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A WANING OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY *

As part of the "Gorbachev revolution," Mikhail Gorbachev has made substantial concessions in the international sphere, especially in accepting the Reagan Administration's "zero option" as the basis for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty of December 1987. In a more fundamental departure from earlier Soviet policies, he has also proposed to restructure NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional force postures and operational doctrines along strictly defensive lines.

In analyzing these changes in Soviet foreign policy and in Gorbachev's domestic "restructuring" program, to which they are linked, the following analysis discusses: 1) Gorbachev's domestic reforms and the reasons why they are taking place 2) the evolution and the nature of the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, and 3) how the United States should react to Gorbachev's policies.

Historically, Soviet expansionism has been largely caused by the nature of the USSR's domestic institutions, especially the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the centralized command economy. These institutions were necessary for carrying out "extensive" economic development in the face of an exaggerated "foreign threat," and they still exist as atavisms that hamper further economic development.

Today, however, in an effort to create a more modern economy through "intensive development," Gorbachev is waging a campaign against entrenched interest groups, such as the military-industrial complex, which are now in eclipse as a result of the

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strengthening of reformist constituencies. Civilian defense intellectuals, reformist ideologues, and supporters of liberalized trade policies among the intelligentsia are gaining influence and calling for changes that would institutionalize new policies. Thus, recent changes in Soviet foreign policy are being caused both by the need to reform the economy and by the interests of Gorbachev's main political constituency—the intelligentsia. Elements of the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy include calls for more involvement in the world economy and an emphasis on "mutual security" as regards the East-West conventional and nuclear military balances.

Since the 1950s, there have been several schools of thought in Soviet strategic thinking. The one that was dominant during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras—"offensive detente"—came into being as a result as an effort to balance the preferences and interests of the military-industrial complex, party militants, and the intelligentsia.

Khrushchev's version of offensive detente relied on nuclear weaponry, and Brezhnev held that the global "correlation of forces" could be shifted in the Soviet Union's favor by redressing the military balance and by supporting progressive forces in the Third World. However, this strategy was overcommitted and expensive, and because of disaffection with the failure of Brezhnev's policies, some changes in Soviet foreign policy took place in the mid-1970s. Strategic procurements flattened out,
Soviet nuclear warfighting doctrine began to change, and there was growing skepticism about backing radical Third World regimes.

The intensive form of economic development that Gorbachev is trying to foster requires deeper participation in the international economy, less costly military and Third World policies, and a policy line that avoids upsetting stable relations with the West. Thus, Gorbachev and his allies have propounded strategic concepts that facilitate their own domestic program. In the military sphere, there have been radical changes regarding both nuclear and conventional questions, largely because the military is no longer the powerful political participant in the Soviet ruling coalition that it once was.

Gorbachev and his aides see America as innately hostile, but they believe that America's aggressiveness can be defused through self-restraint and concessions--through effective, substantive Soviet peace proposals. The most significant aspect of Gorbachev's "new thinking" is his explicit understanding of the need for mutual security. The official Warsaw Pact position is that East and West should reduce their forces to equal, minimum levels that will exclude the possibility of waging offensive operations; a conventional arms control agreement, according to this view, should bring about the creation of force postures that will only be sufficient for defensive operations.

The new defense-oriented thinking on conventional strategy seems to be gaining ground, but primarily among civilian officials, not military planners. For some time, articles discussing
the advantages of defensive conventional operations have been appearing in Soviet military journals. Military officers warn, however, that defensive operations must not be passive. Rather, they argue the need for a vigorous counteroffensive capability and do not see a need to restructure the Warsaw Pact's forces.

Now that domestic political conditions have changed, the civilian decision makers have no reason to remain bound to a costly and destabilizing conventional military strategy. However, it is not entirely clear that the civilians care as much about actually implementing a new defensive conventional doctrine as they do about announcing one.

To some extent, the "new thinking" about offense and defense is also evident where geopolitical questions are concerned. For example, there is a new ambivalence toward the use of force among some Soviet military officers, and progressive change in the Third World is now universally portrayed as slow, reversible, and problematic. But inasmuch as these views are held even by military officers, they may simply reflect learning rather than institutional change.

Notwithstanding Gorbachev's presently preeminent position in the Soviet leadership, there are some threats to Gorbachev's political survival. One cause of concern stems from the character of some of Gorbachev's colleagues. For example, Lev Zaikov, who oversees the Soviet Union's defense industries, has his roots in Leningrad's high-technology military sector. In addition, recent research suggests that certain military circles, who are for
economic restructuring, do not favor Gorbachev's market-oriented proposals. Furthermore, Yegor Ligachev, the second-highest ranking Politburo member, has supported the general idea of reform, but has often voiced reservations about the pace and direction of change. Moreover, his views on detente have an almost offensive, Brezhnevan cast. If Gorbachev's radical program runs into obstacles, Ligachev is in a position to put his stamp on a scaled-down version. Finally, it is possible, though not very likely, that Gorbachev may fail as a result of poor economic performance and a hostile international environment.

Thus, in order to make the most of the opportunities presented by the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, American policy should follow three broad guidelines. First, the United States should avoid intense geopolitical challenges to the Soviet Union that would force Gorbachev's reforms to move in a militarized direction. Second, the United States should continue to reciprocate meaningful Soviet concessions to avoid discrediting the new thinking, parts of which may be quite fragile. Third, the United States should push for a meaningful restructuring of the Soviet foreign trade system and of the Soviet Union's offensive conventional force posture in Europe. The West should be firm in tying Soviet membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the International Monetary Fund to some restructuring of Soviet price-setting practices. The United States should also take up Soviet offers to discuss prospective changes in conventional force postures from offense to defense.
Gorbachev may want to move in these directions in any case, but unless the United States takes an active role and offers to meet him half way, it may be hard for Gorbachev to push his reforms through the Soviet policymaking process. Some of the most positive aspects of Gorbachev's new thinking, especially his interest in defensive conventional strategies, may be short-lived if the West creates an environment that is inhospitable to their survival.
THE GORBACHEV REVOLUTION:
A WANING OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM?

Jack Snyder

Many Americans have long believed that Soviet expansionism stems from pathological Soviet domestic institutions, and that the expansionist impulse will diminish only when those institutions undergo a fundamental change. The Gorbachev revolution in Soviet domestic and foreign policy has raised the question of whether that time is close at hand. At home, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has attacked many of the old Stalinist institutions as obsolete and self-serving, while promoting greater freedom of expression, contested elections at local levels, and an increased role for market mechanisms in the Soviet economy. Abroad, Gorbachev has made some substantial concessions from former Soviet positions, especially in accepting the Reagan Administration's "zero option" as the basis for an agreement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). In a more fundamental departure, he has also proposed to restructure NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional force postures and operational doctrines along strictly defensive lines.

In assessing these developments, I will address the following questions. First, how fundamental and permanent are Gorbachev's domestic changes, and why are they occurring? Second, how new and how permanent is the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy? Is it just a dressed-up version of former General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's approach to detente, which America found so unsatisfactory? Is it simply a tactic to buy time until Russia can regain
its competitive strength? Or is it a qualitatively new development, organically and permanently rooted in the new domestic order that Gorbachev is creating? Third, how should the United States react to Gorbachev's policies? What influence might American policy have on the depth and direction of the domestic reforms? What opportunities has the new Soviet thinking created for enhancing Western security, and how can the West take advantage of them?

A definitive analysis of the Gorbachev revolution is hardly possible at this stage, since the process is still only beginning to unfold. Nonetheless, it is important to have working hypotheses about the causes and consequences of the reforms, since timely American policy choices may hinge in part on that analysis. In that spirit, I advance four main arguments.

First, historical Soviet expansionism and zero-sum thinking about international politics have largely been caused by the nature of Soviet Stalinist domestic institutions, especially the militant Communist Party and the centralized command economy geared toward autarkic military production. These institutions, their authoritarian methods, and their militant ideology were necessary for the tasks of "extensive economic development"—namely, mobilizing underutilized labor and material resources and overcoming bottlenecks—in conditions of imminent foreign threat. After these tasks were accomplished, the Stalinist institutions hung on as atavisms, using the militant ideology and the exaggeration of the foreign threat to justify their self-serving poli-
cies. The offensive form of detente practiced by First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and by Brezhnev was an attempt to satisfy simultaneously these atavistic interests and also newly emerging, post-Stalinist groups, especially the cultural and technical intelligentsia. As recently as the period when Yuri Andropov was General Secretary, in Harry Gelman's view, "the entrenched influence of the military and the ideologues" suppressed the lessons that the reformist intelligentsia was learning about Soviet geopolitical overextension of the late 1970s.

Second, Gorbachev is aiming for nothing less than smashing the power of the entrenched Stalinist interest groups. He realizes that the extensive model of development has run into a dead end, because fallow labor and material resources have run out. There are no more reserves to mobilize. Consequently, new institutions are needed to address the tasks of "intensive development" in a modern economy--namely, efficient allocation of already-mobilized resources and sensitivity to user needs. In the Soviet reformers' view, the old institutions and the ideas associated with them have become fetters on production, serving only their own vested interests. As Gorbachev told the January 1987 Central Committee plenum:

theoretical notions about socialism in many ways remained on the level of the 1930s and 1940s, when society was tackling entirely different problems.... What took place was a kind of translation into absolutes of the forms of the organization of society that had developed in practice. Moreover, such notions, in point of fact, were equated with the essential characteristics of socialism, regarded as immutable and presented as dogmas leaving no room for objective scientific analysis.
According to his diagnosis, atavistic institutions and ideas must yield to new methods that allow greater initiative and autonomy from below.

Third, the requirements of intensive development and the interests of Gorbachev's principal constituency, the intelligentsia, propel new thinking in foreign policy and arms control. These include a more organic Soviet involvement in the capitalist world economy, a reduced defense burden, and the durable detente that this requires. This is more fundamental and far-reaching than a short-lived desire to buy time or digest geopolitical gains. The new conception of detente, moreover, explicitly eschews the Brezhnevian idea of one-way benefits flowing from an improved "correlation of forces," the loose index of political and military trends that the Soviets invoke when discussing the balance of power. As Gorbachev told a Soviet national television audience, "today one's own security cannot be ensured without taking into account the security of other states and peoples. There can be no genuine security unless it is equal for all and comprehensive. To think otherwise is to live in a world of illusions, in a world of self-deception."

Fourth, to promote the favorable aspects of the new foreign policy, the United States should (1) avoid extremely aggressive competitive behavior that might push the reforms in a militarized direction, (2) reciprocate genuine Soviet concessions to avoid discrediting the conciliatory line, and (3) bargain hard for structural changes in Soviet foreign trade institutions and in
offensive conventional military postures in Europe. These latter changes, toward which Gorbachev appears favorably inclined anyhow, would be good in themselves and would work to institutionalize the new foreign policy in Soviet domestic politics.

In presenting these arguments, I will first explain how Stalinist domestic institutions fostered Soviet expansionism, and second, trace the effects of Gorbachev's domestic innovations on Soviet foreign policy. In concluding, I will discuss policy implications for the West.

THE OLD INSTITUTIONS AND OLD IDEAS

The need for forced-draft industrialization in the face of intense threats from more advanced societies shaped the militant institutions and ideas of Stalin's revolution from above. These institutions and ideas lived on for decades, dominating domestic political coalitions and driving foreign and security policies in a militant, expansionist direction. It is against these atavistic institutions and ideas that Gorbachev and the reformers must contend.

The Institutions and Ideas of Stalin's Revolution from Above

Stalinist institutions were marked by their origins in the attempts of an autocrat to whip his backward society to modernize in the face of foreign competition. In this process, international pressure provided both the motive and the opportunity to smash obsolete institutions and replace them with more efficient,
centrally controlled ones.\textsuperscript{11} "Old Russia ... was ceaselessly beaten for her backwardness," Stalin warned at the height of the First Five-Year Plan. "We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this lag in ten years. Either we do it or they crush us."\textsuperscript{12}

The tsars, too, had tried to spur revolutions from above for much the same reason but, as Stalin explained, "none of the old classes ... could solve the problem of overcoming the backwardness of the country."\textsuperscript{13} Instead, they were barriers to the needed transformation. Then, between 1917 and 1921 all of these old urban and elite classes, including the old working class, were swept away by war, revolution, foreign intervention, and civil war. The Bolsheviks were not immediately strong enough to break the peasantry and mobilize the material and labor surpluses needed for rapid industrialization. During the 1920s, however, they were able to form a vanguard of social transformation from the ranks of the new working class, which was younger and less tainted with reformist trade-unionism than the old working class had been.\textsuperscript{14}

This revolution had institutional and intellectual consequences. Institutionally, its implementation required a more militant mobilizing party, the strengthening of repressive police institutions, and a more centralized authoritarian economic structure to overcome bottlenecks and to assert the priority of military-related heavy industrial production. By the late 1930s, the revolution also drew upward from the new working class a politically dependent, hothouse technical elite--what Stalin called "a
new Soviet intelligentsia, firmly linked with the people and ready en masse to give it true and faithful service." This was the Brezhnev generation, for which the Great Purges cleared the way.

Intellectually, these institutions and personnel were motivated and tempered by an ideology of political combat and the exaggeration of internal and external threats. This mobilized energies when pecuniary rewards were lacking, justified repression, and legitimated the priority of resource allocations for the military-industrial complex. According to the definitive study of the enlistment of workers in the campaign to collectivize agriculture:

The recruitment drive took place within the context of the First Five-Year Plan mobilization atmosphere. The Stalin leadership manipulated and played upon popular fear of military intervention and memories of civil war famine, rekindled by the 1927 war scare and the grain crisis of the late 1920s. The dominant motifs of the First Five-Year Plan revolution were military and the imagery was that of the Russian civil war. The working class was called upon to sacrifice for the good of the cause and the preservation of the nation. The state sought to deflect working class grievances away from systemic problems and toward the 'external' and the 'internal' enemies--that is, the 'kulak,' the 'bourgeois' specialist, the Nepmen, and the political opposition [inside the Party] all said to be in league with the agents of international imperialism.

Though this paranoid, pressure-cooker atmosphere was largely generated from above by Stalin and his allies, recent studies have stressed that it was readily internalized and exploited by the upwardly mobile militants that were Stalin's shock troops. During the collectivization campaign and the later purges, these young radicals exaggerated the threat of foreign subversion to push
campaigns to extremes and to sweep away the older bureaucratic elite that was blocking their path to social advancement.\textsuperscript{17}

Stalinist Atavisms and the Politics of Expansion

These institutions and ideas lived on as atavisms after the period of rapid social mobilization that had created them. As early as the late 1940s, the institutional instruments of mobilization were turning into tools for justifying the interests of these Stalinist institutions. The role of orthodox ideology in shaping society, the priority of allocation of resources to the military-industrial complex, and petty interference by party bureaucrats in day-to-day economic administration now functioned more to justify their own continuation than to serve the needs of development.

Foreign policy ideas played an important role in rationalizing and reconciling group interests. By the 1950s, four schools of thought in Soviet grand strategy had emerged: one supported by the military-industrial complex, a second by party militants, a third by the intelligentsia. The fourth, offensive detente, resulted from the efforts of political entrepreneurs like Khru- shchev and Brezhnev to form coalitions among the other three. For the sake of analytical convenience, these outlooks can be divided along two dimensions: first, whether imperialism's hostility toward socialism is conditional or unconditional upon Soviet actions, and second, whether offense is the best defense in international politics. (See Figure 1.)
Molotov: Western Hostility is Unconditional and the Defense Has the Advantage. Vyacheslav Molotov, one of Stalin's henchmen, argued that Soviet efforts to relax tensions with the West would not reduce the imperialists' hostility, but would only reduce vigilance within the socialist camp. However, he saw very few opportunities to exploit imperialist vulnerabilities through offensive action, for example arguing against Khrushchev that the Third World and Yugoslavia were inextricably tied to the opposing camp. Attempts to woo them by reforming Russia's Stalinist image would only lead to unrest in Eastern Europe, he accurately predicted. Consequently, the Soviet Union should adopt a hedgehog strategy of autarky, internal repression, and the forced-draft development of Russia's military-industrial base.18

The constituencies for this outlook were, first, the old Stalinist henchmen like Molotov himself, and second, the military-industrial complex. Stalinists like Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, weaned on Stalin's strategy of "socialism in one country," saw a militant defense as the best way to secure the revolution. As Stalin put it in 1923, "of course, the Fascists are not asleep. But it is to our advantage to let them attack first; that will rally the working class around the communists."19 Since Molotov's prestige and legitimacy hinged on being Stalin's chief lieutenant, especially in foreign affairs, his interests as well as his habits were served by being the guardian of orthodoxy.

A more enduring constituency for this hedgehog strategy lay among the military-industrial interests. When Khrushchev moved to
limit military spending and simultaneously to provoke foreign conflicts, for example, a powerful leader of the opposition was Frol Kozlov, whose political base was rooted in Leningrad's military-oriented economy. In Kozlov's view, which became so prominent in the Brezhnev era, the methodical development of Soviet military strength was the prerequisite for successful dealings with the West.

Zhdanov: Western Hostility is Unconditional and Offense Has the Advantage. Party Secretary Andrei Zhdanov represented a different brand of militancy. Like Molotov, he believed that Soviet concessions would not diminish the aggressiveness of the West, but he was distinctive in arguing that a political offensive was the best defense against imperialism's hostile onslaught. As part of his militant Cominform strategy, for example, Zhdanov promoted the use of violent strikes by Western Communist parties as a means to prevent the implementation of the Marshall Plan, which Zhdanov saw as the groundwork for an American policy of rollback of Communism in Eastern Europe.
The constituency for the Zhdanovite strategy was the party bureaucracy and its orthodox ideologues, who needed a strategic ideology to use as a weapon in struggles against a competing faction led by Malenkov. As early as 1941, Malenkov was attempting to promote the professional interests of the new technical elite against meddling party bureaucrats. He decried the "know-nothings" and "windbags" in the party bureaucracy who exercise "petty tutelage" over industrial experts, reject sound technical advice, and spout empty quotations about "putting the pressure on." The war greatly increased the autonomy of technical experts, so by 1945 Stalin needed to redress the institutional balance of power and turned to Zhdanov to promote a "party revival."

Zhdanov used foreign policy ideas as a weapon in this domestic political struggle. He inflated the threat of ideological subversion from abroad in order to justify the priority of ideological orthodoxy at home. He argued for the thorough communization of Eastern Europe, including East Germany, relying heavily on the mobilizing skills of the party to carry it out. And he emphasized the strategic value of Communist fifth columns in the West.

Upon Zhdanov's death in 1948, the heir to his strategy and position in the Central Committee Secretariat was Mikhail Suslov, who defended the Zhdanov line against Malenkov's criticism that it had served only to unify and militarize the West. Until Suslov's own death in 1982, he served as the proponent of militant
and ideologically orthodox means for promoting progressive change abroad and as the enforcer of the party's corporate interests in the domestic coalition-making process.  

Malenkov: Western Hostility is Conditional and the Defense Has the Advantage. Georgi Malenkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, in contrast, believed that Western aggressiveness could be diminished by Soviet self-restraint, and that defensive advantages dominated the international system. Malenkov's view dovetailed with the arguments of Eugene Varga, who contended that institutional changes in the American state during World War II had made it a stronger but less aggressive international competitor, more able to control the heedlessly aggressive impulses of the monopoly capitalists.  

Malenkov argued that the imperialists had become realistic and sane enough to be deterred by a minimum atomic force, so that defense budgets could be safely cut and the heavy-industry priority reversed. Moreover, he argued, Soviet political concessions in Europe would split the West, defuse its aggressiveness, and revive the close Soviet-German relations that had existed in the 1920s. There is evidence that Malenkov warned on similar grounds against invading South Korea.  

Malenkov sought a constituency for these views among the urban middle class and the cultural and technical intelligentsia. The charges leveled by Zhdanovite inquisitors against Varga's book read like a sociological profile of Malenkov's would-be constituency: "technical" and "apolitical," suffering from "em-
piricism," "bourgeois objectivism," and a "non-party" outlook. Malenkov's conception that the foreign threat is manageable through concessions served the interests of the intelligentsia by removing the major justification for oppressive petty tutelage over them by party ideologues and bureaucrats, for the economic priorities that enriched the military at the expense of their living standard, and for a renewal of the purges. Malenkov's strategy failed, however, because the class that Malenkov hoped to recruit was subject to counter-pressures: many worked in the military-industrial complex, and many had benefited from Stalin's "Big Deal", receiving some of the minimal trappings of petty bourgeois status and life-style in exchange for absolute political loyalty to the orthodox regime. Even a decade later, Kosygin still found that this stratum constituted an inadequate social base for a similar strategic ideology.

Khrushchev and Brezhnev: Western Hostility is Conditional and Offense Has the Advantage (Offensive Detente). Khrushchev and Brezhnev shared the Malenkov-Varga thesis that "realists" in the West made possible a relaxation of international tension, but they coupled this with a belief in offensive advantage in international politics. Imperialism could behave in a heedlessly aggressive manner, they believed, but prudent forces within the capitalist camp, especially the bourgeois state and public opinion, could restrain the most reckless of the monopoly capitalists. The influence of such realists could be strengthened by Soviet policy in two ways: first, Soviet efforts to shift the world correlation
of forces, including the military balance, to the advantage of socialism, would cause Western realists increasingly to shun the dangers of direct confrontation; second, Soviet projection of an image of restraint in the methods by which it pursues its expansionist goals would lull the West. These two elements would reinforce each other, according to Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The increased strength of the socialist camp would leave imperialism little choice but to accept detente on terms favorable to socialism. Detente in turn would weaken imperialism by hindering its counterrevolutionary interventions in the Third World. The success of the strategy depends, in their view, on active measures to improve the Soviet position at the expense of the West, not simply the passive acceptance of a stalemate or balance. As Khrushchev put it: "Peace cannot be begged for. It can be safeguarded only by an active purposeful struggle."

In promoting this conception, Khrushchev and Brezhnev were acting as political entrepreneurs, cementing a broad political coalition with a strategic ideology that promised something for everyone: progressive change for Suslov and the ideologues; military modernization and enhanced national security for the military-industrial constituencies; detente and increased foreign trade for the cultural and technical intelligentsia. The problem was that this political formula worked at home but not abroad. In practice, it led to overcommitted, contradictory policies that provoked the hostility of the West, revealing (as Gorbachev put it) that its strategic vision was "a world of illusions."
This process played itself out somewhat differently under the two leaders, reflecting the different political uses to which Khrushchev and Brezhnev put the strategy of offensive detente. To both Brezhnev and, in his early period, Khrushchev, offensive detente was a strategic ideology that served to legitimate the outcome of political logrolling. But in the period between 1958 and 1962, Khrushchev tried to use offensive detente as a tool to escape the constraints of his logrolled coalition, provoking the worst of the cold war crises as a consequence.

Khrushchev's version of the strategy of offensive detente relied on nuclear technology, especially the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which was to serve as a cheap cure-all. Khrushchev believed it would change the correlation of forces and lead to detente with the West, a favorable political settlement in Europe, low cost security, and the freeing of resources for a rise in Soviet living standards. Such arguments were an attractive element in Khrushchev's political platform during the succession struggle. They had the further advantage that they could not fully be tested until the ICBM was actually produced. By 1958, Khrushchev had his ICBM and was eager to move on to the next phase of his domestic game plan, in which he would cap military expenditures and increase investment in chemicals and other sectors that would benefit agricultural and consumer production. However, the West refused to play its part. Instead of becoming more "realistic," the Americans rejected pleas for a summit, refused to
move toward recognition of the German Democratic Republic, and seemed headed toward the nuclearization of the Bundeswehr. 39

Khrushchev sought to push on with his budgetary reversal of priorities despite this, but several Politburo members balked. "Until the aggressive circles of the imperialist powers reject the policy of the arms race and preparations for a new war, we must still further strengthen the defenses of our country," said Suslov. This had been "the general line of our party ... in the period 1954-1957," and implicitly it had been Khrushchev's own personal pledge during the succession struggle. Thus, Suslov called on Khrushchev to "honestly fulfill [the Party's] duties and promises before the Soviet people." 40 The Berlin crisis offered Khrushchev a way out of this impasse. Using it as a lever to gain a summit, the recognition of the German Democratic Republic, and progress on the test ban, Khrushchev hoped to demonstrate that the correlation of forces had already changed enough to achieve detente on favorable terms, allowing radical cuts in conventional forces and a leveling off of nuclear expenditures. 41

This attempt to use offensive detente to escape from the constraints of political promises helped put Khrushchev on the slippery slope that led to his replacement in 1964 by the team of Brezhnev and Kosygin. Brezhnev learned from this that offensive detente could not be used to escape the strictures of coalition politics, but he did not learn that offensive detente was an inherently self-defeating policy. Indeed, the story of his own coalition-building strategy suggests that he thought that the
distribution of political power in the 1960s still made offensive detente an indispensable tool in domestic politics.\textsuperscript{42}

At first, Brezhnev maneuvered to create a coalition on the moderate left. He attracted ideologues and the moderate military with a foreign policy stressing support for "progressive" Third World states, notably the Arabs, and a military policy that emphasized a huge conventional buildup, while opening the door to nuclear arms control. This isolated Kosygin and Podgorny on the right, who were vulnerable because of their insistence on reduced defense spending, and Shelepin on the extreme left, who apparently hoped to use a platform of even more reckless Third World adventures and flat-out nuclear arms racing to attract a heterogeneous coalition of the military, radical ideologues, and Great Russian chauvinists.\textsuperscript{43} But soon a flaw appeared in Brezhnev's policy of moderate appeasement of the cartels of the left. The strategy was extremely expensive, making him vulnerable to Kosygin's charge that it was wrecking the economy and scuttling indispensable reforms.

To counter this charge, Brezhnev developed a revised version of the "correlation of forces" theory and the strategy of offensive detente. The improved military balance and the liberation of progressive forces in the Third World would encourage realism in the West, leading to detente, arms control, and technology transfers that would solve the Soviet Union's economic problems without Kosygin's structural reforms. The memoirs of defector Arkady Shevchenko show graphically how these pie-in-the-sky
arguments were crafted to appeal to the delegates to the 1971 Party Congress, which ratified the strategy and for the first time gave Brezhnev a commanding political advantage over his rivals. Despite this political victory, Brezhnev was nonetheless stuck with a strategy that was overcommitted and expensive. Through the mid-1970s, he fought a running battle with Marshal Grechko and the military over the budgetary implications of detente in general and SALT in particular. Only after 1976, with Grechko's death and the installation of a civilian defense minister, did strategic force procurement flatten out and nuclear warfighting doctrines wane. The battle revived, however, as a result of the Reagan defense buildup, with Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov insisting that it would be a "serious error" not to increase military outlays. In the wake of the Polish crisis, however, the civilians were more worried about the danger of cutting social programs, and Ogarkov was fired.

Signs of growing skepticism about backing radical Third World regimes also began to surface in 1976, but could not proceed very far until Suslov's death in 1982. A year later, Andropov himself was stressing the need to limit the cost of Soviet counterinsurgency wars in support of pseudo-Marxist regimes, noting that "it is one thing to proclaim socialism, but another to build it."

Thus, through the failure of Brezhnev's strategy of offensive detente, some of the intellectual and political precursors to Gorbachev's new thinking were already in place.
Backdrop to Gorbachev's Revolution

In sum, Soviet expansionist behavior and strategic concepts have had their roots in the institutional and intellectual legacy of Stalin's revolution from above. Atavistic interests with a stake in military-industrial budget priorities and militant promotion of "progressive change" abroad have exploited the ideological baggage of Stalinism to legitimate the continuation of their dominant social role. When Malenkov tried to change this, pushing forward new ideas and a new social constituency, Stalin was quoted to justify his removal from office: "In face of capitalist encirclement ... 'to slacken the pace means to lag behind. And those who lag behind are beaten.'" 49 To gain power, an innovator like Khrushchev had to distort his policies to try to attract or outflank the atavistic interests and ideas, leading to contradictions and over-commitment at home and abroad.

Though foreign policy ideas tended to line up with the interests of groups and coalitions, this was not entirely the result of conscious manipulation. Sometimes conscious manipulation did occur, as in Stalin's trumped-up war scare of 1927. More often, it was probably semi-conscious, as in Brezhnev's packaging of the "correlation of forces" theory for the 1971 Congress. Sometimes it may have been the result of unconscious motivated bias. 50 Khrushchev reports spending several sleepless nights grappling with the implications of atomic weaponry, until it came to him that these fearful instruments would never be used, but
could nonetheless be of great political significance. The connection between ideas and interests was also sustained by the political selection process. Thus, Khrushchev and Brezhnev prevailed in the succession struggle in part because of their strategies of offensive detente, whether or not they adopted those strategies for consciously political reasons.

Though I have stressed the role of the domestic environment, I do not mean to argue that Soviet policy-making has been utterly oblivious to its international environment. Most episodes of Soviet belligerence or expansionism have had international triggers—like the Marshall Plan, the rearming of West Germany, the U-2 affair, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the post-Vietnam syndrome—that made the strategic arguments of some Soviet factions more plausible, some less plausible.

Moreover, the Soviet Union has typically been able to learn from negative feedback from its counterproductive aggressive policies, leading to at least tactical retreats. For example, the failure of the Berlin blockade and the West's reaction to the invasion of South Korea strengthened the hand of Malenkov and other leaders who wanted to reverse the confrontational Soviet policy. This differentiates the Soviet Union from Imperial Germany and Japan, which were so enmeshed in institutionally rooted strategic ideologies that policy failures produced not learning, but ever more reckless attempts to break out of their own self-encirclement. Though the Soviet Union pays more attention to the realities of its environment than they did,
objective conditions are nonetheless an insufficient explanation for even the milder Soviet case of self-encirclement. As Churchill asked in 1949, "why have they deliberately acted for three long years so as to unite the free world against them?" Insofar as the answer lies in the peculiar domestic institutional and intellectual inheritance from Stalin's revolution from above, a sharp break with that domestic order under Gorbachev should produce a radically different foreign policy.

EMERGENT INSTITUTIONS AND THINKING UNDER GORBACHEV

Just as the requirements of extensive development gave rise to the old institutions and ideas of the revolution from above, so too the requirements of intensive development are forcing their replacement by new institutions and ideas. Restructuring for intensive development in both the domestic and foreign areas is creating some new institutions and changing the relative power and interests of many old ones. The military-industrial complex, old-style ideologues, and autarkic industrial interests are in eclipse. Civilian defense intellectuals, reformist ideologues, and supporters of liberalized trade policies among the intelligentsia are gaining influence and trying to force changes that would institutionalize the policies they prefer. The emphasis on two-way security and the deepening of economic interdependence in Gorbachev's new foreign policy thinking grows directly from the
new domestic institutions he is promoting and the political constituencies that he is relying on.

Forces for Change

Four factors are impelling the Gorbachev reforms: the objective requirements of the stage of intensive development, the discrediting of old institutions, the gradual strengthening of the constituency for change as a result of natural processes of modernization, and ironically, the Stalinist legacy of centralized institutions suited to the task of social transformation from above.

First, there is the objective need for restructuring for the tasks of intensive development. As Western experts have argued for a long time, the success of a mature post-industrial economy depends on efficient resource allocation and sensitivity to user demand. These require decentralized price formation, competition among suppliers, and profit-oriented success criteria. Gorbachev's economic reforms, some of them already enacted into law, seem to be heading precisely in this direction, though how far they will go remains in doubt.

Second, these objective needs have become increasingly and widely recognized, as the policy failures of the late Brezhnev period have discredited most of the key Stalinist institutions--the administrators of the centralized economy, the militant "combat party," and the military-industrial complex. Economic stagnation, in particular, has led to the widespread conviction
that the old institutions and the ideas that legitimated them have become fetters on production, atavistic organs surviving only to their own benefit. *Pravda* commentators explain that "individual and group egoism" on the part of "bureaucratic and technocratic elements who were guided solely by their immediate interests" lead to "stagnation" in the period after the "October 1964 plenum." Likewise, Suslov-style ideologues are now called "Old Believers"--the term for proponents of an especially archaic version of Russian Orthodox Christianity--who promote a dogma that "smacks of romanticism. They carry on about dangers, they issue warnings, and they admonish against overdoing things [i.e., overdoing the reforms]. Essentially what they are defending is not even centralism, but centralism's vehicle--the bureaucratic administrative apparatus," but they "could be easily swept aside by a mass movement of the working people based on the will of the Party leadership."58

This kind of criticism has also been extended into the realm of foreign and security policy. Many Soviet political leaders and scholars have implicitly criticized the Brezhnev era's overoptimism about new Marxist-Leninist regimes in Third World. Recently, a Soviet commentator has explicitly criticized the logical contradictions and willful optimism among the orthodox ideologues, like many of those coordinating Third World policy in Brezhnev's Central Committee International Department. Similarly, in the foreign trade area, the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences was fired after warning that an "import plague" was
stifling the development of homegrown technology and thus jeopardizing national security, and his research institutes were charged with nepotism and failure to promote productive young scientists.61

In the wake of the German Cessna landing in Red Square, the military has come in for even more fundamental rebukes. Boris Yeltsin, candidate Politburo member and then Moscow party secretary, told officers of the Moscow Military District that they manifest a "bourgeois mentality," acting "as though they are apart from society." "Rudeness, boorishness, and intimidation," widespread within the officer corps, "give rise to toadies, bootlickers, sycophants, and window-dressers .... An atmosphere of smugness, boasting, and complacency emerged everywhere. This atmosphere deprives active people of initiative and the ability to assert a correct viewpoint" and encourages a "style that blunts the cutting edge of the idea of the motherland's security."62 In short, the prevailing diagnosis blames all of the encrusted Stalinist institutions, with the partial exception of the KGB:63 the orthodox combat party, the "administrative-voluntarist methods" of the command economy, the military-industrial complex, autarkic industry.

A third factor promoting the emergence of the reforms is the strengthening of the constituency that naturally favors it, the cultural and technical intelligentsia. These urban, middle-class professionals have two strong motives to support a campaign for domestic restructuring: first, it will increase their profes-
sional autonomy from arbitrary bureaucratic interference, and second, it will increase their relative income. Inside the cocoon of the old system, the intelligentsia has been steadily growing in size and independence as a natural result of the gradual modernization of the economy and social structure. Between 1959 and 1979, the number of people with full higher education tripled, as did the number with secondary educations. Thus, there is now in place a precondition of restructuring for intensive development, much as the wartime destruction of the old urban classes and the rise of a new working class in the 1920s were preconditions of restructuring for extensive development.

To some extent, the intelligentsia may still be divided between those who want to keep the system that provides their sinecures and those who have professional and economic interests in changing the system so they can earn more and have more to buy. As a whole, however, the professional middle class is not only larger but also more politically alert than the Brezhnev generation, the cohort of Stalin's "Big Deal." For example, though some journalists have not succeeded in making the transition to glasnost', the many who have are sufficient for Gorbachev's purposes.

A fourth factor favoring the reforms is, ironically, a Stalinist legacy: the strong administrative powers available to the top leadership. This includes power over both personnel and the potent propaganda instruments of the Soviet system. Gorbachev can also call upon the traditional argument of the modernizing
Russian autocrat—either we reform or we will be unable "to bring the motherland into the twenty-first century as a mighty, prospering power." This "Russia-was-beaten" argument is one that Gorbachev has used very sparingly, however, perhaps to avoid some of the implications of its prior invocations. He does not want to play into the hands of those who might prefer a more traditional, authoritarian, militarized revolution from above, legitimated by trumpeting the foreign threat. He wants a reform that creates "workers who are computer literate, with a high degree of culture," free to show initiative.

In summary, the forces favoring radical change in domestic institutions and ideas are objective economic needs plus the clout of a strengthened professional class and an already strong reforming leadership. One prominent reformer puts it this way:

Who does want changes? It's the far-sighted political leaders and management personnel and the outstanding people in science and the cultural sphere. They understand that in the twenty-first century the present variant of development will be dangerous for the country. Further, it's the leading contingent of the working class and of collective farmers, engineers and technicians who are striving to improve their lives and who want to earn more, but to earn it by their own labor, without any finagling. And it is the segment of the intelligentsia that is interested in scientific and technical progress.

Domestic Restructuring

Intensive development requires central authorities and the grassroots to gain in power, while mid-level bureaucrats must lose it. The power relationships in Soviet society must thus be reshaped from an inverted pyramid into an hour-glass configuration. These requirements in practice call for some marketization
of the economy, democratization of decisionmaking at the local level, a less inhibited press, and a curtailment of the role of local party organs ... in economic administration. These changes are needed both to break resistance to reform and to improve economic efficiency once the reforms are underway.

In terms of the institutional structure of power, Gorbachev's problem is to devise a system that will make an end run around the recalcitrant mid-level "transmission belts" of the Stalinist system—the government ministries and the regional party prefects, so-called because their whole raison d'etre is to pass along information and orders in a command economy. Transforming Stalin's pyramid of power into an hourglass configuration means that, at the bottom of the hourglass, increased responsibility devolves onto the local level, through partial marketization and democratization. At the top, the power of the central authorities to set overall policy is being strengthened. Reformist economists like Abel Aganbegyan are taking over direction of the "commanding heights" of the economy from the old-style central planners. They rely increasingly on the manipulation of "economic levers" rather than on administrative directives. Similarly, reforming ideologues like Aleksandr Yakovlev are using centralized agitation and propaganda institutions to mobilize and guide the newly empowered locals.

Gorbachev is not trying to build his constituency by collecting a winning coalition from pieces that are already on the board, as Brezhnev did. This would be a losing game for Gorbachev, as
most existing organized interests stand to lose from the changes. Instead, like Stalin, Gorbachev is trying to empower new constituencies, working through new institutions and transforming old ones. Thus, in the economic sphere, Gorbachev promotes private or cooperative entrepreneurial ventures, increases in the service sector of the economy at the expense of blue collar jobs, the closing of unprofitable factories, and increased wage differentials. Within the party itself, Gorbachev and Yeltsin call for a prime party task to be the training of new cadres with a liberal education and big-picture outlook, instead of petty tutelage over the economy. More broadly, by increasing press and artistic freedom, Gorbachev hands power to the intelligentsia, who can for the most part be counted on to use it against his opponents. Gorbachev's campaign for economic reform was getting nowhere until he unleashed the journalists to denounce the self-interested conservatism of his opponents and to expose their corruption. Thus, glasnost' is desired as an end in itself by the creative intelligentsia, but for Gorbachev it is a sledgehammer to smash the opposition "by force of public pressure."74

Restructuring Foreign Policy

In foreign and security policy, the old institutions and ideas of extensive development favored military-industrial spending, autarky, tension with the West, and militant support for progressive change abroad. Intensive development, in contrast, favors a deeper participation in the international division of
labor, less costly military and Third World policies, and consequently a policy line that avoids upsetting stable relations with the West. Oleg Bogomolov, the prominent director of the institute that studies the socialist bloc's economy, puts it this way:

Previously we reasoned: the worse for the adversary, the better for us, and vice versa. But today this is no longer true; this cannot be a rule anymore. Now countries are so interdependent on each other for their development that we have quite a different image of the solution to international questions. The worsening of the situation in Europe will not at all help the development of the socialist part of Europe; on the contrary, the better things are going in the European world economy, the higher the stability and the better the prospects for our development.75

The changes in foreign policy are being caused both by the needs of a reformed economy and by the interests of Gorbachev's main political constituency, the intelligentsia.

In the international economic sphere, the reformers argue that the Soviet Union must make the transition from primary-product exports to a new pattern of "intensive foreign trade," featuring machine exports and schemes for joint production with foreign firms.76 The reformers recognize that this will require greater independence for individual firms to conclude profitable deals on their own initiative. Preliminary reforms along these lines have already been implemented.77

Such reforms create the danger, however, that "the 'monopoly' of the Ministry of Foreign Trade could give way ... to a 'monopoly' of many ministries which have gained the right to foreign economic activity."78 Unless domestic prices are pegged to world levels, traders will have an incentive to extract rents by exploiting arbitrary price discrepancies, instead of making
profits by creating real value. An even more radical solution to this problem, advocated by some prominent Soviet economists and intellectuals, would be convertibility of the ruble into hard currency at market rates. This would allow "more flexible involvement in trade on the world market" and would create "a yardstick with which to measure the effects of restructuring" of the domestic economy. Thus, the push for more intensive international trade, which the West could encourage, may give added impetus to domestic structural changes that Gorbachev says he wants anyway.

In the military sphere, radical changes in Soviet nuclear and conventional postures are taking a place on Gorbachev's agenda, largely because the military is no longer the powerful political participant in the Soviet ruling coalition that it was under Brezhnev. Gorbachev has promoted minions, not independently powerful allies, to oversee the military, and has created a civilian defense think-tank to provide him with alternative strategic analysis. This has allowed him to seek structural changes in Soviet military posture that would stabilize the military competition and reduce its economic burden in a permanent way. The most notable, which I will discuss in more detail later, is a change of Warsaw Pact conventional forces from an offensive to a defensive configuration. If institutionalized, this would of course be less easily reversible than a mere policy change.

The taming of the military creates the possibility for the change from conventional offense to defense, and Western responses
could forward implementation of this change, but there is nothing in Gorbachev's reformed system that absolutely demands it. In the long run, the large-scale production of high-technology, offensive military forces would not necessarily be incompatible with the logic of intensive development.

The logic of the reform and its constituency is also affecting Third World policy, though here its effects may be weaker and mixed. On one hand, some of Gorbachev's key supporters are reform-minded ideologues, like Alexander Yakovlev, who are basically internationalist in outlook. They would be loath to relinquish the idea of a global role for the Bolshevik party. The desire to participate more deeply in the world economy also favors a continued Soviet drive for international influence. On the other hand, the reformers are clearly sensitive to the economic and political costs of futile military involvements in extremely backward societies. Given this particular mix of constraints, it is natural that ideologues like Yakovlev and Karen Brutents have hit upon the promotion of Soviet political and economic relationships with large, prospering Third World countries—the Mexicos and the Argentinas—as the new, relatively benign incarnation of Soviet progressive internationalism.81

Emerging Security Concepts and Implications for the Future

Gorbachev and his allies have propounded strategic concepts that facilitate their own domestic program, just as leaders of the old Stalinist institutions rationalized their interests in terms
of images of the adversary and assumptions about the relative advantages of offense and defense. Because the military-industrial complex, the orthodox ideologues, and autarkic interests are in eclipse, images of unappeasable opponents and offensive advantage are also in eclipse. Because the power of the intelligentsia is increasing, its ideas are on the rise. Like Malenkov, the Gorbachev reformers see a world in which the defense has the advantage and aggressive opponents can be demobilized by Soviet concessions and self-restraint. This similarity in strategic ideology is rooted in the rough similarity of their domestic goals and their domestic political constituencies.

However, because some of the domestic incentives for Gorbachev's new thinking may be ephemeral, some aspects of the new thinking might not survive unless they are institutionalized, for example, in arms control agreements. Offense-oriented, as well as defense-oriented, lower-budget, higher-technology strategies would be consistent with economic reform. At present, attacking the old, offensive military policies may give Gorbachev added arguments to use against holdovers from Brezhnev's top brass, but this is a transitory incentive. In such conditions, where the domestic base for desirable new defense-oriented strategies ideas is tenuous, American diplomacy might play a role in institutionalizing such strategies and promoting their domestic base.

Image of the Adversary. Gorbachev and his circle see America as innately hostile, but they believe that America's aggressiveness can be defused through Soviet self-restraint and concessions.
Initially, some western Sovietologists feared that Gorbachev's foreign policy would come to be dominated by the ideas of Alexander Yakovlev, whom they saw as an inveterate America-hater. The author of several monographs excoriating America's messianic imperialism, Yakovlev has portrayed America as aggressive, but declining, eventually to be abandoned by other capitalist powers more amenable to detente:

The distancing of Western Europe, Japan, and other capitalist countries from U.S. strategic military plans in the near future is neither an excessively rash fantasy nor a nebulous prospect. It is dictated by objective factors having to do with the rational guaranteeing of all their political and economic interests, including security. ... As time goes by, we will witness the establishment of new centers of strength [and potential Soviet trading partners] such as Brazil, Canada, and Australia, not to mention China.82

Yakovlev admits, however, that America is far from collapsing and that splitting NATO through a separate detente with Europe is not a feasible prospect in the short run.83

Others in Gorbachev's circle, like journalist Alexander Bovin, go much further in portraying a more united, but tamer imperialism. Bovin argues that in response to the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, the capitalist powers have agreed to regulate their economic competition internationally in much the same way that the bourgeois state regulates capitalism domestically. "A new transnational model of imperialism is being created before our eyes," says Bovin.84 Thus, he extends Varga's analysis one step further, implying that a major engine of imperialist aggressiveness, the inability of the monopolies and capitalist states to act in their own long-run enlightened self-interest, is coming under
rational control. This is the old Kautskyite heresy of cooperative "ultraimperialism," which Lenin railed against because he realized that it cut to the core of his theory of the sources of aggressive imperialist behavior.\(^85\)

More important than the degree of imperialism's aggressiveness, however, is the question of how that aggressiveness can be reduced. Yakovlev believes that a crucial link in American aggressiveness is the ability of "the colossal, all-penetrating and all powerful propaganda machine" to whip up a "jingoistic fever" among the masses.\(^86\) The way to counteract this, he argues, is through effective, substantive Soviet peace proposals, which constrain even the worst cold warriors to reciprocate in order to save face with their own public.\(^87\) This way of looking at the problem not only gives pride of place to Yakovlev's personal skills as a propagandist, but it also reflects Yakovlev's previous experiences, battling jingoistic Russian nationalists for control of the press in the early 1970s.\(^88\) In this way, Yakovlev has developed a view of imperialism that reconciles the interests and outlook of reformist ideologue-activists, like himself, with those of Gorbachev's broader constituency in the intelligentsia, exemplified by Bovin.

Gorbachev has adopted this strategy as his own, explaining it this way to *Time* magazine:

If all that we are doing is indeed viewed as mere propaganda, why not respond to it according to the principle of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth"? We have stopped nuclear explosions. Then you Americans could take revenge by doing likewise. You could deal us yet another propaganda blow, say, by suspending the development of one of your new
strategic missiles. And we would respond with the same kind of "propaganda." And so on and so forth. Would anyone be harmed by competition in such "propaganda"? Of course, it could not be a substitute for a comprehensive arms-limitation agreement, but it would be a significant step leading to such an agreement. 89

Complementing this notion that convincing arms control proposals demobilize Western aggressiveness is its converse: that Soviet geopolitical misbehavior provokes the West and plays into the hands of cold war propagandists. Thus, "some comrades," including some of Gorbachev's closest foreign policy advisers, have been brave enough to argue that "rash" Soviet actions in Afghanistan "provoked" the anti-Soviet turn in American foreign policy. 90

Of course, even Khrushchev understood that superficial concessions could demobilize the West, buying time and preparing the ground for a strategy of offensive detente. But the articulation of the correlation of forces theory by Khrushchev and Brezhnev clearly signaled the intentions from the outset of their detente diplomacy. There is nothing analogous to the correlation of forces theory in Gorbachev's strategic arguments. On the contrary, he insists that this kind of one-way approach to security constitutes a "world of illusions."

**Offense and Defense in Military Strategy.** The most significant aspect of Gorbachev's new thinking is his explicit understanding of the security dilemma: that security must be mutual to be stable, and that offensive means to security undermine this goal. 91 Consistent with this, Gorbachev and his circle have spoken out against nuclear counterforce and conventional
offense. Measures must be taken, he says, to "rule out the possibility of surprise attack. The most dangerous types of offensive arms must be removed from the zone of contact." The elimination of the military from the Soviet ruling coalition was a prerequisite to this intellectual revolution.

At the nuclear level, Yakovlev and others have argued that America cannot succeed in overturning the deterrent stalemate, which is objectively quite stable. Bovin agrees "theoretically" with an Izvestiia reader who writes that "the USSR can deter the United States with a considerably lower quantity of strategic weapons. Parity is not mandatory" for deterrence, so the Soviets should move for a propaganda coup by making unilateral cuts. Likewise, Bovin notes that "the building and deployment of hundreds of new [SS-20] missiles must have cost a huge amount of money. And if we agree to destroy these missiles: Why then were they built?"

Increasingly, Soviet civilian defense intellectuals are writing about the "de-stabilizing" nature of "counterforce concepts," which might "make easier, especially in a situation of sharp crisis, the taking of a suicidal decision to begin an aggression." Perhaps one reason for their concern is that the Soviet military continues to think in terms that, at best, blur the distinctions between nuclear preemption, launch on warning, and retaliation. Invoking the kind of formula that has traditionally been a euphemism for preemption, Marshal Akhромеев says that "combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces is being constantly
enhanced which allows [them] to prevent a possible enemy aggression at any time and in any conditions, and also to deliver a crushing retaliatory blow should war be unleashed by the enemy anyway.”

Some Western critics have pointed out, however, that Soviet "new thinking" in the nuclear area may not be to the advantage of the West. The agreement to scrap the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) capabilities of both sides, for example, still leaves Western Europe under the shadow of the Red Army's formidable conventional offensive force posture. But Gorbachev has made important overtures in that area as well. The official Warsaw Pact position is that both sides should "reduce their forces to equal and minimum levels that will exclude waging any offensive operations against each other, so that the reductions will bring about such forces on both sides that will be sufficient only for defense." Civilian journals in the Soviet Union have endorsed West European proposals to eliminate "highly mobile tank units" and "strike aircraft" in order to achieve the "goal of reorganizing the armed forces of the sides, such that defensive actions would be guaranteed greater success than offensive operations.”

The new defense-oriented thinking on conventional strategy seems to be taking on an operational cast. For some time, articles discussing the advantages of large-scale defensive conventional operations have been appearing in military journals, though articles on conventional offense still predominate.

Colonel-General M.A. Gareev, deputy chief of the General Staff,
has said that one of the "main tenets of the military-technical aspect of military doctrine" is its "profoundly defensive direction." This represents a distinct break from the traditional position, which held that, while the "socio-political" character of Soviet military doctrine was defensive, its military-technical aspect stressed the operational benefits of the offensive. Military officers warn, however, that defensive operations must not be passive. Rather, they should lead to a vigorous counteroffensive. The Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff insists, consequently, that a defensive strategic stance requires no restructuring of Soviet forces. This, of course, is in direct contradiction to Gorbachev's call for changes in force posture. 101

Such heel-dragging suggests that Gorbachev could not have proceeded as far as he has with the articulation of a non-offensive military doctrine without the curtailment of the military as a significant factor in the Soviet ruling coalition. Circumstantial evidence suggests that a major cause of the increased role of the conventional offensive in Soviet strategy in the 1960s and 1970s was the increased political clout of the military under Brezhnev. Now that political conditions have changed, the strategy can change also.

It has been suggested that the rise of the Soviet "conventional option" stemmed from a rational desire to prevent nuclear escalation should war occur, and that this made sense as a reaction to NATO's shift from massive retaliation to a strategy of flexible response. 102 In fact, the conventional option makes no
sense as a strategy for preventing escalation or as reaction to flexible response, since the decisive conventional offensive that it envisions would create precisely the conditions that would trigger nuclear escalation by NATO. Oddly enough, Soviet doctrinal discussions of the mid-1960s, when the conventional option emerged, seem to recognize this. They portray flexible response largely as a cover for a nuclear warfighting strategy and anticipate that the collapse of NATO's front would almost surely trigger nuclear use. The most that can be said is that the Soviets' offensive conventional option is, on a superficial level, less obviously mismatched with flexible response than with NATO's massive retaliation strategy, which had preceded it.

The rise of the offensive conventional option appears to have had more to do with military organizational interests and civil-military relations than with rational strategy. In the middle and late 1950s, the Soviet military justified large conventional forces as necessary to press home the victory after an initial nuclear exchange. Many troops would die, so many were needed if enough were to survive. Khrushchev, however, argued that nuclear weapons alone would be decisive, and that lean conventional forces were best suited for exploiting the effects of nuclear strikes. When Khrushchev renewed his pressure for ever deeper troop cuts in 1963-64, the military needed a new, more attractive argument for sizeable conventional forces. Thus, although the conventional offense was weak on strategic logic, it was strong on political logic. It suited the military's needs, because carrying out the
conventional offensive would be such a demanding task that huge expenditures would be required.\textsuperscript{105} It was attractive to the political leadership, because it gave them the illusion of retaining civilian control over the escalation process. Finally, it provided common ground for Brezhnev's tacit deal with Marshal Grechko: Brezhnev would name Grechko, not the civilian Ustinov, to the vacant post of Defense Minister; Grechko would also get his conventional buildup and nuclear counterforce programs. In return, Grechko would endorse Brezhnev's claim to be the "supreme commander in chief" and cooperate with Brezhnev in heading off an expensive ABM (anti-ballistic missile) race. According to Sovietological reconstructions, an arrangement roughly along these lines jelled around the time of the December 1966 plenum and an extraordinary Defense Council meeting in April 1967.\textsuperscript{106}

In short, now that domestic political conditions have changed, the civilians have no reason to remain bound to a costly and destabilizing conventional military strategy, which Ned Lebow has aptly labeled "the Schlieffen Plan revisited."\textsuperscript{107} However, Colonel General N.F. Chervov, of the General Staff's arms control directorate, has warned that "one should not expect unilateral steps on the part of the Warsaw Pact. The NATO countries must take practical steps to meet the Warsaw Pact halfway."\textsuperscript{108} Indeed, it is not entirely clear that the civilians care as much about actually implementing a new defensive conventional doctrine as they do about announcing it. Vladimir Petrovskii, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, may have revealed more than he
intended in saying that "already the very fact of the proclamation of the doctrine is having a salutary effect on the climate and situation in the world." Thus, the West should respond to the Soviets' call for an experts' conference on the restructuring of conventional doctrines as a way of institutionalizing a trend that otherwise might slip away.

**Offense and Defense in Geopolitical Strategy.** To some extent, the new thinking about offense and defense also appears in a geopolitical context. Gone are Suslov, Boris Ponomarev, and the other old-style ideologues who were associated over the years with the Comintern, the Cominform, and more recently the International Department of the Central Committee. Gone, too, is the bandwagon imagery of their "correlation of forces" theory. Progressive change in the Third World is now universally portrayed as slow, reversible, and problematic. Gorbachev is prone to admonish visiting dignitaries from backward client states that "no country is secure against the desire of its vanguard to skip over unavoidable stages."

Military conquest, even of backward states, is seen as difficult. This new view seems to be held even by military officers, suggesting that it may simply reflect learning rather than institutional change. In Grechko's time, the military had been a major enthusiast for Third World involvement and later reportedly favored the intervention in Afghanistan. But this recent Yugoslav interview with Marshal Kulikov, the Warsaw Pact
commander, demonstrates a new ambivalence about the use of force. 114

Q: If a country lacks an operative army as big as, for instance, the Warsaw Pact or NATO, but possesses an armed people willing to fight and a wide concept of defense, can such a country be defeated?

Kulikov: Which country?

Q: Any country.

Kulikov: A victory may be attained. Indeed only for a time, for it is something else to rule such a country. World public opinion, other factors, all that is present. It is very difficult to defeat a people determined to defend itself.

Asked specifically about Afghanistan, Kulikov remarks that it is difficult to generalize lessons from it: "I tell you that war in Afghanistan is very strange."

Other Soviet officials, however, have been more willing to generalize. Noting that the Soviet Union has backed whichever side was on the defensive in the Iran-Iraq war in order to prevent the conquest of either, a Soviet U.N. delegate went on to claim that on principle the Soviet Union "does not support materially or in any other form the party that is on the offensive, and I think this is of some importance." 115

Some caveats should be mentioned about the geopolitical aspects of the new thinking. First, even under Brezhnev, the line was that Soviet military power was used to "defend the gains of socialism," as in Ethiopia and Afghanistan, not to export revolution through military offensives. For example, the Soviets refused to allow the Ethiopians to roll Soviet-supplied tanks across the border into Somalia. Second, a number of instances of
increased aggressiveness of Soviet Third World behavior might be noted under Gorbachev. Perhaps the most important was the stepped-up cross-border bombardment of Pakistan during the Afghan war.

Alternate Trajectories of Change

In the preceding sections I have been discussing logical developments of institutions, policies, and ideas, given the assumption that Gorbachev will enjoy a significant degree of success in implementing his domestic reforms. Structural changes have made this a possibility, and the decisions of the June 1987 plenum, which ratified an ambitious economic reform plan and promoted three Gorbachev allies to the Politburo, make it even more likely. Nonetheless, other scenarios deserve mention, especially insofar as the international environment might have some effect on their likelihood.

One cause of concern stems from the character of some of Gorbachev's closest allies. Yakovlev is essentially an ideologue and a propagandist. Though he seems to have devised a stunning formula for modernizing those roles, there is still a danger that some of their traditional content will sneak back in--and if not for Yakovlev personally, then for his underlings or successors. Likewise, Lev Zaikov, the overseer of the defense industries, has his roots in Leningrad's high technology military sector. His orientation toward technological modernization makes him an appropriate backer for Gorbachev's restructuring, but it is hard
to forget the role played by previous Leningrad party chiefs--Frol Kozlov and Grigorii Romanov--in backing big defense budgets. It would not be difficult to imagine Zaikov aligning with modernizing elements in the military, like Marshal Ogarkov, who favor a more militarized version of the reforms. Some research suggests that there are circles in the military who favor economic restructuring, but not of the market-oriented kind. Instead, their notion may be to advance some of the more successful practices of the hierarchical defense sector as a model for the economy as a whole.120

Another source of danger lies at the periphery of the reform coalition. Yegor Ligachev, the second secretary of the party, has supported the general idea of reform, but has often voiced reservations about the pace and direction of change. In the arts, he calls for "vivid and profound images of Communists" to counterbalance what he sees as the excessively critical outpouring under glasnost'.121 In the foreign trade area, he warns about the excesses of the "'imported purchases' craze."122 Moreover, his arguments for detente and reform take on an offensive, Brezhnevian cast:

The restructuring is unbreakably linked with the USSR's vigorous peace-loving policy. On the one hand, its scope depends on the reliability of peace, on the stability of the international situation. On the other hand, the renewal imparts still greater dynamism and intensity to the foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state, strengthens the foundations for their struggle for peace.123

Thus, if Gorbachev's radical program runs into obstacles, Ligachev will be there to put his stamp on a scaled-down version that
retains many of the features of the Soviet domestic order and foreign policy under Brezhnev.

A final possibility is the least likely but the most worrisome. It is possible that Gorbachev may fail spectacularly, but only, after he has so stirred up the social and political system that returning to a Ligachev-type solution is impossible. In that case, a variety of nefarious actors might be able to enter the political process. For example, glasnost' has allowed the extreme Great Russian nationalists to emerge from the shadows and go so far as to compare the current liberal trends in Soviet culture to the German invasion of June 1941. In the past, Shelepin tried to tap this source of political energy, linking it to a heterogeneous would-be coalition that was to attract the KGB, the radical military, and Khrushchevite populists. He had almost no success with this project, but in a more wide-open political environment, an analogous coalition might form around a militarized, xenophobic version of the reforms.

Two factors might make these adverse trajectories more likely. One would be the discrediting of Gorbachev's version of the domestic reforms through dramatically poor economic performance. The second, interacting with the first, would be a hostile international environment, in which SDI was being deployed, Eastern Europe was asserting its autonomy, and Soviet clients were losing their counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan, Angola, and Ethiopia. This would discredit the international assumptions and
requirements of the Gorbachev-style reforms, and possibly promote a more militarized version.

ALTERNATE VIEWS OF GORBACHEV'S REFORMS

I have argued that Gorbachev appears to be aiming for a change in the Soviet Union's fundamental institutions. In the past, these institutions, many of them rooted in Stalin's revolution from above, supported militant expansionism and offensive, zero-sum approaches to security. They also promoted the offensive approach to detente taken by Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Gorbachev's new domestic coalition and institutional innovations are likely to call forth and sustain a new, less militant foreign policy. This is true both because the old institutions are being checked or swept away by reforms, and also because of the new system's inherent need for more stable relations with the advanced capitalist countries.

Making this argument in a brief article, I have not been able to address fully some important rival theories. One is that Gorbachev's new thinking in foreign policy is not rooted in domestic institutions, but simply reflects lessons drawn from the failures of Brezhnev's foreign and security policies. If so, those lessons, like previous swings of the right/left pendulum in Soviet history, could be as easily unlearned as they were learned. The validity of this objection hinges in part on how closely I—and the sources I have cited—have established the
links between particular strategic ideas and the groups and coalitions that support them. Some Sovietologists, arguing for cognitive or international explanations of Soviet foreign policy, have questioned these domestic political connections, pointing out that the top leader himself has often been the source of expansionist policies and concepts.\footnote{128} What this argument has missed, however, is the extent to which the General Secretaries' policies and concepts were a response to a variety of domestic political pressures, identical to none of them individually, but caused by the need to manage all of them simultaneously. Proponents of a second theory would hold that I have placed too much emphasis on the particularities of Stalin's revolution from above, and not enough on earlier pathologies of Leninism or of Russian autocracy.\footnote{129} Here, I would argue that Stalin's system, with its hypercentralism, authoritarianism, xenophobia, and military orientation, was a kind of apotheosis of those earlier patterns. If Gorbachev has broken Stalin's pattern, he has broken his predecessors' as well.

Finally, there is the theory that all great powers behave aggressively because of the consequences of international anarchy or for other reasons.

While this may be true, there has nonetheless been a significant range in the aggressiveness of great powers, a good deal of it due to variations in their domestic systems. The Soviet Union under Brezhnev was already less pathological than some of the great powers that have populated the twentieth century.
Gorbachev's Russia as I have extrapolated it should be still less aggressive.

POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE WEST

In order to make the most of the opportunities presented by the new thinking, American policy should follow three guidelines. First, the United States should avoid mounting intense geopolitical challenges, like a Strategic Defense Initiative deployment or rollback attempts on the Soviet periphery, that would force the reforms to move in a militarized direction. Military-oriented, authoritarian revolution from above is the normal pattern of Russian response to intense pressure from its environment. Moderate international pressure helps Gorbachev, because it makes reform seem necessary, but intense pressure is likely to hurt him, since it makes an Ogarkov-type reform seem more appropriate.

Second, the United States should continue to reciprocate meaningful Soviet concessions, to avoid discrediting the new thinking, parts of which may be quite fragile. Malenkov's fate is instructive in this regard. On one hand, it is true that the West's vigorous military response to the invasion of South Korea undoubtedly helped proponents of a less assertive Soviet foreign policy in the Kremlin, by discrediting the former hard line. On the other hand, once that point was proved, further American intransigence hurt proponents of a relaxation of tension after they came to power. Herbert Dinerstein has shown how Malenkov's
political career foundered in part on America's unhelpful reactions to his strategic innovations.\textsuperscript{130}

Gorbachev is much stronger politically, but the same rule applies. America's reaction to Afghanistan probably worked in his favor, by discrediting the expansionist, militarist aspects of the old Brezhnev line. But further Western intransigence certainly would not help him, since he has implicitly promised that his strategy of competitive peace "propaganda" will lead to a more stable superpower relationship.

Third, the United States should press hard for meaningful restructuring of the Soviet foreign trade system and of the Soviet Army's offensive conventional posture in Europe. The West should be firm in tying Soviet membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to some restructuring of Soviet price-setting practices, which it can justify as insurance against Soviet dumping of goods at prices below their cost of production. The United States should also take up Soviet offers to discuss changes in conventional force postures from offense to defense.\textsuperscript{131} These are measures that could have important side-effects on Soviet domestic structure, deepening the reform and strengthening its institutions. Gorbachev may want to take these steps anyway, but unless America takes an active role and offers to meet him half way, they may be hard for Gorbachev to push through.

Finally, let me reinforce the qualifications with which I opened the argument. Social science does not predict the future.
At best, it generates expectations about future outcomes, assuming that certain causal conditions are present. Thus, I could be wrong either because my theory about the domestic sources of Soviet expansionism is flawed, or because Gorbachev's reforms will not make sufficient changes in the causal variables to affect the outcome.

All the evidence is not yet in on the Gorbachev revolution. Nonetheless, it is important to advance hypotheses as best we can, in part so that we can recognize the relevant evidence when it does come in, and in part because our own interim actions may affect the outcome. Some of the most positive aspects of Gorbachev's new thinking, especially his interest in defensive conventional strategies, may be short-lived if the West creates an environment that is inhospitable to their survival.
NOTES

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2. For an overview and evaluation of these changes, see Seweryn Bialer, "The Education in Progress of Mikhail Gorbachev," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Winter 1988); and Bialer, "Gorbachev's Move," Foreign Policy, No. 68 (September 1987), pp. 59-87.


4. The theory underpinning this analysis is based on Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1962). Current Soviet analyses are similar. Note Gorbachev's Unita interview in Pravda, May 20, 1987, and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union (hereinafter FBIS), May 20, 1987, on the imprint socialism bears from the "grim" conditions in which it was built—intervention, civil war, economic blockade, "the military provocations and constant pressure from imperialism."

5. Following the usage of Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (London University Press, 1951; original ed., 1919), and also that of Gerschenkron, I use the term "atavism" to mean a group or institution that continues to carry out a task that, due to changing conditions, has become dysfunctional for society.


8. See especially the economic reform program ratified by the

10. When I use the term institution, I mean not only bureaucratic organizations, but also established ways of organizing social relationships, such as the institution of central planning or of the market.

11. For a state-building perspective on the Bolshevik revolution, see Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).


13. Ibid., p. 321.


17. Viola dissertation, p. 29; and J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985). For a debate on the new social history of the Stalin period, see the essays by Fitzpatrick, Stephen Cohen, and other commentators in Russian Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 (October 1986). Wolfgang Leonhard recounts that the new intelligentsia was so steeped in the militant ideology of the revolution from above that, when given access to the foreign press, "we could hardly summon up any interest" in viewpoints couched in "expressions which were so
entirely meaningless to us." Only Trotskyite publications were
dangerous, he explains, because they "wrote in our own language."

18. David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin
90-92; and Uri Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third World (Cambridge,

York: Pantheon, 1982), p. 27.

20. On the political economy of Kozlov's Leningrad, see Blair
Ruble, Leningrad: Shaping the Face of a Soviet City (forthcoming
33 and passim. On the budgetary and foreign policy stance of
Kozlov and other military-industrial figures in the late Khru-
shchev period, see Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leader-
ship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1966), pp. 50-54 and passim;
Sidney Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia
(Princeton: Princeton University, 1965), pp. 216-234; and
Christer Jonsson, Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test
Ban Case (New York: Columbia, 1979), pp. 133-208; Michel Tatu,
Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking, 1970). Hannes Adomeit,
Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior (London: Allen and Unwin,
1982), p. 262, points out that Kozlov was apparently not a risk-
taker.

21. Gavriel Ra'anan, International Policy Formation in the
USSR: Factional "Debates" during the Zhdanovshchina (Hamden,
Conn.: Archon, 1983). Werner Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics
(Ithaca: Cornell, 1982), sees Zhdanov as relatively moderate,
especially in comparison with the party militants that succeeded
him, like Suslov. In fact, Zhdanov's constituencies did lead him
to be "moderate" on some foreign and security issues at least some
of the time, e.g., limits on defense spending (to undercut
Malenkov's heavy-industrial base), opportunities for foreign trade
(a Leningrad interest), communization of Eastern Europe by
political (not police) methods. But the suggestion that Zhdanov
was actually opposed to the Cominform policy that he implemented
so vigorously is certainly at odds with the memoirs of the
European Communists who lived through it. See Ruble, Leningrad,
pp. 30-32; Jerry Hough, "Debates about the Postwar World," in
Susan J. Linz, The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union
(Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allenhead, 1985), p. 275; and Eugenio
Reale, Avec Jacques Duclos au Banc des Accuses (Paris: Plon,
n.d.), pp. 10-11 and passim. Zhdanov's Cominform speech is
reprinted in Myron Rush, The International Situation and Soviet
Foreign Policy (Columbus: Merrill, 1969).
22. William McCagg, *Stalin Embattled* (Detroit: Wayne State, 1978), p. 117 for this quotation, and passim for the interpretation on which this paragraph is based.


28. Letteney, "Foreign Policy Factionalism," p. 330. Letteney also provides indirect but voluminous evidence that Malenkov and his allies criticized the 1948 Berlin policy as having justified the formation of NATO and the deployment of American nuclear forces within striking distance of the Soviet Union; pp. 56, 77, and 82-83, quoting *Izvestiia*, February 12, 1949; March 19, 1949; July 22, 1949. Note also that Zhdanov appointees ran Soviet policy in Germany until the lifting of the blockade in 1949, when they were replaced by Malenkov-Beria men. See Ann Phillips, *Soviet Policy toward East Germany Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1986), p. 34. Authors like Dunmore who portray Malenkov as a belligerent cold warrior during this period present virtually no evidence to support their view. It is likely, however, that Malenkov supported the military buildup at this time, because it led to the return to power of his wartime heavy industry cronies. See Jeremy Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard,
1966), ch. 5. I am indebted to Dr. Azrael for a helpful discussion of these issues.


34. Quoted by Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking, p. 224.


36. Richter, adding nuances, develops a similar argument from an analysis of leadership speeches, which can be corroborated by a variety of other kinds of sources. See Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1966) on nuclear diplomacy; Parrott, Politics and Technology, pp. 131, 158-163, and 171-172 on the political role of nuclear and other high technology policies; ibid, p. 137, for Khrushchev's ideas about "the social significance of the ICBM;" and Heikal, Sphinx and Commissar, pp. 97-98 and 128-129, for an exposition to Nasser of Khrushchev's strategic theory.

37. As early as 1954, Khrushchev had used nuclear strategy as a successful political weapon against Malenkov and, in a passage
from a speech that his colleagues excised from the Pravda version, Khrushchev bragged that "we were even quicker than the capitalist camp and invented the hydrogen bomb before they had it; we, the Party and the working class, we know the importance of this bomb." Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin without Stalin (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1975), p. 88. Richter, however, shows that the mature form of Khrushchev's strategic ideology, featuring optimistic reliance on the ICBM and popular forces promoting progressive political change, was not fully worked out until later.

38. For some minor qualifications, see Breslauer, pp. 67-71.


40. Pravda, March 12, 1958. Richter alerted me to this speech.

41. Linden advanced the hypothesis that, in some general way, a victory in Berlin would give Khrushchev the prestige he needed to check his domestic opponents and push on with his economic program. Richter, however, is the first to clarify this argument conceptually and to show in convincing detail how it worked.

42. The following reconstruction draws on Gelman, Parrott, and Richter.


44. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, pp. 211-212.


46. Parrott, Ballistic Missile Defense, pp. 46-47. See also Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 1018, fn. 21. Mark Pekala has discovered an Aesopian piece in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 24 (December 1984), which portrays an alleged attempt by Trotsky in 1923 to exploit a period of foreign threat and leadership transition and illness to militarize the party and the country at the expense of the party's program of economic reform.
and restoration, which required decreased military expenditures. Translated in JPRS, UMA-85-027, April 19, 1985. Cynthia Roberts notes that this piece is full of historical inaccuracies, further suggesting that it had a current policy motivation.


50. For applications of this branch of psychological theory to foreign policymaking, see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981), ch. 5.

51. Heikal, Sphinx and Commissar, pp. 96-97.

52. The clearest cases are perhaps the U-2 (Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, pt. 1) and Jackson-Vanik (Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo, p. 161); Urban, "Contemporary Soviet Perspectives," p. 1379).

53. For example, Woodruff Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (New York: Oxford, 1986). This is another case where Gerschenkron's perspective is helpful.


55. For a summary of and citations to this literature, see Bartlomiej Kaminski, "Pathologies of Central Planning," Problems of Communism, Vol. 36, No. 2 (March-April 1987), pp. 81-95.

56. For a variety of perspectives, some quite skeptical, see Soviet Economy, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October-December 1986).


59. Francis Fukuyama, Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World (Santa Monica: Rand, R-3337-AF, February 1986).


64. Anatolii Butenko, Moscow State University Professor and analyst at Oleg Bogomolov's institute on the bloc economy, Moskovskaja Pravda, May 7, 1987; FBIS, May 26, p. R5.


67. Ibid., RIO.

68. Popov, "Restructuring the Economy " p. 4.


71. Says Central Committee Secretary Vadim Medvedev: "We have succeeded in literally stirring up the masses, even those who previously used to be far from politics, and have succeeded in making them active participants in the restructuring in the outlying areas. The truth expands and reinforces its social base." Pravda, May 17, 1987; FBIS, May 27.

73. For Gorbachev, see Pravda, January 28, 1987, CDSP, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 8 and 13. Yeltsin told the Party Congress that the Party is so "enmeshed in economic affairs that they have sometimes begun to lose their position as agencies of political leadership. It's no accident that the structure of the Central Committee's departments has gradually become all but a copy of the ministries. Many people have simply forgotten what true party work is." Pravda, February 27, 1986; CDSP, Vol. 38, No. 9, p. 5.


75. Czech TV interview, FBIS, April 16, 1987, p. F2. Bogomolov, who exemplifies the importance of the connection between the domestic and international aspects of the economic reform, was also one of the speakers at the June pre-plenum conference. Hanson and Teague, "Party Conference." For one of many similar statements on global economic and security interdependence from Gorbachev, see his speech of February 16, 1987; FBIS, February 17, p. AA22.


81. On this development, see Valkenier, "Revolutionary Change in the Third World," and the other works reviewed in George Breslauer, "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World."
82. Interview in La Republica, May 21, 1985; FBIS, May 24, 1985, pp. CCl.


84. Izvestiia, June 13, 1987; FBIS, June 19.


90. Vadim Zagladin, "Sovremennoy mezhdunarodnyy krizis v svete leninskogo uchenia," MEiMO, No. 4 (April 1984), p. 4, criticizing such views. For this and other examples, see Douglas Blum, "Soviet Perceptions of American Foreign Policy after Afghanistan" (Columbia University), paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, April 1987, forthcoming in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Strategic Beliefs and Superpower Competition in the Asian Rimland. Thomas Bjorkman and Thomas Zamostny, "Soviet Politics and Strategy toward the West," World Politics, Vol. 34, No. 2 (January 1984), pp. 189-214, show that Bovin argued publicly that the invasion of Afghanistan had provoked such a reaction and that others who are now close to Gorbachev have expressed similar views.


98. Viktor Karpov, BBC TV, May 18, 1987; FBIS, May 21, p. AAl.


102. McCGwire, Military Objectives, pp. 29-35.


104. Linden, Khrushchev, pp. 191-192; and Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge: Harvard, 1965), pp. 149-152, offer analyses sensitive to domestic political and budgetary aspects of arguments about conventional strategy in this period. For evidence relating early conventional-option thinking to this budgetary setting, see Wolfe, pp. 121-23 and 131.

105. For a theoretical statement explaining this and other reasons for professional militaries' preference for offensive strategies, see Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell, 1984), esp. p. 49.


123. TASS, April 17, 1987, reporting on Ligachev's interview with visiting Congressman Jim Wright, FBIS, April 20.


126. For this argument on SDI, see Parrott, *Ballistic Missile Defense*, ch. 5.


