological differences are held constant. Since parties vary in their composition by electoral type (for example, in both Dumas, nearly all LDPR and Yabloko members were elected from party lists, while agrarians in the new Duma were predominantly SMD), policy position may be significantly correlated to electoral type. However, a difference of means test shows that neither in the 1994 nor 1996 Duma was the difference in ideological scores between SMD and PL deputies significant. Nonetheless, some of our attitudinal measures clearly tap divisions that engage the policy-based left-right dimension, while others reveal electoral considerations arising from the different categories of membership.

| Table 6 |

Among the current (1996) pool of deputies, judgments about the influence of Chairman Seleznev are significantly related to the left-right division, and not at all to electoral type, while views of the influence of their own faction leader’s power are strongly related to their electoral situation and not at all to their location on the right-left continuum. Electorally-based influences on politicians’ preferences regarding institutional choices are significant even when ideology is held constant. The results support our view that members hold different kinds of goals simultaneously and align differently over different kinds of choices. In the case of the new State Duma, the existence of a shared interest in designing a parliament that could service their common needs for status benefits and electoral advantage enabled them to circumvent their sharp ideological differences. This occurred, however, as parliamentary party leaders took

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14In 1994, a difference of means test between SMD and PL deputies on the left-right dimension showed that SMD deputies in the sample were slightly more reform-minded than were PL deputies (a mean of -.12 for SMD respondents as opposed to .16 for PL respondents). But the difference was barely statistically significant. In the 1996 pool of deputies, there was no difference at all.
advantage of their ability to agree on a party-oriented governance structure in advance of the convening of the full membership. The one-month space of time between election and first session, combined with the absence of agreed-upon usable models from the old system, gave those individuals who were organized and ready the opportunity to shape parliament in accordance with their wishes.

Future Directions

To scholars seeking comprehensive accounts of institutional development, our argument and evidence in favor of retaining distinct theories of institutional choice must be frustrating. We share their desire for an integrated theory that settles on a single goal, accounts for the interaction or tradeoffs among goals, or in some other way resolves the basic differences in frameworks among existing theories. But we are not optimistic that the most frequently recommended conceptual framework, the spatial perspective, offers much hope as the basis of a comprehensive theory. In our view, the first priority of future work should continue to be to clarify and test differences of theoretical perspectives. We should continue to focus on “crucial turning points,” as Riker suggested, and to delineate alternative explanations of specific institutional changes.

We have left untouched many important questions of the organization of parliaments. For example, we have not given parliamentary parties sufficient emphasis in our discussion of the Duma. While we have tested the effect of policy differences and electoral category on Russian politicians’ outlooks on legislative institutions both separately, we have not tested for the effect of party on differences among members. As we observed, different parties differ in their composition by electoral types. Also, they overlap substantially in their policy positions: parties of the left cluster on one side of the spectrum, and reform-oriented parties are often more similar than different in their policy views. If parties were purely instruments of policy-related preferences, we might expect to see more coalescence among like-minded parties. If they were purely electoral vehicles, we might expect greater homogeneity in their composition by electoral mandate type. Is there more to party, then, than ideology and reelection?

We might speculate that parties enable their members to coordinate their action despite differences in their electoral interests or legislative goals. They may solve collective action problems for their members, enabling them to trade off influence or opportunities in one legislative or electoral arena in order to win benefits in another, more vital one. A PR electoral system encourages multiple parties to form and persist by lowering the cost of failing to win pluralities in particular districts. This makes it more practicable for parties differing widely in size, degree of organization, nature of appeal, level of concentration or dispersion of support and other features to maintain themselves by serving the common interests of their members in the parliamentary arena. In future research, we hope to shed further light on the evolution of legislative parties.

While we have been pessimistic about an integrated theory of institutional change, we remain optimistic about the prospects for progress in understanding the process of institutional development. We also view the newly democratizing systems of
the world as an opportunity to make first-hand observations about the critical first steps that may shape the direction of institutional development for many decades to come. In our case, we have taken advantage of surveys of participants in order to avoid some of the problems associated with drawing inferences from observed behavior. Many potentially crucial turning points in institutional development occur in the formative years of institutions and give political science splendid opportunities to test the emerging body of theory about institutional choices.
References


Dodd, Lawrence C. “Congress and the Quest for Power.” In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress Reconsidered. New York: Praeger.


Table 1. How much influence did the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet have over the Supreme Soviet's Work? In Percent, By Self-Described Political Tendency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Democrat-Centrist</th>
<th>Centrist</th>
<th>National Patriot</th>
<th>Communist</th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>Mean Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excessive</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>-.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>.22</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(110)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(110)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(420)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: omits 81 respondents who marked "other" or indicated other multiple combinations of tendencies).

Table 2. In your opinion, does the Federal Assembly need a Presidium? In Percent, By Self-Described Political Tendency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Democrat-Centrist</th>
<th>Centrist</th>
<th>National Patriot</th>
<th>Communist</th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>Mean Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>-.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to Say</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(110)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(110)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(420)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: omits 81 respondents who marked "other" or indicated other multiple combinations of tendencies).
Table 3. How much influence did the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet have over the Supreme Soviet’s Work? In Percent, By Party on the Party List.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party List</th>
<th>SMD</th>
<th>Russ Choice</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Civic Union</th>
<th>Women of Russia</th>
<th>RRDR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excessive</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proper</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to Say</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party List</th>
<th>Agrarian Pty</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>DPR</th>
<th>LDG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excessive</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proper</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to Say</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. In your opinion, does the Federal Assembly need a Presidium? In Percent, By Party on the Party List.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party List</th>
<th>SMD</th>
<th>Russ Choice</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Civic Union</th>
<th>Women of Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidium Needed for State Duma?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needed</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Needed</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to Say</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party List</th>
<th>RDDR</th>
<th>Agrarian Pty</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>DPR</th>
<th>LDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidium Needed for State Duma?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needed</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Needed</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to Say</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Differences in Attitudes About Institutional Arrangements Between Party-List (PL) and Single-Member-District (SMD) Candidates and Deputies (in percent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>PL</th>
<th>SMD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1993 Candidates Survey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rated as “excessive” the influence of the old Supreme Soviet presidium</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>64.9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>considered a presidium to be necessary for the new Duma</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>35.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreed that a majority party or bloc be allowed to name the chairs of committees</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>37.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreed that a majority party or bloc should be allowed to appoint the staff of the Duma</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreed that a majority party or bloc be allowed to set the agenda of the Duma</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>35.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1994 Deputies Survey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rated as “excessive” the influence of the Council of the Duma</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rated as “excessive” the influence of the chairman of the Duma</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreed that committee chairman should be given full voting rights on the Council of the Duma</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>53.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rated as “excessive” the influence of factions on the Duma</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>37.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rated as “excessive” to the influence of faction leaders</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>31.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increase or leave as is the size of the central staff</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>44.6*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1995 Candidates Survey

agreed that parties should have an important role in organizing the parliament 84.3 47.2*

agreed that a majority party or bloc be allowed to name the chairs of committees 72.8 55.4*

agreed that a majority party or bloc should be allowed to appoint the staff of the Duma 55.1 32.2*

agreed that a majority party or bloc be allowed to set the agenda of the Duma 51.7 25.3*

1996 Deputies Survey

rated as “excessive” the influence of the Council of the Duma 13.6 17.2

rated as “excessive” the influence of the chairman of the Duma 30.9 28.0

rated as “excessive” the influence of factions in the Duma 21.0 47.3*

rated as “excessive” the influence of their own faction leader 9.9 32.3*

agreed that committee chairman should be given full voting rights on the Council of the Duma 32.1 38.3*

*Statistically significant difference (p < .05) between PL and SMD respondents. Source: 1993 and 1995 candidate surveys, 1994 and 1996 deputy surveys.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Policy Position</th>
<th>Election Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1993 Candidates Survey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rated as &quot;excessive&quot; the influence of the old Supreme Soviet presidium</td>
<td>-1.33*</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considered a presidium to be necessary for the new Duma</td>
<td>-.39*</td>
<td>.87*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreed that a majority party or bloc be allowed to name the chairs of committees</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreed that a majority party or bloc should be allowed to appoint the staff of the Duma</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreed that a majority party or bloc be allowed to set the agenda of the Duma</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1994 Deputies Survey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rated as &quot;excessive&quot; the influence of the Council of the Duma</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rated as &quot;excessive&quot; the influence of the chairman of the Duma</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreed that committee chairman should be given full voting rights on the Council of the Duma</td>
<td>.40*</td>
<td>-1.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rated as &quot;excessive&quot; the influence of factions on the Duma</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-1.52*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rated as &quot;excessive&quot; to the influence of faction leaders</td>
<td>-.39*</td>
<td>-.48*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995 Candidates Survey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreed that parties should have an important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
role in organizing the parliament  
agreed that a majority party or bloc be allowed to name the chairs of committees  
agreed that a majority party or bloc should be allowed to appoint the staff of the Duma  
agreed that a majority party or bloc be allowed to set the agenda of the Duma  

1996 Deputies Survey  
\[ \begin{array}{cc}
\text{rated as "excessive" the influence of the Council of the Duma} & -.52^* & .25 \\
\text{rated as "excessive" the influence of the chairman of the Duma} & -1.01^* & -.25 \\
\text{rated as "excessive" the influence of factions in the Duma} & -.65^* & 1.28^* \\
\text{rated as "excessive" the influence of their own faction leader} & -.50 & 1.48^* \\
\text{agreed that committee chairs should be given full voting rights on the Council of the Duma} & .08 & .28^* \\
\end{array} \]

*Statistically significant (p < .05).
Figure 1. Left-Right Factor Score of 1993 Party-List Candidates, by Party (Single-Member-District Candidates as a Separate Category).

Figure 2. Left-Right Factor Score of 1994 Deputies, by Parliamentary Faction.

Appendix 1: Description of Survey Data.

1993 Candidate Survey

A. conducted October-November 1993
B. Carried out by Center for Political Technologies (Moscow) in cooperation with Postfaktum News Agency and VTsIOM (All-Russian Center for Study of Public Opinion, ie Russia's leading survey research institute)

C. N = 420. All are candidates running for State Duma
   1. 248 SMD candidates
   2. 172 list candidates, of whom 30 are also SMD.

D. 31 regions represented. At least 68 electoral districts are represented, but several deputies refused to indicate their district.

E. Location of districts:
   1. city of Moscow: 48 respondents from SMD's
   2. city of St. Pete: 36
   3. other regions: Altai krai; Arkhangel'sk; Briansk; Volgograd; Voronezh; Irkutsk; Karachaevo-Cherkessia; Krasnodar krai; Krasnoyarsk krai; Mordovia; Moscow oblast; Nizhnii Novgorod; Novosibirsk; Omsk; Perm; Rostov; Samara; Saratov; Sverdlovsk; Smolensk; Stavropol; Tatarstan; Tula; Udmurtia; Ulyanovsk; Khabarovsk; Cheliabinsk; Chuvashia.

F. Party lists:
   1. 25 Russia's Choice (includes 8 SMD);
   2. 11 PRES (includes 1 SMD);
   3. 13 Yabloko (includes 1 SMD);
   4. 11 Civic Union (includes 2 SMD);
   5. 8 Women of Russia (includes 1 SMD);
   6. 7 RDDR;
   7. 27 Agrarian (includes 8 SMD);
   8. 25 Communist (includes 1 SMD);
   9. 10 DPR (includes 1 SMD);
  10. 31 LDPR (includes 7 SMD);
   11. 3 Future of Russia/New Names.
1994 Deputy Survey

A. conducted December 1994 - January 1995
B. N = 214 (all members of the State Duma)
C. conducted by Center for Political Technologies with interviewers of VTsIOM
D. Breakdown of respondents by faction is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>SMD</th>
<th>PL</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s Choice</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRES</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regional Policy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1995 Candidate Survey

A. conducted 1 October 95 - 15 December 1995 by Center for Political Technologies
B. N = 203
C. Electoral categories:
   1. 102 running in SMDs;
   2. 40 on lists only;
   3. 61 both SMD + PR
D. regions represented (republics, oblasts, krais):
   1. Bashkortostan: 5 elec. districts, 13 respondents
   2. Altai krai: 2; 15
   3. Krasnodar krai: 2; 16
   4. Belgorod obl.: 1; 1
   5. Kemerovo: 4; 15
   6. Leningrad obl.: 1; 1
   7. Nizh. Novgorod: 2; 2
   8. Omsk: 2; 18
   9. Penza: 2; 19
10. Pskov: 1; 1
11. Rostov: 6; 12
12. Samara: 5; 23
13. Sverdlovsk: 1; 1
14. Tula: 3; 12
15. Chelyabinsk: 5; 14
E. distribution by party of those running on a list:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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1996 Deputy Survey

Conducted 20 March 1996 - 29 April 1996 by Center for Political Technologies with VTsIOM interviewers

A. N = 175

B. breakdown of respondents by party and electoral type:

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Appendix II: Summary of Basic Findings

I. Major findings from the 1993 survey of candidates:

The communists are far more likely to have gotten financial support for their campaigns than any other party. 80% of them got financial help. Only 22% of all our respondents got any financial help from their central party or bloc organizations and over half got campaign materials. Of those with some relationship to a national party or bloc, 65% received campaign materials. Among respondents from well organized groups like Russia’s Choice and Civic Union, 80% got campaign materials. But over 90% of the communists did so. (As did all 8 of our Women of Russia candidates.) And only half of the Zhirinovsky candidates did so. 85% of our communist candidates got instructional materials on running a campaign, higher than the % for any other party. (40% for the others on average.) Almost 90% took part in consultations and workshops on campaigning (40% for the rest). For 85%, the party helped them organize their agitation campaign (40% for the rest). Unlike the other parties, among the communists not one candidate reporting receiving no help at all from the central party organization.

With respect to the bloc of questions on how long candidates had contact with their parties, communists again stand out. All 26 of our communist respondents had been associated for at least one year; 20% for 3 or more. The Civic Union respondents (of whom we had only 11) also were all veterans of the organization--had been associated with the organization for at least a year. Russia’s Choice also were experienced party veterans; 3/4 of them (25 were in our sample) had been in contact with it for a year or more. three quarters of our 30 LDPR candidates had been in touch with the party for a year or two, but the rest reported less contact. By electoral type: most PR candidates had at least a year of contact with their parties: 70% of those running on lists only and 2/3 of PR+SMD had had this much contact. Of SMD only candidates, this was so of fewer than half. So proximity to party pays off in obtaining a place on a list.

The close ties that communist candidates had to their party continue to be apparent in the responses to the question about whether candidates had themselves participated in elaborating the platforms and campaign strategies of their parties and blocs. 3/4 of the communists answered affirmatively but only 1/4 of the Russia’s Choice candidates did so. (PRES and Civic Union’s respondents had also by wide margins participated in this effort for their parties; so had 60% of the Yabloko candidates.) Similarly, the communists exhibit traditional party discipline in their responses to the question of how fully they share the views of their party electoral platform: 80% of them “fully agree” with it, the rest partly agree. No other party except for Women of Russia showed such high consensus (all 8 of the WOR candidates “fully shared” their bloc’s platform). Only 44% of the Russia’s Choice candidates were “fully” in agreement with their platform. Among the LDPR, the share who fully agreed with their platform was 63%, the same as the Agrarian Party contingent.
The candidates also show an expected variation on this item by electoral type: of those running only on a party list, 60% fully agree with their party's platform, as do half of those running both ways, and one third of those running in districts.

When we examine the breakdown of views on legislative organization, very sharp differences of opinion by political party appear. 70% of the communists and 55% of the agrarians considered the degree of power of the presidium of the old Supreme Soviet to be appropriate, whereas the reform-oriented parties by overwhelming margins considered it excessive (90% for Russia's Choice; 80% for PRES; 70% for Yabloko). Among reform groups, very few (less than 10% for most) candidates thought that the new Federal Assembly would need a presidium whereas 85% of the communists thought it would (though only 48% of the agrarians agreed with them). Differences among candidates on these questions were very marked but differences among candidates of different electoral categories showed little apparent pattern.

Similar patterns but less marked also appeared in responses to the questions about organizing the chambers--most candidates (61%) believed that a presidium would be needed for the new State Duma, but while 88% of communists thought this, only 56% of the Russia's Choice candidates did so. Deputies were somewhat more willing to centralize chambers in a genuinely bicameral legislature than in one where the presidium regulated both houses.

II. Major findings from the 1995 survey of candidates:

Candidates running both on lists and in SMD's were considerably more likely to report getting financial help from the central organs of their parties--only 30% of those running only on a list got such help, whereas over half of the candidates running both ways did so. Only 22% of the SMD-only candidates reported receiving such help.

Among parties, the numbers are tiny, but the results illustrative: about half of the Russia's Choice, LDPR and Communist candidates reported getting financial help from their party's central bodies, but fewer in other parties.

About three quarters of the respondents received campaign materials (agitation materials) from their party's central bodies, but this was higher among those running on lists--60% for SMD-only candidates, compared with 86% for list-only candidates and 80% for PR+SMD candidates.

Most of those who answered received help in the form of guidelines and advice on how to run a campaign, with 90% of those running on party lists getting such help. Most received help in the form of workshops and consultations on their campaigns, with Russia's Choice and communists about equally likely to report receiving such advice.

Most who responded had help managing their campaign, but those on party lists with substantially more likely to report such help than those running in districts alone (three quarters and more as opposed to half). Again, there was little difference between communists and Russia's Choice in this respect (though N's are small).
Overall, two thirds of respondents reporting receiving financial help from regional and local party organs. But this varied significantly across electoral categories. Fewer than half of those running only in districts reported receiving such help, whereas over 3/4 of those running both on lists did so. Communists and Russia's Choices were equally likely to report this form of help, but they were higher than other parties (of whom very few bothered to answer the question).

86% of candidates who answered reported receiving agitation materials from their local or regional party organs, but this was almost universal among those on party lists and only 2/3 for SMD only candidates.

Similarly, party list candidates were overwhelmingly likely to have received guidelines on how to run their campaigns from local and regional party organizations (90% of those running both on a list and in a district received such help but fewer than 2/3 of those running only as an SMD candidate). Different parties were about equally likely to provide such support.

The PR + SMD candidates were also far more likely to have received help in the form of consultations and workshops on running their campaigns from local party organizations than were either SMD-only or PR-only candidates, of whom only about half reported receiving this help. Again, there appears to be little difference among parties in this respect.

Over 90% of the party list candidates received help in organizing their campaigns from local and regional party organs whereas only 60% of SMD-only candidates did so. There were no differences across parties in this respect.

Only about 40% of the candidates reported helping to write the electoral platform of their party, slightly more among SMD candidates than list candidates. About half of both communist and Russia's Choicers reported that they had done so. Somewhat fewer, around 35%, responded that they had helped design their party's national electoral strategy, again with RC more likely than CP candidates to report having done so (57% vs. 37%).

Party list and SMD-only candidates divide sharply over the issue of whether parties ought to play an important role in managing parliament: fewer than half of the SMD-only candidates agreed, whereas 84% of those running on lists agreed (in equal proportions for the PR-only and PR+SMD groups). Three quarters of the RC respondents agreed with this principle, as did 90% of the communists.

Almost no differences were apparent across electoral types or parties in responses to the questions about the reasons different candidates thought they were nominated--all cited factors such as their record of support for their parties and their prominence as leaders by similar proportions.

This time there were few differences between communists and RC candidates with respect to how much they agreed with their party platforms: 2/3 of the Russia's Choice candidates responded that they fully accepted it, and 72% of communists. Of those who
described themselves as being closest ideologically to "democrats," only 57% said they fully agreed with their party platform as compared with 83% of the self-described communists.

There was little difference by electoral category with respect to career orientations; about 36% responded that they did intend to make a career out of parliament or government. But we had rather few responses to the question. Of the ten RC candidates who answered, half responded yes; of the 7 communists, all responded yes. Little weight can be placed on this item in view of the reluctance of candidates to answer it.

On the question of how the right to propose amendments to legislation should be distributed, little difference in responses by electoral category was apparent: about 30% believed that this right should be restricted to committee sessions only, and around 2/3 would allow it on the floor as well. Communists and Russia's Choice were not appreciably different on this question (8 out of 12 communist respondents took the less restrictive position, as did 13 of 14 RC respondents.)

As in previous surveys, there was a pronounced tendency for pro-reform politicians to be more inclined to espouse the "trustee" conception of duty in cases of conflict between the views of a deputy and his constituents. We asked 2 separate questions on this point, one to be answered only by SMD candidates, and one only by party list candidates. Many respondents nonetheless answered both, even if they were running only in one category. Overall, about 60% of respondents indicated that they thought that their own convictions should prevail over the voters' views in case of conflict; this was also the response of 3/4 of the RC candidates but only 43% of the communist candidates. In the question on conflict between a deputy elected from a party list and his or her party faction, respondents were about evenly divided between those who cited the faction and those who cited their own views as the final arbiter. But among the RC and communist candidates who answered, over half the RC list candidates acknowledged that the faction would be their guide whereas only 1/3 of the communist respondents did so. As to the question about the appropriate decision rule for voting on decisions in the Duma, similar proportions of RC and communist list respondents--about 60% agreed with the more restrictive threshold of a majority of the total number of deputies rather than a majority of those present and voting. Other factions showed a tendency to want a more relaxed threshold, among them Women of Russia and APR.

Concerning the question of the "imperative mandate" issue--ie whether a member of a party faction who violates party discipline should be subject to the loss of his parliamentary mandate--there were almost no differences across candidates by electoral category. Here party differences, though, appeared strongly: 7 of 9 communist candidates who responded agreed with this rule, and 6 of 9 RC candidates disagreed.

On the policy questions:
The question of whether land should be subject to free purchase and sale is one of the most fundamental dividing lines in Russian politics. Our surveys consistently find a sharp divergence over this issue. Among our candidates, about 60% would countenance property rights in land either categorically or with reservations. The proportion is roughly the same for all electoral categories. But differences among parties are acute: 13 of 15 Russia's Choice candidates support property rights in land but 9 of 12 communists oppose this. This issue
comes close to defining the difference between those who describe their political tendency as "democratic" (of whom over 70% support land privatization) and "communist" (of whom 80% oppose it).

A similar story can be told about the next item, whether the privatization of state enterprises should be speeded up or slowed down. 55% of our candidate pool responded that it should be slowed down; this proportion varied little across electoral category. But it sharply distinguished RC candidates, among whom 80% believed it should be accelerated, and CPRF candidates, who by a similar proportion believed it should be slowed down or stopped. On the other hand, this is not an issue which defines democrats ideologically: among our self-described "democrats," 45% would slow down or stop enterprise privatization.

RC and CPRF divide sharply on whether state support for unprofitable enterprises should be reduced or increased: 3/4 of the RC candidates would reduce it while 80% of CPRF candidates would increase it.

There were some consensus issues. A large majority (3/4) believed that the state should pursue protectionist policies in behalf of native industry, a figure which fell to slightly over 60% for RC and rose to nearly 80% for the communists. Even more one-sided was the distribution of responses to the question of whether subjects should have the right to secede, where 85% believed that Russia should be one and indivisible and differences by party and by ideological tendency were slight. Still more lop-sided were the responses to the question about whether all subjects in the federation should have equal rights or whether republics should have more rights. On this issue, by a margin of about 90%, our respondents favored equality of rights, with little difference by party or ideological tendency.

A different question asked about the balance of power between center and regions—whether power should be concentrated more in the center or the regions. Overall about 2/3 of the respondents favored concentrating power in the regions as opposed to the center. This differed relatively little across electoral type and party.

Three quarters of the respondents would favor strengthening the CIS, a figure which is much the same across electoral types and political tendencies. However, both the RC and CPRF respondents are slightly less favorable to this (53% for RC, 58% of CP, but the N's are very small).

Around 55% of the respondents would favor the Serb side in the war in Bosnia, but here the left-right dimension is expressed strongly: 80% of the RC candidates (and similar proportions of other reform-oriented factions) would favor even-handedness toward the warring sides, while 2/3 of the communists (and all of the LDPR candidates) would favor the Serbs. Overall, 3/4 of "democrats" by self-described tendency support even-handedness, and 80% of communists favor the Serbs.

A fundamental difference between parties is also revealed in responses to the question about whether justice or loyalty to the motherland is the more sacred. 90% of RC candidates choose justice; 80% of the communists choose the motherland. Oddly, differences on this item by self-described political tendency are slight.
Party differences are also strong in the question on whether military spending should be cut to free resources for civilian needs. 80% of RC candidates would cut defense spending; 80% of CPRF candidates would raise it. This is a left-right issue as well: 2/3 of self-described communists would raise military spending, three quarters of "democrats" would cut it. Yet another partisan issue concerns whether order justifies limiting political freedom. Three quarters of the CP candidates accept the legitimacy of limiting freedoms for the sake of order, three quarters of RC candidates do not. But this is much less clearly a left-right issue: only 52% of "democrats" reject limits on political freedoms, and only 60% of "communists" accept them.

Still another partisan division appears in responses to the question whether freedom of the individual is a more sacred concept than the Motherland: 2/3 of the CP candidates favor Motherland, 85% of RC candidates favor freedom of the individual. By self-described ideology: only 56% of "democrats" prefer individual liberty, but 82% of communists do so.

Much the same partisanship is apparent in answers to the question whether Russia should encourage greater inflow of Western capital: 85% of RC candidates approve; 85% of CP candidates oppose this. 85% of self-described communists oppose it; 2/3 of self-described "democrats" favor it.

But on constitutional issues, differences are less sharp. virtually all the CP candidates would increase parliament's oversight power over govt; only half the RC candidates would do so. Generally, three quarters of "democrats" would keep things the same, but 80% of "communists" would increase parliament's kontrol power. 60% of RC would make the Central Bank independent; 80% of CP would subordinate it to the parliament. Over half the "dems" would make it independent; 60% of "communists" would subordinate it to the parliament. 80% of RC would not allow parliament to confirm appointments of other ministers besides the PM, 90% of CP would do so. This is ideological--almost half of democrats would not let parl have this power, over 80% of communists would. Very similar breakdown on the item re power to confirm presidential decrees--RC overwhelmingly (73%) no, CP (80%) yes. Dems 60% no, communists 80% yes.

III. Major findings from the 1994 deputy survey:

The bipolarity over fundamental property rights issues is strongly revealed in questions such as those concerning land: all 38 RC deputies favored either strongly or moderately the free right of citizens to buy and sell land. All or nearly all of the members of other pro-reform factions did as well. 70% of the NRP faction did so. But about 80% each of LDPR and agrarians opposed such rights either moderately or strongly, as did 94% of the communists.

Responses to the item on accelerating enterprise privatization are divided similarly (although here, 3/4 of NRP members would slow or stop enterprise privatization). 95% of RC deputies would accelerate privatization, while all the communists would slow or stop it (87%
took the strongest response) and virtually all of the other opposition factions were also unanimous or nearly so on this point. This is a powerful dividing line for the deputies.

Another party division is over the question of state support for unprofitable enterprises. Almost unanimously, RC and other reform deputies support reducing it while all of the communists would increase such help. But Agrarians and LDPR are quite divided on this issue: over half of the agrarians would reduce state support as would 40% of the LDPR deputies.

Similarly on the social welfare item (should the state take care of all citizens, or only those who cannot work, such as children, the elderly and invalids), the deputies in the sample were almost evenly divided between those favoring a wider definition of the state’s welfare obligations, and those taking a narrower view of it. This issue divides the parties sharply. The reform factions took the minimalist view almost unanimously (90% of RC deputies, 85% of Yabloko members, 87% of December 12) responded that the state’s duty is only to those who cannot work) while 87% of communists, 60% of agrarians, and 72% of LDPR deputies took the opposite view.

Some protectionism for Russian industry is favored by 3/4 of our respondents overall, but the issue divides parties. 2/3 of RC members oppose it; 78% of Yabloko members support it; but almost 90% of communists favor it, as do 90% of agrarians and 95% of LDPR members.

The principle of equality for all subjects of the federation (republics and regular administrative territories) is virtually a consensus matter for the deputies: overall 90% support it. It does not divide parties. 78% of the communists and all but one of the RC deputies support it, as do 85% of LDPR deputies and over 90% of the agrarians, and all of the Yabloko and December 12 members, and 85% of NRP.

Less clear-cut are the results for the federalism question, should political power be concentrated mostly in the regions or at the center. Overall, about 40% of the sample would concentrate it in the regions. RC divided similarly: 40% favoring regions, 60% the center. Yabloko members favored the center by 3:1. But the communists were more unanimously centralists, 85% supporting the center. Agrarians, though, were divided: almost 45% favored the regions. LDPR favored the center by 70% to 30%. Thus there are divisions within the camps and in some cases within the parties over the question of centralization of power.

Strengthening the CIS is largely a consensus issue: over 80% of the sample favored strengthening it, and the parties agreed by similar percentages (70% of RC, all Yabloko members, all PRES members, 82% of NRP, virtually all the communists, almost 90% of agrarians—but only 57% of LDPR).

2/3 of all the respondents would cut military spending in order to focus on civilian needs. This was the almost unanimous view of the reform factions (97% of RC, 87% of Yabloko) but was opposed by 3/4 of the communists and 2/3 of LDPR. The agrarians, however, favored the idea by a 2:1 margin. This issue therefore divides ideological camps but not most parties.
The question on whether bringing order to the country justifies imposing limits on political freedoms reveals some unexpected divisions. Pro-reform factions, as expected, are opposed to favoring order over freedom (70% of RC prefer freedom, as do 88% of Yabloko and 81% of December 12 members and slightly over 60% of PRES and NRP members). LDPR, as expected, by 2/3 favors order. But only half the agrarians do so, and only 37% of communists, about the same as the deputy corps as a whole. Is it possible that the communists, whose party was banned temporarily and who regard themselves as an opposition party suffering from restrictions in access to the media, are reluctant to support limitations on liberties?

The liberty vs. motherland issue (is freedom of the individual a more sacred concept than the Motherland?) distinguishes among ideological camps. Some but not all parties fall cohesively on one side or the other of it. 80% of RC favor individual liberty over Motherland, as do 2/3 of Yabloko deputies. But only half of December 12, PRES and NRP members take this side, as do 40% of all deputies. 100% of the communists and nearly all of the agrarians and LDPR deputies favor Motherland over liberty.

Policy toward the collective farms differentiates parties clearly. (Should the state pursue a more active strategy of breaking up collective and state farms and turning them into private farms?) On this point, as expected, communists, LDPR and agrarians overwhelmingly oppose such a policy (85% of communists, 97% of agrarians, 90% of LDPR) while reform factions favor it (86% of RC, 2/3 of Yabloko). Almost 80% of NRP oppose it, however, as do over 60% of PRES members.

On state economic priorities--should fiscal policy give fighting inflation precedence over stimulating production--only RC (by 70%) gives precedence to fighting inflation. Almost 80% of all deputies, and 90% and more of communists, agrarians, and LDPR, would emphasize raising production.

Encouragement of the inflow of Western investment distinguishes the camps. Overall, 2/3 of the deputies would support a policy of encouraging the increase of Western capital investment. But this is opposed by 3/4 of the communists and 60% of LDPR deputies, while all the RC and Yabloko deputies favor increasing it, as do 3/4 of the December 12, PRES, and NRP members. The agrarians differ noticeably from their communist allies on this point: 56% of agrarians would increase it.

The Yugoslav civil war produces a sharp division among the parties. Pro-reform factions strong favor a policy of even-handedness rather than support for the Serbs. Opposition factions strongly favor the Serbs (the communists are 63% in favor of supporting the Serbs; the agrarians by 70%, LDPR with 90%), whereas RC (82%), Yabloko (88%), and other reform-minded factions by 60% and more prefer even-handedness. Even-handedness is the preference of 55% of all deputies.

Russia's foreign policy orientation divides the deputies along left-right lines as well (factor 1 is closely correlated with this item [Pearson’s R = .723]). A decidedly pro-Western orientation appears in RC members' responses to the item on whether Russia should enter
NATO's Partnership for Peace: 95% of RC members favor doing so, as do 2/3 of Yabloko deputies, 87% of December 12, half of PRES, and one third of NRP. All of the communists oppose doing so, as do 90% of LDPR deputies and 2/3 of agrarians. Overall, deputies are split 55% against and 45% in favor.

The item on whether Russia should continue to defend Tajikistan is not clearly divided along party lines: communists favor it by 87%, RC by about the same proportion as all deputies, 2:1.

One of the most divisive issues of all is the Belovezh Treaty, the agreement among Yeltsin, for Russia, and the chiefs of state of Ukraine and Belarus in December 1991 declaring the Soviet Union to be dissolved, and creating a new entity, the CIS, in its place. Nationalists and communists have long sought to persuade parliament to denounce these treaties. Among RC deputies, 95% "strongly" opposed denouncing the agreement. No Yabloko deputies favored denouncing it. But among communists, all 32 respondents strongly supported denunciation, as did 3/4 of the agrarians. 2/3 of LDPR either strongly or somewhat supported denunciation. This item was strongly correlated with the left-right factor score: R = -.78.

Another civil liberties question was less clearly a dividing line between right and left than might have been thought. Asked whether restrictions on civil liberties are justified in the state's effort to fight crime, 70% of all deputies favored protections on civil liberties. 2/3 of communists took this side, as did 57% of agrarians. LDPR stands out for the fact that nearly 2/3 favor such restrictions. Among RC, 86% favor preserving individual rights, as do nearly 90% of Yabloko deputies, and 80% of NRP members.

On the other hand, the question about allowing Western banks into Russia to compete freely with Russian banks distinguished between right and left clearly. Among RC deputies, 85% favored allowing such competition, while 80% of communists opposed it, as did similar shares of LDPR and agrarian deputies.

On one liberty vs. order issue, the reformers are less libertarian than the opposition. Asked whether political organizations that threaten the constitutional order should be outlawed, 87% of RC deputies agree, as do all Yabloko deputies, and 63% of deputies generally. Evidently aware of the recent prohibitions on their freedoms, the communists, by a 2/3 margin, oppose such a principle, as do 53% of agrarians and 48% of LDPR deputies.

Factions differed in how much effort they put into coordinating their legislative activity. In nearly all respects, communists set the pace in the 1994-95 parliament in factional cohesiveness. We asked 3 questions of deputies about how often their factions harmonized the positions their members took in working on particular bills in their committees. Among communists, 3/4 said that this occurred "as a rule." 2/3 of LDPR members indicated this, and a like percentage of Yabloko members. Only 54% of RC deputies gave this response, which was hardly more than the percentage of NRP members--who were all political independents and shunned party discipline. Just under half of the agrarians gave this answer, again indicating the lack of party cohesion in this group.
We see similar breakdowns for the question on whether factions coordinated the stances to be taken by members during committee deliberations: over 60% of communists said this occurred "as a rule" but only half of the LDPR deputies, 36% of agrarians, half of the Yabloko members, and 41% of the RC members--the same as for NRP.

Finally, we asked about coordinating the voting behavior of faction members. 56% of RC members said that this occurred "as a rule" (only 28% of Yabloko members did so) while 72% of communists and 77% of LDPR members reported that this was their practice. Among agrarians, 51% indicated that this occurred as a rule.

Perhaps the effort that communists expended on discussing their positions beforehand spared them the necessity of taking a vote to invoke party discipline in floor voting, whereas the looser RC faction may have needed to make such a decision formally more often. In any event, almost 3/4 of RC members reported that their faction had formally decided to require disciplined voting on an issue at least 4 times since January 1994; this was far more often than for any other group except LDPR (77%). Of the communists, only 47% reported this level of frequency of solidarity votes; of the agrarians, only one third. 55% of the Yabloko deputies reported this level of disciplined voting.

Most faction members, left and right, regarded that level of discipline as appropriate. 3/4 of RC deputies, 94% of Yabloko deputies, 2/3 of communists and 3/4 of LDPR members would not change these arrangements. Dissatisfaction appears in the less cohesive factions, where large shares of members would like to see more cases of agreements to vote cohesively: over half the agrarians wish this occurred more often, as do 36% of NRP. It is noteworthy that many communists would welcome even stronger discipline: 27% would like to see even more frequent solidarity votes.

The process of joining committees varied by faction according to how much influence factions had on members' assignments. Among the communists, 60% indicated that they had chosen their committees themselves but cleared the decision with their faction; only a quarter reported making the decision without involving the faction. 15% had followed the faction recommendation. Among RC deputies, almost half said that their faction was not involved in their choice of committees. Another 30% cleared their decision with their faction, and for 15%, their faction recommended a committee to them. Among Yabloko members, 72% had cleared their choices with their faction but 22% had not. In the LDPR, half claimed that their had chosen a committee without reference to their faction. For communists, then, 3/4 reported some factional involvement; 72% of Yabloko members; 60% of agrarians; among LDPR members, half; and among RC members, half as well.

Overall, 77% of the deputies believed that parliament should have the right to confirm all important [matters of principle] presidential decrees. Support for this rule fell to only half of the RC deputies, and rose to 90% of the communists and agrarians, and 81% of LDPR. Similarly, 80% of deputies indicated that President Yeltsin had exceeded his constitutional authority in decrees issued in 1994. But only half of RC deputies gave this response, as did 69% of LDPR members, and all the communists (& 93% of the agrarians). By large margins, other reform factions besides RC also agreed with this proposition.
Under the 1993 constitution, parliament's right to oversee the executive branch's activity is nowhere provided for, although some argue it is implicit in parliament's powers to conduct investigations and hearings, and to submit interpellations to government. Almost unanimously, deputies believe that parliament should have this right: 97% of the 205 respondents gave this response. The only deputies who disagreed were 2 RC, 1 NRP and 4 LDPR members. This, therefore, is neither a partisan nor an ideological issue.

The question of whether the degree of influence exercised by the party factions on the work of the Duma is excessive, about right, or insufficient produced a very telling distribution of responses. Overall, 59% of respondents believed that it was about as much as appropriate (na dolzhnom urovne). Generally, deputies from party factions were more satisfied, while those from non-party factions were less satisfied, than the median deputy. Among RC members, 2/3 considered it about right; 72% of Yabloko's did so; 62% of PRES. Among LDPRs, only 55% thought it about right but 32% thought it insufficient. 2/3 of agrarians were satisfied, and 77% of communists. But among the non-party factions, satisfaction was much lower. 46% of NRP thought it excessive, as did 81% of the December 12 respondents.

Among all deputies, 62% thought the level of power of their own faction leader was about right; 1/4 thought it excessive and 12% called it insufficient. Among the party factions, again, levels of satisfaction with the current degree of leadership power in their factions were much higher: 70% of RC deputies, 73% of Yablokos, and 83% of PRES deputies considered their leaders' power appropriate, as did 2/3 of LDPR and agrarians deputies and 93% of communists. (4 or 19% of the LDPR deputies thought their leader's power excessive.) But 41% of NRP deputies and 77% of December 12 deputies thought their leader's power excessive, again reflecting the difference between party factions and factions made up of SMD members.

The question of whether the influence of the Council of the Duma is excessive, inadequate, or about right again produced a distribution that is not clearly left-right, but also not clearly party vs. non-party. Overall, 47% of respondents considered the Council's power to be the right amount. But 1/3 thought it excessive while 20% thought it insufficient. Many LDPR and communist deputies thought it excessive (45% of LDPR and 47% of communist respondents), but many in each group also thought it insufficient: 31% of communists and 20% of LDPR deputies. Among RC and Yabloko deputies, most thought the level about right (57% of RC and 2/3 of Yabloko), as did PRES respondents (62%), agrarians (58%) and NRP (52%). Among the December 12 contingent, however, half thought it excessive and 29% thought it about right--yet 21% thought it insufficient. Therefore there was neither a clear left-right division nor party-non-party split on this item. Yet the median position was that its influence was appropriate and neither left nor right was more likely to seek either a weaker or stronger body.

A still more telling instance of the consensus among party factions concerning the governing structure of the Duma is the set of responses to the item asking whether the chairman has too much power. Overall 3/4 of deputies chose the "appropriate" response, and the remaining responses divided evenly between those who thought it insufficient and those who thought it excessive. Generally the party-based factions were more positive than the non-party factions, but reformers were somewhat more satisfied than opposition: 42% of LDPR
considered the power about right, as did 65% of communists (but, showing the ambivalence about whose influence the leadership represents, 16% of communists and 19% of LDPR thought the chairman's power insufficient). But 81% of agrarians thought it appropriate, as did roughly similar proportions of RC, NRP, Yabloko and PRES. It would have been extremely difficult to assemble a majority of deputies either to weaken or strengthen the speaker's powers.

IV. Major findings from the 1996 survey of deputies:

Land --should it be subject to free purchase and sale? --shows strong party division. About 85% of CP opposes; About 85% of NDR and 80% of Yabloko support. Over half of all deputies generally support. But so do 1/3 of LDPR and 43% of agrarians.

Accelerate state enterprise privatization: over half of NDR agrees; 1/3 of Yabloko. But all the communists oppose, and all the LDPRs, and 90% of the agrarians and People's Power members (PP's).

Cut state support for unprofitable enterprises? 3/4 of CP disagrees, along with 90% of agrarians; but half of NDR agree, as do half of LDPR's and 63% of Yabloko.

Welfare: 3/4 of communists want state to care for everybody, as do nearly as many LDPRs and 80% of agrarians; but only half of NDR and 40% of Yabloko.

Protectionism: over 90% of communists favor "reasonable protectionism," but so do 3/4 of NDR's, and only 2/3 of LDPRs. More Yabloko's favor it (70%). 95% of agrarians. Overall, 80% of deputies favor it.

Equality of regions: should subjects of federation be equal in status, or should republics have more rights? 3/4 of deputies take strongest position favoring equality. Communists (2/3) slightly under this mean (27% favor republics), NDR close to it (69% strongly favor equality, 24% do somewhat); and LDPR strongly favors it--88% take strongest equality response, as do 85% of Yabloko members.

Should power be concentrated in center or regions? 37% of all deputies favor regions, half the center; 10% don't know. But communists and NDR both centralists: only 30% of communists favor regions, same for NDR, 20% for LDPR. But 3/4 of Yabloko favor the regions, as do over half the agrarians, half the PP's, and half the Regions of Russia.

CIS: Now a consensus issue: almost 90% of all deputies favor strengthening it; all the communists do so; 93% of NDR's, 3/4 of Yabloko. LDPR now more favorable--73% would strengthen it. 95% of the agrarians. PP's and Russia's Regions (RR's).

Defense spending: still differentiates factions. Overall, just under half of deputies favor cutting defense spending to raise spending on civilian needs. But only 36% of communists support cutting military spending, about the same as for agrarians and PP's, while
2/3 of NDR and 70% of RR's do. Only 10% of LDPR would do so and 77% disagree while 80% of Yabloko favor cutting military spending.

Order vs. freedom: in order to bring order, are limits on freedom justified? Overall, only 1/3 of deputies agree. Communists even less enthusiastic: 1/4 agree. Even fewer Yabloko's (18%). LDPR agrees, but only 54%. 38% of NDR agree. About 1/3 of APR's and RR's, and even fewer PP's (23%). 1e except for Zhirinovsky, opposition factions don't endorse such limits on freedom.

Western investment. About 60% of all deputies would increase the flow of Western investment. 35% of communists would do so; 72% of NDR's and 82% of Yablokos and 3/4 of RR's; but so would 53% of LDPR's and the same of PP's and 43% of agrarians.

Yugoslavia: 52% of all respondents would favor the Serbs rather than treat all sides without favor. Favoring the Serbs is much more popular among communists (3/4) and LDPR (88%) than among NDR (1/3) or Yabloko (20%). The agrarians are distributed similarly to the deputies as a whole: 38% strongly favor the Serbs, 14% somewhat do. [Pearson's R = -.32]

Entering the NATO PFP program is highly divisive. 40% of all deputies support it. Only 15% of communists, 8% of LDPR, 1/3 of PP and 38% of APR approve, while 3/4 of NDR and Yabloko do. [R = .51]

The Belovezh treaty remains extremely divisive: deputies are split rather evenly between support and opposition to the notion of denouncing the treaty, but the responses are concentrated at the extremes (40% strongly favoring denunciation, 35% strongly opposing it). Rather few chose the moderate responses. It is also an issue that divides the parties sharply. All the communists but 1 strong favor denunciation. 90% of the NDR's oppose denunciation. 2/3 of LDPR favor denunciation, 90% of Yabloko opposes it. Nearly all the agrarians and PP's favor denunciation and not one of the RR's do. [correlated at -.54 with the left-right factor.]

Limit freedom justified in fighting crime? Only 1/3 of deputies overall agree. Fewer than half the communists agree and only 43% of agrarians. 30% of NDR's, only half of LDPR's. 14% of Yabloko's. Not a clear left/right issue.

Similar with item on whether state should ban political organizations threatening to constitutional order. 54% of all deputies agree that such organizations should be outlawed. But only 30% of communists agree while 80% of NDR's do so, 45% of LDPR's, and 3/4 of Yabloko's. 38% of Agrarians, 42% of PP's. Favor for banning threatening groups shows modest correlation with liberal-economic reform tendency measured by factor 1 (R = .38 at .000 level).

Constitutional powers issues are distinctly related to party. All the communists and 90% of the agrarians would give parliament the right to confirm all important presidential decrees. Only 38% of NDR would do so. But this issue also taps another question, presidentialism generally. 2/3 of Yabloko (and 65% of PP's) would give parliament such power but only half of LDPR would do so.
Assessment of President Yeltsin's 1994 ukazes: follows similar divisions. 88% of communists agreed that Yeltsin’s decrees exceeded his constitutional authority, only 14% of NDR deputies did so. 61% of LDPR agreed. 3/4 of Yabloko agreed. 81% of agrarians, 82% of PP's agreed.

Consensus on legislative organization issues. Overall, 35% of deputies would give committee chairmen full voting rights in the Council of the Duma. There are few differences among left and right factions on this issue: 30% for communists and LDPR, 28% for NDR, 14% for Yabloko—but 71% of agrarians!

The question of the degree of influence that the factions have in the Duma was divisive, but does not fit the left-right dimension. Asked whether political factions have too much power, about the right amount, or too little, 97% of communists were satisfied with the present situation. Over half of all deputies were as well. 2/3 each of LDPR and Yabloko thought the present setup appropriate. 45% of NDR thought factions had too much influence—only 1/3 of them thought the present situation was appropriate. Over half the agrarians and 85% of the RR's considered that political factions have too much power.

Likewise, 56% of all deputies said that the power exercised by the Council of the Duma was about the right amount. This view was shared by 2/3 of communists and agrarians, 55% of NDR's, 54% of LDPR, and 60% of Yabloko deputies. The PP and RR groups were less favorable—40% of RR and 24% of PP believe it has too much power. But overall, 10% of deputies would give it still more power, a figure which is roughly the same across all factions.

The same percentage (56%) of all deputies believe that the chairman of the Duma has about the right amount of power. Communists are a good deal happier—88% think his power the right amount, and the rest think it insufficient. Agrarians and PP's are satisfied as well: 3/4 of agrarians think it appropriate and the rest would give him more; 70% of PP's are satisfied and some would give him more (3 or 17.6%). Other factions are divided between those who consider the power about right and those that think it too much. Of NDR, 45% each think it appropriate and too much. 35% of Yabloko deputies think it appropriate and 54% think it too much. 70% of the RR group think it too much. Clearly Seleznev does not have the degree of confidence that Rybkin elicited after his first year.

The party factions appear to spend a good deal of effort ensuring coordination of positions of members working in committees. On the question of whether deputies find that their factions guide the legislative work of members working on bills in committee, about 58% of the communists and of the NDR members say this occurs "as a rule." 69% of the LDPR do so. Half of the Yabloko members, and 48% of the agrarians do so as well. Just over half of PP's and under half of RR's do so.

Most members of factions (55% overall) report that their factions try to coordinate the positions of their members on particular votes. This is said to occur "as a rule" by 64% of communists, 55% of NDR, 77% of LDPR, 57% of Yabloko, 48% of agrarians, and 45% of RR's; but much less by the PP's (29%).
Communists and LDPR also show considerably more activity in adopting formal decisions to vote cohesively: 60% of communists report that this has occurred four or more times since January 1996 and 62% of LDPR indicate the same, but only 44% of NDR members do so, 21% of Yabloko’s, and 32% of agrarians, and only about 1/5 for PP and RR. Many agrarians would like to see this occur more often (29% indicate this response) but most deputies think it occurs about as often as needed--70% of all deputies, and 85% of communists, 55% of NDR's, 73% of LDPR's and 93% of Yabloko. 62-65% of RR's and PP's say it occurs about as often as needed at present.

Overall, 44% of deputies say they made their choice of a committee without any reference to a faction. But this is lower for the party factions. Only 30% of communists say this; 38% of NDR; 28% of LDPR; and 32% of Yabloko. The figure is much higher for the agrarians (76%), PP (53%) and RR (75%). Very similar proportions among the Big Four (CP, LDPR, Yabloko and NDR) report that they coordinated their selection with their faction--slightly more than half in each case. Several communists (18%) report that their faction recommended a particular committee to them, and this was higher for the communists than for any other faction.