PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND THE DILEMMAS
OF PARTY REFORM IN THE USSR:
INSIGHTS FROM SOVIET EMIGRANTS

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Abstract

This study draws on data from three surveys of Soviet emigrants to learn about the image of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Although the literature on Soviet politics has described the breakdown of discipline and effectiveness of the party under Gorbachev's predecessors, it has paid little attention to individual differences in perceptions of the party and how these differences reflect differences in individual experiences. This study examines the relationship of individual differences in the perceptions of the honesty and competence of local and central party leaders to four background factors: ideological commitment to strong state or collective control, satisfaction with the material quality of life, perceptions of the qualities of primary party secretaries, and direct experiences in citizen-initiated contacts with the party. The study also examines the reasons people give for joining or not joining the party. It is argued that the very effort to hold party members to extremely strict codes of personal conduct, while at the same time reducing their special privileges, is likely to hurt the party's ability to recruit members. Moreover, the process of democratization has offered new, alternative avenues for individuals with political or moral agendas to become involved in the political process without joining the party.
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND THE DILEMMAS OF PARTY REFORM IN THE USSR: INSIGHTS FROM SOVIET EMIGRANTS

When Mikhail Gorbachev first became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March, 1985, few of his public comments touched on specific questions of party reform. Although he promoted campaigns to expand mass political participation and to root out corruption and complacency in the CPSU apparatus, only gradually did he reveal that the party might be asked to assume a very different role than it had played in the past. The revised party program adopted at the 27th Party Congress in 1986 only hinted at such a redefinition. In his speech to the Congress, Gorbachev emphasized the need for a "psychological restructuring of cadres" (CPSU, 1986, I: 83). He stressed that how the party is perceived, both as a leading organization in Soviet society and as a membership organization, may be critical to defining its role in the future -- thus his aphoristic declaration that "There is no vanguard role of the communist in general; it is expressed in practical affairs" (CPSU, 1986, I: 102). But how this restructuring was to be accomplished, and how it might be linked to other political reforms, was left unspecified.

With the deepening of the reforms, the direction of party reform has become clearer. Gorbachev has proposed a serious overhaul of the party's structure and method of operation. As he observed at the Central Committee conference in November, 1987:

To say "we're going to work the way we've always worked" is incorrect, since today nothing will come of that. Simply putting on pressure, simply giving orders, simply hauling everyone before the district party committee is not a suitable method either....

In these conditions, the party should not so much take on the task of directly receiving questions as pose for itself another, more difficult task -- that of directing, coordinating, uniting and giving impetus to the social activeness of the masses through party organizations and cadres, through party control, through the creation of a healthy, energy-charged atmosphere in cities, districts, and collectives....

Where must the main emphasis be placed? It should be shifted to attention to the primary party organizations, to seeing to it that elective agencies begin working properly (CDSP, 1987: 1).

Thus, Gorbachev began to focus on the role of party organizations, as well as on the character and conduct of individual party members and leaders (the "psychological restructuring of cadres"). And it was the primary party organizations (PPO's) or party cells -- in factories, farms, educational institutions, and so on -- that were singled out for special attention.

The reasons for emphasizing the PPO are not difficult to understand. It is at the workplace that people come into most direct contact with the practical work of the party apparatus, especially with the PPO. If the character and the work of grass roots party organizations are perceived in a bad light, then the party as a whole will be unable to play the type of guiding role that its leaders expect. Moreover, given the large number of new political clubs and other groups that have sprung up in the last few years, the PPO and party members are strategically placed to help central party leaders keep abreast of mass politics.

The resolutions adopted at the 19th Party Conference, held in June 1988, reiterated the concern with the character of individual party members and the role of local party organizations (Moscow News, 1988, No. 29). The proposals sought to reduce the party apparatus in size, to minimize its intervention in state administration, and to ensure a clearer division

1 Earlier, Gorbachev noted at the June, 1987, Central Committee plenum that the PPO's were undergoing a "test for political maturity and capacity for action," and that their efforts would play the pivotal role in the transformation of economic management and in democratization. See Gorbachev (1987: 63).
of labor between party and state. At the same time, the proposals called for combining the leadership of party and state offices at the local level. In place of its old, command-style approach to managing Soviet political life, the party is now to rely on persuasion and indirect involvement, in particular through the activities of PPO's and individual party members in work collectives.

The selflessness and commitment of party members has thus assumed greater importance. To carry out the new role of the party, Gorbachev envisioned a change in recruitment:

We should not hesitate to get rid of all kinds of quotas and bureaucratic approaches to this question of admittance to the party which is so vital to the party. The main criterion of appraising the merits of a person applying for Party membership is his stance and the part he really plays in perestroika. This demand should concern all people -- workers, peasants and intellectuals alike. We all know perfectly well that a man can best be judged about in a collective, which can see clearly who joins the Party because he acts according to his conscience, and who merely seeks benefits for himself.

In fact, recruitment policy had already begun to change before the conference: the intake of new party members leveled off in the mid-1980s and the number of people expelled from the party increased (Harasymiw, 1988).

The Purpose of This Study

Calls for reform of the party at the grass roots claim that the CPSU under Gorbachev's predecessors stagnated, lost its commitment, and lost its ability to generate popular compliance and support. In the words of one delegate to a recent Leningrad party plenum (Khromilina 1989), the party faces a "crisis of confidence" [krizis doveriia]. At the same time, top party leaders still emphasize the party's long-standing claim to play the "leading role" in Soviet society and the need to maintain the CPSU as the sole party in the Soviet Union (see Gorbachev [1988a]).

But to maintain the CPSU's vanguard role requires that the party not become irrelevant to the political process at the grass roots or become just one among many competing institutions and interest groups (Gorbachev, 1987: 57). Much as new party leaders need to build their authority when they come to power (Breslauer, 1982), the party organization as a whole faces a problem of building its authority in an era when the traditional bases of party control

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2 For further discussion of the last issue, see Hahn (1989).

3 Gorbachev also reemphasized the importance of the PPO and its newly enhanced role in his remarks to the July, 1988 Central Committee Plenum on implementing the Party Conference Resolutions: "... [T]oday the primary Party organization is finding itself in a new situation -- what with the mounting processes of perestroika in the economic and social spheres and with the growing democratization of the life of work collectives and the whole of society. This is logical. All practical matters are solved locally, in work collectives. That is why Party committees should devote proper attention to the activity of primary Party organizations at the present crucial stage in the life of the Party and society." See Gorbachev's speech "On Practical Work to Implement the Decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference" (Gorbachev, 1988b).

4 As Viktor Yasmann (1989) reports, Gorbachev reiterated the need for a single party in February 1989. However, the party's claim to be the sole legitimate leader of society has come under attack from some quarters, in particular because of its Stalinist past. See, for example, Andreev (1989). Moreover, any student of comparative politics would recognize that many of the informal organizations involved in nominating candidates for elections in the past year served "party-like" functions.
are being recast. In fact, some Soviet commentators have described this as a critical task for the CPSU (e.g., Petrov, 1989).

In this paper we show that party leaders have very good grounds for concern about the party's image among the mass public. Based on interviews with emigrants from the Soviet Union who last resided there in the late 1970s and early 1980s, we explore individual attitudes toward the CPSU, and we identify what factors make a given individual more positive or more negative toward it. The interview data also reveal some of the dilemmas involved in party reform.

In the first part of the analysis we assess evidence about how the party is perceived -- to establish the scope of the party's authority-building problem. In particular, we examine perceptions of party leaders' honesty and competency, two key dimensions of evaluation commonly used in measuring support for political institutions. We also explore how the party is perceived from a different vantage point, namely, the willingness of individuals to join, and their perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of party membership.

Our ultimate goal is not simply to describe how people evaluated the honesty and competency of party officials or how people felt about joining the party, but to examine what creates a more positive attitude toward the party. We concentrate on four key factors: (1) overall material satisfaction with one's job, standard of living, housing, and medical care; (2) normative agreement -- support for the basic norms of the Soviet regime, in particular state control of the economy and collective control at the expense of individual rights; (3) direct experience with the party secretary at the workplace; and (4) experience with contacting party agencies directly to receive benefits or to redress grievances.

That material satisfaction and commitment to the formal political rules of the game generate greater support for political authorities is not a novel idea in the literature on Soviet politics. Certainly, Soviet leaders have frequently acknowledged a link between popular support and the party's ability to provide consumer goods and to raise the standard of living. But how much the party itself benefits from an increased standard of living is not clear. By examining data on perceptions of party leaders among Soviet emigrants, however, we can test empirically whether ideological appeals and the satisfaction of material wants actually do affect the way people evaluate the CPSU.

Furthermore, we can test the classic Soviet tenet that party officials' performance at the grass roots carries over to evaluations of party leaders more generally. Especially in a unitary party guided by the principles of democratic centralism, a positive assessment of the performance of local party leaders -- those officials who are visible and responsible at the grass roots -- ought to translate into a more positive image for the verkhushka. One reason for this is that central party officials depend on local party leaders to explain, justify, and mobilize

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5 This is an issue at all levels of the party hierarchy. At the middle levels, in cities and provinces, a central issue is how the first party secretaries and party bureaus will redefine their role vis-a-vis enterprise managers in an era when the managers are supposed to be given increasing responsibility for economic "self-management."

6 See, most notably, Breslauer (1978) and Colton (1987). The more general literature in political science has also linked the system's performance to the level of mass support. See, for example, Müller (1970).

7 V. I. Melnikov (1989), the First Secretary of the Obkom of the Komi ASSR, put the matter bluntly at a Central Committee plenary session in April 1989: "In practice, it looks as though the party has never abandoned the functions of feeding, shoeing, and clothing the people. And the people demand all this, and demand it only from the party."

8 However, there has been some substantiation of a link between these factors and the image of authorities as a whole as well as toward the KGB. See Bahry and Silver (1987).
support for central policies and actions. Our data thus allow us to put to the test Lenin's oft-cited dictum that "local practice is the proving ground of central leadership."

In addition, we examine the effects of citizens' direct contacts with party officials on the way they view the top leadership. Given the party's control over a vast system of social services and benefits, the ability to grant benefits may be an important lever in generating a more positive view of party leaders. As Theodore Friedgut (1978: 461) notes, "[T]he citizen can scarcely be expected to render enthusiastic support to the Soviet regime on the great issues of life if he must search in vain for a hearing on questions of daily existence."

However, the effects of citizen contacting may not be straightforward. Western research on bureaucratic encounters suggests that citizens' positive experiences may not do much to increase support for leaders and institutions, while negative experiences are likely to reduce it (Katz, 1975). Since people who initiate contacts with public officials are often likely to be those who expect a favorable outcome, obtaining a positive response may not make them any more favorably disposed toward the officials or toward the government in general. On the other hand, those who initiate contacts with officials but get nothing from them are likely to become more negatively disposed toward the official and the government. Thus, the gains to the party might be asymmetric: a negative payoff if no action is taken or if the action is unfavorable to the citizen, but no positive payoff if a favorable action is taken.

Data

The primary source of information for this study is the first General Survey (GI) of the Soviet Interview Project (SIP), which interviewed 2,793 emigrants from the Soviet Union who arrived in the United States between January 1, 1979, and April 30, 1982. Most of the survey questions asked respondents about their "last period of normal life" in the Soviet Union, which is the five-year period before their life changed in connection with their plans to emigrate. For most respondents, the end of their last normal period of life -- or LNP -- occurred at the time they submitted their application to emigrate. For the great majority of SIP GI respondents, the LNP occurred during the last years of the Brezhnev era. We also draw on results of a follow-up survey, G2, from the Soviet Interview Project; this survey included 572 respondents who arrived in the United States between May 1, 1982 and December 31, 1985 (Anderson and Silver, 1988).

Additional data on some issues are drawn from Harvard Project interviews with Soviet refugees who last lived in the USSR in the 1930s and 1940s. The data are recoded from transcripts of the life history interviews conducted in 1950-51 in Western Europe and the United States. Although the number of cases from the life history interviews is small -- 331 -- they appear to be representative of the 3,000 respondents who were in the Harvard Project sample as a whole, and on which the analysis in The Soviet Citizen (Inkeles and Bauer, 1968) was based. We use these data mainly to give a temporal dimension to part of the analysis, to help to understand whether the findings based on SIP respondents are peculiar to the late 1970s and early 1980s.

9 This aphorism is not to be interpreted to mean that the local party is a way to test the abilities of future central party leaders. Rather, it refers to the performance of the local party as the critical test of the capacity of the party leadership as a whole.

10 The SIP data used in this study are available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Full documentation and a description of the survey and sample methodology are available from the ICPSR.

11 The original data cards from the Harvard Project were lost. The Soviet Interview Project sponsored a "Harvard Recode Project" to create a data set from transcripts of the 331 "life history" interviews from the Harvard Project. See Bahry (1988).
Because the data for this study come from surveys of Soviet emigrants and displaced persons, questions naturally arise about potential biases. In each of these surveys, the researchers subjected the data to a variety of tests for potential bias. One compelling example comes from the Harvard Project: As Inkeles and Bauer demonstrated, respondents hardly fit the model of embittered emigrants. Most supported the established social and economic order, such as state ownership of heavy industry and the provision of public health care and public education. Even respondents who expressed strong hostility to the system as a whole found much about the Soviet system that they approved of (Inkeles and Bauer, 1968). A similar pattern was also found in the Soviet Interview Project (Silver, 1987).

Still, one should be cautious in generalizing about frequency distributions from a survey of emigrants to the Soviet population. SIP respondents come overwhelmingly from medium-sized and large Soviet cities; they are emigrants; and about 85 percent of them are Jewish by some definition. Generalizations should thus be limited to persons of European background from medium-sized and large Soviet cities, the "referent Soviet population" for the SIP sample. Harvard Project respondents came from both urban and rural areas, and were predominantly Russian or Ukrainian.

However, we are less concerned with the aggregate levels or the frequency distributions of the responses to particular questions than we are with the pattern of relations among variables, such as the relation between self-initiated contact with the party and evaluation of party leaders' competency. Based on this criterion, prior research using SIP data suggests that the patterns and relationships found in political data from the SIP General Survey generally are consistent with those reported by Soviet researchers (Bahry, 1987).

In addition, research using the SIP General Survey data shows that most of the responses to questions on political attitudes and behavior do not depend on whether the respondents were Jews or on whether individuals had especially traumatic experiences associated with emigration. Thus, although one can never prove that all the patterns in the responses reflect the attitudes and experiences of the referent Soviet population, there is strong evidence that the results are not primarily artifacts of the obvious potential sources of bias.

Competency and Honesty

We begin our analysis by exploring perceptions of the honesty and competence of party leaders, since these two dimensions of evaluation have often been used to assess public confidence in political elites and institutions.

At the outset, we should note that when respondents evaluate the character of members of the Politburo, they are unlikely to be thinking of specific individuals. Instead, as Unger (1977-78: 33) found in his interviews with Soviet emigrants in the 1970s,

Only a few interviewees could name more than five or six Politburo members and some had notable difficulty in going beyond the then troika of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny. In their perceptions the Soviet leaders were an undifferentiated, collective "they."

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12 The considerable literature dealing with this issue in relation to the Soviet Interview Project General Survey includes the chapters by Anderson and Silver, Bahry, Millar, Swafford, and Silver, in Millar (1987). Also see Donna Bahry (1987b) and Bahry and Silver (1987). For discussions of this issue in relation to other surveys of Soviet emigrants, see Bauer (1953), Inkeles and Bauer (1968), Gitelman (1977); and DiFranceisco and Gitelman (1984).

13 For further discussion, see Anderson and Silver (1987).

14 For further discussion of this point, see Millar (1987), Silver (1987), and Anderson and Silver (1987).
However, as we shall see, respondents clearly perceived Politburo members as different in honesty and competence from the leaders of other major institutions. Hence, we think the concept of "Politburo members" can be regarded as a proxy for "top party leaders" and is not a surrogate for "anyone in a position of authority."

As Table 1 illustrates, Soviet party officials are viewed as more competent than honest -- a split image (Bahry and Silver, 1987). In fact, when the SIP General Survey asked respondents to judge what proportion of the leaders of eight major Soviet institutions were competent (kompetentnyi) and what proportion were honest (chestnyi) or had integrity, the leaders of all eight institutions were rated as more capable than they were honest.

In comparing institutional leaders, people place the Politburo in the middle to lower part of the range on competence, and next to the bottom on honesty. Only the KGB receives a lower rating on honesty or integrity. Local party leaders rate lowest of all the institutional leaders on competence, and near the bottom on honesty. Politburo members get higher marks for competence than do their local counterparts, but they rank lower than local party officials on integrity.

That the respondents differentiate their image of the leaders of various political institutions and rate party leaders near the bottom suggests that party leaders are not judged negatively simply because all Soviet leaders are judged negatively. Instead, it appears that party leaders have an especially good reason for concern about the Soviet public's image of the party.

One could argue, however, that this image is specific to a given point in time, since respondents in the SIP GI Survey are people whose last period of normal life in the USSR occurred when Leonid Brezhnev was General Secretary of the party. Thus, the survey results could be colored by experiences during a period when corruption and poor leadership were reportedly endemic in the USSR. Partly for this reason, the Soviet Interview Project conducted a second survey (G2) among a more recent wave of emigrants, those who arrived in the United States between May 1, 1982, and December 31, 1985. Although the USSR by that time had experienced the Andropov and Chernenko leaderships and the beginning of the Gorbachev period, the average "honesty" and "competency" ratings for different institutional leaders were nearly identical among both the earlier and the more recent emigrants.

In the following sections we examine how these evaluations are affected by respondents' individual backgrounds and experiences. Did people whose direct experiences with local officials were more positive tend to evaluate party officials more positively? Are people who are more satisfied with their quality of life in the USSR more likely to judge party officials as honest and competent? Are individuals who support the idea of strong state and collective instruments of control more positively disposed toward the party? Are people who had perceived their local party secretaries in a more positive light more likely to view local officials and higher party officials more positively?

Self-Initiated Contacts with the Party

One of the most direct mechanisms by which the party might gain in the public eye would be to provide assistance to citizens who have complaints or requests. Our data reveal, however, that while many people turned to public officials for assistance, relatively few turned to the party. SIP respondents were asked:

15 This finding is similar to Unger's (1977-78) report, based on interviews with Soviet emigrants, that local functionaries were rated much lower than higher-level ones.

16 The data are not shown here. In addition, the G2 offers results concerning citizen-initiated contacts with officials and concerning the PPO secretary's image that are extremely similar to those found in GI.
During your last normal period [of life in the USSR], did you ever go to see or write to a government or party official about some need or problem not related to your emigration?

As shown in panel A of Table 2, 16 percent contacted a government official during their LNP, and only 2.6 percent contacted a party official.\textsuperscript{17}

Their reasons for contacting party and state officials can be classified into three groups: material/economic, administrative/regulatory, and protest/political.\textsuperscript{18} As shown in panel B, the overwhelming majority of contacts (81.5 percent) were for material reasons, to obtain such services as housing repairs or pensions; this is true of contacts with both party and government officials. Administrative reasons comprised 13.9 percent and political reasons comprised only 4.6 percent of all contacts. A similar pattern holds for contacts with the party specifically. However, as is highlighted in panel C, a disproportionate share -- 36.4 percent -- of all protest/political contacts were directed at the party.

Hence, most people turn to nonparty agencies with their requests and complaints. Since the party administers few benefits directly to the mass population, questions about housing or job benefits, for example, are far more likely to be directed first to a housing office or to superiors at work. Moreover, some respondents suggest that to contact a party agency is to invite unwanted scrutiny of other aspects of one's life and career. Party officials, in this view, were too inclined to ask other questions -- to investigate you or to ask about things that you may not want to reveal. Thus, the party was not the most common resort of citizens seeking help from officials. In fact, it seems more likely to have been the last resort.\textsuperscript{19}

What do people report about the typical outcomes of their contacts with party and state organs? As shown in panel D, the most common result was that either nothing happened or there was a positive response.\textsuperscript{20} Few people found themselves penalized for their efforts. However, official reactions varied with the issue: persons with a material or administrative claim were twice as likely to get something done as those with a political one.\textsuperscript{21} Reactions also varied with the level of the official who was contacted. Authorities above the local level were less likely to respond favorably than were local officials, apparently because the issues that people took to republic or central agencies were disproportionately political and involved more than just the solution of an individual problem. One-third of those that were directed to the

\textsuperscript{17} Note that although the question referred only to "government" and "party," some respondents referred to superiors at work in answer to the question on who they contacted. For purposes of this analysis, we regard these as "government."

\textsuperscript{18} See note a to Table 2 for the definitions. If the respondent reported more than one such contact during the LNP, the reasons given referred to the last contact.

\textsuperscript{19} The same conclusions emerge from interviews conducted with Harvard Project respondents. In the recoded Harvard Project data, 55 out of 331 respondents reported contacting some official and also gave the reasons for the contact. Of those, 82 percent went to nonparty agencies, and only 18 percent went to the party. For both party and nonparty contacts, material reasons predominated. The party was more likely to be contacted for political reasons, but even so, the majority of the requests to the party concerned material issues, such as housing and work conditions. Thus, the pattern for both the SIP General Survey and the Harvard Project bears out what Fainsod (1958: 396) reported on the basis of the Smolensk Archive records: the obkom first and second secretaries "functioned as the last court of appeal in the oblast', the ultimate dispensers of mercy and patronage after all other alternatives had been exhausted."

\textsuperscript{20} Harvard Project respondents offered a similar picture. In the majority of cases, citizen requests evoked no results, but 42 percent generated a positive response.

\textsuperscript{21} The data are not shown in the table.
central party were political -- critical of official policies -- whereas fewer than 10 percent of those that went to the local party or to the primary party organization were political.

If we focus on responses by party officials ("All Party" in panel D), the party's most common reaction to citizen contacts, in 51 percent of the cases, was to do nothing. However, thirty-nine percent of the contacts did evoke some positive official action. And only 10 percent led to a punitive response. Thus, penalties were uncommon, except (as shown in the "Central Party" and "Republic Party" columns) in the case of complaints aimed at the higher reaches of power. As noted earlier, this reflects the fact that contacts with republic and central party organs were more often political.

When people were asked to evaluate the outcomes of citizen-initiated contacts -- see panel E of Table 2 -- they reported that they received more satisfaction from other agencies than from party organizations. Thirty-eight percent of those who contacted a nonparty agency reported that they were "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with the contact, while only 20 percent of those who contacted a party body reported that level of satisfaction. This, too, reflects the purpose of the contact: simple requests for material benefits have a better chance of a favorable response. Also, for any given type of request, it seems likely that the party was, as the last resort, more likely to receive the less tractable ones.

Evaluations of the Primary Party Secretary

Although few people sought out the party for assistance, almost everyone would have had some contact with one of the more than 400,000 PPO's in Soviet workplaces. To explore the impact of this daily contact with the party, a random one-third of the respondents was asked to evaluate the characteristics of the party secretary at work, i.e., the secretary of the primary party organization, on a number of dimensions.

Table 3 shows that PPO secretaries' image varied widely. For example, being on the scene -- accessible and approachable -- is part of the PPO secretary's responsibility as a party leader. More than half of the respondents rated the secretary relatively high on this dimension -- as accessible, not as someone they would seek to avoid -- and three-fifths stated that he was constantly checking up on other people. The responses suggest that more often than not he was seen as conscientiously carrying out his party assignment as a regulator of conduct within the workplace (see panel A). We shall refer to this as the "regulator" role.

At the same time, party leaders are supposed to be models for others to emulate in their personal conduct and political values. We shall refer to this as the PPO secretary's "paragon" role. The overwhelming majority of respondents report that the PPO secretary failed on this score: more often than not, they felt that he placed his personal interests ahead of those of the collective, and he was not committed to Marxism.

This mixed image fits well with Vera Dunham's (1976: 18) description of the party apparatchik that emerged in postwar Soviet literature:

22 If the respondent did not work at the end of the LNP, the questions referred to the raion (district) party secretary.

23 A factor analysis based on the five items rating the characteristics of the PPO secretary confirms that there are two dimensions -- which we have labelled "regulator" and "paragon." For the analysis below, we constructed a simple summed scale based on the items pertaining to each factor. The details are given in the notes to Table 4. We replicated our later analyses using factor scores rather than the summed scales and found no substantive difference in the results.
Someone resembling a middleclass careerist replaced the revolutionary saint of the 1920s and the party vigilante of the 1930s -- he appeared now in the form of a vigorous manager.

The party secretary and party committee also get mixed evaluations when it comes to their effectiveness on the job. One item in the SIP General Survey asked "What effect did the party committee have on production problems -- did they make things better, worse, or did they have no effect?" As shown in panel B, a majority of the respondents (51.9 percent) felt that the party committee at their workplace had no effect on production problems; but among the other half, nearly twice as many (30.5 percent) felt that it had a positive effect as felt it had a negative effect (17.5 percent). Overall, then, the PPO is seen as being neutral or as something of a "fixer" in solving problems at work.

What people thought of the party organization at the workplace varied, however, with their own job status. Those with jobs on the party's nomenklatura and those who were simply rank-and-file workers gave the PPO the highest marks for helping with production questions. In contrast, people in the middle -- in nonparty supervisory positions -- felt that the party had little impact at their place of work. When the question shifted to the party secretary's role as a model of communist behavior, it was the regular workers who were most positive. They gave the party secretary higher marks as a paragon and a regulator, while people in supervisory jobs and especially people on the party's nomenklatura saw the party secretary as less than a model communist.

A similar picture emerged when men who had served in the military were asked about the effect of the political officer in their unit. Here, too, a sizeable number (41.7 percent) felt that the zampolit had no effect; but of those who felt they did have an impact, most felt that it was positive rather than negative. And here, too, perceptions varied by rank. Conscripts and noncommissioned officers were more inclined than officers to feel that the zampolit had a great deal of influence, and they were almost twice as likely to say that he affected things for the better. The officers were most likely simply to say that the political officer had no effect. However, if they did say he had an effect, they saw it as more positive than negative.

This perception gap between people with higher and lower job status or rank could reflect the different impact of the PPO secretary's activities on people at different levels. In enterprises and military units, the party secretary has few political or material resources that he can offer the director or the commanding officer; in fact, in enterprises where the party secretary is part-time (neosvobozhden), the boss may be the one who designates the party secretary, with the raikom providing confirmation. In such cases, a party secretary chosen from within may provide little help in solving the enterprise's problems with meeting the plan, finding adequate supplies, and so on, which can usually only be solved by going outside the enterprise or to higher agencies. Emigrants who held managerial positions suggest that the PPO secretary normally is not involved in this process. In fact, if he is appointed from within the enterprise, he is likely to have few connections outside that can help his organization with its plan.

On the other hand, one of the PPO secretary's tasks is to help to smooth out problems on the shop floor, and this can mean resolving disputes among workers or helping to get an individual some benefit such as improved housing. Thus, the PPO secretary would be addressing a production problem in the broad sense of boosting worker morale and

24 Zampolit -- an acronym for zamestitel' komandira po politicheskoi chasti, deputy commander for the political section.

25 Literally, "not freed" from normal work assignments to conduct party work.

26 The discussion in this paragraph is based in part on a series of specialized interviews with Soviet emigrants during 1985 and 1986.
productivity or enforcing work discipline. When that happens, rank-and-file workers might credit the party for playing a positive role.

Explaining the Party’s Image

If our hypothesis is correct, a Soviet citizen with a positive view of the party at the grass roots should also see higher party leaders in a more favorable light. But one should also expect the image of party leaders to be affected by other factors. Previous research based on the SIP GI survey revealed that people who were more satisfied with the material quality of life (their jobs, their housing, the availability of goods and medical care) were more favorably disposed toward the established political order (Silver, 1987). It seems reasonable to expect that the same could be true for party leaders, that people who are more satisfied may give credit to party leaders. In addition, individuals whose own political values are more consistent with official values should tend to evaluate top party leaders more positively (Bahry and Silver, 1987). These factors must be taken into account if we are to test for the independent effects of the party’s local practice.

Other factors need to be taken into account as well. For example, the way a person evaluates party leaders should also be influenced by structural variables such as social status, gender, and education. Given prior research, which shows that women are more favorably disposed toward the established political order (Carnaghan and Bahry, 1989; Bahry, 1987), one would expect women to be more supportive of party leaders than men. Also based on previous research (Silver, 1987; Bahry and Silver, 1987), the higher people’s education, the more critical they are likely to be of the established political order; hence the less positive an image they are likely to hold of party leaders.

We also expect that party members would see central party officials in a more favorable light than nonparty members. However, a direct question on party membership could not be asked in the survey, since it was so politically sensitive for Soviet immigrants to the United States. But we can approximate its effects by scoring respondents based on their participation in several activities known to be associated with party membership: holding a party nomenklatura position; working in an election campaign; belonging to the Komsomol; serving on a commission attached to a party agency or a soviet; belonging to the peoples’ militia (druzhina) or to a comrades’ court (tovarishcheskii sud). \(^{27}\) This yields a “party activism” score based on a simple count of the variety of such activities in which the respondent engaged in the LNP. The scores range from 0, for those who participated in none of the acts, to 3, for those who participated in three or more. \(^{28}\)

\(^{27}\) That work in campaigns, membership in the Komsomol, service on a local party or soviet commission, and being in a party nomenklatura position are party-related activities is self-evident. We also include membership in the citizens’ militia and the comrades’ courts because of independent evidence that a large portion of such activists are party members. (See Cheremnykh [1965]; Friedgut [1979].) To test whether this set of activities was in fact an indication of “party activism” among SIP respondents, we first conducted a factor analysis of measures of all five activities. The results confirm that all activities belong to a single underlying factor, and hence are unidimensional. We then examined whether the scores on “party activism” were correlated with whether or not the individual belonged to the party -- for the few individuals who volunteered the information that they had been a party member at some time in the USSR. Although there were several anomalies -- with some self-identified former party members scoring low on the “party activism” factor -- the result on the whole showed considerable consistency between the two indicators.

\(^{28}\) Because few people engaged in 4 or 5 of these activities, those who were scored 3, 4, or 5 were combined into a single group.
We rely on multiple regression (Table 4) to measure the effects of all the variables on the perceived competence (equation 1) and honesty (equation 2) of the Politburo. The regression coefficients that are statistically significant are marked by asterisks.29

As expected, the more people were satisfied with their material standard of living, the greater their faith in the competency and honesty of Politburo members. Also, individuals who supported the idea of state control of the economy had a more positive image of both the competency and honesty of the Politburo.30 However, commitment to collective control (vs. individual rights) is not related to the perceived competency of the Politburo, but it is positively related to its perceived honesty or integrity.

Thus, those who believe that they benefited from the system are likely to give political leaders some credit for its performance. Conversely, the party's image suffers from popular discontent with living standards, as local officials have now begun to acknowledge openly.31 Perhaps more important is the bearing of commitment to regime norms on perceptions of top leaders. The results suggest that people do not judge the regime's performance solely on pragmatic grounds -- "What has the party done for me?" -- but their personal ideology affects their judgment as well. People who agree with regime goals of a strong state also put more faith in the top leadership.

The results in Table 4 generally support our expectations, though there are differences for the two dimensions of the party's image. Even when we take into account people's levels of material satisfaction and support for regime norms, we find that the more educated perceive the Politburo as less honest, and women perceive the Politburo as both more competent and more honest.

However, party membership alone has little effect. Individuals who were more involved in party-related activities have neither a more nor a less favorable image of the Politburo than those who were less involved.32

Similarly, people who initiated contacts with the local party that led to favorable outcomes held no more positive an image of the Politburo than those who did not turn to the party. On the other hand, there is some evidence that people who contacted party officials and got a negative response saw the party leadership as less honest (the coefficients for "negative contact" in Table 4 are negative, as one would predict, though not statistically significant). The results are stronger when the same basic specification is tested using an alternate subsample.33 In this case, people who said that the primary party organization

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29 Coefficients that are significant at $p = .05$ using a two-tailed test are indicated by a double asterisk. Those that are significant at $p = .05$ using a one-tailed test (or at $p = .10$ using a two-tailed test) are indicated by a single asterisk.

30 For further discussion of the regime norms of state control and collective control, see Silver (1987).


32 The lack of an effect of "party activism" on perceptions of honesty and competence of the Politburo is not a result of collinearity between party activism and other measures in the equations. The zero-order relation between party activism and perceived competency is negligible and between party activism and perceived honesty is very weak.

33 The SIP General Survey (G1) questionnaire was divided into a "core," which was administered to all 2,793 respondents, and three "supplements," each of which was administered to a random one-third of the respondents. Questions in the "orange" supplement focused mostly on politics; questions in the "blue" supplement focused mostly on economics and work; and
helped solve production problems at work -- that the PPO played the role of "fixer" -- were more likely to see the top party leadership as both honest and competent; and those who had a negative experience when they contacted the party were significantly more negative toward the party's leaders.34

There is also evidence that the PPO secretary's image at work is related to the perceived integrity of the Politburo. Respondents who felt that the PPO secretary they knew on the job was accessible, approachable, and vigilant -- that is, scored high as a "regulator" -- were more likely to see Politburo members as honest; and respondents who felt the PPO secretary as committed to the collective interest and to Marxism -- who saw him as a "paragon" -- also characterized Politburo members as more honest.

Thus, the multivariate analysis provides mixed support for the notion of the local party as a proving ground for the central political leadership. On the one hand, there is only a modest relationship between the results of people's self-initiated contact with local party officials and their perceptions of central party leaders (and only when the party's response is unsatisfactory).35 On the other hand, the public image of the PPO secretary appears to make a difference. This implies that the campaign to upgrade the party's image is well founded: the image would be enhanced if the moral standards and effectiveness of local party officials were raised.

Why Join the Party?

Perhaps an even stronger test of peoples' attitudes toward the party is their view of joining it. In this section we explore the factors that lead people to have a more positive or negative view of party membership. Although the survey did not include a direct question on whether people had joined, it did ask them whether they would advise a friend to join the party. Those who said "yes" were asked why, and those who said "no" were asked why not, as well as why they thought people do join the party. The results from the SIP G1 respondents are reported in column 1 of Table 5.

Only 14.7 percent of the respondents said they would have advised a friend to join the party. However, the willingness to recommend that someone join varied with the background of the respondent. Nineteen percent of men would advise a friend to join, compared to only 11 percent of women. This disparity is consistent with the male-female difference in the actual distribution of party members in the USSR (Hough, 1977). Although women hold a more favorable image of top leaders, they are less likely than men to see a need to join (Carnaghan and Bahry, 1989).36

questions in the green supplement focussed mostly on culture, media, and leisure. In the case of questions on the PPO, items asking people to evaluate the personal qualities of the PPO secretary were addressed to the subset of respondents answering the "Orange" supplement; the question on the PPO's effect on production problems was asked of the subset of respondents answering the "Blue" supplement.

34 The data are not shown in a table.

35 This is consistent, however, with the findings in the literature on bureaucratic encounters. See Katz (1975).

36 The SIP G1 survey asked the following: "Many different things can help a person to advance in his or her career. In your opinion, which one item on this card was the most important for career advancement at your (last) job (in/before the end of the LNP)?" Of the random one-third of the respondents asked this question, 27.4 percent of the men said party membership was the most important factor, compared to 19.6 percent of the women.
People whom we identified as party activists were more favorable toward the idea of party membership: 22 percent of those who scored highest in party activism would recommend that the friend join, compared to 12 percent of those who scored lowest. A normative commitment to the established rules of the game also made a difference: 23 percent of those who scored high in their commitment to the regime norms of state control and collective control would recommend that a friend join the party, compared to just 10 percent of those who scored low in this commitment.

Thus, despite the low overall percentage who would have advised a friend to join the party, the differences among individual respondents make sense: men, activists, and those who were more committed to regime norms are more likely to approve of joining the party. Moreover, the relations between these factors and whether individuals would recommend that a friend join are not artifacts of the respondents' levels of education, age, or sense of material satisfaction. This evidence runs counter to the assertion that those who join (or would join) the party are no different from those who do not (see Unger, 1977-78; Shtromas, 1984).

The reasons people give for advising someone whether to join the party can be grouped into two categories: Material/Career reasons (opportunities for career advancement, access to privileges, or other material advantages) and Political/Moral reasons (service to the collective good and the attainment of ideological or political objectives). Over 95 percent of the answers fit within these two categories.

As shown in panel B (column 1) of Table 5, 88 percent of the answers by SIP respondents constituted material or career reasons for joining the party. Only 9 percent referred to political or moral reasons. Similarly, in panel C, among respondents who would recommend against joining the party, 83 percent of the reasons given to explain why people join referred to material or career advantages of party membership, and only 12 percent referred to political or moral benefits.

Thus, few respondents suggested that party membership was a way to further individual political objectives or to serve the public good. Political or moral considerations were far more important as reasons not to join the party: as shown in panel D (column 1), 65 percent of the answers given referred to political or moral reasons, and only 30 percent referred to economic or material reasons. These results are consistent with current Western and Soviet views of the party's evolution. Individuals are said to join the party not out of a sense of devotion to socialist principles or the collective good, but because of economic motives.

But there may be a more general implication of these findings. Namely, individual material incentives are criteria in decisions to join all political organizations. Even though people who join a particular organization are likely to be more committed to collective or group norms than people who do not join it, they may not be sufficiently attracted to join in

37 This conclusion is based on a multivariate probit analysis using as the dependent variable whether or not the respondent would recommend that a friend join the party, and using the same independent variables that were included in the equations in Table 4. The results are not shown here.

38 As reported 'disadvantages' to joining, the following answers were excluded from our analysis: "One could lose friends," and "It would be difficult to emigrate." As reported "advantages" to joining, the following answers were excluded: "Tradition," "Inertia," "Just to belong."

39 We should note that the format of the question addressed to the two groups of respondents in panel B and panel C were different. Respondents who gave the answers tabulated in panel B were offered a set of fixed response categories, whereas other respondents who gave the answers tabulated in panel C were not. Yet despite this difference in the format of the response categories, the distributions of the responses are quite similar between the two subsets of respondents.
the first place unless they perceive other, selective incentives for joining (Olson, 1965). Such incentives might include special access to goods and services, to information, to travel abroad, or other opportunities that are less accessible to non-party members. Even an organization whose very reason for coming into existence is a comprehensive program of social and political revolution may be able to attract the bulk of its members only on the basis of selective incentives rather than collective ones. In this sense, the Communist Party is an organization like any other.

Once again, it is important to note that this picture was not limited only to the end of the Brezhnev era. The SIP G2 survey shows that people who witnessed efforts at revitalization of the system during Andropov's short period of rule (and also during Chernenko's rule) give answers that are nearly identical to those by SIP G1 respondents.

Of course, this is still a relatively short time period, and one could argue that it represents a fundamental shift in values from earlier years. If so, then perhaps the evidence from the SIP G1 and G2 surveys means that we are witnessing, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the product of a long-term unraveling of the society itself -- a loss of moral commitment, an upsurge of materialism, and so forth. For example, one common view is that the party has suffered from a diminished level of idealism. As Aryeh Unger (1977-78: 25) suggests, based on his interviews with Soviet emigrants in the 1970s:

With rare exceptions Party membership was an indispensable requirement for advancement to the higher reaches of one's profession, and this fact dominated the considerations that led members of the white-collar classes to seek or accept Party membership. Ideological motivation accounted for no more than a small minority of new recruits. A significant change had occurred in this regard since the 1930s and 1940s.

But is it true that the balance of motivations to join the party was substantially different in the 1930s and 1940s than in the 1970s and 1980s? Evidence from the Harvard Project suggests that it is not. Harvard Project respondents were asked in an open-ended question, "What advantages and disadvantages did membership [in the CPSU] bring?" In panel C of Table 5, one can compare their answers to those given by SIP G1 respondents to a comparable question. The results are remarkably similar: material reasons predominate. In fact, the Harvard Project respondents were even more likely than the SIP respondents to name material or career reasons for joining the party.

Even if one were to assume that the Harvard Project and SIP G1 respondents on the whole were extremely hostile to the Soviet regime -- a characterization that previous research has shown to be far from accurate -- it is remarkable that so few respondents identified moral conviction, service to society, or benefits to the collective good as advantages of party membership: only 12 percent of the SIP G1 responses and 10 percent of the Harvard Project responses consisted of moral or political reasons for joining the party.

Respondents in both surveys had similar views on the reported disadvantages of being a party member. Sixty-five percent of the answers by SIP respondents and 58 percent of the answers by Harvard Project respondents named political or moral grounds for not joining the party. To join the party, one "had to lie," one "sacrificed one's ideals," one had to carry out policies with which one disagreed.

40 In general, the literature on political organization suggests that many people are motivated to join organizations for affiliative or for material reasons and may care little about the ostensible goals of the organization itself. For a discussion of incentive systems for joining organizations, see Wilson (1973).

41 It is also remarkable that very few (2.1 percent) mentioned that people join the party because they are forced to join.
The remarkable similarity between the SIP G1 and the Harvard Project results suggests that when contemporary party leaders call for reviving the emphasis on the personal character and political convictions of party members, they may have in mind a mythical golden age when joining the party was an act of moral or political conviction more than one of convenience. It is well to keep in mind that the mass enlistments of party members in the 1920s and 1930s brought into the party's ranks many whose political commitment was suspect (Getty, 1985). The period when young people were attracted to the party primarily because of ideological commitment may have disappeared in Lenin's time. By the 1930s, party membership was perceived as advantageous primarily as a way to advance one's career or to improve one's material welfare.

This interpretation is also supported by Merle Fainsod's interviews of Soviet refugees in the late 1940s. Fainsod (1956: 275) noted that, contrary to the widespread assumption in the non-Soviet world that the Soviet regime has a nearly complete hold on the loyalty of Soviet youth, "the attraction of Communist ideology for Soviet youth was greatly exaggerated in the West." Referring to one informant, Fainsod reported:

This informant also pointed out that it was important to distinguish between the attitudes of two different generations of Soviet youth: (1) those who came of age in the period of the first Five Year Plan and collectivization, and (2) those who came of age in the middle and late thirties. In the first group, he stated, the imagination of many was caught by the grandiose sweep of the Five Year Plan and the Agricultural Revolution. The Komsomols of that generation started with a vision of a vast constructive effort, and genuine idealistic motivation could not be discounted. . . . But the fervor abated. . . . The new generation which came of age in the mid- and late thirties . . . never really captured the crusading spirit and idealistic vision of the earlier group. For them, the Komsomol and the party organization were much more of a bread-and-butter affair. They were disciplined to repeat the fashionable party slogans of the moment, but they repeated them as gestures of conformity rather than out of any inner conviction. 42

To be sure, this evidence does not prove that only calculations of material interest are relevant to the decision to join the party. The range of motivations found among individuals who join any political organization is often quite broad. The challenge to the leaders of a political organization is to find a mix of incentives -- material, ideological, emotional, and perhaps coercive -- that will assure not only the requisite number of joiners but also joiners with the desired traits. 43 There is some evidence, mentioned previously, that those who are active in party-related affairs in the USSR are more committed to the official ideology. Consistent with this, SIP respondents who were high in political activism were more likely to mention political or moral reasons for joining the party, and less likely to mention moral or political reasons for not joining it (see Table 6).

But even for those who were high in political activism, material and career reasons were mentioned more frequently than moral or political ones for joining the party, and political and moral costs were mentioned more frequently than material or economic ones for not joining the party. A similar pattern is found among Harvard Project respondents. Hence, any reduction in the material payoff from joining the party may well reduce the potential number of joiners, even if a larger proportion of those who join have the desired backgrounds and character traits. The rapid increase in the number of voluntary associations in the USSR in

42 This citation contrasts sharply, however, with Fainsod's own words in How Russia Is Ruled, which was published only three years later: "The power of the regime to bombard the minds of the young is perhaps its most formidable weapon. While loyalties may erode with experience and maturity, each new generation offers the ruling group a fresh opportunity to rebuild its mass support and to renew its life energies" (Fainsod, 1953: 494).

43 For a discussion of the variety of incentive systems that may operate, see Knoke (1988) and Harasymiw (1988).
the last few years attests to people's readiness to be mobilized behind calls to public service and the production of collective goods; but such a mobilization is occurring largely outside the party rather than within it.

Conclusion and Implications

The evidence examined here confirms that people who are more positive about the party's performance at the grass roots have a more favorable image of the competency and integrity of central party leaders and are more favorably disposed toward party membership. Moreover, people who are more satisfied with their material standard of living also see the party more favorably. This finding is consistent with previous evidence of the importance of subjective material welfare for generating political support (Silver, 1987; Bahry and Silver, 1987).

Those who are more committed to a strong state and to central political control are also more favorable toward the party. Thus, there is more to generating political support than simply raising the level of subjective material satisfaction.

We should keep in mind, however, that perestroika, glasnost', and democratization have directed public attention away from the traditional regime norms. Those who were most critical of regime norms in the past—who preferred a less centralized economy and who valued the rights of the individual more than those of the collective—now have more incentive to support the top party leaders under Gorbachev. Hence, the younger generations and the more highly educated are likely to hold a more positive image of a reform-minded top party leadership. At the same time, changes in wages and income distribution that favor individuals in higher-skilled occupations should increase the support for party among these same groups.44

Thus, our research reveals that there are several methods of building support for the party. But it also suggests that party leaders bent on reforming the party itself are likely to confront several dilemmas.

Replenishing the Party Ranks. First, our results show that by holding party members to higher standards of personal integrity and moral commitment, the party can gain popular support. When local party officials are viewed as models of moral and political virtue, higher authorities seem to be viewed more positively as well.

But the call for higher standards of conduct creates a problem in recruiting new party members. If, by joining the party, people are going to have to live very straight lives, be subject to the strictest standards of conduct, attend innumerable meetings and sacrifice much of their personal free time, they need compensation. At the same time, party members are being told not only that they will be held to a high moral standard, but that they will not be put on a pedestal simply because they are party members and they will have less access than in the past to scarce commodities and services, such as medical care, housing, vacations, chauffeured cars, and special rations.45

Thus, while the costs of being a party member are apparently being increased, the benefits—both tangible and intangible—are apparently being reduced. Perhaps for some who are strong idealists, sufficient incentive to join can be found in the opportunity to act on their political and moral convictions within the party. But for many, the decision to join is likely to depend on a calculus that involves a variety of objectives—including material costs and benefits, ideological commitments, the desire for social prestige or power, the need for affiliation, and other factors.

44 For evidence supporting the interpretation in this paragraph, see Silver (1987).

45 See Taubman (1988) for a discussion of reforms, including the planned loss of their office car and driver by 400,000 government and party officials, effective June 1, 1988.
Our evidence suggests that the maintenance of special material incentives, especially those related to career advancement, has long been critical to recruiting qualified people into the party. And we would suggest that it probably needs to remain an important consideration. This is particularly so if party activists are going to be expected to assume added responsibilities related to political and economic reforms. For this reason, we would anticipate that any new role for the party in a period of political restructuring that involves the elimination of material rewards for party membership would seriously undermine the party's capacity to recruit or to mobilize members.

Of course, if current efforts to renew the image of the party are successful and if people are captivated by the new programs and policies pursued by party leaders, then a sufficient number of them may join the party for purposive or ideological reasons. Also, the clan of a smaller, more cohesive, and specialized cadre with increased public prestige might help to offset the greater demands placed on party members. But we would maintain that unless special material rewards and career opportunities for party members are maintained, the party will have to be extremely effective in its policies and in remaking its public image if it hopes to attract sufficient numbers even of those who are committed to the party’s policy objectives. This is all the more so because as a single ruling party that is now to serve as a mediator and reconciler of competing social interests, the CPSU is unlikely to satisfy the programmatic goals of all of its members.

The situation seems most acute for the recruitment of lower echelon party officials. People with the backgrounds and skills that the party wants have alternative career opportunities. As several local party leaders have complained, recruitment has become more difficult because candidates can now earn higher incomes in state enterprises and in cooperatives. Consequently, some local party leaders complain that it has become difficult to fill positions in the party apparatus. As the First Secretary of the Moscow Obkom recently observed:

There is also the overdue issue of adjusting [party cadres'] labor remuneration which is lagging considerably behind the average wage of workers, specialists, and most national economic sector managers. A party raikom instructor now receives R200, a party raikom secretary receives R270, and a raikom first secretary receives R340. In these circumstances, it is difficult to recruit experienced, able party leaders. If the Central Committee ignores these problems, we will lose cadres. Even now, there are dozens of vacancies in our oblast and the situation is getting worse (Mesiats, 1989: 48).

At the same time, popular hostility toward the party apparatus itself makes it difficult to raise the salaries of party workers (Melnikov, 1989; Bobovikov, 1989). Indeed, hostility to the party apparatus seems to have been especially high in the March 1989 elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies. As one candidate reported, not only did his opponents slander him with accusations about his personal integrity and commitment to the people: "But the most ‘fearsome’ of all the accusations put forth by my opponents, was that I am an ‘apparatchik’ and a ‘nomenklaturnyi rabotnik.’ I never was and am not.” Thus, finding people who are willing to serve in party offices may become even more difficult now that party leaders may have to face popular elections.

46 See, for example, Mesiats (1989) and Zhil’tsov (1988).

47 Some of the immediate hostility may have been a response to shortages and the imposition of rationing for sugar, meat, dairy products, tea, and (in the weeks before the March 1989 elections) soap and detergent.

48 The candidate, Vladimir Smirnov, who was a worker in a Leningrad factory, was interviewed in Leningradskata Pravda, April 6, 1989: 3.
The Challenge of Glasnost. Second, glasnost poses a related threat to the party. In the Soviet system, public access to information about state and party activities has been extremely limited. By broadening the channels and reducing the costs through which such information can be acquired, the policy of glasnost may further weaken the incentive for people to become party activists.

The Availability of Alternative Organizations. Third, with the advent of tens of thousands of new political groups, people who do feel a normative commitment toward social activism now have alternative avenues for involvement -- ranging from broad reformist coalitions such as the "Popular Front" organizations to narrowly focused groups concerned with environmental pollution, historical preservation, and so on.

The elections in March 1989 clearly demonstrated the vitality of informal organizations in marshalling candidates and voters behind their programs. Many local party officials complained afterwards about being out-campaigned by informal organizations (e.g., see Mikkau, 1989; Berezov, 1989).

Another apparent consequence of the growth of alternative organizations is a fall-off in recruitment of new members into the Komsomol and the party. As the youth wing of the party, the Komsomol is the primary recruiting ground for party members. Based on interviews with Komsomol officials, Bill Keller (1988) has noted: "In growing numbers, Soviet young people are rejecting Komsomol as stuffy and doctrinaire, and some of them are trying to organize their own, independent forms of political activity." The head of the Komsomol reports that between 1985 and 1988 the number of 14 and 15 year-olds joining declined by 25 percent (Keller, 1988).49 In a recent conversation with a Soviet official in the Higher Komsomol School in Moscow, the authors learned that, by his estimate, 60 percent of Soviet youth who joined the Komsomol did so for "traditional" reasons -- out of habit or custom -- and only 25-30 percent joined out of a sense of normative commitment.50

Similar problems seem to be confronting the party. Fewer people are applying to become party members, fewer applicants are admitted to candidacy, and fewer candidates become full members. In addition, many people are reportedly leaving the party on principle. It is possible that these trends are partly a result of more stringent criteria for the selection of party members. Also, higher party organizations reportedly have stopped imposing quotas for recruiting members from particular social backgrounds (Petrov, 1989; Gerasimov, 1989).

Thus, perestroika and glasnost have helped to create competing outlets for the expression of idealism and interest in public service. In this sense, there may be a fundamental contradiction between the drive for perestroika and democratization, on the one hand, and the effort to renew the membership of the party, on the other hand. It may be extremely difficult for the party to replace materialists and careerists with people who are called to public service out of a sense of moral commitment alone -- without the traditional privileges and other tangible and intangible benefits that go along with party membership.

These are not the only apparent contradictions involved in party reform in the era of restructuring. As our results show, where local party officials are perceived to be effective managers, perceptions of the party as a whole are more favorable as well. But if the party is supposed to become less directly involved in the day-to-day management of economic affairs as a result of the strengthening of economic self-management of enterprises, then local party

49 Between January and September, 1988, Komsomol membership is reported to have declined by 2 million members -- from 38 million to 36 million (RL, 1988).

50 The official attributed the balance of motives to "emotional" reasons and to material or egoistic reasons.
officials and especially PPO's are at risk of being relegated to a role of cheerleader and morale booster rather than that of an active agent or problem solver.\textsuperscript{51}

In addition, in an increasingly "energy-charged atmosphere" in the locales, the capacity of local party officials is likely to be strained. They are supposed to have an open-door policy, to be able to respond to the ever-increasing number of demands from the public, while cutting the size of their staffs. Even if they had adequate staffs, they would still find it difficult to regulate or even monitor all the new forms of mass political participation. And until the new rules of political behavior are well defined, it is difficult for local officials to know which activities to allow and which ones to forbid or to discourage.\textsuperscript{52} Local officials are warned against being unresponsive to public initiatives, but at the same time they are expected to keep events from getting out of hand. The ground rules for evaluating whether initiatives from below are dangerous or tolerable are far from clear, as is suggested in a Pravda editorial (CDSP, 1988):

New, in many ways unusual and as yet unfamiliar forms for the manifestation of initiative "from below" are coming into being. How should they be evaluated? There is only one criterion here: Everything that benefits socialism and democracy should be supported "from above."

Our argument is predicated on the assumption that Gorbachev is sincere in stating that he wants to maintain the party’s role as "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society." We are suggesting not only that it may be difficult to reconcile democratization with the maintenance of the party's leading role, but also that the methods that have been adopted to improve the party's image may make such a reconciliation more difficult. Our argument is not that Soviet leaders should abandon all hope of attracting people into the party who can serve as paragons of political and moral virtue. We suggest only that sizeable selective incentives probably must also be maintained if the party is to attract the desired number of even well-motivated people into its ranks.

\textsuperscript{51} However, the party continues to be invoked as crisis manager, such as in recent calls for the party to assume a stepped up role to counter serious shortcomings in the performance of the transport system and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

\textsuperscript{52} On the ambiguities, see the fictional discussion between two local party secretaries in Fedor Burlatskiy’s teleplay, "Two Views from One Office," shown December 15, 1986 on Moscow television and reprinted in FBIS (1987).
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TABLE 1. Rating of Leaders of Institutions for Competence and Honesty

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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost All (4)</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most (3)</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some (2)</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly Any (1)</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None (0)</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>2.22%</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td>2.15%</td>
<td>2.17%</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
<td>2.83%</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Honesty/Integrity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost All (4)</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most (3)</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some (2)</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly Any (1)</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None (0)</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>1.24%</td>
<td>1.36%</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
<td>1.36%</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>2.17%</td>
<td>2.14%</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Here is a list of some institutions that exist in the Soviet Union. I would like you to think about how many of the people in charge of each of them you felt were honest during your last normal period of life in the USSR. For each one, circle the number under the category that best describes how many of the people in charge were honest.*

[Almost All, Most, Some, Hardly Any, or None] [Institutions listed, in order: Management of Industry, Leaders of local Soviet organs, People in charge of the military, People in charge of the Academy of Sciences, People in charge of the Police, People in charge of the Politburo of the Central Committee, People in charge of the KGB, People in charge of the local party organs in your city.]

*Now turn the page over. On this side, think about how many of the people in charge at each of these institutions were competent, that is, did their jobs well. Remember, try to think about how you felt during your last normal period.* [Same response categories and order of institutions as in the "honesty" question]

*People in charge* was translated as rukovoditeli. *Competent* was translated as kompetentnyi, and *honest* was translated as chestnyi. The term chestnyi also means "honest," "honorable," or "having integrity."
### Table 2. Incidence and Evaluation of Contacts with Party Agencies during LNP

#### A. Respondents Who Initiated Contact with Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Base N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Contacts</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>(2649)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Government</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>(2649)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Party</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>(2649)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. Reason for Contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Administrative</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Base N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Contacts</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>(482)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Government</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>(413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Party</td>
<td>62.3%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>(69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### C. Of All Who Contacted Either Government or Party Agencies for Given Reason, Percent Who Contacted the Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Base N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>(393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>(67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest/Political</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>(22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>(482)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### D. Response to Contact, by Type of Agency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Party</th>
<th>All Party</th>
<th>Central Party</th>
<th>Republic Party</th>
<th>Local Party</th>
<th>FPO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Took Action to Solve Problem</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Nothing</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposed Penalty</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Took Action and Imposed Penalty</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Percent</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N</td>
<td>(425)</td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### E. Percent of Respondents Satisfied with Result of Contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Base N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>(382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>(70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*a* LNP is the individual's "last normal period of life" in the USSR. The question was: "During your last normal period of life in the USSR, did you ever go to see or write to a government or party official about some need or problem not related to your emigration?"

*b* Material contacts are citizen-initiated contacts with public agencies to obtain services, such as pensions or housing repairs. Administrative contacts involve acts of registrations or applications, such as birth registrations and permission to travel abroad (other than emigration). Protest/Political contacts involve criticisms of official policies, or complaints about the state itself or its handling of citizen rights. Of the 495 such citizen-initiated contacts in the LNP, 7 could not be classified into one of these three categories.

*c* Non-Party agencies include offices of the local government, such as housing offices and civil registry offices, as well as superiors at work.

*d* Persons who contacted a party or state official in the LNP and who reported that the official took action to resolve the problem were asked how satisfied they were with the action. Those who reported that they were "very satisfied" or "satisfied" are classified here as "satisfied." The percentage is the proportion of all persons who initiated a contact with an official who reported that they were satisfied with the results of the contact.
TABLE 3. Evaluations of Party Secretary at Place of Work or in Military Unit, SIP GI Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. The Party Secretary (at Work/In Raion)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Was not accessible</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>(665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Was someone to avoid</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>(674)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Was not committed to Marxism</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
<td>(515)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Was constantly checking up on people</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>(585)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Put his personal interests ahead of collective interests</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>(570)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Impact of Party Committee at Work</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The party made production problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>(724)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. Influence of Political Officer in Military Unit</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| How much influence did the political officer have in your military unit?  
A great deal                                          | 66.0%   | (326) |
| Some                                                | 19.0%   |      |
| Not very much                                       | 8.3%    |      |
| None                                                | 6.7%    |      |
| Total                                               | 100.0%  |      |

The figures based on SIP General Survey data in all tables exclude individuals who had not reached age 18 at the beginning of their "last normal period of life" (LNP) in the Soviet Union. Questions on the party secretary at work and the impact of the party committee at work were asked of a random one-third of respondents. Questions about political officers in the military were asked of all those who served in the military after 1960.

Instructions: If R worked at the end of the LNP, the following questions refer to the secretary of the primary party organization at work. If R did not work at the end of the LNP, the questions refer to the raion party secretary. "Think about the party secretary (at your job in your raion) in [END OF LNP]. Would you say the party secretary was accessible to you if you had a problem (at work) that needed to be solved?" [Yes, No] "Would you say that the party secretary was someone you would avoid having contact with?" [Yes, No] "Would you say that the party secretary was someone who was committed to Marxism?" [Yes, No] "Would you say that the party secretary placed the interest of the collective ahead of his personal interests?" [Yes, No] "Would you say that the party secretary was constantly checking up on the activities of other people?" [Yes, No]

At that place where you worked, what effect did the party committee have on production problems -- did they make things better, did they make things worse, or did they have no effect?"

How much influence did the political officer in your [military] unit have -- a great deal of influence, some, not very much, or none?"

On the whole, did he make things better or worse, or did he have no effect?"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Competence of Politburo (Eq. 1)</th>
<th>Honesty of Politburo (Eq. 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td><strong>b</strong></td>
<td><strong>b</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Material Satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Satisfaction</td>
<td>.217**</td>
<td>.355**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Regime Norms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Control</td>
<td>.153**</td>
<td>.175**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Control</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.065**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Material Privileges</td>
<td>-.184*</td>
<td>-.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete Higher</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>-.436**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete Secondary</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-.363**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>-.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-War</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>-.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Stalin</td>
<td>.372*</td>
<td>.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.331**</td>
<td>.242**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-Related Activism</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted Party</td>
<td>.323</td>
<td>.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Contact</td>
<td>.411</td>
<td>.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Contact</td>
<td>-.058</td>
<td>-.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of PPO/Raion Party Secretary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.286*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragon</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td>.374**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>-.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(423)</td>
<td>(431)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TABLE 4 -- Notes**

* coefficient is significant at \( p = 0.050 \) using a 1-tailed test.

** coefficient is significant at \( p = 0.050 \) using a 2-tailed test.

a "Subjective Material Satisfaction" is a summated scale based on responses to five questions concerning the respondent's satisfaction with the material conditions of life during his last normal period of life (LNP) in the USSR: housing, job, standard of living, medical care, availability of goods. The scale ranges between +2 (most satisfied) and -2 (least satisfied), with 0 as a midpoint. For details, see Brian D. Silver, "Political Beliefs of the Soviet Citizen: Sources of Support for Regime Norms," in James R. Millar, Ed., Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 100-141.

b Scores on the "State/Private Control" measure and the "Collective/Individual" measure range from 7 (greatest state/collective control) to 1 (greatest private/individual control). Each measure is based on responses to three questions. For details, see Silver, "Political Beliefs."

c This is a count of the number of privileges the respondent claimed to receive during the LNP, from a list: access to a closed medical clinic, access to special shops, use of an official car. Scores range from 0 to 3.

d Dummy variables representing highest diploma or degree earned. The omitted category is "less than complete secondary education."


f Dummy variable: 1 if female, 0 if male;

g Number of party-related activities in which the individual engaged, out of a possible five: participation in the Komsomol, holding a party nomenklatura post, working in an election campaign, serving on commissions of party or soviet organizations, and being a member of the people's militia (druzhina) or comrades' court. Scores range from 0 to 3. The extremely few individuals with scores of 4 or 5 are recoded as 3 to avoid skewing the results.

h Dummy variables representing results of citizen-initiated contacts with the party. The first (Positive Contact) takes the value of 1 if the individual contacted a party organization or official and reported that he or she was satisfied with the result, and a value of 0 if not. The second (Negative Contact) takes the value of 1 if the individual contacted the party and either a) received no response, b) were not satisfied with the result, or c) were penalized. The omitted category includes persons who did not initiate contact with the party.

i "Paragon" is a based on two items: perceptions that the party secretary "was committed to Marxism" and "put the interests of the collective ahead of his personal interests." Responses were scored as 2 if respondents said the statement was true, and 1 if they said the statement was not true. The total score is an average on the two items. Scores range from 1 to 2.

"Regulator" is an average based on three items: perceptions that the party secretary "was accessible," "was always checking up on the work of others" and "was not someone the respondent would seek to avoid." Responses agreeing with these judgments were scored 2 and responses disagreeing were scored 1. Respondents had to answer at least two of the items to be scored on that item. Scores range from 1 to 2.
TABLE 5. Reasons for Joining or Not Joining the CPSU, by Harvard Project and SIP G1 Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Respondents Who Gave Each Type of Reason&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>SIP G1 (1)</th>
<th>Harvard Project (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Would Advise Friend to Join the Party&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N</td>
<td>(715)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Why Advise a Friend to Join?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material/Career</td>
<td>88.3%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/Moral</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Why Do People Join the Party?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material/Career</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/Moral</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N of Responses</td>
<td>(816)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Why Advise a Friend Not to Join</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material/Career</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/Moral</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base N of Responses</td>
<td>(685)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> "If one of your friends with the same skill level and social status as you had been asked to join the party in [end of respondent's last normal period of life in the USSR], would you have advised the friend to join or not?" This question was asked of a random one-third of the respondents in the SIP G1 survey.

<sup>b</sup> Respondents who answered "yes" to the above question were asked, "Which of these reasons comes closest to why you would have advised your friend to join the party?" [List Shown to Respondent: To gain inside information, To get certain material privileges, To increases the chances of occupational advancement, To gain power and/or prestige, Other (Specify)] Only one answer was coded per respondent. If possible, the "Other" responses were recoded into one of the specified categories. The coded answers were recoded into two basic types: material/career and political/moral reasons.

Material/Career advantages to joining the party included: Access to material and nonmaterial privileges, Career advancement, Educational opportunities, To gain inside information

Political/Moral advantages to joining: Out of conviction, Believed in the party, Believed in the system, To gain power and/or prestige, To gain the trust of the authorities

Material/Career disadvantages to joining: Material disadvantages, Took too much time, Too many responsibilities, Had to go to meetings, No advantage/nothing lost by not joining

Political/Moral disadvantages to joining: Had to lie, Party was ineffective, Members have no influence, Party lost its ideals, Didn't believe in party, Didn't trust party, Party is unrepresentative, Top party officials have unfair privileges, Risky

In the SIP data, the percentages in some panels do not add to 100 because some answers did not fit into the three categories. Among the most common "other" responses for not joining: "people will look down on you," "joining would cause problems when one wanted to emigrate." Note that extremely few people volunteered that they "had no choice" or were forced to join the party. If such answers were given, they were not included in either of the two categories.
In the Harvard Project, the question was: "What advantages and disadvantages did membership [in the CPSU] bring?" The question was open-ended and up to three disadvantages were coded. In the SIP GI survey, the question was: "Why do people join the party?" The question was asked of only a random one-third of the respondents, and of those respondents, only of those who would not have advised a friend of theirs to join the Communist party. The question was open-ended and up to three answers were coded per respondent.

d In the Harvard Project, the question was: "What advantages and disadvantages did membership [in the CPSU] bring?" In the SIP GI survey, the question was: "Why would you have advised [your friend] not to join the party?" In the SIP GI survey, this question was asked only of respondents who said they would have advised a friend to join the party. The question was open-ended and up to three answers were coded per respondent.
TABLE 6. Reasons for Joining or Not Joining the CPSU, by Harvard Project and SIP G1 Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Harvard Project</th>
<th></th>
<th>SIF G1</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Membership</td>
<td>Party-Related Activism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Party</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Would Advise Friend to Join the Party</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Base N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Why Advise a Friend to Join?</td>
<td>Material/Career</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Base N</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Why Do People Join the Party?</td>
<td>Material/Career</td>
<td>91.1%</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political/Moral</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Why Advise a Friend Not to Join</td>
<td>Material/Career</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political/Moral</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Base N of Responses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See the notes to Table 5 for an explanation of the categories.*