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After Kazakhstan declared its independence, the Kazakhstani government started the process of constructing its national identity by making attempts to revitalize the Kazakh language and culture. As in many other postcolonial countries, the government also aspired to create a clear and coherent narrative of the nation’s past in order to justify its existence as an independent entity. But the notions of nationality and ethnicity of the Kazakhs started forming only at the beginning of the 20th century, before which they identified themselves based on their tribal divisions, zhuzes (Dave 31). The Soviet government reinforced this nascent sense of belonging to a Kazakh nation by taking “nationality as the basis for the administrative and political division of Central Asia in the 1920s, together with the subsequent policy of korenizatsiia or ‘nativization,’ which promoted local languages and cultures, as well as members of the titular nation into the administrative positions of the local government” (Abashin 150). In addition to that, however, the Soviet government created a Soviet supranational identity. The latter manifested itself mainly through the Russian language, which was the lingua franca for all nations of the Soviet Union and served as a means to introduce and maintain the “friendship of the peoples” thesis (Slezkine 430). Consequently, independent Kazakhstan inherited a society with strong lingua-cultural ties with Russia. This, together with the fact that the Kazakhs were a minority in their own territory at the time of independence, complicates the construction of Kazakh national identity for the government today (Smagulova 306). That is why it is a project which still resides in national programs and is failing to become the reality.

The challenge of having a clear sense of identity is manifested in modern-day Kazakhstani literature, including contemporary poetry. The latter category can be represented by such poets as Ardak Nurgazy and Anuar Duisenbinov, a considerable portion of whose poetry is devoted to the question of national identity. Both poets are “insiders” and “outsiders” in relation to the Kazakh community in their own way, which is why their poetry reveals not just what the notion of Kazakhness encompasses but also what it does not.

Ardak Nurgazy is a 48-year old poet, playwright, and critic who moved to Kazakhstan in 2004. He was born and raised in China in the Kazakh diaspora, which consists of the descendants of those who left the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s fleeing forced collectivization, famine and repressions (Oka 1). After the country gained its independence, he and more than a million other diaspora Kazakhs returned to Kazakhstan (“On Migration”). But despite being an ethnic Kazakh, and writing poetry in Kazakh, Nurgazy’s oralman [returnee] status and the absence of a Russophone identity equally makes him an “outsider” in his historical homeland. Anuar Duisenbinov, a 35-year-old poet and translator, in contrast, is a native of the country. Duisenbinov writes his poems in Russian, and inserts Kazakh words, phrases, and lines into them. Despite having a hybrid linguistic and cultural identity like most of the Kazakhstani population, he says in one of his interviews: “I am an insider here. But also, a stranger at the same time” (Timofeev). He says that he receives extra attention on the streets because of his long hair, and him being a representative of the LGBTQ+ community makes him stand out in the patriarchal Kazakhstani society.

The unusual position that Nurgazy and Duisenbinov find themselves in as part of Kazakhstani society – being ethnic Kazakhs but belonging to marginal groups – makes them more sensitive to the question of national, linguistic, and cultural identity. Through their lyrical heroes, the poets explore identity-related issues at the time of the latest rebirth of the nation marked by Kazakhstan’s independence. Thus, while searching for Kazakh identity through their
poetry, Nurgazy and Duisenbinov demonstrate the struggle of their lyrical heroes to belong to a nation with a yet-unclear identity and demonstrate the gap that exists between today’s bilingual and culturally hybrid nation and its nomadic ancestors.

The search for a new or revived identity started as soon as the Soviet Union dissolved. The new status as an independent country gave rise to the rhetoric of rebirth of the nation which can still be found at the core of Kazakhstan’s nation-building process. In his 2017 program known as “Rukhani Zhangyru,” the first president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev proclaimed the beginning of the next wave of modernization of the country (Nazarbayev). With the help of this modernization program, the government is trying to construct a new identity on the basis of historical and cultural symbols so as to unite the citizens and allow them to feel belonging to the country they live in. As a synonym for the word “modernization” the Kazakh version of the text uses the phrase qaita tüleu, which means “to be reborn” or “to regenerate.” According to the document, the nation needs to preserve its national culture but “leave behind the elements of the past that hinder its development” (Nazarbayev 3). Similarly, the image of rebirth appears in the poems of Nurgazy and Duisenbinov on national identity. The poets explore the new period in the history of the nation and the challenges the rebirth brings.

As his poem “Kerei” demonstrates, for Duisenbinov, the nation can be characterized by its cyclical rebirth, and the latest rebirth entails an inclination to reconnect with the nation’s past. The poem is named after Kerei Khan, who together with Zhanibek Khan united several tribes of the steppe and founded the Kazakh Khanate in the 15th century, which later served as the foundation of Kazakh nationhood. Addressing Kerei, Duisenbinov’s lyrical hero says:

Следов твоих давно не видно ни в песке,
ни в иле
Ковыль давно расправился, сгорел
И вырос снова, и примялся сразу сотнями коней на четырех колесах
А потом сгорел. (…)

Your footprints have not been seen in sand or silt for a long time
The feather grass has long been straightened, and burned down
Then it grew up again, and was immediately mashed by hundreds of horses on four wheels
Then it burned down. (…)

(Duisenbinov “Kerei”)

The poet demonstrates the periodic regeneration of the nation by the cycles in the life of the feather grass. The cyclicity that starts with the grass growing, being mashed, and burning down can be observed twice in these lines, with some slight differences. When the nation led by Kerei Khan “lived,” it mashed the feather grass. But when the cycle of the nation’s life approached its end, the grass grew and straightened up. So, the two cycles represent two historical periods: one is the pastoral past, and the other is the industrial modernity represented by “horses on four wheels.” The last line of the excerpt describes the grass having burned down, and thus marks the beginning of the third cycle in the life of the nation. This is when the lyrical hero is remembering and addressing the founder of the Kazakh nationhood, Kerei Khan. By doing so, he attempts to connect the point of rebirth in the latest cycle of the nation with a point in the first cycle and establish a link between the two historical periods.

The lyrical hero describes his own life in terms of cycles as well and shows the resemblance between his life and the life of the nation. But despite such a resemblance, there is
still a disagreement between the two. Having described the two life cycles in the life of the nation by life cycles of the feather grass, the lyrical hero says:

А потом сгорел. А я успел расправиться
и стать глубоким вдохом
И сгореть. И фениксом стыда восстать
Then it burned down. And I had time to
straighten up and turn into a deep breath
And burn out. And rise up as a phoenix of
shame

The lyrical hero straightens up, burns out and rises back in the form of a phoenix just like the feather grass and the nation do. He finds himself in the timeline of the nation’s history and becomes a continuation of this cyclicality. However, at the time of the third rebirth which is described in the first line of this excerpt, where the feather grass “burned down,” the lyrical hero “had time to straighten up and turn into a deep breath” [emphasis added]. So, the time his life cycle starts does not coincide temporally with the nation’s rebirth, it occurs earlier. The cycles are not “in rhythm,” there is a disharmony between the nation and the lyrical hero.

Ardak Nurgazy also looks at the history of the nation through the lens of cyclicality. In his narrative poem “Korkyt,” he explores the nation’s rebirth through several images that allow time in the poem acquire cyclical nature. Unlike in Duisenbinov’s poem, however, the life of the nation is not only described by natural processes but is also juxtaposed to the life of the humanity as a whole. The preface to the poem describes several cycles represented by different forms of relationships human beings have had throughout history. Nurgazy writes:

Таным тұрғысынан Жаратушы мен адам,
табиғат пен адам, қоғам мен адам, адам
мен адам байланысын бастан өткердік.
Жаратушыны жоққа шығардық,
табиғатты «өзгерттік», қоғамды қан
төгуге бейім қатігез төңкеріске үйреттік,
адамға адам «қасқыр» дедік. Төртінші
айналымнан сон бізді енді не күтіп тұр?

In terms of cognition, we have experienced the connection between God and human being, nature and human being, society and human being, as well as between human being and human being. We have denied the existence of God, “changed” the nature, taught the society to make bloody and violent revolutions, and became “wolves” to each other. What is waiting for us after the fourth cycle?

(Nurgazy “Korkyt”)

The narrator is puzzled because he does not know what the fifth cycle entails. It might return the human being back to the beginning, and therefore signify the reestablishment of the human’s connection with God, or it may equally signify the beginning of something new.

The figure that Nurgazy juxtaposes to the image of God is the semi-mythical songwriter and composer Korkyt, whose name is the title of this poem. Korkyt supposedly lived in the 8th-9th century in the modern-day Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, or Tajikistan area. Myths, like that of Korkyt, play an important role in the formation of national identity. In his book National Identity, Anthony Smith claims that there is often no clear border between history and mythology when it comes to the national (or ethnic) identity of a certain group (Smith 22). The same phenomenon can be observed in the matter of the historicity of Korkyt: it is still debated whether he is a product of imagination or he truly existed. But, as Smith points out, it is the effect of stories about such mythical or historical figures that is significant in fostering nationhood (22). Myths construct a certain portion of what is perceived as the shared historical memories of the community. Historical events – like the foundation of the Kazakh Khanate, for
example – matter as well, but the value of those events is dictated by the legends that surround
them (22). Thus, history together with myths and legends, becomes one of the building blocks of
national identity. In his article about Korkyt, Nurgazy explains the importance of myths about
this semi-mythical figure for the nation. He states: “The phenomenon of Korkyt is the central
source of spiritual energy for the Central Asian nations. [...] He] is a mythical representation of
the notion about the Creator, which although has faded, has not been completely erased”
(Nurgazy “Korkyt olgen kun”). So, in the same way one may return to the Creator in times of
crisis, the lyrical hero affiliating himself to the Kazakh nation returns to Korkyt and the myths
that surround him.

In the poem, the lyrical hero tries to reconnect with Korkyt at the time of the nation’s
latest rebirth by enacting another “rebirth” in his mind. Nurgazy writes:

Мының жықпылында акқан жұлдыз
сөнді,
Орнында бостық, мөлдірейді есте қалу
мен ұмыту.
Мен тұғанда аспан қүніреніп, жұрт
коркып, соңынан қуанған деседі

The star that fell at the edge of my
consciousness was extinguished,
A void is left, glimpses of memory and
oblivion.
They say, when I was born, the sky turned
dark, people were frightened, but then
rejoiced

(Nurgazy “Korkyt”)

This excerpt is written from the first-person perspective, but the narration almost
unnoticeably shifts from one “I” to the other. The first two lines are told from the lyrical hero’s
perspective, and they describe the ending of one life by the image of a star that is extinguished.
The last line, “They say, when I was born, the sky turned dark, people were frightened”,
however, refers to the legend about the birth of Korkyt. So, the lyrical hero experiences a reverse
“reincarnation”: he envisions a “death” followed by a “rebirth” of one of the most powerful
figures in the nation’s culture. Nurgazy’s lyrical hero is not just trying to connect the points in
history like Duisenbinov’s lyrical hero does, he aims at awakening his connection with the
nation’s history and mythology and becoming one with Korkyt in his imagination.

The lyrical heroes of Nurgazy and Duisenbinov find touchpoints with the nation’s history
in ancestor figures like Kerei or Korkyt and enact their own individual “rebirths,” but still fail to
find their place in the world or as part of the nation. The reason lies in the absence of clear
kinship relations with these mythical and historical figures. Each poet conveys this idea through
an image of a lonely boy who cannot build a relationship with his roots, and thus turns into an
“orphan.”

In Nurgazy’s “Korkyt”, which was analyzed above, the past and the present of the nation
are connected, the lyrical hero envisions his “reincarnation” as Korkyt, but their link seems to be
weak. So, a few lines later, we see a boy wandering around and finding himself at the place
which was home to his ancestors:

Иен қалған жұртта ит пен бала жүр, көк
аспан төбеден төнген
Қалықтаң жүрген карақұсқа ит тұмысының
қотеріп үйріліп ұлыды, ошқін тартқан
қорініс

On an abandoned camping ground, a boy
and a dog are roaming, the blue sky is
hanging over their heads.
The dog howls, turning its nose up to the sky to a soaring imperial eagle, a fading scene.

The image of a camping ground represents the lifestyle of the Kazakhs until the beginning of the 20th century. As part of the Soviet First Five-Year-Plan of 1929, however, the Kazakh steppe needed to undergo a dramatic transformation: the nomadic nation was to be forcefully sedentarized (Cameron). The “return” to a camping ground in the poem, after the nation’s lifestyle has long been changed, signifies what Smith calls the “return to ‘nature’ and its ‘poetic spaces’.” According to him, this “nature and these spaces (…) constitute the historic home of the people, the sacred repository of their memories” (Smith 65). By wandering in the place his ancestors used to inhabit, the boy re-members the nation’s history and therefore re-creates it. But because of the transformation that the nation went through, the lyrical hero finds nobody in his historic home. The “return” is not necessarily voluntary: the only verb that describes the lyrical hero is “roaming.” The verb does not point at him having an aim or eagerness, so it is unclear whether the lyrical hero goes to the place purposefully or just finds himself there and starts roaming. Young and lonely he becomes an heir of this place, having no option other than accepting the situation.

A similar image of a lonely “orphan” appears in Duisenbinov’s poem “V Astane” [In Astana] as well, however unlike Nurgazy’s lyrical hero, this boy is clearly not concerned with his origins. Duisenbinov writes:

…бежит подле них золотой ручей         …a golden stream runs beside them
И купается в нем ребенок, плескается,               A child bathes in it, splatters gold, you
брзжет золотом, спросишь “чей?””      would ask “whose [child] are you?”
А он только молчит и кивает в сторону               But he remains silent, he nods towards the
горизонта                               horizon
Да ветер шепнет “ничей.”                        And the wind whispers “nobody’s.”

(Duisenbinov “V Astane”)

This child has no-one beside him, and does not know to whom he belongs, except having a vague awareness of a place somewhere on the horizon. Compared to the boy in Nurgazy’s poem, Duisenbinov’s orphan is in a state of happy ignorance, the emotions of the boy are not described, and yet the verbs that refer to his actions, “bathes,” “splatters,” are those depicting a cheerful careless individual, who is not mindful enough to find out his origins. The wind, in contrast, acquires an omniscient and omnipotent quality in the poem. It is constantly present, and it carries away “dust and memory, and road repair,” and can even “expos[e] time.” This wind serves as an objective perspective, and claims that the boy does not belong to anyone: he is “nobody’s.” In order to be considered as belonging to a nation, he would need to have some kin relationships with other people. Describing the characteristics and constituents that are necessary to be considered a nation, Smith makes a distinction between Asian and Western nations, and claims that the characteristic that distinguishes the Asian model is the importance of having common descent (Smith 22). The lyrical hero of this poem has no connection to or common descent with anyone, which makes him an “orphan,” like Nurgazy’s lyrical hero.

The inability of the lyrical heroes to reconnect with the nation’s past is conditioned by the transformation that the nation went through partially as a consequence of globalization and modernity, but mainly as a result of the Soviet project which produced hybrid individuals. The
Soviet identity for Kazakhs consisted of Russianness as well as Kazakhness during the USSR period, which is why the Russian language and culture are still significant for modern-day Kazakhs. As Goble puts it, “no past identity ever completely disappears” (80). Nurgazy, not being fluent in Russian, and having not experienced personally the effects of the Soviet hybridizing project, does not discuss Kazakh-Russian hybridity in his poetry. As a Chinese emigrant, the poet has a different kind of hybridity, but he rarely raises this topic in his poetry. In Duisenbinov’s poetry, the other hand, hybridity is one of the main concerns. Both the Kazakh and Russian languages are native and both cultures are valuable to the poet, and that is reflected through his lyrical heroes. In the interview he gives to Timofeev, Duisenbinov explains: “(…) mixing of languages comes from the roots. That is why the fruits are the same [mixed]. I am here just to pick them, taste them and try to describe the taste” (Timofeev). The mixed language becomes a poetic tool in many of Duisenbinov’s poems, which aurally and visually represents the hybridity he talks about in his poems.

Duisenbinov’s poem “Metamorf” [A Metamorph], for example, depicts the linguistic and cultural hybridity of the lyrical hero. Describing the feeling that the lyrical hero experiences having two native languages, the poet writes:

Очень странно переживать за казахский
по-русски (Duisenbinov “Metamorf”) How odd it is to worry about Qazaq in Russian

The lyrical hero expresses his care about the Kazakh language. Him feeling “odd” about this situation shows his assumption that the sign of truly caring about a language must be manifested in not just speaking but also thinking, and, in this situation, caring in that language, thus having an almost natural connection with it. The lyrical hero’s bilingualism, however, allows him to divide the phenomenon of love towards a language into components and perform them separately. He loves the Kazakh language and worries about its future, but does it in Russian, which equally is his native language. It is important to note that the poem itself is also written in the Russian language, so its form reinforces the meaning of its content: the worries of the poet and his lyrical heroes are manifested in Russian, not in Kazakh.

In some of his poems, Duisenbinov chooses to depict the hybridity of his lyrical heroes only through form, but that form plays with the content, adding more layers to its meaning. In his poem “V Astane,” Duisenbinov juxtaposes the two parts of the lyrical hero’s cultural identity. He writes:

(...) Иди отыщи деда своего Коркыта  (...Go find your grandpa Korkyt
Он все там же бродит, на бульваре, у разьебанного корыта He still wanders in the same place, on the boulevard, by a fucking broken trough

The poet rhymes two words “Korkyta” and “koryta” [trough] which refer to the mythologies and fairytales of two different cultures. If Korkyt is a semi-mythical ancestor figure of the Kazakh nation, “by the broken trough” is a phrase taken from Pushkin’s “The Tale of the Fisherman and the Fish” which turned into an idiom. So, while inviting the lyrical hero to return to his roots and reestablish his relationship with his “grandpa Korkyt,” the hypothetical interlocutor describes Korkyt with a Russian idiom. The lines show that cultural hybridity is able to compensate for the lack of knowledge of one culture with its analogues in the other. This
demonstrates how the interlocutor scolding the child himself is incapable of separating the two parts of his identity.

Duisenbinov’s poem “Kerei” also vividly depicts how the two parts of his lyrical hero’s linguistic hybridity coexist. He writes:

А я наивный лёгкий мальчик-
көбелек
And I am a naïve featherweight
butterfly-boy

The combination of two words that the lyrical hero uses to describe himself, “butterfly-boy,” is a linguistic representation of the components of his cultural and linguistic hybridity: the word *malchik* [boy] is a Russian word, whereas *kобелек* [butterfly] is a Kazakh word. Besides its original meaning, the second component word, *kобелек*, also resembles the Russian word *kобелёк*, which is a masculine diminutive form of the word “dog.” Because the Russian letter “ё” [yo] is used less often in print, the Kazakh word *kобелек* can easily be read as the Russian word. So, the two components of the lyrical hero’s identity do not simply co-exist like in a compound word. The doubling in the second word shows that the Russian component of the lyrical hero’s identity shines through the Kazakh identity. The two components cannot be easily separated: they are blended into each other.

Besides the inability of the nation to come back to its roots as a result of the drastic changes it went through, Duisenbinov and Nurgazy raise the concerns of marginal groups. They demonstrate the struggles of ethnic Kazakh individuals from such groups to feel belonging to the nation. In his narrative poem “Qala aspanyndagy qaraqshy” [The Brigand of the City Sky], which alternates between several different voices and opinions, Nurgazy among other issues, raises the question of *орalmans* [returnees]. He writes:

Пенционерлер мен оралмандарды үкімет
уй беру тізімінен шығарып тастапты
Жақсы болған, қайтқан құсты көрмегелді
қай заман
Қайтқан құс деген не өзі, уақыт па, оқиға
ма, төнеу ме?
Баяғы жоқтан бар жасау

Turns out, the government has excluded pensioners and *оралмандар* from the lists for distribution of apartments

Haven’t seen migratory birds in a while

What is it – a migratory bird – a time, an event, or a comparison?

The same old practice of creating something out of nothing

(Nurgazy “Qala”)

The lyrical hero is not pleased that the *оралмандар* have been excluded from the list of people who receive the government’s support. The reason is that the primary incentive of ethnic Kazakh people living outside Kazakhstan to return to their historical homes was the government’s promise to support them. Inviting ethnic Kazakhs from abroad would foster the nation-building processes by helping overcome the minority status of Kazakhs. Because those groups of Kazakhs were not hybridized by the Soviet project, the government also believed that *оралмандар* would reduce the role that the Russian language and culture play in the society. However, these same characteristics, “a lack of familiarity with Soviet cultural codes, and poor knowledge of the Russian language,” caused “xenophobia toward *оралмандар* among the Kazakh/Kazakhstani population” and thus became the obstacle for their integration into the society (Laruelle 6). That is why the role *оралмандар* play in the society becomes ambiguous.
Nurgazy’s narrator wonders: “What is it – a migratory bird – a time, an event, or a comparison?” He asks: do migratory birds, or oralmans, represent the time for movement which is driven by availability of food and other benefits? Is the process of oralmans’ fleeing and returning a historical event? Or is “migratory bird” simply a comparison that is unable to capture the complexity of the problem of oralmans? The question he asks reflects the search of repatriated Kazakhs for their national identity. They returned to their historical homeland in hopes to reunite with their roots, people, and land, but were equally seen as a source of authentic Kazakhness by the government which they could not deliver. In the end, oralmans find themselves marginalized, and both them and the local population fail to complete their search for Kazakh identity.

As a member of the LGBTQ+ community, the lyrical hero of Duisenbinov’s “Kerei,” also finds himself in disharmony with the rest of the society. He envisions himself as a “phoenix of shame”: he is reborn, but he is seen as different and as bringing dishonor to the nation. The idea of shame in relation to the Kazakh nation is discussed in more detail in the poem “Mangilik zhel” [The Eternal Wind]. Duisenbinov writes:

пару месяцев назад меня назвали позором великого казахского народа просто так на улице завидев мои волосы (к слову сказать шикарные)
и еще я возможно ломался манерничал и был счастлив
разговаривал с кем-то по телефону
(“Mangilik” trans. Deykute)

The lyrical hero is a man with long hair, and a member of the LGBTQ+ community. In the original version, the behavior of the lyrical hero is depicted with such verbs as lomalsya, manernichal, that are usually used to describe women. This image goes against the traditional image of a man in the patriarchal Kazakh society. In addition to that, the man that the lyrical hero talks to has a Russian name, Andrey. This intensifies the conflict of the poem, making it not only a question of love between two men deemed unacceptable by the society, but also between formerly oppressed and oppressor nations. That is why the lyrical hero of “Kerei” and “Mangilik zhel” is called “the Disgrace of the Great Kazakh Nation” and is reborn as a “phoenix of shame.” The regeneration of the nation in the time of its independence should have entailed renewal and healing of the injured parts. But the poet shows that even if the rebirth of the nation did take place, the renewal seems to have not.

The poetry of Ardak Nurgazy and Anuar Duisenbinov demonstrates the struggles of the lyrical heroes to find their identity and feel belonging to the nation in the 21st century. They reveal that whether lyrical heroes are eager to reestablish their relationship with the nation’s past or not, they still find themselves unable to maintain a strong connection with their ancestors. The nation turned into a bilingual and culturally hybrid society, which is why the difference between them and the nomadic nation seems unsurmountable. The issue is further exacerbated when one considers marginal groups. Ethnic Kazakhs belonging to such groups struggle to find their place
in the society with an ambiguous identity. The poets show that the nation has transformed enough to have weakened its connection with its history, but still has not adapted to the modern reality. This leaves all members of the nation feeling disoriented. Poetry, therefore, becomes one of the few safe places, where the past and the present of the Kazakh nation can coexist in the harmony of words and rhythms, and where the lost “orphans” of the steppe can unite.


---. “Qala aspanyndagy qaraqshy.” 2018.


The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a decade of massive transition and change to the former Socialist Republics. Rapidly changing structures of government sprang up out of the power vacuum left by the USSR and unleashed an era of political turmoil onto Russia. The country and its citizens found themselves reevaluating former structures, all while being in a state of transition. This presented itself most sharply in the changing themes and undertones of Russian art. Russian artists of the early 1990s would express a sense of alienation, both from the previous Soviet system as well as the budding state. The works of Erik Bulatov, Viktor Pivovarov, and Sergei Bratkov express a sense of uncertainty and detachment that can be viewed as a by-product of the Post-Soviet structure. Russian artists would find themselves inheriting an anxious and uncertain country, stuck between its past and its future.

The Post-Soviet era can be seen as formally beginning with the collapse of the USSR on December 26, 1991 to roughly the end of the 1990s. During this time, Russia and the former Soviet Republics entered a period of massive transition, attempting to find new structures to fill the void left by the previous ones. This decade is best summarized as a period “when the countries of the former Soviet bloc went through a series of radical transformations that touched upon every sphere of social life” (Esanu and Groys 175). Life at all levels was touched, however, in an ultimately cataclysmic fashion. Boris Yeltsin’s policy of “shock therapy,” which aimed for a fluid transition to capitalism, brought to Russia disastrous “economic collapse, with hyperinflation...and disintegration of social services. Accompanying this were widespread criminality, a huge increase in alcohol and drug abuse, [and] sharply declining life expectancy” (Robinson 183). It appeared that any benefits were severely outweighed by the turmoil.

Many Russians viewed Yeltsin’s time in office as a “humiliating period of extreme poverty, state weakness, and rampant corruption” (Robinson 184). With the new system creating more havoc than peace, Russians would find themselves feeling detached from their country and as if any overarching identity that had bound them had been swept away. The transitional period greeted them with a state stripped of its former iconographies. Familiar imagery, which once may have acted as cultural touchstones, were no longer part of national identity. They had become part of the past. The turmoil that policies like shock therapy unleashed onto Russia and former Soviet states would leave citizens and artists grappling with life between two worlds. They were not Soviets, but they were still in the process of discovering what they would become next. Russian artists would respond to these issues by expressing alienation and the perceived loss of identity through their art, showcasing the difficulties of adapting to a system which had not yet taken hold.

These issues can be seen in the work of one of Russia’s greatest living artists, Erik Bulatov, who expressed Post-Soviet alienation uniquely. His 1991 piece Farewell Lenin was produced in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the USSR (fig. 1). It attempts to capture the specific mood of the time and in the process depicts the complex nature of Russian national identity at the time. The scene in Farewell Lenin appears to show a normal, quiet day. A woman walks along a street lined with trees, passing a board plastered with a Socialist Realist image of Vladimir Lenin as road servicemen work in the background. The trees appear to be mid bloom, suggesting the potential rebirth of Russia. The side profile of Lenin is superimposed over bright
blue and red, the only semblance of vibrancy in the work. Besides this, the piece is characterized by subdued, muted tones. While the billboard is the most striking portion of the work, it also appears to be the only component that is actively decaying. The paper appears ripped and crumpled, with pockets of air visibly protruding across the work. The rest of the street continues on as the poster tatters, seemingly without a second thought.

Bulatov utilizes elements of Socialist Realism in his depiction of Lenin in order to capture the specific mood and sensation of the collapse. Socialist Realism was the sanctioned art style of the Soviet Union. The style was optimistic and was intended to enforce partinost’, or party-mindedness, the “consistent referral to party policy as the inspiration and guide to action” (Bullitt 69). It was a form of visual policy aimed at achieving “harmony of aesthetic expression with current party policies” (53). The style and its principles would have been a factor of daily life in the Soviet Union due to its state sponsorship. As a style, it evokes the USSR, its policies, and its attempt at artistic cohesion. The use of this style in Farewell Lenin is significant because it evokes the specific time and mood the artist was attempting to replicate. It creates an intimate view of daily Soviet and Russian life, on a nearly nostalgic level. The use of Socialist Realism in this piece is tongue-in-cheek, using elements of the state sponsored style in a piece nodding to the state’s demise.

While Bulatov’s work possesses suggestions of hope for the future of Russia, it also alludes to a greater sense of detachment felt during the Post-Soviet period. The billboard of Lenin is the only colorful part of the composition, the rest appears in muted tones. The dull greens and grays help to create an almost sickly landscape. The woman walking in the foreground has her back turned to the viewer, her face and any identifiable features are obscured. This is the same for the figures in the background, who are too far away for their faces to be seen. The only face that is visible in the work is that of Lenin. This suggests a loss of identity within the emerging Post-Soviet state. With both Lenin and the state falling away, what is left of national identity? What remains to bind the individuals in the painting together? This work sharply illustrates how art during the fall of the USSR attempted to capture an alienating moment in time, where Russians were trapped in a moment of transition and identity was seemingly torn away.

The work of Viktor Pivovarov in the early 1990s problematizes the sensation of alienation on a much more personal and micro level than Bulatov’s work. Part of the series Apartment 22 (Bailey “This is Radio Moscow…”), the painting This is Radio Moscow... depicts a corner of a room, seemingly at dusk (fig. 2). A yellow lamp sits in the middle of a table, illuminating an open book and a half empty mug. The door to a terrace hangs open, showing a faint yellow sky and a far-off building with only one light on. The image is presented much like a comic strip, with the bottom text reading “Говорит Москва. Время 19 час. 30 минут. Начинаем передачу ‘Театр у Микрофона…” (“This is Moscow Radio. The time in Moscow is 19:30. The next show is ‘Theater at the Microphone…” This work illustrates a slice of everyday life, showcasing what is perhaps the owner’s nightly routine.

While the scene suggests normalcy, aspects of the piece cause it to take on an unnerving tone instead of a comforting one. The radio accompanying the text is unseen, making the text seem omnipotent, nearly prophetic. The portrait hanging on the wall has no face, suggesting a sense of detachment that is amplified by the absence of any individual. This sense of social
alienation is enhanced by the composition, defined by sharp lines, striking colors, and a lack of shading. Pivovarov stated that the image represents “Moscow in the 1950s as his own memory can remember it” (Bailey “This is Radio Moscow…”). While this work attempts to highlight the unease he remembers from the Soviet period, it is directly related to the unease of the 1990s. Produced between 1992-96, it reflects both “the mundanity of Soviet existence” as well as the loss of identity and perceived social alienation during the Post-Soviet transitional stage (Bailey “This is Radio Moscow…”). The scene is simultaneously a part of the Soviet Union while also a part of Post-Soviet Russia, illustrating how Russian artists perceived themselves caught between two worlds.

Pivovarov simultaneously expresses Soviet banality and Post-Soviet detachment in another piece from the same series, entitled *(He) Hit Me with a Hammer and Burst into Tears* (fig. 3). The work depicts a young and an elderly woman, sitting at a table in a small communal apartment (Bailey “*(He) Hit Me*…”). Sitting on the table is a teapot and two cups. The young woman’s cup has a spoon sitting on the saucer and the older woman’s spoon is resting in the cup. A small bed with a pillow and no apparent dressing stands against the opposite wall. This piece mirrors Pivovarov’s other work in that it relies on sharp lines, only employing rounded edges as a means to articulate the women and the bed. The composition utilizes dark, muted tones. The women are dressed in gray and blue and their skin is the same sickly, faded green as the walls of the apartment. Each woman has a hand pressed to their face, with the woman in the foreground clutching a handkerchief, as well. It offers a glimpse into a home experiencing the fall through Pivovarov’s memory of the 1950s.

This work takes on a similarly uneasy and ambient tone as *This is Radio Moscow*. Nothing can be seen outside of the window, instead it is an abyss of white of nothingness. The room is void of any identifiable characteristics and the use of color creates a sickening, unfamiliar space. The text appears at the top of the image, reading “Ударил он меня молотком по голове и заплакал.” (“*(He) hit me with a hammer and burst into tears*”) Due to the text’s placement, the speaker is ambiguous: it could be either of the women. This creates a sense of unease in the work, causing even the viewer to feel as if they could be the speaker. While Pivovarov set the series in the 1950s, these issues and themes relate directly to the social unease that was felt across Russia in the Post-Soviet era. The broader Soviet identity had collapsed and nothing lasting had taken its place. People found themselves as strangers in their own land, confronted by changing national identity. Pivovarov tackles these complex emotions on a much more personal level than Bulatov, avoiding Soviet iconography and simply focusing on how these problems presented themselves at home. This depiction underscores a sense of being caught between two worlds as well as a loss of national identity that proliferated in the early 1990s in the aftermath of the Soviet dissolution.

These issues are also tackled in the photography of Sergei Bratkov, which illustrates issues of identity immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. His work *Mausoleum*, produced in 1992, hints to the detachment felt during this period of massive transition (fig. 4). Sitting on shelves are jars with images of human heads placed within them. The heads are predominantly facing left, with each face maintaining a blank expression. They appear to be “embalmed, not so differently from Lenin himself” (Neumaier 19). They are detached from their bodies and from the heads surrounding them, suggesting a feeling of broader social alienation. While the photograph does not allude to being stuck in a transitory stage in the same ways that
Bratkov and Pivovarov do, its production in 1992 by a Russian artist imbues the work with these feelings.

The fact that the work is a photograph and not a painting creates an additional sense of immediacy in the viewer. The “unstable conditions” the artist is attempting to illustrate are brought to life more pointedly due to photography’s sense of immediacy, which is greatly “associated with ‘real’ social conditions” (Neumaier 19). The composition of the work adds to this, with the black and white creating a sense of uniformity. While the jars vary in height and each contain different photographs, they all appear strikingly similar. This reflects a state that, despite its similarities, remains separated from each other. *Mausoleum* illustrates the social unease of Post-Soviet society by suggesting that a group which once maintained a strong national identity now found itself grappling for social connection. Bratkov’s work poignantly depicts a population which found itself living in an alien society, disconnected from their past, their future, and in turn, their identity.

Within all of the discussed works, faces play a vital role. *Farewell Lenin* displays a larger than life Lenin while the features of those on the street are hidden. Their backs are turned or they are too far away to be distinguished. In Pivovarov’s *This Is Radio Moscow*..., the absence of any individual provides tension to the piece, creating an uncomfortable feeling due to clues in the painting that suggest someone should be present. The portrait hanging on the wall has no face at all, the man appears to be a void framed by hair and an ordinary suit. The faces of the women in *He* *Hit Me*..., while shown, are made to appear ordinary, as if they could be anyone off of the street. The use of muted green to color their skin, the same green as the walls, suggests that they could easily fade into the background of the communal apartment. *Mausoleum* is dominated by the presence of heads physically detached from their bodies and separated from the others by the jars. The human face is the most unique and identifiable part of a person. The fact that each one of these pieces specifically obscures faces, causing them to either blend in, be indistinguishable, or to not even be shown at all, speaks to an overarching feeling of a loss of national and personal identity among post-Soviet artists. These themes speak to broader feelings of alienation among Russians, as if they were trapped between the old and the new.

Russian art during the early 1990s expressed being caught between two states. The transitory period leading to the birth of the new Russia saw the country and its artists grappling for a sense of national identity. In the wake of a structure that placed such great emphasis on iconography and imagery, Russians found themselves in a new country apparently lacking these touchstones. They were caught between two worlds, one gone and one uncertain. The works of Erik Bulatov, Viktor Pivovarov, and Sergei Bratkov act as case studies for fluctuating identity. These depictions pose intriguing questions about national identity and how it was in a state of flux after the fall. While the period following the dissolution of the USSR has been greatly studied by historians and economists, it has been undervalued by art historians. This era could provide unique insight into how national identity is portrayed during the transition of governments and deserves deeper and more meaningful interrogation.
Bailey, Julia Tatiana and Antonio Geusa. “‘(He) Hit Me with a Hammer and Burst into Tears,’ Viktor Pivovarov, 1992,” Tate Modern.

---. “‘This Is Radio Moscow ...’, Viktor Pivovarov, 1992-6,” Tate Modern.


Pivovarov, Viktor. Ударил он Меня Молотком по Голове и Заплакал/(He) Hit Me with a Hammer and Burst into Tears, d. 1992. Enamel paint on canvas on fibreboard. Frame: 766 × 877 × 44 mm. Tate Modern. aq. no. T14797.

---. Говорит Москва.../This is Radio Moscow..., d. 1992-96. Enamel paint on canvas on fibreboard. Support: 1122 × 832 mm. Tate Modern. aq. no. T14798.

Image 2: Говорит Москва.../This is Radio Moscow..., Viktor Pivovarov. d. 1992-96. Enamel paint on canvas on fibreboard. Support: 1122 × 832 mm. Tate Modern. aq. no. T14798.
Prior to the nineteenth century, the question of what made one “Russian” was often framed not in relation to the provinces versus the capitals, but rather Russia versus Western Europe. Following Napoleon’s invasion of Russia and during Russia’s subsequent campaigns into the heart of Europe, Russian officers and intellectuals began to more deeply consider not only Russia’s role in world politics, but particularly how the development of the Russian state compared to that of its European counterparts. Two major schools of thought would evolve within Russian regarding this question in the mid-nineteenth century: the Westernizers and the Slavophiles.

The Westernizers had a vision for Russia that closely modeled the rise of countries such as Germany or France. The Slavophiles, on the other hand, saw the development of the Russian state as relying on recognizing the uniqueness of Russia. The Slavophiles believed in taking some inspiration from Europe but emphasized fundamental differences between Russia and Europe that signaled the need to develop differently. In these discussions, Russia’s thinkers looked inward, considering what made something truly “Russian.” From the time of the Slavophiles to today, there have been questions as to where the boundary between “Russian” and “Ukrainian” lie, if these two identities are compatible, or even if they are very different at all – few writers embody this conflict as well as Nikolai Gogol.

Nikolai Gogol grew up following the War of 1812 and was influenced by the beginnings of the Slavophile movement (Dead Souls was published before Slavophilism was fully formulated), especially as an enthusiast of Russian history who was deeply preoccupied with how Russia’s past may determine its future (Vinogradov 199). Gogol was born in provincial Russia, in what is today part of Ukraine. Gogol, in fact, wrote some of his first stories in the Ukrainian language and about Ukrainians. Despite this, following his move to St. Petersburg Gogol began to identify more directly as a subject of the Russian Empire, and as a Russian man by extension. In an 1844 letter, Gogol wrote on the interconnectedness of Malorussian (Ukrainian/Belorussian) and Russian identity, leading scholars such as Marya Akimova to conclude that the writer clearly saw himself as a Russian subject (Akimova 118). In reference to the Ukrainian stories, Edyta Bojanowska writes:

[Bojanowska 182]

This observation is critical for understanding Dead Souls because it suggests that in this work Gogol does not take the stance of a provincial writer criticizing his Ukrainian homeland, but rather a concerned Russian writer describing a problem afflicting a large portion of the nation. This is further supported by the fact that the town of N, the main setting for the novel, is described as being neither too far from Moscow nor from St. Petersburg, which provides twofold consequences: N must be located northeast of Ukraine and far from its modern borders, meaning the work is not a criticism of Gogol’s native land specifically; and the proximity of N to both
capitals is reminiscent of literary considerations that will be discussed below, namely that N is derivative of the capitals (particularly St. Petersburg) and offers nothing by itself.

Gogol is not a Slavophile thinker in the way that individuals such as Ivan Kireyevsky or Aleksey Khomyakov were, but he was associated with ideas closely related to this school of thought – especially the uniqueness and authenticity of the Russian spirit – and with other writers who were not Slavophiles, but did influence their ideas (such as Piotr Chaadaev, discussed later). I will argue for Dead Souls being a work of Slavophile-inspired literature based on: the types of characters that are satirized, and the types that are not; the recurring theme of sameness and uniformness in provincial towns and the surrounding land; and the idea of “lack,” or poshlust as described below, as it relates to the novel’s setting, landowners, and Russian “authenticity” as a whole.

This paper primarily discusses the role of Dead Souls as a Slavophile work, but before analyzing the novel, discussion of Slavophile ideology and views of the Russian provinces in the nineteenth century are necessary. Slavophilism is founded on a perception of the uniqueness of the Russian spirit. Slavophiles believed the modernization of Russia would take a different course from that of other European nations because of this uniqueness. These writers highlighted key differences in belief between Russia and Europe: while rationalism was popular in Europe as a result of the Enlightenment, Slavophiles maintained that spirituality was an equally, if not more, important part of life. They rejected the notion that all things could be explained by testing and reason, believing that only God himself was omniscient. The important Slavophiles Kireyevsky and Khomyakov clashed regarding certain beliefs but agreed that one’s education had a moral and spiritual component that was equally important as the scientific component (Volodina 246). Deemphasizing purely rational, “Western” thought, such thinkers praised the spontaneity and authenticity of the Russian peasantry. Note that no serious thinkers advocated a complete rejection of rational thought, but rather wanted to stress the importance folk character to the identity of the nation.

Russian folk spirit, embodied by the narod or Russian peasantry, was seen by many thinkers as an authentic manifestation of the unique Russian spirit. “Authenticity” here is thought of as the acting out of an unaffected, natural character – the alternative being the adoption of what is currently deemed “fashionable” from the capitals or abroad. Thus, the provincial towns of imperial Russia provide a potentially problematic middle-ground – do they exemplify Russian folk spirit as well, or something less authentic, or maybe nothing at all? Susan Smith-Peter provides a historical background for the foundations, literal and figurative, of provincial Russian towns:

As an autocracy [The Russian Empire] prized order and legibility across space. The aim, therefore, was to reproduce a series of institutions, buildings, and social groups across the empire in a way that made the local visible to the center. Each provincial capital had a noble assembly, a seminary, an administrative building, and so on….there were laws regulating the architecture and town planning of provincial and district towns in order to make them more legible to the center. (Smith-Peter 23)

The “center” above refers to the capitals of the Empire, either the literal capital of St. Petersburg or the historical and cultural capital of Moscow. Not only was it the Slavophile’s perception that
provincial towns were modeled after larger towns – all the way up to the capitals – but it was in fact imperial law that towns be this way for the sake of the Empire’s massive bureaucracy.

The provinces play a complicated role in the thoughts of the Slavophiles and the works of Gogol. Generally, both have negative views of provincial life, though the provinces are home to many of the peasants that exhibit ‘authentic’ Russian life. For many Slavophile writers, not only were the provinces mere imitations of Russia’s great cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg), but they also were a violation of the Russian spirit for both their derivativeness and orderliness. Anne Lounsbery writes that the highly regulated and organized layout of provincial cities seemed to some Slavophiles a violation of the Russian tendency to spread out and grow as necessary – to these writers, towns and cities should grow organically and around a central place of importance, such as Moscow’s Kremlin. The orderliness of provincial cities also meant that they often resembled not only European-inspired cities such as St. Petersburg but even each other. Thus, provincial cities were seen as interchangeable and characterless.

What matters is the province-vs.-capital opposition, and the fact that in Russian literature the provinces, as the embodiment of cultural lack, are so often not merely drab or backward or philistine, as are, say, Balzac’s provinces. Rather, in Russian literature the provinces can be a version of hell itself, a place where banality threatens to intensify to the point of evil. (Lounsbery 265)

Lounsbery succinctly explains what is wrong with the provinces in the works of Gogol. Reflections of Slavophile thought can be found in the word “lack” – for a group that stressed the national importance of Russia’s individual character, the idea that a part of the country should merely mimic the capitals without having any original character themselves was unacceptable. Lounsbery’s comparison of the provinces to “hell itself” is particularly apt, given that the novel known today as *Dead Souls* was only the first volume out of an intended three, mirrored off Dante’s *Divine Comedy* – this novel, then, would be the *Inferno*.

Gogol, despite being from the provinces himself, seems to agree with such conclusions. The town of N is often described as being like any other provincial town, with the same amenities and architecture, such that if the reader has seen any provincial town, he or she will know what N looks like. Upon Chichikov entering the town’s tavern, the narrator explains, “what these common rooms are, every traveler knows very well: the same walls painted with oil paint…the same besooted ceiling; the same sooty chandelier…in short, the same as everywhere; with the only difference that one painting portrayed a nymph with such enormous breasts as the reader has probably never seen” (Gogol 5). There is a deliberate effort on Gogol’s part to make the town as lacking in personality as possible, with only minute, vulgar differences that would distinguish N from any other provincial town.

While initial impressions of the novel may come off as elitist, times were changing in Gogol’s Russia. The Russian reading public, and who it consisted of, was a concern of many writers, including Gogol. With the increasing availability of print texts, more and more people enjoyed leisure reading in the decades preceding *Dead Souls*’ publication. Before, literary life was only encountered in the salons of Russia’s major cities. In her article “‘Russia! What Do You Want of Me?’: The Russian Reading Public in Dead Souls,” Lounsbery writes that the massive popularity of a particular journal, *Library for Reading*, was concerning for “the perceived incoherence of Russian letters – an incoherence exemplified by the mishmash
published in *Library for Reading* that the educated elite had been deploring for nearly two decades at the time *Dead Souls* was published” (Lounsbery 370). Much like the town of N, this new, pedestrian journal was seen as a chaotic and destructive mixture of all things that could be found across the vast empire, something lacking not in quantity, but rather in quality – another example of encroaching, damaging European influence.

*Dead Souls* is such a long work that it would be impossible to do justice to all the potential reflections of Slavophile tendencies and beliefs that may be found within; therefore, particular characters, events, and settings that best demonstrate a Slavophile leaning have been chosen. In a word, “lack” is what characterizes the Slavophiles’ outlook on the provinces. This is not “lack” in the sense of a vacuum devoid of anything at all; on the contrary, many landowners in the novel want for little. Rather, original ideas are not to be found, towns are based on another that is based on another and so on, and the people have little of substance to say. In the introduction to the translation of *Dead Souls* read for this paper, Richard Pevear explains the importance of the word *poshlust* to Gogol’s work, a word that is an “untranslatable whole made up of banality, vulgarity, and sham.” (Pevear xix). The idea of “lack” should be contrasted with “authenticity,” an expression of original ideas or culture, as the Slavophiles believed Russian peasants exhibited.

The town of N and its inhabitants exhibit *poshlust* for reasons discussed above as well as others. The ladies of the town “were distinguished, like many Petersburg ladies, by an extraordinary prudence and propriety in their words and expressions,” (Gogol 160) preferring imported euphemisms to the way the average Russian might talk. The “lady agreeable in all respects” and the “simply agreeable lady,” two interchangeable characters emblematic of the town of N, are introduced mere pages later discussing meaningless gossip and agreeing on every point.

The area surrounding N, traversed by Chichikov on his odyssey between landowners, is also virtually devoid of any distinguishing characteristics. On more than one occasion, one landowner gives Chichikov incorrect directions to the next – Manilov tells Chichikov’s coachman, Selifan, to skip two turns and take the third left on their way to Sobakevich’s house, which turns out to be completely wrong and takes them to another landowner’s home. Nonetheless, they always find their way to the next landowner eventually, suggesting that the lack of substance in the province means it ultimately does not matter which way they go.

Characters that exemplify *poshlust* have little life of their own in *Dead Souls*. They closely mimic those around them and act and speak as expected of them, e.g. mirroring Petersburg’s high society. One character that exemplifies this well is Manilov. Manilov is a cheery landowner with two children and a wife and becomes one of Chichikov’s first acquaintances in the novel. On the surface he is an agreeable character: he is quick to invite Chichikov to his home, caters to and waits on Chichikov, and is quick even to entertain the protagonist’s proposal to buy all his dead serfs in name. Manilov is not, in a traditional sense, a “bad” person. Through a Slavophilic lens, however, he is a fundamentally empty one, a product of the *poshlust* of the provinces. The narrator even states that “each [person] has his own, but Manilov had nothing” (Gogol 21), meaning no idiosyncrasies or quirks to make his personality unique. In Manilov’s attempts to make Chichikov welcome, he mirrors the guest’s tone of speech and movements: “‘No, I don’t smoke,’ Chichikov replied tenderly and as if with an air of regret.
‘Why not?’ said Manilov, also tenderly and with an air of regret...and after that, for no apparent reason, [Chichikov] looked behind him. Manilov, too, for no apparent reason, looked behind him” (29). This is but one example of many occasions in which Manilov speaks and does just as Chichikov does. Note that even the language is mirrored to underscore Manilov’s attempts to act just as his guest does. Manilov, having nothing in himself, can only do as his guest does to act the part of a warm host. To a Slavophile, Manilov would be one of many logical results and failures of provincial life. Like the land around him, Manilov strives to be what he is not. He gives his sons Greek names, Themistoclus and Alkides – but misspells the first one. Like the provincial towns of Imperial Russia, Manilov is not only inauthentic for copying absentmindedly from other cultures, but he is incapable of even doing that properly.

Andrei Ivanovich, a thirty-something provincial landowner introduced in Volume Two of the novel, is a peculiar character who resembles Gogol himself in many ways. Andrei Ivanovich is described as “neither a good nor bad being, but simply – a burner of the daylight.” (Gogol 259). This description is reminiscent not only of Chichikov or many other characters, but even the land itself – featureless, indistinguishable, simply there. One particular passage elucidates the importance of Andrei Ivanovich in a Slavophile reading of Dead Souls:

Two hours before dinner, Andrei Ivanovich would go up to his study in order to occupy himself truly and seriously...It consisted in pondering a work which had long and continuously been pondered. This work was to embrace Russia from all viewpoints – civic, political, religious, philosophical; to resolve the difficult problems posed for her by the times; and to define clearly her great future – in short, a work of vast scope. But so far it had all ended with the pondering. (261)

Considering the purpose of the trilogy Dead Souls was to be a part of was to attempt to solve the questions of Russia’s development, the character of Andrei Ivanovich seems almost a satire of Gogol himself. It is as if Andrei Ivanovich is a version of the author that never left the provinces for St. Petersburg, who was content to sit on his estate and observe the goings-on of the nation from afar. Taking into account Lounsbery’s conclusion of the provinces having an evil, corrupting influence in Gogol’s works, it as if the surroundings themselves are keeping this mirror of Gogol from achieving his ambitions, keeping him in eternal mediocrity. This is reinforced by the narrator stating Andrei Ivanovich grew up a “clever, talented boy,” signifying the change to boring and unproductive only came about later. This passage is also one of many criticizing the extensive imperial bureaucracy. Andrei Ivanovich finds a job in the bureaucracy as a result of his uncle’s connections, while between jobs he spent two months studying calligraphy. His work is rudimentary and mindless, and the narrator comments that “it seemed to him that he was at some primary school...as if on some account of some delinquency he had been transferred from the upper grade to the lowest.” (Gogol 266). The bureaucracy imposed on the provinces by the capitals is but one of the soul-crushing aspects of life in the town of N and others like it, something European and alien to the Russian soul in the eyes of the Slavophiles.

A set of characters that must be discussed whenever examining Dead Souls, particularly as a Slavophile work, are the peasants. Unlike the landowners lampooned and satirized by Gogol, the peasants were seen by Slavophiles as the natural inheritors and bearers of traditional, authentic Russian culture. Unlike the wealthy gentlemen and ladies of N, they do not try to be anything they are not. The peasants are never caught wearing the latest fashions nor gossiping as
they do in St. Petersburg. Peasants are often in the background, speak simply and directly, and (mostly) do as they are told. *Dead Souls* is not a love letter to the peasantry – Selifan, for example, gets drunk before driving early on in the novel, tipping the *britzka* and getting Chichikov and himself even more lost on the way to Sobakevich’s estate. Peasants are not idealized but are instead given realistic personalities – they are real people instead of caricatures. They make small talk about the weather, grovel before their masters, react as one would expect to the events around them (instead of, say, the landowner Nozdryov, characterized as both a cheat and a man who becomes infuriated at the slightest insult or rebuke). Even when Selifan is driving drunk, the narrator takes care to call him a “Russian man”: “He realized there had been many turns, all of which he had skipped. Since a Russian man in a critical moment finds what to do without going into further reasoning, he shouted, after turning right at the next crossroads” (Gogol 38).

As explained in Pevear’s introduction, *Dead Souls* was popular almost immediately upon publication, and its relevance ranges from ideas of Russian nationalism to a perception of the inherently socialist spirit of the Russian people. At the heart of *Dead Souls* is found great anxiety for the future of Russia (one that would have been overcome in subsequent volumes by Gogol’s plan). How can the country grow and develop, how can it become a model for the rest of the world, if it sacrifices its national character for being another European state? Lounsbery argues that this anxiety is manifested in the Slavophiles’ view of the provinces: if provincial towns are built on the model of St. Petersburg, and Petersburg itself is modeled on Europe, then perhaps Russia is just one massive province of the more advanced countries of Western Europe – which would mean that Russia, on the whole, is an inauthentic replication of Europe (Lounsbery 266). These tensions are further complicated by Gogol’s Ukrainian roots. While Bojanowska argues that Gogol went so far as to undermine Pushkin to claim for himself the title of Russia’s greatest writer, there nonetheless remains the fact of Gogol’s Ukrainian, and therefore provincial, origins. Despite Gogol himself identifying as a Russian, there will always be a doubt as to how “Russian” he can actually be – do his Ukrainian roots keep him from being fully Russian, or can his self-identity prevail? Gogol’s biography creates a sort of nesting doll of negative national identity: a Ukrainian-born writer, identifying as a Russian, justifying Russia’s place as its own nation, not a province of Europe as his home is to Russia.

The Russian thinker Piotr Chaadaev was not himself a Slavophile but is noted instead for his pessimism regarding Russia’s future – namely, the concern that Russia could never develop authentically and independently of Europe, doomed to always linger in Europe’s shadow. Chaadaev and Gogol were acquainted; Boris Chikin details the tumultuous relationship and disagreements between the two, particularly Chaadaev’s pessimism for Russia’s future versus Gogol’s relative optimism – perhaps these disagreements inspired the writing of a work intended to set Russia back on the right path. Paired with the characteristics described in this paper, Gogol’s desire to find a better path for Russia, and optimism that this was even possible, make *Dead Souls* a key work of Slavophile literature. Questions of progress, who belongs where, and what it means to belong to a certain group of people are relevant to this day, as evinced by conflicts in eastern Ukraine involving separatists who identify as Russian. Just as in Gogol’s time, the identities of “Ukrainian” and “Russian” can be mixed and are fluid, especially considering the great cultural influence of Russia. As under Imperial Russia, the people of
Ukraine today have a choice: to look westward for inspiration, or eastward for what may remain of an authentic Slavic identity.


LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION POLICY
AND NATIONALISM
National Identity in Education: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Northern Ireland
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Since the late modern era, education has been a pivotal source of societal indoctrination to promote national objectives. The unification of Italy introduced pedagogical debates about national ideology, ultimately strengthening the state as it navigated through turbulent historical events. However, in Northern Ireland, a nation shaped by sectarianism, educational division allowed for a singular expression of national identity that solidified through times of conflict. Though nationalism shaped the countries in different ways, key points in their narratives showcase the development of the desired nation-state, including an emphasis on education during intense social movements. This paper seeks to define nation-building in education concentrating on Italian amalgamation and Northern Irish separation and to address the implications of nationalism in educational curriculum.

The Italian education system used years of public instruction to unite their splintered regional differences into a distinguished Italian identity. Northern Ireland devised a public education system of sectarian segregation that continues to perpetuate duality in Northern Irish identity. At their core, these educational systems are fashioned to meet the needs of their country’s political agenda. The cyclical nature of democratic education thus further affords Italians and Northern Irish to, in turn, transform their nation through social movements and reform. Analyzing the historical trends of nationalism in European education serves to curtail xenophobia and safeguard the fabric of the existing nation-state.

Defining Nationalism

For the purpose of this paper, nationalism will be defined in accordance with Ernest Gellner’s theory that cultural boundaries align with political borderlines. Gellner maintained that nationalism is a relatively modern concept that arose from necessary social order. Through the creation of symbols, rituals, and narratives, nations constructed its very existence. Benedict Anderson furthered this idea by labeling the production of a nation as an “imagined community”, in which individuals prescribe to the order and rules of the conjured nation without observing it directly. According to Anderson, the construction of imagined communities was homogenized through various tactics such as the printing press normalizing language and education (Eriksen, 2001, p. 275-9).

Gellner and Anderson explain the emergence of nationalism as providing a sense of security and cultural uniqueness for weakened kinship groups. The nation, similar to a religion, expects loyalty and offers purpose for its citizens. By eliciting attachment from its members, the citizenry reinforces the power dynamics of the nation (Eriksen, 2001, p. 275-9). Education is thus one of the most critical means through which a state promotes nationalistic ideology. The nation can monitor the production of knowledge and foster loyalty for the state within the classroom, allowing for social control over those who claim membership to the imagined community (Gellner, 1981). This can result in social cohesion between members of the nation or, conversely, reinforce class differences perpetuated by limited social mobility within the system. Though the fundamental purpose of education is dependent on the nation, nearly all education systems are motivated by political agendas and national priorities.
Before the Risorgimento, the unification of Italy in 1861, modern Italy was ruled by various nation-states. Ascoli (1937) inserted a famous quote by Massimo Azeglio in his text *Education in Fascist Italy* that described the result of the Risorgimento precisely, “we have made Italy, now we have to make the Italians.” Despite having claimed a united Italy, the nation-states themselves felt no connection to others with vastly different languages and histories. With high rates of illiteracy and little connection between other regions, very few people in 1861 were “ideal” Italians, knowledgeable of northern and southern Italian identity. A link was necessary to join the different cultural backgrounds and histories of the former states to larger Italy (Ascoli, 1937).

The Casati Act in 1859 was the first attempt to assimilate these distinct cultures. The law created a national education system in place of a previously religious one, organized by state institutions through the university level. It was a great success as adult illiteracy rates plummeted nearly 50% by 1901 and education began to be perceived as a useful tool for improving the standard of living. Wealthy and impoverished alike could enculturate their children through the secondary school system so long as they were hard-working. An increased number of qualified secondary students led to greater university enrollment, graduation, and typically state employment. With diverse backgrounds drawn together in the education system, the new standard of Italian culture became rich with class cohesion (Ascoli, 1937).

Despite drastic changes in the educational system to reach the objectives of the nation, several educators saw this, according to Ascoli (1937), as the promotion of a “wasteful bureaucracy” in which the common people were still neglected from the fostered domestic culture. In 1922, philosopher Giovanni Gentile became the first Minister of Public Instruction in the first Fascist cabinet. Though he considered himself and his pedagogical style liberal, the fascist state’s willingness to accept his theories led to a profoundly renovated Italian education system in a mere ten months. Gentile thought children had to recognize their desire to learn individually, and he transformed the system to support this model. In elementary schools, the teacher became responsible for adapting to the student and classrooms became joyful places of learning, accompanied by music and free writing. Elementary education became compulsory until age 10, followed by the division of secondary school tracks. Secondary education was highly controlled and monitored by the state and students needed to pass a rigorous exam to graduate. All of this was employed to elevate and continuously rework the notion of Italian culture but was rooted in elitism and eventually overrun with fascist ideology to create Mussolini’s vision of the Italian nation (Ascoli, 1937).

Mussolini considered Gentile’s reform “the most Fascist of all the reforms” because of its effectiveness. As Ascoli (1937) put it, “Gentile and his followers had in their own opinion brought real spiritual and cultural freedom to the Italian people, thanks to the party which was curbing political freedom.” Gentile’s reforms did not come without criticism and challenges in its execution. Fascism began to infiltrate the liberal system Gentile designed, adding uniforms and injecting party and police supervision. Mussolini believed that by creating a sense of Italian unity within schools, students would eventually finish their education to serve the state and retain its interests (Scarangello, 1964). Growing support of fascism curtailed the liberal goals of Gentile, and by the second half of 1924, Gentile was dismissed as Minister of Public Instruction.
With a restructured and subservient youth population searching for education and greater opportunity, Mussolini capitalized on Gentile’s reforms and began solidifying fascist ideology and his national agenda through Italian education (Ascoli, 1937).

Division: A Historical Review of Northern Irish Education

The origins of Irish education look different from Italy, and they began under complete British rule. Throughout the British reign in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Irish Catholics were controlled and discriminated against through Penal Laws that inhibited property, religious, and educational rights. Irish Catholics strongly opposed these laws, fervently practicing their religion and insisting on state-subsidized primary schools for Catholics. In 1831, Lord Stanley proposed a joint Protestant and Catholic education system to develop mutual tolerance among the people (Stanley, 1831). The proposal was highly contested and decidedly ineffective as education was a form of pastoral care and could not be separated from religion. This reinforced cultural divisions between Protestants and Catholics. After the partitioning of Ireland in 1922, the narrow education system finally saw reform (O’Donoghue, 2011).

The partitioning of Ireland allowed for the Irish Free State to independently govern 26 counties. The remaining six counties in Ulster were kept under British rule in what was claimed as Northern Ireland. Given the Protestant majority in Ulster, many of the citizens of Northern Ireland supported unifying with the United Kingdom. However, a sizable Catholic minority remained in pockets across the country and supported a united Ireland of all 32 counties. Those loyal to the United Kingdom became known as unionists, while those dedicated to a united Ireland became known as nationalists. The 30% of Irish Catholics who now belonged to the British-ruled Northern Ireland were left in a particularly hostile state dictated by the Protestant majority (Gray, 2018).

For the Irish Free State, national education became largely managed by Catholics of the Department of Education, whereas in Northern Ireland, Protestants governed education to align with the United Kingdom (O’Donoghue, 2011). Attempts to remove religious education from the curriculum were spearheaded by the Education Act of 1923 in Northern Ireland. The act encouraged collaboration between unionist Protestants and nationalist Catholics through financial incentives but Catholic schools refused to partake in this system to preserve their identity and practices. As a result, Catholic instruction suffered limited state funding and was not provided a voice in the creation of a new system dominated by Protestant representatives and their scholastic beliefs (McGuinness, 2012). Protestant churches converted their schools to the state to receive full funding while the Catholic church managed its schools with less funding, creating county or Protestant “controlled” schools and voluntary or Catholic “maintained” schools respectively. Amendments to the Education Act reinstalled religious teachings in controlled schools and capital grants to maintained schools (ESRC, 2017). The deeply rooted differences and educational autonomy meant controlled schools taught British history and Protestantism and maintained schools taught Irish history and Catholicism. The academic environments promoted their political beliefs through curriculum with their corresponding unionist or nationalist ideology (Emerson, 2018).

Under the Education Act of 1947, secondary schooling became universal in Northern Ireland and the legislation increased funding for maintained schools (ESRC, 2017). This reformation was highly controversial within the unionist community as it arguably allowed for
nationalist activists access to higher educational opportunities and the formation of the Irish civil rights movement in the 1960s (Walker, 2017). Inequalities persisted from 1947 through the 1960s within education, and inspiration from the United States’ civil rights movements encouraged the nationalist advocates to expose the social differences between the unionist Protestant and nationalist Catholic communities (ESRC, 2017). By 1968, inequity and community unrest were evident. The acts of violence that resulted from these conflicts culminated in the Troubles, a three-decades-long sectarian strife that left 3,500 people dead, thousands injured, and Northern Ireland politically ruptured (Smith, 1999).

While the disorder of the Troubles may have been a consequence of segregated schooling in Northern Ireland, it was also an opportunity to reconcile national divisions (Gallagher, 2016). Cross-community projects and citizenship education arose throughout the 1970s and 1980s but implementation was challenging given the schools’ status as “safe havens” from national chaos (Emerson, 2018). In 1982, the Department of Education attempted to bridge the diverging paradigms within the unionist and nationalist communities by mandating conflict comprehension in classrooms but found limited support (McCully & Emerson, 2014). By 1989, this effort was solidified with the Education Reform Order’s emphasis on Education for Mutual Understanding and Cultural Heritage, as well as the introduction of a common curriculum and integrated schools. This reform aimed to help students appreciate differences and recognize similarities within both cultures but the outcome perpetuated divisions and did not support teachers to instruct contentious political issues (Emerson, 2018). The Troubles formally ended with the Belfast Agreement in 1998 but education remains divided by religious school affiliation (Landow & Sergie, 2020). Spiritual differences may have been the impetus behind the Troubles, but politics and nationalism have been profoundly entrenched in nearly all of its consequences.

**Nation-Building as Defined by Education**

In analyzing the recent histories of nation-building and schooling in both Italy and Northern Ireland, education had a prevalent role in inspiring national support during hardships, particularly during social movements. 1968 was a year of significant change for young activists to spark debates about educational rights. In Italy, the student movements erupted in response to a strict, traditional hierarchy within Italian universities and drew inspiration from international civil rights movements. Students independently led the movement demanding compulsory education until 16 years old, free public nursery schools, reformation of higher secondary education, greater value for scientific, technical and vocational education, and a refurbished teacher-student dichotomy. Calls for democratic education were initially repressed until political figures recognized the forceful demands to reform the education system (Grimaldi & Serpieri, 2012, p. 158-9).

In the same year, civil rights movements also influenced Northern Ireland to alter the sectarian structures of their society. The aforementioned Education Act of 1947 opened doors for Catholics to get an education and become politically active members of the country. As tensions heightened during the 1960s, young nationalist leaders led demonstrations and marches for educational, housing, and voting rights (Gray, 2018). Education paved the way for young leaders to understand the oppressive and unequal leadership in Northern Ireland (Walker, 2017). It also became the channel through which Catholic nationalist identity, given the divided schooling, and through which unionist opposition was fostered.
The national education of Italy and Northern Ireland trained students to challenge authority while also providing the educational opportunities and tools needed to alter the nation. The student movements in Italy and the Troubles in Northern Ireland represent the symbiotic nature of nationalism and education. Not only is education key in nation-building, education inherently develops citizens of the nation who help to progressively restructure its national identity. By adapting to the educational demands, the nation maintains control over its citizens; concessions allow the nation to keep its stronghold on those who prescribe to the state. Nationalism in Italy and Northern Ireland shows how education fluctuates in response to national interests. In Italy, the installation of new pedagogical practices led to greater social changes and further unified the nation. In Northern Ireland, the cry for equality provoked questions about citizenship education and community relations while sustaining national divisions.

**Curricular Nation-Building: History, Language, and Religion**

This European case study exemplifies education’s very particular role in nation-building. The political objectives of a country affect its educational and national outcomes. The unification of Italy and the division of Northern Ireland define the countries’ respective national agendas and identity through historical understanding, politicized language, and religious instruction.

The national history curriculum in Italy has defined what a common Italian nation means. Students from northern regions use the same curriculum as those from southern regions so all students have the same opportunity to become Italian intellectuals — other institutional barriers aside. Italian education also emphasizes regional history, encouraging local heritage and the importance of each region in Italy’s development.

In Northern Ireland, however, historical content is delivered and interpreted depending on one’s ascribed faith (Barton, 2001). The national curriculum endorses flexibility in teacher instruction but the ambiguous outline allows professors to brush over contentious parts of history such as oppression and the power dynamics of British imperialism. New efforts to share curricular practices, expose the alternative perspectives of historical events, and engage students from different communities have been made with programs such as Shared Education to bridge the gap in historical content, but its effectiveness remains disputed (Emerson, 2018). Anderson argued that language became a principal component of nation-building with the creation of the printing press and its dissemination of information in a uniform language. Select dialects became standardized among the literate population and, through schooling, homogenous (Eriksen, 2001). In Italy, regional dialects vary drastically but the promotion of “high” Italian in education created a sense of linguistic unity among the Italian people (Ascoli, 1937). Discussions about foreign language learning in Northern Ireland are quarrelsome as the Irish language has become politicized. Given the polarity of the education system, Catholic schools encourage the study of Gaeilge whereas the Protestant schools choose to study other foreign languages such as French or Spanish (Collen, 2018). Using Gaeilge as a statutory language in schools, proposed by Sinn Féin, would seem to infringe upon the beliefs of the unionist-affiliated parties (Collen, 2018).

Religious education may also reflect the desired ideology and values of a country but its
integration into the education system is viewed as a tool to drive nationalism. Mussolini used Catholicism to garner support and to implement his fascist ideology in schools (Ascoli, 1937). For decades, a coalition between the Catholic church and the state allowed for religious groups to have some input into education. Though this policy was changed in the ‘80s, Italy still mandates religious education or ethics courses in public schools (Grimaldi & Serpieri, 2012). In Northern Ireland, political divides are interwoven with religious divisions and 93% of students attend schools split into Catholic or Protestant institutions (Gallagher, 2016). Religion often draws parallels to nationalism in its inherent practices of indoctrination; in both Italy and Northern Ireland, it has been pivotal in shaping a desired citizenry within the national education system.

**Consequences of Nationalism in Education**

As a form of indoctrination, the hazards of strong nationalistic tendencies within education are pervasive (Palmer, 1957). Xenophobia is ever-present in the educational realm, perpetuated by classroom instructors and administrative policies alike (Fulponi, 2016). In Italy, rising waves of mass migration and far-right populist parties have called to question the essence of Italian identity, democratic values, and European Union membership (Scotto, 2017). The deep divisions it has created in communities have undoubtedly spilled into educational practices (Global Detention Project, 2019). While Northern Ireland has implemented many cross-community programs such as Shared Education to combat xenophobic perception, one might question whether these strategies are mending the separation between groups or maintaining the image of the “other.” Furthermore, is it possible to truly eradicate the remnants of conflict in an education system that remains divided? The difficulty of providing alternative perspectives is enhanced when course content can legally be distorted by nationalist beliefs. With the impending changes of Brexit, funding for educational and peace-building initiatives to circumvent sectarian violence may be drastically cut (Royal Irish Academy, 2017). In all contexts, a narrow perspective of knowledge may be disseminated to craft a sheltered understanding of the world, amplifying the challenges for students to engage in controversial yet enriching material (Emerson, 2018).

Understanding, perceptions, and reactions to global challenges are profoundly impacted by national identity in education. The mere capacity to unify and divide has been remarkable in Italy and Northern Ireland, but education in these democratic contexts has also granted students the opportunity to express their needs to the state. Young people should be taught to critically analyze ideological beliefs and discover mediums to achieve national reformation. Most importantly, education should be the primary tool, accessible to all persons, to continuously challenge and advance a country. As the fundamental basis for revolutionizing power, education should serve to empower the voices of these young leaders who, in these arduous times, will pave the futures of their respective nations.
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"Their Mother Tongue": How Russia’s Language Policy Gives Voice to Nationalism
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In July of 2017 while visiting the Republic of Mari El, President Vladimir Putin stated that it was “impermissible to force someone to learn a language that is not [his or her] mother tongue, as well as to reduce the hours of Russian-language [classes in schools] in Russia’s ethnic republics” (Meshcheryakov and Coalson). The years following this statement have seen a decrease in the accessibility of minority languages within Russia, with schools encouraged and sometimes forced to cut previously mandatory classes (Lyubimov). Once promoted under the Soviet Union, the study of minority languages has been demoted from its priority status and instead relegated to optional after school programs. While the loss of traditional languages in favor of a more widely spoken common language is a tendency throughout the increasingly globalized world, language is an important part of ethnic identity. The Russian central government’s policy of limiting the study of ethnic languages is part of an ongoing effort by Putin to centralize the administration of the Russian Federation and eliminate the autonomy and influence of ethnic republics and minority groups, which, in turn, encourages nationalist movements within Russia.

Due to Russia’s vast size and diverse composition, the question of minority ethnic rights and minority languages is an important question for the Russian state and people. According to UNESCO’s 2010 Atlas of Endangered Languages, there are approximately 131 languages currently in danger of dying out within the borders of the Russian Federation (Kyzy). However, during the early years of the Soviet Union, ethnic minority languages were promoted under the policy of Korenizatsiya. The Soviets created alphabets for languages that had previously only been spoken and supplied schools where children could learn in their national languages. Done in an effort to correct the wrongs of “great Russian chauvinism,” these policies helped to revitalize national languages but also sparked nationalist movements. As a result of this increase in nationalism, these policies slid to a halt under Stalin, and it was not until the democratization of the 1980s under Gorbachev that allowed for the revival of minority languages (Mukhamedzhanov). This period also saw the revival of nationalist movements within these groups; as scholar Dmitry Gorenburg argues, “the fear of continuing language shift was one of the main mobilizing factors in the nationalist movements that developed in virtually all ethnic regions of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s” (Gorenburg 258). These historical examples demonstrate how language is tied with nationalism. In each of these cases, language served as a rallying point for nationalists, encouraging minorities to rise up to defend their rights and independence.

Language continued to grow along with these nations; during the 1990s, President Boris Yeltsin’s infamous statement that the republics should “take as much sovereignty as [they could] swallow” led to the creation of the many ethnic republics under a system of “asymmetric federalization” (Nizamova 72). This system of organization, pieced together during the political chaos of the 1990s, allowed for the ethnic republics to gain a favored political status. Tatarstan in particular benefitted from this time, with the signing of the Russian-Tatarstan Treaty granting Tatarstan increased autonomy and sovereignty (“On delamination of...”). This treaty also
emphasized the importance of minority languages, an importance reinforced by the monumental revival effort undertaken by the Tatar government to increase the prevalence of Tatar in education, government and media and the naming of Tatar and Russian as the two official languages of the republic (Gorenburg 10). This period of language revitalization demonstrates how the nation builders of Tatarstan used language as a tool to further their cause. By instituting mandatory education in the Tatar language for Tatars and ethnic Russians, developing the presence of Tatar in the media, and requiring that elected officials within the Tatarstan Republic be fluent in both of the nation’s official languages, these nation builders ensured the representation of Tatars within their own republic.

The importance of national languages was also enshrined in the Russian constitution. According to Chapter 2, Article 26, “[e]veryone shall have the right to use his or her native language, to a free choice of the language of communication, upbringing, education and creative work.” The inclusion of this in the constitution, written in 1993, demonstrates the general openness to national languages and the importance of the ethnic republics to the composition of the Russian state. Russia emerged from the 1990s, not as a unified state, but rather as a messy conglomeration of ethnic republics, oblasts, and autonomous regions, united under a weak central government.

However, once Vladimir Putin came to power, all of this began to change; Putin began to consolidate the power of the Russian central government and establish order in the chaotic system left over from the 1990s. He created federal districts with heads appointed by the central government and began systematically reducing the autonomy of these regions (Gontmakher 39). While this effort did help to reestablish order within the Russian state, it also resulted in a loss of the autonomy many of these regions had gained, leading to discontent among those who had championed it.

As part of this effort, Putin also implemented laws to promote the Russian language as a unifying factor within all of Russia. In 2002, the State Duma passed a law requiring that all minority languages be written in the Cyrillic alphabet, shortly after Tatarstan introduced an initiative to use the Latin alphabet for Tatar (Galeev). In his 2017 speech in Mari-El, Putin asserted that mandatory education in minority languages was “impermissible” as it forced Russians to learn a language that was not their mother tongue and took up time that could be dedicated to the study of the Russian language (Meshcheryakov and Coalson). The location of this statement, the ethnic republic of Mari-El, has faced a severe decline in its language program and autonomy since the beginning of the Putin era. Under the control of the Kremlin-backed Leonid Markelov, education in the Mari language was all but eliminated throughout the republic (Lyubimov). As Vasily Pekteyev, director of the Mari National Theater, stated in an interview with Radio Free Europe, without its language education programs, “Mari-El has already ceased to be an ethnic republic in anything but name. We are just another oblast” (Lyubimov). This statement signifies the importance of national language to national identity; this activist argues that without the Mari language to set them apart, the republic has lost its identity and the reason behind its autonomy from the central government. Through the suppression of the Mari language, the central government was able to bring the republic back under its control.
Following this statement, Putin launched a nationwide investigation into the requirements for the study of minority languages, culminating in a law put forth before the Duma in 2018 (“Tatarstan Steps Up...”). The process of this investigation led to protests and court cases on both sides of this issue, as ethnic minorities fought to maintain their autonomy and supporters of the central government argued to change these policies in their favor. In her article, “Ethnic Tatars in Contention for Recognition and Autonomy: Bilingualism and Pluri-Cultural Education Policies in Tatarstan,” scholar Liliya Nizamoya argues that as languages were promoted during the 1990s, in the 2000s, political nationalist movements within the ethnic republics became more willing to cooperate with the central government and less active in the political sphere (Nizamova 71). However, as these policies have been revoked in the past several years, political nationalist sentiments within the republics have increased once again.

As their national languages were threatened many within the ethnic republics took to the streets in support of their languages. On the day of the Tatar Constitution in 2017, protestors marched in Kazan in support of continued mandatory Tatar language classes (“Protesters in Kazan...”). In Bashkortostan, more than 1,000 rallied in support of the Bashkir language in the aftermath of Putin’s statement (“Chuvash, Bashkir Writers...”). These protestors argued that eliminating national languages would lead to widespread discontent as well as weakening the Russian federation, rather than strengthening the union. Such protests were spread throughout the ethnic republics, demonstrating the power of language as a rallying point. While these republics had for the most part operated happily within the Russian system, when their languages were threatened, people rose up to defend them.

Protests were not only on the streets— there was also a significant online campaign. An image, created by activists Radik Musin and Ivan Pivovarov, showing a pair of scissors cutting off the tongue of a Tatar man with the caption “#StopLanguageGenocide” was widely shared as part of a campaign throughout the Russian federation (Yusupova). Another popular motif among protesters are the words of the Avar poet Ramsul Gamzatov:

\[
\textit{May other tongues cure other men,}
\]

\[
\textit{in their particular way.}
\]

\[
\textit{but if tomorrow Avar dies}
\]

\[
\textit{I’d rather die today! (Kyzy)}
\]

This poem, along with the image, have become rallying points for protestors, used across the Russian Federation, in spite of their specific local origin. These campaigns, along with the traditional protests, led to the creation of the official lobby group, “The Democratic Congress of the Peoples of Russia” in 2018. This group, according to one of the founders Ruslan Aisin, a Tatar activist, was founded with the goal of “resisting projects to alter the administrative structure of Russia” (Lyubimov). This statement relates this movement back to autonomist and nationalist sentiments and demonstrates how language policy lead to this change. Although this organization was founded as a result of support for maintaining minority language programs, it
took that support and used it to fuel resistance to any changes in autonomy, arguing to support the autonomy of these republics. While this organization is certainly not purely nationalist, the evolution of the rhetoric of these movements demonstrates how ethnic nationalists use language as a rallying point to gain support.

Additionally, these protests also took on a religious aspect. As part of a united effort in support of their language, mosques throughout Tatarstan led prayers in support of the Tatar language (Galeev). In this instance, religious institutions rose to fill the void of resistance from the elected authorities to this sweeping policy change. However, as scholar Kamil Galeev argues, this can become dangerous, as it leads to the conflation of religion with a particular ethnic identity; in this case, the Tatar ethnic identity’s conflation with Islam could lead to a religious-ethnic nationalism (Galeev). While this is not currently the case in Tatarstan, if the government continues its persecution of the Tatar language it may cause more people to turn to religious organizations in order to defend their culture.

However, in addition to this outcry, there has also been widespread support for this bill and an elimination of mandatory language policies. In 2017, Olga Ziyatdinova, an ethnic Russian living in Tatarstan sued Tatarstan for damages since her son had been forced to learn the Tatar language as part of his education (Meshvherov and Coalson). She argued that dedicating time to learning Tatar had reduced her son’s study of Russian, placing him a disadvantage when compared to the rest of the country and that her son had “one president, Vladimir Putin, one constitution…and one state language and that he doesn’t intend to study any other” (Meshcheryakov and Coalson). While this case may be an extreme instance, it brings to light the sentiments of some parents within the ethnic republics, who argue that learning ethnic minority languages which have no use outside of the borders of their republics, place their children at a disadvantage compared to students in the rest of Russia. These sentiments are those which Vladimir Putin strove to address in his speech and subsequent investigation.

This opposition to ethnic language also took on a less pragmatic and more ethno-nationalist viewpoint. In an open letter sent to the central government by the organizations of ethnic Russians in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Buryatia, activists argue that “[requiring students to learn ethnic languages] is a threat to the security and integrity of Russia” (Lyubimov). This argument has a distinct ethno-nationalistic sense, as it argues that allowing minority groups freedom within the Russian Federation presents a threat to the country as a whole. In contrast to the decrease in minority nationalism during the 1990s noted by Nizamova as minority languages were promoted, the support for Russian ethnic nationalism became stronger during the 1990s and leading into the 2000s (Nizamova 82). These examples demonstrate how the sentiment of “Россия для русских” (Russia for ethnic Russians) has helped to fuel the support for this language bill. In this sense, the language bill provides a platform and a rallying point for these nationalists to press their agenda, bringing this issue once again into the public mind.

All of these protests and debates culminated in the Russian State Duma passing an amendment to the nationwide educational bill in July of 2018 (“Об образовании…”). According to the stipulations of this bill, education in minority languages may not surpass more than two
optional hours a week, requiring written parental consent from the students participating ("Tatar Language Classes Now...")). As a comparison, prior to this bill in Tatarstan, Tatar language classes were a mandatory six hours a week. Additionally, this bill passed with overwhelming support from the Duma members; 86.2% of the deputies voted for the amendment, with only 0.5% voting against and 13.3% voting present ("Об образовании...")). This led to many of the protest members questioning the representation of their interests on a national level (Lyubimov). This seeming lack of representation leads to many of the ethnic republics questioning their status within the Russian Federation.

By cutting these national language education programs, Putin’s central government has severely restricted the autonomy of the ethnic republics. This reduction in linguistic autonomy indicates a further consolidation of power by Putin’s government, reinforced by the fact that this change in language policy also came in the same year the Moscow central government refused to renew the Russia-Tatarstan Treaty. This treaty, outlining the relationship and describing the autonomy and powers granted to Tatarstan, was the last of its kind still in effect from the era of “asymmetric federalization” (Smirnova). By eliminating educational programs for minority languages, the central government reduces the autonomy of its ethnic republics and encourages both Russian and ethnic minority nationalists.

This bill also indicates that a further curtailing of autonomy is likely on the way. Incorporated into Tatarstan’s constitution, the promotion of the Tatar language was one of the main aspects that differentiated Tatarstan from the other republics ("Tatarstan Steps Up..."). Without language to set them apart, many of the ethnic republics fear further elimination of their special status. This fear has led to continuing protests and court cases, up to the present day. In September 2019, a scholar in Udmurtia committed an act of self-immolation in defense of his native Udmurt language ("Russian Scholar Dies..."). Additionally, there is an ongoing court case between Pavel Shmakov, the director of a private school in Tatarstan, and the Russian central government, in which his school was fined for continuing to teach Tatar above the two hour weekly minimum imposed by the amendment ("Kazan Principle Turns..."). In July of 2019, Shmakov appealed the case to the European court of Human Rights, arguing that the new amendment is a violation of ethnic Tatars’ right to an education. Student activists are also speaking out throughout the Russian Federation, including several vocal protesters from Dagestan and the wider Caucasus region (Kyzy). The continuation of these movements indicates that these republics will continue to stand up for the autonomy of their republics. Additionally, while these protests have not taken on a widespread nationalist-separatist agenda, continued elimination of autonomous rights may lead to the creation of such movements in the future.

However, in his effort to consolidate power and restore order to the chaotic system left from the 1990s, Putin has opened the door to Russian ethnic nationalist movements. By promoting the Russian language over all other languages within the republic, the government has furthered the agenda of a “Russification” of the country. While a unifying language is vital, especially in an increasingly globalized world, Russian ethnic nationalist movements have rallied around this change in language policy, viewing it as support for their agenda.
The debate over language has brought questions of autonomy and nationalism to the forefront of the minds of citizens throughout the Russian Federation. Throughout Russia’s history, language and nationalism have always been tied closely together, from the policies of the Soviet era to modern day autonomous republics. As President Vladimir Putin has restored order to the Russian system, he has used language policy as a tool to further limit the autonomy of the autonomous regions. However, this suppression of ethnic languages has led to demonstrations on both sides of the movement and served as a rallying point for Russian and minority ethnic nationalists. In an increasingly globalized world where the extinction of languages is common, the study of minority languages may not appear to be a vital point, but language remains an important marker of the autonomy enjoyed by these ethnic regions, an autonomy that, as it continues to be threatened, nationalists will rise up to defend.
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GENDER AND SEXUALITY
A Woman’s Place: Anna Karenina in the Context of the ‘Woman Question’ as Compared to Literature Outside of Russia
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The topic of women as portrayed in media is a point of wide discussion; a large number of works have been criticized for having archetypical, one-dimensional women characters, even in more recent works. Literature is no exception to this; the most iconic literary characters are often men, with many authors treating their women as little more than an afterthought or a means to further their plot. Few novels in nineteenth-century literature portray women with the care and delicacy that Tolstoy portrays his female characters with, including not only Anna herself but Kitty and Dolly as well. While Anna Karenina is far from the epitome of feminist literature, it makes for an interesting case study on the position of women in nineteenth-century Russia. The novel serves as something of a historical lesson on women’s issues of the time period— Anna and Vronsky argue about the propriety of women’s education, Kitty frets over her dwindling opportunities as an unmarried woman after she is rejected, and Dolly is horrified to discover that Anna is using birth control so as to enjoy her relationship without risk. At the same time, as unique and thorough as Tolstoy’s work is in its portrayal of women, his writing betrays a misogynistic streak; compared to the men of the story, the women are often shown to be overly emotional even to the point of foolishness, and Anna is not allowed the kind and sympathetic conclusion given to her male counterpart Levin. Despite the work’s faults, however, the novel is still a thorough discussion of the “woman question,” or the debate surrounding women’s rights and roles in society at the time. Additionally, it is useful to compare and contrast Anna Karenina to other works across traditions and times to see varying perspectives on the woman question; while Anna takes a uniquely Russian approach, certain aspects of the discussion surrounding women remain constant across varying works. Thus, it is important in understanding the role of women in society to examine Anna Karenina in the context of the woman question both by itself as a reflection of the time period in Russia, in which Tolstoy explores relevant conflicts and emotions within the female cast as fears and pressures are imposed on them by society, and by examining other works that offer in-depth looks at women, including Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter for a more American perspective, and Hosseini’s A Thousand Splendid Suns for a more modern discussion.

Perhaps one of the most telling instances of the woman question as addressed by Tolstoy is near the end of the novel, mere chapters before Anna makes the decision to end her own life. As Anna is reflecting on what has caused her relationship with Vronsky to sour, the text reads, “It had all begun by [Vronsky’s] laughing at High School for girls, which he considered unnecessary… He spoke disrespectfully of the education of women in general, and said that Hannah, her little English protégée, did not at all need to know physics”; furthermore, she reads Vronsky’s attack on women’s education as an attack on her own self-education (Tolstoy 670). Here the audience is offered a glimpse of the debate surrounding one aspect of the woman question. Additionally, in previous chapters, Anna is shown as educating herself through constant reading (Tolstoy 583). Unlike fellow author Fyodor Dostoyevsky, who also introduced commentary on the woman question in his works by portraying the struggles of lower-class women (e.g. Sonya in Crime and Punishment), Tolstoy approaches the issue of the woman question in respect to wealthy, upper-class women, including Anna. Unable to officially pursue higher education herself, she uses the knowledge that she has gained to tutor the English girl,
Hannah. Indeed, it seems that a position in teaching children is one of the only societal roles available to an upper-class woman such as herself. Unlike Dostoyevsky’s downtrodden Sonya, it is impractical and even more scornful for Anna to turn to prostitution, though she is also unable to advance to respectable positions in society held by her male counterparts. Of course, she flirts with other hobbies as well; Oblonsky briefly mentions that she is writing a children’s book and that she is splendid at it (Tolstoy 629), though this pursuit is only mentioned in passing and thus is again portrayed as something of little importance. Ultimately, these seemingly unimportant endeavors are all that Anna is able to occupy herself with; as intelligent and talented as she may be, she is unable to assume better positions in society, showing how truly trapped an upper-class woman such as herself was at the time. Certainly, it is not that Anna is untalented but, rather, that societal boundaries are keeping her options severely limited. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, she is even mocked by her own husband for her beliefs in women’s education and dismissed for her attempts at developing herself.

That said, it is remarkable that a character such as Anna even exists. Anna sweeps away not only Vronsky, Levin, and countless other men but also the audience themselves. She is portrayed in such a manner that, from the moment she is introduced, she draws in others with her charms. When Vronsky first sees her, the text reads, “...[he] felt compelled to have another look at her, not because she was very beautiful … but because he saw in her sweet face as she passed him something specially tender and kind” (Tolstoy 56). The novel time and time again shows how limited women of the time period were in their career choices and how dependent they were on men for financial and social stability. Anna is a remarkable demonstration of the progress made thus far; she has many talents, has proven herself very intelligent and charming, and is so enigmatic that the numerous artists of the novel cannot truly capture her beauty. In this sense, when examining the novel in the context of the woman question, it is important to mention the complexity of Anna’s character and the thoughtfulness of Tolstoy’s characterization, as she is an excellent example of how women were hindered by society yet still managed to be remarkable individuals.

Yet another prominent example of the woman question as addressed by Tolstoy is shown through Kitty. Even as early as Part II, the audience sees fear begin to take form in Kitty as she falls ill after rejecting Levin and being spurned by Vronsky; when talking with her, Dolly notes that “Kitty’s grief, her hopeless grief, was really caused by the fact that Levin had proposed to her and that she had rejected him, and now... Vronsky had deceived her” (Tolstoy 114). Kitty’s reaction is not merely that of a heartbroken teenage girl’s; her fear is very much real and something serious. It is explored further at Oblonsky’s dinner party in Part VI. When she and Levin separate themselves from the others and begin to converse, Levin thinks, “he saw in Kitty’s heart fear of the humiliation of being an old maid” (Tolstoy 361). Kitty’s struggles are yet another telling example of the position of women at the time. Like Anna, she is severely limited in her options, though also has to contend with being an unmarried woman. While initially this seems like a harmless option and nothing to frown upon, Kitty’s fearful attitude towards such an end reveals that it was far from ideal at the time. Whereas Anna’s struggles are in part used to show how limited women were in terms of working, through Kitty it is shown how unfortunately tied women were to men; that is, Kitty faces deep shame if she does not find a man to marry and raise a family with. When Levin proposes to Kitty a second time and the two wed, Kitty becomes much happier; she quickly becomes motherly and more mature. Of course,
this can be attributed to the joy of being in love and preparing to raise a family, though it is also undoubtedly in part due to the fact that she no longer has to worry about being bound to her family home.

Like Kitty, Dolly is used to show how women were so bound to men at the time. The novel’s opening scene shows how livid Dolly is with her husband, and yet she manages to forgive him thanks to Anna. Though this is likely at least partially due to her own goodness, Tolstoy reveals that there is also a sense of duty in her actions. She does not leave Oblonsky because “she felt that here, in her own home, it was all she could do to look after her five children properly” (Tolstoy 9). Much later in the novel, Kitty notes that “Dolly was in despair; she hated her husband, despised him, pitied him, made up her mind to divorce him and to refuse [to sell her estate]; but ended by consenting…” (711). Whereas Kitty’s fears are based around being condemned to becoming a family maid without the social security of a husband, Dolly’s turmoil is based around the fact that she simply cannot leave her husband. Though Oblonsky has been unfaithful to her many times and has caused their family financial ruin, she is bound to him so as to avoid tearing their family apart (that is, for the sake of the children) and to not compromise her social position. A frequent point of discussion in the novel, after all, is how difficult it is to obtain a divorce and simply how distasteful it causes the divorcees to look; not to mention, of course, that, after seeing the struggles that Anna has gone through, she would not be inclined to follow after her friend, and so she remains socially and emotionally immobilized.

That said, like Anna, Dolly and her struggles are portrayed with remarkable consideration. Perhaps the most distinctive example of this is when Dolly travels to Vronsky’s estate to visit Anna, and the audience is given a glimpse of her worries and self-deprecation. Reflecting on her life and current situation, she thinks, “And what is it all for? What will come of it all? I myself, without having a moment’s peace, …tormenting myself and others…” (Tolstoy 550). She also continually compares herself to Anna and feels inferior next to her (555). Tolstoy portrays Dolly in a deeply sympathetic light in these scenes. The fact that he allows her to express the pains and sufferings of aging and of motherhood, not simply the joy of raising a family, and the misfortunes of an unappreciative husband is especially remarkable; it is not often that women are allowed to express such thoughts in literature of this time period. This poignant yet rather honest portrayal of Dolly again, like with Kitty, shows how she is unfortunately reliant on a man for security in society. She is unable to leave her husband despite her sufferings; though it is true that she threatens to divorce Oblonsky again, it can only be assumed that she stays with him out of duty and due to the impossibility of soundly achieving a divorce without a bitter aftermath.

Aside from the complex, well-developed characterizations of the female characters in the novel, certain other aspects of the woman question are addressed in passing throughout Anna Karenina as well. Namely, women’s sexual freedom and the usage of birth control were also under debate at the time. One notable example of these issues in the novel is when Dolly visits Anna on Vronsky’s estate, and Anna reveals that she has been using birth control; Dolly had insisted that Anna obtain a divorce for her future children’s sake, though Anna says that there is no need for that because of said birth control (Tolstoy 577). Following this revelation, Tolstoy writes, “It was the very thing [Dolly] had dreamt of, but now on learning that it was possible, she was horrified” (577). It is here where Tolstoy’s commentary on the woman question becomes less sympathetic. Notably, this episode is in the same part of the novel where Tolstoy fails to
remain impartial towards Anna and criticizes her for being so uninvolved in her daughter Annie’s life (561); Tolstoy yet again imposes his judgement on Anna’s newfound sexual freedom as she is made out to be almost selfish, with her main reason for using birth control being that she simply does not want more children (577). This scene, then, is useful in examining the controversy surrounding birth control at the time, as well as showing the increasing insistence on sexual freedom by women. While certainly met with opposition, the issue of sexual freedom and birth control being addressed is a remarkable example of progression in a discussion relevant to the time period that would previously have been unthinkable. It shows Anna’s sexual liberation, though it is in a negative light (through Dolly’s horror), thus helping to further understand the views surrounding these particular aspects of the woman question at the time.

It is worth mentioning that, while the perception of women was in the midst of major improvement at the time of the novel’s writing and that Anna herself is an excellent example of how women in literature were beginning to be allowed to be as complex, as flawed, and as perfectly appealing as their male counterparts without being continually and explicitly condemned by the author, the differing endings between Anna Karenina’s two protagonists reveal that Tolstoy is still susceptible to the simplistic view of the woman question that was prevalent in his lifetime. In this sense, it is important to mention Tolstoy’s shortcomings when examining the novel in the context of the woman question. Specifically, Levin is allowed to be happily married, to have a child whom he comes to love, and to experience spiritual enlightenment that brings him peace in life; though he contemplates suicide (Tolstoy 714), he does not decide to end his own life, and he instead finds new purpose in his unique spirituality. Anna is not granted such a peaceful conclusion; for a character who, throughout most of the novel, has been so complex, so enigmatic and lovely, Anna, in her final days, is reduced to the trope of a hysterical, possessive woman before tragically throwing herself under a train (694). Even the other women of the story, particularly Kitty, who feels “a hostility towards this bad woman” (686), and Vronsky’s mother, who claims that she deserved her end (704), are harsh and unforgiving towards her. Certainly, Anna meeting such an end reinforces the tragedy of the story, but did it truly have to end this way? Why, for example, was it not Vronsky who ended his life after a strenuous relationship with Anna? Why did Tolstoy abandon Anna’s complexity to reduce her to the stereotypical hysterical woman and grant her a gruesome death? Certainly, Anna trying to cope with the tragedy while lacking support in a society that has shunned her could be equally as tragic as the untimely end that Tolstoy gave her. Or, even, why did Tolstoy not take the opportunity to explore in depth the notion that it was society who killed Anna for shunning her so? Dr. Gary Saul Morson notes that “[Anna] loves not wisely but too well, and her tragedy results from the impossibility of transcending a culture of lies” (57). While Tolstoy indicates that the society that condemned Anna is not faultless, the narration’s impartiality often falls apart, such as with Anna’s death, the embittered reactions to it, and the vivid comparisons of her affair to murder (Knapp 64), leaving the reader to wonder if it is truly their decision alone to pass judgement on her.

Another shift in Tolstoy’s portrayal with women at the end of the novel is with Kitty. For all her empathy and intelligence, especially when caring for a dying Nikolai, she is reduced to a somewhat incompetent housewife, with Levin harshly reproaching her for being carelessly caught in a storm with their son (Tolstoy 735). This pattern is present in Tolstoy’s other works as
well; *War and Peace*’s Natasha spends so much of the novel being lively and vibrant, only to become Pierre’s quiet housewife who has notably lost her “spark.” Of course, these writing decisions may have been simply what Tolstoy felt was right, or they may have been due only to chance, though it is easy to connect Tolstoy’s narrative shortcomings in terms of his portrayals of Anna with the shortcomings in terms of how women were perceived at the time, despite all of the progress being made. In this sense, it is impossible to ignore the role of the woman question when discussing the endings of the respective protagonists in the novel.

Tolstoy’s *Anna Karenina*, however, is far from the only novel to address women’s place in society. Lisa Knapp writes that *The Scarlet Letter*’s Hester is “[Anna’s] American cousin” (54), and, indeed, the two works and their female protagonists bear many similarities. Hester, too, is a misfortunate woman ruined by a society that is far from sinless yet chooses to cast judgement regardless. One can see in her a mental strain similar to what Anna went through in her final days as those around her pass their burning judgement; while at the scaffold, “under the leaden infliction which it was her doom to endure, she felt, at moments, as if she must shriek out with the full power of her lungs, and cast herself from the scaffold down upon the ground, or else go mad at once” (Hawthorne 18). Both this scene and the moments before Anna throws herself in front of a train are harrowing reminders of how society was (and, truthfully, still is) quick to dehumanize women for their sins despite following a doctrine that preaches forgiveness, and the devastating consequences of this dehumanization— isolation leading to a fragile, almost maddened mental state and, in Anna’s case, even death. Knapp also notes that *The Scarlet Letter* and *Anna Karenina* both recall scenes from Hester’s and Anna’s more innocent youthhoods, adding onto the tragedy of their stories. The recollections remind the audience of times in the protagonists’ lives when their sins did not cast tremendous weight on them, indicating a point of no return regardless of how much they may yearn to return to their younger selves (65).

Furthermore, both novels appear to put their male characters on pedestals while leaving their heroines behind to pick up the pieces of their shattered lives; in other words, “Hawthorne and Tolstoy… suggest the penitence of the adulteress, but only in cursory terms, so that the women’s plots lack the male heroes’ more complete returns to the bosom of God” (Knapp 80). While Hester lives out the rest of her life withstanding the burden of the titular scarlet letter, Dimmesdale is granted a death almost divine in nature, allowing him to impart saintly wisdom in his final moments (Hawthorne 202), bearing a parallel to Levin’s lifechanging philosophical and spiritual revelations at the end of *Anna Karenina*. The heroines are granted no such opportunity, being left to the mercy of God.

While the two works bear parallels as adultery novels, they also diverge in numerous ways, especially in how their female protagonists are portrayed. Notably, as mentioned throughout the paper, Anna, through most of the novel, is a remarkable example of women in literature. She is arguably the most dynamic character in the novel, not reduced to any of the flat, one-dimensional personalities so often seen in women characters; she is neither a motherly saint nor a vile, irredeemable adulteress, and it is this complexity that makes her so compelling. Her death is so tragic and moving precisely because she is so well-written. Like Kitty and Vronsky and many others, the audience too falls in love with Anna, and her mental deterioration and subsequent suicide are a blow to the reader. Hester’s portrayal, on the other hand, while true to Hawthorne’s values, feels much more stereotypically feminine. Unlike Anna who so often shamelessly holds her head high in the face of judgement, living her lavish life and maintaining
her enigmatic, alluring personality for most of the novel, Hester, as Knapp puts it, “lives out the remainder of her life sadly and selflessly, comforting others” (Knapp 54). While Hawthorne does importantly criticize the hypocritical Puritan society that so ruthlessly condemns Hester, the difference between the heroines is apparent. While Tolstoy, for most of his novel, gives a bold presentation of his protagonist, Hawthorne fails to have Hester break the mold of traditional Christian womanhood; Pearl, too, in the end, finds happiness as a good wife and mother. While *The Scarlet Letter* performs its job of exposing the hypocrisy of how women were—and continue to be—perceived and treated versus men, it ultimately takes a more traditional approach to femininity and motherhood, whereas Tolstoy does not hesitate to shy away from its “uglier” side, as with Anna and even Dolly.

Another important divergence between the two novels is how they impart their teachings, and it is here where they reflect their cultures especially noticeably. *The Scarlet Letter* is critical of the Puritans and their approach to Christianity; Hawthorne encourages readers to question the Puritans’ religious foundation and realize how wrong their condemnation is. Hester finds peace not through the teachings of the Puritans who so strongly judged her but through reflection and solitude, practicing a more compassionate Christianity through the end of her life, a reformation from both the humiliation that her punishment brought and the realization of the hypocrisy of her fellow townspeople. This notion of “defying the system” and the emphasis on individualism are very American in nature. Tolstoy, however, puts less emphasis on a religious doctrine and more emphasis on the connection to the natural world, more with Levin’s story than Anna’s. Tolstoy’s unique approach to spirituality is shown through Levin’s closeness to the land, when he enters a trancelike state while mowing his land, and at the end of the novel when he stares up at the night sky and a revelation strikes him. Levin’s faith is best described in the quote, “To me personally, to my heart, has indubitably revealed a knowledge unattainable by reasoning, and I obstinately wish to express that knowledge by reason and in words” (Tolstoy 739). In other words, Tolstoy’s wisdom is something innate but inexplicable, something that can be understood in the heart but cannot be described with words. This deeply philosophical take is expressly Russian in nature—connections to the natural world are emphasized again and again in nineteenth-century Russian literature, and it is this separation from nature that brings about ruin as with Anna. The novel is in a unique time period for Russia, where its technology (or lack thereof), philosophies, and societal structure distinguished it from the rest of Europe. Rather than *The Scarlet Letter*’s focus on reformation and critical examination of the often-hypocritical behavior of others, *Anna Karenina* takes a look at the “bigger picture,” so to speak, and emphasizes the connections not only between others but the world itself.

As a final note, it is also worth examining the portrayal of women in a more modern work to see if methods for differentiating women characters used by Tolstoy are present in a contemporary novel. Khaled Hosseini’s *A Thousand Splendid Suns* is a particularly remarkable example of women in literature. It is an emotional, moving novel about two women, Laila and Mariam, one younger and one older, wed to the same man as they navigate both womanhood and motherhood. Like *Anna Karenina*, *A Thousand Splendid Suns* is not afraid to shy away from the agonies that these bring. “[E]ach snowflake was a sigh heaved by an aggrieved woman somewhere in the world… *As a reminder of how women like us suffer*, she’d said. *How quietly we endure all that falls upon us*” (Hosseini 91, italics in original). *A Thousand Splendid Suns* is even more in-depth about the treatment and position of women in society through harrowing and
often gruesome writing; it shows exactly how heartbreaking being a woman can be, and, indeed, shows the many of the nuances used by Tolstoy in *Anna Karenina* and improves upon them. It is even more open, more honest, while still harking back to Tolstoy’s delicately painted portraits of his women characters and early musings about the unfavorable, oft-ignored sides of both womanhood and motherhood. Anna set a remarkable precedent in literature that still continues to be improved upon today.

Why, though, examine these novels with such a perspective? Why place such importance on the female leads, when the authors themselves provided storylines for their male counterparts as well? In *Anna Karenina* in particular, examining the novel in the context of the woman question is crucial to not only understanding the plot as a whole but also understanding why some of the novel’s most important characters act in the manner that they do. Without understanding how women were so closely tied to men socially and financially, the audience would not as easily understand Kitty’s fears or Dolly’s obligation; the audience would not as easily understand why Anna proceeds in her affair so readily without first divorcing Karenin, and so on. Examining the novel in the context of the woman question even allows the reader to critically examine Tolstoy’s creative decisions, particularly by comparing and contrasting the novel’s two protagonists and how starkly different the two conclusions to their own stories are, despite the similarities in their own internal struggles as they pursue happiness and meaning. Likewise, this feminist perspective can be applied to Hester’s treatment in *The Scarlet Letter* and for understanding why *A Thousand Splendid Suns* is still so impactful and relevant as contemporary literature. Even today the woman question remains relevant, in the form of the modern feminist movement; still women are struggling to be recognized as equal to their male peers, still their social roles in many countries across the world are uncertain and heavily debated even to this day. Examining these works in the context of the woman question allows readers to fully understand not only how far women have come in their progress now but also how wonderful it is that these female characters manage to be so charming and lively despite all that they face. These works would be nothing without their female cast, and thus understanding everything about them and the struggles that they face is essential. While the portrayal of women in media still often falls short, literature from *Anna Karenina* to *A Thousand Splendid Suns* shows that compelling stories and well-written characters are not only reserved for men.
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An Independent Woman in Putin’s Russia: Elvira Nabiullina in Political Context  
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Amid the increasing consolidation of power in modern Russia beneath President Vladimir Putin, one might expect Russia’s Central Bank (Bank Rossii) to be as subordinated to the “vertical of power” and dependent on elite interests as other key governmental organs. However, this appears not to be the case. In words and actions, Bank Rossii’s Governor—Elvira Nabiullina—has publicly stood up to social and governmental elites. She appears to decide Russian monetary policy and banking regulation with significant independence, based on principles of economics rather than short-term political interest. This paper investigates certain political and economic factors which likely contribute to Ms. Nabiullina’s policy-making autonomy: Nabiullina’s history of working with Putin, in view of which he likely trusts her; Nabiullina’s self-presentation as a professional and non-competitor for political power, which assuages potential elite fears of challenge by her while also fitting into an expected type of governmental power-holder; and Nabiullina’s substantial competence in conducting central bank policy for Russia, which contributes to long-term stability and better growth prospects that make opposing the regime less appealing, helping Russia—and those in power—survive. Nabiullina’s autonomy raises important questions about independent policymaking’s role and prospects in semi-authoritarian systems, and the relative importance of competence, political noninvolvement, and personal connections in allowing a professional some independence.

I draw on video and media analysis, macroeconomic data (especially on the state of the banking system and the 2014-5 exchange rate crisis), numerous news articles, and experts’ insights. The vast majority of my sources are in Russian; all translations are my own.

Note: Readers desiring additional background on monetary policy and central banking may refer to the addendum at the end of the paper.
Introduction

In early March 2013, very close to a deadline for doing so, Vladimir Putin announced his nomination for Governor of Bank Rossii, Russia’s central bank (Dmitrienko 2013 (Vedomosti)). According to journalist Sergei Kozlovsky (2013 (Lenta.ru)), “the president promised an ‘unexpected’ candidacy,” which Putin said “will please you.”¹ The nominee, Elvira Nabiullina, fulfilled at least part of this promise. Per Nikolai Vardulh’s article in Moscow Komsomol-member (2013), the media had expected one of five main candidates, a list including neither Ms. Nabiullina, nor any other women. In view of Putin’s increasing consolidation of power in modern Russia, questions about Ms. Nabiullina’s independence as governor (and her gender (NTV 2013), since the only previous female head of Russia’s central bank served in an acting capacity for a short time in the 1990s)² arose immediately after her nomination. This paper addresses the question of independence, and key political factors likely influencing Ms. Nabiullina’s extent of autonomy. I hypothesize that politicians do not interfere in Ms. Nabiullina’s actions for the following principal reasons: (1) Putin likely trusts her, due to significant professional history between them; (2) Nabiullina presents herself as a recognizably powerful professional, but not a competitor for political power (thus not a political threat to elites); and (3) as a competent central banker, Nabiullina promotes Russia’ economic stability and growth, which is important for both the country and regime.

A Few Illustrations of Nabiullina’s Independence

This paper’s first task is analyzing the extent of Nabiullina’s real independence. Here we restrict ourselves to a few key examples: visibly prioritizing monetary policy over the President’s wishes (2014-5), shutting down a bank closely tied to powerful figures including Putin (2017), and publicly sparring with other government officials and even harshly criticizing the entire government, without visible penalty (two 2019 examples).

On December 16, 2014, Nabiullina resolved to sharply raise interest rates from the level Bank Rossii had announced merely five days prior-- 10.5% per annum--to 17% (Bank Rossii, “Decisions on the key interest rate”). In a central banking context, where quarter- or half- point adjustments are common and policy often changes once every three months or less frequently, this change was shockingly rapid and large. Within two days, the state-backed Russian media outlet RIA News asked the President for comment. He noted that “it’s the Central Bank’s business whether to lower [interest rates] or not lower them.” While Putin acknowledges that interest rate policy is not his purview, his choice of words (“lower or not lower” rather than a more neutral presentation of alternatives) clearly reveals a preference that Nabiullina lower rates. In this interview, Putin also said he would appreciate it if the Central Bank would move “a half step faster” (RIA News 18 Dec 2014). This quotation suggests that Putin desired Nabiullina reverse course at least as rapidly as she had changed policy a few days earlier, but his wish went notably unfulfilled: Bank Rossii lowered rates relatively gradually, returning to the level of

¹ He had used similar terminology when asked about a presidential candidate for 2012.
² Tatiana Paramonova, biography on Radio Ekho Moskvý’s Ekho Reyting blog.
10.5% on June 10, 2016, more than 1.5 years after the President’s statements\(^3\) (“Decisions on the key interest rate”). This delay suggests that Nabiullina lowered rates due to changing economic circumstances (the same broad reasons she had raised them), not pressure from Putin. Perhaps Putin can easily say that interest rates are “the Central Bank’s business,” but here his and Nabiullina’s behavior supports these words: the central banker lowers rates when the macroeconomy seems ready while the President endures rate levels higher than he would like.

Later in Nabiullina’s first term (July 2017), she revoked the license of a bank called Yugra, criticizing the bank for weakness, improper use of depositors’ funds (specifically, misdirection into private projects of the bank’s owner and his comrades), and attempts to transfer the bank’s risks to the government (quoted by RAPSI 14 Sep. 2017). However, Yugra and its owner had connections to many powerful people: the bank sponsored a hockey club in which Putin and other important Russians periodically played (Ivanova 2017 (Vedomosti)), while the owner’s and his family’s connections included a former speaker of Russia’s federal parliament and a previous head of the FSB (Gruzinova and Vasil’ev 2016 (Vedomosti)). While the hockey league could survive without Yugra, losing a sponsor undeniably complicates one’s situation. One would expect oligarchs—whether hockey lovers or friends of the family—to intervene, causing Bank Rossii to cancel the revocation. Yugra’s head certainly gave his friends every opportunity, denouncing the revocation of license as “unconstitutional” and suing Nabiullina all the way to the High Court in Moscow. However, despite all of his connections, it seems no one successfully intervened on behalf of Yugra’s owner: the courts agreed with the Central Bank, which was still seeking to recover funds from Yugra’s debtors as of late 2019 (RAPSI 2019; Banki.ru 2019; Litova 2019 (Vedomosti)). Yugra’s owner was even placed under house arrest, having reportedly stolen 7.5 million rubles from his financial organization (Gazeta.ru Apr 19 2019). Here Russia behaved like a country honestly fighting corruption, with the central bank making decisions for itself and defending them in court.

We now address Nabiullina’s ability to criticize those in power. In 2019, she began a public fight with Russia’s Minister of Economic Development (among her former positions) about the risks of credit growth, as well as the projected growth rates for consumer credit and inflation (Ageeva and Demchenko 2019 (RBK)). Nabiullina characterized the Ministry of Economic Development’s forecast for 3% 2020 inflation (lowered from previous Ministry projections of 3.8%) and slower consumer credit growth (4%, according to the Ministry) as unrealistic, estimating that consumer lending would grow closer to 10%. (Russian consumer credit in 2018 grew a record 22.8% (Kozlovsky 2019 (BBC))). Many analysts, including the Minister of Economic Development, fear a bubble in the Russian consumer-credit market due to its immense growth; Nabiullina emphasizes that low-income Russians “are forced to take” loans “for the support of their standard of living, which is an economic problem” (Interfax 2019). Nabiullina does not expect a crisis, likely in part since she is implementing new regulations to prevent one (see e.g. Kazarnovsky 2019 (RBK)).

\(^3\) 10.5% itself represented a significant rate hike from earlier in December 2014.
Nabiullina is not restricted to technical arguments with single members of the administration—she can also broadly and publicly critique Russia’s government. Filipp Sterkin (2019 (Vedomosti)) quotes Nabiullina as saying that those in power “again find themselves in the trap of searching for simple resolutions” and bring this search to the Central Bank. Nabiullina emphasized the severity of “structural problems,” among which Sterkin names “rights-defending organs [e.g. police] … against whom one must defend” and “courts, which judge… in dependence on [socio-economic power; cf. independent from].” Nabiullina said that “words about structural reforms ‘sometimes resemble a shout of despair,’” criticizing structural problems in Russia and accusing the government of lacking any thought-out strategy for development. Strong critique of the authorities can be dangerous in Russia. The number of reporters killed for their work provides one illustration of such dangers. In Russia, 28 journalists were killed between 2000 and 2019. In the same period, 9 journalists were killed in the US, which had 2.5x Russia’s population in 2017 (CPJ data on journalists killed due to their work; World Bank/Eurostat population data). Elvira Nabiullina is alive, uncensured, and serving her second term. She spoke out about problems which struck her as severe, like the head of an independent agency in a democratic country—and continued her career unharmed in Putin’s Russia.

Clearly, Nabiullina has significant freedom to comment on policies affecting the economy, take actions against well-connected people, and implement measures which those in power may not like, which both demonstrates a notable amount of independence from other authorities and Russian elites, and presents a more democratic image of Russia to outside observers. Additionally, one way that Nabiullina helps Russia’s economic prospects is already apparent: her visible independence and ability to freely denounce and combat corruption make Russia appear a more earnest and free country, reassuring international investors especially that their money would be safe in Russia—at least, safer than they may have anticipated. Nabiullina can somewhat curb fears about Russian extralegal crackdowns, quasi-authoritarianism, and rampant corruption. However, that is certainly not sufficient political justification for shutting down friends of the FSB. The following sections explore political and economic factors which more significantly contribute to Nabiullina’s independence.

Nabiullina and Putin’s History of Professional Relations

Nabiullina and Putin have a long history of professional cooperation. In 1999, Nabiullina became vice-president of the fund of a think tank which Putin had founded that year, the Center for Strategic Research (TsSR) (Milyukova 2018 (BBC)). That is, she supported an initiative of his near the beginning of his federal political career, before he had amassed so much power. Between 2000 and 2005, Nabiullina continued to support Putin, working at TsSR and the Ministry of Economic Development in Putin’s first government (as a vice-minister). In 2007, she herself became Minister of Economic Development, serving in that capacity until 2012, when Putin asked her to become his official assistant. Holding progressively more important positions in Putin’s governments, Nabiullina must have worked increasingly closely with the President. Her roles as minister and Presidential assistant would be especially conducive to building Putin’s trust of her. Sergei Guriev, a Russian expatriate economist and social commentator, thinks it likely that Nabiullina does have Putin’s trust as Central Bank governor (interview, 2019).
Nabiullina was sufficiently close to Putin that, after her nomination, some Russian and Western media worried she might change policy at his direction (e.g. Kozlovsky 2013 (Lenta.ru)). This seems not to have happened, but the worries’ existence supports the idea of a personal bond between Putin and Nabiullina.

**Nabiullina’s Apolitical Image**

Since Nabiullina does not present herself as a politician, nor involve herself in politics beyond monitoring how it might affect the Russian economy, her power likely does not strike Russian politicians and influence-brokers as a possible threat. When giving an interview, Nabiullina typically speaks somewhat softly, with some verbal filler and clear sureness of herself. She uses gesture sparingly to accentuate her points and sometimes acts as though interviews are not entirely comfortable for her (though she always conducts herself very calmly). (See e.g. interviews with Posner (2014), Russia 24 (pub. 2019), and CNBC (2019).) This description of Nabiullina’s behavior would also apply well to Putin’s typical self-presentation in interviews: the image of a “professional,” not wholly accustomed to media attention, should be familiar to Russia’s modern elite class. Not all in powerful positions conduct themselves thusly. For example, Valentina Matvienko, leader of the Federation Council (a nominally potent position), behaves like a TV news anchor in interviews: she responds without pauses, verbal filler, or gestures, presenting a more media-savvy variant of professionalism (e.g. interview with Russia 24 (pub. 2016)). This media-savvy image raises more immediate questions about an agent’s ability to manipulate media and public opinion than Nabiullina’s self-presentation as an “uncomfortable” professional.

Russian elites have several reasons to view Nabiullina’s apolitical professionalism less skeptically than Putin’s facially-similar brand. One of these is Nabiullina’s complete lack of a personality cult or media-star presence, which would give her a politically-competitive platform among the general public. My searching of headlines on RIA News (Nov. 27 2019) revealed key differences between Nabiullina and prominent Russian women politicians. Articles about Ksenia Sobchak, Irina Hakamada, and Maria Zakharova sometimes focused near-exclusively on their personal lives⁴ and a recently-published article on Natalya Poklonskaya mainly concerned her opinion on a pop singer, though it had some political relevance. Contrastingly, all articles about Nabiullina related to her official duties as Governor of Bank Rossii—policymaking, economic prognoses, or discussion of economic data. In interviews, Nabiullina also always speaks in her professional capacity. When journalist Vladimir Posner gave her biographical background in a 2014 interview, she contributed only by correcting the record—clarifying that she had not been a gold medalist in school after Posner said she had. Nabiullina keeps her private life private and her personality or ambitions (aside from hitting her inflation target) do not appear in media, curtailing any potential for personality-cult formation.

⁴ Often, concerning Sobchak; example headlines about Zakharova and Hakamada: “Zakharova said that she doesn’t discuss her poems with [Foreign Minister] Lavrov” (Nov 18 2019); “Irina Hakamada—on extreme relaxation, Russian cuisine, and the energy of Baikal” (Sep 27 2018—Hakamada is not often covered).
Comparing the quantity of views on articles about these prominent women also presents revealing differences. Unsurprisingly, articles about Sobchak and Poklonskaya—controversial and scandal-prone figures—often had tens or hundreds of thousands of views. Articles with Zakharova’s name in the headline varied greatly in popularity by this proxy metric; for example, three articles featuring her on November 21 2019 had respectively 671, 45715, and 2716 views. Usually, articles featuring Nabiullina’s name in the headline—all about the economy and central-bank policy—had less than 2000 views (often a few hundred), but a single article about a very important decision could garner 30-40 thousand views. These numbers illustrate that Nabiullina is a known figure, but ordinary Russians do not typically think or read about her as often as about, say, Poklonskaya. Importance of central bank news, rather than Nabiullina’s name, propels its popularity; she does not have an intrinsic media-star megaphone of the sort Poklonskaya and Sobchak do, making her less threatening politically—she personally could not command public attention and use public opinion as others can.

Nabiullina also has a record of broadly respecting the ideological priorities of those in power and not involving herself in politics. In Soviet times, she was a member of the Communist Party who published her dissertation in a volume entitled *Alienation of Work: History and Contemporaneity* (a thoroughly Marxist title) (Kyzminov, Nabiullina, Radaev and Subbotina, 1989), fitting in to the political culture of the time. However, when Russia transitioned to a market economy in the 1990s, Nabiullina became chief specialist on the committee “on questions of economic reform”, continuing to work on market reforms throughout the ‘90s and later becoming a member of the new ruling party, United Russia. In this history, we see that Nabiullina continued to work in the same area through very different ideologies, affording ruling parties basic respect while technocratically continuing her duties. This behavioral record could further reassure socio-politically powerful Russians that she is a professional without covert political ambitions.

**Nabiullina’s High Competency**

Elvira Nabiullina had significant achievements during her first term as Bank Rossii’s governor, enhancing oversight of Russia’s banking system and—amid a crisis—successfully transitioning the country’s monetary policy regime to one more aligned with developed countries. Before Nabiullina assumed governorship, Bank Rossii often influenced Russian exchange rates and did not operate a specified inflation-targeting regime. Developed economies ordinarily operate with market-determined exchange rates and inflation targets. According to Kozlovsky (2013 (Lenta.ru)) and Sergei Alekcashenko, a Russian economist influential on the Internet (2013), corruption and weakness in Russia’s banking system confronted the Central Bank as extremely urgent problems in 2013. These issues both raised the risk of financial crisis and abetted illegal capital outflows. Furthermore, at essentially the same time that Nabiullina became governor of Bank Rossii, the bank merged with a major financial regulatory agency (the FSFR)—thus, in addition to her regular duties, Nabiullina worked on structural and personnel reforms in the Bank from the very start. (It seems that this structural reorganization went well for

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5 Articles about Matvienko, unsurprisingly given her nominal over real power, averaged many fewer views.
Nabiullina, a positive indicator of her competence.) Governor Nabiullina both fought corruption in the banking system and switched Russia to a standard inflation targeting framework, while essentially freeing the ruble. If her policies effectively improved the national financial system and macroeconomic situation, their efficacy would be a powerful argument for politicians not to interfere in Nabiullina’s actions, but allow her independence.

(a) Banks and Illicit Capital Outflows

Pre-2013, Bank Rossii’s oversight of the financial system had a reputation for weakness. Articles on the strengthening of banking regulation published early in Nabiullina’s first term criticized her predecessor, Sergei Ignatiev, for not strengthening oversight himself. Journalist Vladislav Zhukovsky characterized him as prepared to “close the eyes” of Bank Rossii, avoiding regulation of massive criminal activities in the banking system. Zhukovsky felt it was “time to begin” a strengthening of oversight, but foresaw significant probability of failure and risk that the Central Bank would close only those financial institutions easy to shutter (small banks or a small number of banks), leaving alone many weak or criminal banks and credit organizations.

Nabiullina has certainly closed a lot of banks. One illustrative statistic, bank branches per 100,000 adult citizens, significantly decreased from the 2013 level of 38.5 to 29 by 2017. The maximal value of this statistic in the US, which came on the eve of the financial crisis in 2009, was below 36—in 2013, it stood at 33.6, and in 2017, 31. Figures for Brazil, a country often compared to Russia, were much lower—20.5 in 2013 and 19 in 2017. (FRED/World Bank) Russia’s density of banks went from above international norms to a more “normal” range, but this indicator communicates nothing about the efficacy of risk reduction and other impacts of stronger banking regulation. Small banks indeed closed more often (Falyakhov and Yeremina 2018 (Gazeta.ru)), as economists A. Ponomarenko and A. Sinyakova (2018) anticipated would occur after banking regulation became more stringent. Both honest banks and fronts for corrupt activities were likely affected.

Ponomarenko and Sinyakova also expect improvements in the banking system under stronger regulation and the eventual dissipation of early disproportionate impacts on small and medium banks. If this were true for Nabiullina’s strengthening of oversight, one would hope to see risk reductions without substantial losses to economic contribution in Russian banks. The research of A. Sergin (2015), Yu. Yevlyakhova (2019), and Ye. Popkova (2019) illustrates these expected effects, showing that banks’ contribution to GDP improved and risks in the financial system reduced after Nabiullina became central bank governor. Specifically, Sergin found that the capital value (in rubles) of banks and their contribution to GDP increased from 2012 to 2014. Popkova’s analysis includes an “integral indicator of security in the banking system,” which also improved from after the 2014-5 crisis until the most recent years Popkova records. These indicators point to a stronger and healthier banking system, suggesting that most of the many banks closed were indeed weaker or possibly corrupt. Illicit capital flows remain a significant
problem for Russia, but reportedly fell twenty fold from 2013-2018 (Who’s on Track (Kto v kursye) Feb 1 2018).6

Yevlyakhova focuses on an unusual policy introduced at the end of 2015, wherein the central bank officially informed banks which could cause severe damage to the financial system if they failed of their “systemic significance.” One might expect this policy to increase these banks’ risk-taking: after all, the government just admitted that their failure would be severely harmful, making clear that bailouts were more likely if they encountered problems. However, Yevlyakhova found no evidence of increased risk-taking by these banks—if anything, they slightly reduced risk. One possible explanation is that, if large banks were already aware of their systemic significance, these announcements would inform investors and large depositors, who are likely to value the financial system’s survival more than marginally higher returns from a given bank. This would increase pressures on systemically significant banks to behave more responsibly, lest stakeholders punish them for putting the financial system at risk. Regardless of cause, this unusual policy did not harm—and may have benefitted—Russia’s banking system.

One significant problem with the banking crackdown was that settling banks’ accounts once they were closed or under government control sometimes took hundreds of thousands of rubles, which was especially difficult for the Russian agency responsible for helping depositors (Interfax/Vedomosti 2014, BBC 2017 (Russian Service), Syubareva 2017). Nabiullina’s ability to continue closing banks despite high upfront costs also speaks to her independence.

(b) Floating the Ruble

In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, triggering international sanctions; international investors began returning to the developed world, which they had left to avoid extremely low interest rates after the 2008 crisis (the “search for yield”; see e.g. Calomiris et al. 2018); and the price of oil fell dramatically (from July; it continued falling until January 2016 (IMF commodities)). For Russia, this meant intense depreciatory pressures on the ruble, which the central bank was unsustainably draining its foreign exchange reserves in an attempt to stabilize. A central bank subordinate to other authorities might have been pressured into stabilizing the ruble until the last minute and final reserves, worsening the (unavoidably severe) inflationary shocks to Russians. Nabiullina chose to end the stabilization and float the ruble freely on the world market, an idea first proposed by then-Vice Governor Ulyukaev in the mid-2000s (Guriev, interview). Once free (officially declared by the end of November7) the ruble fell dramatically, necessitating high interest rates (at least 15% until May 2015) to combat rising consumer price inflation.8 Abnormally high inflation continued through the beginning of 2015 and the Bank’s contractionary policy contributed to lowering Russia’s GDP (OECD/FRED). The higher interest

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6 A vice-governor of the central bank spoke about the reduction. Taking his words with a grain of salt, flows are still likely to have significantly reduced. From what levels? EADaily (2018) reports that 2000-2017 illicit capital flows were 430.7 billion dollars.
7 Kokoreva 2017 (Banki.ru)
8 Imports drove the rise in inflation. Russia imports many consumer goods and the ruble’s depreciation sharply increased these imports’ prices.
rates marked Nabiullina’s introduction of an inflation targeting regime simultaneously with freeing the ruble, which caused economic pain in the short run while allowing the Bank of Russia to respond much better to fluctuations in inflation long-term. Sergei Guriev credits this change of strategy with making the 2015 recession much less severe than that in 2008 (interview with the author, 2019).

The short-term pain of freeing the ruble would have powerfully deterred most politicians from implementing that policy, but did not dissuade Nabiullina. Within a few months, Russia’s political class could see that the new regime was working as the drastic rise in inflation started to retreat. Inflation in Russia now is typically close to the Central Bank’s target, likely as a result of the change in policy regime. With wider latitude than most Russian policymakers, Nabiullina delivered on financial system improvements and reductions of corruption and illicit capital outflows, and also modernized Russia’s monetary policy regime, avoiding sustained uncontrolled inflation (which Russians would vividly recall from the 1990s). Both of these policy thrusts improve the Russian economy’s long-term stability and growth potential, giving Russians more reasons to support the Putin government.

Conclusion

This paper discussed the surprising independence of Elvira Nabiullina and some political factors which support her autonomy in decision-making, specifically a long-lasting professional relationship with President Putin, which likely allowed her to earn his trust; her image as a thoroughly apolitical professional (complete with a lack of following among ordinary Russians); and her success in financial regulation and monetary policy, key responsibilities of the central bank. Nabiullina’s significant extent of independence in an administrative system generally quite dependent on the president raises questions about the potential for other relatively independent policy professionals in semi-authoritarian countries, and the relative importance of competence, political noninvolvement, and personal bonds in allowing such people to exist. It also remains to be decided whether such professionals make net positive or negative contributions: they may improve country and citizen prospects in their policy area, but at cost of helping their countries’ under-democratic governmental systems continue.
Addendum: Background on Monetary Policy and Central Banking

This paragraph provides a partial overview of central banking functions. In countries with their own currency, the central bank influences interest rates by releasing more money into the economy (expansionary monetary policy, which lowers interest rates) or removing money from the economy (contractionary monetary policy, which raises interest rates). The central bank is also responsible for oversight of the financial system in many countries, including Russia. Central banks are supposed to operate independently of (typically elected) fiscal policymakers to help maintain countries’ long-term macroeconomic stability—this independence is desirable because fiscal policymakers might focus more on short-term outcomes (especially if they face elections), incentivizing them to allow overutilization of the country’s resources and more inflation than is healthy in the long term in order to achieve a short-term economic boom. Developed countries’ central banks typically allow their currencies to float freely on the world market (i.e., they do not engage in foreign exchange interventions) and operate with explicit inflation targets, which they are expected to meet. In less-developed countries, the central bank is more likely to intervene in foreign exchange markets, which often detracts from domestic macroeconomic stabilization, and is less likely to be independent or accountable for its goals. As the public face of the central bank and a significant influence on its policies, the chairperson or governor of a central bank is the individual most responsible for the bank’s conduct and policies.
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Perspectives on the Gay Community in Weimar Berlin
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…German legislation has kept a law on the books—strictly by habit, for it is never applied—with the ancient penalty against the sin of “sodomy.” The paradoxical result of this theoretical sanction is that Germany—a country with a legal punishment for “sodomites”—is also the country in which these gentlemen are most “out.” Willy, The Third Sex (translated by Lawrence R. Schehr), 2007.

In 1871, the passage of Paragraph 175 and criminalization of sex acts between males triggered a wave of gay rights activism that put Berlin’s gay community in the public eye. The subsequent establishment of gay publications, advocacy organizations, and nightlife venues in Berlin increased the community’s visibility and invited mainstream Germans to engage in gay culture and the debate on acceptance of homosexuality. By 1920, Berlin was the world’s first “gay capital,” a global hotspot for artists, activists, and tourists seeking to engage with the vibrant, diverse groups of people living there. This massive visibility, however, can be seen as a double-edged sword. As greater public prominence facilitated calls for gay acceptance, it also provoked attacks on the rights and spaces of gay Germans. By 1934, the Nazi Party adopted an aggressively homophobic stance and subsequently cracked down on gay organizations, venues, and publications. Berlin’s gay community, once the epicenter of global gay culture, was nearly eradicated in less than two decades.

This paper will assess the rise of Berlin’s gay community to global prominence, the advocacy efforts of gay Berliners, and the responses of Berlin’s public and tourists to the community’s increased visibility. This overview will demonstrate that the massive visibility of “gay Berlin” both helped and harmed the community. Mainstream media coverage of the community and its activist efforts provided a platform for gay rights advocacy, but also angered many Germans who saw homosexuality as a sign of degeneration and the decline of “traditional values” in their society.

Terminology is important in this study. Though the acronym, “LGBTQ+,” is inclusive of different identities represented in the queer spectrum today, such comprehensive terms did not exist in the period under study. According to Robert Beachy, discussions published before the community’s rise to prominence referred to men who had sex with men simply as “sodomites,” and did not acknowledge homosexuality as a unique sexual identity. In the twentieth century, the word Urning, meaning a gay man, was invented by Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, a lawyer and prominent gay activist, for use in his advocacy efforts. The word “homosexuality” was also invented around this time and began to spread through European languages. Another sexual identity term invented in the twentieth century was “transvestite,” which was coined by Magnus Hirschfeld to describe cross-dressing individuals he met while studying Berlin’s gay community.

A variety of English-printed secondary sources discuss queer Berliners at length, but it is important to note the disproportionate representation of male homosexuals in these works. Of the

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9 Beachy, Gay Berlin: Birthplace of a Modern Identity, 6.
scholarly sources consulted while writing this paper, many focused extensively on gay men and offered limited analyses of the experiences of lesbians, bisexuals, or transvestites living in Berlin in the 1920s. This absence may be due in part to the disparate treatments of gay men and lesbians in the German legal system. Laws criminalizing homosexuality largely targeted men, thus increasing the visibility of male community members who faced legal prosecution for their relationships. Stereotypical notions that women were more sexually “passive” led mainstream Germans to believe that lesbians did not pose as much of a threat to society as did gay men. Consequently, lesbians were not scandalized to the same extent as male homosexuals, thus reducing their visibility in 1920s media coverage and public discourse. As the most visible members of Berlin’s queer community in the 1920s, the experiences of gay men dominate the available, English-language primary and secondary sources. Thus, my focus is on “gay Berlin,” instead of the city’s queer community as a whole. The relative lack of historical representation in English of queer Berliners other than gay men presents a compelling topic for future research, and also highlights a continuing problem of diversity in scholarly discussions surrounding sexual minorities.

Germany’s gay community entered mainstream public visibility due to a dramatic increase in gay rights activism following the passage of Paragraph 175, which forbade same-sex relations between men. Gay community members, such as Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, responded to this law by publicly declaring their homosexuality and advocating for tolerance of their community. Activism for gay acceptance also came from communities of psychological and medical professionals who applied science-based reasoning to argue that the gay identity was distinct and innate. The most prominent activist in this wing of the homosexual community was Dr. Magnus Hirschfeld, a dogged researcher on sexuality and founder of the Scientific Humanitarian Committee (Wissenschaftlich-humanitäres Komitee or WhK), organized to fight for the abolishment of Paragraph 175.

At the founding of the WhK in 1897, Magnus Hirschfeld outlined a plan to combine “media-savvy activism with modern medical scholarship to ameliorate the plight of German homosexuals.” One instance of Hirschfeld’s use of the media as an instrument of advocacy and education is his funding and direction of the 1919 film, Anders als die Andern-- (§)175 (Different from the Others-- (§)175), one of the first mainstream films in the world to depict homosexuality sympathetically. He also produced an array of publications from 1899 on to publicize his research and political goals. Magnus Hirschfeld also expanded his activist efforts abroad in 1919, when the First Congress for Sexual Reform was hosted in Berlin. The establishment of the World League for Sexual Reform after the 1919 conference led to subsequent meetings in several major cities of Europe that called for legislation to ensure the right to contraception and sex education, and legal and social equality of the sexes.

12 Beachy, Robert. Gay Berlin: Birthplace of a Modern Identity, 86.
Magnus Hirschfeld based his advocacy for equal rights of homosexuals on his scholarly conclusions that homosexuality was innate, not a learned or acquired trait. In a 1926 article titled *Sexual Catastrophes*, Hirschfeld states,

> It is therefore a fact that homosexuality is an inborn condition, that is, a matter of constitution. Typical initial symptoms are demonstrable in homosexuals as early as the seventh and eighth, indeed, even in the third and fourth year of life… The criminal prosecution of homosexuality is based on the fundamental juridical principle that legitimate interests are to be defended against violation. But what interests are violated by a homosexual act? …Once, however, the essence of homosexuality has been recognized, it is the obligation of every fair-minded person to speak out for the elimination of an injustice that already produces more victims and claims by the hour.13

After World War I, Hirschfeld turned his attention to homosexuality in the military. The *WhK* put out a call for stories from gay veterans of their own experiences during their military service. This research sought to demonstrate how Paragraph 175 affected soldiers and officers during the Great War. What Hirschfeld discovered was that many gay men enlisted in the German army for a variety of reasons. Some men were caught up in a wave of nationalistic pride that led them to enlist despite being forbidden to do so by Paragraph 175. Others served for darker reasons—in one passage, Hirschfeld quotes a soldier who enlisted with the intent of dying in battle to bring honor to his family.

> It is my greatest wish to get into the field as soon as possible and to meet an honorable death for otherwise I will be compelled later on to make an end of my rotten life due to my homosexual tendencies for which I am not at all responsible. It is better that my mother should be able to say, ‘My Fritz died a heroic death for his Fatherland,’ than that people should say, ‘So! A suicide, eh?’14

This soldier’s thoughts demonstrate the continuing divisions among gay Germans concerning whether or not their identity was a source of shame. It is evident that “Fritz” saw no future for himself as a gay man, and viewed death as his only option to escape the dishonor of living with his sexuality. “Fritz” also provides a good example how values of nationalism and honor were intertwined with discussions of sexuality in the early twentieth century.

Magnus Hirschfeld’s advocacy efforts reached a new milestone in March 1919, when he founded the *Institut für Sexualwissenschaft* (Institute for Sexual Science) in Berlin. The Institute for Sexual Science was the first organization in the world of its kind and provided sexual and mental health services to Berliners of all sex and gender identities. Hirschfeld sought to establish sexology as a respected medical profession and brought a network of doctors and psychiatrists to the Institute to collaborate on research and participate in conferences.15

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Third International Congress for Sexual Reform on a Scientific Basis, Magnus Hirschfeld divided the study of sexology into four topics: sexual biology, sexual pathology, sexual ethnology, and sexual sociology, and described the responsibility of sexologists to improve sexual ethics by basing them on science rather than morality.\textsuperscript{16}

Present-day historians argue that, during the Weimar Era, Berlin was uniquely suited to become a global epicenter of homosexual culture, due to the intersection of advocacy efforts by scientists and self-identified homosexuals, lax police enforcement of anti-sodomy laws, and the relatively free press which facilitated public debate of homosexual acceptance.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, homoerotic themes and imagery spilled over into such areas of mainstream 1920s German society, such as sports and single-gender educational and physical fitness clubs.\textsuperscript{18} This emphasis on “body culture” was also linked to new attitudes toward sexuality evident in sex reform programs, women’s sexual emancipation, and nudist movements as well as an expanding recognition of the gay community.\textsuperscript{19} These many factors, combined with the forthright activism of Hirschfeld and other homosexual advocates, generated media discourse around the origins and nature of homosexuality that helped to bring Germany’s gay community to national prominence during the Weimar Era.

The press and activists’ eager readership contributed to the increased visibility and support of German homosexuals.\textsuperscript{20} Some of this support came from Human Rights perspective. In 1923, activist Friedrich Radszuweit founded the Bund für Menschenrecht (League for Human Rights, or BfM) in Berlin and supported the publication of many gay and lesbian oriented periodicals, including Blätter für Menschenrecht, the organization’s flagship publication. Likewise, in 1921 journalist Kurt Hiller directly challenged the right of the German government to regulate its citizens’ sexualities:

\begin{quote}
The state may not interfere with the individuals within its compass in the expression of their particularity, in the manifestation of their individuality. It may not interfere with them in the shaping of their lives nor in their activities and arrangements even in cases of extreme deviation from the “norm”—unless the activity of the individual collides with the interests of another individual, a grouping of other individuals, or perhaps of the whole, the society.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

Hiller’s essay is an example of a controversial statement regarding sexual morality, as well as one about the overreach of the German government. The intersection of sexuality and politics in German mainstream media is a theme repeated in Wilhelm Reich’s 1932 article, “Politicizing the

\textsuperscript{17} Beachy, Robert. "The German Invention of Homosexuality." The Journal of Modern History 82, no. 4: 804.
\textsuperscript{19} Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, 297-330.
Sexual Problems of Youth.” Reich appeals to his readers to be more open when talking about sex, and argues that bourgeois morality restricts sexual liberty and the overall freedoms of the proletariat. These examples demonstrate a willingness of the German people to discuss sexuality and debate homosexual tolerance in a public forum.

Weimar’s press also included journals and newspapers that specifically addressed homosexual life. Twenty periodicals for gay men and lesbians appeared between 1919 and 1933, some with a circulation over 100,000. Several gay and lesbian publications, such as Der Eigene and Die Freundin, openly circulated with little government intervention. Gay Germans could even post personal advertisements in newspapers. The French novelist Willy describes several examples of such ads where the authors, under the guise of seeking a roommate or friend, would seek a same-sex companion. These advertisements are interesting because they show that attitudes towards homosexuality in Germany were relaxed enough that gay Berliners could discreetly seek out partners in public forums, but not so much that they could publicly identify themselves as homosexuals without fear of repercussions. If individuals may not have felt free to self-identify as gay in the press, gay activist groups clearly articulated their identities in their publications. Furthermore, the advocacy organization League for Human Rights, advertised meetings, dances, and other events in the gay press to foster community building.

The press also revealed the spectrum of male homosexual representations, especially between Hirschfeld’s science-based perspective and Adolf Brand and others who argued that male homosexuality was not a sexual orientation, but the highest expression of love for masculinity. Furthermore, Adolf Brand publicly clashed with Magnus Hirschfeld, stating at one point that Hirschfeld’s advocacy work turned mainstream Germans against homosexuality and caused a dangerous association of the homosexual movement with the German political left.

While the press facilitated the spread ideas of homosexual acceptance, it also increased public scrutiny of gay Berliners. An early example of this negative attention took place in 1907 with the Eulenberg Scandal that revealed several friends of Kaiser William II as homosexuals. Journalist Maximilian Harden and others exploited this revelation to the German public, tying sexual scandal to perceived larger problems in German society. This event marked a turning point in the relationship between the German media and Berlin’s homosexual community. Robert Beachy argues that the Eulenberg scandal was the first time the entire German public was exposed to the idea of an innate homosexual identity. The Eulenberg scandal also harmed the

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24 Willy. The Third Sex. Translated by Lawrence R. Schehr, 21.
28 Beachy, Robert. Gay Berlin: Birthplace of a Modern Identity, 139.
reputation of the Scientific Humanitarian Committee, but the visibility resulting from the controversy still generated more coverage of the organization’s advocacy efforts and theories on homosexual acceptance. Yet, the scandal also showed how invasive and embarrassing a public trial around homosexuality could be for those involved. Details of the intimate relationships and private lives of the accused were brought before the court as Harden linked homosexuality to passivism and blamed the sexualities of the Kaiser’s friends and advisors for Germany’s failure to pursue an aggressive, masculine foreign policy at the time.

Sexual scandals also criminalized homosexuals during the Weimar Republic. In fact, David James Prickett contends that press accounts of gay Germans and their meeting spaces, “not only further marginalized the male homosexual, but also intensified the mainstream notion that the male homosexual was a criminal.” As in the case of the Eulenberg Scandal, however, Prickett argues that Berlin’s gay community also gained notoriety from scandalous news accounts of male prostitution and exciting stories of gay venues. Conflicting interpretations of the role of the media visibility in the gay community show how visibility can be viewed as a double-edged sword of sorts. The media facilitated advocacy efforts that increased acceptance of homosexuality, but also circulated stories that tied homosexuality to moral failures in society, thus increasing attacks on the community while also improving its support.

Scholars have identified and emphasized the significance of queer spaces in Weimar Berlin. In Gay Berlin: Birthplace of a Modern Identity, Beachy argues that the availability of gay venues such as nightclubs and cabarets, as well as the widespread male prostitution and lax police enforcement at these spaces, made Berlin a desirable destination for sex tourists seeking to explore the gay scene that existed there. Robert Beachy’s inclusion of tourist narratives strengthens his overall argument about the international significance of Berlin’s gay scene. Other studies highlight gay venues as spaces that represented conflicting notions of gay identity and the fascination of mainstream Germans with gay cultures and representations. Other historians emphasize the role of gay theatre revues promoting increased tolerance for homosexuality, making the gay theatre an instrument of advocacy for decriminalizing homosexuality and a platform for homosexual rights.

During the early 1920s, “Gay Berlin” reached international notoriety, due to an influx of sex tourists seeking to take advantage of the Hyperinflation of German currency which

29 Ibid 140.
32 Ibid.
33 Beachy, Robert. Gay Berlin: Birthplace of a Modern Identity, 188.
facilitated cheap travel, as well as the variety of gay bars, cabarets, and other venues described in travel guides and other written works. Unemployment and post-war economic chaos also contributed to the rise of prostitution among women and young men. Queer spaces grew in notoriety, therefore, not only among Berlin citizens, but also with sex tourists capitalizing on popular interest in nightclubs, bars, and other venues generated in salacious accounts in the German press and by non-German writers such as Christopher Isherwood and the French novelist Willy.

Christopher Isherwood was an English novelist who moved to Weimar Berlin to spend time with the gay community there. When writing about his experiences in his books, The Last of Mr. Norris and Goodbye to Berlin, Isherwood implied, but did not directly acknowledge, his own homosexuality. The author chose to obscure the narrator’s sexuality in these books in order to avoid outing himself upon their publication. In The Last of Mr. Norris, the narrator recounts his adventures in Berlin’s nightlife and even describes a visit to a brothel. Though the narrator’s own sexuality is not addressed, Isherwood describes meeting a friend, “Arthur Norris,” who later admits to being a sexual masochist and enjoying pornography. This short story illustrates the excitement felt by sex tourists as they explored Berlin’s sexual underground, as well as the diversity of sexual expressions tourists found there. Isherwood’s narrative focuses largely on venues and parties, and does little to acknowledge other aspects of Berlin’s gay community, such as advocacy efforts, the infighting over conflicting ideals of masculinity and gay identity, or the relationship between the media and the community at this time.

After a stay in London, Isherwood returned to Germany in 1932 and observed the rapid changes taking place as a result of the economic collapse and the rise of the Nazi Party. Set in 1930, Christopher Isherwood’s book Goodbye to Berlin focuses on several people the narrator meets who are targeted by the Nazis for persecution. Some of the characters described by Isherwood in this story include a gay couple he befriended. The book closes in 1933, as the narrator and some friends travel around Berlin one last time to visit some of their favorite venues that will soon be closed by the Nazis. Isherwood’s tone in this work is much darker than in The Last of Mr. Norris. The author expresses remorse for the Germany he loved and specifically mentions the destruction of queer spaces that took place after the Nazis took power in 1933.

Another author who traveled to “gay Berlin” and reported his findings to overseas readers was the French novelist Willy. In his book The Third Sex, Willy describes his journeys to several gay hotspots of Europe in a comical, condescending manner. Translator Lawrence R. Schehr points out in his introduction that Willy may have needed to employ such a cynical tone in his work in order to make his writing palatable to heterosexual readers. According to Schehr, this homophobic tone might actually have helped Willy expose his readers to new ideas about
homosexuality. The translator refers to this work as “the first gay Baedeker,” indicating that Willy’s text could be viewed as a homosexual-centered travel guide to Europe.  

Willy’s work also stands out in that it is by far the most comprehensive tourist account of the experiences of the gay community in Berlin. Willy introduces his section on Berlin by highlighting Germany’s status as a global gay capital. “How can we speak of pederasty without making people think immediately of Germany and its extraordinary organization of the “vice,” more widespread there than in any other country in Europe?” What is especially intriguing is that Willy, a heterosexual man, offered an outsider’s perspective on the gay community. Christopher Isherwood, a gay man who lived in Germany for several years, offered much less detail than Willy about important aspects of the gay experience in Berlin. Isherwood and Willy both emphasize the nightlife and gay venues they visited, but Willy’s narrative of “gay Berlin” goes beyond the nightlife scene and seeks to analyze the social, scientific, and legal standings of the community, as well. For example, Willy discusses Magnus Hirschfeld and the Scientific Humanitarian Committee at length, whereas Isherwood’s “Berlin Stories” focus largely on gay venues and the diverse groups of people and sexual expressions he encountered in Berlin’s gay community.

One possible explanation for the differences in these narratives is the style the writers employed. Isherwood’s works are framed as fiction, whereas Willy’s book was intended to be a work of investigative journalism. It makes sense for Willy’s analysis to be more comprehensive, as his stated goal was to inform readers of the experiences of gay Europeans, whereas Isherwood’s purpose was geared more towards entertaining his audience and subtly advocating for acceptance of homosexuality. Isherwood’s own sexuality may also have limited his narrative, as he had to be careful not to out himself while writing his works. As a self-identified straight man ostensibly visiting the community simply to write about it, Willy had the freedom to discuss what he saw in the gay community without fear of being accused of homosexuality.

Curt Moreck is another writer who contributed to tourist narratives on Berlin’s underground nightlife. Moreck’s writings on “depraved” Berlin encouraged tourists to seek out the hidden clubs and other venues available throughout the city. In her analysis of Moreck’s work, Camilla Smith argues that this guide to “depraved” Berlin was one of many travel guides from this time period that focused on the exciting and salacious stories of Berlin nightlife. The book was even formatted similarly to the Baedeker pocket travel guides, which were popular in the twentieth century. Moreck’s book is unique from conventional travel guides because it offered over fifty pages of commentary solely on gay and lesbian hotspots. Curt Moreck presented his discussion of homosexual nightlife alongside that of the mainstream tourist

40 Willy. The Third Sex. Translated by Lawrence R. Schehr, x-xi.
41 Willy. The Third Sex. Translated by Lawrence R. Schehr, 15.
42 Willy. The Third Sex. Translated by Lawrence R. Schehr, 17-24.
attractions in order to invite readers to participate in the debates surrounding homosexuality that were taking place in Weimar Berlin.\textsuperscript{45}

Daniel Guérin, a French journalist, traveled to Germany in 1932-33 to document the rise of right-wing paramilitary groups in the Weimar Republic. Guérin’s account focused on the ideologies and organizations of young men in the German right, and also described homoerotic trends in these circles. In one passage, the author mentions seeing photos of hazing rituals involving “naked adolescents hanging from branches by their wrists... while members of the clique, also naked, brandished phallic emblems around them.”\textsuperscript{46} This work demonstrates the homoeroticism evident in right-wing fraternal male movements. Not all members of the German right seemed against homosexuality. Homoerotic practices were prevalent among right-wing German youth, including the National Socialist \textit{Sturmabteilung}.

An unfortunate consequence of increased homosexual visibility in the 1920s was the series of open attacks on the perceived immorality of gay Germans. Religious leaders published attacks on the gay community, and some churches even went so far as to “declare war” on the spread of homosexuality. Denouncing it as unhealth, degenerate, and corrupt, opponents to homosexuality claimed it attacked the foundation and viability of the German family and undermined traditional values. Attacks on the community by the German government also increased in the late 1920s. In 1928, many homosexual-specific publications, including \textit{Die Freundin}, were registered as “pornographic and dirty writings” and formally censored.\textsuperscript{47} In the early 1930s, as the Nazi Party rose to power, their political opponents targeted homosexual cliques in the SA and Ernst Röhm on account of his open homosexuality. Left wing journalist Kurt Tucholsky, a supporter of homosexual acceptance, defended Röhm in a 1932 article. “I consider these attacks against the man improper. Anything [including details of Röhm’s private life] is good enough to use against Hitler and his people.”\textsuperscript{48}

Adolf Hitler appeared originally ambivalent towards the presence of homosexuals in party ranks. However, increasing attacks of Röhm from across the political spectrum, as well as pressure from party leaders jockeying for power, led Hitler to change the party stance on gay Germans to one that was aggressively homophobic. After the Nazi Party took power in 1933, the Institute for Sexual Science and other venues were raided and thousands of books relating to homosexuality were burned. Between 1934 and 1936, the NS state sought to eliminate homosexuals from public spaces and eradicate homosexual behavior, as they viewed it as degenerate and inconsistent with their goals to increase the population. In 1935 they toughened provisions of Paragraph 175 to provide the legal groundwork for later radical measures to

\textsuperscript{46} Guérin, Daniel. \textit{The Brown Plague: Travels in Late Weimar and Early Nazi Germany}.
incarcerate homosexuals. Tens of thousands of German homosexuals were arrested, and many were sent to concentration camps during the Second World War. In less than twenty years, Berlin’s gay community, the first global epicenter of gay culture, was forced back underground until after the Holocaust.

The intersection of fervent activism, an unrestricted press, and tourist attention made Berlin uniquely suited to become the world’s first gay capital. By 1920, Berlin was home to many gay rights organizations, queer publications, nightlife venues, and other spaces where homosexuals could express their identities safely. The massive visibility generated in Berlin’s gay community aided activist efforts by spreading their ideas and theories, but it also hurt the community as a whole by provoking further attacks on their identities and their liberties. By the 1930s, attacks on homosexuals in the Nazi ranks forced the party to become aggressively homophobic, leading to the eventual destruction of Berlin’s gay community and their near-complete loss of visibility for decades to come. The story of “gay Berlin” is relevant in modern discussions of LGBTQ+ issues, because it demonstrates how the community’s visibility can be both helpful and hurtful to the queer movement. Berlin is also a haunting reminder that the queer rights movement may never become complacent. The movement’s gains in recognition can be erased, and the community nearly eradicated, within a matter of years.
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BORDERS
Schengen and the Changing Nature of Borders
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Introduction

European integration, beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and culminating in the Single Market, has consistently harnessed a logic of economic interdependence to justify processes of weakening state sovereignty while strengthening supranational sovereignty. Among the liberal economic projects of the European Union (EU) is the Schengen Area, meant to protect and progress the Single Market’s “four freedoms” (free movement of goods, capital, services, and people). The Schengen Area was launched through a series of intergovernmental arrangements in 1995 between the Benelux three, France, and Germany. These agreements sought to eliminate checks on the movement of goods and persons at the national borders of each member state, by virtue of dissolving internal borders within the Schengen Area. In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam embedded Schengen into the *acquis communautaire*, increasing Schengen membership and effectively carving the logic of dissolved internal borders and a common external frontier into the legal framework of the EU’s economy, territory, and polity (Guild et al, 2010).

Traditionally, borders have been steeped in narratives of state sovereignty and power, conceived as inextricably tethered to the nation-state. German political philosopher, Friedrich Ratzel, elucidates this traditional view, stating: “if the state was a body then the border was its skin” (van Dijk, 1999). Here, we can observe an emphasis of the border as a political container, a structure which encloses a sovereign territory. However, Schengen has institutionalized “wider spaces of economic and social activity” by stretching borders past the nation-state to form an external border which contains a continental-scale society and marketplace spanning the geographies of 26 states (22 of which are EU member states) (Walters, 2002). As a result, Schengen has reconfigured the function of borders and, thus, how they are conceived in relation to territory, sovereignty, culture, and economy. This paper concerns itself with the evolving nature of borders in Europe, assessing how this evolution has (1) changed discourses of the function of borders and (2) shifted the spatial dimensions of borders.

Evolution of the Border

The “Hard” Border

In order to understand the relationship between borders and sovereignty, its imperative to look to the history of borders. 19th and early-20th century Europe, housing the globe’s imperial powers and deep-rooted tensions, was a continent characterized by inter-state conflict and territorial expansion (and reduction). As such, borders during this era, up until the post-war period, were viewed as “hard” borders. The “hard” border is an instrument of force, a line of defense, envisioned as a “solid wall” meant to divide and defend the “self” from the “enemy” (Bigo, 2014). Therefore, the “hard” border is a geopolitical tool, serving as an apparatus of war and peace. William Walters stages the geopolitical border as a “field of forces”, emphasizing how the “hard” border is injected with concepts of sovereignty and high-politics (Walters, 2002).
Further, 19th century border officials, such as Curzon and Ratzel, conceived the “hard” border as a measurement and reflection of a state’s power in the geopolitical arena (Walters, 2002). Although this view of borders is quite antiquated, the legacy of the border as a “frontier of defense” exerts influence on contemporary understandings of the border, as modern borders are seen as “sights of control” rather than “lines of exchange” (Guild et al, 2010).

**The “Liquid” Border**

The conception of borders as “hard” would begin to decline during the post-war period, as the vision of interconnected European economies emerged as a peace-preserving solution. EU founding father and architect of the ECSC, Jean Monnet, was guided by this liberal economic logic, recognizing borders between France and Germany as “artificial dividers” bred by “the rise of doctrinal nationalisms” (Monnet, 1978). By wedding concepts of material prosperity and physical security, Monnet began the process of denaturalizing Europe’s internal borders (Walters, 2002). Challenging the “organic” relationship between border and nation-state was furthered with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which launched the vision of an internal market - the European Economic Community. This “denaturalization” of internal borders triggered a shift in discourse surrounding borders and sovereignty. As European (internal) borders were increasingly recognized as “artificial divisions” hindering peace and wealth, the border, once viewed as “hard”, soon became “liquid”. Engaging a metaphor of liquidity “changes the logic of control and security”, as the border is now a “filter” meant to “sift” and “sort” flows of persons, evolving from its former function as a “solid wall” (Bigo, 2014). The “liquid” border also aligns itself with narratives of passage and mobility, further deviating from traditional discourse of the border as a “container”. However, the “liquid” border reserves the right to passage and mobility for those who will “nurture” growth, accepting wealthy tourists/high-skilled immigrants and immediately removing “irregulars” (Bigo, 2014). The impact of the “liquid” border as a “filter”, separating predominantly white, wealthy/skilled, or Western persons from predominantly Muslim, non-white, or poor immigrants, is institutionalizing discrimination (Fassin, 2016). In order to justify the racial and religious biases of the “filter”, a powerful security discourse is assigned to immigrants seeking to enter the EU (van Houtum, 2007). EU border discourse associates asylum seekers and refugees with “drugs”, “crime”, and “terrorism”, rather than “democracy”, “human security”, and “human rights”, indicating the ability of public fear, when mobilized, to securitize even the most vulnerable individuals in society (Walters, 2002).

Essentially, discourses surrounding the function of borders were traditionally constructed around the border as “hard” – an organizing line of force and physical measure of state power. However, as the post-war period ushered in the concept of peace via economic interdependence, European leaders effectively “denaturalized” the relationship between the border and the nation-state. Rather than the border as an impermeable casing of political territory, the border became “liquid”, allowing entry to those that were calculated as a benefit and “filtering out” individuals deemed burdensome. Consequently, the EU border’s incessant need to separate through selection has led to Schengen being compared to a “gated community” (van Houtum, 2007). Ultimately, the concept of the “hard” and “liquid” border share commonality in that they serve as
mechanisms to separate a “self” from an enemy “Other”. However, the two concepts are distinct with regard to the nature of their enemy, with “hard” borders operating against states and “liquid” borders operating against populations.

**Shifting Spatial Dimensions**

Just as discourses surrounding the function of borders have evolved, the spatial dimensions of European borders have shifted. When the Treaty of Amsterdam inscribed Schengen into the legal foundation of the EU, two particular changes took place. First, this established a continental-scale marketplace and polity, now spanning 26 states, bound together by a common external border. Second, by writing Schengen into the *acquis*, this meant control over Schengen’s external border was placed into the hands of the EU institutions (Guiraudon, 2017). The impact of these two changes was the proliferation of the EU’s internal security arena – the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ has served as a, sort of, “legal laboratory” producing unique developments in border governance. Primarily, this section will concern itself with how the AFSJ has produced a shift in the spatial dimensions of borders.

Increased securitization of mobility has fed demands for the constant improvement and expansion of the state security apparatus. The EU has set its gaze on technology as the solution to “the tension among an open economy, freedom of circulation of travelers, and control” (Bigo, 2014). Technology, via surveillance systems and systems of informational exchange, has taken the border, a once fixed, sedentary structure, and breathed life into it, enabling the border to become “mobile” (Bigo, 2014). Technological systems which store and collect data have access to sources of public and private documentation dealing with personal profiles ranging from employment records to social security records to arrest records. As technology has compiled data into an integrated network of information available to all Schengen member states (the SIS), the border, traditionally housed within ports of entry, airports, and external boundaries, has digitized and moved inward. Diplomat and geographer, Michel Foucher, describes this “smart border”, stating, “the entire national territory is now being treated as an expanded frontier zone” (Foucher, 1998).

Moreover, while Schengen has granted the border a formidable sense of mobility, the move of the border inward has been mirrored by its outward expansion. In the aftermath of the 2015 migration crisis, the EU migration regime has adopted a set of policy instruments collectively known as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) - a collection of EU agreements with third countries. Among the most prominent are the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, the Trust Fund for Africa, and several bi/multi-lateral agreements between EU member state and third countries, such as Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya (Buonanno, 2017). These agreements, in essence, offer large sums of money to non-EU states on the condition that they enact aggressive border control practices to prevent irregular migrants from entering the EU via their territory. The European Neighbourhood Policy has effectively exported the borders of the EU to the shores of Northern Africa and the soil of the Middle East. This phenomenon is referred to as a “deteriorialization of border controls”, enabled through “immigration diplomacy” (Walters, 2002). Moreover, the EU has expanded its border outwards by requiring candidate
countries to fully integrate the *acquis communautaire* as a compulsory step toward accession, ensuring that new member states (eventually) join Schengen.

Ultimately, the expansion of the border both inward and outward has been described by Didier Bigo as neither a “hard” nor “liquid” border, but a “gaseous” border. Harnessing the ability of technology to traverse the entire territorial unit of Schengen and the foreign policy pressures of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Schengen border has been constructed via a multitude of points that are linked together through networks of computerized databases constantly exchanging information...collected by foreign consulates, international intelligence services, and private companies” (Bigo, 2014).

The “gaseous” border has harnessed the pooled sovereignty and economy of the Schengen Area and bred an exceedingly complex and capable reconfiguration of spatiality of state power, permeating throughout EU (supra)national territory and manifesting past its external frontier.

**Conclusion**

The security and liberal economic logic of European integration produced a pivotal shift in discourses of borders, “denaturalizing” the relationship between border and nation-state and paving the way for the Schengen Area. The Schengen Area has undoubtedly reconfigured conceptions of European borders, their functions, and their spatial orientations. Although unique to the EU, Schengen allows for a broader view of border practices among states of the global North. The “liquid” border as a “filter” emphasizes how Western states have responded to economic globalization by crafting mechanisms which integrate those who “nurture” and bar those who “burden”. Ultimately, the machinery of Western border regime is powered by the imperative of economic growth. Further, the expansion and diversification of the EU’s spatial dimensions elucidates prominent global trends. First, the use of high technology in international border regime exhibits how the security state, now digitized, has no limits, capable of reaching within and across borders. Second, the European Neighbourhood Policy emphasizes the inextricable connection between border regime and foreign policy, as both are expressions of state interest. Finally, as European studies literature has extensively examined the impact of the Schengen Area on migration policy and border control, I hope for greater attention paid to the effect of EU border control on international human rights and causes of regional instability, both of which should be more accounted for by EU migration policy and border governance.
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In Divided Cyprus, Can Water Come Before Peace? Examining the Hydropolitics of the Turkey-Northern Cyprus Water Pipeline
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Introduction

On the semi-arid island-state of Cyprus, the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has been importing potable drinking water via undersea pipeline from Turkey since 2015. Because of this Turkish-funded investment in water infrastructure provision—totaling approximately 450 million USD—the TRNC has not had to ration water during drought as the rest of Cyprus has. In his speech at the pipeline’s opening, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan remarked that Cyprus could purchase water from the TRNC, declaring that the water could act as “water of peace” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015), resolving the decades-long occupation. No water has been officially exchanged as per sources at this time, but could this water cooperation lead to peace and reconciliation in Cyprus as suggested?

In this essay, I analyze how the Turkey-TRNC water pipeline fails to solve Cyprus’ water scarcity problem. Although Erdogan articulates that this opportunity for water distribution could act as the ultimate conduit for peace in Cyprus, I argue that it would actually hinder pro-unification efforts as it would increase the island’s reliance on other states, namely Turkey. In this paper, I outline Cyprus’ current landscape in regards to water management and situate the pipeline within Turkey’s national hydraulic development efforts. Then, I apply various theoretical perspectives onto the case study, including Mason’s (2019) hydro-territorialism, Conker’s (2018) water nationalism, and Zeitoun and Warner’s (2006) hydro-hegemony. Finally, I offer a brief combination approach towards addressing Cyprus’ water and peace issues, incorporating environmental peacemaking to mitigate the conflict.

Through examination using a variety of hydro-political lenses, this analysis shows how state-building and environment-building efforts attempt to extend the political power of Turkey beyond its borders, but counter hydro-hegemons hinder full acceptance of Turkey’s hydro-hegemony. In this way, Turkey’s efforts do not fully succeed, and alternative efforts for peace and environmental resource management should be considered.

Cyprus’ Water Resource Management

An unprecedented water crisis is facing Cyprus as well as the Mediterranean. A report from the International Panel on Climate Change highlights the Mediterranean as one of the most vulnerable regions in the world to the impacts of global warming (IUCN, 2018). Fertile lands such as Cyprus are at risk of becoming deserts, exacerbated by water misuse as a result of tourism and housing construction for tourists, affecting water levels in aquifers. As early as 1878, efforts have been made to improve the island’s water resource management, which have included reforestation and irrigation improvement efforts; however, British colonial officers finally decided it would be most effective to import water from Turkey in the 1950s. This plan never came to fruition, as conflicts between Turkey and Greece were present even then, making this plan unfeasible (Sülün 2018). Following the coup, invasion, and division of the island into
the Republic of Cyprus and the ad hoc Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, both fragments of the island have faced resource management issues, with natural resource management in the TRNC being characterized as “disorganized, short-term, and ad-hoc” (Bryant and Mason 2017).

Traditionally, groundwater aquifers have been the primary source of water for both domestic and agricultural uses. Both sides of the island were largely impacted by the 2008 drought. During this time, the RoC was able to import water from Greece to meet agricultural needs as well as those of the tourist industry, while the TRNC was reduced to using “brackish groundwater” (Itano 2010). Although the need for proper water management is evident across the island, there is dispute regarding if the Turkey-TRNC water pipeline is the appropriate mechanism to do so.

Cypriot Debates Surrounding the Turkey-TRNC Water Pipeline

There have been mixed attitudes towards the pipeline from both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Solely considering resource exchange, both sides could benefit if the pipeline resulted in other resource sharing, as the RoC would have access to water throughout droughts, while the energy-deficient TRNC could potentially benefit from the natural gas developments in the RoC (Associated Press 2014). However, as Turkey has no co-reliance in this exchange, rather they are sole benefactors, many see this as a motion towards Turkish dependency for Cyprus. Sener Elcil, chairman of the Turkish Cypriot Teacher’s Union, says the pipeline above all else “serves Ankara’s interests,” but it could serve peacebuilding efforts if it were to create interdependence between Turkey and Cyprus, suggesting an expansion to the water-energy nexus (Associated Press 2014).

Greek Cypriots agree that transactional water provision between Turkey and the TRNC is ineffective. “If the island is reunited, it would be an attractive option,” said Sofoclis Aletraris, director of the Greek Cyprus Water Development Department. But until then, “we cannot depend on a country that is at this point hostile to Cyprus” (Itano 2010). From this perspective, reconciliation efforts need to occur before resource exchange, otherwise the motives of said exchange are construed as a power building tool for Turkey over Cyprus, and the TRNC over the island as a whole. Michael Lytras, head of Greek Cypriot farmer’s union PEK, stated that his farmers “won’t even think about buying water from Turkey, which has been occupying our island for so many years, until there is a solution to the Cyprus problem,” noting that the provision of water may start as a gift, but eventually, can come at the price of a number of stipulations (Itano 2010). Other concerns include that the exchange would reinforce the status quo, deepening the occupied areas’ dependence on Turkey, leading to more Turkish settlers. In Greek Cypriot discourse, any efforts that legitimize the occupation of the north constitute “recognition by implication,” and thus, said efforts are not seen as viable by the RoC (Bryant 2015). In this way, it is in the RoC’s interest to not agree to water provisions that imply legitimacy to the TRNC.

It can be argued that the RoC’s concerns are not quite an exaggeration, as Veysel Eroglu, Turkish Forestry and Water Affairs Minister, likened the pipeline to an “umbilical cord” linking
Turkey to Cyprus. In addition, there are other plans to build an electricity cable linking Turkey with Cyprus, increasing the TRNC’s reliance on Turkey (Bryant 2015).

Although benefits of this effort are situated toward improving the hydrological conditions of the TRNC, Turkish Cypriots have historically been skeptical of water sharing plans from Turkey, as plans from the 1950s never came to be. As the Turkey-TRNC pipeline is complete and operating, Turkish Cypriots have expressed concerns regarding the pipeline’s management, as Turkish Cypriots do not want to have their autonomy impinged upon by the fact that Turkey is in control of their water supply, with the potential threat of Turkey cutting it off under their own pretenses (Bryant 2015). Turkey, in opposition, wants it to remain in their control, while Turkish Cypriots are advocating for it to be operated by local water authorities, so that they would not live under threat of having their water resources turned off.

With the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot perspectives in mind, it is worthwhile to examine how Turkey benefits from the pipeline. In recent development projects, Turkey’s regional power as an economic giant has become more prevalent in Cyprus, as Turkey has brought investment, global chains, and resorts to the TRNC, along with their aviation networks via Turkish Airlines. Through these efforts, it can be understood that Turkey’s investments are aiding in the “development” of the TRNC, so that the TRNC will be less negatively impacted by the RoC’s economic policies (Bryant 2015). This almost functions as a positive feedback loop, as the more resources Turkey provides, the more the RoC is concerned with the legitimation of the TRNC, resulting in the RoC providing harsher economic conditions which end up being addressed by Turkey.

It is clear that the climate issues would impact both sides of the island regardless of politics. In this opportunity, where there is neither strong water nor natural resource governance, Turkey’s efforts in the Turkey-TRNC water pipeline project seem fruitful. However, understanding Turkey’s legacy of state-making through hydraulic development is relevant to understanding the full scope of the undersea pipeline project.

Several scholars have examined Turkey’s internal hydraulic development (Conker 2018; Warner 2008; Çarkoğlu and Eder 2005) to highlight how water infrastructure provision has been utilized as a tool to create a cohesive national identity. Through the construction of dams, hydropower plants, irrigation systems, and other hydraulic infrastructures, Conker (2018) has argued that nation-making and state-making processes are bolstered by water resource development. In the following sections, I extend this concept in regards to the Turkey-TRNC water pipeline, highlighting how the water pipeline can be understood as a tool to expand state-power beyond its borders.

**Hydro-Territorialism, Water Nationalism, and the Turkey-TRNC Pipeline**

Mason (2018) uses the term “hydraulic patronage” to describe the Turkey-TRNC water pipeline, positing that Turkey is acting as a patron state to provide resources to Cyprus as a client territory. In recognizing the political, economic, and social implications of this water provision through a political ecology perspective, it is apparent that it is an effort to make Cyprus more
reliant on Turkey, deepening Turkish state influence. In support of this is the fact that Turkey would manage the water provision, although Turkish Cypriots have advocated for the provision to be placed into local municipal rule.

Through this state-making project, Turkey attempts to advance its hydro-territorialization over the island at large. In this sense, the territorialization extends beyond the landscape and into the assemblages that include spatial configurations of human practices, institutions, water flows, and socio-economic structures revolving around the control of water in Cyprus (Mason 2018). As the pipeline is governed and funded by Turkey, the local control over water decreases, shifting toward a market-led distribution network that lessens the water governance authority of the Cypriot state.

In a broader context, water security has always been important to Turkey’s past and contemporary state-making processes. As Turkey’s political bounds have encompassed peoples of various religion, race, ethnicity, and origin, the state has struggled to achieve a homogenized collective ethnicity. In order to achieve this, radical modernization projects were planned so that a “national unity with a common national identity” would be easier to cultivate, and thus a national identity would exist and be supported by its people. Conker (2018) applies Allouche’s (2005) theory of “water nationalism” to Turkey’s internal hydraulic development projects, with similarities found in Mason’s (2018) work. As the first tenant of water nationalism is regarding territorialism over water resources by nation-states, Allouche marks the shift from previous political identities to nation-states as “from frontiers to borders” (96). In dialogue with Mason’s (2018) work, Turkey rescales its water nationalism outward, looking for new “frontiers” in Cyprus to hydro-territorialize.

Understanding Hydro-hegemony Through the Turkey-TRNC Pipeline

Hydro-hegemony is defined as the ability of the riparian state to impose a discourse, preserve its interests, and impede changes to a convenient status quo (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). This display through the Turkey-TRNC water pipeline highlights the technological, economic, and hydrological capacity of Turkey as well as its discursive power in uplifting a marvel of Turkish engineering (Ibid). Greek Cypriots are aware that, by participating in this exchange, they are increasing the legitimacy of the Turkish-occupied land, thus, Greek Cypriots would be conceding to their power.

There are obvious power asymmetries between the TRNC and Turkey (Bryant 2015). As described by Zeiton and Warner (2006), asymmetries are seen in the lack of control over decisions and an inequitable allocation of the resource or its benefits that the TRNC has regarding the pipeline, as many would like to see the management of water operations designated to local municipalities (Bryant 2015). All of these outcomes may create tensions with potential for conflict to follow.

This analysis observes TRNC’s efforts in avoiding said negative hegemonic configurations, in which the TRNC could potentially resent its dependence on the hegemom as well as the tactics it employs to maintain it (Conker 2018). Much hydro-hegemony has fallen
prey to the territorial trap, broadening hydro hegemony beyond the state, as Turkey is also moving beyond the state.

Conclusion

Through this application, it becomes clear how state-making processes are enacted through hydrologic projects. Although much of the literature focuses on its application through the nation-state, it is apparent that Turkey’s efforts go beyond its borders and into new territory in order to cultivate further legitimacy for itself, the people of TRNC, the people of RoC, and the region. If Cyprus did decide to utilize the resources imported from Turkey, it would take resources away from using alternative water development pathways to solve their water problem, including that of sustainable water management or environmental peacebuilding. Because of this, pro-unification efforts have objected to full-state reliance on Turkish resources (Itano 2010).

In Cyprus, water cannot come before peace, but can the two develop together? What if cooperational water resource management acted as a conduit for peace between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots? I assert that this is necessary to address Cyprus’ water dispute within the ethno-political context of the island.

I suggest that the Republic of Cyprus enact an island-wide sustainability plan that centers environmental peacebuilding as the predominant force in solving the country’s water issues. I believe this to be effective for a number of reasons. In studies, environmental issues are often less contentious than other arguments that groups in conflict face: in fact, issues regarding the environment often provide a framework for dialogue between groups in conflict (Wilton Park, 2004). This is especially true when the issue concerns vital resources such as water, which are often too fundamental to social and economic development that parties in conflict cannot afford to militarize them. In summary, a cooperative, sustainable approach to managing the environment forces groups in conflict to overcome the conflict cycle through prevention, mitigation, and management as sides begin working together on environmental issues.

According to the Initiative for Peacebuilding’s (IFP) regional case study on the Middle East, peacebuilding initiatives around water issues can be about avoiding water-related conflicts as well as using existing water-related issues “as an entry point” for cooperation to negotiate peace (Kramer, 2008). In the context of Cyprus, this would mean either a shared desalination plant, imported pipeline, or other water source so that political interests of the patron states Turkey and Greece are minimized. In my solution, I would advocate for a publicly owned, publicly funded desalination plant along the border of occupied Cyprus so that there can be interdependencies between the ethno-national groups. For environmental peacebuilding efforts to advance in Cyprus, provisions must be equally shared so that both sides see the relationship as mutually beneficial. In this way, cooperative relationships and joint action could address the political division of the island.

Some efforts from Cyprus have focused on creating a cross-boundary, creative approach to addressing shared environmental issues already, although not entirely related to water management but other sectors of environmental concern. In a sustainability-focused campaign
entitled “Cyprus 2015” that began in 2011, Program Directors Layik Topcan and Spyros Christou have discussed the necessity of finding issues where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can work together. The campaign highlighted how improved agricultural planning, as well as improved energy use and mobility, were key components to improving sustainable practices in Cyprus while finding common ground between the communities (Cyprus 2015).

Additionally, the framework commonly used to present the “peacemaking through sustainable development” argument must be adjusted to be more relevant to the Cyprus conflict. Many of the environmental peacekeeping projects have been initiated in developing countries, with large numbers of ethnic groups and highly extractive industries. In the Cyprus conflict, there are not nearly as many ethnic groups, and economic sectors are more diverse in that they are not fully dependent on natural resources and resource extraction.

This paper has examined the Turkey-TRNC water pipeline through a variety of hydropolitical lenses to show how the water provision project goes farther than just that--it can be understood as a legitimizing tool to advance the interests of Turkey on both a national, international, and regional scale. Although the Turkey-TRNC water supply has been posited as a solution by the Turkish government, it is clear that it fails to address the longstanding tension between the island’s communities, and instead, has caused further divide between them. Incorporating principles of environmental peacebuilding is essential for Cyprus to address both its growing water concerns and its enduring territorial disputes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
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(Un)orthodoxy in Georgian Democracy: The Paradox of Russo-Georgian Church & State Relations
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Despite Georgia’s extensive efforts to redefine itself since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, this South Caucasus state has yet to fully detach itself from Russian influences. After the civil and separatist conflicts of the mid-1990s, Georgia faced a crisis caused by a rapidly declining economy and an ineffective government (Kalichava 197). Remnants of the bygone Soviet “bureaucratic machine” were visible in Georgian political leadership at the time, making Georgia one of the most corrupt countries in the world by the year 2003 (198). That year, a corrupted parliamentary election incited protests that would start the Rose Revolution. President Eduard Shevardnadze, a former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, resigned, and his successor, President Mikheil Saakashvili, assumed the presidency in early 2004. Since the mid-2000s, political rhetoric in Georgia has formally focused on European integration, with the primary goal of EU and NATO membership. However, sustained challenges to integration, particularly lingering Russian interests and influence in Georgia, have stalled Georgia’s “European Project.” Russia’s formal recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war indicates that European integration would have significant consequences for Georgia. Russia’s recognition of these separatist territories led Georgia and Russia to sever diplomatic ties (Hudson 191). Amid the political tensions that define Russo-Georgian relations, the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) has remained remarkably close to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). This paper will argue that the significance of the GOC to Georgian national identity and culture exacerbates Russo-Georgian political tensions by opening a route for Russian cultural influence that destabilizes Georgian democracy. Despite ongoing challenges to the integrity of Georgian democracy, the Georgian people remain committed to democracy and resistant to Russian influences, suggesting that the country will continue pursuing its own democratic society, keeping its relations with the EU, NATO and Russia in mind.

Georgia’s pro-European aspirations emerged in a context of social, economic, and political tumult after the collapse of the Soviet system. These aspirations have gained traction following key events, including the 2003 Rose Revolution, the 2008 war with Russia, and the 2012 elections, reflecting Georgians’ support for integration. Despite a clear vision and a degree of social, political, and economic progress, Georgia, as a post-Soviet country, still faces significant opposition from Russia in realizing its goals for European integration. Nevertheless, Georgia differentiates itself from its South Caucasus neighbors through a staunch commitment to a European future for its citizens (German 603). Post-Soviet leadership in Georgia continually pushes a narrative of Europeanness and reunion between Georgia and its European heritage. Georgian heritage is also an important part of this narrative, emphasizing the closeness among Georgians based on the Georgian language, the GOC and shared territory (Ingle “Maia Otarashvili”). The country envisions a future defined by a pivot toward Europe and away from the Russian sphere, with membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO as foundational parts of this goal. Georgia’s National Security Concept, published in 2011, emphasizes that a
“return to Europe” is a “natural” part of the country’s post-Soviet development (German 608). Georgia’s cultural ties to Europe are generally accepted in the international community, sending a clear message that it wants to break out of the Russian sphere.

Positioning Georgia on the path to membership in European organizations is, therefore, a calculated step in the country’s post-independence transition and reconfiguration. Georgian Europeanness is neither frivolous nor artificial because the concept of Georgian Europeanness is just as much sociocultural as it is geopolitical. The extent of this commitment to Europe is readily visible in Georgia. The European Union flag flies alongside the Georgian flag in front of police stations, both rural and urban, as well as outside the Georgian Parliament building (See Appendix A, fig. 1). In this context, the EU flags symbolize Georgians’ decision to commit to European organizations and Western civilization (Ingle “Dr. Robert Hamilton”). They are, therefore, manifestations of political rhetoric, signaling disconnection from Georgia’s Soviet past and affirming its goals for a European future. According to political leadership, forming Georgia’s contemporary national identity and international role requires alignment with European Union and NATO member states in a clear rejection of lingering Russian military, political, and cultural influence in the South Caucasus region and broader post-Soviet space.

Contemporary Georgia’s political rhetoric holds that Georgia is naturally European, belongs to Western civilization and shares common values with Western democracies. It asserts that Georgia was cut off from its natural course of development by historical events, namely the conquests of Russian Imperial and Soviet occupation from the early nineteenth century to 1991 (German 613). Political leadership expresses pride in Georgia’s past, citing the integrity of their language, territory, and religion despite multiple long periods of external domination.

While Georgia clearly exerts its European heritage in modern politics, the country also embraces its role as a crossroads between the civilizational concepts of “East” and “West.” The Georgian National Museum in Tbilisi features a quote from Noe Zhordania, head of the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, in 1921 saying,

What do we offer to the cultural treasure of European nations? — [our] two-thousand-year-old national culture, democratic system, and natural wealth. Soviet Russia offered us military alliance, which we rejected… They are heading for the East and we, for the West… we would like to yell at Russian Bolsheviks: turn to the West to make a contemporary European nation… (See fig. 2)

Similar narratives of Georgia’s enduring cultural heritage and resistance to occupation exist in contemporary social and political rhetoric. For example, the European Union supported an exhibit at the Georgian National Museum as part of the European Year of Cultural Heritage in 2018. Plaques at the entrance described Georgia and the Caucasus as “a bridge between Near East and Europe” responsible for the spread of technology and culture between these regions (See fig. 3). Likewise, another plaque in the exhibition describes Georgia as being located “at the crossroad of cultures” (See fig. 4). Russia is treated as a “threat to the very existence of the Georgian nation” in Georgia’s contemporary historical narrative (Kyle 237). Location, therefore,
is an important consideration for Georgia not only culturally, but also economically and politically.

Russian influence creates tensions in Georgian society not only in the sociopolitical sphere, but also in the religious sphere due to the ROC’s close ties to the GOC. Georgia’s Christian identity is a core element of its proclaimed Europeanness. Christianity was adopted in Georgia in the fourth century (Coene 4). In the fifth century AD the Patriarchate of Antioch granted the GOC autocephaly, but this autonomy ended when Georgia was taken over by the Russian Empire in the early nineteenth century. Tsar Alexander I abolished the GOC and made it an exarchate of the ROC in 1811 (Hudson 179). The GOC managed to reclaim its patriarchate in 1917, but was controlled by the Soviet Union until 1991. As a result, the GOC underwent nearly two centuries of “Russification” (Hudson 180). Georgian Orthodoxy is a core pillar of contemporary Georgian national identity and has filled a sociopolitical and ideological vacuum after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Hudson 180). Reasserting the role of the GOC in Georgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union served as part of the country’s national narrative construction in support of its “European Project.”

Unlike in the Western European democracies to which Georgia aspires, the church and state are not separated in Georgia. The GOC has been involved in both Georgia’s domestic politics and foreign relations since the 1990s. In the post-Soviet period, politicians were baptized in the GOC and used religious rhetoric in their public statements. President Shevardnadze legally recognized the GOC, and Article 9 of the Constitution was amended in 1995 to recognize the GOC’s “special role” in Georgian national history (Hudson 180). In 2002, a Concordat was signed between the GOC and the state, recognizing the GOC’s autonomy and “exclusive status in Georgian history, culture and national ideology and among the traditional religions of Europe” (Hudson 181). The Concordat elevated the position of the GOC above other religious identities and connected its history to Georgian statehood (Ingle “Dr. Vasilii Rukhadze”). Patriarch Ilia began to participate in political processes and became a driver of social cohesion (Hudson 180). When Mikheil Saakashvili became president, he attempted to reduce the GOC’s power, but quickly failed. Instead, he resorted to promoting an image of close relations with the GOC. He began to give the GOC approximately $24 million annually, but his surface-level support of the GOC was clear and is likely to have contributed to his electoral loss in 2012 (Ingle “Dr. Vasilii Rukhadze”). In 2015, 91% of the Georgian population reported trust in the GOC, and the GOC continues to exert strong influence over societal opinions in Georgia, including cultural development and the population’s worldview. As a result, the GOC has become a key symbol of Georgia’s national identity, despite variance in actual religiosity among Georgians (Hudson 181). With its important role in Georgian national identity, the GOC serves Georgian society in roles that civil society organizations and government institutions have failed to fill.

The primacy of Georgian Orthodoxy in contemporary Georgian identity would suggest that the GOC would want independence from the Moscow Patriarchate of the ROC. Instead, the country’s most prominent religious figure, Patriarch Ilia, remains closely aligned with the Moscow Patriarchate (Hudson 183). Despite the GOC’s institutional independence from the Moscow Patriarchate, the ROC is known to sponsor religious programs in Georgia, and Patriarch
Ilia often uses themes that some Georgians view as pro-Russian and anti-Western (Hudson 185). The Patriarch generally condemns “soulless” Western culture, criticizing it as materially rich but spiritually poor. He perceives EU and NATO membership as threats to Georgian religious and national ideology that would damage Georgian society (Hudson 186). Despite this opposition to Western European society, the Patriarch is unable to go against the public will, which generally supports EU and NATO membership as a path to social, political, and cultural freedom and economic prosperity (Hudson 187).

In this sense, the GOC is both a conduit for Russian influence and an important channel for communication between Georgia and Russia in the absence of diplomatic relations since the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 (Hudson 192). Despite the complicated, and potentially controversial role of the GOC in Georgian society and politics, Patriarch Ilia is frequently cited as the most-trusted figure in Georgia as trust in Georgian democratic institutions declines (Chelidze 125). Church-state relations in Georgia reveal a paradox between pro- and anti-Russian as well as pro- and anti-liberal democracy sentiments, which are only further complicated by politicians’ connections to Russian power and wealth.

Transitioning from the Soviet system to an independent democracy proved a formidable challenge in Georgia, and the country has achieved a limited degree of success in advancing its democratic institutions. The unpredictability of Georgian government institutions’ effectiveness raises concerns among Western countries because functional democratic governance is a central pillar of European values. In the post-Soviet period, Georgian leadership was not elected through democratic elections, and the political space was destabilized by civil and ethnic conflicts in the 1990s. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first president of independent Georgia, was deposed in 1992 and replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, a former Soviet minister of foreign affairs who had been invited back from Russia, in 1995. Gamsakhurdia had not been recognized within the international community, and the arrival of Shevardnadze marked an early turning point in Georgian-European relations. Soon after his appointment, hopes for Western protections and a new era of foreign policy rose domestically (Coene 11). The duality of Shevardnadze’s political career, built in both Russia and Georgia, made him a complicated figure in Georgian politics. Likewise, his relationship with Russia complicated the advancement of Georgian political development and foreign policy goals. Georgia’s political rhetoric was increasingly focused on EU and NATO integration by the early 2000s, but the ineffectiveness of Georgian politics at this time rendered these efforts largely fruitless. Shevardnadze had ample international recognition and was committed to supplanting Soviet influences with a narrative of European heritage and Georgian Orthodox tradition. However, his corrupt government failed to address declining domestic conditions and drove Georgian politics to a breaking point in the early 2000s (Coene 3). The government’s inability to establish an effective political system or a sense of societal security led to protests in late 2003 that would set Georgia on a path to more intensive democratization (Hudson 180). At the same time, this institutional weakness facilitated the growth of the GOC’s power as the Georgian population looked for an institution on which it could rely for social stability.
A rigged parliamentary election in November 2003 incited protests in Georgia that culminated in what is known as the Rose Revolution. President Shevardnadze was ousted, and various politicians from his administration assumed power. Mikheil Saakashvili, founder of the opposition party United National Movement (UNM) won 97% of votes in a redo of the election in January 2004, enacting a variety of reforms to address domestic issues that had been neglected by Shevardnadze (Kalichava 198). During Saakashvili’s presidency, domestic policies and significant foreign assistance facilitated the near elimination of petty corruption and the creation of an entirely new police force. Between 2003 and 2012 Georgia’s ranking on the Transparency International corruption index moved from 127 to 51 out of 133 countries (Kalichava 197). Since the 2003 Rose Revolution catalyzed intensive development and reforms, Georgia has actively pursued privatization and market liberalization and attracted foreign investment, causing Russo-Georgian relations to further decline (Kalichava 199). Though Saakashvili is known as a modernizer in Georgian politics, his practices had authoritarian tendencies. During his presidency, the power of the GOC grew immensely, and corruption flourished (Ingle “Dr. Vasili Rukhadze”). President Saakashvili did not correctly interpret Western democracy, meaning that his reforms were not as successful as many consider them to be. Moreover, the Rose Revolution disrupted the checks and balances of the Georgian government, vastly increasing presidential power (Dobbins 761). As a result, dissatisfaction with the administration grew and Georgian political parties splintered.

As political tensions mounted toward the 2010s, protests against the Saakashvili administration intensified. The government’s harsh response to these demonstrations amplified public discontent with the UNM and fortified the oppositional Georgian Dream party (Coene 3). The 2012 parliamentary elections were Georgia’s first peaceful transition of power since independence and a key turning point for both domestic and international relations. Emerging opposition parties had been consolidated into the Georgian Dream party, the winner of the 2012 elections (Coene 3). Tensions between the Georgian Dream parliament and UNM-affiliated President Saakashvili continued until Georgian Dream-affiliated candidate Giorgi Margvelashvili was elected as president in 2013. Since the 2012 parliamentary election, the Georgian Dream party has further consolidated political power. Georgian Dream was founded by the multi-billionaire former Georgian Prime Minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is also the largest individual shareholder of the Russian energy company Gazprom. Appointments of party members, often made by Ivanishvili, frequently raise questions of corruption and the party’s influence makes electoral success extremely difficult for opposition candidates (Ingle “Maia Otarashvili”). Since 2013, power has been consolidated by the ruling Georgian Dream coalition and press freedom, which has been declining since the Rose Revolution, has been curtailed (Kyle 243). These trends have continued to the present (Ingle “Maia Otarashvili”). Despite a strong public commitment to democratic development, the realities of Georgian politics suggest that political freedom and democratic processes are constrained by highly concentrated power, restrictions on opposition media and corruption.

The 2018 presidential election became another important moment in Georgia’s political history. President Salomé Zourabichvili’s campaign billboards were visible throughout Tbilisi,
showing both the Georgian and EU flags, making a strong statement about her stance on the European project. The significance of these elections, however, was not the question of European integration, but rather the future of Georgian presidential election procedures (Ayvazyan 79). After the initial introduction of a constitutional reform in 2017, presidential elections in Georgia were planned to change to a proportional electoral system in 2020 to reduce the power of the ruling Georgian Dream party’s parliamentary super majority (Lomsadze 2019). Given the increasing polarity of Georgian politics, the result of popular frustration with the Georgian Dream’s political monopoly, key issues such as European integration and separatist territories will increase tensions as trust in democratic institutions declines, potentially guaranteeing that an election reform of some sort will pass (NDI 2020). Recent waves of protests in Tbilisi show the effects of decreased satisfaction with Georgian democracy, warning of increased political instability (Buziashvili “Georgia’s Pro-Democracy”).

Despite the relative success of democratization in Georgia, recent divisiveness in domestic politics, proposed electoral reforms and waves of protests signal a popular response to persistent authoritarian tendencies in Georgia’s democratic government. The Georgian Dream government fears losing its grip on political power through election reform, but voters are committed to changing the electoral system. A reform that was promised in July 2019 failed, and a deal announced March 2020 would require a constitutional reform, furthering popular distrust and leaving the status of the 2020 election uncertain (Ingle “Maia Otarashvili”). The absence of pluralism in a democracy increases the risk of a country’s regression to more authoritarian governance, indicating that a strong Georgian civil society is essential to supporting democratic reforms and improving government transparency (Kyle 243). Georgians are frustrated by their government’s failure to serve national interests, and they are invested in inciting change.

Though the integrity of Georgian democratic institutions appears to have eroded within the last decade, strong civil engagement and citizen commitment to democracy will prevent a transition to authoritarian governance. The success of the Rose Revolution in 2003 not only initiated pro-Western reforms but also created citizen-led change. The Rose Revolution protests were an early indicator of strong civil engagement in Georgia, and this positive trend continues today. Georgia’s “robust” civil society has manifested again since 2018 in various waves of protests against election practices and the closeness of the Russian and Georgian Orthodox Churches. Popular participation indicates that Georgians are prepared to defend democracy (Ingle “Maia Otarashvili”).

In March 2018, the Interior Ministry raided two nightclubs in Tbilisi, reviving dialogue about liberalizing national drug policies and sparking protests that carried into the early summer. The origins of these protests dated back to June 2017, when a youth movement called White Noise began in Tbilisi and Batumi after the arrest of two Georgian rappers for drug possession. Interestingly, Bidzina Ivanishvili’s rapper son, Bera, gave public support for the rappers as Prime Minister Kvirikashvili and Interior Minister Giorgi Gakharia were under fire for their response to the protests (Oravec 249). The May 2018 protests made many conservative Georgians uneasy and prompted a strong reaction from ultranationalist groups. These groups condemned nightclubs, popular among international tourists, as places of immoral deviation and drug abuse
while physically and verbally assaulting pro-reform protesters. (Lomsadze 2018). Thousands of protestors participated in demonstrations that, combined with a lawsuit, prompted successful narcotics reform in summer 2018, overturning regulations left over from Soviet times (Oravec 250). The events in mid-2018, focused on policy reforms, revealed a significant rift between the liberal youth and conservative groups of Georgian society, one that has carried into more recent protests.

On June 20, 2019, Sergei Gavrilov, a Russian Parliament member with close ties to the Kremlin and ROC, visited the Georgian Parliament. When he addressed the Georgian Parliament, he sat in the speaker’s chair, which many Georgians perceived as an insult to Georgian sovereignty and a betrayal by their government for inviting him to speak (Buziashvili “Gavrilov’s Night”). The intensity of the response to this event, now popularly known as “Gavrilov’s Night,” reflects the controversial connections between the GOC, ROC and Kremlin. Given that the event occurred within the Georgian Parliament, it sparked days of protests in Tbilisi. Gavrilov has publicly shown support for the Kremlin’s 2008 recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, meaning that he supports what Georgians refer to as an illegal occupation of twenty percent of their territory by the Russian military (Buziashvili “Gavrilov’s Night”). Georgians’ response to this event demonstrates popular discontent with the power dynamic between church and state and between Russia and Georgia. A variety of pages on social media platforms attempted to discredit the protests by framing demonstrators as “drug dealers, drug addicts, LGBT activists, members of the opposition, or criminals” (Buziashvili “Gavrilov’s Night”). While these internet posts may suggest disinformation on behalf of Russia or Georgian political groups, they also reveal a splintering of Georgian society. While protesters condemned Russian influence in Georgian politics and the GOC, malicious social media posts framed demonstrators as members of the groups believed by the ROC and GOC to be enemies of traditional Orthodox Christian values (Hudson 186).

Additional protests broke out in November 2019 in response to the government’s failure to pass its promised election reform. Protestors took to the streets in Tbilisi to express their discontent with the ruling Georgian Dream party. Some decorated their tents with photos of Bidzina Ivanishvili, while others went so far as to march to his mansion that overlooks the city (Lomsadze 2019). The failure to pass the election reform was perceived as a threat to democracy. Reform negotiations, mediated by American and European diplomats, continued until Gigi Ugalava, head of the opposition party European Georgia, was sentenced to at least three years in prison on embezzlement charges on February 10, 2020 (Lomsadze “Georgian Parties Reach Agreement”). Opposition leaders accused the court of taking orders from the government when deciding its verdict on the case (Kucera 2020). Until an election reform is passed, it is likely these cycles of protest will continue.

Even more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the practical complexity of church-state relations in Georgia. Despite resistance to its efforts, the Georgian government achieved relative success in controlling the spread of coronavirus. After the first case was reported on February 26, 2020, the Georgian government created a task force to prevent the spread of the virus and manage its effects (Turp-Balazs 2020). While the government’s response
to the pandemic was swift and decisive, the GOC directly contradicted government-issued guidelines. With the 2020 presidential elections approaching, however, the government was weary of upsetting its relations with the GOC.

Since support from the GOC is important for the current government, it has not formally contested the continued operation of churches (Turp-Balazs 2020). Against the orders of health officials, Easter services were held in churches on April 19, drawing large crowds of worshippers (Hauer 2020). GOC officials claimed that sacramental bread and wine, consumed from shared spoons, could not transmit the virus because they were holy. Despite the closeness of the GOC to Georgian national identity, its responses to the pandemic have sparked unprecedented criticism from the population (Lomsadze “Coronavirus Testing Georgia’s Faith”). Many also criticized the government’s inaction toward the GOC, noting that laws were not being equally enforced. Despite the Georgian Dream government’s coordinated response to coronavirus, its special treatment of the GOC could dampen any political gains from this action (Hauer 2020). As the election draws nearer and economic conditions in the country decline amid the pandemic, church-state relations and election reform are among the biggest interests of Georgian voters.

Recent protests and events in Georgia are a microcosm of key tensions in contemporary Georgian society and politics. Tensions between the more liberal younger generation and more conservative groups of the Georgian population manifest in church and state relations and reactions to Russian influences. Communication between the ROC and GOC helps Russia exploit these political tensions to hinder Georgia’s goals of EU and NATO integration. The Georgian people are generally frustrated by stalled democratization exacerbated by the consolidation of power by the Georgian Dream party. Despite the sociocultural and political tensions among the GOC, Georgian Dream Party, ROC, Russia and the Georgian people, Georgians have repeatedly protested against these influences, demonstrating the strength of Georgian civil society. Beside tensions between leaders, the most problematic of whom have connections to Russia, and the people, the liberal-conservative rift in Georgian society highlights the peculiar influence of the ROC in contemporary Georgia. While more liberal groups in Georgia protest police raids of clubs and Soviet-era drug policies, conservative Georgians fear a moral decline. Nowhere is this tension, and paradox, greater in Georgian society than in its interests in joining the EU. Despite the fact that 77% of the population supports joining the EU, many Georgians, not just Patriarch Ilia, consider the EU as a threat to their culture and values (NDI 2019). Though Patriarch Ilia has expressed his distaste for the perceived immorality of Western European culture, Georgians’ widespread support of EU accession means that he must support Georgia’s European Project or risk losing popular trust (Hudson 187). Patriarch Ilia’s moral stances are often perceived as pro-Russian because they express a narrative of conservative culture and values similar to that of Russia and the ROC (Hudson 197). Russia prides itself on a more “traditional [and morally superior] understanding of European heritage,” and uses this narrative to discredit social liberalization in EU member states (Hudson 178). Despite ideological similarity, the GOC promotes the reunification of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, directly contradicting the ROC and Kremlin’s interests. Russian influence on the GOC, therefore, is confined mostly to social issues, rebuilding influence lost when diplomatic
relations were cut in 2008. While some Georgians may truly believe that European initiatives are “imposing” ultra-liberal values on them, most recognize that the social, cultural and political freedoms associated with the “European dream” mean that Georgian heritage would not be lost if EU and NATO membership were achieved (Hudson 187). For the time being, Russia intends to keep Georgian politics polarized and unstable enough that NATO and the EU remain apprehensive about Georgian accession (Buziashvili “Georgia’s Pro-Democracy”). Whether or not Georgia joins these organizations, it is apparent that Russian political and cultural influence is not yet a thing of the past. Georgia, bordering with Russia but looking to the EU, must continue to fight for its own definition of European heritage if it wishes to balance between Russia’s traditional interpretation of Europeanness and the liberalized society of the EU.
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Appendix A: Images

Figure 1: The European Union flies alongside the Georgian flag in front of a police station in the town of Khashuri (left) and in front of the Parliament of Georgia (right). Khashuri and Tbilisi, January 2020. Author’s photos.
Figure 2: Quote from Noe Zhordania in the Georgian National Museum. Tbilisi, January 2020. Author’s photo.
**Figure 3:** Exhibition at the Georgian National Museum hosted through the EU’s European Year of Cultural Heritage (2018) referring to Georgia as “a bridge between Near East and Europe.” Tbilisi, January 2020. Author’s photo.
Figure 4: Plaque at Georgian National Museum refers to Georgia as “a crossroad of culture.” Tbilisi, January 2020. Author’s photo.
ART AND REPRESENTATION IN SOCIETY
Polite Propaganda: Narratives of Progress and Stagnation in Brezhnev-Era Soft Power
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In an issue of *Soviet Life* from 1988, a full-page photograph depicts a woman in a denim jumpsuit and knee-high waders toting a shotgun as she strolls through a field (Fil). The subheading proclaims: “Elena Mashina gave up excellent prospects for a job in the capital to become a forest manager in the Carpathian Mountains” (23). The three-page article contains no shortage of pictures idealizing Mashina’s new rural lifestyle—she is shown patrolling the forest with her spaniel and teaching her two children how to gather mushrooms. A simple, laidback kind of glamour characterizes Mashina’s life in the Carpathians; in one shot, she glares into the camera while eating an apple. In another, she kneels by a waterfall to drink from the stream.

Mashina’s preference for life in the Carpathians embodies a mindset that became pervasive in the Soviet Union during the 1960s and 70s. As exemplified by the Village Prose movement, the countryside began to occupy an important role within Russian national identity. Nationalist thinkers understood the decline of rural Russian values to have disastrous implications for the moral integrity of the Soviet state. By the 1980s, that narrative was reflected in polite propaganda, with articles like this one which celebrate Mashina’s rejection of urban life in favor of a career in nature.

The Village Prose (*derevenskaya proza*) movement, which began in the late 1950s, was one of the earliest and most important components of the revival of Russian nationalism that took place in the Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s. In essence, the movement consisted of novels and short stories that “idealized the traditional Russian village as the embodiment of Russia’s moral values” (Brudny 11). The Village Prose movement was important in that it conflicted with the state-favored, Socialist Realist literature. Socialist Realism asked artists and writers to capture an idealized form of Soviet future, and as such, essentially served as a governing doctrine for Soviet culture.

Crucially, the authors of Village Prose were of a rural background; this was in stark opposition to the Socialist Realist *kolkhoz* literature of the Stalinist period, which, though it focused on collective farms, did so from an urban perspective. Village Prose can be characterized as encompassing themes such as:

…the rural/urban split, criticism of government policy in the countryside, the revival of Russian national and religious sentiment, a search for national values, a concern for the environment, and a nostalgia generated by the loss of traditional rural life… (Parthe 22)

In the context of this literature, the traditional village held an important symbolic status in the zeitgeist of Russian national identity; the decline of rural Russia was understood to have disastrous implications for the Russian people.

The emergence of Village Prose, according to Yitzhak Brundy and Kathleen Parthe, was the result of the Khrushchev era’s relaxation of restraint of public discussion surrounding certain topics. The literature of that time period in some ways mirrored pre-Petrine literature of the Tsarist era; there was a “cultural canon,” but there was also a “zone of permitted anomalies, exceptions to the rules” (Brudny 10). Village Prose fell into the latter category.
Brudny identifies three factors that contributed to the relaxed censorship under which Village Prose emerged. First, and most importantly, the Khrushchev Politburo’s recognition of the fact that suppressing public opinion (in light of unified opposition to terror among political elites) was impossible. Instead, political leadership pursued a policy of “opening a window” for public discussion whenever a policy issue became particularly salient (Brudny 46). The second and third factors are related to the particular windows that Khrushchev opened. Those windows explain “the content and form of Russian nationalism” during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras; in other words, they explain the rise of Village Prose (46).

The first window open to public debate during the Khrushchev era was agriculture. For the entirety of his tenure, Khrushchev remained deeply interested in improving Soviet agriculture, and invested much of his political capital in revitalizing agricultural performance after its decline during the late Stalinist period. It is therefore logical that public discussions surrounding agriculture (in terms of technology and economy, as well as its relationship to Russian national character) increased during the Khrushchev era. Khrushchev’s efforts to revitalize agriculture were intended to overcome Soviet reliance on foreign food, in order to help achieve communism by 1980. In spite of distinctly future-oriented intentions, the open window for discussion of rural Russia gave rise to an idealization of the Russian village.

The second crucial window opened to public discussion was in essence the same window opened at the Twentieth Party Congress— the window that gave intellectuals and the population at large the ability to criticize Stalinism. Primarily, criticism of Stalin revolved around the weapons of political terror that he had directed towards ethnic groups, imagined enemies, intellectual dissidents, and political rivals within the party itself. However, this open window also allowed for the criticism of a number of other Stalinist narratives: it challenged the Stalinist aggrandization of industry; it allowed for a group of authors to re-introduce the concept of nature as that which must be submitted to, as opposed to that which should be overcome; and it emphasized the importance of national and material continuity, as opposed to complete revolution (Parthe 4).

The historical circumstances that served as a petri dish for the emergence of Village Prose also allowed for the projection of those same new narratives and values through Soviet soft power. Specifically, they facilitated an increase in the visibility of rural life, natural landscapes, and environmentalist narratives in Soviet Life magazine. Those articles exhibit an embrace and “advertisement” of the same new values that Parthe identifies as characteristic of the Village Prose movement (Garver 480). In this sense, Soviet Life demonstrates the way that narratives of Russian nationhood emerging in the domestic zeitgeist were subsequently reflected in projects of soft power.

Articles about nature in Soviet Life magazine during the 1960s and 70s do not demonstrate pride in exclusively Russian landscapes. On the contrary, nature from other Soviet republics also featured heavily. I still argue, however, that these features on non-Russian environments within the Soviet Union can be seen as an expression of Russian nationalist sentiment.

The basis for my argument rests on the concept that one component of nationalism involves defining the rightful territorial boundaries of the nation (Brudny 5). In this case— what territory should Russia rightfully exert its cultural and political control over? In the twentieth
century, dominant political ethos was informed by the “one state-one nation” principle; in other words, the boundaries of Russian political control should not extend past the point at which Russians can no longer be considered a demographic majority. By contrast, Russian nationhood in the Soviet period was imperial by nature; it imagined that the Russian culture and nationhood absorbed and appropriated the nationhoods of the Soviet Union’s smaller constituent republics.

The Soviet party line was deliberately ambiguous as “to whether the USSR was the Russian nation-state or a multinational federation,” as reflected by the primarily ethnically Russian composition of political, administrative, and military elites (Brudny 7). The result was that Russian narratives of nationhood took on a neo-imperialist character; the problem with the Soviet Union, Russian nationalism dictated, was that it was not Russian enough. As a result, during the emergence of national Bolshevism in the 1930s, the rightful territory of the Russian nation was redrawn to accommodate non-Russian republics within the Soviet Union. Thus, *Soviet Life* features on Albanian and Ukrainian villages can be understood as an expression of Russian nationalism, and as another facet of the soft-power appropriation of the Russian Village Prose movement.

Articles about Russian and Soviet nature were never absent from *Soviet Life*, but by the 1980s (on the coattails of the peak of the Village Prose movement) the Soviet environment held a more prominent focus within the magazine. This is evidenced not only in specific articles that demonstrate a renewed focus on the village as the source of Soviet cultural values, but also in the organization and formatting of the magazine as a whole. Specifically, when compared to the 1960s, the format of the Table of Contents page in issues from the eighties place a specific emphasis on nature and environmentalism.

This is apparent based on the fact that articles about nature in *Soviet Life* issues from the 1960s are categorized within the Table of Contents under the subheadings of either “Economy and Science” or “Miscellaneous.” For example, one issue from 1962 features an article about the Vakhsh River under the category of “Economy and Science” (19); the same issue categorizes a photo feature titled “Spring” under the category of “Miscellaneous” (45). By contrast, issues from the 1980s carve out dedicated space within the Table of Contents for articles related to nature and environmentalism. Articles such as “Oak Grove in the Kaunas” and “Nature
Preserves: Ecological Paradise?” appear under the subheading “Environment” (Soviet Life November 25).

The same trend— increase in the editorial valuation of Soviet nature— is apparent in the complete reformatting of the Table of Contents page to include a map of the Soviet Union, which pinpoints a different locale or natural formation to focus on in that issue. The map serves as a focal point of the Table of Contents page, and also influences the content of the issue. For example, one issue focuses on Estonia and the Ural Mountains; another, on Arkhangelsk and the Kamchatka Peninsula (Soviet Life July).

Articles on similar topics in Soviet Life issues of the 1960s versus the 1980s demonstrate the same dichotomous contrasts that Parthe notes between the characteristics of Socialist Realist literature and Village Prose. Particularly, articles on agriculture shift from a tone that resembles kolkhoz novels to one that more closely mirrors that of the Village Prose writers. In keeping with Khrushchev’s corn crusade, articles in the 1960s tend to focus on agriculture from the standpoint of economic productivity and technological development. By contrast, articles in the 1980s tend to emphasize the centrality of agriculture to Russian culture and go to great lengths to demonstrate the high value placed on rural life as opposed to urban.

One article titled “Ex-Minister Turned Farmer,” exemplifies that contrast particularly well (Grashchenkov 10). The article is a biographical feature of Harold Mannik, the Estonian Minister of Agriculture, who gave up his government job in favor of life on a farm in Tartu. In the article, Mannik is introduced as a clear protagonist— the son of peasant farmers, who rose through the ranks of Estonian bureaucracy, only to relinquish his career success in favor of a more traditional way of life.

The author, Alexander Grashchenkov, pokes fun at the privilege of government workers as a way to highlight the central importance of agriculture:

I wonder what the huge army of bureaucrats will do when the administrative apparatus is reduced appreciably. What will happen to the people who are used to endless paperwork and whose only talent is writing all sorts of instructions and resolutions when they eventually have to leave their comfortable offices? They are probably in for very hard times. (Grashchenkov 11)

Among those privileged bureaucrats, Mannik is presented as a modest man of a humble, rural background— a hometown hero of sorts, who never forgot his roots. The farming skills learned
in his childhood served him well during his tenure as Minister of Agriculture, and particularly on one trip to the countryside to inspect farms:

Mannik opened the trunk of his car, took out green all-weather boots, put them on, and set off confidently through the mud. The others accompanying him had no special protection for their feet, but they followed the boss anyway, in their dress coats and tailored suits. (Grashchenkov 12)

He maintains his rural hardiness in retirement, as Grashchenkov demonstrates through both images and descriptive language—during their interview, Mannik wears “green overalls, green weather-killer boots, and a traditional Estonian cap” (13).

The characterization of Mannik as a man of the countryside only helps to drive home the ultimate point of the article, which becomes clear when Grashchenkov asks Mannik about his path to success in the agricultural bureaucracy. As Mannik explains, he was initially opposed to the appointment—he rushed to Tallinn to make his appeal to the Central Committee, claiming that he could not accept the appointment as Minister: “Please, I don’t want to lose touch with peasant work” (12).

Eventually, however, Mannik attributes his success as Minister to his seemingly metaphysical connection with the peasant community in rural Estonia: “My conscience is clear. I never made farmers blindly follow all my instructions. True, I had to deal with my superiors. But I have always found the way” (12). In this way, *Soviet Life* uses Mannik’s biographical feature in order to demonstrate the importance of the presence of rural values in the state’s agricultural apparatus. It therefore assigns the same symbolic resonance to Soviet rural life as is demonstrated in Parthe’s conception of Village Prose.

Parthe points out that Village Prose and *kolkhoz* literature take place in distinct settings (axiomatically, the *kolkhoz* literature in the *kolkhoz*, and the Village Prose in a village). Although the village and the *kolkhoz* typically occupy the same physical space (several villages were contained within the typical *kolkhoz*), the village provides a sense of identity; the *kolkhoz*, of faceless industry (Parthe 5). An article from the 1960s demonstrates the opposite end of Parthe’s spectrum—rather than Village Prose, this article exhibits the characteristics of the Socialist Realist *kolkhoz* literature.

The article’s title, “Central Committee Meets on Farm Development: Soviet Agriculture Registers 60 Percent Increase Within Eight Years. This Rate Insufficient. New, Mighty Upsurge Required” in some ways speaks for itself (Volin 1). The six-page feature on the growth of the agricultural sector is surprisingly dry for a glossy magazine feature—it is packed full of
statistics, and visually, the black-and-white photographs of committee members in suits do not invoke nearly the same sense of pride in the rural Soviet Union as does the Mannik article.

Perhaps even more essentially, the content of the article makes it clear that the main characters in the agricultural industry are not the kolkhoz workers themselves; instead, they are the scientists, engineers, and party members who streamline the industry and enable the success of the collective farms:

Ukrainian farmers… are looking to scientists for high-yield, frost-resistant varieties of winter wheat… Zoologists are working on developing fast-growing and more fertile breeds of animals… Chemists are investigating more effective types of fertilizers and herbicides… Engineers are looking for ways of automating all farm operations. All of the sciences are being enlisted to create the abundance of farm commodities forecast in the new Program of the Communist Party. (6)

In this narrative of exponential growth in the agricultural sector, the farmers fade into the background. Instead, educated scientists and engineers accept the credit for that success.

At other points in the article, the author seems to indicate even more explicitly that kolkhozes are thriving in spite of the farmers, thanks to the assistance of the party administration:

The administration will send its people wherever they can help. For example, if a farm is not utilizing the machines in its livestock section to the best advantage, an engineer will be sent out to assist right on the spot. (6)

In this way, the article paints the educated, urban political and scientific actors as the protagonists in the march of agricultural progress; it demonstrates the way that science has been used to augment the productivity of the agricultural industry.

This type of narrative looks at rural Soviet spaces in terms of industry and progress. The article is very much engaged with the linear-progressive conception of history that informs so much of Marxist-Leninist ideology. It implies that agriculture can and should be organized according to logic and science; that life on the kolkhoz should run as precisely as a machine. In some ways, this narrative mirrors that of early Bolshevism— that peasant farmers are socially backwards, and only with the intervention of the state can they be organized productively enough to fuel the industrialization of the rest of the Soviet Union.

In this way, it provides a sharp contrast to the message of the Mannik article, which implies that Soviet agriculture draws its greatness from the continuation of traditional rural life and values. In one narrative, the state intervenes to rationally organize and maximize the productivity of a flawed system. In the other, it allows tradition, and an almost spiritual connection between nature and community, influence the direction of the state’s agricultural sector.

The two articles demonstrate the way in which the state’s understanding of the role of the Soviet village and rural culture in informing agriculture changed over the course of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. In the 1960s, success in the agricultural sector consisted of urban hegemony over Soviet rural spaces. By the 1980s, the state’s understanding of what contributed to agricultural success had shifted so as to encompass the values of traditional rural life.
One article in particular exemplifies the state’s new position regarding rural tradition and its compatibility with the new system of collective farms. “As the Farm Goes, so Goes the Nation” demonstrates the new perspective on the way in which rural tradition must be given its due within the organization of the collective farms (Platoshkin and Kurbatov 4). In an interview with Mikhail Vagin, chairman of the Lenin Collective Farm, Vagin describes the plight of the rural Soviet Union:

... our [agriculture] was ruined. Now it’s going to take a tremendous amount of work to bring it back. All the new patterns of farming need to be nurtured until the basic structures are resuscitated… It’s wrong to say that [collective farms] don’t work anymore. They just had no breathing space before. (5)

Vagin highlights the way in which the timeline of Russian rural life was interrupted by the interjection of the state in the process of collectivization. By the 1980s, however, the farming experience and wisdom gained from rural life had once again become valuable in the eyes of collective farm administrators.

Vagin’s interview also demonstrates the emergence of idealized conceptions of rural life within the urban imagination. Rural life had suddenly become fashionable. Vagin describes how “city folk” were “flooding into the countryside, dreaming of farmsteads of their own, even though the closest they’ve been to a cow was seeing one on television” (Platoshkin and Kurbatov 5). Village life suddenly came to exemplify the same type of Stakhanovite ambition and rapid-fire development that had characterized heavy industry decades before:

We country folk are ambitious. We want our houses to be better than the ones in the city. Have you seen how beautiful our streets are? Our homes are well built… Our school was designed by the best architects… We have a brand-new highway, too. You’d hardly want to leave a village like ours. (6)

In Vagin’s account of the situation in the countryside, the villages were flourishing— farmers earned more than the average city worker, and the standard of living was higher.

Parthe describes the emergence of a belief that attached the decline of the countryside to dangerous repercussions for the USSR as a whole. That belief is reflected in Soviet Life in the form of a bold-faced text inset on a large black-and-white photograph of a somber looking farmer— “What matters most now is encouraging farmers to stay on the farm” (Platoshkin and Kurbatov 7).

Parthe notes another dichotomy between the Socialist Realist depictions of the countryside and derevenskaya representations of the Russian environment. While kolkhoz literature tends to emphasize human dominance over the natural world, Village Prose emphasizes submission to nature. Village Prose “spawned an environmental movement,” and Parthe argues that it did so using a combination of two types of writing: on the one hand, a romanticized, sentimental depiction of nature, and on the other, a more rational “assumption that if nature is abused, it will stop providing what people need to live” (Parthe 8). Changing attitudes towards the relationship between man and nature are apparent in Soviet Life issues from the 1960s and 80s.
An article from the 1960s entitled “Taming the Vakhsh” demonstrates the Socialist Realist perspective on the natural world (Sakharov 18). The story is one of an archetypal struggle of man against nature: the protagonist, Yuri Tchaikovsky, a “deeply tanned” engineer with travel worn shoes and a confident manner (19). Tchaikovsky is the head of the dam-building initiative that will create a 2.7 million-kilowatt power station on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan. Tchaikovsky is tough and experienced—he previously engineered a similar hydropower initiative on the Dnieper River.

But Tchaikovsky is up against a new, more formidable enemy this time around. The river is villainized—it “travels with terrific speed… crushing everything in its way,” and becomes “especially violent when the glaciers melt” (19). Tchaikovsky jovially refers to the river as a “ferocious beast”—one which will be tamed by his team of geologists, construction workers, and engineers. The article explicitly references the “conquest of nature” narrative that it exemplifies:

And meanwhile we have a real struggle between man and nature. It began a year ago… two months later came the first survey party of geologists. Next on site were Vladimir Khan and his team, demolition men and drillers from the neighboring Takobi mine… Now all along the boundaries of the future dam you can hear… the rumble of bulldozers and excavators chewing their way into the mountains. (19)

The article concludes on a particularly resonant note. Where there was once an old mountain village, there is now a modern settlement for the construction crew tasked with conquering the river, complete with a nursery, hospital, and movie theater. The author notes that “It won’t be long before the turbulent waters of the Vakhsh will be serving man” (Sakharov 21).

Several decades later, the fruits of the Village Prose movement are reflected in a Soviet Life article titled “Vasili Peskov: on Man and Nature” (Ananyev and Peskov). Peskov, a writer, photographer, television host, and environmentalist, demonstrates all three of Parthe’s tenets of Village Prose’s attitude towards nature. Peskov has been writing about the environment since the 1960s, and his early works take the form of short narratives about seemingly insignificant natural events. One such narrative, “The Russian Autumn” (excerpted in Soviet Life), demonstrates the kind of poetic waxing that Parthe attributes to some works of Village Prose:

There is a melancholy in the autumn landscapes of Russia; the kind of melancholy that always accompanies true love. In autumn our eyes see more clearly and our hearts feel more keenly… such is the state of nature. Such is the inner state of man… On a day like this, you have an especially acute feeling of being alive, of being part of the universe. (Peskov)

By the 1980s, Peskov had become both a well-known TV personality and an environmental activist. In the article, Peskov claims that his writing inspired him to become a defender of the “defenseless” (Ananyev and Peskov 20). His writing helped him to realize that he could not confine himself merely to understanding it—he must also dedicate himself to protecting it.

The sentiment reflected the Russian national consciousness as the Village Prose movement rose and fell over the course of the sixties and seventies. Within the context of Village
Prose, nature was first romanticized and then understood to have practical value. Both representations contributed to the rise of environmentalism for which Peskov advocated in the 1980s. Peskov’s repeated lament about the responsibility of man to nature (“Will our grandchildren be able to enjoy this Russian landscape unspoiled?”) provides a stark contrast to the depictions of nature in the “Taming the Vakhsh” article of the 1960s (Ananyev and Peskov 20).

In this way, Soviet Life reflects the re-emergence of derevenskaya conceptions of nature and environmentalism into the Russian consciousness. While industrial initiatives in the 1960s were depicted as struggles against man and science versus a violent and irrational nature, the role of man vis-à-vis nature had begun to resemble one of a protector by the 1980s. Changing values belied the influence of the Village Prose movement on projections of Soviet soft power.

In depictions of agriculture in Soviet Life, the dominant narrative of the 1960s had been turned on its head by the 1980s. The same scientists and politicians who had previously been tasked with modernizing the Russian farm were now accused of ignorance of the realities of life in the countryside. Narratives of the natural environment in the 1980s had abandoned the archetypal struggle of man against nature, and instead romanticized the environment as a defenseless treasure in need of human protection.

Soviet Life articles from the 1960s and 1980s demonstrate the changing role of Russian nature in the construction of Russian national identity, a change now projected outward as a form of polite propaganda. In earlier issues of Soviet Life, nature is treated with the rough hand of Socialist Realist values— it plays the role of the backwater threat to Soviet progress that the urban characters (scientists, engineers, and party members) must work to fix. In later issues, the Russian environment takes on a symbolic importance for the welfare of the Soviet Union as a whole— the experience of rural life is valued as a necessary component of a successful agricultural sector, and the newly prominent role of nature in the Russian identity is apparent in the rise of environmental activism.
Works Cited


Of the many genres under which Sara Nović’s *Girl at War* could be placed—a historical fiction, a war novel, or a coming-of-age story—perhaps the most surprising would be a fairytale. Based on true-life accounts, the book follows the tragic life of young Ana who at age ten witnesses unspeakable crimes against humanity during the bloody Croatian War, and whose tale does not necessarily contain a happy ending. In Part I, however, Ana’s father reads to her a beloved fairytale that foreshadows many of the events in her life: the tale of “Stribor’s Forest.” Nović herself states during a lecture that in her youth, her own father would make up stories “as a way to teach us things” (Nović “11th Annual”). The moral of “Stribor’s Forest” in *Girl at War* provides a metaphorical framework for Ana’s character arc. Although her story shares many motifs with the fairytale, Ana’s life primarily parallels that of the mother in the fairytale, Brunhilda: a woman who will never find peace until she understands the worth of her sorrowful life as an alternative to the ease of death.

In order to understand the intersectionality between Ana’s life and the fairytale, one must first be familiar with the story itself. The scene in which Ana’s father tells her of “Stribor’s Forest” takes place relatively early in the novel, on the night of their return from Ana’s sickly baby sister’s first checkup. Ana’s father begins to read from her favorite book, *Tales from Long Ago*, although it is soon revealed the bedtime story is so familiar that he need not use the book for anything more than a prop.

According to her father, the story goes as follows: One day a young man encounters Stribor’s Forest, an enchanted wood containing both black and white magic. Unbeknownst to the young man, the forest is under a spell that can only be broken when one enters who “prefer[s] his own life, even with its sorrows, over all the ease and happiness in the world” (Nović 35). In this magical realm, there appears a woman of surpassing beauty, with whom the young man instantly falls in love. He brings her home, unaware that she is actually a snake in disguise. The young man’s mother, Brunhilda—an improvised name for comedic effect—instantly recognizes the snake for what she is and tries to warn her son of the danger. However, the young man, blinded by the disguised snake’s beauty, ignores Brunhilda and marries the snake-woman. Soon Brunhilda is tasked with difficult chores by her evil new daughter-in-law. Each night, she lies awake crying and longing for an escape from this misery.

Then one night, Stribor, Lord of the Forest, sends fairies to sweep Brunhilda away to his castle, nestled inside the hollow of a great oak tree (Nović 37). Stribor offers Brunhilda flight from her sorrows by returning her youth. Brunhilda agrees, but with one foot in the gateway to youth, she asks what will become of her son. After learning that her son would not be with her in this new life, she refuses Stribor’s offer, stating, “I’d rather know my son than live happily as a young woman without him” (Nović 38). In this instant, the spell lifts and the daughter-in-law returns to her serpent form. Ana’s father concludes the bedtime story by asking if she...
understands the moral that “sometimes hard things are worth the trouble,” to which she replies, “I think so” (Nović 39).

As Ana claims in this scene, Tales From Long Ago is indeed a well-known compilation of fairytales inspired by Slavic folklore. Originally published in 1916 by Ivana Brlić-Mažuranić, Croatian Tales From Long Ago contains a medley of various Croatian folktales (“Literature”). Nović modifies and shortens the version of “Stribor’s Forest” that Ana hears in Girl at War, as Brlić-Mažuranić’s account, translated by F.S. Copeland in 1922, is roughly 20 pages long (Brlić-Mažuranić). Even in this abridged form, Nović keeps most of the key elements of the fairytale in her novel, similar to the way in which Brlić-Mažuranić condensed an array of folklore for her specific audience. According to an article published in the Yale University Library, “[Brlić-Mažuranić] did not use the words of these ancient stories didactically, but integrated them into her own imaginative world to evoke and reestablish their original meaning” (“Literature”). Additionally, Brlić-Mažuranić’s work is unique in that it was written specifically for a Croatian audience, as is supported by an article published in The Guardian, in which the author states, “[Brlić-Mažuranić] used the rudiments of Slavic mythology to create a real mythology just for her country Croatia” (“Croatia”2019).

Today, over a century old, the Croatian legend of “Stribor’s Forest” has remained relevant in popular culture. According to Mirela Dumić, a teacher of Croatian at the International School of London in Surrey, “In Croatia all children grow up with ‘Stribor’s Forest.’ Over generations the story has inspired both adults and children to give it a new life in film, animation, illustration and theatre productions, so the engagement with this classic literary piece has never abated” (Dumić).

In this vein, Girl at War, published in 2016, can be interpreted as a retelling of “Stribor’s Forest,” and more broadly a modern-day equivalent of Ana’s favorite book of folk tales. Like Croatian Tales from Long Ago, Nović’s novel is an amalgamation of various stories that she collected from Croatian people. In an interview with acclaimed author Julia Glass, Nović states:

Ana’s story isn’t my experience, or any one person’s. The genesis of the novel came about when I went to live with some family and friends in Zagreb after I graduated high school. I think because I was a sort of “middleman” to them—American but still family—they were eager to share their experiences with me […] There was a sense of urgency in these stories, and a feeling that people wanted their voices heard. I’ve always been an avid journaler, so I recorded a lot of anecdotes people told me right away. The opening scene with the cigarettes, for example, was an experience that happened to a friend of mine pretty much exactly as Ana experiences it. (Glass 325)

Thus, Girl at War functions much like the lore in Croatian Tales from Long Ago, pooling a variety of accounts into one continuous story.

Girl at War begins during the summer of 1991 in Zagreb, now Croatia’s capital. It was during this season that the Croatian War for Independence broke loose, in the aftermath of Yugoslavia’s dissolution (Rogel 58). For several years, ethnic and religious wars were waged
between Christians and Muslims in the former Yugoslavian territories of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, leaving death and destruction in their wake (Bookman 176). Ana and her family fall victim to this violence when they are forced to remain in Zagreb for the summer instead of traveling to their family vacation community in Tiska.

As the political climate worsens in Zagreb, so too does the health of Ana’s baby sister, Rahela, who cannot receive adequate medical attention due to the city’s limited resources. As Part I nears its climax, Rahela’s condition becomes so severe that Ana’s parents make the difficult and dangerous decision to seek medical help from professionals in Bosnia, who recommend Rahela be sent to America for urgent medical care.

Ana’s deepest sorrows commence during her family’s journey back into Croatia after sending Rahela away when she and her parents inadvertently stumble into a warzone, just as Brunhilda’s sorrows begin when her son stumbles into Stribor’s domain. From there on, both Ana’s and Brunhilda’s sense of identity and place in the world are wholly uprooted. In “Stribor’s Forest,” Brunhilda is displaced by her evil daughter-in-law and becomes a stranger in her own home. Similarly, after Ana escapes the Serbs who killed her parents and is subsequently reunited with Rahela in America, she experiences severe cultural displacement both during her time in the U.S. and when she returns to Croatia. In an article for The Guardian, critic Kapka Kassabova states that after the murder of Ana’s parents “The rest of the novel is a variation on the traditional emigrant narrative of fragmented selves, but with the added baggage of trauma” (Kassabova 2015).

Nović reinforces Ana’s cultural displacement in a variety of ways throughout Part II, but perhaps the strongest parallels to the experiences of the characters in “Stribor’s Forest” can be observed through the strained quality of Ana’s relationships in America. Nović herself reflects on this notion in an interview with journalist Kathleen Harrington when she states:

[Ana] struggles with guilt for having survived, and also feels a great deal of rage, I think because she can’t find peace, or even know where to start seeking such a thing […] for me, this is most visible in her time in the States where she feels an inability to connect with her peers or even her family, because her soul’s experiences and desires are so at odds with her current life. (Harrington 4)

For instance, Ana explicitly expresses the inauthenticity of her relationship with Laura and Jack, her American parents. According to Ana, her integration into the family was not nearly as smooth as that of Rahela’s, around whom Laura and Jack had shaped their life-plans: “With [Rahela’s] presence they began to want the things they’d always dismissed as the desires of people older than they were […] I was nothing to my American parents but the older sister mentioned in Rahela’s MediMission fact sheet. Then […] I was there” (Nović 126). In this sense, Ana was an unplanned addition to the family, little more than a stranger except through her affiliation with Rahela. Ana’s foreignness is further solidified through her commentary on Laura and Jack’s efforts to register her for school: “I had entered the country on a forged visitor’s visa card, and it was hard to sign someone up for school who technically didn’t exist” (Nović 133).
Thus, when Ana arrived in America, she lacked both a legal and personal sense of identity, even within her new family.

The foreign quality of Ana’s familial relationship is reinforced by the ways in which the family members address each other. Both Ana and Rahela’s names are Americanized, Rahela becoming “Rachel” and Ana’s name pronounced with a flat “a” (Nović 120). Ana reveals that although she addresses Laura and Jack as “Mom” and “Dad,” the first time she did so was by accident and from there on she could not take it back. However, she states, “For years onward, each time I said ‘Mom’ or ‘Dad’ a silent prefix of ‘American’ existed in my mind. They were my American parents, and the distinction made me feel less like I was forgetting the other set I’d abandoned in the forest” (Nović 138). This statement reveals that since her arrival in America, Ana has made a continuous effort not to forget her Croatian family, even though she feels she has abandoned them. Similar to the way in which Brunhilda’s role as a mother changes drastically when the daughter-in-law moves in, Ana’s role as a daughter dramatically alters through her interactions with Laura and Jack.

Even Ana’s familial relationship with Rahela, her own flesh and blood, feels inauthentic to Ana. For instance, Rahela is distinctively more comfortable identifying as an American than Ana. As she was only eight months old when Laura and Jack adopted her, Rahela has little memory of her past in Zagreb: “Sometimes I’d whisper to her in Croatian, to see if she remembered. She’d parrot back a word or two, but the things she babbled of her own accord sounded like English” (Nović 128). Now ten years old, Rahela fully identifies as an American, responding only to the name Rachel. While she is dimly aware of her Croatian heritage, she cannot relate to or even fully comprehend Ana’s experiences, which has created a barrier in their relationship as sisters:

Rahela knew, in theory, that we’d been adopted, had been told enough to account for her earlier memories of my accent, for the fact that our sable eyes didn’t match Jack and Laura’s dark green and watery blue ones. She knew, empirically, but she didn’t feel it. For her, there was no one before our American parents, and the loss of these other people, the parents of technicality, was objectively sad, but nothing more. (Nović 146)

This tension between Ana and Rahela shares qualities with the relationship between Brunhilda and her son in “Stribor’s Forest.” Like the young man blinded by the snake-woman’s beauty, Rahela is under the belief that she is an American through and through, unaware of the whole truth about the nature of her parents’ death. However, unlike Brunhilda who tries to warn her son of the snake-woman’s true identity, Ana does not try at this point in the story to unveil the truth about their past to Rahela. In this sense, Ana is a part of the deception and shares more in common with the snake-woman than Brunhilda.

This comparison of Ana to the snake-woman takes on a new depth when one considers the title of Part II: “Somnambulist.” According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, somnambulism is “an abnormal condition of sleep in which motor acts (such as walking) are performed” (Merriam-Webster). In essence, the term somnambulism refers to sleepwalking. Thus, if one
recognizes Ana as a sleepwalker throughout all of her experiences in Part II, then her interactions in America could be considered dreamlike. This observation is particularly interesting when considered through the lens of psychologist Carl Jung’s dream theory:

We can see that by treating the dream images as symbols, with the images all representing elements within the dreamer’s own psyche, and by asking for the dreamer’s personal associations to the dream, as well as amplifying other images with relation to archetypal themes, we are able to understand a dream and what it may be trying to communicate to the dreamer—usually by way of compensating for the dreamer’s current conscious attitude, which is in some way one-sided or incomplete. (The Society of Analytical Psychology)

In other words, Jung contends that the dreamer is not only the protagonist of his or her dream but also shares an identity with all the characters in his or her imagination. Thus, Jung’s dream theory supports the notion that Ana could be compared not only to Brunhilda but also the snake-woman.

More broadly, the title of Part II suggests a parallel between Ana’s narrative and Brunhilda’s experiences in “Stribor’s Forest.” In the dead of night, the fairies carry Brunhilda “by the sleeves of her nightgown” to Stribor’s castle in the heart of the forest (Nović 37). There Brunhilda is enticed by the ethereal beauty and power of Stribor’s kingdom and she is offered all the ease and comfort in the world—the opportunity to escape the misery of her current reality by starting her life over as a young girl. Similarly, during Ana’s darkest hour—in the wake of her parents’ murder—she is flown to America to be reunited with her sister in the safe, peaceful community of Gardenville, New Jersey. In effect, Ana enters “Stribor’s Forest” from the moment she touches American soil, and the motif of the forest is subtly referenced through her location first in the garden state and then in the urban jungle of New York City. In America, Ana is offered the opportunity to begin a new life with her American family, but she recognizes, like Brunhilda, that this offer comes at the cost of abandoning her prior life. Unable to let go of her past and accept her American family, Ana the somnambulist cannot escape the nightmare of her cultural displacement.

Much like Brunhilda’s alienation within her own home, Ana’s sense of cultural displacement actually intensifies upon her return to Croatia. Before she has touched Croatian soil, she begins to feel like an outsider when handed a customs form in which she must identify as a citizen or a tourist, for as she states, “It struck me that Croatia was a country to which, technically, I’d never been” (Nović 173). After reuniting with her childhood best friend, Luka, Ana experiences culture shock within her homeland, as she finds Zagreb unrecognizable and struggles to speak Croatian correctly after so little practice. Consequently, she is referred to by Luka’s young cousins as “American Girl,” further solidifying her feeling of cultural dysphoria. Ana expresses to Luka her desire to go home, internally adding that she is “all too aware I had no idea where that might be” (Nović 182).
Ana’s cultural displacement exacerbates her suffering to the point at which she, like Brunhilda, longs for the relative oblivion of death. In the fairytale, Stribor offers Brunhilda the chance to alleviate her misery by stepping back in time to her youth. In doing so, however, Brunhilda would cease to exist in her son’s life, bringing about her metaphorical death. In this sense, Brunhilda has one foot in the grave before she decides to deny Stribor’s offer. This imagery of one foot in the grave is constantly repeated throughout Ana’s narrative. She had to feign her own death in order to escape the Serbs and was effectively buried alive by those who fell into the pit afterwards. In Part III, as Ana enters the village after climbing out of the grave, she describes herself as “a tiny, blood-crusted zombie, soaked in other people’s bodily fluids” (Nović 222). During her first week in the village, Ana does not seek shelter in the air raids, describing how “the explosions of that first week were inconsequential; I was anesthetized to fear” (223). Finally, Ana explicitly describes that in the aftermath of her parents’ death, she feels suspended between living and dead (232).

Ana’s feeling of intimacy with death does not dissipate even after ten years of living in America. When New York City’s twin towers fall to a terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001, Ana describes how she feels drawn to Ground Zero:

“A desire to be close to the wreckage overwhelmed me. I went out and walked south until I got to the fire engine roadblocks, stood there for a while, awash in emergency light. The air was still thick with the smell of burning plastic and molten steel, dry, itchy breaths filled with plaster particulate.” (Nović 110)

Finally, as Ana reflects on the sorrowful state of her life, she expresses an explicit longing to have simply died in the forest with her parents. She states, “Had I died in the forest, at least I would be with my family and ignorant of such profound loneliness. But then there was Rahela” (Nović 169). Ana’s recognition of her responsibility for Rahela does not prevent her from leaving the country, however, for it is in this episode that Ana decides to return to Croatia. She then writes to Luka explaining her rationale: “Basically, no one here knows who I am, not even me, and I think coming home might set me straight.’ The word home looked strange on the page, but I left it” (Nović 171). In this instance, Ana is unable to take responsibility for her sister for the same reason that she has not told Rahela the truth about their past: She has yet to recognize that embracing life with her sister now is “worth the trouble,” as her father stated so long ago. Only until she can enter the Croatian forest and learn this lesson will she be able to break the spell.

Still unable to find closure in Zagreb, Ana takes a long drive with Luka which literally comes to a screeching halt when she recognizes the fork in the road where the Serbs captured her family ten years before. Morbidly drawn to the burial site of her parents, Ana delves into the woods with Luka close behind. Just as she found Zagreb unrecognizable, she now finds the forest unfamiliar:

“The woods grew darker, then thinned, but when we reached the clearing it was not how I remembered it. The trees were all wrong, the forest floor different from the way I’d
imagined it. The lush summertime green foliage confused me. The place was alive, almost pretty. (Nović 286)

The similarity here between “Stribor’s Forest” and Ana’s experience is that the forest itself harbors both good and evil but is not consistently one or the other. What was remembered by Ana as a place of death and destruction is now, in the light of day, teeming with life and vitality. In the fairytale, the forest is the place where Brunhilda’s misfortunes begin, but also where they end.

Ana finds the clearing that she suspects is her parents’ burial ground, but after searching for any evidence of its exact whereabouts, she comes to accept that she will never locate the exact place where her mother and father were killed by the Serbian Soldiers (Nović 286). As she sits cross-legged on the forest floor, she absent-mindedly dredges up the earth with her fingers. She performs a simple but symbolic act: “A few acorns, still green, had fallen too early, and I took one and buried it in the furrow I’d dug” (Nović 287). With this small gesture, Ana metaphorically buries her parents, who died too young and who, like the acorns, had fallen to the earth.

This specific reference to acorns hearkens back to “Stribor’s Forest,” as Stribor’s castle rests in the heart of the forest’s strongest oak tree. In Indo-European folklore, oak symbolizes great, holy power, often associated with the lightning god Thor “because of the red colour of its fresh cut bark” (Kelly 34). Additionally, in ancient times Slavs associated oaks with the Russian pagan god Perun, to whom oak trees were held sacred (Phillips and Kerrigan 38). The mystical and hallowed power surrounding oak trees emphasizes not only Stribor’s prowess in the fairytale, but also contains implications about the reverence Ana has for her parents in Girl at War. By connecting Ana’s parents to acorns, the seedlings of the most sacred and powerful tree in ancient lore, Nović has illustrated the protective role they played in Ana’s life. This makes their deaths all the more tragic, but it also makes Ana’s gesture more poignant—she is burying not only her parents but also the captivating power they have had over her life up to this point. In essence, Ana’s acorn burial symbolizes her choice to let go of her impossible wish to reunite with her Croatian family, similar to the way in which Brunhilda refuses to accept Stribor’s offer to live in his happy but unreal world.

Ana has taken her foot out of the grave, finally accepting that she cannot return to a time before her parents’ death. Her decision to move on is evidenced when she gets up, wipes her hands of the dirt, and tells Luka “I’m okay” (Nović 287). Ana now has broken the spell: she has entered the forest and accepted her life, even with its sorrows, over the relative ease that death offers. From this moment onwards, Ana knows that she will eventually return to the States in order to finish school, and most significantly “go back to my family” (297). This is the first time that Ana has referred to her family without the American prefix, illustrating that the curse of her past no longer haunts her.
Finally, just as the truth of the snake-woman’s identity is revealed to the young man in “Stribor’s Forest,” Ana resolves to reveal the whole truth of her past to Rahela, as is evidenced by the conversation between Luka and Ana:

“You don’t have to experience something to remember it. You’re going to have kids, and eventually they’re going to want to know where their other set of grandparents is [...] You should tell them the truth [...] The whole story. You should tell Rahela, too. She deserves to know.” “I know.” (Nović 301)

Ana then calls Laura and in a brief conversation, she apologizes for not reaching out sooner and requests to leave a message for Rahela, demonstrating her willingness to fully join her family as it truly is. This acceptance by Ana of her American family mirrors Brunhilda’s acceptance of her family with the evil daughter-in-law, over the temptation to abandon it. The novel ends with Ana finally able to find peace upon the return to her Croatian family’s old beachside cottage in Tiska. Although shabby and abandoned, the cottage comforts Ana as she and Luka stargaze:

Through the gash in the roof we could see the sky, and we stretched our arms upward, tracing constellations. It calmed me, just like it had when we were small and hungry and scared of dying. Around the room the moon filled the shell marks in the walls with a pallid blue light, and they looked full again, like a home. (Nović 316)

Both Brunhilda and Ana move forward with a newly reconstructed family in which they can feel at home. Like the fairytales in Croatian Tales from Long Ago, Nović’s Girl at War does not conclude with the words “happily ever after.” But after all the hardships and displacements that the Croatians have endured, perhaps the happiest ending for both Brunhilda and Ana is simply to recreate a sense of home.

On the 100th anniversary of Croatian Tales from Long Ago’s publication, Nović honors this amalgamation of Croatian fairytales by crafting a parallel retelling of modern-day Croatian experiences. Dumić’s reflection on the cultural impact of “Stribor’s Forest” in Croatia is echoed by Anthony Marra’s review of the novel for the New York Times: “Throughout, Girl at War performs the miracle of making the stories of broken lives in a distant country feel as large and universal as myth. It is a brutal novel, but a beautiful one” (Marra 2015). Sara Nović’s Girl at War is a modern retelling of “Stribor’s Forest,” in which protagonists Ana and Brunhilda learn the same life lesson: that life, with one’s true family despite its many sorrows, is worth the trouble.
Works Cited


PERSPECTIVES ON HIV AND AIDS
Heteronormative Assumptions Affect HIV/AIDS Research in Kazakhstan
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Introduction

Scientific knowledge has always been described to be based on pure empirical data and to be a “mirror” of nature. However, soon after the emergence of sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), a branch of sociology, science has started to be criticized for the way it considers certain claims as “facts”. SSK studies science as a social activity and claims that social factors do contribute to the construction of scientific knowledge. This is particularly true of scientific knowledge construction about HIV/AIDS, a major epidemic emerged in the early 1980s. HIV/AIDS has been a major subject of scientific research and public discussion. In many societies, HIV positive people are suffering not only from symptoms of the disease but also from stigmatization and prejudice. Societies’ views of a disease may contribute to building scientific knowledge about a disease and vice-versa. Understanding scientific knowledge construction about HIV/AIDS is helpful not only to identify social ideologies/factors but also to find better ways to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

While science of HIV/AIDS has been extensively studied from SSK perspective in developed countries, there is little known about how scientific knowledge is built in developing countries like Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is experiencing one of the fastest-growing HIV epidemics in the world (Stringer et. al., 2019) Therefore, understanding how scientific knowledge about HIV in Kazakhstan is being built is crucial.

The heteronormative assumption is one of the factors that have contributed to HIV/AIDS knowledge construction in the early years of the epidemic. Heteronormative assumptions are assumptions/beliefs that consider heterosexuality to be a default state of sexuality and that consider heterosexuality to be superior to other sexualities (homosexuality). Heteronormativity assumes that sexual and marital relations are only fitting between people of the opposite sex. Heteronormativity involves homophobia49. Kazakhstan is a former Soviet Union country, where homosexuality is widely discouraged. Heterosexual marriage is a normative ideal of Central Asian society (Smolak, 2010) Therefore, this paper demonstrates that HIV/AIDS among MSM is under-researched due to heteronormative assumptions. The frequency of discussing MSM or homosexuality in the context of HIV/AIDS and approaches to discussing homosexuality in scientific papers are analyzed in the given paper.

Theory and Methods

Scientific research papers about HIV/AIDS published by Kazakhstani authors were used as primary sources. Concepts/ideas are first published in research papers, which then help ideas/concepts to become facts. To identify the major research topics about HIV/AIDS being discussed by Kazakhstani scientists, analysis of topics and abstracts of papers was performed. Two different databases (Pubmed and Cyberleninka) were used to run a search for papers. The

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49 Hostile attitudes and feelings towards homosexuality.
words “HIV” and “Kazakhstan” were used as keywords for search in Pubmed database, while “спид”, “жите”, and “АИВ инфекция” were typed in Cyberleninka search. Papers that are about HIV/AIDS and that are published by Kazakhstani authors were selected. A total of 85 and 49 research papers about HIV/AIDS were found in Pubmed and Cyberleninka databases, respectively. After that, the contents of 4 scientific papers from the Cyberleninka database, were analyzed. The content analysis helps to identify if heteronormative assumptions may affect the scientist’s work.

Sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) theory will be employed to analyze the research papers about HIV/AIDS. Traditionally, it was accepted that scientific knowledge is independent of human action and is obtained by the revelation of pre-given natural order. It was believed that scientific experiments help to discover the laws of the outside world (nature). However, SSK holds a constructivist view of scientific knowledge: scientific knowledge is created by humans with available materials and cultural resources. Constructivism is the basis for the theoretical framework. Admitting that scientific knowledge can be socially constructed allows for further discussion of how scientific knowledge is constructed. To answer the question “How knowledge is socially constructed?”, SSK theory employs a holistic approach to a study matter. The holistic approach helps to identify all of the factors (from politics to culture) that may contribute to the knowledge. In addition, SSK theory considers the complete context of the situation under which scientists had to work, and does not study it in terms of current ideas and values (methodological relativism). SSK scholars do not engage in assessing whether the scientific idea is true or false, but studies how ideas get accepted as true or false. SSK theory has been employed in similar contexts previously. For example, the 19th-century debate over the origin of life between Louis Pasteur and Felix Pouchet was analyzed by two scholars (Farley and Geison, “The Pasteur-Pouchet Debate,” 183-4). According to Farley and Geison, the controversy was resolved in advantage of the hypothesis not contradicting the religion of French society.

Literature Review

Treichler (1987) originally have argued that HIV/AIDS can be understood as “an epidemic of signification”, an epidemic embedding multiple social, political, cultural meanings and discourses. Studies employing SSK demonstrate that scientific knowledge (cause of HIV/AIDS; risk factors) about HIV/AIDS, which from the first sight, seems to be based on “ethically neutral” empirical data, is/was indeed socially constructed.

Ideology and social control functions to construct medical knowledge and contextualize/define HIV/AIDS. Power and dominance experienced by medical professionals serve to construct definitions/parameters of deviance and normality. Medical professionals and scientists individualize the illness by imputing various meanings to the clinical symptoms

50 Louis Pasteur supported the idea of homogeneity (life cannot be generated spontaneously), while Felix Pouchet was convinced by heterogenea (life comes from non-life). Although there were no conclusive data in support of either side, the French Scientific Community accepted Pasteur’s hypothesis over Pouchet’s hypothesis. According to authors, socio-political reasons have contributed to the final decision: Pasteur’s hypothesis was compatible with Christianity).
manifest among people deviant from social norms. These meanings/prejudices are often embedded in how research is being performed or how scientific controversies are resolved. This can particularly be observed in how HIV/AIDS researches involving homosexual people had been done. Michelle Cochrane, in her book “When AIDS Began: San Francisco and the Making of an Epidemic” (2004), analyzed medical charts and San Francisco Department of Public Health AIDS case report files of nine homosexual/bisexual men, who have been reported to have AIDS in July 1981. She demonstrated a consistent bias of medical workers and scientists towards overemphasizing the correlation of AIDS with homosexual identity. Drug use among these gay male AIDS cases was underreported, while heterosexually transmitted cases of AIDS in Chicago, between 1989 and 1994, have been reclassified into different transmission categories. CDC, while putting primary a focus on the gay lifestyle, failed to consider the socioeconomic status of these patients as a risk factor for AIDS.

Existence of enough scientific data is not necessary for a particular hypothesis about HIV/AIDS to be accepted as true. SSK papers studying scientific controversies around HIV/AIDS often demonstrate the triumph of a particular theory over another, even in the absence of conclusive evidence. A scientific controversy study performed by Kenneth Rochel de Camargo and his colleagues on researches focused on the association between HIV and male circumcision (Global Public Health, 2013) is a great example of this. Camargo et al. studied a popular XIX century scientific controversy, which is “does male circumcision decrease the risk of HIV contraction or not” by employing symmetry postulate. Camargo et al. studied research works (published between 1986 and 2013) that were primarily carried out in South African countries. According to Camargo et al., both biological studies and meta-analyses did not give convincing scientific data about the efficacy of male circumcision in preventing HIV contraction. However, the proposition that male circumcision provides enough protection from HIV infection got accepted by WHO, UNAIDS, and the Gates Foundation. Carmargo et al. also demonstrated the very same trend as Michelle Cochrane. He concluded that the “colonialism” attitude towards African countries have contributed to the win of “circumcision to prevent HIV infection” hypothesis. He argues that the triumph of “male circumcision as a preventative measure for HIV infection” cannot be explained by mentioning the “the disappointment of previous ‘silver’ or ‘magic’ bullets that have not worked as well as we had hoped”. This simple shift in behavior towards safer sex has been extensively promoted in developed countries since the early outbreak of HIV/AIDS. Medicalization (through circumcision) of HIV/AIDS prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa, while a simple change in sexual behavior is just effective for HIV/AIDS prevention, implies a subtler ‘undeclared assumption’, which is Africa's sexual behavior cannot be changed. Carmargo et al. could not provide direct evidence for the existence of “colonialism attitude” in research conducted in South Africa. Carmargo et al. limited themselves by citing a couple of research papers arguing against “circumcision to prevent HIV infection”. The limitation of SSK is that it is not always possible to prove “subtle” ideologies/ideas/attitudes affecting the HIV/AIDS knowledge constructed.

Steven Epstein’s book “Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of knowledge” (1996) also shows that scientific knowledge is underdetermined. Steven Epstein analyzed the
scientific controversy of whether AIDS is caused by HIV or not. This crucial analysis by Steven Epstein proved that ideas or hypotheses do not become facts simply because “they are true”. In 1984, Gallo published an article in Science showing data that demonstrate HIV as a cause of AIDS, and in 1986, HIV got widely accepted to cause AIDS. However, between 1984 and 1986, no “conclusive” research data proving HIV as a cause of AIDS appeared. Steven Epstein highlights that the data that Gallo showed in support of his hypothesis was not strongly convincing. Meanwhile, additional studies conducted on chimpanzees failed to prove the hypothesis. People who are involved in the discourse of a scientific controversy directly impacts the construction of scientific knowledge about HIV/AIDS. Steven Epstein, as mentioned above, studied scientific controversy of “whether AIDS is caused by HIV virus or not”. Epstein mentions that the reputation of Robert Gallo as an influential scientist made a significant contribution to the acceptance of “HIV causes AIDS”. Between 1984 and 1986, the number of publications on AIDS research increased significantly. However, these publications were all citing Gallo’s publication and thus strengthened the credibility of Gallo’s claim. Steven Epstein also proposed that “outsiders to science” also contribute to the scientific discourse and thus, to the knowledge about HIV/AIDS. AIDS movement” has played a role in the acceptance of HIV causing AIDS. The “AIDS movement” was the first in the United States social movement, which converted the disease victims into activist-experts. Homosexual men were particularly active in this movement. The reason is that identifying HIV as a cause of AIDS would free the gay community from blame and stigmatization that AIDS is a “gay plague”; homosexual people would no longer be blamed for their sexual behavior. The movement also included the participants of health educators, journalists, writers, people with hemophilia, injection drug users. Members of the AIDS movement were proactive in studying HIV/AIDS; members of the AIDS movement have learned virology, immunology, and epidemiology. Gay people started to actively participate in scientific conferences, clinical research, governmental groups and they became lay experts of the HIV/AIDS issue. As a result, the AIDS movement significantly accelerated the procedure of accepting HIV as a cause of AIDS. From Steven Epstein’s controversial study, it is clear how outsiders to science may affect scientific knowledge construction.

Overall, review of SSK papers gives an idea of how HIV/AIDS knowledge can be constructed. These studies analyzed a particular scientific controversy and took a holistic approach to reveal factors that have contributed to the resolution of a controversy. Authors did not consider reasons why a particular hypothesis should be true/false but studied how a particular hypothesis became accepted to be true/false. Micro-textual analysis of medical charts and research publications was a methodology for all these SSK studies. Most of SSK studies on knowledge construction about HIV/AIDS is focused on the early years of the epidemic. These studies include scientific discourses that happened/happening in developed countries such as the US. However, there is little known about how knowledge about HIV/AIDS knowledge is being constructed in developing countries such as Kazakhstan. Developed countries have advanced research technology, which allows for the emergence of more and more scientific controversies. This might not be the case in Kazakhstan, where research advancement is far behind that of the US. In 1991, Kazakhstan got independence from the Soviet Union, where political/cultural
ideologies are different from that of the US. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan (located in major drug trafficking routes) is a hotspot for HIV infection. Therefore, research studying how knowledge about HIV/AIDS is constructed in Kazakhstan is strongly needed.

**Primary Source Analysis**

Men who have sex with men (MSM) are one of the key populations most affected by HIV in Kazakhstan (UNAIDS, 2016). Men who have sex with men are considered a high-risk group for HIV due to higher risk practices like anal sex. The number of MSM getting newly infected with HIV is rapidly in Kazakhstan. According to the Eurasian Coalition on Male Health, between 2009 and 2018, there was a seven times increase in the HIV infection incidence among MSM in Kazakhstan. The HIV prevalence among MSM in Kazakhstan has increased from 1.2% in 2013 to 3.2% in 2015, and 6.19% in 2017. MSM account for 4.7% of 3,023 new HIV cases in 2017 (Men Who Have Sex with Men (MSM), 2019). There is a significant number of MSM living in Kazakhstan. About 3.2% of men (154,000 individuals) in Kazakhstan aged 18-59 are MSM (Wu et al., 2017).

While statistics show the significance of MSM and HIV infection among MSM in Kazakhstan, the results of our meta-analysis demonstrate silence among Kazakhstan scientific community around the topic of homosexuality. There are only a couple of papers studying MSM as a HIV risk group. Meanwhile, other HIV risk groups in Kazakhstan have been studied extensively. A search on Pubmed resulted in 85 scientific papers written solely about HIV/AIDS biology and its social aspects (Table 1). Roughly 20 percent (17) of these papers were written about HIV/AIDS among injection users; Approximately 9.4 percent (8) of these papers were about HIV/AIDS among women, while around 10.6 percent (9) of the papers were focused on HIV/AIDS among migrant workers. There was 1 paper about each HIV/AIDS among prisoners and sex workers. Only two scientific papers (published by the same authors) focusing on men having sex with men (MSM) as a study group were found. However, the first authors of these papers were from the USA, while Kazakhstani scientists were only coauthors. A search on Cyberleninka database, where local medical college instructors and medical workers publish their work, resulted in a total of 49 papers about HIV/AIDS: 11 papers were published about vertical/nosocomial transmission of HIV/AIDS among children; 4 papers were about HIV/AIDS among IDU, 4 papers studied HIV/AIDS among sex traders.[4] No paper has been found to study HIV/AIDS among MSM in local journals (Table 2). Both databases demonstrate the same trend of overlooking MSM in HIV/AIDS research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Study Topics</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men who have sex with men as a study group</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,352941176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDU as a study group</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Research topics of scientific papers published by Kazakhstani authors in international journals.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Study Topics</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description of HIV infection symptoms and outcomes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24.48979592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodologies for prevention/treatment/diagnosis HIV infection symptoms and outcomes.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.20408163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characterization (interventions/public policy/epidemiology/genetics/molecular) of HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.44897959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission of HIV from mother to child / HIV among children</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.44897959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injection drug users (IDU)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.163265306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian nationality people</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.081632653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex trading</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.163265306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Papers discussing the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS should discuss all the high-risk population groups. The contents of three epidemiology papers published in the Cyberleninka
database were analyzed. All papers were authored solely by Kazakhstani authors. Two papers were published in 2012 and the remaining paper was published in 2017. These papers provide an extensive number of tables and diagrams, where they depicted the prevalence/incidence of HIV/AIDS among different population groups. All three papers acknowledge the existence of HIV/AIDS among MSM. Akhmetova et.al. explicitly defines MSM as a population at high risk of HIV contraction, while Asenova et.al. classifies the sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS into homosexual and heterosexual ways of transmission among men and women. Abdikerova et.al also acknowledges the homosexual way of HIV transmission in tables and diagrams. However, all the authors fail to acknowledge the HIV infection among MSM in the discussion part of their papers. All three authors put significant effort to discuss HIV incidence/prevalence among injection drug users, prisoners, and newborns, while MSM and homosexual transmission of HIV is not mentioned at all. This is particularly evident in the work of Asenova et.al, who published in 2017. Asenova et.al discusses the HIV transmission incidence and prevalence in Karaganda city, Kazakhstan between 2013 and 2015. The authors provide a bar chart to demonstrate the prevalent ways of HIV transmission in the Karaganda region (Figure 2). Injection drug use, vertical, heterosexual, and homosexual ways of HIV transmission were shown. Asenova et.al states that the heterosexual way of HIV transmission is prevalent in Karaganda population in the whole period. However, the authors fail to acknowledge the dramatic increase in the homosexual way of HIV transmission among men from 0.4%, in 2013 to 3%, in 2015. This is a significant increase for a short period between 2013 and 2015 for a single region in Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, vertical (mother to child) HIV transmission, the incidence of which decreased almost to zero in 2015, is discussed extensively. There is no single mention of words “homosexual” and “MSM” in the paper except in the Bar chart (Figure 1).

![Figure 1](asenova_chart.png)

*Figure 1. Asenova et.al provides a bar chart to demonstrate the prevalent ways of HIV transmission in Karaganda region*
While Kazakhstani authors put minimal effort to discuss HIV/AIDS among MSM, a number of authors from the USA demonstrate the significance of studying HIV/AIDS infection among MSM in Kazakhstan. Alex Smolak discussed the contextual factors influencing HIV risk behavior in Central Asia (Smolak, 2010). Apart from discussing the political economy, migration, and culture of Central Asia, the author also dedicates a whole chapter for discussing MSM in the context of HIV/AIDS. He claims that due to social taboos marginalizing MSM, there is no sufficient data on this population. Meanwhile, he claims that MSM group is at high risk of HIV infection and thus, more research is needed. Wirtz et.al aimed at estimating the size of HIV positive MSM in countries of Central Asia. The authors extensively discussed risks for HIV among MSM in Kazakhstan. The authors have identified that unprotected sexual intercourse and injection drug use are the highest among MSM in Kazakhstan. Non-injection drug use and alcohol consumption among MSM are significant as well (Wirtz et.al, 2013). Additionally, authors emphasized that due to stigmatization of MSM in Kazakhstan, there is little research has been done on HIV/AIDS among MSM. Weir et.al, estimated sexual behavior trends among individuals at social venues in areas at increased risk of HIV transmission in Karaganda, Kazakhstan. While being published in 2004, authors provide extensive data acknowledging HIV transmission risk among MSM in Kazakhstan (Figure 2 and 3). Meanwhile, Kazakhstani authors do not mention the homosexual way of HIV transmission up until the 2010s.

**Table 1.** Results from PLACE assessments in Karaganda, Kazakhstan in 2002 and 2003: characteristics of venues recorded during interviewer visits to venues (Phase 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Venues (%)</th>
<th>2002 (n = 284)</th>
<th>2003 (n = 289)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reported by knowledgeable person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men meet men at the venue</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex workers solicit clients at the venue</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDUs socialise at the venue</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDUs socialise and sex workers solicit clients</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condoms were currently available at the venue</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS prevention activities had occurred at the site</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discarded used syringes had been observed at the venue in past 3 months</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.** Weir et.al provides extensive data acknowledging HIV transmission risk among MSM
Figure 3. Weir et al provides extensive data acknowledging HIV transmission risk among MSM

Conclusion

Due to the high rate of HIV transmission through injection drug use in Kazakhstan, studying HIV/AIDS among MSM seems not to be critical. However, growing rates of HIV infection among MSM in Kazakhstan and the high risk of HIV transmission among MSM demonstrates the need for research in this area. The HIV/AIDS among MSM or MSM in the context of HIV/AIDS is under-researched in Kazakhstan. Very few Kazakhstani research papers acknowledge HIV transmission risk among MSM. Kazakhstani scientists, who acknowledge the high risk of HIV transmission among MSM, do not put significant effort to discuss it. This is in stark contrast with USA scientists, who studied HIV/AIDS among MSM in Kazakhstan. Why then MSM is under-researched in the contest of HIV/AIDS? A significant difference between Kazakhstani scientists and US scientists in their approach to discuss HIV/AIDS among MSM may imply to differences in their attitudes towards homosexuality. Unfortunately, this research cannot provide direct evidence of heteronormative assumptions affecting the HIV/AIDS research.
Works Cited


Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) had an ambiguous and tragic beginning. The precise origin of AIDS remains a mystery, but the syndrome became clinically apparent in Los Angeles and New York in 1981. That same year, the first cases of AIDS in the UK were reported. The number of reported cases of AIDS increased over the following months in 1981 and it quickly became apparent that AIDS had the potential to be a health crisis. In both the US and the UK, an urgent and effective response was necessary in minimizing the epidemic. AIDS service organizations did provide this response in both countries. However, the US government did not provide an adequate response to the AIDS crisis. The US response was characterized by the heavy roles of activist organizations, whereas in the UK, activist organizations played a lesser role as the progressive institutions of the UK government adequately responded to the epidemic.

It is important to note what constitutes an effective response to a public health crisis. There are several sectors of society that contribute to a successful response, mainly, the media, the advocacy of the victimized community (in this case, the gay community), the scientific community, and the government. The media set the stage for the response to AIDS. Factually, there was an unusually high level of infections among previously healthy gay men. However, the first coverage of AIDS was misrepresentative and had a derogatory framing towards homosexual men. The New York Times ran its first story regarding AIDS in July 1981; it was titled “Rare Cancer Seen in 41 Homosexuals”. The Times (of London)’s first report on AIDS was of a similar nature. In December 1981, the medical correspondent for The Times wrote a column

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52 It is important to note that I use the term “gay” to mean homosexual men or men who are physically and/or romantically attracted to other men. This includes queer men of varying labels— bisexual, queer, pansexual, etc.—not just gay men. I use this term for two reasons. One, much of the literature on AIDS (past and present), uses this term. Second, I do not identify as a gay man. I do not know another preferred term nor do I have the right to reclaim another word if there was perhaps a less used preferred term for gay men. Some people prefer the term “queer,” however, some still view that term as derogatory and do not wish to claim it as their own.

53 Consisting of both the medical community and medical research community. The two are jointly related; however, they do act separately. For example, a small number of medical doctors in the US attempted to treat AIDS while medical research regarding AIDS was not granted proper funding or attention.

54 AIDS did not have the terminology of “AIDS” in 1981. The syndrome was originally termed Gay-Related Immune Deficiency (GRID) and nicknamed “gay cancer” and “gay plague.”

titled “Cancer one of the ‘gay syndrome’ illnesses.” The first discussion and release of information regarding AIDS devised the disease as an exclusively homosexual issue. In 1981, this rhetoric did not gain the respect of the majority of society in the US or UK, which were heteronormative and conservative.

After the first reports of AIDS through the media, the first organized response to AIDS was from the victims themselves—homosexual men—and they aimed to shed truth on the AIDS crisis and provide respective care and funding. Self-help organizations in both the US and the UK had a major role in dealing with the AIDS crisis. In the first years of the crisis, 1981-84, self-help organizations were the largest and most legitimate responses to AIDS. Because there was very limited knowledge about the disease itself, these organizations focused their efforts on creating support structures for victims. After decades of combatting injustice culminating with the Stonewall riots, gays in both countries had recently fought for their right to love openly and put an end to overt forms of prejudice and discrimination. Activism for the homosexual community was already in place prior to the outbreak of AIDS, although divided amongst gays and lesbians. Further, certain gays had reached influential roles in American business and the media. This well-footed positioning would prove extremely important in the activism and attention given to the AIDS crisis despite governmental responses.

The Gay Men’s Health Crisis (GMHC) was established in New York in 1982. The GMHC was not only the first group tackling the AIDS crisis, but it was also the most vocal in the US. The GMHC opened the role of self-help organizations in responding to the AIDS crisis, especially in urban areas in the US. A Hotline, which allowed individuals to call in with concerns and questions, was established in May 1982. The GMHC also established a Buddy Program, which brought in a lot of volunteers, to provide care to victims as hospitals struggled or purposefully ignored caring for AIDS patients. The GMHC was instrumental in providing information, services, and organizing the community response to AIDS.

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57 Service organizations responding to the AIDS crisis focused mostly on victims within the homosexual community and disregarded other communities, such as intravenous drug users.


59 Ibid.


61 Hallsor, 57.
Other AIDS service organizations in the US soon followed in the footsteps of the GMHC. The People with AIDS Coalition focused its efforts on demanding better treatment and rejecting the victim mentality by using the term PWAs (People with AIDS). The AIDS Action Council, National Organizations Responding to AIDS, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGTF), and Human Rights Campaign Fund (HRCF) grew to become some of America’s most prominent gay activist groups, specifically in the fight against AIDS. The NGTF and HRCF were persistent in pushing Congress to create legislation to direct and increase funding to fight and treat AIDS. However, proper governmental responses to the AIDS crisis really weren’t achieved until after the Reagan administration.

The UK had a similar response of AIDS service organizations taking on the demands of the crisis. In July 1982, the Terry Higgins Trust (THT) was established after the death of Terrence Higgins, one of the first to die of AIDS in the UK. Family and friends were disgusted with the care Higgins received and set up THT to combat the poor and lacking treatment. THT was originally established to fundraise for the fight against AIDS. However, as time went on and the number of cases of AIDS increased, THT was established as a more expansive charity. Similar to the functions of GMHC in the US, THT ran an informational hotline and set up a similar system to that of the Buddy Program. The Terrence Higgins Trust led (and continues to lead) the response to AIDS in Britain as the government struggled to materialize its response.

Though activist groups in both the US and UK led the initial response to the AIDS crisis, these same AIDS service organizations illustrate the difference in attitude and strategy between the two countries regarding the fight against AIDS. The names of these prominent organizations exemplify this difference. To establish a focus specifically on the homosexual community, the GMHC did not include other AIDS-affected groups, such as drug users or hemophiliacs, in its name. Nor did GMHC aim broadly at the entire American population by naming itself something along the lines of “American Health Crisis.” To some extent, the GMHC advocated for other groups of American society that heavily fell victim to AIDS, but its primary focus was the gay

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62 It is important to note that AIDS Service Organizations (also referred to as ASOs) being the primary activist organizations and taking on the majority of the fight/labor against AIDS because is rooted in the time period (1980-1988) and its political context. New Right politics and its related values/beliefs (which were homophobic/gay-exclusionary) characterized government and politics. Another truth of the time that allowed for this heavy and isolated response, as touched upon earlier, was that the gay rights movement had just materialized into a strong and more public phase. It was now much easier for homosexuals of the 1980s to band together and organize (into ASOs) because contact and strength in numbers had recently come into notable existence.

63 Eaklor, 177.


66 Hallsor, 58.
community. This framing could have been to appeal to mainstream heterosexual American society that already viewed the crisis as a gay issue or it could have been a form of liberation for gays. The Terrence Higgins Trust on the other hand humanized and personalized the AIDS efforts in the UK not only in practice but by naming their organization after a human who died of AIDS. In the UK, AIDS would come to be understood in respect of, but also extending beyond the gay community. In the US, this mindset would take a few more years to develop after the slow breakdown of derogatory, homophobic sectors of politics, medicine, and society as a whole.

In both countries, however, health education was an important function of AIDS service organizations in the early 1980s. This is because the healthcare system, as limited by governmental response, was not providing accurate education efforts. Both the GMHC and the Terrence Higgins Trust distributed literature and messages regarding safe sex practices and information on the causative agent of AIDS (discovered in 1983). Health education grew to be one of the most important functions of AIDS service organizations on both sides of the Atlantic. The GMHC worked with health organizations, such as the Center for Disease Control, for guidance. To provide policymakers with education, the Terrence Higgins Trust consulted with the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Health and Social Services in 1983. AIDS service organizations took on the bulk of the labor in the fight against AIDS, but working alone, their reach and activism expertise could only achieve so much.

It is extremely evident that a proper government response was necessary in minimizing the epidemic; however, the politics of US President Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had the potential to detrimentally shape the response to the AIDS crisis. Despite the US and the UK holding similar conservative stances in the 1980s, the two governments responded in divergent ways. The Reagan administration maintained a socially restrictive stance. It slowly and ineffectively responded to the crisis after years of silence, and

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69 Ibid.

70 This paper will not evaluate the administrative differences and varying governmental powers between a US president and UK Prime Minister. However, it is understood that the differences in these roles (and power and public reach associated with them) is a factor in governmental response discussed in this paper.
this resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands\textsuperscript{71} of Americans.\textsuperscript{72} The UK government, on the other hand, looked beyond its conservative status to provide a socially liberal and effective response to a public health crisis.

Before diving into the political responses of both the US and the UK, it is important to understand the political context in which the AIDS crisis emerged. In the late 1970s, the New Right emerged as one of the most powerful political forces of the late 20th century. In America, the New Right, and its electorate nicknamed the “Moral Majority” attempted to bring conservative Christian values into politics at all levels.\textsuperscript{73} “Family values,” traditional values that pertain to the mainstream nuclear family, became a legitimate goal of politics. The combination of conservative Christian values and family values dominated the campaign and presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan. In doing so, Reagan and his proponents successfully shifted the Republican Party more to the right and made those in the left appear more radical. Members of the New Right as well as their policies also extended beyond the federal executive level, within congress and state and local governments. The New Right viewed homosexuals and their respective legal and social activism as a threat to the stability of the traditional family.\textsuperscript{74} Through stereotypes and threats to heteronormative society’s safety, federal and local politicians of the New Right attempted, and often succeeded at, passing legislation\textsuperscript{75} that targeted homosexuals.\textsuperscript{76}

The nationalized and institutionalized homophobic ideology of the New Right also existed in the UK under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. However, it can be argued that gays received more respect in the UK than in the US. In fact, homosexuality had recently been decriminalized in the UK in 1967.\textsuperscript{77} Whereas in the US in 1967, the Supreme Court’s Decision in Boutilier v. the Immigration and Naturalization Service upheld the ban against

\textsuperscript{71} Roughly 148,000 people died of AIDS in the US during the Reagan Administration. Due to the lack of attention and treatment by the US government in the 1980s, deaths by AIDS became an exponential trend. In 1981, under 600 deaths from AIDS were reported. By the time Reagan left office in 1988, roughly 61,000 deaths in one year (1988) were reported. This trend continued into and throughout the 1990s (with the reported yearly AIDS death rate peaking at 529,000 in 2004) until better treatment and prevention for AIDS was established in the early to mid-2000s. It might be unfair to say that all of these deaths are directly related to the pause and silence on AIDS by the Reagan administration (it took the initially poorly-funded scientific community time and trial to develop treatment). However, it cannot be denied that Reagan’s lack of response definitely played a major role in the unfolding of the hundreds of thousands of deaths related to AIDS in US history.


\textsuperscript{73} Eaklor, 169.

\textsuperscript{74} Eaklor, 170.

\textsuperscript{75} Briefly touched upon later in this paper on pages 8 and 9.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

homosexuality. Nonetheless, Thatcher’s politics also focused on conservative, traditional, family values. Thatcher enacted homophobic laws in the UK for the first time in a century. For example, Law 28, banned the promotion of homosexuality in British schools. Thatcher also voiced her opposition to gay rights at the 1987 Conservative Party Conference. Despite this homophobic ideology of the New Right in the UK, the UK government opted for a more progressive approach to managing the AIDS crisis because AIDS was recognized as a human issue and public health issue, not just a gay issue.

Returning to the US, the Reagan administration prescribed personal responsibility for healthcare. The combination of homophobic ideology and personal healthcare responsibility of the Reagan administration made the Reagan administration extremely reluctant to help the marginalized communities affected by AIDS- including the gay community, the drug-using community, and the black community (as compared to other racial groups). The Reagan administration stayed silent on the issue of AIDS for the entirety of Reagan’s first term as president; this has been termed “Reagan’s Quiet War on AIDS.”

While some states passed legislation that secured anti-discrimination protections based on sexual orientation, there was not a pro-gay unified response to the AIDS crisis. In fact, there was the opposite; antigay measures existed throughout the 1980s. Inadequate funding was provided for AIDS research and education under the Reagan administration and by congress. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina introduced many of these measures, including restricting federal AIDS funds only to educational materials that promoted monogamous heterosexual marriage. A change in American policy towards AIDS was necessary to begin to end the epidemic.

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81 As uncovered later in this paper, this recognition was in huge part by UK public health institutions and government institutions that majorly contributed to and therefore heavily shaped the country’s response.

82 Although the UK government had a progressive response to the AIDS crisis, it did not necessarily respond to all communities affected by AIDS, such as intravenous drug users.

83 This paper will not extensively cover the effects of AIDS on marginalized groups aside from the homosexual community. However, the AIDS epidemic cannot be understood in its entirety without this contextualization.

84 Hallsor, 60.

85 Eaklor, 182.
1985 was a breakthrough year in US AIDS response. Reagan did not publicly mention “AIDS” until 1985\textsuperscript{86} after popular movie actor Rock Hudson revealed himself as having AIDS.\textsuperscript{87} Hudson was a close personal friend of Ronald Reagan and his wife. Once it was acknowledged that AIDS was not solely an issue for marginalized groups of society—especially those deemed “innocent,” such as babies, hemophiliacs, surgical patients, and heterosexuals—the government was forced to alter their response.\textsuperscript{88} In 1985, there was the first increase in federal government funding for AIDS education.\textsuperscript{89} In the media, there occurred a decrease in derogatory framing of the AIDS epidemic and for the first time, AIDS was discussed as a disease that could affect heterosexuals.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite this shift, the response to AIDS by the US government was too little too late. Government funding towards combating the AIDS crisis did not come until four years after the first reported case of the disease. The death toll and the infection rate were both climbing higher and higher each year with no adequate treatment and prevention in sight. The homosexual community remained frustrated by the government’s silence for such a long time as thousands of Americans died of AIDS. In 1987, the AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power (ACT UP) was founded in New York City. Its main goal was the “establishment of a coordinated, comprehensive and compassionate national policy on AIDS.”\textsuperscript{91} In 1987, the first ACT UP demonstration took place on Wall Street and a march on Washington (where an international conference on AIDS was occurring) was arranged. The march successfully attracted significant media attention and illustrated that AIDS activists in the US were willing to take extreme, public measures.\textsuperscript{92} This was a signal to the US government that activists would be relentless until the government made effective policy towards AIDS.

One of the only legitimate, yet very thin, arguments that can be made for the Reagan administration fighting the AIDS crisis is Reagan cutting red tape for the FDA. Reagan sought to decrease government oversight in the FDA, and by doing so, he allowed consumers to have easier access to drugs. At times, this proved harmful as there was little safety regulation as to what and how much consumers could ingest. However, this loosening of regulation allowed


\textsuperscript{87}Eaklor, 175.

\textsuperscript{88}Hallsor, 60.


\textsuperscript{90}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{92}Hallsor, 61.
those suffering from AIDS to try various drugs that they thought could treat AIDS, most of which proved entirely futile.93

Once Ronald Reagan was out of office, the federal government changed its message. President George H.W. Bush signed important pieces of legislation into law that, for the first time in American political history, showed legitimate support in the fight against AIDS by the federal government. The Ryan White CARE (Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency) Act was signed into law in 1990; it allocated funds to provide better access to healthcare to those affected by AIDS, especially to people with low-income or no insurance.94 The Americans with Disabilities Act, also signed into law in 1990, included protections of people with AIDS and HIV from discrimination. Bush also implemented The President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a government initiative introduced to help those afflicted by the disease. In the 1990s, the US was beginning to properly manage AIDS as a public health crisis. However, it is important to note that the AIDS crisis had reached a new height in the 1990s.95 The yearly death toll of AIDS surpassed 100,000 for the first time in 1990 with over 120,000 AIDS-related deaths.96 The American government was no longer silent. However, there is controversy regarding whether this shift was due to politicians being forced to deal with the AIDS crisis to better their chances at re-election or if the American government actually developed a sense of concern for the gay community.

In contrast to the conservative politics that characterized the US response to the AIDS crisis, it was primarily progressive civil service that managed the government response to AIDS in the UK. In 1986, the UK government declared the AIDS epidemic “a high priority.”97 In response, the Secretary of State for Health declared that information was the only vaccine to AIDS. Thus, began the British campaign to fight AIDS for the sake of the entire British citizenry, not just the homosexual community.

Education was the prominent component in the fight against AIDS in the UK. A cabinet committee was formed to oversee the formulation of the proposed AIDS national education campaign and to assess other public health measures, including the distribution of free condoms.98 Originally, much of the education in regards to AIDS was directed towards homosexuals. However, once it was known that AIDS was a universal disease that does not


95 Eaklor, 177.

96 “Thirty Years of HIV/AIDS: Snapshots of an Epidemic.”

97 Hallisor, 61.

98 Ibid.
discriminate, there began a massive effort to educate all of British society on prevention of AIDS. The Expert Advisory Group on AIDS (EAGA) was formed and made up of members of the biomedical community. The EAGA influenced the power of science in the AIDS policy-making arena by providing information and research on AIDS. The EAGA also ensured that all health programs after 1986 were liberally oriented and focused on harm minimization and prevention.

The UK government, aside from Thatcher, realized the necessity of an educational program that extended to all members of British society. This was for two main reasons: first, the government feared that a response aimed directly at the homosexual community could look homophobic. Second, as stated earlier, it was revealed that AIDS was a disease that could, and most likely would, affect all members of society regardless of sexual orientation. “Don’t Die of Ignorance” was the most prominent educational campaign of the British response.

The Don’t Die of Ignorance campaign, managed by the Health Department of the United Kingdom, regularly ran a commercial on national television that opened with intense music, thunder and lighting, and the carving of a tombstone. As the camera panned out, the tombstone read “AIDS.” At the end of the commercial, the tombstone fell backwards with a loud thud and a leaflet that read “AIDS Don’t Die of Ignorance” and a bouquet of flowers fell atop the tombstone. Don’t Die of Ignorance also emphasized the lethality of AIDS; the logo of the campaign was a tombstone that read “AIDS.” The campaign also distributed AIDS education pamphlets to the British public.

Don’t Die of Ignorance was influential in that it extended the reach of AIDS education to all of British society. With this reach, the campaign began the destigmatization of AIDS. Most significantly, it served as a proper example of a government response to the AIDS crisis. As the death rate of AIDS in the US continued to rise, the Don’t Die of Ignorance campaign was heavily enforced in the UK. Because of efforts due in part to Don’t Die of Ignorance, AIDS was relatively successfully managed through awareness in the UK at a time when science was lacking proper cure and prevention tactics.

The development of the AIDS crisis in the early 1980s demanded an urgent response in all countries affected by the disease. In the US, the response to AIDS was taken up by activist and AIDS service organizations as the US government refused to promptly and properly deal with the epidemic after years of remaining silent on the matter. In contrast, the UK’s liberal governmental institutions, despite a conservative Prime Minister, successfully managed the

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99 Ibid.

AIDS epidemic\textsuperscript{101} by working with AIDS service organizations and launching a massive educational awareness campaign. Now, amidst the COVID19 pandemic, state leaders should reflect on some of the factors that led to the successes and failures in managing the AIDS crisis: coming together across the political isles to have a prompt and effective government response, producing accurate and educational media coverage, following the guidance of medical experts, caring for marginalized members of society, and following the lead of other countries successfully managing the public health crisis.

\textsuperscript{101} This is not to say that there were not deaths from AIDS in the UK or that homophobia did not exist. This simple means, given the time period (1980-1988) and comparative geopolitical context, the UK established a more proper and prompter response to the AIDS crisis.
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Analysis of HIV/AIDS Educational Materials Produced by the Ministry of the Healthcare of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Social Constructionism and Face(s) of the “Risk Groups” Behind Government Awareness Efforts
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Starting from the beginning of the epidemic, HIV/AIDS awareness efforts have taken place in different parts of the world. Certainly, the pace and forms with which the awareness efforts reached different locations depended on many factors, including general understanding of what the disease is in itself for the organizations in power. The educational materials included pamphlets, posters, video- and image-production, brochures and other various kinds of textual and visual materials to educate different populations, and Kazakhstan is not an exception. These resources, undoubtedly, are a good means of educating the citizenry of the respective country as they are distributed widely, yet it is important to look at the content that is being produced. According to Conrad and Baker (2010), medical knowledge is not always value-neutral. Instead, it sometimes “reflects and reproduces existing forms of social inequality” and is, implicitly or explicitly, the mirror looks of “the interests of those groups in power” and their outlook on different aspects, such as gender, class, and racial-ethnic inequality (ibid.). This framework is called social constructionism, and some scholars have already attempted to identify the “social” in the “medical” models and knowledge, and vice-versa. Yet, similar studies have not been conducted in the Central Asia (CA) region, and Kazakhstan, as one of the CA countries, still lacks this type of analysis to determine the extent to which the educational materials produced by the “groups in power”, i.e., the Ministry of the Healthcare of the Republic of Kazakhstan, reflect the social constructionism of the disease in the country, and whereas they contain elements of stigma and “culture” of some groups, rather than acknowledging everyone’s risk of being infected. Therefore, in this research project, I would like to argue that the government funded educational materials (1) fail to recognize the importance of changing the behavior for everyone and emphasize everyone’s risk of being infected, rather focusing on particular groups “at risk” and their “culture” in their messages and (2) reproduce social inequality and restrictions in sexual behaviors of people that reflect social, not the medical model of HIV/AIDS prevention. All of these, in turn, jeopardizes stigmatization of the “risk groups” and produces false notions of “healthy” sexual behavior(s) that appears to be counter-productive to the government’s set agenda on HIV/AIDS prevention in Kazakhstan.

To begin with, let me start off with the notion of the “risk groups” coined by Schiller et. al in their article, “Risky Business” (1994). According to the authors, construction of such AIDS risk groups as distinct “cultures” distanced these groups from the “general population”, and such distancing was found problematic for those on both side of such border (ibid.) Firstly, it “has identified the cultural behavior of internally diverse categories of persons with that of conspicuously extreme sub-groups at one end of a behavioral continuum”, stereotyping and simplifying different people and their sexual behavior into one large “risk group” that led to stigmatization and “othering”. On the other hand, it made “general population”, that did not belong to any of the “risk groups”, underestimate their sexual behavior as an important factor in contracting the disease, instead looking at their belongingness to “others”, not themselves and
their own “group”. All of the abovementioned led to “the complacency and denial of the reality of risk of infection among members of this ‘general population,’ even those whose geographical location and (heterosexual) behavior places them at elevated risk” (ibid.). Although largely criticized by Schiller et. al, the policy formation in many countries still seems to follow the idea of “risk groups” in their educational materials and awareness efforts, and Kazakhstan is one of these countries. Looking at the agenda on HIV/AIDS prevention in the country by the Ministry of the Healthcare of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the National Center on Prevention and Control of AIDS (2017), half of the government-initiated commitments (5 out of 10) deal with the notion of the “risk groups”, while other 3 look at the economic commitments of the country and NGOs, and 2 others are aimed at providing services for everyone in the country in the sphere of healthcare. In the main part of this research project, these commitments will serve as a baseline for comparison with the educational materials produced by the same governmental institution.

Definitely, it will be unjust to say that these commitments are shortcomings of the state policy on healthcare solely. Instead, the policy formation is dependent on the large-scale organizations that deal with HIV/AIDS prevention globally, such as the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and their 90-90-90 goals accepted in 2014. Those are: 90% of all people living with HIV will know their HIV status, 90% of all people with diagnosed HIV infection will receive sustained antiretroviral therapy, and 90% of all people receiving antiretroviral therapy will have viral suppression by 2020 (UNAIDS, 2014). Kazakhstan has also accepted these ambitious goals, and I tend to believe that because these goals are hardly reachable by 2020 (as of 2017, the current situation in Kazakhstan is 79-43-24) (UNAIDS, 2018), the governmental materials are trying to persist with the “risk groups” as it is easier to pinpoint to some groups of people and reach them rather than employing strategies aimed at everyone, due to the time frames accepted. UNAIDS also accepts this gap in knowledge of HIV status and general awareness efforts: “… millions of people being left behind—individuals who are not being reached by services delivered using status-quo methods” (ibid.). Thus, despite all of the shortcomings in the global policy formation that could be a subject to another research, the particular criticism of the educational resources of the Ministry will pertain to what could have been done in the visual and textual production to stay in line with one of the commitments, commitment number 4, dealing with zero stigmatization of HIV-infected people and “risk groups” (the Ministry of the Healthcare of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the National Center on Prevention and Control of AIDS, 2017).

The previous research that has been conducted to study main messages, ideologies and frameworks of the government and non-government funded materials on HIV/AIDS awareness has shown that there are definitely effects on HIV/AIDS public perception depending on the educational materials produced. For example, the study by Deborah Johnson of 317 Public Service Announcements (PSAs) made by government health agencies and television networks in 33 different countries on the messages and values set by these PSAs has identified that HIV/AIDS messages order, categorize, and frame reality, and, subsequently, “consciously and unconsciously, their creators put a “face” on the subject” (1997). According to the authors, the
creation of a “face” stems from different factors, by not only their word-, image-choice and the style of the sources they make, but also including the ways of representing different relationships, such as family, male and female relationships, friendships and life and death (ibid.). The main argument made in the article is that the viewers should perceive the characters in these PSAs as those similar to themselves to be able to grasp the information and impact their actions. The analysis of the data divided the messages of PSAs into several categories, such as “(a) talking to friends and family members about HIV, (b) HIV tests, (c) drug use, (d) condoms, (e) limiting the number of sexual partners, (f) other safe sex practices, (g) general information such as “AIDS kills,” and (h) unrelated information”, the most frequent message being condoms (28%), while 12% touched on limiting number of sexual partners but only 4% directly focused on that and 10% mentioned talking to family and friends (ibid.). The researchers also pinpoint at the fact that these educational resources are inexplicit and lack recommendations in being effective so as to deem attitudinal and/or behavioral change cognitively, as well as how heterosexual emphasis might limit the target audience as not every person can put the heterosexual “face” on themselves (ibid.). Similarly, the study of the message frames and social determinants of the educational materials produced in Sub-Saharan Africa in line with HIV prevention has shown that there are certain loss and gain of framing the social determinants of the educational materials (Beaudoin, 2007). Although the article does not touch on a particular face of the HIV contracting individual(s), it does acknowledge that not including characteristics that would pertain to every individual serve as barriers in acknowledging the prevention, and therefore, there is a lack towards changing the behavior in these materials that should have been at their core (ibid.). Thus, both articles touch on the importance of the messages and message frames of the resources that raise awareness in general public overall, not only the “target audience” that is identified by the government and different other organizations on HIV/AIDS prevention, as it is seen as the way in which every person would be liable to changing their behavior, and the inconsistencies in the statistics on infected people and the targeted messages would be limited, such as the limitations of the frames to mostly heterosexuals, while the main population that had contracted the disease is the intravenous drug users and parenteral transmission. These findings in the shortcomings of the message frames are similar to the Kazakhstani educational resources as well, although the frames that lack attention are more representative of what was prevalent in the PSAs, which is acknowledging the relations between people and life and death. In the brochures and the video studies, HIV/AIDS is rarely uttered, and this failure to acknowledge HIV/AIDS by the government, I think, is mirroring the fear of putting a “face” of the country where HIV/AIDS is on the constant rise. This, in turn, goes back to the Conrad and Baker’s argument that social constructionism is related to the way illness is embedded in the society, and how it shapes “responses and influences of the experience of the illness” (2010).

It is also interesting to note that one other research on the narratives of the media has “made sense” of them by the social constructivist position of the country they looked at, emphasizing the historical and cultural backgrounds of the target audience and cultural appropriation of such messages as “know you partner”, “risk assessment”, and “perceived susceptibility” (Goldstein, 2004). As for me, the idea of cultural appropriation is salient in
Kazakhstani government-produced educational materials, and thus the narratives’ examination depending on what is “moral” and “immoral” differ from Goldstein’s analyses in the USA, which proves the different outlooks on the studies of the messages when looking at two and more countries. Yet, the author insists on taking cultural sensitivity into account, as he believes that not doing so will turn as an ineffective means in HIV/AIDS prevention (ibid.). However, I would like to argue that even though cultural appropriation is important, due to the different aspects of culture and history of the country, one cannot always rely on the cultural appropriation—it simply would go counterproductive to the sexual behavior that needs to be acknowledged to not contract HIV, even if the religious and cultural beliefs may contain sentiments against it. Thus, cultural sensitivity should be taken to the point where medical and social models intersect and do not contradict each other, as the ideas of healthy sexual behavior are more at stake in HIV/AIDS prevention. As an exemplary of such attitude, Woods, Davis and Westover in their article on the responses of the American population on AIDS campaigns that was held from July 1987 to February 1991 in the United States when there was a surge in the spread of the pandemics write that the way the media was coined both textually and visually shaped people’s perception (1991). Moreover, the authors also note that the cultural appropriation is a very thin line in material production, and they encourage the organizations to collaborate with the government to show the more realistic outlook of the behaviors that are found to be risky in HIV contraction (ibid.). In addition to that, similar to the studies discussed above, they also discuss how “localization” (similar to the “face” term used previously) is important in making people believe that they also could be at risk when behaving in a certain way, and that such stance is most welcome to ensures widest circulation of a consistent message (ibid.). Inconsistent message would then, as authors mention, make use of the images like father in the “risk group” holding a baby that stemmed in people’s belief in the transmission through casual contact, and that is why the word “group” should have been replaced with the “behavior” to make it more realistic and understandable for the general population that it pertains to the behavior, not to one’s belongingness to a particular group. This kind of messages, according to the authors, also “reinforce discriminatory attitudes against certain groups, while promoting a false sense of security in people who do not think of themselves as belonging to one of the “groups”, and this goes along the argument that has been made before, that is, the importance of acknowledging everyone’s risk of being infected (ibid.). Lastly, there is an advocacy of the more explanatory terms and avoidance of vague terms such as “bodily fluid” to exclude the possibility of promotion unwarranted concerns in the general population (ibid.). In this research paper, this will pertain to one of the themes of the educational materials that was used by the government, and which will be discussed shortly. All in all, the existing literature does look at the messages, their recipients and the social constructionism behind these narratives, yet there is a need to look at all of these systematically. That is, to look at the messages, the “face” of the people being addressed and the extent to which cultural appropriation has taken place in the educational materials. Further research could have also looked at the attitudes of the general population to the materials produced and see whether there are disparities and inconsistencies between what is being tried to achieve and how the media is being interpreted by the addressees.
Now, moving on to the analysis of the media that was produced by the Ministry of Healthcare, let us look at three different brochures and one video:

Brochure 1: To know and not be afraid!

(Retrieved from https://disk.yandex.kz/d/ArKzUdwgk6eDo)
Brochure 2: Infections, contracted through sexual intercourse (STIs).

(Retrieved from [https://disk.yandex.kz/d/ArKzUdwgk6eDo](https://disk.yandex.kz/d/ArKzUdwgk6eDo))
Brochure 3: What every person needs to know about HIV/AIDS.

(Retrieved from https://disk.yandex.kz/d/ArKzUdwgk6eDo)
Snapshot 1: “Three years ago, I thought I lost it all”. (Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1yDjRpLb3g)

Snapshot 2: “I was a **risky** person, only the gamers changed on the table”. (Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1yDjRpLb3g)


Snapshot 4: “There is a **risk** to lose it all or to gain something new”. (Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1yDjRpLb3g)
The analysis of both categories pertains to the versions provided in Russian language as per the linguistic differences of the word use between Kazakh and Russian. The materials made and distributed by the governmental and quasi-governmental institutions are of a great assistance to form a “face” or “faces” of a person(s) at risk in Kazakhstan, as argued by the above-mentioned authors. There are two messages to be analyzed, one is similar to “practicing monogamy” and the other could be interpreted as “know your status”, and a portrayal of a person at risk in these media to be constructed.

Firstly, I want to look at the message that promotes monogamous sex with a stable partner. This message was found in all media, although the word choice was slightly different and hinted to other interpretations of the message. For example, in the brochure “What every person needs to know about HIV/AIDS”, the preventative measure was coined as “use condoms, but it is better to have a stable and reliable partner” (https://disk.yandex.kz/d/ArKzUdwgk6eDo). In the brochure 1, the message was framed as the importance of stable relationships with not infected and loyal partner to protect oneself from contracting HIV (ibid.). An STI brochure (number 2), phrased this message as “The most efficient protection from STIs is a stable sex partner, avoiding too early sexual debut outside marriage” (ibid.). As it can be seen, the message that could be framed as “having sex with a stable partner” or “monogamous intercourse is recommended” as the ones discussed by PSAs and message frames of Sub-Saharan Africa campaigns, the brochures included other words as well, such as “reliable” partner, “not infected” and “loyal” partner, and “avoiding too early sexual debut outside marriage”. I tend to believe that the linguistic choice towards “reliable” and “loyal” partners is rather vague and not consistent, as argued by Woods, Davis and Westover (1991). What does it mean to be “reliable” and “loyal”? It can be dubious when a reader interprets what has been implied, it is either usage of condoms but only if a partner is not stable and reliable, or when having casual sex, or it is acceptable not to use condoms when it comes to a stable and reliable partner of one.

Unlike the message frame of “practicing monogamy” in the Sub-Saharan study, Kazakhstani source seems to include a characteristic which is relative and subjective, that is, having a “reliable” partner. I find it problematic to include in the educational material on preventing the rise of epidemics, as reliability of a person is never constant and is fluid, thus it makes it easy for someone to transition from being a “reliable” partner to “unreliable”, or from “loyal” to “not loyal”, and focusing on one’s stable partner is more efficient and speaks more salient that the characteristic that does not pertain to the frequency of the sexual intercourse and the time span that makes this partner “stable”, as mentioned in the brochure. Moreover, in terms of loyalty of one, what we see in this message is similar to the lack of the change of behavior message, and one’s confidence in “loyalty” may not be reasonable, as anyone can contract HIV, even if s/he has been in a long-term relationship. Secondly, the brochure that talked about “not infected” partner is discriminatory and goes against the objective of “zero discrimination”, one of the objectives put by the Ministry of Healthcare of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which is non-discriminatory attitudes and zero stigmatization of the infected people (2017). People who have HIV/AIDS are excluded from sexual relations with other people in this message, yet, when the safe behavior is followed, no matter what one’s status is, it does not and should not prevent them
from having sexual intercourse. Yet, if an educational resource provided by the governmental institution sends a message of having sex only with non-infected people, it marginalizes those infected and ostracizes them from society as “others”, and results in a failure of one of the commitments set in the country. Moreover, having sex with “not infected” partner does not exclude that any unsafe behavior may lead to contraction of HIV. Thus, othering those with HIV/AIDS is, in the first place, discriminatory, and on the other, does not acknowledge everyone’s risk of being infected, no matter who one’s partner is.

In addition to that, “National report on progress made in implementing the global response to AIDS” as of 2017 aimed at “Providing social protection tailored to specific HIV needs for 75% of people at risk or infected with HIV by 2020” (2017). However, taking into account that the major groups at risk in Kazakhstan are intravenous drug users, sex workers and MSM, none of the educational resources spoke directly to them or mentioned the behaviors that could prevent people in these groups from contracting HIV. Instead, the brochures included these risk groups in the section “Who might have HIV/AIDS?”, but not in the section addressed to the preventative measures, rather looking at “stability”, “loyalty” and “not-infectedness”, as it does not pertain to the sexual and behavioral practices of these groups. From this, we can assume that when talking to the general population in Kazakhstan, the government, although acknowledging their target population and being willing to provide them with social welfare, misses out some of their recipients and does not address them directly in the materials they produce. In line with this disparity is also a vice-versa portrayal of people “at risk” in the video (snapshot 2): “I was a risky person, only the gamers changed on the table” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1yDjRpLb3g). While message emphasizes practicing monogamy, the video hints on the consequences of not following this message, as “the gamers” on the table could be interpreted as sexual partners, and the snapshot with woman’s hand on the shoulders of the gambler is then followed by the bare arm of a woman with a tattoo (ibid.). Here, it is once again important to highlight that it is not the number of one’s partners, but the behavior that they practice, and the government still seems to focus on the message that does not prevent from the contraction of the disease.

Lastly, touching on the topic of social constructionism of the brochures, the second brochure highlighted “…avoiding too early sexual debut outside marriage” (https://disk.yandex.kz/d/ArKzUdwegk6eDo). This message, though not being relevant to any of the safe sex practices included in none of the studies analyzed, purely deals with the cultural notions in Kazakhstan, when sexual intercourse outside of marriage is judged. Thus, due to the cultural and historical “norms”, the appropriation of government-produced educational material to the unscientific and unjustified message is inefficient, as a person in marriage can contract HIV/AIDS, or the person might have contracted the disease from their mother, or under other circumstances. Exclusion of these scenarios in the media is problematic, as it makes people “in the marriage” believe they are exempt of the HIV/AIDS, even if it is assumed that they both are each other’s first sexual partners.

The second message is the “know your status” message produced by the educational resources. Although this message is in line with the 90-90-90 agenda of UNAIDS, the ways to
which people are being motivated to pass HIV test are different. For instance, brochure “To know and not be afraid!” says that the test will “tell what is needed to continue responsible life with/out HIV” (ibid.). The test in itself does not entail what is needed to “continue responsible life”, it shows whether there are any consequences of the sexual behaviors one undertakes. Instead, this message could have been effective if it talked about the consultations people may receive in the Republican AIDS Centers, or the educational resources that are provided in these institutions. In addition to that, the notion of this message could have been demonstrated by the responsible behaviors of anyone, in spite of their HIV status. The video, on the other hand, never utters words HIV/AIDS except in the end when it says, “get checked for HIV and know your status”, one of the key messages found in every resource, both in the US and Sub-Saharan Africa. I find it very odd not to have the words spoken out loud as 30-years-old Dias reveals “his story” of contracting HIV for a video that was produced within “World AIDS Day” activism, instead using the word “risky” in several instances. Moreover, in this video, these “risky” messages are contradictory that overlap from the person’s identity and the image viewers receive while watching the video. For instance, Dias claims to own a big company, to run, and “to have everything a human can dream of…” but that “was not always the case” he says “Three years ago I thought I lost it all: break up, no trust from colleagues - I was a risky person, and there was a risk left to lose everything” (highlighted by the author). Again, as the words “risky” might imply his contracting the disease, I find the messages discriminatory and diminishing for people living with HIV/AIDS, thus meaning that it goes against the agenda put forward by the government on zero stigma. Moreover, if “having everything a human can dream of” was not always the case in Dias’s life story, there is a question pondering whether a person with HIV/AIDS hitherto cannot have everything a “human” can dream of. In addition to that, the character mentions having marriage, drug- and gambling-free life in the end of the video, implying that a person with HIV/AIDS, or, as he himself was possibly HIV infected, could not have a family, was gambling and used drugs, which is a confusing message to be produced and distributed by the Ministry. In the end of the video, he ends by saying “I am thankful to fate for everything it brought”, and it demonstrates how social construction of the disease and AIDS denialism is embedded in the medical, as it is most possibly not the “fate” that made him infected rather than his behavior(s), and that those behavior should be changed for a person so that not to contract HIV. Along with that, it is not the “fate” that brought him the knowledge of his status, but the test he took. Yet, the viewers never know what made him get tested, although the main message of this video is to “know your status” (see the snapshot 4). One more controversy in this “know your status” video is that treatment is being promoted and is for free in the country as indicated in one of the commitments set by the Ministry of the Healthcare, and if the video does not talk about these measures one can take to her/his healthy life, then the number of people who know about the options will be limited and will not consider checking for HIV as one of the very first measures anyone could take is s/he is susceptible, and that treatment is free of charge for anyone. Therefore, although the awareness of the status is one of the main goals set by the 90-90-90 agenda worldwide and in Kazakhstan as well, the way in which it is distributed to the general public is rather arguable in the materials analyzed, where two of the four media mentioned this message and the others did not have it on their list.
Lastly, when talking of the “face” of people at risk in Kazakhstan and the “risk groups” that are being invented, the targeted cues on the groups that are infected with HIV the most in the past years (according to the report on the national progress), such as MSM, heterosexuals and youth seem to be missing in the brochures (2017). In this section, I am looking solely at the visual production in these media. For example, brochure 1 has portrayed three different people: an African American woman, a lady in a pink dress with pink hair and in a seductive dress (though long), and a guy that looks like a geek and has grey hair, if looked at stereotypically. If Goldstein and Woods (2004; 1991) talked about how it is important for people to be able to appropriate the portrayals to themselves, this brochure does not depict Kazakhstani population at all, as it is a rare occasion in which all of the three figures could be seen in the society. Thus, if a person cannot have this “face” on themselves, it makes it problematic to call people for action in the HIV/AIDS prevention efforts, as people simply do not see themselves in this educational material. Moreover, the video with 30-years-old Dias is also not exemplary of people who contract HIV the most in the country, as he is not considered to be an adolescent due to his age, he is not a male who has sex with male as the video shows his family and wife, and he refers to having a wife as one of the best things that happened to him. It is unclear in the video what is the “portrayal” of this video, and who was the target audience to be tested in this government effort to raise awareness due to the World’s AIDS Day in 2018 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1yDjRpLb3g). To conclude, in the portrayals of people at risk in Kazakhstan, it is hard for people to make them “fit” to their lives, and, therefore, to call them for action. Thus, it is vague which population government is trying to reach, and whether by trying to include everyone in the “faces” of the pandemic, they have excluded the behaviors that identify susceptibility, not the group that they belong to, such as gamblers or African American women.

One major takeaway of this study is that the educational materials produced by governmental and quasi-governmental organizations have to deal with framing their messages to reach the population and “call” them “for action” to change their behaviors and acknowledge the risks of their sexual practices. Instead, the shortcomings of the educational materials provided by the Ministry of the Healthcare of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republican AIDS Center lie in their social constructionism and the add-ons of the media, such as “reliability”, “loyalty”, “sexual intercourse before marriage” and “fate” playing role in contracting HIV that do not pertain to the ways that one can get infected, and could largely be interpreted as the reflections of the culture and history of the society and those in power who reproduce and reinforce the ideas they deem to be needed. However, the cultural appropriation and these cues are not effective if they do not reflect the idea that everyone is at risk of being infected, and it is dependent on their behaviors, not their belongingness to a particular group “at risk”. Therefore, in order to make these educational resources effective and reach the goals stated, the producers of these materials need to reconsider the messages so as to encourage everyone to get tested.
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RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE
“If there were better Muslims and an Islamic government, such behavior would not be tolerated”: Corruption and Islamic Revival in Kyrgyzstan
Naomi Messer, Yale University

Located in former Soviet Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has seen a tremendous increase in individuals identifying as Muslim since the end of communism. A 2007 study indicated that 97.5 percent of ethnic Kyrgyz and 99.1 percent of ethnic Uzbeks residing in Kyrgyzstan stated that they self-identified as Muslim, up from 55.3 percent and 87.1 percent respectively in 1996. For nearly 80 years, under Soviet rule, Kyrgyzstan was an atheistic state by law, and therefore, this renewed interest in Islam has been the subject of scholarly debate about the causes of this revival. In this paper, I will argue that Islam in Kyrgyzstan has seen a resurgence due to Kyrgyzstan’s inability to provide services for its citizens, due to national and local corruption, which leads to a desire to restore integrity through religion.

Background

Religion flourished in Kyrgyzstan as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate in the early 1990s, and the inclusion of Islam in the public sphere ushered in popular expression of religion. A traditionally Muslim country, Kyrgyzstan had been under Communist rule since 1917, with religion banned from the public and private spheres. Islamic practices were not fully removed, and individuals continued to mark life-cycle events with Islamic celebrations. Islam was relegated to the role of a custom or a tradition and was not a religion expressed through practice. For example, although individuals may have had a cultural connection to Islam, it was not uncommon for individuals to consume pork or drink alcohol, practices that violate Islamic law. In the words of Adeeb Khalid, “None of this is to say that Islam disappeared from Central Asia…Rather, the meaning of Muslim changed quite radically.”

Theories on Islamic Revivalism

In scholar Eric McGlinchey’s 2009 article, “Islamic Revivalism and State Failure in Kyrgyzstan, he describes a compounding cycle, where social welfare needs contribute to the necessity of Islamic organizations, leading to individuals becoming more devout, which in turn leads to more Islamic charities. For Kyrgyzstanis, Islam appears to offer individuals access to services and a community that would not exist otherwise. However, I would like to propose another dimension to McGlinchey’s conclusions. The rise in Islam is not only linked to economic difficulties in Kyrgyzstan, but also to the perceived corruption in Kyrgyzstan. Due to

106 Khalid, 117.
107 McGlinchey, 17.
economic weaknesses in Kyrgyzstan, individuals are not only more likely to require assistance from Islamic groups or charities, but may also act in a corrupt manner to support themselves. When local officials ask for bribes, it creates the sense that honesty is needed, leading to a new role for Islam in society in providing not only charitable assistance, but also stability to counter the corrupt government.

**Working Definitions**

Defining “religious” and “secular” is a difficult task, considering that religion is in constant flux and therefore difficult to concisely explain. Scholar Victoria Smolkin suggests that, when analyzing the Soviet period, it is not prudent to focus on Western scholars’ conceptions of religion, but more beneficial to define religion in similar terms to the Soviets.108 In keeping with her analysis, I have chosen to only provide more background on Soviet views of religion rather than attempt to craft definitions. Smolkin states:

> For the history of Soviet atheism, however, theoretical questions about the definition of religion are secondary, since regardless of whether or not religion is a human universal, those who comprised the Soviet atheist apparatus – took for granted that religion existed, and that it was antithetical to Communism, posed a danger to the Communist project, and therefore needed to be exorcized from Soviet life.109

Smolkin therefore views Soviet conceptions as affirming that religion existed, and that the secular and religion were distinct. Additionally, Julie McBrien, in her book *Belonging and Belief*, discusses secularism in the Soviet Union. She claims that defining secularism in the multicultural and multi-religious Soviet Union is nearly impossible given the variations in practice;110 however, she also states that secularism in the Soviet Union is incomparable to liberal secularism, because it was imposed by the Soviet government as opposed to being something chosen by the people.111 She mentions that religion became a private, cultural practice rather than communal, as the Soviets effectively broke down the organizational structure of Islam in Kyrgyzstan.112 Although this paper primarily focuses on post-Soviet religion, most scholars discussing religion in Kyrgyzstan describe it in contrast with the Soviet period, and therefore either implicitly or explicitly use the Soviet framework in analyzing the current state of religion. Therefore, I use Smolkin’s and McBrien’s backgrounds of the Soviet period as the guiding definition for this paper, with the acknowledgement that defining religion poses considerable challenges, and much like religion itself, is ever-changing.

Given the fact that religion in the Soviet Union was not primarily based on belief, but rather practice or custom, there is considerable difficulty in analyzing how religious people are in

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109 Smolkin, 4.
111 McBrien, 31–32.
the former Soviet Union. Most scholars of religion do not define religion purely on reported beliefs. As Montgomery states “there is always the possibility that one is lying about what one claims to believe…Because of this intangibility of beliefs, people concern themselves with practice – the way in which beliefs and ideas are acted out.”\textsuperscript{113} In the context of the region, due to a lack of religious knowledge as a result of Soviet degradation of Islamic institutions, individuals often have little knowledge of religious practices, yet identify strongly with Islam. This is evident in McGlinchey’s paper, where he justifies using citizens’ identification with Islam as a metric to judge religiousness by writing, “although other scholars highlight mosque attendance and sharia compliance [to measure religiosity], these measures [are] inappropriate for a society that only recently has had the opportunity to reconnect with the free practice of Islam.”\textsuperscript{114} My paper is in line with this school of thought, as I seek to analyze Kyrgyzstanis’ interactions with Islam, rather than their sense of religion or belief.

**Corruption in Kyrgyzstan**

National government corruption is linked to local corruption which, in turn, is linked to the rise of religion. Unmoored from the economic center of Moscow, and unable to freely trade with its fellow former Soviet republics given their newfound independence, Kyrgyzstan suffered from economic collapse.\textsuperscript{115} The production and provision of raw materials to Russia constituted the majority of Central Asia’s economy and industry was underdeveloped.\textsuperscript{116} Therefore, almost overnight, when subsidies from Russia in exchange for goods dried up, Kyrgyzstan’s economic basis was decimated. In 1992, the economy contracted substantially, with real Gross Domestic Product collapsing by 24 percent.\textsuperscript{117} Moreover, funding earmarked for social services declined, from 16 percent of GDP to 12 percent.\textsuperscript{118} Although the economy has somewhat bounced back from this initial shock, 16 percent of individuals still live below the poverty line.\textsuperscript{119} For example, the average university teacher makes about $40 a month, but the cost for a family to live in an urban area is $100 a month.\textsuperscript{120}

Considering these dire economic problems, corruption has become a mainstay of the state, both on a local and national level. Politics has experienced a high degree of instability in aftermath of the Soviet Union, as most politicians are perceived as corrupt. The first president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, ruled until from 1990 until 2005, and was chosen by former Soviet


\textsuperscript{115} Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia - Islam or Nationalism?*, 4.

\textsuperscript{116} Rashid, 68.


\textsuperscript{118} \textquotedblleft Kyrgyzstan,	extquotedblright  26.


elites in part because of his perceived weakness. In 2005, Akaev was removed from power through street protests, which protested Akaev awarding expensive military contracts to companies owned. He was replaced by Kurmanbek Bakiev. In 2010, protests removed Bakiev as well, citing his son Maksim’s self-enrichment through his control of development agencies. Simultaneously, a wave of ethnically-motivated violence against the Uzbeks occurred in the south, resulting in the deaths of 400 individuals and lingering concerns around Kyrgyzstan’s status as a peaceful, ethnically diverse state would remain intact. After Bakiev’s ouster, Roza Otunbayeva succeeded him as interim president. In 2011, Alzamk Atambayev became president, until Sooronbay Jeenbekov defeated him in the 2017 election. In August 2019, Atambayev was charged with corruption, and it was alleged that he had released a crime boss from prison on humanitarian grounds, with the knowledge that the boss was faking his leukemia diagnosis. His arrest sparked protests, although these charges are seen by Atambayev’s supporters as being politically motivated by Jeenbekov. This tumultuous history demonstrates the centrality of corruption in Kyrgyz politics. Moreover, it explains why corruption is firmly rooted in society, even at the local level, as the government is an active participant.

On the local level in Kyrgyzstan, corruption is complex, often rendered necessary by economic strife. Individuals, desirous of remaining afloat, have turned to requesting bribes, if they are in positions of power. The national government often pays low wages to government employees, perhaps because the government has decreased revenue due to corruption, with the understanding that government employees will accept bribes. Teachers, who are chronically underpaid, offer grades in exchange for money, reducing the value of education and creating an economy where only the wealthy can succeed. One police officer, who mentioned that many of her colleagues were dishonest and that individuals could easily pay their way out of being charged with a crime, justified the actions of the police by saying: “They have their own families that they need to feed. That’s why they take bribes. Maybe, if their salary were bigger, they would be taking fewer bribes.” This quote demonstrates that the increase in corruption on a local level is primarily connected to economics. As a result of the Soviet legacy, wherein local elites would vie for funding at a regional rather than a national level, Kyrgyzstan’s local

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127 “Kyrgyz Ex-President Atambayev Charged with Corruption.”
130 Sanghera, Ilyasov, and Satybaldieva, 722.
leaders are oftentimes more influential than their national-level counterparts, and therefore looking at regional politics provides more accurate conclusions about Kyrgyzstan overall.\textsuperscript{131} However, corruption on the regional level is inextricably linked to the national level. Due to corruption resulting in a \textit{loss of revenue}, individuals on the local level are forced to turn to bribery to have enough money to live, and therefore, national and local corruption are connected.

Additionally, statistics about Kyrgyzstan have demonstrated that the government is not well-regarded, especially compared to religious organizations, and citizens have indicated that they feel more positively towards Islamic charities than they do toward the government. McGlinchey has found that mosques are considered to be trustworthy or very trustworthy by 82.71 percent of the population,\textsuperscript{132} whereas around 50 percent of individuals surveyed said they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with national officeholders.\textsuperscript{133} Additionally, preliminary evidence suggests that young Kyrgyzstanis ranked trust in religious organizations to be a 3.35 out of 5, with 5 being the most trustworthy, compared to 3.01 for state institutions.\textsuperscript{134}

\textbf{Religious Response to Corruption}

Corruption has clearly damaged the social fabric of Kyrgyzstan and people have turned to religion for a sense of stability and integrity. I found no literature discussing the effects of corruption on religion. However, in \textit{Practicing Islam}, scholar David Montgomery recounts a harrowing robbery of one of his friends and the subsequent discussion he had about the incident with a devout Kyrgyz missionary who had studied at Islamic schools in Pakistan and India.

I was discussing with him the story of a young friend of mine who was told by a police officer that he would help her friend only if she had sex with him. The story outraged Iqbol, and he claimed that if there were better Muslims and an Islamic government, such behavior would not be tolerated.\textsuperscript{135}

Although this form of corruption is not monetary, unlike the forms of corruption previously mentioned in this paper, it demonstrates the great rot of corruption in the culture, where individuals are only assisted by the government in exchange for favors. A police department that does not punish those who ask for bribes is liable to have officers attempt to commit serious breaches, such as the one mentioned above. It also demonstrates the likely answer of imams and religious leaders to these sorts of injustices, namely the promotion of Islamic law. Given that

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{mcglinchey1} McGlinchey, “Islamic Revivalism and State Failure in Kyrgyzstan,” 18.
\bibitem{mcglinchey2} McGlinchey, 24.
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individuals are confronted by corruption on both the local and national levels, it is unsurprising that they have looked for an alternative to these institutions in the form of Islam.

Moreover, religion’s ability to provide an answer to corruption can be demonstrated in how Kyrgyzstani politicians interact with their constituents. Montgomery mentions an additional example of how politicians, to get elected, demonstrate their religious bona fides. He reports that “some politicians place a mosque in the background of campaign photos and calendars they distribute so people associate that politician with a symbol of moral righteousness and tradition all year round.”\(^{136}\) Although this anecdote does not demonstrate how individuals initially associated religion with integrity and morality, it does show how positively Islam is viewed in Kyrgyzstan today. It may also represent that Islamic leaders have been effective in getting Kyrgyzstani politicians to consider religion as allaying corruption. The use of the mosque in campaign materials makes it clear that Islam is seen as providing stability and guidance, and it is possible that a politician who depicts himself as being Muslim is seen by voters as being less corrupt. The following sections discuss two case studies that reflect how government corruption has impacted the resurgence of religion.

**Aksakal Courts**

The *aksakal*, or traditional elder, courts, demonstrate some of the ways in which Islam has provided stability in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. President Askar Akaev created the *aksakal* courts to solve disputes in accordance with traditional Kyrgyz law, also known as *salt*.\(^{137}\) Although Judith Beyer, in her book on *aksakal* courts in the northern Kyrgyz province of Talas, does not provide a concise definition for *salt*, it seems as though *salt* could best be explained as nomadic custom. Although elders have generally had a substantial role in Kyrgyz society and despite the *aksakal* courts’ attempts to appeal to a sense of ancient shared history amongst the Kyrgyz, they are clearly a modern creation, given that they try to depict an uninterrupted Kyrgyz history in which the period of Soviet rule almost never occurred.\(^{138}\) In many places, the *aksakal* courts can serve as a replacement to the government. The government has mostly disappeared from individuals’ lives and is primarily depicted as an institution which seeks to take money from citizens and provide them with little.\(^{139}\) The *aksakals* have begun to conceive of themselves as replacing the state. As one elder profiled by Beyer states,

> [State judges] do not come here [to providing training on the law or oversee the courts] because they were offended by us, because now we deliberate on everything here that was supposed to go to them. Since anyone who goes to the [state] court has to pay they do not make money anymore. My work, however, is for free, and this is what people like

\(^{136}\) Montgomery, 92.


\(^{138}\) Beyer, 33.

\(^{139}\) Beyer, 80.
Therefore, it appears as though these aksakal courts, which were founded by the government, have proliferated and gained acceptance in response to perceived governmental failures. Within these courts, there is an enhanced role for Islam and Islamic observance. Elders are expected to be religious and practice Islam in their daily lives, keeping fasts and having some knowledge of Islamic events and customs. Beyer claims that this is a way for elders to gain legitimacy, claiming that “for today’s aksakals, performing Islam also generates respect and sustains their claims to authority.” She states that aksakals have begun to use Islamic prayer in their court sessions and that they have begun to read and recite the Quran, “broadening their established knowledge base further by becoming religious experts.” Although Islam has taken a role in legitimizing the aksakals, it is clear from Beyer’s book that salt and shariah law can be seen as conflicting. Many of her discussions with local Kyrgyzstanis living in the Talas region would suggest that, in their view, salt should prevail over shariah law. Beyer noticed one woman, selling carpets for mourning rituals, reading a book of hadiths in front of her stall. Expensive mourning rituals have been the subject of scrutiny by state religious officials, who have claimed that they are not in line with Islamic law. When Beyer asked her how she reconciled her Islamic beliefs with her job, she responded, “I know it is forbidden to bring carpets and material [to ritual events] and to slaughter animals. But we have salt.”

Beyer herself does not specify which carries more importance to the citizens of Talas. It is possible that individuals who describe salt as overriding shariah law are not responding to Islam itself, but rather attempts by the government to co-opt Islam, which they feel is incongruous with their customs and traditions. Moreover, Islam is on the rise in Talas; Beyer, who conducted her field work from 2005-2006 and subsequently returned in 2008, 2010, and 2015 noticed the sharp increase in individuals going to the mosque. Given that individuals have become more religious over time, coupled with the fact that aksakals are expected to be observant Muslims and that salt is not a fixed set of laws, it seems likely that Islam today plays a greater role in conceptions of salt.

The aksakal courts are demonstrative of how corruption has influenced religiosity in Kyrgyzstan. Although these courts were created by the state, it appears that a considerable

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140 Beyer, 80.
141 Beyer, 103.
142 Beyer, 105.
143 Beyer, 153.
146 Beyer, xxiv.
147 Beyer, 105.
amount of their support is linked to the fact that individuals view the state courts as corrupt and not in line with the needs of the citizens. They therefore turn to other forms of authority to fill in for state functions, in this case the elder court. Even if these courts were not intended to be religious, it is clear that they have become more Muslim as the people have become more religious. Moreover, the elders depend upon Islam and their observance to gain legitimacy from the people. Although the case of the aksakals does not provide a direct link between corruption and the rise of religion, it does show the separate processes that result in religiously-minded institutions developing. The state’s authority is diminished and therefore individuals may look for stability and structure, in this case traditional courts led by aksakals who are well-versed in Islamic matters. These traditional courts demonstrate how state corruption and religion could potentially be intertwined.

**Hizb ut-Tahrir**

Another way in which the growth of Islam as it relates to corruption is evident in Kyrgyzstan is in the rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir. A global Islamic group whose aim is to restart the caliphate, Hizb-ut Tahrir become fairly popular in Kyrgyzstan, although it is banned by the government due to its extremist roots.\(^{148}\) The intention of Hizb ut-Tahrir is to oppose secular governance in Islamic countries and push for the adoption of shariah law, with all Muslims being ruled under one governmental system.\(^{149}\) The movement became active in Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union, and despite its Islamist ideology, has not been linked to terror attacks or violence in Central Asia.\(^{150}\) It is important to note that, although I am discussing an extremist group in Kyrgyzstan, I am not linking religious revival to Islamic extremism. Rather, I am using the popularity of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is one of the most heavily-researched Islamic groups in Kyrgyzstan, to demonstrate why Islam more generally might appeal to individuals looking for stability and integrity.

A considerable amount of support for Hizb ut-Tahrir relates to the services they provide Kyrgyzstanis. They fund mosques and social services, which are necessary given the Kyrgyz government’s failure in this area. As McGlinchey discusses, numerous individuals in a small town in the north, Ak Terek, became followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir because “the party helped organize the repair of the irrigation system for the village’s apricot groves and, similar to HT’s activities throughout southern Kyrgyzstan, partnered with other charities to help residents meet basic welfare needs.”\(^{151}\) It seems as though the citizens are drawn to the organization not necessarily because of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology, but rather because of the services they provide.

Additionally, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s appeal is in large part due to how the organization provides a counter to narratives of corruption. In press releases and other materials found on their website, Hizb ut-Tahrir states their aims to root out corruption and create more equitable


\(^{149}\) Karagiannis, 40.


societies, claiming bribery is not compatible with Islam. Within the context of Kyrgyzstan, Hizb ut-Tahrir has placed their organization in opposition to the government, depicting the government as corrupt and incompetent, with Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamism been treated as movements with integrity. As one press release states,

the only solution of the problem is to refuse to obey the global government system of the Kufir [non-believer]… The Khilafa system will revive in the nearest future, in shaa Allah! And this system will bring peace and calmness not only to Kyrgyzstan, or other Islamic states, but also to the whole world of Kufir, in shaa Allah!

This quote demonstrates Hizb ut-Tahrir’s efficacy in providing an alternative to the corrupt Kyrgyz state through Islamic belief and governance. Scholar Emmanuel Karagiannis, when discussing this topic, outlines the allegations of corruption levied against Kyrgyz governments and concludes, “it is not a coincidence that Hizb ut-Tahrir has gained growing support in recent years.”

Much of the appeal of Hizb ut-Tahrir stems from their ability to not only provide services, but also the concise answer they provide to solving governance issues in Kyrgyzstan. Given Kyrgyzstan’s instability, it is unsurprising that Hizb ut-Tahrir has flourished, as they advocate for a change in government, and directly link their Islamic ideology to a lessened degree of corruption. Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to be an example of how government corruption has led to religious resurgence, considering that much of their appeal stems from their connection of their Islamic ideology to improved governance.

**Conclusion**

Religious revival has occurred in Kyrgyzstan due to the state’s inability to provide for its citizens, as a result of corruption on the national and local levels, which leads to individuals being desirous of a governmental structure that provides stability. National corruption is rampant, with elected officials siphoning off millions, stealing desperately-needed revenue from the government. This results in local government officials turning to corruption, as the government does not pay them a living salary, and corruption is necessary for them to have enough money to live. Citizens of Kyrgyzstan, who are experiencing the effects of both national and local corruption, are desirous of a system that provides stability and integrity, given the lack of both in the government. Islam may provide an alternative to this corruption, given that its leaders often position Islam as being moral in contrast with the corruption of the Kyrgyz government. When looking at examples of an increase of religion in Kyrgyzstan as it relates to corruption, the aksakal courts provide evidence that state institutions, which are viewed as corrupt, are replaced by institutions that are Islamically-tinged. Moreover, the case of Hizb ut-

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Tahrir provides evidence that some aspects of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s rise can be linked to their anti-corruption sentiments. Islamic revival in Kyrgyzstan is likely connected to the corruption of the state.
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The Palladium of Russia: The Political Power of the Vladimir Icon of the Mother of God
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The twelfth-century Vladimir icon of the Mother of God travelled to Russia in a similar manner as Orthodox Christianity itself: as an import of the Byzantine Empire. Over the following millennium, the icon has witnessed three distinctive periods of Russian religious development: the pre-Soviet period (988-1917), the Soviet period (1917-1990), and the post-Soviet period (1990-present). The Soviet era clearly defines this periodization, because in the context of Russian Orthodoxy, the Soviet period serves as the critical juncture, against which both the pre- and post-Soviet periods are defined. During the pre-Soviet period, stories of the protective powers of the icon transformed this image of the Virgin holding her Son into the Palladium of Russia, and princes and tsars therefore exploited Our Mother of Vladimir for their own political agendas. After the October Revolution in 1917, the Soviets transported the icon from its home of several hundred years, the Cathedral of the Dormition in Moscow, to the State Tretyakov Gallery, where museum restorers and curators attempted to strip the icon of any “religious” sentiments and display it as a purely aesthetic masterpiece. The post-Soviet period witnessed an attempt at synthesizing the history of Rus and the Soviet period, which resulted in the joint ownership of the icon by secular and religious organizations. Throughout the three periods, in spite of the changing conceptions of the “religious” and “secular,” the icon has consistently served as an emblem of power for either Church or state authorities.

Definitions of Religion and Secular

Two inconspicuous terms dominate the discourse surrounding this icon and necessitate a discussion of their meaning: religious and secular. Traditional attempts to define religion, which date back to the nineteenth century, have often attempted to reach a universal definition of “religion,” a definition that Socrates sought from the self-proclaimed pious Athenian Euthyphro in one of the early Platonic dialogues (Asad 29-30, McCutcheon 22). Other anthropologists who eschewed the essentialist approach to defining religion have articulated a more functionalist understanding of religion by enumerating the myriad of meanings the term “religion” evokes (McCutcheon 34). Contemporary scholars, such Talal Asad and Brent Nongbri, have rejected both the essentialist and functionalist approach. The essentialist approach fails because any universal definition of “religion” necessitates the presence of its twin of “secularism,” a term which originated during the Enlightenment period and therefore cannot explain periods prior to its emergence (Asad 29, Nongbri 4). The functionalist approach produces extensive lists, which might offer descriptions of examples of “religion” but necessarily fail in the Herculean attempt to include every possible example (McCutcheon 34).

In lieu of a simple definition of “religion,” a genealogy of this construct presents the clearest path to comprehending “religion.” Prior to the Enlightenment, the ancient and medieval worlds neither conceived of any separation between “religious” and “secular,” nor understood either concept. The Greeks, the Romans, and the Russians had no word for “religion” with its current meaning (Nongbri 21). For example, the Russian term “religia” (религия) from the medieval Latin religio did not appear until the eighteenth century. Church Slavonic had the word
“vera” («вера»), meaning “faith,” but this word had no opposing term like “secular” (Yablokov 128). Only after the Enlightenment, which conceived of the “secular,” did systematic attempts at constructing a universal definition of religion emerge (Asad 40). The nineteenth-century Darwinian concept of evolution furthered the thesis that religion was a “primitive and therefore outmoded form of the institutions we now encounter in truer form (law, politics, science) in modern life” (Asad 27). In the last twenty years, anthropologists have rejected this rationalist notion and have posited that religion is “a distinctive space of human practice and belief which cannot be reduced to any other” (Asad 27). Religion appears to elude any satisfactory definition, but Asad clearly suggests that one cannot attempt to define the term by means of negation, either of science or of the “secular.”

Russia historically has lacked a distinct conception of “religion.” A ruler of Kievan Rus, the medieval predecessor to tsarist Russia, Prince Vladimir, converted to Christianity in 988 and subsequently converted his whole principality. This lack of a clear distinction between “religious” and “secular” continued until the Soviet era, when the Soviets, who endeavored to build a militantly atheist state, capitalized on this dichotomy of “religious” and “secular” by portraying religion as “alien and rooted in the old world” and a “false worldview and obsolete way of life” (Smolkin 4). The Soviets attempted the purify their state of the “religious” in favor of the “secular,” but their failure to understand the inextricability of the two – particularly in Russia – continued to present problems in the Soviet period. Throughout the remainder of this paper, all uses of the terms “religious” and “secular” will refer to the conceptions that originated in western Europe during the Enlightenment and served a major role in the Soviet lexicon.

What Constitutes an Icon?

The comprehension of the significance of the Vladimir icon of the rests upon an understanding of the icon or, phrased differently, what differentiates a painting by Andrej Rublev from a portrait of the Madonna by Raphael. According to contemporary Orthodox theologians, the author, the stylistic choices, and the purpose of the painting distinguish a “true icon” from a painting with a religious subject. In order to produce an authentic icon, the author needed to receive special blessing from a priest and to uphold the highest moral standings (Espinola 17). According to several scholars such as Leonid Ouspensky, a contemporary Russian theologian, the icon has two authors: the artist and the divine. Thus, these scholars contend that the icon, as a combination of the labor of the human and Divine hand, rises to the level of “Holy Scriptures and … the Cross, as one of the forms of revelation and knowledge of God” (Ouspensky 30). Vladimir Lossky, another critical twentieth-century Eastern Orthodox theologian, describes icons as “window[s] into heaven,” which offer a mediated glimpse into the invisible, heavenly realities. However, earlier theologians, such as the seventeenth-century archpriest Avvakum Petrov, stressed the necessity of depicting Biblical figures and saints historically accurately: “this is the present issue: they paint the icon of the Savior Emmanuel with bloated face, scarlet lips, curly hair, fat hands and muscles, flabby fingers, fat thighs on his legs; he’s made all big-belled and fat like a German, except there’s no sword painted at his thigh” (Avvakum). Avvakum harshly condemns the iconographers, or “heretics” as he refers to them, who embrace their artistic liberty to produce icons that conform to the aesthetic tastes of the time. Although Lossky
and Avvakum disagree about the necessity of historical accuracy in icons, both writers, cognizant of the icon’s deep spirituality, agree that an iconographer must always remember the icon’s prototype, literally or metaphysically (Bunge 7).

Lastly, the purpose of the painting differentiates an icon of the Theotokos from a stylized Renaissance Madonna. According to Ouspensky, an icon must “reflect the problems of life, but to answer them, and thus, from its very inception, is a vehicle of the Gospel teaching” (27). The icon, a painted Gospel, allowed for the illiterate to receive the Gospels, and through touching the icon and praying before it, the icon assists “in going beyond what can be seen with our physical eyes into the realm of mystical experience” (Forest 18). Although Raphael may have considered his paintings as supplements to theology, Renaissance masters never considered their works as instances of divine revelation. Ultimately, an understanding of the veneration of icons in the pre-Soviet period elucidates the deep significance of the Vladimir icon, which political leaders throughout all three periods recognized and exploited.

**The Vladimir Icon of the Mother of God**

The Vladimir icon of the Mother of God (Владимирская икона Божией Матери), the Byzantine icon also known as the *Virgin of Vladimir* or the *Theotokos of Vladimir*, likely originated in Byzantium in the early twelfth century. Historians cannot identify the artist of the icon, as most icons remained unsigned (Miller 658, Lossky 42). Composed of tempera paint on wood, the icon stands at 106 by 69 centimeters (Bakatkina 9). The front side of the icon features the Theotokos, the Greek word for God-bearer which the Slavonic language calqued “Богородица,” who embraces Jesus in a formulaic Byzantine pose of cheek-to-cheek contact (Bakatkina 9-10, see fig. 1). The back side, a later Russian addition which congregants rarely viewed except during processionals in which priests paraded the icon through the city, depicts the Hetoimasia, or prepared throne of Christ, and the instruments of Christ’s passion (Bakatkina 10-11).

The Vladimir icon exemplifies the tradition of Byzantine iconography and iconographical symbolism. The medieval world lacked the post-Enlightenment conception of originality and creativity, but rather, as articulated by St. Simeon of Thessalonica, iconographers needed to “portray in colours according to the Tradition … this is painting as true as what is written in books and the grace of God rests on it, for what is portrayed is holy” (qtd. in Lossky 42). This cheek-to-cheek-pose, known as an “Icon of Loving Tenderness,” or *Umilenie*, features a prescribed pose of the Virgin embracing Jesus, who in turn gazes into his mother’s eyes. The tenderness of this image symbolizes the mutual love of the Virgin and Christ. The baby Jesus has the proportions of the fully-grown man but appears the size of an infant, which represents his perfection at birth, and the gold on his garment evokes the kingdom of God and identifies the baby as Christ. Similarly, Mary’s dress features three golden stars to indicate “her virginity before, during and after her son’s birth” (Bakatkina 10). These examples reveal the theological significance of each aesthetic element of the icon, a burden which allowed little space for creative license. According to some critics, the excellence of this icon emerges from its ability to capture the affection of this gentle embrace: “the emotional atmosphere of these icons is
determined by the greatest reciprocal tenderness of the Mother and the Child, tinted with a sorrow, in anticipation of Calvary” (Averintsev 13).

The Age of Belief: The Pre-Soviet Period

According to Aleksandr Anisimov, the leading scholar on the Vladimir icon, the icon originated in Byzantium and first appeared in Russia before 1131 (15). The Primary Chronicle, a history of Kievan Rus compiled in the twelfth century, explains that Mstislav I, Grand Duke of Kiev, intended to build a church “Pirogoshcha” and ordered two icons – including the Vladimir icon of the Mother of God – from Constantinople (Anisimov 15). When Andrei Bogolyubski moved the center of Rus to the Suzdal region in 1155, he brought the Vladimir icon as an emblem of his religious ordination to rule in Vladimir and commissioned the construction of the Dormition Cathedral to house the icon (Anisimov 16). To stress the special veneration of this icon, Bogolyubski adorned the Virgin in precious metals and stones and a riza (robe), a metal covering to protect the icon from the flames of candles (Bakatkina 30-31). According to Anisimov, the icon travelled from Vladimir to Moscow in 1395, after Grand Prince Vasilii I and Metropolitan Kiprian requested the icon’s transfer in order to obtain the Virgin’s aid against the invasion of Tamerlane. David B. Miller challenged Anisimov’s timeline by citing the lack of mention of the icon in contemporaneous histories of the invasion of Tamerlane (Miller 659). Regardless of the veracity of the icon’s transfer to Moscow in the fourteenth century, the proliferation of stories of the icon’s ability to protect Moscow from the Mongols reveal the special veneration of this icon (Bakatkina 37).

During the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the icon, now a feature of the Dormition Cathedral in Moscow, again became a political tool. Written in the sixteenth century under the direction of Metropolitan Makarii, the Book of Royal Degrees included a new myth about the creation of the icon: the Apostle Luke painted the icon on a piece of wood from Jesus’ table while looking at the Virgin (Miller 663). In the remainder of the Book of Royal Degrees, Makarii traced the history, compiled from a variety of chronicles, of the icon’s miracles from the time of Prince Bogolyubski to the multiple invasions of the Mongols to the reign of Ivan the Terrible (Miller 667). For the first time, the Book of Degrees explicitly linked “Muscovite claims to leadership, the Russian land, and the Virgin's benevolence” (Miller 667). The enumeration of the various miracles of the icon – Prince Andrei’s victory over the Volga Bulgars in 1164, the defeat of the Tamerlane in 1395, and deterrence of the subsequent Mongol invasions – solidified the Vladimir icon’s role as the “Christian Palladium of Russia,” a reference to the statue of Pallas Athena in ancient Greece worshipped as a military protector (Averintsev 613). Similarly, by tracing the icon’s lineage from Jerusalem to Constantinople to Kiev to Vladimir to Moscow, Makarii positioned Moscow as the new center of Christianity. As the Muscovite rulers, such as Ivan the Terrible, attempted to strengthen their authority and transform the principality into an empire, this “Christian Palladium” contributed to an evolving myth that venerated Moscow as a political and spiritual leader of Christianity.

According to the research of the last major restoration, the Vladimir icon underwent four major restorations before 1919. The first restoration occurred in first half of the thirteenth
century, after a Tatar raid resulted in the stripping of the riza, which damaged the icon’s wooden base (Anisimov 34). Prince Iaroslav II of Vladimir subsequently ordered the first renovation to celebrate the survival of Vladimir and its most treasured icon after the military raids (Bakatkina 19). In the fifteenth century, a second renovation ensued to accompany the consecration of the Moscow Dormition Cathedral (Bakatkina 19). Renowned iconographer Andrei Rublev likely completed this restoration, and his participation reveals the necessity of “clergy or lay artists specially blessed for icon restoration … [who] understand the iconography, theology, and orthography of the icon” to conduct the restoration (Espinola 21). Vasilii III ordered the third renovation a century later in 1514 during a period of prolific icon restoration (Bakatkina 20, Anisimov 34). The Chronicle illuminates the magnitude of this restoration: “from that hour by the grace of God and through the prayers of Our Lady the dark and cloudy sky became gracious and dissolved and emitted the bright sunny shining with warmth” (qtd. in Anisimov 35). Grand Prince Vasilii III and Metropolitan Varlaam capitalized on this restoration to remind their subjects of their divine right to rule during a time of imperial expansion.

The final renovation prior to 1919 occurred in the 1890s, as the Russian state prepared for the coronation of tsar Nikolas II with a significant reconstruction of the Cathedral, where all Russian leaders have been coronated since 1547 (Bakatkina 20). The political motivations again become clear: the brightness of the icon at the coronation of Nikolai II would further this religious and national myth of Moscow as the heir to Jerusalem. During this time of a revived interest in Russia’s historical connections with Byzantium, the Vladimir icon’s approval would specifically connote a return to the historical foundations of Russia. However, iconographers and restorers, Osip Chirikov and Mikhail Dikarev, decided to not even attempt to restore the icon, in spite of its extreme darkness, due to its fragility (Bakatkina 20-21). Instead, they temporarily preserved the icon against further destruction. The caution and hesitancy with which Chirikov and Dikarev approached the icon demonstrates the deep reverence that icon restorers had for icons and their nineteenth-century belief that icon restoration should not change the icon but rather simply support its longevity. In short, even as miraculous stories bolstered the legitimacy of various Russian rulers, the icon’s repeated restorations also served the political aims of the state.

A World Without God: The Soviet Period

The rise of the Communist Party in Russia and the October Revolution in 1917 dramatically altered the eight-hundred-year-long tradition of icon veneration. Influenced by German philosopher and economist Karl Marx, who described religion as “the self-consciousness and self-feeling of man who has either not yet found himself or has lost himself again,” the Soviets believed that the emergence of social science eradicated any need for religion, which they perceived as an inferior attempt to understand the natural world (Smolkin 10). Employing the false dichotomy of the “secular” and “religious,” the Soviets thus strove to cleanse Russian politics, culture, and philosophy of any tinges of “religion” in order to eliminate any competing bastions of power in the U.S.S.R. (Smolkin 14). This attempt to eradicate all religious elements from Russian society rested on an assumption, articulated by Leon Trotsky, that “the Orthodox Church was a daily custom and a government institution. It was never
successful in penetrating deeply into the consciousness of the masses, nor in blending its dogmas and canons with the inner emotions of the people” (qtd. in Smolkin 37). According to Trotsky, the Bolsheviks could provide an alternative form of entertainment that could easily replace the traditions of church-going and icon veneration with “new forms of life, new amusements, new and more cultured theaters” (qtd. in Smolkin 37). In order to accomplish this formidable feat, the Soviet apparatus delegated different agendas to the various arms of the regime: the party strove to produce an atheistic society “free of religion,” the government councils on religious affairs attempted to manage the relationships between the religious institutions and the state, the security organs neutralized any opposition through extralegal means, and the militant atheist groups physically destroyed religious buildings and objects (Smolkin 16). As part of a propaganda campaign against religion, the Soviets produced a poster entitled “How they beat religion into a person,” which ironically portrayed icons as propaganda posters of the Church. Ultimately, the Soviets, relying upon a false conception of the distinction and antagonism between the “religious” and the “secular,” sought to eliminate the greatest threat to their power.

In December of 1918, under the auspices of the newly created Central Museum Administration, the Soviets moved the icon from the Cathedral of Dormition in Moscow to the Kremlin, where a team of twelve art historians, revolutionaries, priests, and financiers examined the icon (Bakatkina 21, Morper 151). Several months earlier, the Soviet apparatus created the Commission for the Conservation of Monuments to protect against the destruction of heritage during the civil war that followed the Bolshevik Revolution, and this restoration project reflected this politically motivated desire to protect – and control – the icon (Bakatkina 22). Led by G. O. Chirikov, the “most experienced restorer of all the Russian technical specialists in this line,” according to fellow team member Anisimov, the team cleaned the icon, examined the various layers of paint, and restored it to its original appearance (Anisimov 23). The restoration of the icon at the critical juncture in Russian history supported both the Soviet atheist agenda and the Church’s attempt to regain authority. The application of twentieth-century scientific innovations to this icon, which had previously held an air of sanctity that prohibited such invasive examinations, demystified the religious treasure. In an attempt to reduce the icon to scientific, empirical, and material categories, Anisimov published an extensive description of the restoration process and deconstructed the icon historically through his analysis of each layer of paint (Anisimov 23-36).

As noted by Anisimov, the icon encompasses several layers of paint, which each correspond to a different restoration, and consequently, the icon can no longer be considered a work of art created by one artist (26). The icon restorers in 1919, therefore, had to decide how they should restore the icon. The restorers eventually decided to restore the icon to its twelfth century appearance, and thus, the restorers acted in line with the “secular” understanding of art, which prizes the original above any reproductions or restorations that do not remain faithful to the archetype. The Church, in contrast, understood the icon as a living Gospel, which underwent many restorations and consequently told the history of the icon through its layers. Orthodox writer Jim Forest praises the “rough terrain of the icon” as its best feature:
There are many good printed reproductions of the Vladimir icon, but none do justice to the original. Partly this is because the surface of the icon, having suffered much damage over the centuries, reveals level upon level of the over-painting done by those who renewed the icon when it had been darkened by candle smoke. We see portions of earlier painting in one area, later painting in others. (78)

As the conservators expunged the contributions of the last four restorers, they, like all the previous conservators of the icon, ironically added themselves to the history of the Vladimir icon and became co-authors of the icon, consequently coopting the icon for a “secular” purpose.

Soviet intellectuals, such as N. Levinson, heralded this cleaning as the savior of Old Russian painting from oblivion. In his article in the Russian journal, Russkoe Iskusstvo (Russian Art), Levinson wrote, “The barriers that had been set up by the Church in the way of investigating scholars were removed, and the old icons may now be studied irrespective of the esteem of sanctity in which they are held” (351). By presenting the Church as an archaic and repressive establishment that requires circumvention, Levinson characterized the Soviets as a progressive institution interested in truth and capable of accomplishing tasks that the former regime could not. Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow’s endorsement of the restoration of the icon complicates this characterization (Anisimov 23). However, no evidence of Patriarch Tikhon’s support appears in texts independent of the Soviet state, and given the repression of speech during the Russian civil war, the absence of sources disproving his support does not tacitly endorse the Soviets’ narrative. Nonetheless, Tikhon’s desire to revitalize the interest in iconography to counter the Soviets’ atheistic campaigns could explain his support for restoration. Regardless of the Church’s opinion on the restoration, the Soviets clearly revealed a desire to reclaim the icon as “national heritage,” to demystify this miracle-working icon, and to undermine the authority of the Church.

The exhibition of the icon in the State Tretyakov Gallery represented a further attempt by the Soviets to “secularize” and “neutralize” the icon. An exploration of heritage studies illuminates the various ways that a museum like the State Tretyakov Gallery could reclaim the icon for “secular” purposes. In Heritage: Critical Approaches, Rodney Harrison explained that “ownership of heritage confers not only rights to control access to (and income generated by) cultural objects, but also the power to control the production of knowledge about the past” (109). For example, classification structures within museums allow curatorial staff to separate items by function, type, national origin, and time period, which allows the museums to craft linear narratives about their collections (Harrison 28). By exhibiting the Vladimir icon in an art gallery alongside other “secular” Russian artists, the state classified this work as “art,” which diminished the religious significance of the icon. Moreover, the sequential structure of the gallery implicitly crafts a narrative of progress and development, to which docents, guides, and nameplates add their own interpretations (Harrison 104, Bennett 43). Russian art museums, including the State Tretyakov Gallery, display the icons as the first attempts at Russian national art, and the following galleries trace the progressive development away from these “primitive” paintings.
toward modernity. By characterizing the icon as the predecessor to “secular” art styles like realism, romanticism, and abstraction, these museums formulate an ahistorical and misleading arc that connects icons with modernity.

Lastly, museums control the behavior of their visitors, and the regulations of the museum prohibit the physical elements of worship that typically occur before icons. In The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics, Tony Bennett argues that museums strive “to tutor their visitors on the modes of deportment required if they were to be admitted” (73). The museums consequently act as a civilizing force in society by educating the working class on proper dress, walking pace, distance from exhibits, and tone of voice. Visitors become trained to relate to the icons like any piece of artwork, so they may not bow before the icon, touch the icon, chant before the icon, or engage in sustained prayer before the icon. In Praying with Icon, Jim Forest enumerates the necessity of physical worship practices in the Orthodox Church: “There are times in prayer when kneeling is appropriate, especially in prayers of sorrow and repentance, or at times in prayers of intercession. There are also times to press your forehead against the floor and to lie prostrate. The prayer itself will often awaken such physical actions” (50). By separating the viewer from the icon by a thick pane of glass, the museum enforces a physical and theological distance between the two. Through all of these measures, the Soviet regime with the aid of the State Tretyakov Gallery contributed to the “process of profanization through which their initial sacrality is being lost” (Meyer and DeWitt 277).

A New Compromise: The Post-Soviet Period

At the height of perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to meet with Patriarch Pimen and the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1988. During this first official meeting between the leader of the Soviet Communist Party and the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church since 1943, Gorbachev and the leaders of the Orthodox Church discussed plans to commemorate a millennium of Christianity in Russia, which began with Prince Vladimir’s adoption of Christianity as the state religion in 988 (Smolkin 1). Gorbachev reversed decades of Soviet policy “to harness Orthodoxy’s moral capital at home and court political favor with Cold War adversaries in order to regain control over perestroika” (Smolkin 2). As part of these conversations, Gorbachev made several major concessions: the return of some religious buildings and property, which the Bolsheviks had nationalized in 1917; the removal of restrictions on the publication of religious literature and the Bible; permission for religious instruction for children; and a limitation on state inference in religious life. By 1990, demands for the return of religious property intensified. In February 1990, Sergei Averintsev, an Orthodox member of the Soviet Parliament, advocated for the return of the cathedrals of the Moscow Kremlin and other well-known churches and monasteries of the capital to the Russian Orthodox Church (Ellis 67). Museum workers feared that the return of religious artifacts and buildings would severely diminish the number of jobs available, and in 1992, they wrote an open letter to Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian Federation:

We are sending you this open letter because of our great anxiety and fear for the fate of those parts of Russia's cultural heritage which are housed in our museums ... It was the
museum workers, restorers and art historians who fought to save church and monastery buildings from being used as warehouses and so on. They constantly showed that these were not just churches: they were works of art, an expression of our national identity, with huge artistic and scientific significance (qtd. in Ellis 69).

These museums workers, embracing the Soviet characterization of Church property as “secular art,” argued that these icons and artifacts served the public best in museums because these museums reached the widest audiences. Academician D. S. Likhachev, sympathetic to both the Church and the museums, penned a detailed article, which acknowledged the dedication of the museum staff over the past several decades who protected these artifacts and churches from destruction. However, Likhachev conceded that museums and libraries should return icons and artifacts of exceptional religious value, and he proposed a compromise for icons that museums had restored, such as the Vladimir icon. Likhachev suggested that “they should be suitably exhibited in the new building of the Tretyakov Gallery, not mixed up with other items in a cramped exhibit” (Ellis 67).

Following this advice, in 1993 the State Tretyakov Gallery and the Patriarch Alexei II reopened the Church of St. Nicholas of Tolmachi, a seventeenth-century cathedral which the Tretyakov Gallery had used as a storage facility since the church’s closure in 1928, and agreed to display the Vladimir icon (“The reconstruction”). Both the Ministry of Culture and the Urban Diocese of Moscow have authority over the St. Nicholas of Tolmachi, but the Tretyakov Gallery retained its ownership of the church. On September 8, 1996, on the feast day of the Vladimir icon, Patriarch Alexei II officially consecrated the altar of the Church of St. Nicholas of Tolmachi, and by the following year, the Tretyakov Gallery completed the renovations of the church, which included the return of the original icons to the iconostasis and the construction of a special bullet-proof glass case for the Vladimir icon (Lebedeva). In order to accommodate the two drastically distinct practices in the space, the museum has allocated certain times of day for worship and certain times of day for museum visitors. From 8 a.m. to noon, worshippers may enter the church through an underground entrance in the Tretyakov Gallery, where visitors must pass through a metal detector and store their outerwear and bags (Sokolov). Museum goers who have purchased a ticket from the Gallery may wander through the church until 5 p.m., but the museum staff places greater restrictions on their behavior, prohibiting the lighting of candles and other devotional practices (Sokolov). The archpriest Nikolai Sokolov must coordinate all services, including the Easter and Christmas midnight vigil, with the museum staff, who, according to Sokolov, “never hinder us” (Sokolov).

This joint ownership of Russia’s national palladium provides the perfect symbol for the image of “secular” and “religious” unity that the post-Soviet state hoped to project, but the logistical and theoretical problems of this shared space undermine this idealized façade. The former director of the State Tretyakov Gallery Irina Antonova remarked: “this is the result of a mutual desire to find consensus, an understanding that both faith and culture are at the heart of our society. When we talk about the unity of faith and culture, we must first think about preserving the greatest masterpieces no matter where they are” (Sokolov). Although Sokolov and Antonova portray the secular-religious partnership as thriving, both tacitly acknowledged the
struggles of negotiating the two conceptions of this space (Sokolov). However, a desire to project harmony between the Church and the state precluded either from disclosing the details of their disagreements.

A theoretical understanding of the challenges of negotiating a secular and sacred space offers insight into the problems that the Tretyakov Gallery and the Patriarchate face. In “Sacrality and Aura in the Museum: Mute Objects and Articulate Space,” Joan Branham attempts to define “sacred space” (Branham 41). To Branham, ritual, which “depends on the interdependency of a wide spectrum of ingredients, such as symbolic objects, consecrated time, specific gestures, and appropriate personages,” distinguishes a sacred space (41). As previously discussed, the museum-space significantly shapes ritual behavior: visitors wander slowly through the galleries, refrain from touching the paintings, and speak in reverently hushed tones. Therefore, from noon to 5 p.m., the museum element – with its various prescribed behaviors – strips the space of its sanctity. But can the Church of St. Nicholas of Tolmachi become a sacred space again from 8 a.m. to noon? According to Branham’s understanding of a sacred space, the mere presence of rituals can reestablish the sacrosanctity of the church. However, the state, through the apparatus of the museum, never allows the Patriarchate complete control over the church. Museum guards monitor the space at all hours, cameras surveil every corner of the church to prevent theft and destruction of church property, and the Vladimir icon remains at a distance from any visitor (Sokolov). The daily oscillation between sacred and secular provides a challenge to visitors, worshippers, and museum staff to truly define the church, and in this liminal space, museum goers may perceive the church as a space that aptly reproduces a Russo-Byzantine church replete with authentic iconographic paintings, while a worshipper may view the church as a location for prayer, which the museum authorities have attempted to co-opt. This inability to categorize the space, nonetheless, reveals the success of the church’s political message. The precious icon of the Orthodox Church has returned to its worshippers, and the museum can exhibit one of the greatest examples of the Byzantine iconographic style.

Conclusion

In spite of the tumultuous political landscape of Russia, which has witnessed the rise and fall of the Kievan and Muscovite principalities, the tsarist empire, and the Soviet Union, the Vladimir icon has persisted as a symbol of power. As the conceptions of “secular” and “religious” changed over the thousand years of Russia’s Christianity, the icon has metamorphosed into an object of worship, a masterpiece of Medieval art, and a national treasure. Does the Vladimir icon have a “universal value ... despite its temporal and spatial contexts” (Branham 45)? The variable notions of the icon during the three periods appears to suggest that the icon only derives meaning from the space and time in which it exists. In Moscow’s Dormition Cathedral in the sixteenth century, the icon symbolized the religious leadership of Moscow as the third Rome. On the white walls of the Tretyakov Gallery during the Soviet period, the icon exemplified the genius of Byzantine iconographers. In the Church of St. Nicholas of Tolmachi in the twenty-first century, the icon embodies the state’s renewed tolerance for religion. However, this rich history, perhaps, provides the icon with its universal value: its
power as an emblem of Russia, even when the conception of “Russia” changed. The icon continues to offer a window into the past, as new layers of history accumulate on the board.
Figures

Figure 1:
The Vladimir Icon of the Mother of God, tempera on panel, 104 by 69 centimeters (41 in × 27 in). Church of St. Nicholas of Tolmachi, Moscow.
Works Consulted


MANIFESTATIONS AND EFFECTS OF TRAUMA
Material Manifestations of Individual Trauma in Margarita Khemlin’s Klotsvog (2009)  
Anna Galperin, New York University

Margarita Khemlin’s novel Klotsvog (2009) is a skaz-style narrative told from the perspective of Maya. Maya appears, on the surface, to be a manipulative and vain woman, only caring about the next pair of shoes or apartment. She is at a remove from all of the events around her; her reactions are either aloof or entirely cold, even in moments of extreme change or in the face of death. However, the few details of Maya’s childhood that readers are aware of allow for a more nuanced understanding of Maya’s materialism.

Like many other Soviet Jews of the postwar era, Maya suffered more than the individual traumas of growing up in the Soviet Union. The generational fear and guilt that later plagues her as an adult is a direct result of the evacuation she glosses over at the start of the novel. This guilt is not something that Maya can express in an obviously emphatic way: her attachment during the most traumatic time in her early life (the evacuation out of her hometown as the Nazis advanced) was to a dress. By addressing and investigating trauma and memory, Khemlin reconciles Maya’s personality as entirely human, and not simply vain and materialistic. As a writer, Khemlin seeks to tell stories of people who cannot do so themselves.

Maya’s story is one of lasting trauma with little hope; there is no future with conclusive finality determined by happiness and escape from that which causes harm. Maya’s trauma follows her entire life. What Khemlin asks of the reader in telling Maya’s story is patience and empathy, but the historicity of trauma necessitates exploration through a materially focused narrative. The lack of emotional description does not mean the narrative lacks emotion: it is drenched in feeling, especially individual trauma. In many ways, Klotsvog is a novel of development, but the development occurs in the material realm. Although the development is articulated with material cornerstones, this only serves to heighten the spiritual relationship between Maya and readers, and Maya’s history and memory. The spiritual stakes are impossible to confront (to both Maya and the reader), so Khemlin builds a bridge between spiritual development and materialistic grounding for this development through Maya’s repression of identity. Trauma is then necessarily assigned material signifiers.

Maya narrates the novel using material identifiers. She experiences the evacuation of her Jewish hometown, Ostyor, as a child. While the event is glossed over, it is marked with identification with material conditions and objects. Maya’s childhood best friend was shot according to other neighbors during the occupation of her hometown of Ostyor. Instead of dwelling on the incident, Maya focuses on the dress that she left behind: “They were shot with the other Jews in the ravine on the Desna […] My dress had definitely disappeared into the unknown, and I cried out my childish soul over it” (Khemlin 4). It is significantly easier to imagine the material unknown than it is the spiritual one, especially for a child, and this NOUN follows her into adulthood.

The next time the wool dress appears in the narrative is when Maya learns that her son has been lying about his intentions of going into a university she had chosen and researched during his
marine service. Her fight with Blyuma is elevated by her breakdown, which is also given little articulation: “And then I started crying. And I cried as much as I had over my wool dress that I left on the bed during evacuation twenty-eight years ago. And I cried a half-hour, no less. And shouted and wailed. And whatever else is done in situations like that” (192). Throughout the narrative, we see few moments of vulnerability from Maya, yet they always seem to tie into a hermetic space and with words that reflect the skaz style and are relativized to objects, in this case, her wool dress. The wool dress itself is not the cause of pain for Maya, but it represents loss that is unable to be explored. In many ways, the dress represents a past that is no longer accessible due to reasons beyond Maya’s control. Misha deciding to oppose his mother’s efforts and embrace his Jewish identity is as uncontrollable as Maya’s childhood best friend dying during the occupation. For Maya, her personal property and appearance is the one thing she is able to control and reign in her world. Being well dressed moves her further from the reality that defies Maya’s power of command. The initial trauma she experienced as a child, and the material memories attached to that trauma, specifically leaving behind a favorite dress, shape her understanding of the world. The attachments made at a young age continue into adulthood, not due to developmental deficiencies, but as survival mechanisms. Personal trauma is described with material objects, but that is only because the spiritual burden is unbearable.

Rebecca Gould, citing Paul Connerton, describes the transition of collectivized memory to individualized memory in the late twentieth century. Khemlin’s narrative is an example of this shift, as Maya seems to abandon her Judaism in a way that ensures her survival in an anti-semitic state. She forces herself to forget Yiddish, moves to various urban centers far from Ostyor, and even marries a non-Jewish man in an attempt to protect her son. Gould claims that “in modernity, memory ensures survival, whereas forgetting can imply a compromise with atrocity, or, more frequently, acquiescence in defeat” (Gould 149); however, Maya doesn’t actually forget her heritage. Her attempts at distancing herself from her heritage seem to sublimate her identity’s importance: if it wasn’t of value there would be no need to protect and hide it. Gould’s essay focuses on the deportation of Muslim people of the Soviet Union and their lack of taxonomy; however, much of the themes explored can be applied to Maya as well, as her evacuation, while short-lived, resonates in all of her future experiences. Especially as history becomes ruptured and time itself is interrupted with the instability of continuity and eventuality, “deportation memory is confronted with the impossibility of finding appropriate places for the chaos induced by time” (Gould 151). The memory of Maya’s evacuation stands as an event marked with the burning image of a wool dress—lamenting over her hometown and locality of identity is impossible as time itself ruptured her personal history. History is marked by events, while memory is marked by objects. As time itself is impossible to locate in a ruptured history, objects are all that is left to stabilize the narrative.

The initial traumatic event and loss of stability Maya experiences as a child is triggered again with the figurative loss of her son. Although Misha is not dead, he is an unknown person to Maya by the end of the novel, much like her best friend became. The lack of foundation and impossibility of imagining either one, the absolute lack of connection Maya feels to people she believed would be in her life forever, is epitomized by a dress that is gone. This is how personal
memory functions: episodic moments rise to the conscious surface when triggered by an external stimulus (Assmann 211-213).

At a base level, the connection between childhood trauma and coping mechanisms in adulthood makes intuitive sense. Further, the focus on materialism and consumerism to cope with spiritual disintegration and collapsing relationships also follows logically based on Maya’s past. A study by Somer and Ruvio found that individuals under constant high-stress, particularly in a war-like environment, who had materialistic values, held the highest levels of post-traumatic stress symptoms. Maya’s case is an accurate and particular literary example of the study; Maya is a figure who, at the start of her life, was concerned with her material conditions and whether or not they were sufficient. Her family worked hard, earned a living, and when able, bought materialistic goods. Maya is also someone who experiences what is called Type IV stress. A psychological study cited by Somer and Ruvio from 1994 by Wilson, et al. identified Type IV stressors as “anomalous, producing high levels of uncertainty and profound adaptational dilemmas as victims are uncertain about effective ways to protect themselves”. These events are repetitive, unpredictable, and have the potential to result in death. While Maya is not experiencing terrorism at a large scale, her Jewish identity forces her to fear her life in several instances. This results in coping mechanisms that typically do not enforce lasting relationships with people; however, Maya does enable her consumerism. She shops and relates to materials more so than people, often describing herself in relation to others by what she is wearing or how they look.

Materialism in *Klotsvog* signals personal trauma as well as transferred trauma. Letters are where the generational divide begins and ends; Maya doesn’t stay in contact with Misha or Ella forty years after the collapse of the house in Ostyor. Aleida Assmann redefines the two categories of collective or individual memories as four instead: personal, social, cultural, and political. Generational memory occupies the social category and is less transient and self-annihilating as personal memory (which disappears when the person who holds the memories dies). As personal memory is epitomized with objects, so is social memory, particularly intergenerational social memory. The novel begins with Maya stating that she was “born in 1930— and like my whole generation— saw too much, things that weren’t pretty” (1). Nothing more is said, and nothing more can be said. War is not an easy topic to divulge a narrative on, especially a personal narrative that isn’t actually about war.

Maya’s two children belong to a different generation, with each diverging from Maya’s path in their own unique way. Misha identifies with his Jewishness more than Maya wishes, whereas Ella is an anti-Semite who mocks her family and steals prized possessions in attempts to disavow her own heritage. Maya teaches Misha to forget the use of Yiddish in public, but she is at a loss with Ella. The material objectification of these relationships failing spiritually is the mode of communication being entirely intercepted, forged, hidden, or otherwise derailed. With Misha, his letters claim one thing but later are revealed to be lies. This revelation occurs in other letters, to Blyuma, and becomes the moment where Maya’s past is awakened. Blyuma’s final letters in which she begs Maya for help and money were intercepted by Ella, mocked, and then thrown out. The cruelty is unimaginable by Maya, and when she travels to Ostyor after finding out that she was being sent letters, she finds Blyuma dead, Fima is gone, and Misha nowhere to be found. This
results in the final breakdown of Maya’s character, and ultimate growth; she burns everything from the house her mother lived in, as well as her former husband Fima, and Misha for a period of time. This finalizes her development. But not without loss; Assmann writes that “the members of a generation tend to see themselves as different from preceding and succeeding generations […] age separates in an existential way due to the temporality of experience” (214). These letters, mere objects, are the source of two significant spiritual breakdowns. They represent the changing social memory that Assmann identifies.

The transference of trauma takes on two different forms in the novel: Misha accepts the burden, but embodies that which Maya fears, whereas Ella renounces her identity altogether, at times going even further than Maya and threatening her parents’ existence based on their identity. Maya, during a conversation with her last husband Marik, divulges that she thinks Ella was “born a stranger” (187). The terrifying truth is made explicitly clear when Ella hides vital letters from Ostyor. The symbol of the letter represents the passage of memory. Letters themselves tell of thoughts that have already passed; they represent a piece of the past that is written into permanence. The act of writing somehow grants the truth of the thoughts, yet with Misha, he consistently lies to his mother about his goals, his beliefs, his ideas, and the act of writing is another tool used to trick Maya into holding onto a version of her son that she accepts. Misha’s letters give Maya false hope, but aren’t produced out of ill will. Yet the ones that are revealed to her by Blyuma, ones that aren’t addressed to Maya, tell the truth in a treacherous way. For Misha, revealing the truth to those who have security in their identity is easier than revealing it to his mother. This is because of the gap between them; Maya and Misha lack the maternal attachment, yet he still developed with the same guilt that Maya had. Generationally, traumas have been passed down. He lies to Maya the same way that Maya lies to herself.

Besides symbolizing the transference of traumas, letters have the ability to cause change without inciting spiritual investigation. They push towards development, defined materially, which points towards the fact that Maya is not quite defeated. The final event in the novel can be investigated through a varying lens, but an interesting path is that the absence of communication finally allows Maya to develop in a significant spiritual way. The way this is expressed is through the destruction of everything in the house on Ostyor after Blyuma’s death and Fima’s disappearance. Ella steals urgent letters addressed to Maya, mocks them, then throws them out. This act of stealing, mocking, and discarding is representative of her generational separation from Maya: at first, she stole Maya’s affection and time (Maya dedicated her life to providing for young Ella and being close to her). Then, she began to mock her heritage, often leveraging the anti-semitic society as a place-holder for her own Jewish shame. Ultimately, though, Ella entirely renounces her identity and relationship to Maya, claiming that she is adopted. This process interrupts generational trauma that could be inherited; instead, Ella uses generational trauma as a force to push her away from that which could cause harm. The severity of the consequences of being Jewish, despite the obvious political threat, is too great for Ella. It is easier to ignore and discard her maternal relationship than it is to face the potential threats of being Jewish. Much like in Maya’s case, it is easier for Ella to avoid any of the potential traumas from her inherited Jewishness. However, she does so methods similar to Maya’s: the absence of Ella’s
narrative regarding her identity proves that it was, in fact, transferred. In negating itself, it shows that it is of value and somehow not worthy of her generation. Perhaps Misha, whose early years in Ostyor shaped his Jewish identity, lies in letters because he harbors an appreciation for his heritage. Meanwhile, Ella, who discards letters not hers to begin with, harbors resentment about her inherited identity that she has no control over. Like Maya, she attempts to control her environment, but failing to do so with her appearance, she lashes out against that which she holds accountable for her appearance, her place in the world, and especially her identity: her mother.

Maya inserts materialistic values largely in places where otherwise the emotional significance would be too much to process. The narrator is telling the story of her life up until the present (final few sentences), hence the narrative is brimming with important events: deaths, births, marital collapses, and relocations follow each other with great speed. The chronology itself is thrown off with tangential recollections and there are no chapters in the novel to signal sound structure. The impression of Maya that readers are left with is that of a vain woman who worries not about the life-changing moments and relationships she has but is incredibly self-involved. To her defense, Maya is a narrator who is biased towards herself. She will be blameless because in her life, she has felt wrongs but hasn’t felt sorry about them until the novel begins. The novel is her attempt to allow herself to be read, to offer a sincere account of her life, and a sincere apology. This fails in producing an emphatic response because it is told from her point of view, but that point of view is not itself offensive. Maya’s insertion of the material world into otherwise emotional moments pushes away readers who expect sincere vulnerability. However, this insertion and inappropriate reference to the clothes she wears, or how others look, proves to provide deeper significance to those same moments. An example of this comes when she confronts her first love and the father of Misha, Viktor Pavlovich. They had an affair while she was his student, but she didn’t find their relationship to be beneficial to the rest of her life (he had a wife and was generally unstable). Instead, she allowed her supervisor to court her and claimed that Pavlovich’s son was his. Towards the end of the novel, she returns to find Pavlovich and find out why he has inserted himself into Misha’s life in Ostyor. The final impression that Maya has of this otherwise emotional moment is that of her shoes: “I turned and left. The heels of my shoes clicked. High heels, by the way. Titanium heel tips. They only applied them in two places in Moscow. And not on just any footwear. Yes. That was my final triumph over Viktor” (203). The final triumph over Viktor meant much more to Maya than she lets on, but that meaning is hidden behind a materialistic facade. Maya uses her femininity and material resources as a defense mechanism against the potential emotional impact of tumultuous moments. Specifically, shoes symbolize a movement away from, and not towards, for Maya. She walks away from Viktor, but not with any specific direction. Shoes are also a symbol of grounding; a dress or a skirt may have fluid characteristics like swaying in the wind. Shoes are stiff, they are rigid, and they embody feminine strength.

A facade is not the only method of masking her true emotions: avoidance is another strategy of dealing with traumatic stressors. Cathy Caruth in Unclaimed Experiences: Narrative, Trauma, and Memory discusses Freud’s Moses and Monotheism in connection to his escape from Nazi Germany. In his text, he describes the repetition of the evacuation of Jews. Caruth investigates the importance of Freud leaving, and stating that he left, Germany in 1938. Maya’s narrative bears
many similarities with this moment, particularly in terms of containing and opening the space for trauma within the text. Whereas Freud’s text inhabits a space of trauma and carves out room for it to exist, Maya’s narrative continues seamlessly over her evacuation and right into her adolescence. However, as Caruth later elaborate, Freud’s “I left” “[...] preserves history precisely within the gap in is text; and within the words of his leaving, words that do not simply refer, [...] but conveys the impact of a history precisely as what cannot be grasped about leaving” (Caruth 21). Due to the skaz-style narrative, there is no indication of a break, so all of Maya’s trauma is condensed into one passage with no before, and certainly no after.

The narrative does not discover the meaning of evacuation, nor does it remember it in a way that indicates memorial. Evacuation, while one of the cornerstones of Maya’s character, is an event that is neither remembered nor forgotten. For the narrative, the implications are that it is unimportant. A superficial quantitative reading measuring the times that Maya’s Judaism or fear of persecution is mentioned against the various catalogs of clothes she wears would reveal that the latter is more important. But the lack of engagement with this event, much like other emotional moments, signals that perhaps there is meaning in what is not said. Much like the moments where Maya openly reveals to readers that she had a breakdown, the unsaid is what is important. There is only so much to say about the event itself, which on paper seems banal, but the historicity is unable to be contained in the narrative as the memory itself is tainted with feelings. That emotional memory carries the whole trauma of the Jewish people (persecution, evacuation, and instability), but to Maya, it is just another moment in her already troubling life. Even in the future, the pain is too great to confront in its entirety. In fact, at the end of the novel, when it is time for the future to be confronted in real-time, the only future Maya envisions for herself is one where she is able to repent and reconcile with her dead relatives. The absence of an easily locatable moment of trauma accentuates the importance and pervasiveness of trauma itself. Trauma haunts Maya and follows her entire life; she is unable to leave behind her Jewishness nor can she defend it in other cities. Her identity is eternally contained in the absence of clear, memorializing narrative.

Although Khemlin’s text is a fictional novel, perhaps the same truth of Freudian repetition that Caruth locates is carried with Maya. Each time she remarries, she does so in pursuit of material gains. While Jewish history is laced with geographic and spiritual resettlement, Maya’s history reflects this resettlement in terms of shoes and apartments. Nonetheless, the repetition is reminiscent of Jewish resettlement; in the final moments of the novel, everyone around Maya abandons her (either by dying or losing contact), but she has hope for an eventual future of her own. Persecution was no longer the final end, but death was instead; and in death, there would be the possibility of repenting. In a way, death itself allowed for a new cycle of interactions with her past relationships, a repetitive reflection being the main goal for the protagonist. Prior to returning to Ostyor for the final time, Maya was concerned with the accumulation and upgrading of objects. After Blyuma’s death and finding out the events that occurred at the house in Ostyor, Maya burns everything from the house in the yard and refuses to put out the fire. While this moment lacks in explicit emotional exploration, nonetheless it shows the final arc of Maya’s character. Objects have lost their meaning as her relationships have dissolved and been extinguished. After this moment, the novel fails to continue in a meaningful way; the lack of events signals an end to history, but
perhaps not the end of memory. Misha and Ella are still alive, and so any anecdotal memories they inherited have the potential to live on; and at the narrative level, one long anecdote, Maya’s skaz will live on through Khemlin’s efforts.

Maya practices her own muted anti-Semitism in denying her identity, and to a child (Ella), this develops into full blown anti-Semitism that goes beyond the pale dissociation with all things Jewish. This imitation is relatively simple, however, the uncanny character of Ella’s anti-Semitic behavior is worth investigating further. In Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied, Alexander Etkind analyzes the history of Russia that has given rise to an uncanny genre of Post-Soviet literature. Also analyzing Freud, he writes that, “Freud’s formulas defined the uncanny as a particular form of memory, one that is intimately connected to fear […] the higher the energy of forgetting, the greater the honor of remembering” (Etkind 17). In this way, forgetting in Khemlin’s narrative plays a dual role: one in which it signals importance and another in which it relativizes memory. Generationally, Maya forgets her identity only for Misha to remember and embrace it and Ella to distance herself from it. Maya must forget it as her friend remains unburied, and that could be Maya’s future too. Misha remembers it for the very same reason; Ella forgets it because Maya has also forgotten it. Etkind writes, “If the loss is not recognized, it threatens to return in strange though not entirely new forms” (16). Although Ella is not one of Etkind’s “undead,” she is an iteration of rebirth: a new generation. Maya doesn’t recognize the loss of identity that plagues her adulthood and character, so Ella adopts it in a strange (anti-Semitic) though not new way; she also separates herself from her Jewishness. Focusing on a particular family and a particular narrator draws attention away from a collective trauma that has been investigated in other literature. The specific manifestations of personal and generational trauma are not necessarily evidence of greater political or cultural trauma, but instead, illustrate how political and cultural trauma has affected the individual. In this way, the external world is reflected in the various conflicts Maya encounters and must deal with, particularly antisemitism in the Soviet Union. The particularity of the story forces the universal to become apparent: the world Maya lives in has forced her to become the person she is. The format of the novel also investigates what it means to remember or forget, and the significance of either in identifying markers of important events. This exercise creates a platform for trauma to be explored, especially in ways that are not apparent on a first read. Omitting paragraphs is itself an act of authorial intent to draw the reader to the eventuality and the string of life; there are no breaks in a personal narrative because events are not compartmentalized as neatly as chapters would suggest. Instead, following two strands of trauma, readers confront the messy reality of repressing an identity and the fear of not being distant enough from that which can cause harm.

Materialism has so far been a tool to enhance the spiritual importance of events in Maya’s life. Materialism is also the core of matter, and consumerism is something that reflects individuality. Klotsvoig is a novel about a particular woman facing particular traumas. Spirituality, as it relates to the material world, is a reflection of a universal notion, religious or otherwise. It becomes clear that Maya’s vanity is a reflection of her narrative, intentionally so. She is not simply a crass character, but the mode of retelling her life necessarily must be materialistic in nature. Her values reflect her position in the world. Where the collective is universalized trauma, Maya’s
personal traumas are grounded in materialism and symbolized as such. Having proved that symbols represent personal trauma and generational trauma, the same symbols must also represent the divide between what is spiritual (the unknown) and what is material (the objects themselves).

Memory functions as a narrative tool in deciding what is written (and therefore remembered and given importance) and what is absent (and forgotten/ unimportant). However, because Maya is a narrator who is bound to her memory unconditionally, the narrative fails to reflect the importance of repressed memory, avoidance, and mechanisms of coping. Primarily, Maya’s materialistic values derail the narrative from its seminal moments; this does not mean that those moments are of less import, in fact, it signals that they have significance beyond that which can be narrated. Much like Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of her generation, ‘what was wrong, and what no dialogue […] could right, was the world”. The world itself has forced Maya to silently hold onto her trauma in a way that is not conducive to building lasting spiritual relationships and progressing into a material future. Maya’s future is spiritual, in that it aims towards the eventuality of life; her materiality is inherent and necessary. Maya’s materialistic vanity stems from her experiences as a child, and materials symbolize various traumatic tracks in the novel. The wool dress that is left behind in the evacuation of Ostyor symbolizes personal trauma; letters symbolize generational trauma. These are two examples of individual trauma (as defined by Assmann) that the novel explores. Khemlin, in writing Klotsvog, seeks to preserve a cultural memory that may be erased through a narrative focusing on individual memory. In doing so, the effects of the antisemitic doctrines of the Soviet Union are observed. Materialism is the antithesis to spiritualism, and thus the equal and opposite method of illustrating individual memory as opposed to collective memory. The spiritual and collective are universal, whereas the individual and material are particular. The novel is a particularized example of collective trauma.
Works Cited


The Protection of Children in Theresienstadt
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Founded in 1780 and about one hour north of Prague, Terezin or “Theresienstadt” as it was once known is now a quiet little town. Currently inhabited by a population of about 3,000, between 1941 and 1945 Terezin became crowded beyond any previously imagined capacity with a population close to 60,000 people. This population was not in Terezin by choice, but rather as forced prisoners of the Third Reich. The inhabitants of Terezin were noncombatant, Jewish civilians and were mainly deported from Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Germany, and confined within the city as a result of the Third Reich’s racial policies that targeted Europe’s Jewish community. Perhaps most significantly, it was not just full fledged adults who were made prisoners of this ghetto. Thousands of children were interned in Terezin during the Holocaust as well. As the most vulnerable members of ghetto society, older internees made a concerted effort to protect the children of Terezin from the worst realities of ghetto life. My research has focused primarily on the lives of children in the camp, the different aspects that made up their daily routines, and the carefully constructed and concealed efforts to educate the ghetto’s children as well as the SS sanctioned cultural programs. If efforts to clandestinely provide the children with a formal education gave the children some structure and normality to their internment, the cultural programming that included art, poetry, and theater gave children an outlet for their grief and anxieties.

Within the Third Reich’s ghetto system, Terezin enjoyed a special status. Reinhard Hedrich, Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia and director of the Reich Security Main Office determined that this small resort town was to be presented to the Jews of Germany and Austria as a luxury ghetto. The Reich’s wealthiest Jews would pay in order to gain admittance to Terezin for themselves and their families thereby avoiding deportation to ghettos in Eastern Europe. Here the richest and most well-connected Jews of European society could comply with National Socialist racial policies while still living in what was promised to be a certain level of comfort and civility. The National Socialist government presented Theresienstadt to the outside world as a humane site of wartime internment. Theresienstadt was designed to illustrate allegations made by the Western Allies of National Socialist mistreatment of Europe’s Jews as nothing more than outrageous propaganda claims created to sabotage the legitimacy of the Nazi government. In fact, in August 1944 the propaganda film “The Fuhrer Gives the Jews a City,” was filmed to magnify this deception about the ghetto as the completed film was sent to the Vatican, the Red Cross, and especially neutral states like Sweden and Switzerland. Within the ghetto walls, however, the situation was much different. Prisoners endured harsh working conditions, gross mistreatment by the ghetto’s guards, and a daily food ration that was insufficient to sustain life in the long term.

156 Ibid., 17.
Within the aforementioned conditions, the presence of children in an internment camp is especially compelling and furthermore, makes Terezin unique. Prisoners were living in a paradox where official policies supported the continuation of education and culture inside the ghetto while prisoners still lived under the constant threat of deportation and the threat of death if they were found to be participating in any type of education or cultural activity not sanctioned by the S.S. administrators of the camp. All of this begs the question- how did Jewish children cope with and survive life in Theresienstadt?

Terezin was not always the quiet resort town that it appeared to be when the first Jewish prisoners arrived there in November 1941. In fact, the town of Terezin was built to meet an entirely different demand. In 1780 at the height of the rivalry between the Habsburg Empire and Prussia, Habsburg Emperor Joseph II ordered the construction of a garrison town to protect his empire from Prussian attacks. This new garrison town was named in honor of Joseph's mother, famed Austrian empress Maria Theresa. The town consisted of a citadel that came to be commonly known as the “small fortress” and a greater town housing support staff and families of soldiers who worked in the citadel that came to be known as the “main fortress.” Although it was constructed to the highest defense specifications, the fortress never saw action as a military installation. In the late nineteenth century, the Habsburg government transformed the citadel into a prison.

Following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and subsequent formation of the new Czechoslovak state in 1918, Terezin became located in western Czechoslovakia, known as the Sudetenland. It is with the German annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938 and the rest of the Czech territory in 1939 that the narrative and character of this small town changed completely.

The geography of Terezin and the area surrounding it played a large role in the National Socialist decision to turn the town into a ghetto. Terezin was only about an hour’s drive by car north from Prague, and the town was only a few miles away from a large railway station. This proximity to the Czech railroad network was essential for Terezin as a transit camp to make the transportation of Jews to and from the ghetto a fairly easy process for the German occupiers. Furthermore, the town still had all of its defensive mechanisms from its days as a garrison town including high walls around the town’s perimeter, a large moat surrounding the outside walls, streets laid out in a simple grid, and only a few entrances allowing passage in or out of the town. All of this made Terezin exceptionally easy to guard. Features that had once been used to keep invaders from coming in would now be manipulated and used to keep prisoners from going out.

In October 1941 Reinhard Heydrich, Acting Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, held two secretive meetings in Prague to discuss the possibility of using Terezin as a ghetto. In these meetings Heydrich and those in attendance decided that Terezin would be turned into not


158 Ruth Thomson, Terezin: Voices from the Holocaust, (Hachette Children’s Group, 2013), 11
just a ghetto, but also a transit camp and assembly point for further transportation to camps in German-occupied Poland. Each Jew would be allowed to take 50 kilograms of luggage with them in accordance with “the well tested method”, that reflected established procedures used in the deportation of Polish Jews to ghettos after the German invasion in 1939. In the long term, following the eventual evacuation of all Jews from Terezin to the General Government the town would be resettled with Germans in compliance with the Third Reich’s goal to Germanize the area.

Theresienstadt’s special status in the eyes of Nazi leaders means it could best be described as a hybrid ghetto and concentration camp. Many of the Jews that were interned there faced eventual deportation to Auschwitz-Birkenau and since children in Terezin were able to live freely with relatively little intervention by the Nazi administrators, Terezin seemed to share the characteristics of a ghetto. Yet, all inhabitants who could work were required to do so as in labor and concentration camps. This proverbial grey area makes Terezin’s role in the Final Solution difficult to ascertain, and makes the questions surrounding the lives of children within the camp all the more important to answer.

The Nazi government promised that life in Theresienstadt would not be as bad for Jews as in ghettos within the Reich. It was presented to Jews as a “special ghetto,” a place where Jews of a certain status could be interred for the duration of the war in Europe. This category of privileged Jews included elderly German and Austrian Jews, decorated German Jewish veterans from the First World War, and prominent Jewish scholars, artists, and other celebrities. This set Terezin apart in status from the other ghettos in German occupied Poland and beyond, which remained the primary destination for deported European Jews. Although conditions in Terezin were unacceptable for a human being to live in, Jews in Terezin had access to much better living and working conditions, and thus had a much greater chance of survival when compared to deported Jews in any other ghetto in occupied Europe.

In December of 1941 the first transport of Jews from Czechoslovakia, renamed the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, arrived in Theresienstadt. Quickly the ghettos’ Council of Elders decided that there was a dire need for the establishment of homes in the ghetto strictly for children, where the youngest and weakest could be shielded from their harsh new surroundings. This need came from the decision made by the Council that the welfare of the ghetto’s young had priority over the ghetto’s oldest inhabitants. For the young prisoners this meant they would receive better food, the best available housing, and more access to medical care. For the elderly this implied a severe disadvantage as limited and desperately needed resources were redirected from them in order to give the children a better chance at survival. Otto Zucker, a member of the Council of Elders, defended the Council’s actions by saying “We were aware that material conditions are of crucial importance for a young person who is still in

\[159\] Ibid, 10

the developmental stage. Those conditions must be as favorable as possible if we are to have a strong and healthy generation that is physically up to the tasks that the future holds for the Jewish people.”161 The decision made in Theresienstadt to do anything possible to give the ghetto’s children a better shot at life was a conscious one, and one made with the firmest belief that European Jews would in some form survive their current ordeal.

It was with the arrival of some of Europe’s most well-known scholars, poets, authors, and musicians to the camp that the idea for a clandestine education system, accessible and available to all of the ghetto’s prisoners but meant especially for the ghetto’s children, first came about. The majority of the children’s teachers were known to the ghetto’s Jewish administration due to their often shared interest or membership in Zionist organizations before the war.162 Whenever it became known that a new arrival to the ghetto had an advanced background in a certain field, the individual was sought out and invited to submit their résumé to the Youth Welfare Office. Based on their professional background and experience working with children, the individual would then receive an assignment to work in one of the Children’s Homes as either a counselor or teacher, and in many cases both. There were two types of education these teachers would give their students- sanctioned and unsanctioned. The SS administration sanctioned education focused primarily on what had been leisurely pursuits- mostly painting, singing, and drawing lessons. Unsanctioned education was traditional academic lessons. The S.S. had expressly forbidden any education of this kind for Jewish children anywhere in the Reich. The Nazi government did not want another generation of young and educated Jews, and instead wanted to ensure that young Jews across the Reich knew and expected nothing from their lives except for the life and death through slave labor that they were destined for under Nazi racial policies.

The S.S. guarding the camp remained on the lookout for forbidden attempts to formally educate the children. The Reich Central Office declared all formal schooling for Jewish children illegal in July 1942.163 With that in mind, a system had to be devised so that teachers could have adequate time to disband their lessons if an S.S. guard came their way. A child would be assigned to stand watch outside of the building where lessons took place, and if a guard was spotted close-by, he or she would quietly raise an alarm that danger was near. All at once students would hide their papers, retake their seats, and start an activity that was deemed “acceptable” for children by the S.S., which was in many cases singing.164 Caught on the giving

161 Hannelore Brenner-Wonschick, The Girls of Room 28 (Thorndike, 2009), 42
163 Ibid., 10.
164 Ibid., 83.
or receiving end of a forbidden formal education often meant dire consequences for all those involved, which in most cases meant almost immediate execution.\textsuperscript{165}

Although the children of Theresienstadt had access to classes taught by some of the brightest Jewish minds in Europe, the clandestine education system lacked continuity and stability. Deportations from Theresienstadt were constant throughout the war, and educators usually had no way of knowing how long they would be in the camp for or when their name might be selected for deportation to a camp further East. Hannelore Brenner, a child survivor of Theresienstadt who lived in one of the children’s homes, remembered “If an English teacher arrived, we were taught English. But it wasn’t long before he had to leave on a transport. Then another teacher came to replace him, but maybe what he knew wasn’t English but mathematics. And so we were taught mathematics.”\textsuperscript{166} In addition to having to adapt to new and strange surroundings, children also had to adapt to new teachers and constantly changing subjects.

Despite inconsistencies in the program and dire consequences if their involvement became known, children still participated in the clandestine education because of their deep desire to get an education. Analysis of post-war accounts of childhood survivors shows that many credit the education system in Theresienstadt with instilling an aspect of normalcy to their incredibly abnormal lives. Going to school tied children back to their pre-war lives and in many cases gave the children hope that they would be able to withstand the violence and chaos that surrounded them in order to return to classes in the school where they had spent some of their most formative years before the war.

In addition to education, cultural productions provided another form of shelter from the harsh realities of camp life for Terezin’s youngest inhabitants. Unlike formal education, cultural activities for children were permitted and encouraged by the S.S. administrators. These activities included theatrical productions, singing in small choirs or in individual lessons between a child and an instructor, writing poetry, and expressing their feelings in a more abstract manner through painting and drawing. Due to Terezin’s status as a special ghetto, some of the most well known Jewish artists of Europe came to be interned behind the ghetto’s walls. This roster of artistic and academic celebrities includes the likes of actor Eugen Burg, well known surrealist poet Robert Desnos, Czech composer Rudolf Karel, classical scholar Friedrich Munzer, Austrian mathematician and creator of Pick’s Theorem, Georg Alexander Pick, Czech historian Alena Hájková, Austrian neurologist and psychologist Viktor Frankl, as well as many others.\textsuperscript{167}

One of the most recognized cultural activities designed for children in Terezin was the production of the children’s opera Brundibar. Written in collaboration by Czech composer Hans Krasa and Adolf Hoffmeister before the pair’s internment in Terezin, Brundibar first premiered

\textsuperscript{165} Vera Schiff, \textit{The Theresienstadt Deception: The Concentration Camp the Nazis Created to Deceive the World} (The Edwin Mellen Press, 2012), 56.

\textsuperscript{166} Hannelore Brenner-Wonschick, \textit{The Girls of Room 28} (Thorndike, 2009), 81

in the ghetto in September of 1943. The majority of performances of the opera took place within Terezín by a children’s choir, and it was almost immediately a success. In fact, the final scene of the opera appeared in the 1944 propaganda film “The Fuhrer Gives the Jews a City,” to demonstrate cultural life in the ghetto.

To understand its popularity in the ghetto regardless of the gender, age, or previous economic or political background of the audience, however, one must first fully examine the storyline of the production itself. The opera tells the story of a young brother and sister who are being raised solely by their ill mother. The children are penniless, and so to raise money to buy the medicine that their beloved mother desperately needs the pair decide to sing songs in their local market in hopes of raising the necessary money. Before the children can begin their show an organ grinder named Brundibar scares the children and chases them away. Dejected and afraid, brother and sister ponder what else they could possibly do to raise the money they need to buy their mother’s medicine. The two are able to enlist the help of the other children of the town to eventually chase Brundibar away, and finally perform their show in the market square to raise the money for their ill mother.

The plight of the children in Brundibar is something that many of Terezín’s prisoners felt that they could identify with: the battle between good and evil, right and wrong, just and unjust. Many survivors later recalled how the opera’s chorus became a rallying cry for ghetto inhabitants. Independent survivor testimonies recall how the opera’s main chorus was constantly heard being whistled in hallways, sung by work commandos as they were being taken out of the ghetto each day, whose first note could provide a revitalizing energy to its listeners. Moreover, nearly all who saw the production could see close parallels between the plot of the show and the political climate that Europe’s Jewish population had found themselves living in in recent years. Finally, both the storyline of the opera and the performance itself could empower children as participants and observers.

One of the most well-known figures involved with cultural life in Terezín is Frederika “Friedl” Dicker-Brandeis. Deported to Terezín alongside her husband in December 1942, she is noted to have brought with her only the bare necessities in terms of clothing and household items; instead, based on her own studies and training as an art educator at the Weimar Bauhaus, she used much of her allotment of luggage for packing as many of her art supplies as she could. She soon began to teach art classes for the ghetto’s children, in a format that might now be found to be comparable to art therapy. Dicker-Brandeis was of the opinion that art could be used to help the young and traumatized children of the ghetto to better understand the complex emotions.

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169 “Hans Krása- Brundibár,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=st4INYATlqc, (March 18, 2019). Interviews with surviving members of the original cast,

they were feeling in relation to the strange environment that they found themselves forced into. Many child survivors of Terezin fondly recall the time they were able to spend with Dicker-Brandeis, and many cite her as one of the most influential and memorable instructors of the entire camp. Unfortunately for her students and for the art community as a whole, Mrs. Dicker-Brandeis did not survive the war. She was deported from Terezin and sent to Auschwitz along with many of her students in October 1944, where records indicate she perished in the gas chambers shortly after her arrival.

Analyzing the art and poetry created in Theresienstadt can offer a personal and unfiltered look into the lives of the young authors and artists. Paper was a precious commodity in the ghetto, and many young artists chose to use what they were given to depict the scenes they saw during their everyday lives, such as multiple drawings of groups of Jews standing at the railroad station in Theresienstadt with their luggage while waiting for the incoming deportation train that would take them from the camp to an unknown fate elsewhere. With paper being so hard to come by in the camp, the number of drawings showing roughly this same scene indicates that it was one that happened with great regularity, and was one that had such a strong impact on the young artists that they wanted to use their only available paper in order to immortalize it. The children’s images offer a stark contrast to the sanitized images of daily life in the ghetto presented in the aforementioned propaganda film produced by the Nazis in 1944.

Analyzing the written work done by children in the ghetto can offer just as much of an insight into the emotions the children struggled to cope with. One clear example can be found in the poem “Homesick” written by an anonymous young prisoner in Terezin during the war. Even though it has been almost eighty years since the poem was written, its words still convey a feeling of heartbreak every time it is read, especially one line in particular when the author laments “That there's a ghetto here, a place of evil and of fear. There's little to eat and much to want, where bit by bit, it's horror to live.” Such strong words remain more than adequate to describe the situation, but this poem and many others like it paint a picture filled with a level of candor that can otherwise be hard to find in the memoirs penned by older survivors. Another poem called “Art Project” by an unknown young prisoner reflects on the possibility for the survival of children in Theresienstadt. The poem states:

Cut 15,000 pieces of paper into dolls
Each piece represents one child

171 Hannelore Brenner-Wonschick, *The Girls of Room 28* (Thordike, 2009), 82
174 Ibid., 46.
Now start a bonfire and burn 14,900 of the dolls

Keep 100.175

This poem illustrates that even the children had a clear understanding of the arbitrary nature of life and death in the ghetto and its associated deportations. It is hard to say how this child would have coped and continued to live without being able to produce poetry, but it is undeniable that poetry was a vital resource in helping children manage the emotions that came with a nearly impossible set of circumstances.

Another example of the written works produced by children in the ghetto is the magazine *Vedem* produced by the boys of children’s home L 417. Written in Czech, *Vedem* served as an outlet for the boys where they could share their creative endeavors. This included poems, essays, stories, drawings, and nearly anything else the boys wanted to share. These selections were on a wide range of topics and of emotional depth with some boys choosing to share stories from their lives before coming to Terezin, some sharing completely fictional pieces, and some sharing stories of their lives since coming to the ghetto. In one untitled piece, a young man writing under an alias wrote:

Broken people walking along the street.

The children are quite pale.

They have packs on their backs.

The transport is leaving for Poland.

Old ones go, young ones go.

Not knowing if they will survive.

…

The German weasel wants more and more blood.176

At an age where boys should have been worried about having their first crush and studying hard at school, these boys faced a daily existence where they wrote about watching their friends and neighbors being taken to their deaths as their preferred method to pass time.

Works like these and dozens of others done by children in Theresienstadt show just how crucial it was for children to have an artistic medium during their time in the camp through which they could express their anger, frustration, and anxieties about their current situation. These written works have also given historians an unprecedented look at what life was like for


176Marie Krizkova, *We are Children Just the Same: Vedem, the Secret Magazine by the Boys of Terezin*, (University of Nebraska Press: 2012), 29.
children in Theresienstadt, more so than has been able to be seen in any other ghetto or concentration camp across the Third Reich.

When comparing the situation in Theresienstadt to the plight of children in other ghettos further East such as Warsaw or Litzmannstadt, it becomes abundantly clear just how much of a difference the efforts made in Theresienstadt had on the lives of the children interned there. Ghettos in the East hoped that by providing free labor for the German army and state, they would be spared death. In the Warsaw ghetto, families often relied on children for their continued survival because of their often greater chances of being able to leave the ghetto undetected in order to find food to supplement their family’s official allotment of subsistence rations. Nevertheless, children were often the first to be selected for deportation due to their inability to work grueling hours in inhumane conditions that older teens and adults were able to. Likewise, in Litzmannstadt, children were the first group targeted for deportation to Chelmno and Auschwitz-Birkenau death camps. Chaim Rumkowski, head of the Jewish Council of Elders in the ghetto, hoped that deportation of children and all those that could not work would in turn spare the lives of older teens and adults and increase their possibility for survival since they could work for the Reich. On September 4th, 1942, Rumkowski made a speech that would forever seal the fates of Litzmannstadt’s children:

“A grievous blow has struck the ghetto. They are asking us to give up the best we possess—the children and the elderly….Brothers and sisters: Hand them over to me! Fathers and mothers: Give me your children! . . .”

With this speech the parents of Litzmannstadt realized they had no choice but to surrender their children for deportation. When the Red Army arrived in the city on January 19th, 1945 only 877 Jews out of a prewar Jewish population of 230,000 were still alive. Among them, only twelve children survived.

When it comes to helping and protecting children in such dire circumstances, it is easy to feel that any amount of action taken is never enough. In the case of Theresienstadt, however, actions taken in the name of the camp’s children, and even some taken without the children in mind, helped keep them nourished mentally, spiritually, and emotionally. By risking their lives to give children a formal education, the camp’s educators instilled in them a sense of normalcy and hope for a future. The S.S. decision to allow organized cultural activities within the ghetto resulted in the unintended consequence of helping children manage their harsh daily life as well as a new type of resistance to the National Socialist efforts to demoralize and dehumanize Theresienstadt’s Jews. This resistance developed through cultural productions, art and written work produced by the children and the spiritual nourishment that they provided. The production of poetry, paintings, and drawings by children in Theresienstadt offered children the opportunity

178 https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/give-me-your-children-voices-from-the-lodz-ghetto
179 https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/history-and-overview-of-lodz-ghetto
to process their surroundings, but it has also allowed historians a unparalleled access into the thoughts and feelings of children in the ghetto on a scale unseen anywhere else in Nazi-occupied Europe during the Holocaust. Their collective works also provide important evidence to contradict the image that National Socialists sought to portray of the ghetto as a humane site that offered those interned a comfortable daily life far from the dangers of war. The children witnessed the truth and left a powerful historical record of their own. Without this spiritual nourishment it is questionable as to whether Theresienstadt would have had as many child survivors as it has been eventually credited as having.
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PUBLIC POLICY
Online Imperialism: Sovereignty and Cyber Warfare in Eastern Europe
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The second half of 2013 marked one of the largest geopolitical shake-ups in Eastern Europe since the collapse of the USSR. In December of the year, Ukrainian protestors occupied the main capitol’s square in opposition to the now-exiled president Yanukovych’s decision not to sign an association agreement with Europe. What started as a small economic protest turned into a full-fledged revolution. Once signs of Ukraine slipping out of Russia’s sphere of influence became a genuine potential, Moscow immediately launched an aggressive military campaign to secure their strategic interests before it would be too late. Russian forces stationed in Crimea commandeered Ukrainian military infrastructure, overpowered the local municipal services, and organized a secessionist referendum to unite the peninsula with Russia. The physical invasion was carried out in tandem with cyber incursions. The army hijacked local telecommunication infrastructure, severing cables and routing calls through Russian mobile operators; simultaneously, hacked social media accounts of local activists became propaganda mouthpieces and even Wikipedia articles were defaced with pro-Kremlin messages. Crimean internet access remains filtered to this day, censoring the majority of foreign news sites deemed dangerous.

But the Kremlin's public statements on Russia’s role in the invasion have evolved asymmetrically. While President Vladimir Putin has denied any and all military involvement since the start of the revolution, he let a few conciliatory remarks slip, admitting to an official presence in the region. But despite admitting to physical incursions, officials have remained mum regarding their hacking unit: the cyberberkut. The Kremlin continues to deny that it has violated Ukrainian cyberspace. Despite substantial proof from Ukrainian and American security services of clear digital interference, Russia’s motivation seems puzzling. Why spend so much energy and resources targeting key telecommunication and online spaces? This question sheds light on the importance of cyberspace to national sovereignty and the ongoing evolution of global norms regarding conquest.

This paper attempts to parse out tentative interpretations to the question above by looking at the motivations and justifications of Russia’s cyber operations in Ukraine. The first section


181 Ibid., 62.

182 Ibid.


185 Pahkarenko, Cyber Operation at Maidan, 64.
will place the current conflict in the context of the geographical and geopolitical rivalry
dynamics in Eastern Europe, emphasizing Ukraine’s vulnerability as a buffer state and Russia’s
motivation in systematic destabilization. The second section will highlight the importance of
cyberspace to physical operations, making the connection between internet and sovereignty. The
third, and final, section will hypothesize potential motivations for the cyberberkut by considering
the strategic, deterrent, and legal potential of cyberspace.

Ukraine and the Borderland

In ancient Slavic, the name Ukraine literally translates to borderland. Not coincidentally,
Ukraine has been the mediator between the east and the west for most of its existence. It served
as the Russia defense from Poland in the 14th century, Ottoman Empire in the 18th century,
Austro-Hungary in the 19th century, and Germany in the 20th century.186 When the Soviet Union
fell in 1991 and NATO began expanding eastward, Ukraine again became the buffer between
Russia and Europe. Since the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000, deterring NATO’s expansion
quickly became the central tenant in Russia’s definition of its new sphere of influence. Russia’s
involvement in Ukraine is interesting to explore now precisely for its historical uniqueness. For
when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined NATO in 2004, venturing on the same path Ukraine
flirted with, they were not subject to military occupation. One of the reasons explored in this
section for Russia’s radically different responses concerns improvements in economic and
military capabilities after 2005. What seemed like a domestic struggle within Ukraine between
east and west in 2014, became a politically reprehensible threat to Russia, propelled primarily by
the changes in regional rivalry dynamics.

The current conflict in Ukraine should not disguise the nascency of Russia’s rivalry with
Europe. A competition between the two regions was not Russia’s central foreign policy concern
in the 1990s. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia suffered politically and
culturally. With a loss of a third of its land and 140 million of its people, the country went from a
global empire to a struggling state almost overnight. The global decline was felt internationally.
The world ignored Russia’s rejection of Kosovo’s independence and NATO continued to expand
directly into the post-Soviet space undeterred.187 But even in light of such diplomatic failures,
global affairs didn’t become Russia’s priority until more than 15 years after the fall. For most of
the post-Soviet decade, domestic concerns remained the major preoccupation. At the end of
Yeltsin’s regime, some demographers predicted that by 2050, the country’s population could
decline from 122 million to 77 million due to falling birthrates and migration.188 If not
concerning enough, these predictions are even more daunting when considering the state of the

186 Kyle Kendall. "Using Their Own People against Them: Russia’s Exploitation of Ethnicity in Georgia and Ukraine." PhD

187 James Greene. "Russian Responses to NATO and EU Enlargement and Outreach." Chatham House: The Means and Ends of
Russian Influence Abroad Series, June 2012.

country’s public health infrastructure. With the lowest life expectancy rates in all of Europe, an average Russian woman was expected to live to 72, while an average man is lucky to make it to 58.  

Russia was not in an economic or political position to help its own citizens, let alone challenge Europe or the United States on the global stage.

The political turn around came with Vladimir Putin and the oil boom. Putin’s Millenium Manifesto, published upon his election in 2000, provides a helpful guide for the country’s direction into the new century.

“If during the same fifteen years we manage to ensure the annual growth of our GDP by 10 percent, we will then catch up with Britain or France… Another foothold for the unity of Russian society is what can be called the traditional values of Russians. These values are clearly seen today. Patriotism… Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and cultural existence. They determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and they cannot but do so at present.”  

Putin’s vision was well supported by the economic rise brought on by the surge in oil prices. The economy bounced back in 2004, allowing it to reform its military and address endemic social problems. Improvements in capabilities brought on an evolution of intentions.

Russian foreign policy became markedly more aggressive after the major economic improvements. The amelioratory policies of the 1990s and early 2000s reverse in the latter half of the decade. When Georgia’s president Mikheil Saakashvili considered joining NATO in 2008, Russia launched a military offensive in Northern Ossetia. The invasion signaled Russia’s renewed confidence in challenge international pressures and

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189 Ibid.


191 See figure 1.


193 The general premise of this idea is borrowed from Fareed Zakaria. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. In the book he explains that America’s underexpansion was primarily due to the state’s inability to capture a large share of national strength, basing his analysis on neorealist assertions that state intentions are shaped by their capabilities.

194 Kendall, Using Their Own People Against Them, 12.
sent a clear sign to European leaders that forays into the country’s strategic territory will be challenged with force.

In the age of Georgia’s invasion, Ukraine took on new importance as Russia’s red line. Putin has been suspicious of European engagement in the affairs of its western neighbors since 2004, when Ukrainians marched on the capital square during the pro-European Orange Revolution. After the western-friendly candidate won the presidential election, Putin blamed American security services for engineering the anti-Russian coup. Ukraine became particularly vulnerable during the second half of the 2000s, turning into an important battleground for Europe and Russia. In 2013, the government openly warned Ukraine and the EU that a trade deal between the two countries would be threatening to Russia’s economy and sovereignty. Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, feared that “Americans are trying to involve the Russian Federation in interstate military conflict, to facilitate the change of power by way of using the events in Ukraine, and ultimately to carve up our country.” While neither Russia nor Europe would benefit from a full out war in Ukraine, both are stuck in a security dilemma; “even if each rival knows that its opponent would prefer to avoid war, neither can be certain that this preference will dominate the strategic imperatives facing the rivals.” As a buffer state, Ukraine is surrounded by rivals unable to make credible commitments to avoid active military engagement. It is particularly difficult to guarantee commitment if the buffer state consciously chooses to align with a rival. Paranoia and information vacuums complicate the space, making it difficult to distinguish what is genuine self-determination and what is exogenously orchestrated political theater.

The Revolution of Dignity further enervated the tenuous security commitment between Russia and the European Union. While the EU has promised not to expand into Ukraine for most of the 2000s, the economic association agreement of 2013 seemed like a serious economic incursion. Whatever trust remained after Yanukovych rejected the agreement in favor of Moscow’s $15 billion bailout was dashed at the helm of the Euromaidan revolution. Putin was quick to characterize pro-European protests as another CIA project, throwing doubt into their rival’s commitment to keeping the buffer neutral. Since Russia could not remain reasonably certain of Ukraine’s status, intervention remained the only option to preserving buffer neutrality.

195 Ibid., 45.
196 Ibid.
199 Greene, Russian Responses to NATO and EU Enlargement, 26.
200 Ibid.
Short of war, Moscow launched a destabilization campaign to prevent European intervention and keep Ukraine dependent. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and separatist movements in Donbas are interesting for their limited scope. Instead of taking over Ukraine in its entirety, which Russia fully had the capacity to do, they engaged in limited hybrid warfare, occupying strategically important territories and fighting primarily through proxies. This behavior is fully expected in light of the post-1945 norm against conquest, where “would-be conquering states seek other methods to satisfy the goals previously achieved through conquest and annexation.” Instead of full territorial conquest, Russia worked to raise the cost for potential European intervention. Moscow flaunted its capabilities and capacity to engage in global war, while leaving the majority of Ukraine in struggling tandem, thus maintaining the strategic importance of neutrality. In order to preserve Ukraine’s buffer status, Russia has attempted to systematically destabilize the country, targeting its information and political networks to ensure perpetual confusion and dependence. While physical operations are central to demonstrating capabilities and intent, cyber operations are paramount to keeping Ukraine precarious.

Internet and Sovereignty: Cyber Operation and Systematic Destabilization

Much of the world has been brought closer together over the past 30 years through the advent of uninterrupted connectivity. The United States might have been the first to advertise the potential of liberalized information and improved control of infrastructure, but the consequences of this unbridled connectedness have been intimately felt in Ukraine over the past 4 years. With Russia intent on seething chaos throughout their western neighbor in order to preserve subserviency and neutrality, cyberspace has become a valuable territory for achieving the strategic goals. Many of the military campaigns during the revolution, like the annexation of Crimea and the proxy wars in Donbas were only made possible through online support. Conquest of physical terrain has become dependent on simultaneous control of cyberspace. Ukraine’s online vulnerability has demonstrated to the world the now obvious, but long unacknowledged, connection between cyberspace and national sovereignty.

In fact, Ukrainian society as a whole is intimately connected to life online. As of 2017, more than half of the population regularly used the internet for news, social media, or commerce. For most Ukrainians, the majority of their socialization -- from learning about the state of the world, to discovering election results, to interacting with friends -- happens online. Even beyond user access, internet infrastructure has been key to maintaining Ukraine’s physical infrastructure. It is easy to forget the level of national operation that is facilitated through cloud

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201 Geers, Russia and its Neighbours, 19.

202 Fazal, State Death, 54.

203 Geers, Russia and its Neighbours, 19.

computing. In Ukraine, everything from nuclear facilities, to election platforms, to physical billboard are maintained remotely through online access.\(^{205}\)

Targeting cyberspace has been part of Russia’s physical campaign to destabilize Ukraine. This manifests itself not only in traditional conquest of telecommunication networks, but through the spread of disinformation, temporary digital incapacitations, propaganda, and spread of malware.\(^{206}\) While it is difficult to measure how effective the operations have been, it is possible to parse out the perception of its importance through individual case studies. Cyber operations targeting Ukrainian media and infrastructure show the capacity of cyber warfare and also its unique imperceptibility.

The majority of the cyber attacks on Ukraine were directed towards the information sphere. In the early days of the revolution, hackers’ main goal was disinformation and confusion. During the lethal shootings at Maidan in February of 2014, the mobile phones of parliament members were flooded with messages and calls to prevent timely communication and a coordinated response.\(^{207}\) Similar strategies targeted official government websites. Operatives affiliated with Moscow carried out sophisticated Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks by flooding websites with fake quarries, intent on overwhelming key servers and effectively shutting down sites to public access.\(^{208}\) This strategy was used to incapacitate the site of the Ukrainian ministry of Foreign Affairs, preventing citizens from getting accurate and timely information about what was actually going on.\(^{209}\)

Denial-of-service attacks were always accompanied by misinformation and propaganda. During the annexation of Crimea, the Wikipedia pages regarding the peninsula were altered to reflect its historic ties to Russia.\(^{210}\) Simultaneously, websites and social media accounts of activists were taken over and defaced with rumors that angry Ukrainian mobs were targeting Russian citizens, creating the perception that an intervention was necessary to ensure their safety.\(^{211}\) Despite their incredulousness, in light of the silence from official Ukrainian channels, citizens had no other source to turn to for corroboration. Timely disinformation attacks from Russian hackers built the foundation for a military intervention.

The implausibility of official lies and misdirections should not be mistaken with ineffectiveness. While early publishings might not have confused senior intelligence official in

\(^{205}\) Pakharenko, *Cyber Operations at Maidan*, 63.


\(^{207}\) Pakharenko, *Cyber Operations at Maidan*, 61.

\(^{208}\) Ibid., 64.

\(^{209}\) Ibid.

\(^{210}\) Ibid., 62

the West, it was never their purpose to begin with. To claim ineffectiveness is to “underestimate
the effects of layered messaging, subtly screened and concealed by more obvious fabrications,
continued saturation, and in particular the pernicious effect of the ‘filter bubble’ on online
reading habits – the way personalized search results driven by advertising models can effectively
isolate internet users from alternative information and viewpoints.”212 Additionally, an onslaught
of contradictory information from many different sources causes general factuality fatigue,
leaving overly saturated readers feelings like nothing can be true. Western critics, in general.
miss the intended audience of disinformation.

Instead of convincing Western readers that the disinformation is true, Russian success is
defined in two other ways: isolating the domestic audience from non-approved
information so that Russian state actions are permissible; and influencing foreign
decision making by supplying polluted information, exploiting the fact that Western
elected representatives receive and are sensitive to the same information flows as their
voters… Russian disinformation campaigns aimed at the West are conducted not only in
NATO languages, but also in Arabic and Russian, targeting minorities across Europe.213

The information campaigns were coordinated in tandem with attacks on infrastructure. In
December of 2015, Kyiv’s regional electricity distribution company reported services outages to
customers; seven substations were disconnected for three hours in the middle of the day.214 Two
different regional electricity distributors were knocked out at the same time, leaving
approximately 225,000 without power during the coldest month of the year.215 Similar attacks
were carried exactly a year later. Investigations from Ukrainian and US security services claimed
that the operation was organized directly by the Russian government, citing the language of the
digital code and its apparent source.216 But in light of the potential source for the attacks, the
cases are particularly interesting for their limited scope. Despite hackers having full access to the
control-and-command centers of the electrical grids, they consistently left the networks before
causing permanent damage.217 Even western intelligence officials cast confusion on what the
benefits might be of gaining full control of a system and leaving it completely intact.218 But not
all cyberinfrastructure operations were for show.

212 Ibid., 26.
213 Ibid.
Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 2016, iv.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
Cyber espionage operations directed at the Ukrainian artillery forces left hundreds of weaponry systems in permanent shambles. Between 2014 and 2016, a hacker group with ties to the Russian intelligence services, FANCY BEAR, infected a target processing software on Ukrainian military forums with spying bugs.\textsuperscript{219} The original application, intended “to more rapidly process targeting data for the Soviet-era D-30 Howitzer” allowed Ukrainian forces to reduce targeting time from over 10 minutes to mere seconds.\textsuperscript{220} X-Agent, FANCY BEAR’s malware intended to retrieve communications and gross locational data, was spotted only in 2017; but by that time, it has already done unretractable damage. While Ukrainian artillery forces have lost around 50\% of their weaponry during the two years, D-30 Howitzer experienced an unprecedented loss rate of over 80\%.\textsuperscript{221} Russian forces were able to use the locational data gleaned by the malware to accurately target the weapon systems, leaving enemy forces disoriented and incapable of effective resistance.

Cyber operations carried out on Ukrainian information and infrastructural networks highlight the centrality of cyberspace to national security. In a Westphalian conception of sovereignty, states have the right to autonomously determine their domestic political structures.\textsuperscript{222} Moscow’s cyber operations inherently violate these norms. Not only were Russian forces aware of the national synergy carried out through online networks, but they also took advantage of them to destabilize Ukraine ideologically and militarily. The operations highlight the importance of cyberspace to national sovereignty. It might be obvious, but Ukraine maintains personal jurisdiction through free control of its key infrastructure; the government’s condemnation of hacking activity implicitly accepts internet’s double bind: how can the space be free and unmediated if it is important strategically and its violations require political and legal rebukation. There is no such thing as a common internet when its infrastructure can be disconnected through tactical precision strikes or it can be commandeered for adversarial military campaigns. While I do not explore the reason for Moscow’s continued denial of the operations, it operates within the same logic. If Russia has physically demonstrated the internet’s national importance it cannot simultaneously violate it without actively denouncing Westphalian norms. Even if everyone might know beyond a reasonable doubt that violations occur, rhetorical rebucations maintain the nature of organized hypocrisy.\textsuperscript{223}


\textsuperscript{220} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{221} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
Denial and Deception: Hypothesizing Geopolitical Motivations

Russia’s commitment to cyber operations sheds light on the country’s conception of cyberspace and its international motivations. American intelligence agencies have claimed on multiple occasions that the onslaught of organized attacks all over the world wide web are more than a hodgepodge side project of self-inspired vigilancies, and there is credible evidence to suggest that they have been part of the GRU’s global political motivations.224 The amount of resources and energy Moscow pours into its cyberberkut betrays a deeper strategic interest. While it would be difficult to corroborate the genuine intentions, I will outline three potential motivations, proceeding from the most obvious to the most hypothetical: from regional strategic interests in Ukraine, to international deterrence, to international legal frameworks on global internet governance.

The clearest motivation for the cyber attacks lies in destabilizing Ukraine and maintaining its buffer status. As I’ve outlined in some previous analysis, the internet is a treasure trove for informational and infrastructural networks that can be manipulated remotely. Structuralist theory does a great job of outlining the security dilemma rivals get forced into within a buffer state.225 Since both Russia and Europe are unable to make a credible commitment, and are constantly threatened by domestic political movements, both are perpetually concerned about the first-mover-advantage a rival might have if they engaged in the space first. Tarish Fazal would hypothesize that in most other time periods Ukraine should have been conquered, but the post-1945 order has created alternative incentives.

Outright conquest is frowned upon and discouraged in the contemporary international order. While prior to 1945 almost all transnational wars resulted in redistribution of land, only 30% of wars afterwards produced territorial adjustments.226 The evidence demonstrates a robust norm against territorial conquest that states are willing to accept and enforce. But conquest hasn’t exactly disappeared, it has mostly evolved. States are now more likely to seize small stretches of territory in order to avoid all-out war.227 And the justifications for these types of incursions have also evolved. While the dominant doctrines for territorial expansion transformed from right-of-discovery, to right-of-conquest, to right-of-occupation, the modern standard evades all three.228 Instead of referencing the law of the strong, states go back to the archives, legitimizing every conquest attempt through a historic territorial claim.229

224 Geers, Russia and its Neighbours, 25.
225 Fazal, State Death, 36.
229 Altman, Evolution of Territorial Conquest, 46.
Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and subtle cyber incursions fit well within the norms dictated by the international order. To shift the balance of powers, Moscow seized small chunks of Ukraine, basing them all on historic Soviet policies.230 Cyber warfare is particularly useful in the 21st century, because unlike a clear physical presence that can be easily corroborated by witness accounts, satellite imagery, and surveillance footage, war on the internet is easy to deny. Russia continues to stand by its original claim that IP address data is easy to fake and the language of a computer virus says little about its origin or political intention.231 If Russia is unable to take over the entirety of Ukraine, it will do everything in its power to maintain a manageable buffer in the Donbas region and prevent European or American intervention through continuous online terror.

But flexing one’s cyber muscles has advantages far beyond mere regional control. In the age of internet security, almost every major power in the world has full government divisions dedicated to maintaining the sanctity of their online sovereignty. Early governance of outer space is a good reference point to modern displays of cybernetic virtue. If the open avowal of satellite imagery allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to keep track of each other’s military capabilities in order to avoid a nuclear apocalypse, an honest exhibition of hacking capabilities prevents a cyber Armageddon.232 United States and Israel demonstrated what their security services can do to a nuclear reactor given a few months and an aloof employee with a flash drive.233 Russia demonstrated what it can do to an electrical grid given a few days and a vulnerable security system.234 In this sense, incursions into Ukrainian cyberspace serve as an international deterrent. One has to look no further than at the recent worry concern American academics have expressed regarding the vulnerability of electrical infrastructure across the country.235

The final hypothesis concerns Moscow’s recent legislation regarding its own cyberspace. For the past 4 years, Russia has pursued an aggressive policy of cyber-nationalism. The country’s highest court banned Telegram, a messaging service, after the company refused to hand over users’ encrypted data to the security services.236 National lawmakers have made it explicitly clear that there’s no such thing as free and unbounded communication; if a Russian

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230 Kendall, Using Their Own People Against Them, 56.

231 Seddon, Russia Denies Involvement in Global Cyber Attack.


233 Greenberg, How An Entire Nation Became Russia's Test Lab for Cyberwar.

234 Ibid.


citizen wants to communicate via the internet their thoughts will be filtered through government apparatchiks. But the stint against Telegram extended beyond messaging. Unable to curb the service, lawmakers “approved a controversial bill to cut off the country’s internet traffic from foreign servers… designed to route all web traffic through Russian servers, enabling the government to control information and block messaging or other applications.”\textsuperscript{237} The law was colloquially termed data-localization, tying the data of all firms operating in the country to national territory, and subsequently to its legal framework; in essence, the internet has become unilaterally mandated by the whims of the state. Popular protests have condemned the moves, often sporting banners like “hands off the internet,” and “no to isolation.”\textsuperscript{238} As the Kremlin continues to toe the line between internet security and political censorship, they have faced abundant criticism from abroad. If Russia is serious about enforcing their national law and maintaining legitimacy, their domestic policies must align with their international maneuvers, or at least its rhetoric.

Precedent-setting is the final lens to understand Russia’s motivations with cyber warfare. A good analogy to the Eastern European status quo is America’s legal approach towards outer space in the 1960s. When space technology increased to the point of being strategically valuable, United States gleaned the potential of using satellite imagery in order to bridge the information gap between its own porous media and Soviet’s tight informational control.\textsuperscript{239} Since Americans had a notable advantage in cosmonautics, they attempted to instill a perception of space as common property by giving foreign diplomats satellite images of their countries.\textsuperscript{240} The geopolitical theory establishes that “states with superior exploitative capability will favor common ownership as a means to access as much of the frontier as possible without having to pay costs of exclusion.”\textsuperscript{241} United States’ superiority in space is similar to their superiority in cyberspace currently. America is the exporter of the largest tech firms in the world and the majority of telecommunication infrastructure. But while the Soviet Union failed to resist communalization of space, Russia has put up an international fight to reject it on the internet.

If satellite imagery set the rhetorical precedent for common treatment of outer space, destruction of Ukrainian military infrastructure and control of its media outlets is setting a precedent for national treatment of cyberspace. Russia’s limited intrusion into Kyiv’s electrical grids, for example, opens the conceptual door for considering the internet as integral to national security. Despite the fact that Moscow had the ability to destroy vital energy infrastructure and refused to do so, electrical hacks of 2015 and 2016 are an international signal. It has put

\textsuperscript{237} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{239} Sanger, How High Can Sovereignty Fly? The US and USSR in Outer Space, 121.

\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., 124.

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 117.
American strategists on alert to the vulnerability of their own infrastructure. Recent domestic pressured to more heavily regulate American social media firms and cybersecurity systems help Russia form an international legal precedent for heavy control of its own cyber resources.

While it is difficult to conclude on what Moscow’s genuine intentions in cyberspace might be, it is helpful to outline potentially intended (or unintended) motivations. Russia’s dedication to its cyber warfare departments sheds light on the country’s perception of the space’s importance. While regional destabilization, deterrence, and legal precedence seeking might not be the genuine motivation, they are at least its consequences. Regardless of the theoretical conception of the space, cyber warfare will continue nonetheless. The strategic and legal frameworks must be further analyzed to determine the appropriate measures necessary to address the 21st century’s weapon of choice.

Conclusion

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is helpful to understand the evolving rivalry dynamics in Eastern Europe and the national importance of cyberspace. In attempting to maintain dominance (or at least the status quo), Russia has used Ukraine as an international deterrent and a training bootcamp. I hope this paper demonstrated the fragility of regional alliances and how unexpectedly the situation can evolve on the ground. Cyberspace is a radically new domain and we are only starting to see all of the potential forms it can take. As wealth continues to concentrate online and technological capabilities develop, so will the nation’s geopolitical motivations. There’s abundant room for growth and unforeseen developments. For now, we can expect more rivalry dynamics to play out on the internet, which will continue to shape and redefine global conceptions of cyberspace.

Works Cited


The Effects of Bukharan Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union on Afghanistan’s Domestic Policy Towards Jews
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Introduction

In her article “The Demise of Afghanistan’s Jewish Community and the Soviet Refugee Crisis (1932-1936),” Sara Koplik writes that the “[Afghan] Jewish community’s serious plight worsened when Bukharan Jewish refugees fleeing Stalin began to arrive in northern Afghanistan, just as Afghanistan’s nativist economic policy provided a framework for discriminative political action.” Koplik analyzes how the influx of Soviet refugees to Afghanistan influenced the Afghan government’s policy towards Jews. The study of Bukharan Jewish emigration provides a valuable lens through which to understand how the interplay of Soviet politics and intra-Afghan tensions shaped the experiences of Central Asian Jews.

In my essay, I will investigate how the Afghan government’s response to Bukharan refugees reflected and amplified the political tensions between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. To inform my argument, I will provide an overview of how Jews living in Central Asia and Afghanistan have been excluded from scholarship pertaining to Jewish history and culture. I will continue with a historiographical overview of the political, economic, and social position of Afghan Jews prior to the formation of the Soviet Union. I situate this analysis within a discussion of how Jewish communities within Afghanistan historically engaged with other “Central Asian” Jews. Then, I will explore the causes of the Bukharan refugee Soviet emigration crisis, while also considering the ways in which the Bukharan Jewish experience differed from the experience of other Jews living under the Soviet Union’s jurisdiction. This background will lay the foundation for my analysis of the Soviet Union’s influence on Afghanistan’s domestic policies directed towards refugees and minority communities. This context will frame my analysis of the personal testimonies of Bukharan and Afghan Jews who experienced these political and social upheavals firsthand. I will close the paper with a brief discussion of the Afghan and Bukharan Jewish diasporas today.

Untold Histories: The Marginalization of Central Asian Jewish Narratives in Scholarship

Although Jews have historically played an important role in Central Asian intellectual, economic, and political life, their stories do not figure prominently in scholarship pertaining to the region. According to certain Jewish historians, the first Jews settled in Persia, Central Asia, and Afghanistan as early as 538 B.C.E. However, as cultural historian Alanna Cooper observes, “Through the ages, [Central Asian Jews] have lived at the far margins of areas traditionally considered centers of the Jewish world. They have therefore, been treated as

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irrelevant to the story, and have been largely excluded from Jewish histories.”245 Cooper further contends that previous models of scholarship focus on identifying, constructing, and portraying “centers” of Jewish life.246 Such accounts tend to privilege the narratives of urban, educated, and affluent Jews; while Jews who do not fit into these categories are seen as geographically and culturally isolated from the diasporic experience as a whole. In response to this problem, Cooper advocates for an analytical model that repositions Jewish history as an ongoing process of contact between peripheral ‘zones,’ which is one of the goals of this research project.

Defining “Central Asian” Jewish Identity and the Experiences of the Afghan Jewish Community Before the Creation of the Soviet Union

To understand how the Jewish community has influenced Afghanistan, it is necessary to define the concept of “Central Asian” Jewry through a brief discussion of the geographic and cultural history of the region. Prior to Russian involvement in the area, Bukhara referred to the land under the control of Uzbek rulers, which was divided into two ‘khanates’ called Bukhara and Khorizm.247 Most Jews lived in Bukhara, where the fluid political structure of the region shifted depending on the relations between the khanates.248 Alanna Cooper notes that because the populations did not identify strongly with the central government of their khanate, “[Bukharan Jews] – unlike Jews in other parts of the world where nationalist movements were beginning to burgeon by the nineteenth century – were not viewed as foreign inhabitants.”249 In other words, Bukharan citizens viewed the Jewish population as an integral component of society, even as the government placed special regulations and restrictions on the participation of Jews in public life in accordance with the prevailing interpretation of Islamic law, which held that Jews were “people of the book” but not entitled to equal treatment.250

While Bukharan Jews encountered discrimination in the Bukharan khanate, Jews in Afghanistan leveraged their non-Muslim identity in the economic sector. Sara Koplik notes that “[Jewish] traders would be the only ones allowed into disputed areas, as they were considered neutral.”251 That is to say, the non-Jewish public did not view Jews as implicated in political or social conflicts outside of their own insular community, which afforded Jews a certain degree of flexibility in terms of their economic options and geographical mobility. Unlike other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, Jewish merchants often left their families to engage in international trade. It is important to note that the distinction between Afghan Jews and Bukharan Jews blurred in the 1930s, as a result of the efforts of Bukharan journalists and intellectuals to refer to “all

246 Ibid., 25.
247 Ibid., 18.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid., 19.
250 Ibid.
Persian-speaking Jews of Central Asia” under a single umbrella term. Since the Russian Empire distinguished between Bukharan Jews who lived in Bukhara and “local” Jews who lived under Russian jurisdiction, the term “Central Asian Jewry” was intended to be more inclusive of Jewish people within and outside Bukhara. However, the Soviet Union repurposed this term in order to flatten distinctions between Bukharan Jews and Persian-speaking Jews so as to enforce their restrictive ‘nationality policy.’ While the term “Central Asian” is often used to refer to both Bukharan and non-Bukharan Jews living in the region, it is essential to recognize that the Afghan Jewish community’s experiences do not necessarily reflect the lives of other ‘Central Asian’ Jews.

Afghan-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Refugee Crisis

The complex relationship between Amanullah Khan and the Soviet Union helps to explain the origins of the tensions that led to the influx of Jewish refugees into Afghanistan. Amanullah Khan, who ruled Afghanistan between 1919 and 1929, initiated conversations with Soviet leaders in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution so as to gain leverage and protection against the British amidst ongoing conflict regarding the Durand Line. Although Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1921, which enabled Amanullah’s government to receive significant financial and military support from the Soviet Union, tensions pertaining to the Soviet Union’s role and involvement in the Central Asian territories complicated the relationship between the two governments. After the Soviet army declared their jurisdiction over the Soviet People’s Republic of Bukhara in 1920, thereby dethroning the emir of the Bukharan Emirate, relations between Amanullah Khan and the Soviet Union deteriorated further. Specifically, Amanullah Khan did not approve of the Soviet Union’s desire to keep control over Central Asian territories because it “endangered his nation’s fledgling independence . . . [so] he began to actively support the anti-Soviet Basmachi movement.” These tensions continued to worsen as conditions in the Soviet Union became untenable for Jewish individuals and other minority populations, thereby contributing to the refugee crisis.

In the eyes of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan quickly became instrumental in terms of defending the Soviet Union’s borders. When Mohammad Nadir Shah came to power in Afghanistan in the early 1930s, he agreed to militarize the border between Afghanistan and the

252 Thomas Loy, Bukharan Jews in the Soviet Union: Autobiographical Narrations of Mobility, Continuity, and Change (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2016), 42.
Soviet Union. Afghanistan became an external police force for the Soviet Union, although around 60,000 refugees made it into Afghanistan anyway. In so doing, the Afghan government attempted to prevent Bukharan refugees from fleeing the famine induced by catastrophic collectivization policies, which decimated the resident populations in Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia. Some scholars estimate that twenty percent of the Bukharan Jewish population died by the mid-1930s due to a combination of violence and starvation. Alanna Cooper notes that although the Soviet policy towards religion in Central Asia initially targeted Muslims, the Jewish population also encountered significant limitations of the scope of their religious practice, which included prohibitions on religious education and the closing of synagogues. In her work on the Soviet Union’s policy towards Jewish citizens, Ludmilla Tsigelman notes that the “Soviet regime used both repression and ideological propaganda to establish and stabilize itself.” The Afghan state under the leadership of Mohammad Nadir Shah supported this mission through indirectly reaffirming the legitimacy of the Soviet Union by policing its borders.

Afghan Policy Towards Bukharan Jewish Refugees and its Impact on Established Afghan Jewish Communities

The Afghan government’s policies towards refugees depended to a significant degree on the ethnic background of those attempting to flee the Soviet Union, with preference given to Muslim refugees. Historian Eunan O’Halpin writes that “the Afghan government’s response to the migration problem, while severe generally, distinguished between Jews and others: ‘Moslem refugees are to be admitted’ but were not permitted to settle within thirty miles of the frontier, whereas ‘Russian Jews are not to be permitted to take refuge.’” The government framed this distinction in terms of espionage. Afghan officials viewed Jewish and Christian refugees as “identified with European powers” in a way that Muslim refugees were not. Bukharan Jewish refugees appealed to the British government to permit members of their community to reach Palestine through Afghanistan, but the British government expressed reluctance to providing support because they feared that Jewish refugees were agents for the Soviet Union. While some refugees did serve as spies and informants for the Soviet Union, Afghanistan’s policy disproportionately targeted ethnically Jewish individuals without any evidence that they were

258 Ibid., 356.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
266 Ibid., 361.
involved in such activities.\textsuperscript{267} Despite these barriers to arrival and integration, Bukharan Jewish refugees continued to arrive in Afghanistan to flee purges, violence, and starvation.

The state-sanctioned rhetoric concerning Bukharan Jewish refugees negatively transformed the way in which society interacted with established Afghan Jewish communities. As previously described in the paper, Afghan Jews were historically integral to trade and exchange within Afghanistan. However, during the 1930s, Afghanistan placed significant restrictions on the mobility of its Jewish citizens, under the pretense of tracking migration to the region and protecting regional security. The state required its Jewish citizens to return to the city of their birth, which “effectively expropriated Afghan Jews, who had been engaged for centuries in exporting . . . and importing” while simultaneously confiscating their passports.\textsuperscript{268} The majority of Afghan Jews were repatriated to Herat and Kabul. O’Halpin argues that contact between economic policy makers in Afghanistan like Abdul Majid Khan and the German Foreign Office introduced fascist propaganda to Afghanistan’s domestic policy in the years leading up to World War II, thereby exacerbating the government’s approach to Jewish citizens and refugees.\textsuperscript{269} While Afghanistan’s treatment of Jews should not be entirely attributed to such diplomatic relationships, the \textit{Jewish Telegraphic Agency} reported that laws in Kabul and Herat, which required Jews to wear identifying clothing and prohibited them from congregating in public spaces, were at least partly inspired by Nazi influence.\textsuperscript{270} On the one hand, these decrees impoverished the Afghan Jewish community. On the other, the government’s policy further strained the social relationships between Jewish and non-Jewish families, because Afghanistan’s nativist economic policy portrayed Jews as ‘threats’ to the economic success of Muslim Afghans.

Official policy towards Jews resulted in extralegal violence that targeted vulnerable Jewish populations. Rape became rampant as a means of punishing Jewish women, and in some cases men, for their perceived threat to Afghan nationhood. Such crimes often went unaddressed by judicial authorities.\textsuperscript{271} In one case, a Jewish fourteen year old boy named Elish Bekhor Abo Gajar was sexually assaulted by a mob, but the foreign minister refused to intervene because the matter fell under “local jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{272} Additionally, Jewish individuals were repeatedly accused of attempting to forcibly convert Muslim citizens to Judaism, which sparked turmoil in Herat.\textsuperscript{273} In response to ensuing riots, many Jews fled the city. When they later tried to return, the officials prohibited them from taking up residence again.\textsuperscript{274} In other words, while Jews were initially forcibly relocated to Herat and Kabul, they encountered hostility and animosity in these urban centers, which reflected the prevailing governmental rhetoric.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnoteref{267}
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Ibid., 301.
\footnoteref{269}
Ibid., 303.
\footnoteref{270}
Ibid., 305.
\footnoteref{271}
\footnoteref{272}
Ibid., 370.
\footnoteref{273}
Ibid., 368.
\footnoteref{274}
Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
As the treatment of Jews in Afghanistan deteriorated, the British government attempted to influence the Afghan government’s policy towards Jews so as to “protect” against Jewish migration into Pakistan and India. The British government feared that accepting Central Asian Jewish refugees, especially those from Bukhara, would provide an advantage to the Soviet Union and threaten British interests in the region. Thus, although British officials periodically approached the Afghan government to advocate for better treatment of Jews, their interest was primarily motivated by their desire to keep Jews within Afghanistan. Many Jewish Afghans and refugees asked Britain for visas to pass through India in order to reach Palestine and escape stifling conditions within Afghanistan. That being said, the British government was reluctant to approve these requests because they did not want Afghanistan to deport all of the Jewish residents to India. Indeed, the question of permitting Jewish resettlement in Palestine was a contentious question within Afghanistan. Until 1950, when King Zahir Shah legalized Jewish immigration to Israel–Palestine, Jews were not legally allowed to leave for Palestine because neighboring states including Turkey and Iraq expressed opposition to such resettlement. Due to this situation, most Afghan Jews and Bukharan Jewish refugees had to withstand the economic and social marginalization that the Afghan government facilitated. Significantly, when the Afghan government ultimately allowed Jews to go to Palestine, many Jewish families who had lived in Afghanistan for generations left along with Bukharan refugees due to the severity of the conditions that both groups faced.

Narratives of Migration and Displacement: Testimonies of Jewish Refugees and Afghan Jews

To understand the effects of forced migration and state-sanctioned discrimination in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, it is essential to create space for the narratives of Jewish refugees and Afghan Jews who were directly affected by these policies. In his book entitled *Bukharan Jews in the Soviet Union: Autobiographical Narrations of Mobility, Continuity, and Change*, Thomas Loy utilizes interviews with Jews from across the Central Asian diaspora to explore and complicate the history of the region. The testimony of Arkadi Il’yasov illustrates how Central Asian Jews had to constantly renegotiate their identities in order to adapt to the shifting conditions facing Jews in the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Il’yasov was born to a family of Iranian descent, but his family relocated to Herat in 1855, where they became active members of Herat’s Jewish community. His family briefly moved from Herat to Marv, until the Russian tsarist government forcibly relocated them to Kerki, which straddles the border between Afghanistan and Bukhara because it did not accept them as legitimate Russian subjects. Initially, Arkadi Il’yasov’s family participated actively in trade and integrated themselves into society from their new home in Kerki, even after the Revolution overthrew the

276 Ibid.
277 Ibid., 73.
279 Ibid., 73.
tsarist government. Loy notes that this preliminary sequence of migrations did not figure prominently in Il’yasov’s oral history, because he did not consider these events to have disrupted his family as much as subsequent Afghan and Soviet policies. As a result, even though antisemitism and transnational conflicts shaped the experience of multiple generations of Il’yasov’s family, he does not remember each experience in the same way.

The remainder of Arkadi Il’yasov’s testimony focuses on the geographical fragmentation of his family unit and the degree to which they were excluded from life in Afghanistan. Due to the nationalization of Afghan trade and the relocation of Jews to Herat, Kabul, and Balkh, Arkadi’s uncles who previously had been active in trading networks in Northern Afghanistan fled from Afghanistan to Palestine. Since Il’yasov’s family lived in the border territories, they were viewed as Afghan citizens by the Soviet Union who threatened national security and as potential Soviet agents by the Afghan state. As Il’yasov recounts in his narrative, “When our relatives lived in Kerki, they all had Afghan passports. They were Afghan subjects, not Soviet ones. Then in 1937, they received the order to leave Kerki in a matter of 48 hours, ‘Go wherever you want, but leave this town! You don’t have Soviet passports. You are Afghan subjects.’”

Thus, Arkadi’s family lost any claim to a “nationality,” which meant that they had to leave to Samarkand, which was still under the control of the Soviet Union but housed many Central Asian Jewish refugees. Expulsion from the northern regions of Afghanistan meant that nobody in the Il’yasov family could maintain their livelihoods through trading, and their deportation from Kerki split their family apart.

While in Samarkand, Arkadi’s family did not receive official recognition from the Soviet government. Loy notes that “Arkadi’s [generation] . . . was the first Jewish generation in Central Asia completely cut off from Jewish culture and entirely educated in Russian,” although they did not receive Soviet citizenship until Stalin died. The government of Samarkand registered Arkadi and other Jewish refugees as stateless, which meant that his family could not move freely because they lacked internal passports. However, although Jewish families did not enjoy the basic rights afforded to other Soviet citizens, they were also linguistically and culturally alienated from their Jewish heritage. That being said, Arkadi’s family tried to help other refugees from their new life in Samarkand, including those who were displaced by World War II. Notably, his parents adopted a Polish Jewish girl who was sent to Samarkand after her parents died in the Siege of Leningrad. Arkadi’s narrative does not only reflect how the rhetoric and policies of the Afghan and Soviet states stripped Jewish residents of their autonomy, but also serves as a testament to the resilience and solidarity that Central Asian Jewish networks relied on during this period.

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280 Ibid., 74.
281 Ibid.
282 Ibid., 76.
283 Ibid., 78.
284 Ibid., 79.
285 Ibid., 80.
286 Ibid., 77.
Rahel Karayof, a Bukharan Jew whose family fled to Afghanistan as a result of the Soviet Union’s policies, provides an alternative perspective on the experience of Jewish refugees in Kabul. Alanna Cooper writes that the lives of Karayof and her family in Afghanistan “were forever temporary, a fleeting state sandwiched between a mourned past and an idyllic future.” Although her family attempted to emigrate to Palestine multiple times, the Afghan government prevented them from doing so. Rahel recalls that the Bukharan Jewish refugees were not permitted to openly express their religion and identity in Kabul, and that the majority of their cultural activities took place secretly in her family’s domestic spaces. Rahel’s testimony highlights the ways in which the Afghan government’s restrictions on Jewish refugees distanced her from her Bukharan heritage. However, unlike Arkadi Il’yasov’s narrative, Karayof does not speak extensively about the geopolitical events that determined the trajectory of her family’s experience. Of course, both forms of testimony are compelling representations of the catastrophic effects that Afghan policy had on both a communal and personal level.

The Afghan Jewish and Bukharan Jewish Communities Today

The painful legacy of the Bukharan Jewish refugee crisis contributed to the striking disappearance of both Jewish refugees and Afghan Jews from Afghanistan. As a result of the years of cultural repression, economic deprivation, and violence that Afghan Jews and Bukharan Jewish refugees faced within Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, nearly all of the remaining Jews in Afghanistan left for Palestine in the 1950s. The few hundred Afghan Jews who stayed left when the Soviet Union invaded in 1979. While most of the Afghan Jewish and Bukharan Jewish diasporic population resides in Israel today, there are also large communities in New York. As Alanna Cooper notes, these communities in New York do not necessarily identify strongly with Judaism as a religion, but most families value their proximity to other Central Asian Jewish refugees with similar histories of displacement. Afghan and Bukharan Jewish culture are still transmitted to subsequent generations, but members of these diasporas do not express optimism about the possibility of returning to their homelands.

While nearly all Jews have left Afghanistan, there is one Afghan Jewish person living in the country today who is attempting to preserve the records and texts held in Kabul’s synagogue. The “final” Jew living in Afghanistan, Zabulon Simentov, lives in Kabul’s last synagogue. While the Taliban leadership states that they do not take issue with Jews because they are

288 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
“People of the Book,” Simentov fears that President Ashraf Ghani will be unable to limit the influence of the Taliban. While most of his family left for Israel, Simentov has resolved to stay in Afghanistan regardless of what happens. Although the focus of this research is not on the present state of the Afghan Jewish diaspora, it is essential to consider how the study of the Bukharan Jewish refugee crisis and Afghanistan’s domestic response to its Jewish population contributed to the contemporary political landscape in Afghanistan today.

Conclusion

The Bukharan Jewish refugee crisis did not only shape the relationship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, but also redefined how the Afghan government interacted with the Jewish population living within their borders. The influx of Bukharan Jewish refugees reinforced the exclusion of Jewish individuals from the Afghan society and economy. That being said, the testimonies of Afghan Jews and Bukharan refugees who were subjected to violence in both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan speak to the rich history of Jewish communities in the region. While Jews are largely absent from contemporary Afghanistan, their experiences and contributions are key to understanding the long-term evolution of Afghanistan’s policy towards minorities.

294 Ibid.
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The Impact of Age, Enfranchisement, and Social Media on Independence Referendums in Europe
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Abstract
Voter turnout is a vital part of assessing the validity of any election. This is especially true for cases such as Catalonia, Scotland and the United Kingdom, where recent referendums have taken place regarding the potential secession of a nation from a state or supranational organization. This paper lays a basic foundation for the elements of mobilization by studying the impact that social media, casual conversations, and the expansion of enfranchisement have on voter turnout. This analysis presents the conclusion that perceived legitimacy of a referendum is a factor that influences turnout in the cases of Catalonia, Scotland and the United Kingdom.

Introduction
A foundational aspect of democracy is the informed participation of citizens during routine elections. When the plebiscite, or direct vote of the electorate, is regarding the potential secession of a nation from its current state or supranational organization, the stakes for high voter turnout are even more precipitous. Engaging with potential voters becomes more difficult if a government refuses to legitimize the results of the referendum. In some instances, such as Scotland and the United Kingdom, the secession referendums were binding; the result of the vote would determine the fate of the nation. In other cases, such as Catalonia, the Spanish government declined to recognize secession attempts as legitimate; the referendums were nonbinding and would not create an independent Catalonia, even if all participants voted for independence.

In the months leading up to an independence referendum, the nationalistic supporters of independence have to grapple with finding the most effective method of mobilizing voters in order to increase voter turnout. Antiquated methods of engagement such as posting signs and mailing mass-produced flyers to houses can do little to address the personal concerns of individuals who have yet to decide their stance on an issue. It can be predicted that using more individualized techniques to expand campaigning efforts will result in the engagement of a larger population. Additionally, organizing ways to promote discussion is also likely to have a positive impact on voter turnout. Most notably, the perceived legitimacy or ‘binding nature’ of a referendum may be the determining factor in whether or not there are high levels of turnout during a nation’s attempt at independence.

Literature Review
Catalonia
In the case of Catalonia, the hallmarks of independence are ingrained in the cultural activity of Catalans. The Catalan language, with roots back to the middle ages, is cited as evidence of an autonomous community. In addition to language and shared history, the people of Catalonia boast other symbols of an independent nation such as a flag, anthem, and political institutions (Micó et al., 2017). Catalonia’s regional government, a mark of their autonomy, is headed by
Quim Torra, while King Felipe VI is the Spanish Chief of State (IFES Election Guide: Country Profile: Catalonia).

Concerned with the lack of sovereignty and Spanish monetary policy\textsuperscript{295}, Catalan leaders have pushed for secession efforts in order to ensure the sustenance of their cultural identity. However, the Spanish constitution prevents regional governments from holding official secession referendums. Not having a legitimate way to secede has set into motion a multiplicity of unofficial referendums within Catalonia, each differing in location, amount of money spent campaigning, and methods of increasing engagement. This started in 2009 in Arenys de Munt, but has spread to surrounding Catalan municipalities (Muñoz, J., & Guinjoan, M., 2013). Spain’s reaction towards Catalan efforts is defined by the waxing and waning control exerted over the Catalan people. When municipalities make any attempt at independence, they are met with Spanish repressive authority, ripping away aspects of Catalan autonomy in an effort to quell rebellious actions. Spain’s reaction stands in stark contrast with that of the United Kingdom in response to the efforts of the Scottish National Party.

\textit{Scotland}

Scotland has been a part of the United Kingdom since acquiescing to unification in 1707 (Bosque, 2018). The Scottish National Party (SNP), led by First Minister Nicola Sturgeon (IFES Election Guide: Country Guide: Scotland), is a nationalistic political party that calls for Scottish independence from the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom not only agreed to legitimize an independence referendum in Scotland, but increased Scotland’s autonomy in an effort to appease nationalists and convince them to remain as a part of the UK (Bosque, 2018). For the SNP, the motivation for independence is rooted in the belief that Scotland would fare better financially if Scotland was independent from the United Kingdom. The SNP boasts that an independent Scotland would have a stronger welfare state funded by newly-nationalized North Sea Oil and increased tourism (Cannon, Crowcroft, 2015). A majority of the Scots that voted against secession in 2014 cited economic factors of currency and administrative perks such as the United Kingdom’s seat at the G7 council, and position in the European Union as their reasons for wanting to remain unified. (Chikhoun, 2015).

\textit{United Kingdom}

The question of maintaining position in the European Union is not only limited to Scotland, but to the rest of the United Kingdom as well. Support for the British exit from the European Union (Brexit) gained ground for a variety of reasons. British nationalism is on the rise, as can be seen in the increasing percentage of British citizens who identify with their nationality instead of as ‘Europeans’ (Dennison et al, 2019). Citizens in favor of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union usually credit their decision to their discontent regarding increasing levels of multiculturalism that the EU fosters (Birch, 2019).

\textsuperscript{295} Around 20\% of Spain’s GDP comes from Catalonia (Bosch, 2018).
Independence Referendums

Independence referendums have the power to capture the attention of people that have not historically been politically active (Birch, 2019). Because the results of referendums are typically legitimized by democratic countries (Quortup, 2012), votes of such magnitude provide incentive for young voters to develop their own political opinions, thus shaping the political activity of new voters (Sloam, 2018). Noting the potential for self-determination of new voters to shape future political behavior, Catalonia and Scotland expanded enfranchisement before their respective plebiscites in an attempt to increase voter turnout.

Methodology

This research synthesizes information regarding the impact that specific and informal methods of campaigning have on voter turnout when analyzed alongside instances of adjusted enfranchisement. The focus on qualitative information is a reflection of the personalized nature of informal methods of campaigning. Additionally, the use of quantitative data highlights the relationship between rates of engagement and voter turnout.

Results

Catalonia

Though the 2009 referendum in Arenys de Munt only had a turnout of 40 percent (Medir, 2015), the referendum inspired 552 of all 947 surrounding municipalities to hold similar votes (Munoz, 2013). While turnout for the initial Arenys de Munt referendum was 16 percent lower than the turnout of the 2006 Catalan parliamentary elections, turnout increased for later series of referendums. The turnout of the 2017 referendums averaged 43 percent (Bosque, 2018). Of the 43 percent, 90.09 percent of the electorate were in favor of Catalan independence (Catatlan Elections: Voter Turnout). It is important to note that the average voter turnout of the 2017 Catalan referendum was significantly lower than Catalonia’s national turnout of 63.27 percent.

The series of referendums in Catalonia were prefaced by intense discussion between already engaged individuals. Some of the aforementioned discussion happened on social media platforms. Catalan media outlets and individuals used social media as a way to educate the electorate about independence and encourage people to vote. This resulted in an increased number of young people taking interest in the referendums, which ultimately was the catalyst for expanded enfranchisement. In order to vote in the illegitimate referendum, an individual had to present a document showing proof of residency, showing only that they lived in the municipality. This meant that people who lived in the municipality but were not Spanish citizens were eligible to vote. Additionally, the voting age was expanded to include 16 and 17 year olds, not just people over the legal age of 18 (Munoz, 2012). In the end, it was a coordinated effort among the municipalities that anyone that had been included on a local census was eligible to vote (Medir 2015).
Scotland

While Catalonia saw a decrease in the turnout in comparison to officially recognized referendums, Scotland saw a drastic increase in turnout. With 97 percent voter registration (Breeze, 2017), the turnout of the referendum in Scotland was 84.59 percent--26.1 percent higher than Scotland’s own national average for parliamentary elections (Election Guide: Country Profile: Scotland). In the end, of the Scots that voted, 55 percent voted to remain part of the United Kingdom (Breeze, 2017). A 2014 pre-referendum survey of voting intentions, organized by age and taken before the election, showed that voters over 65 years old leaned heavily (57 percent) towards the idea of remaining part of the United Kingdom. This is in comparison to people of all age groups spanning from 16-64, of which the average of people wanting to remain within the UK was 34 percent (Statista Research Department, 2018).

In the time leading up to the referendum, informal methods of communication such as engaging in social media discussions or talking to family members were most effective in sparking the political interests of young voters. (Breeze, 2017). In a qualitative study of motivating factors, one young voter said: “[m]y cousin was in Young Scots for Independence and I asked him to point me in the right direction” (Breeze, 2017). Noting that social media campaigns and the unprecedented nature of the plebiscite, Scotland expanded the age of enfranchisement to 16, making it so any citizen of the United Kingdom living in Scotland and over the age of 16 could vote in the 2014 referendum (Cannon, 2015). As a result, 16 and 17 year olds voted at a rate that almost matched the national average, bypassing the turnout of 18-24 year olds. In the end, voters in Scotland aged 16-24 were 44 percent more likely to vote for independence, 34 percent more likely to vote to remain unified, and 22 percent of those surveyed said that they were undecided (Statista Research Department, 2018). As a result of the unexpectedly high youth turnout, the age for all votes taking place in Scotland has been permanently expanded to 16. This is not for any UK-wide election, only the elections that are strictly limited to Scotland. (Breeze, 2017).

United Kingdom

While the average parliamentary election in the United Kingdom records an average of 62.2 percent of registered voters, the 2016 Brexit referendum brought a turnout of 72.3 percent (Election Guide: Country Profile: United Kingdom). This 10 percent increase was the highest turnout since the 1992 general election. Most notably, the turnout of youth voters increased alongside the national turnout. While turnout for 18-24 year old Brits in 1992 was at an average of 60 percent, the average dropped to about 40 percent between the years of 2001-2015 (Sloam, 2018). In comparison, the Brexit referendum issue boasted a 73.2 percent turnout rate for 18-24 year old voters (Birch, 2016).

The magnitude of a referendum that would determine whether or not the United Kingdom remained as part of the European Union was enough to spark the #VoteBecause movement. This hashtag is a way of tracking posts related to voting, as users of the hashtag typically post pictures of themselves holding signs that state their own reason for voting. Of the initial participants that were interviewed, 68 percent of students said that committing to the cause via a social media
post is the action that encouraged them to talk to their friends about voting. As a result, 92 percent of adult students had committed to talking to their friends about voting or registering to vote. Of the interviewed students, 75 percent felt confident that they knew enough about the referendum to convince someone of the reasons why they should vote (Sloam, 2018). Unlike Catalonia and Scotland, the United Kingdom did not expand enfranchisement to 16 and 17 year old citizens, despite increased levels of political interest among the demographic.

Discussion

Even though Catalonia expanded enfranchisement to young voters and non-citizens, the electorate was still not fully motivated. This is because, despite the fact that many unofficial referendums had taken place, the efforts had not resulted in the desired outcome: Catalan independence as a sovereign state. Furthermore, while other factors not examined here do play a role in voter turnout, it is clear by the downward trend in participation of Catalan referendums that the electorate is frustrated with this reality. Especially during the early years of the referendum process in 2009, voters were stimulated and enfranchised but unable to make a meaningful impact. The Catalans (or enfranchised foreigners) that do turn out to vote on polling day are too passionate about the cause to stay silent. This leads to the speculation that the people who are able to vote but do not show up may simply be aware that their efforts will be in vain. In both Catalonia and Scotland, not only did the newly enfranchised voters turn up at the polling booths, but they also took an unprecedented interest in politics, similar to the interest levels of adults that had been voting for years.

In all cases, informal discussion through various means of communication such as conversing with family and teachers, and joining forums online, both educate and interest people. This is particularly prevalent among the youngest voters. Social media has the power to unite people who are interested in the same cause. Hashtags such as #VoteBecause can be used to track the reach or progress of a movement. This makes it easier for people to gather a community of like-minded individuals. Additionally, lowering the legal age of voting, such as in Scotland, recognizes the interests and legitimizes the opinions of young voters. In summary, knowing that their vote will actually influence a change is enticing to voters of all ages. The sacred trust between the electorate and leaders is vital to the cause of democracy, and a key to drawing voters of all ages to the polls, time and time again, as seen in the most recent 2019 elections in the United Kingdom and Scotland.

Conclusion

After analyzing the voter turnout of recent referendums, it is clear that the stereotype of disengaged young voters is beginning to fade: young people are not as ‘politically apathetic’ as it has been suggested, they are just changing what it means to be politically active. Traditional

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296 Level of education, economic status, family history, etc. are all things that impact voter turnout for a population.

297 It is important to note that the United Kingdom did not lower the legal age to vote for the Brexit referendum or the following elections, but has continued to register an increasing amount of new voters in the time since.
practices of engagement such as mass-produced flyers in mailboxes or cold-calling houses in a
district do not mobilize people to vote in the same way that these actions did in the past. Young
people are responsive to issue-based efforts, especially when they know what impact the vote
will have on them personally. In terms of activity, ‘sharing’ a political picture online or getting
in-app notifications regarding an issue-based organization is how young people are showing their
commitment. Though social media posts may be started by people who are already committed to
voting or being politically active, the posts are able to reach the devices of enough individuals
that it becomes difficult not to become engaged in some way.

Another factor that influences the turnout of independence referendums, especially for young
people, is the perceived legitimacy regarding the vote. By giving young people the ability to
vote, local governments are ensuring that they feel a sense of power. The alternative is being
politically mobilized but having no ability to voice an opinion through legitimate channels,
something which will only result in frustration. Factors such as social and political trust,
education, funding and location undoubtedly play a role in the overall turnout of an election.
Noting with interest the participatory habits of young people, turnout for an independence
referendum can be increased by the following: enhancing discussion via nontraditional methods
such as social media participation and informal discussion, expanding enfranchisement to
include more people who are personally invested in the outcome, and providing legitimate
channels for the vote to take place.
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TENSION AND IDENTITY
IN SOCIETY
A Look Inside the Tensions Underlying Russian Identity
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I. Introduction

The idea of delineating between one’s ethnic origins and their current legal residency is one that remains ardently contested throughout the industrialized world to this day (Akturk, 2011). In part, this concern may be addressed through a linguistic perspective. The terms “nation” and “country” are frequently used interchangeably, although their proper definitions draw a distinct line between cultural cohesion and legitimate political sovereignty. It is intriguing to look further at how this particular conflict between ethnic identity and national allegiance has played out first in the Soviet Union, and subsequently in modern Russia. In an attempt to answer the question of who can actually be considered a true Russian, I will examine a wide range of materials, including international legal journals and scholarly publications, to look first into how citizenship was defined according to Soviet law and how that changed over the 69 year period of expansion and power consolidation in the northeastern hemisphere. Recent research examines how nationality and citizenship were differentiated during the Soviet period and discusses how the laws of the time period were used as justification for discrimination toward minority groups such as the Jews (Alexopoulos, 2006; Akturk, 2011; Salenko, 2012). Finally, I will conduct a comparative analysis of current citizenship laws and requirements in the Russian Federation and their counterparts in the United States of America in terms of inclusion and absorption of ethnic groups. This paper aims at bridging relevant research on discrimination in the U.S.S.R. and the role played by the legal system in supporting it.

II. Background: Legal definitions of citizenship in the U.S.S.R.

Given that the Soviet era stretched over a time frame of nearly 70 years, there was much fluctuation in the laws dictating citizenship requirements. The European Union Democracy Observatories (EUDO) 2012 Country Report on Russia looked at how four of the Soviet regimes—Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev—characterized citizenship in order to make sense of the differences in the law over time.

When Lenin first took office before the U.S.S.R. was formally established, a concerted effort was made to strip away all civil ranks and titles and recategorize everyone as general citizens of the republic; this was done as an attempt to break down the existing social class system and bring workers and peasants into the citizenry (Salenko, 2012). The establishment of Lenin at the head of the Russian government was followed five years later by the formal creation of the Soviet Union in December of 1922. The first formal legal declaration on matters of citizenship in the newly formed empire came with the passage of the 1924 Constitution of the U.S.S.R., which granted citizenship to every person living at that moment within the borders of the Soviet Union (Salenko, 2012). The legislator delegated authority on matters of citizenship to the public bodies of the republics and in accordance with the federal system in place for the government, granted the populace two citizenships: a Federal Soviet Citizenship and a Republican Citizenship in accordance with one’s current residence in a specific republic.
The initial citizenship laws in the U.S.S.R. were notably among the most progressive for the time period with regard to women, who had the right to maintain their Soviet citizenship regardless of their marital status (i.e. married to foreigners or divorced) (Salenko, 2012).

The establishment of a new constitution in 1936 was followed shortly by the 1938 Citizenship Law, a key feature of the approach of Stalin’s regime to the question of citizenry (Salenko, 2012). Most notably, automatic acquisition of Soviet citizenship was repealed under the new law (Salenko, 2012). The law further sought to define more specifically that anyone who did not possess Soviet citizenship and had no evidence of foreign citizenship was to be considered stateless; this regulation was closely linked to that which identified methods of taking away citizenship, which included court judgement and “in special cases due to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR” (Salenko, 2012).

The Brezhnev era constitution was drafted in 1977 and extensively detailed new key components of Soviet citizenship. For example, while extradition of U.S.S.R. citizens to foreign states was explicitly banned, the law also included stipulations that dual foreign nationalities of Soviet citizens were not to be recognized (“UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,” 1981). The law also addressed the question of applying for Soviet citizenship as follows but did not provide details on what that process would have looked like: “Foreign citizens and stateless people can, at their request, be admitted to citizenship of the USSR in conformity with this Law, irrespective of race, nationality, sex, education, language and place of residence” (“UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,” 1981). In the American Journal of International Law former U.S. State Department official Durward Sandifer described how Soviet law was exceptionally vague in detailing the naturalization process, leaving it to be carried out by administrative regulation (1936). In regard to foreigners wishing to become Soviet citizens, the policy throughout the thirties was that “no period of residence is required as a prerequisite to naturalization, and that foreign workers and peasants residing in the Union, and foreigners enjoying the right of asylum on account of persecution for revolutionary-emancipatory activities, are eligible to the simplified procedure of naturalization” (Sandifer, 1936).

As part of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika policy initiatives, the last citizenship law of the U.S.S.R. was put into effect in 1991. The most drastic change in the law was that control over the regulation of citizenship was transferred to the President of the Soviet Union from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (Salenko, 2012). While the previous versions of the law had all been extremely vague in defining when citizenship could be revoked, leaving much leeway for broad interpretations, this new law was characteristically more democratic, specifying that the deprivation of citizenship could occur only under the following circumstances:

“1) as a consequence of the fact that the person has entered into the service of military forces, security forces, police, organs of justice or other governmental, administrative bodies of a foreign state; 2) if a Soviet citizen with permanent residence abroad failed to register in the respective Soviet consulate for five years without any reasonable
excuse; 3) if Soviet citizenship was obtained by use of fraudulent documents or by knowingly using false information” (Salenko, 2012).

Overall, throughout these four eras of the Soviet period, there are several key factors of the laws on citizenship that stayed, for the most part, relatively constant throughout. While a dual system of citizenship was established under Lenin’s regime, this never truly came to fruition as the Republican Citizenship was essentially moot (Salenko, 2012). Maintaining additional foreign citizenships was largely prohibited and methods for taking away citizenship were present up through the collapse of the Soviet Union (Salenko, 2012).

Given the above background information on the legal framework that defined citizenship in the Soviet era, it is important to look at this construct through the lens of how the factor of ethnicity was interwoven among the legal jargon.

III. Evidence of differentiation in the Soviet period

At the rise of the Soviet era, the political entity was set up in a way that was intended to serve as an equalizer so that all people would be treated the same in the eyes of the law, with a strong emphasis given to granting equal rights and opportunities to the working class (Alexopoulos, 2006). As the new Soviet government began to form,

“class, and not geography or birth, would now determine social membership. Thus membership in the new community of Soviet workers and peasants was extended to the laboring classes of all countries and nationalities and, correspondingly, withheld from the bourgeois classes. In theory, citizens ‘with full rights’ consisted of the laboring classes, a group of people united by their shared history of exploitation at the hands of the bourgeoisie” (Alexopoulos, 2006).

However, over time, a clear shift in policy became evident, with greater attention given to noting how citizenship could be stratified depending on where one’s ethnicity placed them within the ranks of social class (Osakwe, 1980). The way in which the Soviet government approached citizenship going forward gave evidence of a deeply ingrained legal system of discrimination. Differentiation on the basis of ethnicity, with little regard for citizenship status, was evidenced in the inclusion of nationality on nearly all forms of important personal documents, including passports, birth certificates and school papers.

Increasingly strict and more fully fleshed out citizenship laws throughout the Soviet period shifted the legal framework to be set up in a way that powerfully delineated between nationalities, allowing for the physically documented segregation of minority groups. In 1932, an internal passport system was introduced, mandating that everyone age 16 and older was required to carry this document with them at all times (Osakwe, 1980). This passport was required to note the bearer’s nationality (i.e. Polish, German, Jewish) but not their citizenship status (Osakwe, 1980).

This passport system was introduced in the Stalin period, which can be characterized as a repeated attempt to disenfranchise citizens with non-Russian nationalities. It was during Stalin’s
administration that the section noting one’s nationality, “Item 5,” was introduced to the internal passport, making it easier to target minorities (Osakwe, 1980). The idea of “Item 5,” or пятая графа, became well known throughout the U.S.S.R. due to its frequent inclusion in documentation and made its way into Soviet slang as a way to quickly pinpoint one’s ethnicity. The determination of Item 5 was done according to parentage; however, if a child’s parents had different nationalities, the passport holder could select which one they wanted on their legal documents (Salenko, 2012).

Once a system such as this one was established wherein it became easy to target minority groups based off their papers, the practice of the removal of citizenship rights as defined in the section above became more commonplace. These ethnically specific passports have been credited with the deportation of ethnic groups including Chechens and Crimean Tatars, “resulting in the decimation of their populations” (Akturk, 2011). During the Stalin regime in particular, “labor camps and settlements greatly expanded, crowded with citizens who lacked the full rights of citizenship” (Alexopoulos 2006). This practice of taking away rights from citizens actively continued until a deep divide was created between those in full capacity of their citizenship rights and those from whom these had been stripped away.

Passport ethnicity also fueled rampant anti-Semitism throughout the Soviet Union, allowing for the discrimination against Jews in areas of politics and employment (Akturk, 2011). Furthermore, the application of using ethnicity to revoke citizenship, a right which the Soviet government always maintained among its powers throughout the various laws, was seen in 1967, when Soviet authorities cited that part of the law as reasoning for why Jews leaving the U.S.S.R. to emigrate to Israel were deprived of their citizenship (Salenko, 2012).

While many nations have traditionally struggled with issues of discrimination and the targeting of minority groups, the Soviet system of discrimination was particular in that it was framed not as a rejection of the external “other,” but rather as an internal hunt to strip anyone of a different ethnicity of the rights supposedly granted to them as Soviet citizens (Alexopoulos, 2006). According to Alexopoulos (2006), “it is the degree or severity of exclusion, the broad definition and perpetual redefinition of who was excluded, as well as the vulnerability of all citizens to enter the ranks of the excluded,” that made the Soviet form of discrimination so unique from all the other states that have historically targeted similar groups of people.

Interestingly, it is said that Khrushchev considered removing nationality from the internal passport and instead denoting “Soviet,” but this never came to fruition due to strong oppositional ideological forces which favored the “Stalinist ideological establishment built around the idea of passport ethnicity and institutionalized multinationality” (Akturk, 2011). Similar reform attempts in the 1970s under the Brezhnev regime likewise failed, in part due to the problem that power was largely distributed out to the individual republics, making it difficult to consolidate any kind of actual change in policy (Akturk, 2011).

Moving out of the Soviet period, the new Russian government now had to grapple with how to establish its own independent citizenship laws. Six years after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, Item 5 was removed from the Russian internal passport by presidential decree from Yeltsin in 1997, creating “a central fault line in Soviet and post-Soviet Russian identity politics” (Akturk, 2011). This process was simplified as the new government was now only responsible for the documentation of itself, and not all 15 republics. The push to finally remove ethnicity from the passport was in part due to how many of the people that rose to power in the new government did so with the aid of their diverse constituencies and how those voter groups might have been responsible for fueling their campaigns by means of ethnic-specific grievances and assurances from the politicians that they would work toward diminishing national discrimination once in office (Akturk, 2011).

Based on the examination of evidence for how Soviet legal policy clearly distinguished between ethnic Russians and those of other nationalities, regardless of their citizenship status, one may conclude that this was an effective and widely used tactic for rationalizing rampant discrimination against minority groups. While current Russian passports no longer bear the ethnicity of the holder, differentiation on the basis of nationality is still apparent in Russia today, especially when looked at in comparison to the United States of America and how the two countries’ approaches to the relative importance of citizenship and ethnicity factor into everyday life.

IV.  A look at modern Russian policy vis-à-vis the U.S.

Particularly in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s approach to defining its new citizenship was somewhat complicated by the frequency of disintegration of ethnic boundaries during the majority of the 20th century (Shevel, 2009). After 1991, the republics were essentially forced to either absorb all of the formerly Soviet citizens permanently residing within their borders, regardless of their ethnicity, which is what most of the states did, or to insist on an ethnic-based granting of citizenship rights, which was what Latvia and Estonia did initially (Shevel, 2009). Given how the independent states did not have established and functioning economic and social structures in place to serve as guidelines for legislating citizenship, “the newness of statehood and the legacies of Soviet nationality policy make national identity a key source of citizenship policies,” leading the way to how ethnicity is still prominently relevant in Russian political spheres (Shevel, 2009).

According to the law currently in effect in Russia, citizenship of the Russian Federation is granted by birth to children whose parents both hold citizenship (“РОССИЙСКАЯ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ,” 2002). If both parents are not citizens, however, this process then becomes more complicated. If one parent is a citizen and the other is either stateless or missing, the child is granted citizenship (“РОССИЙСКАЯ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ,” 2002). In cases where one parent is a Russian citizen and the other is a foreign national, citizenship is granted to the child only if it is physically born in Russia or if it were to somehow become stateless if not given citizenship (“РОССИЙСКАЯ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ,” 2002). The only case in which a child born in Russia to two foreign or stateless parents would be granted citizenship of the Federation would be if the parents’ state does not grant citizenship to the child (“РОССИЙСКАЯ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ,” 2002).
Over across the ocean, the United States citizenship law is predominantly different in that it entails the idea of birthright citizenship, a policy that grants immediate legal entry into the United States for any child born within its territories (“Thinking of becoming,” 2009). Furthermore, even if residing abroad, as long as a child has at least one parent who is an American citizen, it is eligible to receive citizenship (“Thinking of becoming,” 2009).

Looking at this difference in citizenship practices, it is clear that Russia still maintains a firm grasp on the idea of the importance of nationality in determining the country’s demographics (Shevel, 2009). Whereas America is considered to be a melting pot of diverse cultural backgrounds, Russian policy, as evidenced in its current laws, shows that the government is still insistent on ensuring that its citizens bear some amount of “Russianness” (Blakkisrud, 2016). As was seen in the Soviet period, modern day Russian policies ensure that the concept of citizenship and that of nationality are not conflated (“РОССИЙСКАЯ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ,” 2002). While the term “American” is used broadly to categorize all citizens of the U.S., regardless of their ethnic backgrounds, the label “Russian” is used to denote only those of Russian nationality. This distinction is important to note when analyzing how the Russian system of discrimination is unique when looking at other similarly developed nations across the globe:

“While modern international law uses the term ‘nationality’ to refer to the legal bond between an individual and a sovereign state, Russian domestic law uses the term ‘citizenship’ (grazdanstvo). According to Russian legislation there is a striking difference between citizenship (grazdanstvo) and nationality (nationalnost). In consequence, in the Russian context the term citizenship cannot be used as a synonym for nationality” (Salenko, 2012).

The American approach to the cohesion of its populace has been described as although quite similar to that of the European Union, in terms of its integration of peoples, rather different in that it melts the abundance of nationalities present into one people who share not only a language, but a culture at large as well (Zuleeg, 1997).

This has not always been the case, however. While current U.S. practices grant automatic citizenship to any children born on American soil regardless of their parents’ immigration status, naturalization legislation has historically been tinged with racism, such as the discrimination against people of African descent (Zuleeg, 1997). In the period following World War II many citizens of Japanese origin were racially targeted regardless of their citizenship status, a movement initially backed even by the Supreme Court decision in the infamous Korematsu case (Zuleeg, 1997).

Nonetheless, as race-based biases have been weeded out from American legal codes over time, “up to the present the flood of immigrants from almost all countries in the world with different beliefs, cultures, races and other features” have been incorporated into society, which has striven to create a “postethnic America” (Zuleeg, 1997).

In Russia, however, the way in which the law is defined and the subtleties of language,
seen by the concrete distinction between the terms nationality and citizenship, has been, in recent years, coupled closely with the rise of nationalism, that has brought along with it a renewed interest in codifying differences in ethnicity (Bovt, 2013).

An article published in The Moscow Times in 2013 details how “54 percent of ethnic Russians would like to stipulate on Russian passports a citizen's ‘nationality,' or ethnic origin, as was the practice during Soviet times” (Bovt, 2013). While government officials have by and large ignored such attempts to bring back mandated passport nationality, the recent resurgence of the nationalist movement in Russia has seen a romanticized view of the Soviet era brought to attention, rekindling fears of a return to a time when the practice of using ethnicity as reasoning for preventing someone from securing work or acceptance to a university was rampant (Bovt, 2013).

This push to return to a more ethnically focused regime has been further seen in political discourse across Russia (Blakkisrud, 2016). In the book *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015*, Helge Blakkisrud argues that President Vladimir Putin has “redefined the national ‘self’ from a predominantly civic understanding based on citizenship and identification with the state, to a more ethnic one focused on Russian language and culture, one in which the ethnic Russians take centre stage” (Blakkisrud, 2016).

In looking at the current approaches that the Russian Federation and the United States of America take in resolving citizenship legislation, and what role ethnicity plays into shaping these laws, it is clear to see a divide between the two. Although both countries have faced historical hurdles in terms of the racial groups that have been barred from obtaining equal citizenship rights, the notion of having a clear legal separation between varying ethnic groups is a uniquely Russian concept that is maintained even today (Blakkisrud, 2016).

V. Conclusion

In considering the tensions underlying the conflict between Russian ethnicity and citizenship, I looked at several sources that highlighted how this disparity was emphasized throughout the Soviet period, and how its effects have lasted into modern-day Russian law and political discourse. Legal documents and research on the U.S.S.R. showed that discrimination against minority groups was not only culturally widespread, but was also supported by a strong legal framework that made it easier to negatively differentiate between those who were ethnically Russian and those who were not (Osakwe, 1980; “UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,” 1981). The examination of more current law showed that Russia has yet to reconcile the terminology that separates out the idea of nationality from the general branch of citizenship, a stark contrast from American policies, which place a greater emphasis on one’s legal status in the country as opposed to their ethnic origin (“РОССИЙСКАЯ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ,” 2002; “Thinking of becoming,” 2009). A recent rise of nationalism in Russia has brought back ideas about the institution of passport ethnicity, raising concern over a glorified outlook on the Soviet era and a return to a more solidly supported legal groundwork upon which to base ethnic discrimination (Bovt, 2013).
Works Cited


РОССИЙСКАЯ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНЫЙ ЗАКОН О ГРАЖДАНСТВЕ


Conflict is often rooted in difference. Individuals differ in their personal opinions, their upbringing, their lifestyles, even their education. Out of every person in the world, there are no two that are completely alike. A lack of common ground creates the potential for misunderstanding and disagreement, and therefore can inherently create barriers and separations between entire groups of people. These differences are a major underlying element in the division of social classes. At the basic level, these separations are driven largely by social economic status. Economic wealth serves as a defining factor that has the ability to open the door to other opportunities and advantages. Based on this value, individuals are placed into an entire hierarchical system that single-handedly establishes where they stand in terms of their societal position. Individuals within these classes then eventually gain a sense of class consciousness, which allows them to be able to perceive their own standing within that hierarchy as a whole. Social class is a theme that is sometimes addressed in literature, often to observe it through a critical lens. Authors take different approaches to exploring the conflicts and differences that exist between different classes. I will be examining the various portrayals of this social element by Katherine Mansfield in “The Garden Party”, James Joyce in “The Dead”, Henry James in “The Real Thing”, and D. H. Lawrence in “You Touched Me”.

As a brief background, class consciousness is a modern sociological concept associated with the social theory posed by Karl Marx and is defined as “the self-understanding of members of a social class” (Munro). The concept was born through Marx’s idea that workers shared common grievances against the capitalists, which heightened their awareness of their own opposition to capitalism as a group. This disparity and collective struggle against the capitalists essentially set them apart as their own social class. Born out of this was the notion of two divided classes; the working-class proletariat and the capitalist bourgeoisie. Hungarian Marxist philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs worked further with this concept and “stressed the need to distinguish between class consciousness and the ideas or feelings actually held by the members of a social class” (Munro). While Marx had looked at the group more objectively as a whole, Lukacs felt it was important to stress the differences in perception on a more individual level. The system of capitalism works in a way that leads to the promotion of economic inequalities. Capitalists own the means of production and distribution, while the larger working class has to sell their own labor power in exchange for wages. The system thrives off of the unequal distribution of wealth between the two classes, and therefore defines the social structure of class and endows the bourgeoisie with a sense of class privilege. Although the concept originated in Marxist theory, other sociologists have proposed that social classes are more associated “with distinct understandings of reality without presuming one to be more valid than others” (Munro). For example, sociologist Karl Mannheim identified class consciousness with a sense of alienation existing between the different social classes. This is rooted deeply in the lack of perspective and understanding among the classes which therefore forces them into isolation from one another.
It should initially be noted that literature is reflective of many elements of society. Functioning almost as a mirror-like reflection of real human life, “literature has been thought to reflect economics, family relationships, climate and landscapes, attitudes, morals, races, social classes, political events, wars, religion, and many other more detailed aspects of environment and social life” (Albrecht 426). Similar to both sociological and psychoanalytic theory, literature can take on both manifest and latent meaning. Manifest content is defined as “those objective consequences contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of the system which are intended and recognized by participants in the system” (Helm 51). In the literary context, it is consciously understood as the basic subject matter and actual storyline. On the other hand, latent content is indicative of consequences “which are neither intended nor recognized” (Helm 51). As an unconscious interpretation, the latent content generally carries more of the social commentary and a deeper symbolic meaning relative to the major thematic content of the story. Looking at this more complex meaning allows readers to explore the authorial motives behind the surface-level storyline and connect the two together to form a new understanding of the story.

The discrepancy in understanding between classes is a major element that is often depicted within literary criticism dealing with social class. This is best exemplified by the characters in Joyce’s “The Dead”. The first instance we see of this is in Gabriel’s interaction with Lily, the caretaker’s daughter, at the start of the story. When she speaks to him as she helps him take his overcoat off, “Gabriel smiled at the three syllables she had given his surname” (Joyce 436). He proceeds to ask her if she still attends school, to which she answers that she does not. These two small actions in combination immediately establish Gabriel as being a character that appears to be of high social class and education, also making him seem condescending towards those that he perceives to be below him in these aspects. This is further supported by his next comment to Lily, indicating that she will soon be marrying. He is implying here that since she is no longer receiving an education, and because she is a girl of lower social class with little money, she has no other option than to get married so that she will be supported. Gabriel’s assumption suggests not only that she cannot support herself without a man, but also that individuals of a lower class do not have much potential other than getting married and starting a family. Lily’s reaction to this is bitter, and Gabriel seems to realize how he had offended her. It is clear that he does not know how to further handle the situation, so he offers her a coin. He is essentially using his own wealth and class to buy his way out of the problem, while simultaneously assuming that this will automatically earn him forgiveness since Lily does not have much money.

This interaction with Lily increases Gabriel’s self-consciousness and anxiety about the speech he is supposed to give. As he waits for the waltz to finish before he enters the room, the “indelicate clacking of the men’s heels and the shuffling of their soles reminded him that their grade of culture differed from his” (Joyce 436). Taking note of this, he becomes nervous about how they will perceive the speech that he gives, and if his poetry quotes would just go over their heads and make him look ridiculous. He worries that they will think he is trying to flaunt his superiority and intelligence, and “he would fail with them just as he had failed with the girl in the pantry” (Joyce 437). Again, Gabriel’s thinking process here shows his low expectations and
condescension towards those that are less educated and of a lower social class than he is. Although he is extremely aware of class division, it seems as though he has trouble seeing things from any point of view other than his own and seems to make prejudiced assumptions based solely on the matter of class.

Relative to this awareness, a research study was conducted on what was proposed as the five elements of class consciousness. The first one that the researchers examined was the awareness of social class. To have class awareness means that the members within the class must be able to acknowledge that social class is based on meaningful structure and that economic resources are divided on the basis of these specific groups, not on individual entities. It “is a specific form of group entitativity, the extent to which groups are perceived as having social reality” (Keefer, Goode & Berkel, 2015). Previous research conducted on entitativity has found that individuals differ in their perceptions of how meaningfully connected other groups are, as opposed to just being completely alienated individuals. If someone sees others only as separate individuals, it is less likely that they will be conscious of the presence of class divisions.

In Mansfield’s “The Garden Party”, we can see Laura beginning to transition into this state of class awareness. At first, she seems encompassed by the bubble of her upper-class life that she has grown up in and is accustomed to, as she and her sisters prepare the garden party. As they are making their arrangements, she learns of the fatal accident that had occurred. A neighbor, one of the ones living in the small cottages nearby, had been killed when he had been thrown off his horse right on to his head. Laura immediately thinks that they must stop the garden party, out of respect. But the prejudices that the family holds against the members of the working-class become clear, and Laura has difficulty holding her own among them. Laura’s sister Jose implies that she believed the accident had occurred due to the man being drunk, showing her low expectations of the working-class. To her, this makes his death his own fault and justifies them not canceling the party. Soon after, Laura’s mother does not seem to take her seriously and claims that “if someone had died there normally—and I can’t understand how they keep alive in those poky little holes—we should still be having our party, shouldn’t we?” (Mansfield 571). In a way, Laura’s family is similar to Gabriel in that they see themselves as superior but make false assumptions about the lower classes and fail to see eye-to-eye with them. Even the omniscient third-person narrator adds to this tone, especially when describing the cottages as being “far too near. They were the greatest possible eyesore, and they had no right to be in that neighborhood at all” (Mansfield 570). The narrator’s alignment with the judgmental views of the family is representative of a group-like mentality and places emphasis on the tendency of the upper-class to blame the poor for their own predicament.

Laura, however, is different from her family in that she seems to develop an awareness of her privileged spot in society as a reaction to her neighbor’s death. Unlike her family, she can move past the judgmental perception of the lower class and attempt to consider their perspective, rather than being confined to her own. Her acknowledgement of them as neighbors contrast with the narrator’s suggestion that their cottages are out of place, and her consideration for the family’s mourning process shows her ability to empathize with them. When her mother suggests that they make up a basket for the neighbors out of the leftover food from the party, Laura is
hesitant. Since she seems to be the only one that can at least begin to understand the lower-class family, she considers how it may feel to be receiving scraps of leftovers from an extravagant party. Nevertheless, she delivers the basket and becomes increasingly self-conscious of her expensive clothes as she walks down to the cottages, worrying that they may offend the less fortunate families. This feeling seems to hold similarities to Gabriel’s anxieties pertaining to his speech and his assumption that it is too intellectual for his audience. Although Laura’s class awareness has progressed, her understanding of the lower-class experience does not seem to fully develop. She is filled with guilt and feels an urge to escape when she is inside her neighbors’ house, seeming to struggle even to communicate and hold a conversation with them. Looking at the dead man’s body, she thinks she has some sort of revelation and has achieved an understanding of the lower-class way of life. In the same way, her brother Laurie assumes that he understands her thoughts at the end, although it is relatively clear that he does not.

Another major component of class consciousness is concerned with the conception of social identity. The material conditions that one grows up with and experiences on a normal basis can have a lasting impact on their identity and characteristics as a person, and therefore affect major aspects of their social behavior. A study done on social economic status and identity showed that “those with higher SES attached more importance to identities that are indicative of their SES position, but less importance to identities that are rooted in basic demographics or related to their sociocultural orientation” (Manstead 270). Many researchers have argued that social class leads to specific patterns of thinking, feeling, and behavior. The differences in material resources available to those of different social ranking create cultural identities that are based on patterns of observable behavior that arise as a result of differences in wealth, education, and occupation.

James’ “The Real Thing” differs from Joyce’s and Mansfield’s stories in the sense that it is told from the first-person perspective of an illustrator who is not of a high social class status. Major and Mrs. Monarch show up to the narrator’s studio, hoping to sit as models for him. The couple had lost a great deal of money and were therefore forced to seek out a job as a result. It is even remarked by the narrator that “it was very odd to see such people apply for such poor pay” (James 403). Essentially, the Monarchs have no prior experience with modeling. The narrator seems to see the Monarchs critically and can envision the lifestyle that they must be accustomed to. He sees it “in their faces, the blankness, the deep intellectual repose of the twenty years of country-house visiting that had given them pleasant intonations” (James 404). Furthermore, it was soon apparent to the narrator that they could not be what he needed them to be. They were amateurs that seemed only capable of representing a ‘type’, and he found that they did not show the character that he needed when they were modeling. With Mrs. Monarch, the narrator “began to find her too insurmountably stiff… her figure had no variety of expression” (James 408). As high-class English gentlefolk, the Monarchs represent the idealized image of the proper English gentleman and lady, and they themselves are aware of this. With an air of awkwardness and embarrassment, Major Monarch had basically suggested to the narrator that he and his wife were the best options for models because they were embodiments of “the real thing”. The fact that they were so confident in this sense was almost infuriating to the narrator, along with the fact
that they figured they were doing him a favor simply by modeling for him. They had assumed that just because they were good-looking people of a high social status, they would be perfect models and would be exactly what the illustrator was looking for.

The Monarchs are put in direct contrast of Miss Churm, another one of the narrator’s models. With her cockney accent and the disheveled way that she is first introduced as she arrives, she represents a lower class than the Monarchs, with much less of an air of dignity and elegance. Yet it is clear that she is a better model than they are, primarily because she can give the narrator the element of character that he needs for good illustrations and seems to be regarded as more of a professional. The Monarchs, however, do not see her this way. They look down on her because of her clear lower social status and could not see that she was actually a much better model than they were. It is clear that due to their social identity and the lifestyle that they are accustomed to, the Monarchs almost seem to think that they can do no wrong. Their privileged position society has no doubt restricted them from seeing their shortcomings and has led them to believe that they are the ultimate representation of perfection no matter the context. The narrator begins to realize that the Monarchs can really be of no actual use to him and he has to let them go. In the final scene, Mrs. Monarch heroically fixes Miss Churm’s hair as she sits posed for the narrator, and James uses this moment to demonstrate that despite the class difference between the Monarchs and Miss Churm, they are actually no better than her. Desperately, the Monarchs stoop to the low position of servitude in a reluctant acceptance of their failure.

It is important to additionally note the effect that class consciousness can have on relationships, particularly those existing between two people that come from different social classes. Despite the divide between them, there is the occasion that two individuals of completely different class status will come into frequent contact with one another and have to establish a personal relationship. This, therefore, extends beyond just the perception that one level of the social hierarchy may have of another. Many sociologists and authors have examined how class-related issues pervade into issues that are more concerned with psychology and sexuality. Within private relationships that tend to have more intimacy, “the echoes of social rumblings can be heard” (447). Social class status has the capability of acting as a major barrier between members of different classes, even on a more personal, intimate basis. The writer D. H. Lawrence was among those who believed, as a result of this, that Western civilization needed to change socially if anyone were to reach their full potential in society. It was his assumption that “no sexual, psychological, or artistic growth was possible under modern industrialism with its fundamentally exploitative social, economic, and sexual relationships” (448). For this reason, Lawrence’s writing often reflects character experiences that are explicitly linked to the social climate and setting that they find themselves in.

This is demonstrated in Lawrence’s “You Touched Me”, a story that is concerned primarily with the idea of assimilation and intermingling of the social classes. Matilda and Emmie Rockley remain unmarried mainly due to their feelings of superiority over the men of their ugly industrial town, who they deem as being below them and unworthy. Therefore, the sisters remain at the Pottery House and care for their ill father, from whom they will each receive a substantial inheritance after his passing. When they learn of their adopted brother, Hadrian,
coming to visit their father in his final days, the sisters become fluttered and anxious. Years ago, their father had gone to London and brought six-year-old Hadrian home from a Charity Institution. The girls were kind to him, but there was an underlying resentment in the way they regarded him. They had “insisted he should address them as Cousin… he complied, but there seemed a mockery in his tone” (Lawrence 395). Their insistence on him referring to them as ‘Cousin’ is a result of their reluctance to admit a boy of a clearly lower social status into their immediate family. They use this as a way to further distance the boy from themselves, despite the fact that he took their last name and essentially assumed the role of their younger brother. Although he was just a child, Hadrian seemed to be aware of what made him an outsider in comparison to the older girls, and therefore regarded them in a sort of jeering way.

When Hadrian arrives home as a young man, now twenty-one years old, the sisters are wary of him and suspect that he must be after their inheritance. After all, it is clear that he did and still does share a special bond and understanding with their father. But dynamics shift when Matilda enters her father’s room at night to check on him, forgetting that Hadrian was staying in there. She brushes his forehead softly before realizing that it was not her father in the bed, and this awkward moment impacts them both deeply. For Hadrian, “the fragile exquisiteness of her caress startled him most, revealed unknown things to him” (Lawrence 402). Despite being taken in by the family as a child, Hadrian still did not have the same upbringing or background as the girls, and the softness in her touch was something new to him. On the other hand, Matilda resents him for this mistake. The hand that had touched his forehead physically aches, and she feels that “her hand had offended her, she wanted to cut it off. And she wanted, fiercely, to cut off the memory in him” (Lawrence 403). In her eyes, a very important line has been crossed. She had let the young man, who she felt was so below her, feel such an intimacy in her touch and be able to see something new in her.

As this touch had awakened some new feelings in Hadrian, it had seemed to do the same for her. Yet her close-mindedness and prejudice towards those of a lower social status than herself makes her disgusted with herself for having these feelings, and she represses them. Hadrian decides that he would like to marry her, and her father loves the idea so much that he threatens to give away the girls’ inheritances to Hadrian if Matilda does not comply. Matilda despises Hadrian even more, believing the situation to be completely indecent and repulsive. Hadrian’s argument, when confronted by Matilda, is simply that “you’ve touched me”, as if the touch was a solidifying promise (Lawrence 409). Matilda finally agrees to marry him, overcoming her prejudices for the sake of her dying father, and perhaps giving in slightly to the underlying desires she had been working so hard to extinguish.

While the social class criticism is more overt and obvious in James’ story compared to the others, a similar lack of understanding seems to pervade all of the stories. Despite awareness and even at least a small sense of empathy, it seems as though the social classes have a limited ability to comprehend the experiences of other classes. Conflict is not a major theme in any of these stories, yet it seems as though it could be underlying in all of them just due to the misunderstandings and prejudiced attitudes. Studies have found that “people of higher self-reported socioeconomic status and more educated parents also score higher on measures of
entitlement and narcissistic personality tendencies than people not in their class” (DeAngelis, 62). The advantages that come with higher class create the tendency for members within that class to maintain or act on beliefs that are consistent with or justify their societal position. We see evidence of this with Gabriel, who proves to be a very self-involved character. This works against him in the sense that it severely limits him to his own perspective, and though he worries about what others think, he cannot actually interpret their views. Similarly, Laura’s family displays preconceived and somewhat ignorant notions held against members of the lower class. With the exception of Laura, they appear to be consistent with one another in their beliefs, which only serves to reinforce the way that they will continue to see themselves as an upper-class family in relation to the lower class. The Monarchs also seem to be the embodiment of upper-class entitlement. Their inability to display character as they pose as models shows not only the overconfidence that their privileged position had given them, but also their disconnect from the realities of a lower-class lifestyle and profession. Finally, Matilda’s tendency to see herself as being above everyone else, especially Hadrian, makes her close-minded and prevents her from being able to accept any desire she may have for him. Critically analyzing these stories in terms of class consciousness allows us to see the monumental gaps between social classes, which then create immense amounts of tension resulting from the overall lack of understanding, compassion, and open-mindedness.
Works Cited


According to Natalie Kononenko, one of the foremost Slavic folklorists, “Through folklore, we can learn about a people—what matters to them, how they see themselves in relationship to other groups and to the world, even how they perceive what it is to be human” (1). In her book, *The Tiger’s Wife*, Téa Obreht weaves together several narratives that demonstrate folklore’s contribution towards an understanding of the world through shared culture and narrative. Set against the backdrop of World War II and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, protagonist Natalia reminisces upon the life of her recently deceased grandfather and the stories that shaped his life. Obreht parallels Natalia’s interactions with the Romanian diggers to Natalia’s grandfather’s experiences with the Tiger’s Wife and the Deathless Man; all three stories demonstrate how folklore is still very much at work in the Slavic world, often as coping mechanisms for trauma.

Folklore serves a variety of functions for the culture that creates and maintains it. In Obreht’s novel, folk tradition serves as a means of cultural identity, explaining the unexplainable, and establishing a protocol for daily life. According to Kononenko, “Folklore, for many Slavic Peoples, was a way of defining themselves against other groups” (1). Though Slavic mythology shared many of the same demons, spirits, gods, and themes, each country had their own tales specific to their region. Folklore was also a framework through which one could categorize the unknown. In the words of Vladimir Propp, “The old is changed in accordance with the new life, new ideas, and forms of consciousness” (12). Slavic folklore, especially, required strict adherence to proper behavior so as not to offend the world’s many spirits, some “generally friendly, others quarrelsome or vengeful, but all demand[ing] the greatest respect” (Kerrigan 59). As the Slavic people satisfied the spirits in their own realm, they were also careful to pay proper obeisance to the dead so that their ghosts would not seek retribution in malignant forms (81). Folklore served as a means to direct people towards proper behaviors that would give them a sense of purpose as well as keep them safe from a world filled with supernatural hazards.

Folklore also serves as a mechanism for the modern concept of disremembering which, according to Aleksandar Hemon, “is to recognize one’s own experience under the new narrative ... [blending] non-fiction and fiction, genocide documentation and utopian imagery, and [implying] an alternative interpretation of reality” (Raljević). In order to cope with a combination of physical and mental trauma, the characters in *The Tiger’s Wife* return to their folkloric framework that had remained essentially unchanged until the 20th century (Philips 14).

*The Tiger’s Wife* takes place following the break-up of Yugoslavia. After the death of communist leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980, preexisting ethnic tensions reached a boiling point. The Serbs, Yugoslavia’s Orthodox majority, grew more oppressive and controlling over the minority Catholic Croat and Bosniak Muslim ethnic groups (Barber). Croatia and Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 (Gall 71). In retaliation, the Serbian paramilitary conducted an ethnic cleansing campaign against non-Serbs in order to unite Bosnia under a “Greater Serbia” (71). Radical Croatians, as well, formed a
radical union that tried to create a Croatian state of “Herzeg-Bosna” from the multi-ethnic Bosnia (71). After years of brutal civil war, leaders from the Balkan nations signed the Dayton Accords in 1995, meant to settle the territorial wars over Bosnia and Herzegovina (Lansford 171). However, ripple effects of hostility lasted well into 1996 (171). By this time, thousands of Slavs had either been displaced or killed. It is into this chaotic postwar milieu that the reader encounters the utilization of folklore as a coping mechanism for psychological trauma.

During Natalia’s goodwill mission to inoculate orphans on the other side of the new border, she encounters a group known only as “the diggers,” who are shoveling earth in the vineyard next to the house where she is staying. The diggers are searching for the body of a cousin that one of them, Duré, had buried there twelve years ago during the war. They believe the cousin’s spirit is making their children ill because his body was “calling out for last rites, a proper resting place” and that the children would not recover until the cousin’s soul was safely transported to the spirit world (Obreht 126).

The ethnicity of the diggers is purposely vague—Obreht provides no explicit ethnic or geographic names anywhere in the novel. When she refers to Natalia’s home in “The City,” one can only assume Obreht is alluding to Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, where Obreht herself was born before the war (Jurišić). Since the Diggers come from Natalia’s side of the border (Obreht 137), they are most likely Romanian or Roma living in Romania. Romania lies on the other side of Serbia and the only digger’s name Obreht mentions, Duré, translates to “ache” in Romanian (bab.la.com).

Working under this assumption, the Roma people are a prime example of a culture that maintains a strong sense of community both through folk tradition and necessity since they have historically been one of the most persecuted ethnic groups. However, being nomadic, Roma often “[do not] follow a single faith; rather they adopt the predominant religion of the country where they are living” (Bradford). One of the owners of the vineyard comments on the diggers’ protective talisman pouches—“Whoever heard of such a thing- we Catholics don’t have it; the Muslims don’t have it” (Obreht 29). The diggers do not belong to any of the prominent ethno-religious groups (Serb, Croat, Bosniak), which practice Abrahamic religions. The diggers, therefore, process grief based on their Slavic folk belief which gives them a prescriptive process of dealing with death.

The diggers believe that they must perform alternative funeral rites for their cousin because of the Slavic dichotomy between “good” and “bad” deaths. To die a good death was typically a longer process where family had time to prepare the dying for a transition into the afterlife (Kukharenko, Holloway 68-69). These dead could have the sacred rites read over them and be buried in a cemetery. A bad death, on the other hand, was associated with prolonged sickness, childbirth, a fatal accident, murder, or suicide— to name a few (69). Since the cousin died a bad death, his body needed to go through specific cleansing rituals to stop his malignant spirit from plaguing the family members (Bogaturëv 111). According to the village crone, the diggers must “wash the bones, bring the body, and leave the heart behind” (Obreht 136).
Victims of bad deaths needed to be buried or have their ashes scattered at a crossroads, where evil spirits congregated, and one could travel from the living world to the spirit realm (Kukharenko, Holloway 55). Once the diggers cremated the body, someone would leave the urn at the crossroads with an offering of coins so that the *mora*, or revenant, would guide the cousin’s soul into the spirit world where he would cease to prey on the living (Kajkowski 15-17). Ultimately, beneath these painstaking rituals is the need for the living to atone for themselves and make peace with their grief.

Duré, the informal leader of the diggers, was the one who brought the murdered cousin down from the mountains and buried him in the vineyard (Obreht 126). Beneath the compulsion to follow tradition, Duré must make peace with his grief as well as twelve years’ worth of guilt:

> Twelve years of accounting for his inability to return the body, his negligence in leaving a family member behind, loyalty suspect, always defending himself from the conclusions they must have been drawing when he explained himself- had he abandoned a dying man? ... how he must have circled around his own guilt, hinted at it while he searched for cures from the village crone, until the old woman finally caught on and told him what he wanted to hear, pointed to his recklessness and irresponsibility with the body, absolved him by confirming that the burden was his. (Obreht 136)

Düré needed an explanation for his children’s sickness. Unwilling to look outside his ethnic community, he administered cures that were not medically sound. His folkloric tradition also dictated that Düré look inwards towards loose ends. There, he found circumstances he had failed to rectify and innocence he was unable to prove. If there was a revenant haunting him, it was the internal feeling that he left unfinished business. It does not matter that those outside of the diggers’ perspective know that Düré’s children needed modern medicine to get better. Düré’s folk narrative is real because this folk practice serves as a mechanism for understanding and remedying his guilt.

The story of the Tiger’s Wife takes place outside the narrative of Natalia and the diggers. Natalia’s grandfather witnessed this story in his youth while living in the isolated village of Galina. The “tiger’s wife” refers to the deaf-mute Muslim girl brought to the village by an unwilling husband. The townspeople refer to her as “the tiger’s wife” because they suspect her of befriending an escaped tiger living in the nearby forest. The villagers of Galina had no frame of reference to understand what the tiger was— “... in my grandfather’s village, in those days, a tiger— what did that even mean?” (Obreht 219). In order to process this unknown threat, the people of Galina used their folkloric framework to apply what Propp referred to as the old being “changed accordance with the new life, new ideas, and forms of consciousness” (12) to accommodate the tiger into their conception of the world and therefore mitigate their fears.

The people of Galina not only feared the tiger because they were unfamiliar with it but also because a herdsman first sighted it in the forest (Obreht 105-106). To the Slavic people, the forest was the habitat of the unknown where trickster spirits and malicious forces could carry
unsuspecting travelers away. Upon entering the woods, one must be prepared to encounter the *leshiii*, the protector of the forest, who could shapeshift and misguide travelers who could not outwit him (Philips 73). The witch Baba Yaga lived in the woods as well, in her house on chicken legs, and might capture and eat an unwary traveler (Kerrigan 102). The forest was filled with a variety of devils, so the villagers assumed that the tiger was one of them.

Devils, in the Slavic conceit, were physical manifestations of what Russian peasants referred to as *nechistaya sila*, or “unclean force” (Philips 44). This force “existed for the sole purpose of inflicting harm and prompting evil deeds” (Ivanits 38). The folklore of the Balkans also stated that devils could transform into animals, especially cats and dogs (5). Since the villagers could fit the tiger into all of these categories, they regarded it as a devil and therefore something to be feared.

Only Natalia’s grandfather understood that the tiger was a mundane predator, like a wolf or a bear, because he owned a copy of Kipling’s *The Jungle Book* that featured a full-color illustration of the tiger Shere Khan. Therefore, “it became clearer and clearer to [her grandfather] that this particular thing in the woods was not the devil, and not a devil, but perhaps something else, something he maybe knew a little bit about” (Obreht 107). This understanding freed her grandfather from his fear, which also made him unafraid of the Tiger’s Wife. However, her grandfather’s familiarity did not extend to the townspeople. Their folk narrative dictated that they loathe the tiger, and that loathing extended to the deaf-mute girl who would become his “wife.”

The “deaf-mute girl” hails from Sarobor, another one of Obreht’s invented provinces and a likely pseudonym for Mostar, a city in Bosnia (Jurišeć). The deaf-mute girl is called a “Mohemmedan” by the people of Galina, which places her in the Bosniak (Muslim) ethnic group. She was brought to Galina, a town that still remembered the Ottoman raids, by her unwilling husband, the town butcher. Neither her husband nor the townspeople identify her beyond her ethnicity because she can neither hear nor speak. In other words, she is an unknown, a source of suspicion.

This suspicion blossoms into hostility when the deaf-mute girl’s abusive husband catches her leaving meat for the tiger. The husband hangs her up on meat hooks so that the tiger will eat her. However, in the morning, the husband has disappeared and the girl is still alive (Obreht 214-216). Natalia does not know who first called her the Tiger’s Wife, but “the name stuck. Her presence in town, smiling, bruiseless, suddenly suggested an exciting and irrevocable possibility for what had happened to [her husband], a possibility the people of Galina would cling to even seventy years later” (Obreht 217). It is not a coincidence that the “The Tiger’s Wife” mythology arises after the newly widowed deaf-mute girl is seen wearing the “Turkish silks” of her native Sarobor (Obreht 216).

One interpretation of the tiger in *The Tiger’s Wife* is that he is a symbol of the outsider, the loathed and oppressed immigrant of the Balkan wars (Raljevič). The Tiger’s Wife feeds and protects the tiger because she sees in him a reflection of herself; he is a foreigner, unable to
speak and explain himself. She knows how the villagers treat the threatening unknown and wants to save the tiger from the same fate. Natalia’s grandfather realized “The tiger saw the girl as she had seen him: without judgment, fear, foolishness, and somehow the two of them understood each other without exchanging a single sound” (Obreht 220). This alliance between two foreign entities spurred the villagers’ propensity for speculation and fear.

Unable to fathom a benign unknown, the people of Galina turn to folklore to generate a protocol for surviving this new threat. Had circumstances been different, the Tiger’s Wife could have been considered a *vila* among the villagers, “something sacred to the entire village ... a protective entity, sanctified by her position between them and the red devil on the hill” (Obreht 217). However, “the winter was the longest anyone could remember, and filled with a thousand small discomforts, a thousand senseless quarrels, a thousand personal shames, the Tiger’s Wife shouldered the blame for the villagers’ misfortunes” (Obreht 217). The villagers believed her to be a witch who got the power to kill her husband from the tiger, claiming, “the devil gave her the strength to do it, and now she’s his wife” (Obreht 218).

Many villagers believed that the tiger got the Tiger’s Wife pregnant since there was an unspoken acknowledgement in the village that the butcher was a homosexual. In Slavic folktales, marriages between humans and animals were commonplace, such as the tale of “The Animal Bride,” where a human prince marries a frog princess (Kononenko 25). The women in the village claim that “the tiger come all the way up to the door of [the butcher’s] house, and then he gets up and take off his skin. Leave it out on the step and goes in to see his pregnant wife. Leave it out on the step and goes in to see his pregnant wife” (Obreht 225). This rumor supported the villagers’ assumption that the tiger was a devil or sorcerer; he could also be an *oboroten*, a human cursed by a sorcerer to take on an alien form” (Kerrigan 120). Regardless, many of Galina’s villagers wanted to run her and the tiger out of town (221-222). They did not consider that the poor girl was probably molested, and her muteness prevented her from exposing the rapist (220).

Only Natalia’s grandfather did not believe the rumors that the deaf-mute girl was in league with the tiger or that the tiger was a “devil” (219). This is because Natalia’s grandfather knew what the tiger was. Though his only exposure had been through the fictional narrative of Shere Khan and *The Jungle Book*, her grandfather knew enough to understand that the tiger was not a supernatural entity to be feared. In fact, *The Jungle Book* narrative made her grandfather so desirous to see the tiger that he hid himself under a tarp in the smokehouse, hoping the tiger would come by. When her grandfather was struck with the sudden fear that the tiger would attack him, “he thought of *The Jungle Book*- the way Mowgli had taunted Shere Khan at Council Rock ... and he put his hand out through the tarp and touched the coarse hairs passing by him” (116).

While the grandfather’s *Jungle Book* narrative quelled fearful uncertainty, the folk narrative of Galina validated that fear. Even Galina’s apothecary, who had disregarded the threat of the “Tiger’s Wife” as a superstition, felt she needed to be destroyed. When he tried to administer pre-natal care, “her upper lip lifted and her teeth flashed out, and she hissed at him with the ridge of her nose folded up against her eyes ... he knew suddenly that she had learned to
make that sound mimicking a face that wasn’t human” (Obreht 320). The apothecary mixed a bottle of poison and had it sent to her home disguised as medicine; she drank it and died (320-321).

Yet even after her death, the Tiger’s Wife was a unifying, ethnocentric commonality between the villagers of the time. “They attached their anxious grief to the girl so they could avoid looking past her to what was coming. After her death, their time with her became the unifying memory that carried them into the spring through the arrival of the Germans with their trucks” (Obreht 337). This disremembering not only helped the villagers process their fear, but also created a shared scapegoat that was easier to understand than the approach of an unprecedented world war.

When Natalia travels to Galina to learn about her late grandfather, she notes that the villagers still carry folkloric beliefs about the tiger, if not about the Tiger’s Wife. “They are aware, all the time, that the tiger has never been found, that he has never been killed. Men don’t go to cut timber alone; there is a strong stipulation against virgins crossing the pasture on a full-moon night, even though no one is really sure of the consequences” (Obreht 338). Again, the uncertainty of the unknown is more compelling than the realistic. Since the tiger was never caught, he therefore still exists. Though the tiger is most certainly dead, he still exists for the villagers because the former generation integrated it into their lore as a caution specific to their town.

The story of “The Deathless Man” is told through the perspective of Natalia’s grandfather who encounters Gavran Gailé, Deathless Man, thrice throughout his life. Though decades pass between each meeting, Gavran never ages because he can never die. Whenever he and Natalia’s grandfather cross paths, the Deathless Man is congregating around the dead and the dying so that he might lead their spirits to the crossroads where they may cross into the spirit world. The Deathless Man inverts the hero motif of the Slavic folktale while also serving as a shepherd of the spirit world. Gavran Gailé follows the formulaic protocol of Slavic folk tradition, hoping that he will one day atone for his offenses against Death and earn the right to die.

One of the most telling characteristics of the Deathless Man is that his desire to die inverts the goal of many Slavic folk heroes. Rather than trying to evade Death, a personified entity in Slavic myth, Gavran’s “deathlessness is not a gift, but a punishment” (Raljevič). In fact, his story parallels the story of another outlying hero: “The Soldier and Death,” a Russian folktale recorded in 1920. A soldier wins a magical sack which will catch anything he wishes and he acquires the ability to see the fate of the ailing in a cup of water, allowing him to become a renowned physician. Yet, when the Tsar becomes terminally ill, the soldier cures him despite the sign of Death in the water glass. When Death comes for the soldier to take his life in exchange, the soldier captures Death in a sack and hangs her from a tree in the forest. The soldier soon regrets his folly and releases Death, but neither she, nor the devil, nor God Himself will take him; the soldier is forced to wander the earth for all eternity and “he may be living yet” (Ransome).
In the case of Gavran Gailé, he receives his medical prowess from his uncle, Death himself, as a legacy for being his nephew. Death gives him a magical cup that shows a person’s fate based on the paths in the coffee dregs at the bottom just as the soldier can see the presence of Death in a water glass. Gavran also cures someone doomed to die: the woman he loves. Yet Death does not ask for Gavran’s soul in exchange for his folly as in “The Soldier and Death” nor does Gavran have a magical item, like the sack, that will hold Death prisoner. Instead, Death takes Gavran’s wife away and curses him that “[His] time will never come, and [he] shall seek all the days of [his] life and never find it” (Obreht 184). This is where the parallel between Gavran and the soldier ends. From this point, Gavran serves as Death’s mediator in the hopes that his uncle will forgive him.

Gavran Gailé is easily identifiable as a messenger for the dead not only through his kinship with Death, but also by his name. “Gavran” directly translates to “raven” in Croatian (Raljević), alluding to Slavic links between birds and the dead as in funeral laments where “birds appear as enticers of people away from the world” and “may be asked to deliver messages to the dead” (Oinas 79-80). Each time Natalia’s grandfather encounters the Deathless Man, Gavran Gailé is trying, with varying degrees of success, to tell the ailing if they are going to die. When her grandfather first meets the Deathless Man, he had been shot and drowned by a doomed man and the second, Gavran is locked in the drunk tank for telling the sick they were dying (Obreht 69; 176). Only at their last meeting does the Deathless Man realize that the living wants no such message (296-297).

Even as he strays away from his role of messenger to the dying, The Deathless Man persists in atoning for his wrongs against Death by carrying out the role of a mora— perhaps the same mora that Duré and his family hoped would take their cousin’s spirit into the next life. During the Forty Days of the Soul, where the spirit of a newly dead person remains in the land of the living (Obreht 7), the Deathless Man “take[s] them to the crossroads, and leave[s] them for [his] uncle” (186). Gavran “seeks the company of the dying, because, among them, [he] feels [he] will find [his] uncle” (186), despite Death declaring that Gavran would never find him again. The Deathless Man chooses to disremember the fate his uncle dictated for him by holding out for redemption that might never come. Gavran says, “I confess, too, that I am hoping, all this time, that my uncle will forgive me” (187). He leans back on the protocol of his folkloric tradition to stave off the despair he feels in immortality.

Even at the end of The Tiger’s Wife, Obreht does not reveal whether Slavic folklore is diegetically “real” in the world of The Tiger’s Wife. In fact, Obreht leaves the magical realism of the text irritatingly open-ended. Natalia never meets her grandfather’s Deathless Man (384) nor does she know for certain whether or not the tiger and his wife were companions at all (335). The reader is left to assume that Duré’s children recovered from their illnesses since Natalia sent them down to the clinic to get inoculated (269). Ultimately, it is irrelevant whether Obreht means for the spirit world to diffuse into the living world or if the superstitions could be explained away.
The characters’ experience with folklore is real because they believe it. Duré’s cousin was able to rest easier in the grave because his reburial allowed Duré to put his own guilt to rest. A marriage between a “Mohemmedan” and a tiger is rational for the people of Galina because it was more conceivable than a foreign bomb hitting the Belgrade Zoo and sending a tiger into the their forest (Obreht 94-95). The Deathless Man, whether a figment of Natalia’s or her grandfather’s imaginations, needed to believe in the power of redemption in order to stave off the despair of an indefinite lifespan. Obreht takes disremembering into a new plain by showing the process of grief and confusion through folktales that “[are] not based on normal characters or normal actions in a normal situation ... folktales choose things strikingly unusual” (Propp 19). This folkloric device makes disremembering accessible to an audience unaccustomed to trauma, demonstrating how a psychologically wounded person and a psychologically wounded country would need new narratives to comprehend atrocity.


Ransome, Arthur. The Soldier and Death: A Russian Folktale Told in English, John G. Wilson, 1920. This pamphlet was accessed digitally through the University of South California Library.