CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND DEMOCRATIZATION: 
A WEBERIAN PERSPECTIVE

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SUMMARY

In at least three cases of democratization in Eastern and Central Europe (ECE), charismatic leaders have played an important role in overthrowing the old regime and in shaping the pattern of new institutions. In addition to Lech Wałęsa in Poland, Vaclav Havel of the Czech (and formerly Slovak) Republic, and Boris Yeltsin of Russia, can be classified as charismatic leaders with little controversy. While there are other charismatic leaders in the region, their commitments to democracy are quite shaky, and thus they fall outside the scope of this paper.

The greatest contribution to our understanding of charisma as a social force has been the work of Max Weber. His sociological writings on charisma serve as the point of departure for this paper. After surveying Weber's analysis of charisma, this study turns to what his writings tell us about the relationship between charisma and democracy. It then addresses the question of the impact that democratization has on charismatic leadership and use this to interpret the political fortunes of Lech Wałęsa, Vaclav Havel, and Boris Yeltsin. It concludes with a discussion of the role of charisma in both democracy and dictatorship in the contemporary era.

Despite their pivotal role in the demise of the communist regimes in their countries and their leadership during key phases of the democratization process, none of the three leaders have been fully successful in translating their visions for their respective countries into reality. In order to understand why Lech Wałęsa, Vaclav Havel, and Boris Yeltsin have run into problems, this study holds that there are three ways in which democratization comes to constrain and potentially weaken the power of charismatic leaders. First it subjects it to rational-legal constraints. Second, it transforms the bonds of the charismatic community into the reflective consent that underpins democracy. Third, once the personal appeal of charisma is supplanted by reflective consent, the popularity of leaders comes to be based on more mundane performance criteria by a larger population.

Havel has chosen to occupy an office, the Czech Presidency which has little executive power. He instead has made his mark by using this office to morally exhort his countrymen. Had Havel desired political power he would have had to follow the path that Vaclav Klaus took, taking hold of as much of Civic Forum as possible, turning it into a party, and leading it to victory in a general election. Havel has maintained the basis of his charismatic power, an outsider's moral perspective on
politics, but he has eschewed the partisanship of party, in order to try to be the country's moral compass. This moral perspective has far less power to mobilize than it did in November 1989.

Yeltsin has taken a much different path. After suppressing and dissolving the parliament of the Russian Federation in 1993, Yeltsin promoted and won a superpresidential constitution. While the new parliament was elected in fully competitive conditions (something which the previous parliament was not), the executive, the president and the government responsible to him, has extensive autonomy from the parliament. In this way Yeltsin has largely insulated his power from anything but direct plebiscitary ratification. He has opted for power over democracy, and this means that the charismatic element in his power has not been fully constrained by rational-legal elements, making it problematic to say that Russia is democratic. If this tendency is not reversed, Russia will most likely become a plebiscitary dictatorship or a non-democratic form of rule of law.

Walesa was as interested in maintaining his power as Yeltsin was, yet lost it. Walesa’s climb to power in 1990 placed him in a presidential office which was constructed to reassure the Soviets as the Polish Communists attempted to salvage something of their power through reform in 1989. When these arrangements were fully democratized by elections in 1990 and 1991, Walesa was but one dyarch in a semi-presidential system in which he often found himself sharing power, more often than not, with a prime minister (e.g. Olszewski, Pawlak, and Oleksy) with whom he had an adversarial relationship.

Ultimately Walesa found himself in an office where his power was constrained and his popularity plummeted. Despite his continual attempts to establish precedents for expanding the scope of his power and his strong opposition to governmental policies with which he did not agree, he passed the ultimate test of a democratic charismatic leader. When his charisma failed him in electoral competition, he left office.

What is most puzzling about Walesa and Yeltsin as leaders interested in directly exercising political power is their conspicuous failure to attempt to organize political parties to support their ambitions. While some say this reticence is logical when "party" has been so discredited by long years of party-state rule, this has not stopped large numbers of Yeltsin’s and Walesa’s national compatriots from voting for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or the Social-democracy of the Republic of Poland. Rather, both Yeltsin and Walesa have tried to portray themselves as defenders of national interest above the narrow interests of parties and politicians. This strategy is a pipe dream. It is impossible to pursue and exercise power and not be partisan. The only way to be above politics is to relinquish direct political power in the way that Havel has.

While charismatic leadership can be compatible with democratic rule, it is by no means incompatible with dictatorship either. One rather unexpected result of this investigation is the finding that many forms of modern authoritarianism, notably plebiscitary rule, similarly legitimize themselves by a combination of charisma and rational-legal procedures. The difference is the degree
to which charismatic power has been effectively subordinated to rational-legal controls. This insight pertains directly to the debate on the questions of authoritarian viability and the alternatives to democracy in the contemporary age.

Beginning with Fukuyama (1989) a large number of observers have either discounted the viability of non-liberal-democratic systems, or noted the growing difficulties in legitimating authoritarianism. The position that there are no alternatives to liberal-democracy or that authoritarian systems cannot legitimate themselves boil down to the same argument -- only liberal democracy can legitimate itself in the present era. Yet many forms of modern authoritarianism and democracy legitimate themselves in similar fashions -- through a combination of charismatic appeals and rational-legal procedures. While there may no longer be a competing modern world civilization to liberal-democratic capitalist modernity, authoritarian leaders can utilize any number of issues -- nationalism, order, substantive justice, tradition, economic necessity, national security -- to justify the abrogation of democracy while claiming that this is in the interest, or common good of the people. Any number of recent cases of authoritarian development can be cited -- Albania, Algeria, Belarus, Croatia, Nigeria, Peru, or Serbia to name but a few. Such rationalizations for authoritarian rule are made in the guise of popular will. Even when dictators demonstrate their popularity by plebiscitary means, they do not rule democratically because of the absence of rational-legal constraints on their power. It does not matter that there is no ideology that poses a global alternative to liberal-democracy. Future authoritarian regimes will justify and legitimize themselves in the guise of democracy.
Introduction

In at least three cases of democratization in Eastern and Central Europe (ECE), charismatic leaders have played an important role in overthrowing the old regime and in shaping the pattern of new institutions. In addition to Lech Walesa in Poland, Vaclav Havel of the Czech (and formerly Slovak) Republic, and Boris Yeltsin of Russia, can be classified as charismatic leaders with little controversy. While there are other charismatic leaders in the region, their commitments to democracy are quite shaky, and thus they fall outside the scope of this paper.

Yeltsin’s emergence as the dominant figure in Russia, after successfully leading efforts to thwart the attempted hard-line coup d’etat in August 1991, mark him, like Walesa as a heroic leader who emerged in the heat of a pivotal struggle. No particular heroic act, like Walesa’s leadership of the strike at the Lenin Shipyard in 1980 or Yeltsin’s resistance, catapulted Havel to the center of politics in his country. The acknowledgement of Havel by the crowds during the Velvet Revolution of 1989 was based on his long record of principled resistance to the repressive normalization pursued by the Husak regime in the aftermath of the Prague Spring. Havel thus differs from Yeltsin and Walesa in that his appeal is that of a morally exemplary figure, rather than that of a hero in a time of struggle.

Despite their pivotal role in the demise of the communist regimes in their countries and their leadership during key phases of the democratization process, none of these leaders have been fully successful in translating their visions for their respective countries into reality. In two years time Yeltsin found himself engaged in a destructive struggle with the legislature which was only resolved by force. Under the new Russian “superpresidential” constitution, power is so concentrated in an executive that is highly insulated from parliament, that the democratic nature of Russian institutions can be treated as an open question.

Havel’s political fortunes have also been rocky since his ascension to the Hrad on December 29, 1989 and his address to the nation on New Year’s Day 1990. The Czecho-Slovak presidency was a weak office and Havel was unable to prevent the dissolution of the federation. While he was subsequently elected President of the Czech Republic, Havel is head of state, while a Prime Minister as head of government is the more powerful figure. He has struck a solid moral pose similar to that which his friend von Weizsäcker struck in Germany. There is no doubt that Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has had much more influence in shaping the Czech Republic.

As for Walesa, his push to assume the presidency in 1990 should be acknowledged as the proximate cause for the end of the limits on democracy posed by the Roundtable Agreement (Bernhard, 1996). It is also clear that a range of ambitions and considerations beyond a commitment to democracy also played a role in his actions (Kurski 1991, 1992). Yet success under routine conditions, if it is defined as effectively exercising power and maintaining it, has eluded Lech Walesa. Since his replacement by Alexander Kwasniewski, he has retained a prominent political profile, but
has not emerged as the clear leader of the opposition to the rule of the post-Communists (though this is by no means precluded).

The combination of charismatic leadership and democratization is not new in Poland's history. It was also a central factor in the birth and death of Poland's short-lived interwar democracy. Piłsudski's role was decisive in the reconstitution of the Polish state and its rebirth as a democracy in the period from 1918-22. The interwar constitution was purposefully shaped by the National Democrats without a strong independent executive or a predominant figure in the military in order to diminish his power. This in combination with the fragmentation of the party system and nagging socioeconomic problems (economic reconstruction and integration, deficits and inflation, land reform, minority problems) made the new Polish parliamentary system ineffective, and thus prepared the way for Piłsudski's coup d'état in 1926.

Despite the seeming importance of charismatic leadership in many cases of democratization (or in the breakdown of democracy for that matter), the main schools of thought offering explanations for the emergence of democracy fail to consider idiosyncratic, case-specific phenomena like the role of leaders. Modernization theory sees democracy as product (or a correlate) of a broader socioeconomic process of modernization (i.e., Lipset 1959, 1993; Bollen 1979; Huntington 1984). Comparative historical sociology explains regime type (including democracy) as a product of the political struggles articulated by economic development and the evolution of social structure (Luebbert 1991; Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). Political cultural explanations attempt to pinpoint how the values and attitudes of the public contribute to the persistence or demise of democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam et al. 1993). Studies of democratic transition and consolidation pinpoint key actors and junctures in the process whereby authoritarian regimes are replaced by democracy (Rustow 1970, O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Przeworski 1991, Linz and Stepan 1996). Among the many authors cited above, only Moore makes any acknowledgement that leaders can play a critical role in the process, when he argues that "England’s progress toward democracy" was in part attributable to "moderate and intelligent statesmen" (p. 39). Yet given the record in Poland and ECE, it would seem that to fully appreciate the processes involved in and the chances of success for democratization in the region, we need to have a more systematic understanding of the potential role of charismatic leadership.

The greatest contribution to our understanding of charisma as a social force has been the work of Max Weber. His sociological writings on charisma will serve as the point of departure for this paper. After surveying Weber's analysis of charisma, this contribution will access what his writings tell us about the relationship between charisma and democracy. It will turn then to the question of the impact that democratization has on charismatic leadership and use this to interpret the political fortunes of Lech Wałęsa, Vaclav Havel, and Boris Yeltsin. It will conclude with a discussion of charisma and its role in both democracy and dictatorship in the contemporary era.
What is Charisma?

Charismatic domination is one of three ideal-typical forms (along with traditional and rational-legal) that Weber developed to understand legitimate domination. In his sociology ideal types are analytic constructs which accentuate various characteristics of “more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena.” They are precise and unambiguously-defined abstractions derived from real phenomena, i.e., not descriptions, which in turn can be compared to reality to understand the mechanisms at play in a given situation (Weber 1949:89-92, 1978:20-1). Thus charismatic, traditional, or rational-legal legitimate domination hardly, if ever, exist in pure form. They are useful standards which can be compared and contrasted to reality in order to understand which of these elements are at work in systems of legitimate domination.

Weber defines charisma as follows (1978:241-2):

The term “charisma” will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a “leader.” [...] How the quality in question would be ultimately judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other such point of view is naturally entirely indifferent for purposes of definition. What is alone important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his “followers” or “disciples.”

Charismatic leaders share an intense personal bond with a following that believes in their extraordinary qualities. Because of this they have a powerful say in the shape of the social formations over which they preside. Weber attributes the power to “reveal” or “ordain” “normative patterns” and/or to “order” them (Weber 1978:215-6).

Weber also specifies three important accompanying characteristics of charisma. The first two explain why he attributed such transformational power to leaders who possess charisma and the third points to the limitations of power based on it. First, charismatic domination is a response to unusual circumstances. Second, as a response to such conditions, it is revolutionary in nature. Third, it is inherently unstable. In this last regard, it does not matter whether charismatic leadership is successful. Whether a leader is victorious or vanquished, charisma itself is relatively short-lived.

Weber (1978:1121) describes the origins of charismatic domination:

Charismatic rulership in the typical sense described above always results from unusual, especially political or economic situations, or from extraordinary psychic, particularly religious states, or from both together. It arises from collective excitement produced by extraordinary events and from surrender to heroism of any kind.

Thus, it is not the personality of a ruler in itself which gives rise to charismatic domination. The nature of the situation in which charismatic rulership arises, one of fundamental distress in the existing state of affairs, sets the stage for a potentially charismatic figure to emerge.
Charisma responds to the unusual circumstances that have called it into being by destroying existing norms and transforming old values. Weber calls it "the great revolutionary force" of periods of traditional rule. It is not the only force in Weber's sociology that is subversive of tradition; "instrumental rationality" (Zweckrationalität), which underlies rational-legal domination, also is revolutionary with regard to tradition. However, charisma and rationality undermine tradition in different ways. Charisma works directly on the individual to change his/her orientation internally. It replaces traditional rules and norms with a new faith (Weber 1978:245 & 1115-6).

Instrumental rationality, on the other hand, revolutionizes human existence "by altering the situations of life and hence its problems, finally in this way changing men's attitudes toward them." It changes the conditions of life and humans are forced to adapt to them. Corresponding beliefs follow only in time. With respect to the external environment, charisma's ability to revolutionize "from within," in contrast, seeks to alter "material and social conditions to revolutionary will." Because of this difference, charisma is not only revolutionary with respect to tradition, but can be disruptive of rational-legal rule as well (Weber 1978:245 & 1116-7).

For Weber all "Charismatic authority is naturally unstable" (1978:245 & 1114). This is not only because its exceptional character requires ongoing proof. Even if charismatic authority proves itself for a period of time and successfully alters the conditions that called it into existence, it faces inescapable pressure that strips it of its revolutionary impetus. Weber calls this "the routinization of charisma." Thus even a successful charismatic leader will rule for only a short time on the basis of charisma in its pure form.

First, let us consider why charisma has this burden of proof and why this makes it inherently unstable. The exceptional qualities that inspire belief in a charismatic leader are seen by followers as a "gift" [often divinely bestowed in pre-modern cases] (Weber 1978:1112). The gift has a specific purpose -- to right the troubles, distress, or crisis which led to a leader's emergence -- a "mission" (Weber 1978:1117). The gift and the mission are inescapably and continually in tension with each other in charismatic domination. The gift exists in order to fulfill the mission, and failure to do so undermines its credibility. Weber points out that this saddles charismatic leadership with a demanding performance criterion: "If proof and success elude the leader for long, if he appears deserted by his god or his magical or heroic powers, above all, if his leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear" (1978:242). Failure to fulfill the mission has the direct effect of undermining belief in the leader's gift, and in turn, destroys the power of charisma.

But further, even charisma that fulfills its mission, according to Weber, is doomed from the outset: "Every charisma is on the road from a turbulently emotional life that knows no economic rationality to a slow death by suffocation under the weight of material interests: every hour of its existence brings it nearer to this end" (1978:1120). In its earliest and purest phases, charisma
eschews material concerns beyond those necessary to support the mission, e.g. "booty" for bands of heroic warriors. With success, comes a yearning for normal life and a desire among members of the charismatic community (e.g. staff, disciples, party workers) to realize their material interests (Weber 1978 :245-6 & 1121).

With this transformation, charismatic authority becomes institutionalized and routinized. In this process it moves in the direction of the other two bases of legitimate domination: it becomes traditionalized, rationalized, or some combination of the two. Thus, charismatic domination exists in a nearly pure form only "in statu nascendi." With routinization, charisma comes to be "fused with them [inb—insitutions and routines] in the most diverse forms so that it becomes a mere component of a concrete historical structure." Charisma's remnants become imbedded in the institutions and practices of a new order. Charismatic domination only persists in those aspects of the new order which can be analytically traced back to their charismatic roots (Weber 1978 :246 & 1121).

Can Charismatic Leadership Lead to Democracy?

A great deal of the literature on charisma treats it as an antidemocratic force. Intellectually, this is understandable as a response to the rise of destructive modern dictatorships, often on a charismatic basis, since the World War I. Many recent studies tend to stress the authoritarian side of charisma by discussing dictators and cult figures such as Hitler, the Reverend Moon, the Ayatollah Khomeni, Mussolini, Charles Manson, Jim Jones, and Sukharno (Lindholm 1990, Willner 1984, Glassman and Swatos 1986).

For Weber, however, charisma does not necessarily have dictatorial ramifications. Gerth and Mills even go so far as to argue that charisma "serves... as a metaphysical vehicle of man's freedom in history" for Weber (1946 :72). The question of whether charisma will have democratic or dictatorial ramifications though is a question of how charisma is routinized. Traditional domination will be the likely result if charisma is enshrined as the basis of a new revealed truth. This is no basis for modern mass democracy. However, if charisma is routinized in a rational-legal direction, the issue is much less clear cut. Rationalized charisma as Weber understands it holds out the prospect for modern democracy. The decisive factor is the way in which the rational and charismatic combine in the post-revolutionary system of domination.

In his discussion of the routinization of charisma, Weber uses a number of modern examples, including both dictatorships and democracies. In discussing Napoleon, for instance, Weber talks of how his rise to power showed it was possible "for the strictest type of bureaucracy to issue directly from a charismatic movement..." (1978 :263). Leninist parties also showed a marked proclivity toward post-revolutionary bureaucratization. This combination of charismatic appeal and bureaucratic administration is typical of many forms of modern dictatorship. Jowitt (1983) has shown that with
time such party bureaucracies can become neo-traditional when they hold power for extended periods of time.

While charismatic leadership often produces non-democratic forms of government, Weber argues that charisma potentially has democratic ramifications (1978:267):

The basically authoritarian principle of charismatic legitimation may be subject to an anti-authoritarian interpretation, for the validity of charismatic authority rests entirely on the recognition by the ruled, on "proof" before their eyes. To be sure, this recognition of a charismatically qualified, and hence legitimate, person is treated as a duty. But when the charismatic organization undergoes progressive rationalization, it is readily possible that, instead of recognition being treated as a consequence of legitimacy, it is treated as the basis of legitimacy: democratic legitimacy.

For this to occur the recognition that followers bestow upon leaders must be stripped of it magical or exemplary character. With this, the "proof" that a leader must demonstrate takes on a new significance. Instead of it being incumbent on followers or disciples to recognize the charismatic quality of a leader and submit to his or her domination, leaders must secure the approval of the ruled. In this way the proof that charisma demands may be rationalized into the formal reflective consent that underlies legitimacy in democratic regimes.

Mass approval in itself does not automatically translate into democracy. Dictatorship may be even more popular than representative democracy. As a basis for legitimate domination mass approval does not necessarily entail formal institutions designed to regularly elect leaders on the basis of full and free suffrage or any of the other minimal conditions for representative democracy. Weber discusses charismatic leaders who seek democratic legitimacy yet who do not rule democratically when he introduces the concept of plebiscitary leadership as a transitional form from pure charismatic to democratic legitimacy. He notes that "it is always present where the chief feels himself to be acting on behalf of the masses and is indeed recognized by them." Such plebiscitary ratification of domination does not meet criteria of fair suffrage, and voting often takes place after leaders have taken power by force. Weber (1978:267) notes:

Regardless of how its real value as an expression of the popular will may be regarded, the plebiscite has been the specific means of deriving the legitimacy of authority from the confidence of the ruled, even though the voluntary nature of such confidence is only formal or fictitious.

Plebiscitary leadership is thus a form of dictatorship that "hides behind legitimacy that is formally derived from the will of the governed." Weber mentions revolutionary dictators like Cromwell, the leaders of the French revolution, and the two Napoleons as modern examples (1978:268).

For democracy to exist, clearly something more than the popular acclamation of a dictator is necessary. Greater routinization in a rational-legal direction must take place. Weber speaks of how plebiscitary leadership can ultimately develop into modern democracy (1978:1127):
Acclamation by the ruled may develop into a regular electoral system, with standardized suffrage, direct or indirect election, majority or proportional method, electoral classes and districts. It is a long way to such a system. As far as the election of the supreme ruler is concerned, only the United States went all the way -- and there, of course, the nominating campaign within each of the two parties is one of the most important parts of the election business. Elsewhere at most the parliamentary representatives are elected, who in turn determine the choice of the prime minister and his colleagues. The development from acclamation of the charismatic leader to popular election occurred at the most diverse cultural stages, and every advance toward a rational, emotionally detached consideration of the process could not help but to facilitate this transformation.

Thus for Weber, legitimate democratic domination does not exist as an ideal type in itself. It contains at least a mixture of both rational-legal and charismatic elements. Similarly, modern forms of dictatorship also rely heavily on charismatic elements in order to legitimate themselves. However, the degree to which representative democracy relies on rational-legal procedures is much greater. The decisive factor distinguishing it from plebiscitary dictatorship is the fact that elections have become regularized and routinized, and thus competitively select, not just ratify, rulers. The understanding that modern dictatorship also seeks to establish democratic legitimacy, is born out by and helps to explain the mania with which dictators stage plebiscites with ridiculously high rates of turnout and approval.

The arguments on the instability of charismatic domination and its ramifications for regime type presented in the two sections above are summarized in Figure One on page 11.
Figure One: The Evolution of Charismatic Domination and Its Ramifications for Regime-Type

Charismatic Leadership
Fulfills mission?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lose following</td>
<td>Routinization</td>
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Routinization

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Traditionalization (predominant direction)</th>
<th>Rationalization</th>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional rule</td>
<td>Is rule-boundedness sufficient to constrain charismatic arbitrariness?</td>
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<tr>
<th>no</th>
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<td>Plebiscitary rule</td>
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Rule of law

Non-democratic forms of rule of law (e.g., competitive oligarchy, "racial" democracy, "limited" democracy, democrazia

Neo-traditionalization

Modern Neo-traditionalism (e.g., mature Soviet-type regimes, mature fundamentalist regimes)
Should charismatic leadership fail to fulfill the mission, the gift will come to be questioned by the following and it will begin to fall away. Fulfillment of the mission leads to routinization. The directions depicted in the figure are simplifications in that many real forms of domination (including democracy) sometimes combine elements from all three ideal-types. Traditionalization leads to traditional forms of rule (patrimonialism, hierocracy, sultanism, caudillismo, cacicismo etc.).

Rationalization on the other hand can lead to a number of different outcomes. When charismatic elements (the arbitrary and personal exercise of power) predominate over institutionalized rational-legal procedures (the rule-boundedness of power) the result is plebiscitary rule, one of the bases of modern dictatorship. When the opposite is true (when rational-legal elements predominate over the charismatic), Weber argues that the potential for democracy exists. However, there seem to be a number of other elements that must come into play for democracy to result. This situation might be better described as the basis for rule of law, of which democracy is only one variant. In cases where competition excludes part of the population (competitive oligarchy or "racial" democracy) or formal democracy is constrained by tutelary powers, institutional defects, or other restrictions ("limited" democracy, democradura) less than fully democratic forms of rule of law are possible. Thus democracy is but one form of rule where the rational-legal predominates over the charismatic. Finally, both plebiscitary rule and non-democratic forms of rule of law can, given the right circumstances, develop into forms of neo-traditional rule.

How Democratization Affects Charismatic Leadership

In order to understand why Lech Wałęsa, Vaclav Havel, and Boris Yeltsin have run into problems, this section will begin with a general discussion of how democratization affects charismatic leadership. There are three ways in which democratization comes to constrain and potentially weaken the power of charismatic leaders. First it subjects it to rational-legal constraints. Second, it transforms the bonds of the charismatic community into the reflective consent that underpins democracy. Third, once the personal appeal of charisma is supplanted by reflective consent, the popularity of leaders comes to be based on more mundane performance criteria by a larger population.

First, charismatic leaders who pursue democracy subject their own power to the constraints of rational-legal rule. In democracy charisma's moment of greatest potency is during elections. Mobilizing supporters to the polls is when charisma has its greatest impact in democratic politics. Once elected to power a charismatic leader faces the same constraints that any other official in a rational-legal system faces. There are well-specified rules and regulations that elected officials, even those elected to the supreme office, must obey.

Second, when a charismatic leader stands for office in competitive elections, he/she changes the nature of the bond with his/her followers. By standing for election a charismatic leader
transforms his/her charisma into popularity in pursuit of the support necessary to rule in a mass
polity. This transformation brings a purposeful acceleration of the process whereby the onus of proof
in the charismatic bond is rationalized into the formal reflective consent that democracy demands.
This negates the obligation of obedience that falls on followers. It is rationalized into the regular
periodic consent of the governed produced in competitive democratic elections.

Third, assumption of an office whose tenure must be periodically renewed means that leaders
must not only be concerned with the loyalty of his/her followers, but of the broader electoral public,
which does not share the bond of the charismatic community. This opening up of leadership to
popular ratification is a necessary part of institutionalizing a mass democratic system. The leader
comes to be evaluated on the basis of performance in power under routine circumstances by the
whole of the electorate. It is at this juncture that material interests of followers and other
constituencies, as well as other mundane concerns come into play. Failure to fulfill them has negative
ramifications for popularity. Given that democratization necessitates a transformation of the power of
charismatic leaders, the problems that Wałęsa, Yeltsin, and Havel have experienced become much
easier to understand.

Havel has chosen to occupy an office, the Czech Presidency which has little executive power.
He instead has made his mark by using this office to morally exhort his countrymen to act decently.
The real source of power in the Czech system is the Prime Ministership. Had Havel desired political
power he would have had to follow the path that Vaclav Klaus took, taking hold of as much of Civic
Forum as possible, turning it into a party, and leading it to victory in a general election. Havel
curiously has maintained the basis of his charismatic power, an outsider’s moral perspective on
politics, by holding a position with little power of office. He has eschewed the partisanship of party,
in order to try to be the country’s moral compass. This moral perspective has far less power to
mobilize than it did in November 1989.

Yeltsin has taken a much different path. After suppressing and dissolving the parliament of the
Russian Federation in 1993, Yeltsin promoted and won a superpresidential constitution. While the
new parliament was elected in fully competitive conditions (something which the previous parliament
was not), the executive, the president and the government responsible to him, has extensive
autonomy from the parliament. In this way Yeltsin has largely insulated his power from anything but
direct plebiscitary ratification. He has opted for power over democracy, and this means that the
charismatic element in his power has not been fully constrained by rational-legal elements, making it
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become a plebiscitary dictatorship or a non-democratic form of rule of law.

Wałęsa was as interested in maintaining his power as Yeltsin was, yet lost it. Wałęsa’s climb
to power in 1990 placed him in a presidential office which was constructed to reassure the Soviets as
the Polish Communists attempted to salvage something of their power through reform in 1989. When
these arrangements were fully democratized by elections in 1990 and 1991, Wałęsa was but one dyarch in a semi-presidential system in which he often found himself sharing power, more often than not, with a prime minister (e.g. Olszewski, Pawlak, and Oleksy) with whom he had an adversarial relationship.

Ultimately Wałęsa found himself in an office where his power was constrained and his popularity plummeted. Despite his continual attempts to establish precedents for expanding the scope of his power and his strong opposition to governmental policies with which he did not agree, he passed the ultimate test of a democratic charismatic leader. When his charisma failed him in electoral competition, he left office.

What is most puzzling about Wałęsa and Yeltsin as leaders interested in directly exercising political power is their conspicuous failure to attempt to organize political parties to support their ambitions. As Weber pointed out in an essay written in a much more conspicuously political moment, the party is the best vehicle for political leaders to pursue power in a democracy (1946:102-3 & 113). While some say this reticence is logical when "party" has been so discredited by long years of party-state rule, this has not stopped large numbers of Yeltsin's and Wałęsa's national compatriots from voting for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or the Social-democracy of the Republic of Poland. Rather, both Yeltsin and Wałęsa have tried to portray themselves as defenders of national interest above the narrow interests of parties and politicians. This strategy is a pipe dream. It is impossible to pursue and exercise power and not be partisan. The only way to be above politics is to relinquish direct political power in the way that Havel has.

Conclusion: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Charismatic Legitimation

While it has been established above that charismatic leadership can be compatible with democratic rule, it is by no means incompatible with dictatorship either. It also has been shown that democracy is legitimized with constant recourse to electoral procedures which entrap the principle of charismatic affirmation within a rational-legal framework (though in practice almost all democracies also incorporate traditional elements as well). Democracy cannot legitimize itself without this charismatic element.

One rather unexpected result of this investigation is the finding that many forms of modern authoritarianism, notably plebiscitary rule, also legitimize themselves by a combination of charisma and rational-legal procedures. The difference is the degree to which charismatic power has been effectively subordinated to rational-legal controls. This insight pertains directly to the debate on the questions of authoritarian viability and the alternatives to democracy in the contemporary age.

Beginning with Fukuyama (1989) a large number of observers have either discounted the viability of non-liberal-democratic systems (Plattner 1991, Nyong'o 1992, Krauze 1992) or noted the growing difficulties in legitimating authoritarianism (Pye 1990, Huntington 1991). While Fukuyama
(1995) has qualified his position and others have pointed out serious problems with it (Schmitter 1995; Melzer, Weinberger and Zinman 1995), Weber's insights on the legitimation of democratic and plebiscitary authoritarian systems elucidate a neglected aspect of this debate.

The position that there are no alternatives to liberal-democracy or that authoritarian systems cannot legitimate themselves boil down to the same argument -- only liberal-democracy can legitimate itself in the present era. Yet this reconsideration of Weber's theory of charisma reminds us that many forms of modern authoritarianism and democracy legitimate themselves in similar fashions -- through a combination of charismatic appeals and rational-legal procedures. While there may no longer be a competing modern world civilization to liberal-democratic capitalist modernity, authoritarian leaders can utilize any number of issues -- nationalism, order, substantive justice, tradition, economic necessity, national security -- to justify the abrogation of democracy while claiming that this is in the interest or common good of the people. Any number of recent cases of authoritarian development can be cited -- Albania, Algeria, Belarus, Croatia, Nigeria, Peru, or Serbia to name but a few. Such rationalizations for authoritarian rule are made in the guise of popular will. Even when dictators demonstrate their popularity by plebiscitary means, they do not rule democratically because of the absence of rational-legal constraints on their power. It does not matter that there is no ideology that poses a global alternative to liberal-democracy. Future authoritarian regimes will justify and legitimize themselves in the guise of democracy.
NOTES

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2 Charisma also is an important concept in Weber's later political writings which addressed the problems posed by the collapse of Wilhelmine Germany. In the debates over the political structure of Weimar Germany, Weber often posed the figure of the charismatic party politician as part of the solution to the political and leadership crisis of a recently defeated and democratic Germany, still striving to play the role of great power. Weber's acute and realistic assessment of charismatic leadership in his earlier sociological writings which point out the exceptional, volatile, and difficult nature of charismatic rule (see below), make it difficult to understand how he saw this as an unproblematic solution to Germany's post-war political dilemmas. For this reason, this paper will concentrate on Weber's sociological writings. For an excellent account of Weber's later political writings on charisma, and their social and political context, see Mommsen (1984), particularly chapters 9 and 10.

3 Weber (1978) discusses many of these forms in his chapters on "Charisma and its Transformation" and "Political and Hierocratic Domination." These include charismatic acclamation, democratic suffrage, lineage charisma, "clan states," primogeniture, office charisma, as well as various forms of hierocratic domination.

4 S.N. Eisenstadt (1968:xxiii) points out a number of socio-psychological studies that look at receptivity to charisma as pathological and authoritarian.

5 See Chirot (1996) for an outstanding account of the varieties of modern dictatorship in the twentieth century.

6 Willner (1984) is a partial exception to this tendency in her treatment of both Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Mohandas K. Ghandi.

7 It should not be precluded that there may be traditional elements as well. Long-standing democracies seem to "traditionalize" aspects of rule. Lawrence Scaff has suggested to me that "constitutionalism" in the United States seems to fit this pattern. Similarly, modern dictatorships often incorporate elements of traditional belief in their construction of rule. Tucker (1987) makes a strong case for this in his discussion of Stalinism.

8 When Weber pays attention to the conduct of modern politics, he suggests that the most important charismatic elements in democratic systems reside in the party system, party leadership, and the perpetual campaigns of parties to mobilize voters (1946 :103).

9 Of course though there are moments when leaders attempt to go over the heads of other leaders or officials "directly to the people" to create pressure in support of their aims.
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