This report is based upon research supported in part by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research with funds provided by the U. S. Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, through the Council's Contract #701 with the University of Illinois for the Soviet Interview Project. Subsequent to the expiration of federal support and the Council's Contract #701, the author has volunteered this report to the Council for distribution within the U. S. Government. By agreement with the Department of State, the costs of duplication and distribution are covered by the Council under its Grant #1006-555009 from the Department under Title VIII. The analysis and interpretations in this report are those of the author, and not of the Council or any part of the U. S. Government.
From Aristotle to Angus Campbell and beyond, the political role of women has been subject to dispute. Underlying much of the debate has been the assumption that woman is a different political animal than man, that she participates at different rates, in different ways, and for different reasons, and that her attitudes toward politics and political issues differ significantly from those of men.

Most research on gender differences in political attitudes has focused on Western, capitalist systems. This paper will expand that focus and use new evidence from a survey of 2793 former Soviet citizens to determine whether significant differences exist between Soviet men and women in their attitudes toward politics and on a range of policy issues. The Soviet case is especially interesting, on the one hand, because official doctrine has declared gender differences to be socially irrelevant and, on the other, because male dominance, particularly in the political realm, nonetheless persists.

Gender, though, is an especially vexed subject: although sex is a primary, biological, more or less unchanging characteristic, gender relations are profoundly social, profoundly artificial, profoundly mutable constructs. In addition to studying the effect of gender on variations in political attitudes, then, this paper will also examine the effects of the varying roles and situations that follow usually but not inevitably in the wake of gender. Our analysis will proceed at three interconnected levels, asking three questions: What theories explain why and on what issues men and women in Western countries
might have different political attitudes? What in the Soviet Union indicates that these attitude variations can—or cannot—be expected to exist? From Soviet Interview Project\(^1\) survey data, what concrete evidence is there of gender-based attitudes differences?

**Gender Differences in Political Attitudes: The Literature**

Much of the political science literature of the 1950s and 1960s saw women as passive, sensitive, supportive beings, less interested in and knowledgeable about politics, uncomfortable with political conflict, and more concerned with the personal qualities of candidates and with the emotional, esthetic aspects of political life than with issues.\(^2\) Surveys indicated that women were less interested and involved in politics than were men and had less of a feeling that they could or ought to take an active role in political life.\(^3\)

\(^1\) The Soviet Interview Project (SIP) is a survey of 2793 former Soviet citizens who arrived in the United States between 1 January 1979 and 30 April 1982. They were interviewed between March 1983 and January 1984. Field work for the survey was conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. The average length of the interviews was three hours. All but 10 of the interviews were conducted in Russian. The sample was a stratified random sample based on a list of adult emigrants from the USSR to the United States between the dates mentioned. Participation in the survey was voluntary. The response rate was 79 percent.


Differences were also noted in regard to attitudes on certain political issues. Women were argued to be less politically tolerant as a result of their cultural role in protecting the young. Stouffer found evidence of this intolerance in the fact that women were more likely to favor limiting the civil liberties of left-wing nonconformists. Women were also argued to be more moralistic and more interested in local social welfare issues, from parks and libraries to schools, traffic lights, clean water, and social legislation.

The idea that women may be less interested in politics, more politically intolerant, moralistic, or concerned with social welfare issues has continued to appear in more recent scholarship. Within the last decade, the idea that women's political attitudes are different from men's has received still more attention as a result of discussions of the "gender gap." Surveys have found American women to be more likely than men to favor the Democratic Party, to be more compassionate—more in favor of governmental involvement in social welfare, health, and the promotion of equality, to favor peace, and to oppose militarism.

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6Lane, pp. 212-13; Gruberg, p. 12.

7Gruberg, p. 14.

and defense spending. Other studies, however, have questioned the magnitude of the differences between men and women.

Whether there are differences in the political attitudes of men and women—even if those differences change over time—is interesting but only part of the picture. The question is not only whether gender has an effect on political attitudes but how and why it has such an effect.

Probably the most primal explanation for differences in female attitudes is the biological argument that there is a connection between politics, aggression, and maleness. Woman is a different physical—and thus political—being. Konrad Lorenz, Robert Ardrey, and Lionel Tiger have made variations of this argument. If biology alone explains differences in behavior, then sex alone should explain differences in political attitudes.

The idea that "biology is destiny," though, begs the question of when biology becomes social conditioning and of when protective motherhood is a social—and socialized—rather than purely biological role. It may be attitudes toward traditional gender roles, not gender alone, that shape political attitudes. Women who accept traditional roles—the idea of woman as nurturer

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11See Lapidus, pp. 199-200, and Jaquette, p. vi, for summaries.

12See, for example, Virginia Sapiro's discussion of what is really measured when gender is used as an independent variable. The Political Integration of Women: Roles, Socialization, and Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 57-61.
and caretaker and of men as the proper actors in the world—can be expected to have a lower sense of political efficacy and less interest in politics: it is just not their sphere. Yet research is fairly sparse on how gender attitudes affect political attitudes, and few studies have found a clear and strong relationship. One of our concerns here is to provide a more rigorous test of these relationships.

Gender roles are not simply psychological, affecting how women see themselves and their proper activities. They also underlie the concrete daily lives of women. The "situational" explanation of the political effects of gender argues that the female roles of wife and mother keep women isolated, busy, and concerned more with their own private affairs than with public issues. By working outside the home, women are seen to gain information, skills for action, qualifications for leadership, and a basis for interest in politics. Presumably, their political attitudes change as well. Research has shown that women who work outside the home are more liberal or feminist in


14 See Hershey, pp. 261-287.

15 Jennings, p. 364; Duverger, p. 128; Sapiro, esp. chs. 3 & 7; Welch, p. 711. Welch offers evidence that marriage and children have minimal effects on political activity, p. 724.
regard to sex roles or equal opportunity. 16 Kent Tedin, David Brady, and Arnold Vedlitz argued that the situational stimulation would make working women more politically interested, but their study left unclear how much work actually provided this "stimulation". 17 However, to the extent that women remain concentrated in less-skilled, less well-rewarded occupations, to the extent that work does not provide "stimulation," working outside the home may have a limited effect on political attitudes; and that is another issue this paper will examine.

In addition to variables linked to gender and gender roles, the structural variables of age, education, and income may explain some differences in attitudes between men and women. 18 Early studies found that age, education, and income were important in political behavior, especially voting, 19 and they can be expected to be significant in the formation of political attitudes as well.

The literature on political attitudes thus suggests that certain attitudes toward politics and policy issues—specifically, interest in politics and political efficacy, intolerance, moralism, concern for social welfare, and anti-war sentiment—may be linked to gender. Analysts disagree, though, on whether

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17 Kent L. Tedin, David W. Brady, and Arnold Vedlitz, "Sex Differences in Political Attitudes and Behavior: The Case for Situational Factors," Journal of Politics, 39 (May 1977), 448-56. In their study, education, rather than work, was used to measure the "stimulation" which work outside the home is thought to provide.


19 Campbell, et al., p. 493; Duverger, p. 46.
gender alone has the expected effect or whether gender mediates a number of other variables: the structural variables of income, age, and education; socialized attitudes toward gender roles, ranging from the traditional to the feminist; and the stimulating effect of working outside the home.

Gender Differences in Attitudes—The Soviet Union

The Western literature deals—not surprisingly—with Western women. Our concern here is Soviet women; and the question that must be faced is whether there is something unique about their lives that would alter the arguments of the Western literature. After all, the Soviet Union is a country whose leaders, from Lenin onward, have claimed to have solved the "woman's question."

In fact, though, the transformation of the status of women under Soviet-style communism has been largely limited to increased labor force participation and its accompanying benefits—the expansion of educational opportunities, an improved childcare system, and the enactment of protective labor legislation and social programs designed to make sure that woman's employment outside the home does not interfere too much with her traditional role within it.20 In the late sixties, stimulated by Brezhnev's concept of "developed socialism," Soviet theorists began to acknowledge that the equality of the sexes had not yet been achieved and that the attainment of equality, like the creation of socialism, would be a long and protracted process.21 With the advent of glasnost',

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critiques of women's unequal status have increased. Women are equal before the law—formally—but not in fact. In that respect, the position of women in the Soviet Union is sufficiently similar to the position of women in the West that it is reasonable to think that the findings in the Western literature may have parallels among Soviet women.

Indeed, Western specialists and some of their Soviet colleagues have argued that Soviet women share some of the attitudes toward politics and policy issues of Western women. From interviews with Soviet women, Barbara Jancar concluded that Soviet women see politics as a man's field: women are less interested in politics and have a lower sense of political efficacy. Tatyana Mamonova, one of the founding members of the Soviet feminist journal, *Almanac: Women in Russia*, has argued that women naturally oppose war and other uses of violence. Like Western women, Soviet women are also thought to be more concerned with social welfare questions, particularly, in the Soviet case, with the provision of public services and the availability of consumer goods. Soviet women are

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also seen as more moralistic: Soviet data reveal, for example, that they make up the majority of religious believers.26

The evidence of these attitudes, though, is uneven. Systematic data on the political attitudes of Soviet women are in short supply, and researchers have had to rely on interviews with small numbers of women or on extrapolations from participation data, for instance the number of female Communist party members. In the case of alleged female concern with social welfare issues, Western researchers have based their conclusions largely on the likely result of laboring under the double burden of work and traditional womanhood.27 Soviet sociological data do provide some insight into women's attitudes, but few studies attempt to control for such intervening factors as age, education, attitudes toward gender roles, and situational factors.

Not only are some of the attitudes where gender is presumed to play a role similar in the Soviet Union and the West; some of the mechanisms through which gender is thought to work are also similar. Attitudes toward socialized gender roles are considered important in both cases. Although the Soviet government has made significant strides in increasing women's participation in the work force, since the 1930s it has also stressed the importance of the nuclear family and of woman's role in it for the successful construction of communism. It appears that many Soviet women have been influenced by the government line, for,

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26E. I. Martynova, Formirovanie dukhovnovo mira sovetskoj zhenshchiny (Krasnoyarsk: Krasnoyarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1983).

27Daniel Nelson, in in-depth interviews with local level political actors in Romania and Poland, found that Eastern European women indeed were more concerned than men with education, housing, and provisioning. "Women in Local Communist Politics in Romania and Poland," in Wolchik and Meyer, pp. 153, 165.
as Barbara Jancar pointed out, Soviet women’s self-concept remains steadily traditional.28 Many Soviet women appear to feel that the primary duty of women is to be a mother and wife.29 A Soviet feminist, Ekaterina Alexandrovea, concluded:

Here is a society that had proclaimed as its goal the extrication of women from the narrow confines of the family and the inclusion of these women in all forms of public activity... And yet, in this very society, among these very women, a patriarchal social order and its psychology thrive.30

On the other hand, changes in situational factors that affect women’s lives may be altering perceptions of gender roles. Ethel Klein argued that a new group consciousness is the product of changed social and economic circumstances, which in turn alter people’s understanding of themselves.31 In order to become feminist, women need to experience nontraditional roles that permit a rejection of biological explanations of women’s roles and a recognition of discrimination. Though a strong feminist movement is missing in the Soviet Union, Klein builds a strong case for why there might be considerable feminist sentiment there. Soviet women, as a whole, are well-educated, work outside the home, lately have been having fewer children, and live in a country where the official ideology propounds equality for all people. This should lead to a critical stance toward traditional roles for women. Further, if work outside the home makes Western women more feminist and interested in politics and contributes to a sense of

28Jancar, pp. 78-87.
31Klein, pp. 5, 81.
personal influence, the same may be true for Soviet women.

In the past twenty years, however, studies both in and out of the Soviet Union have documented the low level of skill, mobility, and income of women workers, their heavy double burden of work in and out of the home, and the inadequate social services provided for working mothers and their families. Equality in rates of labor force participation has been achieved; but occupational equality has not. Average earnings of female workers are about 60 to 65 percent those of men, a differential roughly parallel to those in Western Europe and the United States. To the degree that Soviet women see work as a burden rather than a source of satisfaction, the fact of working outside the home itself may have little effect on their political attitudes. It may be that only a rewarding or satisfying job influences their view of the political world. Further, because almost all Soviet women do work outside the home, simply working may not be as significant as working in fields traditionally dominated by men.

The structural variables of education, age, and income can also be argued to have an effect on the political attitudes of Soviet women. From Soviet

32Dodge, p. 4; Lapidus, p. 188.


Interview Project data, Brian Silver has shown that education is negatively related to regime support and that younger Soviets are less supportive of the rights of the collective, even after taking educational differences into account. Also using SIP data, Donna Bahry found that age affected compliant political behavior, nonconformity, and political interest, with younger Soviets taking part both in more compliant and more unorthodox political activity than the older groups. Bahry and Silver found that, though older people were more supportive of regime norms, more satisfied with their material standard of living, and more likely to be compliant in their political behavior, they had a comparatively lower assessment of the abilities of people in positions of authority. As for income, although income differentials in the Soviet Union probably are not as extreme as they are in many capitalist countries, they do exist and they can be presumed to have an effect on political attitudes. Silver has shown, for instance, that higher income means more support for the Soviet state's role in managing the economy.

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37 Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR," American Political Science Review, 81 (December 1987), 1065-98.

Findings

The literature, then, provides a number of points of controversy to guide empirical analysis, controversy that applies to the Soviet as well as Western case. Do women evidence different attitudes on a range of issues—interest in politics, sense of political efficacy, intolerance, moralism, concern for peace, and interest in social welfare issues? Are such differences attributable just to sex, to socialized attitudes toward gender roles, to the situational aspects of women's lives, or to the structural variable of age, education, and income?

To examine these questions, we analyzed data from the Soviet Interview Project survey. In the interviews people were asked to concentrate on the five-year period before their lives changed as a result of their plans to emigrate (dubbed the "last normal period," or LNP, of life in the USSR). We used the responses of the 2667 people who were of voting age at the time their LNP began. Of these, 1165 were male, 1502 were female. In terms of the highest level of education attained, 481 had completed less than secondary education, 1059 did complete secondary education, 130 had completed some higher education, and 997 had finished their higher education. Four hundred and thirty respondents belonged to what Hough\(^{39}\) has labeled the "Brezhnev" and "Purge" generations; they were born before 1918 and came of age in the late 1920s and 1930s. Three hundred and one belonged to the "Wartime" generation, born between 1919 and 1925; 879 were born between 1926 and 1940 and are part of the "Postwar" generation; and 1057, the "Post Stalin" generation, were born between 1941 and 1960. Of the women in the sample, over 97 percent had worked in a public-sector job in the USSR; 28.3 percent had always worked, while 71.7 percent had

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interruptions in their work careers. Over 95 percent were married while in the USSR, and almost 90 percent had children.40

For statistical purposes, the SIP data have the advantage of both a large number of respondents and a large number of questions. The data also have disadvantages. Respondents are not a random sample of the Soviet population. Not only are all the respondents emigrants, 85 percent are Jewish by some definition. In addition, most respondents come from urban areas in the European section of the Soviet Union.

Previous studies using the SIP data have shown that these problems are not as insurmountable as they may seem.41 Though the respondents are all emigrants, they do not as a whole fit the stereotype of embittered expatriates. Many did not emigrate for political reasons. Many did not even make the decision to emigrate themselves but just accompanied other family members. Furthermore, the results of our analysis are not intended to be generalized to the Soviet population as a whole but only to the Soviet referent population of European background residents in large and medium-sized cities.

The nonrepresentativeness of the sample is an element of the more general category of selection bias, and selection bias has been shown to be approximately the same as omitted variable bias.42 Of course, omitted variable


41 See particularly Bahry, pp. 61-99, and Silver, pp. 100-41.

42 James Heckman, "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica, 47 (January 1979), 158. Selection bias appears to have been the only serious statistical problem. Multicollinearity did not arise. Autocorrelation was unlikely since no time series data were involved. Homoskedasticity could be assumed within each regression. Due to the large data set, analysis of residuals was difficult, but there was no a priori reason for
bias is not a problem if there is no relationship between the included and omitted variables or if the effect of the omitted variables is zero. In the SIP case, the problem is knowing not only what the omitted variables are but how they might affect the relationships we find. Previous analyses of the data suggest that the two key sources of potential distortion, "emigration bias" and "ethnic bias," do come into play on selected issues. For example, those who actually made the decision to emigrate were more critical than their family members of Soviet institutions and policies. Emigrants with the strongest sense of Jewish identity were more critical of Soviet nationality policies. However, on other issues, such as the relationship between gender and attitudes, these factors have little effect. Moreover, where the data permit comparison, our findings seem to match Soviet reports on several aspects of women's lives—for instance, on time spent shopping (double to triple the time spend by men)\(^{43}\) or on relationships between age, education, gender and attitudes toward gender roles within the family.\(^{44}\) The reliability of Soviet surveys may be open to question; but, given the different interviewing conditions between SIP and Soviet surveys, the fact of similar findings is compelling.

Least-squares regression analysis was chosen as the best way to include the effects of a variety of independent variables and to control for the effect of believing that the residuals did not have a common variance or that, within each regression, some measures were more reliable than others. With the exception of a couple of the composite variables discussed in the appendix, all observations were dropped if an individual failed to answer one or more of the included questions.


some variables on others. Since our object was to examine differences in political attitudes, the dependent variables were a range of attitudes. The independent variables for each regression were sex—since we were primarily interested in whether there were significant differences between men and women on the attitudes studies—and the structural variables of age, education, and income, to control for the effects of these factors. Another variable, job status, was added to approximate the effects of occupational hierarchy and party membership. (See the Appendix for precise explanation of measurement and definition of all variables and for the actual survey questions on which the variables were based.)

We were particularly interested in four other independent variables, developed from explanations of why gender differences in attitudes might exist. The first of these was a measure of attitudes toward gender roles, included as an interaction term with being female. We expected that low support for traditional gender roles, or what we referred to as a high feminist orientation, would result in a higher sense of political efficacy and more interest in politics, and possibly in more democratic and tolerant political attitudes.

45Income was included rather than a measure of social class because social class is so closely correlated with education that the effects cancel out. Bahry, pp. 61-99.

46Western research on gender attitudes has shown that there are different dimensions underlying views toward women's roles: attitudes about women's proper role in political life differ from those on work roles and on intra-family relations. See, for example, Karen O. Mason and Larry Bumpass, "U.S. Women's Sex-Role Ideology," American Journal of Sociology, 80 (March 1975), 1212-19; Andrew Cherlin and Pamela Barnhouse Walters, "Trends in U.S. Men's and Women's Sex-Role Attitudes: 1972-78," American Sociological Review, 46 (1981), 453-60. In the SIP survey, questions about gender roles focused on work and on family decision-making. We analyzed both sets of questions but found the level of consensus about the ideal rules for family decisions was so high that there was no variance to explain.
Table 1 shows the distribution across the sample of non-traditional attitudes toward women's place in Soviet society.

See table 1, page 17a

Women, it turns out, are less traditional on this issue than are men, at all educational levels and in all age groups. Yet age and education do matter: both men and women with a college degree and those who came of political age after the Stalin period are more inclined toward a feminist viewpoint than are their older or less educated counterparts.\(^{47}\) Having a job in a male-dominated field also seems to mean a less traditional orientation among women; but having a greater sense of influence seems to make little difference in whether women accept or reject traditional roles. Whether these relationships hold when other factors are added needs to be tested, however, and we will come back to these questions in discussing our regression results below.

We also included two measures of women's work roles: a measure of job satisfaction and of whether the job held was in a field not traditionally female in the USSR. These were treated as interaction terms with being female. According to theory, the effect of working outside the home, especially in field not considered female and especially in jobs that provide some satisfaction, should be expected to reverse some of the "traditionally female" political attitudes. Women working under these conditions might be more interested in politics, more tolerant, and so on.

One last variable was included, again as an interaction term with being female: a measure of whether or not pre-school-age children were present in the household. This variable targeted situational factors in women's lives other

\(^{47}\)Similar evidence is offered by T. N. Sidorova, and Pankratova and Iankova.
Table 1. Nontraditional Attitudes on Gender Roles, by Education, Age, Sense of Personal Influence and Type of Job

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education:</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>of which:</th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete secondary N</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete higher N</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prewar N</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime N</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar N</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PostStalin N</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Personal Influence:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (low)</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (high)</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Job:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in predominantly male occupations N</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in predominantly female occupations N</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men N</td>
<td>2.24</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Data represent mean scores for nontraditional gender role attitudes on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is most traditional ("mothers should stay home with young children;" "it's a bad idea for men to work under women supervisors") and 4 is least traditional. For definitions of variables and the questions on which they are based, see appendix.*
than the work-related ones already mentioned. The literature indicates that
caring for small children in the home might make women less interested in
politics and more moralistic. 48

Personal Influence and Interest in Politics

Many scholars have argued that women have a lower sense of political
efficacy and less interest in politics. Our data bear out this prediction. As
hypothesized, women have less interest in politics than men do; however, not all
women are quite the same in this respect. 49 Those with less traditional or more
feminist attitudes display a greater concern with the political world. So, too,
do women who were more satisfied with their last job in the USSR and those
working in predominantly male fields. Nontraditional women do indeed seem to be
more attentive to public affairs.

See Table 2, page 18a

Women also rate their own influence lower than men do, though again there
are significant differences among Soviet women once a situational factor—job
satisfaction—is taken into account. Those who felt less satisfied at work
rated their sense of influence higher than did other women. This may reflect

48 Jennings and Niemi, Generations and Politics, pp. 296-98. We also tested
several other models, with more and fewer variables and with different
combinations of variables as interaction terms with gender. The model presented
was preferred because it was most stable over iterations and because it did not
suffer from multicollinearity problems which plagued those with too many
interaction terms.

49 Evidence in a landmark Soviet study of leisure time supports the same
conclusion: among men, between 20 and 40 percent (depending on their age and
educational level) reported that they discussed politics with friends. Among
women, the figure ranges between 9 and 9 percent; the 9 percent represents the
most highly educated women in the sample. L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopo,  
Chelovek posle raboty, Sotsialnye problemy byta i vnerabocheho vremen. 
Table 2. Gender, Sense of Personal Influence, and Interest in Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sense of Influence</th>
<th>Interest in Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.198**</td>
<td>-.299**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Feminist</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.074**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Job Satisf.</td>
<td>-.191**</td>
<td>.337**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Nontraditon Job</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>.121**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Young Children</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>-.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Job Status</strong></td>
<td>.104**</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>.068*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compl. Sec.</td>
<td>-.150**</td>
<td>.502**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compl. Higher</td>
<td>-.082**</td>
<td>.929**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>.145*</td>
<td>.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>.192**</td>
<td>.128*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PostStalin</td>
<td>.171**</td>
<td>.167**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>2.176**</td>
<td>.975**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted R2</strong></td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.163</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2161</td>
<td>2228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data represent unstandardized regression coefficients. Those significant at \( p \leq .05 \) in a two-tailed test are marked with a double asterisk; those significant at the same level in a one-tailed test are marked with a single asterisk. For definitions of variables, see the appendix.
the fact that more influential positions convey a sense of efficacy but also carry more pressures and provide less satisfaction.50

For the most part, then, our data bear out what the literature predicts on psychological involvement in politics and self-ranked influence. Soviet women, like their Western sisters, pay less attention to the political world and feel themselves to be less influential than men do, even when age, education, and job status are introduced as controls. Yet it would be incorrect to group all Soviet women together: women with more feminist attitudes, high job satisfaction, and in male-dominated fields are more interested in politics.

Political Tolerance and Civil Liberties

If the Western literature holds, Soviet women should also be less tolerant, less supportive of democratic political norms, and more inclined to favor collective interests (the state's position) over the interests of individuals. The results in Table 3 indicate that women do prove to be less tolerant of political diversity and less inclined to support democratic norms. Table 3 also shows that Soviet women, again, disagree among themselves on these issues. Those with more feminist notions of gender roles are also more tolerant: they believe that there is more than one correct political philosophy in the world and that politics may require compromise. On the other hand, such situational elements as job satisfaction and being in a male-dominated occupation make

50This seems to be borne out by the fact that women in leadership positions—such as party or government posts or administrators in other public organizations—register lower job satisfaction than men in the same positions or women in other types of jobs. (The data are not shown.) In addition, since women with higher job satisfaction tend to be found more in such "caring" fields as education and health care, their lower sense of influence may reflect the lower status of these fields in the USSR.
little difference in women's willingness to tolerate divergent viewpoints. Working in a predominantly male occupation does mean somewhat greater support for democratic norms, while another situational factor—having pre-school-age children at home—seems to mean a less democratic orientation.

See Table 3, pages 20a & 20b

When questions become more specific about the Soviet state's controls over individuals, such as the need for residence permits or the right to strike, women are neither more nor less supportive of the state's position than men are. This suggests that questions on concrete restrictions of civil liberties may be capturing attitudes toward what the Soviet state should or should not do, while questions on tolerance and on democratic norms measure more abstract attitudes on individual rights.

Moralism

One of the key areas where the literature predicts that gender differences should prove salient is moralism. We measured moralism with two variables, one an item on self-reported religious belief and the other a composite of support for censorship of images of explicit sex, violence, abstract art, anti-government ideas, and ethnic stereotypes. The results (see Table 3) show that women are in fact more likely to be religious believers but that gender alone seems to have no significant effect on support for censorship. Being female and relatively satisfied on the job however, does make a difference: women who were happier with their job situation are less religious. They are also less supportive of state controls over the media and culture, which is especially notable since many worked in the media, culture, and education. The hypothesis that women are more moralistic thus receives only partial support. If moralism is defined solely in terms of religious belief or atheism, then gender matters.
Table 3. Women and Political Tolerance, Support for Democratic Values, Censorship, and Atheism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Support for State Controls On Individuals</th>
<th>Support for Democratic Norms</th>
<th>Political Tolerance</th>
<th>Atheism</th>
<th>Support for Censorship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.388**</td>
<td>-0.474**</td>
<td>0.316**</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Feminist</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.111**</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Job Sacrifice</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>0.027**</td>
<td>-0.072**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Nontraditional Job</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.152*</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Young Children</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>0.219**</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>0.08/</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Status</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade School</td>
<td>-0.240**</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.573**</td>
<td>-0.064**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>-0.393**</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.406**</td>
<td>0.594**</td>
<td>-0.112**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>-0.493**</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.240**</td>
<td>-0.091**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>-0.457**</td>
<td>0.205**</td>
<td>0.515**</td>
<td>0.370**</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Stalin</td>
<td>-0.578**</td>
<td>0.481**</td>
<td>0.630**</td>
<td>0.548**</td>
<td>-0.102**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.174**</td>
<td>0.272**</td>
<td>1.964**</td>
<td>1.747**</td>
<td>1.469**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2214</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>2180</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When the same model is run for males, it is education and job status that predict attitudes toward gender roles. (See Table 5.) The more educated, the less traditional the orientation. Yet the higher the job status, the more traditional: men in more responsible positions are slightly more likely to believe that men should not work under female superiors and that women should stay home with young children—though the size of the coefficient for job status and the significance level suggest that this is not a strong relationship.

Part of the explanation for this divergence between the sexes may be that women and men hold different perceptions about the degree of gender equality in the USSR. Women are far more likely to feel that their opportunities to hold responsible posts in economic and political life were restricted. (Table 6) The younger the woman, however, and the more educated, the more inclined is she to say that women and men had the same opportunities.

See Table 6, pages 24a & 24b

What is striking is that few women in the sample report direct experiences with discrimination at school or on the job, and even fewer attribute the discrimination to their sex. Women are no more or less likely than men to feel they had been denied access to education (Table 6), and only one respondent said she had not reached her desired level of schooling because of gender discrimination. On the job, women were more likely to say the boss had treated them "about the same as others," while men were slightly more likely to say they had been treated better. Of the few women who said their boss responded to them differently because of their sex, five felt they were treated better, while only
Table 6. Perceptions of Gender Equality in Education and Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less Than Comp. Sec.</th>
<th>Comp. Sec.</th>
<th>Less Than Comp. Higher</th>
<th>Comp. Higher</th>
<th>Prewar</th>
<th>Mariner</th>
<th>Postwar</th>
<th>Post-Stalin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Believing women had fewer/more opportunities for responsible posts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fever</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sore</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
<td>(110)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Saying did not reach desired level of educ.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Saying superiors at last job in USSR treated differently</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better than others</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as others</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse than others</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes to Table 6.

M = males, F = females

"During your LNP, did you think Soviet women had more, fewer, or about the same opportunities to hold responsible posts in economic and political life as men did?" This was posed to a random one-third of the sample.

"Did you reach the level of education that you wanted to in the Soviet Union?" Of those who indicated that they did not reach the desired level, one person gave gender discrimination as the reason.

"Did you feel that, in general, your immediate supervisor (at the end of LNP just before you left that job) treated you the same as other people at your level at that job, better than other people, or worse than other people?"

"Many different things can help a person to advance in his or her career. [INTERVIEWER HANDS RESPONDENT A CARD.] In your opinion, which one item on this card was the most important for career advancement at your (last) job (at/before the end of the LNP)?" Asked of a random one-third of respondents. We grouped responses as follows:

- personal qualifications - "have higher education and diploma," "have knowledge and experience,"
- "have talent and ability to organize the work of other," "work well, be industrious,"
- connections/loyalty - "have protektsiya and connections," "have ability and desire to get along with superiors and be loyal to them;"
- party membership - "be a party member."

Four percent of all the responses on this question were not codeable or were references to antisemitism, and these are omitted from data presented here.
two said they were treated worse.\textsuperscript{52} This suggests that, although women are cognizant of gender-based inequality in Soviet society, they may not feel that it touches them directly.

Conclusions

Scholars of Soviet politics have shown that men and women in the USSR differ substantially in the political roles they assume. Whether these differences are mirrored in gender-based variations in political attitudes has been more controversial. Our data confirm that gender shapes the way people view political issues, even among men and women of similar age, income, job status and education. Soviet women do appear to have a diminished sense of personal influence and interest in politics, to be less democratic, less tolerant, and more religious, to support spending for social programs, and not to support a higher defense budget or state control over the economy.

More striking, however, is the finding that there are Soviet women who do not fit this mold. Specifically, women who are more feminist in their orientations tend to differ from the bulk of their Soviet sisters in other political attitudes as well. Although a feminist movement in the Soviet Union is most notable for its absence, it is not fair to conclude that all Soviet women accept their traditional custodial role in society, the role the regime,

\textsuperscript{52}Additional evidence in the survey also reveals that men and women differ in their perceptions of what it took to get ahead on the job in the USSR. Women tend to say that personal qualifications—education, skill, experience—mattered most, while men are more likely to stress party membership and personal connections or loyalty to superiors. The gap narrows among younger generations and especially among the more highly educated. Only four people out of 772 (two men and two women) mention gender as the key factor.
largely, has encouraged. There are many possible reasons these women have not formed a powerful and visible feminist movement, ranging from the traditional constraints on independent political activity, to the lack of time, to the political cleavages among women themselves. Our research confirms that these women exist, though, and that their feminist orientations strongly affect their broader political outlooks.

Though not quite as consistently, women with jobs in male-dominated fields also differ in their political attitudes from the rest of their Soviet sisters. They display a greater interest in politics, and it may be that the work environment in this case stimulates more concern with political issues. They do not, however, display a significantly greater tendency toward feminism once education, income and age are controlled. Ethel Klein's suggestion that work in a field outside traditional female occupations breeds a more feminist orientation is not borne out in our data.

Other situational factors, such as job satisfaction and having young children at home, produce attitude differences among women only on selected issues. Women with higher satisfaction at work are less inclined to impose controls over the content of media and culture, are more supportive of social welfare spending, and are less opposed to the use of force in international affairs. This appears to be related to the types of jobs they held—in fields such as education, culture, health care, media and communications. Having young children at home proves significant only in support for democratic values and for feminism. On other issues, this measure of the double burden makes little

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53 Patricia Gurin, surveying data from Western countries, offers a persuasive argument about the social and cognitive obstacles to women's mobilization. "Women's Gender Consciousness," Public Opinion Quarterly, 49 (Summer 1985), 143-63.
The answer to the question of whether gender is an important political variable in the Soviet Union, then, is yes. Why that is so is a somewhat more complicated matter. On the one hand, our evidence seems to make a compelling case for the relevance of biological differences. After all, many social differences were controlled in our study, yet gender remained statistically significant.

An alternate explanation is that our measure of gender still includes socialized sex roles. After all, our data show not only that women differ from men, but also that women differ from each other. It is hypothetically possible that the apparent effect of sex would disappear if we could measure and include more of the factors that differentiate among women. Having tried a large number of variables and combinations of variables, we would be inclined to argue that this possibility is more hypothetical than practical. Due to the extreme degree to which gender roles are socially defined, it may be impossible to take the social component out of gender.

On the other hand, we have shown that certain social—not biological—categories are significantly related to variations in political attitudes. Attitudes toward gender roles and, less so but sometimes, situational factors—work and children—vary with political attitudes. The structural variables of age and education are also important in explaining political attitudes.

54We also tried measuring the double burden by including the amount of time women spend shopping in an average week. Women of all ages and educational levels spend more time on this (the data are not shown). But the amount of time they spent was not clearly connected to their attitudes on the issues studied here.
In the respect that gender remains an important political variable, Soviet women resemble their Western sisters. What we have found about Soviet women confirms hypotheses and other quantitative research on American and European women in regard to sense of personal influence, interest in politics, support for democratic norms, tolerance, religious belief, support for social and welfare spending, and support for defense spending. Our findings diverge from research on American women in that Soviet women do not favor censorship or restrictions on civil liberties, and they do not come down clearly against the use of force.

As in the United States, in the Soviet Union age and education are also often related to variations in political attitudes. Income and job status, on the other hand, are rarely statistically significant for explaining attitudes among our respondents. Compared to the United States, situational--job and children--factors appear to be less related to political attitudes. This may be because research in the United States has over-estimated the effects of those variables. Alternately, the life situations of women in socialism may be different enough from their Western sisters for certain situational factors to have less influence. After all, it is in labor force participation that the Soviet Union has most changed the status of women and equalized the lives of men and women. Interestingly, despite the attention paid to the double burden of work and home in the Soviet Union, more overt evidence of that burden, such as small children in the home, does not seem to be systematically related to political attitudes, except for feminism. Attitudes toward gender roles are related to political attitudes in the Soviet Union, though, a relation not always strongly found in Western studies.

Gail Lapidus has remarked that Soviet women have not achieved true sexual equality and that sex role differentiation has survived and been functional to
Many scholars have remarked on the traditionality of Soviet women's views of gender roles. Yet our findings caution against focusing too much on the traditionality of Soviet women. Not all Soviet women accept the traditional remnants of their gender roles, and not all Soviet women think the same way.

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Dependent Variables used in the Analysis

* Feminist Orientation/Nontraditional Attitudes is a scale where higher values represent a less traditional attitude toward gender roles. The scale is based on two questions: "Ideally, a married women should stay at home rather than work full time while her children are of school age," and "It is a bad idea for men to work under women supervisors." For both, agree strongly-2, agree somewhat-2, disagree somewhat-3, disagree strongly-4.

* Sense of personal influence is a self-rated scale based on the question, "Here is a ladder. Let's say that the most influential person in the Soviet Union is at the top and the person with the least influence is at the bottom. Where would you have put yourself on this ladder in terms of your influence?" Steps on the ladder ranged from 1 to 10. Since answer categories were skewed toward the low end, they were combined here so that original values of 1 or 2 were set equal to 1, values of 3 or 4 were set equal to 2, 5 or 6 were set equal to 3, and 7 through 10 were set equal to 4.

* Interest in politics is a self-rated scale based on the question, "During your last normal period (of life in the USSR), how interested were you in politics and public affairs—were you very interested (the value of the variable equals 3), somewhat interested (-2), only slightly interested (-1), or not at all interested (-0)?"

* Support for state control over individuals is an average score across three questions: "Some people in the Soviet Union say that the rights of individuals accused of crimes must be protected even if a guilty person sometimes goes free. Others say that the rights of society must be protected, even if an innocent person sometimes goes to prison. Where would you have
placed yourself on this issue in (end of last normal period)?;" "Some people in the Soviet Union believe that workers should not be able to strike, because strikes are costly. Other people feel that all workers should have a right to strike, even if it means that certain services may be interrupted;" "Some people in the Soviet Union believe that people should be required to have residence permits to live in the large cities so that the authorities can plan public services. Others think that people should be completely free to live where they want." Answers range from 1, "protect individual/right to strike/free to live where they want," to 7, "protect society/prohibit strikes/require residence permits."

* Support for democratic norms is an average score for three questions: "Government officials should ignore people who offer uninformed criticisms or opinions;" "In any society it will always be necessary to keep dangerous ideas from being expressed in public;" "It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything." Answers were "agree strongly" (-1), "agree somewhat" (-2), "disagree somewhat" (-3), "disagree strongly" (-4).

* Political tolerance is an average score across 3 items: "Of all the different philosophies in this world, there is probably only one that is correct;" "To compromise with one's political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side;" "There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against it." Respondents were asked if they "agree strongly" (-1), "agree somewhat" (-2), "disagree somewhat" (-3), "disagree strongly" (-4).

* Atheism is a self-rated scale based on the question "Which of these statements come closest to what you believed (during your last normal period)?" 1- I
believed in God as the creator of the Universe; 2- I believed in a power greater than myself, which some people call God, other call Nature; 3- I believed in the worth of humanity but not in God or a supreme being; 4- I believed that ultimately everything is knowable according to the scientific method; 5- I was not quite sure what I believed; 6- I was an atheist.

* Support for censorship is an average across five questions: "During your last normal period, did you believe that the government should ban or allow movies, plays or books that presented ideas contrary to government policy? Explicit descriptions or portrayals of sex? Abstract art? Scenes of brutality and violence? Ethnic or national stereotypes?" (1-allow, 2-ban)

* Support for state control over the economy is an average score across three questions: "Some people in the Soviet Union say that the state should own all heavy industry. Others say that all heavy industry should be owned privately. Where would you have placed yourself on this issue in (end of last normal period)?": "Some people in the Soviet Union believe that the state should control production and distribution of all agricultural products. Others believe that all agricultural production and distribution should be private;" "Some people in the Soviet Union say that the state should provide free medical care for all citizens. Others believe that medical care should be provided and paid for privately." Answers range from 1, "should be private," to 7, "state should own."

* Support for more social and welfare spending is an average across three answers to the question "The Soviet Union is faced with many problems, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether, during your last normal period, you thought the Soviet Union was spending too much money on it, too little, or about the right amount." The problems named were "improving
the nation's health?;" "agricultural production?;" "improving the nation's education system?" Possible answers were too much (-1), about right (-2), too little (-3).

* Support for more defense/foreign spending was constructed in the same way as support for more social and welfare spending, but respondents were asked to evaluate spending on "aid to countries in Eastern Europe," "on the military, armaments and defense," and "the space exploration program."

* Oppose use of military force is an average on three questions: "People have very different opinions about the role of military force in relations between countries. Did you think that the Soviet Union was right or wrong to fight back against the Germans in 1941? To provide military aid to North Vietnam after the United States bombed North Vietnam in 1966? To send troops to Czechoslovakia in 1968?" (1-right, 2-wrong)

**Independent Variables used in the Analysis**

* Gender - The value of this variable is one if the respondent is female, zero if the respondent is male.

* Feminist is identical to the dependent variable, Feminist Orientation.

* Job satisfaction is a four-point scale where the value is one if the respondent is very dissatisfied; two, if somewhat dissatisfied; three, if somewhat satisfied; and four, if very satisfied.

* Nontraditional job - The value of this variable is one if a respondent worked in a predominantly male occupation (as recorded in the 1979 Soviet census) and is zero otherwise.

* Young children in household - The value of this variable is one if the respondent had a child under age seven in the household and is zero otherwise.
* Job status is a five-point scale, where 1-non-supervisory job, 2-supervisor of fewer than 10 employees, 3-supervisor of 10 or more employees, 4-nonparty nomenklatura position, and 5-party nomenklatura position.

* Income is the respondent's gross monthly wage/salary in rubles, logged.

* Education - The value of this variable is zero if the respondent did not complete secondary education. Secondary education equals one if the respondent completed secondary education and equals zero otherwise. Higher education equals one if the respondent completed higher education and equals zero otherwise.

* Generation - The value of the variable is zero if the respondent was born before 1919. Wartime equals one if the respondent was born between 1919 and 1925 (came of age during World War II), and zero otherwise. Postwar equals one if the respondent was born between 1926 and 1940 (came of age in postwar period), and zero otherwise. PostStalin equals one if the respondent was born between 1941 and 1960 (came of age after Stalin era) and equals zero otherwise.