

**SLAVOPHILES AND WESTERNIZERS REDUX:**  
**Contemporary Russian Elite Perspectives**

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## **Executive Summary**

This paper assesses the extent to which developmental-path preference and orientation to the domestic political economy continue to be major predictors of Russian elite orientations at mid point in the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. The paper begins by exploring elite preferences concerning Russia's developmental path and whether the distribution of attitudes to Western-type market or liberal democracy among Russian foreign policy elites remains unchanged. The paper then considers whether these attitudes continue to play the major predictive role vis-a-vis foreign policy they did at the end of the 1990s.

## **Introduction**

In a book published in 2002,<sup>1</sup> my central question was whether and to what extent Russian orientations to Russia's domestic political economy were major predictors of Russian foreign policy perspectives. I found this was the case pertaining to East-West strategic and economic interactions and the intensity with which Russians favored re-unification with Belarus and Ukraine, but not with respect to dispositions concerning Russia's regional goals, its regional security perceptions, or the use of force on Russia's perceptions.

In particular, I argued that those Russians, especially foreign policy elites, who were favorably disposed to a market rather than a planned economy and had attitudes congenial to liberal democracy had more benign views than other Russians about United States foreign and security policy and about East-West economic interdependence. Likewise they were less favorably disposed than other Russians to the prospects of Russia's reunification with Belarus and or the Ukraine.

These findings applied both to foreign policy elites and to mass publics but there were striking differences in the support Russian elites and ordinary citizens manifested for liberal democracy as the term is widely understood in the West. Consistent with results elsewhere, a majority of Russian elites-- far more than among mass publics—were found to support liberal democracy. This had the consequence that in their foreign policy orientations Russian elites were more internationalist than the Russian public, both in the everyday meaning of that term and in the more carefully defined sense ascribed it by Eugene Wittkopf in his work on American foreign policy.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993-2000* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

In the process of addressing the overall theme of the link between orientation to the Russian domestic political economy and foreign policy perspectives, I also found,<sup>3</sup> but did not develop fully, that by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century a broader issue was arguably an even more frequent statistically significant predictor of Russian elite orientations to foreign policy than was orientation to the domestic political economy. That broader issue was a reprise of the Westernizer-Slavophile divide of the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>4</sup>

At the end of the Yeltsin era and the dawn of the twenty-first century it turned out that once again whether Russia should follow the path of the West or, rather, it should pursue its own unique path while taking into account its own putatively unique historical and geographical uniqueness had quite concrete implications for how Russian elites lined up on major foreign policy matters.

This paper assesses the extent to which developmental-path preference and orientation to the domestic political economy continue to be major predictors of Russian elite orientations at mid point in the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Drawing on a fourth wave of Russian foreign policy elites<sup>5</sup> funded by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research and

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<sup>2</sup> “On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 30, no. 4 (1986): 423-45.

<sup>3</sup> *The Russian People*, pp. 178-86.

<sup>4</sup> Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Nicholas Riasanovsky, *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles* (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1952), Esther Kingston-Mann, *In Search of the True West: Culture, Economics and Problems of Russian Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Both Walicki and Kingston-Mann, from different viewpoints, emphasize that the 19<sup>th</sup> century Slavophiles were much drawn to the West but not to Western liberalism.

<sup>5</sup> All four elite surveys were conducted by ROMIR and directed by Elena Bashkirova. Persons were drawn from the media, the economy (including enterprises where the state did and did not own a major share), academic institutes with strong international connections, both the legislative and executive branches of the government, and the armed forces. Those surveyed were selected positionally and, with minor qualifications, the positions have been constant over the period 1993-2004. As the text above indicates, the persons interviewed report diminished political efficacy over time, but it should be stressed that these are nevertheless powerful people who would be thought of as members of the political elite anywhere: heads of directorates in the Presidential administration, ministers, deputy ministers,

conducted in March and April 2004, this two-part paper considers whether the findings and the explanation thereof reported in *The Russian People* continue to obtain and what this signifies for Russian foreign policy. (The data for that book came primarily from three mass surveys and three surveys of Russian foreign policy elites conducted over the time period 1993-2000.) The paper begins by exploring elite preferences concerning Russia's developmental path and whether the distribution of attitudes to Western-type market or liberal democracy among Russian foreign policy elites remains unchanged. The report then considers whether these attitudes continue to play the major predictive role vis-a-vis foreign policy they did at the end of the 1990s. The paper finds that, while elites do not resonate in large numbers to the term "Western democracy," there is almost no difference in the distribution among elites of attitudes to the developmental path Russia should take or in the support for core values associated with liberal democracy in the 1999 and 2004 surveys.

In both 1999 and 2004, a slim majority of Russian elites opt for taking a path that responds to Russia's uniqueness rather than choosing to follow a Western path. Likewise, in both years, a substantial majority continue to support the underlying values that are often associated with liberal or market democracy. In particular, the distribution of responses Russian elites gave

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heads of departments in the government; members of foreign policy committees of the Duma and Federation Council, editors and deputy editors, directors and deputy directors of institutes, owners and CEOs of firms, colonels and above in the armed services. (For full details on the 2004 survey, see the "Methodological Report on Russian Foreign Policy Project" prepared by the ROMIR staff and available from the author. Descriptions of the 1993, 1995 and 1999 samples are to be found in Zimmerman, *The Russian People*, pp. 20-22.) Thus, if a person from the military or secret police had been brought in by Putin to be the head of a directorate in the Presidential administration he—Russian elites are almost invariably men—might or might not have been one of those interviewed. The reason he was interviewed was because he was a role occupant—a head of directorate in the government, a member of a Duma committee dealing with foreign affairs, an editor or deputy editor of a newspaper, etc. Those classified as elites were persons who by virtue of their occupations suggested a *prima facie* expectation that they would have substantial potential to affect foreign policy. Given the selection criterion, their responses on foreign policy and security topics may not be representative of what elites in general think about foreign policy. But they were sufficiently representative of the foreign policy elite that we can reasonably draw inferences about foreign policy elite orientations to foreign policy. Since, though, those interviewed were not selected for their attitudes to other key questions, the size of the sample probably is such that for issues such as orientation to democratic values for which the sample was **not** constructed, those interviewed may be regarded as samples of the Russian national elite in general. For an elaboration, see Zimmerman, *The Russian People*, pp. 18-30.

in 2004 to the items used to construct a typology of orientations to the political economy and the typology itself were nearly identical to those similar elites gave in 1999.

In the second part of this essay, I show that the differences among the distributions of responses to a wide range of foreign policy items by liberal democrats, Westernizers and other Russian foreign policy elites, however, have diminished appreciably. Surprisingly, though, it turns out that this has occurred because the distribution of responses among liberal democratic or Westernizing elites has often remained as in 1999, while the distribution of responses to foreign policy questions among other elites in 2004 either approximates that of liberal democratic elites or, minimally, has moved in that direction.

In this respect, one may speak of a certain homogenization of Russian foreign policy perspectives and a decreased role for orientation to the political economy as a predictor of foreign policy orientations. But when we think more broadly about those who are oriented to building on Western experience-- those who are disposed to follow the Western path--**and** especially about those Westernizers whom we code as having liberal democratic orientations to the Russian political economy, their foreign policy orientations usually distinguish them sharply from other Russian foreign policy elites, most notably, but not only, those who think Russia should follow its own path.

## **I. Elite Orientations to Russia's Internal Evolution**

For good reason, scholarly and journalistic accounts of President Vladimir Putin's first years in office have despaired of the near-term prospects for democracy in Russia. While in formal constitutional terms the Constitution that Boris Yeltsin had introduced in December 1993

was to say the least super-presidential,<sup>6</sup> in practice center and periphery were loosely and asymmetrically coupled, the media including television were largely free, elections were competitive and by and large counted fairly and, while opposition candidates faced obstacles in gaining access to the media, mass publics had a reasonable understanding of the basic policy orientations of, for instance, the presidential candidates in the 1996 and 2000 elections.<sup>7</sup>

One would be hard put to find observers who would challenge the proposition that Russia has become more centralized under Putin, even if some would ascribe much of this to Yeltsin's ineptness rather than to Putin's behavior. Lists would vary but most would include the continued failure thus far to develop an effective competitive party system, the limited independence of the judiciary, the diminished role of the Duma, the drastic change in the means of selecting regional governors and the state's domination of the television channels as indicative of movement away, from rather than toward, democracy.

What's more, one can readily infer from mass survey data that support for democracy among mass publics is strikingly low when compared with the overwhelming majority of other European post-communist systems or of states that, like Russia, the OECD codes as mid-level developing countries.

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<sup>6</sup> Michael McFaul, *Russia's Troubled Transition from Communism to Democracy: Institutional Change during Revolutionary Transformations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

<sup>7</sup> Zimmerman, *The Russian People*, ch. 4.

Thus, the most recent round of data-gathering conducted as part of the World Values Survey included 39 mid-level developing countries including Russia. Respondents were asked a battery of questions including:

- Do you feel there is a lot of respect for individual human rights in our country?
- Would you say that [having a democratic system] is a) 1. very good... 4. very bad ...way of governing the country?
- Whether they agreed that “In a democratic system, the economic system runs badly.”
- Whether “Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling.”
- Whether “Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order.”
- Whether democracies have problems but are better than other systems.

The mean response for the Russian survey was the lowest of the 39 mid-level countries surveyed concerning whether a democratic system was a good or bad way to govern a country; the second most likely to agree that the economy runs badly in a democratic system; fourth most likely to assert that democracies are indecisive, second most likely to agree that democracies aren’t good at maintaining order, and least likely to agree that democracies have problems but are better than others.

As a result, neither institutional developments nor mass public attitudes have been such as to encourage optimism about the prospects for a democratic Russia. In any assessment of such prospects, however, a major role has to be ascribed to elites, who, after all, virtually by definition play a more central role than do mass publics. The data on which this paper is based are entirely drawn from a sample of elites.

Obviously, therefore, we can not address systematically whether the gap between Russian elites and Russian mass publics in their orientation to the political economy has altered in the first five years of the Putin era. But what can be done is to examine Russian elite responses to surveys conducted in 2004 and previously in post-Soviet Russia to ascertain whether there are systematic differences over time in elite assessments.

It is a somewhat mixed story. In 2004, foreign policy elites perceived themselves and most institutions as playing less of a role in foreign policy decision making than they had previously. Elite self-perception of their role in decision making has declined steadily since 1993.<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, as Table 1 indicates, they perceived the President as playing a greater role in 2004 than either in 1995 or 1999. Not only do they say his influence was higher in 2004 than they did in 1995 or 1999, but the perceived distance between him and all other relevant players is greater. If their perceptions are accurate—they mesh with what is widely asserted--and their read on their role in foreign policy making transfers to domestic policy as well, then their ability to affect outcomes relevant to the long-term prospects for democracy in Russia are more circumscribed than they were in the 1990s. But, as Table 1 and the data reported in the previous paragraph also suggest, some elites and some of the institutions in which these elites operate, continue to play some role, albeit generally diminished, in the policy process.

So, it continues to matter for the long term prospects for democracy in Russia what kind of political system elites consider most suitable for Russia. This question has been asked explicitly of such elites both in 1999 and in 2004. When presented with four options-- “the Soviet system before perestroika,” “the Soviet system before perestroika but in a more democratic form,” “the current system” , and “Western democracy (demokratia zapadnogo tipa)”--only 29 percent of those who gave some answer in 2004 (and less than a quarter of all respondents) said they thought Western democracy most suitable for Russia (Table 2). At the same time, the footnote to table 2 is, indeed, noteworthy. When given the choice between “the Soviet system

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<sup>8</sup> Only a few among the foreign policy elites interviewed have ever said they affected a decision “significantly” or “decisively.” The range is from eight percent in 1993 to five percent in 2004. More telling is the decline over time in those who say that they had had “some” effect on a foreign policy decision. More than half (51.3 %, n=81) the respondents in 1993 answered that they had had some effect on a foreign policy decision, slightly less than half in 1995 (46%, n=80), less than a third in 1999 (30%, n= 63) and approximately a quarter (26%, n=70) in 2004.

before *perestroika*" and "the Soviet system but in a more democratic form" essentially no one (3 of 280 possible answers) among Russian elites in 2004 considered the former Soviet system the one most suitable for contemporary Russia.

Both of these findings—that only a minority favor Western democracy and that essentially no one wants to return to the pre-*perestroika* era—apparently differ from the results obtained in the 1999 survey of elites. Then, more than three-fifths (61 percent, n=75) of those who answered the question responded that Western democracy (*demokratiia zapadnogo tipa*) was the political system most suitable for Russia. Slightly less than a quarter (24%, n=29) answered that the old system before *perestroika* was more suitable, with the balance identifying the present system as the one most suitable for Russia. This would suggest that by 2004 views as to the system most suitable had become less polarized, with the majority of elites believing that the traditional Soviet system in a more democratic guise or the present system is the polity most suitable for Russia.

Observers following Russian developments during the first five years of Vladimir Putin's tenure as President would find this plausible. That being said, it should be stressed that what we are reporting may well be an artifact of the differences between the response categories for this question that were employed in 1999 and in 2004. In 1999, respondents were given three choices: whether they thought the Soviet system before *perestroika*, the present system, or Western democracy was most suitable. What I had not anticipated in framing the responses in such a way was how much Russian elites wished to have their cake and eat it, too.

In general, Russian elites answer almost all questions. In this instance, though, the framing of the question responses in 1999 generated an enormous number of refused- to-answer or "don't know" responses from elites. Better than two in five respondents (87 of the 210

interviewed) refused to answer the question or said “don’t know.” By contrast, 15 percent (43 of 280) of the respondents interviewed in 2004 said “don’t know” or refused to answer, when given four choices including “the Soviet system before perestroika but in a more democratic form.”

Had the same proportion of respondents refused to answer or said “don’t know” in 1999 as did in 2004 (15 percent) there would have been an additional 55 respondents giving answers. If there had been a choice between the previous system and the present system such as “a more democratic Soviet system” and all or almost all the 55 “excess” non-respondents had chosen that intermediate response, those who answered “the Western system” would not have been in the majority among those responding in the 1999 survey either. Consequently, the finding that a majority of Russian elites did not consider Western democracy the most suitable political system for Russia may have been old news by 2004, an artifact of the difference between the choices presented respondents in 1999 and 2004 respectively. What was definitely new was to learn that when the Soviet system in a more democratic guise was offered as an alternative to the Soviet system before *perestroika*, preference for the latter dropped off virtually to zero.

Moreover, several considerations may prompt the finding that “Western democracy” is not something a majority of Russian elites favor. The problem might be more with “Western” than with “democracy.” Those who embrace beliefs that Western academics or plain people would associate with liberal democracy as it commonly conceived in the West might not assert that Western democracy is the system most suitable to Russia because they have views about how other Russians think about democracy. They may be responding to all the adverse publicity

directed against Russian democrats (usually in sarcastic quotation marks) or to widespread assertions that the West is trying to undermine the Russian economy or the Russian state. They may equate Western democracy with a particular orientation to the market.<sup>9</sup>

We can sort out somewhat the extent to which those who do not believe Western democracy the political system most suitable for Russia are reacting primarily to “Western” or “democracy” by simple bi-variate analysis. In 1995, 1999, and 2004 elites were asked whether they agreed with those who “believe that Russia should follow the route of the developed countries, integrate into the world community, and profit from the experience of the Western civilization” (Westernizers) or with those who assert that “Taking into account the historical and geographical position of Russia, located at the juncture of Europe and Asia, it should follow its own separate path.” (Slavophiles). In all three years a slight majority (56 percent in 1995 and 1999, 54 percent in 2004) answered that Russia should follow its own path.

Table 3 cross-tabulates Russian elite responses to the questions about the most suitable Russian political system and whether Russia should emulate the West or follow its own path. Overwhelmingly, those who assert Russia should take its own path are not disposed to regard Western democracy as the suitable system for Russia. Those who favor Russia taking the path of the West are far more likely to affirm that Western democracy is the system most suitable for Russia. But even among them a majority consider the present system or the Soviet system, but in a more democratic form, the system most suitable for Russia.

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. Table 6 which shows that Russian elites strongly endorse a proposition to the effect that competition among firms is good for Russia but generally do not believe that heavy industry should be in private hands. The proposition that Russians generally believe that heavy industry should be in the hands of the state is one of the most stable findings extant in Russian studies.

But this does not mean that Russian elites have different conceptions of democracy than are widely accepted in the West, nor that their views about what democracy entails have shifted from those their counterparts expressed in 1999, or even that those elites who think Russia should follow its own path have statistically significant differences in their conceptions of democracy. If we compare the responses given in 1999 and 2004 by elites when presented a list of statements and asked whether the statements corresponded to their conception of democracy,<sup>10</sup> the similarities are striking.

In both surveys, competitive elections, competition among parties for power, free speech, the ability to choose one's place of work—all are said by more than 85 percent of the respondents in both years to correspond to their conception of democracy. In both instances, also, 79 percent of the elite respondents affirm that the right to participate in any organization corresponds to their notion of democracy. What they least associated with democracy were statements that a characteristic aspect of democracy is that the state does not intervene in the economy (23 percent in 1999, 34 percent in 2004) and that a country's leaders act in correspondence with the wishes of the people (43 and 44 percent in 1999 and 2004 respectively). Both in 1999 and 2004, Russian elites revealed understandings of conceptions of democracy that paralleled that in the west.

Indeed, there were essentially no changes in the proportions of those elites saying that a particular concept did or did not correspond to their understanding of democracy between 1999 and 2004. In addition, no statistically significant distinction is observed when we compare the proportions characterizing the items enumerated above as corresponding to their sense of the essence of democracy on the part of those who respond that Russia should follow a Western path and those who respond that a more distinctive conception is warranted. Whereas developmental

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<sup>10</sup> For a comparison of the responses in 1995 and 1999, Zimmerman, *The Russian People*, p.45.

path corresponds robustly to the responses elites give to a question about the political system suitable for Russia, it does not predict to judgments about items that mesh with respondents' conceptions of democracy.

Similarly, when we examine both the breakdown of respondents who are categorized by a typology I have developed (building on previous work by Charles Lindblom<sup>11</sup>) pertaining to respondents' orientation to the political economy we draw much the same conclusion. In that scheme, I assert that at the core Russians and others in the post communist world face two choices: between democracy and dictatorship and market and state-controlled obligatory planning. Those who favor markets and democracy I term liberal or market democrats. Those who are more disposed to a planned economy but nevertheless evidence democratic proclivities, I term social democrats. Those who favor market solutions in the economy but evidence an authoritarian impulse get the sobriquet, market authoritarians, while those who are basically Leninists in that they favor both state control of the economy and compulsory planning and who are authoritarians politically are termed socialist authoritarians. I employ nine questions to assess respondents' orientation to the political economy, four dealing with orientation to the economy and five to politics. A simple additive scale<sup>12</sup> was constructed based on how respondents had agreed or disagreed with nine propositions. They were:

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<sup>11</sup> *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

<sup>12</sup> The items were all on a five point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree with "I'm ambivalent (*koleibius*)" as an intermediate point. Responses were scored from 2 for statements strongly agreeing with a democratic or market-oriented value to -2 for those that were strongly anti-liberal democratic or anti-market. (To account for affirmative set response, those items marked with [R] were included and then reversed in order to construct the scale.) The first four items listed above were used to construct the economic dimension (plan vs. market) of the typology and the last five to construct the political dimension (democracy/dictatorship). Those whose aggregate scores on both the political and economic dimensions were greater than 0 were treated as liberal democrats. Those whose political liberalism score was below 0 but whose economic liberalism score was above 0 were labeled market authoritarians, while those with political liberalism scores above 0 and economic orientation below 0 were termed social democrats. Those scoring below 0 on both dimensions were termed socialist authoritarians. Respondents scoring 0 on either scale were treated as ambivalent and those for whom scores could not be calculated because of the number of times they refused to answer an item were termed 'unmobilized.'

**Economy:**

- Competition among various enterprises, organizations, and firms benefits our society.
- It's normal when the owner of a prosperous enterprise, using the labor of his workers, becomes richer than many people.
- There's no sense in beginning a new business inasmuch as it might fail.[R]
- All heavy industry should belong to the state and not be in private hands. [R]

**Polity:**

- Competition among various political parties makes our system strong.
- The rights of the individual should be defended even if guilty persons sometimes remain free.
- In any society it will always be necessary to prohibit the public expression of dangerous ideas [R]
- The interests of society should be protected even if innocent people sometimes end up in prison.[R]
- It is apparent that all of the existing philosophies, there is only one that is clearly correct

As Table 4 indicates, there have been four surveys of Russian foreign policy elites: 1993, 1995, 1999, and 2004. In every instance liberal democrats have been in the majority. For analytic purposes in this paper I have labeled those who were not liberal democrats as "the others" or "those not liberal democrats."

Moreover, as in the case of elite conceptions of democracy, the proportion coded as liberal democrats in 2004 was essentially the same as in 1999. Western oriented respondents are somewhat more disposed to liberal democracy than are those whose preferences are to pursue a separate path; the differences between where they are placed in the typology are not statistically significant (Table 5). This is important analytically because as we shall see subsequently it turns out that it makes sense both theoretically and empirically to separate those liberal democrats who are Westernizers and those who advocate following Russia's own unique path.

The same continuity obtains when we examine elite responses to the individual items that make up the typology. As Table 6 demonstrates, the distribution of elite responses to these items was strikingly comparable to the responses for the same items in 1999. Six of the nine items for

2004 were within a single standard error of the same item for 1999, and one within two standard errors.

The two that were not were the item about the gains from competition between parties and the one that referred to free speech. In both instances, respondents were modestly more disposed to views congruent with liberal democracy than were the mean responses for 1999. It did turn out that on roughly half the items, those who favored following a Western path were modestly distinguishable from the 21<sup>st</sup> century Slavophiles but these were weak, if statistically significant, associations. Overall several important observations obtain. As they did in 1999, Russian elites in 2004 generally had conceptions of democracy broadly analogous to those in the West. A majority of them continued to be classified as market or liberal democrats, as had been the case in the 1990s. The replication of the nine items serving as the basis for that classification yielded results that almost duplicated the pattern in evidence in 1999, with the exception that with respect to two items, elite respondents gave on average slightly more liberal answers than their 1999 counterparts had done.

Writing in 2005, it is manifest that “Western democracy” is not a phrase that sits well with Russian elites, even though they have been more favorably disposed to democracy than Russian mass publics have been. What this part of this paper has shown is that in 2004 a majority among Russian elites, as they did throughout the 1990s, had a conception of what democracy involved congruent with Western notions. More important, they endorsed views about key components of what democracy entails that are core to liberal democracy. Indeed, it turns out that in the aggregate support for these views is not different among those whom we are terming Westernizers and those labeled Slavophiles by way of indicating the predispositions about the developmental path Russia should take.

In part II of this paper, we consider how preferences concerning the developmental path Russia should take and orientation to the political system shape contemporary Russian foreign policy perspectives on East-West strategic interactions and the links that Russia should have with Belarus and Ukraine.

## **II. Liberal Democracy, Westernizers, and Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy**

As noted at the outset of this paper, in previous work I found that both orientation to the domestic political economy and preferences concerning Russia's developmental path were seen to have independent and statistically significant effects in bivariate and multivariate analysis for a range of issues relating to East-West interactions and as well as to aspirations for re-unification with Belarus and Ukraine. On other dimensions, notably, Russia's relations with countries on its border and the use of force abroad, orientation to the domestic political economy did not play a major role. Respondents' preferences about core democratic values did not constitute a major predictor of their orientations to Russian elite perspectives on Russia's foreign policy on its periphery or the use of force. To highlight the explanatory power of the divide between Westernizer and Slavophile I concentrate in this section on those areas—East-West relations and Russia's linkages to Belarus and Ukraine—where both developmental path and orientation to the political economy were often statistically significant predictors of foreign policy perspectives during the 1990s.

Table 7 compares the responses of Westernizers and Slavophiles to a battery of questions pertaining to East-West relations and the preferred relationship between Russia and Belarus and Russia and Ukraine for 1995, 1999, and 2004. There are several notable points that emerge from the results reported in the table. Perhaps the most obvious of these is that in bi-variate analysis

the gap between Westernizers and Slavophiles in both 1995 (especially) and 1999 was usually huge. The smallest discrepancy among the responses by Westernizers and Slavophiles to the items in Table 7 for the years 1995 or 1999 pertains to their views about Russia's ties with Belarus, where about three of five Westernizers (61 percent) and exactly four of five Slavophiles gave responses above the scalar median<sup>13</sup> on a scale the low end of which was that Russia and Belarus should be entirely separate countries and the high end, that the two should be one country. Usually the discrepancies were far greater. Thus, in 1995 a quarter (24 percent) of the Westernizers and three-quarters (76 percent) of the Slavophiles agreed the United States was a threat to Russian security, a view endorsed by almost two out of five Westernizers in 1999 (38 percent) and almost five out of six Slavophiles (82 percent) in 1999.

Similarly, half (49 percent) of the Westernizers and almost four out of five (78 percent) of the Slavophiles characterized the danger of NATO intervention in ethnic conflicts in Europe as either a great or the greatest threat. Even on the question of ties to Ukraine, four out of five Slavophiles in 1995 gave responses above the scalar median for uniting Ukraine and Russia as compared with fewer than half (46 percent) of the Westernizers. (The discrepancy for 1999 was more modest: with two-thirds [68 percent] of the Slavophiles and exactly half the Westernizers giving responses above the scalar median.)

Second, a homogenization in perspectives had taken place in the interim between 1999 (less clearly, 1995) and 2004, in every instance, with the slight exception of views about Russia's ties with Belarus. In the latter case, both Westernizers and Slavophiles were more disposed to

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<sup>13</sup> I refer throughout to the awkward "scalar median" because in 1999 respondents were presented with a seven-point scale whereas in 2004 the scale employed contained the more conventional five points. The end points in Russian are Russia and the Ukraine [Belarus] "dolzhny byt' absolutno nezavisimymi stranami" and "dolzhny byt' ob'edinineny v odnu stranu."

closer ties than in 1999 but the proportion of Slavophiles giving pro-unification responses had increased somewhat more than had the share of the Westernizers expressing such views.

What is especially significant is that the general tendency toward homogenization of responses occurs because, with the exception of the two NATO items (which by 2004 both Westernizers and Slavophiles were much less likely than in 1999 to consider a great or the greatest threat), the proportion of Westernizers who considered the West a threat and the percentages favoring reunification with one of the Slavic former Soviet republics remained roughly constant. The proportion of those fearful of the West among those who favored following a Western path had not increased. Indeed, the distribution of their assessments about various threats from the West and their dispositions about unification with Ukraine and Belarus had neither increased nor decreased noticeably. Instead, the homogenization occurs primarily because the proportion of Slavophiles worrying about the West, NATO, or the US decreased considerably during the five year period.

Still, a substantial gap persisted in 2004 with regard to most of the items in Table 7 between the distribution of perspectives on the part of Westernizers and Slavophiles. There remains, as in 1999, a statistically significant difference between Westernizers and Slavophiles in respect to such security matters as whether the US is a threat to Russian security, whether Russia should balance power vis-a-vis the West, and whether the increase in US power is a great or the greatest threat. Only in the case of responses about NATO intervention is there not a statistically significant difference.

Similarly with respect to Russian ties with Belarus and Ukraine: confronted with scales ranging from the proposition that Russia and Ukraine (Belarus) should be completely independent and one that the countries should be united into a single country, exactly half the

Westernizers, as in 1999, gave answers above the median scalar position in regard to unification with Ukraine. By comparison, nearly two-thirds (65%) of the Slavophiles gave such answers in 2004 in connection with Russia's ties with Ukraine. With respect to Belarus, somewhat more than three out of five Westernizers (61%) in 2004 gave answers above the median scalar position while almost nine out of ten (88%) of those coded as Slavophiles gave responses above the median scalar position.

How important the Westernizer/Slavophile divide had become is borne out when we compare the distribution of responses for 2004 among liberal democrats and among other elites. Table 8 parallels Table 7. The items are the same but the comparison is between the responses of liberal democrats and those of other foreign policy elites for 1995, 1999, and 2004. By inspection, we observe the gap, often huge and always statistically significant, in 1995 and 1999 between liberal democrats and others in the distribution of their perspectives on East-West security issues and on feelings about re-unification of Russia with Belarus and Ukraine. Only half, for instance, of the liberal democrats (51%) considered the United States a threat to Russian security in 1999, a view endorsed by almost four fifths (79%) of the remaining elite respondents. Similarly, there is a twenty four percent differential between the proportion of liberal democrats (62%) whose responses were above the scalar median concerning Russian re-unification with Belarus and the responses of other elites (86%) to this item.

The homogenizing trend noted in the previous paragraphs on Westernizers and Slavophiles is all the more striking when compared to the differences in responses by liberal democratic and other elites pertaining to East-West security relations and Russia's relations with Belarus and Ukraine for 2004. For 2004, Table 8 is cluttered with the notation n.s. (for not significant) in comparing responses whether:

- The US is a threat to Russia's security
- Russia should balance the power of the West
- The increase in US power is a threat to Russia
- Belarus and Russia should unite, and
- Ukraine and Russia should unite.

Moreover, in most instances the reason why no statistical significance between the two groups is observed is that the distribution of views among other elites changed more dramatically than did the pattern of responses by liberal democrats between the years 1999 and 2004, as Table 8 again shows. On security matters, the decrease in worries about US behavior and power on the part of elites who were not liberal democrats was remarkable. In 1999, approximately four of five elites not liberal democrats (79 percent) considered the US a threat to Russian security, advocated balancing against the power of the West (82 percent), and considered the increase in American power a great or the greatest threat (83 percent). In 2004, by comparison, these proportions had decreased sharply. Indeed, elites other than liberal democrats were divided roughly equally in 2004: 53 percent regarded the US a security threat, 58 percent agreed that Russia should balance the power of the West, 46 percent answered that the increase in US power was a great or the greatest threat and 63 percent termed NATO intervention in nationality conflicts in Europe a great or the greatest threat. A decrease in the proportion of those elites not liberal democrats giving responses above the median scalar position with respect to Russian ties to Belarus and Ukraine also occurred, though it was more modest (Table 8).

As with the Westernizer-Slavophile comparison, the trend to homogenization of views on the part of liberal democrats and other elites did not turn primarily on the pattern of liberal democratic responses. Rather, on the questions about the United States as a threat to Russian security, whether Russia should balance against the West, and whether the growth in US power is a great or the greatest threat, the pattern of liberal democratic responses in 2004 was

statistically indistinguishable from that of 1999. Both among liberal democratic and other elite respondents, fewer were exercised about NATO expansion in Eastern Europe and the prospects of NATO intervention there in 2004 than in 1999.

The primary instance in which convergence occurred pertained to responses about Russia's ties to Belarus. Whereas about three-fifths of the liberal democrats (62 percent) had given responses above the scalar median favoring unification in 1999, fully three quarters (76 percent) of them did so in 2004, while those not liberal democrats moved in the opposite direction. More than five of six not liberal democrats had expressed views above the scalar median regarding Belarus in 1999; that proportion had diminished somewhat by 2004 to marginally less than four in five (79 percent) by 2004. It is also the case that modest convergence occurred between 1999 and 2004. Liberal democrats were modestly more disposed to give responses above the scalar median in 2004 than in 1999 (but not in comparison with their responses in 1995) and those elites not liberal democrats were similarly less inclined to such answers in 2004 than in 1999.

Instead, the big story in Table 8 is the decrease, sometimes dramatic, in the proportion of those not democrats who regarded the US, or the West more broadly, as a threat. But what neither Table 7 or 8 do, is convey the importance not only of distinguishing between Westernizers and Slavophiles but to suggest the importance of preferences about developmental path--emulating the West or opting for a separate path--is in determining the foreign policy orientations of liberal democratic elites. That is brought out by Table 9, which distinguishes Western-oriented liberal democratic elites, liberal democrats who affirm that Russia should

follow its own path and others not liberal democrats. For 1995, 1999, and 2003 the three groups constitute roughly equal thirds.<sup>14</sup>

Table 9 accomplishes several things. Most important, it italicizes the differences in foreign policy orientations of Western-oriented and Slavophile liberal democrats. Columns one and two make this manifestly clear. “Own-path” liberal democrats are much more akin to those elites who are not liberal democrats than they are to Western-oriented liberal democrats. Put differently, Western-oriented liberal democrats are a breed apart for whom orientation to the domestic political economy and foreign policy perspectives remained tightly associated in 2004.

In addition, partitioning the data in this manner indicates that more convergence in perspectives occurred than either Table 7 or 8 intimates. Table 9 repeats the column labeled “others” in Table 8 which reveals the often sharp diminution in the proportions of those alarmed by American or Western behavior who are not liberal democrats. But what it also shows is that among Western-oriented liberal democrats there had been some increase in the proportion who were worried about the US as a threat to Russia’s security, were more disposed to balance Western power, were more prone to agree that the increase in US power constituted a large threat, and whose responses about Russian unification with Belarus and with Ukraine were above the scalar median. While in many respects the distribution of perspectives of those categorized here as either Westernizers or as liberal democrats remained essentially unchanged between 1999 and 2004, this masks the sharp decrease in worries about the US and the West generally on the part of those who were Slavophiles and liberal democrats and the modest increase in unease among those who were Westernizers and liberal democrats. Trichotomizing the data in this way

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<sup>14</sup> Specifically, for 1995 Western oriented liberal democrats made up exactly a third of the sample, Russian path liberal democrats, 37 percent and others, 30 percent; for 1999, the breakdown was 32 percent, 28 percent, and 40 percent respectively; for 2004, it was 32 percent, 31 percent, and 37 percent.

emphasizes how important developmental path had become as a predictor of foreign policy perspectives.

Exactly how substantial that role is reinforced by multi-variate analysis. Table 10 reports the significance levels for age, membership in the erstwhile CPSU, developmental path, and orientation to the domestic political economy. Logistic regressions are used for the seven items considered in Tables 7 through 9 dealing with East-West security relations and Russia's ties with Belarus and Ukraine for 2004. (I employ significance levels as a kind of short hand to make a point, especially since logistic regression coefficients are not readily interpretable in the way that least squares coefficients are.)

We have seen that the proportion of liberal democrats among foreign policy elites was basically constant from 1999 to 2004. Moreover, the response patterns of liberal democrats to questions about East-West security matters and Russia's links to Belarus and Ukraine in 2004 were also approximately the same. Nevertheless, the case for distinguishing market democrats (undifferentiated) and others in their orientations to foreign policy cannot be made for 2004. Rather, with the exception of NATO intervention in ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe, developmental path plays a separable role in predicting Russian elite perspectives in the crucial domains of East-West security matters and Russia's relations with Belarus and Ukraine but, among the items included in Table 10, NATO intervention is the only item for which orientation to the political economy by itself is statistically significant in multi-variate analysis.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> See by contrast an analogous table in *The Russian People*, p.183 where in seven of twelve cases (seven of which are reproduced in Tables 7-10) in this article orientation to the domestic political economy is statistically significant in multivariate analysis, three at the .10 level and four at the .05 level.

Nor do other usual suspects such as erstwhile membership in the CPSU<sup>16</sup> or age provide substantial purchase in explaining Russian elite perspectives. Some great divides evidently do not disappear; that old chestnut, the Westernizer-Slavophile divide, provides much the same contribution to understanding Russian foreign policy perspectives at the outset of the twenty first century as it did in differentiating attitudes in mid-nineteenth century Russia.

### **Discussion and Directions for Further Research**

Several possible implications emerge from the data presented in this paper. While “democrats” and “Western democracy” are not in good odor in current day Russia, among elites support for *values* Western scholars and plain people associate with liberal democracy remains at levels they were at in 1999. This may give some grounds for optimism about the long-term prospects for democracy, should a political entrepreneur attempt to combine appeals to elites emphasizing democratic values, if not democracy per se, along with re-distributive economic appeals to mass publics. At the same time, a small majority among Russian foreign policy elites are disposed to “believe that Russia should take its own, Russian, path” rather than “follow the path of the developed countries.” The majority disposition to endorse Russia’s following its own path may contribute to understanding why the centralizing thrust of the past five years has met as little adverse reaction as it has. At the same time overwhelming support for survey items symbolic of values core to democracy may signify limits to this acquiescent behavior that will constrain somewhat those who are disposed to locate all power in the institution of the President or at the disposal of the current incumbent.

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<sup>16</sup> In analyzing the 1999 data, CPSU membership was more frequently statistically significant in multi-variate analysis than it was for either 1993 or 1995.

But findings about the parallels between the level of elite identification with democratic values in 1999 and 2004 and the stability in response patterns among liberal democrats for these two years do not translate into a connection between orientation to the political economy by itself and foreign policy perspectives in 2004. In the areas where the connection between orientations to the political economy and foreign policy perspectives were among the clearest during the 1990s, East-West security relations and links between Russia and Belarus and Ukraine, neither bivariate nor multivariate analysis sustain the argument that this association has persisted into Putin era. By 2004, the distinctions noted throughout the 1990s were not there. Rather, it is to the Slavophile-Westernizer divide we must turn in the first instance for an explanation of elite preferences in these domains.

But “in the first instance” merits italicizing. Those we have coded liberal democrats who opt for Russia taking its own path are closer in their foreign policy perspectives to other, non-liberal democratic, elites<sup>17</sup> than they are to their liberal democratic confreres. Those liberal democrats who are oriented to the West in their developmental path preference are people for whom preferences pertaining to Russia’s domestic political economy and foreign policy perspectives go hand in hand. As a group they see the West in considerably less threatening terms. Fewer of them wish to merge with Belarus or Ukraine than do elites not liberal democrats or liberal democrats who think Russia should follow its own path.

These findings raise more questions than they answer and suggest some important possible research directions. Why for instance the trend toward homogeneity in perspective across elites with differing orientations to the political economy that is illustrated by Tables 8?

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<sup>17</sup> The sharpness with which we can distinguish Western oriented and “own path” liberal democrats does not characterize the other foreign policy elites. There are differences to be sure, but among the non-liberal democratic elites, the Westernizer-Slavophile distinction is statistically significant at the .05 or better level with regard to only three of the seven items employed in Tables 7 through 10.

One hypothesis would be that the time elapsed since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been such that a sizeable number of persons have adjusted their views to what they take to be realities of the international system. For a sizeable fraction of liberal democrats, the West and the US in particular is viewed with less rose colored lenses than in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse but on security matters other than about NATO these views have remained largely unchanged between 1999 and 2004. Other, not liberal democratic, elites have expressed views that suggest that for many of them their worst fears had not been realized.

Observers have commented on the geo-political, realist trend in much of Russian commentary over the past decade.<sup>18</sup> To some extent the detachment of assessments of East-West relations from dispositions about orientation to Russia's domestic political economy is commensurate with such commentary. But the core weakness of realism is as much a problem in understanding Russian perspectives as it is in applying it to Western assessments.

Much more beyond the scope of this paper is required to ascertain what are the underlying features attitudinally and demographically of the half of Russian elites who, for instance, consider the US a threat and the half that do not. Likewise, three quarters of the liberal democrats and three quarters of the others favor close ties with Belarus. In the recent past, observers, both in Russia and in the West, have argued that closer ties with Belarus would weaken the hands of liberals in Russia. Why then do three quarters of the liberal democrats give responses above the scalar median for connecting Russia to Belarus? And why do almost a quarter of the elites who are not liberal democratic prefer an association that does not imply anything like complete integration?

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<sup>18</sup> For early discussion, see Celeste A. Wallender, ed. *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996) especially the chapters by Astrid Tuminez and James Richter. More recently, see Andrei Tsygankov, *Whose World Order: Russia's Perception of American Ideas after the Cold War* (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004).

Those who have studied elite and mass attitudes in the United States<sup>19</sup> and elsewhere in the West have emphasized the role of cue-taking. Some of this definitely seems to have taken place. Against a backdrop of Putin's persistent theme (as he told the parliament in April 2005) that "above all else Russia was, is and will, of course, be a major European power," it seems plausible to assert that elites on both the right and the left have been responding to leadership cues, especially in settings where elements exist in the international environment that provide ancillary evidence of the possibilities for collaboration: US –Russian collaboration on terrorism, for instance.

But it is not clear that the cue taking has extended much beyond that. George Breslauer has pointed out to me in a personal correspondence that in a more hierarchical setting such as contemporary Russia cue taking by mid-level elites in the state sector might be even more prevalent than in the United States. Were this to be the case, one would expect that the change in response patterns between 1999 and 2004 would be systematically related to whether the respondents were a part of the state sector or to what passes for the private sector in Russia.

For several reasons, the data available are not optimal for ascertaining whether persons who are more directly connected to the state are more disposed to cue-taking than other elite members, but they are adequate enough for being skeptical that such has been the case. The sample sizes for each group are small—30 each in 1999 and 40 in 2004. I have no way of knowing whether someone from the media directs a state-owned television channel or is an editor of a privately owned newspaper.

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<sup>19</sup> Most notably, John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992). But see also his self-critical "Monica Lewinsky's Contribution to Political Science" *PS*, 31, no. 2 (January 1998), pp. 182-189.

Nevertheless, I compared the changes between 1999 and 2004 in response to each of the seven items that are the bases for Tables 7 through 10 for each of the groups from which the sample was drawn: the media, the academy, the more or less private economy, more or less state enterprises, the executive branch, the legislature, and the military. Across the board, the intensity in concern about NATO has diminished.<sup>20</sup> The Russians could not do much to prevent NATO expansion. It occurred and the impression created from the responses to questions about NATO asked in 1999 and 2004 is that Russian elites are gradually accepting that new reality. Those whose views were most constant were private sector business elites and, a propos NATO intervention, media elites. The greatest change in response patterns occurred not among governmental or military elites but among institute directors and other leading academics and key figures in state enterprises.

Where governmental elites seemed most distinctive in picking up cues had to with unification with Belarus. A whopping 34 percent more persons in governmental executive positions gave responses above the scalar median favoring unification with Belarus in 2004 than in 1999. Members of the foreign policy committees of the Duma and Council of the Federation and key figures in private sector enterprises followed suit. By contrast, the proportion of those in the military and those playing major roles in state enterprises supporting unification with Belarus decreased.

Likewise, the distribution of views about the United States as a threat to Russian security and the proportion saying Russia should balance the power of the West was basically unchanged between 1999 and 2004, while governmental officials were more inclined to worry about the growth in US power. Those in the military, on the other hand, expressed radically different views

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<sup>20</sup> I think their concerns about NATO expansion were genuine. Why exactly they should have exaggerated their concerns to ROMIR interviewers is not at all clear. While assuring the respondents of confidentiality at the outset of the interview, the interviewers do not indicate that an American is the principal investigator.

in 2004 than in 1999 on these items.<sup>21</sup> There was a decrease of 49 per cent in the number of those in the military who said the US was a threat to Russian security and who said Russia should balance against the west and a 61 percent decrease in the number saying US power was a great or the greatest threat. If much larger samples of separate elite groups produced the same results as the above, it would be difficult to maintain that those directly a part of the state broadly conceived were more disposed to follow cues than those in what amounts to a private sector in contemporary Russia.

As to why orientation to the domestic political economy does not have the independent and statistically significant impact it did in the 1990s, it is worth reiterating that in the aggregate the responses liberal democrats gave in 2004 were in most instances not fundamentally different than they had been in 1999. Rather, in 2004 those who were not liberal democrats were generally less agitated about the West and the US in particular than they had been in 1999. It is their move in the direction of the foreign policy views liberal democrats held in 1999 and continued to hold in 2004 that washes out the statistically significant relationships noted in 1999 (and previously) and not noted in 2004 between orientation to the domestic political economy and views about East-West security and Russia's ties to Belarus and Ukraine.

In addition, we need to explore the content that hides behind the summary phrases "following the path of the developed countries, bearing in mind the achievements of Western civilization" and "taking its own Russian path." It would be astonishing to learn that what Russian elites have in mind when they opt for one or the other as an overall statement of preferences about the future direction of Russia does not in large part involve ideas about Russia's domestic political economy and its overall political system. In either event, careful

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<sup>21</sup> Indeed, the responses by the military in 1999 and 2004 were so disparate that I re-analyzed Tables 7 through 9 without the military. While the percentages change, obviously, the patterns do not.

monitoring of a theme in Russian history with a pedigree that extends back at least 150 years will take us a long way in assessing choices Russians make about the direction of contemporary Russian foreign policy.

**TABLE 1: MEAN ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS PLAYERS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1995-2004**  
 (level of influence: 1, lowest, 7, highest) (Standard error in parenthesis.)

*Perceived Influence (S.E.)*

	1995	1999	2004
<b>President</b>	6.16 (.10)	5.70 (.11)	6.44 (.06)
<b>Minister of Foreign Affairs</b>	5.06 (.13)	5.28 (.10)	4.73 (.09)
<b>Ministry of Defense</b>	4.43 (.12)	4.59 (.10)	4.49 (.09)
<b>Business elite</b>	4.19 (.11)	4.55 (.11)	4.67 (.08)
<b>Duma</b>	3.45 (.10)	3.90 (.08)	3.82 (.09)
<b>Regional leaders</b>	3.25 (.10)	4.10 (.09)	3.82 (.09)
<b>Public opinion</b>	2.94 (.12)	3.01 (.09)	3.23 (.09)
<b>Parties</b>	Not asked	Not asked	3.23 (.08)

Source: ROMIR survey of elites, 2004.

**TABLE 2: WHICH POLITICAL SYSTEM, IN YOUR OPINION, FITS RUSSIA BEST?**

	N=	Percent of all respondents	Percent of those responding
<b>Soviet system in a more democratic form*</b>	97	34.6	40.9
<b>The current system</b>	72	25.7	30.4
<b>Western democracy</b>	68	24.3	28.7
<b>Total of those responding</b>	237	84.6	100.0
<b>Refused to answer or don't know response</b>	43	15.4	
<b>OVERALL TOTAL</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

\*Includes 3 who said they preferred the Soviet system before *perestroika*.  
 Source: as in Table 1.

**TABLE 3. CORRELATING DEVELOPMENTAL PATH SHOULD RUSSIA TAKE AND WHAT POLITICAL SYSTEM RESPONDENTS SAY MOST SUITABLE FOR RUSSIA, 2004**

	Western path	Russia's unique path
Soviet system but in more democratic form * N= ()	26% (28)	53% (67)
Present system	28% (30)	32% (40)
Western democracy	45% (48)	15% (19)

- Includes three who said Soviet system before perestroika. Omits don't know and refusals.
  - Tau<sub>c</sub> = -.37, p<.001. Does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.
- Source as in Table 1.

**TABLE 4. POLITICAL ECONOMY TYPOLOGY FOR ELITES, 1993-2004**

	1993	1995	1999	2004
<b>Liberal democrat n=</b>	146	129	132	177
	73.0%	71.7%	62.9%	63.2%
<b>Social democrat</b>	9	12	19	31
	4.5%	6.7%	9.0%	11.1%
<b>Market authoritarian</b>	10	8	10	14
	5.0%	4.4%	4.8%	5.0%
<b>Socialist authoritarian</b>	9	6	19	13
	4.5%	3.3%	9.0%	4.6%
<b>Ambivalent</b>	19	21	27	40
	9.5%	11.7%	12.9%	14.3%
<b>Unmobilized</b>	7	4	3	5
	3.5%	2.2%	1.4%	1.8%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>280</b>
	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: ROMIR surveys for each year.  
Because of a minor coding error, these numbers for 1993, 1995, and 1999 differ slightly from those found in Zimmerman, *The Russian People*, p. 52.

**TABLE 5: POLITICAL ECONOMY TYPOLOGY CONTROLLING FOR DEVELOPMENTAL PATH PREFERENCE, 2004**

	Follow West	Pursue own, unique Russian path
<b>Liberal democrats n= ()</b>	69% (87)	60% (87)
<b>Social democrats</b>	9% (11)	12% (18)
<b>Market authoritarians</b>	2% (3)	7% (10)
<b>Socialist authoritarians</b>	6% (7)	4% (6)
<b>Ambivalent</b>	14% (17)	15% (22)
<b>Unmobilized</b>	1% (1)	2% (3)

Tau<sub>c</sub> =.09, n.s.

Source: as in footnote 1.

**TABLE 6: MEAN ELITE RESPONSES TO INDIVIDUAL ITEMS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY TYPOLOGY, 1993-2004**

	ELITES			
	1993	1995	1999	2004
<b>A. POLITICAL SYSTEM</b>				
Competition among various political parties makes our system strong.	.58	.61	.42	.64
The rights of the individual should be Defended even if guilty persons Sometimes remain free.	.77	.60	.26	.25
In any society it will always be Necessary to prohibit the public Expression of dangerous ideas [R]	.39	.02	-.20	.05
The interests of society should be Protected even if innocent people Sometimes end up in prison. [R]	1.13	.95	.75	.79
<b>B. ECONOMY</b>				
Competition among various enterprises, organizations, and firms benefits our society.	1.20	1.17	1.02	1.11
It's normal when the owner of a prosperous enterprise, using the labor of his workers, becomes richer than many other people	1.13	.79	.79	.77
There's no sense in beginning a new business inasmuch as it might fail. [R] <sup>3</sup>	1.04	.90	.87	.90
All heavy industry should belong to the state and not be in private hands. [R]	-.10	-.08	-.45	-.50

Sources: ROMIR interviews for relevant years. Standard errors all less than .10.

**TABLE 7: WESTERNIZERS AND SLAVOPHILES ON RELATIONS WITH WEST AND ON INTENSITY OF PREFERENCES FOR RUSSIAN UNIFICATION WITH BELARUS AND UKRAINE, 1995-2004**

	Westernizers	Slavophiles	Agreed:
1995 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.51, p<.001	24% (17)	76% (69)	<b>US threat to Russian security</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.43, p <.001	38% (29)	82% (84)	
2004 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.16, p =.01	43%(50)	58% (80)	
1995 Tau <sub>c</sub> .25,p=.001	31% (23)	57% (52)	<b>Russia should balance Western power</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.35, p<.001	48% (40)	83% (91)	
2004 . Tau <sub>c</sub> -.17, p<.01	51% (62)	68% (97)	
1995 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.41, p<.001	27% (20)	69% (65)	<b>Increase US power great or greatest threat</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.36, p<.001	42% (36)	78% (87)	
2004 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.15, p=.01	40% (50)	55% (80)	
1995 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.31,p<.001	49% (30)	80% (75)	<b>Expansion NATO in EE great or greatest threat?</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.29, p<.001	44% (37)	73% (80)	
2004 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.13, p<.05	31%(37)	44% (63)	
1995 Not asked (NA)			<b>NATO intervention in ethnic disputes in Europe great or greatest threat</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.28, p<.001	49% (41)	78% (86)	
2004 n.s.	40% (50)	49% (69)	
			Responses:
1995 NA			<b>Above scalar median for uniting Belarus with Russia*</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> .33, p<.001	61% (51)	80%(89 )	
2004 Tau <sub>c</sub> .34, p<.001	64% (80)	88% (129)	
1995 Tau <sub>c</sub> .34, p<001	46% (33)	80% (76)	<b>Above scalar median for uniting Ukraine and Russia</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> .30, p <.001	50% (42)	68% (76)	
2004 Tau <sub>c</sub> .26, p <.001	50% (63)	65% (97)	

The exact wording for these items and in the tables that follow were:

1. Do you think the United States is a threat to Russia's security?
2. [In your opinion, is] achieving a balance of power with the West [a very important or a less important] goal of Russian foreign policy?
3. Which of the below represent the greatest threat to the security of Russia and which do not threaten it all?....Growth of U.S military power in comparison with that of Russia
4. ....The expansion of NATO to include countries of Eastern Europe
5. ....Military intervention in inter-nationality conflicts among European states
6. Some assert that Russia and Belarus should be completely independent countries....Others think Russia and Belarus should be united into one country. What position corresponds to your point of view?
7. Some assert that Russia and Ukraine should be completely independent countries....Others think Russia and Ukraine should be united into one country. What position corresponds to your point of view?

Sources: ROMIR for various years.

**TABLE 8: LIBERAL DEMOCRATS AND OTHERS ON RELATION WITH THE WEST AND PREFERENCES FOR TIES WITH BELARUS AND UKRAINE, 1995-2004.**

Year/elite classification	Liberal democrats	Other elites	Agreed that:
1995 Tau $\approx$ .21, p=.001	46% (56)	71% (35)	<b>US threat to security</b>
1999 Tau $\approx$ .26, p<.001	51% (62)	79% (57)	
2004 n.s.	49% (82)	53% (50)	
1995 Tau $\approx$ .26, p<.001	37% (47)	69% (34)	<b>Should balance power of West</b>
1999 Tau $\approx$ .24, p<.001	57% (73)	82% (64)	
2004 n.s.	62% (105)	58% (59)	
1995 Tau $\approx$ .32, p<.001	39% (49)	78% (40)	<b>Increase US power great or greatest threat</b>
1999 Tau $\approx$ .34, p<.001	47% (62)	83% (65)	
2004 n.s.	49% (86)	46% (47)	
1995 Tau $\approx$ .18, p<.05	58% (74)	80% (41)	<b>Expansion NATO in EE great or greatest threat</b>
1999 Tau $\approx$ .16, p=.01	52% (68)	69% (54)	
2004 Tau $\approx$ .11, p=.06	34% (57)	46% (43)	
1995 Not asked (NA)			<b>NATO intervention great or greatest threat</b>
1999 Tau $\approx$ .21, p=.001	55% (71)	77% (60)	
2004 Tau $\approx$ .24, p<.001	37% (64)	63% (62)	
1995 NA			<b>Responses above scalar median for: Uniting Russia with Belarus</b>
1999 Tau $\approx$ .23, p<.001	62% (80)	86% (66)	
2004 n.s.	76% (134)	79% (81)	
1995 Tau $\approx$ .16, p<.01	60% (77)	80% (40)	<b>Uniting Russia with Ukraine</b>
1999 Tau $\approx$ .23, p<.001	50% (65)	74% (57)	
2004 n.s.	56% (99)	65% (66)	

Sources: as in Table 7. For wording of questions see also Table 7.

**TABLE 9: WESTERN ORIENTED AND OWN-PATH LIBERAL DEMOCRATS AND OTHERS ON RELATIONS WITH WEST AND PREFERENCES RE RUSSIAN UNIFICATION WITH BELARUS AND UKRAINE, 1999-2004\***

	Liberal	Democrats:	Others	
	a. Western-oriented	b. Own path		Agreed:
1995 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.47, p<.001	19% (10)	70% (43)	71% (25)	<b>US threat to Russian security</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.42, p <.001	32% (18)	75% (38)	79% (57)	
2004 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.14 p <.05.	37% (30)	62% (51)	53% (50)	
1995 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.37, p<.001	26% (15)	45% (28)	69% (34)	<b>Russia should balance power of West</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.38, p<.001	38% (23)	80% (44)	82% (64)	
2004 n.s.	48% (39)	75% (64)	58% (59)	
1995 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.53, p<.001	18% (10)	60% (37)	78% (40)	<b>Increase US power great or greatest Threat</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.45, p<.001	33% (21)	66% (37)	83% (65)	
2004 n.s.	40% (34)	59% (51)	46% (47)	
1995 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.32, p<.001	44% (25)	74% (46)	80% (41)	<b>Expansion NATO in EE great or greatest threat</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.25, p = .001	40% (25)	69% (38)	69% (54)	
2004 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.21, p=.001	21% (18)	47% (41)	46% (43)	
1995 NA				<b>NATO intervention in ethnic conflicts in Europe</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.29, p<.001	44% (27)	71% (40)	77% (60)	
2004 Tau <sub>c</sub> -.29, p<.001	30% (26)	42% (36)	63% (62)	
1995 NA				<b>Above scalar median for uniting Belarus with Russia</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> .29, p<.001	53% (33)	73% (41)	86% (66)	
2004 Tau <sub>c</sub> .13, p <.05	63% (55)	87% (76)	79% (81)	
1995 Tau <sub>c</sub> .34, p<.001	41 % (23)	76% (48)	80% (40)	<b>Above scalar median for uniting Ukraine and Russia</b>
1999 Tau <sub>c</sub> .29, p <.001	42% (26)	63% (35)	74% (57)	
2004 Tau <sub>c</sub> .15, p<.05	47% (41)	63% (55)	65% (66)	

Sources: as in Table 7. For question wording see Table 7.

**TABLE 10: AGE, CPSU MEMBERSHIP, DEVELOPMENTAL PATH, AND ORIENTATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY AMONG ELITES AS PREDICTORS OF EAST-WEST SECURITY RELATIONS AND ORIENTATION TO UNITY WITH BELARUS AND UKRAINE, 2004. (P= )**

	Born after 1949?	CPSU member?	Russian path?	Market democrats?
<b>US threat</b>	.312	.062	.035	.435
<b>Balance West</b>	.251	.293	.003	.293
<b>PERCEIVED DANGERS:</b>				
<b>NATO expansion</b>	.530	.531	.039	.163
<b>NATO intervention</b>	.936	.507	.112	.001
<b>Growth US power</b>	.146	.955	.009	.481
<b>STRONGLY FAVOR UNIFICATION WITH:</b>				
<b>Belarus</b>	.478	.039	.000	.381
<b>Ukraine</b>	.005	.047	.008	.136

Sources: as in Table 7. For exact wording see Table 7. For comparable figures for 1999, see Zimmerman, *The Russian People*, p.183.