

# **EU ENLARGEMENT, AGRICULTURAL POLITICS, AND DOMESTIC POLICY NETWORKS IN POLAND**

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## **Executive Summary**

As Poland prepares to join the European Union, how do agricultural interests organize to cope with the new political and economic structures? A network database was created by coding responses of seventy-eight elite informants surveyed in spring 2002; with these data, the authors are able to specify linkages of agricultural policy networks in Poland. This Working Paper presents results from a network analysis of communications and resource sharing among groups in the agricultural policy domain. The authors find that 1) the agricultural policy network is organized as a center-periphery structure; 2) the key actors are four state agencies involved in agricultural policymaking and implementation; 3) the political tensions from the communist past are superimposed on the present, which is consequential for the manner and effectiveness of interest representation; and 4) the power of the Polish state is increased as Poland adopts the Community *acquis*. This is evidenced by the expansion of state bureaucracies and the centrality of state agencies as power brokers in agriculture, a critical economic sector.

## **Introduction**

Multilevel governance and the expansion of the European Union have received much attention by political scientists and sociologists in recent years (Glenn 2002; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996a; Marks et al 1996b; Mayhew 1998; Moravcsik 1998). The very complexity of the European intergovernmental institutions has demanded scholarly attention, if for no other reason but the need to explain the workings of the EU to politicians and the public.

Partly because of this, some social scientists have concentrated on the supranational EU structures and their constraints on domestic policy-making (Vahl 1997; Paterson 1997). Other analysts have considered pressures from below, showing how popular protests have been used by domestic occupational groups (workers, farmers) attempting to influence state and EU-level actors (Imig and Tarrow 2000; Roederer-Rynning 2000). Overall, the expansion of the European Union multiplies opportunities for actors to exert political pressure in favor of their policy interests.

In Western Europe, EU lobbying is highly institutionalized. Even French farmers' dramatic protest confrontations are orchestrated primarily to give leverage to their sponsoring organizations in the yearly agricultural negotiations that take place in Brussels (Roederer-Rynning 2000). In the East European candidate countries, however, policy communities are not yet institutionalized; post-communist modernization generates new political interests which are in flux. How the interests become organized—and interest representation mobilized—will be consequential. With East European governments struggling to shape their domestic policies to conform to EU standards, the simultaneous institutionalization of the new interests that arise from the reforms is linked politically to EU accession.

Our research project investigates this process of institutionalization in the shadow of the European Union. We concentrate on the agricultural policy domain in Poland for three reasons. First, agriculture is the most politically and economically salient sector of EC policy-making. Almost half of the EU budget is spent for this purpose and discussions of CAP reforms are politically very sensitive (Pappi and Henning 1999; Paterson 1997). Second, agricultural modernization took a back seat to other economic reforms in post-communist Poland prior to negotiations with the EU. Rapid agrarian transformation now is urgent for the Polish government in preparation for accession. Consequently, an examination of changes in the agricultural sector will reveal the most about institutionalization of political-economic interests as a function of EU enlargement. Third, Poland is the largest and most geopolitically salient of the East European post-communist countries. Others in the region will be watching the Poles' progress toward integration with great interest.

Pappi and Henning (1999) identify three major access routes to European institutions: via national governments, via the European peak organizations, and directly to the supranational EU organizations. These are the paths available to the established members of the European Union. However, candidate countries preparing for EU accession are not yet part of the club; their organizations and interests are not strongly established within the European community. We would expect that newly established interest groups would first tread the path to EU influence via their national governments; then through the peak organizations, and finally, directly to the supranational institutions. Our research team has collected network data to delineate the pathways of influence. We have adopted a network approach as the most effective method for empirically establishing the connections between a moderately large number of actors. In this

paper, we give an overview of changes within the agricultural sphere in Poland, and then present the results of our initial data analysis.

### **Rural Social Change in Poland**

Rural modernization in Poland has taken an unusual path. Although agrarian transformation was achieved through commercialization of agriculture in Western Europe and collectivization in Eastern Europe, Poland did not exactly follow either of these models. Polish communists' inability to effectively socialize agriculture led to "growth without development" (Kuczynski 1981), a limited modernization of the technical means of production in farming but without the structural changes in landholding that could sustain commercial agriculture. In the 1990s, 20 to 25% of the Polish workforce remained employed in agriculture, and farming continued to be dominated by smallholders (Frenkel 1997; Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 1995, 1996, 1997).

Changes initiated by successive Polish democratic governments since 1989 have been directed towards creating a viable, profitable agricultural sector. These include removing legal restrictions on land and machinery purchases by private parties, privatization of former state farms, and the creation of state agencies to modernize and commercialize agriculture (Gorlach 1999). Since 1999, an infusion of PHARE and SAPARD funds from the EU has accelerated the process of agrarian economic and social change (European Union 2000; Zawalińska 2001). This aspect of globalization—the accommodation by domestic actors to the requisites of the international market and institutions—is also shaping how Polish agricultural interests lobby in Warsaw and, increasingly, in Brussels.

While the vestiges of communist-era organizations and habits remain, domain actors (agricultural producers and workers, processors and traders) are rapidly adapting to changing market demands and governing structures (Podeworna 2000). A configuration of organizations, foundations, federations, and unions form the new vehicle for agricultural interests and comprises the subject matter of our study.

### **The Sociological Foundations of Agricultural Policy Networks**

European integration is influencing the re-organization of Polish agriculture. In order to effectively articulate Polish farmers' interests and operate under the conditions established by a broader European framework, new agricultural actors are emerging on the policy scene. In our study, we investigated the nature of these actors, their inter-relations, and their connections to Polish governmental and EU agencies. We sought answers to the following questions. What is the character of the currently existing corporate representatives of the agricultural arena? Are the new agricultural unions, trade and other associations effectively representing Polish farmers' economic and political interests? How does the configuration of domestic agricultural policy networks affect governmental efforts to prepare for EU membership? Finally, given the multiple pressures for rapid modernization and economic advancement in agriculture, can agricultural interest organizations cope with the challenges raised by Poland's timetable for Poland's accession to EU in 2004?

In this section, we first address the organizational changes in the agricultural domain in Poland by identifying how these actors are differentiated. Second, we describe our research design and data gathering procedures. Third, using the data from our Polish Farmers Database (© 2002 Youngblood and Osa), we analyze four sets of relational ties: the communications network,

affiliations among core actors, technical advice network, and the conflict network. In the paper's conclusion, the implications of these network configurations for the ongoing process of democratization as well as for the prospects of EU integration are considered.

### **The Differentiation of Corporate Actors in the Agricultural Domain**

The most active organizations in the agricultural domain are not private firms, but rather trade associations, farmers' unions, professional associations, government agencies, and private and government-supported foundations. These organizations vary along a number of dimensions: origins, organization goals, membership, resources, and the extent of organizational autonomy. We will discuss each of these aspects in turn.

The origins of Polish agricultural organizations are particularly important; historical origins situate the organization within a political context, influencing the way other actors view them. Three junctures have given rise to different types of Polish agricultural associations. First, the democratization of 1989 gave birth to opposing groups: reorganized versions of communist-front organizations such as the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and anti-communist groups associated with Solidarity, such as Rural Solidarity (RIS).<sup>1</sup> In their organizational literature, PSL avoids mentioning their support of (and inclusion in) the communist governments of the 1945-1989 period. Rather, they stress the origins of the Polish Peasant Party when it was a pro-Polish independence organization founded in the Russian partition in 1895. The second "founding date" provided in their literature cites 1990, the year when PSL regained its status as an independent organization following the collapse of the Polish People's Republic.

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<sup>1</sup> Polish organizations are listed in the text by their three-letter identification code (used in the network diagrams) and the English translation of the Polish name. See Table 1, "Polish Agricultural Organizations Interviewed" for the complete list.



Despite the organizational amnesia reflected in their official statements, farmers and politicians are keenly aware of PSL's uninterrupted history. On the other side of the spectrum is Rural Solidarity, which formed in 1981 during the explosion of social protest in support of the free trade unions in People's Poland (Osa 2003). Rural Solidarity came into being as a farmer's union rather than a trade association because at the time the state was the sole supplier and buyer for agricultural products. In addition, the social support for the idea of free trade unions legitimized the private farmers' organizational effort. Rural Solidarity today is less suited to coping with the situation faced by farmers and is unable to lobby effectively for sectoral economic interests. Nevertheless, RIS still enjoys a high level of political salience and legitimacy largely because of the historical role it played in Poland's anti-communist resistance.

In 1990/91, as capitalist transformation took place in Poland, a stock market was established, industrial enterprises privatized, and commodity markets expanded. This second historical juncture gave rise to new agricultural associations. The first organizations to appear were public-interest associations whose purpose was to inform farmers about marketization and to assist them in obtaining investment credits. Shortly after this, trade associations formed to represent agricultural sectoral and regional interests. In order to manage the economic transition, the Polish government established the Agricultural Market Agency (ARR) in 1990 to provide agricultural price supports for farmers as they adapted to the market economy. A non-profit association, Agro-Info (WAI), formed at the same time to improve farmers' education and to disseminate technical information for agricultural producers. Once agricultural reorganization was underway, we see the formation of sectoral trade associations, such as the Polish Union of Meat Producers, Exporters and Importers (EIM), and the Polish Federation of Food Producers (FPZ).

Finally, the negotiations between Poland and the EU provided the most recent impetus for the further development of the agricultural domain. In preparation for EU accession, new public sector organizations and state agencies formed to assist farmers in upgrading technical production standards and maneuvering through new bureaucratic labyrinths. Two organizations founded in 1999 are representative of this trend. For example, the non-profit Rural Center for European Integration (CIE) organized to inform Polish farmers about the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and the various European structural funds for agricultural development. That same year the trade association, the Economic Chamber of Grain Traders, Growers and Processors (IGH), began lobbying in Warsaw and Brussels on behalf of its members; IGH also attempted to influence Polish public opinion in support of EU membership. In 2002, the Polish government gave the Agricultural Restructuring and Modernizing Agency (ARM) a new set of tasks: to create (and oversee) an agricultural commodities exchange as well as to supervise the distribution of EU investment funds.

Organizational goals also vary among the agricultural associations. Goals may be general, tactical, or legally constrained. First, general goals are often characteristic of public institutions and foundations working on agricultural issues. For example, the Institute of Agricultural and Food Economy (IER) is a public institution whose stated goal is "to engage in scientific research on food economies." The "Perfect Commune" Foundation (FIG) is a non-profit with similarly general goals: "to support rural development, promote rural education and fight unemployment in the villages."

Second, trade associations and other groups involved in political lobbying activities usually adopt tactical goals. For example, the Polish Cattle and Swine Breeders Union (WUS) state that their goals are "to defend the interests of cattle and hog breeders, to organize producers

groups, and to set product quality standards.” Since the interests of members change with economic and political conditions, they give their trade representatives needed flexibility. The National Federation of Agricultural Owners and Leaseholders (SDW) is another trade association whose objectives are expressly political: “to represent the interests of agricultural owners in their contacts with governmental agencies, before legislative commissions, and with other agricultural associations.”

Finally, some organizations, primarily government agencies and state-sponsored foundations, have their goals constrained (or defined) by statute. Parliament created the Agricultural Restructuring and Modernization Agency (ARM) and provided funds to “support investment in agriculture, correct the agrarian (land tenure) structure, and create an agricultural commodities exchange.” Even organizations that are not directly part of the government may have goals circumscribed through legislation. The National Council of Agricultural Chambers (RIR) lists its goal “to represent farmers before the government administration and Parliamentary commissions, and to assist [local] Agricultural Chambers in carrying out their statutory functions.”<sup>2</sup>

How memberships and/or constituencies are defined represent a third dimension of variance among agricultural groups. We distinguish between direct membership/voluntary associations and indirect membership/constituency organizations. First, direct memberships are represented by typical voluntary associations, such as trade groups. The National Association of Rapeseed Producers (RZE), for example, is funded through dues from 1400 members organized in six regional societies. A second type of “voluntary” association carries automatic enrollment linked to some other function. For example, membership in local agricultural chambers (affiliated with the National Council of Agricultural Chambers, RIR) is automatic with the

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<sup>2</sup> Agricultural Chambers are territorially based, a sort of “Chamber of Commerce” for farmers.

payment of land taxes on agricultural properties. A third type of “voluntary” organization is a necessary affiliation for the fulfillment of professional functions. Membership in the National Medical-Veterinary Chamber (WET) is required for veterinarians to be licensed and to practice.

Second, governmental agencies or non-profit associations that serve agricultural or rural constituencies indicate a type of indirect membership. The government’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MRR) administers programs for farmers, rural inhabitants, food producers, processors and exporters. The non-profit Foundation for Village Water Supplies (FWW) assists farmers with obtaining irrigation water and villagers with water purification for home use.

A fourth organizational characteristic that distinguishes among agricultural groups is the amount and type of organizational resources. Resource-rich organizations tend to use more direct strategies (e.g., lobbying) to influence agricultural policy. For example, the Agri-business Club (AGK) is a well-endowed organization whose members are private firms including some of the most profitable food production companies. The Agri-business Club possesses abundant financial resources and a central location with modern facilities. AGK’s lobbyists have direct contacts with vice-ministers in the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development, with deputies in the Parliament, and with department heads.

Resource-poor organizations are often dependent on local foundations and public institutions that can lend staff or facilities. For example, the Union of Agricultural Tenants-Owners in the Mazowiecki region (affiliated with SDW, above) has only two permanent staff members and no computer in their two-room office. Although the members are among the larger landowners in the Mazowiecki area, they do not have the access to capital that the Agri-business Club members do. Resource-poor organizations such the Mazowiecki Union of Agricultural

Tenants-Owners are thus more likely to influence policy by engaging in coalition-building activities with other agricultural groups.

A fifth, and final, dimension is the scope of organizational activity. Most of the organizations included in this study operate at the national level, although some actors are based in a region or province.<sup>3</sup> Increasingly, however, the activities of domestic associations span national boundaries. An organization whose activities bridge the national/international level is the Polish Federation of Food Producers (FPZ) whose lobbyists are active in Warsaw but whose staff have also promoted Polish food products in Brussels at a commercial exhibition there in May 2002. An example of an organization with a regional/international focus is the Małopolska Farmers Chamber (MIR). Although MIR is primarily a provincial association, it also is participating in farmers' international exchanges and in joint programs with agricultural chambers in Western Europe.

## **Research Design**

Our object of study is the “*agricultural policy domain*” in Poland on the eve of European Union accession. A policy domain is a social subsystem of consequential actors engaged in policy debates and decisions intended to resolve the substantive problems they face in their economic or professional field (Laumann and Knoke 1982, 256.) This definition implies a number of elements for investigation. First, a population of “consequential actors” must be identified and their patterns of communication and exchange mapped. Second, the issues contested in the policy debates that are the focus of decision-making must be explored. Third, the events in which these actors participate in solving the substantive problems in question are also

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<sup>3</sup> Since we are concerned with the national policy domain, local country or village level organizations are not included in the dataset.

vehicles through which the power and influence of the prominent actors is asserted and/or challenged.

Thus, analyzing patterns of participation in events and the coalitional or oppositional groupings associated with critical events exposes the underlying power structure of a particular domain (see also Knoke 1990; Knoke et al 1996). The mechanisms through which organizational prominence is established are the same means through which corporate actors influence substantive decision-making. In short, our research investigates the patterns of affiliation and communication, the intensity of policy preferences on relevant issues, and participation in critical events facing the domain in order to explain the domain structure and agricultural policy outcomes. Since modernizing Polish agriculture is a crucial prerequisite for EU membership, policy conflicts and the resolution of problems in this arena are important indicators of Poland's progress on the path towards European integration.

As the scope of a working paper must necessarily be limited, we concentrate here on a single aspect of our research: the structure of the domain population, its networks of communication, exchange, and conflict. The in-depth analysis of policy issues and events will be presented in our book (Osa, Gorlach, and Podedworna, manuscript-in-preparation). In the remainder of this section, we will discuss the aspect of our research strategy aimed at delimiting the population of consequential actors in the agricultural policy domain, and the survey questions we posed to elicit information on communication, exchange, and conflict networks.

Probably the most important—and the most difficult—task for our research is the delineation of the organizational population. Following Laumann and Knoke, we accept that “for all practical purposes, the members of a national policy domain are complex formal organizations—such as corporations, confederations, commissions, and committees—rather than

natural persons acting in their own right” (Laumann and Knoke 1987, 11). Since we are interested in describing the structural relations among the consequential actors concerned with agricultural policy, we must name the entire population. Sampling is not a viable option.

A triangulation strategy was used to identify the population of organizations in the agricultural policy domain. Our first attempt to enumerate the organization set relied on the informed opinions of an expert panel (comprised of journalists, government bureaucrats, and rural sociologists) as well as information from an internet directory of NGOs. From the directory, we selected those non-profit groups actively engaged with Polish agriculture or rural issues. Our initial list named ninety-three organizations. In the second phase of this process, we used information from our interviewees to add consequential actors and eliminate marginal or isolated organizations.

We did this through a set of “snowball” survey questions that allowed respondents to add organizations not on the original list. After a predetermined number of interviews were completed, we constructed an interorganizational affiliation matrix to examine named and listed entities. Organizations from the original list that were not tied to any of the interviewed organizations were eliminated. Organizations mentioned by at least two respondents but not on the original list were scheduled for interviews. At the completion of the data-gathering phase of the project we had identified eighty-four consequential actors populating the agricultural policy domain. Seventy-eight interviews were completed; our response rate was 93%.

We conducted structured interviews with seventy-eight respondents over a five-month period (March through July 2002). Our respondents were in executive positions within the target organizations, and were well informed concerning the policy preferences and activities of their

respective groups. The communication section (Part III) of the interview schedule concerned the target organization's links to others through sharing resources and communication.

We used a general question to establish the broadest network, asking respondents to please name those organizations that they discussed agricultural policy with or from whom they received policy advice (C1a, C1b).<sup>4</sup> Two questions explored various types of resource exchange: which organizations exchanged technical information (C2), and which organizations shared staff and/or facilities with the interviewed group (C2, C4a, C4b). We also probed for the existence of a conflict network by asking respondents to name organizations that frequently advocated an opposite policy position from their own (C7).

In the following section, we analyze data drawn from these lengthy interviews. Our purpose is to reveal the structure of political influence in the agriculture domain just at the point when the Polish state is acting to meet the conditions and timetable for accession to the European Union.

### **Network Analysis: Presentation of Data and Interpretation of Results**

Our analysis begins with an examination of the most inclusive set of connections among domain actors, the communication network through which actors give and receive information and advice on agricultural policy issues. The ties graphed in Figure 1 document communication links among the organizations in the agricultural policy domain. This network exhibits a number of interesting characteristics. First, this is a completely connected network; there are no isolated organizations. The mean number of ties of any node is about twenty, which is an extraordinarily high mean degree centrality. Second, while network density is moderately high (26%),


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<sup>4</sup> Parenthetical references are to specific questions from the questionnaire. For example, "C1a" is the first question in the Communication section.



centralization is *very* high, at 60%. This means that organizations in the communication network tend to cluster in dense pockets around a limited number of highly central (influential) actors. Finally, from the descriptive statistics, we see that density and centralization are inversely related across all the networks. This leads us to propose that the tendency towards centralization is likely to be the strongest network effect exhibited in this policy domain. (See Table 2 and Figure 1).

**FIGURE 1: AGRICULTURAL POLICY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK**  
**N = 78**




In all of the networks we graphed, the same four organizations consistently appear as the most central (measured as nodal degree). They are the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MRR) and three additional governmental agencies: State Treasury Agency for

Agricultural Property (AWR), Agricultural Restructuring and Modernization Agency (ARM), and the Agricultural Market Agency (ARR). (These organizations are circled in blue on Figure 2, the restricted organization set, “high centrality organizations”). MRR, AWR, ARM, and ARR are the major players in the agricultural domain. These governmental units are involved in funding and setting national policy affecting farmers, agricultural producers and food processors. Besides distributing funds from the state budget, the Agricultural Restructuring and Modernization Agency (ARM) has the discretion to allocate European PHARE and SAPARD monies.

Within a second circle of influence surrounding these four core actors is a group of powerful organizations representing a range of economic, social, and political interests. This “inner circle” is composed of the Institute of Agricultural Economics and Food Economy (IER), the main agricultural economics research center; “Self-Defense” (SAM), a populist agrarian political party; the National Council of Agricultural Chambers (RIR), a territorially organized association of farmer/landowners; the National Federation of Agricultural Producers (ZPR), the major agricultural trade association; and KRUS, the farmer’s pension fund board.


Finally in the “outer inner circle” we find the major political parties (apart from “Self-Defense”) that are interested in courting agricultural constituencies, as well as sectoral agricultural trade associations and foundations. Although the “inner” and “outer inner” circles directly compete for the resources and attention of the core actors, these organizations also function as important brokers for the entire network, mediating between the core state actors and the peripheral organizations.

FIGURE 2: CORE ACTORS: HIGH CENTRALITY ORGANIZATIONS  
N = 34



**FIGURE 3: TECHNICAL ADVICE NETWORK**

**N = 78**




The core-periphery organization of the domain is clearly visible in the “technical advice” network. (See Figure 3.) The question which elicited information on the target organization’s sources of technical information was framed to include legal and economic advice as well as purely scientific questions. Respondents most often named the four core actors as sources of

authoritative information concerning technical knowledge, market information, and EU regulations.

The core was the recognized “center” in the eyes of our informants. This perception of the core was reinforced by the lower than expected positions of National Union of Agricultural Circles (WOR), the National Council of Agricultural Chambers (RIR), and the National Advisory Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (WCD)—groups whose avowed aims were to provide specialized technical information to farmers. In the exchange of technical information among domain actors, specialized knowledge seems to be less valued than authoritative information. Excluded from the technical information network are regional branches of national organizations and small sectoral trade groups (isolates NAP, OHO, PZF, SFW). Again, this reinforces our interpretation of the agricultural domain as a center-periphery structure. The influence of the national level organizations in determining agricultural policy is evident, despite the assertions of isolated regional and local branch managers to the contrary.

**FIGURE 4: STAFF AND FACILITIES**

**N = 78**



The staff and facilities exchange network is the next set of relations we examined. We asked respondents to name the organizations “you permit to use (your) staff or facilities.” This question selected relations of trust and dependency. This affiliation set shows the connections between organizations that collaborate on joint projects and poor organizations that depend on their trusted partners for operational resources. In the communications and technical advice networks, organizations surround a well-defined core; by contrast, organizations that sharing staff and facilities cluster around multiple centers. The tie contents of trust and dependency define a more restricted network than, for example, the communications network. The network density here is quite low (4%) while centralization is proportionally high (22%) because trusted organizations cluster around the “star” in their circle of trust. (See Table 2 and Figure 4.)

There are four organizations which are most involved in sharing staff and facilities. First, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MRR, degree 19), one of the core actors, also appears at center of the staff and facilities exchange network. MRR has the most resources, so it attracts the most requests for use of space and other forms of assistance. Among those groups that go to the Ministry for resources are some technical and professional organizations (WET, KPR, SIT, WCD), political parties (PSL, UWL), and trade associations representing private milk producers (WUS, PPM). In addition, some groups are tied to the MRR because they are legally subordinated to the Ministry or their budgets are contingent upon MRR oversight (FAP, WCD, FSU, FPG, FSW, RIR.)


Second, the National Council of Agricultural Chambers (RIR, degree 13), is the national representative of all the local Chambers of Agriculture. Although RIR receives resources from the Ministry, RIR is itself the second most involved in staff and facilities exchange. Examples of organizations which RIR allows to use its staff and facilities are: KCD, KRU, SAM, and WCD. Organizations that permit RIR the use of their resources include: MRR, FAP, FSW, IER, NMR, WAI, ZPR, and WCD. The National Council of Agricultural Chambers is so involved in resource exchange because of its size, its reach into the rural areas, and the diverse nature of its activities.

Third, the Union Federation of Agricultural Producers (ZPR, degree 12), one of the largest trade associations, exchanges with the Ministry (MRR) often since their offices are on the sixth floor of the Ministry of Agriculture building. ZPR also benefits from resources shared by the Polish Agricultural Assistance Programs Foundation (FAPA), Rural Solidarity (RIS), Polish Beekeepers Union (PZP), and Union of Hamlet Headmen of the Polish Republic (ZSR). In addition, ZPR is the benefactor to seven other organizations: Mazowiecki Union of Agricultural Manufacturers (MZP), National Federation of Planters of Fruit and Vegetables for Processing (POW), National Association of Root Crop Producers (PRO), National Council of Agriculture Chambers (RIR), Polish Cattle and Swine Breeders Union (WUS), Polish Union of Horse Breeders (ZHK), and Polish Union of Corn Producers (ZPK).

Fourth, the National Center for Consulting on Agricultural and Rural Development, Krakow branch (KCD, degree 12) appears to be a prominent node in the exchange network. This is deceptive. KCD is resource poor; consequently, this organization's ties are to others who allow them the use of needed physical and human resources (ARM, KRU, RIR, WAI, FAP, MRR, FPG, AWR, ARR, SDW, WOR, KGW).

Having considered a number of relational contents, or types of ties, among domain actors, we now turn to lines of conflict within the network. One caveat before we begin: asking our respondents to name those organizations that “often take an opposite position from [target organization] on agricultural issues” was perceived as inappropriate by many interviewees. Consequently, our data on this particular issue is not as complete as we would like. Nevertheless, we received sufficient responses to outline three overlapping sets of cleavages. (See Figure 5.)

**FIGURE 5: CONFLICT NETWORKS**  
**N = 26**



The first conflict structure involves the core state actors (see top of Fig. 5), and highlights political and economic cross-pressures on the state. RIR, representing the interests of



farmer/landowners, places demands on the state for subsidies and other measures to reduce the cost of the agrarian reforms to farmers. Agricultural Circles (WOR) place similar demands on the state agencies. The peasant political parties, PSL and SAM, direct their energies to lobbying different agencies. PSL is in conflict with the state treasury's agency for agrarian property transfers, AWR, and SAM directs its copious wrath against the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MRR). These conflicts concern PSL's attempts to promote the interests of small-holders by accessing former state farmlands that are held in trust by AWR. The State Treasury Agency, on the other hand, is more receptive to private agricultural corporations from which they can get higher prices for land sales. Finally, core actors are subject to policy demands from trade associations for policies to enhance their market positions.

A second web of conflict is clearly political, and here SAM acts as a "lightning rod," stimulating conflict and keeping agricultural issues squarely on the political agenda. SAM ("Self-Defense") is an opponent of almost all the major political parties: Freedom Union (UWL), the Conservative Populist Party (SKL), and the (former communist) government party, Left Democratic Party (SLD). However, it is interesting to note that although the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) is a member of the government coalition (together with the Left Democratic Party, SLD), SAM is not directly in conflict with them PSL. While SAM is not openly cooperating with PSL, it does silently support PSL's pro-farmer policies. There is a highly ambiguous relation between these two political parties because of their claims to represent peasant-farmers as a class. Besides annoying the political parties, the contentious SAM has drawn in other organizations into conflict over agricultural issues: agricultural business groups and trade associations (WAI, SOG), rural officials (KSS), and agricultural workers unions (ZPM), among others.

Finally, there is another thread of conflict, which is not as strong as might be expected, between the modern, sectoral agricultural interest organizations and the traditional rural groups. In particular, we find the village “headman” association frequently cited as an opponent of various modern, sectoral trade associations or agri-business groups, such as: ABK, SOG, ZPM. However, this is not a major theme.

## **Conclusion**

The agricultural domain in Poland is an emergent political arena. It is not yet institutionalized: patterns of interest representation in Poland represent an amalgam of influence peddling from the communist era, extra parliamentary protest, and professional lobbying. The pressures to conform to EU standards in preparation for accession are placing greater importance on the institutional channels. Thus, the trend is towards political action and pressure that is increasingly defined by bureaucratic rules and contained within institutional boundaries. In our study, we attempt to define the contours of this emergent space for a critical area of policy: agriculture.

The data analysis presented in this paper represents our initial cut into an extensive body of information collected from prominent informants in the organizations that make up the agricultural policy domain. In this first stage of analysis, it was necessary to identify the key actors in the domain, to understand some of the factors associated with organizational emergence, and to describe the domain structure. While there remains much work to do with the database, some tentative conclusions are possible, based on the analysis of relations of the four tie contents: communications, technical advice, resource sharing, and conflict.

First, the overall network organization appears as a center-periphery structure.<sup>5</sup> This global structure is not a mystery to our respondents, who clearly perceive where to go for resources and which decision-makers to approach. Cooperation among domain actors is evident also, especially between those on the technical side (agronomists, economists, agricultural engineers, surveyors, etc.) and those in government. This type of network structure should facilitate the implementation of large-scale programs. In fact, the rapid agrarian modernization brought about by the effective allocation of PHARE and SAPARD monies is evidence for this assertion.

Second, the key actors in the domain are the state agencies involved in agricultural policy-making and implementation. Despite lingering political tensions stemming from the Communist past, Poles still look to Warsaw for authoritative information and actions. We do not see much American-style economic decentralization despite a decade-long effort of privatization by the government. However, there is not a hard line between state and other organizations. Since the state is a primary source of funding for agricultural research, technical institutes and rural relief programs, there tends to be a high level of interpenetration between state and ostensibly non-state, public organizations.

Third, political tensions from the past are superimposed on the present; this political reality has consequences for the manner and effectiveness of interest representation. For example, competing organizations may duplicate the representation of agricultural interests. The National Association of Village Headmen (KSS) and Union of Village Headmen of the Polish Republic (ZSR ) both claim to be *the* national-level organization representing local village

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<sup>5</sup> Our examination of the sub-networks delineated through various tie contents suggests that centralization (clustering, or 2-star effect) is the strongest network effect at work configuring the agricultural domain. This hypothesis will be tested in a further stage of analysis. We will use an exponential random graph (p\*) model to estimate the effects of basic network forces such as edge effects, clustering, and closure on the full network. This type of modeling allows us to predict a developmental trend for the domain as it becomes larger and more complex. See Osa and Skvoretz 2002.

chiefs. KSS and ZSR both engage in the same types of activities in the name of the same constituency but refuse to cooperate with each other.

The explanation for this state of affairs is found in the origins of the competing associations. ZSR is associated with the Populist Conservative Party (SKL), itself a remnant of a right-wing faction of Solidarity. The opposing KSS is connected with the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), considered a politically “old” (i.e., Communist) association. Thus, the inability of these village officials to establish a single national organization to represent their interests (vis-à-vis the government and its modernization program) reflects the persistent animosities and orientations left over from the earlier period.

Finally, while many political scientists expect that the market or international institutions such as the European Union will diminish the role of the state (Pierson 1996), this is not happening in Poland. The power of the Polish state is enhanced for two reasons. The state has become more central because EU funds are disbursed through its agencies; and the state has grown by creating new institutions to shape the agricultural domain according to EU requirements.

Post accession, however, we would expect to see political pressure from Polish agricultural groups directed at the various EU institutions as well. Not only national organizations but also regional associations may see Brussels as a potential way around the core actors of the state. There are signs that this strategy is emerging: 12% of the domain organizations have already made political connections in Brussels, either through affiliates or by setting up new units within the domestic national organization to lobby the EU. It was recently announced that the chairman of the Rural Circles (RKR), Władysław Serafin, was appointed

vice-chairman of COPA (Committee of Agricultural Organizations) in Brussels, even before full accession.

In short, our data gathering in Poland took place at a critical juncture for the agricultural domain. An infusion of European investment funds, efforts by Polish lawmakers to modernize the legal structure and harmonize the laws with the European Community *acquis*, and the professionalization of interest representation—all these changes have created new conditions for Polish commercial farmers. They have responded chiefly through intensifying their efforts to organize effective agricultural associations—organizations that will help them make a successful entry into a competitive European marketplace. In the next stage of our project, we will analyze data on controversial agricultural issues and events in order to determine the location and flexibility of political alignments that support (and oppose) European integration.

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<b>Table 1. Polish Agricultural Organizations Interviewed</b>			
<b>IDCode</b>	<b>NamePolish</b>	<b>NameEnglish</b>	<b>OrgtypeSimplified</b>
ABK	Agro Biznes Klub	Agrobusiness Club	Trade Association
ARM	Agencja Restrukturyzacji i Modernizacji Rolnictwa	Agricultural Restructuring and Modernization Agency	Govt Agency
ARR	Agencja Rynku Rolnego	Agricultural Market Agency	Govt Agency
AWR	Agencja Wlasnosci Rolnej Skarbu Panstwa	State Treasury Agency for Ag. Property	Govt Agency
CIE	Wiejskie Centrum Integracji Europejskiej	Rural Center for European Integration	Non-Profit
CUJ	Katedra Chorób Wewnętrznych i Medycyny Wsi Collegium Medicum UJ.	Internal Diseases and Rural Health Center of Jagiellonian University.	Public Institutions
EIM	Polski Związek Producentów, Eksporterów i Importerów Mięsa	Polish Association of Meat Producers, Exporters and Importers.	Trade Association
FAP	Fundacja Programow Pomocy dla Polskiego Rolnictwa	Polish Agricultural Assistance Programs Foundation (FAPA)	Non-Profit
FIG	Fundacja Idealna Gmina	"Perfect Commune" Foundation	Non-Profit
FIS	Fundacja Inicjatyw Społeczno - Ekonomicznych	Foundation for Socio-Economic Initiatives	Non-Profit
FPG	Fundacja Promocji Gmin Polskich	Polish Localities Promotion Fund	Non-Profit
FPZ	Polska Federacja Producentow Zywnosci	Polish Federation of Food Producers	Trade Association
FRP	Fundacja na Rzecz Postępu, Rozwoju Rolnictwa i Gospodarki Zywnosciowej	Polish Agricultural Development and Food Economy Foundation	Non-Profit
FRR	Fundacja na Rzecz Rozwoju Polskiego Rolnictwa	Foundation for the Development of Polish Agriculture	Non-Profit
FRW	Fundacja na Rzecz Rozwoju Wsi Polskiej "Polska Wies 2000"	Rural Poland Development Foundation: "Rural Poland 2000"	Non-Profit
FSF	Fundacje-Spółdzielczy Fundusz Socjalny Wsi	Foundations - Countryside Cooperatives Social Fund	Non-Profit
FSW	Fundacja Spoldzielczosci Wiejski	Foundation of Rural Cooperatives	Non-Profit
FWI	Fundacja Wspierania Inicjatyw Ekologicznych	Sustainable Ecology Fund	Non-Profit
FWW	Fundacja Wspomagania Wsi	Foundation for the Development of Village Water Supplies	Non-Profit
IER	Instytut Ekonomiki Rolnej i Gospodarki Zywnosciowej	Institute of Ag. and Food Economy	Public Institutions
IGH	Izba Gospodarcza Handlowcow Przetworcow Zboz I Producentow Pasz	Economic Chamber of Grain & Feed Traders, Growers and Manufacturers	Trade Association
IML	Instytut Mleczarstwa	Dairy Institute	Trade Association
IMW	Instytut Medycyny Wsi	Rural Areas Medical Institute	Public Institutions
KCD	Krajowe Centrum Doradztwa Rozwoju Rolnictwa i Obszarów Wiejskich oddział Kraków	National Center for Consulting on Agricultural and Rural Development, Krakow branch	Non-Profit



<b>Table 1. Polish Agricultural Organizations Interviewed</b>			
<b>IDCode</b>	<b>NamePolish</b>	<b>NameEnglish</b>	<b>OrgtypeSimplified</b>
KGW	Koła Gospodyń Wiejskich	Rural Women's Circles	Non-Profit
KHK	Okręgowy Związek hodowców Koni w Krakowie	Krakow Regional Horse Breeders Union	Trade Association
KOR	Wojewódzki Związek Rolników Kótek i Organizacji Rolniczych w Krakowie	Union of Farmers Circles and Agricultural Organizations, Krakow Province	Trade Association
KOW	Międzynarodowa Koalicja Obrony Polskiej Wsi	International Coalition to Protect the Polish Countryside	Non-Profit
KPR	Klub Profesorów na rzecz wsi i rolnictwa	Professors Assoc. for Agriculture and Rural Affairs	Public Institutions
KRD	Krajowa Rada Drobiarstwa.	National Poultry Council	Trade Association
KRU	Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Społecznego	Farmers Social Insurance Fund	Govt Agency
KSS	Krajowe Stowarzyszenie Sołtysów	National Association of Hamlet Heads	Non-Profit
KUS	Polski Związek Hodowców i Producentów Trzody Chlewnej (POLSUS) Kraków	Polish Cattle & Swine Breeders Union (Krakow)	Trade Association
KZP	Wojewódzki Związek Pszczelarzy w Krakowie.	Provincial Union of Beekeepers in Cracow.	Trade Association
MFR	Małopolska Fundacja Rolnicza	Malopolska Agricultural Foundation	Non-Profit
MIR	Małopolska Izba Rolnicza	Malopolska Farmers Chamber	Trade Association
MRR	Ministerstwo Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi	Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development	Govt Agency
MZP	Mazowiecki Związek Przedsiębiorców Rolnych	Mazowiecki Union of Agricultural Manufacturers	Trade Association
NAP	Fundacja Programów Pomocy dla Rolnictwa (FAPA) Oddział w Nowym Sączu	Polish Agricultural Assistance Programs Foundation, Nowy Sącz branch	Non-Profit
NMR	Związek Zawodowy Centrum Narodowe Młodych Rolników	National Union Center of Young Farmers	Trade Association
OHO	Regionalny Związek Hodowców Owiec i Kóz w Opolu.	Regional Association of Sheep and Goat Breeders, Opole	Trade Association
PAN	Instytut Rozwoju Wsi i Rolnictwa PAN	Polish Academy of Sciences Institute for Agricultural & Rural Development	Public Institutions
PCD	Krajowe Centrum Doradztwo Rolniczego, Poznan	National Center for Agricultural Consulting, Poznan	Non-Profit
PDS	Fundacja Partnerstwo dla Środowiska.	Partnership for the Environment Foundation	Non-Profit
PKZ	Polski Komitet Zielarski	Polish Herbalists Committee	Trade Association
POW	Krajowy Związek Zrzeszeń Plantatorów Owoców i Warzyw dla Przemysłu	National Federation of Planters of Fruit and Vegetables for Processing	Trade Association
PPM	Związek Prywatnych Przetwórców Mleka	Association of Private Milk Producers	Trade Association

<b>Table 1. Polish Agricultural Organizations Interviewed</b>			
<b>IDCode</b>	<b>NamePolish</b>	<b>NameEnglish</b>	<b>OrgtypeSimplified</b>
PRO	Krajowy Związek Plantatorów Roslin Okopowych	National Assoc. of Root Crop Producers	Trade Association
PSL	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	Polish Peasants Party	Political Party
PWD	Federacje Związków Pracodawców Właścicieli i Dzierżawców Rolnych	Federations of Employer Unions of Agricultural Owners & Leaseholders.	Trade Association
PZF	Polski Związek Hodowców i Producentów Zwierząt Futerkowych	Polish Association of Raisers and Producers of Fur Animals.	Trade Association
PZP	Polski Związek Pszczelarski	Polish Beekeepers Union	Trade Association
RIR	Krajowa Rada Izb Rolniczych	National Council of Agriculture Chambers	Trade Association
RIS	NSZZ RI Solidarnosc	Rural Solidarity	Trade Association
RKR	Krajowy Związek Rewizyjny Spółdzielni - Kółek Rolniczych.	National Revisional Association of Cooperatives - Agricultural Circles	Trade Association
RZE	Krajowe Zrzeszenie Producentów Rzepaku	National Association of Rapeseed Producers	Trade Association
SAM	Samoobrona	Self-Defense	Political Party
SDW	Krajowy Związek Stowarzyszeń Dzierżawców i Właścicieli Rolnych	National Federation of Agricultural Owners & Leaseholders	Trade Association
SFW	Sadecka Fundacja Wsi i Rolnictwa	Nowy Sacz Foundation for Villages and Agriculture	Non-Profit
SIT	Stowarzyszenie Inżynierów i Techników Rolnictwa	Association of Engineers and Agricultural Technicians	Trade Association
SKL	Stronnictwo Konserwatywno - Ludowe Ruch Nowej Polski	Populist-Conservative Party – New Poland Movement	Political Party
SLD	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Democratic Left Union	Political Party
SOG	Zrzeszenie Producentów Nasion Ogrodniczych i Materiału Szkółkarskiego i Grzybów "Sognas"	Assoc. of Producers of Horticultural Seeds, Mushrooms, & Nursery Supplies	Trade Association
UWL	Unia Wolności	Freedom Union	Political Party
WAI	Fundusz Współpracy Agro-Info	Agro-Info Cooperative Fund	Non-Profit
WCD	Krajowe Centrum Doradztwa Rozwoju Rolnictwa i Obszarów Wiejskich (National Headquarters)	National Center for Consulting on Agricultural and Rural Development, (Nat'l HQ)	Non-Profit
WET	Krajowa Izba Lekarsko-Weterynaryjna	National Medical-Veterinary Chamber	Trade Association
WOR	Krajowy Związek Rolników, Kolek i Organizacji Rolniczych	National Union of Farmers' Circles and Agricultural Organizations	Trade Association
WUS	Polski Związek Hodowców i Producentów Trzody Chlewnej POLSUS (Warszawa)	Polish Cattle & Swine Breeders Union (Warsaw)	Trade Association
ZHK	Polski Związek Hodowców Koni	Polish Union of Horse Breeders	Trade Association
ZHO	Polski Związek Hodowców Owiec i Kóz	Polish Union of Sheep and Goat Breeders	Trade Association
ZPK	Polski Związek Producentów Kukurydzy	Polish Union of Corn Producers	Trade Association
ZPM	Federacja Związków Zawodowych	Trade Union Federation of Polish	Trade Association

<b>Table 1. Polish Agricultural Organizations Interviewed</b>			
<b>IDCode</b>	<b>NamePolish</b>	<b>NameEnglish</b>	<b>OrgtypeSimplified</b>
	Pracowników Mleczarswa w Polsce	Dairy Industry Workers	
ZPP	Polski Związek Producentów Pasz	Polish Union of Fodder Producers	Trade Association
ZPR	Federacja Związków Producentów Rolnych	Union Federation of Agricultural Producers	Trade Association
ZSM	Krajowy Związek Spółdzielni Mleczarskich - Związek Rewizyjny.	National Association of Dairy Cooperatives – Revisional Union	Trade Association
ZSP	Związek Szkółkarzy Polskich	Polish Union of Nurserymen	Trade Association
ZSR	Związek Soltysów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej	Union of Hamlet Headmen of the Polish Republic	Non-Profit

**Table 2. Network Analysis Descriptive Statistics**

<b>Network</b>	<b>N=</b>	<b>Mean Degree Centrality</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Centralization (%)</b>	<b>Density (%)</b>
1) Communication	78	19.8	13.4	60.3	26
2) Core Actors	34	26.1	4.5	18.9	78
3) Technical Advice	78	8.4	8.7	42.2	11
4) Staff and Facilities	78	2.8	3.6	21.6	4
5) Conflict Networks	26	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A