TITLE: SUCCESSOR UNIONS IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES: EVIDENCE FROM ST. PETERSBURG

AUTHOR: Derek C. Jones  
Hamilton College

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL  
FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLEx VIII

1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036
COPYRIGHT

The work for this paper was not supported by the Council, although the author is under Council contract for research on a related topic. It has been volunteered to the Council by the author, for distribution under a limited release of copyright to the Council and to the United States Government for internal use, but not for publication by either. It has not been edited by the Council.
On Successor Unions in Transitional Economies: Evidence from St. Petersburg

Derek C. Jones*

January 1994

Abstract

Using survey data for 1993 from St. Petersburg for union leaders in unions that have succeeded the old Russian unions, we find evidence of high levels of member commitment to successor unions. This contrasts with the situation for unions without precursors. Pronounced evolution away from arrangements that characterized the old unions is also found. Diverse changes, including in union structure and personnel, point to greater democracy and vibrancy within unions. Apparently significant changes have occurred in the profile, activities and compensation of union leaders. Membership in the Communist Party is not found to have significant effects on union tenure and union leader turnover. However, the system of labor relations that has emerged during this early phase of transition undoubtedly will change as the privatization process continues.

* Professor of Economics, Hamilton College, Clinton, N.Y. 13323.
I Introduction

The immense political and economic changes in the former USSR and the new Russian Federation have profoundly affected labor-management relations. In this paper I examine several key issues of reform in labor unions during the early stages of transition towards a market economy. Fundamentally we are interested in seeing whether the formal ending of the subordination of unions to the Communist Party has led to specific changes in the nature, purpose, and behavior of those unions that have succeeded the former official unions-- members of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR). Most scholars (e.g. Ruble, 1981) believe that several features, including extraordinary centralization and bureaucratization, characterized the old unions (and thus distinguished them from most western unions). Our focus is on potential changes in successor unions in several broad areas -- membership, structure, functions, leadership, compensation and democracy.

Improving our understanding on these matters is of tremendous potential interest to both policy-makers and researchers. Diverse legislation provides that Russian trade unions continue to have important formal powers. In state firms, unions must approve many basic personnel decisions, including layoffs. In addition, as the state and its agents have abandoned their formal representation of the interests of capital, unions have acquired important informal powers. Thus unions appear to be deeply involved in the wage determination process and, where appropriate, often are playing prominent roles in influencing
particular privatization choices by enterprises. Furthermore, unions exercise enormous political influence at all levels and they articulate programs on the national stage on behalf of labor. Often these activities have been at odds with the policies of the Yeltsin administration-- in particular, FNPR leaders were vocal in their condemnation of the decision to close the Parliament in September 1993. Finally, there are several issues that intrigue researchers. Fundamentally, in the new situation how relevant are successor unions? How has this changed from the times when unions were not independent but viewed essentially as a "transmission belt" for the policies formulated by the Communist Party. In turn, if the old "dualistic" model of trade unions no longer applies, what is taking its place?

Informative accounts of some innovations in labor market institutions during the early stages of transition have appeared. Thus the tendency toward decentralization within FNPR unions and the emergence of alternative labor unions have been documented (e.g. Standing (1992), Gordon and Klopow (1992), Silverman et al. (1992, 1993)and Economic and Industrial Democracy, 1993). However, our new data enable us to both improve on the often limited detail in existing studies and to provide more systematic evaluation of key issues. We use diverse sources, mostly from St. Petersburg, and including new survey data for 1993 for union leaders and material derived from case studies. Our main approach is to assemble "stylized facts". In addition, we undertake some exploratory multivariate analyses.
II Institutions and the Data

Until about 1990, essentially all employees in St. Petersburg (as in the rest of the USSR) were members of the old, official unions. These old unions were organized along branch lines, were strongly centralized and were widely believed to be heavily bureaucratized with, for example, little turnover of personnel in leadership positions. In addition these official unions were postulated to have dualistic functions. First, like many other institutions, the trade unions were an integral part of the centrally administered system. These arrangements, whereby unions had no separate identities, but were subservient to the Communist Party, had several implications for the structure and functioning of the labor movement. For example these "official" unions were the only unions and nearly all workers belonged to unions. Top union leaders were likely to be members of the Communist Party and were believed to be almost as well paid as top administrators. The second function of unions, albeit within this framework, was to represent the interests of employees—e.g. on grievances and on monitoring enterprise safety.

Of course, even before the late 1980s, there had been many partial attempts to reform unions, including efforts to promote improved member involvement in achieving production targets and in protecting members' interests. Most important, perhaps, beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s was the revival of brigades (Van Atta, 1989). Yet most scholars have concluded that such innovations did not produce basic changes in either labor
participation or in union functioning (e.g. Slider, 1987).

The critical step in changing this "transmission-belt" model took place in September 1989, when delegates at a congress of the old "official" unions declared their independence from the Communist party. A year later, at another congress of the official unions, the centralized structure of the old arrangements was overturned with the establishment of a much looser, decentralized confederation of unions. In turn, these basic changes in union structure were reflected at regional levels. Thus, in the Leningrad (St. Petersburg) region, a new federation emerged in March 1991 to serve successor unions. After a protracted struggle, Yevgeny Makarov, a former production worker without substantial leadership experience in the old unions, was elected as the first President of this new body.

To gather more systematic data on the dynamics of changes in labor unions in St. Petersburg, a survey was administered to a sample of union leaders and a series of visits were undertaken to enterprises and union headquarters. The survey resulted in 101 usable responses--a 33% response rate. About 60% of respondents had leadership positions at the local (enterprise, rather than the branch) level. For the bulk (91%) of respondents, their current leadership position was union president at that particular level; the remainder were vice-presidents. They worked for unions that in 78% of cases were between 1 and 10 kilometers from the center of St. Petersburg, though 13% of the time the distance was further than 10 kilometers.
Our findings are organized under a number of themes. Before reporting these we note some of the principal differences for firms and industries within which union reforms were taking place, as well as changes in the larger context. First, in the early 1990's plural forms of property were beginning to appear in Russia and serious discussion of privatization was underway. The distribution of property forms at which leaders at the enterprise level were located is shown in Table 1A. From this we see that whereas nearly all firms were state owned in 1991 (with modest representation of leased firms), a year later, about 3 in 10 were now joint stock organizations.

This was also a time of enormous fluctuation in product markets in Russia. In St. Petersburg it seems that the rate and scale of change were particularly fast. In part this probably reflects not only the collapse of aggregate demand but also the structural changes caused by movement away from the past heavy dependence on defense industries in the St. Petersburg area. For example, in a shipyard I visited whereas in 1990 70% of its market was defence related, by 1992 this had fallen to 6%, an astonishing change in the composition of demand.

In turn these shifts had major implications for labor markets in Russia. Apparently the official rate of unemployment in St. Petersburg is double the national average (Gendler and Gildengersh, 1992). This turbulent picture is reflected in the enormous diversity in the dynamics of employment at the level of individual enterprises in the survey. Thus whereas the median
firms have increased staffing levels while others have registered much sharper job-losses (see Table 1B.)

III Findings

(1) Union Membership: Successor and Alternative Unions

Whereas under the old unions, union membership was almost automatic, recently the decision to be a union member has become more- and-more a matter of a choice. One might, therefore, expect union membership levels in successor unions to have fallen significantly. However, aggregate data provided by the Confederation indicate that in January 1993 successor unions represented 2.5 million employees (from a workforce of about 2.9 million)-- a density of about 86%.

To provide partial checks on these overall in-house figures for successor unions, we estimated union density for survey enterprises by combining survey data on union membership and enterprise labor forces. From Table 2C we see that union density in successor unions is typically very high. While there has been loss of membership in some firms, the median membership is 95% and almost one in three firms had 100% levels of membership. While fewer observations are available for 1991, when they are available for the same firm they show density changes in a range between -9.1% and 7.2%; the median change was 0%. In nearly all cases union officers report that essentially all members were paying their dues.
By comparison with levels of union membership for other countries, both in western Europe but also for some in Eastern Europe, it seems that the rates of union membership are very high in St. Petersburg. Levels of 95% probably exceed even the levels for Sweden, which is usually thought to be the Western country with the highest levels of union membership (averaging about 80% of the labor force). Moreover, the St. Petersburg levels are considerably higher than in most other transitional economies in Eastern and Central Europe.

In the new environment, it might also be expected that there will have been significant switching by members from successor unions to the new alternative unions. This might be expected to be especially prevalent in St. Petersburg where some authorities claim that the impetus for the new unions was especially strong. However, the Confederation estimates membership in alternative unions in St. Petersburg only at between 8,000-10,000 and that there are about 28 active alternative unions locally. To provide a rough check of this estimate of the extent of membership in alternative unions, respondents were asked to estimate membership in unions other than their union (all of which were successor unions). Always this was reported to be quite tiny—never amounting to more than 2% of the workforce, and often being reported as zero. While the available data are not perfect, based on this evidence for manufacturing firms in the St. Petersburg region, it does not appear that membership in alternative unions or multiple unionism
at the same plant was a strong phenomenon. In turn, this casts doubt on the membership figures of up to 5 million that some have claimed for national membership in the alternative unions.

The finding of sustained commitment to successor unions might primarily reflect inertia on the part of union members. In turn, the "inertia" might be fueled, at least in part, by the requirement of union membership for access to certain benefits (such as subsidized vacations), and the union's exclusive administration of benefits such as social insurance. In addition, factors such as the continued existence of a checkoff system and successor unions owning many assets clearly favor the established unions. At the same time, the decision to remain a union member may reflect a more complicated choice by individuals who, at least in part, view union membership as insurance against the probability of future job losses.

(2) Who are the Union Leaders?

In the old unions, the perception is that the typical union leader was, first and foremost, a member of the communist party. Leaders were apt to be male, well educated, middle aged and not to hail from a blue collar background. To determine a profile of the leaders in successor unions, summary statistics are presented in Table 3.

From these we see that the mean age for union leaders in the sample is 47. The age distribution ranges from 33 to 65 with almost two thirds of the sample below 50 y.o. Almost 90% of union
leaders are male (though for branch leaders the figure is 5/33) and 84% presently are married. 78% had a higher level of formal education and had considerable work experience too-- 68% had worked at least 10 years in the previous job and 30% of these had worked for more than 20 years.

In terms of occupational backgrounds, all union leaders had previously belonged to the technical/managerial end of the spectrum. None had previously been unskilled workers or even semi-skilled workers. By contrast, almost 3 in 4 union leaders had been a specialist of one sort or another. Of the remaining 25%, 8% had been managers, 4% foremen and the rest skilled workers. As such this occupational distribution is more technocratic/managerial than that of their parents, especially on their mothers' side, more than 21% of whom had been either semi-skilled, unskilled or maintenance workers.

While at one time 78% were members of the Communist Party, 22% of today's leaders never were members. Moreover, 52% of the sample had quit that party, with 62% doing so in 1991, 33% in 1990 and 4.8% in 1989. In addition, there is no clear pattern of political sympathies amongst the respondents, and support for parties identified as "left wing" is relatively weakest.

In Table 4 we explore this possible link between membership status in the Communist Party and political beliefs further by presenting cross tabulations on party membership and political beliefs. Three party variables are used: whether or not the individual is currently a member of the party (CPCUR), formerly a
Compared with their counterparts in many other western countries, on average union leaders in St. Petersburg appear to be have higher qualifications. For example the biographical data assembled by Allen (1954) indicate that British union leaders typically have not had higher formal levels of education and seldom came from professional backgrounds. The observation that women are relatively underrepresented in union leadership positions is a phenomenon that is observed in many other countries. (See, for example, the data for American union leaders assembled by Hammer, (1992) and Taft, (1954) and for the UK by Edelstein and Warner, (1972).) Equally, the fact that more than one-in-ten union leaders is a woman means that the extent of female representation is probably more advanced in St. Petersburg than is typical in many western countries.

(3) Union Functions: What do Union leaders Do?

In the old unions, to the extent that union leaders (at least at branch and enterprise levels) directly served the separate interests of members, they mainly did so by exercising welfare functions, such as disbursing holiday vouchers and handling social insurance claims. There is also evidence that in the mid 1980's, at the plant level, union leaders would spend considerable time and energy pursuing individual employee grievances and supervising workplace safety (Ruble, 1986). At the same time, in a regime of central planning, union leaders did not get involved in many functions that are traditionally
member of the party (EXCP), or has never been a Party member (CPNEVER). Three types of political affiliation are identified—LEFT, RIGHT and CENTER. From the Table we see that those leaders that were never in the party are more likely to have preferences for the right rather than for the left. However, irrespective of Party status, in all cases the majority of union officers describe themselves as centrists. These data strongly suggest that there is no relationship between a union leader's status concerning the Communist Party and political beliefs.

By making some additional comparisons we can put this profile of the average union leader in a broader context. Beginning first with the overall labor force in the St. Petersburg area, Gendler and Gildingersh (1992) estimate that 26.4% of that group have higher education and that the largest group of the workforce (54%) is in the 25-44 age bracket. Hence our data on union leaders indicate that union leaders are better educated and older than the average worker in St. Petersburg. Moreover, since women make up about half of the local labor force (Gendler and Gildingersh, 1992), a disproportionately small share of union leaders in St. Petersburg are women, especially at the level of President. Other accounts enable some comparisons to be made between leaders in successor unions and brigade leaders in industry in the past throughout Russia. By using data for the mid 1980's, Slider (1987:392) notes that most brigade leaders in industry, unlike local union leaders today, were likely to be blue-collar workers.
associated with western-style collective bargaining. Moreover, typical protest forms like strikes and slowdowns, were completely prohibited.

The changes ushered in by the advent of perestroika mean that the framework within which unions function has dramatically changed. Fundamentally the system of central planning (including central wage fixing) has formally collapsed. However, exactly what are to be the new ways of determining wages and employment (and the role of unions therein) remains unclear. At the time of the survey, for example, there was no new labor code in place. Also, the successor unions usually have inherited substantial assets, especially infrastructure such as kindergartens, houses and vacation centers. Along with ownership, however, comes potential obligations to serve their members by administering these assets (thus constraining how unions might otherwise allocate their scarce resources.)

To gather new data on the question of what successor unions actually do in the new and evolving context, union leaders were asked to evaluate a variety of tasks in order of the priority they assigned when deciding how to allocate their time and other union resources. A five point scale was used (1 = most important to 5 = least important) and responses for leaders at local and branch levels are tabulated in Table 5.

Broadly speaking it seems that typically respondents view issues as falling into three categories. Consistently ranked as most important (and receiving a "1" in at least 50% of cases) are
improving or protecting pay, helping members solve problems and
grievances on the job, protecting job security and improving
safety and health at work. If top priority issues are defined by
responses that receive a response of either "1" or "2" then in at
least 65% of the cases, then to this list must be added
administering social security and keeping members informed. The
issue which consistently ranked as being of lowest priority is
arranging for holidays at union-owned facilities. (Thus fewer
than 1 in 5 union leaders rank this as either 1/2, while 50%
rate the issue as a 4/5.) For many union leaders distributing
products or consumer goods is also a low priority issue (though
there is considerable variation amongst respondents to the
importance they attach to this issue). Those issues that are
usually accorded medium priority are: improving the way the union
is run; improving or protecting benefits; and organizing
non-union workers.

Information derived from cases also presents a picture of a
substantial shift having occurred in the ways in which, compared
to leaders of the old unions, successor union leaders spend
their time. A union president at a manufacturing company reported
how, in the past, activities such as the organizing of sporting
and cultural activities, including running and staffing a
library, took a great deal of his time. Now such activities were
of very low priority, and in this case in fact were in the
process of being ceded to the enterprise management.

Turning to top level leaders, the main object of the
federation is to represent the interests of organized labor in St Petersburg. Often this is done on a tripartite basis, through structures that also involve the union of entrepreneurs (employers) and the local authorities. The federation is very active both on regional issues and on matters affecting individual firms. Typical issues include: enterprise reform, including advising members on privatization options and unions' and members involvement in that process, especially matters of ownership and management; implications for members of changes in the level and composition of demand, especially concerning the conversion of defense industry firms; and the nature of (and the way of financing) a program for unemployment compensation. In part to help to finance its activities, given the reduced income flows from member dues, in part to aid members, the confederation has also launched a financial fund. This accepts cash and privatization vouchers as deposits and uses these funds for several investment purposes. These include buying shares (up to a maximum of 10%) in firms that are being privatized and also becoming a part owner in other new businesses.

(4) Union Structure

To compare various aspects of the formal structure of successor unions at all levels, including their relation to other bodies, with what prevailed previously, we rely mainly on evidence derived from interviews and visits. Reflecting its origins with the old unions, in 1992 the members of the new
confederation overwhelmingly were branch unions. But an important development has taken place. In addition to 33 branch (industry) members, for the first time there were four independent unions. Each of these represents workers at very large enterprises. They had chosen to directly affiliate (rather than be represented, as in the past, through a branch.) This was the case, for example, with workers at the Baltysky shipyard.

Another important change concerns decentralization and an on-going process by which the role of the center is being deemphasized. This is indicated, for example, by cuts in paid staff at all levels. At the confederation there has been a sharp downsizing of the confederation, from a staff of 100 in 1992 to only 30 in September 1993. Similar processes of decentralization have occurred at the branch and, where appropriate, individual union levels. Thus at the Baltyski shipyard, at the end of 1993 the staff was half as large as it was in 1991\(^3\).

In former times diverse structures, for example production committees, existed at the enterprise level in tandem with the machinery of the old union. Potentially such bodies had meaningful implications for enterprise performance (Grancelli, 1988; Gerchikov, 1992). Apparently important changes are underway, though at varying rates, concerning the relation of successor union structures within enterprises and these inherited, formally non-union bodies. Thus, in most cases it seems as though the production committees have been discontinued, at least at the shop level. But often brigades remain in place at
the shop level though today brigade leaders are more likely than in the past to be union officials. And at the plant level, often bodies such as the labor collective or the council of the production collective exist. The strong impression gained from all of my enterprise visits is that essentially these seem to be quasi co-determination arrangements and that they are an important mechanism in the decision-making process.¹⁴

(5) Leaders' Compensation and Effort

The median monetary compensation (wages plus bonuses) for the leadership position was 24,000 roubles per month (in Feb. 1993 roubles). However, from Table 5B we see that the monetary rewards of the job varied considerably ¹⁵ and that there was considerable variation in the hours worked per month by union officials. Whereas about 4% worked fewer than 40 hours, 12% worked more than six times as long on union business. In terms of compensation per hour, more than one third of respondents reported compensation to be less than 100 roubles per hour. However, hourly compensation ranged widely, from 15.8 roubles per hour to 540 roubles per hour.

One clear change that has occurred concerns the earnings of union leaders relative to previously important reference groups, such as the senior manager. Though data on the exact ratios are often difficult to ascertain it is clear that branch union leaders typically receive much less relative to top managers than they did formerly. In the past, reflecting the almost co-equal
status of union presidents and senior managers, union leaders typically earned about 70-90\% of what a director earned. In 1993 the best estimates are that union leaders seldom earned more than one-third of a top manager. However, union leaders wages continue to be linked to average worker earnings, receiving between 2.8 and 4 times the average wage in the enterprises I visited. In other words, the fall in relative earnings or union leaders, fundamentally reflects the improved position of managers relative to all other groups.

When such comparisons are extended to other countries, it seems that the situation in St. Petersburg probably resembles most closely that prevailing in western countries, e.g. the UK. Equally it seems to be quite different from the situation that applies within US unions whereby "...the United States is probably unique among advanced societies in the high salaries of its union officials." Edelstein and Warner (1976:12)

The available data enable compensation equations for union leaders to be estimated. In the old unions it was widely believed that membership in the Communist Party had a positive influence on a union leader's salary. In exploring factors that potentially account for variation in compensation of union leaders in successor unions, we are particularly interested in seeing whether or not past or present membership in the Communist party continues to have an influence. To this end we include dummy variables to capture whether an individual has ever been in the Party (CPNEV) and for those who were, whether they have left the
Party (EXCP). The available data also enable us to examine several other reasonably standard hypotheses. These include whether union leaders earnings are positively related to whether or not an individual had higher educational qualifications (HIED), whether or not the individual previously worked in a professional or specialist capacity (PROF) and age. We also test to see if there is a negative relationship between earnings and the legal form of ownership. Specifically we scrutinize whether or not representation of workers in a state owned enterprise (STATE92), rather than the probably more profitable joint-stock form of organization, had a impact on compensation of union leaders.

The results of such an exploratory exercise are reported in Table 6. Several of the individual coefficients are not significant at customary levels of statistical significance. These include the leader's age, form of ownership and level of education. However, individuals who have never been in the Communist Party and those who were but have quit that body are found to receive lower levels of pay, other things equal.

(6) Union Democracy

The available accounts indicate that the old Russian unions were deeply bureaucratized and undemocratic (e.g. Ruble, 1981). Moreover, other bodies that existed alongside unions in the old structures were viewed in a similar light. Thus, concerning brigades, most authors (e.g. Van Atta, 1989) found that formerly there was a limited level of employee autonomy. Slider (1987)
too found that a high level of formalism characterized elections of brigade leaders. Finally Ruble (1981:33) observed that production conferences were also a failed institution insofar as they did not enhance employee participation.

To see whether there has been change, evidence that attempts to gauge the extent of democracy in unions is presented. Much of this is assembled in Table 2. In so doing we note that there is a long history of examining this theme for Western trade unions (see, for example, (Edelstein and Warner, 1976; and Taft, 1962). Furthermore, these and other studies that attempt to measure democracy in other organizations, indicate that there is no single ideal indicator or measure and that there are obvious problems in interpreting some of the evidence.

We begin by considering evidence on elections. In almost 94% of cases respondents reported that union rules required elections for their position every 5 years; the balance reported a shorter term of office. The survey data indicate that in most cases the rules were being adhered to. Thus data on the timing of the last elections for the incumbents' current position indicates that more than half of respondents reported that they were last elected between two and three years ago. Table 2A also indicates that elections typically were held in fairly structured settings, especially the union conference. In terms of the number of candidates competing for a post, from Table 2A we see that in 35% of cases there was only one candidate. In another 34% instances the contest was a two-horse race. Finally, respondents
reported that at least 80% of the potential electorate voted in the last election; in fact the median rate was 97%. Similarly when asked to report the percent of delegates that participated in elections, typically answers were of a similar order --usually in the high 90% range.

Turning to measures of incumbency, the median duration for the time that respondents had held their current position in the union (tenure in office) was found to be one-two years. However 15% had held office for more than five years-- i.e. well before the reform process began in earnest. Importantly, however, more than two in three union leaders reported that they had been newly elected to their current position (Table 2A).

Information was also collected on the previous experience of union officers in the labor movement. The median number of union jobs previously held was 2. However, 35% of respondents had held only one union job before assuming their present position; only 7% had held four or more union positions. The median length of time that incumbents had held their previous union jobs was 3-4 years. However, 28% had been in their previous union position for seven or more years. Thus the data indicate potentially conflicting tendencies. They reveal tendencies both for many union officials to have risen through the ranks, as well as for much new blood to have appeared recently in successor unions.

We turn finally to indicators of membership and meetings. In 95% of cases, leaders reported that all members were able to see copies of the union membership lists (Table 2C.) Data on the
frequency with which meetings of the general membership are held is also shown in Table 2C. In 45% of the cases reporting, meetings were held at least every three months and in 10% of cases meetings were a monthly occurrence. Typically there was a good turnout at these meetings. While in the majority of cases from 60-79% of the membership was in attendance, 8% of the time the attendance rate exceeded 90%. Moreover, this did not always reflect the fact that meetings were held at the workplace. In fact the workplace was the venue for only 37% of general membership meetings of the union. The most popular assembly place was the union hall (57%).

Another item we collected information on was whether or not there was a special newspaper/newsletter. About half of those who answered this question indicated that such a communication channel did exist. However, in the bulk of these cases the paper was not controlled by the trade union but rather was distributed at the plant with trade union participation.

To explore some of these issues further, we undertake two sets of exploratory exercises. We estimate binomial probit models in which the dependent variable is whether or not the union leader is newly elected to that position. Second, we estimate OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the length of time (TENURE) the leader has been in office. In both cases we examine hypotheses on issues concerning aspects of bureaucratization and democracy by testing for the statistical significance of three sets of variables: personal characteristics
VI Conclusions and Implications

By using new data for leaders in successor unions in St. Petersburg "actually existing" unionism in Russia during the early phases of transition to a market economy is described and evidence relevant to diverse issues, especially hypotheses on the ability of successor unions to undertake internal reforms, is presented. Since St. Petersburg is one of the key sites where the stimulus for the new alternative unions first appeared (Temkina, 1992), arguably this study is of broader relevance. While there remains a clear need for additional data, especially for other unions in other regions of Russia, on the basis of the existing data some tentative conclusions can be drawn.

First, the level of union membership continues to be very high by international standards in both Western and Eastern Europe. Moreover, it is a commitment to successor unions (rather than the new, alternative unions) that is strongest.

Second, the characteristics of today's union leaders suggests some movement away from the profile of leaders in the old unions. In particular, the role of membership in the communist party had diminished considerably by mid 1993. At the same time, there remain ways in which the typical leader in successor unions strongly resembles his precursor.

Third, the data on union functions clearly indicate movement away from the old model. The mission of the confederation is very different than its precursor. At other levels, what union leaders do now is different from the objectives that were stressed.
(e.g. age, gender, membership in the communist party); firm characteristics (e.g. size, legal form of organization); and union characteristics.

From Table 7 we see that tenure in office (column 1) is systematically related to some individual characteristics. Those who have a higher education are more likely to have assumed office more recently. Those who were never in the Party are also more likely to have a relatively short tenure, though there is no statistically significant relationship between tenure and having quit the party. Also men and those with a professional background are more likely to have longer tenure in office, other things equal. Age and parents’ professions do not seem to affect tenure in union office. In no case did variables designed to capture aspects of firm or union characteristics attain the customary levels of significance.

The probability of being newly elected (column 2) is found to be statistically significantly and inversely related to age. The reported probit estimates also suggest that women are more likely to be newly elected to union office and that those with right wing political preferences are less likely to be new to office. Somewhat surprisingly, firms which remain as state-owned are also more likely to have new leaders. All other variables, including level of education, membership in the Party, professional background and age are found not to be systematically related to whether or not the union officer was newly elected.
previously. The concerns that loom largest today relate to groups of workers—for example wages and job protection.

In terms of formal union structures, while there are some clear and strong enduring links with the past, there is also evidence of substantial change. Particularly noticeable are the emergence of more decentralized structures and quasi-codetermination arrangements. Alternative unions are not a big factor at all in most plants in St. Petersburg.

Relative to enterprise managers, there has been substantial erosion in union leaders' compensation. Equally, there is evidence of significant variation in compensation and effort among union leaders. Compared with union leaders who have a past or present affiliation with the Communist Party, union leaders who have never been in the Communist Party tend to receive lower incomes from the union.

Finally, diverse formal indicators suggest that today's unions in Russia are more democratic than was formerly the case and also compared with other bodies that existed alongside unions in the old structures. There is evidence that much new blood has appeared in leadership positions in successor unions and that the average tenure of union leaders has fallen. Past or present membership in the Communist Party is not related to the likelihood of a leader being newly elected.

In sum, while the findings are not uniform, in these uncertain times, on balance we do find evidence that Russian workers view successor unions as worthwhile institutions. In
addition there is evidence of movement away from the old bureaucratized model and that successor unions are much more vibrant and democratic institutions than the old unions. Furthermore, it appears that, compared to their precursors, the role and function of successor unions and their leaders have changed in significant respects, especially in the direction of more emphasis on job-related issues. Successor unions in St. Petersburg do not appear to be still dominated by leaders who emerged under the old regime. The extent of the restructuring in unions may be appreciated even more when contrasted with the virtual absence of organizational or personnel changes on the management side (Hare, 1993). At the same time, many union leaders have had leadership positions for a long time and there are some indications that past or present membership in the Communist Party still continues to have some influences (e.g. positively on compensation of union leaders). Hence, the situation is quite complicated and the influence of the old guard on the policy making process within successor unions probably cannot be ignored.

One implication of these findings arises from the observation that this is a key time of transition in the industrial relations systems in Eastern and Central Europe and that once systems are set in place, major modifications are often quite difficult to make (Katz, Kuruvilla and Turner, 1993; Freeman, 1993). In Russia a critical issue concerns the respective roles that the FNPR unions and the new independent
unions should be encouraged to play at this vital stage. Some claim that FNPR successor unions should not be supported because they have not (and, some would argue, cannot) really changed their nature and functions. Our data cast doubt on this argument. By providing evidence of progressive changes in actual practices and sustained member commitment to the successor unions, our findings imply it may not be either socially nor economically optimal to clear away all vestiges of the old institutional arrangements. On the contrary, the St Petersburg experience suggests that in facilitating the emergence of a tripartite system it is possible (and perhaps more efficient) to gradually build on the old system. At minimum, successor unions are a good complement to the newer (alternative) unions which, while attracting the lion's share of attention by western analysts, have tended to remain quite weak in practice during the early stages of transition.

In some respects it seems that our findings for St. Petersburg mirror those for other transitional economies. This is the case, for example, concerning the strength of successor versus alternative unions (Freeman, 1993). And in Bulgarian unions evidently a higher level of democracy exists in successor unions than was the case in the former unions previously (Jones, 1992). Equally, the available evidence for most other countries is quite slender and thus precludes general pronouncements.

As for the future, the situation is very dynamic and unions face important challenges in an uncertain environment. An
important test arises from the recent decision to end trade unions' responsibility for administering social security funds. Another potential trial concerns the matter of ownership of assets accumulated by the former unions. This has not yet been addressed in ways comparable to its treatment in other countries. At the same time we note that in most former socialist countries, even after the loss of assets to rival unions (and the state) often one finds that membership commitment to successor unions continues. This is the case, for example, in Poland and Bulgaria. Hence for the foreseeable future in Russia there is no reason to believe that these two challenges will lead to members switching away from successor (and to alternative) unions, though further erosion in union membership levels is likely.

But perhaps the key difficulty confronting successor unions is privatization. On this count the implications for unions are much more uncertain and potentially troubling. Eventually this will mean the emergence of real employers and, in turn, this will undermine the strategic alliance of management and employees that has often prevailed in the early stages of transition. In this very different context, while there will be further loss of membership, the extent of the expected loss in membership remains unclear. A raft of questions likely will also arise, including many under the themes we have examined. An important question is whether the various quasi-codetermination bodies and other organizational structures will survive in the new era. What will these new arrangements mean for the scope and functions of trade
unions at the level of the enterprise? How will this, in conjunction with changes in ownership, affect enterprise performance? All of the issues are especially intriguing since most large and medium sized manufacturing firms in Russia (including St. Petersburg) chose the privatization option that provided for majoritarian employee ownership (Bim, Jones and Weisskopf, 1993).
Notes

This paper owes much to many. I wish to give particular thanks to Yevgeny Makarov, Kari Tapiola, Leonid Gordon, Richard Freeman, Peter Dorman, Kelly Smith and Guy Standing.


2 For more detail on the emergence of the new system of industrial relations, see the collection of essays in Economic and Industrial Democracy, 1993.

3 A sample of 300 leaders at all levels—confederation, branch and enterprise— in manufacturing unions was drawn using confederation records. In such a time of extraordinary rapid change complete population records were unavailable and thus it was impossible to attempt to draw a representative sample. After postal and face-to-face pre-tests of the survey, the survey data were collected using both methods between February and July 1993. Enterprise visits, which focused on face to face interviews with local leaders, included two shipyards and an engineering firm. In addition, meetings took place with three branch leaders and two leaders at the confederation level. All of these visits took place during two field trips in October 1992 and May 1993.

4 For an account of the different forms of enterprise organization in Russia and the former USSR during this period, see Bim, Jones and Weisskopf, 1993;1993a. Note also that there is some indication that the private sector was growing quite fast there (relative to other parts of Russia) (see Webster, 1992; Bim, Jones and Weisskopf, 1993a))

5 The number of workers in the production level that corresponded to the union leaders' function ranged from 70 to 290,000. The total number of workers covered by the survey (covering the greater St. Petersburg area) was about.... This compares with a potential labor force estimated at 3.1 million and employment of 2.525 million for the city of St. Petersburg alone. (Estimates derived from Gendler and Gildingersh, 1992). The population of St Petersburg itself was just over 5 million, of which 2.75 million were female.

6 In some cases union membership exceeded the labor force. (These observations are not included in the reported figures. Had they been, such cases would have represented 17.5% of total responses.) It is not clear whether these represent processing errors or delays in removing former members from the rolls of actual figures reflecting released or retired workers retaining union membership.

7 For details on union membership in Western European countries, see Blanchflower and Freeman (1992). See Freeman, 1993, for
information for other East European countries.

8 The absence of multiple unionism in St. Petersburg is markedly different than in other transitional economies. However, while multiple unionism is more common elsewhere, the norm remains a situation in which successor unions have the largest membership rates. This is clearly the case, for example, in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. On the latter case see Jones (1993).

9 In the aftermath of the events surrounding the dissolution of the Parliament in September 1993, this right was taken away from trade unions.

10 Unfortunately there do not seem to be precise data with which one can make comparisons. The impression of the profile of the average union leader comes from several sources, for example Granick (1954).

11 See the appendix for a complete list of variables.

12 To the extent that union leaders continue to play a role in influencing layoffs in factories, conceivably this might lead to women being more likely (than men) to be laid off. (In turn, this may partially explain why females are overly represented among the unemployed.)

13 During the same period the labor force fell by 11%.

14 Also various symbolic indicators of change were apparent in visits to enterprises. Sometimes some of the symbols of the old system were still noticeable. For example, statues of Lenin, however, frequently remained in public spaces in many enterprises. But in only one meeting, with a branch union leader, was a picture of Lenin prominently displayed. Also, while charts for socialist competition were sometimes still on display, these seldom seemed to be in use.

15 Efforts to collect information on the money value of various kinds of income in kind (e.g. subsidized food and transportation) and other unpaid privileges, were largely unsuccessful. However, Standing (1992) reports evidence how, on average, for employees, this part of total compensation was growing during 1992, especially in manufacturing.

16 For example, long tenure in office or few candidates for a position may imply either a strong and popular incumbent (whom no-one wants to challenge) or an entrenched incumbent with considerable resources.

17 Some of these formal indicators of democracy are comparable to data for unions elsewhere. Thus, in his classic study of 34 international American unions between 1900 and 1948, Taft (1954) found that on average 23.4% of offices were contested and for the
position of president the figure was only 18.8%. For British unions Allen (1954) used diverse indicators of union democracy including: constitutional periods of office; actual time in office; and methods of voting to elect leaders. If comparable formal indicators are used in St. Petersburg, by such a token contemporary Russian successor unions are at least as formally democratic.

18 This tendency has been observed for many western trade unions (See Allen, 1954 and Taft, 1954).

19 Evidence on some of these matters is also available from enterprise visits. At one large firm, union affairs were handled by a trade union committee of 45. More than half of the members of this body had changed during the last two years, including some through a recall provision. This body met monthly though individual members would meet with their constituents (e.g. in workshops) each week. On another occasion I was present at a meeting of the Trade Union confederation during a visit by a delegate of the National Confederation from Moscow. This was quite a lively meeting with active participation by all present.

20 There is some suggestion that, compared to successor unions, alternative unions were often more dependent on such funds as a source of revenue. It has also been suggested that, again compared to successor unions, alternative unions were often disbursing a smaller fraction of such funds for social security purposes. If so, this development will be especially hard on the alternative unions.
Appendix: Definitions of the Variables

STATE92 = Dummy variable for whether or not enterprise was state owned in 1992
PAYRATE = Earnings per hour (Roubles)
HIED = Dummy for whether or not the union leader had higher education
AGE = Age of union leader
AGESQ = AGE*AGE
GENDER = 0=male; 1=female
CPNEVER = Dummy for whether respondent was ever a member of the Communist Party
CPCUR = Dummy for whether respondent is currently a member of the Communist Party
EXCP = For those who were (are) in the Communist Party, a dummy for whether or not they have quit the party.
LEFT = Dummy for whether or not the respondent has political sympathies for parties on the left (socialists, laborists etc.)
RIGHT = Dummy for whether or not respondent has political sympathies for parties on the right (Democrats, radicals etc.)
CENTER = Dummy for whether or not respondent has political sympathies for parties in the center
PROF = Dummy for whether or not individual has a professional background
PROFMA = Dummy for whether or not individual's mother had a professional background
PROFPA = Dummy for whether or not individual's father had a professional background
References


Bim, Alexander, Derek C. Jones and Tom Weisskopf (1993) "Hybrid Forms of Enterprise in Russia and the Former USSR", Comparative Economic Systems


Charup and Webster Private Manufacturing Firms in St. Petersburg. The World Bank.


Hare, Paul (1993)


_______ "Trade Union Membership and Employee Participation in


Silverman, Bertram, Robert Vogt and Murray Yanowitch (1992) Labor and Democracy in the Transition to a Market System Sharpe, N.Y.


Table 1 Characteristics of Sample Firms (%)

A. Property Form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leased</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Stock</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership/Association</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Size and Change of Labor Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 500</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1-50 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001-2500</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-1 to -10 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2501-5000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-10 to -20 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5001-50,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-21 to -50 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;50,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>&gt;(-51) 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>9,518</td>
<td>11,348</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source

Author's survey.
Table 2 Bureaucratization and Union Democracy (%)

A. Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where Elected</th>
<th>Time since last Election for position (months)</th>
<th># Candidates for position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>12 &lt; 6 9</td>
<td>1 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>7-12 21</td>
<td>2 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference</td>
<td>65 13-24 13</td>
<td>3 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>12 25-36 52</td>
<td>4 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidium</td>
<td>10 37-48 2</td>
<td>5 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 49 3</td>
<td>&gt;6 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Tenure as Union Officer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Months</th>
<th>Newly Elected (to that office)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-36</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-48</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49-60</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-72</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73-90</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 91</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Membership and Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members can Access Membership Lists</th>
<th>Frequency Membership at Gen. Meetings</th>
<th>Membership at Gen. Meetings (%)</th>
<th>Union Membership (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 10</td>
<td>&gt; 90 8</td>
<td>&lt;69 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3 35</td>
<td>80-89 22</td>
<td>70-79 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95%</td>
<td>4-6 42</td>
<td>70-79 32</td>
<td>80-89 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7-12 13</td>
<td>60-69 32</td>
<td>90-100 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; 60 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
Source: Authors' survey. Data are for 1993.
Table 3  Characteristics of Union Leaders (%)

A. Averages
Age (years) 47
Male 88
Currently Married 84
Experience in previous occupation (Years) 15
Ex-member of Communist Party 52
Member of the Communist Party mid 1992 23
Never a member of the Communist party 25
Left wing political sympathies 16
Right wing political sympathies 18
Centrist political sympathies 66

B. Distributions by Age, Education and Experience (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Years in Previous Job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29-39</td>
<td>16 Secondary</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>49 Special Second</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>30 Semi High</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>4 Higher</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Distributions by Occupational Background of Leaders and their Parents (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Mother</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialists</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sources: Author's survey. Data are for 1993.
Table 4 Crosstabulations of Membership in the Communist Party and Political Preferences (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RIGHT</th>
<th>CENTER</th>
<th>LEFT</th>
<th>Row Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPCUR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXCP</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPNEVER</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
CPCUR = currently a member of the Communist Party
EXCP = formerly a member of the Communist Party
CPNEVER = never a member of the Communist Party

Source: Author's survey. Data are for 1993.
### Table 5 What Do Unions and Leaders do?

**A. How Union Leaders Allocate Time and Resources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>78</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>81</th>
<th>82</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>84</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>86</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Priority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
76 = helping members solve problems and grievances on the job
77 = improving or protecting pay
78 = improving safety and health at work
79 = keeping members informed
80 = improving the way the union is run
81 = distributing products or consumer goods
82 = protecting job security
83 = improving or protecting benefits
84 = arranging for holidays at union-owned facilities
85 = organizing non-union workers
86 = administering social security

**B. Effort and Compensation of Union Leaders: (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compensation (r. per month)</th>
<th>Hours Worked (p. month)</th>
<th>Compensation (r. per hour)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;3,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>&lt;40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000-10,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001-20,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>81-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,001-30,000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>121-160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001-40,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>161-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,001-50,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>201-240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,001-75,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>241-269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;75,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**
1. Compensation includes only money earnings.
2. Source. Author's survey. Data are for 1993.
Table 6  **The Determinants of Compensation of Union Leaders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>48104</td>
<td>(17180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIED</td>
<td>-6458.7</td>
<td>(5329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>-110.72</td>
<td>(340.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPNEVER</td>
<td>-16386</td>
<td>(6419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPART</td>
<td>-10503</td>
<td>(5483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE92</td>
<td>2611.2</td>
<td>(4756)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ = 0.14

$n$ = 66

**Notes**
Standard errors are in parentheses.
The dependent variable is PAYRATE (roubles per hour).
Table 7  The Determinants of Tenure and Whether Leaders are newly Elected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Tenure</th>
<th>(2) Newly Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>199.26 (135.36)</td>
<td>7.5056 (3.785)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIED</td>
<td>-30.385 (18.00)</td>
<td>0.3167 (0.7042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>-9.1082 (7.482)</td>
<td>-0.1410 (0.0677)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGESQ</td>
<td>0.1130 (0.0811)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>54.544 (30.81)</td>
<td>-1.9927 (1.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROF</td>
<td>46.613 (22.50)</td>
<td>-0.9903 (1.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFPA</td>
<td>19.663 (12.61)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFMA</td>
<td>-12.667 (12.59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPNEVER</td>
<td>-24.51 (14.62)</td>
<td>4.1498 (42.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPART</td>
<td>0.275 (14.31)</td>
<td>-0.0041 (-0.0126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE92</td>
<td>8.323 (11.21)</td>
<td>1.7501 (0.924)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIGHT</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.4346 (0.8169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td></td>
<td>-15.958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
The estimates reported in column 1 are OLS where TENURE = the number of months in office. The estimate reported column 2 is a binomial probit where the dependent variable is whether or not the union leader is newly elected.