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SOVIET CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ON THE EVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION

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Abstract

This study reassesses the debate over Soviet citizen politics in the USSR during the Brezhnev era. We argue the need for a more complex model of citizen participation in the USSR before Gorbachev if we are to have an accurate baseline for evaluating changes in regime-society relations. We examine the connections between individual attitudes and individual behavior, and we show that political participation under the "old regime" was not nearly as one-dimensional and devoid of affect as many previous researchers (and current Soviet leaders) have described it. Many forms of political participation in the Soviet Union before Gorbachev did not fit the stereotype of a psychologically disengaged citizenry driven to participate only by coercion, a desire to conform, or a quest for particularized benefits from public officials.
SOVIET CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ON THE EVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION

One of the most visible products of reform in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has been the transformation of mass politics. The rise of thousands of informal groups and the defeat of many candidates supported by the Communist Party in the March 1989 election marked a revolutionary turn in political participation in the USSR. Soviet citizens displayed a degree of sophistication in their nominating and vote garnering strategies as well as in casting their ballots that few students of Soviet politics would have predicted. The subsequent development of parliamentary institutions and the breaking of the Communist Party's monopoly of power carried the political revolution even further.

The new politics has been accompanied by a reappraisal of political involvement before the advent of Gorbachev's democratization. Analysts in the USSR now emphasize that the level of participation in that era fell far short of the mass activism prescribed in Soviet theory. And they question how much of citizen participation was in fact authentic -- how much of it reflected real personal commitment and how much of it was simply a response to pressures for conformity.

The debate echoes a lively controversy among Western scholars over the nature of Soviet citizen participation under Khrushchev and Brezhnev (for overviews, see Schulz 1981 and Hahn 1987). While many analysts have described participation then as almost entirely a product of regime-directed mobilization, others have suggested that citizens' motives and opportunities for political activism could not be as narrow as the mobilization model implied. However, evidence to sort out these competing arguments is scant and contradictory. For each study suggesting a positive connection between political interest, individual values, and political involvement, another finds apathy and alienation to be prevalent among those who were formally active in politics before democratization.

We reexamine the connection between individual attitudes and political behavior on the eve of the Gorbachev era. Although many Soviet and Western authors now dismiss citizen activism in the so-called "period of stagnation," we shall present evidence that political involvement was hardly as one-dimensional and devoid of affect as it is currently described. We argue that there is a critical need for a more complex model of participation before Gorbachev if we are to have an accurate baseline for evaluating change in the Soviet citizen's orientations toward the political world. The theoretical framework for analyzing political involvement needs to be recast in order to explain better the levels and types of citizen activism.
We also draw some insights from comparative theories of political participation. As analysts from Verba and Nie (1972) onward have emphasized, there may be little value in treating participation as a single, unidimensional construct. Different forms of political involvement offer a different mix of costs and benefits to potential activists, and these affect who will become active (see especially Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Barnes and Kaase 1979).

The Nature of Soviet Political Participation

One of the appeals of the mobilization model was that it fit well with the Soviet tradition of political control. Not only were Soviet political institutions authoritarian, but society itself seemed inhospitable to democratic values. Analysts wondered whether Soviet political culture would support democratic political processes and open political debate; at best, it seemed to encourage subject competence and covert participation (Barghoorn and Remington 1986; DiFranceisco and Gitelman 1984).

Moreover, the mobilization model suggested that the Soviet citizen was largely depoliticized and disengaged psychologically from the political process. Sharlet (1967) contended, for example, that those who participated in public activities organized by the state were no more interested and no more committed to the system than the few who did not; and that they were no more efficacious than those who did not. Roeder (1989a) suggested that enforced "departicipation" might be a more appropriate term to describe citizen involvement. And Shtromas (1984) argued that political action reflected not the internal acceptance of regime norms, but merely an external sign of willingness to conform. Being a conventional political activist therefore said little about what a person believed.

DiFranceisco and Gitelman (1984, 605) took this notion of political disengagement a step further, contending that the Soviet citizen dismissed official channels of participation as a mere formality. There was "a meaningful form of participation," but it was "limited to affecting political outputs that concern the individual directly." Although some people might derive emotional rewards from taking part in conventional public organizations, the one activity in which people invested the most energy was contacting public officials to obtain individualized benefits -- activity that DiFranceisco and Gitelman labelled "covert participation." Citizens were cynical about the formal institutions of conventional politics, preferring instead to work the output side of the system for personal gain.

Analysts skeptical of the mobilization model contended that individuals had more options and more varied ideas about their own roles in public life. As Little (1976) observed, the wide variety of public organiza-
tions in the USSR meant that citizens had some choice of which groups to join and how much to participate in any one of them. Citizens might also choose not to participate at all. And this, in turn, implied that individual values might play a role in determining how active each citizen would become (Baylis 1978, and Schulz 1981). Hough (1976) contended that the notion of mobilization might apply to some forms of political involvement such as voting, but that other types of participation could have much more meaning for individuals and more of a potential impact on the Soviet system.

The available empirical data have added to the controversy. Unger (1981), relying on emigrant interviews, found support for the disengagement model: activists in the party and Komsomol were seldom enthusiastic about public activism or committed to the values of these organizations. Friedgut's (1979) research in the USSR and interviews with Soviet emigrants showed that people were uninterested in state-sponsored political activity. They acquiesced "passively but gracefully" in the post-Stalin regime's demands for a public display of activism, especially since the bulk of obshchestvennaia rabota [civic activity] could be carried out at work.

Friedgut (1981) also found, however, that people who participated in residential and neighborhood activities such as local improvement projects enjoyed a sense of community with their neighbors and valued the tangible benefits of their work. Also, citizens who contacted their local officials and deputies had opportunities for "cooperative and active" work within the system. Such individuals, in Friedgut's (1983) analysis, felt a sense of competence about their ability to get a response from local institutions. Similarly, Hahn (1987, 261) -- based on interviews with deputies to local soviets -- contended that "Soviet citizens, either as deputies or through them, can and do participate effectively in their local government."

Yet DiFranceisco and Gitelman's (1984, 610-11) interviews with Soviet emigrants led them to conclude that political involvement did not connote a positive orientation toward political institutions. Participants in political life were found to be hostile or at best neutral toward the Soviet system, distrustful of other people, lacking in political efficacy, and dubious about the value of formal participation. Indeed, the authors stood the normal connection between individual values and citizen participation on its head: it was the people most alienated from the regime and from other people who were the most "self-initiated and active."

The explanation DiFranceisco and Gitelman (1984, 610-11) offered for this striking result emphasized the social atomization of Soviet political culture: "The participation of Soviet citizens lacks an element of interpersonal trust that is essential to cooperative public activity." The authors thus concluded that the "Soviet citizen tends to avoid or denigrate cooperative activity and formal channels of interest articulation." Friedgut
(1979, 313-314) offered a similar assessment, noting an inherent conflict between "the incessant pressure on citizens to join together in participatory groups, and the atomized social structure generated by the regime's demand for orthodoxy and by the control mechanisms of totalist community penetration." Social atomization has also been put forward to explain why there was so little opposition to the established political order (e.g., Brzezinski 1961; Zaslavsky 1982).

Thus, Western scholars remain divided over the connection -- if any -- between the attitudes and the behavior of the Soviet citizen under the "old regime." And the debate leaves several critical questions unanswered.

One question is how many people did in fact participate in political life. Mobilization theorists suggested that it was extremely important for Soviet leaders "that political participation be intense and almost all-embracing," to serve the goals of the regime (Brzezinski and Huntington 1965, 92). And if participation was so pervasive, then differences in individual motivation could have little bearing on rates of political involvement. A person's interest in politics or sense of personal efficacy or values would simply not matter.

In fact, conventional participation was hardly universal. Soviet researchers from the 1960s onward reported that participation in obshchestvennaia rabota typically engaged between 40% and 50% of the adult population (Volov 1965, Kurevin 1986). The "Pravda 77" all-union survey in 1977 found that 44% of adults engaged in such activity; an all-union survey in 1980-81, 53% (Voz'mitel' 1987, 41). Even in the best of circumstances participation in obshchestvennaia rabota often reached only 60-65% (Baikova 1977; Toshchenko 1980; Artemov 1987; Nazimova 1987; Shibalis 1987), with leaders and activists comprising a much smaller group. And general meetings at work, which would be especially difficult to avoid, usually drew only 60 to 70% of the work force (Starchenko, Pustel'nik, and Chernysh 1988, 91-92; Kliuev 1987, 43).

According to one study conducted in the early 1980s, substantial numbers of Soviet citizens claimed little interest in, or time for, public activism (Kurevin 1986, 44). Another study reported that 21% of adults in an all-union survey had never participated in obshchestvennaia rabota (Voz'mitel' 1987, 41). Similarly, research on the effectiveness of political propaganda showed that Soviet citizens often avoided attending lectures and discussions on political themes (White 1980; Remington 1983). And a careful examination of voting data revealed that even electoral turnout was far from total. Studies based on emigrant informants and on reported votes suggested that the real turnout was lower than the widely proclaimed 99% (Zaslavsky and Brym 1978; Karklins 1986; Roeder 1989b). Soviet scholars now admit privately that the turnout data may have been exaggerated.
Although the level of participation of Soviet citizens could be considered high by comparative standards, for most people involvement in public affairs was sporadic at best, and only a fraction of the population took a leading or active role. Despite the regime's emphasis on universal public involvement, people chose whether to participate, evade, or dissent (Little 1976; Friedgut 1979). And those who did participate confronted a further choice of how much to engage in a given activity. Soviet scholars showed that people differed substantially in the time and energy they devoted to public life (Iovchuk and Kogan 1972; Smirnov 1983). The degree of activism depended not only on people's objective social position but also on their values and subjective disposition to participate (Davidiuk and Korobeinikov 1986).

A second unanswered question in the participation debate is how best to characterize the different forms of political involvement. Scholars who emphasize mobilization and disengagement tend to speak of participation as a whole, without distinguishing among different types. Other scholars identify several forms of activism, but disagree on how to conceptualize them. Friedgut (1979), for example, devotes separate chapters to elections, local soviets and deputies, and communal or neighborhood organizations. Little (1976) and Hough (1976) discuss alternate forms of activism ranging from voting to membership in community groups. And DiFranceisco and Gitelman (1984) identify three main forms of participation: "formal-ritualistic participation"; "citizen-initiated contacts with official persons and institutions whose task is to represent, check up on and run interference for people"; and "contacts over implementation (particularized contacting)." However, most empirical studies focus on a single type of political activity.

Yet the varieties of participation were hardly equal in the demands and incentives they offered for citizen activism. Voting in noncompetitive elections would make little demand on the individual's time, energy, and political commitment and offer little reward other than certifying compliance with official norms of citizen behavior. Other forms of participation, such as seeking benefits from the zhilotdel [housing bureau] or sobes [sotsial'noe obespechenie, social security office], would demand resources -- knowledge of the bureaucracy, time, persistence, and sometimes personal connections -- to work the system for personal advantage. But citizens might expect tangible gains from their efforts.

Demands and payoffs would vary among different state-sponsored organizations as well. Attending trade union meetings probably would not demand much, since it was just a part of the work day. But being a leader in a housing commission would demand time, knowledge of the bureaucratic system, and, contrary to the disengagement model, cooperative skills, including interpersonal trust. It could also offer more in the way of
benefits, ranging from getting a better apartment to deriving feelings of community or a sense of accomplishment over the commission's work (Friedgut 1979, 1981; cf. Wilson 1973).

Of course, many forms of Soviet public activism left individuals little choice. Voting, and Komsomol and trade union membership seem to fit into this category. Some civic obligations might be assigned outright or tied directly to career advancement. Party membership was a not only a prerequisite for a wide variety of responsible posts; party members were also expected to be active in election work, družiny [citizen militias], and other special assignments (Friedgut 1979). But other choices, such as housing and parents' commissions, civic improvement organizations, and preservation groups, were much less structured.

Furthermore, there were several varieties of non-state or self-initiated activism apart from that of contacting officials with individual complaints or requests. Unsanctioned and informal groups existed well before Gorbachev's reforms (Alekseeva 1977; Sundiev 1987), along with more unconventional types of political activism ranging from producing and distributing samizdat [unauthorized publications] to engaging in strikes and protests. It is not clear, however, how participants in such unsanctioned activities differed from their more conventional counterparts, except that dissidents were said to be the only ones whose political actions reflected their real attitudes (Unger 1981; Shtromas 1984).

A third point of controversy in the participation debate is whether citizens could feel efficacious in a system in which their influence over leadership selection and policy decisions was so minimal (Sharlet 1967; Unger 1981). Certainly, the political system marginalized citizen influence over such choices, and empirical evidence from the USSR in the mid-1980s suggests that people were not optimistic about their ability to influence government decisions.4

Yet individuals may also have a sense of internal efficacy -- a more general sense of personal effectiveness in dealing with others, or a sense of control over their social environment that would make them more inclined toward political participation.5 Moreover, participation itself might generate some sense of limited influence. While people might lack the power to change institutions or leaders, they might still enjoy the relative advantage of control over others. In a society where so many decisions come from above, the opportunity to be a "little boss" could draw people into minor political roles (Unger 1981; Lewin 1985).

Finally, the participation debate raised a fundamental question about the connection between political activism and interpersonal trust. Analysts who stressed disengagement noted a lack of trust among individuals - as theorists of totalitarianism had suggested (Arendt 1951, and Brzezinski 1961). And the absence of interpersonal trust meant that people would be unlikely to cooperate in pursuit of collective aims, unless they were
impelled by social pressure or by careerism to join public organizations. More recent evidence, however, belies
this picture of social atomization: the generation that came of political age at the height of the Stalin era retains
a low sense of interpersonal trust, but generations that came of age after World War II display much greater faith
in other people (Bahry and Silver 1987). Hence, the Soviet system under Brezhnev was not the atomized society
that the mobilization model implied.

Reconceptualizing Soviet Citizen Participation

We suggest that measures of overall participation have limited value in explaining patterns of citizen
activism and passivity. Instead, we offer a conceptual scheme that emphasizes the differences among alternate
forms of participation, and the different mix of incentives (both positive and negative) that applied to each one.

A key distinction is whether individuals acted alone or in groups. Cooperative or group activity by
definition suggests results affecting the wider community, while individual activism is likely to be more restricted
in its scope (cf. Verba and Nie 1972). Joining a workers' soviet will have different implications from merely
contacting the local housing office. Moreover, working within the group requires certain kinds of resources, such
as faith in people, that are not necessarily relevant to more particularistic forms of political behavior such as
contacting public officials. Contacting officials, especially in pursuit of individual material benefits, is typically
episodic, requiring little in the way of cooperative behavior or interpersonal trust; and it is likely to be unrelated
to a person's beliefs about the larger political system.

Another critical distinction is that between conventional and unconventional activism. We would argue
that these are separate dimensions of participation, and not simply different points along a single continuum (cf.
Kaase and Marsh 1979). In other words, people might engage in both conventional and unconventional activity
or in neither of them. Political nonconformity entails a willingness to risk official retribution and public sanction
that sets the participants off from those who are either active in conventional activities or merely passive
conformists.

Conventional participation has many forms, however. Some activities such as election work and
involvement in citizens' militias and comrades' courts have traditionally been more politicized than others. These
are activities that the Communist party apparently has considered more critical (Friedgut 1979) and whose
payoffs have generally been higher for individuals interested in advancing their careers. In contrast, participation
in residential and neighborhood activities such as housing commissions represents a different, more "social" form
of activism. The rewards are more likely to be purposive and solidary rather than career-based.
It is, of course, important to distinguish between simple membership in public organizations and being active in such groups. While many people belonged in name only, many others took a more prominent role, and activists and nonactivists should differ markedly in their levels of interest in politics, trust in others, sense of personal influence, and commitment to the values of the Soviet regime.

We argue not only that individual attitudes ought to matter in determining how much people participated, but also that a different combination of them would come into play for each type of activism. We are particularly concerned here with attitudes central to the participation debate: levels of interest in politics, sense of personal influence, commitment to regime norms, interpersonal trust, and satisfaction with material living standards. These do not, of course, exhaust all possible individual orientations to political life, but they offer a good test of our argument.

Table 1 summarizes the expected relationships. The sign indicates the expected direction of the relationship: positive, negative, or none.

For Table 1 see page 34

We expect an individual’s sense of personal influence to be an important political resource. Those who feel influential should be more involved in conventional activities, especially activities requiring cooperation. They should also be more inclined to contact public authorities, since they would be more confident about getting a positive outcome. In addition, having a greater sense of personal influence should be important for unconventional activism, in either of two ways. On one hand, people who feel influential might be less inclined to nonconformity, because they have less reason (i.e., they feel influential in the society the way it is); on the other hand, a greater sense of personal effectiveness might be an important resource that would allow someone to cope with the risks of unconventional activism.

In addition, based on findings from other countries as well as the Soviet Union (Almond and Verba 1963; Bahry and Silver 1987), we expect individuals who have more faith in other people — who are higher in levels of interpersonal trust — to engage more in cooperative political activity, because they are more likely to be able to cooperate and to count on the support of others. Faith in people should also be positively related to involvement in unconventional activity, since an ability to trust others reduces the perceived costs of being unconventional (Bahry and Silver 1987). But there should be no correlation between faith in people and citizen-initiated contacts with officials, since this activity does not require cooperation among citizens.

Having more interest in politics should lead to greater unconventional activity and cooperative conventional activity. It should also raise the odds of contacting public officials, since those with high levels of
interest in the political world would be more inclined to view the government or party as an appropriate avenue for resolving individual problems. Satisfaction with one's material quality of life -- housing, job, standard of living -- should give people a tangible stake in the system, thus fostering conventional political and community activism and inhibiting unsanctioned political activity. Conversely, those who are dissatisfied with the material quality of life should be more inclined to contact officials or the media, since they would have more reason to turn to public officials for assistance.

Finally, people who concur with fundamental values of the Soviet regime -- who support state control of the economy and government limitations on individual civil rights -- should be more involved in compliant political and social activity, since they would have more of a normative stake in the system; while those who oppose these traditional regime norms should be more disposed toward unconventional activity. However, we expect that support for regime norms will be unrelated to contacting of officials, because this activity is typically personalized and nonideological.

In sum, there should be a psychology of Soviet political participation, not simply a sociology. Contrary to the image of apolitical participation under Brezhnev, individual attitudes and motivations should make a difference. And the particular mix of attitudes that foster activism should vary with different types of participation. This is not to say that activists were satisfied with the system or content with the existing avenues for political participation. Far from it. But individual differences were more important in accounting for the extent and types of participation than the notions of mobilization and disengagement have allowed.

Data

The data for this study come from several sources. We rely primarily on the Soviet Interview Project (SIP) General Survey, with supplementary material from discussions with Soviet specialists on political activism and from personal interviews with several activists in new informal groups during the fall of 1989. In the SIP survey, the 2,793 respondents are Soviet emigrants who arrived in the U.S. between January 1, 1979, and April 30, 1982. Most of the questions focused on a respondent's "last normal period of life" (LNP) in the USSR, that is, the five years before his or her life changed significantly in connection with the decision to emigrate. For most respondents, the end of the LNP occurred very shortly before they actually emigrated. Thus, the responses refer to the end of the Brezhnev era. For this analysis, we restrict our attention to the 2,667 respondents who were age 18 or older at the start of their last normal period of life in the USSR.
The Soviet Interview Project sample has been described in detail elsewhere (Anderson and Silver 1987a), and potential problems of bias in a sample of this nature have been addressed at length (Anderson and Silver 1987b; Millar 1987; Bahry 1987; Silver 1987; Swafford et al. 1987). The three most significant potential sources of bias are that most of the respondents (about 85%) are Jewish, that all emigrated from the Soviet Union, and that the respondents come primarily from large cities and had above average education and incomes compared to the Soviet population as a whole. The potential for bias from these sources would seem to be particularly large for questions on attitudes and political participation.

We cannot summarize here the many studies testing for bias in the SIP data. It is important to note, however, that the biases do not affect the basic findings we report. Having examined the effects of ethnic and emigration bias, and having controlled for the effects of social status, we discovered that the conclusions that we offer below hold up regardless of the nationality of the respondent, the degree to which he or she played a major role in the decision to leave the Soviet Union, and the social composition of the sample.8

Equally important, new survey data emerging from the USSR confirm many of the results from studies based on SIP data. For example, the basic connections found in the SIP survey between education, generation, and gender, on the one hand, and satisfaction with the quality of life, on the other, are almost exactly mirrored in a survey of residents of Moscow in 1988 (Project Understanding 1988). Even more compelling data (for the current study) emerge from a comparative study of participation among American and Estonian youth (Silver and Uuekula 1989), which shows a strong relation between individual values and conventional political participation among young adults in Estonia in 1987. Unfortunately, new surveys still do not touch on many topics that are critical to our understanding of political change in the Soviet Union, and they shed no direct light on patterns of political behavior before Gorbachev's drive toward democratization.

The value of the SIP interviews for the present study lies in the opportunity to test some critical hypotheses about political engagement and disengagement under Brezhnev. In fact, the data offer a particularly stringent test of our argument. If we assume that political disengagement ought to be higher among emigrants than among the general Soviet population, then positive evidence of political engagement in our sample is all the more compelling. Nonetheless, in view of the social backgrounds of the respondents, the SIP data should not be assumed to reflect the views of the rural population or of non-European populations in the Soviet Union. Instead, the appropriate Soviet referent population is the "adult European population in large and medium-sized Soviet cities" (Anderson and Silver 1987a, 361).

To gain a better understanding of the new forms of political organization emerging under Gorbachev,
one of the present authors also interviewed several leaders of "informal groups" in Moscow and Tallinn in October-November 1989. The interviewees were selected to reflect a broad range of the political spectrum, from those demanding market reforms and full democratization, to those calling for a return to traditional values and restoration of Marxism. While such a small sample is limited in what it can tell us about the full scope of informal group activities, it does allow us to raise some questions about the ways in which participation may be changing under Gorbachev.

Results

We begin by describing the varieties of political participation by SIP respondents in their last normal period of life in the Soviet Union. Using factor analysis, we show that the different kinds of participation group into four categories. We then analyze the relation between individual attitudes and the degree of involvement in each type of activism. This analysis both clarifies the structure of political participation in the Brezhnev period and makes clear the need to reappraise previous generalizations about individual motives for political participation.

Varieties and Levels of Political Participation

Table 2 shows the number of people who engaged in each of several activities during their last normal period of life (LNP) in the Soviet Union. As we would expect, of all the varieties of participation that respondents discussed, voting and trade union membership were the most common. Nearly 90% of the respondents reported that they voted at least sometimes during their LNP, and a similar percentage belonged to a trade union. Of those who did vote, however, only four-fifths always voted; and of those who belonged to a trade union, fewer than half attended meetings regularly. Thus, the two most pervasive forms of political activity included a large segment of marginally mobilized people. This should not be surprising, given that trade union membership was all but mandatory and that election workers might bring a ballot to the house to ensure a high turnout.

For Table 2 see pages 35-36

Other types of public activism reveal a smaller gap between formal membership and actual involvement. Most of the people who belonged to housing commissions, people's control, party and soviet committees, and similar public groups report that they actually participated in those organizations, though the frequency of their participation varied. Of those who belonged to a committee or commission at work, 98% participated at
least sometimes, and 71% did so regularly. In contrast, although 92% of those who belonged to a citizen's militia or a comrades' court participated at least occasionally, only 42% did so regularly.

Overall, 20% of the SIP respondents were leaders or activists in at least one public organization, and another 50% were members of at least one such group (including the Komsomol). Excluding rank-and-file trade union membership, roughly half of the respondents were either leaders or members of one or more public organizations -- well within the range indicated in Soviet surveys. Also, 12% worked in election campaigns, and about 20% contacted either the media or a party or government official during their LNP.

Few people engaged in unconventional activity such as unsanctioned study and discussion groups, protests, and strikes: 2% were leaders; another 10% took part in at least one such activity during their LNP.12 The most common form of unconventional activity was participation in study or discussion groups. Very few people took part in protests or strikes.

Dimensions of Political Participation

Although it is possible to rank individuals according to their level of involvement in both conventional and unsanctioned political activity, using simple scales of activism begs the question whether certain types of activity group together. Were those who engaged in the more common types of activity such as voting, but who did little else, just less involved in political life in general? Or were they distinct in other ways from those who engaged in alternative forms of public activism?

To group the different forms of participation and to allow comparisons with crossnational empirical research on participation, we rely on factor analysis. Table 3 presents the results of a factor analysis on the activities listed in Table 2.13 The activities group along four dimensions.

For Table 3 see page 37

The first dimension, "unconventional political activism," incorporates distribution of samizdat, participation in public protests, involvement in unsanctioned study or discussion groups or other unsanctioned political activity, and avoidance of voting. The second, "compliant political activism," is defined best by involvement in activities that are the epitome of conventional behavior: serving on a commission or committee at work, on a party or soviet commission, and on a comrades' court or in the people's militia. The third dimension, "social activism," includes groups and activities focussed on neighborhood and family life: service on parents' committees and housing commissions. And the fourth, "contacting," is defined by individual efforts to contact party and government officials and mass media. Most such contacts involve requests to solve personal problems, such as
housing repairs and pension benefits. A few involve complaints about government policies or the performance of officials (Bahry and Silver 1990).

Bear in mind that these groups of activities are not mutually exclusive. For example, most social activists also participated in some form of what we have called compliant political behavior. And some people, especially within the younger generation, engaged in both conventional and unconventional political activity.

Nonetheless, the analysis so far bears out our expectation of several distinct dimensions of political participation. The question remains whether the four types of activity attract people who have different subjective political orientations.

**The Bases of Political Activism: A Multivariate Analysis**

For each broad category of political activism we estimate a separate regression equation to capture the effects of individual attitudes. Each equation also includes a series of social background and status measures, to allow us to evaluate the subjective side of political involvement independently of a person's education, gender, age, and other personal characteristics. The results are presented in Table 4.24

For Table 4 see pages 38–39

The multiple regression results show that individual motivations did make a difference: people who were less satisfied with their material quality of life, were very interested in politics, had high faith in people, or were less supportive of state control of the economy were more likely to engage in unconventional activity (column 1 of Table 4). Thus, unconventional political behavior is clearly related not only to people's social background but also (independently of social background) to their political orientations.

It would be surprising had we not found such relationships. Given the potential for an adverse response by political authorities, political nonconformity ought to be more common among those who hold clear motivations to violate political convention. But the disengagement model implies that individual motivations should bear little relation to conventional forms of political participation. Since conventional activism tends to be viewed as mobilized participation, those who become involved need not be favorably disposed toward the regime, satisfied with the material quality of life, interested in politics, or trusting of other people.

The evidence, however, suggests a rather different picture. Compliant political activism -- involvement in commissions at work, for the party, or for soviets, or involvement in trade unions or other public organizations -- was indeed related to an individual's attitudes and values (column 2 of Table 4). Even with social background taken into account, people who had a stronger sense of personal influence, who were more interested
in politics, who had greater faith in people, and who supported state control over civil liberties were more involved in conventional political activities.

Social activism also depended on individual motivations (see column 3 of Table 4). People who felt more influential and more satisfied with their material quality of life were more inclined to be social activists. But the more political motivations seem to have been less important: social activists did not have especially high levels of interest in politics or support for state control over civil liberties and the economy.

Whether individuals contacted public officials or the mass media (column 4 of Table 4) also depended on their attitudes. People who were less satisfied with their material quality of life, who were more interested in politics, or who were less supportive of state control of civil liberties were more likely to contact an official about some problem or issue. But there was no relationship between individual contacting and the amount of faith in people. This is just what we would expect, because individual contacting, the seeking of particularistic favors or services from public officials, would not necessarily require cooperation between individual citizens.

Thus, subjective motivations made a difference in political activism, independently of objective social status. The empirical results are quite consistent with the expected patterns depicted in Table 1. Although some of the findings do not fit the anticipated pattern, in no case is there a reversal of signs between our initial expectation and the empirical results.

One unanticipated finding is that satisfaction with material living standards did not lead to greater conventional political activism. We think this may be due to the asymmetric effect of subjective material satisfaction: people who were satisfied might either be active in regime-sponsored organizations or simply passive; while those who were dissatisfied would be motivated to contact the authorities or to engage in unconventional activism. A second unexpected finding is that neither faith in people nor support for regime norms was linked to the degree of social activism. This does not mean that such activists were disengaged or lacking in real motivation; rather it suggests only that political motives were less important than others in fostering such participation. As Friedgut (1979) observed, people derived other kinds of satisfaction from involvement in community affairs, such as a sense of communal identity.

Third, the connection between support for regime norms, unconventional activism, and conventional activism turns out to be more complex than we expected. It is not simply the case that conventional activists were "for" state control while unconventional activists were "against" it. For one thing, conventional and unconventional activism were not mutually exclusive: some people, especially among the youngest generation, engaged in both. Nor were the two dimensions of state control that we examined, over the economy and over individual behavior,
perfectly correlated. Respondents proved far more willing to accept government ownership and central planning than restrictions on civil liberties.

Fourth, we had anticipated that a stronger sense of personal influence would mean greater odds of contacting the authorities, but we found that subjective personal influence had no effect on this form of participation. The reason may be that people who felt influential had other, less formal ways of getting things done, such as relying on connections to handle problems and complaints. Additional data in the survey support this interpretation: those who felt they had good connections were less inclined to contact the authorities themselves (the data are not shown).

Finally, we had expected that there would be no connection between support for regime norms and contacting public officials. Yet our results showed that those who favored broader civil liberties were more inclined than others to contact a party or government agency. Further analysis reveals, however, that the connection holds only for certain types of contacts. Advocates of expanded civil liberties were more likely to turn to a government or party organization for what might be called political reasons, such as complaints about official behavior or state policy. But they were exceptions. They made up a distinct but very small percentage of all contacts. Those who went to officials to obtain material benefits, who accounted for the vast majority of contacts, were just as supportive of state control as those who did not. Therefore, the typical "covert participant" was no more or no less alienated from the regime than other people.

We should also note that, although our findings on conventional political participation and subjective influence are basically in line with our earlier predictions, one might question the direction of causality. A stronger sense of personal efficacy can lead to greater participation, but activism can also give people a sense of influence. Or both could simply be functions of a person's social or job status. After all, a show of activism was expected of people aspiring to managerial or administrative posts.

We would argue that the connection between participation and influence is reciprocal. People who lack even a minimum feeling of personal effectiveness are likely to remain passive. It may take some sense of individual influence to become actively involved in public life (beyond simple membership in an organization). And becoming active in public life, with the opportunity to exert authority over other people, is also likely to strengthen a person's sense of influence in society at large, even though it may not yield a sense of being able to influence leaders or policies. In fact, Soviet survey research suggests that acquiring some authority over others can be a prime motive for participation.18
Our data indicate, however, that the degree of activism and the organizational context made a difference in how influential people felt. When participants were asked whether "people like you" had any influence over the group's activities, the more active they were, the more they felt that activists had influence (Table 5). The type of organization mattered as well. Activists in social organizations -- organizations with fewer party members -- were the most inclined to feel that people like themselves could affect the work of their group. Activists in more overtly political organizations, such as the party and the soviets, felt their groups offered fewer possibilities to wield influence.

For Table 5 see page 40

The connection between activism and sense of influence is not simply a product of higher social status. As Table 4 shows, subjective personal influence is linked to conventional participation, independently of one's level of education, income, and privileges. Other data (not shown here) bear out this conclusion as well: even among people at the same rank in the occupational hierarchy, those with a greater sense of personal influence were more active in public organizations.

Varieties of Disengaged Participation

Our empirical investigation calls into question several key elements of the mobilization model. The image of undifferentiated, ritualistic participation in state organizations clearly did not fit the pattern of political activism under Brezhnev. Nor is it accurate to picture the Soviet citizen then as psychologically disengaged, mobilized to take part in public life by a simple desire to get ahead or to avoid conflict with the authorities. Individual motivations and attitudes mattered, not only for unconventional activities but also for conventional ones. People made choices whether to participate in most types of activity, and these choices were systematically related to their attitudes as well as their social position.

Nevertheless, the disengagement model did apply to some forms of participation. Enforced turnout and lack of choice among candidates meant that voting was usually not related to an individual's level of interest in politics, sense of personal influence, or faith in people. An analysis of the correlates of voting, similar to that presented in Table 4, confirms this (see Table 6). Still, nonvoting does seem to have been a form of protest (cf. Karklins 1986). Not only does it cluster with other forms of unconventional political activism in the factor analysis, but, as shown in Table 6, people who were less satisfied with their material quality of life and who were less supportive of regime norms voted less.

For Table 6 see page 41
Komsomol membership is another activity to which the disengagement model applied. Whether young people were Komsomol members during the LNP depended neither on their social background nor their political attitudes. The main reason is that, like voting, Komsomol membership was so widespread among the target population -- so lacking in selectivity -- that being a member said little about whether an individual was psychologically engaged or disengaged from political life.

In contrast, being a party member said a good deal about whether a person was psychologically engaged in political life. Using a proxy measure for party membership, we find that people who were more interested in politics, felt more influential, and who supported state controls over civil liberties were more likely to be party activists. This is not to say that party activists uncritically accepted the party's style of rule, its leaders or programs (Bahry and Silver 1990). But their subjective orientations to politics were indeed different from those of nonactivists (cf. Zaslavsky 1982, 32-33).

To find that activists in the party and in other conventional political organizations were more "engaged" leaves us with a puzzle, however. If the more active citizens were indeed the more interested, the more trusting, the more efficacious, and the more supportive of core regime values, how can one explain the mass exodus from conventional organizations in the era of perestroika? We would suggest several answers (while emphasizing that "old" organizations have varied in their responses to perestroika and democratization). Although some marginal participants may well be activated by the new political atmosphere under Gorbachev, many (especially the most marginal) now have more opportunity to opt out of organized political life, in favor of other, nonpolitical pursuits.

On the other hand, those who were most active under the old system have acquired the opportunity to leave restrictive, hierarchical organizations for groups whose agendas and style offer a closer fit to their own values. Political competition has thus drawn the activist stratum into new channels. As one scholar at the Academy of Social Sciences noted to us, many activists in the Brezhnev era had untapped "reserves" of commitment and motivation which have been allowed fuller play under Gorbachev (on this same theme, see Kommunist 1988).

In addition, even though activists in conventional political organizations were on average more supportive of the regime's values than were nonparticipants, they were by no means in accord with the regime's position on many key points. As Figure 1 reveals, leaders in conventional political organizations -- like most other people -- were generally favorable toward state ownership and control of heavy industry, and especially toward state provision of medical care. But they were substantially less enthusiastic about the state's restrictions on the right
to strike and about the use of residence permits to regulate migration to cities. And they were strongly inclined
to support private, rather than state-run, agriculture.24

For Figure 1 see page 33

Implications

Our results suggest the need to reevaluate some key issues in the debate about the meaning of political
participation in the USSR on the eve of the Gorbachev era. The portrait of disengaged participation, of a
disparity between personal beliefs and public behavior, is both true and false. Some people were uninterested
in politics, distrustful of others, and skeptical about core regime norms on the role of the state. And a great
many felt that they lacked influence: only a quarter of SIP respondents rated themselves as having even
moderate influence in Soviet society, and Soviet survey data as recently as 1986 suggested that levels of external
efficacy, of feeling able to influence government or party policies, were even lower (Politicheskoe soznanie 1988,
37). Soviet research also confirms that often half or more of the adult population did not take an active role in
public life. Political participation in the Brezhnev era drew in a much narrower stratum of activists than Soviet
theory prescribed.

These are facts about the extent of interest, efficacy, trust, and participation. They say little, though,
about the connection between attitudes and activism. Some types of conventional behavior, the most pervasive
ones such as voting and Komsomol membership, bore little relation to individual values and attitudes; but other
forms of conventional activism did. The more interested in politics people were, the more they felt influential,
and the greater their faith in others, then the more they participated in conventional political activity. Citizens
who were psychologically disengaged were significantly less active.

One explanation for this selectivity in real participation would focus on the system itself, emphasizing
the failure or decline of regime-directed mobilization (Zimmerman 1987; Roeder 1989a). The system had
relaxed in many ways; coercion had diminished; people were less malleable. Another explanation, however,
would emphasize the importance of individual characteristics. People differ in their psychological involvement
in politics and in the relevance of political life to other everyday concerns. These differences in attitudes produce
differences in behavior, even when a coercive political leadership seeks a uniformly high level of participation.

We would argue for a synthesis of both views. Certainly, no analysis of participation can ignore the
regime’s efforts to structure and limit citizen involvement in the political process. Yet the empirical evidence
shows that individuals responded in different ways despite the state’s quest for universal participation in officially
approved activities. Thus, no explanation of citizen involvement can be complete without recognizing the differential incentives and resources that led people to choose a given path.

Our analysis also suggests the need to rethink the results of earlier Western studies of Soviet political participation. We have shown that "participation" actually comprised several different forms of activism, each of which mobilized a somewhat different segment of the population. In this sense, our results mesh with those of authors who emphasized the distinctions among different types of political behavior (Friedgut 1979, Little 1976, Hough 1976). We have, however, offered an alternate conceptualization of political participation, one based on the costs and consequences of different political acts for the individual. We also find a clear correlation between values and behavior, particularly conventional political involvement, in contrast to the image of a Soviet citizenry acquiescing "passively but gracefully" in the regime's demands for a show of activism (Friedgut 1979, Shtromas 1984).

Yet our empirical results do suggest disengagement in particular types of political participation. For example, our findings parallel Unger's (1981) conclusion that Komsomol members were often disengaged. But we would suggest that party membership should not be lumped into the same category. As we have shown, the party recruited people whose subjective orientations to politics better fit the model of a conventional activist.

We also found, as DiFranceisco and Gitelman (1984) emphasized, that citizen-initiated contacts with government and party officials represent a conceptually distinct form of political involvement; and, like those scholars, we found a lack of a connection between this type of participation and interpersonal trust. But our analysis does not support DiFranceisco and Gitelman's conclusion that political participation "lacked a critical element of faith in people" or that it was "devoid of emotional content." We have shown this description applies only to contacting of public officials -- and DiFranceisco and Gitelman's measure of political activity is heavily weighted toward contacting.25 Most people who turned to the government or the party did so to resolve very specific material problems that had little to do with their ideological orientation or their level of interpersonal trust. They were often dissatisfied with material conditions, hence the quest for assistance from public agencies. But other forms of public involvement reflected a different set of orientations: people who were interested in politics, who felt influential in society, who trusted others, and who supported key regime values participated more in conventional political activities.

Our analysis also puts political events under Gorbachev into perspective. Contrary to the disengagement model's emphasis on a socially atomized society, many Soviet citizens in the Brezhnev era did in fact trust other people and did value cooperative activity. That would help to explain how a purportedly atomized political
culture could suddenly give rise to thousands of informal groups under Gorbachev. Of course, the rise of new groups highlights the lack of outlets under the old system for a wide variety of political interests, some of which were expressed as dissent or unconventional participation under Brezhnev.

Our findings also hold some implications for analyzing changes in citizen participation from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. The existence of an interested, activist stratum in the Brezhnev era implies that the USSR experienced a form of political specialization by its citizens common in industrial societies, despite the regime's stage-managing of mass participation. The system drew people with activist orientations into public roles -- people with higher levels of interpersonal trust, a greater sense of personal effectiveness, more interest in politics, and more support for key regime values. The system also created situations in which activists could acquire political experience and skills, if only in cajoling their less committed coworkers and neighbors into participating nominally in political life.

We would expect that, while the scope and forms of mass participation have changed with democratization, the pattern of political specialization we have described under Brezhnev would persist. As the literature on transitions to democracy reminds us, the first wave of democratization produces a temporary surge in political activity as old constraints are removed. But the number of people with an ongoing commitment to political activism is likely to be very limited. At the mass level, the opening up of the electoral process alone has enabled a large segment of the population who formerly voted as a show of good citizenship to become more engaged in the system. The March 1989 defeat of many official candidates to the Congress of Deputies who were running unopposed suggests that Soviet citizens no longer regard voting as a formality. Moreover, hundreds of thousands people have now taken part in strikes and in public demonstrations. But as a more voluntary mass politics develops in the Soviet Union, one can expect a substantial proportion of the population to avail themselves of new opportunities not to participate in politics, despite the efforts of leaders of new political organizations to mobilize the population behind their banners and programs.

If our argument is correct, people who were active before democratization should be overrepresented among the "new" activists. The number of "gladiators" in the political arena would remain a minority. Once the transition period ends, most people would play the role of "spectators," who would follow and discuss politics and would vote, but whose political activism would seldom go beyond this level.26

Interviews with Soviet sociologists and with leaders of new informal groups themselves suggest that the number of activists is indeed limited. By their estimates, activists in new informal groups (as opposed to occasional participants) may comprise 2% to 5% of the population. Thus the large number of such groups (some
estimates put it at 60,000 in 1989) may not necessarily convey an accurate picture of the extent of mass activism, especially since such groups form and disband rapidly in a transition period. And since activists often belong to more than one new group, simply focusing on the number of groups involves a good deal of double counting of individual participants.

Interviews with "new" activists also suggest that most had indeed been politically active before the Gorbachev era, as conventional activists or, in some cases, as dissidents. For dissidents, liberalization provides new legitimacy or at least more tolerance. For conventional activists, liberalization provides opportunities to achieve a better fit between individual value preferences and group membership. Democratization has shifted the initiative from state to society, and redefined the political space in which citizens participate. But it may also involve important continuities in political stratification, where individuals with political experience and skills developed in the old system comprise a disproportionate share of the new activists.

In conclusion, our findings emphasize the need to reappraise the model of citizen involvement in the post-Stalin era in order to have an accurate basis for evaluating recent changes. We should not assume that attitudes and behavior only began to converge under Gorbachev. If we are to rewrite the book on political participation to reflect transformation in the Gorbachev era, we need to start by rewriting the chapters on participation in the past.
Appendix: Factor Analysis of Participation

In the factor analysis, we used several methods of estimation, all of which yielded similar results. We ran the factor analysis first using all the activities in Table 2, including trade union membership, and then a second time excluding simple union membership (on the grounds that it is all but obligatory). The results are virtually the same in both cases. That suggests that the intensity of involvement in union activities is much like the intensity of involvement in other public organizations. We opted to keep union membership in the factor analysis, because we did not want to lose information; and because, for some people at least, time spent on activism in the union might preempt participation in other types of activity.

Komsomol membership is excluded because it is a very age-specific form of participation that comparatively few of the respondents could have engaged in during their last normal period of life in the USSR. Including it in the factor analysis yields a factor structure identical to that shown in Table 3. Komsomol membership loads most heavily on the third dimension, social activism, but its loading is negative. That is, being in the Komsomol is negatively related to being on a parent’s committee or housing commission. We think this is a result of the age-specificity Komsomol activity.

Participation in strikes was also excluded from the final analysis. When included, it loaded most heavily on the particularized contacting factor, probably because it was a form of expressing economic grievances to officials -- as was the overwhelming majority of reported citizen-initiated contacts with officials and the mass media. Strikes are excluded here, however, to reduce possible ambiguity in interpreting the particularized contacting dimension. This exclusion does not appreciably affect the overall factor analytic results. When we replicated the analysis in Table 4 using factor scores that include the strike variable, the substantive results are the same as those reported above.

We used two different methods of factor analysis, principal components and principal axis factoring. The results in both cases yield the same four factors, but in the principal axis method, contacting and social activism have eigenvalues below 1.0 (the commonly accepted norm for determining whether a factor is in fact a distinct dimension). However, the factor scores from a principal axis (PA) solution still turn out to be highly correlated with the scores derived from a principal components (PC) model: for conventional political activism, the Pearson correlation coefficient between PA and PC-derived factor scores is .936; for unconventional activism, the correlation is .989; for contacting, .782; and for social activism, .845. We chose principal components because it is the preferred method for generating valid factor scores -- which we wanted to use in the analysis (Dillon and Goldstein 1984, 50-51). Factor scores were derived using the regression method.
We should note that the delineation of factors could, of course, be different if a different list of activities were included. We are not claiming that we have exhausted all the possible types of activism; there may be other distinctions one could make. We want to emphasize only that political activities -- especially conventional ones - should not be treated as interchangeable.
References


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Volkov, Iu. 1965. Tak rozhdaetsia kommunisticheskoe samoupravlenie. Moscow: Mysl'.


1 Soviet and Western scholars have also disagreed about how much the level of participation has changed over time. Soviet evidence suggests that official data have often been exaggerated to demonstrate the success of participatory campaigns under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Volkov (1965) notes, for example, that a check of activism in standing committees of local soviets in Sverdlovsk in 1954 revealed that the majority were "paper activists." See also Varchuk and Razin (1967) and Hough (1976).

2 In a 1981 survey, Soviet researchers also outlined a variety of "anti-stimulants" to public activism: lack of interest, perceptions of activism as careerism, perceptions of the ineffectiveness of participation, lack of encouragement to become involved, and so on (Plotkin and Uuekula 1985).

3 Cheremnykh (1965) confirmed this pattern indirectly with evidence on different rates of party saturation in different conventional organizations. The highest proportions of party members were found in ispolkomy [executive committees of soviets], deputies' posts, and party control; the lowest, in housing commissions, women's soviets, pensioners' groups, and municipal councils. See also Kukonkov (1986).

4 In a 1987 survey conducted by the Academy of Social Sciences, nine percent of respondents reported that they had a "real possibility" to influence government decisions (Politicheskoe soznanie 1988).

5 The classic discussions of the effects of ego strength and personal effectiveness on participation can be found in Lane (1959) and Campbell et al. (1960). For a review of the literature, see Abramson (1983). For an analysis of the distinction between external and internal efficacy in the literature on American politics, see Balch (1976). For a discussion of political efficacy in the Soviet context, see Oliver (1968).

6 Soviet research conducted between 1968 and 1981 showed that many survey respondents were in fact less than satisfied with obshchestvennaia rabota: it did not bring the desired results, administrators did not adopt the recommendations put forward by participants, the demands on time and resources were too high for participants to be very effective (Baturin 1984, 131). And Voz'mitel' (1987, 41) observed that as many as 50 percent of participants in obshchestvennaia rabota in some parts of the country wanted to participate less.

7 The data are available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Ann Arbor, Michigan).
Participation in unsanctioned activity is significantly higher among the non-Jews in the sample, because political
dissidence was often their ticket out of the USSR. However, this difference proved to have little effect on the
results we present below. The impact of other individual background characteristics and of individual attitudes
on political activism turn out to be the same whether the respondent was Jewish or not. See the notes to Table
4 (below).

Nine activists were interviewed about their previous and current political activities. Questions focused on the
size of the groups they belonged to, the proportion of activists among total members, the platforms and programs
the groups supported, their organizational structures, and their relations with the authorities.

Respondents were not asked directly whether they had belonged to the Communist Party, because of the
extreme political sensitivity of a question about party membership for Soviet emigrants to the United States.
Pretests of the questionnaire showed that the question was too sensitive to yield accurate results. However,
several questions in the survey offer an indirect measure of party membership, as we discuss below (footnote 23).

It is possible, of course, that some people who were only nominal members of organizations might not even
mention that they had belonged. But this is unlikely. People did mention nominal membership, especially in
the organization where we would most expect it to occur (the unions). Moreover, the percentages of people
belonging to any given organization, and the percentages of people reporting that they took part in obshchest-
vennaia rabota, are similar to the figures reported by Soviet scholars.

The survey also included a question on attendance at unofficial cultural events, but we omitted the item from
our analysis. Some SIP interviewers noted that many respondents heard the question as "unofficial art exhibits"
or "poetry readings" or "other cultural events," thus missing the emphasis on unofficial activities in the latter two
categories. The interviewers did not express the same concern about other questions concerning unofficial or
unsanctioned activity.

In the factor analysis we use all of the forms of participation included in Table 2 except for Komsomol activity
and strikes. See the Appendix for a description of the factor analysis. An earlier analysis yielded similar results
(Bahry 1987), with separate factors for conventional political activism, unconventional participation, and
contacting. That factor analysis, however, also included questions on self-rated interest in politics and on
attentiveness to Western media -- items which we decided were more properly treated here as independent
variables.
For the most part, the results presented in Table 4 are consistent with findings we presented earlier on Soviet citizen participation (Bahry 1987; Bahry and Silver 1987). However, we should emphasize that our measures of activism are different here, and this produces some differences in individual coefficients. The most important difference is that our measures here exclude participation in the Komsomol. As a result, the level of activism among the youngest respondents is understated. We deal with Komsomol participation below. The earlier findings (Bahry 1987) also found a somewhat weaker connection between support for regime norms and conventional and unconventional participation. Those results included only respondents who answered every question about regime norms -- generally respondents who were younger and more highly educated. As a result, the correlations between political activism and support for such norms were attenuated. Here, we include respondents who answered at least one of the three questions on state controls over the economy, and one of the three items on collective controls over individuals.

Overall, the measures of objective status did better in accounting for variance in activism than did the measures of subjective status; but the variance accounted for by the subjective variables taken together (that is, the increment to the $R^2$) was always statistically significant, even after the respondent's objective status was taken into account.

The coefficient for faith in people is significant at $p \leq .15$, but this was below the level typically accepted in social science research.

Pankratova and Iankova (1978, 25) suggest, for example, that one reason women become involved in what we label social activism is that it helps preserve their feeling of belonging to a larger community.

Shibalis (1987, 234-35) reports, for example, that one of the most common motives people named for participating in public organizations (obshchestvennaia rabota) was to strengthen their sense of importance or authority. In their words, participation "provides the opportunity to feel important" or to "strengthen one's authority in the eyes of coworkers and superiors."

Some activists, of course, played a leading role in more than one organization, and thus the data in Table 5 may include some double counting. Yet if we restrict our analysis to those people active in only one group, and thus eliminate the double counting, the results prove to be very similar.

Since the dependent variable, voting, could be treated as dichotomous, we also employed a logit model in
which respondents were coded as a 1 if they voted always or sometimes in the LNP, and 0 if they did not vote in the LNP. The logit model yields the same basic results as in Table 6.

21 This is confirmed by logit regression analyses (not shown) in which the dependent variables are, alternately, variables measuring whether or not the respondent had been a member of the Komsomol, and whether or not the respondent had been a Komsomol leader.

22 Komsomol membership often seems to have been a formality. According to Volkov (1965) and Kukonkov (1986), almost half of Komsomol members in several surveys spent little or no time on public assignments. However, among older generations, having been active in the Komsomol as a youth does predict subsequent conventional participation. Among people who were age 33 or older at the end of their LNP, those who had been Komsomol leaders in their youth were more likely to be compliant political activists later in life — independent of their job or social status.

23 The analysis is not shown here. The proxy measure for party membership is based on the respondents' participation in several activities known to be associated with party membership: holding a party nomenklatura position; working in an election campaign; belonging to the Komsomol; serving on a commission attached to a party agency or a soviet; belonging to the peoples' militia (druzhina) or to a comrades' court (tovarishcheskii sud). For further discussion, see Bahry and Silver (1990).

24 Similarly, leaders in such organizations tended to be somewhat more positive about the personal qualities of party officials, but they were still critical of both the officials' honesty and competence.

25 DiFranceisco and Gitelman measure rates of individual participation with an additive scale based on eight activities, five of which involve contacting of officials: writing a letter to the editor of a Soviet newspaper; contacting an ispolkom/raispolkom [sic] official; contacting a procurator; contacting a People's Control Commission; contacting an elected soviet deputy; holding an elective office; and membership in the Communist Party and in the Komsomol.

26 The gladiator-spectator analogy is from Milbrath (1965).
Figure 1. Support for Regime Norms, by Status as Leader of Organization

(7 = max. possible state support; 1 = min. possible)

Source: SIP G1 Survey

Number of Conventional Political Organizations Led
Table 1. Schematic Diagram of the Expected Relations Between Individual Orientations and Political Activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperative Activity</th>
<th>Particularistic Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unconventional</td>
<td>Conventional Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activism</td>
<td>Activism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Material</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith in People</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Personal Influence</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Regime Norms</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The signs indicate the direction of the expected relationship: positive, negative, or none.*
TABLE 2. Incidence of Political Activity During Last Normal Period of Life in the USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Base N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voted</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>2,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted Party or Government Official</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>2,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in Electoral Campaign</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>2,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted Media</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved in Komsomol in LNP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent Involved in other Conventional Activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission at Work</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druzhina/Comrades' Court</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party or Soviet Commission</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Public Organization</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Commission</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents' Commission</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent Involved in Unsanctioned Political Activity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonged to Study/Discussion Group</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protested</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struck</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributed Samizdat/Tamizdat</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in Other Self-Initiated Activity</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35
"Did you yourself always vote in elections to the soviets during your last normal period, or did you sometimes not vote?" The figures in the table exclude those who were not eligible to vote in their LNP (last normal period of life in the USSR). People who reported that someone else cast a ballot for them were counted as not voting.

"During your last normal period, did you ever go to see or write to a government or party official about some need or problem not related to your emigration?"

"Between [DATE 5 YEARS BEFORE END OF LNP] and [END OF LNP], did you ever, on your own initiative, write a letter to or call a local, republic, or central newspaper, journal, or radio or TV station?"

"Did you ever belong to the Komsomol?" The figures on Komsomol membership refer to respondents who were between ages 18 and 32, inclusive, at the end of their LNP.

In the sample as a whole, out of 2657 respondents, 17.1% had been Komsomol members and another 5.5% had been Komsomol leaders in their youth.

"I'd like to know something about the groups and organizations that you belonged to during your last normal period in the Soviet Union. During that time, did you belong to ... a trade union? A housing, sanitary or repair commission? A parents' committee? A volunteer committee of the local soviet or party organization? The People's Militia, People's Control or a Comrade's Court? Committees at work?"

[Respondents who said they belonged to such organizations were asked, for each item, how often they attended and whether they were a leader, organizer, or officer in the group.] "Was there any other public organization (obshchestvennaia organizatsiia) that you regularly took part in then?"

Also includes participation in People's Control posts and groups.

Including, for example, professional soviets, DOSAAF, preservation societies, scientific-technical societies, and other groups.

"During your last normal period, did you ... take part in an unsanctioned study or discussion group? Distribute samizdat or tamizdat? Take part in an open protest against some Soviet policy? Take part in a strike or protest at work? Belong to any (other) unofficial groups or take part in any (other) unsanctioned activities?"

[Respondents who said they took part in such groups or activities were asked, for each item, whether they took a leading role in them.]

Includes unofficial cultural and literary groups, religious and ethnic observances, writing of samizdat material, unofficial human rights groups, and other such activities.
TABLE 3. The Dimensions of Political Activism: Factor Analytic Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unconventional</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Contacting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Activism</td>
<td>Activism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samizdat/Tamizdat</td>
<td>.740</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Self-Initiated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsanctioned Activity</td>
<td>.677</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.068</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study/Discussion Group</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.082</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonvoting</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>-.211</td>
<td>.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Militia</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.684</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>-.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party/Soviet Commission</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.590</td>
<td>-.217</td>
<td>-.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Campaign</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission at Work</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.502</td>
<td>.310</td>
<td>.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>-.101</td>
<td>.468</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Public Group</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.352</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>.208</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parents' Committee</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.778</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Commission</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.504</td>
<td>-.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted Media</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted Official</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.702</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pct. of Variance</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>2.162</td>
<td>1.984</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td>1.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,633</td>
<td>2,633</td>
<td>2,633</td>
<td>2,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a The factor results were derived through principal components; the data in the table are standardized regression weights for each variable on each factor. The factor results were rotated using the varimax procedure in SPSS. The steps in the analysis are described in the Appendix.

b For the factor analysis, respondents who said they "never went" to a group to which they nominally belonged were treated as nonparticipants. An analysis run with them included as minimal participants yields the same basic results.
### TABLE 4. Multiple Regression of Four Types of Activism by Social and Demographic Characteristics, Interest and Influence, and Political Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Unconventional Political Activism</th>
<th>Compliant Political Activism</th>
<th>Social Activism</th>
<th>Contacting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generation(b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-25</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.318**</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>-.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-40</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.215*</td>
<td>.550**</td>
<td>-.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-60</td>
<td>.231**</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>-.251**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Completed Secondary</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.096</td>
<td>-.041</td>
<td>.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Higher</td>
<td>.196**</td>
<td>.304**</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>-.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female(c)</td>
<td>-.104*</td>
<td>-.216**</td>
<td>.283**</td>
<td>.137**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnings(d)</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.101**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privileges</td>
<td>.129**</td>
<td>-.075</td>
<td>.324**</td>
<td>.176**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Party Nomenklatura(f)</td>
<td>-.253*</td>
<td>.786**</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Personal Influence(g)</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.194**</td>
<td>.182**</td>
<td>-.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in Politics(h)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly</td>
<td>-.070</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>-.083</td>
<td>.300**</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.241**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very</td>
<td>.015**</td>
<td>.443**</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.312**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith in People(l)</td>
<td>.062**</td>
<td>.089**</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>-.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Material Quality of Life(i)</td>
<td>-.132**</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.075**</td>
<td>-.171**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for State Control on Civil Liberties(j)</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.065**</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>-.052**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for State Control of the Economy(j)</td>
<td>.074**</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.027</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>-1.454**</td>
<td>-1.000**</td>
<td>-5.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R(^2)</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Note that some questions, such as those on interpersonal trust, were asked only of a random one-third of the SIP sample, making our effective sample size with missing data excluded 786. The coefficients are unstandardized. The dependent variables are factor scores with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Regressions coefficients significant at p<.05 (two-tailed test) are marked by a double asterisk (**). Those significant at p<.10 are marked by a single asterisk (*). We also ran the same models a second time, to include all the variables listed plus controls for respondent's nationality (Jewish or non-Jewish) and role in the family's decision to emigrate from the USSR. The results prove to be the same: the connections between political action, background and attitudinal factors hold whether respondents were Jewish or not and whether they made the decision to leave the USSR themselves or merely accompanied other family members.

- Generation categories are derived from Hough (1980).
- Female: 1 if respondent was female, 0 if not.
- Earnings: natural log of the monthly salary at the last job before the end of the LNP.
- Privileges: a count (from 0 to 3) of the individual's access to special benefits — access to a state car, to a closed medical clinic, or to a special store.
- Nomenklatura: 1 if respondent held a party nomenklatura position, 0 if not.
TABLE 4 — Notes (continued)

9 Sense of Personal Influence: “Here is a ladder. Let’s say that the most influential person in the Soviet Union is at the top and the person with the least influence is at the bottom. Where would you have put yourself on this ladder in the Soviet Union in terms of your influence? (Probe, if necessary: Would you have placed yourself near the most influential person at the top or near the person with the least influence at the bottom?)” Scores range from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest).

h Interest in Politics: “During your last normal period, how interested were you in politics and public affairs — were you very interested, somewhat interested, only slightly interested, or not at all interested?” The categories are rescored as dummy variables.

i Faith in People: two items are used to construct the Faith in People measure:

   “Some people we’ve talked to say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can’t be too careful in your dealings with people. How did you feel about that during your last normal period of life in the Soviet Union?” [The answers coded were: Most People Can Be Trusted, You Can’t Be Too Careful, It Depends (if volunteered).]

   “Speaking generally, would you have said during your last normal period that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?” [Answers coded: More Inclined to Help Others, More Inclined to Look Out for Themselves, It Depends (if volunteered).]

Scores are derived by assigning a 3 to the answers “Most People Can Be Trusted” and “More Inclined to Help Others,” 1.5 to “It Depends,” and 0 to “You Can’t Be Too Careful” and “More Inclined to Look Out for Themselves,” then averaging the values of each item. If only one item was answered with a valid value, only that item is used to compute the score.

j Satisfaction with Quality of Life: based on average responses to five items. “In (END OF LNP), how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with . . . a) your housing?, b) (your/your family’s) standard of living?, c) public medical care?, d) your job?, e) the availability of consumer goods in your town? Response categories: (2) Very Satisfied, (1) Somewhat Satisfied, (-1) Somewhat Dissatisfied, (-2) Very Dissatisfied. The scores range between +2 (most satisfied) and -2 (least satisfied), with 0 as a midpoint.

k Support for State Control of Civil Liberties: the average response to three items — (1) “Some people in the Soviet Union say that the rights of individuals accused of crimes must be protected even if a guilty person sometimes goes free. Others say that the rights of society must be protected, even if an innocent person sometimes goes to prison.” (2) “Some people in the Soviet Union believe that workers should have a right to strike, even if it means that certain services may be interrupted.” (3) “Some people in the Soviet Union believe that people should be required to have residence permits to live in the large cities so that the authorities can plan public services. Others think that people should be completely free to live where they want.” For each question, respondents rated themselves on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (no state control) to 7 (full state control).

l Support for State Control of Economy: average response to three items — (1) “Some people in the Soviet Union say that the state should provide free medical care for all citizens. Others believe that medical care should be provided and paid for privately.” (2) “Some people in the Soviet Union say that the state should own all heavy industry. Others say that all heavy industry should be owned privately. Where would you have placed yourself on this issue in (END OF LNP)?” (3) “Some people in the Soviet Union believe that the state should control production and distribution of all agricultural products. Others believe that all agricultural production and distribution should be private.” For each question, respondents placed themselves on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (no state control) to 7 (full state control).
### TABLE 5. Members' Perceived Sense of Influence in Conventional Public Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Leader (%)</th>
<th>Attended Regularly (%)</th>
<th>Attended Sometimes (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents' Commission</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base N)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(133)</td>
<td>(84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee/Commission at Work</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base N)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Commission</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base N)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druzhina/Comrades' Court</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base N)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(97)</td>
<td>(154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission of Local Party/Soviet</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base N)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base N)</td>
<td>(246)</td>
<td>(828)</td>
<td>(887)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Organization/Group</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base N)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(73)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This question was asked only of those respondents who said they went at least sometimes to one of the organizations listed. The wording was, "Did people like you who (regularly) attended meetings (and were active in the organization) have a say in deciding group activities?" (Yes/Had a Say, No/Did Not)*

*b Only respondents who reported that they attended regularly or were leaders were recorded in the survey as belonging to an "other organization."*
### TABLE 6. Multiple Regression of Voting by Social and Demographic Characteristics, Interest, Influence, and Political Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Unstandardized Regression Coefficients*</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Generation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1919–25</td>
<td>.115</td>
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<tr>
<td>1926–40</td>
<td>.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941–60</td>
<td>-.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Secondary</td>
<td>-.131*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Completed Higher</td>
<td>- 129*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>.138**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfaction with Material Quality of Life</strong></td>
<td>.139**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Earnings</strong></td>
<td>-.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Privileges</strong></td>
<td>-.025</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>On Party Nomenkatura</strong></td>
<td>.023</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sense of Personal Influence</strong></td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interested in Politics</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly</td>
<td>.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very</td>
<td>-.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Faith in People</strong></td>
<td>-.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for State Control on Civil Liberties</strong></td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for State Control of the Economy</strong></td>
<td>.067**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-1.610**</td>
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<td><strong>Adjusted R²</strong></td>
<td>.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Voting is a three-category variable. Of those people who were eligible to vote at the end of their LNP, 1=never voted, 2=sometimes did not vote, 3=always voted.