

THE TRANSFORMATION OF STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

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Executive Summary

Based on a preliminary analysis of mass survey data from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, this paper argues that citizens of these countries have become disengaged from their states. States are no longer involved in citizens' lives and people interact little with their officials. Also most citizens now compete for state resources instead of regularly receiving them. In the Soviet era a main characteristic of the state was that it was a source of benefits, such as medical services and education. In the post-Soviet era a key attribute of the state is that it is an arena where citizens vie to obtain resources, like jobs. Because post-Soviet states continue to control a preponderance of resources relative to non-state entities, societal actors, including Islamic leaders and elders, have not taken over the state's role. Citizens turn to government officials, before societal actors, for assistance with everyday problems.

I. Introduction

In the former Soviet Union, governments and citizens are rewriting the “contract” that once connected them. In the late Soviet era, the state provided low quality benefits and social order in return for citizens’ compliance. Many of the governments that have emerged from the former Soviet Union today offer few benefits and little order. The decline in state services is particularly apparent in reform-oriented post-Soviet countries, where government officials have intentionally reduced the state’s role in society as part of political and economic restructuring. Shortages of resources, corruption among leaders, and the chaos of creating independent economies and polities have also contributed to the decline in some countries.

How, if at all, are post-Soviet governments and citizens connected today? To what extent has the decline in state services encouraged citizens to turn to non-state actors for assistance? Scholars have devoted attention to the poor provision of services in the former Soviet Union, but they have not explored its influence on state-society relations.¹ Are relations between governments and citizens in this region of the world developing along the lines of an existing model, or are they breaking new ground?

To explore post-Soviet state-society relations, this investigation focuses on Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, in particular. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars predicted that elements of Central Asian culture, especially Islam and respect for elders, could pose a challenge to the new states. Religious leaders and elders could threaten the states, not only directly by vying for power, but also indirectly by winning the loyalty of citizens through the provision of goods and services no longer offered by the government. Radical

¹ This is a large literature, but some of the key works about the post-Soviet sphere include the multiple publications and projects by Jude Howell, Branko Milanovic, Richard Rose, and Cynthia Werner, the World Bank’s Living Standard Surveys, and the United Nations Development Programme’s *National Human Development Report* for individual countries.

Islamic group, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, have emerged in the post-Soviet era and worked to overthrow existing governments. These organizations also offer disgruntled citizens wages and an alternative ideology. To what extent have Islamic leaders and organizations and elders replaced the state in citizens' daily lives?

This paper argues that for most citizens the state has shifted from being a font of resources to a place to compete for resources. In the Soviet era a main characteristic of the state was that it was a source of benefits, such as medical services and education. In the post-Soviet era a key attribute of the state is that it is an arena where citizens vie to obtain resources, like jobs. Because post-Soviet states continue to control a preponderance of resources relative to non-state entities, societal actors, including Islamic leaders and elders, have not taken over the state's role. Citizens turn to government officials, before societal actors, for assistance with everyday problems.

These conclusions are based on survey research conducted in Central Asia. With the assistance of BRIF, a private research firm in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and in cooperation with Pauline Jones Luong, I conducted mass surveys in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in late November and early December of 2003. The surveys were face-to-face interviews lasting approximately an hour and in Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Russian, or Uzbek, depending on the respondent's preference.

The sample for the mass survey in each country was a multistage stratified probability sample of the country. In each country the mass survey questionnaire was administered to 1500 individuals, age 18 and older. In each country, macroregions were defined—14 for Uzbekistan, 14 for Kazakhstan, and 8 for Kyrgyzstan, including the capital cities as macroregions. Strata were distributed among the macroregions based on each macroregion's proportion of the total

population. Primary sampling units (PSUs) were administrative districts. PSUs were selected randomly using probability proportional to size. Within each PSU, households were randomly selected. One respondent was randomly chosen from each household. If a potential respondent declined to participate, another was selected randomly from the PSU.

II. Models and Actors

Studies of states and societies offer numerous models to describe the relations between the two entities. The five paradigms described below are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but instead display a degree of overlap. First, *incorporation* exists where “large segments of the population associate with the state and take part in its activities in order to share its resources.”² Second, in the *welfare state*, citizens, mostly those in Western countries, pay taxes to their governments in return for services.³ Third, *embedded autonomy* is characterized by a state bureaucracy that is insulated from societal demands yet embedded in societal structures, a phenomenon evident in countries as different as Japan and Zaire.⁴ Fourth, the *overdeveloped state*, common in the developing world exists when resource-poor citizens fight for resources from a highly interventionist, centralized government.⁵ Fifth, *disengagement* is characterized by

² Victor Azarya, "Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement," in *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, ed. Donald S. Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, African Modernization and Development Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 6. Migdal also uses this model. Joel S. Migdal et al., *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 25.

³ Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 181-182.

⁴ Peter B. Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change," in *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State*, ed. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 165-166.

⁵ Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

either the state or society or both the state and society interacting little with each other.⁶ Azarya describes citizens' disengagement as "the tendency to withdraw from the state and keep at a distance from its channels as a hedge against its instability and dwindling resource base."⁷

The role of non-state actors in society also influences the state's relationship with its citizens, particularly its ability to provide them with effective governance. In *Strong Societies and Weak States*, Joel Migdal argues that arms, personnel, and money are not sufficient for a state to be effective. A state must also be able to mobilize average citizens in order to establish armies, collect taxes, and implement other policies. For this reason, the organization of society affects state capacity. Social and economic transformations, like the collapse of communism, require new survival strategies and new non-state actors emerge to meet these needs.⁸ When non-state actors provide citizens with resources for survival, the state has difficulty mobilizing citizens to achieve its goals. People have little motivation to lend support.⁹

III. State-Society Relations

The Soviet state was a provider of resources and was quite involved in citizens' lives. Since the Soviet era states and societies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have become disengaged with one another. Citizens use state resources to a lesser extent and interaction among officials and citizens has declined. State resources are no longer guaranteed, but instead are something for which citizens must compete. The change has been significant in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan because of market reforms and more subtle in Uzbekistan where the state has tried to preserve much of the Soviet-style economy.

⁶ Azarya, 5. Migdal et al., 26.

⁷ Azarya, 5.

⁸ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 94.

The Soviet Era

Citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan characterize the Soviet state as foremost a place to obtain resources. More than 80 percent of respondents in each country strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, “In the Soviet Union citizens used state resources such as medical services and education,” as indicated in Column C of Table 1 at the end of the paper. No other attribute of the state was as widely agreed upon as this idea of the state as a source of goods and services.

Other attributes of the Soviet state common across the three countries included knowledgeable officials who were responsive to citizens’ needs and involved in their lives. Approximately 50 to 70 percent of respondents agreed with the following statements, as enumerated in Columns E, F, and H of Table 1.

- In the Soviet Union government officials were knowledgeable of citizens’ needs.
- In the Soviet Union the state responded to citizens’ needs.
- In the Soviet Union the government was very involved in citizens’ lives.

Other characteristics of the Soviet-era state differ by country. Compared to their counterparts in Uzbekistan, respondents in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were more likely to identify a contract between state and society, where citizens contributed to the state and the state provided. In Kazakhstan 57.5 percent of respondents and in Kyrgyzstan 61.1 percent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, “In the Soviet Union citizens expected that the state would provide services to them if they contributed to the state, for example by actively participating in meetings and government campaigns.” By contrast, only 39.5 percent of survey participants in Uzbekistan had the same response. (See Column D in Table 1.) This

⁹ Ibid., 22, 173, 178.

difference might reflect the greater role of the informal economy in Uzbekistan. Citizens in this country were less tied to a contract with the state because they could more readily obtain goods and services through the private sector.

Other distinctions between the countries include a higher response in Kyrgyzstan to the ideas that citizens and officials interacted and that citizens competed for state resources. In Kyrgyzstan 59.0 percent and 52.5 percent of respondents, respectively agreed with the statements, “In the Soviet Union, citizens interacted with state officials regularly, in person, by telephone, or by mail” and “In the Soviet Union, state officials interacted with citizens regularly in person, by telephone, or by mail.” The numbers were only 37.3 percent and 28.7 percent in Kazakhstan and 38.8 percent and 32.7 percent in Uzbekistan. (See Columns A and B in Table 1.)

In all three countries citizens did not emphasize the state as a place of competition for resources; however, more respondents in Kyrgyzstan took this view. In that country 50.1 percent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, “In the Soviet Union, the state was a place where citizens competed to possess resources, such as jobs, or access to foreign goods.” In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, only 36.1 and 34.7 percent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed.

Individuals’ abilities to recall their experiences in the Soviet era and their current situations clearly influence these responses. Approximately 15 percent of the respondents in each country were children during the Soviet era so their memories of the role of the state are limited. An element of nostalgia might also be included in these responses, as many citizens’

economic positions have worsened encouraging them to look upon the Soviet state and its extensive welfare benefits fondly. Nonetheless, these characterizations of the state resonate with insider and outsider accounts from the Soviet era.

From the survey results it is clear that the model of *incorporation* best characterizes the Soviet state. Citizens considered the state an entity to associate with in order to use its resources. It was not a *welfare state* because the idea of a contract between the state and citizens was weak. Citizens did not see an exchange relationship where they contributed to the state through participation in meetings and government campaigns in return for resources. Instead, there was more of a sense of pure entitlement. The fact that an exchange relationship does not resonate with Soviet experience is somewhat surprising to outsiders since we often characterize the late Soviet era, the Brezhnev period in particular, as a time when people complied, by attending party meetings and supporting government campaigns, and in return the state provided a stable, adequate standard of living. Yet, for the average citizen these activities were perhaps either expressions of patriotism or bureaucratic requirements, not directly tied to welfare benefits.

The extensive guarantee of state resources, in the form of welfare benefits, helps explain why respondents did not consider the Soviet state a site of competition. Basic benefits were easy to come by; there was no need to compete. In this sense, the Soviet state was not *overdeveloped*. This characteristic became exaggerated as the totalitarian model, or total rule, in Western scholarship. Industrialization and literacy enabled the Soviet state to escape the trap of developing countries from which the overdeveloped state model was created. In the developing world overdeveloped states are highly interventionist but have limited resources and a weak network to distribute those resources. As a result, resource-poor citizens fight for resources within the state.

By contrast, the Soviet state had relatively greater resources and an extensive network through which to share them with its citizens. An involved state from which citizens use resources is also clearly not a paragon of *disengagement*. The model of *embedded autonomy* is a weak fit as well. The Soviet state was embedded in societal structures; however, it was not insulated from societal demands. State officials were aware of and responded to citizens' demands about their everyday needs. More complex needs, such as for political protest, were not met in the Soviet Union; however, for most citizens a guarantee of an adequate standard of living was sufficient.

The Post-Soviet Era

In the post-Soviet period the state has primarily become a place for competing for resources. This is particularly true in Kazakhstan where the percentage of respondents strongly agreeing or agreeing with this characterization of the post-Soviet state grew from 36.1 percent to 70.3 percent. (See Table 2 at the end of the paper for current figures.) In Kyrgyzstan agreement increased from 50.1 percent to 60.9 percent, and in Uzbekistan it grew from 34.7 percent to 45.9 percent. This was the foremost characteristic of the state in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan, respondents identified it as a close second (45.9 percent) to the prevailing Soviet attribute of the state as a source of goods and services (50.9 percent).

In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the states have clearly withdrawn from society. Respondents strongly agreeing or agreeing that the state was very involved in their lives dropped from 51.5 percent to 11.4 percent in Kazakhstan and 73.7 percent to 13.3 percent in Kyrgyzstan. Agreement with the idea that the citizens contributed and the state provided fell from 57.5 percent to 27.5 percent in Kazakhstan and from 61.1 percent to 35.7 percent in Kyrgyzstan. In

the post-Soviet era the surveys used a statement that was slightly different to reflect new economic realities, specifically, “Citizens expect that the state will provide services if they pay their taxes.” Responsiveness to citizens’ needs, citizens’ interaction with officials, and officials’ interaction with citizens fell to 9.1, 11.9 and 7.7 percent in Kazakhstan and to 16.9, 16.5, and 11.9 percent in Kyrgyzstan, representing a drop in the range of 20 to 50 percentage points. Considering the decline in interaction, it is not surprising that citizens’ assessment of state officials’ knowledge of their needs fell dramatically. (See Column E in Table 2.)

In Uzbekistan, the numbers also fell, though on average, not nearly as dramatically as in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Specifically, agreement with the idea that the state was very involved decreased from 50.1 to 35.4 and with the statement about responsiveness from 48.1 to 28.1. Slightly more respondents found that the idea that citizens contribute and the state provides in the post-Soviet era more accurate than in the Soviet era. Agreement with the ideas about interaction fell only a small amount.

The more radical changes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan relative to Uzbekistan reflect the fact that the governments in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have pursued extensive market reforms while the leadership of Uzbekistan has maintained much of the Soviet-era economy. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have reduced and privatized welfare benefits, whereas Uzbekistan has attempted to maintain them. In Uzbekistan any withdrawal of the state from society can be attributed to the country’s faltering economy. The leadership of Uzbekistan has not adopted a new ideology but its depleted coffers have reduced its ability to provide resources to citizens.

The degree of political liberalization also influences state-society relations in the three countries, although most likely to a lesser extent than economic reform. In the early 1990s Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser degree Kazakhstan, introduced democratic reforms that enabled the

growth of opposition media and political groups. Although there has been backsliding in each country, the governments meddle less in civil society than the government of Uzbekistan does.

In the name of fighting radical Islam, the government of Uzbekistan destroyed above ground political opposition in the early 1990s and more recently has arrested thousands of individuals suspected of anti-state religious activities and created networks of informers to report on religious practices. The government in Uzbekistan has remained involved in citizens' lives not only by trying to maintain Soviet-style benefits, but also by monitoring their religious practices.

Today the *overdeveloped state* and *disengagement* models best characterize Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan falls somewhere in between the Soviet-era model of *incorporation* and these other two. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the state is an arena where citizens compete for resources. Governments no longer readily provide extensive benefits and most citizens' economic positions have weakened. The governments are still wealthy compared to most actors in these countries, so citizens are forced to vie for state resources. In contrast to this model, however, the Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani states are no longer highly interventionist. Market ideologies have encouraged them to withdrawal from society. State and society have become disengaged with citizens and officials having only limited interaction. *Embedded autonomy* also does not characterize these states in the post-Soviet period as they are no longer embedded in societal structures although they have grown more insulated from societal demands. The *welfare state* model has even less salience today than it did in the Soviet era.

IV. Non-State Actors and Citizens' Loyalty

In all three countries, although particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, citizens and government officials have become disengaged from one another. Yet, people have not found alternative sources of assistance, so they have had to continue to seek help with everyday problems, such as job loss or expensive education, from government officials, particularly when the family is of no help. Other societal actors, such as Islamic groups and elders, tend to have few resources to offer, and this has hampered their ability to vie for the loyalty of citizens.

Survey respondents in the three countries report that they have sought the help of government officials more in the post-Soviet era than in the Soviet period. These are village and city officials and, to a lesser extent, district officials. Citizens rarely turn to regional and national officials for help. The percentage of respondents relying on officials rose from 7.0 to 12.6 in Kazakhstan, 6.5 to 18.5 in Kyrgyzstan, and 3.5 to 14.7 in Uzbekistan. (See Columns A and B in Table 3.) Reliance on employers and labor unions has fallen dramatically, as these institutions were the distributors of most benefits in the Soviet era, but they now have adapted to the new economies. Employers have significantly reduced benefits in order to compete in the market economies. Independent labor unions with a wealth of resources have not emerged in the post-Soviet era. As employers and unions have ceased to serve as problem-solvers for citizens, individuals have been forced to turn increasingly to government officials.

Respected elders have grown in importance only in Uzbekistan. Whereas in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan citizens' reliance on elders has not changed dramatically, in Uzbekistan it has risen from 2.8 to 10.2 percent. Respected elders are typically former party apparatchiks whom locals like. In Kazakhstan's and Kyrgyzstan's more market-oriented economies, elders are of little help. The economic and political rules of the game they were accustomed to have largely

changed, leaving them with little advice for those struggling today. Elders who held office in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period might have managed to enrich themselves during the selling off of state property; however, their resources likely pale in comparison to current officeholders.

In Uzbekistan where economic reform has been less dramatic, elders are likely to be of more help coping with everyday problems. They also likely have more resources compared to their counterparts in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan because they are often tied to the mahalla community organizations. As the Uzbekistani government struggles economically and has somewhat withdrawn from the society, respected elders serve as another source of support for citizens.

Interestingly in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan significantly more respondents consider elders a source of assistance than actually rely on them. (See Columns C in Table 3.) In Kyrgyzstan 3.3 percent of respondents have relied on elders but 9.1 identify them as a source of support in the community. The numbers in Uzbekistan are 10.2 and 31.7 respectively. In both countries elders are associated with regional networks, often labeled clans by insiders and outsiders. These networks are publicized and often derided in the media or public discourse, so perhaps citizens tend to see them as a force in the community more than they actually rely on them.

Despite the growth of radical Islamic groups in Central Asia, religious institutions and leaders have not become a significant source of support in these countries. No more than 1.5 percent of respondents turned to religious groups or leaders for help in the last year. Religious institutions tend to have limited resources so they have not served as a key service-provider in

these societies. Also, after decades of atheist policies and current warnings about fundamentalism, most citizens do not consider religious institutions an obvious place to turn for assistance with everyday problems.

Charitable organizations have also not replaced the state as a provider of assistance. With the loosening of restrictions on organizing in the late Soviet era, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including charities, proliferated. With the demise of the Soviet Union a flood of foreign NGOs also entered post-Soviet countries. Yet, no more than 1.5 percent of respondents report having turned to local charities and no more than .7 percent of respondents to foreign charities. (See Table 3.) The resources of local charities are meager compared to those of states, and, despite the Western scholarly focus on foreign NGOs, their impact initially was limited to the capital cities. Even in the late 1990s as they increasingly extended their efforts into provincial cities, they assist relatively few citizens.

Lacking experience with private charities from the Soviet era, citizens do not consider them an obvious place to seek help. Yet, they are aware that they are a growing phenomenon in their countries. For this reason, a greater percentage of respondents identify them as a source of support in the community rather than as a source on which they have actually relied. Particularly in Kyrgyzstan, a country that has been the darling of the international aid community, people are aware of the influx of foreign organizations. Whereas only .7 percent of respondents have relied on foreign charitable organization for assistance, 10.9 percent cite them as a source of support in the community.

V. Implications

The decline of the state welfare systems in Central Asia seems to be contributing to a trend in de facto decentralization. Disengagement with the state is the prevailing model. Citizens use fewer state resources, although they do continue to compete for them. To the extent that individuals interact with the state, it is with village and city officials and, to a lesser degree, district officials. Societal actors do not pose a threat to the state, but local officials might effectively win citizens' loyalties. Citizens have always had closer relations with local authorities, but now citizens are no longer tied to the national government through an extensive welfare system. Central Asia seems to be approximating the African model where national governments have little influence in the periphery.

Nationalism and political networks can counter the decentralization trend; however, their effectiveness seems limited to date. Nationalism has been tied to titular identity thus pushing ethnic minorities, like the Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan, farther away. Despite democratic reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, officials' ties with civic groups in the periphery continue to be weak, in part, because many authorities understand the "nongovernmental" in NGO to mean "antigovernmental." Uzbekistan's networks of informers and climate of fear about religious practices might encourage cohesion, although the risk of protest will likely grow with time. The government of Uzbekistan has not managed to establish a "totalitarian" state, and even "totalitarianism" eventually came undone.

TABLE 1. STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE SOVIET ERA
(percentage of respondents; A=agree, D=disagree)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
	Citizens interacted with state officials regularly in person, by telephone, or by mail.	State officials interacted with citizens regularly in person, by telephone, or by mail.	Citizens used state resources, such as medical services and education.	Citizens expected that the state would provide services to them if they contributed to the state, by actively participating in meetings and government campaigns.	The government officials were knowledgeable of citizens' needs.	The state responded to citizens' needs	Citizens competed to possess state resources, such as jobs or access to foreign goods.	The government was very involved in citizens' lives.
KAZAKHSTAN								
Strongly A	37.3	28.7	89.5	57.5	49.3	49.7	36.1	51.5
Somewhat A/D	24.1	26.5	4.2	17.7	31.4	32.7	23.5	30.4
Strongly A/D	21.7	26.3	2.7	11.8	10.0	9.9	30.7	9.8
Difficult to Answer	15.6	17.0	2.7	11.7	8.3	6.6	8.6	7.1
Decline to Answer	1.3	1.5	.9	1.3	.9	1.0	1.1	1.1
TOTAL (rounded)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
KYRGYZSTAN								
Strongly A	59.0	52.5	89.4	61.1	72.6	70.3	50.1	73.7
Somewhat A/D	15.8	18.8	5.4	15.8	16.1	16.7	20.4	16.1
Strongly A/D	12.1	14.6	.9	9.0	5.1	6.3	16.7	3.9
Difficult to Answer	12.5	13.4	4.0	13.7	5.7	6.3	12.3	5.9
Decline to Answer	.7	.7	.3	.5	.5	.5	.6	.4
TOTAL (rounded)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
UZBEKISTAN								
Strongly A	38.8	32.7	81.1	39.5	52.6	48.1	34.7	50.1
Somewhat A/D	14.3	16.6	7.0	19.7	19.4	22.1	18.7	19.0
Strongly A/D	21.0	22.5	1.9	10.5	7.7	6.9	14.8	8.2
Difficult to Answer	24.0	26.5	8.5	28.6	18.5	21.4	30.5	21.1
Decline to Answer	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.5
TOTAL (rounded)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

TABLE 2. STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA
(percentage of respondents; A=agree, D=disagree)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
	Citizens interacted with state officials regularly in person, by telephone, or by mail.	State officials interacted with citizens regularly in person, by telephone, or by mail.	Citizens use state resources, such as medical services and education.	Citizens expect that the state will provide services if they pay their taxes.	The government officials are knowledgeable of citizens' needs.	The state responds to citizens' needs.	Citizens compete to possess state resources, such as jobs. ¹	The government is very involved in citizens' lives.
KAZAKHSTAN								
Strongly A	11.9	7.7	27.6	27.5	27.4	9.1	70.3	11.4
Somewhat A/D	25.9	20.9	35.5	29.3	30.4	36.7	13.0	37.1
Strongly A/D	50.7	58.7	34.6	34.9	35.5	47.6	10.5	43.8
Difficult to Answer	10.7	11.7	1.7	7.5	6.0	5.7	5.5	7.0
Decline to Answer	.8	1.0	.5	.8	.7	.9	.7	.7
TOTAL (rounded)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
KYRGYZSTAN								
Strongly A	16.5	11.9	33.5	35.7	30.5	16.9	60.9	13.3
Somewhat A/D	23.8	20.7	34.8	23.5	27.3	33.7	19.9	29.1
Strongly A/D	49.3	57.2	28.8	32.4	37.1	42.9	12.1	52.3
Difficult to Answer	10.3	10.1	2.7	8.1	4.9	6.3	6.7	5.1
Decline to Answer	.1	.1	.2	.3	.1	.2	.4	.3
TOTAL (rounded)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
UZBEKISTAN								
Strongly A	32.7	28.1	50.9	42.7	36.1	28.1	45.9	35.4
Somewhat A/D	19.8	19.2	28.4	22.5	25.7	28.9	20.9	28.5
Strongly A/D	32.9	38.3	16.3	20.0	26.7	28.5	14.1	23.5
Difficult to Answer	13.6	13.1	3.7	14.1	10.7	13.9	18.5	11.9
Decline to Answer	1.0	1.2	.7	.7	.7	.7	.6	.7
TOTAL (rounded)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
¹ For the post-Soviet era the example of access to foreign goods was dropped from this statement to reflect the changing economies of these countries.								

TABLE 3. INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS FROM WHOM CITIZENS SEEK ASSISTANCE
(percentage of respondents)

Column A: Before 1991 whom did you rely on for help with everyday problems? Choose as many as apply.

Column B: Which people and organizations have you relied on for help with [everyday] problems in the last year? Choose as many as apply.

Column C: In general, in your community which of these people and organizations offers assistance to people? Choose as many as apply.

	KAZAKHSTAN			KYRGYZSTAN			UZBEKISTAN		
	Soviet	Current		Soviet	Current		Soviet	Current	
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
Party or Government Official ¹	7.0	12.6	16.3	6.5	18.5	17.6	3.5	14.7	16.3
Employer ²	18.7	3.5	NA ³	16.1	2.5	NA	9.3	4.1	NA
Labor Union	17.6	.7	3.1	11.7	1.1	1.9	7.9	.4	2.8
Respected Elder	.6	.7	2.7	2.4	3.3	9.1	2.8	10.2	31.7
Official Religious Institution/Leader	.3	.7	3.1	.9	1.5	3.9	0	.2 ⁴	.9
Unofficial Religious Institution/Leader	.1	.1	.7	.2	.5	1	0		
Local, Private Charitable Organization	.3	.6	5.5	.6	1.5	4.9	.3	.5	4.5
Foreign Charitable Organization	.1	.3	2.9	.3	.7	10.9	0	.2	2.1

¹ This list represents a selection of the options provided in the survey. Respondents also had the option of identifying individuals or institutions not on the list. For the Soviet era question the option was party or government official. For the current era question the option was government official.

² For the Soviet era question the option was place of employment at the time. For the current era question the option was current employer.

³ For the question about individuals and groups in the community who provide assistance, one's own employer was not an option.

⁴ Due to the political climate in Uzbekistan, respondents in the survey pretest were not comfortable distinguishing between official and unofficial religious leaders and institutions in the current era. For this reason a distinction was not made during the actual interviews.