
An NCEEER Working Paper by

Keith Brown
Brown University
Project Information*  
Principal Investigator: Keith Brown  
NCEEER Contract Number: 827-03  
Date: January 2, 2014

Copyright Information

Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from research funded through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). However, the NCEEER and the United States Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, in written and electronic form, reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract or Grant Agreements either (a) for NCEEER’s own internal use, or (b) for use by the United States Government, and as follows: (1) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments, entities and/or individuals to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) for dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy of the United States Government granting the public access to documents held by the United States Government. Neither NCEEER nor the United States Government nor any recipient of this Report may use it for commercial sale.

* The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author.
Executive Summary

This working paper is a preliminary effort to lay out some of the history of the environmental movement in the Republic of Macedonia within Yugoslavia, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It comes out of the author's own long-term interest in the history of the Republic: and in particular his interest in understanding what happened in the Republic in the five-year period between 1987 and 1992.
Introduction

This is a preliminary effort to lay out some of the history of the environmental movement in the Republic of Macedonia within Yugoslavia, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It comes out of my own long-term interest in the history of the Republic: and in particular my interest in understanding what happened in the Republic in the five-year period between 1987 and 1992. At the start of that period, the Republic was generally considered as lagging behind other Yugoslav Republics—in particular Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia—in terms of economic and civic development. This was highlighted by events in August 1987, when the republic’s leadership first deployed militia equipped with electric truncheons against citizens in the village of Vevčani who were protesting against what they saw as unjustified and unprincipled intervention to redirect the natural springs that ran through their community; and subsequently denied that disproportional force had been used, and pressurized official media within Macedonia to defame the people of Vevčani as religious chauvinists. Journalists elsewhere in Yugoslavia told the villagers’ side of the story; in its hardline use of force, subsequent efforts to promote a singular, distorted picture of what had happened, and stubborn refusal to engage with federal inquiries about human rights or other legal infractions, Macedonia’s leadership were labeled as leaders of a “temin vilayet”—a “dark province,” using an administrative term from Ottoman history.

The next five years saw a flourishing of pluralist political engagement in the Republic in a variety of domains. Whereas environmental protests, satirical,
irreverent media, debate over the nature of democracy, and challenges to the “authorized” narrative of Yugoslav communist orthodoxy were primarily associated with Slovenia—where, in turn, they are seen as having spread through a variety of Eastern European transnational networks and influences described by Padraic Kenney in *Carnival of Revolution*—this five-year period witnessed all these, and more “subaltern publics” emerging in the Republic of Macedonia. They did so with such rapidity and apparent durability that in 1992, when the European Commission-established Badinter Commission was charged with assessing the various Republics’ readiness for autonomous, sovereign statehood, Slovenia and Macedonia were adjudged ready; Croatia and Bosnia were not. In Macedonia’s case, this is all the more striking given first its 1987 reputation, and second the fact that in contrast to the largely ethnically homogenous and economically advantaged Slovenia, it was home to an Orthodox Slav majority constituting around 65% of the population, alongside a 20-25% Muslim Albanian community; and its GDP remained among the lowest across the Federation.

The Badinter Commission’s recommendation was not accepted by the European Community, in part because of Greek objections to the constitutional name of the Republic that are widely considered to be newly-constituted and symbolic, but which have an under-reported economic and geo-political dimension. Since 1992—and especially since 1995, when Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov was targeted by a car bomb in downtown Skopje—the Republic of Macedonia has remained an anomalous and vulnerable state, recognized under a contingent name,
blocked from membership of key international organizations, and location of ethno-
political tensions that in 2001 generated an armed insurgency among Albanians.

Most narratives discount the achievements and promise of the period 1987-
1992. I think it worth analyzing because a diverse set of actors, brought up under
Yugoslav communism, in this period discussed, and took concrete action to lay out,
the path they envisaged from socialism to post-socialism. Many of these actors are
alive; they are acutely aware that their activism and energy did not bring about the
outcomes that they hoped for. They are in many cases willing to talk about their
hopes, dreams and experiences of that period, and offer their own explanations of
how and why history took the course it did. As such, they provide a challenge to the
easy dualisms of socialism/post-socialism; and especially, to both the market
triumpahalism that shaped early outside narratives of what should happen; and the
return of neo-primitivist “blame the natives” explanations of the persistence of
underemployment, corruption, praetorianism and other systemic societal problems.
Although not in the same league as Kosovo and Bosnia, Macedonia has been the
location of substantial international intervention. The effects of those interventions
have their own complex history; but the one that I suggest we can begin to challenge
and undo is the neo-colonial stereotyping of the social landscape on which those
interventions took place as characterized by lack or absence.

Environmental activism is perhaps the least known of all. I realize that “gap-
filling” is insufficient rationale; nor is telling untold stories itself of interest beyond
Macedonia. So what I plan to do is explore the ways in which the Macedonian
experience challenges or confirms elements of paradigms established in
ethnographic study of other neighboring countries: and also leverage the particular advantage of working in a small country (total population around 2 million) for illuminating how individual careers and lives can cross the boundaries that we sometimes erect around particular issue domains.

In this regard, I envisage telling (at least) five stories in this chapter, each anchored in the work of individual participant in ecological and/or environmental activism in the period—which showcase the factors that pulled them apart. The five individuals are

Pandora Nikuševa, from the town of Veles (formerly Titov Veles): a chemistry teacher and founder of Vila Zora, the city’s environmental organization.

Xhabir Deralla, from Skopje, a journalist with Mlad Borec, who went on to make a career as a human rights activist.

Vančo Meandžiski, one-time journalist for Nova Makedonija who specialized in ecological coverage, and was heavily involved in first Opstanok and then also the creation of the new nationalist party. Reportedly, now disillusioned and living in Eastern Macedonia.

Petar Bošeski, from Skopje, founder and first president of Opstanok.

(XXX) Aljuoši, from Vevčani, first president of the village’s ecological association.

These individuals all came together, (certainly four of them) on Monday October 16, 1989, at 6pm, a public demonstration was held in Skopje’s main square, organized by Opstanok—survival. The meeting was announced ahead of time in Nova Makedonija, the newspaper of record, and marked the first high-profile activity of the organization. Buses came from other environmental organizations in the
country, including from Veles and Vevčani, with contingents headed by the presidents.

The Opstanok demonstration was a call to identify which organs in the federal and republican system of government were responsible for the ecological catastrophe of Lake Dojran in the previous summer. Drought had hit the Axios valley in Northern Greece; in response to pleas from Greece for help, the Yugoslav government had agreed that to save Greek farmers from ruin, the Greek authorities could draw water from Lake Dojran, up to an agreed amount. It appears that the agreement operated on good faith, as an emergency measure. Greece diverted more than three times the agreed amount of water from the Lake which dropped over 30 cm in level, shrinking the total surface area considerably and precipitating a major shock to the eco-system of the lake, as well as the livelihood of Macedonian communities that depended on it. Scientists at the time anticipated that even with the best efforts at remediation, the effect would be felt for 25 years.

At the time of the demonstration more than a year later, no major measures had been taken; indeed, further loss was sustained to the lake in the summer of 1989. Obviously, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was then wrestling with a slew of other issues; Greek-Yugoslav-Macedonian relations were also complicated by the fact that in summer 1988 Skopje had hosted the first international meeting of the Deca Begalci—self-identified Macedonian adults who as children had left Greece during the Civil War, and faced enduring problems over rights of visitation and return, as well as restitution of family property. 1988 had also seen protests by Macedonian students over a Greek decision to discontinue recognition of diplomas.
awarded by Macedonia’s Universities. This hit Greek students hardest, who previously had come to the Republic to pursue higher education with every intention of returning to Greece to live and work; but it was also experienced as a symbolic slight by Macedonian citizens.

In this broader charged context, Opstanok had specific goals for what they planned as a peaceful protest meeting. This was classic political protest to call for a number of identified committees and other organs to be held to account; at the same time, in the relatively new mode of “activism beyond borders” described by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (Keck and Sikkink 1998), they were seeking to elicit pressure on the national government to act by appeal to UN and other international bodies, to which Yugoslavia was a signatory.

In the coverage of the event on the next day, *Nova Makedonija* quoted the remarks of Opstanok President Petar Boševski. The news article continued on to report that “after the meeting finished, which lasted around a half hour, a large group of participants, consisting of inhabitants from Vevčani, marched through the streets and took their protest to the Greek consulate, and the national assembly.” (Nova Makedonija, Tuesday October 17 1989, p.3). And two days later, in a commentary on the events, under the title “Demonstration post-demonstration” (Miting posle miting), writer V. Mičnovski criticized what he called the “politicization of ecology.” Continuing the strand of negative coverage of Vevcani’s political activism—which had culminated in May 1989 in a march on the government building in Skopje—Mičnovski suggested that the Society for the
defense of nature from Vevčani had undermined the Opstanok cause and weakened its message by breaking from the planned strategy of the meeting.

It’s always easy—and problematic—to cherry-pick newspaper headlines and events as having unheralded significance. But the Opstanok-led protest of October 1989 still seems like a pivotal moment, indicating that even as the different protest groups physically came together for the first time, they were already coming apart. What might have been a vehicle to unite popular sentiment and have a major impact on the direction of politics to focus on shared challenges for the country as a whole (as well as the region) instead unraveled. Participants in the meeting recall that some of those present took the opportunity to protest communist falsification of history; at least one of the founders of Opstanok was simultaneously involved in the creation of the nationalist political party, VMRO-DPMNE.

This kind of fragmentation of effort occurred even as some were seeking to do the opposite. On October 11 1989, a week ahead of the demonstration, for example, Nova Makedonija had a story with the headline “The Greens are a reality;” and June 5, 1990—an international day of the environment, marked by activities across the country, had an editorial entitled “The Greens are among us.” This followed the creation of an umbrella organization to bring together the different local organizations through the creation of the Movement of Ecologists of Macedonia on May 19 1990 in Veles (a key site, because of air and soil pollution issues), presumably to try to prevent or mediate the kind of mixed messages that had come out of the Skopje demonstration; and preceded the attempt to enlist larger public membership in a Green political party, which seems to have on Thursday
August 30 1990—that is, toward the end of the phase of party creation and jockeying for a share of the vote, that had started with the legalization of the multi-party system in the spring of 1990, with the bold title “Without ecology there can be no democracy” and a tear-out form with which people could register their membership.

This movement was not an anomaly in the region. Ecologists were a key component of Slovenia’s broad civil society, anti-regime movement, as anti-nuclear protesters found common cause with women’s, peace, human rights and other organizations there. In that case, the presence of the Krško nuclear reactor since 1983—and the Watershed moment of the Chernobyl disaster, which took place in April 1986—was a clear catalyst and focus. Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, hosted a significant anti-nuclear demonstration, organized by the Youth League, on May 10 1986 (Jancar 1987: 331; Kenney 2002: 136-137). Kenney sees the Chernobyl demonstration of 1986 – and an anniversary event in 1987—as “dress rehearsal” for the Slovene spring of 1988, which tapped into anti-Yugoslav nationalism. In her book Wild Capitalism, Krista Harper has documented the salience of anti-nuclear activism—first local, and then global—in Hungarian environmentalism (Harper 2006).

In Macedonia’s Eastern neighbor, Bulgaria, the environmentalist movement had grown out of protests over air pollution in the border city of Ruse in September 1987. The Ekoglasnost movement was formed in Sofia on March 22 1989, and in October that year articulated the position that ecological rights were key human rights (Baumgartl 1992; Baker and Baumgartl 1993). That November, Ekoglasnost
organized demonstrations of up to 10,000 citizens in Sofia—which was reported as a pivotal moment in popular mobilization, and in December contributed to the formation of the wider opposition Union of Democratic Forces, and a Green Party which participated in elections in June 1990. (Baumgartl 1993: 163-166. In A. Vari and Pal Tamas (eds.) 1993, *Environment and Democratic Transition*). A somewhat similar story—though involving activists who developed ties over a longer period of rural restoration as well as out of attention to the effects of communist planning—is told for Slovakia by Edwar Snajdr in *Nature Protests* (Snajdr 2008). ¹

Ekoglasnost’s impact was witnessed by former Vermont governor Madeline Kunin, and her staffer George Hamilton—who had participated as election observers in Bulgaria in 1990. They were inspired by the story of Ekoglasnost—citizens uniting against an environmental problem, building common ground, then taking their just cause first to the streets and then into parliament—they saw in it components of the kind of small-town, neighbor-by-neighbor, issue-based politics that were enshrined in Vermont’s tradition of governance through town meetings. And so they saw an opportunity to cooperate with Ekoglasnost and similar movements in other countries, drawing on the longer institutional traditions and practices of such grass-roots democracy in their home state, advocating for such approaches with the US government, and providing technical assistance to such organizations, as well connecting them to international forums where, in the heady

¹ Snajdr notes that much of the energy of the movement, as it transitioned to direct political engagement through participation in party construction, was sapped by the revelation, during Slovakia’s lustration process in 1990, that its leader had been an informer for the secret police. Similar accusations have subsequently been made regarding Ekoglasnost figures; it seems at least plausible that such accusations are the extension of politics by other means, and are not necessarily rooted in fact.
days after the end of the Cold War, activists were planning how to realize the dream of a more just, equitable and sustainable world society. In 1991, Kunin and Hamilton founded the Institute for Sustainable Communities, ISC, to further this goal.

In 1995 Steve Nicholas, a young environmental activist with experience in city politics, arrived in Skopje to start up ISC’s work in Macedonia. In an initial report he wrote in 1995, he made the assessment that Macedonia’s environmental associations were the most robust and active segment of civil society and activism, and therefore provided the best base to work with, in ISC’s idea to catalyze the kind of local energy that Kunin and Hamilton had witnessed in Bulgaria. At the same time, he saw that they were often issue-specific and local in their orientation.

This was a case of a well-intentioned, future-oriented professional perceiving the potential start of something. In this view, he was undoubtedly encouraged/affirmed by his immediate interlocutors, many of whom were young idealists recently recruited into the environmental movements. In fact, though, what oral histories from within the movement—so far produced with Xhabir Deralla, and other key figures in the period from 1989-1995—suggest is that already, the “fragile story” of the potential of the environmentalists was fragmenting. As is clear from its energizing effect in fall 1989, to bring diverse demonstrators together in Skopje, the case of Dojran Lake in the summer of 1988 was a critical start point. It revealed a breakdown in the effective conduct of international relations (still conducted from Belgrade) and contributed to Macedonian fears that their interests were peripheral or marginalized in Yugoslav-Greek politics. In this case there was incontrovertible evidence of direct damage to citizens’ interests: there was nothing abstract, or
ambiguous, about the unprecedented and ruinous drop in Lake Dojran’s water level (although, reportedly, Greek actors in the drama sought to conceal it, by removing a concrete pillar that served as indicator). It had the potential to serve as Macedonia’s Krško.

Citizen engagement in issues of national interest, though, is not automatic, given or spontaneous: public opinion in complex industrialized societies, as Walter Lippman demonstrated as long ago as 1922, is latent and malleable. People don’t just get facts and act on them: they make selections, impose frames, and only in cases of the dramatic collapse of master-narratives do they engage in critical questioning and reassessment.

The end of the 1980s provided such an opportunity for all Yugoslav citizens. Those in Macedonia who took up environment as a key component of their world view did so from different impulses. For some, like Xhabir Deralla, it came as a result of encounters from voracious reading in and beyond the Marxian canon that remained at the heart of Yugoslavia’s world-class and internationally-oriented educational system. He came across the writings of members of the Vermont-based “Deep ecology” movement, and the coherence and radicalism appealed to him. For Pandora Nikuševa in Veles, it was the fact of major pollution by the aluminum smelter located—in line with a socialist ideal that had workers walking from their homes to the factory—very close to the city. For the citizens of Vevčani, it sprang from a locally-oriented appreciation for natural resources.
In the aftermath of the hijacked street demonstration of October 1989—and the departure of some of the more vociferously anti-government members into other political parties, he mainspring of Skopje’s environmental movement remained the University of Kiril and Metodi. Some science faculty members had set up an association of professional ecologists in the early 1970s. In interviews with two of the key young activists with whom Steve Nicholas collaborated in 1995 in setting up and then running Macedonia’s Institute for Sustainable Communities, they both emphasized the key role played by charismatic professors on the architecture faculty in sparking their interest—in particular, Professor Mihail Tokarev, who was and who was a central figure, alongside a number of faculty from the Department of Biochemistry, in establishing the organization Opstanok. The other key figure involved was Josif Tanevski, a professional chemist who established his own company, Farmahem, in October 1990.

In this phase, the organization combined the expertise of professors and professionals with the energy of students; talking with some of those involved 20 years later, it was striking how positively they remember that time. In one sense the organization and movement had a rather familiar, patriarchally-flavored form: the key professors were all men, and many of the most active of the students involved were young women. But it is recalled as a warm, familial feel: Katerina Stojkoska, for example, recalled that Tokarev and Tanevski were in some sense “like fathers” to the young people involved. What was striking was the degree to which the organizations quickly empowered the younger members. This was partly a result of their resolve to learn from the West, where the environmental movement
was further developed: as a result of longer-term shifts in education, and also media access, the students knew English better than their professors, and this meant that they were often to the fore in conversations with foreigners. Biljana Stefoska, for example, was general secretary of DEM, the umbrella organization, while in her early 20s.

In his speech celebrating the fifth anniversary of the formation of DEM, delivered in June 1995, Josif Tanevski indicated that 26 organizations were then members. What’s clear in this document is DEM’s decision—working closely with Opstanok, which was the largest single member organization—to work through the system through establishing facts and shared knowledge, raising public awareness, and advocating for and providing expertise to implement change through legislation and its implementation. Relationships were key: in an interview in 2009, before his untimely death in mid 2010, Josif Tanevski recalled in particular the way in which he and others made every effort to interest and engage journalists; making their job easy by sharing data, taking them into the field to show them how, for example, data about pollution was actually assembled; and serving as a resource. He was able to list 10-15 journalists with whom DEM worked closely at the time: thereby getting their message out through existing media. So too, all three of Tanevski, Stefoska and Stojkoska alluded to DEM’s success in establishing relationships with international organizations—at a time, when the Republic of Macedonia was still facing obstacles at the formal, diplomatic level—including Friends of the Earth and after 1993, the Regional Ecological Center, a new network headquartered in Budapest. DEM sent
representatives to the world summit in Rio in June 1992, where their commitment to sustainable development was affirmed.

The organization also worked with existing and new government structures, as well as alongside other non-governmental organizations. In 1992, the president Kiro Gligorov signed his own symbolic application to join “Opstanok”—a major media coup for the organization. Less visibly, Stefoska recalls how this coherent, long-term strategic planning paid off in the first five years of DEM’s existence:

We were also successful in the lobbying so new legislatives ne programs new strategies, everything was developed. [09:00] I didn’t mention that ...also we lobbied to create new ministry for environment, as at the time we didn't have a ministry. So the ministry for environment protection was created. [then]. Can you imagine how strong we as a movement were and media outlets. The country was young we were not established very well but we were something which was undercover government [09:30], we did everything instead of the ministry. Also in the women’s association this umbrella was also successful regarding the social issue questions.

There was, then, a sense of unity and common purpose in the environmental movement of Skopje in the early 1990s. DEM’s links with international organizations—Friends of the Earth, the Regional Environmental Center in Budapest—their presence at the Rio Earth summit, and their creative relationship-building, were arguably part of the way in which dynamic and principled reformers in the Republic transformed its reputation and established a genuine civic capacity.
What changed? In her account, Stefoska suggested that the “professionalization” of the civil society sector played a key part. This is, of course, a recurrent theme in the evolution of systems—recall Weber’s discussion of charisma and bureaucracy: in the eastern European context, scholars like Dietrich and Marilyn Rueschemeyer discuss the shift from “movements”—short-lived and based on voluntarism—to “organizations” and argue that it is the latter that endure and effect change. In this regard, Stefoska and Stojkoska’s post-DEM and post-ISC profiles are rather striking in their divergence. Stojkoska left DEM to work for REC; then worked for ISC, and then returned to work again for REC, which still has a Skopje presence, as the sixth of the organizations founded with foreign capital in the early 1990s (the other pioneers include the better-known Macedonian Red Cross, MCIC and the Open Society Foundation). REC has little contact with the wider public; it is an implementing organization for policy-makers.

Stefoska, by contrast, stayed with DEM through to the late 1990s—in the course of which, she suggests, ecological organizations lost their spirit as they “followed the money” offered by international donors, became aid-dependent, turned away from their grass-roots origins and their focus on the long-term future: then when the aid disappeared, found they had no vision, membership or soul to fall back on. She left to form her own organization, specializing in training and grass-roots activism; while also enrolling on the faculty, to write on the the human security and international relations dimensions of disputes over natural resources. Dojran is a key case study.
Clearly, issues of organizational evolution and human ambition, and the easy money of international assistance, all played a part in the dissolution of the unity of the environmental associations of the early 1990s, and the dissipation of popular energy. But this history also points to the same larger dilemmas that faced Macedonian change agents in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Part of what made their efforts possible and successful was the general level of social security in the Republic—at least among Macedonians. Social exclusion undoubtedly already existed as a disintegrative process, but affected Albanians, Macedonian Muslims and Roma far more than Macedonians, Turks, Vlahs or Serbs. The existence of a form of a middle-class was in Macedonia—as it is everywhere—the bedrock of effective and enduring popular mobilization around long-term common issues.

Education, and levels of understanding, is also a part of the story. DEM tried to promote the environmentalist frame of making sense of the world—in which, for example, Dojran Lake, the issues of water distribution in Vevčani (and later the Prilep and Kičevo region) air, soil and water pollution in Veles, and air pollution and solid waste disposal in Skopje, all combine to make the argument that full disclosure, recognition of mutuality and overlapping demands and rights, and acknowledgement of the need for arbitration and mediation, governed by expertise and without disenfranchising or indebting future generations is the basis for leadership and policy-making in place of divisive politics. But others, operating in the same space and time, adopted different frames that were more easily constructed. There’s no question that Greek policy in the case of Dojran Lake was self-serving; it was possibly duplicitous, and perhaps deliberately destructive. But it
didn’t have to be connected so tightly with issues around Greek treatment of minorities, and dignity and human rights, that it became impossible to negotiate or manage separately from that. Applying the nationalist frame, and indulging in the name calling of “national theft,” in this case, drowned out the possibility of ways forward.

That said, the *Nova Makedonija*, interpretation, that it was Vevčani activists who hi-jacked the Opstanok demonstration in October 1989, was clearly partisan. What participants in fact report—along with Opstanok organizers—is that it was the VMRO-DPMNE types—a presence that Nova Makedonija was not yet ready to acknowledge as existing—who scuffled with police. This reveals the limitations of relying on communist newspaper sources—or reading them with awareness of the context, in which they were still engaged in a campaign of defamation against a village’s perceived agenda. But it does serve as confirmation of what oral history interviews with individual present indicate, that a byproduct of the meeting was a turn away from direct action by several who attended in good faith, anticipating that numbers, and commitment to non-violence, would make their moderate message resonate in government circles. After that demonstration, the different associations did convene in Veles at the founding meeting of DEM; within a year, though, the Vevčani association had discontinued its participation, and committed to the village’s more limited goal, to secure a limited autonomy). In justification, Vevčani veteran activists now recall their frustration in what they saw as naivete, in Opstanok’s leadership seeking to operate through governmental bodies, and enlisting UNESCO to try to pressurize Macedonia and Yugoslavia to do the right
thing by its citizens, when they already knew, from a longer experience, the frustrations of seeking justice, in their terms, through legal means. They were, then, at different stages along the path of non-violent action described by Martin Luther King in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail.

And this is one dimension of the tragic fate of collective action, that oral history can help to reveal. In a society and political system like that of Yugoslav Macedonia in the late 1980s, even though all knew it was in crisis, some kind of change was inevitable, and reform or revolution was necessary, still the array of resources that authorities still commanded was more than enough to fragment the nascent sense of common purpose among citizens. What critical oral history can also perhaps do though, is highlight the relationship of past, to present, to future. We are now 25 years on from the Lake Dojran scandal. Undoubtedly it might be mobilized as political capital to sour Greek-Macedonian relations again, or further—when the current public relations policy of antiquization gets old, perhaps, as a tool to get people on the streets, then someone will calculate the economic damage that Dojran has suffered, and put the number on placards. But the story also tells us about choices made, roads not taken along the way: it could also serve as the cornerstone of a renewed initiative by which people discuss the proper role of government; the importance of cross-national scientific fact-finding; the place of ecological understanding in a national education system designed to equip students with the skills of global citizenship; and the responsibilities of a plural media to find a way to expand the spaces of civic dialogue and understanding.