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AUTHORS: KAZIMIERZ SLOMCZYNSKI and GOLDIE SHABAD
Ohio State University

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1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
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CONTRACTOR: Ohio State University

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Kazimierz M. Siomczynski and Goldie Shabad

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This comparative analysis of support among students (aged 13-14), teachers, and parents for key aspects of democratic rule and a market economy during the initial period of systemic transformation in Poland shows that, although all three groups differ in terms of their orientations, among none is there is strong consensus in favor of either the emergent ideology of democratic capitalism or the core values of the previous system of state socialism. This study also demonstrates that individuals' psychological dispositions -- valuation of self-direction versus conformity, authoritarian/conservatism versus open mindedness, and resistance to change versus acceptance of innovation, as well as their location in the social structure, affect support for systemic change among students, teachers and parents.

This study was motivated by two broad issues relevant to the consolidation of new democratic regimes. The first concerns the degree to which widespread commitment to democratic values and rules of the game on the part of the mass public is a necessary condition for stable democracy. The second has to do with the effectiveness of efforts by political and cultural elites to socialize members of society, especially the young, into the values and norms of a new political and economic order.

Hence, the purposes of this study are twofold. The first is to gauge relative levels of support for democracy and a market economy among three groups in post-communist Poland: students aged 13-14, and corresponding "cohorts" of teachers and parents. In our examination of levels of support for democracy, we focus on the principles of political equality, the legitimacy of the expression of group interests, and the holding of competitive elections. These core principles of liberal democracy stand in sharp contrast to those that underlay both the ideology and practice of Communist rule in Poland. In our analysis of support for the new economic order, we focus on such key features of market capitalism as tolerance for marked disparities in income, the use of material incentives to promote and reward educational attainment, and the reliance on individual initiative and responsibility for one's well being; these principles, too, are the antithesis of those of a state socialist economy.

The second purpose of this paper is to assess the relative impact of certain key determinants of support for democracy and the market among students, teachers and parents. We focus on two widely researched sets of factors that are known to affect the outcomes of political socialization: psychological dispositions or aspects of personality and an individual's social structural characteristics (e.g., income, employment status, educational level). This analysis thus presents a "snapshot" of the psychological and structural context in which the learning of political and economic values is taking place during this period of great flux and uncertainty in Poland.
This study is based, in part, on original data gathered in 1994 on a sample of 295 students and a sample of 53 teachers from 12 selected schools in Poland who were about to begin their participation in a new curriculum of civic education. We also use data from larger surveys, conducted in 1978 and in 1992-1993, in which both adolescents, aged 12-15, and parents of children, aged 12-14, were respondents.

Our study shows that at that time in the systemic transformation in Poland neither the cultural legacy of the past nor the emergent ideology of democratic capitalism held sway. Evidence of a "hybrid" pattern of beliefs among all three groups is not surprising, given the recency of the transition, government instability, and the high social costs of inflation, unemployment and growing poverty that have accompanied privatization and marketization of the economy. Whether support for democratic and market principles will become more widespread in Poland (and other post-communist societies) will depend as much, if not more, on macro-level political and economic developments as on the success of political socialization efforts by the regime.

At the same time, the three groups did differ in their overall support for systemic change. Teachers tended to be the most supportive of the political and economic transformation. We further found that adults were substantially more supportive of democratic principles and less positive in their endorsement of a market economy than students. Thus, the pattern of inter-group differences varied, depending upon whether the change in question had to do with the political or the economic realm. Two inferences may be drawn from these findings. First, support for democratic rule and support for a market economy may be two distinct dimensions of individuals' orientations toward systemic change. Second, generational effects are apparent in the pattern of value differences between adults and adolescents. But there are distinct components to generational effects and which of these is the more pronounced depends upon the kind of orientation, economic or political, in question.

Our analysis also shows that, at the individual level, support for democracy and the market is affected both by one's position in the social structure and psychological dispositions. In general, valuation of self-direction, open mindedness, and tolerance of innovation, as well as an advantaged position in the social structure, are related to support for democracy and a market economy. Such findings might lead to skepticism about the degree to which efforts to inculcate democratic and market values, even among the young, are likely to be successful. Social structural location and the self interests it generates, as well as psychological functioning, are not easily or quickly manipulable. However, our analysis indicates that these individual-level characteristics are not so closely linked to political and economic orientations as to foreclose the influence on adolescents of schools and other agents of socialization, as well
as political learning on the part of both students and adults that comes from a variety of direct experiences in informal and institutional settings.

Our findings also suggest that the intergenerational transmission of values, at least in this current period of flux, does not preclude the acquisition of different and in this case pro-democratic and pro-market values. Although parents’ beliefs certainly have an impact on those of their children, the relationship between the two is only moderately strong and it is somewhat weaker now than it was in the late 1970s during the era of relative political stability in Poland.

In sum, the effects of both social structural and psychological attributes of individuals, as well as of familial values, may well become stronger should the normative and institutional context in which Poles live become more stable. But in the short term, there is considerable room for other determinants and other agents of socialization to have a discernible impact on the political and economic orientations of younger members of Polish society.

The school is, of course, one such arena of political socialization, and that is why we have focused here on the views of teachers in conjunction with those of students and parents. Studies of political socialization show varying effects of civics education on students’ social values and norms. Other characteristics of formal education, such as the structure of learning and the degree of congruence between the content of civics curricula and the visible reality of political and economic life, also have an impact on students. Moreover, apart from socialization in the school and in the family, there are numerous other influences on political learning in Poland: the peer group, the mass media, the Church, and, of course, students’ own personal experiences with political authority. Some of these may reinforce the education for democracy and the market that students receive in school. Others, however, might convey messages and provide experiences that counteract democratic and capitalist values.

What our study implies then for political socialization in Poland is that the present context of political learning is particularly malleable and allows for overt and concerted efforts to create a democratic and market culture among the young. But, given the uncertainty of political and economic developments and the existence of multiple and competing channels of socialization in the post-communist period, the outcome of such efforts is not foreordained. It is quite likely that, notwithstanding the explicit efforts to socialize the citizenry in liberal democratic and capitalist values, the political culture of Poland will neither be a replica of the past nor a copy of an “ideal type” democratic and market culture. Rather, as is the case with all political cultures undergoing fundamental change, it will likely evolve toward a unique composite of elements of the past, of the newly emergent “official ideology,” and of values that stem from individuals’ experiences of and innovative responses to the transformation itself.

This brings us to a final consideration, namely the relationship between politico-economic culture and the prospects for consolidation of democratic rule and a market economy in Poland
and other post-communist societies. There is heated debate among social scientists as to whether stable democracy and a well-functioning economy require mass-level support and widespread commitment to such core values as the willingness to compromise and individual initiative. Some have argued that the cultural legacy of Leninism is pervasive in post-communist societies and, as a consequence, the prospects for stable democratic capitalism are dim. Others are more sanguine about the possibility of a successful transition even in the absence at the outset of "democrats" and "capitalists" among the mass public.

To argue that a democratic political culture is a necessary condition for the establishment of a democratic regime flies in the face of empirical evidence. The creation of a democracy would seem to depend far more on the interests, values and behavior of political elites than on commitment to democracy at the mass level. But the requisites of a durable and effective democracy may be quite another matter. As the multiple examples of democratic failure suggest, the survival and quality of a democracy, once established, appear to require popular legitimacy, voluntary compliance with both the rules of the game and public policies, citizen participation, and sufficient immunity to the appeals of anti-system movements and leaders. Such commitments and behavior on the part of the mass public rest, in turn, as much on fundamental features of a society as on the orientations and actions of political elites. The importance of a congruent political culture for durable and effective democratic governance is well understood by post-authoritarian political elites. Hence, their emphasis on political socialization.
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN POLAND

Kazimierz M. Slomczynski

Goldie Shabad

INTRODUCTION

It will long be a matter of considerable debate what role the lack of popular support for single party rule and state socialism played in the downfall of Communism in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. So, too, will the notion that widespread commitment to democratic values and rules of the game on the part of the mass public is a necessary condition for stable democracy. But what cannot be disputed is the fact that elites in non-democratic and democratic regimes, in revolutionary and traditional societies alike are keenly interested in reproducing, through informal and formal political socialization processes, the core values and norms that underlie the prevailing political and economic order. Newly established regimes, in particular, will engage in overt and intensive efforts to shape the values and norms of young generations, inasmuch as in the early stages of political transformation recently emergent elites must confront the cultural legacies, and often the leaders and political forces, of the past.

Despite efforts by dominant elites to “create” and maintain political and economic cultures that are congruent with and hence serve to legitimize the existing order, processes of political socialization, the content of what is learned, and therefore the outcomes of political education are not uniform across all members of a society. These depend on the individuals’ psychological characteristics, social structural positions, group self-identities, and personal experiences in the family, school, workplace, and so on. Thus, although it is reasonable to expect that differing cultures will over time come to be associated with differing political and economic systems and their underlying values systems, we should also expect there to be within any one society and at any one point in time rather striking variations in individual-level

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2Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, 300 Bricker Hall, 190 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210, Phone: (614) 292 6681, Fax: (614) 292 6687.

3Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, 2140 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210, Phone: (614) 292 2880, Fax: (614) 292 1146.
cognitive and normative orientations toward the existing political and economic order. Such 
variations were certainly evident in Poland under Communist rule. Such value differentiation 
should be even greater in Poland now that it is undergoing profound systemic change.

The purposes of this paper are twofold. The first is to gauge the relative levels of 
support for democracy and a market economy -- the new political and economic order -- 
among three groups in post-communist Poland: students aged 13-14, and corresponding 
“cohorts” of teachers and parents. In comparing these groups’ political and economic 
orientations, we concentrate primarily on inter-generational differences rather than on intra-
school or intra-familial processes involved in political socialization. In our examination of 
levels and determinants of support for democracy, we focus on the principles of political 
equality, the legitimacy of the expression of group (even narrow “special”) interests, and the 
holding of competitive elections as mechanisms for the selection of governmental leaders and 
for ensuring that those who rule are held accountable for their actions to the public. These 
principles of political equality, group representation, political pluralism, and governmental 
accountability are at the core of the definition of liberal democracy. They stand in sharp 
contrast to those that underlay both the ideology and practice of Communist rule in Poland. 
Just as liberal democracy is the mirror image of single party Communist rule, the operating 
rules and institutions of market capitalism are the antithesis of those of state socialism. In 
our analysis of support for the new economic order, we focus on such key features of market 
capitalism as tolerance for marked disparities in income, the use of material incentives to 
promote and reward educational attainment, and the reliance on individual initiative and 
responsibility for one’s well being. The questions that we pose, then, are to what extent do 
students, teachers and parents express agreement with these core elements of democracy and a 
market economy, and to what degree do the three groups differ from one another in terms of 
their political and economic orientations?

We posit a number of hypotheses with regard to differences among students, teachers and 
parents in their level of support for democratic rule and a market economy. The first stresses 
the importance of period effects on shaping the orientations of these particular groups and can 
be stated as the null hypothesis: that is, there will be negligible differences among these 
groups, inasmuch as all three will exhibit similar patterns of inconsistent values characteristic 
of periods of radical social change. An emphasis on generational effects, however, leads one to 
expect discernible differences in the orientations between students, on the one hand, and 
teachers and parents, on the other.

Considering generational effects, contradictory hypotheses can be posited. The first of 
these asserts that students are more likely than teachers or parents to express pro-change 
sentiments because the new emergent ideology of democratic capitalism, as conveyed by
political elites and the mass media, has a greater impact on youth than on adults. This is so because of adolescents' far more limited exposure to the values of the past system and because of their greater capacity for political learning associated with youth per se. The second hypothesis, however, stresses another aspect of generational effects, namely the existence or lack thereof of a comparative referent point by which to evaluate the new political and economic order. Since students, unlike adults, have negligible direct experience of the past regime and have no personal basis on which to reject it, students' orientations are likely to be affected more than those of adults by their negative experience of political instability and economic insecurity of the transition era. Thus, lacking a comparative referent point with which to interpret and assess the present situation, students will be less supportive of systemic change than teachers or parents. As for differences between teachers and parents, we expect that teachers are more in favor of systemic change than parents since civics education requires a better understanding of mechanisms of democracy and a market economy. In addition, all teachers in our study were involved in an Education for Democracy program through a process of self-selection which may enhance the value differences between them and parents. We will return to this point.

The second purpose of this paper is to determine the relative impact of certain key determinants of support for democracy and the market among students, teachers and parents. Here we focus on two widely researched sets of variables that are known to affect the outcomes of political socialization. The first of these are psychological dispositions or aspects of personality having to do with valuation of self-direction versus conformity, authoritarian-conservatism versus open mindedness, and resistance to change versus acceptance of innovation. There is a substantial body of evidence in support of the long-standing argument that these three dimensions of psychological functioning, as well as others, influence individuals' political and economic orientations. In this case, we would expect that those persons who place greater emphasis on self-direction and who are more open-minded and receptive to change would be more likely to embrace democracy and the market. Moreover, these personality characteristics may have greater impact on the views of teachers and parents, for example, than those of students. This may be so for two reasons. First, adults' orientations are likely to be more internally constrained than those of adolescents. Second, empirical research suggests that personality characteristics, such as valuation of self-direction, authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change are more stable among older than younger cohorts.

Another set of determinants of support for democracy and the market that we explore here pertains to the social structural characteristics of individuals. Income, employment status, educational level, among other individual-level social structural attributes, are strongly related
to one's self interests and hence to one's preferences regarding political and economic matters. Certainly, in the case of post-communist societies, the ongoing transition to a market economy will create clear “winners” and “losers”, depending upon individuals’ market assets and their ability and willingness to adjust to the new economic rules of the game. Thus, we expect that those whose economic situation is better off in terms of income and job security, for example, are more apt to be pro-change than their more disadvantaged counterparts. But it is also well documented that in many societies, including Poland, an individual’s position in the social structure is related as well to one’s valuation of self-direction, authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change. Hence, in examining the degree to which both psychological dispositions and social structural attributes are related to the political and economic orientations of students, teachers and parents, we will also assess the independent effects of each set of variables on support for systemic transformation.

Like the descriptive analysis of aggregate levels of support for democracy and the market among our “triad”, this analysis of the psychological and social structural determinants of such political and economic orientations can also serve as a benchmark for subsequent studies of political socialization in Poland. This analysis presents a snapshot, as it were, of the structural and psychological context in which the learning of political and economic values is taking place during this period of flux and uncertainty. Our results may reflect secular trends with regard to the determinants of support for democracy and the market, or they may instead be indicative of more short term patterns in the processes and outcomes of political learning. Only longitudinal studies of political socialization will be able to address this issue.

DATA

In 1994 we gathered original data on a sample of 295 students and a sample of 53 teachers in Poland. The student and teacher surveys contained a common core of questions related to psychological dispositions, political and economic orientations, and standard individual-level demographic characteristics.

The collection and analysis of these data constitute a part of a larger research effort pertaining to the policy initiative of the Education for Democracy project. As a result of this project, a new curriculum of civic education was introduced in Autumn 1994 in 56 elementary schools in Poland. Since Education for Democracy was conceived as an experiment in political socialization, we decided to gather survey data from students before they were exposed to the new civics curriculum. Thus, at the beginning of the 1994 school year a questionnaire was administered to students in twelve selected elementary schools in which the new program in civic education was being introduced. We chose these schools from various regions of Poland so that they would "represent" diversified school environments. We do not claim that we have
a probability sample of either schools or students. Ours is a special sample of those who were
to be subject to an experimental treatment. Nonetheless, we will show that the findings from
this sample are very similar to the results from another, more representative, sample of
students of the same age.

A questionnaire was administered to teachers in June and August 1994 at the beginning
of a special training session of the Education for Democracy project. The first session was
attended by 27 teachers and the second by 26. Certainly, the teachers included in our study do
not represent all elementary school teachers, or even all teachers of civic education; rather,
they constitute a select group linked to the Education for Democracy initiative. Some of them
taught in schools included in our 1994 sample of students; others did not. Nonetheless, since
they volunteered to participate in the experimental program, one can assume that they were
more interested in issues of democracy and the market than regular teachers of civic education.

In this paper we also use data from other surveys. In particular, we analyze data from a
1992-1993 study "Intergenerational Transmission of Values under Conditions of Systemic
Change", in which respondents were students, aged 12-15, and both of their parents. This
constitutes our TRIADS 1993 data file. In addition, we make use of an analogous file,
TRIADS 1978, which contains data for students and their parents gathered 15 years earlier,
toward the end of Edward Gierek’s rule and prior to the formation of Solidarity. Finally, for
comparative purposes we also present 1993 survey data from a national sample of Polish
adults. From this survey we extracted data for those who were parents of children aged 12-
14. These data are referred to as PANEL 1993.

AGGREGATE LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND A MARKET
ECONOMY: STUDENTS, TEACHERS AND PARENTS

We begin our analysis of support for systemic change in Poland among students, teachers
and parents -- our “triad” in adolescent socialization processes -- with an examination of their
orientations toward certain core elements of democratic rule and a market economy. Our 1994
surveys of students and teachers, as well as the 1993 study of parents, included a wide variety
of questions related to respondents’ political and economic orientations. From the inception of
our analysis, we attempted to utilize selected questions to construct indexes that are at once
comparable among our three groups--students, teachers, and parents--and valid for each of
them. Based on an extensive exploratory factor analysis of a full range of items in the
questionnaires for each group, we have selected those that are equivalent for all groups and
pertain to fundamental aspects of democracy and market capitalism. In the case of democracy,
our items refer to political equality, competitive elections, and the legitimacy of interest group
politics. In the case of market capitalism, our items refer to income differentiation, the use of

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material incentives to reward professional training, and individual initiative and responsibility. We recognize that these values are highly abstract and that even in stable and long-lived democracies verbal commitments to such values may erode when respondents are asked to apply them to specific groups and situations. However, these values serve well as general indicators of support for political and economic transformation.

Using the full range of answers to the two sets of questions presented in Table 1 (page 24), separate principal component analyses were performed. These analyses show that all items in each set do indeed constitute single dimensions of support for democratic norms and a market economy, respectively, among all three groups of respondents. As Table 2 (page 27) demonstrates, in the case of support for democracy, for each group the factor loadings are above .600 and the eigenvalue is above 1.0, indicating good measurement properties. Almost equally good are measurement properties of support for the market. However, one item. “The state should provide a job for everyone who wants one”. has a particularly low factor loading in the case of students. Before entering the labor force, students are specially receptive to predictions of high unemployment in coming years. As a result, a vast majority of them agreed with the statement implying that the state has the responsibility to provide enough jobs to prevent unemployment.

We rely on principal component solutions for both the democracy scale and the market scale assuming that the questionnaire items partly define our construct rather than that the construct—the latent variable—governs respondent’s answers. Neither traditional nor new definitions of reliability work well for indicators that cause latent variables. In this situation, we validated our measures of overall support for democracy and the market in additional analyses. Based on factor scores derived from the principal component analyses presented in Table 2, the values of our measures were established for all respondents and then correlated with various additional items related to democratic norms, feelings of political efficacy and alienation, state welfarism and reliance on material incentives.

First, we examined the external validity of the pro-democracy scale. In the questionnaire for teachers we included two additional items pertinent to democratic rule: (1) “The minority should have an opportunity to gain increasing support and eventually power”; and (2) “For ordinary people it is important that political leaders be truly responsive and understanding rather than being only experts.” Agreement with each of these statements correlates positively and significantly with our pro-democracy scale. The Pearson correlation coefficients are .68, and .59, respectively. Thus, for teachers, our scale is positively validated by other survey items. The same applies to students and parents, although the items used for external validation were less suited for this kind of analysis than in the case of teachers.
Second, the external validity of the pro-market scale is especially important in the case of students, since for this group the factor loading of one item was much lower than those of the other two. However, our analysis shows that students’ pro-market responses to other questions having to do with the individual’s responsibility for his or her own well being and a differentiated reward structure for work are positively and significantly correlated with our overall construct of support for the market. The correlation coefficients range from .21 to .47. Thus, we are confident that our scale reflects a generalized pro-market orientation.

Inter-group Comparisons of Support for Democracy and a Market Economy

In this early phase of systemic transformation, the relative degree of support for democratic rule and a market economy among students, teachers, and parents may differ due to various factors. Obviously, none of the groups, not even the youngest among them, is a tabula rasa with regard to orientations toward the proper nature of political authority, the role of the state in providing social welfare, the acceptability of substantial income differentiation, and so on. All have been socialized to a greater or lesser extent and over a longer or shorter period of time into either the values of the "official" ideology of Communist Poland or the values of the counter-ideology of anti-Communism, or both. Still, on the one hand, we might suppose that, of the three groups, students might exhibit the highest degree of support for democratic norms and certain features of a market economy. This would be due to the greater capacity of younger people for political learning (of new and different values), as well as to their comparatively limited exposure to Communist-era values in the school and the mass media.\(^{15}\)

On the other hand, it is also reasonable to expect that teachers and parents would be more apt than students to express pro-change views, especially with regard to the political order, because many of them actively rejected the Communist past based on their own personal experience.

The percentages, arithmetic means and standard deviations of pro-democratic and pro-market responses of students, teachers, and parents to the several questions on political and economic transformation provide a base for assessing group differences (cf. Table 1). In general, adults tend to be substantially more supportive of democratic principles than students. For instance, almost five times as many teachers as students disagreed with the statement "Elections are not necessary if political leaders represented well the interests of citizens."\(^{16}\)

Differences between parents and students in their degree of support for democracy were smaller, but still significant in statistical terms. For instance, 51.2 percent of parents and 15.1 percent of students disagreed with the statement "It is best for the state if only one well-suited person governs." This difference in the two groups’ responses can be attributed to the contrasting political experiences of the two generations. For adults, expressing support for one-
person rule implies acceptance of a return to the dictatorial regime of the past. For students, on the other hand, whose experience of Communist rule is negligible, agreement with the same statement most likely implies a negative response to the political instability which has characterized the first stages of building democracy in Poland.

The pattern of responses among the three groups was different with regard to acceptance of certain basic features of a market economy -- substantial income differentiation, the necessity to employ material incentives for professional training, and the acceptability of unemployment. As the hypothesis regarding the greater impact on young people of the emergent ideology of capitalism would predict, on the whole, students were somewhat more positive toward the market than were either teachers or parents. There was one glaring and surprising exception to this tendency, however. Only five percent of students, but 31 percent of teachers and 25 percent of parents, disagreed with the statement "The state should provide a job for everyone who wants one." As we commented earlier, for students the prospect of finding a job appears quite unfavorable, at least according to mass media reports about employment trends in the near future. The percentage difference, albeit small, in the responses of the two adult groups corresponds to their likelihood of job retention in this period of economic transformation. Teachers have relatively secure jobs--more secure than in the case of adults of a similar age, including the cohort of parents of adolescent youth.

In order to facilitate systematic inter-group comparisons, we now turn to the summary measures of support for democracy and the market. Specifically, we use the two-population confirmatory factor analysis (LISREL) with fixed parameters of the measurement--that is factor loadings--according to the solution presented in Table 2 to determine the difference in the population averages (means). Under such a specification, the arithmetic means of teachers on both scales are statistically higher than those of parents, which are fixed at 0. The difference between the two groups for the pro-democratic scale is .11, and .19 for the pro-market scale. Both these differences are statistically significant at \( p < .05 \).

In interpreting these results we should take into account that our group of teachers is comprised of those persons who chose to be involved in pursuing a new civics curriculum. Thus, what we may be observing here is the effect of self selection: those teachers who were particularly strong in their support of systemic transformation decided to take part in the Education for Democracy training sessions. Accordingly, the teachers in our sample were much more optimistic in their overall evaluation of recent political and economic changes in Poland than the comparative group of parents. In response to the question "In your opinion, have the changes introduced in Poland in the past four years brought most people only benefits, more benefits than losses, as many benefits as losses, more losses than benefits, or
only losses?", only 11 percent of teachers answered "more losses than benefits" or "only losses". In contrast, a total of 68 percent of parents responded in the same fashion.

Students were less supportive of democracy than parents, as indicated by their respective arithmetic means for each of the three specific items. The differences between students and teachers should be assessed with extreme caution because of the very small number of common items involved. However, in the case of these two common items, the average scores for each indicate that students were also less supportive of democracy than their teachers. The difference between average scores for each item is statistically significant (p < .05).

With respect to support for the market, the differences between students and the two groups of adults are much clearer and again conform to the findings presented in Table 1. According to the confirmatory factor solution (LISREL), the average construct score for students is significantly higher than those for teachers and parents, which for comparative purposes, were fixed at 0. In the case of teachers the difference is .14, and in the case of parents the difference is .21, in both cases p < .05.

Although our analyses indicate significant inter-group differences in the levels of support for democracy and a market economy, it is also clear that each group was marked by internal division in their political and economic orientations. In no instance was there an overwhelming majority in agreement with either democratic norms or with market principles. Indeed, in the few instances when a consensus occurred it was in support of certain values associated with the "Communist legacy": the illegitimacy of the pursuit of group interests and state welfarism. Thus, what we see here among both adults and adolescent youth are varied combinations of norms and orientations associated with two competing political and economic belief systems: one, the legacy of the Communist past and the other, an emergent ideology of liberal democracy and market capitalism. It might be that in a period of radical social change, people are more consistent in their views with respect to what they have directly experienced (e.g. the Communist past) than with respect to values and norms associated with a new political and economic system.

We now turn to an analysis of individual-level variation in support of this emergent ideology. Why is it that some individuals, whether they are students, teachers or parents, are more likely to express pro-democratic and pro-market views than others? Here, we focus on two different, but by no means conflicting, explanations of the holding of such orientations. The first explanation has to do with individual's psychological dispositions and the second pertains to his or her current location in the social structure.
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITIONS AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND A MARKET ECONOMY

Our analysis of the impact of psychological dispositions on individual-level support for democratic norms and core features of a market economy focuses on three dimensions of psychological functioning that are widely regarded to affect the content of political and economic orientations. These are: (1) valuation of self-direction, (2) authoritarian-conservatism, and (3) resistance to change.

Valuation of self-direction versus conformity to external authority or externally imposed rules is of significant theoretical interest in its own right, and has been found to underlie many facets of self-conception and social orientation. Moreover, extensive cross-national analyses indicate that self-direction versus conformity is a universal dimension of values.17 Authoritarian-conservatism, also the focus of much attention in attitudinal research, refers to people’s definition of what is socially acceptable: at one extreme, is a rigid adherence to dictates of authority and intolerance of non-conformity and, at the other extreme, open-mindedness.18 Resistance to change refers to people’s lack of receptivity to innovation. Although authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change are strongly correlated with each other, they constitute distinguishable dimensions of personality, not only in the United States but also in Poland.19

Measurement of Self-Direction, Authoritarian-Conservatism, and Resistance to Change

Our measurement of the valuation of self-direction follows the tradition of studies originated by Kohn and Schooler.20 Their approach is based on the theoretical premise that a central manifestation of values is to be found in choice. It is not so important that a person values honesty per se; the critical question is whether that person values honesty more or less than self-control, or obedience, or some other valued personality characteristics. Consonant with the most comprehensive study of self-direction in Poland,21 in our student and teacher questionnaires we included thirteen personality and behavioral characteristics that can be valued for young people, aged 13-15: responsibility, good manners, neatness and cleanliness, being a good student, honesty, obedience to parents, self-control, curiosity, sensitivity to others’ needs, acting like a boy/girl should, getting along with others, and trying hard to succeed. Both students and teachers in our 1994 surveys were asked to partially rank the above set of characteristics by choosing, from among the thirteen, the three they considered to be the most desirable, the one that was most desirable of all, the three that were least important, and the one that was least important of all. Such a ranking makes it possible to place respondents’ valuations of each characteristic along a five-point scale: 5 = the most valued of all; 4 = one of the three most valued, but not the most valued; 3 = neither one of the three most nor one
of the three least valued; 2 = one of the three least valued but not the least valued; and 1 =
the least valued of all.

According to our own and other studies, eight characteristics presented in Tables 3 and 4
(pages 29-30) identified the dimension of self-direction. Since only eight characteristics were
finally included in confirmatory factor analysis the dependencies built into the data due to a
ranking technique were practically eliminated. Based on this analysis, we then tested the
goodness of fit of data to our measurement model.

The factor loadings shown in Table 3 indicate that virtually the same structure of
valuation of self-direction emerged among students at three different points in time. For
students in 1994, 1993, and 1978 such characteristics as responsibility, curiosity, sound
judgment, and self-control were positively related to self-direction, while such characteristics
as good manners, neatness, obedience, and being a good student were negatively related to
self-direction. Sizable differences between 1994 and 1993 in the numerical values for sound
judgment, responsibility, and curiosity should be attributed to measurement error rather than to
substantive features of the two populations. For both the 1993 and 1994 student samples, the
measurement model fits the data very well. The two-population model (LISREL) does not
reveal a significant difference in the mean value of the scale, when one mean value is fixed at
0 and the other is unconstrained. We can conclude that, with respect to valuation of self-
direction, the students from our 1994 sample were as equally representative of this population
group as those from the 1993 national survey.

However, a significant difference emerged between students surveyed in 1993 and 1978.
Mach's research and our own analysis, both of which were based on the two-population
model, reveal that students surveyed in 1993 valued self-direction more highly than did those
surveyed in 1978 if the valuation of self-direction for 1978 is expressed on a standardized
scale, N(0,1). The comparative mean for 1993 is .10 and the difference is statistically
significant (t = 2.02, p < .05).

Table 4 presents the measurement models of valuation of self-direction for teachers and
parents. The structure of these models is very similar to that for students in 1993 and 1994
insofar as responsibility, curiosity, sound judgment, and self-control load positively, while
good manners, neatness, obedience, and being a good student load negatively. Only with
respect to one item, responsibility, is the loading for teachers noticeably lower than that for
parents. It is likely that for teachers the responsibility of children is viewed as a part of
teacher-student relations rather than as a desirable characteristic per se. However, even for
teachers the data fit the model well and there is no significant difference in the mean values of
the measure of self-direction for them and for parents surveyed in 1993.
These results for parents are in accord with those of other studies of valuation of self-direction in Poland conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, several studies based on national and regional samples reveal that the valuation of self-direction is a very robust dimension of psychological functioning among adults. According to these studies, inter-group differences among age cohorts and between men and women were negligible. Moreover, no researcher has demonstrated change in the valuation of self-direction among the adult population over time. Given this stability in adults’ psychological values, at least with respect to self-direction, it is worth noting once again that we, like Mach, have found that there has been a significant shift in the valuation of self-direction among students: in 1994 they valued self-direction more than they did at the end of 1970s.

In Tables 5 and 6 (pages 31-34) we present measurement models for authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change. In the case of students in 1978 one item, "The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents", was originally eliminated from the model of authoritarian-conservatism because of a large number of missing responses. In that period students were likely to understand this item as referring to Catholic teaching. They might have refused to respond to such an item insofar as its referent was perceived as being contradictory to the official ideology of the regime. The omission of this item does not influence the performance of other indicators.

Our analysis for students, teachers, and parents shows that the fit of data to the measurement models of authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change is satisfactory, as indicated by the low ratio of chi squared to the degrees of freedom. The average scores on the authoritarian-conservatism scale of both students and parents diminished significantly in the period 1978-1993. Both students and parents were less conservative in the present period of rapid societal change than in the era of Communist stability of the late 1970s. Unfortunately, we cannot assess the temporal shifts on the scale of resistance to change. For both students and parents we lack a measurement model for resistance to change in 1978 due to an insufficient number of appropriate indicators.

Inter-groups Comparisons of Psychological Dispositions

Teachers and parents did not differ from each other with respect to their arithmetic means of the three scales of psychological functioning: valuing self-direction, authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change. The two-population tests for all three scales revealed no significant differences. Teachers and parents valued self-direction to the same extent. They were similarly open-minded and receptive to innovation. Thus, we can infer from these results that both adult groups were likely to convey much the same "messages" to children regarding core personal values and psychological dispositions.
From the point of view of socialization processes, the crucial question is the degree to which adolescents share these basic values and dispositions. Table 7 (page 35) shows that there were moderately large and statistically significant inter-generational differences. Students were less authoritarian and less resistant to change than both teachers and parents. Students valued self-direction more than did parents and teachers. We can also observe an interesting temporal change in the extent of intergenerational differences in psychological functioning. In 1993 the difference between parents and their children was greater with respect to both the level of self-direction and authoritarian-conservatism than in 1978.

What these findings suggest, then, is that the inter-generational transmission of certain basic psychological values and dispositions appears to be weaker in the current period of systemic change that during the period of state socialism, in which the ideological values of the regime itself stressed submission to authority and to externally imposed rules, intolerance of non-conformity, and adherence to the status quo. We have noted that the parent population did not change significantly, at least in terms of their valuation of self-direction, between 1978 and 1993. Thus, the fact that students have changed significantly and in the direction of increased self-directedness and less authoritarian-conservatism suggests that other socialization agents--such as the media and informal networks--are conveying values and norms at variance with those of teachers and parents. It is also likely that students have become less passive recipients of influences stemming from their environment. It may well be that during periods of rapid social change adolescents take a more active role in interpreting and constructing values and norms for themselves.

In the domain of basic values and psychological dispositions the direct influence of parents on their children has diminished between 1978 and 1993. Some evidence in support of this claim can be found in the correlations between parents' and their adolescent children's scores on two psychological measures derived from the 1993 and 1978 TRIAD studies. In 1993, the Pearson correlations were .41, and .32 for valuation of self-direction and authoritarian-conservatism, respectively. In 1978, the correlations for the same variables were .47 and .40. Thus, the inter-generational transmission of basic values and psychological dispositions has weakened somewhat during the period of rapid social change.

The Impact of Psychological Dispositions on Support for Democracy and a Market Economy

What is the effect of these psychological dispositions on support for democracy and a market economy? Certainly, it is reasonable to expect that valuation of self-direction, less authoritarian-conservatism, and greater receptivity to change would all be positively associated with support for democracy and a market economy, inasmuch as each system is based on
individual rights, responsibility and initiative, and is characterized by diversity and differentiation, conflict and competition, and uncertainty of outcomes.27

In Table 8 (Page 36) we present the Pearson correlations between our summary scales of pro-democratic and pro-market orientations, on the one hand, and the three psychological measures, on the other. As can be seen, all relationships are in the expected direction. Moreover, the coefficients are, in most instances, moderately strong and statistically significant for students, teachers, and parents. The exception to this is surprising and one for which we have no explanation: among students and teachers (but not parents) the relationships between valuation of self-direction and support for both democracy and a market economy are weak and, in three out of the four instances, statistically insignificant.

In addition to the overall similarity in results for both pro-democratic and pro-market views and for all three groups, two other findings in Table 8 should be noted. First, among students the three sets of psychological dispositions were more strongly linked to their economic orientations than to their political views. This was not the case for teachers, among whom psychological dispositions were as strongly associated with support for democracy as with support for the market. And second, psychological dispositions and pro-change orientations were more strongly related to each other among teachers and parents than they were among students.

We can only surmise why this was so with the data available to us. It may be due to the fact that adults' value systems, including both their psychological dispositions and political and economic orientations, are more internally constrained than those of adolescents.28 If for no other reason than the fact that adults have had more years of education, parents and teachers ought to be better able to make the appropriate cognitive connections between their basic views regarding authority, their valuation of self-direction, and orientations toward change, on the one hand, and norms associated with democratic rule and a market economy, on the other. Indeed, there is a clear effect of education on the congruence between psychological dispositions and political and economic orientations. Of course, this effect is relatively weak among teachers since the variance of their educational attainment is very limited. However, even among them the negative impact of authoritarian-conservatism on support for democracy is reduced once we control for education level (the partial correlation coefficient equals -.248). In the case of parents, among whom educational levels vary greatly, the impact of authoritarian-conservatism is weakened even more (the partial correlation coefficient equals -.111). The discernible effect of level of education on the congruence between psychological dispositions and political and economic orientations leads us to our second explanation of individual-level variations in support for democratic rule and a market economy, namely one's location in the social structure.
THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF POSITION IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE ON SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND A MARKET ECONOMY

It is a well known finding of comparative value and attitudinal research that the social group to which one belongs shapes an individual's political and economic orientations, including not only attitudes toward the issues of the day but also more basic cognitive and normative views concerning equality, justice, the exercise of authority and the economic order. Nonetheless, it has been argued by some that in the case of post-communist Eastern Europe one's position in the social structure will have relatively little bearing on an individual's political and economic views during this fluid and uncertain period of systemic change. Nonetheless, it has been argued by some that in the case of post-communist Eastern Europe one's position in the social structure will have relatively little bearing on an individual’s political and economic views during this fluid and uncertain period of systemic change. However, the impact of one’s location in the social structure on support for democracy and the market is an empirical question, and one that requires systematic analysis. Here we present only a preliminary examination of the relative impact of social structural position on support for systemic change. We begin with our student population.

Of the several social structural characteristics of students, two in particular appeared to affect their level of support for democracy and a market economy. The first pertained to a situation of unemployment in the family. We asked students whether their fathers and mothers were presently employed or worked in their own business; if at least one parent was unemployed, we coded this as 1, and all other responses as 0. The resulting dichotomous measure was then used as an indicator of unemployment in the family. The second social structural variable that stood out was a combination of the financial resources of the family. Since in Poland persons working in their own private business tend to underreport their relatively high real income, we placed the group of self-employed at the top of a financial ladder. Those who received social security benefits were put at the bottom. Various intermediate categories were then divided into two broad lower-middle and middle-middle income groups. We must stress that this variable provides only a very rough estimate of students' family financial situation.

As Table 9 (page 37) shows, these rather crude social structural variables proved to have an effect on adolescents' support for democracy and the market, even after taking into account their valuation of self-direction, and placement on the measures of authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change. Unemployment in the family had a statistically significant and negative relationship with our pro-democracy measure. And as one might expect, students from higher income families tended to be more supportive of the market than their less well off counterparts. As for the impact of our three measures of psychological functioning when taking into account students’ social structural position, Table 9 shows that each retained its expected effects on support for democracy and the market. But only in two instances did the relationships continue to be statistically significant: resistance to change negatively affected
pro-democracy orientations and authoritarian-conservatism was negatively related to acceptance of the market.

In the case of the group of parents the two most important structural variables were education and family income. They affected both psychological dispositions and social orientations. The more educated and those having higher incomes tended to value self-direction, exhibit more tolerant views, and opt for change to a greater extent than did the less educated and more socio-economically disadvantaged parents. These findings are consistent with the results of various studies of adult samples in Poland. Also consistent are findings that the more educated and the better off financially tend to be more supportive of democracy and the market than those who have fewer years of education and lower income.

Table 10 (page 38) shows the effects of structural variables on support for democracy and the market in terms of both correlation and regression coefficients. Each of these structural characteristics, as well as age and gender, is related to parental support for democracy and the market. One’s position in the social structure does matter for pro-democracy and pro-market orientations since it embodies the interests of specific social groups, as well as their life experiences and associated psychological disposition.

Results in this section should be viewed from a comparative perspective. As one researcher has noted “[a]ttempts to explain the political socialization process with regard to the influence of agents of socialization or with reference to learning theory have rarely yielded results which allow for the investigator to account for more than 10 percent of the variance in their subjects’ attitudes or behavior”. In terms of explained variance of political orientations, our research does not yield surprising results. However, it should be noted that in a country undergoing radical social change, structural variables alone explain no less than 3 percent of variance of pro-democratic or pro-market support. Moreover, one must remember that regression analysis is not a method for discovering scientific laws but a procedure for providing an interpretation of the manifestations of an assumed causal process as it operates in particular populations. In the case of both students and parents, we cannot reject the hypothesis that structural variables matter for political orientations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

This study investigates the patterns and determinants of political and economic orientations among students, teachers and parents in a society undergoing rapid systemic transformation. It is an examination of basic values in a society in which the new ideology of democratic capitalism represents a radical departure from the core tenets of previous system of state socialism. Thus, our study differs from typical political socialization research which has been conducted in the context of relative societal stability and is premised on the assumption that substantial continuity
in the transmission, learning and determinants of basic values -- of cultural themes -- constitutes the “normal” state of affairs. As such, the extant research on political socialization did not provide appropriate guidance for the formulation of our hypotheses concerning both inter-group differentiation in support for democracy and the market in Poland and the relative effects of various determinants of individual-level dispositions under the conditions of systemic change. Moreover, even in conditions the empirical findings of political socialization research have been less than clear-cut.

Consequently, we posited a number of competing hypotheses with regard to differences among students, teachers and parents in their level of support for democratic rule and a market economy. Our study shows that at this time of systemic transformation neither the cultural legacy of the past nor the emergent ideology of democratic capitalism holds sway. These findings are not surprising, given the recency of the transition, government instability, and the high social costs of inflation, unemployment and growing poverty that have accompanied privatization and marketization of the economy. Thus, although the null hypothesis is not supported by our analysis, period effects are nonetheless evident in the “hybrid” pattern of beliefs expressed by all three groups. Whether over time support for democratic and market principles becomes more widespread in Poland and other post-communist societies will depend as much, if not more, on macro-level political and economic developments as on the success of political socialization efforts by the regime. Certainly the nature and pace of cultural change in post World War II West Germany had as much to do with the “economic miracle”, stable and effective democratic governance, and generational turnover, as with formal inculcation of democratic values in the schools and the media.

At the same time, the three groups did differ in their overall support for systemic change. Of the three groups, overall teachers tended to be the most supportive of systemic change. We further found that adults were substantially more supportive of democratic principles and less positive in the endorsement of a market economy than students. Thus, the pattern of inter-group differences depended upon whether the change in question had to do with change in the political or the economic realm. Two inferences may be drawn from this finding. First, support for democratic rule and support for a market economy may be two distinct dimensions of individuals’ orientations toward systemic change. Second, as we discussed earlier, generational effects are apparent in the pattern of value differences between adults and adolescents. But there are distinct components to generational effects and which of these is the more pronounced depends upon the kind of orientations, economic or political, in question.

Our analysis also shows that, at the individual level, support for democracy and the market is affected both by one’s position in the social structure and psychological dispositions. Such findings might lead to skepticism about the degree to which efforts to inculcate democratic and
market norms, even among the young, are likely to be successful. Social structural location and the self interests it generates, as well as psychological functioning, are not easily or quickly manipulable. However, our analysis indicates that these individual-level characteristics are not so closely linked to political and economic orientations as to foreclose the influence on adolescents of schools and other agents of socialization, as well as political learning on the part of both students and adults that comes from a variety of direct experiences in informal and institutional settings.

Our findings also suggest that the intergenerational transmission of values, at least in this current period of flux, does not preclude the acquisition of different and in this case pro-democratic and pro-market values. Although parents’ beliefs certainly have an impact on those of their children, the relationship between the two is only moderately strong and it is somewhat weaker now than it was in the late 1970s during the era of political stability.

The effects of both social structural and psychological attributes of individuals, as well as of familial values, may well become stronger should the normative and institutional context in which Poles live become more stable. But in the short term, there is considerable room for other determinants and other agents of socialization to have a discernible impact on the political and economic orientations of younger members of Polish society.

The school is, of course, one such arena of political socialization, and that is why we have focused here on the views of teachers in conjunction with those of students and parents. Studies of political socialization show varying effects of civics education on students’ social values and norms. Other characteristics of formal education, such as the structure of learning and the degree of congruence between the content of civics curricula and the visible reality of political and economic life also have an impact on students. Moreover, apart from socialization in the school and in the family, there are numerous other influences on political learning in Poland: the peer group, the mass media, the Church, and, of course, students’ own personal experiences with political authority. Some of these may reinforce the education for democracy and the market that students receive in school. Others, however, might convey messages and provide experiences that counteract democratic and capitalist values.

What our study implies then for political socialization in Poland is that the present context of political learning is particularly malleable and allows for overt and concerted efforts to create a democratic and market culture among the young. But, given the uncertainty of political and economic developments and the existence of multiple and competing channels of socialization in the post-communist period, the outcome of such efforts is not foreordained. It is quite likely that notwithstanding the explicit efforts to socialize the citizenry in liberal democratic and capitalist values, the political culture of Poland will neither be a replica of the past nor a copy of an "ideal type" democratic and market culture. Rather, as is the case with all political cultures undergoing
fundamental change, it will likely evolve toward a unique composite of elements of the past. of the newly emergent "official" ideology, and of values that stem from individuals' experiences of and innovative responses to the transformation itself.

We have dwelled thus far on the possible effects of multiple arenas of socialization on the creation of a political and economic culture supportive of the emergent system of democratic capitalism in Poland. This brings us to a final consideration, namely the relationship between politico-economic culture and the prospects for consolidation of democratic rule and a market economy in Poland and other post-communist societies. As we noted at the outset of this paper, there is heated debate among social scientists as to whether stable democracy and well-functioning economy require mass-level support and widespread commitment to core values, such as the willingness to compromise and individual initiative. Jowitt, for example, has strongly argued that the cultural legacy of Leninism is pervasive in post-communist societies and, as consequence, the prospects for stable democratic capitalism are dim. In contrast, Di Palma is far more sanguine about the possibility of a successful transition even in the absence of "democrats" and "capitalists" among the mass public.

To argue that a democratic political culture is a necessary condition for the establishment of a democratic regime flies in the face of empirical evidence. The creation of a democracy would seem to depend far more on the interests, values, and behavior of political elites than on commitment to democracy at the mass level. But the requisites of a durable and effective democracy may be quite another matter. As the multiple examples of democratic failure suggest, the survival and quality of a democracy, once established, appear to require popular legitimacy, voluntary compliance with both the rules of the game and public policies, citizen participation and sufficient immunity to the appeals of anti-system movements and leaders. Such commitments and behavior on the part of the mass public rest, in turn, as much on fundamental features of a society -- the vitality of its civil culture -- as on the orientations and actions of political elites. The importance of a congruent political culture for durable and effective democratic governance is well understood by post-authoritarian political elites. Hence, their emphasis on political socialization.

Our findings and interpretations strongly argue for the necessity to employ longitudinal and especially panel studies to investigate systematically the pattern and determinants of political and economic orientations among various groups involved in political socialization. Only in such a way can we hope to understand better both continuities and changes in the processes and outcomes of political learning in societies undergoing profound transformation.


The field work was conducted by Polish social scientists, Dr. Marta Zahorska-Bugaj and Dr. Waldemar Kozlowski. The questionnaire was pretested by using the method of "critical respondents", which involved intensive interviewing of a small number of experienced field workers. Since most of the items in our questionnaire were identical to those in other studies, we limited the pretesting to five intensive interviews. The questions were assessed according to two criteria: whether they were self-explanatory with respect to their substance, and whether the answers to them fit the coding scheme. As a result, some of the initial questions were eliminated (about 15 percent) and some modified (about 10 percent). The pre-final questionnaire, containing about 100 questions in its students' and teachers' versions, was then reviewed by education experts, psychologists, and field work methodologists. Coded data were transcribed onto a computer device and tested for logical consistency. Less than one percent of all information had to be corrected, usually by declaring them "missing data". The final data sets, STUDENTS 1994 and TEACHERS 1994, exist in SPSS format, and are available from the authors. The overview of results is presented in Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, “Political Socialization, Public Policy and Civic Education: A Research Program,” a paper prepared for the Polish-American Symposium “Challenges in Political Socialization of Children and Youth in Poland,” sponsored by the Mershon Center at the Ohio State University and organized by the Institute of Psychology and the Institute.
of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Jablonna near Warsaw, Poland, March 17-19, 1995.

10 For a detailed description of the data, see Bogdan W. Mach, “Self-direction and Authoritarianism Under Conditions of Radical Systemic Change: Intergenerational Transmission of Values and Orientations in Poland,” Polish Sociological Review 4(108)(1994): 1-11. Actually, in each triad one parent—mother or father—was interviewed in 1992; a child and the other parent was interviewed in 1993. Each parent interviewed in 1992 was drawn from a national sample of the urban population in Poland, aged 19-65. All face-to-face interviews were conducted in respondents’ homes by well-trained interviewers from the Center of Sociological Research at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences.


12 Henryk Domanski and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, Social Changes in Poland 1987-1993: A Follow-up Study, Machine Readable Codebook (Warsaw: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1994). This study consists of a survey conducted on a national sample of the adult population in Poland. Interviewers from the Center of Sociological Research at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences approached all respondents in their homes.

13 Prothro and Grigg; McClosky.

14 Kenneth A. Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables (New York: Wiley, 1989), pp.206-223. We should note that, when applying usual factor analytic criteria, our scales show a low or moderate degree of reliability. For students, the value of Cronbach alpha equals .351 for the democracy index and .210 for the market index. In the case of teachers and parents the corresponding values are higher but do not exceed .526. However, these estimates provide a lower bound for the reliability of the simple sum of congeneric measures. There is no reason to assume that our measures are parallel or tau-equivalent. Thus, in practical terms the reliability of our scales must be higher.

15 For research linking personality characteristics to democratic beliefs via the capacity for social learning, see Paul M. Sniderman, Personality and Democratic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). For cross-national research assessing intergenerational differences in commitment to democratic norms due to differences in the capacity for social learning during periods of regime change, see James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch, “Elitist Theory and Political Tolerance in Western Europe,” Political Behavior 13 (1991):191-212.

16 Commenting on this difference, we should point out that in Polish answering questions expressed in a negative form does not seem to be more difficult in the case of students than in the case of adults. Since in Polish disagreeing with a statement containing a negation is well suited to everyday language, even elementary school students use this form frequently. In our study, for some questions expressed in a negative form more students than teachers responded in disagreement with those items. Thus, we assume that the difference between students and adults in answering questions pertaining to democracy does not result from item formulation.

17 Kohn and Slomczynski.


19Kohn and Slomczynski; Slomczynski, Janicka, Mach, and Zaborowski.


25Mach.

26The one exception concerns the last of the indicators of authoritarian-conservatism: “Young people should not be allowed to read books that are likely to confuse them.” We can only surmise that this is not something teachers would be prone to agree with, given that their professional role is to broaden students’ understanding of complex issues.

27Lane; Sniderman; Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1963).

28Converse.


35Niemi and Hepburn.


37It has been argued that the Romantic tradition has a significant role to play in present-day citizenship education in Poland; see Malgorzata Niemczynska and Adam Niemczynski, "Perspectives from Past and Present on Moral and Citizenship Education in Poland," Journal of Moral Education 21 (1992): 225-233.

38Jowitt. For a similar, but more general, argument concerning cultural obstacles to democratization, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer, 1984): 193-218.


Table 1

Indicators of support for democracy and a market economy among students and teachers in 1994, and parents in 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Support for democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone should have a right to participate in elections even if he or she knows nothing about politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of “strongly agree”</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean value</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of “don’t know”</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is best for the state if only one well-suited person actually governs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of “strongly disagree” or “rather disagree”</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean value</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of “don’t know”</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1 - continued (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only those who are able to act in the interest of all citizens should be involved in politics

| Percent of “strongly disagree” or “rather disagree” | 4.1 | 13.2 | 19.6 |
| Mean value | 4.6 | 4.3 | 4.1 |
| Standard deviation | 1.0 | .9 | 1.2 |
| Percent of “don’t know” | .7 | 1.9 | 5.1 |

Elections are not necessary if political leaders well represent the interests of citizens

| Percent of “strongly disagree” or “rather disagree” | 14.2 | 67.9 | 42.7 |
| Mean value | 3.8 | 2.3 | 2.9 |
| Standard deviation | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 |
| Percent of “don’t know” | 2.0 | 3.8 | 4.8 |

Support for the market

Large differences in income are necessary to ensure the well being of our country

| Percent of “strongly agree” or “rather agree” | 43.7 | 37.7 | 40.1 |
| Mean value | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.1 |
| Standard deviation | 1.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 |
| Percent of “don’t know” | 3.1 | 9.4 | 6.2 |
Table 1 - continued (2)

No one would study for years in order to become a doctor or a lawyer if s/he didn't expect to make a lot more money than the average worker.

| Percent of “strongly agree” or “rather agree” | 55.8 | 35.8 | 38.1 |
| Mean value | 3.5 | 2.9 | 3.1 |
| Standard deviation | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| Percent of “don’t know” | .3 | 1.9 | 7.1 |

The state should provide a job for everyone who wants one.

| Percent of “strongly disagree” or “rather disagree” | 5.4 | 31.4 | 25.3 |
| Mean value | 4.4 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
| Standard deviation | 1.0 | 1.4 | 2.0 |
| Percent of “don’t know” | .7 | 3.8 | 5.1 |

1 This and all other indicators range from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5).

Sources: STUDENTS’ and TEACHERS’ datafiles (1994). In the case of support for democracy, parents are from TRIADS file (1993), and in the case of support for the market, parents are from the PANEL file (1993).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructs and indicators</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor loadings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A. Support for democracy**

Everyone should have a right to participate in elections even if he or she knows nothing about politics.\(^1\)

- .666

It is best for the state if only one well-suited person actually governs

- .506

- .601

Only those who are able to act in the interest of all citizens should be involved in politics

- .681

- .611

- .614

Elections are not necessary if political leaders well represent the interests of citizens

- .767

- .715

- .712

(Eigenvalue)

(1.308) (1.290) (1.347)
B. Support for the market

Large differences in income are necessary to ensure the well being of our country

No one would study for years in order to become a doctor or a lawyer if s/he didn’t expect to make a lot more money than the average worker

The state should provide a job for everyone who wants one

1 This and all other indicators range from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5).

Sources: see Table 1.
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good manners</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>-.50</td>
<td>-.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neatness</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound judgment</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-control</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>-.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being interested</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a good student</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>-.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Chi squared/degrees of freedom)  
(2.11)  (2.35)  (1.74)

Sources: Students 1994 -- authors' own computation from the STUDENTS data file (1994); students 1993 in Slomczynski et al., 1994, p. 140 (Table IX-1); students 1978 in Kohn and Slomczynski, 1993, p. 177 (Table 7.1B).
Table 4


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Teachers 1994</th>
<th>Parents 1993</th>
<th>Parents 1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good manners</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neatness</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound judgment</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-control</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>-.56</td>
<td>-.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being interested</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a good student</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Chi squared/degrees of freedom) (2.01) (1.31) (1.74)

Sources: Teachers 1994 -- authors' own computation from the TEACHERS' data file (1994); parents 1993 in Slomczynski et al., 1994, p. 140 (Table IX-1); parents 1978 in Kohn and Slomczynski, 1993, p. 177 (Table 7.1B), average loadings for fathers and mothers.
Table 5

Measurement of authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change among students in 1994, 1993 and 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructs and Indicators</th>
<th>Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor loadings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Authoritarian-conservatism

The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents. 

In this complicated world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on leaders and experts. 

It's wrong to do things differently from the way our forefathers did. 

Any good leader should be strict with people under him in order to gain their respect. 

No decent man can respect a woman who has had sex relations before marriage. 

One should always show respect to those in authority. 

Young people should not be allowed to read books that are likely to confuse them.
Table 5 - continued

(Chi squared/degrees of freedom) \( (2.31) \) \( (2.16) \) \( (2.91) \)

**B. Resistance to change**

Generally, change is much worse than no change. \( .71 \) \( .67 \) 

People who question the old and accepted ways of doing things usually just end up causing trouble. \( .59 \) \( .56 \) 

New things more often bring trouble than resolution. \( .72 \) \( .76 \) 

It generally works out best to keep on doing things they way they have been done before. \( .58 \) \( .61 \)

(Chi squared/degrees of freedom) \( (.91) \) \( (1.12) \)

Sources: see Table 3.
Table 6


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Teachers 1994</th>
<th>Parents 1993</th>
<th>Parents 1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Authoritarian-conservatism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The most important thing to teach children is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolute obedience to their parents.</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In this complicated world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on leaders and experts.</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It's wrong to do things differently from the way our forefathers did.</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any good leader should be strict with people under him in order to gain their respect.</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No decent man can respect a woman who has had sex relations before marriage.</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One should always show respect to those in authority.</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You should obey your superiors whether or not you think they're right.</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people should not be allowed to read books that are likely to confuse them.</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 - continued

(Chi squared/degrees of freedom) (3.05) (2.78) (2.10)

B. Resistance to change

Generally, change is much worse than no change. .49 .52 -

People who question the old and accepted ways of doing things usually just end up causing trouble. .79 .63 -

New things more often bring trouble than resolution. .28 .41 -

It generally works out best to keep on doing things they way they have been done before. .56 .49 -

(Chi squared/degrees of freedom) (1.09) (.89) -

Sources: see Table 4.
Table 7

Intergroup differences in average scores of valuation of self-direction, authoritarian-conservatism, and resistance to change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group comparison</th>
<th>Self-direction</th>
<th>Authoritarian-conservatism</th>
<th>Resistance to change</th>
<th>Difference in average score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students -- teachers (1994)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students -- parents (1993)</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students -- parents (1978)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.09*</td>
<td>.---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05

** p < .01

Table 8

Correlations of psychological variables with support for democracy and the market among students, teachers, and parents in 1993-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological variables</th>
<th>Scale of support for democracy</th>
<th>Scale of support for the market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>correlations</td>
<td>correlations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Students, 1994

Valuation of self-direction  
Authoritarian-conservatism  
Resistance to change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>correlations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valuation of self-direction</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian-conservatism</td>
<td>-.110**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to change</td>
<td>-.182**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.099*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.215**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.216**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Teachers, 1994

Valuation of self-direction  
Authoritarian-conservatism  
Resistance to change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>correlations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valuation of self-direction</td>
<td>.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian-conservatism</td>
<td>-.358**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to change</td>
<td>-.335**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.273*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.365**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Parents, 1993

Valuation of self-direction  
Authoritarian-conservatism  
Resistance to change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>correlations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valuation of self-direction</td>
<td>.194**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian-conservatism</td>
<td>-.340**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to change</td>
<td>-.298**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05

** p < .01

Sources: STUDENTS' and TEACHERS' datafile (1994); parents from TRIADS' datafile (1993).
Table 9
Regression of the scales of support for democracy and the market on structural and psychological variables, for students in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural and psychological variables</th>
<th>Scale of support for democracy</th>
<th>Scale of support for the market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment in the family</td>
<td>-.174*</td>
<td>-.112*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family's financial situation</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.213**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta coefficients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment in the family</td>
<td>-.134*</td>
<td>-.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family's financial situation</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.167*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuation of self-direction</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian-conservatism</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>-.149*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to change</td>
<td>-.163*</td>
<td>-.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>(.215)</td>
<td>(.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>(2.353)</td>
<td>(3.161)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*  p < .05
** p < .01

Source: STUDENTS' datafile (1994).
Table 10

Regression of the scales of support for democracy and the market on structural variables for parents in 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural variables</th>
<th>Scale of support for democracy</th>
<th>Scale of support for the market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.204**</td>
<td>.143*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>.199**</td>
<td>.226**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta coefficients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.144*</td>
<td>.096*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.104*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>-.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.101*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>(.261)</td>
<td>(.211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>(4.411)</td>
<td>(3.751)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05
** p < .01

Source: In the case of support for democracy data are from TRIADS (1993) file, and in the case of support for the market data are from PANEL file (1993).